Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Notes and Cases in Political Law: May 2009 Edition (For The September 2009 Bar Examinations)
Notes and Cases in Political Law: May 2009 Edition (For The September 2009 Bar Examinations)
Notes and Cases in Political Law: May 2009 Edition (For The September 2009 Bar Examinations)
IN POLITICAL LAW
Volume II
May 2009 Edition
(For the September 2009 Bar Examinations)
(BILL OF RIGHTS)
Prepared by:
Pre-Bar Reviewer
COSMOPOLITAN LAW REVIEW CENTER (CRC)
(Political Law)
Baguio City
UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN PRE-BAR REVIEW CENTER
Dagupan City
LEX REVIEW CENTER
Zamboanga City
CHAPTER 1
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
(Police Power)
1. Define:
A.
has the right to grant or forbid such privilege in accordance with certain
conditions.
But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, their
exercise may be regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to
safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general
welfare of the people. As such, mandamus will not lie to compel the
Board of Medicine to issue licenses for the respondents to practice
medicine.
RA 2382 which prescribes the requirements for admission to the
practice of medicine, the qualifications of the candidates for the board
examination, the scope and conduct of the examinations, the grounds for
the denying of the issuance of a physicians license, or revoking a license
that has been issued. It is therefore clear that the examinee must prove that
he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed
by law and the licensing authority to be granted the privilege to practice
medicine. In short, he shall have all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. The petition is therefore granted.
to promote and protect public safety; (AGUSTIN VS. EDU, 88
SCRA 195; TAXICAB OPERATORS VS. JUINIO, 119 SCRA 897 )
d. to maintain and safeguard peace and order; (GUAZON VS. DE
VILLA)
e. to protect public morals; (CITY OF MANILA VS. JUDGE
LAGUIO, JR., 455 SCRA 308; WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION
VS. CITY OF MANILA, January 20, 2009; DE LA CRUZ VS.
PARAS, 123 SCRA 569; ERMITA MALATE HOTEL VS. CITY
MAYOR, July 31, 1967; JMM PROMOTIONS VS. CA, 260 SCRA
319; VELASCO VS. VILLEGAS, February 13, 1983)
c.
4
1[1]
Id. at 46.
Id. at 62-69.
4
[6]
Id. at 45-46.
[41]City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1; Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, G.R. No. 40243, 11 March 1992, 207 SCRA
157, 161; Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No. 102782, 11 December 1991, 204 SCRA 837, 845; Magtajas
v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., G.R. No. 111097, 20 July 1994, 234 SCRA 255, 268-267.
7
[42]Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, 127 Phil. 306 (1967).
8
[43]
JMM Promotion and Management Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 87, 94 (1996) citing Rubi v. Provincial Board of
Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 (1919).
9[44]
10[45]
11[46]
12
[47]
13
17
[52]
Id, at 152.
review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom
of the mind or restricting the political process, and the rational basis
standard of review for economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate
scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating
classifications based on gender18[53] and legitimacy.19[54] Immediate
scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig,20[55] after the
Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed.21[56] While the test may have first
been articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States
since been applied in all substantive due process cases as well.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in
analysis of equal protection challenges.22[57] Using the rational basis
examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a
legitimate governmental interest.23[58] Under intermediate review,
governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less
restrictive measures is considered.24[59] Applying strict scrutiny, the focus
is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental
interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that
interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny
refers to the standard for determining the quality and the amount of
governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental
freedoms.25[60] Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws
dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other
fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal
protection.26[61] The United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope
18[53]
19
[54]
20
[55]
21
[56]
22
[57]
Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531 (2004); Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. Nos. 78742, 79310, 79744, and 79777, July 14, 1989, 175
SCRA 343; In Ermita-Malate, supra note 1 at 324, the Court in fact noted: if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the
person, the standard for the validity of government acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects
what are at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider."
23[58]
Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, supra note 57.
24[59]
Id.
25
[60]
Mendoza, J., Concurring Opinion in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, 19 November 2001, 369 SCRA 394.
26[61]
Id.
27[62]
28[63]
29[64]
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). It has been opined by Chemerinsky that the use of the equal protection
clause was to avoid the use of substantive due process since the latter fell into disfavor in the United States. See ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (2nd ed. 2002).
30
[68]
Rollo, p. 258.
31
[69]
Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their bonds in intimate
sexual conduct within the motel's premises be it stressed that their consensual sexual behavior does not contravene any
fundamental state policy as contained in the Constitution. (See Concerned Employee v. Glenda Espiritu Mayor, A.M. No. P-02-1564,
23 November 2004) Adults have a right to choose to forge such relationships with others in the confines of their own private lives and
still retain their dignity as free persons. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows persons the right to make this choice. Their
right to liberty under the due process clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the
government, as long as they do not run afoul of the law. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the exception.
Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint; it must include privacy as
well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is the beginning of all freedom it is the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men. City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. supra note 1 at 337-338.
10
11
12
7. Coffee shops
8. Flower shops
9. Music lounge and sing-along restaurants, with well-defined
activities for wholesome family entertainment that cater to both local
and foreign clientele.
10. Theaters engaged in the exhibition, not only of motion
pictures but also of cultural shows, stage and theatrical plays, art
exhibitions, concerts and the like.
11. Businesses allowable within the law and medium intensity
districts as provided for in the zoning ordinances for Metropolitan
Manila, except new warehouse or open-storage depot, dock or yard,
motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any
machinery, or funeral establishments.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of
decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within
the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution
or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial
or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must
be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.[37]
The Ordinance contravenes
the Constitution
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is
subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the
limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good.[43] In the
case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of
delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The relevant constitutional provisions are the following:
SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,
liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.[44]
SEC. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and
shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
[45]
13
14
15
instead should regulate human conduct that occurs inside the establishments,
but not to the detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants, premiums
and blessings of democracy.
While petitioners earnestness at curbing clearly objectionable social ills is
commendable, they unwittingly punish even the proprietors and operators of
wholesome, innocent establishments. In the instant case, there is a clear
invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals
desirous of owning, operating and patronizing those motels and property in
terms of the investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein
employed. If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution,
fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations
such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the
conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend
or revoke their licenses for these violations;[67] and it may even impose
increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to reasonably
accomplish the desired end.
Means employed are
constitutionally infirm
The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors, massage parlors,
karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques,
cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns in the Ermita-Malate area. In Section 3
thereof, owners and/or operators of the enumerated establishments are given
three (3) months from the date of approval of the Ordinance within which to
wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside the ErmitaMalate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable
within the area. Further, it states in Section 4 that in cases of subsequent
violations of the provisions of the Ordinance, the premises of the erring
establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the
achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on
the constitutional guarantees of a persons fundamental right to liberty and
property.
Modality employed is
unlawful taking
In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially
divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property.[77] The Ordinance in
Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the enumerated businesses in the
Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to wind up
business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said businesses
into allowed businesses. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of
property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond
regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just
compensation.[78] It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of
individuals.
16
17
[103]
18
19
5. Read:
a. JMM Promotions vs. CA, 260 SCRA 319
b. ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL VS. MAYOR OF MANILA, July 31,
1967;
c. ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ, 101 Phil. 1155
d. CHURCHILL VS. RAFFERTY, 32 Phil. 580
e. PEOPLE VS. POMAR, 46 Phil. 447
f. US VS. TORIBIO, 15 Phil. 85
g. VELASCO VS. VILLEGAS, February 13, 1983
h. ILOILO ICE & COLD STORAGE VS. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, 24
Phil. 471
i. AGUSTIN VS. EDU, 88 SCRA 195
j. YNOT VS. IAC, 148 SCRA 659
RESTITUTO YNOT VS. THE ITERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, G.R. No. 74457,March 20,
1987
Cruz, J.
Facts:
1. On January, 13, 1984, Ynot transported six carabaos by using a
pumpboat from Masbate to Iloilo. The six carabaos, were, however,
confiscated by the Police Station Commander of Baratoc Nuevo, Iloilo for
alleged violation of Executive Order No. 626-A which prohibits the interprovincial transporting of carabaos and carabeefs which does not comply
with the provisions of Executive No.626;
2. That Section 1 of the said law provides that "henceforth, no carabaos
regardless of age, sex physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall
be transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef
transported in violation of the said law shall be subjected to confiscation
and forfeiture by the government to be distributed to charitable institution
and similar institutions as the Chairman of the National meat inspection
Commission may see fit in the case of the carabeef, and to deserving
farmers through the dispersal of the Director of Animal Industry, in the
case of carabaos;
20
3. Ynot filed a suit for recovery and the carabao were returned to him
upon the issuance of a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersede as
bond in the amount of P12,000.00;
4. After trial of the case, the Judge upheld the validity of the act of the
Police Station Commander in confiscating the carabaos. Ynot was ordered
to returned the carabaos but since he could not do so, the court ordered the
confiscation of the bond. The court refused to rule on the constitutionality
of the said Executive Order on the ground of lack of authority to do so
and also because of its presumed validity;
5. The petitioner appealed to the IAC but the said court upheld the
decision of the Trial Court. Hence this petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court where YNOT claimed that the penalty of
confiscation is INVALID the same was imposed without according the
owner the right to be heard before a competent and impartial tribunal as
guaranteed by due process.
Issues:
1. May a lower court (like the MTC, RTC, of the Court of Appeals)
declare a law unconstitutional?
2. Is Executive Order No. 626-A constitutional?
Sub-issues under this are:
a. Was it a valid police power measure?
b. Was there an undue delegation of legislative power?
Held:
1.
While the lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional question, THEY ARE NOT PREVENTED
FROM RESOLVING THE SAME WHENEVER WARRANTED, subject
only to review by the supreme court. This is so because under Section 5,
[2(a)], Art. VIII, of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Supreme Court
has the power to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal" or
certiorari as the rules of court may provide, final judgements and orders of
the lower courts in all cases involving the constitutionality of certain
measures. This simply means that lower courts may declare whether or
not a law is constitutional.
2. In order that a measure or law may be justified under the police
power of the state, it must meet two tests:
a. the subject must be lawful; and
b. the means employed is lawful.
21
22
23
24
25
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
involving an LRTA property in Pasay City for P102,760.00 per month for
25 years;
On June 27,1984, the PGHFI subleased the said property for P734,000.00
per month to the Transnational Construction Corporation represented by one
Ignacio Jumenez;
After petitioners husband was deposed as President of the Philippines, she
and Dans were charged of alleged violation of Section 3 [g] of RA 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the
Sandiganbayan;
After trial , the First Division of the Sandiganbayan failed to comply with the
legal requirement that all the 3 justices must be unanimous in its Decision
because Justice Garchitorena and Justice Jose Balajadia voted for the
conviction of both accused while Justice Narciso Atienza voted to acquit
them;
Thereafter, Justice Garchitorena as Presiding Justice issued Administrative
Order No. 288-93 constituting a Special Division of five and designating
Justices Augusto Amores and Cipriano del Rosario;
On September 21, 1993, Justice Amores wrote Justice Garchitorena that he
be given 15 days his Manifestation. On the same date, however, Justice
Garchitorena dissolved the division of 5 allegedly because he and Justice
Balajadia had agreed to the opinion of Justice del Rosario;
On September 24, 1993, a Decision was rendered convicting the petitioner
and Dans of violation of Sec. 3 [g] of RA 3019;
On June 29, 1998, the Third Division of the Supreme Court by a vote of 3-2
affirmed the conviction of the petitioner but acquitted DANS;
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and at the same time
prayed that her Motion be heard by the Supreme Court en banc claiming that
her right to due process of law, both substantive and procedural, was
violated:
a. as a result of the fact that she was convicted as a result of the alleged
disparity of the rentals agreed upon with PGHFI and the subsequent
sub-lease contract between PGHFI and Transnational Construction
Corporation; and
b. the First Division convicted her after Justice Garchitorena dissolved
the Special Division of 5 after a lunch in a Quezon City restaurant
where they agreed to convict her in one case and acquit her in her other
cases. The said meeting was attended by another justice who is not a
member of the First Division or the Special Division in violation of the
Rules of the Sandiganbayan which requires that sessions of the court
shall be done only in its principal office in Manila and that only
justices belonging to the division should join the deliberations.
Held:
The petitioner is hereby acquitted.
26
1. The great disparity between the rental price of the lease agreement
signed by the petitioner (P102,760.00 per month) and the sub-lease rental
(P734,000.00 per month) does not necessarily render the monthly rate of
P102,760.00 manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government in
the absence of any evidence using rentals of adjacent properties showing
that the rentals in the property subject of the lease agreement is indeed
very low. NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER WAS PRESENTED BY
THE PROSECUTION REGARDING THE RENTAL RATE OF
ADJACENT PROPERTIES.. As such, the prosecution failed to prove the
guilt of the petitioner reasonable doubt.
2. The court notes likewise the bias and prejudice of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena against the petitioner as shown by his leading, misleading
and baseless hypothetical questions of said justice to RAMON F.
CUERVO, witness for the petitioner. Said justice asked 179 questions to
the witness as against the prosecutor who cross-examined the witness
which was 73. Said number of questions could no longer be described as
clarificatory questions. Another ground therefore for the acquittal of the
petitioner is that she was denied IMPARTIAL TRIAL before the
Sandiganbayan. This is one reason why the case could no longer be
remanded to the Sandiganbayan especially so that the other
Sandiganbayan Justices in the Special Division of 5 have retired. There is
therefore no compelling reason why the case should still be remanded to
the lower court when all the evidence are already with the Supreme Court.
(NOTE: The vote was 9-5 for Acquittal. CJ Narvasa, Justices Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, and Panganiban voted for conviction while Justice
Vitug was the only Justice who voted for the return of the case to the
Sandiganbayan to allow the corrections of the perceived irregularities
in the proceedings below.)
c.
d.
e.
f.
FACTS:
1.
The petitioner Evelio Javier and the private respondent Arturo
Pacificador were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa
election in May 1984;
27
28
Respondents:
Only "contests" need to be heard and decided en banc, all other cases
can be - in fact, should be - filed with and decided only by any of the
three divisions.
There is a difference between "contests" and "cases" and also a
difference between "pre-proclamation controversies" and "election
protests". The pre-proclamation controversy between the petitioner and
the private respondent was not yet a contest at the time and therefore
could be validly heard by a mere division of the Commission on elections,
consonant with Sec. 3. The issue at that stage was still administrative and
could be resolved by a division.
HELD:
a. The S.C. decided to resolve the case even if the Batasang Pambansa
had already been abolished by the Aquino government, and even if Javier
had already died in the meantime. This was because of its desire for this
case to serve as a guidance for the future. Thus it said: "The Supreme
Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the
conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but
we must also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are
times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled
and decision is no longer possible according to law. But there are also
times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it
nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act, then,
not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also
for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future."
b. The S.C. held on the main issue that in making the COMELEC the
sole judge of all contests involving the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city
officials, the Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear and
decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matter related thereto,
including those arising before the proclamation of the winners.
The decision rendered by the Second Division alone was therefore set
aside as violative of the Constitution. The case should have been decided
en banc.
c. Pre-proclamation controversies became known and designated as such
only because of Sec. 175 of the 1978 Election Code. The 1973
Constitution could not have therefore been intended to have divided
contests between pre and post proclamation when that Constitution was
written in 1973.
29
30
31
b.
the tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
c.
the decision must have something to support itself;
d.
the evidence must be substantial;
e.
the decision must be based on the evidence presented
during the hearing;
f.
the tribunal or body must act on its own independent
consideration of the law or facts;
g.
the board or body shall in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceedings can know the various issues involved.
b. AMERICAN TOBACCO VS. DIRECTOR, 67 SCRA 287
c. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. NLRC, 263 SCRA 531
d. DELGADO VS. CA, November 10, 1986
If an accused was represented by a non-lawyer during the trial
(though he thought that he was a lawyer), his right to due process was
violated and therefore entitled to a new trial.
3. Procedural due process in disciplinary actions against students
Academic freedom; due process in disciplinary actions involving students
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON.WILFREDO D. REYES, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional
Trial Court of Manila, THE COMMISSION ON
HIGHER EDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS, ALVIN
AGUILAR,
JAMES
PAUL
BUNGUBUNG,
RICHARD REVERENTE and ROBERTO VALDES,
JR., G.R. No. 127980, December 19, 2007
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE FACTS:
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung,
Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma
Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU)
and College of Saint Benilde (CSB) Joint Discipline Board because of
their involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner
James Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity.
The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims,
namely: petitioner James Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and
32
Michael Perez, are members of the Domino Lux Fraternity, while the
alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul
Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of
Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity, a rival fraternity.
The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint
with the Discipline Board of DLSU charging private respondents with
direct assault. Similar complaints were also filed by Dennis Pascual
and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and private respondents Valdes and
Reverente. Thus, cases entitled De La Salle University and College of
St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar (AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung
(AB-PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-APM/9235086), Alvin
Lee (EDD/9462325), Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin
A. Papio (AB-MGT/9251227) were docketed as Discipline Case No.
9495-3-25121.
The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to
private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente
informing them of the complaints and requiring them to answer. Private
respondents filed their respective answers.
Said notices issued by De La Salle Discipline Board uniformly
stated as follows:
Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had
been constituted to hear and deliberate the charge against you for
violation of CHED Order No. 4 arising from the written complaints of
James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.
You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on
April 19, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. at the Bro. Connon Hall for you and your
witnesses to give testimony and present evidence in your behalf. You may
be assisted by a lawyer when you give your testimony or those of your
witnesses.
During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995,
private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi. No fullblown hearing was conducted nor the students allowed to cross-examine
the witnesses against them.
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a
Resolution finding private respondents guilty. They were meted the
supreme penalty of automatic expulsion pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.
The dispositive part of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds
respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (AB-BSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL
33
34
35
b. Under the Education Act of 1982, students have the right "to freely
choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue
their course therein up to graduation, EXCEPT in case of academic
deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations."
The petitioner were denied of this right, and were being disciplined
without due process, in violation of the admonition in the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools that "no penalty shall be imposed upon
any student except for cause as defined in *** (the) Manuel and/or in the
school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only after due
investigation shall have been conducted. It has already been held in
Berina vs. Philippine Maritime Institute, 117 SCRA 581, that it is illegal
of a school to impose sanctions on students without conducting due
investigation.
c. Of course, all schools have the power to adopt and enforce its rules. In
fact the maintenance of good school discipline is a duty specifically
enjoined on every private school. The Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools provides that:
"* * The school rules governing discipline and the corresponding
sanctions therefor must be clearly specified and defined in writing and
made known to the students and/or their parents or guardians. Schools
shall have the authority and prerogative to promulgate such rules and
regulations as they may deem necessary from time to time effective as of
the date of their promulgation unless otherwise specified."
d.
The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of
procedural due process. Due process in disciplinary cases involving
students :
a. need not entail proceedings and hearing similar to those prescribed
for actions and proceedings in court of justice;
b. the proceedings may be summary;
c. cross-examination is not an essential part thereof.
But the S.C. said that the following minimum standards must be met to
satisfy the demands of procedural due process:
1. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of
any accusation against them;
36
2. they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with
the assistance of counsel;
3. they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
4. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
5. the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case.
a. BERINA VS. PMI, September 30, 1982
Due process in the dismissal of employees
Requisites of Due Process before the NLRC
1. Notice; and
2. Hearing
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
37
38
Id. at 35-36.
39
40
the said congressional district. On May 31, 2007, respondent filed with
the HRET a Petition of Protest (Ad Cautelam)33[4] contesting the results of
the elections and the proclamation of petitioner.
On June 14, 2007, the Secretary of the HRET caused the service of
summons34[5] upon petitioner through registered mail at Purok Losaria,35
[6]
Tamnag (Poblacion), Lutayan, Sultan Kudarat, requiring petitioner to
file an Answer to the protest within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
On July 11, 2007, the HRET received the Registry Return Receipt
Card,
showing that a certain Aileen R. Baldenas37[8] (Baldenas)
received the summons on June 27, 2007.
36[7]
[4]
34
[5]
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
41
[13]
See Note 3.
Rollo, p.12.
42
[15]
RULE 80. Applicability. The following shall be applicable by analogy or in suppletory character and
effect in so far as they may be applicable and are not inconsistent with these Rules and with the orders,
resolutions and decisions of the Tribunal, namely:
(1) The Rules of Court;
(2) Decisions of the Supreme Court;
(3) Decisions of the Electoral Tribunals.
43
interest and the will of the electorate) strictly follow the hierarchy of
modes of service of summons under the Rules of Court.
The Court sees no reason why the HRET cannot make use of its
own process servers to personally serve the summons, or alternatively,
delegate the matter to the process server of a court with territorial
jurisdiction over the place of residence of the respondent/protestee in the
election case, at the expense of the petitioner/protestant. Considering
that the proper service of summons on the respondent/protestee is a
jurisdictional requirement and goes to heart of due process, we cannot
allow service of summons by a method not sanctioned by the HRET Rules
in relation to the Rules of Court.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the HRET committed grave
abuse of discretion in considering petitioner to have entered a general
denial of the allegations in respondents petition of protest and in denying
his motion to reconsider as well as his motion to admit answer with
counter-protest.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED.
HRET is directed to admit the Answer with Counter-Protest of petitioner
Datu Pax Pakung S. Mangudadatu.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION VS.
GODOFREDO CUANAN, G.R. No. 169013,
December 16, 2008
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On March 11, 1996, Luzviminda Borja and Juliana Castro, on behalf of their
respective minor daughters, Lily Borja and Charo Castro, filed before the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports - Regional Office No. III (DECS-RO No. III),
Cabanatuan City, two separate administrative complaints45[3] for Sexual Harassment
and Conduct Unbecoming a Public Officer against Cuanan, then Principal of Lawang
Kupang Elementary School in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija.
Acting on the complaints, DECS-RO No. III Regional Director Vilma L.
Labrador constituted an Investigating Committee, composed of three DepEd officials
from the province, to conduct a formal investigation. Following the investigation, the
Investigating Committee submitted its Investigation Report46[4] dated December 14,
1999, finding Cuanan guilty of sexual harassment and recommending his forced
resignation without prejudice to benefits. In a Decision47[5] dated January 28, 2000,
Regional Director Labrador concurred in the findings of the Investigating Committee
45
46
47
44
and meted out the penalty of forced resignation to Cuanan without prejudice to
benefits.
In an Order48[6] dated April 13, 2000, then DepEd Secretary Andrew Gonzales
affirmed the Decision of Regional Director Labrador. On May 30, 2000, Cuanan filed
a Petition for Reconsideration49[7] thereof, but the same was denied for lack of merit by
Secretary Gonzales in a Resolution50[8] dated June 19, 2000.
Cuanan elevated his case to the CSC. On January 20, 2003, the CSC issued
Resolution No. 030069,51[9] which set aside the June 19, 2000 Resolution of Secretary
Gonzales and exonerated Cuanan from the charge of sexual harassment. On January
23, 2003, copies of the resolution were duly sent to the parties, including the DepEd.52
[10]
Cuanan received a copy of Resolution No. 030069 on January 31, 2003.53[11]
In a Letter dated February 3, 2003, Cuanan requested his reinstatement as
Elementary School Principal I.54[12] In a 1st Indorsement, the District Supervisor
recommended appropriate action.55[13] In a 2nd Indorsement dated February 4, 2003,
Schools Division Superintendent Dioscorides D. Lusung (Superintendent)
recommended that Cuanan be reinstated to duty as School Principal of San Antonio
District upon finality of the decision of the CSC.56[14] In a Letter57[15] dated February
10, 2003, Regional Director Ricardo T. Sibug informed the Superintendent that
Cuanan could not be immediately reinstated to the service until an order of
implementation was received from the Department Secretary.
Sometime in March 2003, DepEd Undersecretary Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon
sent a letter to the CSC requesting a copy of CSC Resolution No. 030069 dated
January 20, 2003. In a Letter58[16] dated March 25, 2003, the CSC informed the DepEd
that a copy of the requested resolution was duly sent to it on January 23, 2003.
Nonetheless, the CSC sent another copy of the resolution to the DepEd for its
reference. The DepEd received said reference copy on March 28, 2003.59[17]
On April 11, 2003, then DepEd Secretary Edilberto C. de Jesus filed a
Petition for Review/Reconsideration60[18] with the CSC. No copy of the pleading was
served upon Cuanan.
On July 29, 2003, Secretary De Jesus filed a Supplemental Petition for
Review/Reconsideration61[19] reiterating the prayer for reversal of the resolution.
Again, no copy of the pleading was served upon Cuanan.
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
45
Subsequently, pursuant to Division Special Order No. 001 series of 2003 dated
June 18, 2003, Cuanan was reinstated to his former position as school principal
effective April 30, 2003.62[20] In Division Special Order No. 285, series of 2003 dated
July 8, 2003, Cuanan was directed to return to duty.63[21] Based thereon, Cuanan
requested payment of salaries and his inclusion in the payroll, which the Division
School Superintendent of Nueva Ecija duly endorsed on November 7, 2003.64[22]
However, on October 22, 2004, the CSC issued Resolution No. 04114765[23]
setting aside CSC Resolution No. 030069 dated January 20, 2003. It found Cuanan
guilty of Sexual Harassment, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service and meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service
with forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of his service eligibility, and
perpetual disqualification from holding public office. Cuanan received a copy of the
Resolution on November 9, 2004.66[24]
Thirteen days later, or on November 22, 2004, Cuanan filed a petition for
certiorari67[25] with the CA seeking to annul Resolution No. 041147, alleging that the
CSC should not have entertained the petition for review/reconsideration since the
DepEd was not the complainant or the party adversely affected by the resolution; that
the petition for review/reconsideration was filed out of time; and that Cuanan was not
furnished copies of the pleadings filed by the DepEd in violation of procedural due
process.
The DepEd sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper
remedy, the mode of review from a decision of the CSC being a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
On May 16, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision68[26] granting the petition for
certiorari and setting aside CSC Resolution No. 041147 dated October 12, 2004.
The CA held that while a motion for reconsideration and a petition for review under
Rule 43 were available remedies, Cuanan's recourse to a petition for certiorari was
warranted, since the act complained of was patently illegal; that the CSC gravely
abused its discretion in granting the petition for review/reconsideration filed by the
DepEd without regard for Cuanan's fundamental right to due process, since he was not
duly notified of the petition for review/reconsideration, nor was he required by the
CSC to file a comment thereon, much less, given a copy of the said petition; that the
DepEd failed to establish that the resolution was not yet final and executory when it
filed its petition for review/reconsideration.
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
46
69[27]
DepEd contends that the CA should have dismissed outright the petition for
certiorari because CSC decisions are appealable to the CA by petition for review
under Rule 43; that the filing of a motion for reconsideration was a precondition to the
filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65; that the DepEd, even if not the
complainant, may question the resolution of the CSC; that Cuanan failed to prove that
the CSC's petition for review/reconsideration was not seasonably filed; that even if
Cuanan was not served a copy of the pleadings filed by the DepEd, the CSC was not
bound by procedural rules.
Cuanan, on the other hand, contends that the DepEd cannot file a motion for
reconsideration from the CSC Resolution exonerating him, since it is not the
complainant in the administrative case and therefore not a party adversely affected by
the decision therein; that even if DepEd may seek reconsideration of the CSC
Resolution, the petition for review/reconsideration was filed out of time; and that
Cuanans right to due process was violated when he was not given a copy of the
pleadings filed by the DepEd or given the opportunity to comment thereon.
The Court finds it necessary, before delving on the grounds relied upon by the
DepEd in support of the petition, to first resolve the question of whether the DepEd
can seek reconsideration of the CSC Resolution exonerating Cuanan.
In a long line of cases, beginning with Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy,72
[30]
and reiterated in Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, Jr.,73[31] the Court has
maintained that the disciplining authority qualifies as a party adversely affected by the
judgment, who can file an appeal of a judgment of exoneration in an administrative
69
70
71
72
73
47
74[32]
48
80[38]
were duly sent to the parties, including DepEd, on January 23, 2003.
Cuanan
81[39]
received a copy thereof on January 31, 2003,
while the DepEd requested a copy
sometime in March 2003, or about two months later. Under the Rules of Evidence, it
is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed, unless contradicted.82[40]
This presumption includes that of regularity of service of judgments, final orders or
resolutions.
Consequently, the burden of proving the irregularity in official conduct -- that is,
non-receipt of the duly sent copy of CSC Resolution No. 030069 -- is on the part of
the DepEd, which in the present case clearly failed to discharge the same.83[41] Thus,
the presumption stands that CSC Resolution No. 030069 dated January 20, 2003 had
already become final and executory when the DepEd filed its Petition for
Review/Reconsideration on April 11, 2003, more than two months later.
It is elementary that once judgment has become final and executory, it becomes
immutable and can no longer be amended or modified. In Gallardo-Corro v.
Gallardo,84[42] this Court held:
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains
finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer
be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the
court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. Just as the losing
party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the
winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of his case. The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice, and that,
at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments or orders of courts must
become final at some definite time fixed by law; otherwise, there would
be no end to litigations, thus setting to naught the main role of courts of
justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the
maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with
finality.85[43]
Moreover, while it is true that administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial
functions are free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, they are bound
by law and practice to observe the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in justiciable cases presented before them.86[44] The relative freedom of the
CSC from the rigidities of procedure cannot be invoked to evade what was
clearly emphasized in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
49
87[45]
Relations:
that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process.
Furthermore, Section 43.A.88[46] of the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service provides:
Section 43.A. Filing of Supplemental Pleadings. - All pleadings
filed by the parties with the Commission, shall be copy furnished the
other party with proof of service filed with the Commission.
Any supplemental pleading to supply deficiencies in aid of an
original pleading but which should not entirely substitute the latter can be
filed only upon a favorable action by the Commission on the motion of a
party to the case. The said motion should be submitted within five (5)
days from receipt of a copy of the original pleading and it is discretionary
upon the Commission to allow the same or not or even to consider the
averments therein.(Emphasis supplied)
Cuanan undoubtedly was denied procedural due process. He had no
opportunity to participate in the proceedings for the petition for review/
reconsideration filed by the DepEd, since no copy of the pleadings filed by the DepEd
were served upon him or his counsel; nor was he even required by the CSC to file his
comments thereon. Considering that pleadings filed by the DepEd were not served
upon Cuanan, they may be treated as mere scraps of paper which should not have
merited the attention or consideration of the CSC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87499 are AFFIRMED.
420
50
51
52
53
54
55
to make law itself. We delineated the metes and bounds of these tests in
EASTERM SHIPPING LINES VS. POEA, thus:
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power , viz: the completeness test and the
sufficiency of standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete
in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that
when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will do is enforce it. Under
the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot. BOTH TESTS ARE
INTENDED TO PREVENT A TOTAL TRANSFERENCE OF
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY TO THE DELEGATE, WHO IS NOT
ALLOWED TO STEP INTO THE SHOES OF THE LEGISLATURE
AND EXERCISE A POWER ESSENTIALLY LEGISLATIVE.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our
constitutional landscape because such has become an inevitability in light
of the increasing complexity of the task of government. In fact, in
HIRABAYASHI VS. UNITED STATES, the Supreme Court through
Justice ISAGANI CRUZ held that even if the law does not expressly
pinpoint the standard, THE COURTS WILL BEND BACKWARD TO
LOCATE THE SAME ELSEWHERE IN ORDER TO SPARE THE
STATUTE; IF IT CAN, FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY.
5. EO No. 392 failed to follow faithfully the standards set by RA 8180
when it considered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF Fund.
The misapplication of this extra factor cannot be justified. The executive
is bereft of any right to alter either by addition or subtraction the standards
set by RA 8180 for it has no power to make laws. To cede to the
executive the power to make laws would invite tyranny and to transgress
the separation of powers. The exercise of delegated power is given a strict
scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a mere agent whose action cannot
infringe the terms of the agency.
6. Section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution provides:
The state shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interests
so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition
shall be allowed.
A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more
persons or companies, consisting of the exclusive right or power to carry
on a particular business or trade, manufacture a particular article or
control the sale or the whole market structure in which one or only a few
firms dominate the total sales of a product or service. On the other hand, a
combination in restraint of trade is an agreement or understanding
between two or more persons, in the form of contract, trust, pool, holding
56
57
58
59
II.
The constitutional aspect of this petition raises obviously interesting
questions. However, such questions have in fact been mooted with the passage
in 2008 of Republic Act No. 9502, also known as the Universally Accessible
Cheaper and Quality Medicines Act of 2008.
Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 9502 amends Section 72 of the Intellectual
Property Code in that the later law unequivocally grants third persons the right
to import drugs or medicines whose patent were registered in the Philippines by
the owner of the product:
72.1. Using a patented product which has been put on the
market in the Philippines by the owner of the product, or with his
express consent, insofar as such use is performed after that product
has been so put on the said market: Provided, That, with regard to
drugs and medicines, the limitation on patent rights shall apply
after a drug or medicine has been introduced in the Philippines
or anywhere else in the world by the patent owner, or by any
party authorized to use the invention: Provided, further, That
the right to import the drugs and medicines contemplated in this
section shall be available to any government agency or any
private third party;
The unqualified right of private third parties such as petitioner to import
or possess unregistered imported drugs in the Philippines is further confirmed
by the Implementing Rules to Republic Act No. 9502 promulgated on 4
November 2008. The relevant provisions thereof read:
Rule 9. Limitations on Patent Rights. The owner of a patent
has no right to prevent third parties from performing, without his
authorization, the acts referred to in Section 71 of the IP Code as
enumerated hereunder:
(i) Introduction in the Philippines or Anywhere Else in the
World.
Using a patented product which has been put on the market in
the Philippines by the owner of the product, or with his express
consent, insofar as such use is performed after that product has been
so put on the said market: Provided, That, with regard to drugs and
medicines, the limitation on patent rights shall apply after a drug or
medicine has been introduced in the Philippines or anywhere else in
the world by the patent owner, or by any party authorized to use the
invention: Provided, further, That the right to import the drugs and
medicines contemplated in this section shall be available to any
government agency or any private third party. (72.1)
60
61
they are disabled from invoking the bare personal use exemption afforded
by the SLCD.
Even worse is the fact that the law is not content with simply banning, at
civil costs, the importation of unregistered drugs. It equates the importers of
such drugs, many of whom motivated to do so out of altruism or basic human
love, with the malevolents who would alter or counterfeit pharmaceutical drugs
for reasons of profit at the expense of public safety. Note that the SLCD is a
special law, and the traditional treatment of penal provisions of special laws is
that of malum prohibitumor punishable regardless of motive or criminal intent.
For a law that is intended to help save lives, the SLCD has revealed itself as
a heartless, soulless legislative piece.
2-d.LACSON VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, January 20, 1999
3. Taxicab Operators vs. BOT, September 30,l982
4. Bautista vs. Juinio,127 SCRA 329
5. Dumlao vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392
6. Villegas vs. Hiu, 86 SCRA 270
7. Ceniza vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763
8. UNIDO vs. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 38
9. Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433(Read also the dissenting
opinion of Justice Makasiar
10. Sison vs. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654
11. Citizens Surety vs. Puno, 119 SCRA 216
12. Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30
13. Hawaiian-Phil. Co. vs. Asociacion, 151 SCRA 306
14. Ormoc Sugar Co. vs. Ormoc City, 22 SCRA 603
15. Flores vs. COMELEC, 184 SCRA 484
CHAPTER IV - THE SEARCH
AND SEIZURE PROVISION
62
63
64
739
65
customs searches;
searches of moving vehicle;
seizure of evidence in plain view;
consented searches;
search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
stop and frisk measures.
66
67
customs searches;
searches of moving vehicle;
seizure of evidence in plain view;
consented searches;
search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
stop and frisk measures.
68
69
70
71
72
killing of the four victims and a physical injuries case for inflicting
gunshot wound on the survivor be filled instead against the suspects.
Thereafter, four separate informations to that effect were filed with the
RTC of Masbate with no bail recommended.
On November 21, 1989, a motion for change of venue, filed by the
petitioners was granted by the SC. It ordered that the case may be
transferred from the RTC of Masbate to the RTC of Makati.
Petitioners then moved that another hearing ba conducted to
determine if there really exists a prima facie case against them in the light
of documents showing recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary
investigation. They likewise filed a motion to order the transmittal of
initial records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the municipal
judge of Barsaga of Masbate. These motions were however denied by the
court because the prosecution had declared the existence of probable
cause, informations were complete in form in substance , and there was
no defect on its face. Hence it found it just and proper to rely on the
prosecutors certification in each information.
ISSUE:
---------Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by
simply relying on the prosecutions certification and recommendation that
a probable cause exists?
Held:
----1. The judge committed a grave abuse of discretion.
In the case of Placer vs. Villanueva, the sc ruled that a judge may
rely upon the fiscal's certification of the existence of a probable cause and
on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. However, the certification
does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant of arrest. This
decision interpreted the "search and seizure" provision of the 1973
Constitution. Under this provision, the judge must satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of order of arrest. If
on the face of information, the judge finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's certification and require the submission of the
affidavits of witness to aid him at arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of a probable cause. This has been the rule since U.S vs.
Ocampo and Amarga vs. Abbas.
2. In the case of Soliven vs. Makasiar, decided under the 1987
Constitution, the Court noted that the addition of the word personally after
the word determined and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973
73
the
the
the
the
74
75
76
77
78
NOTES:
This might be useful also in your Remedial Law.
Was a petition for Habeas Corpus before the Supreme Court the
appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
The Supreme Court held that the criminal case before the respondent
judge is the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have
provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The correct course was for
the petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted
to bail, claiming a right to bail per se or by reason of the weakness of the
evidence against him. ONLY AFTER THAT REMEDY WAS DENIED
BY THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD THE REVIEW JURISDICTION OF
THE SUPREME COURT BE INVOKED, AND EVEN THEN, NOT
WITHOUT FIRST APPLYING TO THE COURT OF APPEALS IF
APPROPRIATE RELIEF WAS ALSO AVAILABLE THERE.
Even assuming that the petitioner's premise that the information
charges a non-existent crime would not excuse or justify his improper
choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would
have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the
respondent judge.
g. Warrantless searches and seizures--when valid
or not. Is "Operation Kapkap" valid?
Read:
PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE, G.R. No. 87059, June,
1992, 210 SCRA 174
Warrantless search and
seizure
Cruz, J.
Facts|
-----1. On August 8, 1987, the Western Police District received a telephone
call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at
the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Blvd., in Tondo, Manila;
2. When the surveilance team arrived therein, they saw the accused
"looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen". They approched
these persons and identified themselves as policement that is why they
79
tried to ran away because of the other lawmen, they were unable to
escape;
3. After their arrest, a .38 cal. Smith and Wessor revolver was confiscated
from the accused and several days later, an information for violation of
PD 1866 was filed against him;
4. After trial, Mengote was convicted of having violated PD 1866 and was
sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua based on the alleged gun as the
principal evidence. Hence this automatic appeal.
Issue:
-----Was there a valid warrantless search and seizure?
Held:
----There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal
search or seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. That
is the absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3 [2], of the
Constitution. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the
justification given by Justice Learned Hand that "only in case the
prosecution, which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it
cannot profit by their wrong will the wrong be repressed."
Section 5, Article 113 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.- A peace officer or
private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
x x x
We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot see
how we we can agree with the prosecution.
80
81
in their
82
83
84
85
of the NBI agents, Reyes opened the box and discovered that the odor
came from the fact that the dried leaves were actually those of the
marijuana flowering tops.
Two other boxes,marked as containing books and tabacalera cigars;
also revealed bricks or case-like marijuana leaves and dried marijuana
leaves respectively.
Marti was later invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted
shipment of the dried leaves. Thereafter an information was filed against
the appellant for violating RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. The
Special Criminal Court of Manila convicted accused Marti of violating
sec.21(b) of said RA.
ISSUES:
-----------1. Did the search conducted by a private person, violate accused's
right against unreasonable searches seizures and invocable against the
state?
2. Was the evidence procured from the search admissible?
Held:
-------1. No, constitutional protection on search and seizure is imposable only
against the state and not to private persons.
Since Art. III,2 of the 1987 constitution is almost verbatim from the
United States constitution, the SC may consider US Fed. SC cases as
likewise doctrinal in this jurisdiction. Hence, in US cases, the
constitutional provision against unreasomable searches and seizure was
intended as a restraint upon the activities of the sovereign authority and
NOT intended against private persons. If a search was initiated by a
private person the provision does not apply since it only proscribes
government action. This view is supported by the deliberations by the
1986 Constitutional Commission.
In short, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts comitted by private individuals so as to bring it
within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.
Case at bar will show that it was Job Reyes` initiative that
perpetrated the search. He opened the packages and took the samples to
NBI. All the NBI agents did was to observe and look in plain sight. This
did not convert it to a search as contemplated by the constitution.
86
2. Yes, since the search was valid, the evidence from therein is admissible
evidence.
Art.III [2], on the admissibility of evidence in violation of the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, likewise applies only to the
government and its agencies and not to private persons.
(U.S. cases cited: Burdeau v. McDowell (256 us 465 [1921], state v.
Bryan (457 p 2d 661 [1968], Walker v. state (429 s.w 2d 121 [1969]), Barnes v.
us (373 F 2d 517 [1967]), Chadwick v. state (329 sw 2d 135).
VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
1. Search made incidental to a valid arrest
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
87
FACTS:
----------In July 1987, the Special Operations Group of the CIS received a tip
from one of its informers about an organized group engaged in
importation of illegal drugs and smuggling of contraband items. To
infiltrate the crime syndicate, they recruited confidential men and "deep
penetration agents" under OPLAN SHARON 887. One such agent was
Reynaldo Tia (the dicharged/accused). As an agent, he submitted regular
reports of undercover activities of suspected syndicates. CAPTAIN
PALMERA, head of oplan sharon 887, in turned informed the Dan
gerous Drugs Board of Tia's activities.
Tia was introduced to his co-accused Lim Cheng Huat by another
agent named George. Lim wanted a male travelling companion for his
business trips abroad. Tia offered his services and was hired by Lim.
Later, Tia was introduced to Peter Lo (alias of accused/appellant Lo Ho
Wing), the later turning out to be Tia's intended companion.
Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia left for Hongkong on October 4,
1987. Tia telephoned Capt. Palmera that they would return to the
Philippines on October 6. From Hongkong, the two proceeded to
Guangzhou in mainland China. There, appeallant Lo Ho Wing bought six
(6) cans of tea.Tia saw these 6 bags when they were opened for
examination. That evening, they went to Lo Ho Wing's room and he saw
two other men with him. One was fixing the tea bags, while the other was
burning a substance on a piece of aluminum foil using a lighter. Appellant
Lo Ho Wing joined the second man and sniffed the smoke emitted by the
burning substance. When Tia asked Lo Ho Wing what cargo they would
88
bring to Manila, the latter replied that they would be bringing Chinese
drugs.
The next day en route to Manila, customs examiners inspected the
bags containing the tin cans of tea. Since the bags were not closely
examined, appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia were cleared. In Manila, They
were met by Lim Cheng Huat. Appelant Lo Ho Wing and Tia boarded a
taxi from the airport and loaded their luggage in the taxi's compartment.
Lim Cheng Huat followed them in another taxi.
Meamwhile, a team composed by Capt. Palmera positioned
themselves in strategic areas around the airport. The CIS men who first
saw Lo Ho and Tia followed them. Along Imelda Avenue, the CIS car
overtook the taxi ridden by Lo Ho Wing and Tia , forcing the taxi driver
to stop his vehicle. The CIS team asked the taxi driver to open the
baggage compartment. The CIS team asked permission to search their
luggage.
A tin can of tea was taken out of the compartment. Sgt. Cayabyab of
the CIS pried the lid open and pressed it in the middle to pull out the
contents. Crystalline white powder resmbling crushed alum came out.
Suspecting the crystalline powder to be a dangerous drug, he had the three
travelling bags opened for inspection. All the bags threshed out a total of
six tin cans. Tia and appellant were taken to the CIS headquarters for
questioning. Meanwhile, the second taxi carrying Lim Cheng Huat sped in
attempt to escape. However, they were later captured.
Samples from the bag tested positive for metamphetamine. The
three suspects were indicted for violating Art. III, sec.15 of the Dangerous
Drug Act. Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Lim Cheng Huat were sentenced to
suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P25,000 each. Reynaldo Tia
was discharged as a state witness. The trial court gave full credence to the
testimonies of government agents since the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duties were in their favor.
ISSUES:
---------1. Was the warrantless search valid?
2. Are the effects taken admissible as evidence?
HELD:
----1. This is a case of search on a moving vehicle which is one of the
well-known exceptions to the valid warrantless search and seizure. To
stilol get a search warrant from a judge would allow the accused go scotfree.
89
2. Since the search and seizure are valid, the evidence obtained is
admissible as evidence in any proceeding.
3. Seizure of goods concealed to avoid duties/taxes (Valid)
a.
b.
c.
d.
90
91
Held:
There can be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the police
action of the nature described by the petitioners would be illegal and
blatantly violative of the Bill of Rights. If the military wants to flush out
subversive and criminal elements, the same must be consistent with the
constitutional and statutory rights of the people. However, nowhere in the
Constitution can we see a provision which prohibits the Chief Executive
from ordering the military to stop unabated criminality, rising lawlessness
and alarming communist activities. However, all police actions are
governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. The government cannot
adopt the same reprehensible methods of authoritarian systems both of the
right and of the left. This is so because Art. III, Section 3 of the
Constitution is very clear as explained in Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA
687 and Century Fox vs. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 655. Also, it must
be pointed out that police actions should not be characterized by methods
that offend one's sense of justice (Rochin vs. California, 342 US 165).
The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were
actually committed. But the remedy is not to stop all police actions,
including the essential and legitimate ones. A show of force is sometimes
necessary as long as the rights of people are protected and not violated.
However, the remedy of the petitioners is not an original action for
prohibition since not one victim complains and not one violator is
properly charged. It is basically for the executive department and the trial
courts. The problem is appropriate for the Commission of Human Rights.
The petition was therefore remanded to the Regional Trial Courts of
Manila, Malabon and Pasay City where the petitioners may present
evidence supporting their allegations so that the erring parties may be
pinpointed and prosecuted. In the meantime, the acts violative of human
rights alleged by the petitioners as committed during the police actions are
ENJOINED until such time as permanent rules to govern such actions are
promulgated.
********************
Cruz, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ. , Dissenting
The ruling of the majority that the petitioners are not proper parties is a
specious pretext for inaction. We have held that technical objections may
be brushed aside where there are constitutional questions that must be met
(RODRIGUEZ VS. GELLA, 92 PHIL. 603; TOLENTINO VS.
COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702; PHILCONSA VS. JIMENEZ, 65 SCRA 479;
EDU VS. ERICTA, 35 SCRA 481; GONZALES VS. COMELEC, 27
SCRA 835; LAGUNZAD VS. CA, 154 SCRA 199; DEMETRIA VS.
ALBA,148 SCRA 208). Lozada was in fact an aberration.
92
2.
i. Searching questions
Read:
93
94
95
96
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to
the record."
b. There was also no searching questions asked by the respondent judge
because as shown by the record, his questions were too brief and short and
did not examine the complainant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers. On the contrary, the questions asked
were leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. As held in
Quintero vs. NBI, June 23, 1988, "the questions propounded are not
sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Asking of leading
questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant and
conducting of examination in a general manner would not satisfy the
requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant."
The Court avails of this decision to reiterate the strict requirements for
determination of probable cause in the valid issuance of a search warrant
as enunciated in earlier cases. True, this requirements are stringent but the
purpose is to assure that the constitutional right of the individual against
unreasonable search and seizure shall remain both meaningful and
effective.
c. The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if
the officer with the warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and
identify the place intended (P VS. VELOSO, 48 PHIL. 180). In the case at
bar, the warrant described the place to be searched as the premises of the
PUP, more particularly the offices of the Department of Science and
Tactics as well as the Office of the President, Nemesio Prudente.
There is also no violation of the "one specific offense" requirement
considering that the application for a search warrant explicitly described
the offense: illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under PD
1866.
d. CIRCULAR NO. 19 OF THE SUPREME COURT merely provides for
a guideline, departure from which would not necessarily affect the
validity of the search warrant provided the constitutional requirements are
complied with.
a. HUBERT WEBB VS. DE LEON, 247 SCRA 650
Read also:
1. Alvarez vs. CFI, 64 Phil. 33 (When the applicant is basing his
knowledge from an informant, the same is not valid)
2. Luna vs. Plaza, 26 SCRA 313
3. De Mulata vs. Irizari, 62 SCRA 210
4. Marinas vs. Siochi, 104 SCRA 423
5. Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 687
97
6. Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388 (Depositions of the applicants and
witnesses should be attached to the record of the case)
7. Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 541
8. Nolasco vs Pano, 147 SCRA 509
9. Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800
10. P. vs. Burgos, September 14,1986
11. P. vs. Aminnudin Y Ahni, July 6,1988
12. Ponsica vs. Ignalaga, July 31,1987 (When the statements in the
affidavits of witnesses are mere generalities, mere conclusions of law, and not
positive statements of particular acts, the warrant is not valid)
13. Aberca vs. Ver, April 15,1988
2. Panganiban vs. Cesar, 159 SCRA 599
3. PENDON VS. CA, November 16, 1990. (When the questions asked to the
applicant for a search warrant was pre-typed, the same is not valid since
there could have been no searching questions)
j. Warrantless searches and seizures--when valid
or not.
Read:
1. RICARDO VALMONTE VS. GEN RENATO DE
VILLA,
GR No. 83988, September 29, 1989
Warrantless searches and seizures;
validity of checkpoints
Padilla, J.
Facts:
1. On January 20, 1987, the National Capital Region District Command
(NCRDC) was activated with the mission of conducting security
operations within its area of responsibility for the purpose of maintaining
peace and order. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the
NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila.
Petitioners claim that because of these checkpoints, the residents of
Valenzuela, MM are worried of being harassed and of their safety being
placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the
military authorities manning the checkpoints considering that their cars
and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups,
especially at night or dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or
court order.
98
99
THE MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION,
Very Important:
The Supreme Court in its Resolution of the Motion for
Reconsideration dated 15 June, 1990, held that military and police
checkpoints are not illegal as these measures to protect the government
and safeguards the lives of the people. The checkpoints are legal as where
the survival of the organized government is on the balance, or where the
lives and safety of the people are in grave peril. However, the Supreme
Court held further that the military officers manning the checkpoints may
conduct VISUAL SEARCH ONLY, NOT BODILY SEARCH.
Read also the RESOLUTION ON THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION dated JUNE 15, 1990, 185 SCRA 665
Read also:
1-a. Rizal Alih vs. Gen. Castro, June 23,1987
1-b. P s. Cendana, October 17, 1990
1-c. P. vs. Castiller, August 6, 1990
1-d. P. vs. Olaes, July 30, 1990
2. Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA 857
3. Roldan vs. Arca, 65 SCRA 336
4. P. vs. CFI, 101 SCRA 86
5. Pacis vs. Pamaran, 56 SCRA 16
6. Lopez vs. Commisioner, 65 SCRA 336
7. P vs. Cruz, 165 SCRA 135
8. Nolasco vs. Pano, 147 SCRA 509 & 139 SCRA
152
9. P vs. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646 (There is a valid warrantless search if a
NARCOM officer arrests the person who owns a bag which contains marijuana
100
which he found out when he smelled the same. Here , there is a probable
cause since he was personal knowledge due to his expertise on drugs)
11. PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO, July 10, 1994. (After the informant
was given by the police the amount of P100.00, he went to buy
marijuana from the accused then return to the police headquarters with
said article. Thereafter, the policemen went to arrest the accused
without warrant. The arrest is not valid since it does not fall under
Section 5 Rule 113)
Likewise, after securing a search warrant authorizing the seizure of shabu
and its paraphernalia and instead, an unlicensed firearm was seized instead, said
gun is inadmissible in evidence.
k. May a non-judicial officer issue a warrant of arrest? (NO)
Read:
1.
2.
3.
4.
101
102
103
104
safety or order
prescribed by law.
requires
otherwise
as
105
The identity (name and address, and the police or law enforcement
organization) of the members of his team judicially authorized to track
down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record the communications, messages,
conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words;
106
107
108
109
110
Carpio, J.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No.
420 that mandates the Adoption of a Unified, Multi-purpose Identification
System by all Government Agencies in the Executive Department. This is
so despite the fact that the Supreme Court held in an En Banc decision in
1998 OPLE VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN TORRES
Administrative Order No. 308[National computerized Identification
Reference System] issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos that the same
is unconstitutional because a national ID card system requires legislation
because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance
system, where none existed before. The Supreme Court likewise held
that EO 308 as unconstitutional for it violates the citizens right to
privacy.
Based on the Ople ruling, the petitioners claimed that Proclamation
No. 420 is unconstitutional on two (2) grounds:
a. usurpation of legislative powers; and
b. it infringes on the citizens right to privacy
Held:
The said Executive Order No. 420 does not violate the citizens right to
privacy since it does not require all the citizens to be issued a national ID
as what happened in AO 308. Only those dealing or employed with the
said government entities who are required to provide the required
information for the issuance of the said ID.
CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340,
October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 704
111
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
The Facts:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago
introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455),89
[4]
directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses
incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
(POTC),
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due
to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board
of Directors.
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the
authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio
of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the
resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and
Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to
deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.90[6]
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio and other commissioners of the PCGG
declined the invitation because of prior commitment.91[7] At the same
time, they invoked Section 4(b) of
E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.
On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General
Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building, No. 82
EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where
he was detained.
Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services,
their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and
Members.
I S S U E S:
Is the investigation conducted on the petitioners violative of their
right to privacy?
89[4]
90[6]
91[7]
112
H E L D:
The claim of immunity is without merit.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws.92[46]
Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused
by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous
regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that
the right to privacy is a constitutional right and the right most valued
by civilized men,93[47] but also from our adherence to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, no one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy and everyone has
the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks.94[48]
Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution,
provides at least two guarantees that explicitly create zones of privacy. It
highlights a persons right to be let alone or the right to determine
what, how much, to whom and when information about himself shall be
disclosed.95[49] Section 2 guarantees the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose.
Section 3 renders inviolable the privacy of
communication and correspondence and further cautions that any
evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court
must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation
of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by
unreasonable government intrusion.96[50] Applying this determination to
these cases, the important inquiries are: first, did the directors and
officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation exhibit a reasonable
expectation of privacy?; and second, did the government violate such
expectation?
The answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited in the
Senates public hearing to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455, particularly
92[46]
Marquez v. Desierto, G.R. No. 135882, June 27, 2001, 359 SCRA 772.
93[47]
See Morfe v. Mutuc No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424.
94
[48]
95
[49]
96
[50]
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See also Article 17 (1) and (2) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.
Constitutional and Legal Systems of ASEAN Countries, Sison, Academy of ASEAN Law and Jurisprudence, 1990, at
221, citing I.R. Cortes, The Constitutional Foundations of Privacy, 7 (1970).
Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P 2d 590 (1974). See Katz v. United states
(1967), 389 U.S. 347, 350-352, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576; People v. Krivda (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 357, 364, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62, 486
P. 2d 1262; 8 Cal. 3d 623-624,105 Cal. Rptr. 521, 504 P. 2d 457. INSERT Herreras Handbook on Arrest, Search and Seizure.
113
Supra.
98[52]
99[53]
100[54]
114
115
2. US vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (A public official should not be onionskinned with reference to comments upon his official acts. The interest of
the government and the society demands full discussion of public affairs)
3. P. vs. Perez, 45 Phil. 599
4. Mercado vs. CFI, 116 SCRA 93
2. Freedom of the press, in general
Read:
BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER & CECILLE
AFABLE VS. COURT OF APPEALS & RAMON
LABO, JR., 444 SCRA 28 [November 25, 2004]
Freedom of Expression; the public has the right to be informed on the mental,
moral and physical fitness of candidates for public office.
FACTS:
1.
In the January 3, 1988 issue of the Baguio Midland Courier (BMC),
Cecille Afable, the Editor-in-Chief, in her column In and Out of Baguio
made the following comments:
Of all the candidates for Mayor of Baguio City), Labo has the most
imponderables about him. People would ask: can he read and write?
Why is he always talking about his Japanese father-in-law? Is he really a
Japanes Senator or a barrio Kapitan? Is it true that he will send P18M aid
to Baguio? Somebody wanted to put an advertisement of Labo in the
Midland Courier but was refused because he has not yet paid his account
of the last time he was a candidate for Congress. We will accept all
advertisements for him if he pays his old account first.
2.
In the same column, Cecille Afable wrote the following comments in her
January 10, 1988 column at the Courier:
I heard that the Dumpty in the Egg is campaigning for Cortes.
Not fair. Some real doctors are also busy campaigning against Labo
because he has not also paid their medical services with them. Since he is
donating millions he should also settle his small debts like the reportedly
insignificant amount of P27,000 only. If he wins, several teachers were
signifying to resign and leave Baguio forever, and Pangasinan will be the
franca-liqua of Baguio.
3.
As a result of the above articles, Ramon Labor, Jr. filed a complaint for
Damages before the regional trial Court of Baguio City as he claimed said
articles were libelous. He likewise filed a separate criminal complaint before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio but was dismissed;
116
4.
Labo claimed that the said articles were tainted with malice because he
was allegedly described as Dumpty in the Egg or one who is a failure in his
business which is false because he is a very successful businessman or to mean
zero or a big lie; that he is a balasubas due to his alleged failure to pay his
medical expenses;
5.
The petitioners, however, were able to prove that Labo has an unpaid
obligation to the Courier in the amount of P27,415.00 for the ads placed by his
campaigners for the 1984 Batasang Pambansa elections;
6.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City, in its Decision dated
June 14, 1990 dismissed Labos complaint for damages on the ground that the
article of petitioner Afable was privileged and constituted fair comment on
matters of public interest as it dealt with the integrity, reputation and honesty of
private respondent Labo who was a candidate for Mayor of Baguio City;
7.
On January 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision and
ordered the petitioners to pay Ramon Labo, Jr. damages in the total amount of
P350,000.00 after concluding that the Dumpty in the Egg refers to no one but
Labo himself.
Hence, the Petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
A. WAS LABO THE DUMPTY IN THE EGG DESCRIBED IN
THE QUESTIONED ARTICLE/
B. WERE THE ARTICLES SUBJECT OF THE CASE LIBELOUS
OR PRIVILEGED/
HELD:
The Court of Appeals is wrong when it held that Labo is the Dumpty in
the Egg in the questioned article. This is so because the article stated that The
Dumpty in the Egg is campaigning for Cortes, another candidate for mayor
and opponent of Labo himself. It is unbelievable that Labo campaigned for his
opponent and against himself. Although such gracious attitude on the part of
Labo would have been commendable, it is contrary to common human
experience. As pointed out by the petitioners, had he done that, it is doubtful
whether he could have won as City Mayor of Baguio in the 1988 elections,
which he actually did. In line with the doctrine in BORJAL VS. CA, 310 SCRA
1, that it is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the
person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a 3rd person could
identify him as the object of the libelous publication, the case should be
dismissed since Labo utterly failed to dispose of this responsibility.
2.
Labo claims that the petitioners could not invoke public interest to
justify the publication since he was not yet a public official at that time. This
1.
117
argument is without merit since he was already a candidate for City mayor of
Baguio. As such, the article is still within the mantle of protection guaranteed
by the freedom of expression provided in the Constitution since it is the
publics right to be informed of the mental, moral and physical fitness of
candidates for public office. This was recognized as early as the case of US VS.
SEDANO, 14 Phil. 338 [1909] and the case of NEW YORK TIMES VS.
SULLIVAN, 376 U.S. 254 where the US Supreme Court held:
it is of the utmost consequence that the people should
discuss the character and qualifications of candidates for their
suffrages. The importance to the State and to society of such
discussions is so vast, and the advantages derived so great, that they
more than counterbalance the inconvenience of private persons
whose conduct may be involved, and occasional injury to the
reputations of individuals must yield to the public welfare, although
at times such injury may be great. The public benefit from publicity
is so great and the chance of injury to private character so small, that
such discussion must be privileged.
Clearly, the questioned articles constitute fair comment on a matter
of public interest as it dealt with the character of the private respondent
who was running for the top elective post in Baguio City at that time.
2. PABLITO V. SANIDAD VS. COMELEC,
G.R. NO. 90878, January 29, 1990
Freedom of expression and of the press
(Note: Unanimous en banc decision)
Medialdea, J.
Facts:
1. On October 23, 1989, RA 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR
AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS
REGION" was enacted into law;
2. Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and Provinces of Benguet,
Abra, Mt. Province, Ifugao and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the
autonomous region shall take part in a plebiscite originally scheduled for
December 27, 1989 but was reset to January 30, 1990 specifically for the
ratification or rejection of the said act;
3. By virtue of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code (BP
881), the Comelec issued Comelec Resolution No. 2167, Section 19 of
which provides:
118
"Section 19. Prohibition on columnist, commentators or announcers.During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite
day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality
shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against
the plebiscite issues."
4. On November 20, 1989, petitioner PABLITO V. SANIDAD who is a
columnist ("OVERVIEW") for the Baguio Midland Courier, a weekly
newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, filed a
petition for Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction against the Comelec
to enjoin the latter from enforcing Section 19 of resolution No. 2167.
Petitioner claims that the said provision is violative of his constitutional
freedom of expression and of the press and it also constitutes a prior
restraint because it imposes subsequent punishment for those who violate
the same;
5. On November 28, 1989, the Supreme Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the respondent from enforcing Section 19 of
Resolution No. 2167;
6. On January 9, 1990, Comelec through the Solicitor General filed its
Comment and moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that
Section 19 of Resolution No. 2167 does not absolutely bar the petitioner
from expressing his views because under Section 90 and 92 of BP 881, he
may still express his views or campaign for or against the act through the
Comelec space and airtime.
Held:
What is granted by Art. IX-C of the Constitution to the Comelec is the
power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises,
permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other
public utilities to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the
right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public
information campaigns and forums among candidates are insured. The
evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a
franchise holder may favor or give undue advantage to a candidate in
terms of advertising time and space. This is also the reason why a
columnist, commentator or announcer is required to take a leave of
absence from his work during the campaign period if he is a candidate.
HOWEVER, NEITHER ARTICLE IX-C OF THE CONSTITUTION
NOR SECTION 11(B), 2ND PAR. OF RA 6646 CAN BE CONSTRUED
TO MEAN THAT THE COMELEC HAS ALSO BEEN GRANTED
THE RIGHT TO SUPERVISE AND REGULATE THE EXERCISE BY
MEDIA PRACTITIONERS THEMSELVES OF THEIR RIGHT TO
119
120
1. Obscenity; test of
Read:
a. P. vs. Kottinger, 45 Phil. 352
b. P vs. GO PIN, August 8, 1955
Tests:
a. Whether the average person applying to contemporary community
standards would find the work appeals to prurient interest;
b. Whether the work depicts or describes a patently offensive sexual
conduct;
c. Whether the work as a whole lacks serious literary , artistic,
political or scientific value.
c. Miller vs. California, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419
d. Ginsberg vs. New York,390 U.S. 629
e. Pita vs. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (A City Mayor may not order the
warrantless seizure of magazines which he believes to be obscene; otherwise,
he will become the complainant, prosecutor and judge at the same time. He
should obtain a search warrant from a judge)
2. Libel or slander; test ofRead:
a. Lopez and Manila Times cases, supra
b. Quisumbing vs. Lopez, 96 Phil. 510
3. Cases undersub-judice
Read:
121
for redress of
122
The petitioners are not therefore entitled to their salaries during their
suspension because the general proposition is that a public official is not
entitled to any compensation if he had not rendered any service.
BAYAN,
KARAPATAN,
KILUSANG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP),
and
GABRIELA vs. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity
as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor LITO
ATIENZA, Chief of the Philippine National Police, Gen.
ARTURO M. LOMIBAO, NCRPO Chief Maj. Gen.
VIDAL QUEROL, and Western Police District Chief
Gen. PEDRO BULAONG, G.R. No. 169848, May,
2006
AZCUNA, J.:
The Facts:
Petitioners come in three groups.
The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838, allege
that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their
rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally
they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by
policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.
The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess
del Prado, et al., in G.R. No. 169848, who allege that they were
injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they held
on September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently dispersed by
the police. They further assert that on October 5, 2005, a group they
participated in marched to Malacaang to protest issuances of the
Palace which, they claim, put the country under an undeclared
martial rule, and the protest was likewise dispersed violently and
many among them were arrested and suffered injuries.
The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al.,
petitioners in G.R. No. 169881, allege that they conduct peaceful
mass actions and that their rights as organizations and those of their
individual members as citizens, specifically the right to peaceful
assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of
Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR) being followed to
implement it.
123
124
the
duty
and
3.
The application shall be filed with the office of the
mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended
activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the
scheduled public assembly.
4.
Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly
acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or municipal mayor
shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous
place in the city or municipal building.
SEC. 6. Action to be taken on the application.
1.
It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in
his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and
present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience,
public morals or public health.
2.
The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on
the application within two (2) working days from the date the
application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed
granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in
125
Official
NEWS
September 21, 2005
126
127
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
1.
2.
3.
128
129
130
131
132
133
6.
x x x The principle under American doctrines was given
utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these words: The question, if
the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved,
is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its
purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their
utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the
Constitution protects. There could be danger to public peace and
safety if such a gathering were marked by turbulence. That would
deprive it of its peaceful character. It is true that the licensing
official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in
determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not,
however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that there
be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what
may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the
assumption especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a
specific public place is that the permit must be for the assembly
being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of
Justice Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to
be abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other
place.
xxx
8.
By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to
hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date,
the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it
were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one
entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should
be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to
appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the
permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an
indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear
and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If
he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of
a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.
Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be
transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded,
they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. Free speech
and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms,
are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot
be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, -- even more so than
on the other departments rests the grave and delicate responsibility
of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No
verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with
what has been so felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes as the
sovereign prerogative of judgment. Nonetheless, the presumption
134
SEC. 4.
Permit when
required and when not
required.-- A written permit
shall be required for any person
or persons to organize and hold
a public assembly in a public
place. However, no permit
shall be required if the public
assembly shall be done or made
in a freedom park duly
established by law or ordinance
or in private property, in which
case only the consent of the
owner or the one entitled to its
legal possession is required, or
in the campus of a governmentowned
and
operated
educational institution which
shall be subject to the rules and
regulations of said educational
institution. Political meetings
or rallies held during any
election campaign period as
provided for by law are not
covered by this Act.
SEC. 5.
Application
requirements.-All
applications for a permit shall
comply with the following
guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be
in writing and shall include the
135
136
137
It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban
of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time,
place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmea v.
Comelec,101 where the Court referred to it as a content-neutral regulation
of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies.102
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that
it refers to all kinds of public assemblies103 that would use public places.
The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because
assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not
be peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither are the words
opinion, protesting and influencing in the definition of public
assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words
petitioning the government for redress of grievances come from the
wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally,
maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is
independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear
and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience,
public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the
exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right
to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a
101
102
103
138
clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right
to prevent.
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the
speech is not relevant to the regulation.
As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a
precise and sufficient standard the clear and present danger test stated in
Sec. 6(a). The reference to imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is not an
inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent Mayor has the same
power independently under Republic Act No. 7160104 is thus not necessary
to resolve in these proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties in their
arguments.
Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law provides
for an alternative forum through the creation of freedom parks where no
prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any time:
SEC. 15. Freedom parks. Every city and municipality in the
country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or
designate at least one suitable freedom park or mall in their respective
jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within
the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any
time without the need of any prior permit.
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the
respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the period of
six months from the effectivity this Act.
2
The Court now comes to the matter of the CPR. As stated earlier,
the Solicitor General has conceded that the use of the term should now be
discontinued, since it does not mean anything other than the maximum
tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880. This is stated in the Affidavit
of respondent Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, submitted by the
Solicitor General, thus:
The truth of the matter is the policy of calibrated preemptive
response is in consonance with the legal definition of maximum
tolerance under Section 3 (c) of B.P. Blg. 880, which is the highest
degree of restraint that the military, police and other peacekeeping
104
The Local Government Code. Specifically, Section 16 stating the general welfare clause, thus:
SEC. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support among other things, the preservation and enrichment of
culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order,
and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
139
140
141
105[6]
[7]
Id.
[8]
Id. at 90.
106
107
108[9]
Id. at 91.
109
[10]
Id. at 92.
[11]
Id. at 93-97.
[12]
Id. at 98-102.
[13]
Id. at 103-110.
[14]
Id. at 103.
[15]
Id. at 111.
110
111
112
113
114
142
115
[16]
Id. at 18-19.
[32]
Article 3, Sec. 4.
[33]
116
117
143
119
[35]
See TJ Burgonio, Isabela gov who ended a dynasty wins RM prize, Philippine Daily Inquirer (1 August 2008), at
http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/letterstotheeditor/view /20080801-151950/Isabela-gov-who-ended-a-dynasty-winsRM-prize
120
[36]
[37]
[38]
Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, 15 February 2008, 545 SCRA 441, 491.
121
122
123
[39]
Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. COMELEC, 409 Phil. 571, 585 (2001); citing New York Times v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 714, 29 L. Ed. 2d 822, 824 (1971).
124
[40]
Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168335, 15 February 2008, 545 SCRA 441, 492.
144
126
[42]
[43]
Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, 15 February 2008, 545 SCRA 441, 493.
127
128
[44]
[45]
Id. at 957.
129
145
[47]
Id. at 178-179.
131
146
132
[53]
133
[54]
See White Light v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122846, 20 January 2009.
[55]
134
147
160 Phil. 991, 1001 (1975). See also MHP Garments, Inc., v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86720, 2 September 1994,
236 SCRA 227, 235.
136
[86]
[87]
137
138
[88]
According to an article posted on the official website of Bombo Radyo, DZNC accordingly resumed broadcast on 8
February 2006. See http://www.bomboradyo.com/archive/ new/stationprofile /bombocauayan/index.htm (last visited, 6 March
2009)
139
[89]
148
140[90]
[Exemplary damages] are an antidote so that the poison of wickedness may not run through the body politic. Octot
v. Ybaez, etc., et al., 197 Phil. 76, 82 (1982).
141
[91]
[The award of exemplary damages] would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. Octot v. Ybaez, supra note 87, at 85; citing Ong Yiu v. CA, 91 SCRA 223.
142
[92]
143
[3]
149
to the alleged use of some cuss words in the August 10, 2004 episode of Ang
Dating Daan.144[4]
After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB,
by Order of August 16, 2004, preventively suspended the showing of Ang
Dating Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with Section 3(d) of
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3,
Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD
1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure.145[5] The same
order also set the case for preliminary investigation.
The following day, petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive
suspension order, praying that Chairperson Consoliza P. Laguardia and two
other members of the adjudication board recuse themselves from hearing the
case.146[6] Two days after, however, petitioner sought to withdraw147[7] his
motion for reconsideration, followed by the filing with this Court of a petition
for certiorari and prohibition,148[8] docketed as G.R. No. 164785, to nullify the
preventive suspension order thus issued.
On September 27, 2004, in Adm. Case No. 01-04, the MTRCB issued a
decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is
hereby rendered, finding respondent Soriano liable for his utterances
and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months
suspension from his program, Ang Dating Daan.
SO ORDERED.149[9]
Petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for injunctive relief, docketed as G.R. No. 165636.
In G.R. No. 164785, petitioner raises the following issues:
THE
ORDER
OF
PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION
PROMULGATED BY RESPONDENT [MTRCB] DATED 16
AUGUST 2004 AGAINST THE TELEVISION PROGRAM ANG
DATING DAAN x x x IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING ISSUED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
(A)
BY REASON THAT THE [IRR] IS INVALID INSOFAR AS
IT PROVIDES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION ORDERS;
144
[4]
145
[5]
146
147
148
149
Id. at 110.
Id. at 112-113, Rules of Procedure in the Conduct of Hearing for Violations of PD 1986 and the IRR.
[6]
Id. at 141-151.
[7]
Id. at 152-154.
[8]
Id. at 166-252.
[9]
Id. at 378.
150
(B)
BY REASON OF LACK OF DUE HEARING IN THE CASE
AT BENCH;
(C)
FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION
UNDER THE LAW;
(D)
FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION;
AND
(E)
FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXPRESSION.150[10]
In G.R. No. 165636, petitioner relies on the following grounds:
SECTION
3(C)
OF
[PD]
1986,
IS
PATENTLY
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ENACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION x x x CONSIDERING THAT:
I
SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER,
UNDULY
INFRINGES
ON
THE
CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION, SPEECH, AND
EXPRESSION AS IT PARTAKES OF THE NATURE OF A
SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT CURTAILING THE SAME;
CONSEQUENTLY, THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS, RULES OF PROCEDURE, AND OFFICIAL
ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO, I.E. DECISION
DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER DATED 19
OCTOBER 2004, ARE LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY
INFIRM AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH;
II
SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER,
UNDULY
INFRINGES
ON
THE
CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL
PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW; CONSEQUENTLY, THE
[IRR], RULES OF PROCEDURE, AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF
THE MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO, I.E., DECISION DATED
27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER
2004, ARE LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS
APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH; AND
III
[PD] 1986 IS NOT COMPLETE IN ITSELF AND DOES NOT
PROVIDE FOR A SUFFICIENT STANDARD FOR ITS
IMPLEMENTATION THEREBY RESULTING IN AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY REASON THAT
IT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR THE PENALTIES FOR
150
[10]
Id. at 182.
151
BOARD
shall
xxxx
c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from
and/or prohibit the x x x production, x x x exhibition and/or
151
[11]
152
[12]
Id. at 46.
Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 116033, February 26, 1997, 268 SCRA 747.
153
[13]
Pimentel v. COMELEC, Nos. L-53581-83, December 19, 1980, 101 SCRA 769.
154
[14]
Agpalo, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2005); citing Matienzon v. Abellera, G.R. No. 77632, June 8, 1988, 162
SCRA 1.
152
153
[15]
156
[16]
Lastimoso v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 116801, April 6, 1995, 243 SCRA 497.
Alonzo v. Capulong, G.R. No. 110590, May 10, 1995, 244 SCRA 80; Beja v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97149,
March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 689.
154
157
[17]
Chavez v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007, 530 SCRA 235, 295-296; citing
Azarcon, supra note 12, at 761; Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. Santiago, Nos. L-29236 & 29247, August 21,
1974, 58 SCRA 493, 497.
158
[18]
63 Phil. 139, 177 (1936).
159
[19]
Rollo (G.R. No. 164785), p. 12.
160
[20]
Id. at 94.
161
[21]
Id. at 95.
162
[22]
Beja, supra note 16; Espiritu v. Melgar, G.R. No. 100874, February 13, 1992, 206 SCRA 256.
155
[23]
164
[24]
156
violates, apart from his religious freedom, his freedom of speech and
expression guaranteed under Sec. 4, Art. III of the Constitution, which reads:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievance.
He would also have the Court declare PD 1986, its Sec. 3(c) in particular,
unconstitutional for reasons articulated in this petition.
It is settled that expressions by means of newspapers, radio, television,
and motion pictures come within the broad protection of the free speech and
expression clause.165[25] Each method though, because of its dissimilar presence
in the lives of people and accessibility to children, tends to present its own
problems in the area of free speech protection, with broadcast media, of all
forms of communication, enjoying a lesser degree of protection.166[26] Just as
settled is the rule that restrictions, be it in the form of prior restraint, e.g.,
judicial injunction against publication or threat of cancellation of
license/franchise, or subsequent liability, whether in libel and damage suits,
prosecution for sedition, or contempt proceedings, are anathema to the freedom
of expression. Prior restraint means official government restrictions on the press
or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or
dissemination.167[27] The freedom of expression, as with the other freedoms
encased in the Bill of Rights, is, however, not absolute. It may be regulated to
some extent to serve important public interests, some forms of speech not being
protected. As has been held, the limits of the freedom of expression are reached
when the expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.168[28] In
the oft-quoted expression of Justice Holmes, the constitutional guarantee
obviously was not intended to give immunity for every possible use of
language.169[29] From Lucas v. Royo comes this line: [T]he freedom to express
ones sentiments and belief does not grant one the license to vilify in public the
honor and integrity of another. Any sentiments must be expressed within the
proper forum and with proper regard for the rights of others.170[30]
Indeed, as noted in Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire,171[31] there are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech that are harmful,
the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problems. In net effect, some forms of speech are not protected
by the Constitution, meaning that restrictions on unprotected speech may be
165[25]
US v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131; Eastern Broadcasting Corporation v. Dans, Jr., No. L-59329, July 19,
1985, 137 SCRA 628.
166
[26]
Eastern Broadcasting Corporation v. Dans, Jr., supra note 25; citing FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726;
Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak, No. L-69500, July 22, 1985, 137 SCRA 717.
167
[27]
J.G. Bernas, S.J., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY
205 (1996).
168
[28]
Lagunsad v. Soto vda. De Gonzales, No. L-32066, August 6, 1979, 92 SCRA 476.
169
[29]
Trohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); cited in Bernas, supra at 218.
170
[30]
G.R. No. 136185, October 30, 2000, 344 SCRA 481, 490.
171[31]
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
157
172[32]
175
176
158
159
[37]
178
[38]
179
180
181
182
160
161
189[49]
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133486, January 28, 2000, 323 SCRA 811; Adiong v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712.
190[50]
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707 & 80578, February 1, 1989, 170 SCRA 1.
191[51]
Supra note 25, at 635.
192[52]
No. L-82380, April 29, 1988, 160 SCRA 861.
193
[53]
Supra note 48.
194
[54]
Supra at 898.
162
Supra at 899-900.
Kauper, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 113 (1966); cited in Gonzales v. COMELEC, supra
note 48; also cited in J.G. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A
COMMENTARY (2003).
197
[57]
Id.
196[56]
163
After a careful examination of the factual milieu and the arguments raised
by petitioner in support of his claim to free speech, the Court rules that the
governments interest to protect and promote the interests and welfare of the
children adequately buttresses the reasonable curtailment and valid restraint on
petitioners prayer to continue as program host of Ang Dating Daan during the
suspension period.
No doubt, one of the fundamental and most vital rights granted to citizens
of a State is the freedom of speech or expression, for without the enjoyment of
such right, a free, stable, effective, and progressive democratic state would be
difficult to attain. Arrayed against the freedom of speech is the right of the
youth to their moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social being which the State is
constitutionally tasked to promote and protect. Moreover, the State is also
mandated to recognize and support the vital role of the youth in nation building
as laid down in Sec. 13, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution.
The Constitution has, therefore, imposed the sacred obligation and
responsibility on the State to provide protection to the youth against illegal or
improper activities which may prejudice their general well-being. The Article
on youth, approved on second reading by the Constitutional Commission,
explained that the State shall extend social protection to minors against all
forms of neglect, cruelty, exploitation, immorality, and practices which may
foster racial, religious or other forms of discrimination.198[58]
Indisputably, the State has a compelling interest in extending social
protection to minors against all forms of neglect, exploitation, and immorality
which may pollute innocent minds. It has a compelling interest in helping
parents, through regulatory mechanisms, protect their childrens minds from
exposure to undesirable materials and corrupting experiences.
The
Constitution, no less, in fact enjoins the State, as earlier indicated, to promote
and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being of
the youth to better prepare them fulfill their role in the field of nationbuilding.199[59] In the same way, the State is mandated to support parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character.200[60]
Petitioners offensive and obscene language uttered in a television
broadcast, without doubt, was easily accessible to the children. His statements
could have exposed children to a language that is unacceptable in everyday use.
As such, the welfare of children and the States mandate to protect and care for
them, as parens patriae,201[61] constitute a substantial and compelling
government interest in regulating petitioners utterances in TV broadcast as
provided in PD 1986.
198
[58]
199
[59]
200
201
164
[62]
165
166
[63]
204
[64]
205
G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996, 259 SCRA 529, 544, 552.
Supra note 56, at 235.
[65]
G.R. No. 155282, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 575.
167
[66]
168
169
[67]
170
[68]
Supra note 17; citing Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936); Provident Tree Farms, Inc. v. Batario,
Jr., G.R. No. 92285, March 28, 1994, 231 SCRA 463.
171
209[69]
of a particular statute.
The grant of the rule-making power to
administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers
and is an exception to the non-delegation of legislative powers.210[70]
Administrative regulations or subordinate legislation calculated to promote
the public interest are necessary because of the growing complexity of modern
life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the law.211[71] Allowing the MTRCB
some reasonable elbow-room in its operations and, in the exercise of its
statutory disciplinary functions, according it ample latitude in fixing, by way of
an appropriate issuance, administrative penalties with due regard for the
severity of the offense and attending mitigating or aggravating circumstances,
as the case may be, would be consistent with its mandate to effectively and
efficiently regulate the movie and television industry.
But even as we uphold the power of the MTRCB to review and impose
sanctions for violations of PD 1986, its decision to suspend petitioner must
be modified, for nowhere in that issuance, particularly the power-defining
Sec. 3 nor in the MTRCB Schedule of Administrative Penalties effective
January 1, 1999 is the Board empowered to suspend the program host or
even to prevent certain people from appearing in television programs. The
MTRCB, to be sure, may prohibit the broadcast of such television programs or
cancel permits for exhibition, but it may not suspend television personalities,
for such would be beyond its jurisdiction. The MTRCB cannot extend its
exercise of regulation beyond what the law provides. Only persons, offenses,
and penalties clearly falling clearly within the letter and spirit of PD 1986 will
be considered to be within the decrees penal or disciplinary operation. And
when it exists, the reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the person
charged with violating the statute and for whom the penalty is sought. Thus, the
MTRCBs decision in Administrative Case No. 01-04 dated September 27,
2004 and the subsequent order issued pursuant to said decision must be
modified. The suspension should cover only the television program on
which petitioner appeared and uttered the offensive and obscene language,
which sanction is what the law and the facts obtaining call for.
In ending, what petitioner obviously advocates is an unrestricted speech
paradigm in which absolute permissiveness is the norm. Petitioners flawed
belief that he may simply utter gutter profanity on television without adverse
consequences, under the guise of free speech, does not lend itself to acceptance
in this jurisdiction. We repeat: freedoms of speech and expression are not
absolute freedoms. To say any act that restrains speech should be greeted with
furrowed brows is not to say that any act that restrains or regulates speech or
expression is per se invalid. This only recognizes the importance of freedoms
of speech and expression, and indicates the necessity to carefully scrutinize acts
that may restrain or regulate speech.
209
[69]
210
[70]
211
People v. Maceren, No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450, 458.
Id.
[71]
Id.
172
[1]
Section 4, Article III, Constitution.
213
[2]
Article 353-359, Revised Penal Code; Article 33, Civil Code.
214
[3]
Article 26, Civil Code.
173
215
[4]
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
216
[5]
Gonzales v. Kalaw-Katigbak, 222 Phil. 225 (1985).
217
[6]
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, G.R. No. 173034,
535 SCRA 265.
218
[7]
Eastern Broadcasting Corporation v. Dans, No. 222 Phil. 151 (1985).
219
[8]
Id.
9 October 2007,
174
220
[9]
Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119673, 26 July 1996, 259 SCRA 529;
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
221
[10]
Bayan v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 169838, 169848 and 169881, 25 April 2006, 488 SCRA 226.
222
[11]
Section 11(2), Article XVI, Constitution.
223
[12]
Article 201, Revised Penal Code.
224
[13]
Section 6(a), Milk Code.
225[14]
175
226[15]
[14]
Article 142, Revised Penal Code.
226
[15]
Article 138, Revised Penal Code.
227
[16]
See note 2.
228
[17]
See note 3.
229
[18]
Articles 138 and 142, Revised Penal Code.
230
[19]
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
231
[20]
Id.
176
[21]
See note 9.
177
7960-707&
178
179
That the conjugal arrangement with Quilapio has the approval of her
congregation.
Escritor likewise claimed that she had executed a DECLARATION OF
PLEDGING FAITHFULNESS in accordance with her religion which
allows members of the Jehovahs witnesses who have been abandoned by
their spouses to enter into marital relations. The Declaration thus makes
the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all over the
world except in countries where divorce is allowed.
HELD:
Escritors conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has
made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental
right to religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld
in order that freedoms---including religious freedom---may be enjoyed.
IN THE AREA OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE AS A PREFERRED
FREEDOM, HOWEVER, MAN STANDS ACCOUNTABLE TO AN
AUTHORITY HIGHER THAN THE STATE, and so the stateinterest
sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the
very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of
a showing that the state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe
to the Infinite.
Escritor was therefore held not administratively liable for grossly
immoral conduct.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
-any specific system of belief, worship or conduct, often involving a code of
ethics and philosophy.
-A profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his
Creator.
The existence of a Divine being is not necessarily inherent in religion; the
Buddhists espouses a way of life without reference to an omnipotent God.
Strong fences make good neighbors. The idea is to delineate the
boundaries between two institutions and prevent encroachments by one against
the other.
The doctrine cuts both ways. It is not only the State that is prohibited from
interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs; the Church is likewise barred from
meddling in purely secular matters.
NON-STABLISHMENT CLAUSE:
180
It simply means that the State cannot set up a church; nor pass laws
which aids one religion; aid all religion, or prefer one religion over another nor
force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his
will; or force him to profess a belief or disbelief; that the State cannot openly or
secretly participate in the affairs of any religious organization or group and vice
versa (EVERSON VS. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 330 US 1)
This clause seeks to protect:
Voluntarism---must come into existence through the voluntary support of its
members;
Insulation from political processgrowth through voluntary support of its
members will not take place if there is intervention from the State.
There will be no violation of the non-establishment clause if:
the statute has a secular legislative purpose;
its principal or primary effect is one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
and
it does not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.
(LEMON VS. KURTZMAN, 403 US 602)
The government is neutral and while protecting all, it prefers none and
disparages none. All here applies both to the believer and the non-believer.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION INCLUDES FREEDOM FROM RELIGION; THE
RIGHT TO WORHIP INCLUDES THE RIGHT NOT TO WORSHIP.
SCHOOL PRAYER CASE (ENGEL VS. VITALE, 370 US 421)
It is unconstitutional for a school to require the students to recite a prayer
composed by the Board of Regents at the starts of the days class. It is no part
of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the
American People.
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF ABINGTON VS. SCHEMPP, 374 US 203
It is unconstitutional for a law to require that at least 10 verses from the
Holy Bible be read daily without comment because the same constitute a
religious exercise which violates the non-establishment clause.
BOARD OF EDUCATION VS. ALLEN, 392 US 236
A law requiring the Board of Education to lend textbooks free of charge
to all students from grades 7-12 of parochial school. This is constitutional since
it is not the parochial school which gets the benefits but the parents.
181
182
Phil. 398
Grino--Aquino, J.
Facts:
-----1. The petitioners are high school and grade schools students enrolled in
the different public schools of the Province of Cebu and who belong to
the religious group known as the Jehovah's Witnesses;
2. That they rrefused to take part in the flag ceremony which includes
playing by a band or singing the Philippine National Anthem, saluting the
Philippine Flag and reciting the patriotic pledge because they considered
the flag as an image and they should not worship it except GOD;
3. That because of their refusal to perform the foregoing acts as required
by RA 1265 of July 11, 1955 and by Department Order No. 8 dated July
21, 1955 of the DECS making the flag ceremony compulsory in all
educational institutions, they were expelled by the respondent school
authorities.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
-----May the petitioners be expelled for refusing to salute the flag, recite
the patriotic pledge or sing the national anthem in order to follow their
religious beliefs?
Held:
The same issue was raised in Gerona vs. Secretary of Education,
106 Phil. 2 (1959) and Balbuna vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150
(1960) where the SC held that:
183
184
coverage of the closed-shop agreement between the labor union and the
company because it would violate the teaching of their church not to join
any labor group.
We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's
Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of
respect to their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may
seem to others
CHAPTER VII - THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO TRAVEL
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of
changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as
may be provided by law.
NOTE: THE APPLICABLE PROVISION OF THE HUMAN SECURITY
ACT ON THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
Section 26 provides that persons who have been charged with
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism---even if they have been
granted bail because evidence of guilt is not strongcan be:
129 SCRA
185
2. Read:
FERDINAND MARCOS, ET AL. VS. HON. RAUL
MANGLAPUS, ET AL., G.R. NO. 88211, September
15, 1989 and the Resolution of the Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 27, 1989
right to travel; liberty of abode
and "right to return"
En banc
Cortes, J.
This is a petition for mandamus and prohibition asking the Supreme
Court to Order the respondents to issue travel documents to the petitioners
and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their
return to the Philippines.
The case for the petitioners is founded on the assertion that their right
to return to the Philippines is guaranteed by the following provisions of
the Constitution:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life liberty or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied equal
protection of the laws.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by
law.
The petitioners contend that the President has no power to impair the
liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only the Courts may do so
"within the limits prescribed by law". Nor may the President impair the
right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
Also, the petitioners claim that under international law, particularly the
Universal Declaration of Humjan Rights guaranteed the right of the
Marcoses to return to the Philippines. Thus:
Art. 13 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence
within the borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, AND
TO RETURN TO HIS COUNTRY.
186
187
188
189
190
191
235[7]
192
the
the
the
the
193
194
195
196
I S S U E S:
1. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern; and
H E L D:
E.O 464 likewise violates the constitutional provision on the right
to information on matters of public concern. There are clear distinctions
between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power
of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of
documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same
obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither
does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony
from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and
not to an individual citizen.
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally
conducted in public, however, any executive issuance tending to unduly
limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily
deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of
legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are
thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating
their own opinions on the matter before Congress opinions which they
can then communicate to their representatives and other government
officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of
expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte:
It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political
discussion be maintained to the end that the government may
perceive and be responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open
dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is
informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when
the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access
197
236
(Emphasis and
390
4. Read:
1. In re: ATTY. EDILLON, 84 SCRA 554
2. Tarnate vs. Noriel, 100 SCRA 93
3. Samahan ng Manggagawa vs. Noriel, 108 SCRA 381
4. Villar vs. Inciong, April 20,l983
5. P. vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382
6. P. vs. Ferrer, 56 SCRA 793 (Read the dissenting
opinion of Justice
FERNANDO in both cases)
CHAPTER X - THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN
236
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
248[22]
1187
of the Civil Code provides that the effects of a conditional
obligation to give, once the condition has been fulfilled, shall retroact to
the day of the constitution of the obligation. Hence, when HTRDC
complied with the given conditions, as determined by the RTC in its
Order249[23] dated 21 April 2003, the effects of the constructive delivery
retroacted to the actual date of the deposit of the amount in the
expropriation account of DPWH.
The owners of the expropriated land are entitled to legal interest on the
compensation eventually adjudged from the date the condemnor takes
possession of the land until the full compensation is paid to them or deposited
in court.
Requisites before immediate possession or writ of possession may be
issued in expropriation cases, involving local government units as the
expropriating agency:
1. Complaint sufficient in form and substance; and
2. Payment of 15% of the Market value as appearing in the
latest Tax Declaration.
THE CITY OF ILOILO VS. JUDGE LEGASPI,
RTC 22, ILOILO CITY, 444 SCRA 269
Requisites before the expropriator is allowed immediate entry on the property
subject of expropriation if the expropriator is a local government unit.
248
249
207
208
proceedings, 29
209
b. that P32.00 per square meter was the appraised value made by the Office
of the Provincial Assessor of Batangas; and
c. the complaint itself prays that the market value be pegged at P32.00 per
square meter.
Issue:
------
210
211
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the proerty
sought to be expropriated (Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 378). The measure is not the taker's gain but the
owner's loss. he compensation, to be just, must be fair not only to the owner but
also to the taker.
To determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the
market value of the property, to which should be added the consequential
benefits which may arise from the expropriation.
The market value of the property is the price that may be agreed upon
by the parties willing but not compelled to enter into a contract of sale.
Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market
value are:
1. cost of acquisition;
2. the current value of like proerties;
3. its actual or potential uses;
4. particular case of lands;
5. their size, shape, location; and
6. the tax declarations thereon.
Finally, note that as held in the case of Republic vs. Santos, 141 SCRA
30, the market value as recommended by the board of commissioners
appointed by the court were at best only ADVISORY AND PERSUASIVE
AND BY NO MEANS FINAL OR BINDING.
2. NHA vs. Reyes, 123 SCRA 245
3. Manotok vs. CA, May 21,1987
4. EPZA vs. Dulay, April 29,l987
5. Lagunzad vs. CA, 154 SCRA 199
When it is considered for "public use":
6. Sumulong vs. Guererro, 154 SCRA 461
7. Republic vs. CA, 154 SCRA 428
8.Cosculluela vs. CA, 164 SCRA 393
5. Requisite of "taking" in eminent domain cases
Read:
1. Rep. vs. Castellvi, 58 SCRA 336
Requisites of taking:
a. the expropriator must enter the property;
212
b.
c.
d.
e.
213
respondent Judge dated June 14, 1979 be SET ASIDE and the respondent
Judge is permanently enjoined from taking any further action on Civil Case No.
7001-P;
5. On August 8, 1981, the defendants in Civil Case No. 7001- moved for the
dismissal of said case since the decision of the Supreme Court is already final;
6. On September 2, 1983, the Republic moved for the dismissal of the case due
to the encatment of BP 340 expropriating the same properties for the same
purpose. On the same date, the Court dismissed the case. The defendants moved
for a reconsideration which the Court denied;
7. De Knecht appealed the Order dismissing the case to the Court of Appeals
who on December 28, 1988 issued its decision setting aside the Order appealed
from and dismissing the expropriation proceedings before the lower court on
the ground that the choice of the above-mentioned streets as the line through
which the EDSA should be extended is arbitrary and should not receive judicial
approval;
8. The Republic of the Philippines filed a Petition for Review with the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the legislature could still pass a law expropriating the lots of
the private respondents despite the existence of a final decision of the Supreme
Court which held that choice of their lot to be used as an extension of EDSA is
arbitrary?
Held:
It is true that there is already a final decision of the Supreme Court to the
effect that the choice of the Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets is arbitrary and
should not receive judicial approval. However, it is equally true that the
Constitution and our laws may expropriate private properties after the payment
of just compensation. When on February 17, 1983, the Batasang Pambansa
passed BP 340 expropriating the same properties for the same purpose, IT
APPEARS THAT THE SAME WAS BASED ON SUPERVENING EVENTS
THAT OCCURRED after the decision of the SC in De Knecht vs. Bautista in
1980. The social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this
extension has disappeared because of the fact that the residents of the area have
been relocated and duly compensated and only DE KNECHT now is left while
her property is only about 5% of the area to be expropriated. The Republic
could continue it expropriation proceedings considering the supervening events
after the decision was rendered.
BP Bilang 340 THEREFORE EFFECTIVELY SUPERSEDED THE
AFORESAID FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISION OF THE SUPREME
214
SCRA 706
215
216
217
degree or his physician at any time of the day without any form of
restriction. The logbook shall contain a clear and concise record of:
1. name, description, and address of the detained person;
2. date and exact time of his initial admission for custodial arrest
and detention;
3. the name and address of the physician/s who examined him
physically and medically;
4. the state of his health and his physical condition a the time of his
initial admission for custodial detention;
5. the date and time of each removal of the detained person from his
cell for interrogation or for any purpose;
6. the date and time of his return to his cell;
7. name and address of the physician who examined him physically
and medically;
8. summary of the physical and medical findings after each
interrogation;
9. names and addresses of the members of his family and relatives;
10. names and addresses of the persons who visited him;
11. date and time of such visits;
12. date and time when the detained person requested to
communicate or confer with his lawyer;
13. the date and time of visits by his legal counsel and the date
and time of departure; and
14. all other important events bearing on all relevant details
regarding the treatment of the detained person while under
custodial arrest or detention.
Section 24. No torture or coercion in Investigation and interrogation. No
threat, intimidation, or coercion, and no act which will inflict any form of
physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or psychological pressure on the
detained person which shall vitiate his free will shall be employed in his
investigation and interrogation; otherwise, the evidence obtained from said
detained person shall be in its entirety, absolutely not admissible and usable
as evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative
investigation, inquiry, proceeding or hearing.
The summary of the rights of an accused during custodial
investigation (from the time of arrest) under the Constitution,
laws and jurisprudence.
Rights of the accused during custodial
investigation; obligations of the arresting
officers and investigators during and after
arrest; effect of non-compliance by the
investigators
218
VS.
En Banc
Per Curiam:
Considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that
evidence against an accused were obtained through lawful means, the
Court, as guardian of the rights of the people, lays down the PROCEDURE,
GUIDELINES, AND DUTIES WHICH THE ARRESTING, DETAINING,
INVITING OR INVESTIGATING OFFICER OR HIS COMPANIONS MUST
OBSERVE AT THE TIME OF MAKING THE ARREST AND AGAIN AT
AND DURING THE TIME OF THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION OR
INTERROGATION IN ACCORDANCE with the Constitution, jurisprudence
and Republic Act No. 7438. It is high time to educate our law enforcement
agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-called
Miranda rights which had become insufficient and which the court must
update in the light of new legal developments.
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial
investigation must be informed in a language known to and
understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown
a copy of the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings,
information or communication must be in a language known to and
understood by said person;
2. He must be warned that he has the right to remain silent and that
any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all
times and have the presence of an independent and competent
lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the
services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer
may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be
appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one
acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, , he must be
informed that no custodial investigation in any form shall be
conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid
waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the
right to communicate or confer by the most expedient means---
219
220
Ynares-Santiago, J.
Facts:
For allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National Power
Corporation intended for the purchase of US Dollars from the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB), the accused-appellants were charged of Malversation
through Falsification of Commercial Documents as defined and penalized under
Arts. 217 and 171 [8] in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. After
trial, all accused were convicted by the Sandiganbayan.
While the Information charged the accused of willful and intentional
commission of the acts complained of while the Decision found the accused
guilty of inexcusable negligence.
Accused Ochoa interposed an appeal and claimed that his conviction was
based on his alleged sworn statement and the transcript of stenographic notes of
a supposed interview with an NPC personnel and the report of the NBI. He
maintains that he signed the sworn statement while confined a the Philippine
heart center and upon assurance that it would not be used against him. He was
not assisted by counsel nor he was apprised of his constitutional rights when he
executed the affidavit. He likewise claimed that his constitutional rights to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against and due process were
violated.
Held:
1. Even if the information charges willful malversation, conviction for
malversation through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence
ultimately proves that mode of commission of the offense. (Diaz vs.
Sandiganbayan, 302 SCRA 118). This was the doctrine laid down in the
case of Samson vs. Court of appeals, 103 Phil. 277.
2.
221
222
rd
223
in particular
Read:
1. Constitutional right to remain silent,104 SCRA
1-a. People vs. Marcos Jimenez, Dec. 10, 1991
391
224
225
information for parricide was filed against the widow and her sons, Marcos,
Robert, and Wilkins. In an order dated July 21, 1986, the trial court absolved
the widow and Wilkins of any participation in the filling for lack of proof. On
December 12. 1986, the trial court found Marcos and Robert guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide, noting that the unsigned confession
is admissible in evidence inasmuch as evidence aliunde corroborated such
confession. Both accused contest such ruling. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
---------Is the extrajudicial confession of Marcos admissible in evidence?
HELD:
--------No. Decision reversed.
Section 12 (1), Article III OF THE 1987 Constitution declares that a
person being investigated by the police as a suspect in an offense has the right,
among others, (1) to have a competent and independent counsel of his own
choice and if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one; and that (2) said right cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
The lawyer who assists the suspect under custodial interrogation
should be of the latter's own choice, not one foisted on him by the police
investigators or other parties. In this case, the former judge whose
assistance was requested by the police was evidently not of Marcos
Jimenez' own choice; she was the police officers' own choice; she did not
ask Marcos if was is willing to have her represent him. This is not the mode
of solicitation of legal assistance contemplated by the constitution.
Furthermore, the former judge was not present when Marcos was being
interrogated by the police. While she asked him if he had voluntarily given the
statements contained in the typewritten document, this is far from being
substantial compliance with the constitutional duty of police investigators
during custodial interrogation.
The typewritten confession is unsigned and was in fact expressly rejected
by Marcos. Hence, the supposed waiver made therein of his constitutional right
to counsel of his own choice.
Neither can the confession prejudice his co-accused, his brother Robert,
not only because it was obtained in violation of the constitution but also
because of the principle of res inter alios acta.
226
227
Read:
1. P vs. Usman Hassan, 157 SCRA 261
2. Gamboa vs. Judge Cruz, 162 SCRA 642
2 3. DE LA TORRE VS. CA, 294 SCRA 196
4. PEOPLE VS. HATTON
4. The right to counsel; Waiver of the right to counsel/exceptions/requisites
228
229
Libarnes y Acejo, who are still at large, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation and
with use of firearms, carry away and deprive Robert Yao, Yao San,
Chua Ong Ping Sim, Raymond Yao, Ronald Matthew Yao, Lennie
Yao, Charlene Yao, Jona Abagatnan ang Josephine Ortea against
their will and consent on board their Mazda MVP van for the
purpose of extorting money in the amount of Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00), that during the detention of Chua Ong Ping Sim
and Raymong Yao, said accused with intent to kill, willfully and
unlawfully strangled Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao to
death to the damage and prejudice of their heirs in such amount as
may be awarded to them by this Honorable Court.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Jona Abagatnan (Abagatnan),
Robert Yao (Robert), Yao San, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Alex Alberto, PO3
Roberto Jabien, Atty. Florimond Rous (Atty. Rous) and Atty. Carlo Uminga
(Atty. Uminga). Their testimonies, taken together, attest to the following:
The Yao family is composed of Yao San (father), Chua Ong Ping Sim
(mother), Robert and Raymond (children), Lenny (daughter-in-law, wife of
Robert), Matthew and Charlene (grandchildren), and Jona Abagatnan and
Josephine Ortea (housemaids). The Yao family owns and operates a poultry
farm in Barangay Santo Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
On 16 July 1999, at about 11:00 p.m., the Yao family, on board a Mazda
MVP van, arrived at the their poultry farm in Barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan. Yao San alighted from the van to open the gate of the farm.
At this juncture, appellant Reyes and a certain Juanito Pataray (Pataray)
approached, poked their guns at Yao San, and dragged him inside the van.
Appellant Reyes and Pataray also boarded the van. Thereupon, appellants
Arnaldo and Flores, with two male companions, all armed with guns, arrived
and immediately boarded the van. Appellant Flores took the drivers seat and
drove the van. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their cohorts then
blindfolded each member of the Yao family inside the van with packaging
tape.251[6]
After about 30 minutes of traveling on the road, the van stopped. Per
order of appellants and their cohorts, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond
and Jona Abagatnan (Abagatnan) stepped out of the van with appellants Reyes
and Arnaldo, Pataray and one of their male companions.252[7] Appellant Flores,
with the other male companion, drove the van with the remaining members of
the Yao family inside the vehicle.253[8]
Later, the van stopped again. Appellant Flores and his male companion
told Yao San to produce the amount of five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) as
251[6]
252[7]
253[8]
TSN, 26 October 1999, pp. 3-14; TSN, 11 August 2000, pp. 3-7; TSN, 21 September 2000, pp. 2- 8.
TSN, 26 October 1999, pp. 16-17; TSN, 11 August 2000, p. 7.
Records, p. 34.
230
ransom in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond
and Abagatnan. Thereafter, appellant Flores and his male companion left the
van and fled; while Yao San, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene and Josephine
remained inside the van. Upon sensing that the kidnappers had already left,
Yao San drove the van towards the poultry farm and sought the help of
relatives.254[9]
Meanwhile, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan were
taken on foot by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one male
companion to a safe-house situated in the mountainous part of San Jose Del
Monte, Bulacan where they spent the whole night.255[10]
On the morning of the following day, at around 4:00 a.m., appellants and
their cohorts tried to contact Yao San regarding the ransom demanded, but the
latter could not be reached. Thus, appellants instructed Abagatnan to look for
Yao San in the poultry farm. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and one male
companion escorted Abagatnan in proceeding to the poultry farm. Upon
arriving therein, Abagatnan searched for Yao San, but the latter could not be
found. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo told Abagatnan to remind Yao San about
the ransom demanded. Thereafter, appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their
male companion left Abagatnan in the poultry farm and went back to the safehouse.256[11]
In the safe-house, appellants told Robert that they would release him so he
could help Abagatnan in locating Yao San. Robert and appellants left the safehouse, and after 30 minutes of trekking, appellants abandoned Robert. Robert
then ran towards the poultry farm. Upon arriving at the poultry farm, Robert
found Yao San and informed him about the ransom demanded by the
appellants. Robert also told Yao San that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond
were still held by appellants and their cohorts.257[12]
On 18 July 1999, appellants called Yao San through a cellular phone and
demanded the ransom of P5 million for Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. Yao
San acceded to appellants demand. Appellants allowed Yao San to talk with
Chua Ong Ping Sim.258[13]
On the morning of 19 July 1999, appellants again called Yao San via a
cellular phone and threatened to kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond because
of newspaper and radio reports regarding the incident. Yao San clarified to
appellants that he did not report the incident to the police and also pleaded with
them to spare the life of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. Appellants then
instructed Yao San to appear and bring with him the ransom of P5 million at
3:00 p.m. in the Usan dumpsite, Litex Road, Fairview, Quezon City. Yao San
arrived at the designated place of the pay-off at 4:00 p.m., but none of the
254[9]
255[10]
256[11]
257[12]
258[13]
Id.
TSN, 26 October 1999, pp. 16-23; TSN, 7 December 1999, pp. 2-5; TSN, 11 August 2000, pp. 8- 9.
TSN, 7 December 1999, pp. 4-7.
Id. at 7-8; TSN, 11 August 2000, pp. 10-12.
Records, p. 35.
231
appellants or their cohorts showed up. Yao San waited for appellants call,
but none came. Thus, Yao San left.259[14]
On 23 July 1999, the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were
found at the La Mesa Dam, Novaliches, Quezon City.260[15] Both died of
asphyxia by strangulation.261[16]
On 26 July 1999, appellant Arnaldo surrendered to the Presidential AntiOrganized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) at Camp Crame, Quezon City.
Thereupon, appellant Arnaldo, with the assistance of Atty. Uminga, executed a
written extra-judicial confession narrating his participation in the incident.
Appellant Arnaldo identified appellants Reyes and Flores, Pataray and a certain
Tata and Akey as his co-participants in the incident. Appellant Arnaldo also
described the physical features of his cohorts and revealed their whereabouts.262
[17]
Subsequently, appellant Reyes was arrested in Sto. Cristo, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan. Thereafter, appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were identified in a
police line-up by Yao San, Robert and Abagatnan as their kidnappers.263[18]
On 10 August 1999, agents of the PAOCTF arrested appellant Flores in
Balayan, Batangas. Afterwards, appellant Flores, with the assistance of Atty.
Rous, executed a written extra-judicial confession detailing his participation in
the incident. Appellant Flores identified appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray
and a certain Tata and Akey as his co-participants in the incident. Appellant
Flores was subsequently identified in a police line-up by Yao San, Robert and
Abagatnan as one of their kidnappers.264[19]
For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of appellants, Marina
Reyes, Irene Flores Celestino, Wilfredo Celestino, Jr., Rachel C. Ramos, and
Isidro Arnaldo. Appellants denied any liability and interposed alibis and the
defense of frame-up. Their testimonies, as corroborated by their witnesses, are
as follows:
Appellant Arnaldo testified that he was an asset of the PAOCTF. He
narrated that on 25 July 1999, while he was at the tricycle terminal of Brgy.
Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, a police officer named Liwanag of
the PAOCTF approached and invited him to go to Camp Crame to shed light on
a kidnapping case allegedly committed by a certain Brgy. Captain Ramos and
by members of the Aguirre and Bautista families. He accepted the invitation.
Subsequently, he proceeded to Camp Crame and met therein Colonel Cesar
Mancao III (Colonel Mancao) of the PAOCTF. Colonel Mancao told him that
the PAOCTF would arrest Brgy. Capt. Ramos and certain persons named
Gerry Bautista and Dadie Bautista. Colonel Mancao instructed him to identify
259[14]
260[15]
261[16]
262[17]
263[18]
264[19]
232
said persons as responsible for the kidnapping of the Yao family. He refused
to do so because he feared Brgy. Capt. Ramos. The day after, Colonel Mancao
called appellant Arnaldo to his office. Upon arriving thereat, the latter saw Yao
San. Yao San promised him that if their kidnappers would be apprehended
through his cooperation, he would give him P500,000.00. He accepted Yao
Sans offer under the condition that he would identify a different set of
suspects. Later, Colonel Mancao gave him P30,000.00.265[31]
Subsequently, he pointed to appellants Reyes and Flores as his cohorts in
kidnapping the Yao family. He implicated appellants Reyes and Flores to get
even with them, since the two had previously mauled him after he sold their
fighting cocks and failed to give them the proceeds of the sale.266[32]
He denied having met with Atty. Uminga. He was not assisted by the
latter when he was forced by the PAOCTF to make a written extra-judicial
confession on the kidnapping of the Yao family. Further, he claimed that while
he was under the custody of PAOCTF, a certain Major Paulino utilized him as a
drug pusher. Upon failing to remit the proceeds of the drug sale, he was beaten
up by PAOCTF agents and thereafter included as accused with appellants
Reyes and Flores for the kidnapping of the Yao family.267[33]
On the other hand, appellant Reyes testified that he slept in his house with
his family from 6:00 p.m. of 16 July 1999 until the morning of the next day;
that on the early morning of 26 July 1999, five policemen barged into his house
and arrested him; that the policemen told him that he was a suspect in the
kidnapping of the Yao family; that he was mauled by the policemen outside his
house; that the policemen forcibly brought him to Camp Crame, where he was
subsequently tortured; that he knew the Yao family because he worked as a
carpenter in the familys poultry farm at Brgy. Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan; that he had no involvement in the kidnapping of the family; and that
appellant Arnaldo implicated him in the kidnapping of the family because
appellant Arnaldo held a grudge against him.268[34]
For his part, appellant Flores testified that he stayed in his sisters house at
Antipolo City from 12 July 1999 up to 30 July 1999; that he went to her house
on 12 July 1999 because it was the birthday of her child; that he worked as a
construction worker during his stay in his sisters house; that he was arrested in
Batangas and thereafter brought to Camp Crame, where he was beaten up by
policemen for refusing to admit involvement in the kidnapping of the Yao
family; that after three days of beating, he was forced to sign a document which
he later found out to be a written extra-judicial confession; that he never met
nor did he know Atty. Rous; that he knew the Yao family because he lived near
the familys poultry farm, and he used to work therein as a welder; that he had
no participation in the kidnapping of the family; and that appellant Arnaldo
265[31]
266[32]
267[33]
268[34]
233
234
Rollo, p. 34.
235
was coerced to sign the purported confession; that he was forced to sign it
because he could not anymore endure the beatings he suffered at the hands of
the PAOCTF agents; and that he never met or knew Atty. Rous who, according
to the PAOCTF, had assisted him during the custodial investigation.
Appellant Arnaldo contends that his written extra-judicial confession
should be excluded as evidence, as it was procured in violation of his
constitutional right to have an independent counsel of his own choice during
custodial investigation. He claims that he was not given freedom to choose his
counsel; that the agents of the PAOCTF did not ask him during the custodial
investigation whether he had a lawyer of his own choice, and whether he could
afford to hire a lawyer; and that the agents of the PAOCTF suggested the
availability of Atty. Uminga to him.
Thus, we have held that an extra-judicial confession is admissible in
evidence if the following requisites have been satisfied: (1) it must be
voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. 276
[67]
236
237
and agents left them, he and appellant Arnaldo went to a cubicle where only
the two of them were present. He interviewed appellant Arnaldo in the Tagalog
language regarding the latters personal circumstances and asked him why he
was in the PAOCTF office and why he wanted a lawyer. Appellant Arnaldo
replied that he wanted to make a confession about his participation in the
kidnapping of the Yao family. Thereupon, he asked appellant Arnaldo if the
latter would accept his assistance as his lawyer for purposes of his confession.
Appellant Arnaldo agreed. He warned appellant Arnaldo that he might be
sentenced to death if he confessed involvement in the incident. Appellant
Arnaldo answered that he would face the consequences because he was
bothered by his conscience. He inquired from appellant Arnaldo if he was
harmed or intimidated into giving self-incriminating statements to the PAOCTF
investigators. Appellant Arnaldo answered in the negative. He requested
appellant Arnaldo to remove his shirt for him to check if there were torture
marks on his body, but he found none. He also observed that appellant
Arnaldos appearance and movements were normal. His conference with
appellant Arnaldo lasted for 15 minutes or more. Thereafter, he allowed the
PAOCTF investigators to question appellant Arnaldo.286[78]
Further, Atty. Uminga sat beside appellant Arnaldo during the inquiry and
listened to the latters entire confession. After the taking of appellant Arnaldos
confession, Atty. Uminga requested the PAOCTF investigators to give him a
copy of appellant Arnaldos confession. Upon obtaining such copy, he read it
entirely and thereafter gave it to appellant Arnaldo. He instructed appellant
Arnaldo to read and comprehend the same carefully. He told appellant Arnaldo
to ask him for clarification and comment if he did not agree or understand any
part of his written confession. Appellant Arnaldo read his entire written
confession and handed it to him. Atty. Uminga asked him if he had objections
to it. Appellant Arnaldo replied in the negative. He then reminded appellant
Arnaldo that the latter could still change his mind, and that he was not being
forced to sign. Appellant Arnaldo manifested that he would sign his written
confession. Later, he and appellant Arnaldo affixed their signatures to the
written confession.287[79]
With respect to appellant Flores, Atty. Rous declared that before the
PAOCTF investigators began questioning appellant, Atty. Rous interviewed
him in Tagalog inside a room, where only the two of them were present. He
asked appellant Flores about his personal circumstances. Appellant Flores
replied that he was a suspect in the kidnapping of the Yao family, and he
wanted to give a confession regarding his involvement in the said incident. He
asked appellant Flores whether he would accept his assistance as his lawyer.
Appellant Flores affirmed that he would. He asked appellant Flores why he
wanted to give such confession. Appellant Flores answered that he was
bothered by his conscience. Atty. Rous warned appellant Flores that his
confession would be used against him in a court of law, and that the death
penalty might be imposed on him. Appellant Flores told him that he wanted to
286[78]
287[79]
238
tell the truth and unload the burden on his mind. He requested appellant
Flores to lift his shirt for the former to verify if there were torture marks or
bruises on his body, but found none. Again, he cautioned appellant Flores
about the serious consequences of his confession, but the latter maintained that
he wanted to tell the truth. Thereafter, he permitted the PAOCTF investigators
to question appellant Flores.288[80]
Additionally, Atty. Rous stayed with appellant Flores while the latter was
giving statements to the PAOCTF investigators. After the taking of appellant
Flores statements, he instructed appellant Flores to read and check his written
confession. Appellant Flores read the same and made some minor corrections.
He also read appellant Flores written confession. Afterwards, he and appellant
Flores signed the latters written confession.289[81]
It is true that it was the PAOCTF which contacted and suggested the
availability of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous to appellants Arnaldo and Flores,
respectively. Nonetheless, this does not automatically imply that their right to
counsel was violated. What the Constitution requires is the presence of
competent and independent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his
clients defense without any intervening conflict of interest.290[82] There was no
conflict of interest with regard to the legal assistance rendered by Atty. Uminga
and Atty. Rous. Both counsels had no interest adverse to appellants Arnaldo
and Flores. Although Atty. Uminga testified that he was a former National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent, he, nevertheless, clarified that he had been
separated therefrom since 1994291[83] when he went into private practice. Atty.
Uminga declared under oath that he was a private practitioner when he assisted
appellant Arnaldo during the custodial investigation.292[84] It appears that Atty.
Uminga was called by the PAOCTF to assist appellant Arnaldo, because Atty.
Umingas telephone number was listed on the directory of his former NBI
officemates detailed at the PAOCTF. Atty. Rous, on the other hand, was a
member of the Free Legal Aid Committee of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Quezon City at the time he rendered legal assistance to appellant
Flores.293[85] Part of Atty. Rous duty as member of the said group was to render
legal assistance to the indigents including suspects under custodial
investigation.
There was no evidence showing that Atty. Rous had
organizational or personal links to the PAOCTF. In fact, he proceeded to the
PAOCTF office to assist appellant Flores, because he happened to be the
lawyer manning the office when the PAOCTF called.294[86] In People v.
Fabro,295[87] we stated:
The Constitution further requires that the counsel be
independent; thus, he cannot be a special counsel, public or private
288[80]
289[81]
290[82]
291[83]
292[84]
293[85]
294[86]
295[87]
239
296[88]
297[89]
298[90]
299[91]
240
Records, p. 18.
Id. at 19.
229 Phil. 577, 582 (1986).
People v. Bagnate, supra note 90.
Santos v. Sandiganbayan, 400 Phil. 1175, 1206 (2000).
G.R. No. 88451, 5 September 1991, 201 SCRA 364, 377.
241
307
Rollo, p. 169
[3]
242
That appellants first counsel may not have been a member of the bar does
not dent the proven fact that appellant prevented Nelia and company from
proceeding to their destination. Further, appellant was afforded competent
representation by the Public Attorneys Office during the presentation by the
prosecution of the medico-legal officer and during the presentation of his
evidence. People v. Elesterio308[4] enlightens:
As for the circumstance that the defense counsel turned out
later to be a non-lawyer, it is observed that he was chosen by the
accused himself and that his representation does not change the fact
that Elesterio was undeniably carrying an unlicensed firearm when
he was arrested. At any rate, he has since been represented by a
member of the Philippine bar, who prepared the petition for habeas
corpus and the appellants brief. (Underscoring supplied)
Read also:
1. The right to counsel, 57 SCRA 481
1-a. P vs. Nolasco, 163 SCRA 623
1-b. P vs. Hernandez, 162 SCRA 422
1-c. P. vs. Ampo-an, July 4, 1990
1-d. P. vs. Saludar, July 31, 1990
1-e. P. vs. Kidagan, August 20, 1990
1-f. Estacio vs. Sandiganbayan, 183 SCRA 12
1-g. P. vs. Buenaflor, 181 SCRA 225
2. P vs. Tampus, 96 SCRA 624
3. P vs. Taylaran, 108 SCRA 373
4. P vs. Tawat, 129 SCRA 431
5. P vs. Marcos, 147 SCRA 204 (Note that this
criticized by
constitutionalists)
6. P vs. Ladrera, 150 SCRA 113
7. P. Nulla, 153 SCRA 471
8. P vs. Marquez, 153 SCRA 700
9. P vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513
10. P vs. Caguioa, January 17, 1980
ll. P vs. Pecardal, 145 SCRA 624
12. P vs. Lasac, 148 SCRA 624
13. P vs. Pena, 80 SCRA 589
14. P vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 516
decision is widely
How about if the lawyer who assisted him during custodial investigation
is a public attorney who was not chosen by the accused himself but given to
him free of charge? The extrajudicial confession is inadmissible as evidence.
Read:
308
[4]
243
244
presumption of
extrajudicial confession?
Read:
1. Stonehill vs. Diokno, supra
2. P vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 576
3. P. vs. loveria, July 2, 1990
8. Inadmissible as evidence
a. The doctrine of the "fruit of the poisoned
tree"
245
5.
Before 3 to 4 p.m., prosecution witness Natividad Bernardo,
saw accused-appellant pass their house carrying a child who looked
about 5-6 years old.
6.
At about the same time, witness Leah Magno saw the
accused-appellant carrying a child was seen heading towards the
wooded area in the Macalong River;
7.
By 5 p.m. to 6:30 p.m. of that same day, Magno saw accusedappellant walking alone to town coming from the direction of the
Macalong River;
8.
Meanwhile, the parents of Tisay were frantically searching for
their child and when their search proved futile, they reported the
matter to the Barangay Captain and to the Police;
9.
Upon receipt of the information that the child was last seen
with the accused-appellant, the police together with the Barangay
Captains of Camantiles and Bayaoas, Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
proceeded to the house of the accused-appellant;
10. As they approached the house, the accused-appellant jumped
out of the window carrying a black bag. The police authorities gave
chase and finally caught him after twenty (20) exhausting hours;
11. After his arrest, accused-appellant was brought to the Urdaneta
Police Station where he admitted that he raped, killed and buried
Maria Lourdes near the Macalong River in Barangay San Vicente,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, while UNDER INVESTIGATION
WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF A LAWYER. INDEED, THE
BODY OF TISAY WAS FOUND IN THE PLACE WHICH HE
DESCRIBED DURING HIS CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
12. After trial, the trial court (RTC 45 presided over by JUDGE
JOVEN COSTALES) rendered a judgment of conviction and
imposing the penalty of death to the accused-appellant. The court
admitted as evidence the extrajudicial confession of the accusedappellant and used the same as one of the grounds in support of the
judgment of conviction.
A. I S S U E S
1. Is the extrajudicial confession of the accused appellant
admissible in evidence?
2. Whether the lower court erred in convicting in convicting the
accused-appellant?
Held:
246
1
The alleged extrajudicial confession of the accused while under custodial
investigation and without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence
despite the fact that he was allegedly appraised of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel.
This is so because under the 1987 Constitution, the said rights could not
be waived except in the presence of counsel. As such, in accordance with the
doctrine of the fruit of the poisoned tree, the same is inadmissible in evidence.
Any information or admission given by a person while in custody which
may appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent assistance
or an independent counsel should be struck down as inadmissible.
2
Though the extrajudicial confession of the accused-appellant is
inadmissible as evidence, his conviction by the trial court is correct. This is so
because [1] the compromising circumstances were duly proven which were
consistent with each other and which lead with moral certainty to the
conclusion that he was guilty of the crime charged; and [2] the totality of such
circumstances eliminated beyond doubt the possibility of his innocence. In
People vs. Mahinay, it was held that conviction may be had on circumstantial
evidence provided the following requisites are present: [a] there is more than
one circumstance; [b] the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and [c] the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The evidence in this case are more than sufficient to prove the accusedappellants beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence is not a weaker
form of evidence vis--vis direct evidence and cases have recognized that
circumstantial evidence in its weight and probative force, may surpass direct
evidence in its effect upon the Supreme Court.
(NOTE: The indemnification for the death of a person in a rape with Homicide
cases was increased from P50,000.00 to P125,000.00. The said indemnity shall
also be applicable where the death penalty is authorized by applicable
amendatory laws))
b. The exclusionary rule, 145 SCRA 700
Read:
1. P vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 516
2. P vs. Alcaraz,136 SCRA 74
3. Does it also include the confession of a
247
Read:
1. P vs. Bombesa, 162 SCRA 402
2. p. vs. Yutuc, July 26, 1990
9. Sec. 12(2)
Read:
1. Dizon vs. Gen. Eduardo, May 3,1988
2. P vs. Eligino, August 11,1988
3. Contado vs. Tan, April 15, 1988
10. Extrajudicial confession; when admissible or
inadmissible
Read:
1. The admissibility of an extrajudicial
prosecution,142 SCRA 110
2. Admissibility of an extrajudicial
10 SCRA 520
confession,135
confession in a criminal
SCRA 419 and
force, 114 SCRA
SCRA 637
248
Read:
1. P vs. Dy, 158 SCRA 111
CHAPTER XIII - THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO BAIL
Section 13. All persons, except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong,
shall before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The
249
250
to serve his sentence and that the offense and the penalty for the offense is
within the purview of the Probation Law.
Sections 5 and 16 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court (on the different
kinds of bail) APPLIES ONLY TO AN ACCUSED UNDERGOING
PREVENTIVE IMPRISONMENT DURING TRIAL OR ON APPEAL.
THEY DO NOT APPLY TO A PERSON CONVICTED BY FINAL
JUSGMENT AND ALREADY SERVING SENTENCE.
Judge Bugtas was therefore fined P40,000.00 for gross ignorance of the
law and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt
with more severely.
3. Read:
******************************************************
Excessive bail:
1. De la Camara vs. Enage, 41 SCRA 1
*****************************************************
1-a. Pestano vs. Judge Velasco, July 3, 1990
******************************************************
Waiver of the right to bail:
1-b. P. vs. Donato, June 5, 1991
*****************************************************
2. Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38
3. Marcos vs. Cruz, 67 and 70 Phil.
4. Villasenor vs. Abano, 21 SCRA 312
5. P vs. IAC, January 10,1987, 147 SCRA 219
6. Manotoc vs. CA, May 30,1986
7. Garcia vs. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143
8. P vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522
4. See Section 10, Rule 114, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure
3
a. Procedure when prosecutor does not object to the petition for bail in
capital offenses:
PEOPLE VS. AGBAYANI, 284 SCRA 315
Bail in Extradition cases.
UNITED STATES VS. JUDGE PURUGGANAN & MARK JUMENEZ
November, 2002
251
252
[1]
310
[2]
311
[3]
312
[4]
253
[5]
254
314[6]
29, 2004
was prepared by P/Sr. Insp. Chief Haveria, Jr., addressed
to the Chief of the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office,
requesting for the conduct of laboratory examination on the seized items
to determine the presence of dangerous drugs and their weight. PO2
Dano also requested that appellant be subjected to a drug test.315[7]
The following day or on January 30, 2004, at 3:00 P.M., upon
receipt of three sachets, a laboratory examination was conducted thereon
by Police Senior Inspector Annalee R. Forro, Forensic Chemical Officer
of the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office, who, in Physical
Science Report No. D-0094-04E316[8], recorded, among other things, the
specimen submitted, her findings and conclusion as follows:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with
markings marked as A through C respectively, each containing
white crystalline substance with following recorded net
weights and markings:
A = 0.02 gram EBB-ED BUYBUST 01/29/04
B = 0.02 gram EBB-ED POSS 1 01/29/04
C = 0.02 gram EBB-ED POSS 2 01/29/04
x-x-x
x-x-x
x-x-x
F I N D I N G S:
x x x
x-x-x
x-x-x
C O N C L U S I O N:
Specimens A through C contain Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 317[9] (Italics and emphasis in
the original)
Denying the charges against him, appellant, a former police
officer, claimed that he was framed up and gave the following version:
On January 29, 2004, while he was playing inside 3 Cs billiard
hall, PO2 Brubio, whom he knew was a policeman, entered the billiard
hall. After greeting PO2 Brubio in Bicolano, he continued playing but
314
[6]
315
[7]
316
[8]
317
[9]
Id. at p. 15
TSN, June 15, 2004, p. 41
Records, p. 17
Exhibit C, folder of exhibits, p. 2
255
256
[13]
322
[14]
Rollo, p. 68.
Id. at p. 66 (citations omitted)..
257
258
And you know for a fact that under the new drugs law,
this is a requirement for the apprehending team to do, is
it not?
Pros. Gapuzan:
Counsel is asking for a conclusion of law. I will object.
Court:
Witness may answer the question.
Witness:
Yes, sir.
xxxx
Atty. Puentebella:
So it is very clear now Mr. Witness that at the time you
apprehended the accused, you did not make an
inventory in the presence of the accused nor you did
not [sic] make a photograph of the items seized in the
presence of the accused, an elective official, a
representative from the Department of Justice, or the
media, thats very clear?
Witness:
Yes, sir.
Atty. Puentebella:
Since you did not make any inventory, it follows that you
did not require them to sign your inventory as required
by law?
Witness:
Yes, sir.323[16] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly then, the apprehending police officers failed to comply with
the above-quoted provision of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
People v. Pringas holds, however:
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with
Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground
therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its noncompliance will not render an accused's arrest illegal or the
323
[16]
259
324
[17]
325[18]
326
[19]
327
[20]
G.R. No. 175928. August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 828, 842-843
Took effect on November 27, 2002.
Vide TSN, June 15, 2004, pp. 81-85.
TSN, August 10, 2004, pp. 6-7.
260
329
330
331
[21]
People v. Laxa, 414 Phil. 156, 170 (2001) citing People v. Rigodon, 238 SCRA 27 (1994).
261
confiscated
substancewhich
yielded
positive
for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride contentdid not have personal
knowledge of the ultimate source of the drug.332[4]
Appellant was brought to trial after having entered a negative
plea.
The prosecution then proceeded to prove the charge
against him through the lone testimony of police officer Jerry
Velasco (Velasco). Velasco was the alleged leader of the raiding
team that apprehended appellant on 18 May 2004 at the corner of
G.Tuazon and Jhocson Streets in Sampaloc, Manila.334[6]
333[5]
262
263
264
353[28]
265
was in his possession and custody. Aside from that, it was not
reasonably explained why these same witnesses were not able to
testify in court. While indeed the prosecution and the defense had
stipulated on the qualification of the forensic chemist, dispensed
with his testimony and admitted that said forensic chemist had no
personal knowledge of the ultimate source of the drug submitted for
examination, nevertheless, these stipulations and admission pertain
only to a certain Elisa G. Reyes and not to Forensic Chemical
Officer Maritess Mariano who, based on the chemistry report, was
the one who examined the contents of the plastic sachet at the crime
laboratory.
In view of these loopholes in the evidence adduced against
appellant, it can be reasonably concluded that the prosecution was
unable to establish the identity of the dangerous drug and in effect
failed to obliterate the hypothesis of appellants guiltlessness.
Be that as it may, although testimony about a perfect chain
does not always have to be the standard because it is almost always
impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody indeed
becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real
evidence is a narcotic substance. A unique characteristic of
narcotic substances such as shabu is that they are not distinctive and
are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific
analysis to determine their composition and nature.357[32] And
because they cannot be readily and properly distinguished visually
from other substances of the same physical and/or chemical nature,
they are susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination,358[33]
substitution and exchange359[34] whether the alteration, tampering,
contamination, substitution and exchange be inadvertent or
otherwise not.360[35] It is by reason of this distinctive quality that the
condition of the exhibit at the time of testing and trial is critical.361[36]
Hence, in authenticating narcotic specimens, a standard more
stringent than that applied to objects which are readily identifiable
must be applieda more exacting standard that entails a chain of
custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it
improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with
another or contaminated or tampered with.362[37]
The Court certainly cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the
possibility of substitution, alteration or contaminationwhether
intentional or unintentionalof narcotic substances at any of the
links in the chain of custody thereof especially because practically
357
358
359
360
361
362
266
267
268
269
draw strength from its own evidence and not from the weakness
of the defense. The rule, in a constitutional system like ours, is
invariable regardless of the reputation of the accused because the
law presumes his innocence until the contrary is shown. In dubio
pro reo. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the
balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter
of right.379[55]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02158 affirming the judgment of
conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
2, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Samuel Obmiranis
y Oreta is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is thus
accordingly ordered released immediately from confinement, unless
he is lawfully confined for another offense.
JUNIE MALLILLIN Y. LOPEZ
VS. PEOPLE,
G.R. No. 172953 , April 30, 2008
THE FACTS:
On the strength of a warrant of search and seizure issued by
the RTC of Sorsogon City, Branch 52, a team of five police officers
raided the residence of petitioner in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City
on 4 February 2003. The team was headed by P/Insp. Catalino
Bolanos (Bolanos), with PO3 Roberto Esternon (Esternon), SPO1
Pedro Docot, SPO1 Danilo Lasala and SPO2 Romeo Gallinera
(Gallinera) as members. The searchconducted in the presence of
barangay kagawad Delfin Licup as well as petitioner himself, his
wife Sheila and his mother, Normaallegedly yielded two (2)
plastic sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets
containing residual morsels of the said substance.
Accordingly, petitioner was charged with violation of Section
11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
That on or about the 4th day of February 2003, at about 8:45 in
the morning in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, custody and control two (2) plastic sachets of
methamphetamine hydrochloride [or] shabu with an aggregate
weight of 0.0743 gram, and four empty sachets containing shabu
residue, without having been previously authorized by law to
possess the same.
379
270
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Petitioner entered a negative plea. At the ensuing trial, the
prosecution presented Bolanos, Arroyo and Esternon as witnesses.
Taking the witness stand, Bolanos, the leader of the raiding
team, testified on the circumstances surrounding the search as
follows: that he and his men were allowed entry into the house by
petitioner after the latter was shown the search warrant; that upon
entering the premises, he ordered Esternon and barangay kagawad
Licup, whose assistance had previously been requested in executing
the warrant, to conduct the search; that the rest of the police team
positioned themselves outside the house to make sure that nobody
flees; that he was observing the conduct of the search from about a
meter away; that the search conducted inside the bedroom of
petitioner yielded five empty plastic sachets with suspected shabu
residue contained in a denim bag and kept in one of the cabinets,
and two plastic sachets containing shabu which fell off from one of
the pillows searched by Esternona discovery that was made in the
presence of petitioner.380[10] On cross examination, Bolanos admitted
that during the search, he was explaining its progress to petitioners
mother, Norma, but that at the same time his eyes were fixed on the
search being conducted by Esternon.
Esternon testified that the denim bag containing the empty
plastic sachets was found behind the door of the bedroom and not
inside the cabinet; that he then found the two filled sachets under a
pillow on the bed and forthwith called on Gallinera to have the items
recorded and marked.381[12] On cross, he admitted that it was he
alone who conducted the search because Bolanos was standing
behind him in the living room portion of the house and that
petitioner handed to him the things to be searched, which included
the pillow in which the two sachets of shabu were kept;382[13] that he
brought the seized items to the Balogo Police Station for a true
inventory, then to the trial court383[14] and thereafter to the
laboratory.384[15]
Supt. Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), the forensic chemist who
administered the examination on the seized items, was presented as
an expert witness to identify the items submitted to the laboratory.
380
[10]
[12]
381
382[13]
Id. at 16-17.
383[14]
384[15]
Id. at 9.
271
She revealed that the two filled sachets were positive of shabu
and that of the five empty sachets, four were positive of containing
residue of the same substance.385[16] She further admitted that all
seven sachets were delivered to the laboratory by Esternon in the
afternoon of the same day that the warrant was executed except that
it was not she but rather a certain Mrs. Ofelia Garcia who received
the items from Esternon at the laboratory .]
The evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the
search and seizure conducted by the police operatives. Petitioner
testified that Esternon began the search of the bedroom with Licup
and petitioner himself inside. However, it was momentarily
interrupted when one of the police officers declared to Bolanos that
petitioners wife, Sheila, was tucking something inside her
underwear. Forthwith, a lady officer arrived to conduct the search of
Sheilas body inside the same bedroom. At that point, everyone
except Esternon was asked to step out of the room. So, it was in
his presence that Sheila was searched by the lady officer.
Petitioner was then asked by a police officer to buy cigarettes at a
nearby store and when he returned from the errand, he was told that
nothing was found on Sheilas body.386[18] Sheila was ordered to
transfer to the other bedroom together with her children.
Petitioner asserted that on his return from the errand, he was
summoned by Esternon to the bedroom and once inside, the officer
closed the door and asked him to lift the mattress on the bed. And as
he was doing as told, Esternon stopped him and ordered him to lift
the portion of the headboard. In that instant, Esternon showed him
sachet of shabu which according to him came from a pillow on the
bed.387[20] Petitioners account in its entirety was corroborated in its
material respects by Norma, barangay kagawad Licup and Sheila in
their testimonies. Norma and Sheila positively declared that
petitioner was not in the house for the entire duration of the search
because at one point he was sent by Esternon to the store to buy
cigarettes while Sheila was being searched by the lady officer.
Licup for his part testified on the circumstances surrounding the
discovery of the plastic sachets. He recounted that after the five
empty sachets were found, he went out of the bedroom and into the
living room and after about three minutes, Esternon, who was left
inside the bedroom, exclaimed that he had just found two filled
sachets.]
385
[16]
TSN, 28 May 2003, p. 14. The results of the chemical analysis are embodied in Chemistry Report No. D-037-03. See records, p.
[18]
18.
386
387[20]
Id. at 11-12.
272
273
389[42]
390
[43]
274
People v. Ambrosio, G.R. No. 135378, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 312, 318 citing People v. Tan, 382 SCRA 419 (2002).
392[53]
People v. Ambrosio, G.R. No. 135378, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 312, 318 citing People v. Tan, 382 SCRA 419 (2002).
393
[54]
275
276
395[2]
396
[3]
Id. at 5.
The McDonalds branch in P. Ocampo St. was later determined to be in Manila.
277
[4]
278
398
[5]
399
[6]
400
401
402
279
[10]
404
[11]
280
We start off with the most basic, the testimony of the prosecutions
principal witness, PO3 Ramos, who identified accused-appellant and
described her role in the conspiracy to sell shabu. In the witness box, PO3
Ramos testified that, after being told by Arguson to wait for someone who
will come out from the street whence Arguson would enter, accusedappellant emerged from said street, checked on the purchase money,
asked the operatives to wait, and later re-appeared. What happened next
is captured by the following answers of PO3 Ramos to the prosecutors
questions:
Q: What did you see when Cervantes already returned? A:
When Monalyn return the one holding the plastic bag was
Wilson, sir.
Q: Wilson? A: Yes, sir, together with Richard, Wilson,
Arguson, they were four (4).
Atty. Cruz: Your honor, may we move to strike that out x x x.
Fiscal Formoso: Thats part of the answer x x x now, when all
these accused here return with Monalyn Cervantes, what
happen[ed]?
A: Arguson took the plastic bag from Wilson, sir and handed it
to Balosbalos, Balosbalos gave Arguson the boodle money
while I flash the signal x x x then we apprehended them.406[13]
As may be noted, PO3 Ramos categorically stated that Del Monte
was among the four who emerged with Arguson from a street. Without
hesitation, PO3 Ramos pointed to Del Monte as the one holding the
plastic bag allegedly containing the prohibited substance until Arguson
took it from him and handed it over to PO2 Balosbalos. There is no
suggestion that accused-appellant, while at the crime scene, ever handled
the merchandise or its container. Yet, the trial court acquitted Requiz and
Del Monte, but convicted accused-appellant, stating: Clearly, accused
Monalyn Cervantes complicity with accused Isidro Arguson in the sale of
shabu has been established by the testimony of PO3 Ramos.407[14] But
two paragraphs later, the RTC went on to write:
x x x While PO3 Ramos testified that the bag was
initially held by accused Del Monte and then taken from him
by accused Arguson, there is no other evidence which can
support the charge of conspiracy with Arguson and Cervantes
x x x. The court does not find the evidence sufficient to pass
the test of moral certainty to find accused Del Monte liable as
406
[13]
407
[14]
281
charged. Even if PO3 Ramos saw him to have held the bag for
Arguson, it could have been possible that he was merely asked
by Cervantes or Arguson to carry the bag.408[15]
Before us then is a situation where two personsaccusedappellant, a laundry woman; and Del Monte, a car park boy, in the
company of the ostensible pusher, Arguson, during the actual buy bust
are being indicted, on the basis alone of the testimony of a witness, with
confederating with each and several others to sell shabu. The overt acts
performed by accused-appellant, as indicia of conspiracy, consisted of
allegedly verifying whether the poseur-buyer still had the purchase
money, disappearing from the scene and then coming back with the
principal player. On the other hand, Del Monte came accompanying
Arguson carrying the drug-containing plastic bag no less. As between the
two acts performed, carrying the bag would relatively have the more
serious implication being in itself a punishable act of possession of
regulated drugs. Both offered the defenses of denial and instigation, each
testifying that they just happened to be near or passing by McDonalds at
about 4:30 in the afternoon of April 4, 2000 when they were apprehended.
But the trial court, in its observation that it could have been possible that
[Del Monte] was merely asked by x x x Arguson to carry the bag,
extended to Del Monte the benefit of the doubt, a benevolence denied to
accused-appellant without so much of an acceptable explanation. Any
reasonable mind might ask: Why the contrasting treatment? Why consider
PO3 Ramos as a highly credible eyewitness as against accused-appellant,
but an unreliable one as against Del Monte, when both accused are
complete strangers to the policeman?
To paraphrase an unyielding rule, if the inculpatory testimony is
capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with the innocence of
the accused persons and the other consistent with their guilt, then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support a conviction.409[16]
But even if we were to cast aside the foregoing equipoise rule, a
reversal of the appealed decision is indicated on another but more
compelling ground. We refer to the postulate that the prosecution, having
failed to positively and convincingly prove the identity of the seized
regulated substance, is deemed to have also failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt accused-appellants guilt. We shall explain.
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drug, what is
crucial is the identity of the buyer and seller, the object and its
consideration, the delivery of the thing sold, and the payment for it.
Implicit in these cases is first and foremost the identity and existence,
coupled with the presentation to the court of the traded prohibited
408
[15]
409
[16]
Id. at 28-29.
People v. Navarro, G.R. No. 173790, October 11, 2007, 535 SCRA 644, 653.
282
410[17]
[17]
411
[18]
283
the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that everyone who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the
condition in which it was received, and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain.417[24] The need for the punctilious
observance of the chain-of-custody process in drug-related cases is
explained in Malillin in the following wise:
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the
standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain,
an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable
and essential when the item of real evidence is not
distinctive and is not really identifiable, or when its
condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when
a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same
standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is
susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and
even substitution and exchange. In other words, the
exhibits level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration
or tamperingwithout regard to whether the same is
advertent or otherwise notdictates the level of
strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.
xxxx
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they
are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to
scientific analysis to determine their composition and
nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the
likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the
links in the chain of custody over the same there could
have been tampering, alteration or substitution of
substances from other casesby accident or otherwise
in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar
evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in
authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than
that applied to cases involving objects which are readily
identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard
that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient
completeness if only to render it improbable that the
original item has either been exchanged with another or
been contaminated or tampered with.418[25] (Emphasis
added.)
As the Court distinctly notes in this case, of the individuals who
came into direct contact with or had physical custody of the seized
417
[24]
418
[25]
284
regulated items, only PO3 Ramos testified for the specific purpose of
identifying the evidence. In the witness box, however, he did not indicate
how he and his companions, right after the buy bust, handled the seized
plastic bag and its contents. He did not name the duty desk officer at
Camp Vicente Lim to whom he specifically turned over the confiscated
bag and sachets at least for recording. What is on record is Exhibit C,
which, as earlier described, is a memorandum419[26] PO3 Ramos
prepared420[27] dated April 5, 2000 from the RSOG-IV Director to the
Chief, PNP R-IV Crime Laboratory Service, submitting for qualitative
analysis the white crystalline substance confiscated by the buy-bust group.
Needless to stress, the unnamed person who delivered the suspected
shabu and the recipient of it at the laboratory were no-show in court to
testify on the circumstances under which they handled the specimen or
whether other persons had access to the specimen before actual testing.
And C/I Geronimo, the analyzing forensic chemist, was not also
presented. Then, too, no one testified on how the specimen was cared
after following the chemical analysis. As the Court observed aptly in
People v. Ong, [T]hese questions should be answered satisfactorily to
determine whether the integrity of the evidence was compromised in any
way. Otherwise, the prosecution cannot maintain that it was able to prove
the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt.421[28]
It cannot be overemphasized that Inspector Tria was really not
part of the custodial chain. And she did not as she could not,
even if she wanted to, testify on whether or not the specimen
turned over for analysis and eventually offered in court as
exhibit was the same substance received from Arguson.
Given the foregoing perspective, it is fairly evident that the police
operatives trifled with the procedures in the custody of seized prohibited
drugs in a buy-bust operation, as embodied in Sec. 21(1), Art. II of RA
9165, i.e., the apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control of the drug shall:
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the [drug] in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.422[29]
419
[26]
420
[27]
Records, p. 33.
TSN, October 23, 2001, p. 20.
421
[28]
Supra note 20, at 490.
422[29]
The IRR of RA 9165 provides further, non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
285
[30]
286
[32]
287
426[33]
[33]
427
[34]
288
289
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
290
444[16]
291
292
452[28]
Although the Court has held that frame-up is inherently one of the
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
293
466[61] as it is both easily concocted and difficult to prove,467[62]
weakest defenses,
in the present
the lower courts
the weakness of the prosecution's evidence and its failure to
case,
seriously erred in ignoring
prove the guilt of petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt. The rule requiring a claim of frame-up to be
supported by clear and convincing evidence468[63] was never intended to shift
to the accused the burden of proof
in a criminal case.
As the Court held in People of the Philippines v. Ambih:469[64]
[W]hile the lone defense of the accused that he was the victim of a frameup is easily fabricated, this claim assumes importance when faced with the
rather shaky nature of the prosecution evidence. It is well to remember
that the prosecution must rely, not on the weakness of the defense
evidence, but rather on its own proof which must be strong enough to
convince this Court that the prisoner in the dock deserves to be punished.
The constitutional presumption is that the accused is innocent even if
his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to
convict him.470[65] (Emphasis supplied)
In People of the Philippines v. Gonzales,471[66] the Court held that
where there was material and unexplained inconsistency between the
testimonies of two principal prosecution witnesses relating not to
inconsequential details but to the alleged transaction itself which is subject
of the case, the inherent improbable character of the testimony given by
one of the two principal prosecution witnesses had the effect of vitiating
the testimony given by the other principal prosecution witness. The Court
ruled that it cannot just discard the improbable testimony of one officer
and adopt the testimony of the other that is more plausible. In such a
situation, both testimonies lose their probative value. The Court further
held:
Why should two (2) police officers give two (2) contradictory
descriptions of the same sale transaction, which allegedly took place
before their very eyes, on the same physical location and on the same
occasion? We must conclude that a reasonable doubt was generated as to
whether or not the "buy-bust" operation ever took place.472[69]
In the present case, to repeat, the glaring contradictory testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses generate serious doubt as to whether a
firearm was really found in the house of petitioner. The prosecution
utterly failed to discharge its burden of proving that petitioner is guilty of
illegal possession of firearms beyond reasonable doubt.
The
constitutional presumption of innocence of petitioner has not been
demolished and therefore petitioner should be acquitted of the crime he
was with.
Read also:
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
294
295
2. On appeal with the S.C. after he was convicted the accused later
claims that there was a violation of the order of trial provided for in Sec.
3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. He also cites the case of Alejandro vs.
Pepito, 96 SCRA 322, wherein the S.C. ruled that : "It behooved the
respondent Judge to have followed the sequence of trial set forth x x x the
form of a trial is also a matter of public order and interest; the orderly
course of procedure requires that the prosecution should go forward and
present all of its proof in the first instance."
HELD:
The case of Alejandro vs. Pepito is not applicable inasmuch as the
accused in the case at bar did not object to the procedure followed. In fact
in the said Alejandro case, the Court also stated:
"It is true that in the case of U.S. vs. Gaoiran, 17 Phil. 404 (l910),
relied upon by the prosecution and the trial Court, the defense has
produced its proofs before the prosecution presented its case, and it was
held that no substantial rights of the accused were prejudiced. There is
one radical difference, however, since in that case no objection was
entered in the Court below to the procedure followed in the presentation
of proof. In this case, the change in the order of trial made by respondent
Judge was promptly and timely objected to by the defense."
In fact it should be noted that under the newly adopted 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure (Sec. 3e), Rule 119)the said procedure is now
expressly sanctioned. Thus:
"However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in
the complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of
trial may be modified accordingly."
3.Sec. 3(3), Rule 119 , 1985 Rules on Criminal
amended.
4. Other cases Read:
1. P vs. Opida, June 13,1986
2. P vs. Tempongko, October 2,1986
3. P vs. Drammayo, 42 SCRA 59
4. P vs. Fernando, 145 SCRA 151
5. P vs. Tolentino, 145 SCRA 597
6. Castillo vs. Filtex, September 30,1983
7. Dumlao vs. COMELEC, supra
5. Right to counsel-during trial
Procedure , as
296
Read:
1. P vs. Holgado,85 Phil. 752
2. Delgado vs. CA, 145 SCRA 357
3. P vs. Cuison, 193 Phil. 296
5-a. The right to be heard by himself and counsel during trial
Effect of the fact that accused was represented
by a NON-LAWYER at the early part of the
trial but a full-pledged lawyer took over as his
counsel when he presented his evidence.
(Also important in your criminal law as to the
distinctions between robbery and grave
coercion)
PEDRO CONSULTA VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 179462,
February 12, 2009
473
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and
Lucas P. Bersamin; CA rollo, pp. 166-176.
297
474[2]
CONTRARY TO LAW.
underscoring supplied)
[2]
Records, p. 1.
298
against him for grave threats and another for light threats which were
dismissed or in which he was acquitted.
Appellant went on to claim that despite frequent transfers of
residence to avoid Nelia, she would track his whereabouts and cause
scandal.
Appellants witness Darius Pacaa testified that on the date of the
alleged robbery, Nelia, together with her two companions, approached
him while he was at Ambel Street in the company of Michael Fontanilla
and Jimmy Sembrano, and asked him (Pacaa) if he knew a bald man who
is big/stout with a big tummy and with a sister named Maria. As he
replied in the affirmative, Nelia at once asked him to accompany them to
appellants house, to which he acceded. As soon as the group reached
appellants house, appellant, on his (Pacaas) call, emerged and on
seeing the group, told them to go away so as not to cause trouble.
Retorting, Nelia uttered Mga hayop kayo, hindi ko kayo titigilan.
Another defense witness, Thelma Vuesa, corroborated Pacaas
account.
The trial court, holding that intent to gain on appellants part is
presumed from the unlawful taking of the necklace, and brushing aside
appellants denial and claim of harassment, convicted appellant of
Robbery, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds
accused PEDRO C. CONSULTA guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, as principal of the felony of Robbery with Intimidation
of Persons defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraph
No. 5, in relation to Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
from one (1) year, seven (7) months and eleven (11) days of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to eight (8) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances which attended the
commission of the said crime.
The said accused is further ordered to pay unto the
complainant Nelia Silvestre the amount of P3,500.00
representing the value of her necklace taken by him and to pay
the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED. (Italics in the original, underscoring
supplied)
299
475
[3]
476
[4]
Rollo, p. 169
G.R. No. 63971, May 9, 1989, 173 SCRA 243, 249.
300
[5]
People v. Reyes, G.R. 135682, March 26, 2003, 399 SCRA 528
301
[6]
479
[7]
480[8]
481
Exhibit 2 Information for Maltreatment, Exhibit 4 Light Threats, Exhibit 5 Grave Threats.
Vide Exhibit 3 Order granting Supplemental Motion to Quash (Malicious Mischief), folder 1, records, pp. 202-203,
Exhibit 4 Order dismissing the information for Light Threats.
RULES OF COURT, Rule 120, Section 4.
[9]
Id. at Section 5
302
303
[3]
484
[4]
485
[5]
304
was received by his counsel on February 1, 2002 and yet the counsel did not
inform him of any action taken thereon.
I S S U E:
Whether or not the delay in appealing the instant case due to the defiance
or failure of the petitioner's counsel de oficio to seasonably file a Notice of
Appeal, constitutes excusable negligence to entitle the undersigned detention
prisoner/ petitioner to pursue his appeal?
Whether or not pro hac vice, the mere invocation of justice warrants the
review of a final and executory judgment?
HELD:
Petitioner contends that the negligence of his counsel de oficio cannot be
binding on him for the latter's defiance of his instruction to appeal automatically
breaks the fiduciary relationship between counsel-client and cannot be against
the client who was prejudiced; that this breach of trust cannot easily be
concocted in this situation considering that it was a counsel de oficio, a lawyer
from PAO, who broke the fiduciary relationship; that the assailed CA
Resolutions both harped on technicalities to uphold the dismissal by the RTC of
his petition for relief; that reliance on technicalities to the prejudice of petitioner
who is serving 14 years imprisonment for a crime he did not commit is an
affront to the policy promulgated by this Court that dismissal purely on
technical grounds is frowned upon especially if it will result to unfairness; and
that it would have been for the best interest of justice for the CA to have directed
the petitioner to complete the records instead of dismissing the petition outright.
In his Comment, the OSG argues that the mere invocation of justice does
not warrant the review of an appeal from a final and executory judgment; that
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is
not only mandatory but jurisdictional and failure to perfect the appeal renders
the judgment sought to be reviewed final and not appealable; and that
petitioner's appeal after the finality of judgment of conviction is an exercise in
futility, thus the RTC properly dismissed petitioner's petition for relief from
judgment. The OSG further claims that notice to counsel is notice to clients and
failure of counsel to notify his client of an adverse judgment would not
constitute excusable negligence and therefore binding on the client.
We grant the petition.
A litigant who is not a lawyer is not expected to know the rules
of procedure. In fact, even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the
web of procedure.486[12] We have held in a civil case that to demand as
much from ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of
right would turn the legal system into an intimidating monstrosity where
486
[12]
See Telan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95026, October 4, 1991, 202 SCRA 534, 541.
305
[13]
488[14]
489
[15]
Id.
Id. at 540-541.
Id. at 541.
306
better.
490[16]
While as a general rule, the failure of petitioner to file his motion for
reconsideration within the 15-day reglementary period fixed by law rendered the
resolution final and executory, we have on some occasions relaxed this rule.
Thus, in Barnes v. Padilla491[17] we held:
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve
substantial justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or
property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c)
the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault
or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a
lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects
this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive
and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared
to be final.
In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, this Court, speaking through the late
Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, had occasion to state:
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set
forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and
chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere
slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion.
That is precisely why courts in rendering justice have always been,
as they ought to be guided by the norm that when on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the
other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate
language of Justice Makalintal, "should give way to the realities of
the situation.
Indeed, the emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to
afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.492[18]
Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or
resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and rigid
490
[16]
491
[17]
492
[18]
307
[21]
494
[22]
495
308
was not rendered for naught. It bears pointing out that in rape cases, it
is often the words of the complainant against the accused, the two being
the only persons present during the commission of the crime. This is so
because the complainants testimony cannot be accepted with precipitate
credulity without denying the accuseds constitutional right to be
presumed innocent. This is where cross-examination becomes essential to
test the credibility of the witnesses, expose falsehoods or half-truths,
uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination testimonies may
successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial
matters which create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and
thus give substance to the constitutional right of the accused to confront
the witnesses against him. For unless proven otherwise to be guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is presumed innocent.
(NOTE: For your Legal & Judicial Ethics)
Atty. Brotonel as counsel de oficio, had the duty to defend his client
and protect his rights, no matter how guilty or evil he perceives accusedappellant to be. The performance of this duty was all the more imperative
because the life of the accused-appellant hangs in the balance. His duty
was no less because he was counsel de oficio.
The Decision of the RTC convicting the accused is SET ASIDE and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
Read:
1. P vs. Dischoso, 96 SCRA 957
2. Read also:
PEOPLE VS. YAMBOT, G.R. NO. 120350, 343 SCRA 20, OCT. 30, 2000;
PEOPLE VS. BANIHIT, G.R. NO. 132045, 339 SCRA 86, AUG. 25, 2000.
Right to be Heard by himself and counsel and to present evidence for his
defense.
In this case, the non-appearance of counsel for the accused on the scheduled
hearing was not construed as waiver by the accused of his right to present
evidence for his defense. Denial of due process can be successfully invoked
where no valid waiver of rights had been made as in this case.
In another case, the accused-appellant validly waived his right to present
evidence. This is in consonance with the doctrine that everyone has a right to
waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection
of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and
relinquished without infringing on any public right, and without detriment to
the community at large.
309
497
498[3]
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and
Sesinando E. Villon, concurring; rollo, pp. 90-100.
[2]
Id. at 102-112.
Id. at 228-230.
310
Id. at 231-232.
Id. at 233-235.
Records, p. 194.
Id. at 253-259.
311
completed the presentation of its evidence and was ordered by the RTC
to file its formal offer of evidence within thirty days.
After being granted extensions to its filing of a formal offer of
evidence, the prosecution was able to file said formal offer for Criminal
Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 on 25 November 2003.503[8]
On 2 December 2003, petitioner moved to dismiss Criminal Case
No. 119830 due to the Peoples alleged failure to prosecute. Claiming
violation of his right to speedy trial, petitioner faults the People for failing
to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time and without
giving any excuse or justification for the delay. According to petitioner,
he was persistent in asserting his right to speedy trial, which he had
allegedly done on several instances. Finally, he claimed to have been
substantially prejudiced by this delay.
The prosecution opposed the Motion, insisting on its claim that the
parties had an earlier agreement to defer the trial of Criminal Case No.
119830 until after that of Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832, as the
presentation of evidence and prosecution in each of the five cases
involved were to be done separately. The presentation of evidence in
Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832, however, were done simultaneously,
because they involved similar offenses of non-disclosure of beneficial
ownership of stocks proscribed under Rule 36(a)-1504[9] in relation to
Sections 32(a)-1505[10] and 56506[11] of Batas Pambansa Bilang 178,
otherwise known as the Revised Securities Act. Criminal Case No.
119830 pertains to alleged violation of Section 27 (b),507[12] in relation to
Section 56 of said act.
503
[8]
504
[9]
505
506
507
312
[13]
313
314
515
315
or
arbitrary,
or
based
on
In this case, the Court is convinced that the findings of the Court of
Appeals on the substantial matters at hand, while conflicting with those of
the RTC, are adequately supported by the evidence on record. We,
therefore, find no reason to deviate from the jurisprudential holdings and
treat the instant case differently.
An accuseds right to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial is
guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14(2) of Article III of the
Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being
to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and
expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt
determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the
presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may
interpose.516[21] Intimating historical perspective on the evolution of the
right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal maxim, justice delayed is
justice denied. This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious
resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused
is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial.517[22]
Following the policies incorporated under the 1987 Constitution,
Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as The Speedy Trial Act of
1998, was enacted, with Section 6 of said act limiting the trial period to
180 days from the first day of trial.518[23] Aware of problems resulting in
the clogging of court dockets, the Court implemented the law by issuing
Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, which has been incorporated in the
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Section 2 of Rule 119.519[24]
In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan,520[25] the Court had occasion to state
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy
disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the
oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution
516
[21]
517
[22]
518
519
520[25]
316
Id. at 313-314.
317
From the initial hearing on 27 February 2001 until the time the
prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence for Criminal Cases No.
119831-119832 on 25 November 2003, both prosecution and defense
admit that no evidence was presented for Criminal Case No. 119830.
Hence, for a period of almost two years and eight months, the prosecution
did not present a single evidence for Criminal Case No. 119830.
The question we have to answer now is whether there was
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay. To this, we apply the fourfactor test previously mentioned.
We emphasize that in determining the right of an accused to speedy
trial, courts are required to do more than a mathematical computation of
the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. A
mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is clearly
insufficient,523[28] and particular regard must be given to the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case.524[29]
In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,525[30] the Court ruled that there was no
violation of the right to speedy trial and speedy disposition. The Court
took into account the reasons for the delay, i.e., the frequent amendments
of procedural laws by presidential decrees, the structural reorganizations
in existing prosecutorial agencies and the creation of new ones by
executive fiat, resulting in changes of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction,
and the functions and powers of prosecuting agencies. The Court also
considered the failure of the accused to assert such right, and the lack of
prejudice caused by the delay to the accused.
In Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan,526[31] the complexity of the
issues and the failure of the accused to invoke her right to speedy
disposition at the appropriate time spelled defeat for her claim to the
constitutional guarantee.
In Cadalin v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administrations
Administrator,527[32] the Court, considering also the complexity of the
cases and the conduct of the parties lawyers, held that the right to speedy
disposition was not violated therein.
Petitioners objection to the prosecutions stand that he gave an
implied consent to the separate trial of Criminal Case No. 119830 is
belied by the records of the case. No objection was interposed by his
defense counsel when this matter was discussed during the initial
522
[27]
Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, 407 Phil. 985, 999-1000 (2001); Dela Pena v. Sandiganbayan, 412 Phil. 921, 929
(2001).
523
[28]
Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 324 Phil. 151, 170 (1996); Tai Lim v. Court of Appeals, 375 Phil. 971, 977
(1999).
524
[29]
525
[30]
526
[31]
527
[32]
Santiago v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 109266, 2 December 1993, 228 SCRA 214, 221.
G.R. No. 101689, 17 March 1993, 220 SCRA 55.
408 Phil. 767 (2001).
G.R. No. 104776, 5 December 1994, 238 SCRA 721.
318
528[33]
hearing.
Petitioners conformity thereto can be deduced from his
non-objection at the preliminary hearing when the prosecution manifested
that the evidence to be presented would be only for Criminal Cases No.
119831-119832. His failure to object to the prosecutions manifestation
that the cases be tried separately is fatal to his case. The acts, mistakes
and negligence of counsel bind his client, except only when such mistakes
would result in serious injustice.529[34] In fact, petitioners acquiescence is
evident from the transcript of stenographic notes during the initial
presentation of the Peoples evidence in the five BW cases on 27 February
2001, herein quoted below:
COURT: Atty. Sandejas, call your witness.
ATTY. SANDEJAS [SEC Prosecuting Lawyer]: May
we
make some manifestation first, your Honor, before we
continue presenting our witness. First of all, this witness
will only be testifying as to two (2) of the charges: nondisclosure of beneficial ownership of Dante Tan x x x.
xxxx
COURT: (to Atty. Sandejas) Call your witness.
ATTY. SANDEJAS: Our witness is Mr. Wilfredo Baltazar of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, your Honor.
We are presenting this witness for the purpose of nondisclosure of beneficial ownership case
COURT: I would advise the counsel from the SEC to make it
very clear your purpose in presenting your first witness.
ATTY. SANDEJAS: Yes, your Honor. Can I borrow the file?
COURT: Show it to counsel.
ATTY. SANDEJAS: Crim. Case Nos. 119831 and 119832,
for Violation of RA Rule 36(a)1, in relation to Sec. 32
(a)-1 of the Revised Securities Act when he failed to
disclose his beneficial ownership amounting to more than
10% which requires disclosure of such fact.530[35]
During the same hearing, the People manifested in open court that
the parties had agreed to the separate trials of the BW Cases:
528
[33]
529
[34]
530[35]
319
PROSECUTOR LAZARO:
May we be allowed to speak, your Honor?
Your Honor please, as we x x x understand, this is not a joint
trial but a separate trial x x x so as manifested by the SEC
lawyer, the witness is being presented insofar as 119831 and
119832 as against Dante Tan only x x x.531[36]
The transcript of stenographic notes taken from the 3 April 2001
hearing further clarifies that only the two cases against Dante Tan were
being prosecuted:
ATTY. DE LA CRUZ [new counsel for accused Eduardo Lim,
Jr.]:
Your Honor, please, may I request clarification from the
prosecutors regarding the purpose of the testimony of the
witness in the stand. While the Private Prosecutor stated the
purpose of the testimony of the witness. . .
xxxx
PROSECUTOR LAZARO:
I was present during the last hearing. I was then going
over the transcript of this case, well, I believe the testimony x
x x mainly [is] on accused Dante Tan, your Honor. As a matter
of fact, there was a clarification made by the parties and
counsels after the witness had testified that the hearing in these
cases is not a joint trial because it involves separate charges,
involving different documents, your Honor. That is why the
witness already testified only concerning Dante Tan. Per the
query made by Atty. Fortun, because at that time, Atty. Fortun
was still representing Mr. Lim, I believe, your Honor, then I
understand that the testimony of this witness cannot just be
adopted insofar as the other accused, your Honor.
ATTY. MARANAN:
We confirm that, your Honor, since x x x particularly
since this is already cross, it is clear that the direct examination
dealt exclusively with Mr. Dante Tan.
PROS. LAZARO:
531[36]
320
532[37]
[37]
533
[38]
534
535
536
537
321
322
541[46]
542[47]
543[48]
544[49]
[45]
Id.; Philippine Savings Bank v. Bermoy, G.R. No. 151912, 26 September 2005, 471 SCRA 94, 106, citing
People v. Bans, G.R. No. 104147, 8 December 1994, 239 SCRA 48, 55.
407 Phil. 279 (2002).
Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM (Vol. II, 2001), p. 503.
314 Phil. 35, 45 (1995).
325 Phil. 525, 537 (1996).
323
The old adage that justice delayed is justice denied has never
been more valid than in our jurisdiction, where it is not a rarity for a case
to drag in our courts for years and years and even decades. It was this
difficulty that inspired the constitutional requirement that the rules of
court to be promulgated by the Supreme Court shall provide for a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy trial and disposition
of cases.545[50] Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance, for
justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone.546[51]
Evidently, the task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to
preserve our democratic society under the rule of law, ensuring that all
those who appear before or are brought to the bar of justice are afforded a
fair opportunity to present their side. As correctly observed by the Court
of Appeals, Criminal Case No. 119830 is just one of the many
controversial cases involving the BW shares scam where public interest is
undoubtedly at stake. The State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its
day in court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case. A hasty
dismissal, instead of unclogging dockets, has actually increased the
workload of the justice system and unwittingly prolonged the litigation.547
[52]
545
[50]
546
[51]
547
324
1. On August 14, 1991, the petitioner and several others were charged
of violation of Section 3 [e] of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Antigraft and Corrupt Practices Act;
2. On August 23, 1994 after the presentation of the parties evidence, the
case was deemed submitted for decision before the 2nd Division;
th
3. Thereafter, the case was unloaded to the newly created 5 Division,
particularly to Justice Godofredo Legaspi and later re-assigned to
Justice Ma. Cristina Cortez-Estrada upon her assumption of office on
November 3, 1998.
4. In the early part of 2002 while Justice Estrada was writing the decision
of the case, she found out that the November 26, 1993 transcript of
stenographic notes, which was the cross-examination of the petitioner,
was missing so she called the parties for a conference on April 19,
2002 to discuss the matter.
5. Instead of attending the conference, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
the case based on the alleged violation of his right to speedy trial. The
Court denied the same as well as the subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition.
Issue:
Was there violation of the petitioners right to a speedy disposition
of his case when the same was not decided for almost 8 years from the
time it was deemed submitted for decision?
Held:
No. The right is violated only if the proceedings were attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The determination of
whether the delays are of said nature is relative and cannot be based on
mere mathematical reckoning of time. Particular regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case. As held in the case of DE LA PENA VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN, certain factors shall be considered and balanced
to determine if there is delay, as follows:
3.
4.
5.
6.
325
326
327
328
However, it is not necessary for the information to allege the date and
time of the commission of the crime with exactitude unless time is an essential
ingredient of the offense.551[29] In People v. Bugayong,552[30] the Court held that
when the time given in the information is not the essence of the offense, the
time need not be proven as alleged; and that the complaint will be sustained if
the proof shows that the offense was committed at any time within the period of
the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action.
In People v. Gianan,553[31] the Court ruled that the time of the commission
of rape is not an element of the said crime as it is defined in Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal
knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated therein, i.e.: (1) by
using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or
is demented. In accordance with Rule 110, Section 11 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as long as it alleges that the offense was committed at any
time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed, an
information is sufficient.
The doctrine was reiterated with greater firmness in People v.
Salalima554[32] and in People v. Lizada.555[33]
In the case under review, the information in Criminal Case No. 2638
alleged that the rape of BBB transpired sometime and between January 1992
up to December 6, 1998 in Barangay Codon, Municipality of San Andres,
Province of Catanduanes. In Criminal Case No. 2650, the information averred
that from sometime in January 1990 up to December 1998 in Barangay
Codon, Municipality of San Andres, Province of Catanduanes, AAA was
raped by appellant. To the mind of the Court, the recitals in the informations
sufficiently comply with the constitutional requirement that the accused be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
In People v. Garcia,556[34] the Court upheld a conviction for ten counts of
rape based on an Information which alleged that the accused committed
multiple rapes from November 1990 up to July 21, 1994. In People v.
Espejon,557[35] the Court found the appellant liable for rape under an information
charging that he perpetrated the offense sometime in the year 1982 and dates
subsequent thereto and sometime in the year 1995 and subsequent thereto.
551[29]
People v. Santos, 390 Phil. 150, 161 (2000); Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000), Rule 110, Sec. 11 reads:
Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense. It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the
offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on
a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.
552[30]
G.R. No. 126518, December 2, 1998, 299 SCRA 528.
553[31]
G.R. Nos. 135288-93, September 15, 2000, 340 SCRA 477.
554[32]
G.R. Nos. 137969-71, August 15, 2001, 363 SCRA 192.
555[33]
G.R. Nos. 143468-71, January 24, 2003, 396 SCRA 62.
556[34]
G.R. No. 120093, November 6, 1997, 281 SCRA 463.
557[35]
G.R. No. 134767, February 20, 2002, 377 SCRA 412.
329
In the case under review, the information in Criminal Case No. 2638
alleged that the rape of BBB transpired sometime and between January 1992
up to December 6, 1998 in Barangay Codon, Municipality of San Andres,
Province of Catanduanes. In Criminal Case No. 2650, the information averred
that from sometime in January 1990 up to December 1998 in Barangay
Codon, Municipality of San Andres, Province of Catanduanes, AAA was
raped by appellant. To the mind of the Court, the recitals in the informations
sufficiently comply with the constitutional requirement that the accused be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Indeed, this Court has ruled that allegations that rapes were committed
before and until October 15, 1994,558[36] sometime in the year 1991 and the
days thereafter,559[37] and on or about and sometime in the year 1988560[38]
constitute sufficient compliance with Rule 110, Section 11 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
More than that, the Court notes that the matter of particularity of the dates
in the information is being raised for the first time on appeal. The rule is wellentrenched in this jurisdiction that objections as to matter of form or substance
in the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal.561[39] Appellant
failed to raise the issue of defective informations before the trial court. He
could have moved to quash the informations or at least for a bill of particulars.
He did not. Clearly, he slumbered on his rights and awakened too late.
Too, appellant did not object to the presentation of the evidence for the
People contending that the offenses were committed sometime and between
January 1992 up to December 6, 1998 for Criminal Case No. 2632 and
sometime in January 1990, up to December 1998 in Criminal Case No. 2650.
On the contrary, appellant actively participated in the trial, offering denial and
alibi as his defenses. Simply put, he cannot now be heard to complain that he
was unable to defend himself in view of the vagueness of the recitals in the
informations.
REASONS
FOR
THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON
THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE
INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND
CAUSE OF ACCUSATION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , G.R. No. 175929,
December 16, 2008
558[36]
330
right of confrontation
331
evidence.
Read:
1. Cavili vs. Hon. Florendo, 154 SCRA 610
2. Fajardo vs. Garcia, 98 SCRA 514
******************************************************
CHAPTER XV - HABEAS CORPUS
*******************************************************
Read:
1In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Ferdinand Marcos,
etc, GR No. 88079, May 18,
1989 and August & October, 1989.
1-a. Harvey vs. Santiago, supra
2. Cruz vs. Juan Ponce Enrile, April 15,1988
3. Abadilla vs. Fidel Ramos, December 1,1987
********************************************************
CHAPTER XVI - THE RIGHT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
********************************************************
1. Self-incrimination, 24 SCRA 692
2. Read
1. Chavez vs. CA, 24 SCRA 663
332
including the
PEOPLE VS. BANIHIT, G.R. NO. 132045, 339 SCRA 86, AUG. 25, 2000;
PEOPLE VS. CONTINENTE, G.R. NOS. 100801- 02, 339 SCRA 1, AUG.
25, 2000.
The essence of this right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion
or the giving of evidence against oneself through a testimonial act. Hence, an
accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and have a
substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was
suffering from a disease that was contracted by his victim without violating this
right.
********************************************************
CHAPTER XVII - THE RIGHT AGAINST
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
********************************************************
1. Read:
1. Aclaracion vs. Gatmaitan, 64 SCRA 131
2. Caunca vs. Salazar, supra
********************************************************
CHAPTER XVIII - RIGHT AGAINST
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT
********************************************************
333
1987 Constitution?
Read:
1. P vs. Gavarra, 155 SCRa 327
2. P vs. Masangkay, 155 SCRA 113
3. P vs. Atencio, 156 SCRA 242
4. P vs. Intino, September 26, 1988
5. People vs. Munoz, 170 SCRA 107
b. Is death as a penalty a cruel or unuasual
punishment?
No. Death through lethal injection is the most humane way of implementing the
death Penalty (Leo Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice)
Read:
1. P vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647
2. P vs. Villanueva,, 128 SCRA 488
3. Veniegas vs. People, 115 SCRA 79
4. P vs. Camano, 115 SCRA 688
2. On the death penalty whether it was abolished or not
Read:
a. P vs. Idnay, 164 SCRA 358
********************************************************
CHAPTER XIX - RIGHT AGAINST
NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT
********************************************************
1. Read:
1. Lozano vs. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323
2. Ajeno vs. Incierto, 71 SCRA 166
*********************************************************
CHAPTER XX - THE RIGHT
AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY
********************************************************
1. Requisites present before this right can be invoked
334
Records, p. 32.
335
566
[6]
567
[7]
Id. at 37.
568
[8]
Id. at 41.
569
[9]
Rollo, p. 55.
570
[10]
571
[11]
Id. at 93-94.
572
[12]
336
337
573
[13]
574
[14]
338
575[15]
In the order
dated 23 August 2005, the RTC affirmed the acquittal
of petitioner but ordered the remand of the case to the MTC for further
proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. The RTC ruled that the MTCs
recital of every fact in arriving at its conclusions disproved the allegation that it
failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also
demonstrated that the MTC conducted the trial of the case in the manner
dictated by Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, except that the defense no
longer presented its evidence after the MTC gave due course to the accuseds
demurrer to evidence, the filing of which is allowed under Sec. 23, Rule 119.
The RTC however agreed that the MTC failed to rule on the accuseds civil
liability, especially since the judgment of acquittal did not include a declaration
that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the
RTC declared that the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and resolved
to remand the issue to the MTC. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the Municipal Trial
Court of Sibulan on accuseds acquittal is AFFIRMED. The case
is REMANDED to the court of origin or its successor for further
proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. No costs.
SO ORDERED.576[16]
Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration of the RTC order, but
these were denied for lack of merit in the order577[17] dated 12 September 2005.
Respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals
under Rule 42, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179. The appellate court
subsequently rendered the assailed decision and resolution. The Court of
Appeals ruled that there being no proof of the total value of the properties
damaged, the criminal case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC and the
proceedings before the MTC are null and void. In so ruling, the appellate court
cited Tulor v. Garcia (correct title of the case is Cuyos v. Garcia)578[18] which
ruled that in complex crimes involving reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide or physical injuries and damage to property, the jurisdiction of the
court to take cognizance of the case is determined by the fine imposable for the
damage to property resulting from the reckless imprudence, not by the
corresponding penalty for the physical injuries charged. It also found support
in Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the 1991 Rule 8 on
Summary Procedure, which govern the summary procedure in first-level courts
in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence where
the imposable fine does not exceed P10,000.00. As there was no proof of the
total value of the property damaged and respondents were claiming the amount
575
[15]
576
[16]
Id. at 81.
577
[17]
Id. at 89-90.
578
[18]
339
Rollo, p. 35.
580
[20]
Id. at 90-94.
581
[21]
Supra note 2.
582
[22]
Entitled AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BLG.
129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980, which took effect on 14 April 1994.
340
584
[24]
People v. de los Santos, 407 Phil. 724, 744 (2001, citing Reodica v. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 87, 102 (1998).
585
[25]
586
[26]
Venancio Figueroa y Cervantes v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 147406, 14 July 2008, citing Alarilla v.
Sandiganbayan, 393 Phil. 143, 155 (2000) and Escovar v. Justice Garchitorena, 466 Phil. 625, 635 (2004).
341
through
criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof. It follows that criminal cases for reckless
imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods should fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC.
Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the same pertained to the MTC
and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction over the criminal case.587[27]
Consequently, the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly taken
cognizance of the case and the proceedings before it were valid and legal.
As the records show, the MTC granted petitioners demurrer to evidence
and acquitted him of the offense on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is filed
after the prosecution had rested its case, and when the same is granted, it calls
for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its
sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a
dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the
accused.588[28] Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer
to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused
in double jeopardy.589[29] But while the dismissal order consequent to a
demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is still reviewable but
only by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in such case, the
factual findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing court, and
the only legal basis to reverse and set aside the order of dismissal upon
demurrer to evidence is by a clear showing that the trial court, in acquitting the
accused, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment
void.590[30]
Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition for certiorari
alleging that the MTC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the case and
failing to consider the evidence of the prosecution in resolving the same, and in
allegedly failing to follow the proper procedure as mandated by the Rules of
Court. The RTC correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing the criminal complaint. The MTCs conclusions were based on
facts diligently recited in the order thereby disproving that the MTC failed to
consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also show that
the MTC correctly followed the procedure set forth in the Rules of Court.
The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the
remand of the case of the matter of civil liability for the reception of evidence.
587
[27]
Venancio Figueroa y Cervantes v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 147406, 14 July 2008.
588
[28]
People v. Sandiganbayan, 488 Phil. 293, 310 (2004), citing People v. City of Silay, No. L-43790, 9 December 1976, 74
SCRA 247.
589
[29]
Id.
590
[30]
People v. Uy, G.R. No. 158157, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 668.
342
Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, G.R. No. 165496, 12 February 2007, 515 SCRA 502, 513.
592
[32]
593
[33]
594
[34]
Id. at 607.
595
[35]
Id. at 518-519.
343
******************
It must be pointed out, however, that in PEOPLE VS. TAMPAL, 244
SCRA 202 and PEOPLE VS. LEVISTE, 255 SCRA 238, the SC reversed the
dismissal of the criminal case by the trial court based on speedy trial since
the same was not predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial.
It is only when there is a clear violation of the accuseds right to speedy trial
that the dismissal results in double jeopardy.
3. Double jeopardy, 102 SCRA 44 and 12 SCRA 561
4. When the act is punished by both a law and an ordinance:
PEOPLE VS. RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292
If the accused was charged of theft of electricity based on the City
Ordinance of Batangas and not based on the Revised Penal Code and later on
the case is dismissed by the judge due to the fact that the crime has prescribed,
the government can no longer charge the accused of the same crime under the
Revised Penal Code since double jeopardy has set in.
Read:
1. P vs. Duero, 104 SCRA 379
2. CUDIA VS. CA, 284 SCRA 173
3. CUISON VS. CA, 289 SCRA 159
2. P vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 516
3. P vs. Abano, 145 SCRA 555
4. P vs. Tolentino, 145 SCRA 597
5. P vs. Salig, 133 SCRA 59
6. P vs. Cruz, 133 SCRA 426
7. P vs. Prudente,, 133 SCRA 651
8 P vs. Trinidad, 162 SCRA 714, when the
does7, 1966
2. P vs. City Court,154 SCRA 175
3. Galman vs. Pamaran, 144 SCRA 43
4. P vs. Molero, 144 SCRA 397
5. P vs. Quibate, 131 SCRA 81
6. P vs. Obania, June 29,1968
7. Dionaldo vs. Dacuycuy, 108 SCRA 736
8. P vs. Judge Hernando, 108 SCRA 121
9. Esmena vs. Judge Pogoy, 102 SCRA 861
10. Mazo vs. Mun. Court, 113 SCRA 217
11. Andres vs. Cacdac, 113 SCRA 217
12. Buerano vs. CA, 115 SCRA 82
presumption of regularity
344
345
in its order dismissed the original complaint, but ordered the Fiscal to
cause the filing of a new complaint charging the proper offense of rape
committed on or before February 5, 1976;
5. A new complaint was therefore filed dated March 30, 1978
6. Molero claims that the new complaint places him in double jeopardy.
HELD:
There is no double jeopardy.
a. Dismissal of the first case contemplated by the rule against double
jeopardy presupposes a definite and unconditional dismissal which
terminates the case.(Jaca vs. Blanco, 86 Phil. 452; People vs. Manlapas,
5 SCRA 883; People vs. Mogol, 131 SCRA 296) And "for dismissal to
be a bar under the jeopardy clause of the Constitution, it must have
the effect of acquittal.(People vs. Agoncillo, 40 SCRA 579);
b. It is quite clear that the order of the trial court dismissal the original
complaint was without prejudice to the filing of a new complaint and/or
information charging Molero with the proper offense. The said dismissal
did not therefore amount to an acquittal.
c. In fact there was no need for the trial court to have adopted such a
cumbersome procedure. It could have merely ordered an amendment of
the complaint. Sec. 12, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court applies
when there is a mistake in charging the proper offense, but not when an
honest error of a few days is sought to be corrected and the change does
not affect the rights of the accused.
d. The precise time of the commission of the crime is not an essential
element of the offense of rape. The amendment of the complaint changing
the date of the commission of the crime of rape from February 13, 1976 to
February 5, 1976 , a difference of 8 days was only a matter of form under
the facts of this case and did not prejudice the rights of the accused.
e. The reliance of the accused on the case of People vs. Opemia, 98
Phil. 698 is not well-taken. In the said case the proposed amendment
was the changing of the date of the commission of the crime from
June 18, 1952 to July 1947, or a difference of 5 years. The S.C. held
that the amendment that would change the date of the commission of
the offense from 1947 to 1952 is certainly not a matter of form.
f. The dismissal of the first complaint did not amount to the appellant's
acquittal. In effect, the order of dismissal does not constitute a proper
basis for a claim of double jeopardy. (People vs. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166)
346
597[2]
598[4]
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and
Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 2-25.
Penned by Presiding Judge Andres B. Soriano; CA rollo, pp. 11-23.
Id. at 13.
347
41859, March 8,
687
Criminal Procedure
*******************************************************
CHAPTER XXI
RIGHT AGAINST EX-POST FACTO LAW,
BILL OF ATTAINER, ETC.
*******************************************************
Read:
1. Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433
2-LACSON VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, January 20, 1999
PANFILO M. LACSON VS. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.
ROMEO ACOP & FRANCISCO ZUBIA, JR.,
Petitioners-Intervenors
G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999
348
349
before the passage of the same provided trial has not begun at the time
of its approval.
On March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution denying
the Motion for Reconsideration of the Office of the Special Prosecutor
and ruled that it stands pat in its Resolution dated May 8, 1996 ordering
the transfer of the 11 criminal cases to the RTC of Quezon City. On the
same day, however, the Sandiganbayan issued an ADDENDUM to its
March 5, 1997 Resolution where it that with the passage of RA 8249, the
court admitted the amended informations in these cases and by the
unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring nor dissenting, retained
jurisdiction to try and decide the cases.
The petitioner questioned the said Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
to the Supreme Court on the following grounds:
1. their right to due process of law and equal protection of the law was
violated as a result of the application of the new law by which restored to
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over their cases especially so that the
Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for 9 months the resolution of the
pending incident involving the transfer of these cases to the RTC of
Quezon City and waited for the passage of the law to overtake such
resolution and thereby rendering their vested rights under the old
Sandiganbayan law moot;
2. the retroactive application of the new law violates their constitutional
right against ex-post facto law;
3. the title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid
innocuous provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather
than defines the old Sandiganbayan law thereby violating the one title
one subject requirement of Section 26 [1] Article VI of the Constitution.
The petitioners-intervenors claimed that while the law (Sections 4
and 7) innocuously appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, it is in fact a class legislation and an ex-post facto law
statute intended specifically to apply to all the accused in the Kuratong
Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan. Finally, if their case
will be tried by the Sandiganbayan, they will be deprived of their twotiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan which they acquire under RA 7975
before recourse to the Supreme Court could be made.
Held:
1. The contention that the law violates petitioners right to due process
and equal protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. It is an
established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
350
351
352
alleged that they committed the crimes in relation to their public office
which is a jurisdictional requirement in order that the same be tried by the
Sandiganbayan.
Finally, sometime in May, 1999, the Quezon City RTC to whom the
said cases were raffled DISMISSED the 11 murder cases as a result of the
retraction made by the eyewitnesses. The same was revived by the DOJ in
April, 2001. The same was returned to the QC RTC to determine if the 2year provisional rule under the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure is
applicable)
2.a. Kay Villegas Kami, 35 SCRA 429
3. Sevilleja vs. COMELEC, 107 SCRA 141
4. P vs. Ferrer, 46 & 56 SCRA
5. Tan vs. Barrios, October 18, 1990
CHAPTER XXII-CITIZENSHIP
1. Effect of naturalization in another country
Read:
a. Ramon Labo, Jr. vs. Comelec, July 3, 1992
a.-1 RAMON LABO JR. VS. COMELEC, GR No. 86564,
1989
August 1,
353
354
355
preside over them as the City Mayor of Baguio. Only citizens of the
Philippines have that privilege. The probability that many of those who
voted for him may have done so in the belief that he was qualified only
strengthens the conclusion that the results of the elections cannot nullify
the qualifications for the office now held by him.
3. Who shall take the place of the petitioner then as the City Mayor of
Baguio? Is the private respondent entitled to it? HE CANNOT FOR THE
SIMPLE REASON THAT HE OBTAINED ONLY THE SECOND
HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES IN THE ELECTION AND
THEREFORE, HE WAS OBVIOUSLY NOT THE CHOICE OF THE
PEOPLE OF BAGUIO CITY.
It is true that in SANTOS vs. COMELEC, 137 SCRA 740 , the
Supreme Court held that in cases like this, the second placer shall take the
place of the disqualified candidate since the latter was considered as noncandidate and all that he received are considered stray votes. The second
placer, in effect, won by default. Said decision was supported by 8
members of the Court, three dissented, two reserved their votes and one
on leave. Re-examining said decision, the same shall be REVERSED in
favor of the earlier case of Geronimo vs. COMELEC, 136 SCRA 435,
which is the more logical and democratic rule first announced in the 1912
case of Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238, and was supported by ten (10)
members of the Court without any dissent. The Vice Mayor of the City of
Baguio shall be entitled to become the City Mayor instead of the private
respondent.
b. Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, June 23, 1989
c. Board of Commissioners vs. De la Rosa and William Gatchalian, May
31, 1991
d. Aznar vs. COMELEC, 185 SCRA 703
1-a. Effect of naturalization of wife and minor
children
Read:
1. Burca vs. Republic,51 SCRA 248
2. Reyes vs. Deportation Board,May 30,1983
2. Effect on the citizenship of an alien woman married
to a Filipino citizen
Read:
1. Moy Ya Lim vs. Comm. on Immigration, 41 SCRA
292
356