SP-2062 - HSE Specification Specifications For HSE Cases

Petroleum Development Oman LLC
Revision: 1.0 Effective: Mar-11
Petroleum Development Oman L.L.C.

Document Title: Specification for HSE Cases
Document ID
SP-2062
Document Type
Specification
Security
Unrestricted
Discipline
Technical Safety Engineering
Owner
MSE/4 Head of Technical Safety Engineering
Issue Date
31 March 2011
Version
1.0
Keywords: This document is the property of Petroleum Development Oman, LLC. Neither the whole nor any part of this document may be disclosed to others or reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form by any means (electronic, mechanical, reprographic recording or otherwise) without prior written consent of the owner.
Page 1
SP-2062 Specification for HSE Cases
Printed 25/09/13
The controlled version of this CMF Document resides online in Livelink. Printed copies are UNCONTROLLED.

This page was intentionally left blank
Page 2
Printed 25/09/13
Document Authorisation
Page 3
Printed 25/09/13
ii Revision History
The following is a brief summary of the 4 most recent revisions to this document. Details of all revisions prior to these are held on file by the issuing department.
Version No. Draft
Date 22/02/2011
Author Karen McConnachie
Scope / Remarks New document
iii Related Business Processes

Code Business Process (EPBM 4.0)
iv Related Corporate Management Frame Work (CMF) Documents

The related CMF Documents can be retrieved from the Corporate Business Control Documentation Register CMF.
Page 4
Printed 25/09/13
TABLE OF CONTENTS
i ii iii iv 1 Document Authorisation ......................................................................................................... 3 Revision History ..................................................................................................................... 4 Related Business Processes ................................................................................................. 4 Related Corporate Management Frame Work (CMF) Documents ........................................ 4 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 8 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 2 3 Purpose ............................................................................................................................ 8 General Definitions ........................................................................................................... 8 Review and Improvement (SP 2062) ............................................................................... 8 Deviation from Standard .................................................................................................. 8
WHEN ARE HSE CASES REQUIRED? ................................................................................ 9 WHAT TYPES OF HSE CASES ARE THERE? .................................................................. 11 3.1 Asset/Facility HSE Cases at different ORP phases ....................................................... 11 Identify and Assess ...................................................................................... 12 Select ............................................................................................................ 12 Define ........................................................................................................... 12 Execute ......................................................................................................... 12 Operate ......................................................................................................... 13
3.1.1 3.1.2 3.1.3 3.1.4 3.1.5 3.2
Roles and Responsibilities for the HSE Case ................................................................ 13 Sign Off Dates .............................................................................................. 13
3.2.1 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6
Roles and Responsibilities within the HSE Case ........................................................... 13 Workforce Involvement .................................................................................................. 16 Deliverables .................................................................................................................... 16 Performance Monitoring ................................................................................................. 16 Review and Improvement (HSE Cases)....................................................... 17 Material Change ........................................................................................... 17
3.6.1 3.6.2 4
ASSET INTEGRITY - PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT .............................................. 18 4.1 Process Safety Manual, HSSE Control Framework, Section ........................................ 18
4.2 Centre for Chemical Process Safety Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety (CCPS RBPS) ...................................................................................................................................... 18 4.3 4.4 5 Process Safety in Projects ............................................................................................. 19 Critical Drawings ............................................................................................................ 19
HEMP ................................................................................................................................... 20 5.1 Hazards and Effects Register ........................................................................................ 21
6 7
BOW-TIES ........................................................................................................................... 22 SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS ......................................................................................... 25 7.1 7.2 7.3 SCE (Hardware) Barriers ............................................................................................... 25 SCE Selection ................................................................................................................ 27 Performance Standards ................................................................................................. 28 SP-2062 Specification for HSE Cases
Printed 25/09/13
Page 5

7.3.1 8 9
Performance Standard Approval .................................................................. 29
HSE CRITICAL TASKS ....................................................................................................... 30 MATRIX OF PERMITTED OPERATIONS (MOPO) ............................................................ 31 9.1 9.2 Using the MOPO ............................................................................................................ 31 Deviations from the MOPO ............................................................................................ 31 ALARP demonstration .................................................................................................... 32 ALARP Definition .......................................................................................... 32 How to Undertake an ALARP Assessment .................................................. 33 Principles of Hazard Management ............................................................... 33 Good Engineering Practice .......................................................................... 33 Good Engineering Principles ........................................................................ 34 HEMP Studies .............................................................................................. 34 ALARP Review ............................................................................................. 34 Assessment of Complex Decisions .............................................................. 35 OPERATE PHASE CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT .................................................... 36 Drivers for Improvement ............................................................................... 36 Remedial Actions.......................................................................................... 36 Qualitative Analysis of RAP Items ................................................................ 37 Interpreting the RAP ..................................................................................... 38
10 10.1 10.2
10.2.1 10.2.2 10.2.3 10.2.4 10.2.5 10.3 11 11.1 11.2 11.2.1 11.2.2 12 13 14 14.1 15 15.1 15.2 15.2.1 15.2.2 15.2.3 15.2.4 15.2.5 15.2.6 15.3 16 16.1 16.2 16.2.1 16.2.2 16.2.3
Page 6
STATEMENT OF FITNESS ........................................................................................... 39 MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE ....................................................................................... 41 CONCEPT SELECTION REPORT ................................................................................ 43 DCAF Deliverables for Identify, Assess and Select Phases ........................ 44 DESIGN HSE CASE REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................ 45 Basic Requirements ..................................................................................... 45 Format .......................................................................................................... 45 Contents ....................................................................................................... 45 Part 1 Introduction ........................................................................................ 45 Part 2 CSR ALARP demonstration Summary .............................................. 46 Part 3 Design Basis & Facility Description ................................................... 46 Part 4 Hazards & Effects Management Process .......................................... 46 Part 5 Improvement (Action Plan) ................................................................ 47 DCAF Deliverables for Define and Execute phases .................................... 47 OPERATIONS HSE CASE REQUIREMENTS .............................................................. 49 Basic Requirements ..................................................................................... 49 Format .......................................................................................................... 49 Contents ....................................................................................................... 49 Part 1 Introduction ........................................................................................ 50 Part 2 Facility Description ............................................................................. 50 SP-2062 Specification for HSE Cases
Printed 25/09/13

16.2.4 16.2.5 16.2.6 16.3 Appendix 1 Appendix 2 Appendix 3 Appendix 4 Appendix 5 Appendix 6 Appendix 7 Appendix 8 Appendix 9 Appendix 10 Appendix 11 Appendix 12
Part 3 People, HSE Critical Tasks ................................................................ 50 Part 4 Hazard and Effects Management ...................................................... 50 Part 5 Improvement (Action Plan) ................................................................ 51 DCAF Deliverables for Execute and Operate Phases ................................. 51 Glossary of Definitions, Terms and Abbreviations ....................................... 53 Related Business Control Documents and References ............................... 55 Hazard Inventory Checklist .......................................................................... 56 Example Hazard and Effects Register ......................................................... 63 Safety Critical Elements Categories ............................................................. 64 Example Safety Critical Elements Register .................................................. 65 Example Design Performance Standard ...................................................... 66 Example Operations Performance Standard (EP 2009-9009, Ref. 10) ....... 69 Example of Implementation Table ................................................................ 70 MOPO ........................................................................................................... 72 Operations HSE Case Change Approval ..................................................... 78 CCPS RBPS Process Safety Elements ....................................................... 83
Page 7
Printed 25/09/13
1 Introduction
An HSE Case provides a documented demonstration that risk reduction philosophies and measures have been developed and implemented at each phase of the Opportunity Realisation Process (ORP) to ensure that the risks are tolerable and as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) through the systematic application of the Hazards and Effects Management Process (HEMP) as set out in the PDO HSE Management System (HSEMS). This document should be read in conjunction with the guideline Applying Process Safety in Projects GU-648 [4].
1.1
Purpose
This purpose of this specification is to establish minimum requirements for the content of HSE Cases and it shall be used for the development of HSE Input to Concept Select Reports, Design HSE Cases and Operations HSE Cases. This specification SHALL [PS] be used for demonstration of the following requirements of the Process Safety Manual in the Shell HSSE & SP Control Framework [Ref. 7]: Identify and document Hazards with RAM red and yellow 5A and 5B Process Safety Risks for existing and new Assets (Requirement 1). Develop a Statement of Fitness for the Assets (Requirement 7) Review the Process Safety Risks to the Asset at least annually, in line with 8 Management Review (of the HSSE & SP Management System) (Requirement 20).
This specification contains information on the contents of each type of HSE Case and gives guidance and examples of information to be contained in specific sections.
1.2 General Definitions

The capitalised term SHALL [PS] indicates a process safety requirement. The lower case word shall indicates a requirement. The word should indicates a recommendation.
1.3 Review and Improvement (SP 2062)

Responsibility for the upkeep of this Specification shall be with the CFDH Technical Safety Engineering (Owner of this Specification). Changes to this document shall only be authorised and approved by the Owner. Any user of this document who encounters a mistake or confusing entry is requested to immediately notify the Document Custodian using the form provided in CP 122 Health, Safety and Environment Management System [Ref. 1]. This document shall be reviewed as necessary by the Owner, but not less than every two years.
1.4 Deviation from Standard

Deviation to this Specification shall follow the requirements of PR-1247 Project Change Control & Standards Variance Procedure, Version 1 31/8/1999.
Page 8
Printed 25/09/13
2 WHEN ARE HSE CASES REQUIRED?

HSE Cases are mandatory for all PDO operated (owned, leased or contracted) projects/operations containing hazards rated severity five or high risk on the PDO risk assessment matrix (RAM) as per Figure 2-1 [Ref. 1]. Hazards to that fall into this category are referred to as Major Accident Hazards (MAH), and are typically identified during the HAZID conducted at the start of concept phase of a project. However, for smaller, less complex projects or modifications to an existing asset where an Operations HSE Case already exists, it may be suitable to undertake a design review in place of a Design HSE Case and then update the existing Operations HSE Case. For projects that fall into Category C as per Figure 2-2 overleaf, both qualitative (bow-tie analysis) and quantitative analysis (QRA) are required to determine the level of risk and to demonstrate that risks are reduced to tolerable and ALARP, thus a Design and Operations HSE Case must be compiled. Guidance and confirmation shall be sought from MSE/4 on an individual project basis.
Consequences A
Environment Reputation Severity People Asset
Increasing likelihood B C D
Never Heard of in Has Has Has heard of in the Industry happened happened happened the Industry in PDO or at the more than more than Asset or 1>yr at the 1>yr in the more than Asset Industry 1>yr in PDO
0 health effect No damage 1 2 3 4 5

Slight injury or health effect Minor injury or health effect Major injury or health effect PTD or up to 3 fatalities More than 3 fatalities Slight damage Minor damage Moderate damage Major damage massive damage
No injury or
No effect Slight effect
No impact Slight impact
Minor effect Minor impact
Moderate effect
Moderate impact
Major effect major impact
massive effect
Massive impact
Figure 2-1: PDO Risk Assessment Matrix Figure 2-2 shows the industry guidelines for a framework for risk related decision support by Oil and Gas UK in 1997 (formerly the UK Offshore Operations Association, UKOOA). Once a new project has been assessed against the risk assessment matrix in Figure 2-1 and found to contain level 5 or high risk hazards, it shall be categorised as per the chart in Figure 2-2.
Page 9
Printed 25/09/13
Figure 2-2: Framework for risk related decision support in PDO To use the Framework, first relate the decision being considered to the decision context characteristics on the right hand side of the Framework. Establish a horizontal line across the Framework at the point that best fits the nature of the decision. The segments of this horizontal line define the relative weight that should be given to the different decision making approaches in the ALARP determination. The descriptors on the lefthand side of the diagram describe the type and extent of consultation that is needed for the selected decision context and type. Type B and C decisions shall be taken at higher levels within an organisation than Type A decisions. Type A decisions are those involving well-understood hazards and proven solutions. The lessons learned from past years have been incorporated into authoritative Good Practice. Reference to the relevant Good Practice, supported by expert judgment, is sufficient to define the barriers needed to reduce the risks to both tolerable and ALARP. Type B decisions are those involving less well-understood hazards. Good Practice has to be supplemented by more detailed analytical methods such as quantified risk assessment (QRA) particularly to address the uncertainties of novel aspects of design. However, riskbased analysis cannot be the only approach, as illustrated by the fact that it forms no more than 40% of a horizontal line through the Type B band. Type C decisions are those involving hazards that may create societal concerns. The more technological factors in the ALARP determination need to be conditioned, or viewed in the context of how the situation will be seen by stakeholders. The A, B, C groupings are not intended to split the framework into three discrete sections, but should be used to indicate a continuum of decision context types from a strongly Type A (technology based) at one extreme to a strongly Type C (judgment based) at the other extreme. A range of decision-making approaches will contribute, especially to Type B and C decisions. The background to the Framework is described in [4].
Page 10
Printed 25/09/13
3 WHAT TYPES OF HSE CASES ARE THERE?

PDO activities and operated facilities fall into different categories and the different types of HSE Cases used to cover these are listed below: o Asset/facility: hydrocarbon gathering/production facilities organised into delivery teams or hydrocarbon transporting infrastructure and storage facilities. The majority of PDO HSE Cases fall into this category and the content shall meet the requirements of this HSE Case Specification o Contractor drilling rigs and hoists; the content shall meet the requirements of International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) [Ref. 4] and this HSE Case Specification o Air Operations; the content shall meet the requirements of EP 2005-0263 Air Transportation Standard and this HSE Case Specification o Land Transport; the content shall meet the requirements of EP 2005-0261 Road Transportation Standard and this HSE Case Specification Air transport operations, road transport operations and marine operations with severity 5 or high level hazards (as defined by the RAM in Figure 2-1) that are PDO operated (owned, leased or contracted) shall have an Operations HSE Case. The nature of Transport and Drilling Rig HSE Cases is that they are developed to describe the hazards and set out controls associated with the respective operation or activity. These cases are reviewed and updated as they develop, but rarely is there a requirement to develop a new HSE Case for these activities. Asset/Facility HSE Cases differ in that new design projects or production stations may require that a new HSE Case is developed in accordance with this specification. Asset/Facility HSE Cases are further separated into the following types of HSE Cases: o Concept Select Report: This demonstrates that there has been a systematic application of HEMP during the Identify, Assess and Select phases, that the HSE risks associated with each development option have been identified and assessed, the lowest risk option has been chosen or that the cost/effort required to adopt the lowest risk concept is grossly disproportionate to the benefit. o Design HSE Case: This demonstrates that there has been a further systematic application of HEMP during the Define and Execute phases, demonstrates that the severity 5 or high level hazards identified are both tolerable and ALARP and that all safety critical elements (with associated performance standards) have been identified and meet the performance standards. o Operations HSE Case: This describes management of the severity 5 or high level hazards to ensure that they are tolerable and ALARP, bow-tie diagrams showing the hazards and the barriers to the hazards, a list of HSE critical tasks, references to operational management systems and a statement of fitness. This acts as confirmation that the HSE Case Owner (Director) is satisfied that the arrangements are in place for the facility to operate safely.
3.1 Asset/Facility HSE Cases at different ORP phases

The opportunity realisation process (ORP) is split into 5 phases punctuated by Decision Gates (Dg1-5) and Value Assurance Reviews (VAR1-5). Once the need for an HSE Case has been identified, the type of HSE Case and when it should be compiled needs to be identified as per Figure 3-1. The Identify & Assess; Select; Define; Execute and Operate phases are discussed in the following sections.
Page 11
Printed 25/09/13
Figure 3-1: 5 stages and applicable HSE Cases 3.1.1 Identify and Assess This phase initiates opportunities and demonstrates the feasibility of those opportunities. Ideas are generated and aligned with business principles and strategies and potential values established so a decision to fund and staff further development of these ideas can be made. This phase also asks the question as to whether the project has looked sufficiently at the risks, different development options, realisations and all possible outcomes. Is there at least one solution that would work in most, perhaps all, of the realisations? The project must understand what it is going to be taking into the Select phase. HSE input at this stage is at a high level and includes a preliminary HAZID, HSE-SD Plan and input to the Risk Register. 3.1.2 Select This stage must select the best concept solution for delivering value from the opportunity and make it clear why one choice was the preferred option. HSE input into the select phase has potentially the greatest impact. The option selected to take forward into the define phase must be ALARP. An ALARP demonstration must be provided in the CSR (see section 14). 3.1.3 Define The selected concept must be defined technically (scope, cost, schedule) or commercially (JVA, JOA, country entry) for final investment decision (FID). Note that the timing of a technical FID may not coincide with a commercial FID. HSE activities and deliverable at the define stage include a Design HSE Case and other HEMP Studies. 3.1.4 Execute The project is to be delivered as a facility consistent with the forecast scope, cost, schedule and proven performance and has to be accepted by the Owner of operations (usually the Relevant Director) for use.
Page 12
Printed 25/09/13
During the execute phase the Design HSE Case is refined. The Operations HSE Case is developed prior to handover to operations. Further HEMP studies are carried out to support the ALARP Demonstration. 3.1.5 Operate The project is operating as per expected and is maximising returns to Shareholders and protecting the License to Operate. The Owner of operations (usually the relevant Director) has accepted responsibility for continued safe operations. The Operations HSE Case will contain the ALARP demonstrations for the Operate phase. This is built and maintained throughout the operate phase, (see section 16).
3.2 Roles and Responsibilities for the HSE Case

Delivery Team Leaders (DTL): DTLs are responsible for ensuring that the HSE Cases are developed and maintained for their assets and meet the requirements of this specification. Project Managers: Project Managers are responsible for ensuring that the Concept Select Report and Design HSE Cases are developed and meet the requirements of this specification. Contract Holders: For Air Operations, Road Transport and Drilling & Hoist Rigs, it is the Contract Holders that are responsible for ensuring that their Contractors develop and maintain HSE Cases that meet the requirements of this specification. 3.2.1 o o o o Sign Off Dates Sign off dates for the CSR/HSE Cases shall be as follows: The Concept Select Report Case shall be signed off prior to VAR3. The Design HSE Case shall be signed off prior to VAR4. The Design HSE Case during detailed design phase shall be signed off when completed and prior to the PSUA. The Operations HSE Case shall be signed off prior to start up.
3.3 Roles and Responsibilities within the HSE Case

There are three main roles for developing, implementing and maintaining an HSE Case; the HSE Case Owner, HSE Case Custodian and the HSE Case Administrator. These roles for each type of HSE Case are shown in Table 3-1 and cover new projects and modifications to existing facilities. Table 3-1: Roles and responsibilities within an HSE Case HSE Input to Concept Select Report (CSR) HSE Case Owner Project Manager Identifies the requirement for a HSE Section in the CSR in accordance with this specification Appoints HSE resource
Page 13
Design HSE Case
Operations HSE Case
Project Manager Identifies the requirement for an HSE Case in accordance with this specification Appoints HSE Case Custodian and assigns responsibilities
Asset Director Identifies the requirement for an HSE Case in accordance with this specification Initiates Operations Case and assigns responsibilities
Printed 25/09/13
HSE Input to Concept Select Report (CSR) Approves the Concept Select Report
Design HSE Case Approves outcome of ALARP multi-disciplinary reviews Develops a Statement of Fitness for the Asset Approves the Design HSE Case
Operations HSE Case Develops a Statement of Fitness for the Asset Approves outcome of HEMP studies Approves the Operations HSE CaseAssigns HSE Critical Element ownership to the appropriate Technical Authority/HSE Adviser; Ensures ongoing compliance with this specification Conducts periodic Operations HSE Case reviews Ensures facility is operated according to the Operations HSE Case Delivery Team Leader Ensures the HSE Cases are developed and maintained for their assets in accordance with latest requirements. Ensures participation in development and awareness and proper use of the HSE Case by the organisation Validates HEMP studies and technical accuracy of the contents of the HSE Case Co-ordinates review of HSE critical tasks listings and associated Performance Standards Ensures that revisions and updates are prepared when necessary, adequately controlled and distributed Reviews facility specific emergency response plans Reviews and approves all action items raised for correct detail, action party and target date
HSE Case Custodi an
Project HSE Lead Manages HEMP studies, ensures risk tolerability and suitable and robust ALARP demonstrations are made Prepares HSE content of the CSR and checks DCAF content all signed off Coordinates the development of the HSE Input to the CSR.
Lead Technical Safety Engineer Identifies HEMP studies to assess the hazards and risk associated with the project Develops risk reduction strategies, identifies safety critical elements (SCE) and associated Performance Satandards in conjunction with SCE Technical Authorities (TA) Facilitates that suitable and robust ALARP demonstrations are made. Reviews and approves all action items raised for correct detail, action party and target date Compiles/co-ordinates the HSE Case
Page 14
Printed 25/09/13
HSE Input to Concept Select Report (CSR) HSE Case Adminis trator N/A
Design HSE Case N/A
Operations HSE Case
Directorate Technical Safety Engineer Compiles/co-ordinates the HSE Case and subsequent reviews and updates Supports the HSE Case Custodian
Page 15
Printed 25/09/13
Petroleum Development Oman LLC 3.4 Workforce Involvement
The HSE Case shall demonstrate that the workforce have been part of the development and review of the HSE Case. Workforce in this context is the front line operations and maintenance staff that are directly involved in the day-to-day running of the facilities. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that front line operations and maintenance staff: have knowledge of the Major Accident Hazards that have been identified for the facility where they work are aware of the controls and barriers in place to manage these MAHs (SCEs, performance Standards, HSE Critical Tasks, MOPOs) have knowledge of how these controls are managed (MIE, FSR, assurance reviews)
For Design HSE Cases, workforce involvement can be demonstrated by ensuring that relevant staff representatives have been involved in the design. This may be done by ensuring they participate directly in the design activities (HAZIDs, HAZOPs, HEMP studies) and by participating in project assurance reviews such as Design Reviews, peer reviews and project Audits. Operations HSE Cases shall be communicated to the operations and maintenance teams on site. The focus shall be on what the case means to them and what impact is it likely to have. In addition, representatives from current operational, engineering, and maintenance teams and workforce representatives (where applicable) shall be included in the regular reviews as described in Section 13. This engagement may be demonstrated by ensuring that the HSE case is reviewed regularly by operations and maintenance staff, which can be achieved through job descriptions and staff performance contracts dedicated communications initiatives staff onboarding committees or working groups (e.g. AIPSALT).
For both types of HSE Cases, the details of how workforce involvement has been achieved shall be described in the HSE Case or in the documentation of the periodic review of the HSE Case.
3.5 Deliverables
Design and Operations HSE Cases are classified as Essential Records according to CP102 Documents & Records Management and shall be maintained on Livelink by the HSE Case Administrator. Design and Operations HSE Cases are mandatory deliverables for new projects and existing assets, as described by the Discipline Control and Assurance Framework (DCAF) section in SP-2061 Technical Authority System [Ref. 7].
3.6 Performance Monitoring

Routine performance monitoring of HSE Cases shall include: o o
Page 16
Assurance of Design HSE Cases at VARs Review of Operations HSE Cases during Pre-Start up Audits SP-2062 Specification for HSE Cases
Printed 25/09/13

o o 3.6.1 AI-PSM Assurance of Operations HSE Cases Monitoring of Operations HSE Case KPIs Review and Improvement (HSE Cases)
Once the Concept Select Report is signed off, it is not anticipated that any revisions will be required as further project work will be covered in the Design HSE Case. The Design HSE Case may need to go through several revisions during the Define and Execute phases depending on the nature of the design of the new project. The Operations HSE Case shall be reviewed and updated at a maximum interval of 5 years unless any of the following circumstances occur: o o As part of a Material Change to the Facility, operation or surrounding environment that may have a potential impact on the risk profile When it cannot be verified that the performance of safety critical elements (SCEs) meet the performance standards and/or when mitigation measures have been employed for extended periods to compensate for this shortfall Prior to any material changes to the organisational arrangements or personnel levels Following a major incident involving the Facility or operation, or from lateral learning from other major incidents applicable to the Facility or operation Enhancements in knowledge or technology that change the basic assumptions on which the risk tolerability and ALARP demonstrations are based If there is a change to any of the signatory parties for the HSE Case, i.e. HSE Case Owner (Director), HSE Case Custodian (Delivery Team Leader) or HSE Case Administrator (Technical Safety Engineer)
o o o o
3.6.2 Material Change A material change is any change that significantly affects the basis for original the ALARP demonstration in the HSE Case. In practice this usually includes changes that have the potential to affect the major accident hazards or their controls, either directly or indirectly. Examples of direct effects are: Significant modifications or repairs to the plant or equipment, either as single large modifications or multiple smaller modifications. o an increase in hydrocarbon inventory, o new technology, processes or operational complexity, o new types of combined operations, or new activities in connection with an installation, o new operational risk controls. Examples of indirect effects are: o o o new ownership or operatorship, introducing a change in the management system, a major change of contractor, and extension of the use of the installation or its components beyond the original design life. o
Page 17
Printed 25/09/13
4 ASSET INTEGRITY - PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT

Assuring the safety of people, assets, the environment and reputation is a core value and providing assurance that major process safety risks are being managed is a critical aspect of PDO corporate governance. Asset Integrity Process Safety Management (AI-PSM) describes the way in which PDO assets are managed so that the process risk is as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). There are two Process Safety implementation mechanisms within PDO: 1. The Process Safety Manual of the Shell Group HSSE Control Framework [Ref. 6] 2. AI-PSM as developed by Centre for Chemical Process Safety Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety (CCPS RBPS) [Ref. 9].
4.1
Process Safety Manual, HSSE Control Framework, Section

The HSSE & SP Control Framework replaces the mandatory requirements in EP2005 series, and includes mandatory Standards, Manuals, Specifications and Glossary terms, and non-mandatory Assurance Protocols and Guides. The Process Safety Manual of the HSSE & SP CF comprises four elements: 1. Asset Integrity Process Safety Management Application Manual 2. Design and Engineering Manual 1 (DEM1) 3. Design and Engineering Manual 2 (DEM2) 4. Override of Safeguarding Systems.
A full description of each element can be obtained in The HSSE & SP Control Framework [Ref. 6] Compliance to the detailed requirements of the Process Safety Manual is demonstrated by signing a Statement of Fitness (SoF). The Statement of Fitness is shown in section 12 and testifies that the hazards have been appropriately managed in accordance with HEMP and that a suitable and robust ALARP demonstration has been made. The Statement of Fitness is a requirement of the AI-PSM Application Manual and a signed SoF shall be included in Design and in Operations HSE Cases, respectively. For operational assets the SoF shall be signed by Asset Directors, and for new projects by the Project Manager before handover to operations.
4.2
Centre for Chemical Process Safety Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety (CCPS RBPS)
The CCPS RBPS AI-PSM process is an assurance process containing 20 elements that describe minimum expected standards and stipulates the requirements for a range of process related activities ranging from organisational culture, workforce involvement, risk management, HEMP and audit through to design. The assurance process includes routine checking, self-assessments and audits, as well as independent 3rd party verification that the AI-PSM system and practices are consistent with industry best practice and are controlling process risk to ALARP. The assurance process also identifies opportunities for improving the management and control of process risk and therefore, is a key driver for continuous improvement.
1
A description of the 20 AI-PSM elements is provided in Appendix 12. SP-2062 Specification for HSE Cases
Printed 25/09/13
Page 18
HEMP is an integral element of the AI-PSM process and the HSE Case and provides a clear link between the two processes. Both the AI-PSM and HSE Case processes aim to identify, control and reduce risk levels to ALARP.
4.3
Process Safety in Projects

AI-PS requirements in projects, from project identification through to execution, is described in GU-648 Guide for Applying Process Safety in Projects [Ref. 4]. This guideline extracts all the relevant information from the existing ORP documentation that is necessary to meet the AI-PS requirements at handover. It also provides further clarity with regards to the assurance processes which underpin the project teams a bility to demonstrate that AI-PS requirements are met at the end of every project phase. The main objective of this guideline is to explain the key AI-PS objectives and deliverables throughout the project phases that demonstrate the facility is fit for the safe introduction of process fluids and that systems, processes and procedures are in place so that AI-PS can be safeguarded in the subsequent operate phase. This will allow PDO to make the statement that Our Asset is Safe and we know it after each project phase.
4.4 Critical Drawings

Critical drawings are those drawings which are required to be maintained in order to support the implementation of critical tasks. Critical drawings are required to ensure that the risks from MAHs are ALARP. A list of critical drawings shall be made for each facility. All critical drawings shall be stored in an easily accessible database to reflect the current design and status of the asset (as-built status). This will ensure that all personnel have access to reliable and up to date information to allow accurate planning of work operations and activities, management of change and investigative activities (when an incident has occurred). Critical drawings include, but are not limited to: o o o o o o o o o o o PFS PEFS Cause and Effect matrix Hazardous area classification Area Layout Site plan (sub-field layout) Key plan and Plot plan Escape routes Safety equipment layout Critical valve list (including locked open and locked closed valves) Fire and Gas layouts.
Page 19
Printed 25/09/13
5 HEMP
The hazards and effects management (HEMP) process identifies and asses HSE hazards, implements control and recovery measures and maintains a documented demonstration that major HSE risks have been reduced to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). HEMP shall be applied to all activities over which PDO has operational control and shall cover the entire lifecycle of the asset or operation; from concept through to decommissioning and disposal. Work undertaken by a Contractor and under the Contractors own management system shall have a requirement for an equivalent HEMP approach expressly stated in the contract. HEMP is fundamental to all analysis and assessment elements of the formal HSE activities, and is at the heart of the HSE management system used in PDO. The HEMP process comprises four basic steps: Systematic identification of hazards, threats, unwanted events and their effects Assessment of the risks against screening criteria, taking into account the likelihood of unwanted events and the potential severity of the consequences in terms of effects to people, assets, the environment and reputation of PDO Implementation of suitable risk reduction measures to control or mitigate the hazard and its effects Planning for recovery in the event of a loss of control leading to an unacceptable effect.
The main objective of HEMP activities is to demonstrate that hazards (and associated risks) have been identified and where the hazard cannot be eliminated the risks are controlled to a level that is tolerable and as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). The HEMP model is characterised by Figure 5-1.
RISKS TOLERABILITY & ALARP
Identify
Assess
Control
Recover
DOCUMENT
Figure 5-1: HEMP Model HEMP studies shall be performed by staff who are knowledgeable about the facility and operations and who are competent in the HEMP techniques necessary. The studies shall be planned and implemented in a timely manner to enable the results to be incorporated without incurring avoidable rework and costs. The studies should be documented such that key information and decisions made are transparent and available for future reference. Recommendations arising from HEMP studies shall be recorded in an appropriate action tracking system.
Page 20
Printed 25/09/13
Petroleum Development Oman LLC 5.1 Hazards and Effects Register
Hazards and their effects on people, the environment, the assets and the reputation of PDO shall be systematically identified and listed for the full lifecycle of the asset and operations. The hazards are identified in a Hazard Identification (HAZID) meeting, and the outcome of this meeting is used to develop the Hazards and Effects Register. PDO use a checklist of potential hazards to populate the Hazards and Effects Register. It is recommended that a multi-disciplinary team facilitated by an experienced person go through the list of hazards and identify those relevant to the specific facility/asset/ operation under consideration. Ideally the team should be made up of Management, Operations, HSE, Maintenance and Engineering Disciplines (Concept, Detailed Design as appropriate) personnel. The PDO Risk Assessment Matrix in Figure 2-1 shall be used to assess the hazards and their severity and frequency of occurrence. The experience of the team will be used to brainstorm hazards known to have been realised from previous experience or thinking whether it is a credible hazard that could occur within PDO operations. This is a subjective process and care must be taken not to over-complicate the process by thinking of multiple events, double jeopardy events or highly unlikely events. Examples of credible scenarios could include major leak from oil storage tank at MAF, leak at a Booster station on the main oil line, leak from offtake tanker hose, loss of containment from on-plot processing facilities, loss of containment of H2S (affecting both onsite personnel and the general public). Consequences from such incidents usually cover injury/fatalities, fires/explosions, environmental impact, loss of facility and negative impacts on reputation. For low and medium risk hazards, the controls for the hazards, i.e. permit to work, job safety assessment, operating procedures, competence assessments, tool box talks, etc., are discussed and then added to the Hazards and Effects Register. Hazards that have been assessed as being a severity 5 or high risk on the risk assessment matrix are then modelled further using bow-tie methodology as described in next section. See Appendix 3 for the full checklist of potential hazards, and an example of a Hazard and Effects Register is provided in Appendix 4.
Page 21
Printed 25/09/13
6 BOW-TIES
The Hazards and Effects Register documents that all hazards associated with the facility and that control and mitigation measures have been identified. Hazards that have been assessed as being a severity 5 or high risk on the risk assessment matrix (Figure 2-1) are then modelled further using bow-tie methodology. The Bow-Tie is a model that represents how a Hazard can be released, escalate, and how it is controlled. It contains the elements required to effectively manage the Hazard such that the risks are tolerable and ALARP. Bow-Ties can also be used to support risk management of non-HSE processes. For each severity 5 or high level hazard, the bow-tie methodology allows for: 1. Identification of the hazard release, escalation and consequence scenarios 2. Identification of controls, e.g. barriers and escalation factor controls required to manage the hazards 3. Categorisation of controls into Inherent Safety, Safety Critical Element (hardware) or Critical activity (procedures, processes, operator action) 4. A clear visual representation to enable the ALARP review to be undertaken 5. An aid in the incident review process if occurrence of such a major incident has occurred.
The bow-tie is a model that represents how a hazard can be released, escalate and how it is controlled. Bow-Tie XP is the PDO preferred software tool
Figure 6-1: Generic bow-tie model
Page 22
Printed 25/09/13

Table 6-1: HEMP definitions and Bow-tie terminology ALARP
As Low As Reasonably Practicable (Risk) means that having reviewed all practical alternatives for Major Accident Hazard elimination, Threat Controls and Recovery Measures, further reduction in risk would involve disproportionate cost or resources for the risk reduction achieved. Barriers prevent or reduce the probability of each Threat (left hand side of the bow-tie), limit the extent of, of provide immediate recovery from the Consequences (right hand side of the bow-tie). Barriers may be hardware, such as safety systems (e.g. F&G ESD, etc) or management systems and procedures. Consequences in the bow-tie are a direct result of the Top Event occurring. Indirect consequences, if applicable shall be modelled in a separate bow-tie, Can include potential consequences that have not been heard of in the industry. Factors that defeat, or reduce the effectiveness of a Barrier Measures put into place to prevent or mitigate the effects of Escalation Factors. Any situation with the potential for harm to people, environment, asset or reputation e.g. hydrocarbons under pressure, dropped load. Critical An HSE Critical Task develops, implements or maintains the effectiveness and integrity of a Barrier or Escalation Control Factor in Bow-Ties for Severity 5 or High Risk Hazards. HSE Critical Positions are those that execute HSE Critical Tasks HSE Critical Positions are those that execute HSE Critical Tasks Hazards that are classed as High Risk (Red) or severity 5 on the PDO Risk Assessment Matrix. This means any situation with the potential for major consequences (harm) to people, environment, asset and reputation if released. Any measure put in place to manage Consequences and assist recovery from a Top Event. The likelihood of a Top Event combined with the severity of the Consequences (The risk is from the Hazard to people, environment, asset and reputation). Any action or mechanism that could bring about the unplanned release of a hazard. Any measure put in place to prevent a Threat being successful. Tolerable Risks are those that have been reduced to a level where they comply with the applicable laws and regulations, standards, strategic objectives and other agreed Tolerability Criteria. The first thing that happens when a hazard is released. Individual bow-ties shall have a single Top Event.
Barrier
Consequence
Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Hazard
HSE Task
HSE Critical Position Major Accident Hazards (MAH)
Recovery Measure Risk
Threat Threat Control Tolerable Risk
Top Event
The role of a barrier on the bow-tie diagrams is to prevent (Left hand side of BT) or limit (Right hand side of BT) the consequence of a major incident. Barriers may be:
Page 23
Printed 25/09/13
1. Design (inherent) features, e.g. separation distances, reduction of process pressures, minimisation of leak sources, etc. (depicted blue on the bow-tie). 2. Safety Critical Elements (hardware and logic software), e.g. Process Containment Systems, Pressure Relief Valves, ESD, Fire and Gas Detection, Escape & Evacuation Systems, Breathing Protection, etc. (depicted green on the bow-tie) 3. Operational Safety Processes, e.g. valve lock out/tag out, breaking containment procedures, permit to work, etc. (depicted yellow on the bow-tie) 4. Operational Intervention Tasks, e.g. Plant Monitoring, Alarm Response, Shutdown, etc. (depicted yellow on the bow-tie)
Barriers shall be: 1. Effective in preventing the Top Event or Consequence 2. Able to prevent a specific Threat from releasing the Hazard 3. Verifiable how shall the effectiveness of the barrier be confirmed? 4. Independent of other barriers in the same Threat line, e.g. no common mode failure.
Hardware Barriers for Severity 5 or High Risk Hazards (HSE) shall be classified as HSE Critical Elements. Selection of these Barriers shall be in accordance with EP2009-9009 SCE Management Manual [Ref. 10]and is further described in Section 7. Common barriers or escalation factor controls that appear frequently, e.g. such as those to do with Operator/Human Error, should be modelled using a separate bow-tie to manage the single Threat of Operator/Human Error. See Section 10 ALARP demonstration for further information.
Page 24
Printed 25/09/13
7 SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS

A Safety Critical Element (SCE) is any item of hardware, system or logic software the failure of which could cause a major Accident Hazard (MAH) or whose purpose is to prevent or mitigate the effects of a MAH. SCEs groups are categorised according to Shell EP20099009 Safety Critical Element Management Manual [Ref. 10]. These groups or barriers (see section 7.1) contain the definitions of those items that may be classed as safety critical on any given facility. Safety Critical Elements shall be selected from these groups during the bow-tie development process. The bow-tie diagrams show the SCEs as barriers to the MAH. A deliverable of the Bow-Tie development process is a list of SCEs applicable to the facility. This list shall be further developed as part of a SCE identification process that defines the safety critical components of each SCE barrier. The role of a barrier on the bow-tie diagrams is to prevent or limit the consequence of a major incident. Barriers may be: 1. Design (inherent) features, e.g. separation distances, reduction of process pressures, minimisation of leak sources, etc. 2. Safety Critical Elements (hardware and logic software), e.g. Process Containment Systems, Pressure Relief Valves, ESD, Fire and Gas Detection, Escape & Evacuation Systems, Breathing Protection, etc. 3. Operational Safety Processes, e.g. valve lock out/tag out, breaking containment procedures, permit to work, etc. 4. Operational Intervention Tasks, e.g. Plant Monitoring, Alarm Response, Shutdown, etc.
The SCE management manual [Ref. 10] describes the activities and processes for managing the critical hardware barriers (SCEs) that appear in the MAH bow-ties.
7.1 SCE (Hardware) Barriers

Each SCE is grouped under one of 8 hazard management barriers, as depicted in the Swiss Cheese Model (Figure 7-1). The hazard management barriers are as follows: Structural Integrity Process Containment Ignition Control Detection Systems Protection Systems Shutdown Systems Emergency Response Life Saving Equipment
Each SCE belongs to one hazard management barrier. Generally, the Structural Integrity, Process Containment and Ignition Control SCEs together with some aspects of the PSD/ESD system, reside on the left hand-side of the bow-tie top event. Failure of any of these barriers could cause or significantly contribute to a MAH. The remaining SCEs normally reside on the left hand-side of the bow-tie top event. These SCEs are provided to control or mitigate the effects of a MAH after it has occurred.
Page 25
Printed 25/09/13
Figure 7-1: SCE Hardware Barriers and SCE Groups
The hardware barriers in Figure 7-1 are depicted with a number of small holes that represent an integrity failure either in design or operating performance. On their own, these failures may not be significant but, if the holes line up, there may be no effective barriers in place between safe operations and escalating consequences, leading to a major incident. For example, a loss of containment in a sweet gas facility would not normally be expected to cause fatalities unless it is ignited. An integrity failure in the process containment system combined with a failure in the ignition control system could cause an ignited event, i.e. a fire or explosion. If there are no personnel in the area then this in itself would not cause fatalities. However, if there are integrity failures in the fire and gas detection system then the event may not be detected and the process system not isolated and the event may have the potential to escalate to adjacent inventories. This would also be the case if an ESD Valve or Blowdown Valve failed to operate on demand. Finally, if adequate assembly points and EER systems such as emergency telecoms are not provided or are not suitable, then personnel may not be evacuated quickly enough and the process release would have the potential to cause fatalities. The example shows that a number or what on their own would sometimes be considered as minor failures have combined to produce a Major Accident causing fatalities.
Page 26
Printed 25/09/13
Figure 7-1 shows the importance of maintaining and monitoring and ensuring the integrity status of all hardware barriers, so that what might be considered to be relatively small faults in individual barriers do not combine together in an unforeseen manner that compromises the ability if the barriers to prevent or control a major incident. Note that it is not necessary for all barriers to fail to lead to a major incident. For example, failure of a single barrier such as process containment on a high sour facility may lead directly to major incident. Each SCE is attached to a relevant discipline who are designated as the owner of the associated Performance Standard.
7.2 SCE Selection

SCEs should be colour coded green on the Bow-tie and the specific SCE category denoted beneath the barrier that appears in the Bow-tie. The process for selection of SCEs starts with a review of the generic list of SCEs provided in the SCE Management Manual [Ref. 10] to identify those SCEs that are applicable to the facilities, for each of the identified Major Hazards. The list of selected SCEs shall be reviewed and agreed by the relevant discipline engineers during the define phase. Figure 7-2 depicts the process for the selection of SCEs. The HSE Case shall contain a list of the SCEs identified in the bow-tie diagrams as per the table provided in Appendix 5. The HSE Case shall contain a table showing each SCE against the MAH bow-ties where they appear as hardware barriers, and an example is shown for the SCE group Process Containment in Appendix 6.
Page 27
Printed 25/09/13
Generic List of SCEs EP9009-2009
Could failure of this element cause a MAH?
Ye s
No
This item is a Safety Critical Element. Ye s

No
No
Could failure of this element contribute substantially to a MAH? No

No
Is the purpose of this element to prevent a MAH? No

No
Ye s
No
Ye s
No
This item is not a Safety Critical Element.
Is the purpose of this element to limit the effects a MAH? No

No
Figure 7-2: Selection Process for Safety Critical Elements
7.3 Performance Standards

A Performance Standard is a statement, which can be expressed in qualitative or quantitative terms, of the functional performance required of a SCE, and which is used as the basis for managing the risk from the Major Hazards. Defining and ensuring compliance with suitable Performance Standards provides assurance that the SCE is and will remain a barrier to the identified MAH. Generally, the SCEs and Performance Standards follow a one-to-one relationship where each SCE has its own Performance Standard. Performance Standards are used as the basis for design and technical (operational) integrity verification and are expressed in terms of functionality, availability, reliability, survivability and dependencies/interactions with other SCEs. Functionality Functionality is an expression used to define what the system or equipment is required to achieve in order to ensure design integrity. Reliability and Availability Reliability is defined as the required probability that the system or equipment will operate on demand, when required. Availability is defined as the extent to which the system or equipment is required in order to retain its functional integrity.
Page 28
Printed 25/09/13

Survivability
Survivability defines the external loading events such as fires, explosions or extreme weather, associated with the various MAHs against which the system or equipment is required to retain its functional integrity. Dependencies and Interactions This is used to identify other systems or equipment that are critical to the functionality of the primary system or equipment. By identifying these dependencies and interactions it is ensured that all interfaces have been covered.
There are two types of Performance standards; Design Performance Standards. Design Performance Standards must be developed during the Define phase. They shall provide a list of key functional criteria to which the SCE must comply with during the design. In practice the content of the performance standards will be largely taken from the design and engineering standards that apply to the item or SCE. However, other information may be taken from the basis for design, the design philosophies, or the results of workshops and HEMP Studies such as HAZID/HAZOP, Design Review, Layout Reviews, Fire & Explosion Analysis, QRA, IPF, SAFOP, etc. The Design Performance Standards will mature further during the execute phase and will check that the SCEs have been constructed as designed. The existing QA/QC procedures and practices should be used to support the Design Performance Standards. The design must take into account operational demands so that suitability can be ensured into the operate phase. The Design Performance Standards will evolve into Operate phase Performance Standards at the end of the execute phase before handover. Operations Performance Standards. The Operate phase Performance Standards for SCEs should evolve from the Design Performance Standards. These Performance Standards are formatted to comply with the requirements of SAP-PM and SAP-QM in terms of minimum assurance tasks, assurance measures, assurance value and units of measure for the correct allocation to the appropriate level in the asset hierarchy.
Examples of the two types of Performance Standard are provided in Appendix 7 and Appendix 8, respectively. 7.3.1 Performance Standard Approval Each performance standard is allocated an owner. The owner is responsible for ensuring that the content of the performance standard is appropriate and achievable. The performance standard owner is normally the CFDH for the items covered by the SCE. However, the CFDH may delegate the review and approval of their performance standards to the relevant TA2.
Page 29
Printed 25/09/13
8 HSE CRITICAL TASKS

An HSE Critical Tasks is one that is in place to develop, implement or maintain the effectiveness and integrity of a Barrier, Escalation Factor Control or Recovery Measure Control in the MAH bow-ties. An HSE Critical Position are those that execute HSE critical tasks. The minimum information required for a HSE critical task shall be: The description and purpose of the HSE critical task required The person (position and reference indicator) responsible for performing each task Reference to supporting documentation, e.g. work instructions, SAP, procedure, etc The method and criteria to verify that the task is performed as required to maintain barrier effectiveness.
HSE critical tasks should be developed to the level of the party responsible for ensuring that tasks are completed on time and to the required standard, e.g. Managers, Supervisors and Specialists the position responsible for ensuring that the task is done and not the person who is actually undertaking the work. Bow-tie XP software enables the HSE critical tasks to be linked to the relevant barriers. Inspections and preventative maintenance activities for hardware SCEs are implemented via the Maintenance Management System, i.e. SAP. The task information is contained within the task description in SAP for all SCE barriers and is NOT listed as an HSE critical task, and is considered part of the hardware barrier itself. This applies to for example maintenance and calibration of a gas detector. Implementation tables shall be developed for each HSE Critical Position. The implementation tables describe each HSE Critical Task, its supporting business controls and the business records required to verify that the task is being adequately executed. The implementation tables also provide a link to relevant barriers (HSE Critical Activities) and hazards on the Bow-Tie diagrams. See Appendix 9 for an example extract from an Implementation table. Communication of HSE Critical tasks to affected people in affected position is the responsibility of the HSE Case Custodian.
Page 30
Printed 25/09/13
9 MATRIX OF PERMITTED OPERATIONS (MOPO)

A matrix of permitted operations (MOPO) is an information tool to assist Supervisors and Line Managers during the planning and coordination of operations and activities by providing useful information on: The operation or activity operating envelope and safe operating limits. Actions(s) to take if/when certain situations arise that could compromise safe operations.
The MOPO is a set of matrices that maps operational activities against foreseeable situations that if or when they arise could compromise safe operating limits these situations are identified from: The Threats and Escalation Factors identified as part of the Bow-tie assessments for severity 5 and high risk hazards. An assessment of other operations and activities that could contribute to the escalation of an incident, e.g. continuing with hot work when fire pumps (a safety critical element (SCE)) are unavailable.
Circumstances that could compromise safe operations are grouped into three categories: Simultaneous operations (SIMOPs), where large work parties under different management structures carry out work which results in hazards that may impact the other. e.g. removal or overhaul of equipment and/or production and/or construction and/or drilling in the same area (MOPO entitled SIMOPs MOPO) External influences, e.g. extreme weather, visibility, security issues (MOPO entitled Adverse Weather MOPO) Inactive safeguards; i.e. SCE unavailability or impairment, e.g. ESD systems, firefighting systems (MOPO entitled SEC Impairment MOPO).
The MOPOs shall identify and differentiate between stop (red) conditions, i.e. operation NOT permitted and what are proceed with caution (amber) conditions, i.e. continue following appropriate risk assessment and provide additional controls where necessary. All other activities in the MOPO that do not require further assessment or controls are denoted safe to proceed (green). For developing a new MOPO or reviewing and updating an existing MOPO, refer to Appendix 10.
9.1 Using the MOPO

Copies of the MOPO shall be readily available in a suitable format (poster size, laminated, etc) and displayed in the control room and other operational and job planning /coordination areas. The MOPO shall be referred to during both routine work planning and coordination and in responding to unforeseen conditions.
9.2 Deviations from the MOPO

In event of a situation arising where the preferred option is contrary to that given in the MOPO, this shall be assessed and approved by the Delivery Team Leader and relevant discipline authority as defined in DCAF. In the event of a SCE being impacted, relevant discipline authorities shall also be consulted using the FSR process.
Page 31
Printed 25/09/13
10 ALARP demonstration
10.1 ALARP Definition
ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) allows a proportional level of effort to be put into risk reduction once the initial level of risk has been assessed for a particular operation or process. The ALARP principle is used to determine whether risks are broadly acceptable, tolerable or intolerable via comparison against company risk criteria. The use of the ALARP principle requires judgement to determine whether or not risk levels are as low as reasonably practicable. ALARP can be demonstrated when the sacrifice (cost, time, effort) required to reduce the risk any further, would be disproportionate to the risk reduction potentially achieved (the benefit). The term sacrifice relates to the time, effort and/or cost of th e complete implementation and future maintenance and operation of the particular risk reduction measure in question. Benefit relates to the level of risk reduction offered by a risk reduction measure. Reasonably practicable is the balance between the sacrifice and benefit of implementing the risk reduction measure, or suite of measures. ALARP justification also requires demonstration that all risk reduction measures assessed as reasonably practicable have been implemented. The use of reasonably practicable uses a goal setting approach to risk reduction rather than a prescriptive one . This is a standard approach for all high risk industries including the oil and gas industry. ALARP demonstration can be based on a comparison of the suite of barriers and control measures that are in place, versus those expected to be seen in equivalent assets or industries. This represents good practice and can be identified as standards for controlling risk that have been judged and recognised as satisfying a particular set of laws or regulations. In the absence of a developed regulatory system, company standards, corporate global standards, best engineering practice and engineering judgement may be used as a basis for comparison. For ALARP to be demonstrated, all hazards and risks must have been identified as far as practicable and assessed against the PDO Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) (Figure 2-1) and as described in Section 5. This provides a prioritised listing of hazards. As a minimum, all Major Accident Hazards (High Risk and Severity 5 hazards) shall be subjected to Bow-Tie analysis as described in Section 6. This is a qualitative approach to demonstrating ALARP using the engineering, process, Process Safety and HSE knowledge and experience of the selected workshop group. In addition to this approach, ALARP demonstration can employ a combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques dependent on the novelty, complexity and type of process or project under assessment. The HSE Cases are assessed in line with the Framework for risk related decision support in PDO as shown in Figure 2-1 and the level of risk assessment performed proportional to the level of risk associated with the process or project. Refer also to GU-648 Guide for Applying Process Safety in Projects [Ref. 4] and CP117 Project Engineering Code of Practice [Ref. 6] for further description of ALARP requirements.
Page 32
Printed 25/09/13
Petroleum Development Oman LLC 10.2 How to Undertake an ALARP Assessment

10.2.1 Principles of Hazard Management
The hazard management hierarchy as shown in Error! Reference source not ound. is used to manage HSE risks and shall be referenced when demonstrating ALARP. . Nevertheless, all hazard management controls should be considered at each stage of the development.
MOST EFFECTIVE
Eliminate
Substitute
Isolate/Separate
Engineer Isolate
Engineer Organisation
Admin Procedures
Eliminate
Eliminate sources of f lammable gas release
Eliminate Substitute Substitute Separation -
Eliminate theHouse hazard Substitute Compressor for open arrangement
Use processes or from methods with lower Separate c ompressors each other Separate c ompressors from rest of plant Separate gas cloud from ignition sources Isolation / Separation Segregate hazards and/or targets
risk impact
Engineered Safeguards
PREVENTION Design f or proc ess containment integrity Engineered Safeguards MITIGATION Gas detec tion, shutdown, blowdown PREVENTION Design to prevent an unwanted event Isolation of ignition sources RECOVERY Design to mitigate harmful consequences Forced ventilation
Organisational Controls
Training, Competency, Communication Operator training f or Compressor upset conditions

Communication for emergency response ProceduralNot Controls -
Organisational Controls
LEAST EFFECTIVE
PPE PPE
Operating procedures, Work instructions, Permits assessed in Procedural Controls Maintenance regimes Operating procedures quantitative Emergency Response procedures Emergency response procedures terms
N/ A there is no PPE effec tive against explosion
Personal Protective Equipment Personal Protective Equipment

Protect the person
Figure 10-1: Hazard Management Hierarchy
The strategy selected for managing a hazard will differ depending on the project phase, and this principle shall form part of the evaluation when making ALARP demonstrations. As the opportunity for influencing the facility design is greatest during early design phases, the focus shall be on elimination or substitution of the hazards. This typically applies to Identify& Assess and Select phases of the ORP process. As the project matures into Define and Execute, there is less opportunity to apply elimination or substitution and hence the predominant hazard management controls consist of isolation/separation and engineering solutions that can be put in place. Once a facility becomes operational, the hazard management will largely focus on the organizational and procedural controls. PPE is generally regarded as the last principle of hazard management and therefore also the least effective. 10.2.2 Good Engineering Practice In most situations, deciding whether HSE risks have been reduced to ALARP involves a comparison between the control measures a project is proposing and the measures PDO would normally expect to see in such circumstances i.e. the requirements of relevant good practice captured in Company specifications and procedures listed in GU-611.
Page 33
Printed 25/09/13
The scope for eliminating hazards and threats and reducing the scale of consequences is greatest at the beginning of the project and progressively reduces as the project develops. In part this is because the cost and difficulty of delivering a given risk reduction solution increases as the project develops. ALARP demonstrations must be robust for each of the HSE Cases as per Figure 3-1. CP-122 Health, Safety and Environment Mgmt System CoP describes application of the AI-PSM process from CCPS RBPS within PDO to demonstrate compliance to good engineering practice and to ensure that risk levels are ALARP. This is made via demonstrating compliance against the 20 Process Elements shown in Appendix 12. 10.2.3 Good Engineering Principles Company specifications and engineering standards should be followed unless there is sound justification, and then consideration given to whether there is any more that can be done to reduce the risk. If there is more that can be done, these further measures need to be assessed by comparing the risk reduction with the cost and effort involved in further reducing it. Simply following standards does not in itself demonstrate ALARP, particularly for more complex or novel projects, where additional considerations shall be made. 10.2.4 HEMP Studies HEMP studies undertaken during the select, define, execute and/or operate phases of the development are used to assess risk levels and identify any further risk reduction measures. Applicable HEMP studies for each project phase are defined in DCAF. 10.2.5 ALARP Review In assessing the risks associated with the Design or Operations HSE Case hazards, a qualitative review of the Bow-ties shall be undertaken. The review shall be led by an experienced facilitator and the review team shall be comprised of experienced staff from the following areas of expertise: o o o o o o o Engineering Process HSE Maintenance Operations Management Asset stakeholders. Each of the threat lines in the bow-ties shall be reviewed in turn and the discussion should cover such questions such as: o o o o o Does industry best practice state what should be done or make any recommendations? Can a benchmark exercise be undertaken against other operators and similar controls implemented? Where are the gaps/shortfalls and what action needs to be taken to address these gaps/shortfalls? See Section 11.2. Is there sufficient quantity and quality of barriers? Is there anything else that can be done to further reduce the risk?
Page 34
Printed 25/09/13
Both barrier effectiveness and the number of barriers contribute to the overall effectiveness of control, although in general, the effectiveness of individual barriers is more critical. The number, independence and reliability of the control and recovery measures shall be commensurate with the risk. By approaching the bow-tie review in this systematic fashion, the barriers can be challenged in terms of completeness and adequacy and gaps identified and addressed so that the review team is satisfied that the risks arereduced to ALARP. The HSE Case process enables an ALARP argument to be formulated although in isolation, a complete ALARP argument cannot be made. The claims made against the numbers, quality, performance and location of the barriers must also be verified. This verification of the safeguards (both hardware and procedural controls) is performed via AI-PSM audit and the TR-MIE and TI-HBV processes. These processes substantiate the claims made within the Bow-Ties and MOPO in terms of barrier integrity and performance.
10.3 Assessment of Complex Decisions

Demonstrating ALARP shall involve consideration of fundamentally different options to provide assurance that the Company gets the best value for money over the lifetime of the facility. The assessment of fundamentally different options normally takes place in the identify, assess and select phases. Assessment of complex decisions requires consideration of all the hard and soft issues related to a range of options and should reflect a decision taken at the right level in the organisation with full knowledge of all the options and their associated risks and costs. The following structure is recommended for documenting ALARP demonstration for complex project decisions: 1. IDENTIFY a. Problem Definition b. HSE Issues and Potential Risk c. HSE Standard & Tolerability Criteria
2. ASSESS a. Options Considered b. Basis for Selection and Uncertainties c. Justification for Chosen Option
3. CONTROL & EVALUATION a. Residual HSE Risks b. Recommendation for Next Project Phase c. Requirements for the Operations HSE Plan/Case
The ALARP demonstration for such decisions shall be signed by the person developing the demonstration as well as relevant discipline Technical Authorities.
Page 35
Printed 25/09/13
11 OPERATE PHASE CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT

11.1 Drivers for Improvement
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) have been established for the AI-PSM programme within PDO. AI-PSM KPIs consist of: o o A set of KPIs defined by Operational and Functional Leadership, collected on a uniform basis at all assets (Corporate KPIs). Any additional asset-specific KPIs targeted at the key risks of that asset.
Typical AI-PSM KPIs include: o o o o o o o o o Number of Process Safety incidents reported YTD. Number of Process Safety near misses reported YTD. Percentage compliance with Level 2/3 audit schedule. Number of deviations/non-compliance with PTW discovered during worksite visits (in the quarter). Number of approved waivers, forces and safeguarding overrides in place. Safety Critical Element corrective maintenance compliance. Safety Critical Element preventive maintenance compliance. Number of overdue actions arising from Process Safety studies (HAZOP, OBRA, FERM, TI-HBV, PSBR, Incident investigations, LEVEL 1/2/3 AI-PSM audits, PSUA). Number of SCEs that failed to meet Performance Standard (per quarter).
11.2 Remedial Actions

Action items can be raised during compilation of a new HSE Case or review and update of an existing HSE Case. These areas for improvement in the systems or controls in place to manage Major Accident Hazards need to be addressed to ensure that operations continue to be maintained at ALARP. All action items raised shall be reviewed and approved by the action party and the HSE Case Custodian prior to be entered into the HSE Case and the action tracking system (FIM) for close out. The HSE Case Administrator is responsible for ensuring that actions are closed out in a timely manner. The HSE Case Custodian has overall responsibility for ensuring all technical information within the action close out is correct and complete. Target dates are dictated by the most reasonably practicable timescale within which the actions can be completed. Items in the remedial action plan (RAP) must be rectified in accordance with the timescales set out. Where an action is not to be taken because the cost and resources required to complete the action are not considered reasonably practicable in view of the benefits gained in risk reduction (ALARP evaluation), this is stated in the RAP.
Page 36
Printed 25/09/13

11.2.1 Qualitative Analysis of RAP Items
Risk reduction measures, and in particular those warranting the implementation of additional safeguards, shall be compared against a simplistic cost benefit matrix, as detailed in the Cost, Benefit, Effort Multiplier in Table 11-1. This results in each of the potential risk reduction measures being categorised as: o o o Do - Implement the option Study - Investigate the option further and implement if practicable Pass Review category to confirm rating, if still assessed as Pass, record decision making process and do not invest further effort. Review in future for practicability. The decision on whether to take the action shall be dependent on the resulting score. The multiplication results in a numerical score from 1 (most attractive) to 27 (least attractive). The result of this iterative process shall be tabulated in the Remedial Action Plan within the HSE Case. Table 11-1: Cost * Benefit * Effort Multiplier
Score Cost (over years) Benefit Effort 3
1 <$50K High Quick fix
2 $50-$500k Medium Simple Fix
3 >$500k Low Complex
Solution Matrix
Cost x Effort 1 2 3 4 6 9 H Benefit M Benefit L Benefit 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 6 9 2 4 6 8 12 18 3 6 9 12 18 27
Sample Score Assignments

Range 1-4 6-9 12 or greater Proposed Action Do Study Pass
Page 37
Printed 25/09/13

11.2.2 Interpreting the RAP
The remedial actions shall be included in a table as described below so that actions and targets appear in a consistent format. Table 11-2: Example Remedial Action Plan
Item no. 1 Bowtie ref. H-01.005b H-01.003a H-01.003d H-01.005d H-04.002 H-10.016 Action Description Ensure compliance of speed limits inside NRPS. Speed limits within NRPS are currently not complied with. Conduct drive to further communicate hazards of speeding within NRPS. Strategy to Achieve the Action Develop and implement program to reinforce awareness of speed limits inside NRPS. Implement PDO consequence management procedures for speeding. Measure / Indicator Developed and implement program to reinforce awareness of speed limits inside NRPS. C B E 1 2 1 S Reso Action Target Comments urce Owner Date / Status OSS Q109 Closed 12/09/2009 PDO consequen ce matrix implemente d. Drive for road safety (within the 4MW). Various campaigns and posters displaying consequen ces for breaking road rules (includes speeding).
2 OSO
PDO consequence management procedures for seeding Install speed implemented. limits signs (if not present). Speed limits installed (if required).
Table 11-3: Interpreting the RAP
TITLE
Action No Bow-Tie Ref Action Description C B E S Action Resource Action Owner Date Action Was Logged
SCOPE/COMMENTS
Sequential action number or FIM reference Reference number of the Bow-Tie diagram where the action was raised Description of action A qualitative assessment of the cost of implementation, derived using the Qualitative ALARP matrix (Section 0) A qualitative assessment of the HSE benefit from implementation, derived using the Qualitative ALARP matrix (Section 0) A qualitative assessment of the effort of implementation, derived using the Qualitative ALARP matrix (Section 0) A qualitative score derived using the Qualitative ALARP matrix (Section 0) The person responsible for carrying out the action The individual who is accountable for the completion of the action. The date when the action was raised. Date at which the target will be reached and action completed. Timescales can be revised at the annual review stage of the action plan. If an action is no longer applicable and/or the target cannot be met, clear reasoning and steps to resolve must be given. Opportunities and risks if action is not undertaken.
Target Date
Comments/Risks
Page 38
Printed 25/09/13
12 STATEMENT OF FITNESS
A Statement of Fitness is required by CP-117 [Ref. 6] and CP-122 HSE Management Manual and shall be included in the HSE Case. A Statement of Fitness shall be developed for the Assets prior to teh pre start up audit for a project, before starting or commissioning a new Asset or a modification to an existing Asset. Table 12-1 contains each element of the Statement of Fitness together with a guide to minimum requirements for demonstrate compliance with each element. Further guidance is provided in GU-648. Table 12-1: Statement of Fitness
REQUIREMENT
Process Safety Risks have been identified and documented and are managed to ALARP
DEMONSTRATION
HSE Risk studies including HAZOP, HEMP, FERM and Bow-Ties have been completed ALARP demonstration has been made for the asset ALARP demonstration includes assessment of SIMOPS and development of a MOPO Risk register and Risk Management Plan in place An Emergency Response Plan addressing each of the identified Major Accident Hazards has been developed and is routinely tested Critical PCAP deliverables No outstanding unapproved variations to DEM1, DEM2 or actions from ALARP workshops Operator competence assurance plans with HSE critical roles indentified in job descriptions Personnel in HSE Critical roles are fit to work TA approval framework is in place (DCAF or similar) SCEs have been indentified and documented and included in the HSE Case Performance Standards have been developed for all identified SCEs and approved by TAs PCAP in place & followed TIV Report (assurance and verification of the SCEs) finalized all punch listed items closed out All requirements of DEM 1 are met a derogation register is maintained where DEPs cannot be satisfied Critical documents and drawings are prepared and approved. Well Handover Document completed All applicable PSBRs are met (DEM2) Operations procedures are in place Integrity operating envelopes and Alarm Catalogues are completed Protection Device (Trip) settings in place, including wells Operations Procedures in place Performance Standards and maintenance/ inspection routines are current and uploaded to SAP
Printed 25/09/13
Employees or Contractors executing HSE Critical Activities are competent and fit to work
Safety Critical Equipment meets Technical Integrity Requirements
its
Design and Construction of new Assets and modifications to existing Assets meet design and engineering requirements
Process Safety Basic Requirements are met Procedures are in place to operate Safety Critical Elements within its Operational Limits. The Asset Register, Safety Critical Elements (SCEs), SCE related Performance Standards (PSs) acceptance criteria and Maintenance /
Page 39

REQUIREMENT
Inspection Routines are identified and loaded into the maintenance management system (SAP).
DEMONSTRATION
Asset register is current and uploaded to SAP CMMS and SCE Management system is populated and available Corrosion management plans are in place Well integrity management is in place FSR is in place Management of Change (MOC) Process is documented Staff in HSE Critical Positions are trained and a log maintained MOC procedures are in place and used A change register is maintained Level 1, 2 and 3 audits are scheduled and completed as per the HSE Business Plan Audit findings are internally communicated to all levels in the organisation and a RAP developed
Modifications are complete and have been managed via the Management of Change process (PR-1001)
HSE audit and inspection programmes test compliance with the AI-PSM and HSE Case Standards
Page 40
Printed 25/09/13
13 MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE
All PDO Operations HSE Cases shall be reviewed on an annual basis (by year end) to ensure that all the following sections of the HSE Case remain true and valid to operations. It is the responsibility of the Delivery Team Leader as the HSE Case Custodian to ensure these updates are completed, with support from the HSE Case administrator. Bow-tie assessment o o o o Have any new severity 5 or high level risks been identified? Are all barriers still valid? Have any new barriers been identified? Are all barriers correctly categorised (Inherent Safety, SCE, Critical Activity)?
SCE listing o o o o o Is the hardware barrier correctly identified as an SCE? Does the barrier have the correct SCE identifier attached? Are all the performance standards complete and up to date? Has all SCE been entered into the Asset Register? Has the task information embedded within the system been added to the HSE Critical Task information?
HSE Critical Tasks o o o Has there been any Directorate/Departmental re-organisation? Are all the reference indicators and positions still current? Have all personnel signed off to say they are aware of their tasks (annual requirement) and that their assigned tasks are correct?
Remedial Actions o o Are any of the remedial actions overdue? Do any of these open action items compromise safe operations of the plant as signed in the Statement of Fitness?
Statement of Fitness o o Annual review of the Statement of Fitness to ensure that it is correct and accurately reflects the status of operations. The Statement of Fitness shall be signed off by the HSE Case Custodian after each review.
Other changes that may trigger a revision to the Operations HSE Case are listed below: o o As part of a Material Change to the Facility, operation or surrounding environment that may have a potential impact on the risk profile When it cannot be verified that the performance of safety critical elements (SCEs) meet the performance standards and/or when mitigation measures have been employed for extended periods to compensate for this shortfall Prior to any material changes to the organisational arrangements or personnel levels
Page 41
Printed 25/09/13

o o o o
Following a major incident involving the Facility or operation, or from lateral learning from other major incidents applicable to the Facility or operation Enhancements in knowledge or technology that change the basic assumptions on which the risk tolerability and ALARP demonstrations are based Updated HEMP study findings/results If there is a change to any of the signatory parties for the HSE Case, i.e. HSE Case Owner (Director), HSE Case Custodian (Delivery Team Leader) or HSE Case Administrator (Technical Safety Engineer)
All identified changes to the HSE Case, whether as a result of a periodic review or any of the other criteria listed above shall be assessed by the HSE Custodian, the Technical Safety Engineer and the HSE Case administrator (where this is not the TSE). Where relevant, the change should also be assessed by a discipline Technical Authority. The roles and responsibilities for changes to the HSE Case and how these changes shall be recorded are further described in Appendix 11.
Page 42
Printed 25/09/13
14 CONCEPT SELECTION REPORT

The Concept Selection report forms the basis for the engineering activities in the Define phase. It clarifies the context in which the selection decision has been made, the data that have been used, the alternatives that have been studied, and the values and trade- offs between alternatives. The purpose of the HSE content of the Concept Selection report is to: 1. Demonstrate that there has been a systematic application of HEMP during the Identify & Assess and Select Concept phases of the ORP [18] for each option being considered; 2. Confirm that the lowest risk option have been actively sought and selected; or alternatively, demonstrate that the cost/effort required to adopt the lowest risk concept is grossly disproportionate to the benefit (ALARP).
The HSE content of the Concept Selection report shall include: o o o o o o Reference to descriptions of the options being considered; A Hazards and Effects Register in accordance with EP Tool Hazards and Effects Register [14] for each development option considered; Summary of the risk profiles associated with each option; A summary of the HEMP studies and key assumptions that have been made in the Hazard identification and risk assessments studies; Summaries of the philosophies and measures implemented during this phase to reduce residual risks to ALARP The justification that the selected option shall present the lowest overall risks, or alternatively, the ALARP demonstration showing that the cost/effort required to adopt the lowest risk concept is grossly disproportionate to the benefit; Any issues that may have an impact on the risk profile and so need to be addressed during the Define and Execute phases. Summary of rejected options with a description of reason for not pursuing the respective options. SIMOPS considerations for Sour projects
o o o
Relevant HEMP studies will depend on the nature, size and complexity of the project. Large and complex projects will typically require a separate ALARP demonstration report to meet the above requirements.
Page 43
Printed 25/09/13
Petroleum Development Oman LLC 14.1 DCAF Deliverables for Identify, Assess and Select Phases
Individual components of the Concept Select Report are required deliverables under the Discipline Controls and Assurance Framework (DCAF). The Concept Select Report is itself a required DCAF deliverable. The full list of HSE DCAF deliverables for the Select phase which should be produced and signed off individually by the relevant competent person/Technical Authority is given below. Ensure DCAF is consulted for latest version of specified deliverables and the Discipline Authority Manual (TAs): o o o o o o o o o o o ALARP Demonstration Report HEMP Findings and Close out Report HAZID Report Concept Risk Assessment Report (i.e. the Qualitative Risk Assessment (QRA)) Preliminary Hazard and Effects Register Greenhouse Gas (GHG) and Energy Efficiency Report Fire and Explosion Assessment Sustainable Development Strategy Regulatory Compliance and Permitting Plan HSSE and SP (Social Policy) Plan HSSE and SP Philosophy Document
The Concept Select Report shall contain summaries and/or references to all the above documents.
Page 44
Printed 25/09/13
15 DESIGN HSE CASE REQUIREMENTS

The Concept Select Report is the starting point for developing the Design HSE Case as it describes the Identify & Assess and Select phases in detail. The Design HSE Case focuses on the chosen concept through the Define and Execute phases and is a DCAF Deliverable. It must be signed off by the project management prior to VAR4 (for FEED) and prior to the Pre-Start Up Audit for HSE Cases at the end of detailed design. The final design HSE Case is used as part of the ALARP demonstration in the Operations HSE Case.
15.1 Basic Requirements

The Design HSE Case: o Is required to demonstrate that there has been a systematic application of HEMP during the Define and Execute phases and that the risk has been actively and systematically reduced to ALARP shall incorporate any design changes made during the Define and Execute phases that impact severity 5 or high level hazards and updating the risk tolerability and ALARP demonstrations shall incorporate a full list of safety critical elements (SCEs) with relevant performance standards (SCEs shall be identified in accordance with EP2009-9009) shall be signed off by the Project Manager shall be used to develop the Operations HSE Case prior to the pre-start up audit (PSUA) and subsequent operate phase
o o o
15.2 Format
The Design HSE Case shall be based on the following structure: o o o o o o 15.2.1 o o o Contents Part 1 Introduction Part 2 Concept Select Report Summary Part 3 Design Basis & Facilities Description Part 4 HEMP and major accident hazard (MAH) assessment (including ALARP Demonstration, safety critical elements (SCE) and Bow-ties) Part 5 Improvement (Remedial Action Plan) Contents This part shall contain: Document authorisation, identification of the HSE Case Owner, HSE Case Custodian, and HSE Case Administrator and their responsibilities Version control, showing the scope of each revision Signed off Statement of Fitness for the Design HSE Case by the HSE Case Owner (usually the Project Manager). The Statement of Fitness is signed on the understanding that all remedial actions outlined in Part 5 of the Design HSE Case are, or will be, closed out effectively by their action target dates. 15.2.2 Part 1 Introduction Part 1 shall:
Page 45
Printed 25/09/13

o o o o 15.2.3
Describe the scope of the Design HSE Case State the relationship with the HSE Management System (HSE-MS) Manual, CP122 Provide a summary of the change control process applied trhough the various stages of the project. Include a project summary Part 2 CSR ALARP demonstration Summary Part 2 shall contain a summary of the ALARP demonstration in the Concept Select Report which describes the process from the Identify & Assess phase to the Select phase and the selection of the chosen concept. This includes a list of supporting safety studies undertaken.
15.2.4 o
Part 3 Design Basis & Facility Description Part 3 shall contain: A detailed description of the chosen concept, including site selection, plant layout, material selection, etc., including a project overview to show boundaries of the HSE Case A description of all of the safety critical elements and any other safety systems provided. A list of all DEPs, codes, standards and specifications used in the design A summary description and reference to, the Operations and HSSE Philosophies, including manning strategies and philosophies A list of identified HSE risks from the Project Risk Register. A list of the MAH associated with the facilities A Variance Register, or reference to it, providing justification why the engineering standards or specifications for the project deviate from applicable Design Engineering practices (DEP) A list of all safety critical elements (SCE) - defined as hardware barriers on the bow-ties (in accordance with EP2009-9009) Part 4 Hazards & Effects Management Process Part 4 shall contain: o A Hazard and Effects Register containing details of all severity 5 and high risk hazards and an assessment of each hazard including the key assumptions (assessed using the PDO risk assessment matrix in Figure 2-1) Bow-Tie diagrams for severity 5 and high risk hazards, with barriers categorised as inherent safety, safety critical element (SCE), procedural control and remedial action/shortfall ALARP Demonstration, to state how the qualitative Bow-Tie assessment has been reviewed to ensure all applicable measures to reduce risk to tolerable and ALARP have been assessed and implemented Details of utilised HSE Risk Tolerability, Acceptance Criteria, and ALARP Framework Summaries of the philosophies and measures implemented during the Design phase to reduce residual risks to ALARP Summary of HEMP studies undertaken since the Concept Select Report, e.g. Hazard Identification studies (HAZID), Hazard and Operability studies (HAZOP), Instrumented Protective Function (IPF), plant layout study, Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA), Health Risk Assessment (HRA) Human Factors Engineering (HFE), consequence modelling, EER Assessment, etc. SP-2062 Specification for HSE Cases
Printed 25/09/13
o o o o o o
15.2.5
o o o
Page 46

o
A summary of practical risk reduction measures and their implementation unless demonstrated not reasonably practicable. These may be represented on ALARP Worksheets. Any issues that may have an impact on the risk profile and so need to be addressed during the Operate phase See Sections 5, 6 and 10 for more details on undertaking HEMP, Bow- Ties and ALARP Demonstrations, respectively.
15.2.6
Part 5 Improvement (Action Plan) Part 5 shall contain an action plan that is SMART (specific, measurable, agreed, realistic and timely) which lists all the actions to be carried forward to, and dealt with, in the Operations HSE Case. All remedial action items arising from review and update of the HSE Case shall be accepted by the appropriate action parties and approved by the HSE Case Custodian (Delivery Team Leader). Following approval, the action items shall then be entered into the PDO action tracking system to be formally tracked and closed out. At the time of issue of this Specification, the Fountain Incident Management (FIM) system is used for tracking actions from HSE Cases. See Section 11 for more details on continuous improvement.
15.3 DCAF Deliverables for Define and Execute phases

Many of the individual components of the Design HSE Case are required deliverables under the Discipline Controls and Assurance Framework (DCAF) (note that the Design HSE Case is a required deliverable in itself). Some deliverables may simply require an update of the DCAF deliverable from I/A and Select phase. The Design HSE Case shall contain summaries of, and/or references to, the following HSE DCAF deliverables for the Define and Execute phases: o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
Page 47
ALARP Demonstration Report (Final) HEMP Findings and Close out Report (updated) HAZID Report (updated) Concept Risk Assessment Report (i.e. the Qualitative Risk Assessment (QRA) updated) Hazard and Effects Register (Updated) Greenhouse Gas (GHG) and Energy Efficiency Report Facilities Layout Rational Living Quarters Specification and temporary refuge where applicable, e.g. Sour projects. Performance Standards for Safety Critical Elements Impact Assessment Implementation (including Baseline studies) Fire and Explosion Assessment (updated) Sustainable Development Plan (Updated) HSSE and SP (Social Policy) Plan HSSE and SP Philosophies Document (updated) Environmental Permit Health Hazards Exposure Monitoring Medical facilities Assessment Matrix of Permitted Operations (MOPO) part of the Design HSE Case. SP-2062 Specification for HSE Cases
Printed 25/09/13
Consult DCAF for latest version of specified deliverables and the Discipline Authority Manual (TAs)
Page 48
Printed 25/09/13
16 OPERATIONS HSE CASE REQUIREMENTS

The Operations HSE Case focuses on the Operate phase of the project and covers safe and continuous operation of the facility. It ensures that all procedural (operational, maintenance and inspection) controls are in place to ensure that the facility remains within pre-set design limits and specifications (as per the Design HSE Case where relevant). For new projects, the Design HSE Case will usually be the starting point for developing the Operations HSE Case. For brownfield projects, the Design HSE Case serves as the starting point for updating the existing Operations HSE Case. The Operations HSE Case shall be signed by HSE Case Owner, Custodian and Administrator prior to the Start-Up of the facility.
16.1 Basic Requirements

The Operations HSE Case: o o Is required to demonstrate how severity 5 or high level hazards are managed during operations to ensure that the risk is tolerable and ALARP Shall describe how the relevant management systems (asset integrity, Maintenance Integrity Execution, competence and permit to work, etc.) implement the requirements of the PDO HSE-MS and the AI-PSM systems, including management of medium hazards Shall be accepted and signed off by the relevant Director (in the Statement of Fitness)
16.2 Format
The Operations HSE Case shall be based on the following structure: o o o o o o 16.2.1 o o o Contents (including the Statement of Fitness) Part 1 Introduction Part 2 Facility Description Part 3 People, HSE critical tasks Part 4 HEMP and major accident hazard (MAH) assessment (including ALARP Demonstration, safety critical elements (SCE) and Bow-ties) Part 5 Improvement (Action Plan) Contents This part shall contain: Document authorisation, identification of the HSE Case Owner, HSE Case Custodian, and HSE Case Administrator and their responsibilities Version control, showing the scope of each revision Signed off Statement of Fitness of the Operations HSE Case by the HSE Case Owner (the relevant Director). The Statement of Fitness is signed on the understanding that all remedial actions outlined in Part 5 are, or will be, closed out effectively by their action target dates.
Page 49
Printed 25/09/13

16.2.2 o o o o Part 1 Introduction Part 1 shall:
Describe the scope of the HSE Case State the relationship with the HSE Management System (HSE-MS) Manual, CP122 State the purpose of the Operations HSE Case in relation to different users and where relevant information can be found within the document Summarise the change control process to be applied to the HSE Case and the mandatory review and update requirements. Part 2 Facility Description Part 2 shall contain:
16.2.3 o
o o
o 16.2.4 o o
A detailed description of the facility, including plant layout, material selection, safety system, process systems, utilities, etc., including a project overview to show boundaries of the HSE Case A description and reference to, the Operations and HSSE Philosophies, including manning strategies and philosophies A list of the MAHs associated with the facilitiesA list of all safety critical elements (SCE) defined as hardware barriers on the bow-ties (in accordance with EP20099009) A list of major changes to the HSE Case since its inception Part 3 People, HSE Critical Tasks Part 3 shall contain: Normal operation facility manning levels and listing of key positions An organogram showing the organisational structure and highlighting all personnel within the Operations HSE Case who hold an HSE Critical Position, i.e. they have HSE critical tasks assigned to them Tables arranged by HSE Critical Position identifying for each HSE Critical Task: Where the HSE Critical Task fits into the Bow-ties e.g., Facilities/ Equipment and Hazards/Barriers A brief description of the HSE Critical Task and link to the specifications and procedures, documenting how the HSE Critical Task is implemented The means by which the HSE Critical Task is assured e.g. PTW forms, FAIR Reports, etc.
A summary of the HSE Competency assurance system and links for further information
16.2.5 o
Part 4 Hazard and Effects Management Part 4 shall contain: A Hazards and Effects Register containing all hazards identified for the facility/operations are to be listed and assessed using the PDO risk assessment matrix (Figure 2-1). The severity 5 and high risk hazards contain references to the relevant Bow-Tie diagrams Bow-Tie diagrams for severity 5 and high risk hazards, with barriers categorised as inherent safety, safety critical element (SCE), procedural control and remedial action/shortfall
Page 50
Printed 25/09/13

o
ALARP Demonstration, to state how the qualitative Bow-Tie assessment has been reviewed to ensure all applicable measures to reduce risks to tolerable and ALARP levels have been assessed and implemented see Section 10.2.5. Summary of HEMP studies undertaken since the Design HSE Case, e.g. Hazard Identification studies (HAZID), Hazard and Operability studies (HAZOP), Instrumented Protective Function (IPF), plant layout study, Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA), SIMOPS QRA, Human Factors Engineering (HFE), consequence modelling, etc. A matrix of permitted operations (MOPO) to define the operating envelope and safe operating limits for the facility and provide guidance on action required in event of abnormal situations. Situations mapped shall cover: Adverse weather conditions Simultaneous operations (SIMOPs) Safety critical element (SCE) and critical manpower unavailability
See Appendix 10 for details on MOPO requirements. 16.2.6 Part 5 Improvement (Action Plan) Part 5 shall contain an action plan that is SMART (specific, measurable, agreed, realistic and timely) which lists all the actions raised during the development of the Operations HSE Case. All action items shall be entered into the PDO action tracking system to be formally tracked and closed out once they have been fully approved by the HSE Case Custodian. At the time of issue of this Specification, Fountain Incident Management (FIM) is used for tracking actions from PDO HSE Cases. Part 5 also contains a brief description of how the Operations HSE Case is continually improved through the use of annual HSE Plans, HSE Case key performance indicators (KPIs) and audit and review. See Section 11 for more details on continuous improvement.
16.3 DCAF Deliverables for Execute and Operate Phases

Many of the individual components of the Operations HSE Case are required deliverables under the Discipline Controls and Assurance Framework (DCAF) (note that the Operations HSE Case is a required deliverable in itself). The full list of HSE DCAF deliverables for the later Execute and Operate phases which should be produced and signed off individually by the relevant competent person/Technical Authority are: o o o o o o o o o o o o
Page 51
ALARP Demonstration (Bow-ties for qualitative ALARP demonstration) HEMP Findings and Close out Report (updated) HAZID/HAZOP Reports (updated) Concept Risk Assessment Report, i.e. the Qualitative Risk Assessment (QRA) updated Hazard and Effects Register (updated) Greenhouse Gas (GHG) and Energy Efficiency Plan Performance Standards for Safety Critical Elements Impact Assessment Fire and Explosion Assessment (updated) Sustainable Development Plan (Updated) HSSE and SP (Social Policy) Plan (updated) HSSE and SP Philosophies Document (updated) SP-2062 Specification for HSE Cases
Printed 25/09/13

o o o o o o o Environmental Permit Health Hazards Exposure Monitoring Plan Health Risk Assessment report Medical facilities Assessment Job type Health Risk Assessment Emergency Response Plan Security Management Plan
Consulted DCAF for latest version of specified deliverables and the Discipline Authority Manual (TAs)The Operations HSE Case shallcontain summaries and/or references to all the above documents. The following DCAF documents will be incorporated into the Operations HSE Case, either within the main body or as an appendix. o o o o Statement of Fitness (within the Operation HSE Case) Matrix of Permitted Operations (MOPO) (within the Operations HSE Case) Asset Register (updated) (Appendix) Safety Critical Element Register (Appendix)
Page 52
Printed 25/09/13
Appendix 1
Acronym AI-PSM ALARP CFDH CSR DCAF DEP DG FEED FERM FID GHG HAZID HAZOP HBV HEMP HFE HSE HSE-MS HSSE IADC IPF JOA JVA KPI MAH MIE MOPO ORP PEFS PSBR PSUA PTW QRA RAM
Glossary of Definitions, Terms and Abbreviations

Definition Asset Integrity - Process Safety Management As low as reasonably practicable Corporate Functional Discipline Head Concept Selection Report Discipline Controls and Assurance Framework Design engineering practise Decision Gate Front End Engineering and Design Fire and Explosion Risk Management study Final investment decision Greenhouse gas Hazard Identification Hazard and operability study Hardware Barrier Verification Hazards and Effects Management Process Human Factors Engineering Health, Safety and Environmental Health, Safety and Environmental Management System Health, Safety, Security and Environmental International Association of Drilling Contractors Instrumented protective function Joint Operating Agreement Joint Venture Agreement Key performance indicator Major accident hazard - Any situation with the potential for major consequences (harm) to people, environment, asset and reputation if released (severity 5 or high risk hazard) Maintenance Integrity Execution Matrix of permitted operations Opportunity Realisation Process Process engineering flow schematics Process safety basic requirements Pre-start up audit Permit to Work Quantitative Risk Assessment Risk assessment matrix Any measure put in place to manage consequences and assist recovery from a top event The likelihood of a Top Event combined with the severity of the Consequences (The risk is from the Hazard to people, environment, asset and reputation). Safety Critical Element Shell International Exploration and Production Specific, measurable, agreed, realistic and time-constrained
Recovery measure Risk SCE SIEP SMART
Page 53
Printed 25/09/13
Acronym SP TA Threat Threat control Tolerable risk Top event TR-HBV TR-MIE UKOOA VAR
Definition Social policy Technical Authority Any action or mechanism that could bring about the unplanned release of a hazard Any measure put in place to prevent a Threat being successful Tolerable Risks are those that have been reduced to a level where they comply with the applicable laws and regulations, standards, strategic objectives and other agreed Tolerability Criteria. The first thing that happens when a hazard is released (also known as first consequence) Total Reliability - Hardware Barrier Verification Total Reliability - Maintenance integrity Execution UK Offshore Operators Association Value Assurance Review
Page 54
Printed 25/09/13
Appendix 2
Related Business References
Control
Documents
and
1. CP-122 - Health, Safety and Environment Management System CoP, Version 4, 22/04/02 2. Shell Yellow Guide, Risk Assessment Matrix, Issue 3.0, March 2006 3. A Framework for Risk-related http://www.ukooa.co.uk/ Decision Support, UKOOA, 1999
4. GU-648 - Guide for Applying Process Safety in Projects, Rev 1.0, 15th December 2010 5. International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) Drilling Contractors, Health, Safety and Environment Case Guidelines for Land Drilling Contractors, Issue 1.0.1, 27 July 2009. Click Here for latest version of this document. 6. CP-117 - Project Engineering Code of Practice, Rev 4.0, 11 January 2011 7. SP-2061 - Functional Technical Directorates, Technical Authority System, Revision 2.0, Jun-10 8. Shell Group HSSE & SP Control Framework, Section 03, Process Safety Manual. http://sww.manuals.shell.com/HSSE/ 9. Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety. Center for Chemical Process Safety, 9780-470-16569-0, 2007. http://www.knovel.com/web/portal/browse/display?_EXT_KNOVEL_DISPLAY_bookid=1 794 10. Safety Critical Element Management Manual, Second Edition, EP2009-9009, Feb 2009. Click Here for all Operational Excellence documentation on Shell Wiki.
Page 55
Printed 25/09/13
Appendix 3
Ref. No H-01 H-01.001 H-01.002 H-01.003 H-01.004 H-01.005 H-01.006 H-01.007 H-01.008 H-02 H-02.001 H-02.002 H-02.003 H-02.004 H-02.005 H-02.006 H-02.007 H-02.008 H-02.009 H-02.010 H-03 H-03.001 H-03.002 H-03.003 H-03.004 H-04 H-04.001 H-04.002 H-04.003 H-04.004 H-04.005 H-05
Page 56
Hazard Inventory Checklist

Hazard Name Possible Source Cryogenic plants, tankers. Storage tanks, gas wells, gas pipelines, gas separation vessels. Reservoirs, wells, oil/gas separators, gas processing plants, compressors, gas pipelines. Mining activities, boiler fuel source. Reservoirs, wells, pipelines, pressure vessels, storage tanks. Mining activities, extracted oil shale deposits. Tar sands, bituminous sands (clay, sand, water, bitumen). Sub sea gas hydrates. Process fractionating equipment, storage tanks, transport trucks and rail cars. Vehicle fuelling stations, vehicle maintenance. Aircraft, portable stoves, systems, storage tanks. portable lanterns, heating
Hydrocarbons (Unrefined) Liquid Natural Gases (LNGs) Condensate Hydrocarbon gas Coal Crude (oil) Hydrocarbons from Shale Oil Sands Other Hydrocarbon source Hydrocarbons (Refined) Liquefied Petroleum (e.g. Propane) Gasoline's (Napthas) Kerosenes / Jet Fuels Gas Oils (Diesel Fuels / Heating Oils) Heavy Fuel Oils Lubricating Oil Base Stocks Aromatic Extracts Waxes and Related Products Bitumen's Derivatives and Bitumen Gases
Vehicle fuelling stations, vehicle maintenance. Shipping fuel, bunkers, heating systems, storage tanks. Engines and rotating equipment, hydraulic pistons, hydraulic reservoirs and pumps. Heavy fuels, petroleum pitches and resins, rubber and plastics, naphtha. Filter separators, well tubulars, pipelines. Road construction. Furnaces, boilers
Petroleum Coke Explosives Detonators Commercial Explosive Material Shaped Charges Military Ordnance Pressure Gas under Pressure Liquid under Pressure Vacuum Hyperbaric Operations Hypobaric Operations Differences in Height
Seismic operations, pipeline construction. Seismic operations, displays. blasting, construction, firework
Well completion activities, demolition. Spent munitions, UXB, land mines, depleted uranium rounds, improvised explosive devices.
Welding bottles, laboratory gas, pipe-works, air lines, air brakes, air guns, diving operations (air tanks). Water disposal, water floods and injection operations, strength testing of pipe works, well fracturing and treatments. Tanks, accumulators. Diving operations. Working at high altitude (generally >2000m).
Printed 25/09/13

Ref. No H-05.001 H-05.002 H-05.003 H-05.004 H-06 H-06.001 H-06.002 H-07 H-07.001 Hazard Name Personnel at Height >2m Personnel at Height 0m<2m Objects Overhead Ground / Slope Stability Objects under Induced Stress Objects under Tension Objects under Compression Dynamic Situations Land Transport (Driving) Possible Source
Working on scaffolding, suspended access, ladders, platforms, excavations, towers, stacks, roofing, working overboard, working on monkey board. Slippery/uneven surfaces, obstructions, loose grating. climbing/descending stairs,
Objects falling while being lifted/handled or working at a height over people, equipment or process systems, elevated work platforms, slung loads, hoists. Pipeline trenches, excavations, repairing buried facilities.
Guy and support cables, anchor chains, tow & barge tie-off ropes, slings. Spring-loaded devices such as relief valves and actuators and hydraulically operated devices.
Driving to and from locations and camps, transporting materials, supplies and products, seismic field operations, moving drilling rigs and work over rigs. Boat transport to and from locations and camps, transporting materials, supplies and products, marine seismic operations, barges moving drilling rigs and work over rigs, boat collision. Helicopter and fixed wing travel to and from locations and camps, transporting materials, supplies and products. or Engines, motors, compressors, drill stems, rotary table, thrusters on DP ships. Galley, seismic line clearing, grubbing operations.
H-07.002
Water Transport (Boating)
H-07.003 H-07.004 H-07.005 H-08 H-08.001 H-08.002 H-08.003 H-08.004 H-08.005 H-09
Air Transport (Flying) Equipment with Rotating Parts Using Hand Tools Natural Environment Weather Conditions Marine / Water Conditions Tectonic / Land Effects Fire Lightning Electricity Moving
Winds, temperature extremes, rain, storms. Physical impact of waves, tides or other sea states, river currents, floods, tsunami. Earthquakes, landslips or other earth movement activity. Natural wild fire potential, forests, grasslands. Working in open spaces, close to power lines, close to trees, near seismic spreads.
H-9.001
Voltage > 50v
Power cables, temporary electrical lines, electric motors, electric switchgear, power generation, welding machines, transformers, overhead power lines, office equipment, and domestic equipment. Consider AC, DC, current, single and three phase. Contact between storage vessels and piping, product transfer hoses, wiping rags, unearthed equipment, high velocity gas discharges, offimce carpets, door handles.
H-9.002 H-10 H-10.001
Electrostatic Energy Physical X rays <10nm (ionising)
Medical scanners, inspection.
Page 57
Printed 25/09/13

Ref. No H-10.002 H-10.003 H-10.004 H-10.005 H-10.006 H-10.007 Hazard Name Ultra Violet Light (UV) Wavelength 100 - 400 nm (Non Ionising) Visible Light - Wavelength 400 780 nm (Non Ionising) Infra Red (IR) - Wavelength 400 - 1400 nm (Non Ionising) Microwaves (750 - 2500nm) Lasers - Wavelength: 100 - 1000 nm (Non Ionising) Radio Wave / Microwave Radiation - Wavelength: 1 mm 30 km (Non ionising) Extremely Low Frequency Magnetic Radiation (ELF) Wavelength: > 30 km Alpha, Beta Particles Gamma Rays Neutron Radiation Naturally Occurring Radiation (NORM) Ionising Sunlight, arc welding. Possible Source
Arc welding, sunshine, flood lighting, night lights. Flares, laser pointers. Domestic, industrial catering equipment. Instrumentation, surveying, metal cutting. Telecoms, mobile phones.
H-10.008 H-10.009 H-10.010 H-10.011
Transformers, power cables. Well logging, instruments. radiography, densitometers, interface
Well logging, radiography. Nuclear reactors, well logging. Scales in tubulars, vessels and process plant fluids (especially in C3 reflux streams), cosmic radiation (international air travel), radon gas (granites), mining activity oil/gas/coal/mineral sands, phosphates, recycled scrap steel. Both impact (acute) and background (chronic), releases from relief valves, pressure control valves, engine rooms, compressor rooms, drilling brake, air tools. Hand / whole body vibration, hand power tools, maintenance and construction worker, boating, motion sickness. Process piping, storage vessels, tankers, vapour lines, crogenic plants, cold stores / walk in refrigerators, arctic climates, seas < 10oC. Near flare, on the monkey board, in open exposed areas, summer heat, process piping, steam outlets, exhausts, confined closed spaces, glycol regeneration, steam generators, hot oil heating systems, regeneration gases. Climates where sweat evaporation rates are too low to cool the human body, personal protective clothing, lack of moisture (cold dry climates). Packing materials, wood planks, paper rubbish Metal scale from vessels in sour service, scale on filters in sour service, iron sponge sweetening units
H-10.012
H-10.013
Noise
H-10.014
Vibration
H-10.015
Cold Temperature Differentials
H-10.016
Hot Temperature Differentials
H-10.017 H-10.018 H-10.019 H-11 H-11.001
Humidity Cellulosic Materials Pyrophoric Materials Toxic Atmosphere/Medium Oxygen concentration in air (in balance)
Breach of oxygen / nitrogen balance. Confined spaces, tanks, nitrogen deluge systems, Oxygen depleting deluge systems
Page 58
Printed 25/09/13

Ref. No H-11.002 Hazard Name Toxics in air (CO, H2S, heavy metals etc) Possible Source
Welding/burning operations, blanking systems that are toxic, exhaust pipes, faulty heating devices, poorly vented workshops, condensate vapours, sour gas gantries, fuelling points, aluminium oxides. Smoke, soot, diesel fumes, cutting brickwork and concrete, driving on unpaved roads, carpenter shops, grit blasting, sand blasting, catalyst (dumping, screening, removal, drumming), mineral fibres, powdered mud additives, sulphure recovery plants. Risk of drowning in rivers, creeks, swimming pools. Note: If required a detailed Level 3 Hazard listing is provided in EP Guideline Explanatory Text to the Hazard Inventory [2].
H-11.003
Particulates in Air / Dusts
H-11.004 H-12 H-12.010 H-12.011 H-12.012 H-12.013 H-12.014 H-12.015 H-12.016 H-12.017 H-12.018 H-12.019 H-12.104 H-12.105 H-12.108 H-12.115 H-12.116 H-12.119 H-12.130 H-12.132 H-12.133 H-12.136 H-12.141 H-12.142 H-12.143 H-12.144 H-12.145 H-12.146 H-12.153
Page 59
Water Chemical Substances Additives Asbestos all Forms Brines Butanes Degreasers Glycols Halons Nickel Catalysts Paints & Thinners Polychlorinated (PCBs) Ammonia Ammonium Bifluoride Benzene Calcium Bromide Calcium Chloride Chlorine Diisopropanolamine LFG90 Ethane Ethanol Ethylene Gluteraldehyde Hexane Hydrogen Hydrogen (Hydrochloric Acid) Hydrogen (Hydroflouric Acid) Hydrogen Sulphide Mercury Chloride Fluoride Biphenyls
CAS# 1332-21-4, CAS# 12001-28-4. Hydrocarbon production, well kill fluid, packer fluids. Bottled gases. Maintenance shops (halogenated & non-halogenated). MEG, TEG used for dehydration of natural gases. Used as antifreeze. Fire fighting equipment, refrigerants CAS# 7440-02-0. Two-pack paint systems (isocyanates). Transformer oils (NB, approx. 50 congeners each with a separate CAS number.). CAS# 7664-41-7. CAS# 1341-49-7. CAS# 71-43-2. CAS# 7789-41-5. CAS# 10043-53-4. CAS# 7782-50-5. Hand cleaning gel. CAS# 110-97-4. CAS# 74-84-0. CAS# 64-17-5. CAS# 74-85-1. Cleaning agent. CAS# 111-30-8 CAS# 110-54-3 (Chem-SBP containing n-hexane >5%). CAS# 1333-74-0. CAS# 7647-01-0. CAS# 7664-39-3. CAS# 7783-06-4. CAS# 7439-97-6.
Printed 25/09/13

Ref. No H-12.154 H-12.163 H-12.170 H-12-176 H-12.180 H-12.182 H-12.183 H-12.184 H-13 H-13.001 H-13.002 H-13.003 H-13.004 H-13.005 H-13.006 H-13.007 H-13.008 H-14 H-14.001 Hazard Name Methanol Nitric Acid Phosphoric Acid Propane Sodium Hydroxide Sodium Hypochlorite Sulphur Sulphuric acid Biological Plants Animals & Reptiles Insects, Bees Bacteria Protozoa, Mycoses and other Parasitical Diseases (includes 'other') Virus Fungal Growths Lifestyle Factors Ergonomic Workspace Spiders, Scorpions, CAS# 67-56-1. CAS# 7697-37-2. CAS# 7664-38-2. CAS# 74-98-6. CAS# 1310-73-2. Possible Source
Disinfecting agent (e.g. bleach), CAS# 7681-52-9. 7704-34-9. CAS# 7664-93-9. Note: If required a detailed Level 3 Hazard listing is provided in EP Guideline Explanatory Text to the Hazard Inventory [2]. Ivy, deadly nightshade, fungi. Dogs, cats, wild animals, snakes, rats. Arthropods insects, spiders, scorpions, stinging bees. Contaminated food, water. Includes WHO A15-A19; A20-28; A30-49; A50-A64; A65-69; A70-74. Includes WHO Classification A00 to A09; A75-79; B35-49; B50-64; B65-83; B85-89; B90-94; B99. Contaminated blood, blood products and other body fluids. Metal working fluids containing fungal growth. Choices relating to smoking, alcohol / drug use, diet, physical exercise, sexual behaviours.
Awkward, difficult or uncomfortable working conditions, inadequate lighting, noise, etc. Lack of knowledge or unrealistic expectations about the physical abilities of the workforce (e.g. differences between males and females in reach, strength, endurance), medical unfitness. Inability of the workforce to detect and comprehend the feedback (visual and auditory) provided about machine/equipment identification and status during normal and abnormal situations, thus leading to human error.
H-14.002
Physically Demanding Task
H-14.003 H-15
Human Machine Interface Psychological
H-15.001
Organisation, Culture
Systems
and
Poor leadership, lack of clarity about organisational objectives and structure, bureaucratic procedures; formality of hierarchy, inability to talk openly to manager; lack of support by colleagues, complex, new or unreliable systems e.g. IT, inadequate tools to perform job, information overload or under-communication, career stagnation and uncertainty, under-promotion / overpromotion, limited opportunities for learning or development.
Page 60
Printed 25/09/13

Ref. No Hazard Name Possible Source
H-15.002
Job Demands
Work overload/under load (boredom); lack of control over work content or process; frequent deadlines; unclear or conflicting roles and responsibilities; poor work/life balance; Lack of training; travel requirements; badly designed shift patterns and rosters; long or unpredictable hours. Frequent changes to organization and/or job; tele-working, virtual teams; outsourcing and globalisation; introduction of new systems; poor management and communication; not understanding changing priorities; job insecurity; expatriation and repatriation. Poorly understood reward policies; perceived inequity; mismatch of individual expectations; lack of transparency/communication in assessment and reward process; poorly managed performance management process; poor status, pay and conditions. Discrimination, bullying and harassment; lack of inclusiveness and isolation; problems working with people from different cultures and backgrounds; interpersonal issues with manager and/or colleagues. Concern about personal liability resulting from actions; difficulties in delivering due to legal constraints; fear of prosecution; unpredictability of legal process; length of legal processes involving the individual e.g. as witness in a tribunal or court case. Witnessing or being involved in a serious incident; natural disasters and terrorist attacks; travel fears and incidents. to Physical and mental health issues; substance abuse and recovery; conflicting demands of work and home; domestic issues involving family; lack of social support; care of dependants; financial issues; housing and travel.
H-15.003
Experience of Change
H-15.004
Reward and Recognition
H-15.005
Diversity & Inclusiveness
H-15.006
Litigation & Liability
H-15.007
Critical Incidents at Work Personal Work Security Armed Conflict Terrorism Violent Crime Organised Crime Militant Activism Civil Unrest Issues External
H-15.008 H-16 H-16.001 H-16.002 H-16.003 H-16.004 H-16.005 H-16.006
War, Armed Insurrection, Insurgent Groups against legal governments. Unprovoked authorities. violent attacks against general public,
Assault, violence against an individual. Large scale criminal manipulation of Company operations, extortion, kidnap, piracy, Mafia, white collar, cyber hacker. Pressure Groups, Single Issue Zealots, violet or threatening protests against Company, people, assets. Breakdown of social order, riots, lawlessness, absence of government authority. Deliberate, targeted espionage and loss of commercially sensitive information, documents, plans, financials, telephone conversations, email loss, senior management itineries. Note: If required an example of a more detailed Level 3 Hazard listing is provided in EP Guideline Explanatory Text to the Hazard Inventory [2].
H-16.007
Theft of Sensitive Information
H-17
Environmental Aspects1
Page 61
Printed 25/09/13

Ref. No H-17.001 Hazard Name Resource Use Possible Source
Consumption of materials, water, land, raw materials, air, energy, steam, process chemicals, Habitat removal, ecological degradation. Produced Water. Regular drainage of liquids including sewage systems (grey/black water), water outfalls, & overflows to surface waters; seepage of liquids to groundwater. Waste disposal including domestic, industrial (inc. Pig trash, oil based tank sludges, medical & hazardous chemicals, used engine oils etc). Discharge of chemicals to air (deluge systems), venting, fugitive emissions, flare stacks, exhaust, dusts, particulates, smoke (normal and abnormal operations).
H-17.002
Discharge to Water
H-17.003
Discharge to Land
H-17.004 H-18 H-18.001 H-18.002 H-18.003 H-18.004
Emissions to Air Social Performance Procurement Philosophy Revenue Streams Land Take Temporary Project construction) (e.g.
Supply chain management, local purchasing, employment and labour. Revenue transparency and revenue streams, equity, socioeconomic changes, corruption. Land right livelihood. entitlement, resettlement, loss/change of
Change in make up of population, boom-bust, social services, large workforces, disturbance impacts, archaeological sites or artefacts, cultural and sacred sites. Changes in power relations, community decision-making structures and skills, high expectations, vulnerable groups, conflict, human rights, perceived health and environmental impacts. High prices paid for local commodities, use of local labour and talent, use of local accommodation, transportation, and infrastructure.
H-18.005
(Lack of) Engagement
H-18.006 H-99 H-99.000
Conflicting Use for Resources Emergency response Emergency Response
Response to any emergency
Page 62
Printed 25/09/13
Appendix 4
Hazard ID
H-01.01
Example Hazard and Effects Register

Activity Threats Controls Top Event
Oil Spill
Risk Ranking Consequence P

Localised environmental impact -
Hazard
Recovery Measures E
C3
A
C2
R
C2 1. 2. 3. 4. Oil spill contingency Pollution control capability Radio controlled ESD from vessel 3 yearly MOSAG oil spill audit
Crude oil under pressure
Loading Crude at the SBM
Integrity Failure: hose, flange, piping.
Programme of equipment inspections: Floating Hose daily Underwater hose- 6 mths SBM topsides- daily Submarine pipeline- 5 yearly Pipeline pigging -5 yearly Corrosion protection: Impressed current Anodes Replacement: Change-out equipment on a time & condition basis
Anchor Handling
Ships Anchors lashed & checked Restricted area defined Pipeline route area under observation
Damaged Pipeline
Localised environmental impact
C3
B3
C2
1. 2. 3.
SBM/ PL redundancy OSR capability Continuous diving capability Spare SBM SBM Redundancy Critical SBM spares available
Vessel collision with SBM
1. 2. 3.
Engine use procedure Focsle watchkeeper Tug assistance available
Damaged SBM
Localised environmental impact
C3
B3
C2
1. 2. 3.
Page 63

Printed 25/09/13
Appendix 5
Safety Critical Elements Categories
Those SCEs in the SCE Management Manual relevant only to offshore facilities have been omitted. SCE CODE SI001 SI002 SI003 SI005 SI008 PC001 PC002 PC003 PC004 PC005 PC006 PC007 PC008 PC009 IC001 IC002 IC003 IC005 IC006 IC007 IC008 IC009 DS001 DS002 DS003 PS001 PS002 SCE DESCRIPTION Foundation Structures Topsides & Surface Structures Mechanical Equipment Road Vehicles Drilling Systems Pressure Vessels Heat Exchangers Rotating Equipment Onshore Tanks Piping Systems Pipelines Relief Systems Well Containment Fired Heaters Hazardous Area Ventilation Non-Hazardous Ventilation Earth Bonding Fuel Gas Purge Systems Inert Gas Blanket Systems Miscellaneous Ignition Control Components Flare Tip Ignition Systems Fire & Gas Detection Systems Security Systems Water in Condensate (gas dew point) Measurement Deluge Systems Fire and Explosion Protection Area Handling SCE CODE PS004 PS005 PS006 PS007 PS008 PS009 PS010 PS011 PS012 PS013 SD001 SD002 SD003 SD004 SD005 SD006 SD008 SD009 ER001 ER002 ER003 ER004 ER005 ER007 ER010 LS001 SCE DESCRIPTION Firewater Pumps Firewater Ringmain Passive Fire Protection Gaseous Fire Protection Systems Fine Water Spray Systems Sprinkler Systems Power Management Systems Fixed Foam Systems Sand Filters Chemical Injection Systems ESD Systems Depressurisation Systems HIPPS Systems Operational Well Isolation Pipeline Isolation Valves Process ESDVs Drilling Well Control Utility Air Temporary Refuge/Muster Areas Escape & Evacuation Routes Emergency/ Escape Lighting Communications Systems Uninterruptible Power Supply Emergency Power Drain Systems Personal Survival (PSE) Drain Systems Equipment
Certified Electrical Equipment
Page 64
Printed 25/09/13
Appendix 6
Example Safety Critical Elements Register

H-01.005b Crude Oil Under Pressure - on plot H-01.005c Crude Oil Under Pressure - off plot Fired H-10.016 High Pressure Steam - Steam Generation & Steam Injection H-99.001 Emergency MAH Preparedness Measures H-01.005d Ambient at Oil Crude Conditions - FWKO, CWT & Storage Tanks (Production
H-01.003c Gas Hydrocarbon uncontrolled flaring/venting
H-01.003b Hydrocarbon Gas - off plot
H-01.003a Hydrocarbon Gas - on plot
SCE GROUP Process Containment
SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENT PC001 Pressure Vessels PC002 Heat Exchangers PC003 Equipment PC004 Tanks PC005 Piping Systems PC006 Pipelines PC007 Relief System PC008 Well Containment Rotating
Page 65
H-04.002 Water Under Pressure -
Gas
H-01.005a Producers Oil Phase)
H-01.003d Hydrocarbon Heater

Printed 25/09/13
Appendix 7
SCE GROUP SCE GOAL
Function No.
Example Design Performance Standard

Assigned TA Review # Date Assurance These should be tasks/activities in a scheduled assurance event specified in a Company process/procedure.** Approved Flare Relief and blowdown Study. Approved/checked calculations for relief devices. Approved specification and data sheets. Verification Mechanical Static
BARRIER REFERENCE PROCESS CONTAINMENT PC001 Pressure Vessels To maintain integrity of the pressure envelope
Functional Criteria Performance criteria 1.1 Pressure Vessel External Inspection There shall be no unacceptable flaws in the Pressure Vessel as defined within the Inspection Management Process. * There shall be no unacceptable cracks in the vessel or supports. * There shall be no unacceptable corrosion in the vessel, flanges, bolting and supports * There shall be no unacceptable visible damage (gouges, dents, deformations, arc strikes) to vessel or supports.
To maintain the pressure envelope for conditions within design basis
HAZOP review. PCAP/DCAF Driven TIVP/AIPSM Driven OE/Flawless Driven 1.2 Pressure Vessel Internal Inspection These should be tasks/activities in a There shall be no unacceptable internal flaws in the Pressure Vessel as defined within the Inspection scheduled assurance event specified in a Management Process. Company process/procedure.** * There shall be no unacceptable cracks in the vessel. PCAP/DCAF Driven * There shall be no unacceptable corrosion inside the vessel. * There shall be no unacceptable visible damage (gouges, dents, deformations, arc strikes) to vessel. TIVP/AIPSM Driven OE/Flawless Driven
Review flare relief and blowdown study and 10% sample review of relief device calculations, specifications, vendor data sheets and supplier quality field inspection reports to check that performance criteria has been achieved.
Page 66

Printed 25/09/13
1.3 Key Documents The latest piping and instrument drawing(s) on which the pressure vessel appears shall accurately represent the vessel configuration and design conditions.
These should be tasks/activities in a scheduled assurance event specified in a Company process/procedure.** PCAP/DCAF Driven TIVP/AIPSM Driven OE/Flawless Driven
1.4 Wall Thickness There shall be no Pressure Vessel with a wall thickness less than its design.
1.5 Attachments No bolting is missing or loose. No valves or instruments are loose or damaged.
To prevent a release of hazardous materials
2.1 Loss of containment There shall be no unacceptable leaks, weeps or seeps from the main body of the vessel nozzles, or mechanical connectors onto the vessel.
RELIABILITY / AVAILABILITY Function No. System /Sub System Performance criteria Basis and Assurance Verification
Page 67

Printed 25/09/13
These should be tasks/activities in a scheduled assurance event specified in a Company process/procedure.** PCAP/DCAF Driven TIVP/AIPSM Driven OE/Flawless Driven SURVIVABILITY Function No. Hazardous Event Performance criteria Basis and Assurance These should be tasks/activities in a scheduled assurance event specified in a Company process/procedure.** PCAP/DCAF Driven TIVP/AIPSM Driven OE/Flawless Driven Verification
Page 68

Printed 25/09/13
Appendix 8
Example Operations Performance Standard (EP 2009-9009, Ref. 10)
Page 69

Printed 25/09/13
Appendix 9
Example of Implementation Table
The table below provides guidance on interpreting the HSE Critical Task implementation tables. This framework has been developed to set out the HSE Critical Task implementation tables in a consistent and user-friendly format. Table 16-1: Implementation Table Guidance TITLE Task ref. DESCRIPTION HSE Critical Task reference number as developed in BowTieXP software in accordance with PDO activity model: Bow-Ties Threats/Consequences HSE Critical Activities Task Description Documentation Verification Project Engineering (e.g. 1.01) Technical Integrity Management (e.g. 2.01) Occupational Health (e.g. 3.01) Operate Surface Assets (e.g. 4.01) Communication (e.g. 5.01) Organisation (e.g. 6.01) Competence Assurance (e.g. 7.01)
Bow-Tie diagram/s on which activity appears e.g. H-01.001. Threat or consequence line/s on which HSE Critical Task appears e.g. internal corrosion, ignited release HSE Critical Activity (yellow barriers) for which HSE Critical Task is carried out to ensure barrier is in place and functional. Brief description of HSE Critical Task Supporting documentation for HSE Critical Task Document/audit control to provide assurance HSE Critical Task has been carried out.
Page 70
Printed 25/09/13

Table 16-2: Example Implementation Table 3.1.1.
Task Ref. 4.29
South Operations Manager (OSO)

Bow-Ties H-01.003a H-01.003b H-01.003c H-01.003d H-01.005a H-01.005b H-01.005c H-01.005d H-04.002 H-10.016 H-01.003a H-01.003b H-01.003c H-01.005a H-01.005b H-01.005c H-01.005d H-10.016 H-01.003a H-01.003b H-01.003c H-01.003d H-01.005b H-01.005c H-01.005d H-10.016 Threats/ Consequences Human error HSE Critical Activities (BowTie Barriers) Task Description Documentation Verification
Consequence management Implement company consequence management Plant Operations Manual Disciplinary reports (disciplinary procedures) for procedure for non compliance PR-1029 Competence non-compliance Assurance and Assessment
4.49
Sabotage/ 3rd party Asset Security Plan interference ROP presence
Ensure asset security plan appropriate for CP-126 Personnel and Asset Security Plan location risks is established and implemented. Asset Security This should include dialogue and interface with PL-10 Security & the ROP. Emergency Response Policy
6.03
Lack of manpower/ Man Power Model/ERROS - Ensure the Manpower model is implemented for GU-4884 Planning and Manpower report Nimr operations Scheduling Guidelines resources Estimated Resources Required on Site
Page 71

Printed 25/09/13
Appendix 10
MOPO
The team to develop or review the MOPO shall consist of operations, maintenance, HSE and management personnel who are familiar with the operation of, and the activities required, at the facility/asset. The team shall be lead by an experienced facilitator and shall: Identify Threats and Escalation Factors in the Bow-ties that could compromise safe operating limits. Identify other operations and activities that could compromise safe operating limits. Develop the MOPO under the appropriate headings of SIMOPs, External Influences and Inactive SCE Identify the stops and proceed with cautions using the red/amber traffic light system. Provide supporting guidance notes for the proceed with cautions that will assist Supervisors etc if/when the situation arises. Collectively review the matrices and ensure they reflect current practise and give clear guidance for action to be taken under the specific circumstances.
A number of assumptions are used in the template MOPO: The SIMOPs MOPO shall assume that two or more major activities, e.g. production, drilling, are simultaneously being performed in the same location/area. The Impaired SCE MOPO shall assume that the operation is in the vicinity of, or within the area affected by, the impaired SCE. The Impaired SCE MOPO shall define the minimum level failure mode assessed as having an impact on one or more of the high level activities/operations. Failure modes below this level shall be subject to risk assessment and remedial action in accordance with EP2009-9009. When SCEs are in test mode, alternative controls shall be put in place to ensure that their functionality is provided. Testing of these systems is not generally considered impairment for purposes of this MOPO. In case multiple barriers are unavailable/impaired, the combined effect of the simultaneous failure on the activities shall be subject to risk assessment.
Additional controls required as indicated in the MOPOs (coloured amber) shall be listed. Wok shall only be carried out under the formal control of the Permit to Work (PTW) system, including component elements such as plant isolation certificates, vessel entry certificates, hot work permits, etc. All applicable procedures and work instructions relating to the work to be undertaken shall be complied with. In certain cases, the specific operation is not directly impacted by the barrier that is impaired, but consideration shall be given to proceeding with non-essential work that could increase the risk. Where necessary, the requirement for undertaking risk assessment shall be noted. Measures shall be taken to maintains risks at ALARP and the effectiveness of the measures shall be verified. All actions involving bypassing the safeguarding systems shall be authorised by the Production Delivery Team Leader who shallprepare individual procedures for all tasks not covered by existing procedures and consult relevant discipline technical authority. Examples of the three MOPOs (Adverse Weather, SIMOPs, and SCE Impairment) follow. These shall be used as guidance for construction of a new MOPO or for review of an existing MOPO. The notes within the MOPO are intended to support rather than supersede the specific risk assessments required, particularly for SCE Impairment where FSR and CMPT processes shall be applied. For a MOPO to be effective it must provide clear concise information to the Operator of immediate action to be taken under the specified conditions, e.g. if working at height is ongoing and wind speed increases, he needs to be able to quickly see when to stop the activity in question.
Page 72
Printed 25/09/13

MOPO NOTES TO ACCOMPANY THE EXAMPLE MOPOs
NO. 1 2 3 4 5 6 REQUIREMENT Operation specific. Subject to well engineering procedures; refer to WECO HSE case. Loading and unloading pigs not permitted in adverse weather conditions. Subject to task-based risk assessment. Subject to appropriate risk assessment and PDO Journey Management Procedures.
Continued work subject to heat stress evaluation. Schedule work during cooler part of day. Provide forced ventilation, shaded areas and cold water (not iced). Summer working hours and extended lunch breaks apply. Simultaneous drilling and production operations permitted subject to compliance with minimum separation distances between live wells and flowlines and drilling operations in accordance with WECO HSE Case. Simultaneous drilling and production operations not permitted inside separation distances. Permitted subject to pigging procedures (maximum flow rate for pigging operations). Grit blasting/jet washing not permitted on live systems. Venting permitted outside the sterile area only. Permitted subject to risk assessment with specified controls or mitigation in place.
7 8 9 10
MOPO ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS

ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITION HEAVY SHAMAL HIGH AMBIENT TEMP >50 C 1 1 Y Y 5 Y Y 5 5 5 5 5 Y Y Y 5 5 5 5 Y Y 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 Y 5 5 5 5 5 WIND >20 KTS
HEAVY RAIN SEVERELY REDUCED VISIBILITY & WADI FLOODING
HEAVY MIST SEVERELY REDUCED VISIBILITY
NIGHT TIME WORKING
ACTIVITY/OPERATION Drilling Well Services Operate Wells/Flowlines Operate Pipelines Pigging (future) QA MPS Operation GT operation BFW Heater Start-up (Plant Start-up) HRSG Start-up (Plant Start-up) Steam Distribution Plant Start-up Oil & Gas Plant Start-up PGC/Plant unit Start-up Operate Steam Plant Operate Oil & Gas Plant APO Operation N2/He Leak Testing Working Outdoors Sampling Radiography Vehicle Movement on-plot Vehicle Movement off-plot Road Maintenance/ Grading Grit Blasting / HP Water Jet Lifting/Crane Operations Fork Lift Truck Operations High Noise Generating Activities Excavation Activities Work at Height (outside permanent structures) Working on Tall Structures Zone 1 Area Work Zone 2 Area Work Breaching Maintenance Non-Breaching Maintenance Class A Permit Work Class B Permit Work HRSG entry Confined Space Entry Flaring Local Venting Draining to open systems Chemical unloading Chemical Disposal by Vac Truck Construction Activities
1 1 Y Y 2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 3 3 Y 3 3 3 3 N 3 Y 3 N 3 Y Y 3 Y Y Y Y Y Y 3 Y 3 3 3
1 1 Y Y N Y Y N N N N N Y Y Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N
1 1 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 4 N N N N Y N N N 3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 3
1 1 Y Y 2 Y Y N N N N N Y Y Y N 3 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N
1 1 Y Y 2 Y Y N N N N N Y Y Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N
Page 73
LIGHTNING 1 1 Y Y 2 Y Y N N N N N Y Y Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N
Printed 25/09/13
MOPO SIMOPs
STEAM DISTRIBUTION PLANT START-UP GENERATING MAINTENANCE/ (PLANT GRIT BLASTING / HP WATER JET TALL OFFCHEMICAL DISPOSAL BY VAC TRUCK N STARTUP VEHICLE MOVEMENT ON-PLOT OPERATE WELLS/FLOWLINES TRUCK DRAINING TO OPEN SYSTEMS LIFTING/CRANE OPERATIONS OIL & GAS PLANT START-UP OPERATE OIL & GAS PLANT CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES BREACHING MAINTENANCE PGC/PLANT UNIT START-UP
CONFINED SPACE ENTRY
EXCAVATION ACTIVITIES
OPERATE STEAM PLANT
CLASS A PERMIT WORK
CLASS B PERMIT WORK
MOVEMENT
ACTIVITY/OPERATION Drilling Well Services Operate Wells/Flowlines Operate Pipelines Pigging (future) QA MPS Operation GT operation BFW Heater Startup (plant startup) HRSG Startup (plant startup) Steam Distribution Plant start-up Oil & Gas Plant start-up PGC/Plant unit Startup Operate Steam Plant Operate Oil & Gas Plant APO Operation N2/He Leak Testing Working Outdoors Sampling Radiography Vehicle Movement on-plot Vehicle Movement off-plot Road Maintenance/ Grading Grit Blasting / HP Water Jet Lifting/Crane Operations Fork Lift Truck Operations High Noise Generating Activities Excavation Activities Work at Height (outside permanent structures) Working on Tall Structures Zone 1 Area Work Zone 2 Area Work Breaching Maintenance Non-Breaching Maintenance Class A Permit Work Class B Permit Work HRSG entry Confined Space Entry Flaring Local Venting Draining to open systems Chemical unloading Chemical Disposal by Vac Truck Construction Activities
6 6 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
6 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 8 N Y Y Y Y Y 3 Y N Y 3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
7 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y 8 N Y Y Y Y Y 3 Y N Y 3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y 8 Y Y Y Y Y Y 3 Y N Y 3 3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y N N N
Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y 8 Y Y Y Y Y Y 3 Y Y Y 3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y 8 Y Y Y Y Y Y 3 Y Y Y 3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N Y Y Y Y Y Y 8 Y Y Y Y Y Y 3 Y Y Y 3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N N N N Y Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N
Y N Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y
N N N Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N Y Y N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N
Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y
Y N N Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y
N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N
N Y N N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N Y N Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y
N N N N N N N N N N N N N
N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N Y N N N N N Y N N N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N
Y Y Y N N N N Y
Y Y N N Y Y Y
Y N N N N Y
9 Y Y Y Y
Y N N N
N N N N N
Page 74

Printed 25/09/13
CHEMICAL UNLOADING
WORKING OUTDOORS
N2/HE LEAK TESTING
OPERATE PIPELINES
QA MPS OPERATION
ZONE 1 AREA WORK
ZONE 2 AREA WORK
STARTUP HRSG STARTUP)
PIGGING (FUTURE)
HEATER BFW (PLANT STARTUP)
WORK AT HEIGHT
ON
NON-BREACHING MAINTENANCE
LIFT FORK OPERATIONS
APO OPERATION
WELL SERVICES
LOCAL VENTING
GT OPERATION
RADIOGRAPHY
NOISE HIGH ACTIVITIES
WORKING STRUCTURES
HRSG ENTRY
SAMPLING
DRILLING
ROAD GRADING
FLARING
VEHICLE PLOT

MOPO SCE & CRITICAL MANPOWER IMPAIRMENT/UNAVAILABILITY
ACTIVITY/OPERATION
ACTIVITIES GENERAL (MAINTENANCE, INSPECTION, PAINTING, COLD WORK) LIFTING AND HOISTING OVER HC EQUIPMENT
ROAD TRANSPORT, ROAD TANKERS, LOADING/ UNLOADING
BREAKING HC-CONTAINMENT (SAMPLING,VENTING,DRAININ G)
PRESSURE/LEAK TESTING
EQUIPMENT
EQUIPMENT
IMPAIRED/UNAVAILABLE SCE SCE GROUP SI002 Civil Structures / Structural Support SI003 Heavy lift cranes and mechanical handling PC001 - PC006 Process Containment PC007 Relief System SCE FAILURE MODE Observed or detected structural defect resulting in increased risk of MAH Observed or detected structural/mechanical defect resulting in increased risk of MAH due to dropped load Uncontrolled release of process fluids resulting in increased risk of MAH Unavailability of relief at design flow rate resulting in increased risk of MAH due to overpressure Uncontrolled release of well fluid resulting in increased risk of MAH Unavailability of BMS/IPS resulting in increased risk of MAH Certified electrical equipment fails to meet PS requirement resulting in increased risk of ignition Earth bonding fails to meet PS requirement resulting in increased risk of ignition Inability to provide required fuel gas purge flow to flare header resulting in air ingress to flare Total loss of gas blanket system resulting in increased risk of ignition Inability to provide required gas blanket flow individual equipment resulting in increased risk of ignition Loss of primary & secondary flare ignition systems resulting in flare out Total loss of F&G detection system N 10 N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
PC008 Operational Well Containment PC009 Fired Heaters (Burner Management System) IC003 Certified Electrical Equipment
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
IC005 Bonding
Earth
10
10
IC006 Fuel Gas Purge
10
IC007 Gas Blanket System Total loss IC007 Gas Blanket System Loss to individual equipment IC009 Ignition System Flare Control
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
DS001 Fire and Gas - Total loss
10
10
10
10
10
Page 75
Printed 25/09/13
CONFINED SAPCE (INCLUDING HRSG)
OPERATE FACILTY
START-UP PLANT
OPERATE PLANT
HOT WORK
START-UP SYSTEM
OPERATE SYSTEM
ENTRY
10
10
10
10

ACTIVITY/OPERATION
EQUIPMENT
EQUIPMENT
DS001 Fire and Gas - Local or partial loss
DS002 Security Systems PS013 Chemical Injection System SD001 ESD System - Total loss SD001 ESD System - Local or partial loss SD002 Depressurisation System - Total loss SD002 Depressurisation System - Local or partial loss SD004 Operational Well Isolation SD006 ESDV Process
Loss of F&G detection end element resulting in impaired local functionality e.g. 2ooN in voted system & 1ooN in non-voted systems Loss of access control to facilities Inability to provide required chemical injection flow Total loss of ESD system
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10 10
Y Y
10 10
Y Y
Y Y
Y Y
Y Y
Y Y
Y Y
Y Y
Y Y
10
10
10
10
10
10
Local or partial loss of ESD system Total loss of EDP system
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
Local or partial loss of EDP system
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
ER001 Temp Refuge/ Muster Areas ER002 Escape/ Evacuation Routes ER003 Emergency/ Escape Lighting ER004 Communication Systems - Loss of GA ER004 Communication Systems - Loss of ER communications ER005 Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS)
Inability to isolate steam injection well or annulus resulting in potential back flow of HC Inability of ESD end element valve to adequately isolate processes resulting in potential escalation of MAH Primary muster area impaired Escape/ evacuation routes impaired Emergency/ escape Lighting impaired Loss of GA communication system
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
Loss of ER communication system including radios and landlines Inability to provide emergency power supply to essential systems
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
Page 76
Printed 25/09/13
OPERATE FACILTY
START-UP PLANT
OPERATE PLANT
HOT WORK
START-UP SYSTEM
OPERATE SYSTEM
ENTRY
10
Y Y
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

ACTIVITY/OPERATION
EQUIPMENT
EQUIPMENT
ER010 System
Drains
LS001 Personal Survival Equipment Personal monitors LS001 Personal Survival Equipment Escape sets LS001 Personal Survival Equipment Rescue BA sets LS001 Personal Survival Equipment Chemical PPE LS001 Personal Survival Equipment Safety showers/eye wash stations
Inability to provide secondary containment for HC/chemicals spills resulting in potential escalation of MAH Personal H2S monitors below minimum level or faulty Portable BA Sets below minimum level or faulty (Escape Sets) Portable BA Sets below minimum level (SCBA & Rescue Sets) Insufficient number or inadequate type of Chemical PPE available Safety showers/eye wash stations not available or inoperable
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
CRITICAL MANPOWER UNAVAILABILITY

HSE Position ER Members ER - QA Brigade Critical Competent persons not available to fill HSE Critical Position Competent persons not available to fill ER team member position QA fire brigade not available for extended period Insufficient number of first aiders available onsite Competent persons not available to fill LECC positions or LECC not available N N 10 10 10 N N N N N N N
Team
10
10
10
Fire
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
ER - First Aider
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
LECC
10
10
10
Page 77
Printed 25/09/13
OPERATE FACILTY
START-UP PLANT
OPERATE PLANT
HOT WORK
START-UP SYSTEM
OPERATE SYSTEM
ENTRY
10
10
Appendix 11
Operations HSE Case Change Approval
This appendix details the process for identifying, assessing and implementing changes to Operations HSE Cases to ensure that the hazards and risks associated with Major Accident Hazards (MAHs) are maintained as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). This procedure is mandatory for Operations HSE Cases in PDO but may also be used for Design HSE Cases. It is to be used by all parties who may be responsible for initiating a change that may have an effect on the underlying assumptions or information presented in a HSE Case. A suitable system to ensure that the Steps described in this procedure are followed is provided by the proforma HSE Case Change Approval Form at the end of this Appendix RACI Matrix
Roles & Responsibilities Technical Safety HSE Engineer/ Case Custodian Case HSE Custodian
Technical Authorities
Task
1. Identify Change 2. Assess Impact of Change and Develop Workscope 3. Perform Workscope 4. Prepare HSE Case Changes 5. Review proposed Changes 6. Approve Changes 7. Publish Changes HSE Case
C R A R R R R
C C C I C C I
A C C A A A A
I I C I C C I
R C C I C I I
Action Parties I R I I I I
Stakeholders
(R) (A) (C) (I)
Responsible: Accountable Consult Informed
The party responsible for executing the task and obtaining parties involvement Party accountable for approval Party responsible for contributing when consulted Party informed of outcome
Role Originator Individual or group who identifies the need for change(s). This function describes a variety of roles: Page 78
Responsibilities Identifies and summarises need for change(s) Discusses potential change with MSE/4 Dept. to determine whether it will affect the HSE Case or its underlying assumptions Identifies relevant Stakeholders, with advice from MSE/4 Dept. Contributes to preparing text change(s) as required Reviewing and approval of proposed change(s)
Asset (management, supervision or operations); Workforce; Technical Authorities (TAs); Discipline engineers; Contractors.
Originator
Printed 25/09/13

Role Technical Safety Engineer Responsibilities Action Parties HSE Case Custodian (Delivery Team Leader / Asset Representative)
Assesses the impact of the change(s) on the HSE Case and its underlying assumptions Supports the HSE Case by providing management, technical support, knowledge and authoring Ensures appropriate description of the change(s) in the HSE Case Liaises with other TAs as appropriate Once the change has been agreed, logs the change in the HSE Case MOC register Maintains an up to date version of the HSE Case MOC register Advise on impact of change(s) Provide information on actions required Provide input to HSE Case update Propose change(s) resulting from, for example, changes to the operation of the asset or other changes raised by personnel associated with the asset Review change(s) as a Stakeholder Contribute to text change(s) in the HSE Case Check proposed change(s) and co-ordinating workforce involvement Ensure that the information contained in the HSE Case reflects the current status of the asset and its operating practices Propose change(s) resulting from, for example, change(s) to the engineering or operation of the Asset or other change(s) raised as a result of issues in their discipline Review change(s) as a Stakeholder Contribute to text change(s) in the HSE Case Check proposed change(s) and co-ordinating involvement of other TAs Provide specialist knowledge and expertise Review and approve text change(s) in the HSE Case
Technical Authorities
Stakeholder A person or person(s) who may be called upon to contribute to/consult on the assessment of change(s) required, or who may need to be advised of the potential change(s) to the HSE Case. This function describes a variety of roles: Asset (management, supervision or operations); Workforce; Technical Authorities (TAs); Discipline engineers; Contractors.
Page 79
Printed 25/09/13

HSE Case Change Approval Form
HSE Case Change Approval Form Ref.:
GD/2008/01
Step 1: Identify Change Asset/Facility: Yibal Originator: A N Other Date raised: 24/07/2010
Details of proposed change(s) (summary of the change(s) use continuation sheet if required):
Step 2: Assess Impact of Change(s) and Develop Workscope Significant Change? (Yes/No) Details of Stakeholder engagement: Justification:
Description of assessment and statement of required work activities:
Step 3: Perform Workscope (record the summary of outcomes for Step 3):
Step 4 & 5: HSE Case Changes (record summary of changes use continuation sheet if required for detailed changes): Part: Section: Heading: Comments:
Immediate publication of change required? (Yes/No)
Justification
Step 6: Approve Changes (signatories as required) a. Originator b. Technical Authority c. HSE Case Custodian d. Technical Safety Engineer Name: Name: Name: Name: Signature: Signature: Signature: Signature: Date: Date: Date: Date:
Step 7: Publish Change Date Completed: Rev Number: Name: Signature
Page 80
Printed 25/09/13

Step 1: Identify Change(s)
As soon as it is practicable, discuss the potential change(s) with the Asset Technical Safety Engineer to determine whether the proposed change(s) will affect the HSE Case or its underlying assumptions. Any proposed changes (e.g. engineering, procedural, organisational) that have an impact on the risk profile of the Facility or Activity, shall be managed in accordance with this Procedure (including an ALARP Demonstration) and the HSE Case shall be updated accordingly. The possible changes that might affect the HSE Case and its underlying assumptions are those listed in Section 13. Step 2: Assess Impact of Change(s) and Develop Workscope a) Determine whether the proposed changes(s) will affect the Case content or its underlying assumptions. If it is agreed that there is no effect on the Case or its supporting studies, no further action is required. b) Where it is agreed by there is an effect on the Case, develop workscope with relevant Stakeholders. c) Ensure that the workscope includes review and update, as required, to: i. ii. iii. iv. v. HEMP Studies and ALARP justification; QRA Studies; Bow-Tie assessments; HSE Critical Element and Performance Standards; HSE Critical Task listings.
d) Agree and record actions with originator, action parties and Stakeholders. e) Summarise details of the HSE Case Change Approval Form f) Logs the HSE Case change in the HSE Case MOC register. The register should ensure that all changes to the HSE Case are grouped together for review and to allow assessment of cumulative effects or risk.
Step 3: Perform Workscope a) Perform agreed workscope as identified in 2b above. b) Representatives from the current operational, engineering and maintenance teams, and workforce involvement representatives shall actively participate in performing the workscope as appropriate. c) Review outcomes for actions to determine final impact. d) Consult with Stakeholders on effect on HSE Case (where appropriate). e) Complete change(s) to relevant documents/processes/drawings etc. Step 4: Prepare HSE Case Change(s) a) Prepare change(s) to HSE Case in consultation with action parties and Stakeholders.
Page 81
supporting
studies
or
other
associated
Printed 25/09/13

Step 5: Review Proposed HSE Case Change(s)
a) Issue the HSE Case Change Approval Form with proposed change(s) to the HSE Case to relevant action parties and Stakeholders for comment/review. b) Amend proposed change(s) as required reflect any comments received. On the HSE Case Change Approval Form annotate which sections of the HSE Case have been changed. c) Determine need for immediate publication of change(s). Consider whether change is significant and needs immediate update. Also consider cumulative effects of changes to date. Step 6: Approve Change(s) a) Gain acceptance of proposed change(s) from relevant parties, including sign-off of HSE Case Custodian (obtain signatures). b) Update status of HSE Case Change Approval Form in the HSE Case MOC Register including Date Agreed. c) If applicable, update FIM to record any changes that affect any open items still under review (e.g. Change to HSE Case Remedial Action Plan). Step 7: Publish Change(s) a) Make change(s) to HSE Case. b) Publish HSE Case on Livelink / issue to document copy holders. c) Update status of Update status of HSE Case Change Approval Form in the Change Register including Date Completed. HSE Case MOC Register
Ref. Description Significant change? Yes/No Yes FCP No. (if applicable) n/a Date raised 01/01/2008 Date agreed 01/01/2008 Date completed 01/10/2008
GD/2008/01
Revision of Yibal HSE Case to address internal / external audit findings and issues raised at workforce reviews. Structure and content changed to reflect PDO adoption of EP20050310-ST. Yibal team involved in engagement workshops, bow tie review workshops, ALARP workshops, and roll out sessions
Page 82
Printed 25/09/13
Appendix 12
CCPS RBPS Process Safety Elements
The AI-PSM process within PDO identifies 20 elements from the Centre for Chemical Process Safety Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety (CCPS RBPS) which describes minimum expected standards and stipulates the requirements for a range of process related activities ranging from organisational culture, workforce involvement, risk management, HEMP and audit through to design.
ELEMEN T NUMBER
AI-PSM ASSURANCE ELEMENT
ELEMENT AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
Process Culture Compliance Standards
Safety
with
Corporate Process Safety Competency
Workforce Involvement
Stakeholder Outreach Process Knowledge Management
Hazards and Effects Management Process (HEMP)
Operating Procedures
Permit to Work
To establish and reinforce high standards of process safety performance through the organisational norms for employee and contractor values and behaviours at all levels in the organisation. To ensure that the facility conforms to the applicable standards, codes and regulations so that the facility operates in a safe and legal fashion. A key aspect of demonstrating commitment to process safety, the process safety competency element is about developing, sustaining and enhancing organisational competency. This is different to individual competency assurance (which is covered in element 12). The key concern here is the concept of the learning or transformational organisation Personnel at all levels of the organisation should have roles, responsibilities and opportunities to effectively contribute to process safety programmes. This element ensures that a system is developed for enabling the participation of operators, technicians and contractors in the development and implementation of process safety activities through employee participation To ensure that internal and external stakeholders to the organisation are identified, and that their information needs are understood and adequately met. To enable risk assessment and risk-based process safety. Understanding process risk depends on having accurate process knowledge, and without an understanding of process risk, process safety can never be assured. To enable risk assessment and risk-based process safety. Understanding process risk depends on correctly and completely identifying the hazards associated with the operation, and accurately assessing the risks posed by those hazards. Without an understanding of process risk, process safety can never be assured. A consistent high level of human performance is essential for a successful process safety programme. Up to date clear operating procedures assure that the intended and proven methods and techniques are applied consistently. To ensure that the risks associated with non-routine work are managed in a systematic way through the application of a permit-to-work system and operations / maintenance procedures (which are described in the previous element)
Page 83
Printed 25/09/13

ELEMEN T NUMBER
AI-PSM ASSURANCE ELEMENT
ELEMENT AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
10
Technical Integrity
11
Contractor Management
12
Training Performance Assurance
and
13
Management Change
of
14
Operational Readiness
15 16
Conduct Operations Emergency Management Incident Investigation
of
17
18
Measurement Metrics Auditing Management Review Continuous Improvement
and
19
To ensure that equipment is properly designed, fabricated, installed and maintained in accordance with recognised standards and codes, and that it fulfils its design intent and remains fit for purpose until removed from operation To ensure that contracted services do not add to or increase process safety risk by ensuring familiarity with process safety risks and a formalised process to manage contractor activities from a process safety (as well as commercial) point-of-view. A consistent high level of human performance is essential for a successful process safety programme. Training and performance assurance provides confidence and demonstration that work tasks will be consistently completed to the required standard, and that personnel have the knowledge and ability to respond appropriately to non-routine situations. To ensure that changes made to plant equipment or technology, or to the Organisation operating the equipment, do not result in the inadvertent introduction of new hazards and risks, or unknowingly increase the risk from existing hazards. To ensure that equipment is safe to start-up and operate, and that the activities necessary to ensure continued fitness for service have been put in place. It covers start up of new equipment, modified equipment and existing equipment restarting after a plant shutdown To create an organisation that demonstrates excellence in the performance of every task, and has zero tolerance for deviations. To reduce the consequences of a major accident and to save lives, protect property and the environment. To learn from incidents and near misses and to prevent them from recurring. Identifying and correcting systemic incident causes will not only help prevent a repeat of that incident but by strengthening the AI-PSM management system can prevent other incidents. To provide a means for near-real-time monitoring of the performance of the AI-PSM system, and so indicate whether process risk is being managed as low as reasonably practicable and in line with company criteria for tolerable risk. To reduce risk by systematically and pro-actively identifying strengths and weaknesses in the implementation of AI-PSM. To ensure that the defined AI-PSM activities produce the desired results throughout the facility lifecycle.
20
and
Page 84
Printed 25/09/13

SP-2062 - HSE Specification Specifications For HSE Cases

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

SP-2062 - HSE Specification Specifications For HSE Cases

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Petroleum Development Oman LLC

Revision: 1.0 Effective: Mar-11

Petroleum Development Oman L.L.C.

Technical Safety Engineering

MSE/4 Head of Technical Safety Engineering

SP-2062 Specification for HSE Cases

Petroleum Development Oman LLC

Revision: 1.0 Effective: Mar-11

SP-2062 Specification for HSE Cases

Petroleum Development Oman LLC

Revision: 1.0 Effective: Mar-11

SP-2062 Specification for HSE Cases

Petroleum Development Oman LLC

Revision: 1.0 Effective: Mar-11

Version No. Draft

Author Karen McConnachie

Scope / Remarks New document

iii Related Business Processes

iv Related Corporate Management Frame Work (CMF) Documents

SP-2062 Specification for HSE Cases

Petroleum Development Oman LLC

Revision: 1.0 Effective: Mar-11

3.1.1 3.1.2 3.1.3 3.1.4 3.1.5 3.2

3.2.1 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6

HEMP ................................................................................................................................... 20 5.1 Hazards and Effects Register ........................................................................................ 21

Petroleum Development Oman LLC

Revision: 1.0 Effective: Mar-11

Performance Standard Approval .................................................................. 29

Petroleum Development Oman LLC

Revision: 1.0 Effective: Mar-11

SP-2062 Specification for HSE Cases

Petroleum Development Oman LLC

Revision: 1.0 Effective: Mar-11

1.2 General Definitions

1.3 Review and Improvement (SP 2062)

1.4 Deviation from Standard

SP-2062 Specification for HSE Cases

Petroleum Development Oman LLC

Revision: 1.0 Effective: Mar-11

2 WHEN ARE HSE CASES REQUIRED?

0 health effect No damage 1 2 3 4 5

No effect Slight effect

No impact Slight impact

Minor effect Minor impact

Major effect major impact

SP-2062 Specification for HSE Cases

Petroleum Development Oman LLC

Revision: 1.0 Effective: Mar-11

SP-2062 Specification for HSE Cases

Petroleum Development Oman LLC

Revision: 1.0 Effective: Mar-11

3 WHAT TYPES OF HSE CASES ARE THERE?

3.1 Asset/Facility HSE Cases at different ORP phases

SP-2062 Specification for HSE Cases

Petroleum Development Oman LLC

Revision: 1.0 Effective: Mar-11

SP-2062 Specification for HSE Cases

Petroleum Development Oman LLC

Revision: 1.0 Effective: Mar-11

3.2 Roles and Responsibilities for the HSE Case

3.3 Roles and Responsibilities within the HSE Case

Design HSE Case

Operations HSE Case