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CHARLES VS THE QUEEN

The Facts

The case for the prosecution was that Mr. Desmond Charles a 40 year old Attorney/Politician deliberately and intentionally shot 28 year old Alana Williams in response to an attack that she made upon him. The case for the defence was that the gun went off accidentally in the course of a struggle between Mr. Charles and Ms. Williams. Mr. Charles was convicted of manslaughter on 22nd February 2011 and sentenced to serve 15 years in prison. He appealed on grounds which seek to impeach the directions that the learned trial judge gave to the jury or failed to give to the jury.

My Lady ship the appeal alleges:

The appeal alleges: 1. That the trial judge misdirected the jury on intention : CAP 72 A. SECTION 12 (1) OF THE GRENADIAN CRIMINAL COURTS READS: IF A PERSON DOES AN ACT OF SUCH A KIND IN SUCH A MANNER THAT IF HE OR SHE USEAD REASONABLE CAUTIONAND OBSERVATION IT WOULD APPEAR TO HIM THAT THE ACT WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE ORCONTRIBUTE TO CAUSE AN EVENT, OR THAT THERE WOULD BE GREAT RISK OF THE ACT CAUSING OR CONTRIBUTING TO CAUSE AN EVENT HE OR SHE SHALL BE PRESUMED TO HAVE INTENDED TO CAUSE THAT EVENT, UNTIL IT IS SHOWN THAT HE OR SHE BELIEVED THAT THE ACT WOULD NOT CAUSE OR CONTRIBUTE TO CAUSE THE EVENT.

SECTION 13(1) FURTHER ELABORATES: A PERSON CAUSES AN EVENT NEGLIGENTLY IF WITHOUT INTENDING TO CAUSE THE EVENT, HE OR SHE CAUSES IT BY VOLUNTARY ACT, DONE WITHOUT SUCH SKILL AND PRECAUTION AS ARE REASONABLY NECESSARY UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES, OR AS HE OR SHE IS IN THE PARTICULAR CASE ARE BOUND BY LAW TO HAVE AND USE FOR PREVENTING THE EVENT FROM BEING CAUSES. IN THE DECIDED CASE OF BEDMINSTER ET AL AND THE QUEEN, LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT QUOTED FROM THE CASE OF R V NEDRICK : WHEN DETERMINING WHETHER A DEFENDANT HAD THE NECESSARY INTENT IT MAY THEREFORE BE HELPFUL TO THE JURY TO ASK THEMSELVES TWO QUESTION: 1. HOW PROBABLE WAS THE CONSEQUENCE WHICH RESULTED FROM THE DEFENDANTS VOLUNTARY ACT. 2. DID HE FORESEE THAT CONSEQUENCE? IF HE DID NOT APPRECIATE DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY HARM WAS LIKELY TO RESULT FROM HIS ACT, HE CANNOT HAVE INTENDED TO BRING ABOUT THAT RESULT. IF HE DID BUT THOUGHT THAT THE RSK TO WHICH HE WAS EXPOSING THE PERSON KILLED WAS ONLY SLIGHT THEN IT MAY BE EASY FOR THE JURY TO CONCLUDE THAT HE DID NOT INTEND TO BRING ABOUT THAT RESULT. ON THE OTHER HAND IF THE JURY ARE SATISFIED THAT THE MATERIAL TIME THE DEFENDANT RECOGNISED THAT DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY HARM WOULD BE VIRTUALLY ERTAIN (BARRING SOME UNFORESEEN INTERVENTION) TO RESULT FROM HIS VOLUNTARY ACT, THEN THAT IS A FACT FROM WHICH THEY MAY FIND IT EASY T

INFER THAT HE INTENDED TO KILL OR DO SERIOUS BODILY HARM, EVEN THOUGH HE MAY NOT HAVE HAD ANY DESIRE TO ACHIEVE THAT RESULT. IN WOOLLIN, LORD STEYN STATED THAT IT MAY BE APPROPRIATE TO GIVE DIRECTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH NEDRICK IN ANY CASE IN WHICH THE DEFENDANT MAY NOT HAVE DESIRED THE RESULT OF THE ACT. MY LADY, IN THE CRIMINAL APPEAL ASE OF BOWEN AND THE QUEEN, A CASE WHICH TURNS SIMIMALR FACTS, CONSEQUENCES AND GROUNDS FOR APPEAL, LEARNED QUEEN COUNSEL SIR RICHARD CHELTENHAN COMPLAINED HAT THE LEARNED TRIAL JUDGE MISDIRECTED THE JURY ON INTENTION AND THEREBY DEPRIVED BROWN OF A FAIR CHANCE TO BE ACQUITTED. IN THIS CASE THE LEARNED TRIAL JUDGE GAVE THE FOLLOWING DIRECTIONS: IN LAW IF A PERSON DOES AN ACT OF SUCH A KIND OR IN SUCH A MANNER THAT IF HE USED REASONABLE CAUTION AND PLAIN COMMON SENSE HE WOULD REALISE THAT HIS ACTION WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE OR CONTRIBUTE TO CAUSE A PARTICULAR EVENT AND THERE WOULD BE A GREATER RISK OF THAT EVENT CAUSING THE PARTICULAR EVENT THEN HE IS TAKEN TO CAUSE THAT EVENT. LEARNED COUNSEL CONTENDED THAT THIS DIRECTION WAS CONFUSING AND SAID THAT WHILE THIS WAS A DIRECTION ON CAUSATION, IT WAS GIVEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE JURYS NEED TO DECIDE BOWENS INTENTION. HE FURTHUR CONTENDED THAT IF THE DIRECTION WAS MEANT TO CONVEY THAT A PERSON MUST BE TAKEN TO INTEND THAT WHICH WAS REASONABLY FORSEEABLE AS THE LIKELY RESULT OF HIS ACTION, THEN IT WAS A CLEAR MISDIRECTION.

JUSTICE OF APPEAL HUGH RAWLINS SUBMITTED- THE TRIAL JUDGE CORRECTLY DIRECTED THE JURY THAT THEY WERE ENTITILED TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE ACTS WHICH CAUSED THE DEATH OF MS. BARTHLEY WERE SUCH THAT DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY HARM WAS NATURAL AND PROBABLE RESULT. THE CRITICAL QUESTION HOWEVER IS WHETHER THERE WAS MATERIAL MISDIRECTION THAT WOULD VITIATE THE VERDICT. IN THIS REGARD, IT IS MY VIEW THAT BOWENS CONVICTION FOR MANSLAUGHTER COULD BE TAKEN AS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT WHILE THERE WAS AN ABSENSE ON INTENTION TO KILL, HE HAD COMMITTEED AN UNLAWFUL ACT. I THINK THAT A REASONABLE JURY PROPERLY DIRECTED WOULD HAVE FOUND MANSALUGHTER ON THE BASIS OF BOWENS OWN EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL. JUSTICE OF APPEAL RAWLINS FURTHER ELABORATED- THE MISDIRECTION ON INTENTION WOULD THEREFORE HAVE HAD NO IMPACT ON THIS APPEAL AGAINST BOWENS CONVICTION FOR MANSLAUGHTER. I WOULD THEREFORE DISMISS THE APPEAL ON THIS GROUND. MY LADYSHIP IT IS FOR THESE REASONS THAT THE CROWN MOVES FOR THE REJECTION OF THIS GROUND OF APPEAL MADE BY THE DEFENCE.

THE APPEAL FURTHER ALLEGES THAT:

The learned judge failed to properly direct the jury on the law of accident. IN THE STATE AND SIMMONS AN AUSTRAILIAN CASE OF 1976, JUSTICE OF APPEAL R.H LUCKHOO STATED IN DEALING WITH WHAT HE [I.E THE JUDGE] CALLED THE DEFENCE OF ACCIDENT, HE REFERRED TO IT AS A COMPLETE DEFENCE IN LAW AND STRESSED THAT IF THE JURY ACCEPTED THAT DEFENCE IN LAW, THEY WOULD HAVE TO ACQUIT THE ACCUSED.
IN BOWEN AND THE QUEEN A CASE WHICH BEARS SIMILAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES, DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTION SUBMITTED IN EFFECT THAT ACCIDENT WAS NOT A PROPER DEFENCE TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE CASE, THIS HE SAID WAS BECAUSE ALOTHOUGH BOWEN SAID THAT MS BARTHLEY WAS ACCIDENTALLY SHOT, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT SHE WAS ACTUALLY SHOT BY ACCIDENT. THE DEFENCES CASE WAS THAT THE FATAL INJURY TO MS.BARTHLEY OCCURRED WHEN THE GUN WHICH BOWEN CARRIED ACCIDENTALLY DISCHARGED DURING A STRUGGLE. JUSTICE OF APPEAL POSITED THAT IN HIS VIEW THE JUDGES REERENCE TO THE RELEVANT EVIDENCE IN HIS SUMMATION SUPPORTS THIS. I THINK THEREFORE THAT IT WAS A MATTER FOR THE JURY AND THE TRIAL JUDGE CORRECTLY GAVE DIRECTIONS AND ASKED THE JURY TO CONSIDER ACCIDENTS. HE CONTINUED, IN MY VIEW THE JUDGE CORRECTLY STATED THE BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF REQUIRED FOR THE DEFENCE OF ACCIDENTS. HE ALSO CORRECTLY TOLD THE JURY THAT AN INTENTION TO KILL NEGATED ACCIDEN AND FURTHER THAT ACCIDENT ONLY ARISES WHERE THE ACTIONS OF THE ACCUSED PERSONS OR WILLED. I DO NOT AGREE THAT THE ERRORS IN DIRECTION ON INTENTION AND MURDER IMPACTED THE DIRECTIONS OF ACCIDENTS DIRECTIONS ON ACCIDENT ARE INTENDED TO FOCUS MORE CLOSESLY ON THE INTENDED ACTION OF AN ACCUSED PERSON.

MY LADY IT IS THE BELIEF OF THE CROWN THAT THE OVERWHELMING SIMILARITIES WHICH ARE EVIDENT IN BOWEN AND THE QUEEN AND THIS PRESENT CASE THAT THE JUDGEMENTS DELIVERED BE CONSIDERED HEAVILY AS THEY FALL WITHIN THE THRESHOLDS OF THE DEBATE HELD HERE TODAY, AND IT IS THESE GROUNDS THAT THE QUEEN MOVE FOR THE APPEAL ON THE MISDIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF ACCIDENTS BE DISMISSED.

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