A S H RA E

JOURNAL

The following article was published in ASHRAE Journal, February 1998. Copyright 1998 American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers, Inc. It is presented for educational purposes only. This article may not be copied and/or distributed electronically or in paper form without permission of ASHRAE.

Applying Process Hazard Analysis To Laboratory HVAC Design

By John O. Varley, P .E.
Member ASHRAE
Guide Words No Less More Part of As well as Reverse Other than Meaning Design intent is not achieved. Result is less than the design intent. Result is more than the design intent. Result is qualitatively less than the design intent. Result is in addition to the design intent. Result is the opposite of the design intent. Complete substitution for design intent.

he chemical and oil processing industries have operated under self-regulated best practice, including the use of process hazard analysis (PHA) techniques, for several years. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) authored a federal mandate, the Process Safety Management (PSM) of Highly Hazardous Chemicals...1 (29 CFR 1910.119) in 1992, which provides regulatory motivation for engineers to apply PHA techniques to new or revised processes. Although laboratory facilities using hazardous materials are excluded from this law, the procedures and guidelines listed in it provide excellent guidance for the design and operation of these facilities. Regardless of the nature of the hazards (chemical or biological) contained in a laboratory, the engineers and operations personnel responsible for laboratory design, construction and maintenance can benefit by using PHA methods. Several guidelines exist for the design and maintenance of laboratory facilities. For example, regulatory requirements for laboratories using hazardous chemicals are summarized in Occupational Exposure to Chemicals in Laboratories 2 (29 CFR 1910.1450). In addition, federal mandates exist for nonclinical and pharmaceutical laboratories3,4 (21 CFR 58, 21 CFR 211). Finally, several industry guidelines and standards5,6,7,8 (ASHRAE, 1995; NRC, 1981; NFPA, 1996; ANSI/AIHA,1992) are available for laboratory HVAC design. These tools offer prudent guidance for the design and operation of laboratories; but none of them specify the deliberate methods of evaluating design listed in the PSM rule. Although not intended to be used as a design tool, PHA offers designers a systematic approach to engineering for safety. This article will review PHA requirements, offer ideas to apply them to HVAC system design and operation, and relate the benefits of their use. PHA Method Overview Process hazard analysis is the study of a facility, process, building, service or operation carried out to ensure that hazards are identified, understood and properly controlled. A variety of PHA methods are available, including: Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Studies. What If analysis. Failure modes and effects analysis. Fault tree analysis. Event tree analysis. Cause-consequence analysis. Human error analysis. A more detailed overview of these approaches can be found in the literature9 (AICHE, 1985). In this article, the HAZOP method is reviewed9,10 (AICHE, 1985; Larkin, 1996).
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Table 1: HAZOP guide words.

HAZOP is only part of the total hazard study of a new or revised process. A typical hazard study consists of several phases: 1. This phase is performed during the initial and preliminary engineering stage of project development. Its purpose is to ensure that the project, the process and related processing materials are understood. This study will result in a cursory understanding of the safety, health and environmental issues associated with the project. It plays an important role in enabling management to make key policy decisions and establishing rapport among the project team members. Upon completion of flow diagrams and general equipment layouts significant hazards, their possible causes and protective measures to meet relevant criteria, are identified. 2. This phase is performed after detailed process and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) have been generated. It is intended to identify hazards or obstacles to operability that could arise from deviations in the design intent. In this phase the HAZOP method is applied. 3. The post-construction phase consists of several steps: process commissioning, review of safety, health and environmental protection, and documentation verification. The purpose of the commissioning process is to verify that the building and/or process has been built to the intended design and that actions from the previous hazard studies have been completed. Next, safety, employee health and environmental protection on the site are reviewed for conformance with corporate and legislative requirements. Finally, all documentation associated with the

About the Author

John O. Varley, P.E., is a consulting engineer located in Bray Village, Ohio. He is a member of ASHRAE TC 9.10, Laboratory Systems. Varley has a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Akron, Akron, Ohio, and a Master of Science in Chemical Engineering from Cleveland State University, Cleveland, Ohio.
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project is reviewed and AIR HANDLING UNIT incorporated into the EXHAUST FAN operation of the facility. Using a team-oriHWR ented approach that HWS M brainstorms potential problems with a design, EA the HAZOP method evaluates process hazOUTSIDE AIR ards and identifies potential operability T issues. It achieves its results by applying guide words to specific points (or nodes) in the DA Damper actuator Legend: T Temperature sensor design. LAB MODULE GEA General exhaust air EOA Exhaust outside air TE Temperature element The HAZOP study EA Exhaust air MA Makeup air FT Flow transmitter requires basic informaInstrument PT Pressure transmitter FV Face velocity Use tion prior to commenceSA Supply air SP Static pressure ment including a preliminary process and instrumentation diagram Figure 1: Sample AF&ID. (P&ID), material data safety sheets (MSDS) EXHAUST FAN and preliminary operatNODE 2 AIR HANDLING UNIT ing procedures. The NODE 3 project manager typically drives the HAZOP HWR NODE 6-EXHAUST HWS process by assembling MANIFOLD M the data, establishing the EA schedule and identifying the team members. Team membership OUTSIDE AIR NODE 5 should include a trained T HAZOP team leader, a scribe to record the NODE 4 results of the study, releNODE 1 vant operating personnel Control LAB MODULE and the project manager. Volume of The team meetings Node begin after the process or facility has been divided into its discrete Figure 2: Breakdown of AF&ID into nodes. nodes. Under the tutelage of the study leader, the team identi- same materials as a hazardous chemical tion of process hazard analysis methods fies the design intent of each node and or biochemical process facility, but in to laboratory design. then applies guide words (Table 1) to smaller and more varied quantities. Prior to the HAZOP session, the Therefore, the hazards within the labora- design team will have gathered the folreview the process. The use of guide words prompts dis- tory facility can be as severe as a process lowing information: covery of deviations from the design facility, as seen in recent catastrophic The airflow and instrumentation diintent. The team then discusses the con- accidents11,12,13 (Dowdy, 1995; Lhotka, agram (AF&ID). This drawing is similar sequences and causes, suggests recom- 1995; Reed, 1996). Further, the HVAC to the P&ID described earlier and promendations and records results. The system associated with the laboratory is vides the basis for the structure of the results are recorded. An example of this a primary means of hazard mitigation. HAZOP (Figure 1). process is discussed later in this article. This suggests that application of the Relevant material data safety sheets HAZOP method is a logical extension of Applying HAZOP (MSDS). the design process. Although a literature Preliminary equipment list. Regardless of the nature of work search uncovered discussion of risk Sequence of operations for the conhoused in a laboratory (industrial, aca- assessment14 (West, 1978) for laboratodemic or institutional), it will contain the ries, no work was found on the applica- trol system.
TE MA FT DA OA DA SA DA EA PT SP DA EOA DA GEA FT FV YY XX
TE MA FT DA OA DA SA DA EA PT SP DA DA EOA GEA FT FV

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Guide Word No Less Reverse

Deviation No Flow Less Flow Reverse flow

Causes VAV Valve failure, blockage, power failure

Consequences Chemical exposure

Recommendations 1. Evaluate failure modes of VAV valve. 2. Establish procedure for low flow situation. 3. Establish procedure for this failure. 4. Evaluate failure mode of damper. 5. Minimize leakage areas in duct. 6. Explore possibility of installing LEL detectors. 7. Investigate whether explosion venting for the duct should be installed. 8. Establish procedure to verify hood performance prior to use. 9. Establish appropriate controller response time. 10. Establish procedure for clean-up. 12. Investigate installing emergency devices in hood and room. 13. Establish emergency response procedure for incident in hood or outside of hood.

Same as no. Hoods all open Chemical exposure at the same time. Fan Failure Chemical exposure

Late

Late valve action Slow controller response

Same as no

As well as

Spill in hood as well as normal hazards

Spill

Chemical exposure, fire and explosion hazard

Table 2: HAZOP example.

The project manager (owners representative) will then assemble the study team. The team members should consist of the following: The hazard study team leader. Scribe. The local safety and health manager. Commissioning manager. Facilities representative. The affected lab users. The engineer. The project manager. The meeting membership (with the exception of the hazard study leader and scribe) should be composed of individuals who have working knowledge of the proposed system. For example, the portion of the study involving mechanical space should involve facilities personnel. On the other hand, the study of operations within the lab module should involve lab personnel. Typically, executive management is excluded from hazard study meetings. Prior to the meeting, the project manager and engineer will reduce the airflow and instrumentation diagram into its nodes (Figure 2). This will allow the team to focus on discrete parts of the process to simplify the discussion. The study team participants should allow ample time to complete the study. Although time requirements vary according to the complexity of the drawings, a typical rule-of- thumb is to allow thirty minutes per node. Common nodes can receive a cursory study, thereby eliminating some labor. In addition, the deliberate quality of the study will require many breaks in the meeting. To maintain a high
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caliber of discussion, the meetings should not extend to a point where team members can no longer concentrate. Four hour meetings seem to provide optimal results. This discussion suggests that the effort associated with a rigorous HAZOP should not be underestimated. As a result, the study team leadership must receive the support of executive management. This will provide positive reinforcement to the team membership to contribute the requisite time for this endeavor. The effort of documenting the study can be significantly reduced by using software readily available on the market. Other meeting tools, such as an overhead projector, can also improve discussion and productivity. With team and tools assembled at the meeting place, the actual process of HAZOP begins. Following the HAZOP guide word method, each node is evaluated for possible deviations to the design intent. The study depicted in Table 2 involves the design of a manifolded VAV exhaust system. The node illustrated here (Node 1 of Figure 2) includes a fume hood, fume hood sensor, controller and exhaust valve. The design intent, as determined by the team, is to provide a hood to enclose weigh-up and mixing operations, and solvent cleaning of lab apparatus. The study leader must ensure that all nodes are identified and discussed during the session. The project manager is responsible for responding to all recommendations (sometimes referred to as findings). Although the HAZOP method is ideally suited for evaluation of AF&IDs, it can also be used to review building con-

struction practices. In addition, the other aforementioned PHA techniques may offer expedient and effective approaches to the analysis of the process and building. Conclusion Process Hazard Analysis enhances the opportunity to create inherently safe designs by identifying alternatives to processing, raw materials used in processing, construction materials and procedures. In addition, PHA forces the design team to rigorously analyze their design assumptions and clearly document the intent of their design. Although design improvements generated by PHA significantly lower the hazards of the process, the identification of procedural and educational requirements for the design may provide even greater benefits. As seen in the earlier example, these needs are identified and resolved. Thus, the PHA process can significantly reduce the hazards created by human error. By using a multi-discipline team, these studies tend to identify design improvements. Although HAZOP requires an expenditure of time and money, it can result in even greater savings in first costs and operating costs by improving the system design. As a result, processes that have been evaluated using PHA are inherently more value-driven than those designs that ignore the technique. Further, PHA reduces costly additions to a project during construction by enhancing communication among team members during conceptual and preliminary engineering. Finally, the process expedites the commissioning and turn-over phase of a project. Operating personnel involved
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with the study receive early training relative to the design. This results in a higher degree of involvement by the users of the design and ultimately greater buy-in. In addition, the HAZOP provides complete documentation of the design intent of the process, thereby facilitating the commissioning of control loops and other operations. References
1. American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, New York, NY, 1985. 2. ANSI/AIHA, Standard Z 9.5-92, Laboratory Ventilation, American Industrial Hygiene Association, Fairfax, VA, 1992. 3. ASHRAE, Laboratory Systems, Chapter 13, Applications Handbook, 1995. 4. Code of Federal Regulations, Current Good Manufacturing Practice for Finished Pharmaceuticals, 21 CFR 211. 5. Code of Federal Regulations, Good Laboratory Practice for Non-clinical Laboratory Studies, 21 CFR 58. 6. Code of Federal Regulations, Occupational Exposure to Chemicals in Laboratories, 29 CFR 1910.1450. 7. Code of Federal Regulations, Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals, 29 CFR 1910.119. 8. Dowdy, Zachary R., Chemical Explosion Burns Two Lab Technicians, Boston Globe, p. 24, col 3, Aug. 30, 1995. 9. Larkin, Felim, HAZOP Study from Theory to Practice, Process Engineering, vol 27, p. 26-7, March 1996. 10. Lhotka, William C., Technician Succumbs to Blast Injuries, St. Louis-Dispatch, Sec. D, p. 12, col. 1, Sep. 17, 1995. 11. National Research Council, Prudent Practices for Handling Hazardous Chemicals in Laboratories, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1981. 12. NFPA, Standard 45, Fire Protection for Laboratories Using Chemicals, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, 1996. 13. Reed, Mack, Firm Agrees to Record Fine in Fatal Blast, Los Angeles Times, Sec. A, p. 3, col.5, April 9, 1996. 14. West, D., Assessment of Risk in the Research Laboratory: A Basis for Facility Design, ASHRAE Transactions, Vol. 84, Part 1B, 1978. Please circle the appropriate number on the Reader Service Card at the back of the publication. Extremely Helpful ........................ 462 Helpful ....................................... 463 Somewhat Helpful ....................... 464 Not Helpful................................. 465
February 1998

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