Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Military Strategy Quotes
Military Strategy Quotes
Military Strategy Quotes
TheCADREDigestofAir
PowerOpinionsand
Thoughts
Compiledby
LtColCHARLESM.WESTENHOFF,USAF
AirpowerResearchInstitute
(TextscannedinbyAirWarCollege,NonresidentStudies)
AirUniversityPress
MaxwellAirForceBase,Alabama361125532
October1990
LibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationData
Westenhoff,CharlesM.
MilitaryAirPower:TheCADREDigestofAirPowerOpinionsand
Thoughts/compiledbyCharlesM.Westenhoff.
p.cm.
"October1990."
Includesbibliographicalreferences.
1.Airwarfare.2.Airpower.3.Militaryartandscience.
1.AirUniversity(US).CenterforAerospaceDoctrine,Research,and Education.
II.Title.
UG630.W3961990
358.4dc20 9045674
CIP
DISCLAIMER
ThispublicationwasproducedintheDepartmentofDefenseschoolenvironmentin
theinterestofacademicfreedomandtheadvancementofnationaldefenserelated
concepts.Theviewsexpressedinthispublicationarethoseoftheauthoranddo
notreflecttheofficialpolicyorpositionoftheDepartmentofDefenseortheUnited
Statesgovernment.
Thispublicationhasbeenreviewedbysecurityandpolicyreviewauthoritiesandis
clearedforpublicrelease.
ForSalebytheSuperintendentofDocuments
USGovernmentPrintingOffice
Washington,DC20402
Foreword
Thisisabookofquotationsandcommentsaboutairpower,war,andmilitary
matters.
But it would be a great mistake to simply read the quotes and take them
literally.Eachselectionpresentsapicturethatyoucanlookatagainandagain.
Taken together, different views of the same subject matter are like a drafter's
plans:theycanmakeeitheraninterestingmultipleviewdescriptionofthesubject
orapuzzle.
Evenahundredbookscouldn'tgiveacompletepictureofairpowerandwar.
Whatthisbookattemptstodoispresentamosaicabig,grainypictureofmilitary
airpowerthatgainsvalueasyoustepbackfromitandachieveperspective.And
likeamosaic,thispicturefillsinonlyasyoufiteachpiecewiththeothers.
Readerswhoarejustembarkingonaseriousstudyofthemilitaryprofession
willfindfoodforthoughthere;themoreadvancedstudentshouldfindafeast.You
are invited to read, reflect, enjoy, and appreciate, so you may apply your
understandingwhencalledtodoso.
DENNISM.DREW,Col,USAF
Director
AirpowerResearchInstitute
TheChallenge
Knowanduseallthecapabilitiesinyourairplane.Ifyoudon't,soonerorlater,
someguywhodoesusethemallwillkickyourass.
Dave("Preacher")Pace,quotedinRobertL.Shaw'sFighterCombat
Comparethisto:
Every art has its rules and maxims. One must study them: theory facilitates
practice. The lifetime of one man is not long enough to enable him to
acquireperfectknowledgeandexperience.Theoryhelpstosupplementit;it
providesayouthwithprematureexperienceandmakeshimskillfulalsothrough
the mistakes of others. In the profession of war the rules of the art are never
violatedwithoutdrawingpunishmentfromtheenemy,whoisdelightedtofindus
atfault.
FredericktheGreat
Frederickwaswritingforinfantrymenandfornationalmilitaryauthoritiesat
thesametime.Buthisprincipalideas willholdforthose whofly,support,and
commandtheaerospaceplane.Theselectionsinthisbookcompelmanyquestions
including:
Isaparticularlessonofwarequallyvalidatallscales,fromtheindividual
engagementtonationalpolicyandstrategy?
Whatcreatesuncertaintiesandfrictioninwar?Howbigorimportantarethey?
Arethererealconstantsinwar?
Whatdoesanypictureofwarlooklikefromanenemy'sviewpoint?Fromdifferent
levelsorscales?
INTRODUCTION
Orientation
MilitaryAirPowercontainsbriefstatementsonairpowerandwar.Becausethese
statementsareshort,theirfullmeaningisabsent.Thefulloriginaltextssupport,
qualify,andoftenmodifytheseshortselections.
WARNING
TheshortselectionsthatmakeupMilitaryAirPowerare
not intended to represent current doctrine or policy. In
fact,manywereincludedfortheirironyorbombast.
RegardlessofAirForceSpecialtyCode,wemustunderstandtheoverallpurposes
of military air power and then see how our individual duties support those
purposes.
ColKeithW.GeigerinAirpowerJournal,Fall1987
Hebelieved,first,thatsupervisorsandassociatesmustrecognizetheimportanceof
eachman'sjobortask,aswellasofthemanhimself.
HarryR.BorowskionGenCurtisE.LeMay'sprinciplesofleadership
OnBrevity
AsoneveteranIsraelipilotsaidaftertheJune1982aircampaignoverLebanonin
responsetoAmericanquestionsabouthowmuchdoctrinetheIsraeliAirForcehad
writtendown,"Yes,wehavebooks.Buttheyareverythin."
BarryD.WattsandJames0.HaleinAirUniversityReview,1984
WARNING
Itisagoodthingforanuneducatedmantoreadbooksof
quotations.
SirWinstonChurchill
TheChecklistisnotasubstituteforthefulltextofthe
FlightManual.
StanEval("famousaviator")
Anotherproblemisthatshortstatementsbecomeslogans,whichareeasytorepeat
andmaygainahypnoticquality.
Adherencetodogmashasdestroyedmorearmiesandcostmorebattlesthan
anythinginwar.
J.F.C.Fuller
AboutFredericktheGreatandBrevity
SirCharlesNapierwrotehisbrotherfromthefield:
I have found Frederick of Prussia's Instructions very useful. I cannot tell how,
exceptthattheyarepractical...andtheyareinonelittlevolume,whereasIhave
tohuntthroughyoursixvolumes,andNapoleon'snine,whicharethereforeuseless
tome;forIcannotcarrythem,andwouldnothavetimetohuntoutpassages....
Jominiistoovoluminous,theArchdukeCharlesisbetter,butnotaltogetherwhatI
wantandmean;Fredistheman.
QuotedbyJayLuvaasinFredericktheGreatontheArtofWar
Itwouldfurtherhumanknowledgeif,insteadofwritingnewbooks,wewouldapply
ourselvestomakingdecentextractsfromthosethatarealreadyinexistence.Then
onewouldhopetoavoidwastinghistimebyreading.
FredericktheGreat
CAUTION
FredericktheGreat'swritingsfillthirtybooks.
NOTE:ThemostpertinentofFrederick'sbooksishisInstructionstoHisGenerals.
FrederickisfullofpracticaladvicethatechoestheideasofSunTzu,Clausewitz,
andtwentiethcenturyairmen.NapierwasreferringtoFrederick's Instructionsto
HisGeneralsintheletterabove.
Assumptions
Amodern,autonomous,andthoroughlytrainedAirForceinbeingatalltimeswill
notalonebesufficient,butwithoutittherecanbenonationalsecurity.
H.H.("Hap")Arnold
Knowledgeispower.
FrancisBacon
Fortunefavorsthepreparedmind.
LouisPasteur
In other words, the more Air Force professionals share a common baseline of
knowledgeabouttheprofessionofwar,andthebetterthatbaselineis,themorewe
canworkeffectivelytoachievecommonobjectiveswithoutwastedeffort.
Purpose
Warisnotanaffairofchance.Agreatdealofknowledge,study,andmeditationis
necessarytoconductitwell.
FredericktheGreat
Nostudyispossibleonthebattlefield.
FerdinandFoch
Manycommandinggeneralsspendtheirtimeonthedayofbattleinmakingtheir
troopsmarchinastraightline,inseeingthattheykeeptheirproperdistances,in
answering questions which their aides de camp come to ask, in sending them
hither and thither, and in running about themselves. In short, they try to do
everythingand,asaresult,donothing.Howdoesthishappen?Itisbecausevery
fewmenoccupythemselveswiththehigherproblemsofwar.Theypasstheirlives
drillingtroopsand[cometo]believethatthisistheonlybranchofthemilitaryart.
When they arrive at the command of armies they are totally ignorant, and, in
defaultofknowingwhatshouldbedone,theydoonlywhattheyknow.
MauricedeSaxe
WarisamatterofvitalimportancetotheState,theprovinceoflifeordeath,the
roadtosurvivalorruin.Itisthereforemandatorythatitbethoroughlystudied.
SunTzu
Whenblowsareplanned,whoevercontrivesthemwiththegreatestappreciationof
theirconsequenceswillhaveagreatadvantage.
FredericktheGreat
Scope
Themilitarystudentdoesnotseektolearnfromhistorytheminutiaeofmethod
andtechnique.Ineveryagetheseareinfluencedbythecharacteristicsofweapons
currently available and the means at hand for maneuvering, supplying, and
controlling combat forces. But research does bring to light those fundamental
principles, and their combinations and applications, which, in the past, have
producedsuccess.
DouglasMacArthur
Officersnolongerlookuponhistoryasakindofdustheap....Theygotoitasa
mineofexperiencewherealonethegoldistobefound,fromwhichrightdoctrine
thesoulofwarcanbebuiltup.
JulianCorbett
Awisemanlearnsfromhisexperience;awisermanlearnsfromtheexperienceof
others.
Confucius
Itisrighttobetaught,evenbyanenemy.
Ovid
Thereisonlyonemethodoffittingourintellectstobereadyforwar,andthatisby
studyingthehistoryofairwarfare,andbynomeansshouldweneglectnavaland
landwarfare.
"SquadronLeader"
NOTE:"SquadronLeader"wasthepennameoftheauthorofBasicPrinciplesof
AirWarfare,a1927classicwiththesubtitleTheInfluenceofAirPoweronSeaand
LandStrategy.
SelectionofMaterials
ReadnottheTimes;readtheEternities.
HenryDavidThoreau
AsanationwewerenotpreparedforWorldWarII.Yes,wewonthewar,butata
terrificcostinlives,humansuffering,andmaterial,andattimesthemarginwas
narrow.Historyalonecanrevealhowmanyturningpointstherewere,howmany
timeswewerenearlosing,andhowourenemies'mistakesoftenpulledusthrough.
Intheflushofvictory,someliketoforgettheseunpalatabletruths.
"Hap"Arnold
Historyisnotkindtonationsthatgotosleep.PearlHarborwokeusupandwe
managedtowin,althoughwearealreadyforgettingthedarkdayswhenvictory
wasuncertain,whenitlookedasthoughthescalesmightbetippedtheotherway.
GeorgeC.Kenney,1950
While mankind's oldest histories are of wars, air power has added a
significantlydifferentelementtotheconductofwarinthiscentury.Thelargestuse
ofairpowerinwar,anditsmostvariedandcomplicatedapplication,occurredin
WorldWarII.Thepressureofsignificantenemysuccessesforcedaircommandersto
discardprewardogma,freeingairoperationsfromtheirprewarsubordinatestatus,
andforgingflexible,capableairforces.WorldWarIIwasfoughtagainststrong,
wellledandwellequippedairforces,anditiswelldocumented.Inevitably,this
volumeleansheavilyonWorldWarIIsources.
AirPower
AirPowerTheories..........................................................................17
TheNatureofAirPower...............................................................20
ElementsofAirPower....................................................................23
"Complete"UsesofAirPower.......................................................25
GeneralArnold'sFundamentalPrinciplesofAirPower.............28
ObjectivesofAirPowerEmployment...........................................31
EconomicandPoliticalObjectives.................................................32
PsychologicalEffects......................................................................35
ControloftheAir............................................................................38
AirPowerandManeuver...............................................................41
LordTedder'sPrinciplesofAirWarfare.......................................43
InterdictionandAttrition..............................................................46
Persistence......................................................................................50
AirPowerProphecy:ItsHazards.................................................51
AIRPOWER
Wehavetheenemysurrounded.Weareduginandhaveoverwhelmingnumbers.
Butenemyairpowerismaulingusbadly.Wewillhavetowithdraw.
Japaneseinfantrycommander,situationreporttoheadquarters,Burma,
WorldWarII.
AirPowerTheories
GeneralSpaatzhada"complete"viewofairpower,freeofartificialconstraints,
mandatoryprescriptions,orabsolutes.Allusefulideasfromthemanytheoristsof
thedifferingschoolscontributetoapragmatic,unfettered,and"complete"viewor
theoryofairpower.
Ifweshouldhavetofight,weshouldbepreparedtodosofromtheneckupinstead
offromtheneckdown.
JimmyDoolittle
Airpowerisindivisible.Ifyousplititupintocompartments,youmerelypullitto
piecesanddestroyitsgreatestassetitsflexibility.
FieldMarshalBernardMontgomery
Airpoweristheabilitytodosomethingintheair.
BillyMitchell
Airpowerislikepoker.Asecondbesthandislikenoneatallitwillcostyoudough
andwinyounothing.
GeorgeKenney
AirpoweralonedoesnotguaranteeAmerica'ssecurity,butIbelieveitbestexploits
thenation'sgreatestasset
ourtechnicalskill.
HoytS.Vandenberg
ItmaybesaidthatDouhetwasthetheoristofairpower,Mitchellthepublicistand
catalyticagent,andTrenchardtheorganizationalgenius.
HarryH.Ransom
TheNatureofAirPower
Oncethecommandoftheairisobtainedbyoneofthecontendingarmies,thewar
mustbecomeaconflictbetweenaseeinghostandonethatisblind.
H.G.Wells
Intheairalldirectionsleadeverywhere.
H.G.Wells
NeithertheArmynortheNavyisofanyprotection,orofverylittleprotection,
againstaerialraids.
AlexanderGrahamBell
The first important difference between air forces and armies is that, within his
tactical range, the airman is independent of lines of communication and has no
flanks.Theonlyotherimportantdifferencebetweenarmiesandairforcesisthatan
airforceisnotcommittedtoanyonecourseofaction.
J.C.Slessor
Because of its independence of surface limitations and its superior speed the
airplaneistheoffensiveweaponparexcellence.
GiulioDouhet
Themeasureofairpoweristheabilityofanationtoexploitairspaceforitsown
purposesandinwartimetodenyittoanenemy.
AdmArthurRadford
Assumptionsregardingbasicfeaturesofwarinthemediumofairspaceare:the
primacyofairsuperiority;theunityofairpower;criteriafortheselectionoftargets
forattack;thefactorsofrange,basevulnerability,andselectionoffirepower;the
crucialrelationshipbetweenoffenseanddefense;andairforcesasadeterrentto
enemyinitiative.
EugeneM.Emme
Airpowercaneitherparalyzetheenemy'smilitaryactionorcompelhimtodevote
tothedefenseofhisbasesandcommunicationsashareofhisstraitenedresources
fargreaterthanwhatweneedintheattack.
WinstonChurchill
Aerialforcesmenacealltheterritorycomprisedintheirradiusofaction.Theycan
setofffromdifferentpointsandarrive"enmasse"onachosenpoint.Theylend
themselvestotheoffensivebecausetheyleavetheadversary,untilthelastmoment,
inuncertaintyastotheirobjective.
A.Vauthier,paraphraseofDouhet
Theairoceananditsendlessouterspaceextensionareoneandindivisible,and
shouldbecontrolledbyasinglehomogeneousforce.
AlexanderP.deSeversky
The very flexibility of air forces makes true cooperation essential. Air forces, at
shortnotice,canbeswitchedfromonesortoftargettoanotherand,withinlimits,
fromonetypeofoperationtoaquitedifferenttype.Thereis,therefore,aconstant
temptationtousethempiecemealtomeetanimmediaterequirement,ratherthan
tousethemonalongtermjointplan,andtoutilizetheirflexibilityinthemethodof
achievingaconsistentaimwhichisanintegralpartofourgovernment'spolicyand
ofourstrategytoimplementthatpolicy.
J.C.Slessor
Everysoldiergenerallythinksonlyasfarastheradiusofactionofhisbranchofthe
serviceandonlyasquicklyashecanmovewithhisweapons.
LuftwaffeGenKarlKoller
Ifwelosethewarintheairwelosethewarandloseitquickly.
FieldMarshalMontgomery
ElementsofAirPower
Airpoweristhetotalaviationactivitycivilianandmilitary,commercialand
private,potentialaswellasexisting.
"Hap"Arnold
Theairpowerofanationiswhatitactuallyhastoday.Thatwhichithasonthe
draftingboardcannotbecomeitsairpoweruntilfiveyearsfromnow.
FrankM.Andrews
Ihaveflowninjustabouteverything,withallkindsofpilotsinallpartsofthe
worldBritish,French,Pakistani,Iranian,Japanese,Chineseandtherewasn'ta
dime'sworthofdifferencebetweenanyofthemexceptforoneunchanging,certain
fact:thebest,mostskillfulpilothadthemostexperience.
CharlesE.("Chuck")Yeager
Whycan'ttheybuyjustoneairplaneandtaketurnsflyingit?
CalvinCoolidge
Airpowerisacomplexofatleastfifteendifferentelements,eachofwhichmustbe
consideredindispensable.Therelativeimportanceofeachmustbevariable,yetthe
absenceofanyonemustendangercontroloftheairorpreventitsexploitation....
Thefifteenelementsare:
Rawmaterialsandfuel
Industrialpotential,toolreserves,andhighrateoftechnologicalprogress
Basesandprotectiveforces
CommunicationsandElectronics
Logisticsandsupplies
Auxiliaryservices
Airborneforces
Guidedmissilesandatomicweapons
Aircraft
Manpower
Training
Morale
Intelligence
ResearchandInventiveness
TacticsStrategyPlanning
StefanT.Possony
"Complete"UsesofAirPower
[WorldWarII]showedbeyondallcavilthatairpower,especiallywhenappliedas
widelyandinasmanydirectionsastheUnitedStatescould[applyit],dominated
surfacewarfare.
DavidMacIsaac
Therewasnolineofcleavagebetweenstrategicandtacticalairforces.Itwasover
alleffort,unitingalltypesofaircraft,coordinatedformaximumimpact.
'Tooey''Spaatz
ThefourprinciplesofairpowerthatIsetoutwere:
1. Toobtainmasteryoftheair,andtokeepit,whichmeanscontinuallyfightingfor
it.
2. Todestroytheenemy'smeansofproductionandhiscommunicationsbystrategic
bombing.
3. Tomaintainthebattlewithoutanyinterferencebytheenemy.
4. Topreventtheenemybeingabletomaintainthebattle.
AirMarshalHughTrenchard
Oncerealmasteryoftheairwasobtained,allsortsofenterpriseswouldbecome
easy.Allkindsofaeroplanescouldcomeintoplay.
WinstonChurchill
AirpowerhadamightyvindicationinWorldWarII.ButitwasMitchell's
conceptionofitanythingthatfliesratherthanDouhet'sthatwasvindicated.
BernardBrodie
ThesingleclearlessonofWorldWarIIwasthatthevisionarieswerecorrectthat
allfuturewarfarewouldbedominatedfromtheair.Theyagreedonthat.Whatthey
arguedaboutwasjusthowairpowerwoulddominatesurfacewarfare.
DavidMacIsaac
Itwasnotappreciated,andhasscarcelybeenappreciatedtoday,thatthefighting
powerofanarmyistheproductandnotthesumofthearmscomposingit.
J.F.C.Fuller
A nation may have every other element of air power but still lag behind if its
government hasnorealurgetoinsureitsfuturedevelopment.Theattitudeand
actions of government will fully determine the size of our military air
establishment,andgreatlyaffecttheefficiencyofourcivilairestablishment,our
aeronauticalindustryandfacilitieshenceourairpowerinbeing.
JohnC.Cooper
GENERALARNOLD'SFUNDAMENTALPRINCIPLES
OFAIRPOWER
Throughout the war, l tried to have the Air Force operate under
certainfundamentalprinciples:
1.ThemainjoboftheAirForceisbombardment:largeformations
ofbombardmentplanesmusthittheenemybeforetheenemyhitsus.
Inshort,thebestdefenseisattack.
2.Ourplanesmustbeabletofunctionunderallclimaticconditions
fromtheNorthPoletotheSouthPole.
3.Daylightoperations,includingdaylightbombing,areessentialto
success, for it is the only way to get precision bombing. We must
operatewithaprecisionbombsightandbydaylightrealizingfullwell
thatwewillhavetocometoadecisivecombatwiththeenemyAir
Force.
4. We must have highly developed, highly trained crews working
togetherasateamonthegroundformaintenanceandintheairfor
combat.
5.InordertobringthewarhometoGermanyandJapan,anddeprive
themofthethingsthatareessentialfortheirwaroperations,wemust
carryourstrategicprecisionbombingtokeytargets,deepintheenemy
territory, such as airplane factories, oil refineries, steel mills,
aluminumplants,submarinepens,Navyyards,etc.
6.Inadditiontoourstrategicbombing,wemustcarryouttactical
operations in cooperation with ground troops. For that purpose we
must have fighters, dive bombers, and light bombers for attacking
enemyairfields,communicationscenters,motorconvoys,andtroops.
7. All types of bombing operations must be protected by fighter
airplanes.ThiswasprovedtobeessentialintheBattleofBritain,and
priortothatourownexerciseswithbombersandfightersindicated
thatbombersalonecouldnoteludemodernpursuit,nomatterhowfast
thebomberstraveled.
8.OurAirForcemustbereadyforcombinedoperationswithground
forces,andwiththeNavy.
9.Wemustmaintainourresearchanddevelopmentprogramsin
ordertohavethelatestequipmentitwaspossibletoget,assoonasit
waspossibletogetit.
10. Air power is not made up of airplanes alone. Air power is a
composite of airplanes, air crews, maintenance crews, air bases, air
supply, and sufficient replacements in both planes and crews to
maintainaconstantfightingstrength,regardlessofwhatlossesmay
be inflicted by the enemy. In addition to that, we must have the
backingofalargeaircraftindustryintheUnitedStatestoprovideall
kinds of equipment, and a large training establishment that can
furnishthepersonnelwhencalledupon.
______
Source:ExtractedfromGeneralArnold'sGlobalMission,29091.
ObjectivesofAirPowerEmployment
Theearlytheoristsexploredthewaysinwhichairpowercouldcontributetoor
decidetheoutcomeofwar.Thevarioustheoriesfocusedonpolitical,economic,and
psychologicalobjectives,ontheatermaneuver,andonneutralizingopposingairand
surfaceforces.
Objectivesvaryconsiderablyinwar,andthechoiceofthemdependschieflyupon
theaimsought,whetherthecommandoftheair,paralyzingtheenemy'sarmyand
navy, or shattering the morale of civilians behind the lines. This choice may
thereforebeguidedbyagreatmanyconsiderationsmilitary,political,social,and
psychological.
Douhet
EconomicandPoliticalObjectives
Differencesbetweenairpowertheoriesrevealculturaldifferences.Forexamplea
writerconcernedwithdefendingthenationfromairattackwilltendtounderstand
thecountry'svulnerabilitiesandexpectthesamevulnerabilitiestoapplyinanother
nationeventhoughdifferentculturesmaynotsharethesamepriorities.
The Strategic Theory postulates that airattack on internal enemy vitals can so
depletespecificindustrialandeconomicresources,andonoccasionthewilltoresist,
astomakeacontinuedresistancebytheenemyimpossible.
Toaccomplishthestrategicpurpose,itisnecessarytodestroyonlyasmall
portion of industry, probably not more than a fraction of the total required to
conductmodernwarfareonalargescale.
Itisconceivablethattherewillalwaysbeoneindustry,suchastheoilindustry
inGermany,sonecessarytoallphasesofthenationalwarmakingabilitythatits
destructionwouldbefataltothenation.
"Hap"Arnold
[InWorldWarI]airraidsonbothsidescausedinterruptionstoproductionand
transportationoutofallproportiontotheweightofbombsdropped.
EdwardMeadeEarle
Theflexibilitywhichtherangeofaircraftgivestoairforcespermitsconcentrated
effortagainstaparticulartargetsystemorcomplexwithoutneedforconcentration
againstaparticulartargetofthesystem;hencetheenemyisunabletokeephis
defensesinonegeographicalarea.
AirUniversityManual1,1951
Amodernstateissuchacomplexandinterdependentfabricthatitoffersatarget
highlysensitivetoasuddenandoverwhelmingblowfromtheair.
B.H.LiddellHart
Targetsystemsforairattackmaybebroadlydividedintotwoclasses:pointtargets
andcommondenominators.
1.Keypointsarevulnerablepartsoftheindustrialormilitarystructure,the
destructionofwhichmightwreckthewhole.
2.Commondenominatortargets...railways,canals,powerplants,ironand
steelplants,oil:probablydispersedgeographically,butdestructionofwhichwould
collectivelyaffectthewholewareffort.
AirChiefMarshalSirArthurTedder
Strategic air assault is wasted if it is dissipated piecemeal in sporadic attacks
betweenwhichtheenemyhasanopportunitytoreadjustdefensesorrecuperate.
"Hap"Arnold
The advocates of allout airpower maintain that area destruction and mass
annihilationcaneffectivelydestroythewarpotentialoftheadversaryandlowerhis
strengthandwilltocontinuethestruggle.Itshouldberemembered,however,that
theobjectiveofwaristheexerciseofeffectivecontroloverthepoliticaleliteofthe
statetoenforceapoliticaldecision.
S.T.Das
PsychologicalEffects
Airpowerhashadenormouspsychologicalimpactonthebattlefieldandhasbeen
particularly influential when first introduced. In a war that is primarily
psychological, air power objectives can be selected for maximum impact on a
particulargroupofpeople.
Airpoweris,aboveall,apsychologicalweaponandonlyshortsightedsoldiers,too
battleminded,underratetheimportanceofpsychologicalfactorsinwar.
LiddellHart
Astherewasnodefence,thetwoairshipshoveredlowoverthecity,andonecould
seethegleamoflighteachtimeatrapdooropenedtodropabomb.Themoraleffect
ofthatundisturbedattackwassogreatthateverytimethesirenssounded,inthe
weeksthatfollowed,thousandsofthepopulationstreamedoutintothesurrounding
countryside.
PersonalaccountofaZeppelinraidbyLiddellHart
Everyreliablereportfromthosecapitalstellsofthemountingfearthatseizedupon
thepopulation:thefearofbeingbombedfromtheair.Thefearoftheunknownis
ever more potent than the fear of a known thing which may be weighed and
measuredandresolutelyfaced.
GeorgeFieldingEliot
Lossofhope,ratherthanlossoflife,isthefactorthatreallydecideswars,battles,
andeventhesmallestcombats.Thealltimeexperienceofwarfareshowsthatwhen
menreachthepointwheretheysee,orfeel,thatfurthereffortandsacrificecando
nomorethandelaytheend,theycommonlylosethewilltospinitoutandbowto
theinevitable.
LiddellHart
[DuringtheSpanishCivilWar]boththeFascistsandRepublicanswerefightingfor
control of the country and, as a result, the destruction of cities and production
facilitiesbyeitherbelligerentwouldhaveproducedfortheattackeranimmediate
advantageandasubsequentliabilityintheeventofvictorydirectlyproportionalto
thesuccessoftheattack.
"Tooey"Spaatz
ControloftheAir
Withoutareasonabledegreeofairsuperiority,noairforcecaneffectivelyassist
landorseaforcesorstrikeattheenemy'swarpotential.
LordTedder
ThemajorthesisheldbyTrenchardandMitchell,aswellasSeversky,wasthat
commandoftheairisoffirstprioritytoanymilitarysuccessinwar.
Dale0.Smith
Aircontrolcanbeestablishedbysuperiorityinnumbers,bybetteremployment,by
betterequipment,orbyacombinationofthesefactors.
"Tooey"Spaatz
Afterall,thegreatdefenceagainstaerialmenaceistoattacktheenemy'saircraft
asnearaspossibletotheirpointofdeparture.
WinstonChurchill,memoof5September1914, proposingacombined
offensiveanddefensivecounteraircampaign
After Big Week, Spaatz, who commanded the United States strategic air forces,
sensedthatairsuperiorityhadbeenwrenchedfromtheenemy.Inthespaceofsix
days,massiveanddeeppenetrationshadbeenmadetofifteenlargeindustrialareas
bysomesixthousandbombers.Alliedlosseswerefarlessthanhadbeenexpected,
amountingtoaboutsixpercentforthesixdaybattle.Asaconsequence,Allied
moralesoaredwhileenemymoraleplummeted.
Dale0.Smith
Thefirstandabsoluterequirementofstrategicairpowerinthiswarwascontrolof
theairinordertocarryoutsustainedoperationswithoutprohibitivelosses.
"Tooey"Spaatz
Onegeneralinferencetobedrawnhasbeenthatintwentiethcenturywar,defeat
willalmostalwaysbeavoided(andoutrightvictorylikelygained)bythesidethat
hassecuredairsuperiority.Indeed,amorecomprehensiveperusalwouldprobably
showthatvirtuallytheonlyexceptionsconcerncounterinsurgencywarfare.
NevilleBrown
The future battle on the ground will bepreceded by battle in the air. This will
determine which of the contestants has to suffer operational and tactical
disadvantages and be forced throughout the battle into adopting compromise
solutions.
GermanGenErwinRommel
To use a fighter as a fighterbomber when the strength of the fighter arm is
inadequatetoachieveairsuperiorityisputtingthecartbeforethehorse.
AdolfGalland
AirPowerandManeuver
TheprimaryobjectiveofAlliedforcesintheSouthwestPacificistoadvanceourown
networkofairbasesdeepintotheJapaneseperimeter.
"Hap"Arnold
Movement is the essence of strategy. This is true even though strategy is not
confinedtothemilitaryart:theimplementationofeverypoliticaldecisionrequires
movement.Itmaybemessagesthatmove,ormen,ormoney,ormunitions.
StephenB.Jones
Airstrategybeginswithairplaneranges.Airplanerangesdeterminethelocationof
bases.Theproximitytothetargetofthebasesunderone'scontrolfixestheweight
andrhythmoftheattack.
"Tooey"Spaatz
TheAmericans,withminimumlosses,attackedandseizedarelativelyweakarea,
constructedairfields,andthenproceededtocutthesupplylinestotroopsinthat
area.TheJapaneseArmypreferreddirectassault,afterGermanfashion,butthe
Americansflowedintoourweakerpointsandsubmergedus,justaswaterseeksthe
weakestentrytosinkaship.Werespectedthistypeofstrategyforitsbrilliance
becauseitgainedthemostwhilelosingtheleast.
LtColMatsuichiIino,JapaneseEighthAreaArmy
Strangeasitmayseem,theAirForce,exceptintheair,istheleastmobileofallthe
Services.Asquadroncanreachitsdestinationinafewhours,butitsestablishment,
depots,fuel,spareparts,andworkshopstakemanyweeks,andevenmonths,to
develop.
WinstonChurchill
When the United States forces first landed in North Africa, there were nine
airdromesthatourplanescoulduse.Withinafewmonthstherewereahundred.
Mud,andlaterdust,weretheworstproblems.WiththeAxisontherun,airfields
werebuiltevenfaster.Onerequestwasreceivedtobuildseveralairfieldsinthe
Sbeitlasector;seventytwohourslater,allwereinuse.
"Hap"Arnold
Ihadocularproofoftheadvantagetobederivedfromsuchobservations....An
observerisdoubtlessmoreathiseaseinaclocktowerthaninafrailbasketfloating
inmidair,butsteeplesarenotalwaysathandinthevicinityofbattlefieldsand
theycannotbetransportedatpleasure.
HenriJomini
LORDTEDDER'SPRINCIPLESOFAIRWARFARE
InJune1942aftertheBritishvictoryatElAlamein,Air
MarshalLordTedderenunciatedteninviolablerulesofairpower.
TheseprinciplesbecamethefoundationuponwhichAlliedtactical
airdoctrinewouldevolveattheCasablancaConferenceinJanuary
1943.Thesetenprincipleswere
1.Airpowermustbeindependentoflandandseaforces.
2.TheArmyHeadquartersinthefieldandtheAirHeadquarters
mustbeadjacenttoeachother.Thiscloseproximitywillfacilitate
communicationandcooperationbetweenthetwoservices.
3.Everynighttheairandgroundcommandersmustholdajoint
staffmeetingtohashoverproblemsanddecidetomorrow'sprogram.
Theclose airsupport and airinterdictioncampaigns canthen be
integrated into the ground commander's overall concept of
operations.
4.Radar is very important to air and land forces. It should be
locatedonairfieldssothatfighterswillnotbecaughtontheground
anddestroyedbyasurpriseenemyattack.
5.Thefighterplaneisthebasicweaponofanairforce.Itshould
beusedforthefollowingmissionsinthispriority:
a.Fightersweepstocleartheenemyoutofthesky.
b.Escortforlightandmediumbombers.
c.Interceptionofenemyaircraft.
d.AsafighterbombertoprovideCASforgroundforces.
6. Always assure quick communications between the Air
Headquarters and the Unit Commander. Air power is based on
beingattherightspotatthepropertimetodestroytheenemyair
andlandforces.Quickcommunicationsareessentialtothisflexible
responsebyaircraft.
7.TheentireairforceshouldbecommandedfromanAdvanced
Headquarterslocatedclosetothefrontlines.
8. Air power must have a simplified chain of command.
Commanders should restrict the number of people who report to
them.Thesemenshouldbedirectlyresponsibleforairoperations.
DuringtheNorthAfricancampaigns,LordTedderhadonlysixmen
reportdirectlytohim.Thiswayhismindwasnotbotheredbytrivial
matters. These responsibilities he delegated to his key staff
members.
9.Intelligenceisveryimportanttoanairorgroundcampaign.He
hadtohavetheinformationcominginconstantly,rightwherehe
couldseeit.HisIntelligenceandOperationsofficerssatatadjoining
desksandsharedphonelinestotheunits.SincetheA2andA3sat
sidebyside,LordTeddercouldwalkinandgetanyinformationhe
wanted,rightonthespot.
10. Mobility is the key to successful air operations. He believed
unitsshouldbebrokendown,eventothesquadronlevel,ina50/50
ratioeachdividedintotwoparts,witheachpartselfmaintainingin
all departments. If independent operations were needed, he
employedaleapfrogtechnique.Thefirstelementwoulddeployto
thefront;whenthenextdeploymentoccurredthesecondunitwould
leap frog past the first unit to the front lines. The most forward
element would then become the command element to control the
battle.Healsobelievedthatunitsshouldbeabletomovewithin
fourhoursandshoulddeploytosupportitsoperationsinisolation
forthreetofourdays.
Theseprincipleswereincorporatedintothetraininganddoctrineof
eachNinthAirForceunitbyGeneralsBreretonandQuesada.The
BritishArmyandRoyalAirForcealsoincorporatedtheseideasinto
theirdoctrineafterElAlameinin1942.MuchoftheAlliedtactical
airforcesuccesssprangfromLordTedder'stencrucial airpower
principles.
InterdictionandAttrition
Airpowerhasconsistentlydemonstrateditsadvantagesinattackingsurface
forces at a time and place of choice. This has permitted disruption, attrition,
exhaustion,defeatindetail,demoralization,andoccasionallyannihilation.Equally
important,airpowerhascreatedconditionsthathelpedcooperatingsurfaceforcesto
fightbetter,magnifyingthepayofffortheoperationalinvestment,sotospeak.
Tohavecommandoftheairmeanstobeabletocutanenemy'sarmyandnavyoff
fromtheirbasesofoperationandnullifytheirchancesofwinningthewar.
Douhet
Itisinfrequentlyclaimedthatthemaintenanceofafavorablesituationintheairis
theprincipaltaskofbothbombersandfightersinthefield.Thisisdefinitelynotso.
Airsuperiorityisonlyameanstoanend.Theobjectofairsuperiorityisthecontrol
ofaircommunications,firstlyforourownuseandsecondlytodenyittotheenemy.
Andtheusewerequireisto"conductoperationsagainstanenemy";andthis,ina
landcampaign,meanstobreakdowntheresistanceoftheenemyarmy.
J.C.Slessor
Thegreatestsecretofwarandthemasterpieceofaskillfulgeneralistostarvehis
enemy.
FredericktheGreat
Theideathatsuperiorairpowercaninsomewaybeasubstituteforhardslogging
andprofessionalskillonthegroundisbeguilingbutillusory.Airsupportcanbeof
immense value to an army; it may sometimes be its salvation. But armies can
fightandnotonlydefensivelyinthefaceofalmosttotalairsuperiority.
J.C.Slessor
Forourairoffensivetoattainitsfulleffect,itisnecessarythatourgroundoffensive
shouldbeofacharactertothrowthegreatestpossiblestrainupontheenemy's
communications
WinstonChurchill,1917
Iftheenemyhasairsupremacyandmakesfulluseofit,thenone'sowncommandis
forcedtosufferthefollowinglimitationsanddisadvantages:
Byusinghisstrategicairforce,theenemycanstrangleone'ssupplies,especially
iftheyhavetobecarriedacrossthesea.
Theenemycanwagethebattleofattritionfromtheair.
Intensive exploitation by the enemy of his air superiority gives rise to far
reachingtacticallimitationsforone'sowncommand.
ErwinRommel
TheargumenthasbeenadvancedthattheAirForceshouldbeconcernedwithland
objectives,andtheNavywithobjectivesonandoverthewater.Thatdistinctionis
to deny the peculiar quality of the air medium, the third dimension. The air is
indivisible;itcoverslandandsea.
"Tooey"Spaatz
Controloftheairwasessentialtoeverymajormilitaryoperation.Controloftheair
allowedsurfacevesselstosailtheseasasfarasthatcontrolextended,evenwithin
range of enemy landbased airplanes. Control of the air permitted amphibious
landings at any point where that control could be assured. Control of the air
permittedcloseairsupporttogroundforces,theeffectivenessofwhichwasdecisive
whereverfullyemployed.Controloftheairoverlinesofcommunications[blocked
enemyinterdictionofthem]andpreservedthemtoourselves.Controloftheairover
theJapanesehomeislandspermittedthedestructionbylongrangebombersofsuch
of her industries and cities as we chose to attack. The first objective of all
commanders in the Pacific war, whether ground, sea or air, whether American,
AlliedorJapanese,wastoassurecontroloftheair.
OrvilA.Anderson
Theguidingprincipleofbombingactionsshouldbethis:theobjectivemustbe
destroyedcompletelyinoneattack,makingfurtherattackonthesametarget
unnecessary.
Douhet
Douhetexpressedanidealthathasrarelybeenpossible.
Airbattleisnotdecidedinafewgreatclashesbutoveralongperiodoftimewhen
attritionanddiscouragementeventuallycauseonesidetoavoidtheinvadingair
force.
Dale0.Smith
Thisprocessofimposingyourwillonanenemy,ofreducinghisabilitytoresistto
thebreakingpoint,israrelyinanywaragainstadeterminedfoeaquickorsimple
one. Against a tough foe, only the sustained application of military forces, not
sporadicandintermittentattack,iseffective.
HansonBaldwin
AirPowerProphecy:ItsHazards
Inordertoassureanadequatenationaldefense,itisnecessaryandsufficientto
beinapositionincaseofwartoconquerthecommandoftheair.
Douhet
Thebomberwillalwaysgetthrough.
StanleyBaldwin
Enginesofwarhavelongsincereachedtheirlimits,andIseenofurtherhopeofany
improvementintheart.
Frontinus,90A.D.
FewpeoplewhoknowtheworkofLangley,Lilienthal,Pilcher,MaximandChanute
butwillbeinclinedtobelievethatlongbeforetheyear2000A.D.,andveryprobably
before1950,asuccessfulaeroplanewillhavesoaredandcomehomesafeandsound.
H.G.Wells,1901
War
TheNatureofWar...................................................................................................55
ClausewitzonPolicyandWar................................................................................57
WarasArtandScience...........................................................................................59
TimeandSpace........................................................................................................62
Strategy.....................................................................................................................66
Deterrence................................................................................................................70
Friction!War'sResistantMedium..........................................................................75
OilsfortheFrictionofWar.....................................................................................77
UncertaintyandtheArtofCircumstances.............................................................80
TheNatureofWar
Wecangettoknowwarinthesamewaywecangettoknowthesurfaceofthe
earth:ifwarisconsideredasahugeexpanseofterrain,wecanseeonlysmallpieces
oftheterrainthroughpersonalexperience.Greatmilitarythinkerswhospenttheir
livesstudyingwaronlyprovideusmapsoftheterraintheycovered.Detailedmaps
ofspecificfeaturesforexample,aircombatcoveronlyportionsoftheterrain.The
broadmapsofwriterssuchasSunTzucanonlyshowuswar'sbigfeatures.It's
important,then,tokeepinmindthatwecanstudyothers'maps,buttheterrainof
wardefiesperfectrepresentation.
Fivegreatenemiestopeaceinhabitwithusavarice,ambition,envy,anger,and
pride.Ifthoseenemiesweretobebanished,weshouldinfalliblyenjoyperpetual
peace.
Petrarch
CAUTION
Itisapparentlynotpossibleforanotherrealwaramongthenationsof
Europetotakeplace.
DavidStarrJordan,1914
Weliveinaworldwhereemergenciesarealwayspossible,andoursurvivalmay
dependonourcapacitytomeetemergencies.Havingsaidthat,itisnecessaryalso
tosaythatemergencymeasureshowevergoodfortheemergencydonotmakegood
permanentpolicies.Emergencymeasuresarecostly,theyaresuperficial,andthey
implythattheenemyhastheinitiative.
JohnFosterDulles
Soldiersusuallyareclosestudentsoftactics,butrarelyaretheystudentsof
strategyandpracticallyneverofwar.
BernardBrodie
Warispartoftheintercourseofthehumanrace.
Waristheprovinceofdanger,andthereforecourageaboveallthingsisthefirst
qualityofthewarrior.
Waristheprovinceofphysicalexertionandsuffering.
Waristheprovinceofuncertainty.Waristheprovinceoffriction.
Wardemandsresolution,firmness,andstaunchness.
ChaptertitlestoErnestHemingway'sMenatWar,quotingClausewitz
ClausewitzonPolicyandWar
Nowthefirst,thegrandest,andmostdecisiveactofjudgmentwhichtheStatesman
andGeneralexercisesisrightlytounderstandinthisrespectthewarinwhichhe
engages,nottotakeitforsomething,orwishtomakeofitsomething,whichbythe
natureofitsrelationsitisimpossibleforittobe.
Theultimateobjectofourwars,thepoliticalone,isnotalwaysquiteasimpleone.
Thegreatpointistokeeptheoverrulingrelationsofbothpartiesinview.Outof
themacertaincenterofgravity,acenterofpowerandmovement,willformitself,
onwhichalldepends.
Truthaloneisbutaweakmotiveofactionwithmen,andhencethereisalwaysa
greatdifferencebetweenknowingandaction,betweenscienceandart.
Where no powerful motives press and drive, cabinets will not risk much in the
game. The more war becomes in this manner devitalized so much the more its
theorybecomesdestituteofthenecessaryfirmpivotsandbuttressesforreasoning.
Wherejudgmentbegins,thereartbegins.
Clausewitz
WarasArtandScience
Theterrainofwarisgenerallymappedusingoneoftwo"projections":thoseofart
andscience.Aswithothermaps,detailedstudyofbothprojectionsleadstomore
completeunderstandingoftheterrain.
Thescienceofwar(knowledge).
Theartofwar(applicationofknowledge).
WallaceP.FranzandHarryG.Summers,notesinArmyWarCollege,Artof
WarColloquiumText
Itisabsolutelytrueinwar,wereotherthingsequal,thatnumberswhethermen,
shells,bombs,etc.wouldbesupreme.Yetitisalsoabsolutelytruethatotherthings
areneverequalandcanneverbeequal.Thereisalwaysadifference,anditisthe
differenceswhichbybegging todiffersofrequentlythrowallcalculationstothe
winds.
J.F.C.Fuller
WarbelongsnottotheprovinceofArtsandSciences,buttotheprovinceofsocial
life.Itisaconflictofgreatinterests,whichissettledbybloodshed,andonlyinthat
isitdifferentfromothers.Itwouldbebetter,insteadofcomparingitwithanyArt,
tolikenittobusinesscompetition,whichisalsoaconflictofhumaninterestsand
activities;anditisstillmorelikeStatepolicy,which,again,canbelookeduponasa
kindofbusinesscompetitiononagreatscale.
Clausewitz
Allthenumerousapplicationsofphysics,chemistry,engineering,etc.,whichmake
upthemodernarsenalareinfactatthemercyofhumans,thesoldierswhouseor
directthem.
S.T.Das
Warandtruthhaveafundamentalincompatibility.Thedevotiontosecrecyinthe
interests of the military machine largely explains why, throughout history, its
operationscommonlyappearinretrospectthemostuncertainandleastefficientof
humanactivities.
LiddellHart
IfIalwaysappearprepared,itisbecausebeforeenteringonanundertaking,Ihave
meditatedforlongandhaveforeseenwhatmayoccur.Itisnotgeniuswhichreveals
to me suddenly and secretly what I should do in circumstances unexpected by
others;itisthoughtandpreparation.
Napoleon
Thereisnoothersciencewherejudgmentsaretestedinbloodandansweredinthe
servitudeofthedefeated,wheretheacknowledgedauthorityistheleaderwhohas
wonorwhoinstillsconfidencethathecanwin.
BernardBrodie
War,likemostthings,isasciencetobeacquiredandperfectedbydiligence,by
perseverance,bytime,andbypractice.
AlexanderHamilton
Inwar,situationsaretheproductsofmutuallyexclusiveandincompatiblewills.
Thus,theyarepracticallyalwaysfluid
S.B.Griffith
TimeandSpace
Timeisnecessarytobothbelligerents,...theonlyquestionis:whichofthetwo,
judgingbyhisposition,hasmostreasontoexpectspecialadvantagesfromtime?
Clausewitz
Whenyouengageinactualfighting,ifvictoryislongincoming,themen'sweapons
willgrowdullandtheirardourdampened.Again,ifthecampaignisprotractedthe
resourcesoftheStatewillnotbeequaltothestrain.Thus,thoughwehaveheardof
stupidhasteinwar,clevernesshasneverbeenassociatedwithlongdelays.Thereis
noinstanceofacountryhavingbenefittedfromprolongedwarfare.
SunTzu
Timeistheconditiontobewontodefeattheenemy.Timeranksfirstamongthe
threefactorsnecessaryforvictory,comingbeforeterrainandsupportofthepeople.
Onlywithtimecanwedefeattheenemy.
HoChiMinh
Spaceinwhichtomaneuverintheair,unlikefightingonlandorsea,ispractically
unlimited.
J.E.("Johnnie")Johnson
Attheoutsetofawar,timeisthesupremefactor.Donotletusforgetthatthe
aggressorisalsoconcernedwiththetimefactor;heisready,otherwisehewouldnot
haveprovokedarmedconflict;heinevitablyhopesandplansforaquickdecision,
sincenoonewouldwishforalongwarifitcouldbeavoided;moreoverhewantsa
decision before his opponent has had time to "turn his capacity into the new
activitieswhichwarcallsfor."
LordTedder
Gosir,gallop,anddon'tforgetthattheworldwasmadeinsixdays.Youcanaskme
foranythingyoulike,excepttime.
Napoleon
Agoodplanexecutednowisbetterthanaperfectplannextweek.
GeorgeS.Patton
Inpeacetime,differencesofopinionmaybeallowedtogobytheboardwithout
greatharmbeingdone....Inwarthecaseisdifferentchickensremorselesslyand
rapidlycomehometoroost,errorscanseldomberectified(theenemywillseeto
that)andmen'slivesareatstake.
FieldMarshalSirWilliamRobertson
Rapidityistheessenceofwar.
SunTzu
Thelastwarisnotmodern,itisoutofdate.
Atthesametimetherearefactorsthatdonotchange,oronlychangevery
slowly.Geographydoesnotchangethoughitseffectonmilitaryoperationsmaybe
modified by technical changes. Human nature does not change, and national
characteristicsandtemperamentschangebutslowly.Economicfactors,generally
speaking,changeslowly.
LordTedder
But there is one element in relation to the flying machine that we are not
producing,thatwecannotproduceinanemergency,andthatisthemen.Wecan
producemachinesbutnottheaviators.Thattakestime.
AlexanderGrahamBell
Strategyistheartofmakinguseoftimeandspace.Spacewecanrecover;losttime,
never.
Napoleon
He who can move twice as fast as his opponent doubles his operative time and
therebyhalvesthatofhisopponent.
J.F.C.Fuller
Timewashisconstantally;hecapitalizedeverymoment,neverponderedonit,and
therebyachievedhisendsbeforeothershadsettledontheirmeans.
J.F.C.FullerdescribingAlexandertheGreat
Strategy
Thecomplexitiesofwarcontinuetoincreasewithtechnicaldevelopments.Atthe
broadest levels of military thought, "ideal" solutions to military problems are
constrained by the realities of political checks and balances, alliances, popular
thought and feeling, and competing demands for resources. Detailed study of
strategyplansandalternativescreatestheabilitytoperceiveopportunitieswhere
othersseeonlyproblems.
Strategyistheemploymentofbattletogaintheendinwar;itmustthereforegive
anaimtothewholemilitaryaction,whichmustbeinaccordancewiththeobjectof
thewar;inotherwords,strategyformstheplanofthewar.
Clausewitz
Tactics are concerned with doing the job "right," higher levels of strategy are
concernedwithdoingthe"right"job.
DennisM.DrewandDonaldM.Snow
Whilethehorizonofstrategyisboundedbywar,grandstrategylooksbeyondthe
wartothesubsequentpeace.
LiddellHart
ThroughouthislifeAlexanderconsistentlysubordinatedstrategytopolicy,whichis
theessenceofgrandstrategy.
J.F.C.Fuller
Thestrategistishewhoalwayskeepstheobjectiveofthewarinsightandthe
objectiveofthewarisnevermilitaryandisalwayspolitical.
AlfredThayerMahan
Thetwinproblemsofmodernwarfare:
Howtopersuadetheadversarytocometotermswithoutinflictingonhimsuch
severedamageastoprejudiceallchancesofsubsequentstabilityandpeace?
Underwhatcircumstancescanarmedforcebeused,intheonlywayinwhichit
canbelegitimatetouseit,toensurealastingandstablepeace?
MichaelHoward
Thesoundeststrategyistopostponeoperationsuntilthemoraldisintegrationofthe
enemyrendersthedeliveryofthemortalblowbothpossibleandeasy.
VladimirI.Lenin
Trueeconomyofforceisusingtheindirectapproachtoeffectapsychologicaldefeat
withoutengaginginactualcombat.
LiddellHart
Inwarthevictoriousstrategistseeksbattleafterthevictoryhasbeenwon,whereas
hewhoisdestinedtodefeatfirstfightsandafterwardslookstovictory.
SunTzu
Wemustperceivethenecessityofeverywarbeinglookeduponasawholefromthe
veryoutset,andthatattheveryfirststepforwardthecommandershouldhavethe
endinviewtowhicheverylinemustconverge.
Clausewitz
InJapantherewasnothingthatcouldbecalledgrandormilitarystrategyuntila
shorttimebeforetheoutbreakofWorldWarII.Therewaslittlecorrelationbetween
hernationaldefensetheoryandthestrategicplansofthearmyandthenavy.In
[myopinionthis]eventuallyresultedinthecalamityofJapanenteringintoher
disastrouswar.
JapanesehistorianToshiyukiYokoi;itdeservesmentionthatJapan'sarmy
andnavalstrategieswerenotwellcoordinated
Generallyinwarthebestpolicyistotakeastateintact;toruinitisinferiortothis.
Tocapture the enemy's armyisbetter thantodestroy it.Tosubduethe enemy
withoutfightingistheacmeofskill.Thus,whatisofextremeimportanceinwaris
toattacktheenemy'sstrategy;nextbestistodisrupthisalliances,nextbestisto
attackhisforces.Theworstpolicyistoattackhiscities;dosoonlywhenthereisno
alternative.
SunTzu
Wherethestrategistisempoweredtoseekamilitarydecision,hisresponsibilityis
toseekitunderthemostadvantageouscircumstancesinordertoproducethemost
profitable result. Hence his true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a
strategicsituationsoadvantageousthatifitdoesnotofitselfproducethedecision,
itscontinuationbybattleissuretoachievethis.
LiddellHart
1. Hewillwinwhoknowswhentofightandwhennottofight.
2. Hewillwinwhoknowshowtohandlebothsuperiorandinferiorforces.
3. Hewillwinwhosearmyisanimatedbythesamespiritthroughoutalltheranks.
4. Hewillwinwho,preparedhimself,waitstotaketheenemyunprepared.
5. He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the
sovereign.
Victoryliesintheknowledgeofthesefivepoints.
SunTzu
Deterrence
Tobepreparedforwarisoneofthemosteffectualmeansofpreservingpeace.
GeorgeWashington
Theexpensesrequiredtopreventawararemuchlighterthanthosethatwill,ifnot
prevented.beabsolutelynecessarytomaintainit.
BenjaminFranklin
Ifanationvaluesanythingmorethanfreedom,itwilllosethatfreedom;andthe
ironyofitisthatifitiscomfortormoneythatitvaluesmore,itwilllosethat,too.
SomersetMaugham
Theresponsibilitiesofanofficerarequiteanalogoustothoseofapolicemanora
fireman.Thebetterheperformshisdailytask,thelessfrequentlydoeshehaveto
takedirectaction.
GeorgePatton
ThegreatlessontobelearnedinthebatteredtownsofEnglandandtheruined
citiesofGermanyisthatthebestwaytowinawaristopreventitfromoccurring.
Thatmustbetheultimateendtowhichourbesteffortsaredevoted.Ithasbeen
suggestedandwiselysothatthisobjectiveiswellservedbyinsuringthestrength
andsecurityoftheUnitedStates.TheUnitedStateswasfoundedandhassince
lived upon principles of tolerance, freedom, and goodwill at home and abroad.
Strengthbasedontheseprinciplesisnothreattoworldpeace.Preventionofwar
willnotcomefromneglectofstrengthorlackofforesightoralertnessonourpart.
Those who contemplate evil and aggression find encouragement in such neglect.
Hitlerreliedheavilyuponit.
USStrategicBombingSurvey,SummaryReport(Europe)
Ifwearelivinginaworldwhereeithersidecanmakeasurpriseattackuponthe
otherwhichdestroysthelatter'scapabilitytomakeameaningfulretaliation,thenit
makessensetobetriggerhappywithone'sstrategicairpower.Butif,ontheother
hand,thesituationissuchthatneithersidecanhopetoeliminatetheretaliatory
poweroftheother,thatrestraintwhichwassuicidalinonesituationnowbecomes
prudence,anditistriggerhappinessthatbecomessuicidal.
BernardBrodie
Americamustmaintainastateofreadinessfordefenseandcounterattack.Thisis
notjustforthesakeofbeingprepared.Ofequalorgreaterimportanceisthefact
thatthevisibilityofourpreparednesswilldeterattacksagainstus.
CurtisE.LeMay
Forcesthatcannotwinwillnotdeter.
NathanF.Twining
Theonlywaranationcanreallywinistheonethatneverstarts.
HoytVandenberg
Deterrenceisnotjustaircraftonalertandmissilesinthesilos.Itisnotdefinedby
thesizeofthedefensebudget.Itisaproductofbothcapabilityandcredibility.
JeromeF.O'Malley
Deterrence now means something as a strategic policy only when we are fairly
confident that theretaliatory instrument onwhich it relieswill not becalled to
functionatall.Nevertheless,thatinstrumenthastobemaintainedatahighpitch
ofefficiencyandreadinessandconstantlyimproved,whichcanbedoneonlyata
high cost to the community and great dedication on the part of the personnel
directlyinvolved.
BernardBrodie
WARNING
Anation,regardlessofitsprotestations,ifitfeelsthatits
national existence is threatened and that it is losing a
war,willturntoanyweaponthatitcanuse.
WalterBedellSmith
There will always be time enough to die; like a drowning man who will clutch
instinctivelyatastraw,itisthenaturallawofthemoralworldthatanationthat
findsitselfonthebrinkofanabysswilltrytosaveitselfbyanymeans.
Clausewitz
Whenyousurroundanarmy,leaveanoutletfree.Donotpressadesperatefoetoo
hard.
SunTzu
Friction,War'sResistantMedium
Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult. These
difficultiesaccumulateandproduceafrictionwhichnomancanimagineexactly
whohasnotseenwar.
Clausewitz
Ifonehasneverpersonallyexperiencedwar,onecannotunderstandinwhatthe
difficultiesconstantlymentionedreallyconsist,norwhyacommandershouldneed
anybrillianceandexceptionalability.
Clausewitz
Onlythestudyofmilitaryhistoryiscapableofgivingthosewhohavenoexperience
oftheirownaclearpictureofwhatIhavejustcalledthefrictionofthewhole
machine.
Clausewitz
Itisadoctrineofwarnottoassumetheenemywillnotcome,butrathertorelyon
one'sreadinesstomeethim;nottopresumethathewillnotattack,butratherto
makeone'sselfinvincible.
SunTzu
Thereisnosecurityonthisearth;thereisonlyopportunity.
DouglasMacArthur
Wariscomposedofnothingbutaccidents,andthoughholdingtogeneralprinciples,
ageneralshouldneverlosesightofeverythingtoenablehimtoprofitfromthese
accidents;thatisthemarkofgenius.
Napoleon
Waristherealmofuncertainty;threequartersofthefactorsonwhichactioninwar
is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and
discriminatingjudgmentiscalledfor:askilledintelligencetoscentoutthetruth.
Clausewitz
Clausewitzframedthenotionoffrictioninwarinchapter7,book1,ofOnWar.
Thisthreepagelongchapterisessentialreadingforanymilitaryprofessional.
OilsfortheFrictionofWar
Nowisthere,then,nokindofoilwhichiscapableofdiminishingthisfriction?Only
one,andthatoneisnotalwaysavailableatthewilloftheCommanderorhisArmy.
ItisthehabituationofanArmytoWar.
Clausewitz
Clausewitzcorrectedthenotionthathabituationwasthesoleremedyforthe
friction of war by prescribing leadership as a second remedy. Other remedies
include: understanding war's uncertainty, professional training, exercises that
include friction, war games and thought exercises, maintaining alternatives,
maintainingreserves,plansthatprovideroomforfrictionalresults,mentalagility,
organizational agility, clarity of purpose, judicious use of the initiative, and the
compoundlubricantsofmentalclarity,originality,discipline,anddoctrine.
Ifonecanincreasethefogandfrictionencounteredbytheenemy,themorelikelyit
is that the enemy will be defeated. Flexible plans with alternative objectives,
counterintelligence, disinformation deception, concealment, and campaigns to
disrupt theenemy...cannotonlyleadtoserious errors bytheenemyonthe
battlefield,butcanalsocauseconfusionanduncertaintythatlowersmorale,saps
aggressiveness,causestentativeness,andunderminesinitiative.
DennisDrewandDonaldSnow
Youwillusuallyfindthattheenemyhasthreecoursesopentohim,andofthesehe
willadoptthefourth.
Moltke,TheElder
Forwantofanail,theshoewaslost;
Forwantofashoe,thehorsewaslost;
Forwantofahorse,theriderwaslost;
Forwantofarider,thebattlewaslost.
BenjaminFranklin
Thetiniestdeviationsatthebeginningofamotioncanleadtohugedifferencesat
latertimesinotherwords,minisculecausescanproduceenormouseffectsaftera
certaintimeinterval.Ofcourseweknowfromeverydaylifethatthisisoccasionally
thecase;theinvestigationofdynamicalsystemshasshownusthatthisistypicalof
naturalprocesses.
GertEilenberger
Wars spring from unseen and generally insignificant causes, the first outbreak
beingoftenbutanexplosionofanger.
Thucydides
Inwar,importanteventsresultfromtrivialcauses.
JuliusCaesar
A battle sometimes decides everything; and sometimes the most trifling thing
decidesthefateofabattle.
Napoleon
Allactioninwarisdirectedonprobable,notcertain,results.Whateveriswanting
incertaintymustalwaysbelefttofate,orchance,callitwhichyouwill.Wemay
demandthatwhatissoleftshouldbeaslittleaspossible,butonlyinrelationtothe
particularcasethatis,aslittleaspossibleinthisonecase,butnotthatthecasein
which the least is left to chance is always to be preferred. That would be an
enormous error. There are cases in which the greatest daring is the greatest
wisdom.
Clausewitz
UncertaintyandtheArtofCircumstances
Themostimportantthingistohaveaflexibleapproach....Thetruthisnoone
knowsexactlywhatairfightingwillbelikeinthefuture.Wecan'tsayanythingwill
stayasitis,butwealsocan'tbesurethefuturewillconformtoparticulartheories,
whichsooften,betweenthewars,haveprovedwrong.
RobinOlds
Donotswallowabaitofferedbytheenemy.
SunTzu
Inhismanybattleshistacticalgeniusisapparentinthelightninglikespeedwith
whichheadaptedhisactionstonovelcircumstances.
J.F.C.FulleronAlexandertheGreat
Whetherornotairpower,despitebeingcastinanancillaryrole,shouldattemptto
pursueanindependentstrategyconformingtoitsownconceptionoftheneedofthe
forces it is supporting is a big question which ought to be left to specialists. It
involves theoldandmuchdebatedquestion ofclosesupport versus interdiction,
aboutwhichtherehasbeenmuchdoctrinaireargument.TheKoreanexperienceand
the campaigns of World War II suggest that the issue is affected most by the
circumstancesoftheoccasion.
BernardBrodie
Thecarryingoutofaplan,fromitsverybeginningtotheconclusionofanoperation,
is another process of knowing the situation; i.e., the process of putting it into
practice. In this process, there is need to examine anew whether the plan
correspondswiththeactualities.Iftheplandoesnotcorrespondordoesnotfully
correspond with them, then we must, according to fresh knowledge, form new
judgmentsandmakenewdecisionstomodifytheoriginalplaninordertomeetthe
newsituation.
MaoTsetung
Itisaboveallnecessarythatageneral shouldadoptaroleproportionatetohis
capacity, a plan that he feels himself able to follow out methodically amidst
dangers,surprise,friction,accidentsofallsorts.
JeanColin
Thetruthsofwarareabsolute,buttheprinciplesgoverningtheirapplicationhave
tobededucedoneachoccasionfromthecircumstances,whicharealwaysdifferent.
WinstonChurchill
One falls into a feeling of security by mental laziness and through lack of
calculationconcerningtheintentionsoftheenemy.
Toproceedproperlyitisnecessarytoputoneselfinhisplaceandsay:What
would I do if I were the enemy? What project would I form? Make as many as
possibleoftheseprojects,examinethemall,andaboveallreflectonthemeansto
avertthem.Butdonotletthesecalculationsmakeyoutimid.Circumspectionis
goodonlyuptoacertainpoint.
FredericktheGreat
Technology
Impact.......................................................................................................................85
EffectsofIntroducingTechnology.........................................................................89
CumulativeEffectsofTechnicalChanges..............................................................91
TechnologyandNumbers.......................................................................................93
ReactionstoTechnology.........................................................................................95
Impact
Victorysmilesuponthosewhoanticipatethechangesinthecharacterofwar,not
uponthosewhowaittoadaptthemselvesafterthechangesoccur.
Douhet
Yettherearedangersinallowingoneselftobecomemesmerizedbytechnological
promise.Itisoftenmucheasiertomaketechnologicaldecisionsthanitistomake
socialorpoliticaldecisions.
JonathanAlford
Itmaybesaidthatwarfarehasacquiredanewphasetechnologicalwar.Inthe
past,researchanddevelopment wereonly preparationforthefinalanddecisive
testingofnewsystemsinbattle.Todaythekindandqualityofsystemswhicha
nationdevelopscandecidethebattleinadvanceandmakethefinalconflictamere
formalityorcan
bypassconflictaltogether.
BernardSchriever
Inthedevelopmentofairpower,onehastolookaheadandnotbackwardandfigure
outwhatisgoingtohappen,nottoomuchwhathashappened.
BillyMitchell
Solongasthereremainsasubstantialperiod(oftenuptotenyears)betweenthe
inceptionofanewweaponsystemanditsdeployment,eventheverylatestweapons
areoutofdateintermsofwhattechnologycoulddeliver.
JonathanAlford
The first essential of the airpower necessary for our national security is
preeminenceinresearch.Theimaginationandinventivegeniusofourpeoplein
industry, inthe universities, in the armedservices, and throughout thenation
musthavefreeplay,incentive,andeveryencouragement.Americanairsuperiority
in this war has resulted in large measure from the mobilization and constant
applicationofourscientificresources.
"Hap"Arnold
Weshouldbaseoursecurityuponmilitaryformationswhichmakemaximumuseof
scienceandtechnologyinordertominimizenumbersofmen.
DwightD.Eisenhower
ThemostsignalcontributionmadebyAlfredThayerMahaninthefieldofmilitary
doctrine was his recognition that the conduct of war changes rapidly with
technological advance. Weapons, he said, advance faster than the tactics and
concepts of warfor employing those weapons. Thus military systems always lag
behindweaponcapabilities.
Dale0.Smith
Performancemeansinitiativethemostvaluablemoralandpracticalassetinany
formofwar.
SholtoDouglas
Anotherdebateconcernstheinteractionoftechnologyanddoctrine:Whichshould
beparamount?Shouldtechnologyservedoctrineandsoproduceweaponsthatfit
preconceptionsandprejudices?OrshouIddoctrinebeadaptedtomakebestuseof
whattechnologyhastooffer?
JonathanAlford
In England the great need in the earlier days of the war was for interceptors
designedformaximumclimb,maneuverabilityandspeed.Thesewereperfectfor
bringingdownGermanbombersoverEngland.Buthowdifferentisairwarin1943
when we are sending our bombers by the hundreds over Germany. The
requirementsarenowfocusedonthematteroflongerfightingrange.
"Hap"Arnold
New conditions require, for solutionand new weapons require, for maximum
applicationnewandimaginativemethods.Warsareneverwoninthepast.
DouglasMacArthur
Anairforceisalwaysvergingonobsolescenceand,intimeofpeace,itssizeand
replacement rate will always be inadequate to meet the full demands of war.
Militaryairpowershould,therefore,bemeasuredtoalargeextentbytheabilityof
theexistingairforcetoabsorbintimeofemergencytheincreaserequiredbywar
togetherwithnewideasandtechniques.
"HapArnold
Inmanyinstancestheinformationdisplayedforthecommander,whentracedback
toitsorigins,restsuponanassumption,anestimate,oranextrapolationofdata
derivedfromafieldtrialofsomeweaponoritemofequipment.Commanders,who
haveseldomparticipatedinderivingthealgorithmsbywhichtheinformationon
display before them was drawn, tend to accept the given data as reliable fact,
especiallywhenthedataarepresentedinnumericalform.Thesesoftlinksinthe
chainofremoteinputsarefatallyeasytooverlook.
I.B.Holley,Jr.
EffectsofIntroducingTechnology
Thedevelopmentofanewweaponisgenerallyhinderedbyakindofenthusiasm
that concentrates attention on maximum capabilities in performance. This
particularkindofviolationofthelawofdiminishingreturnincursthepenalties[of
two]mistakesprematureuseandfailuretoexploitinitialgains.
J.M.Cameron
Thebiastowardtheoffensivecreatesspecialproblemsinanytechnologicallynew
situationwherethereislittleornorelevantwarexperiencetohelponereacha
balancedjudgment.
BernardBrodie
Outofthe16,000V1slaunchedagainstEnglandandtheLowCountriesin19445,
nearly 7,000 were to be destroyed by fighters, antiaircraft guns, or barrage
balloons. Yet the first waves suffered only 2 per cent attrition. Within a week,
however,nearto50percentwasbeingregistered.Towardstheendoftheattacks
onEngland,antiaircraftbatterieswereshootingdownupto80percentofthoseV
1sthatcrossedtheirsights.
NevilleBrown
Weknowfromeventhemostcasualstudyofmilitaryhistoryhowfalliblemanisin
mattersconcerningwarandhowdifficultithasbeenforhimmostlybecauseofthe
discontinuityofwars,toadjusttonewweapons.Yetcomparedtothechangeswe
considernow,thoseofthepast,whenmeasuredfromonewartothenext,were
almosttrivial.Andalmostalwaysinthepasttherewastimeevenafterhostilities
beganforthesignificanceoftechnologicalchangestobelearnedandappreciated.
BernardBrodie
CumulativeEffectsofTechnicalChanges
Withinagivensector,theimprovementofoverallperformancewillstaygradualfor
quiteawhilebutthenbecomeevermorerapid.Thenitwillprogressivelyslowdown
again,asthesaidtechnologymatures.Boththeaccelerationandtheretardation
arelikelytostartquitesuddenly.
Progress in a particular direction, aircraft speed or whatever, is usually
registered via a diversity of increments (more exotic fuel, innovations in engine
design,improvedwingsandsoon).Nonetheless,thecumulativeresultislikelyto
approximateasigmoidcurve[ofsuddenaccelerationanddeceleration].
NevilleBrown
TheAlliesprovedthatexterminationraidsofstrategicalimportancewerepossible.
Thecomponentsoftheirsuccesswere:(1)Concentrationofraidingforcesonone
target.(2)Combinationofdayandnightraids.(3)Simultaneousapplicationofnew
meansandmethods:radarinterference,bomberstream,etc.
AdolfGalland
Wehaveneverbeenlikelytogetintotroublebyhavinganextrathousandortwoof
uptodateairplanesatourdisposal.Asthemanwhosemotherinlawhaddiedin
Brazil replied, when asked how the remains should be disposed of, "Embalm,
cremate,andbury.Takenorisks."
WinstonChurchill,April1938
Onecanneverhavetoomanyguns;oneneverhasenough.
Napoleon
Theburningwreckofoneaircraftoronewhiteparachutespillingoutagainstthe
skywereoftenglimpsedbymanypilotswhentheytwistedandturnedfivemiles
high.Therecanbenodoubtthatintheconfusedandintricateairfighting,manyof
ourclaimswereduplicated,but,wisely,thoseinauthoritywerenotconcernedwith
merenumbers,butwiththegreaterissuesofwhetherornottheLuftwaffewas
beingheldatbay.
"Johnnie"Johnson
Someoftheareaswhereourmodelingofaircombatgreatlyneedsimprovement:
Lethalitytoooftenoverestimated.
Commandcreativitytoooftenneglected.
Employmentstrategyoptionstoooftenignored.
WilfredL.Goodson
Thehopeofthewisdomessentialtothegeneraldirectionofmen'saffairsliesnotso
much inwealth ofspecialized knowledge as inthe habits andskills required to
handleproblemsinvolvingverydiverseviewpointswhichmustberelatedtonew
concretesituations.Wisdomisbasedonbroadunderstandinginperspective.Itis
nevertheproductofscientific,technological,orotherspecializations,thoughmenso
trainedmay,ofcourse,acquireit.
WallaceB.Donham
Itistruethat[inGermanyinWorldWarII]unheardofinventionsandprogress
weremadeinindividualfields,faraheadoftherestoftheworld,buttheyallcame
toolateand,...theycameinsuchsmallnumbersthattheycouldnolongerbe
decisive.
KarlKoller
ReactionstoTechnology
The great bomber can use weapons other than the hydrogen bomb, just as the
policemancandiscardhispistolforthetruncheon.
J.C.Slessor
Ifaman'strustisinarobotthatwillgoaroundtheearthofitsownvolitionand
utterlydestroyeventhelargestcitiesonimpact,heisstillpitiablyvulnerabletothe
enemywhoappearsonhisdoorstep,equippedandwillingtocuthisthroatwitha
penknife,orbeathimtodeathwithacobblestone.Itiswelltoremembertwothings:
noweaponisabsolute,andthesecondofevengreaterimportnoweapon,whose
potentialisoncerecognizedasofanydegreeofvalue,everbecomesobsolete.
J.M.Cameron
Noformoftransportationeverreallydiesout.Everynewformisanadditionto,and
notasubstitutionfor,anoldformoftransportation.
AirMarshalTrenchard
Whenoffensiveweaponsmakeasuddenadvanceinefficiency,thereactionofthe
sidewhichhasnoneistodisperse,tothinout,tofallbackonmedievalguerrilla
tacticswhichwouldappearchildishiftheydidnotrapidlyprovetohaveexcellent
results.
GenG.J.M.Chassin
Forthewealthynation,theprobabilityoflossexceedsthepossibilityofgainand
dictatesitsroleasthedefender.Theunburdenedopponent,enjoyingtheprospectof
gainforcomparativelyinsignificantloss,retainstheinitiative.Hemayendlessly
alternate threat of action with pretense of compromise and continue no wise in
dangerofdiminishment.Whentheutmostpossiblegainisachievedinthisway,he
maystillattackathisowndiscretion.
J.M.Cameron
Thehighlysophisticatedindustrialeconomyoftheadvancednationsoftheworld,
thedegreeofurbanizationoftheirdemographicdistribution,andthehighstandard
of living, make them very sensitive to weapons of mass annihilation and area
destruction.Ontheotherhand,theunderdevelopedareasoftheworlddisplaya
hardeningofconflictwhenfacedwithsuchweaponsandresorttoguerrillawarfare,
wheremanissuperiortomachine....Peopleusedtohighmaterialstandardsof
livingaremostunlikelytohardentheirwillinthefaceofmassannihilationand
areadestructionandresorttoguerrillawarfare.
S.T.Das
Itissufficientlyprovedinhistorythatrudeandsemibarbarousnations,illarmed
andwithlittleofwhatiscalleddiscipline,oftendiscomfitthesystematicarmiesof
scientifictechniciansandaccomplishedgenerals.
RobertJackson
Thescientificandtechnicaltalentsofthecontemporaryworldarespreadrather
evenlyamongallpotentialcontenders.Thismeansthatwhoeverinventswhatever
newdevicetosupplementhispower,theotherwillnotbelonginshapingithimself
forhisownuses.Whileheisdoingit,hisprimaryinterestwillbenotinbringing
thedevicetomaximumeffectiveness,butinthestudyofitfordeficiencies.
J.M.Cameron
For over a month after the V1s began to fall, interception was poor and most
missilesreachedLondon.Throughdesperateeffortsthedefensesystemeventually
attained a ninety per cent efficiency. Yet this improvement was gained more
through revised techniques and coordinated teamwork than through the
introductionofnewtechnology.
WeexpectedtheV1stobombardAntwerpafterwehadtakenthatcityforour
principalEuropeanportofsupply,andhencewesetupthemostformidableairraid
defensesystemeverdevised.Nothingwassparedtomakeitwork.Thebuzzbombs
cameaspredicted.Again,overamonthofoperationaldevelopmentwasnecessary
beforetheefficiencylevelwasraisedtothepointwheremostoftheV1sdispatched
againstusweredestroyed.
Allthis...illustratesthatwhatistechnicallyfeasibleisnotnecessarilytactically
possible.
Dale0.Smith
PrinciplesofWar
Foundation..............................................................................................101
Objective.................................................................................................104
UnityofCommand.................................................................................107
Offensive,Initiative,andSurprise........................................................110
TheOffensiveAim..................................................................................112
TheDefender'sDilemma........................................................................113
LimitsoftheOffensive...........................................................................114
UsingtheInitiative:Agitation.................................................................115
UsingtheInitiative:Alternatives............................................................116
TheOffensiveSpirit................................................................................117
Mass,Concentration,andEconomyofForce........................................119
EconomyofForce.....................................................................................122
ManeuverandMobility............................................................................125
Simplicity..................................................................................................127
Security....................................................................................................129
ConstantsIfNotPrinciplesofWar.....................................................133
Communications.....................................................................................133
PublicSupport.........................................................................................134
Logistics...................................................................................................136
Celerity....................................................................................................137
Time.........................................................................................................137
ThreeBritishPrinciples...........................................................................138
Foundation
IftherewereacollegedegreeinWar,therequired"foundation"coursesmightbe
thecommonlyacceptedprinciplesofwar.We'veincludedsomeuseful"electives"at
theend,aswell.
PrinciplesofWarareonlytheprinciplesofcommonsenseappliedtowar.
J.C.SlessorinalecturetoAirWarCollege,1957
Theideasaboutstrategywhichhaveevolvedfromtimetotimenosoonergained
acceptancethantheywerestrippedtotheirbarestessentialsandconvertedinto
maximsor,astheyhavelatterlycometobecalled,"principles."Thebaggagethat
was stripped normally contained the justifications, the qualifications, and the
instancesofhistoricalapplicationormisapplication.
BernardBrodie
Principlesofwar,thoughtheycanbesimplystated,arenoteasytolearn,andcan
neverbelearnedfrombooksalone.Theyaretheprinciplesofhumannature;and
whoeverlearnedfrombookshowtodealsuccessfullywithhisfellows?Warwhich
driveshumannaturetoitslastresourcesisagreatengineofeducation,teachingno
lessonswhichitdoesnotillustrate,andenforcingallitslessonsbybitterpenalties.
WalterRaleighinWarintheAir
Theprimaryelementsoftacticsaretobeseenintheirsimplestforminafight
betweentwounarmedmen.Theyare:tothink,toguard,tomove,andtohit.
Before a bout opens, each man must consider how best to knock out his
adversary,andthoughasthefightproceedshemaybecompelledtomodifyhis
means,hemustneverabandonhisaim.Atthestarthemustassumeadefensive
attitudeuntilhehasmeasureduphisopponent.Nexthemustmoveundercoverof
his defence, he must assume the offensive and attempt to knock him out. In
militaryterms,thefourprimarytacticalelementsare:theaimorobject,security,
mobilityandoffensivepower.
Ifthetwopugilistsareskilledintheirart,theywillrecognizethevalueofthree
accentuating elements. They will economize their physical force, so as not to
exhaust themselves prematurely; they will concentrate their blows against the
decisivepointselected,theleftorrightoftheiropponent'sjaw,orhissolarplexus,
and throughout will attempt to surprise himthat is, take him offguard, or do
somethingwhichhedoesnotexpectorcannotguardagainst.Inmilitaryterms
these accentuating elements are: economy of force, concentration of force, and
surprise.
J.F.C.Fuller
ItshouldberememberedthatthestatementsofthePrinciplesofWarwerederived
fromstudyofsurfaceoperationsandwrittenbysoldierswithgroundwarfarein
mind.They stem from periodsofhistorywhen theairplaneexistedonly inthe
mindsofmen.
NathanF.Twiningquotinga1947AirWarCollegeseminar
Toooftenweseetheprinciplesofwarregardedasinstrumentsapplicablebyman,
ratherthanaslimitstohischoiceofactions.Theconstantlycitednineprinciplesof
war are honored about equally among them by misapplication and
misunderstanding.Theirauthoritydarenotbechallenged,however,andtheyare
to be recognized as masters rather than servants. Like all good masters, their
bountymakesthemseemasservantswhenproperlyobeyed.Whentheirdemands
areignored,theirpunishmentsarejustlysevere.
J.M.Cameron
Objective
TheprincipleoftheObjectivemeans,foremost,thatmilitaryoperationsmustbe
consciouslyaimedatanunderstoodpurpose.Becausetheoperationsofeachechelon
ofcommandareaimedatdistinct,feasible,andnormallymeasurablegoals(take
thathill,destroythatbridge),thereisatendencytoconfusethetaskortargetwith
theactualobjectofanoperation.
The ordinary man is much more likely to do the right thing if he really
understands why he is doing it, and what will probably happen if he does
somethingelse;andthebestbasisforsoundjudgmentisaknowledgeofwhathas
beendoneinthepast,andwithwhatresults.
J.C.Slessor
GeneralMacArthurapproved[my]programandsaidtogoahead,thatIhadcarte
blanchetodoanythingthatIwantedtodo.Hesaidhedidn'tcarehowmygang
washandled,howtheylooked,howtheydressed,howtheybehaved,orwhatthey
did,solongastheywouldfight,shootdown[Japaneseairplanes],andputbombs
onthetarget.
GeorgeKenney
Themissionoftacticalfighterandfighterbomberunitsistoengageinoperational
missions,asdirectedbyhigherechelonswithinthetheaterairstructure.These
operationsmaybeindependentoforinconjunctionwithsurfaceaction,butinany
event are all directed toward the effective, efficient, and economical
accomplishmentofthetheatercommander'sassignedmission.
AirForceManual5144,1953
Anirresolutegeneralwhoactswithoutprinciplesandwithoutplan,eventhough
heleadanarmynumericallysuperiortothatoftheenemy,almostalwaysfinds
himselfinferiortothelatteronthefieldofbattle.Fumblings,themiddlecourse,
loseallinwar.
Napoleon
CAUTION
Atthesametime,thenatureoftheenemyandthe
immediatethreatheposestonationalandfriendlyforces,
demandactionthatmaydistractfullcommitmenttoone's
ownobjectives.
S.T.Das
UnityofCommand
Thereisaweaknessinacouncilrunningawar.Thatistrueofanycouncil.Idon't
careifitiscomposedofthebestmenintheworld....Inwar,youmusthave
decision.Abumdecisionisbetterthannone.Andthetroubleisthatwhenyouget
three,youfinallygetnone.
DwightEisenhower
The compromise which forms the mean between several plans usually combines
theirfaultsratherthantheirmerits.
SirCharlesOman
TheAdmiralandGeneralappointedtocommandthehastilyorganized"conjunct
expedition" to Norway in April 1940 were given no clear indication of what the
government'spurposeswere,anddidnotevenknowwhichofthemwasinsupreme
command.Itisnotsurprisingthattheundertakingendedinafiasco.
S.W.Roskill
Nothingismoreimportantinwarthanunityincommand.
Napoleon
Myobservationis[that]whereonepersonisfoundadequatetothedischargeofa
dutybycloseapplication,itisworseexecutedbytwoandscarcelydoneatallby
three.
FriedrichvonSteuben
The same consequences which have uniformly attended long discussions and
councils of war will follow at all times. They will end in adoption of the worst
course,whichinwarisalwaysthemosttimid,or,ifyouwill,themostprudent.The
onlytruewisdominageneralisdeterminedcourage.
Napoleon
Aneducatedguessisjustasaccurateandfarfasterthancompilederrors.
GeorgePatton
Unityofcommandisnotalonesufficient.Unityofplanning,unityofcommonitem
procurement,andunityofdoctrineareequallynecessary.
"Hap"Arnold
Perhapstheclearestexampleoftheconsequencesofdividedcommandisgivenby
Thucydides describing the Athenian compromise plan to invade Syracuse. Three
competentgeneralsNicias,Lamachus,andAlcibiadesproposedthreedifferentbut
promising strategies. The Athenian government sent all three to take Syracuse
possiblyhopingtheywouldagreeona"best"plan.WhenAlcibiadeswasrecalledthe
othertwoadoptedaplanhalfwaybetweentheirtwooriginaldesigns.Itsfailureled
totheendoftheAthenianstate.
WeareseeminglystillintheperiodoftransitionDouhetdescribedin1928....He
saidthenthatthereweremencompetenttowagewaronland,otherstowagewar
atsea,andstillotherstowagewarintheair,butthattherewerenotyetmen
competenttowagewaringeneral.
LouisA.Sigaud,1941
Offensive,Initiative,andSurprise
Thepoweroftheinitiativemightberelatedtotheprincipleofsurprise.Without
initiative,thebestonecandoistoholdone'sown.Withthepoweroftheinitiative,
theoppositioncanbedestroyed.Itwouldthereforeseemaxiomaticthatthefirst
principle of our national security policy would be to seize and maintain the
initiativeinalldimensionsofmodernwar;toincludetheeconomic,psychological,
political,military,andthetechnological.
NathanTwining
Offenseistheessenceofairpower.
"Hap"Arnold
Trueoffensivedoctrineconsistsofcreatingfavorablesituationswhentheydonot
otherwiseexist,strikingattheenemywiththemaximumpoweratthedecisive
timeandplace,anddrivinghometheeffortdeterminedlyuntilthedesiredresults
havebeenaccomplished.
AirForceManual5144,1953
Theadvantageoftheoffensiveinwarisobvious:itdisorganizestheenemy,upsets
his plans and combinations; the assailant, to some extent, imposes on him his
initiative,hiswill.
JeanColin
Militaryofficersaretrainednottobeobjective.Theyaretrainedtobebiasedin
favoroftheoffensive,muchasordinarypersonsaretrainedtobebiasedinfavorof
virtue.
Thebiastowardtheoffensivecreatesspecialproblemsinanytechnologically
newsituationwherethereislittleornorelevantwarexperiencetohelponeto
reachabalancedjudgment.
BernardBrodie
Inordertohaverestoneselfitisnecessarytokeeptheenemyoccupied.
FredericktheGreat
Air forces characteristically take the offensive. Even in defense, they defeat an
invadingenemybyattack.
AirUniversityManual1,1951
Successistobeobtainedonlybysimultaneousefforts,directeduponagivenpoint,
sustainedwithconstancy,andexecutedwithdecision.
ArchdukeCharlesofAustria
Staticanddynamicanalysesofthemilitarybalancearedeceptivebasesfordefense
planning if they are abstracted from the political, psychological, and doctrinal
uncertainties that would attend the outbreak of conflict. For hedging against
suddenattack,lesspromiseliesinsolutionsaimedatreducingtheprobabilityof
surprise than in those that make plans, strategies, and operational doctrines
effectiveifsurpriseoccurs.
RichardK.Betts
TheOffensiveAim
Tostrikewithstrongeffect,onemuststrikeatweakness.
LiddellHart
In place of hitting at a vital spot, however tough, they committed the deadly
tacticalsinoflookingforasoftspot.
J.F.C.FullerdescribingaWorldWarIbattle
Holdoutbaitstoenticetheenemy....Amidtheturmoilandtumultofbattle,
there may be seeming disorder and yet no disorder at all; amid confusion and
chaos,yourarraymaybewithoutheadortail,yetitwillbeproofagainstdefeat.
Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated fear postulates
courage;simulatedweaknesspostulatesstrength.
SunTzu
TheDefender'sDilemma
Thespotwhereweintendtofightmustnotbemadeknown;forthentheenemywill
havetoprepareagainstapossibleattackatseveraldifferentpoints;andhisforces
beingthusdistributedinmanydifferentdirections,thenumbersweshallhaveto
faceatanygivenpointwillbeproportionatelyfew.
SunTzu
Pettygeniusesattempttoholdeverything;wisemenholdfasttothekeypoints.
Theyparrygreatblowsandscornlittleaccidents.Thereisanancientapothegm:he
whowouldpreserveeverything,preservesnothing.Therefore,alwayssacrificethe
bagatelleandpursuetheessential.
FredericktheGreat
Thegeneralisskillfulinattackwhoseopponentdoesnotknowwhattodefend;and
heisskillfulindefensewhoseopponentdoesnotknowwhattoattack.
SunTzu
LimitsoftheOffensive
Warisatwopartyaffair,soimposingtheneedthatwhilehittingonemustguard.
Itscorollaryisthat,inordertohitwitheffect,theenemymustbetakenoffhis
guard.Effectiveconcentrationcanonlybeobtainedwhentheopposingforcesare
dispersed;andusually,inordertoensurethis,one'sownforcesmustbewidely
distributed. Thus, by an outward paradox, true concentration is the product of
dispersion.
LiddellHart
Thebestmethodofdealingwiththeenemy'sbombersaswithhisfighterswill
normally be the maintenance of an active offensive. On the other hand, it is
dangeroustomakeafetishofanyprincipleortobecometheslaveofanytactical
doctrineastheFrenchdidin1914.Justasitmaysometimesbenecessarytodivert
temporarilyeventhewholeofourairforcestothestrategically defensiverolefor
reasonsofsecurity,soonoccasionswemaybecompelledforthesamereasonto
divertpartofourfighterstrengthtothetacticaldefensive.
J.C.Slessor,1936
Theoffensive,however,isthemoreexhaustingformofaction.Nothingdoesmore
ruintoaforceoranationthanoffensiveswhichshownoprofitcommensuratewith
theircost.ThesandsofhistoryarelitteredwiththewrecksofStateswhichsettheir
compassonanoffensivecourseonly.
S.T.Das
UsingtheInitiative:Agitation
Offensiveactionhasoftenbeenusedtoprovokereactions,toforceanopponentto
make mistakes. Just as certainly, one's enemies are likely to try probing and
stirringinreturn.
Agitate the enemy and ascertain the pattern of his movement. Determine his
dispositionsandsoascertainthefieldofbattle.Probehimandlearnwherehis
strengthisabundantandwheredeficient.
SunTzu
Attacksonthedecisionelementofcommandarelimitedonlybytheimagination.
Theycanrangefromdirectstrikesatenemycommandpoststocomplexoperations
tomisleadtheenemyandinducehimtodosomethinginappropriate.
JohnA.WardenIIIinTheAirCampaign
IstartedshootingwhenIwasmuchtoofaraway.Thatwasmerelyatrickofmine.I
didnotmeansomuchtohithimastofrightenhim,andIsucceededincatching
him.Hebeganflyingincurvesandthisenabledmetodrawnear.
ManfredvonRichthofen
UsingtheInitiative:Alternatives
Maintainingsensiblealternativesisliketakingagoodstanceinsports;the
purposeistopreservethebenefitsoftheinitiative.
Iftheenemyiscertainastoyourpointofaimhehasthebestpossiblechanceof
guardinghimselfandbluntingyourweapon.If,ontheotherhand,youtakealine
thatthreatensalternativeobjectives,youdistracthismindandforces.
LiddellHart
The question "Where should the decisive point be sought?" does not arise; the
questionis, "How canapreponderance offorcebebrought against the enemy's
will?"
Therearetwoanswerstothisquestion:todosomethingwhichtheenemy
cannotprevent,andtodosomethingwhichhedoesnotsuspect.
J.F.C.Fuller
Placeyourcampinsuchamannerthatiftheenemypassesonyourrightoronyour
left,theterrainwillgiveyouanequaladvantage.
FredericktheGreat
TheOffensiveSpirit
Noguts,noglory.Ifyouaregoingtoshoothimdown,youhavetogetinthereand
mixitupwithhim.
FredC.("Boots")Blesse
Ialwaysthoughttogoaroundincircles,slowerandslower,wasaridiculousthing.
...It'snotthewaytofight.Thebesttacticistomakeapass,thenbreakoffand
comeback.Ifyoudon'tdothisyou'lllosepeople.Onecan'tbegreedy.
RobinOlds
Whenwestudythelivesofthegreatcaptains,andnotmerelytheirvictoriesand
defeats,whatdowediscover?Thatthemainspringwithinthemwas originality,
outwardlyexpressingitselfinunexpectedactions.
J.F.C.Fuller
Originalityisthemostvitalofallmilitaryvirtuesastwothousandyearsofhistory
attest.Inpeaceitisatadiscount,foritcausesthedisturbanceofcomfortableways
withoutproducingdividends,asincivillife.Butinwar,originalitybearsahigher
premiumthanitcaneverdoinacivilprofession.
LiddellHart
Neverforgetthatnomilitaryleaderhaseverbecomegreatwithoutaudacity.
Clausewitz
Iapproveofallmethodsofattackingprovidedtheyaredirectedatthepointwhere
theenemy'sarmyisweakestandwheretheterrainfavorsthemtheleast.
FredericktheGreat
Anaggressive act inthe initial phases of theattack will very often give you a
breather and a head start home. . . . Showing a willingness to fight often
discouragestheenemyevenwhenheoutnumbersus,whileontheotherhandI
have,byimmediatelybreakingforthedeckonotheroccasions,giventheenemya
"shotinthearm,"turninghishalfheartedattackintoanaggressiveone.
JohnC.Meyer
Mass,Concentration,andEconomyofForce
The alternative to massing forces is piecemeal employmenta practice
summarizedbythephrase"defeatindetail."
Wehadbeentaughtalesson,brutallyandunmistakably.Thefirstroundinmodern
wartakesplaceintheairthefightforairsuperiority;andtobesuccessfulone
musthavereasonablestrengthinquantityaswellasquality,andone'sairbases
must have securitythe security given by warning systems, by dispersal, by
protection and by guns. In Greece and Crete we had none of these things. The
lessonisclear.Itwasnousehavingavictoriousandpredominantsurfacefleetifit
wasnotfreetooperatebecausewehadlostcontroloftheair;itwasnousehavinga
strongarmyif,forthesamereason,itcouldnotbesuppliedandmaintained.
LordTedder
One of the best examples of Mass and Economy of Force is the Battle of the
Bismarck Sea. General Kenney's longrange aircraft were massed to attack the
Japanese convoy as it approached New Guinea. Kenney used his shortrange
aircraft,incapableofjoiningthemass,toattackJapaneseairfieldsinNewGuinea
andpreventairinterceptionjustbeforethemainattackbegan.Theuseofsmall
supportingforcestolenddisproportionateassistancetothemaineffortnotunwise
division of forcesis typical of the specialized support functions of diversion
deceptionscoutingandfeints.Supportingactionsthatactuallyaddweighttothe
main actiondemonstrate the positive applicationofthe principle ofEconomyof
Force.
The principles of war could, for brevity, be condensed into a single word:
concentration.
LiddellHart
One ofthe guiding principles offighting with anair forceis the assembling of
weight,bynumbers,ofanumericalconcentrationatdecisivespots.
AdolfGalland
TheprinciplesofMasswerebetterstated:"Massistheconcentrationofoptimum
combatpowerselectedfromtheavailablemaximum,tobeusedatacriticaltime
andplace."
J.M.Cameron
HistoryshowsagainandagainthatacombinationofResistanceandMobilityof
ShieldandSwordisthetrueanswertoMass.
J.F.C.Fuller
Whereastoshifttheweightofeffortonthegroundfromonepointtoanothertakes
time,theflexibilityinherentinAirForcespermitsthemwithoutchangeofbaseto
beswitchedfromoneobjectivetoanotherinthetheatreofoperations.Solongas
thisisrealisedthenthewholeweightoftheavailableairpowercanbeusedin
selectedareasinturn.Thisconcentrateduseoftheairstrikingforceisabattle
winningfactorofthefirstimportance.Itfollowsthatcontroloftheavailableair
power must be centralised and command must be exercised through Air Force
channels.Nothingcouldbemorefataltosuccessfulresultsthantodissipatetheair
resources into small packets placed under command of land formation
commanders, with each packet working on its own plan. The soldier must not
expectorwishtoexercisedirectcommandoverairstrikingforces.
FieldMarshalMontgomery
EconomyofForce
Theuseandexpenditureofforcesinallthetransactionsofnatureisgovernedby
the laws of parsimony. From the boundless reservoir attendant to her needs,
nature will apply the precise minimum of her resources that will effect her
purpose. Translated into human values the law of parsimony becomes a
constellationofprinciplesthemostconspicuousofwhichisthelawofdiminishing
return. It allows for human error in that it punishes infraction discriminately
accordingtothemagnitudeofthecrime.Itisanexcellentmodelforrulingthe
expenditureofmilitarystrength.
Therecaninallthingsbetoomuchofagoodthing.Beyondtheoptimumevery
addedincrementofeffortwillresultinacorrespondingdeclineofaccomplishment.
J.M.Cameron
TheprincipleofEconomyofForceissometimesmisunderstoodasholdingbacka
largebodyoftroopsandcommittingtheminimumforcetobattle.Thisisnotthe
trueinterpretationorapplicationofthelaw.Toholdbacktroopswhentheycanbe
gainfullyemployedisfalseeconomy.Theuseofreservesontheotherhandisa
tactical application of the same principle. When information is lacking or the
situationissuchthatonlyaftertheinitialengagementcantheenemy'sweakspot
bediscovered,insuchcasesreservesarenotreallyheldbackfromthebattlebutare
actuallykeptreadyforbattlewhenthedecisivetimeandplacehasbeenreached.
S.T.Das
Inplanning,neverauselessmove;instrategy,nosteptakeninvain.
ChenHao
Apartmustneverbeimprovedattheexpenseofthewhole.
J.M.Cameron
Therearegenerallyinsufficientforcestoconductextensiveoperationsinallair
tasksatonetime;thustheselectionoftargetsandtheallocationofeffortmustbe
in terms of the needs of the theater. Enemy action may necessitate a major
revisionintaskpriorities.
AirForceManual13,1953
Tomeanunnecessaryaction,orshot,orcasualty,wasnotonlywastebutsin.
T.E.Lawrence
ManeuverandMobility
TheenemymustnotknowwhereIintendtogivebattle.Forifhedoesnotknow
whereIintendtogivebattle,hemustprepareinagreatmanyplaces....Forifhe
preparestothefronthisrearwillbeweak,andiftotherear,hisfrontwillbe
fragile.Ifhepreparestothelefthisrightwillbevulnerableandiftotheright,
therewillbefewontheleft.Andwhenheprepareseverywherehewillbeweak
everywhere.
SunTzu
Theultimateobjectofmobilityistoobtainsuperiorpowerinbattle.
MauricedeSaxe
Ibelievethat,moreorless,alloftheAlliedoperations[intheSouthwestPacific]
dependedondeceptionbylandinginplaceswherewethoughtalandingandthe
buildingofairfieldsimpossible.
LtColMasaruShinohara,JapaneseEighthAreaArmy
Modernwarisawarforairbases;thebulldozermustaccompanytheplane....One
oftheelementsofvictoryinNorthAfricawasthespeedwithwhichouraviation
engineersconstructedairfieldsbehindthefrontlinesandpressedtheattack.
"Hap"Arnold
Maximumtimeovertargetorextremedepthofpenetrationmaybenecessary.This
normallyrequiresthataircraftbebasedasclosetothetargetareasaspossible.
Since ground action is often fluid in nature, tactical air units must possess a
considerabledegreeofmobility.Itisessentialthatallcomponentsofthetactical
airorganization,includingsupportingorserviceunits,beabletomovefromsiteto
sitewithoutdisruptingthecombatmission.Equipmentshouldbedesignedwith
thisinmindand,wheneverpossible,beairtransportable.
AirForceManual5144,1953
Thegiantairbasesoftodaywillbecomethebombercemeteriesofafuturewar.
GenP.F.Zhigarev,SovietAirForces,1958
The strength of air forces lies in mobility and flexibility. These characteristics
permitconcentrationofmassedfirepowerattheplaceandtimedictatedbythe
situationwithmaximumsurprise.Mobilityandflexibilityarereducedwhen:
a.Airforcesarecompartmentedinseparateunitsunderseparatecommands,and
b.Areallottedtolowerechelons.
AirUniversityManual1,1951
Simplicity
Perhaps the most important principle when transitioning from peace to war,
when first employing forces, and when trying new tactics, procedures and
techniquesinharm'sway,isSimplicity.
Difficultiesalwaysarisefromattemptstoimprovetothepointofachievingwhatis
notpossible,therebyfailingtogainwhatiswellwithinreach.
J.M.Cameron
Theprincipalmessageoffog,frictionandchanceisthatstrategymustbeflexible.
Plansthatrelyonflawlessexecutionareoverlysusceptibletofailure.Plansthat
rely on rigid timetables and rigidly sequenced actions are overly susceptible to
failure.Ingeneral,themorecomplextheplan,themorelikelythatsomethingwill
goawry.
DennisDrewandDonaldSnow
Fewordersarebest,buttheyshouldbefollowedupwithcare.
MauricedeSaxe
Remember,gentlemen,anorderthatcanbemisunderstoodwillbemisunderstood.
Moltke,TheElder
Security
Naturally, the combination of active and passive devices sometimes has proved
adequate and sometimes not, depending on circumstances and luck, but the
chancesforsurvivalwereusuallybetterforhavingadefensewhichincludedboth
kinds.
BernardBrodie
Skepticismisthemotherofsecurity.Eventhoughonlyfoolstrusttheirenemies,
prudentpersonsneverdo.Onefallsintoafeelingofsecurityafterbattles,when
one is drunk with success, and when one believes the enemy completely
disheartened.Onefallsintoafeelingofsecuritywhenaskillfulenemyamusesyou
with pretended peace proposals. One falls into a feeling of security by mental
laziness.
FredericktheGreat
Paradoxically,itistheveryattachmentofthemilitarytotheoffensivespiritthat
createsinthemastrongimpulsetodisregardthelikelihoodthattheenemymay
havecomparableattachmentsandmaythereforeattempttoinitiatehostileaction.
BernardBrodie
Alwayspresumethattheenemyhasdangerousdesignsandalwaysbeforehanded
withtheremedy.Butdonotletthesecalculationsmakeyoutimid.
FredericktheGreat
Ideasexaltingmilitaryaggressivenessderivefromanagewhenitwasthesame
forcewhichtooktheoffensiveorstayedonthedefensive.Ifanoffensivefailed,an
impromptu redeployment usually achieved a defensive posture. The accent was
thereforeappropriatelyonboldness.Evenwhenboldnessprovedimprovidentand
costly, it rarely sacrificed the life of the nation. Today, failure to meet the
requirementsofthedeterrentposturecanclearlyhavethatresult.
BernardBrodie
Threecankeepasecretiftwoofthemaredead.
BenjaminFranklin
Ourcontinuousairoffensivehadevidentlyannoyedthem,astheraidwasmadeby
twentyfourbombersescortedbyaboutthesamenumberoffighters.Welosteleven
aircraftonthegroundatSevenMileAirdrome.Inaddition,theoperationsbuilding
wasburneddown,severaltrucksdestroyed,twohundreddrumsofgasolinewent
upinsmoke,andtherunwaywashitinseveralplaces.TheJapaneselefteight
callingcards in the shape of longdelay timefuzed bombs which exploded at
intervalsallthewayuptofortyfourhours.Severalmenwerewoundedbybomb
fragments.Onceagainourwarningservicewasinadequate.
GeorgeKenney
When the fighting [World War I] was over, Maj Gen Mason M.
Patrick,ChiefofAirService,AmericanExpeditionaryForces,wanted
tofindoutwhatlessonshadbeenlearned,whatknowledgehadbeen
gainedbyAirServicepersonnelduringthewar.Hedirectedthatsuch
informationwastobesenttoColEdgarS.Gorrell,AssistantChiefof
Staff,whowascompilingthehistoryoftheAirService,AEF....No
onewastogohome,Patricksaid,untilhehad"furnishedinwritingto
Colonel Gorrell any information of value which he possess[es] and
whichhehasacquiredwhileintheAmericanAirService...."
Someoftheresultingreportswerewellwrittendocuments,carefully
and thoughtfully prepared. Others obviously were dashed off
hurriedlytoberidofadistastefulandseeminglynonsensicaltaskas
quicklyandeasilyaspossible.Oneunsympatheticsquadronadjutant
cameupwiththefollowingformletterresponse,dulycompletedand
submittedbytenfirstandsecondlieutenants:
Date__________________________1918
From:______________________________________
To:Col.Gorrell,OfficeChiefofAirService
Subject:Information.
1.InaccordancewithinstructionscontainedintelegramZ727TG,
from Chief Training Section, Headquarters Air Service, Tours, the
followingcertificateissubmitted.
2. I certify that I have acquired, while in the Air Service, no
informationofvalue.
(Signed)_____________________________
Source:AdaptedfromMaurerMaurer,TheU.S.AirServiceinWorld
WarI (Washington, D.C.:OfficeofAirForceHistory,Headquarters
USAF,1979),vol.IV,12.
ConstantsIfNotPrinciplesofWar
Communications
ThetacticalskilloftheMongolhordehadbeendevelopedinthestressofwar.In
maneuverforbattle,theyhadlearntnottodependoncommandsgivenbyavoice
which very often could not be heard in the uproar of moving mounted men.
Regimentssignalledtheirmovementsbyraisingblackorwhiteflagsduringtheday
andbysimilaruseofcoloredlanternsatnight.Othersignalsweregivenbytheuse
ofwhistlingarrowswhichemittedsoundthroughahollowpiercedhead.Theyhid
theirformations,attimes,behinddriftingsmokescreens.
S.T.Das
Congress can make a general but only communications can make him a
commandinggeneral.
OmarBradley
PublicSupport
Exceptforvalidsecurityreasons,anyactionthatcannotbesatisfactorilyexplained
tothetroops,theCongress,andthegeneralpublic,shouldberegardedassuspect
andthoroughlyexamined.
MatthewB.Ridgway
Byrapiditymanymeasuresoftheenemyarenippedinthebud,andpublicopinion
isgainedinourfavor.
Clausewitz
ItisstrangethatexceptbyClausewitzandtosomeextentbyMacklin,thePrinciple
of"PublicOpinion"hasnotbeenconsideredveryvitalevenbythemodernmilitary
theoreticians.
S.T.Das
Itisveryeasytofoolthepeopleatthestartofawarandrunitonaconfidential
basis.Butlaterthewoundedstartcomingbackandtheactualnewsspreads.Then,
finally,whenwehavewon,themenwhofoughtthewarcomehome.Therewillbe
millions of them who will come home knowing how things were. A government
whichwantstokeeptheconfidenceofitspeopleafterthewar,orduringthelast
stagesofit,shouldtakethepeopleintoitsconfidenceandtellthemeverythingthat
theycanknow,badaswellasgood,solongastheirknowingofitdoesnothelpthe
enemy.Coveringuptheerrorstosavethemenwhomakethemcanonlyleadtoa
lackofconfidencewhichcanbeoneofthegreatestdangersanationcanface.
ErnestHemingway
Logistics
Whentheenemyassessesourforces,hevaluesonlythoseforceswhichthelogistics
communityhasreadyforcombat,orcangetreadyintime,andthensustainfora
requisiteperiodoftime.
F.M.Rogers
MyDearGeneral,thisexpandingandpilingupofimpedimentia[sic]hasbeenso
faralmostourruin,andwillbeourfinalruinifitisnotabandoned
Letter,AbrahamLincolntoGenNathanielP.Banksontheinabilityofthe
UnionArmytomoveduetologisticexcesses
Logisticscontrolsallcampaignsandlimitsmany.
DwightEisenhower
The crews of a heavy bombardment group in China must ferry over their own
gasoline,bombs,replacementpartsandeverythingelseintheirownB24s.Before
thisbombardmentgroupcangoononecombatflight,itmustmakefourtripsover
theHump.Toperformoneextremelydangerousmission,thosecrewsmustmake
fourseparateflightsoverthemosthazardousterrainintheworld.
"Hap"Arnold
Celerity
Attacktheenemysuddenlywhenheisnotpreparedtoresist.Celerityisthesecret
ofsuccess.
DennisHartMahan
Thepolicyofcelerity...involvesallelementsofnationalpower:military,political,
economic,andpsychological....Celerityinthestrictlymilitarysensemeansswift,
powerful, integratedactions directedat vulnerable andunexpected points ofthe
enemywarmakingestablishment.
Dale0.Smith
Time
During the last great aerial raid on England, the German Air Force flew about
1,200 bombers over industrial targets which were critical to the survival of the
BritishEmpire.AtthesametimetheRoyalAirForceFighterCommandconsisted
oflittlemorethanahandfuloftrainedpilotsandfighterplanes.Theincredible
Germandecisiontostaggertheattack,andtousetwelvehoursforitscompletion,
actually multiplied the strength of the Royal Air Force Fighter Command by a
factoroffive.ThiswaspossiblebecauseonthatdayeachSpitfirepilothadthetime
toflyfivemissions.
NathanTwining
Whenyouseemtobemostprodigalofthesoldier'sblood,youspareit,bysupporting
yourattackswellandbypushingthemwiththegreatestvigortopreventtimefrom
augmentingyourlosses.
FredericktheGreat
Quickdecisionsareunsafedecisions.
Sophocles
Thegodofwarhatesthosewhohesitate.
Euripides
Taketimetodeliberate,butwhenthetimeforactionarrives,stopthinkingandgo
on.
AndrewJackson
ThreeBritishPrinciples
Morale: Success in war depends more on morale than on physical qualities.
Numbers,armament,resources orskill cannot compensateforlackofcourage,
energy,determinationandtheboldoffensivespiritwhichspringsfromanational
determinationtoconquer.
Flexibility:Modernwardemandsahighdegreeofflexibilitytoenableprearranged
planstobealteredtomeetchangingsituationsandunexpecteddevelopments.By
strategical and tactical flexibility, force can be concentrated rapidly and
economicallyatdecisiveplacesandtimes.Thisentailsgoodtraining,organization,
discipline,andstaffwork,andaboveall,thatrapidityofdecisiononthepartofthe
commanderwhichensuresthattimeisneverlost.
AnotherPrinciple:Poise
AirForcesmorethansurfaceforcesmustconsciouslyanticipate,posture,and
ready their fighting forces to take advantage of fleeting opportunities. In the
vernacular, they must be springloaded without being overcommitted to one
anticipatedcourseofevents.Inthefighterpilotvernacular,commandelementsmust
"leadturn," or constantly stay ahead of, events; they must develop cues to guide
increasedsurveillanceandalertstatus;theymustbementallypreparedtoherdthe
enemyratherthansimplyreact.Theexperienceofwarindicatesthatcommanders
must also economize alertness by aggressively relaxing their forces when
opportunitiesforrecoveryandrestareachieved.Onlyruthlessreductionofsensor
andinformationdata,todistinguishessentialsfromalltheavailableinformation,
canpermitthementalclaritynecessaryforoptimumpoiseandperception.
SuggestedbytheideasofClausewitz,OnWar
Command
HumanFactorsinWar..........................................................................................143
ProfessionalGrowth..............................................................................................144
Command...............................................................................................................148
Advice.....................................................................................................................151
TheCommanderandtheStaff..............................................................................153
AdministrationandCombatSupport...................................................................157
InformationManagement......................................................................................159
TheOperationsOrder............................................................................................161
FieldOrderNo.2...................................................................................................162
CommandArrangements......................................................................................164
FieldManual10020..............................................................................................167
HumanFactorsinWar
Alltheseattemptsattheoryareonlytobeconsideredintheiranalyticalpartas
progressintheprovinceoftruth;butintheirsyntheticalpart,intheirpreceptsand
rules,theyarequiteunserviceable.
Theystriveafterdeterminatequantities,whilstinWarallisundetermined,and
thecalculationhasalwaystobemadewithvaryingquantities.
Theydirecttheattentiononlyuponmaterialforces,whilethewholeactionis
penetratedthroughoutbyintelligentforcesandtheireffects.
Theyonlypayattentiontoactivityononeside,whilstWarisaconstantstateof
reciprocalactionstheeffectsofwhicharemutual....
Everytheorybecomesinfinitelymoredifficultfromthemomentittouchesonthe
provinceofmoralquantities.
Clausewitz
Withequalorinferiorpowerofdestructionhewillwinwhohastheresolutionto
advance, who by his formations and maneuvers can continually threaten his
adversary with a new phase of material action, who, in a word, has the moral
ascendancy.
ArdantduPicq
ProfessionalGrowth
Every art has its rules and maxims. One must study them: theory facilitates
practice. The lifetime of one man is not long enough to enable him to acquire
perfect knowledge and experience. Theory helps to supplement it, it provides a
youthwithprematureexperienceandmakeshimskillfulthroughthemistakesof
others.
FredericktheGreat
In sum the leader has to achieve a balance between the essential need for
professionalcompetenceinhisowntechnicalfieldandthatbroaderunderstanding
of human problems which can only be achieved from a wide and largely self
acquirededucation.
S.W.Roskill
Ifwewishtothinkclearly,wemustceaseimitating;ifwewishtoceaseimitating,
wemustmakeuseofourimagination.Wemusttrainourselvesfortheunexpected
inplaceoftrainingothersforthecutanddried.Audacity,andnotcaution,mustbe
ourwatchword.
J.F.C.Fuller
Theessentialbasisofthemilitarylifeistheorderedapplicationofforceunderan
unlimitedliability.Itistheunlimitedliabilitywhichsetsthemanwhoembraces
thislifesomewhatapart.Hewillbe(orshouldbe)alwaysacitizen.Solongashe
serveshewillneverbeacivilian.
GeneralSirJohnW.Hackett
Trainingislightandlackoftrainingisdarkness.Theproblemfearstheexpert.A
trainedmanisworththreeuntrained:that'stoolittlesaysix;sixistoolittlesay
tentoone....
AlexanderSuvorov
Agreatcaptaincanbeformedonlybylongexperienceandintensestudy;neitheris
hisownexperienceenoughforwhoselifeistheresufficientlyfruitfulofeventsto
renderhisknowledgeuniversal?
ArchdukeCharlesofAustria
Itiscommontoseemenwhohaveusedalltheirlimbswithoutonceintheirlives
having utilized their minds. Thought, the faculty of combining ideas, is what
distinguishesmanfromabeastofburden.Amulewhohascarriedapackforten
campaignsunderPrinceEugenewillbenobetteratacticianforit,anditmustbe
confessed,tothedisgraceofhumanity,thatmanymengrowoldinanotherwise
respectableprofessionwithoutmakinganygreaterprogressthanthismule.
FredericktheGreat
Intheprofessionofwartherulesoftheartareneverviolatedwithoutdrawing
punishmentfromtheenemywhoisdelightedtofindusatfault.Anofficercan
sparehimselfmanymistakesbyimprovinghimself.
FredericktheGreat
Educationisatwoedgedsword.Ifitindoctrinateswithrigidprinciples,constantly
hammering home the fixed and immutable nature of those principles, and if it
offersneatsolutionstoeveryhumanproblemintermsofthesefixedprinciples,
thenchangeanddevelopmentcannottakeplace.
Dale0.Smith
Themanwhocan'tmakeamistakecan'tmakeanything.
AbrahamLincoln
Todaywemaintainourselves.Tomorrow,sciencewillhavemovedforwardyetone
more step and there will be no appeal from the judgment which will then be
pronouncedontheuneducated.
AlfredNorthWhitehead
Perhapsthemostvaluableresultofalleducationistheabilitytomakeyourselfdo
thethingyouhavetodo,whenitoughttobedone,whetheryoulikeitornot.
T.H.Huxley
Few men during their lifetime come anywhere near exhausting the resources
dwellingwithinthem.Therearedeepwellsofstrengththatareneverused.
AdmRichardE.Byrd
Wewantcommandersnotcommitteestosendourtroopsintobattle.
W.G.Wyman
Thefirstqualityforacommanderinchiefisacoolhead,whichreceivesacorrect
impressionofthings.Heshouldnotallowhimselftobeconfusedbyeithergoodor
badnews.Theimpressionswhichhereceivessuccessivelyorsimultaneouslyinthe
courseofadayshouldclassifythemselvesinhismindinsuchawayastooccupy
theplaceswhichtheymerit,forreasonandjudgmentaretheresultofcomparison
ofvariousimpressionstakenintojustconsideration.
Napoleon
Thequalificationsofthecombatcommanderdeterminetoalargerextentthanany
othersingleelementtheeffectivenessofaunitincombat.
"Hap"Arnold
Thefirstrequirementtobeamilitaryleaderistoknowthoroughlyone'sspecialty,
andthesecondtobeloyaltoone'ssubordinates.Bothconditionswillsaveonefrom
mutualdisloyalty.
SimonBolivar
Rememberthis:thetrulygreatleaderovercomesalldifficulties,andcampaigns
andbattlesarenothingbutalongseriesofdifficultiestobeovercome.Thelackof
equipment,thelackoffood,thelackofthisorthatareonlyexcuses;therealleader
displayshisqualityinhistriumphsoveradversity,howevergreatitmaybe.
GeorgeC.Marshall
Idon'tmindbeingcalledtough,becauseinthisracketit'sthetoughguyswholead
thesurvivors.
CurtisLeMay
LeMayapproachedleadershipwiththreebasicprinciplesinmind....Hebelieved,
first,thatsupervisorsandassociatesmustrecognizetheimportanceofeachman's
jobortask,aswellasofthemanhimself.Second,someprogress,howeversmall,
mustbemadetowardanestablishedgoal;otherwiseseriousdissatisfactionwill
develop.Lastly,commandersandsupervisorsmustrecognizeanddemonstratereal
appreciationtothosewhohaveaccomplishedtheirassignedtasks.
HarryBorowski
ThenameofTrenchardspellsoutconfidenceintheRAFandwewouldnotloseit
byhearinghimdecried.Wethinkofhimasimmense,notbywhathesays,forheis
asnearascanbeinarticulate:hiswordsbarelyenoughtomakementhinkthey
divinehisdrift:andnotbywhathewrites,forhemakestheleastuseofwhatmust
betheworld'sworsthandwriting:butjustbywhatheis.Heknows;andbyvirtue
ofthispolestarofknowledgehesteersthroughalltheingenuityandcleverness
andhesitationsofthelittlemenwhohelporhinderhim.Trenchardinventedthe
touchstonebywhichtheAirCounciltryalltheirworks."Willthis,orwillthisnot,
promotetheconquestoftheair?"
T.E.Lawrence,whileenlistedasAircraftsmanRoss
No normal young man is likely to recognize in himself the qualities that will
persuadeotherstofollowhim.Ontheotherhand,anymanwhocancarryout
orders in a cheerful spirit, complete his work step by step, use imagination in
improvingit,andthenwhenthejobisdone,canfacetowardhisnextdutywith
anticipation,needhavenoreasontodoubthisowncapacityforleadership.
S.L.A..Marshall
Thecommandershouldpracticekindnessandseverity,shouldappearfriendlyto
thesoldiers,speaktothemonthemarch,visitthemwhiletheyarecooking,ask
themiftheyarewellcaredfor,andalleviatetheirneedsiftheyhaveany.Officers
withoutexperienceinwarshouldbetreatedkindly.Theirgoodactionsshouldbe
praised.Smallrequestsshouldbegrantedandtheyshouldnotbetreatedinan
overbearingmanner,butseverityismaintainedabouteverythingregardingduty.
FredericktheGreat
Advice
Nevertellpeoplehowtodothings.Tellthemwhattodoandtheywillsurpriseyou
withtheiringenuity.
GeorgePatton
Everygeneralinchiefwhoundertakestoexecuteaplanthatheknowstobebadis
culpable. He should communicate his reasons, insist on a change of plan, and
finally resign his commission rather than become the instrument of his army's
ruin.
Napoleon
When things go wrong in your command, start searching for the reason in
increasinglylargerconcentriccirclesaroundyourowndesk.
GenBruceC.Clarke
The principal task of the general is mental, involving large projects and major
arrangements. But since the best dispositions become useless if they are not
executed,itisessentialthatthegeneralshouldbeindustriousinseeingwhether
hisordersareexecutedornot.
FredericktheGreat
Beaseconomicalwithyourmen'sphysicalresourcesasyoumustbewithyour
own,andguardbothascarefullyasmaterial,munitionsorfuel.Aboveall,practice
inpeaceonyourselfandyourmen.Industriousnessistoooftenequated,falsely,to
efficiencyinapeacetimeforce;yetifitbecomesahabititcouldbe,inwar,aself
inflictedwound.
AirViceMarshalJohnR.Walker
Moralemakesupthreequartersofthegame,therelativebalanceofmanpower
accountsforonlytheremainingquarter.
Napoleon
TheCommanderandtheStaff
Orderordisorderdependsonorganization.
SunTzu
Ihad[thegeneral]assemblehiswholestaffandtriedtogivethemapictureof
whatwewereupagainstinNewGuinea.Thatwaswherethewarwasanditwas
not moving to Australia. Those youngsters up there were our customers and
customersarealwaysright.Ouronlyexcuseforlivingwastohelpthem.Wemight
work ourselves into having stomach ulcers or nervous breakdowns, but those
thingswerenotfatal.TheworkthosekidsinNewGuineaandatDarwinwere
doing,however,hadahighfatalityrate.Theydeservedalltheycouldget.Mostof
thecrowdappreciatedwhatIwastalkingabout.Theotherswouldgohome.
GeorgeKenney
Thefinaltestofcompletedstaffworkisthis:Ifyouyourselfwerethecommander,
wouldyoubewillingtosignthepaperyouhaveprepared?Wouldyoustakeyour
professionalreputationonitsbeingright?Ifyouranswerwouldbe"No,"takethe
paperbackandreworkit,becauseitisnotyetcompletedstaffwork.
Anonymousmonograph,quotedbyRobertD.Heinl,Jr.
The leader must know what he wants, think rapidly, andtell his subordinates
clearlyandsimplywhatisdesired.Theleadershouldalwaysseektheeasy,correct
waytoperformatask.Veryfrequentlythisisnotdone.Thebrightsubordinate
quicklydetectstheinefficiencyofhissuperiorwhenhedoesthingsthehardway.
MajGenCharlesH.Corlett
Thestaffissimplytheservant ofthegeneralforce;itexistsbuttofurtherthe
welfareofthefightingestablishment.Thosewithinitareremissiftheyfailtokeep
thisruleuppermost.
S.L.A..Marshall
MyLord,
IfIattemptedtoanswerthemassoffutilecorrespondencethatsurroundsmeI
shouldbedebarredfromallseriousbusinessofcampaigning.
I must remind your Lordshipfor the last timethat so long as I retain an
independent position, I shall see to it that no officer under my command is
debarred,bymerequilldrivinginyourLordship'soffice,fromattendingtohisfirst
duty, which is, and always has been, so to train the private men under his
commandthattheymay,
withoutquestion,bestanyforceopposedtotheminthefield.
Iam,myLord
Yourobedientservant,
Wellington
Possiblyapocryphalcorrespondence,supposedlywrittenin1810
Abulkystaffimpliesadivisionofresponsibility,slownessofactionandindecision,
whereasasmallstaffimpliesactivityandconcentrationofpurpose.
WilliamTecumsehSherman
When service at sea was constant and battle more and more rare, there was a
natural inclination to devote more attention to seamanship than to warlike
exercises.Iftherewastimeleftoverfromseamanshipdrills(andattentiontothe
outwarddisplaywhichisalwayslikely,inadisciplinedserviceduringaperiodof
stagnation,tobeacceptedasamarkofefficiency)itcouldbeemployedingunnery
drillsdevotedtomaintainingahighrateoffire;theywereimpressivetobeholdand
did not have the disadvantages of actual target practice, in which the powder
consumedwaslikelytomakepaintworkdirtyandhadtobeaccountedfortoa
niggardlyandhardpressedgovernment.
C.S.ForesterexplainingthedeclineoftheRoyalNavy,leadingtotheir
stunningtacticaldefeatsintheWarof1812
AdministrationandCombatSupport
Whenadministrationandordersareinconsistent,themen'sspiritsarelow,and
theofficersexceedinglyangry.
ChangYucommentingonSunTzu
A battle sometimes decides everything, and sometimes the most trifling thing
decidesthefateofabattle.
Napoleon
Imusthaveassistantswhowillsolvetheirownproblemsandtellmelaterwhat
theyhavedone.
GeorgeC.Marshall
NobodyintheBritishArmyeverreadsaregulationoranorderasifitweretobea
guideforhisconduct,orinanyothermannerthanasanamusingnovel;andthe
consequence is, that when complicated arrangements are to be carried into
execution...everygentlemanproceedsaccordingtohisfancy,andthenwhenitis
foundthatthe[mission]fails(asitmustfailiftheorderisnotstrictlyobeyed)they
comeuponmetosetmattersrightandthusmylaborisincreasedtenfold.
Wellington
Itisnotrecognizedthattheobjectofregulationsandrulesistoproduceorderinthe
fightingmachine,andnottostranglethemindofthemanwhocontrolsit.
J.F.C.Fuller
Rules can certainly be burdensome and sometimes foolish; but if they are
misbegottentheyoughttobeabolishedcompletelyratherthanselectivelywaived.
Awiseruleshouldnotbeappliedselectivelyeither.
TheEconomist,28January1989
Therehasbeenaconstantstruggleonthepartofthemilitaryelementtokeepthe
endfighting,orreadinesstofightsuperiortomereadministrativeconsiderations.
Themilitaryman,havingtodothefighting,considersthatthechiefnecessity;the
administratorequallynaturallytendstothinkthesmoothrunningofthemachine
themostadmirablequality.
AlfredThayerMahan
Any commander who fails to exceed his authority is not of much use to his
subordinates.
ArleighBurke
InformationManagement
Unityofactiondevelopsfromfullnessofinformation.Incombat,allrankshaveto
knowwhatisbeingdone,andwhyitisbeingdone,ifconfusionistobekepttoa
minimum.Thisholdstrueinalltypesofoperation,whatevertheService.However,
asurfeitofinformationcloudsthemindandmaysometimesdepressthespirit.
S.L.A..Marshall
Thereareno"battlemanagement"magicbulletsthatwillsubstitutefortheability
ofonscenecommanders,soldiers,andairmentomakeappropriatedecisionsbased
ontheebbandflowofevents.
RichardP.Hallion
Todoourworkweallhavetoreadamassofpapers.Nearlyallofthemarefartoo
long.Thiswastestime,whileenergyhastobespentinlookingforvitalpoints.
Iaskmycolleaguesandtheirstaffstoseetoitthattheirreportsareshorter.
Theaimshouldbeshortreportswhichsetoutthemainpointsinaseriesof
shortcrispparagraphs....
Letushaveanendofsuchphrasesasthese:"Itisalsoofimportancetobearin
mindthefollowingconsiderations..."or"Considerationshouldbegiventothe
possibility of carrying into effect. . . ." Most of these woolly phrases are mere
paddingwhichcanbeleftoutaltogether,orreplacedbyasingleword.
Let us not shrink from using the short expressive phrase, even if it is
conversational.
ReportsdrawnuponthelinesIproposemayatfirstseemroughascompared
with the flat officialese jargon. But the saving in time will be great, while the
discipline of setting out the real points concisely will prove an aid to clearer
thinking.
WinstonChurchillin1940
TheOperationsOrder
ThecurrentoperationsorderusedinAirForceandjointplansandoperations
predatestheestablishmentoftheAirForce.CurtisLeMaysaidthemostimportant
thinghelearnedattheAirCorpsTacticalSchoolwastheoperationsorderformat.
Knownasthefieldorder,thefiveparagraphfieldorder,andtheoperationsplan,
thisorderhasdirectedtheactionsofairmenincombatsinceWorldWarII.
Theprinciplevirtueoftheoperationsorderisthatitbrieflystatesthemissionsof
subordinatecommands,whileclearlystatingtheobjectivesofhigherechelons.
Forexample.considertheoperationsorderofanairdivision.
1. Situation. Depicts the overall enemy situation and the objective of the
numberedairforce.
2.Mission.Statestheobjectiveassignedtotheissuingheadquarters,inthiscase
theairdivision.
3. Execution. Assigns subordinate objectives to each wing that will lead to
accomplishingtheairdivision'soverallobjective.
4. AdministrationandLogistics (alsoknownas ServiceSupport).Assigns
necessarymeansforaccomplishingtheobjective.
5.CommandandSignal.Providesnonroutinecommunicationsinstructionsthat
subordinateechelonsneedfortheirmissions.
HEADQUARTERS
ALLIEDAIRFORCES
APO.929
September8,1942.
FIELDORDER)
:
NO. 2)
MAPS:NewGuineaArea
HydrographicchartsSeaapproachesNewGuinea.
1 . a.The enemy has concentrated large air, land andnaval forces inthe
RabaulFaisi Area. He has a small force at Milne Bay, which he supplies and
probablyreinforcesnightly.Heisattackinginconsiderablestrengthourtroopsin
theEfogiarea,withtheapparentintentionofalandapproachtoMoresby.Heis
slowly moving up to Bulolo Valley against our Kanga force on the left, as a
diversioninsupportofhismaineffortatEfogi.
ItisbelievedthattheenemymaysoonattempttoreinforcestronglyMilneBay
force,aswellashisgroundforcesintheBunaarea.Heisexpectedtoreinforce
heavilyhisairunitsatLae,SalamauaandBunabetweenSeptember10thand
14th, with the objective of furnishing strong air support to the land forces
operatingagainstMoresby.
b.OurAirForcesintheMoresbyareaarebeingreinforcedbytwofighter
squadronsandaBeaufighterSquadronatonce.NineB17'sandeightB26'swill
beheldatMoresbyforastrikingforce.
2. This Air Force will attack and destroy enemy convoys approaching New
Guinea,andwillprevent,thrubombingandstraffingraidsonhisairdromes,the
effectiveemploymentofhisairforcebytheenemy.
3.a.TheNineteenthBombardmentGroupwillmaintainaforceofnineB17's
atMoresby,andastrikingforceofallotheravailableB17'sandcrewsatMareeba.
The force at Moresby, acting under the direct orders of this headquarters, will
attack and destroy enemy convoys approaching New Guinea. The Commanding
General, Rear Echelon, Townsville, will employ the striking force at Mareeba
against suitable enemy convoy movements toward New Guinea, acting upon
informationreceivedfromreconnaissanceaircraftandcoastwatchers.
b.TheTwentySecondBombardmentGroupwillmaintainaforceofeightB
26's at Moresby, and a reserve of all other available aircraft and crews in the
Townsville area. The force at Moresby, acting under the direct orders of this
headquarters,willattackanddestroyenemyshippingapproachingthenorthcoast
of New Guinea, and will be employed also against enemy airdromes in New
Guinea.ThereserveintheTownsvilleareawillbeoncalltothisheadquarterson
onehoursnoticeeffective0000ZSeptember10th.
c.TheThirdBombardmentGroupwillmaintainaforceoftwentyfiveA20's
inthe89thSquadron(Reinforced)atMoresby.Itwillmaintainareserveofall
availableA20'sandB25'sintheTownsvilleareaoncalltothisheadquarterson
onehoursnoticeeffective0000ZSeptember10th.TheforceatMoresbywillattack
enemy airdromes on orders from this headquarters, destroying enemy aircraft,
materielandpersonnelwithmachinegunfireandparachutebombs.
d.TheFighterCommand(Provisional)willprotectlocalairdromesandvital
installationsfromgroundandairalertstatus.Itwillbepreparedtoescortlight
andmediumbombardmentonmissionswithintherangeofitsequipment.Itwill
assist bombardment in its mission of destroying enemy aircraft on the ground
whenlackofenemyairstrengthpermitsgroundstaffing.Itwillmaintainareserve
oftwelveP40'sandcrewsatMoresby,areserveofallavailableP30aircraftand
crews in the Townsville area, and a reserve of ten P400's and crews in the
Townsville area, all on call to this headquarters on one hours notice. Escort of
fighter replacements to Moresby will be performed by B 25 aircraft of the 3rd
Bomb.Group.
e.TheNinthOperationalGroup(RAAF),lessallbutoneflightofthe30th
Squadron,ischargedwiththelocaldefenseofMilneBay,operatingagainstenemy
convoysapproachingMilneBaywithintheeffectiverangeofitsequipment,and
preventingeffectiveenemyairattacksonairdromesandvitalinstallations.
The30thSquadron,lessoneflight,willattackanddestroyenemyaircrafton
New Guinea airdromes with cannon and machine gun fire on orders from this
headquarters.
No. 6 Squadron of the Ninth Operational Group will maintain a
reconnaissanceduringdaylighthoursoftheseawardapproachestoMilneBay,as
well as daily surveillance of the D'entre Casteau Islands and the Louisiade
archipelago. Detailed and specific coverages will be assigned daily by this
headquarters.
f.The435thReconnaissanceSquadronwillmaintainaclosesearchofthesea
approachestoNewGuineafromRabaul,FaisiandTruk.Specificcoverageswillbe
assigneddailybythisheadquarters.
g.The8thPhotoSquadronwillmaintainaclosesurveillanceduringdaylight
hours of the North Coast of New Guinea from Finschhafen to Tufi peninsula,
reportinganyenemyshippingimmediately,particularlyenemyairconcentrations
onairdromesatLae,SalamauaandBuna.
4.Nochange.
5.SeedailyAnnextoOperationsOrders.
BycommandofBrigadierGeneralWHITEHEAD:
F.H.SMITHJr.,
Colonel,AirCorps,
OFFICIAL: ChiefofStaff.
WILLIAMG.HIPPS,
Major,AirCorps,
ACofS.G3.
CommandArrangements
Itisastonishinghowobstinatealliesare,howparochiallyminded,howridiculously
sensitivetoprestigeandhowwrappedupinobsoletepoliticalideas.Itisequally
astonishinghowtheyfailtoseehowbroadmindedyouare,howclearyourpicture
is, howupto dateyouareandhow cooperative andbigheartedyou are. It is
extraordinary.
FieldMarshalSirWilliamSlim
Theproverbialweaknessofalliancesisduetoinferiorpowerofconcentration.
AlfredThayerMahan
This is notably less of a limitation for combined air forces, which can be
concentrated in space and time, can provide simultaneous supporting efforts if
differently equipped, can mutually support one another in many ways, and can
concentrateovertimeonparticulartargetsystems,objectives,andcampaigns.
Of all the lessons we learned about tactical air operations, perhaps the most
importantisthattheaircommander,hisgroupandsquadroncommandersmust
haveasinceredesiretobecomepartofthegroundteam.TheArmymust,ofcourse,
havethesamededicationtoreciprocate.Thiscloseliaisoncancomeonlyfromclose
daytoday contactespecially at command levels; there must be almost
instantaneouscommunicationbetweengroundandairandthroughallthechainof
command.
LtGenElwoodR.("Pete")Quesada
AtthestartofWorldWarII,servicecooperationandeventaskforcecooperation
wasoftencreaky,inadequate,downrightbad.Inrearareasandinoverallconcepts
andpoliciesandaboveallinresults,servicerivalriesandobsoleteorselfishand
arbitraryrestrictionsmarredthewareffortintheopeningmonths.
HansonBaldwin
Thegreatestlessonofthiswarhasbeentheextenttowhichair,land,andsea
operationscanandmustbecoordinatedbyjointplanningandunifiedcommand.
The attainment of better coordination and balance than now exists between
servicesisanessentialofnationalsecurity.
"Hap"Arnold
It[ajointcommittee]leadstoweakandfalteringdecisionsorratherindecisions.
Why,youmaytakethemostgallantsailor,themostintrepidairman,orthemost
audacioussoldier,putthematatabletogetherwhatdoyouget?Thesumoftheir
fears.
AttributedtoWinstonChurchill
Mutualsupportisthefundamentalbasisuponwhichtheairsurfacerelationshipis
founded.
AirForceManual13,1953
FM10020
FIELDSERVICEREGULATIONS
COMMANDANDEMPLOYMENT
OFAIRPOWER
SECTIONI
DOCTRINEOFCOMMAND
ANDEMPLOYMENT
1. RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES.LAND POWER
AND AIR POWER ARE COEQUAL AND
INTERDEPENDENT FORCES; NEITHER IS AN
AUXILIARYOFTHEOTHER.
2. DOCTRINE OF EMPLOYMENT.THE GAINING
OF AIR SUPERIORITY IS THE FIRST
REQUIREMENT FOR THE SUCCESS OF ANY
MAJORLANDOPERATION.AIRFORCESMAYBE
PROPERLY AND PROFITABLY EMPLOYED
AGAINST ENEMY SEA POWER, LAND POWER,
AND AIR POWER. HOWEVER, LAND FORCES
OPERATING WITHOUT AIR SUPERIORITY MUST
TAKE SUCH EXTENSIVE SECURITY MEASURES
AGAINST HOSTILE AIR ATTACK THAT THEIR
MOBILITY AND. ABILITY TO DEFEAT THE
ENEMYLANDFORCESAREGREATLYREDUCED.
THEREFORE,AIRFORCESMUSTBEEMPLOYED
PRIMARILYAGAINSTTHEENEMY'SAIRFORCES
UNTILAIRSUPERIORITYISOBTAINED.INTHIS
WAY ONLY CAN DESTRUCTIVE AND
DEMORALIZING AIR ATTACKS AGAINST LAND
FORCES BE MINIMIZED AND THE INHERENT
MOBILITYOFMODERNLANDANDAIRFORCES
BEEXPLOITEDTOTHEFULLEST.
3. COMMAND OF AIR POWER.THE INHERENT
FLEXIBILITY OF AIR POWER, IS ITS GREATEST
ASSET.THISFLEXIBILITYMAKES
ITPOSSIBLE TO EMPLOY THE WHOLE WEIGHT
OF THE AVAILABLE AIR POWER AGAINST
SELECTED AREAS IN TURN; SUCH
CONCENTRATED USE OF THE AIR STRIKING
FORCEISABATTLEWINNINGFACTOROFTHE
FIRST IMPORTANCE. CONTROL OF AVAILABLE
AIR POWER MUST BE CENTRALIZED AND
COMMAND MUST BE EXERCISED THROUGH
THEAIR
FORCE COMMANDER IF THIS INHERENT
FLEXIBILITY AND ABILITY TO DELIVER A
DECISIVEBLOWARETOBEFULLYEXPLOITED.
THEREFORE,THECOMMANDOFAIRAND
GROUND FORCES IN A THEATER OF
OPERATIONS WILL BE VESTED IN THE
SUPERIOR COMMANDER CHARGED WITH THE
ACTUAL CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN THE
THEATER,WHO
WILL EXERCISE COMMAND OF AIR FORCES
THROUGH THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER AND
COMMANDOFGROUNDFORCESTHROUGHTHE
GROUND FORCE COMMANDER. THE SUPERIOR
COMMANDER WILL NOT ATTACH ARMY AIR
FORCES TO UNITS OF THE GROUND FORCES
UNDER HIS COMMAND EXCEPT WHEN SUCH
GROUND FORCE UNITS ARE OPERATING
INDEPENDENTLY OR ARE ISOLATED BY
DISTANCEORLACKOFCOMMUNICATION.
JULY1943
Doctrine
Basics......................................................................................................................171
Terminology...........................................................................................................174
Basics
Those who are possessed of a definitive body of doctrine and of deeply rooted
convictionsuponitwillbeinamuchbetterpositiontodealwiththeshiftsand
surprises of daily affairs than those who are merely taking short views, and
indulgingtheirnaturalimpulsesastheyareevokedbywhattheyreadfromdayto
day.
WinstonChurchill
Theorganizationofmenandmachines intomilitaryforcesdoesnotnecessarily
meanthattheyareequippedandtrainedfortheaccomplishment,ifnecessary,of
decisive action in war. For this, the discipline of a coherent body of thought
appearstobeindispensable.
EugeneEmme
Inshort,doctrineiswhatisofficiallyapprovedtobetaught.Butitisfarmorethan
justthat.Doctrineisthedepartureforvirtuallyeveryactivityintheairarm.
I.B.Holley,Jr.
Onemightsaythatdoctrineistheschoolofthoughtonwarwhichisinvogueatany
onetime.
Dale0.Smith
Thestandardizationoftechniqueofoperationsisnotpossibleinthisglobalwar,for
90timesoutof100anideathatsucceedsinItalywillnotworkinNewGuinea.
Hence we must be versatileour tactics must be susceptible to changeour
commandingofficersmusthaveingenuityandimagination.
"Hap"Arnold
Doctrineislikeacompassbearing;itgivesusthegeneraldirectionofourcourse.
Wemaydeviatefromthatcourseonoccasion,buttheheadingprovidesacommon
purposetoallwhotravelalongtheway.Thisputsagraveburdenonthosewho
formulate doctrine, for a small error, even a minute deviation, in our compass
bearinguponsettingout,mayplaceusmanymilesawayfromthetargetattheend
oftheflight.Ifthosewhodistilldoctrinefromexperienceordeviseitfromlogical
inferenceintheabstractfailtoexercisetheutmostrigorintheirthinking,the
wholeservicesuffers.
I.B.Holley,Jr.
Thetraditionsamongallthearmedservicesaremucholderthananygovernment,
moreconservativethananydepartmentofgovernment,andmoresuretobuildon
afoundationthattheyarecertainof,ratherthantotakeanychanceofmakinga
mistake.
BillyMitchell
TherearetensofthousandsofindividualsintheAirForcewhosetrainingand
traditionsleadthemtoidentifywithoneoranotherofthemajorcommands,with
SACorTAC,orMAC.Andeachofthesebespeaksavestedinterest.Eachsuch
interestmustbeplacated,reconciled,accommodated.Thesenecessities,alongwith
theneverendingconfrontationswithotherservicesfightingforrolesandmissions,
keepthepresentdayguardiansofAirForcedoctrineeternallyontherun.They
aresobusyputtingoutfires,fewofthemfindtimeinwhichtothinkatleisure.
I.B.Holley,Jr.
Theclarityandthereforetheutilityofdoctrineisadirectproductofhowwell
languageisusedinitswriting.
How many a dispute could have been deflated into a single paragraph if the
disputantshadjustdaredtodefinetheirterms.
Aristotle
Thebeginningofwisdomiscallingthingsbytheirrightnames.
Confucius
OnJuly26,1945,thePotsdamDeclarationurgedJapantosurrender.Thereupon
the Japanese Cabinet agreed that it was time to make peace, and on July 28
PremierSuzukiannouncedapolicyof"mokosatsu."Thisunfortunatewordhasno
exactcounterpartinEnglish.Itsapproximatemeaningis"towithholdcomment,"
butitalsomeans"toignore."TheDomeiNewsAgencyatoncebroadcastinEnglish
thattheCabinethaddecidedtoignorethePotsdamultimatum.Aftertheatomic
bombshadbeendropped,PresidentTrumancitedtheJapaneserejectionofthe
ultimatumasareason.Convincingevidenceavailablesincethenshowsthatthe
Premierhadindeedmeanttoconvey"nocomment,"withtheimplicationthata
significantannouncementwouldcomelater.Connoisseursoftheifsofhistorysay
that the right translation could have brought quick peace without atomic
explosions.
PeterT.White
PROFESSIONALREADING
OnAirPowerandWar
Emme,EugeneM.TheImpactofAirPower.Princeton,N.J.:D.VanNostrandCo.,
Inc.,1959.Thisgreatanthologyconsistsof118shortreadingsonairpowerbyover
100authoritiesontheirsubjects.
TheHarmonMemorialLecturesinMilitaryHistory19591987.Washington,
D.C.:OfficeofAirForceHistory,1988.Thirtylecturesbyprominenthistorianson
leaders and leadership, tactics and strategy, history and military affairs.
Worthwhilealoneorasanintroductiontothelecturersandtheirworks.
Weigley,Russell F. TheAmericanWayofWar.Bloomington:IndianaUniversity
Press,1973.Averyreadable survey of American military actions, policy, and
thinkingsincetheRevolution.
OnAirPower
Higham,Robin.AirPower:AConciseHistory.NewYork:St.Martin'sPress,1973.
Justwhatthetitleadvertises.
Stokesbury,JamesL.AShortHistoryofAirPower.NewYork:WilliamMorrow
andCo.,Inc.,1986.Anothergoodsurvey.
Warden, John A., III. The Air Campaign. Washington, D.C.: National Defense
University Press, 1988. A modern look at air operations from the theater and
campaignperspective.
FirstPersonAccountsofAirPowerinWar
Johnson,J.E.WingLeader. NewYork:BallantineBooks,1957.Oneofthebest
featuresofJohnson'swellwritten storyisthevarietyofmissionshedescribes.
Kenney,GeorgeC.GeneralKenneyReports.Washington,D.C.:OfficeofAirForce
History,1987.Kenney's conversationalnarrationoftheairwarintheSouthwest
PacificinWorldWarIIisthebestbookyeton theater air command, fighting
at a disadvantage, organizing a disorganized air force to fight, and creating
operationalopportunities.
Arnold,HenryH.("Hap"). ReportoftheCommandingGeneraloftheArmyAir
ForcestotheSecretaryofWar. Washington, D.C.: War Department Bureau of
PublicRelations,1944.Theimmensevarietyofmissionsand tasks covered in
thisreportshowsthecomplexityofglobalwar.
Bingham,Colin.MenandAffairs.NewYork:Funk&Wagnalls,1967.
Bloch,Marc.StrangeDefeat.NewYork:W.W.Norton&Co.,1968.Anearlyand
penetratinganalysisofthefailureofFrenchdoctrinebeforeWorldWarII.
Brodie,Bernard.WarandPolitics.NewYork:Macmillan,1973.
Brown,Neville.TheFutureofAirPower.NewYork:Holmes&MeierPublishers
Inc.,1986.Adetailedsurveyof manysignificantcurrentandemergingchallenges
toairpower.
Cameron,JamesM.TheAnatomyofMilitaryMerit.Philadelphia:Dorrance&Co.,
1960.Byamilitarydoctor, studdedwithworthwhileinsights.
Churchill,WinstonS.StepbyStep:19361939.NewYork:G.P.Putnam'sSons,
1939.AseriesofmagazinearticleswrittenduringHitler'srisetopowerrevealsthe
tremendousuncertaintiesofeventsastheyhappen.
CondensedAnalysisoftheNinthAirForceintheEuropeanTheaterofOperations.
Washington,D.C.:OfficeofAirForceHistory,1984.
Das,S.T.AnIntroductiontotheArtofWar.NewDelhi:SagarPublications,1970.
WorthwhileforseeingWestern militarytheorythroughanoutsider'seyesplusa
fascinatingsurveyusingsourceslargelyunfamiliartoWesternwriters.
____________.TheEagle'sTalons:TheAmericanExperienceatWar.MaxwellAFB,
Ala.:AirUniversityPress,1988.
Fuller,J.F.C.Generalship:ItsDiseasesandTheirCure.Harrisburg,Pa.:Military
ServicePublishingCo.,1936.
Futrell,Robert F. Ideas,Concepts,Doctrine:AHistoryofBasicThinkinginthe
UnitedStatesAirForce1907 1964.MaxwellAFB,Ala.:AirUniversity,1971.
Galland,Adolf.TheFirstandtheLast.NewYork:HenryHoltandCo.,1954.
Goodson,WilfredL.RemarksinPhalanx,June1985.
Heinl, Robert D., Jr. Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations. Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1966. The most comprehensive book of military
quotationsavailable.
Hemingway,Ernest,ed.MenatWar.NewYork:CrownPublishers,1942.
Hughes,DanielJ."WhenceMilitaryDoctrine?"MilitaryReview,October1988.A
bookreviewessayondoctrinetoday.
Impact:TheArmyAirForce'sConfidentialPictureHistoryofWorldWarII.
8vols.NewYork:JamesPartonandCo.,Inc.,1980.
Johnston,EdwardS."AScienceofWar."TheCGSCQuarterly14,no.53(1934).
Jones,WilliamA.MaximsforMenatArms.Philadelphia:DorranceandCo.,1969.
Knox,DudleyW. "TheRoleofDoctrineinNavalWarfare."USNavalInstitute
Proceedings41,no.2(MarchApril1915).
Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2d ed., enlarged.
Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1970.
LiddellHart,Adrian,ed.TheSwordandthePen.PreparedbyB.H.LiddellHart.
NewYork:ThomasY.CrowellCo.,1976.Ananthologyofmilitarywriting.
____________.ThoughtsonWar.London:FaberandFaberLtd.,1944.
Luvaas,Jay.FredericktheGreatontheArtofWar.NewYork:FreePress,1966.
Marshall,S.L.A.TheOfficerasaLeader.Harrisburg,Pa.:StackpoleBooks,1966.
____________.Skyways.Philadelphia:J.B.LippincottCo.,1930.
Pike,Douglas.PAVN.Novato,Calif.:PresidioPress,1986.
Powers,BarryD.StrategywithoutSlideRule:BritishAirStrategy191439.New
York:Holmes&MeierPublishers,Inc.,1976.Afinesurveyofthedevelopmentof
Britishairpowerandstrategy.
RootsofStrategy.2vols.Harrisburg,Pa.:StackpoleBooks,1987.Book1contains
writingsbySunTzu,Vegetius, Saxe,Frederick,andNapoleon.Book2consistsof
writingsbyduPicq,Clausewitz,andJomini.
Roskill,S.W.TheArtofLeadership.London:Collins,1948.
Slessor,J.C.AirPowerandArmies.London:OxfordUniversityPress,1936.Using
World War I as background, Slessor brilliantly explains tactical air operations,
muchasweknowthemtoday.
Smith,DaleO.U.S.MilitaryDoctrine:AStudyandAppraisal.ForewordbyCarl
Spaatz.NewYork:Duell,Sloan andPearce,1955.
____________.TheEagle'sTalons.Washington,D.C.:SpartanBooks,1966.
Spaatz,CarlA. "StrategicAirPower:FulfillmentofaConcept."ForeignAffairs,
April1946.
____________."IfWeShouldHavetoFightAgain."Life,5July1948.
Tedder,Arthur.AirPowerinWar.London:HodderandStoughton,1948.
Twining, Nathan F.Neither Liberty nor Safety. NewYork: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston,1966.
Walker,JohnR."Leadership."AirClues,October1987.
Watts, Barry D. The Foundations of U.S. Air Force Doctrine: The Problem of
FrictioninWar.MaxwellAFB, Ala.:AirUniversityPress,1984.
Miller,SamuelDuncan. AnAerospaceBibliography.Washington,D.C.:Officeof
Air Force History, 1978. Thorough but a bit dated. Contains a bibliography of
bibliographies.
Paret,Peter,ed.MakersofModernStrategy.Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity
Press,1986.Thisbookcontains someexcellentbibliographicalessays.
Anderson,OrvilA., MajorGeneral,USAF.Deputydirectorforoperationsofthe
EighthAirForceinWorldWarII.
Aristotle. Athenianphilosopher,scientist,andphysician;tutortoAlexanderthe
Great.
Arnold, Henry Harley ("Hap"), General of the Air Force. Aviation pioneer;
learnedtoflywiththeWrightbrothers;commanderofArmyAirForcesinWorld
WarIIwhentheseforcesnumbered2,500,000peopleand75,000aircraft;author
ofAirmenandAircraft(1926)andGlobalMission(1949).
Bacon,Francis,ViscountSt.Albans.Elizabethanphilosopher,statesman,writer;
proponentofthescientificmethod.
Baldwin,Stanley, FirstEarlBaldwinofBewdley.TwiceprimeministerofGreat
Britain,192331and193537.
Bell,AlexanderGraham.Inventorofthetelephone;earlyaeronauticalscientist;
devotedhimselftoimprovingaircraftdesignduringWorldWarI.
Bingham,PriceT.,LieutenantColonel,USAF.MilitaryanalystattheAirpower
ResearchInstitute;prolificauthor;advocateofmilitaryhistoricalanalysis.
Bradley, Omar N., General of the Army. Commander of major ground force
echelonsinTunisia,Sicily,andEuropeduringWorldWarII;chairmanoftheJoint
ChiefsofStafffrom1949to1953.
Brown, Neville. Futurist; author of The Future of Air Power (1986) and The
FutureGlobalChallenge(1977).
Burt,Richard.Militaryanalyst;authorofNewWeaponsTechnologies (1976)and
ArmsControlandDefensePosturesinthe1980s(1982).
Byrd, Richard Evelyn, Admiral, USN. Pioneer airman and polar explorer;
authorofSkyward(1928),Discovery(1935),andAlone(1938).
Cameron,JamesM.,Colonel,USA.Medicaldoctorandproponentofapplicationof
naturallawtomilitaryscience;authorofTheAnatomyofMilitaryMerit(1960).
ChangYu.SungdynastyauthorofcommentaryonSunTzu.
Charles,ArchdukeofAustria. CommanderoftheAustrianArmyoftheRhein;
wonseveralbattlesagainstFrenchforcesintheNapoleonicera.
Chassin,G.J.M.,General,FrenchAirForce.CommanderofFrenchAirForcesin
Indochinafrom1951to1954.
ChenHao.TangdynastyauthorofcommentsonSunTzu.
Churchill, Sir Winston Leonard Spencer. Prime Minister of Great Britain
duringWorldWarII;militarytrainingatSandhurst;battleexperienceasasoldier
inIndia,Sudan,SouthAfrica,andBelgium;earlycabinetlevelresponsibilitiesfor
theRoyalNavyandRoyalAirForce;hisflairfortheEnglishlanguage wasthe
resultofeducatinghimself;prolificauthorofveryreadablemilitaryhistory.
Clarke,BruceC.,General,USA.CommanderofarmoreddivisionsinWorldWar
II;commanderinchiefofUSAREURandCENTAGfrom1960to1962;authorof
GuidelinesfortheLeaderandtheCommander(1964).
Colin,Jean,GeneralofBrigade,FrenchArmy.LecturerattheEcoledeGuerre;
criticoftheoffensivedogmathatprovedsocostlyinWorldWarI;killedinbattle
in 1917; author of The Military Education of Napoleon (1900) and The
TransformationofWar(1912).
Coolidge,Calvin.ThirtiethPresidentoftheUnitedStates(19231929).
Cooper,JohnC.,Commander,USN.CommanderinWorldWarI;aviationscholar
andactivist;authorofTheRighttoFly(1948)andTheFundamentalsofAirPower
(1948).
Corlett,Charles H.,MajorGeneral,USA.CommanderofTaskForceKiska,the
7thInfantryDivision(atKwajalein),andXIXCorps,inWorldWarII.
Das,S.T.Indian;authorofAnIntroductiontotheArtofWar(1970).
deSeversky,AlexanderProcofieff, Major,ImperialRussianAirForce.World
WarIcombatflyingboatpilot;designerofleadingsingleenginefighteraircraft,
includingtheP47;prominentairpoweradvocate;authorof VictoryThroughAir
Power(1942)andAirPower:KeytoSurvival(1950).
Donham,WallaceBrett.AuthorofAdministrationandBlindSpots(1952).
Doolittle,JamesHarold("Jimmy"), LieutenantGeneral,USAF.Leaderofthe
Doolittleraid;famousairracerandtestpilot;commanderoftheTwelfth,Fifteenth,
andEighthAirForcesinWorldWarII.
Douglas, William Sholto, Air Marshal, RAF. World War I fighter pilot;
commanderofRAFFighterCommandandCoastalCommandinWorldWarII.
Douhet,Giulio,General,ItalianAirForce.Earlyaviatorandairpoweradvocate;
authorof TheCommandoftheAir (1921)and ProbableAspectsofaFutureWar
(1928).
Drew, Dennis M., Colonel, USAF. Prominent strategic analyst and military
theorist;directoroftheAirpowerResearchInstitute.
Dulles,JohnFoster.SecretaryofStateintheEisenhoweradministration;author
ofWarorPeace(1950);strongsupporterofNATOandSEATO.
duPicq,CharlesArdant,Colonel,FrenchArmy.MilitaryleaderintheCrimean
andFrancoPrussianwars;authoroftheclassicBattleStudies(1870).
Earle,EdwardMeade.Eminenthistorian;consultanttoGeneralArnoldontarget
selectioninWorldWarII;authorofTheInfluenceofAirPoweronHistory;editorof
MakersofModernStrategy(1943).
Eisenhower,DwightDavid,GeneraloftheArmy.ThirtyfourthPresidentofthe
UnitedStates;supremecommanderofAlliedforcesinEuropeinWorldWarII.
Eliot, George Fielding. American military commentator; author of Bombs
BurstinginAir(1938)andHateHopeandHighExplosives(1948).
Emme,EugeneM.NASAhistorian;authorofTheHistoryofSpaceFlight(1965);
editoroftheclassicTheImpactofAirPower(1959).
Euripides.AthenianplaywrightandcontemporaryofThucydides.
Forester,C.S.Britishnovelistandnavalhistorian.
Franklin,Benjamin.Americanrevolutionarystatesman,scientist,andwriter.
Frontinus(SextusJuliusFrontinus).TwiceconsulofRome;governorofBritainin
thefirstcenturyA.D.;authorofStratagematicon("onwar").
FrederickII("theGreat"),KingofPrussia.Brilliantmilitaryleaderanddomestic
reformer;rebelledagainstmilitarydisciplineasayouthandwascourtmartialed;in
theSevenYears'Warof17561763,heheldoffthearmiesofRussia,France,and
Austria(alllargerpowers)throughadroitmaneuvering,timing,andskill.
Geiger,KeithW.,Colonel,USAF.FormereditorofAirpowerJournal.
Goodson, Wilfred L., Brigadier General, USAF. Fighter pilot (128 missions in
SoutheastAsia);astrophysicist;operationsresearchtheorist;assistantchiefofstaff
for studies and analysis; commander of the Air Force Center for Studies and
Analysis.
Griffith,SamuelB.,II, BrigadierGeneral,USMC.TranslatorofSunTzu(1963)
andMaoTsetung(1961);authorofTheBattleforGuadalcanal(1963).
Groves,PercyRobertClifford,BrigadierGeneral,BritishArmy.AirMinisterfor
BritaininWorldWarI;earlyairprophet;authorof OurFutureintheAir (1935)
andBehindtheSmokeScreen(1934).
Hackett,SirJohnWinthrop,General,BritishArmy.WorldWarIIleaderofelite
units;brigadecommanderduringtheairborneassaultofHolland;authorof The
ProfessionofArms(1986).
Hale,JamesO.,andBarryD.Watts.Authorsof"Doctrine:MereWords,oraKey
toWarFightingCompetence?"inAirUniversityReview.SeptemberOctober1984.
Hall,NorrisF.Harvardprofessorofchemistry;prophesiedbothfusionandfission
weaponsinhis1925lecture"ScienceinWar."
Hamilton,Alexander.StatesmanandleadingFederalist;captainofartilleryand
aide to General Washington; distinguished for bravery at Yorktown; first US
secretaryofthetreasury.
Heinl,RobertD.,Jr.USMarineCorpsofficer;compilerofDictionaryofMilitary
andNavalQuotations(1966).
Hemingway,Ernest.Americanjournalist,novelist,andshortstorywriter;author
ofAFarewelltoArms(1929)andMenatWar(1942).
HoChiMinh.TwentiethcenturyVietnameserevolutionarytheoristandleader.
Holley,I.B.,Jr.,MajorGeneral,USAF.Eminenthistorianofideas;author
oftheclassicIdeasandWeapons(1953).
Howard, Michael. Britishmilitarytheorist;authorof TheCausesofWarsand
OtherEssays(1984)andClausewitz(1983).
Hughes,DanielJ.CommandhistorianoftheUSArmyCombinedArmsCenterat
FortLeavenworth.
Huntington,SamuelP.AuthorofTheSoldierandtheState(1956),thefirstmajor
lookattheUSmilitaryasaprofession.
Iino,Matsuichi.JapaneseArmyofficerinWorldWarII;interviewedinReportsof
GeneralMacArthur.
Jackson,Andrew.SeventhPresidentoftheUnitedStates;victorofseveralbattles
intheWarof1812.
Johnson,JamesEdgar("Johnnie"), AirViceMarshal,RAF.WorldWarIIace;
historianofaircombat;authorofWingLeader(1956)andFullCircle(1968).
Jomini,AntoineHenri,GeneralofBrigadeofFranceandLieutenantGeneralof
Russia.ServedasMarshalNey'schiefofstaff;directoroftheFrenchgeneralstaff's
historicalsectionintheNapoleonicWars;authorofTheArtofWar(1855).
Jones,StevenB. Politicalgeographer,professorofgeography;authorof"Global
StrategicViews"inTheImpactofAirPower,ed.EugeneM.Emme.
Jordan,DavidStarr.Californiaactivist,essayist,andpolitician;authorofWar&
Waste:ASeriesofDiscussionsofWarandWarAccessories(1913).
Kenney,GeorgeChurchill, General,USAF.WorldWarIfighterpilotwithtwo
victories; commander of Southwest Pacific Area Air Forces and Far Eastern Air
Forces in World War II; author of General Kenney Reports (1949) and three
biographies.
Koller,Karl, General,GermanAirForce.LastchiefofstaffoftheGermanAir
ForceinWorldWarII.
Lay,Beirne,Jr.,Colonel,USAF.EighthAirForcestaffofchiefinWorldWarII;
authorandscreenwriterofO'ClockHigh(1948).
Lenin(formerlyUlyanov),VladimirIlyich. Russianrevolutionaryleaderand
theorist.
Liddell Hart, Sir Basil Henry, Captain, British Army. Military theorist and
historian;advocateofcombinedarmswarfareandtheindirectapproach;authorof
numerousbooks,includingParis,ortheFutureofWar(1925)andStrategy(1954).
Lincoln,Abraham.SixteenthPresidentoftheUnitedStates.
Luvaas,Jay.Distinguishedmilitaryhistorian;authorofFredericktheGreatonthe
ArtofWar(1966)andTheEducationofanArmy(1954).
MacArthur,Douglas,GeneraloftheArmy.DivisioncommanderinWorldWarI;
chiefofstafffrom1931to1935;commanderofAlliedforcesintheSouthwestPacific
inWorldWarII;commanderofUnitedNationsforcesinKoreauntilrelievedby
PresidentTruman.
MacIsaac,David,LieutenantColonel,USAF.Eminentairpowerhistorian;author
ofStrategicBombinginWorld WarII(1976);editorofTheUnitedStatesStrategic
BombingSurvey:SelectedReportsinTenVolumes(1976).
Mahan, Alfred Thayer, Admiral, USN. Son of Dennis Hart Mahan; naval
historianandtheorist;authorof TheInfluenceofSeaPoweruponHistory (1890),
oneofthemostinfluentialvolumesofhistoricalanalysiseverwritten.
Mahan,DennisHart.ProfessorofmilitaryartandscienceatWestPoint;founder
of professional military study in the United States; influenced many Civil War
generals.
MaoTsetung.TwentiethcenturyChineserevolutionarytheoristandleader.
Marshall,GeorgeCatlett,GeneraloftheArmy.Chiefofstafffrom1939to1945;
chiefstrategistandorganizerofmilitaryoperationsandlogisticsinWorldWarII;
awardedtheNobelPrizeforhiscontributionstothepostwarrecoveryofEurope.
Marshall,SamuelLymanAtwood, BrigadierGeneral,USA.Militaryhistorian
andanalyst;advocatedinterviewinglargenumbersofsoldiersimmediatelyafter
battle;authorofBlitzkrieg(1940),thecontroversialMenAgainstFire(1947),and
manyotherbooks.
Maugham,WilliamSomerset.Britishshortstorywriter;adventurer;intelligence
operativeinWorldWarI.
Meyer,JohnC.,General,USAF.WorldWarIIacewith24victories;KoreanWar
wing commander with two victories; commander in chief of the Strategic Air
Command.
Montgomery,ViscountBernardLaw,FieldMarshal,BritishArmy.Commander
of the British Eighth Army in North Africa;commanderofAllied landforces at
Normandy.
Napier, Sir Charles James, General, British Army. Military leader in the
NapoleonicWarsandinIndia.
Napier,SirWilliam.MilitaryleaderintheNapoleonicWars;militaryhistorian;
youngerbrotherofSirCharles Napier.
Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France. Military leader; multiskilled
reorganizerofcontinentalEuropeanpoliticsandlaw.
Olds,Robin,BrigadierGeneral,USAF.WorldWarIIacewith13victories;wing
commanderinSoutheastAsiawithfourvictories.
O'Malley,JeromeF.,General,USAF.PilotofthefirstoperationalSR71mission;
wingcommanderofreconnaissancewingsinSoutheastAsia;commanderofTactical
AirCommandatthetimeofhisdeathin1985.
Pasteur,Louis.Nineteenthcenturychemist;"fatherofbacteriology."
Patton,GeorgeSmith,Jr.,General,USArmy.Commanderofarmoredforcesin
WorldWarI;commanderoflargegroundforces,includingThirdArmy,inWorld
WarII;prolificauthorofarticlesinmilitaryprofessionalmagazines.
Petrarch(FrancescoPetrarca).Italianscholarandauthor;thefirstgreatfigure
oftheRenaissance.
Posen,BarryP.AuthorofTheSourcesofMilitaryDoctrine(1984).
Possony,StefanT.PoliticalscientistandearlyconsultanttotheUSAirForce;
author of Tomorrow's War (1938), Strategic Air Power (1949), and A Century of
Conflict(1953).
Power,ThomasS.,General,USAF.CommanderofbomberforcesinWorldWarII;
commanderinchiefofSACfrom1957to1964;authorofDesignforSurvival(1964).
Quesada,ElwoodRichard("Pete"),LieutenantGeneral,USAF.Pioneeraviator;
commander of fighter forces in North Africa and Europe in World War II; first
commanderofTacticalAirCommand;firstadministratorofNASA.
Radford,ArthurW.,Admiral,USN.Carrieraviator;WorldWarIIcommanderof
CarrierDivision6atIwoJimaandOkinawa;majorfigureinthe"Admiral'sRevolt";
chairmanoftheJointChiefsofStafffrom1953to1957.
Raleigh,SirWalterAlexander.Scholarandwriter;preparedTheWarintheAir
19141918(7vols.,19221937),theofficialhistoryoftheRAFinWorldWarI.
Ransom,HarryHowe.Militaryresearcherandwriter;authorofnumerousworks,
includingCentralIntelligenceandNationalSecurity(1958).
Richthofen,Manfredvon,Rittmeister,GermanAirForce.Germany'sleading
aceinWorldWarIwith80victories.
Ridgway,MatthewB.,General,USA.Commanderofthe82dAirborneDivision
and XVIII Airborne Corps in World War II; commander of United Nations
CommandintheKoreanWar;chiefofstafffrom1953to1955;authorof Soldier
(1956)andTheKoreanWar(1967).
Robertson, Sir William, Field Marshal, British Army. Chief of the Imperial
GeneralStaffinWorldWarI;authorofFromPrivatetoFieldMarshal(1921).
Rogers, Felix M., General, USAF. Ace with 12 victories in World War II;
commanderofAirForceLogisticsCommand.
Rommel,Erwin,FieldMarshal,GermanArmy.LeaderofGermanarmoredforces
in the Battle of France and the North African campaigns; organizer of invasion
defenseforcesinWorldWarII.
Roskill,StephenW., Captain,BritishRoyalNavy.CommanderinthePacificin
WorldWarII;authoroftheRoyalNavy'sofficialhistoryofWorldWarII, TheWar
atSea(1961).
Saxe, Hermann Maurice de, Marshal of France. Commissioned at age 12, a
regimentalcommanderofcavalryat17;leadingmilitarycommanderoftheearly
eighteenthcentury;authorofMyReveries(1732).
Shaw, Robert L., Lieutenant Colonel, USAFR. Fighter pilot; author of Fighter
Combat:TacticsandManeuvering(1985).
Sherman,WilliamTecumseh,General,ArmyoftheUnitedStates.Uniongeneral
intheCivilWar;earlyinthewar,presscorrespondentslabeledhiminsane;athis
request,retiredin1874soSheridancouldsucceedhimasthearmy'scommanding
general.
Slessor,SirJohnCotesworth,AirMarshal,RAF.WorldWarIpilot;architectof
BritishairstrategyinWorldWarII;authorofseveralbooks,includingAirPower
andArmies(1936)andTheCentralBlue(1957).
Slim,SirWilliamJoseph,FieldMarshal,BritishArmy.Servedonthreefrontsin
World War I; Allied commander in Burma during World War II; author of the
classicDefeatintoVictory(1956).
Smith,Dale0., MajorGeneral,USAF.SquadronandgroupcommanderinWorld
WarII;militarytheorist;authorofU.S.MilitaryDoctrine:AStudyandAppraisal
(1955).
Smith,WalterBedell.StrategicplannerandchiefofstafftoGeneralEisenhower
inWorldWarII.
Snow, Donald M. Political scientist and writer; author of The Nuclear Future
(1983)andNationalSecurity(1987).
Sophocles.Athenianplaywright;contemporaryofThucydides.
Spaatz,CarlA.("Tooey"),General,USAF.FirstchiefofstaffoftheUSAirForce,
1947 to 1948; World War I fighter pilot with three victories; early air pioneer;
commandedtheQuestionMarkenduranceflightandair refueling demonstration;
commanderofmajorairforceelementsineveryoverseastheaterinWorldWarII.
Spruance,RaymondAmes, Admiral,USN.TaskforcecommanderattheBattle
ofMidway;commanderoflargenavalforcesinthePacificinWorldWarII.
"SquadronLeader."PseudonymoftheauthorofBasicPrinciplesofAirWarfare:
TheInfluenceofAirPoweron Sea and Land Strategy (1927); this volume and
Slessor's AirPowerandArmies typifythe"conservative"orflexibleschoolofail
powertheory,whichcontrastswiththeexclusiveprescriptionsofDouhetandhis
adherents.
Thoreau,HenryDavid.NineteenthcenturyAmericanidealistandessayist.
Thucydides. Commander of land and sea forces in the early period of the
Peloponnesian Wars; author of The Peloponnesian Wars, probably the most
illustrativebookeverontheproblemsofstrategyandpolicy.
Trenchard,HughMontague,BritishAirMarshal,Viscount.Commanderofthe
RoyalFlyingCorpsinthefieldinWorldWarI;chiefofAirStafffrom1919to1929;
singlemindedadvocateofairprogress.
Twining,NathanFarragut,General,USAF.Commanderofmajorairforceunits
in the Pacific and Europe in World War II; chief of staff from 1953 to 1957;
chairmanoftheJointChiefsofStafffrom1957to1961;authorofNeitherLiberty
norSafety(1966).
Vandenberg,HoytS., General,USAF.CommanderofNinthAirForceinWorld
WarII;chiefofstafffrom1948to1953.
Walker,JohnR.,AirViceMarshal,RAF.Prolificauthorofmoderncommentaries
onairpower,includingAirtoGroundOperations(1987).
Warden, John A., III, Colonel, USAF. Fighter pilot; forward air controller in
SoutheastAsia;authorofTheAirCampaign(1988).
Washington,George,GeneraloftheArmiesoftheUnitedStates.FirstPresident
oftheUnitedStates.
Watts,BarryD., LieutenantColonel,USAF.Fighterpilotanddoctrineanalyst;
advocateofstudyingthefrictionsinherenttowar;authorof TheFoundationsof
U.S.AirDoctrine:TheProblemofFrictioninWar(1984).
Welch,Larry.Chiefofstaff,USAirForce.
Wellington,ArthurWellesley,FirstDukeofWellington.LeadingBritishgeneral;
defeatedforcesofNapoleoninthePeninsularCampaignandatWaterloo.
Wells,HerbertGeorge.Futurist;authorofTheWarintheAir(1908).
White,PeterT.Journalistandlinguist;servedinUSArmyintelligenceinWorld
WarII.
Yeager,CharlesElwood("Chuck"),BrigadierGeneral,USAF.WorldWarIIace
with13victories,includingfiveononemissionandavictoryoverajet;testpilot:
firstmantoflysupersonic.
Zhigarev,PavelF.,ChiefMarshalofAviation,SovietUnion.Commanderinchief
ofSovietairforcesfrom1941to1942and1949to1957;later,headofAeroflot.
Acknowledgments
LtGenTrumanSpangrudputthefuelintothisproject.DrDavidMacIsaac
withtheassistanceofLtColsJeffBenton,PriceBingham,RickClark,RickDavis,
and Frank Donnini, and Maj Tom Blowdid the preflight. The staff of the Air
UniversityLibrary,andinparticularMelroseBryant,hookedupthepowercart.Lt
ColCharlesWestenhoffcrankedtheengines.TheAirUniversityPressstaffran
thechecksandpulledthechocks.ColDennisM.DrewwasthemarshalerandCol
SidneyJ.Wisecalledforclearance.
ThelateLtGenRalphE.Havensinspiredusallandprovidedtopcoverthe
essenceofairpowerandleadership.