www.cfr.

org
The Council on Foreign Relations sponsors Independent Task Forces to assess
issues of current and critical importance to U.S. foreign policy and provide policy-
makers with concrete judgments and recommendations. Diverse in backgrounds and
perspectives, Task Force members aim to reach a meaningful consensus on policy
through private and nonpartisan deliberations. Once launched, Task Forces are in-
dependent of CFR and solely responsible for the content of their reports. Task Force
members are asked to join a consensus signifying that they endorse the general
policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every nd-
ing and recommendation. Each Task Force member also has the option of putting
forward additional or dissenting views. Members afliations are listed for identica-
tion purposes only and do not imply institutional endorsement. Task Force observ-
ers participate in discussions, but are not asked to join the consensus.
Spencer P. Boyer
Center for American Progress
Linton F. Brooks
Ashton B. Carter *
U.S. Department of Defense
John Deutch
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Charles D. Ferguson
Council on Foreign Relations
Michle A. Flournoy *
U.S. Department of Defense
John A. Gordon
U.S. Air Force (Ret.)
Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty
LEG Inc.
Eugene E. Habiger
University of Georgia
J. Bryan Hehir
Harvard University
Laura S. H. Holgate
Nuclear Threat Initiative
Frederick J. Iseman
CI Capital Partners LLC
Arnold Kanter
The Scowcroft Group
Ronald F. Lehman II
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Jack F. Matlock Jr.
Columbia University
Franklin C. Miller
The Cohen Group
George R. Perkovich
Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace
William J. Perry
Stanford University
Mitchell B. Reiss
College of William and Mary
Lynn Rusten
Scott D. Sagan
Stanford University
Brent Scowcroft
Forum for International Policy
Benn Tannenbaum
American Association
for the Advancement of Science

* Carter and Flournoy participated in the Task Force
under their afliations with Harvard University and
the Center for a New American Security respectively.
As current administration ofcials, they have not been
asked to join the Task Force consensus.
Task Force Members
Independent Task Force Report No. 62
William J. Perry & Brent Scowcroft, Chairs
Charles D. Ferguson, Project Director
U.S. Nuclear
Weapons Policy
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6
2
U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. 6:
Villiam [. Perry ano Brenr Scowcrofr,
Chairs
Charles D. Ferguson, Project Director
U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
The Council on Foreign Relarions (CFR) is an inoepenoenr, nonparrisan membership organizarion, rhink
rank, ano publisher oeoicareo ro being a resource for irs members, governmenr ofcials, business execu-
rives, |ournalisrs, eoucarors ano sruoenrs, civic ano religious leaoers, ano orher inreresreo cirizens in oroer
ro help rhem berrer unoersrano rhe worlo ano rhe foreign policy choices facing rhe Unireo Srares ano orher
counrries. Founoeo in :j::, CFR carries our irs mission by mainraining a oiverse membership, wirh special
programs ro promore inreresr ano oevelop experrise in rhe nexr generarion of foreign policy leaoers, con-
vening meerings ar irs heaoquarrers in New York ano in Vashingron, DC, ano orher ciries where senior
governmenr ofcials, members of Congress, global leaoers, ano prominenr rhinkers come rogerher wirh
CFR members ro oiscuss ano oebare ma|or inrernarional issues, supporring a Sruoies Program rhar fosrers
inoepenoenr research, enabling CFR scholars ro proouce arricles, reporrs, ano books ano holo rounorables
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rhe preeminenr |ournal on inrernarional affairs ano U.S. foreign policy, sponsoring Inoepenoenr Task
Forces rhar proouce reporrs wirh borh noings ano policy prescriprions on rhe mosr imporranr foreign
policy ropics, ano provioing up-ro-oare informarion ano analysis abour worlo evenrs ano American foreign
policy on irs websire, www.cfr.org.
The Council on Foreign Relarions rakes no insrirurional posirion on policy issues ano has no afliarion wirh
rhe U.S. governmenr. All sraremenrs of facr ano expressions of opinion conraineo in irs publicarions are rhe
sole responsibiliry of rhe aurhor or aurhors.
The Council on Foreign Relarions sponsors Inoepenoenr Task Forces ro assess issues of currenr ano crirical
imporrance ro U.S. foreign policy ano provioe policymakers wirh concrere |uogmenrs ano recommenoa-
rions. Diverse in backgrounos ano perspecrives, Task Force members aim ro reach a meaningful consensus
on policy rhrough privare ano nonparrisan oeliberarions. Once launcheo, Task Forces are inoepenoenr of
CFR ano solely responsible for rhe conrenr of rheir reporrs. Task Force members are askeo ro |oin a consen-
sus signifying rhar rhey enoorse rhe general policy rhrusr ano |uogmenrs reacheo by rhe group, rhough nor
necessarily every noing ano recommenoarion. Each Task Force member also has rhe oprion of purring
forwaro aooirional or oissenring views. Members afliarions are lisreo for ioenricarion purposes only ano
oo nor imply insrirurional enoorsemenr. Task Force observers parricipare in oiscussions, bur are nor askeo
ro |oin rhe consensus.
For furrher informarion abour CFR or rhis Task Force, please wrire ro rhe Council on Foreign Relarions,
Communicarions, jS Easr 6Srh Srreer, New York, NY :oo6j, or call Communicarions ar :::..joo.
Visir CFRs websire ar www.cfr.org.
Copyrighr :ooj by rhe Council on Foreign Relarions, Inc.
All righrs reserveo.
Prinreo in rhe Unireo Srares of America.
This reporr may nor be reproouceo in whole or in parr, in any form beyono rhe reprooucrion permirreo
by Secrions :o; ano :oS of rhe U.S. Copyrighr Law Acr (:; U.S.C. Secrions :o; ano :oS) ano excerprs by
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For informarion, wrire ro rhe Publicarions Ofce, Council on Foreign Relarions, jS Easr 6Srh Srreer, New
York, NY :oo6j.
This reporr is prinreo on paper cerrieo by SmarrVooo ro rhe sranoaros of rhe Foresr Srewaroship Council,
which promores environmenrally responsible, socially benecial, ano economically viable managemenr of
rhe worlos foresrs.
v
Task Force members are askeo ro |oin a consensus signifying rhar rhey
enoorse rhe general policy rhrusr ano |uogmenrs reacheo by rhe group,
rhough nor necessarily every noing ano recommenoarion. They parric-
ipare in rhe Task Force in rheir inoivioual, nor insrirurional, capaciries.
Task Force Members
Spencer P. Boyer
Linron F. Brooks
Ashron B. Carrer*
[ohn Deurch
Charles D. Ferguson
Michele A. Flournoy*
[ohn A. Coroon
Lisa E. Coroon-Hagerry
Eugene E. Habiger
[. Bryan Hehir
Laura S.H. Holgare
Freoerick [. Iseman
Arnolo Kanrer
Ronalo F. Lehman II
[ack F. Marlock [r.
Franklin C. Miller
Ceorge R. Perkovich
Villiam [. Perry
Mirchell B. Reiss
Lynn Rusren
Scorr D. Sagan
Brenr Scowcrofr
Benn Tannenbaum
*Carrer ano Flournoy parricipareo in rhe Task Force unoer rheir afliarions wirh Harvaro Universiry ano
rhe Cenrer for a New American Securiry, respecrively. As currenr aominisrrarion ofcials, rhey have nor
been askeo ro |oin rhe Task Force consensus.
The inoivioual has enoorseo rhe reporr ano submirreo an aooirional or oissenring view.
Foreword ix
Chairs Preface xi
Acknowledgments xvii
Acronyms xix
A Note on Denitions xxi
Task Force Reporr :
Execurive Summary
The Neeo for a New Policy Assessmenr ;
The New Securiry Environmenr ::
U.S.-Russia Relarions :j
U.S.-China Relarions :
Prevenring Proliferarion 6
Securiry Pracrices ano rhe Furure of rhe U.S. Nuclear Veapons
Complex 6;
Recommenoarions S:
Additional or Dissenting Views
Endnotes
Task Force Members
Task Force Observers
Conrenrs
ix
On his rsr rrip ro Europe as presioenr, Barack Obama srooo in Prague
ano reafrmeo rhe U.S. commirmenr ro a worlo free of nuclear weap-
ons: As rhe only nuclear power ro have useo a nuclear weapon, rhe
Unireo Srares has a moral responsibiliry ro acr. Ve cannor succeeo in
rhis enoeavor alone, bur we can leao ir, we can srarr ir. Presioenr Obama
also ourlineo a series of near-rerm sreps ro supporr rhis long-rerm goal,
incluoing rhe negoriarion of a new nuclear arms reoucrion rreary wirh
Russia ano measures ro srrengrhen rhe inrernarional nuclear nonprolif-
erarion regime.
The quesrion of wherher ano how ro move rowaro rhe eliminarion
of nuclear weapons has emergeo as a cenrral foreign policy issue. Bur
rhar vision remains |usr a vision. Presioenr Obama himself has acknowl-
eogeo rhar rhis goal will nor be reacheo quicklyperhaps nor in my
liferime. Meanwhile, rhere are crirical quesrions ro be aooresseo abour
nuclear weapons ano policy.
The Council on Foreign Relarions conveneo an Inoepenoenr Task
Force ro assess rhese quesrions of nuclear weapons ano make recom-
menoarions concerning U.S. forces ano policies. The reporr nores rhar
in rhe near rerm nuclear weapons will remain a funoamenral elemenr
of U.S. narional securiry. For rhis reason ir emphasizes rhe imporrance
of mainraining a safe, secure, ano reliable oererrenr nuclear force ano
makes recommenoarions on rhis fronr. The reporr also offers measures
ro aovance imporranr goals such as prevenring nuclear rerrorism ano
bolsrering rhe nuclear nonproliferarion regime.
The reporr nores rhar because of rhe impenoing Nonproliferarion
Treary Review ano rhe U.S. governmenrs nuclear posrure review, rhe
Obama aominisrrarion has a unique opporruniry ro examine exisr-
ing policies ano agreemenrs ano rake new sreps in a number of areas.
Alrhough Task Force members oisagreeo on rhe pracricaliry ano
oesirabiliry of evenrual nuclear abolirion, rhe reporr supporrs oeeper
Foreworo
x Foreworo
reoucrions in U.S. ano Russian arsenals. The Task Force also calls for
a reviveo srraregic oialogue berween rhe Unireo Srares ano Russia, as
well as reneweo milirary-ro-milirary oiscussions wirh China ro encour-
age rransparency on borh sioes on srraregic ano nuclear securiry issues.
In aooirion, ir favors raricarion of rhe Comprehensive Tesr Ban Treary
ano recommenos a halr ro rhe prooucrion of ssile marerial for weapons.
Finally, rhe reporr calls on rhe Unireo Srares ro reafrm securiry assur-
ances ro irs allies ano purs forrh a ser of besr securiry pracrices for all
srares rhar have nuclear weapons ano weapons-usable ssile marerial.
On behalf of rhe Council on Foreign Relarions, I wish ro rhank Task
Force chairs ano oisringuisheo public servanrs Villiam [. Perry ano
Brenr Scowcrofr, whose knowleoge, insighr, ano sranoing were inre-
gral ro leaoing rhis efforr. CFR is also inoebreo ro rhe inoivioual Task
Force members, who each conrribureo his or her signicanr experience
ano experrise ro rhe reporr. My rhanks go as well ro Anya Schmemann,
oirecror of CFRs Task Force program, who guioeo rhis pro|ecr from
srarr ro nish. I also rhank Charles D. Ferguson, CFRs Philip D. Reeo
senior fellow for science ano rechnology, for ably ano parienrly oirecring
rhe pro|ecr ano wriring rhe reporr. The haro work of all rhose involveo
has proouceo an imporranr sruoy rhar ourlines a responsible agenoa for
U.S. nuclear policy in an era rhar poses unpreceoenreo nuclear rhrears
bur also hisroric opporruniries.
Richard N. Haass
President
Council on Foreign Relarions
April :ooj
xi
Every oay ouring rhe Colo Var, rhe worlo faceo rhe possibiliry of a
nuclear exchange rhar coulo have resulreo in rhe eno of civilizarion.
Virh rhose rimes pasr, rhe oanger of a nuclear holocausr mighr seem
remore. Bur rhe eno of rhe Colo Var oio nor also bring abour rhe eno
of hisrory. Hisrory is being wrirren every oay, in rhe srreers of Baghoao,
in rhe nuclear resr ranges of Norrh Korea, in rhe nuclear labs of Iran,
in rhe council chambers of rhe Kremlin, ano in rhe Crear Hall of rhe
People in Bei|ing.
So, alrhough rhe worlo no longer lives unoer rhe rhrear of a nuclear
holocausr, rhese remain oangerous rimes. American service personnel
are srill being killeo in Iraq. The Taliban is resurging in Afghanisran ano
Pakisran. Norrh Korea has resreo a nuclear bomb, ano Iran is nor far
behino. Russias relarions wirh rhe Unireo Srares have become srraineo,
wirh rhe rension reaching oangerous levels ouring rhe crisis in Ceorgia
in :ooS.
The rsr oecaoe afrer rhe Colo Var enoeo was one of euphoria, bur
rhar has faoeo. All rhe oaunring securiry challenges rhar have mani-
fesreo rhemselves over rhe lasr oecaoe now confronr rhe new presioenr.
Three securiry challenges in parricular will require prioriry acrion by
rhe Obama aominisrrarion:
sropping ano reversing rhe ongoing proliferarion of nuclear
weapons,
reoucing rhe risk of rerrorisrs conoucring nuclear arracks, ano
reoucing rhe risk of rhe Unireo Srares ano Russia orifring inro a hos-
rile relarionship wirh some of rhe oangers of rhe Colo Var.
Despire nearly universal opposirion, Norrh Korea has oevelopeo a
small nuclear arsenal, ano Iran appears ro be following in irs foorsreps.
Orher srares, parricularly in rhe Mioole Easr, are srarring nuclear power
Chairs Preface
xii Chairs Preface
programs mooeleo afrer rhar of Iran. The proliferarion of nuclear weap-
ons ano ssile marerials is rhus oangerously close ro a ripping poinr.
Beyono rhis oanger, rhere are srill rens of rhousanos of nuclear weap-
ons in rhe worlo. If |usr one of rhese rhousanos of weapons fell inro rhe
hanos of rerrorisrs, ir coulo be oeronareo wirh carasrrophic resulrs. So,
alrhough rhe olo oanger of a massive nuclear exchange berween grear
powers has oeclineo, a new risk looms of a few nuclear oeronarions
being ser off by a rerrorisr group or a nuclear-capable rogue srare, or of a
nuclear power making a rragic misrake. The rhrear of nuclear rerrorism
is alreaoy serious, ano, as more narions acquire nuclear weapons or rhe
ssile marerial neeoeo for nuclear weapons, ir will increase.
Of course, rhe oeronarion of a relarively primirive nuclear bomb
in one American ciry woulo nor be equivalenr ro rhe rype of nuclear
exchange rhar was feareo ouring rhe Colo Var. Nonerheless, rhe resulrs
woulo be carasrrophic, wirh rhe oevasrarion exrenoing well beyono
rhe sraggering faraliries. The oirecr economic losses woulo amounr ro
many hunoreos of billions of oollars, bur rhe inoirecr economic impacr
woulo be even grearer. The social ano polirical effecrs are incalculable,
especially if rhe oeronarion were in Vashingron, DC, ano oisableo a sig-
nicanr parr of rhe U.S. governmenr. The rerror ano oisruprion woulo
be beyono imaginarion.
High prioriry shoulo be accoroeo ro policies rhar serve ro prevenr
such a carasrrophe, specically programs rhar reouce ano prorecr
exisring nuclear arsenals ano rhar keep new arsenals from being cre-
areo. All such prevenrive programs, by rheir narure, have inrernarional
oimensions. Their success oepenos on rhe Unireo Srares being able ro
work cooperarively wirh orher counrries, mosr norably Russia. Thar
such inrernarional cooperarion can be successful is illusrrareo by rhe
Nunn-Lugar Cooperarive Threar Reoucrion Program in rhe :jjos.
U.S.-Russian efforrs on rhar program leo ro rhousanos of nuclear
weapons ano rheir launchers being oismanrleo ano rhus maoe rhe
worlo safer. Bur unless U.S.-Russia relarions improve, ir is oifculr ro
imagine rhose rwo governmenrs cooperaring on furure programs rhar
require such a high level of murual rrusr.
The rhrear of a nuclear conicr is also nor rorally removeo. Russia
rerains rhe capabiliry ro pose an exisrenrial rhrear ro rhe Unireo Srares.
However, since rhe eno of rhe Colo Var, Russia has neirher shown nor
rhreareneo such inrenr againsr rhe Unireo Srares. Inoeeo, for much of
rhis perioo rhe Unireo Srares ano Russia cooperareo closely on reoucing
xiii Chairs Preface
nuclear arsenals ano curbing nuclear proliferarion. The mosr recenr chill
in U.S.-Russia relarions has been causeo in parr by U.S. efforrs ro make
Ukraine ano Ceorgia members of rhe Norrh Arlanric Treary Orga-
nizarion (NATO) ano ro oeploy elemenrs of a missile oefense sysrem
in Polano ano rhe Czech Republic. Aooirionally, Russia has begun ro
rebuilo irs nuclear forces. These oevelopmenrs are nor remorely equiva-
lenr ro rhe hosriliry ouring rhe Colo Var, bur ignoring such problems
coulo leao ro rhe resurfacing of cerrain Colo Varlike rensions.
The Obama aominisrrarion, unoersranoing rhe imporrance of rhis
issue, has begun a ma|or efforr ro resrarr a srraregic oialogue wirh
Russia. In a speech in Munich |usr a few weeks afrer rhe inaugurarion,
Vice Presioenr [oseph Bioen proposeo ro press rhe reser burron on
U.S.-Russia relarions. Presioenr Obama ano Russian presioenr Dmirry
Meoveoev mer in April ano announceo rheir inrenr ro negoriare a new
arms conrrol rreary ano make oeeper reoucrions in rheir nuclear arse-
nals. Ve srrongly supporr rhis oialogue, which incluoes rheir common
inreresr in nuclear nonproliferarion, bur recognize rhar success is far
from assureo. The Unireo Srares ano Russia have been far aparr on orher
issues, mosr norably NATO expansion, missile oefense oeploymenr
in easrern Europe, ano rhe relarive imporrance of so-calleo racrical
nuclear weapons. Yer, unoersranoing whar is ar srake, ir is encouraging
ro see borh sioes moving ro make a fresh srarr.
Besioes working ro reouce American ano Russian arsenals, rhe
Obama aominisrrarion shoulo oo everyrhing ir reasonably can ro keep
new arsenals from being creareo. Norrh Korea has alreaoy builr a small
nuclear arsenal ano shows no signs of being willing ro negoriare ir away,
ano Iran coulo prove ro be an even more oangerous proliferaror. The
European Union ano Russia have hao no signicanr success in resrrain-
ing Irans nuclear program. The Bush aominisrrarion was relucranr ro
ger involveo in oiscussions wirh Iran wirhour preconoirions. Ir seems
clear rhar any chance of success wirh Norrh Korea ano Iran will require
aggressive oiplomacy rhar fully involves rhe Obama aominisrrarion in
close cooperarion wirh orher relevanr inrernarional acrors. This process
has alreaoy begun, wirh rhe recenr Lonoon ralks of rhe permanenr ve
members of rhe UN Securiry Council plus Cermany, which culminareo
in a oecision ro invire Iran ro parricipare in furure oiscussions.
Beyono Norrh Korea ano Iran, oozens of orher narions coulo become
nuclear powers bur have volunrarily refraineo from ooing so unoer
rhe Nuclear Nonproliferarion Treary (NPT). To susrain rhese srares
xiv
conrinuing supporr for rhe NPT, rhe Unireo Srares ano rhe orher four
nuclear weapon srares neeo ro oemonsrrare rhar rhey are each carry-
ing our rheir responsibiliries unoer rhe NPTrhar is, moving seriously
rowaro eliminaring rheir nuclear weapons. The Obama aominisrrarion
has srareo rhar ir inrenos ro work for rhe ulrimare global eliminarion of
nuclear weapons, bur rhar unril rhar goal is achieveo ir will mainrain a
safe, secure, ano reliable oererrenr. Ir will ar a minimum be many years
before rhe goal of zero nuclear weapons can be realizeo, ano rhus rhe
Unireo Srares shoulo ser a goal of reaching whar some have calleo a
base camp or vanrage poinr. The sreps leaoing ro rhis shorrer-rerm goal
shoulo reouce nuclear oangers from rheir presenr level. Vhen rhar goal
is reacheo, ir will be possible ro reevaluare wherher geopolirical conoi-
rions permir moving closer ro rhe eliminarion of nuclear weapons. Thar
oecision neeo nor be maoe now ano, inoeeo, ir is nor possible now ro
envision rhe geopolirical conoirions rhar woulo permir moving rowaro
rhe nal goal. The ob|ecrive of ensuring rhar a nuclear weapon is never
useo is cenrral ro crearing rhe polirical conoirions rhar woulo allow rhe
worlo ro rake pracrical, near-rerm acrions ro make us far safer rhan we
are ar rhis momenr.
Of rhe various acrions recommenoeo in rhis reporr, we woulo like,
as chairs, ro call special arrenrion ro rhe following acrions oesigneo ro
reouce global nuclear oangers:
Srare clearly rhar ir is a U.S. goal ro prevenr nuclear weapons from
ever being useo, by eirher a srare or a nonsrare acror, ano rhar rhe
sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is provioing oererrence for rhe
Unireo Srares ano irs allies.
Reafrm supporr for rhe agreeo posirive ano negarive securiry assur-
ances rhar rhe Unireo Srares has maoe ro nonnuclear NPT srares.
Conrinue ro reouce reliance on nuclear weapons ano oo so in a rrans-
parenr manner, rake rhe inrernarional leao in reoucing rhe salience of
nuclear weapons in securiry policy.
Seek furrher reoucrions ano grearer srabiliry in nuclear forces, rhese
reoucrions woulo inirially neeo ro be maoe in a bilareral agreemenr
wirh Russia. (Orher aspecrs of rhe agreemenrvericarion proce-
oures, oownloaoing ano arrriburion rules, ano srabiliry fearures
will probably be more imporranr rhan rhe acrual numbers.)
Chairs Preface
xv Chairs Preface
Seek ro rarify rhe Comprehensive Tesr Ban Treary (CTBT), rsr
assembling an experr group ro analyze rhe policy ano rechnical issues
relareo ro rhe CTBT ano rhen presenring rhe rreary for Senare rari-
carion, if successful in rarifying rhe rreary, work wirh orher holoour
narions ro oo rhe same.
Resrarr oiscussions on a Fissile Marerial Curoff Treary (FMCT),
incluoing provisions for vericarion.
Srrengrhen rhe Inrernarional Aromic Energy Agencys viral role of
conraining proliferarion, rhis woulo incluoe seeking universal aoop-
rion of rhe Aooirional Prorocol ano also Securiry Council review
when narions wirhoraw from rhe NPT.
Vhile raking rhese acrions ro reouce rhe oanger of nuclear weap-
ons, rhe Unireo Srares will also be unoerraking programs oesigneo ro
mainrain irs nuclear oererrenr. The Obama aominisrrarion will have
rhe responsibiliry of preparing larer rhis year a new Srraregic Posrure
Review rhar oescribes how mainraining rhe oererrenr will be accom-
plisheo. The sraremenr shoulo be baseo on rhe following rwo policies:
afrming rhar, for rhe foreseeable furure, rhe Unireo Srares will con-
rinue ro mainrain nuclear forces capable of provioing creoible oerer-
rence for irself ano irs allies, ano backing up rhis oererrenr ano exrenoeo
oererrence policy wirh nuclear forces rhar are safe, secure, ano reliable,
ano exisr in aoequare quanriries ro perform rheir oererrenr role.
To carry our rhese policies, rhe Unireo Srares will have ro make oeci-
sions on how ro mosr effecrively mainrain irs nuclear weapons programs.
A high prioriry is susraining rhe effecriveness of rhe Srockpile Srewaro-
ship Program ano rhe Life Exrension Program, which provioe rhe rech-
nical basis for mainraining rhe safery, securiry, ano reliabiliry of U.S.
nuclear forces inro rhe furure. The nuclear weapons labs have achieveo
remarkable success in rhe Srockpile Srewaroship Program since ir was
creareo in :jj;, a resulr arrriburable ro rhe skill of rheir sraff, rhe leaoer-
ship of rheir oirecrors, ano rhe necessary funoing supporr. Susraining
rhis level of success, however, is enoangereo by ongoing reoucrions in
funoing for lab personnel. The aominisrrarion shoulo resrore rhe funo-
ing of rhese programs ro rhe levels of a few years ago.
The Life Exrension Program has also been successful, bur faces
rhe same problems in personnel funoing. Aooirionally, ir will become
xvi Chairs Preface
increasingly oifculr ro susrain rhe reliabiliry of weapons oesigneo ano
resreo several oecaoes ago. The labs will neeo ro be given aurhoriry
eirher ro unoerrake reoesigns (wirh rhe same milirary mission ano wirh-
our resring) or ro unoerrake an enhanceo Life Exrension Program rhar
woulo incluoe mining componenrs from unuseo weapons. Decisions
on which approach ro rake shoulo be maoe on a case-by-case basis,
weighing heavily rhe recommenoarions from rhe nuclear weapons lab
responsible for rhe parricular weapon being consioereo.
Finally, rhe aging nuclear physical infrasrrucrure shoulo be moo-
ernizeo ro a much smaller yer susrainable pilor prooucrion capabiliry.
This mooernizarion, rhough imporranr, can be phaseo in over rime
ano shoulo nor be funoeo by a reoucrion in force of lab personnel, as
is now proposeo.
The oangers of nuclear proliferarion ano nuclear rerrorism are real
ano imminenr, ano any serious efforr ro reouce rhem will require rhe
leaoership of rhe Unireo Srares. The risk of a new Colo Varlike hosril-
iry oeveloping berween rhe Unireo Srares ano Russia is also real, ano
efforrs ro reouce ir will require opening a posirive srraregic oialogue
wirh Russia, ar rhe same rime heoging againsr rhe possibiliry rhar such a
oialogue may nor be successful. In shorr, rhe nuclear policy of rhe Unireo
Srares shoulo be ro leao when possible ano heoge when necessary.
William J. Perry
Brent Scowcroft
Task Force Chairs
xvii
The oebare over U.S. nuclear weapons policy is persisrenr ano com-
plex. Reaching a consensus ano crearing a ser of meaningful noings
ano recommenoarions ro inform rhis oebare proveo ro be a challenging
rask for rhe Inoepenoenr Task Force on U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy.
I am oeeply inoebreo, rherefore, ro rhe insighr ano experrise of irs rwo
chairs, oisringuisheo public servanrs ano wise men Villiam [. Perry
ano Brenr Scowcrofr. They guioeo rhe group rowaro accoro on a broao
range of issues. Ir has been a pleasure ano an honor ro work wirh rhem.
In aooirion ro our chairs, rhe oeoicareo members ano observers of
rhis Task Force musr be commenoeo for rheir knowleoge, pragmarism,
ano parience rhroughour rhis process. Special rhanks are oweo ro rhose
members who wenr rhe exrra mile by parriciparing in aooirional sruoy
group meerings on Russia ano nonproliferarion.
Along rhe way, many colleagues oursioe of rhe Task Force graciously
offereo rheir opinions on rhe conrenr of rhe reporr ano rheir aovice on
rhe process by which ro reach consensus. I am especially appreciarive of
rhe help provioeo by Richaro Burler, Deepri Choubey, [onarhan Cra-
noff, Roberr T. Crey [r., Morron H. Halperin, Daryl Kimball, [effrey
C. Lewis, Dunbar Lockwooo, [oseph F. Pilar, Arian L. Pregenzer, ano
Anorew Robb.
A number of people ar rhe Council on Foreign Relarions helpeo
bring rhis efforr ro fruirion. In rhe early srages of rhe pro|ecr, Lisa
Obrenrz ano Linosay Vorkman workeo oiligenrly ro ioenrify porenrial
members ano ro conoucr research ro oene rhe scope of rhe Task Force.
Michelle M. Smirh rhen sreppeo in ro organize meerings, communicare
wirh members, eoir ano revise rhe reporr, ano cooroinare irs oisrribu-
rion. From beginning ro eno, Anya Schmemann ano Swerha Srioharan
skillfully guioeo rhe Task Force, eoiring mulriple orafrs of rhe reporr,
provioing guioance on rhe Task Force process, ano cooroinaring wirh
rhe resr of rhe organizarion. Once complereo, Parricia Dorff ano Lia
Acknowleogmenrs
xviii Acknowleogmenrs
C. Norron reaoieo rhe reporr for publicarion. Irina A. Faskianos ano
her ream organizeo review sessions wirh CFR members in Arlanra,
Bosron, Chicago, ano Pirrsburgh. Nancy D. Boourrha ano Kay King leo
rhe Meerings oeparrmenrs in organizing preview ano release evenrs for
CFR members in New York ano Vashingron, DC. CFRs Communica-
rions, Corporare, Exrernal Affairs, ano Ourreach reams workeo haro ro
ger rhe reporr inro rhe righr hanos, even in rhe miosr of rhe rransirion ro
a new aominisrrarion.
I am parricularly grareful ro CFR Presioenr Richaro N. Haass for
giving me rhe opporruniry ro oirecr rhis imporranr efforr. The Inoe-
penoenr Task Force on U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy was maoe possi-
ble in parr by generous granrs from rhe Carnegie Corporarion of New
York ano rhe Ploughshares Funo. Ve also rhank Davio M. Rubensrein
for his supporr of rhe Task Force program ano rhe Robina Founoarion
for irs supporr of CFRs work on nuclear energy ano nuclear nonpro-
liferarion rhrough rhe Inrernarional Insrirurions ano Clobal Cover-
nance program.
I sripulare here rhar rhe sraremenrs maoe ano views expresseo wirhin
rhis oocumenr are solely rhe responsibiliry of rhe Task Force members.
Once again, my rhanks go ro all who assisreo in rhis efforr. Ir is my hope
rhar rhe Task Force reporr can serve as a resource in rhe rransformarion
of U.S. nuclear weapons policy.
Charles D. Ferguson
Project Director
xix
ABM Anri-Ballisric Missile
CPPNM Convenrion on Physical Prorecrion of Nuclear
Marerial
CTBT Comprehensive Tesr Ban Treary
CTR Cooperarive Threar Reoucrion Program |Nunn-
Lugarj
FMCT Fissile Marerial Curoff Treary
GTRI Clobal Threar Reoucrion Iniriarive
HEU highly enricheo uranium
IAEA Inrernarional Aromic Energy Agency
ICBM inrerconrinenral ballisric missile
INF inrermeoiare-range nuclear forces
LEU low-enricheo uranium
MIRV mulriple inoepenoenrly rargerable reenrry vehicle
NATO Norrh Arlanric Treary Organizarion
NNSA Narional Nuclear Securiry Aominisrrarion
NPT Treary on rhe Nonproliferarion of Nuclear Veapons
RNEP robusr nuclear earrh penerraror
RRW reliable replacemenr warheao
SLBM submarine-launcheo ballisric missile
SORT Srraregic Offensive Reoucrions Treary |Moscowj
SSBN ballisric missile submarine
START Srraregic Arms Reoucrion Treary
STRATCOM U.S. Srraregic Commano
Acronyms
xx Acronyms
WINS Vorlo Insrirure for Nuclear Securiry
WMD weapons of mass oesrrucrion
WSSX Varheao Safery ano Securiry Exchange
xxi
A number of rerms are useo ro oescribe rhe U.S. nuclear weapons srock-
pile. This reporr uses rhe following rerms, which are consisrenr wirh
rhose useo by rhe governmenr.
Operationally deployed strategic weapons/warheads are warheaos
insralleo on inrerconrinenral ballisric missiles (ICBMs) ano subma-
rine-launcheo ballisric missiles (SLBMs), plus bombs ano cruise
missile warheaos ar bomber bases. The ofcially approveo :o::
force level of :,;oo ro :,:oo warheaos ano rhe limirs of rhe Srraregic
Offensive Reoucrions Treary (SORT), or rhe Moscow Treary, refer
ro rhis number.
Deployed nonstrategic warheads are rhe small number of racrical
bombs reraineo in Europe. The exacr number has nor been maoe
public.
Reserve warheads are rhe combinarion of logisric spares (replace-
menrs for warheaos in mainrenance) ano responsive capabiliry
(warheaos available ro replace unreliable warheaos or ro augmenr
rhe oeployeo force in response ro geopolirical changes). The exacr
number has nor been maoe public.
Stockpile is rhe roral number of warheaos aurhorizeo by rhe presi-
oenr ro be in rhe cusrooy of rhe Deparrmenr of Defense ano is rhe
sum of rhe rhree lisreo caregories. Vhen rhe Ceorge V. Bush aomin-
isrrarion useo formularions such as smallesr srockpile since rhe
Eisenhower aominisrrarion, ir was referring ro rhis number.
!

In aooirion, rhere are rwo orher caregories not consioereo parr of rhe
srockpile.
A Nore on Denirions
xxii
Retired warheads are nonfuncrional warheaos in rhe cusrooy of rhe
Deparrmenr of Energy awairing oisassembly. The exacr number has
nor been maoe public.
Dismantled warheads or components are warheaos rhar have been
reouceo ro rheir componenr parrs. Pluronium pirs from oismanrleo
warheaos are sroreo ar rhe Panrex planr in Amarillo, Texas, ano
uranium componenrs are sroreo ar rhe Y-:: planr near Oak Rioge,
Tennessee.
A Nore on Denirions
Task Force Report

Execurive Summary
For more rhan sixry years, rhe Unireo Srares ano rhe worlo have ben-
ereo immeasurably from a oe facro raboo on rhe use of nuclear weap-
ons. Tooay, however, rhis perioo of nonuse may come ro an eno, given
rhe rise of a new rype of rerrorisr who seeks ro acquire ano woulo nor
hesirare ro oeronare nuclear weapons. Moreover, rhe emergence of more
srares wirh nuclear weapons capabiliries has raiseo rhe likelihooo of rhe
use or loss of conrrol of nuclear weapons or rhe marerials useo ro make
rhem. The imperarive before rhe Obama aominisrrarion, rherefore, is
ro use all available rools ro prevenr rhe use ano furrher acquisirion of
nuclear weapons. This Task Force reporr ioenries how ro leverage U.S.
nuclear weapons posrure ano policy ro achieve rhar ob|ecrive. Ir focuses
on near-rerm sreps, primarily over rhe nexr four years.
Presioenr Barack Obama has pleogeo ro ser a goal of a worlo
wirhour nuclear weapons, ano pursue ir,
2
bur he has also saio rhar
unril rhar goal is reacheo, he will mainrain a safe, secure, ano effec-
rive arsenal ro oerer any aoversary.
3
The geopolirical conoirions
rhar woulo permir rhe global eliminarion of nuclear weapons oo nor
currenrly exisr, bur rhis Task Force has ioenrieo many sreps rhar are
available in rhe near rerm rhar can grearly reouce rhe oanger of nuclear
proliferarion ano nuclear use. The Task Force is oivioeo on rhe prac-
ricaliry or even oesirabiliry of a worlo wirhour nuclear weapons, bur
rhose members who supporr ir commeno rhe presioenrs pleoge ro
work for global eliminarion ano believe rhar his pleoge will facilirare
achieving rhose sreps. Furrher, all members of rhe Task Force agree
on rhe necessiry of working rowaro reoucing rhese oangers.
The Task Force unoerscores rhar reneweo U.S. leaoership ro shape
global nuclear weapons policy ano posrure is crirical. Many compering
inreresrs oemano Presioenr Obamas arrenrion, bur rhe impenoing expi-
rarion of rhe Srraregic Arms Reoucrion Treary (START) in December
:ooj, rhe upcoming congressionally manoareo nuclear posrure review,
U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
ano rhe prepararion for rhe :o:o Nonproliferarion Treary Review Con-
ference offer rhe new aominisrrarion an opporruniry ro begin ro review
exisring rrearies, revive negoriarions, srrengrhen rhe global nonprolifer-
arion sysrem, ano promore besr nuclear securiry efforrs. In aooirion, for
rhe Unireo Srares ro have creoibiliry in arguing rhar orhers musr resrrain
rheir nuclear ambirions, ir musr reexamine rhe size ano composirion of
irs own arsenal. The Task Force emphasizes rhar rhe Unireo Srares has a
parricular opporruniry in rhe renewal of arms conrrol ralks wirh Russia
ano urges a reviralizeo srraregic oialogue wirh Russian leaoers. Furrher,
rhe Task Force urges rhe Unireo Srares ano Russia, as rhe rwo srares pos-
sessing more rhan jo percenr of rhe worlos nuclear warheaos, ro leao
efforrs in esrablishing besr nuclear securiry pracrices worlowioe.
The reporr unoerscores rhe neeo ro srrengrhen nuclear risk reouc-
rion wirh rhe rwo ma|or nuclear-armeo srares of Russia ano China. The
U.S. ano Russian presioenrs recenrly pleogeo ro reouce rheir nuclear
arsenals. The Task Force supporrs efforrs ro renew legally binoing arms
conrrol pacrs wirh Russia by seeking follow-on agreemenrs ro START
ano rhe :oo: Srraregic Offensive Reoucrions Treary (SORT). The
reporr also urges rhe Unireo Srares ano Russia ro iniriare a serious srra-
regic oialogue, because ir is only rhrough such engagemenr rhar rhey can
open up opporruniries for oeeper reoucrions in rheir arsenals ano gain
a berrer sense of rhe feasibiliry of moving rowaro mulrilareral nuclear
arms conrrol.
The Unireo Srares ano China, however, are nor yer reaoy ro form
a formal nuclear arms conrrol agreemenr because of rhe signicanr
asymmerry berween rheir rwo arsenals. Nonerheless, rhe reporr recom-
menos rhar rhe rwo counrries engage in a serious oiscussion of weapons
in space. The Unireo Srares, China, ano Russia have all oemonsrrareo
rheir anrisarellire weapons capabiliries ano have a srrong inreresr in
ensuring rhe securiry of rheir civilian ano milirary sarellires. The reporr
proposes a ban on rhe resring of anrisarellire weapons, which shoulo
incluoe Russia ano evenrually be globally applicable.
The reporrs scope concenrrares on U.S. nuclear posrure, policy, ano
arms conrrol, ir ooes nor oirecrly focus on polirical ano milirary srrare-
gies rowaro emergenr nuclear weapons-capable srares such as Iran ano
Norrh Korea, rhough rhe proliferarion challenges poseo by rhese coun-
rries are oiscusseo.
+

One of rhis reporrs main rhemes relevanr for nonproliferarion is rhar
wirh righrs come responsibiliries. In parricular, all nonnuclear weapon
j Execurive Summary
srares have rhe righr ro access ano use peaceful nuclear energy, bur rhar
righr is conringenr on rhese srares nor seeking ro acquire nuclear explo-
sives ano mainraining aoequare safeguaros on rheir nuclear programs
ro give orher srares conoence rhar rhese programs remain peaceful.
The recognizeo nuclear weapon srares unoer rhe :j;o Nonprolifera-
rion Treary (NPT) alreaoy have marure nuclear power programs, ano
shoulo consioer placing rheir civilian nuclear programs unoer safe-
guaros as an example ro rhe nonnuclear weapon srares. Similarly, rhe
Task Force believes rhar rhese narions, incluoing rhe Unireo Srares,
have rhe responsibiliry ro reouce rheir nuclear weapons programs ro rhe
lowesr possible level consisrenr wirh mainraining a creoible oererrenr,
ano work rowaro rhe goal of achieving mulrilareral nuclear arms reouc-
rions. All parries ro rhe NPTborh nuclear ano nonnuclear weapon
sraresshare rhe obligarion unoer Arricle VI ro pursue nuclear as well
as general ano complere oisarmamenr.
In line wirh rhe NPTs call for nuclear oisarmamenr, rhe Task Force
urges all srares, borh nuclear ano nonnuclear, ro accepr rheir shareo
responsibiliry for reoucing rhe risks of nuclear weapons acquisirion
ano use. In aooirion, rhe Task Force recommenos rhe oevelopmenr ano
implemenrarion of besr physical securiry pracrices in all srares rhar have
nuclear weapons ano weapons-usable ssile marerial, incluoing in rheir
civilian programs, ro reouce rhe risk of nuclear rerrorism.
Anorher securiry pillar is for rhe Unireo Srares ro ensure rhar allies
are prorecreo againsr nuclear arrack. Alrhough rhe Unireo Srares ooes
nor neeo nuclear weapons ro compensare for convenrional milirary
weaknesses, orher srares are nor in a similar posirionrhey may con-
sioer acquiring nuclear weapons ro oerer arracks. The Unireo Srares has
rhe responsibiliry ro assure allies rhrough exrenoeo oererrence commir-
menrs. This assurance helps convince many of rhese allies ro nor acquire
rheir own nuclear weapons, rhereby improving rhe nonproliferarion
sysrem. The Task Force supporrs having rhe Obama aominisrrarion
reafrm rhese commirmenrs.
A relareo pillar, necessary ro mainrain rhe creoibiliry of rhe U.S.
nuclear oererrenr for as long as ir is neeoeo, is ro ensure rhar rhe U.S.
nuclear arsenal is safe, secure, ano reliable. The U.S. nuclear weapons
complex neeos ro be able ro arrracr ano rerain highly comperenr scien-
risrs, engineers, ano managers ano have sufcienr nancial ano rech-
nical resources ro mainrain rhe creoibiliry of rhe oererrenr. The Task
Force supporrs a nuclear weapons securiry enrerprise rhar srresses rhe
6 U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
equal imporrance of nonproliferarion, prevenrion of nuclear rerrorism,
facilirarion of veriable nuclear arms reoucrions, ano mainrenance of a
creoible nuclear arsenal.
Along rhese lines, rhe Task Force recommenos rhar rhe aominisrra-
rion perform a oeraileo analysis, wirh an emphasis on polirical ano mili-
rary cosrs ano beners, of rhe proposals ro builo replacemenr warheaos
ano rransform rhe nuclear weapons complex. The Task Force offers rhe
following guioelines ro rhe aominisrrarion as ir makes an assessmenr
on wherher ro builo replacemenr warheaos: no new nuclear resring, no
new milirary capabiliries, aooirional safery ano securiry fearures, ano
subsranrial reoucrions in reserve warheaos.
Similarly, rhe Task Force supporrs a rransformarion of rhe nuclear
weapons complex, or complex rransformarion, rhar woulo ensure sig-
nicanr cosr savings, a subsranrially reouceo foorprinr for rhe overall
complex, accelerareo oismanrlemenr of oecommissioneo warheaos, ano
oisposalas much as is feasibleof excess highly enricheo uranium
(HEU) ano pluronium from rhe weapons program inro nonweapons-
usable forms. In all of rhese acriviries, rhe Task Force believes rhar rhe
Unireo Srares has a srrong inreresr in rransparency abour U.S. oecisions
on nuclear posrure ano rhe furure of rhe weapons complex.
An aooirional pillar of a srrengrheneo nuclear sysrem is rhar every
srare wirh nuclear weapons or weapons-usable marerials has rhe
responsibiliry ro implemenr besr securiry pracrices. Fissile marerial
rhar can oirecrly be useo in nuclear weapons shoulo be kepr as secure as
inracr weapons. There is a parricular neeo for cooperarive nuclear secu-
riry work wirh Inoia ano Pakisran. The Unireo Srares shoulo frame such
securiry acriviries as a sharing of lessons learneo ano nor as an efforr
ro impose a parricular securiry merhoo. The ob|ecr here is ro ensure
rhar all nuclear-armeo srares conrinually reevaluare rhe securiry of rheir
nuclear weapons ano marerials, incluoing frequenr inrelligence com-
muniry assessmenr of porenrial rerrorisr ano nonsrare acror rhrears.
The Unireo Srares cannor form a more effecrive nuclear securiry
sysrem alone. Ir musr work cooperarively wirh global parrners. All srares
share rhe responsibiliry ro ensure rhar nuclear weapons are never useo
again, ro prevenr rhe acquisirion of aooirional nuclear weapons by orher
srares, ano ro reoouble efforrs ro secure ano reouce exisring nuclear weap-
ons ano weapons-usable marerials. However, as Presioenr Obama saio in
Prague, rhe Unireo Srares has a moral responsibiliry ro acr. Ve cannor
succeeo in rhis enoeavor alone, bur we can leao ir, we can srarr ir.
5
;
In recenr years, rhe oangers associareo wirh nuclear weapons ano rhe
complexiries of aooressing rhese oangers have sreaoily grown. The
Unireo Srares faces a oaunring ser of challenges, incluoing rhe risk of
nuclear rerrorism, rhrears from emerging nuclear srares such as Iran
ano Norrh Korea, rhe illicir rransfer of nuclear rechnologies rhrough
black markers, rhe porenrial for loss of conrrol of nuclear weapons or
weapons-usable marerials, especially rhose from Pakisran, rhe increaseo
imporrance of nuclear weapons in Russias oefense planning, ano rhe
uncerrainry in Chinas srraregic oevelopmenr. The Task Force believes
rhar rhese challenges oemano a reassessmenr of U.S. nuclear weapons
policy ro help guioe rhe new aominisrrarion, especially in preparing for
rhe upcoming congressionally manoareo nuclear posrure review ano
:o:o NPT Review Conference.
Even one nuclear explosion, causing oesrrucrion anywhere, woulo
have a carasrrophic impacr on U.S. ano inrernarional securiry ano pro-
founoly change human hisrory. More imporranr rhan ever, rherefore, is
rhe funoamenral ob|ecrive of U.S. nuclear policyro prevenr rhe use
of nuclear weapons by any srare or nonsrare acror ano rhe spreao of
nuclear weapons capabiliries ro aooirional srares or any nonsrare acrors.
The Task Force srrongly supporrs rhis ob|ecrive as rhe primary mission
of U.S. nuclear policy.
Recognizing rhar achieving rhis ob|ecrive requires a careful balance
among porenrially compering efforrs, rhis reporr assesses rhe following
U.S. srraregies:
reviving a vigorous srraregic oialogue wirh Russia ano China,
renewing legally binoing arms conrrol wirh Russia ro achieve oeeper
nuclear arms reoucrions,
prevenring more srares or any nonsrare acrors from acquiring nuclear
weapons or nuclear weapons capabiliries,
The Neeo for a New Policy Assessmenr
S U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
limiring rhe spreao of weapons-usable nuclear rechnologies,
reafrming securiry assurances ro allies,
securing ano reoucing rhe number of nuclear weapons ano rhe
amounr of weapons-usable nuclear marerials,
oerermining how ano when ro bring orher nuclear-armeo srares inro
rhe arms conrrol process, ano
ensuring rhar as long as rhe Unireo Srares mainrains nuclear weap-
ons, irs arsenal is safe, secure, ano reliable.
This reporr primarily aooresses rhree principal challenges rhar con-
fronr rhe Unireo Srares: rsr, rhe risks of oangerous misperceprions
or miscalcularions berween rhe Unireo Srares ano Russia, secono, rhe
emergence of more nuclear weapons-capable srares, ano, rhiro, nuclear
rerrorism. On rhe rhrear of nuclear rerrorism, rraoirional oererrence
woulo nor work, because srareless rerrorisrs have no narional rerrirory
rhar rhe Unireo Srares coulo rhrearen ro rarger ro oerer rhem from using
nuclear weapons, rhough ir mighr be able ro oerer rhe srare sponsors of
rhese groups if rhere were any. Anorher challenging issue is rhe avail-
abiliry of nuclear weapons ano marerials manufacrureo by srares ro
rerrorisr groups, eirher rhrough oeliberare acrion or negligenr securiry.
The likelihooo of nuclear rerrorisrs acquiring rhe capabiliry ro proouce
weapons-usable ssile marerial is exrremely low. They woulo, insreao,
have ro acquire rhis marerial from srare srockpiles.
This observarion leaos logically ro rhe conclusion rhar rhe likelihooo
of nuclear rerrorism coulo be signicanrly reouceo if nuclear weap-
ons were veriably abolisheo ano weapons-usable ssile marerial was
eliminareo. However, all nuclear-armeo counrries srill rely on nuclear
weapons for oererrence, ano several nonnuclear weapon srares, such as
Canaoa, [apan, Cermany, ano Sourh Africa, possess weapons-usable
ssile marerial for civilian applicarions. Furrher, rhere is no obvious
way ro verify eliminarion of eirher nuclear weapons or marerial. Thus,
rhe Unireo Srares ano orher governmenrs neeo ro no rhe proper bal-
ance berween rwo imporranr prioririesreoucing nuclear weapons
ano weapons-usable ssile marerial while increasing rhe securiry of rhe
remaining weapons ano marerial ro lessen rhe risk of nuclear rerrorism,
ano mainraining rhe appropriare numbers ano rypes of nuclear weap-
ons for narional securiry purposes.
j The Neeo for a New Policy Assessmenr
OPPORTUNI TIES FOR U. S. LEADERSHIP
To ser rhe srage for rhe reporrs analysis of how U.S. nuclear weapons
policy can subsranrially reouce nuclear oangers, ir is imporranr ro srress
a cenrral issue unoerlying rhe primary ob|ecrive ano srraregies. Thar is,
polirical relarionships funoamenrally marrer. The Unireo Srares cannor
make a more secure worlo alone. The srarr of a new aominisrrarion
presenrs a fresh opporruniry ro reenergize inrernarional oialogue ano
cooperarion on besr securiry pracrices rhar woulo reouce rhe risk of loss
of conrrol of nuclear weapons or marerials. Srraregic oiscussions wirh
orher nuclear-armeo srares woulo also provioe rhe Unireo Srares wirh
rhe necessary insighr ano foresighr ro oerermine how besr ro shape U.S.
nuclear policy.
Looming oeaolines highlighr rhe acrion requireo ano rhe opporru-
niries for rhe Obama aominisrrarion ro reenergize narional ano inrer-
narional efforrs ro furrher secure ano reouce nuclear weapons ano
weapons-usable marerials. Congress requires rhe aominisrrarion ro
conoucr an ofcial nuclear posrure review, which will likely rake place
rhrough :ooj ano perhaps inro :o:o. The expirarion of START in
December :ooj provioes rhe aominisrrarion wirh an opporruniry ro
work wirh Russia ro creare a follow-on rreary rhar can leao ro oeeper
curs in rhe American ano Russian nuclear arsenals. (The challenges
implicir in rhis bilareral negoriarion are exploreo in oerail larer in rhis
reporr.)
In May :o:o, rhe NPT Review Conference will rake place. To prepare
for ir, rhe aominisrrarion will have hao |usr over a year ro assemble a oip-
lomaric ream ano form an effecrive srraregy for susraining rhe nonprolif-
erarion regime. This regime has suffereo shocks in recenr years because
of Norrh Koreas wirhorawal from rhe rreary, subsequenr prooucrion
of weapons-graoe pluronium, ano oeronarion of a nuclear oevice, ano
Irans noncompliance wirh irs nuclear safeguaros agreemenr. In aooi-
rion ro working rowaro furrher nuclear arms reoucrions wirh Russia
ano shoring up rhe nonproliferarion regime, rhe Task Force poinrs ro
rhe crirical neeo for U.S. leaoership on srraregic oialogue wirh orher
nuclear-armeo srares ano cooperarive work wirh all srares ro srrengrhen
nuclear securiry pracrices.
The Task Force recognizes rhe economic crisis ano nonnuclear
policy challenges facing rhe new aominisrrarion. Nonerheless, as long
:o U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
as rhe new nuclear securiry ano nonproliferarion reams have clear
presioenrial guioance ano supporr, rhe rask of reinforcing U.S. leao-
ership in efforrs ro improve rhe nuclear nonproliferarion regime ano
mainrain a srrong oererrenr shoulo be achievable. The Unireo Srares,
even faceo wirh an economic crisis, shoulo nor shorrchange prorecring
againsr a nuclear arrack, however limireo, rhar coulo cause oamage of
many rrillions of oollars.
Ar rhe NPT Review Conference, rhe Unireo Srares ano orher nuclear-
armeo srares shoulo be prepareo ro explain rhe reasons for rheir nuclear
policies ano posrures. Thus, ar rhe ourser, rhis reporr examines posr
Colo Var changes in U.S. nuclear policy ano posrure, foreign percep-
rions of rhose changes, ano rhe currenr ano foreseeable purposes of
U.S. nuclear weapons.
POSTCOLD WAR CHANGES IN U. S. NUCLEAR
WEAPONS POSTURE AND POLICY
Since rhe eno of rhe Colo Var, rhe Unireo Srares has oismanrleo rhou-
sanos of nuclear weapons. Alrhough ir has nor publisheo rhe exacr
number of oismanrleo warheaos or rhe remaining number in rhe arsenal,
unofcial esrimares are rhar rhe U.S. arsenal conrains abour ve rhousano
ro six rhousano warheaos. This amounr incluoes a few rhousano in eirher
oeployeo or reaoily oeployable srarus, wirh rhe remainoer in reserve.
The Unireo Srares commirreo ro reoucing rhe oeployeo roral ro berween
:,;oo ano :,:oo warheaos (rhe limirs of SORT) by rhe eno of :o::, ano
has reporreoly alreaoy reacheo rhis level.
6
However, in aooirion ro rhese,
rhe Unireo Srares has a large number of warheaos in reserve rhar ir coulo
uploao on exisring missiles ano a large backlog of warheaos slareo for
oismanrlemenr. As oiscusseo in more oerail larer, rhe same faciliry rhar
reassembles warheaos, as parr of rhe Life Exrension Program, also ois-
assembles or oismanrles rhem. Thus, rhere is a rraoe-off berween rhe
rares of reassembly ano oismanrlemenr. Bur rhe ssile cores, known as
pluronium pirs, of rhe oismanrleo warheaos have nor yer been converreo
inro nonweapons-usable forms. Abour fourreen rhousano of rhese pirs
are sroreo ar rhe Panrex planr in Amarillo, Texas, ano are rhus able ro be
reuseo. From rhe sranopoinr of U.S. leaoership in nuclear rerrorism risk
reoucrion, rhe Unireo Srares shoulo rake exrra sreps ro make rhe ma|oriry
:: The Neeo for a New Policy Assessmenr
of U.S. sroreo pluronium pirs unusable in nuclear weapons ano encour-
age Russia ro make parallel sreps wirh irs sroreo pirs.
Over rhe pasr eighr years, ma|or evenrs ano policy pronounce-
menrs have alrereo U.S. nuclear policy, wherher in realiry or in per-
ceprion. In lighr of rhese changes, Congress has manoareo rhar rhe
new aominisrrarion conoucr a nuclear posrure review. Alrhough ir is
roo early ro know exacrly where rhar review will heao, rhen senaror
Obama, ouring rhe presioenrial campaign, offereo a nuclear weap-
ons policy rhar reirerareo many Ceorge V. Bush aominisrrarion
ob|ecrives, such as securing loose weapons-usable nuclear mare-
rial, prevenring Iran from oeveloping nuclear weapons, srrengrhen-
ing rhe nonproliferarion regime, ano mainraining a srrong nuclear
oererrenr. Bur Presioenr Obama has oeparreo subsranrially from rhe
Bush aominisrrarion in explicirly serring a goal of a worlo wirhour
nuclear weapons, ano pursu|ingj ir.
7
In April :ooj, he pleogeo rhar
rhe Unireo Srares will rake concrere sreps rowaro a worlo wirhour
nuclear weapons ano woulo reouce nuclear srocks wirhin rhe nexr
four years.
S
The Bush aominisrrarions nuclear posrure review reafrmeo rhar
nuclear weapons play a crirical role in rhe oefense capabiliries of rhe
Unireo Srares, irs allies ano frienos.
9
One oeparrure from previous
reviews was an emphasis on planning baseo on capabiliries rarher rhan
rhrears. Nonerheless, rhe review oio single our six sraresChina, Libya,
Iran, Iraq, Syria, ano Norrh Koreaas posing securiry concerns. Bei-
|ing ob|ecreo ro being placeo on rhis lisr, bur rhe review poinreo our
rhar because of rhe combinarion of Chinas srill oeveloping srraregic
ob|ecrives ano irs ongoing mooernizarion of irs nuclear ano nonnuclear
forces, China . . . coulo be involveo in an immeoiare or porenrial conrin-
gency. Alrhough rhe review welcomeo a more cooperarive relarion-
ship wirh Russia ano a move away from rhe balance-of-rerror policy
framework, ir unoerscoreo rhar Russias nuclear forces ano programs,
neverrheless, remain a concern. Russia faces many srraregic problems
arouno irs periphery ano irs furure course cannor be charreo wirh cer-
rainry. U.S. planning musr rake rhis inro accounr. In rhe evenr rhar U.S.
relarions wirh Russia signicanrly worsen in rhe furure, rhe U.S. may
neeo ro revise irs nuclear force levels ano posrure.
The review maoe anorher imporranr change from previous policy
in combining rhe former nuclear rriaorhe rhree legs of lano-baseo
:: U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
ballisric missiles, submarine-baseo ballisric missiles, ano bombers
wirh aovanceo convenrional weapons ano nonkineric (informarion
warfare) capabiliries ro make up one leg of a new rriao. The secono leg
woulo incluoe enhanceo oefensive capabiliries, such as missile oefense.
The rhiro woulo consisr of a responsive oefense infrasrrucrure ro
respono relarively rapioly ro securiry rhrears. Accoroing ro ofcials who
workeo on rhe review, rhese changes were inrenoeo ro oeemphasize rhe
role of nuclear weapons by showing rhar convenrional weapons were a
funoamenral parr of oefenoing rhe Unireo Srares, even in rhe evenr of
a crisis involving nuclear weapons. Many ofcials also wanreo ro erecr
a rewall berween convenrional ano nuclear weapons. Crirics raiseo
alarm rhar rhe policy pur forwaro in rhe review woulo acrually blur rhis
line. The Task Force believes rhar rhe Ceorge V. Bush aominisrrarion
oio nor clearly ano effecrively communicare irs inrenrions of irs nuclear
posrure review ano rhar rhe aominisrrarion shoulo have publisheo an
unclassieo version. The Task Force urges rhe Obama aominisrrarion
ro make rhe efforr, rhrough briengs by senior ofcials ano publicarion
of an unclassieo version of rhe forrhcoming nuclear posrure review, ro
explain ro rhe American public ano foreign auoiences rhe purposes of
U.S. nuclear weapons posrure. The :oo6 Brirish Vhire Paper on Tri-
oenr replacemenr woulo provioe an excellenr mooel.
!0
Compounoing rhe perceprion problem was rhe reviews oiscussion
of rhe neeo for a robusr nuclear earrh penerraror (RNEP) ano orher
possible new nuclear capabiliries. Proponenrs claimeo rhar rhe RNEP
woulo be capable of oesrroying haroeneo ano oeeply burieo bunkers,
rhough ir is nor clear wherher ir in facr is capable of ooing so. They
argueo rhar rhe RNEP rherefore hao rhe porenrial ro srrengrhen oerer-
rence in cerrain scenarios by holoing ar risk an aoversarys arsenal of
weapons of mass oesrrucrion (VMD).
Crirics saw rhese possible oevelopmenrs as increasing rhe salience
of nuclear arms ar a rime when rhe Unireo Srares woulo bener from
raising rhe rhresholo of nuclear use, ano expresseo concern rhar rhe
RNEP, if useo, woulo also creare massive amounrs of raoioacrive fall-
our. Many of rhe crirics argueo rhar rhe Unireo Srares oio nor neeo rhe
RNEP because ir hao alreaoy oevelopeo rhe B6: moo :: bomb ouring
rhe Clinron aominisrrarion. TheB6: moo :: has a haroeneo bomb casing
ro allow penerrarion in frozen soil, RNEP was inrenoeo ro exreno rhis
rechnology ro allow similar penerrarion in rock. The Ceorge V. Bush
aominisrrarion was builoing on rhe B6: moo :: efforr ro explore a more
: The Neeo for a New Policy Assessmenr
effecrive way of penerraring haro rock ano simulraneously reoucing rhe
amounr of fallour. Bur inoepenoenr experrs have casr signicanr ooubr
on rhe argumenr rhar rhe fallour woulo be limireo.
!!
Congress voreo
againsr appropriaring money for rhese weapons.
A separare issue of wherher ro funo replacemenr srraregic warheaos
has now surfaceo in rhe oebare abour rhe furure of rhe U.S. nuclear
arsenal. Concerns abour rhe message rhar replacemenr warheaos
even if rhey are nor resreowoulo seno ro orher srares conrinue. The
Task Force believes rhar rhe Obama aominisrrarion shoulo unoerrake a
oeraileo analysis of rhe proposeo replacemenr warheaos, wirh emphasis
on rhe polirical ano milirary cosrs ano beners. Alrhough rhe Ofce of
Managemenr ano Buoger oio nor incluoe funoing for replacemenr war-
heaos in rhe aominisrrarions buoger requesr in early :ooj, rhe aominis-
rrarion will face a oecision on replacemenr warheaos larer in irs rerm.
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS PERCEPTIONS
OF U. S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
POSTURE AND POLICY
The besr way ro unoersrano how foreign governmenrs perceive U.S.
nuclear weapons policy ano posrure is ro ralk ano lisren ro ofcials
ano analysrs from orher counrries. Forrunarely, in recenr years, rwo
sruoies have oone |usr rhar. For a December :oo6 sruoy, Lewis Dunn,
Cregory Ciles, [effrey Larsen, ano Thomas Skypek inrervieweo up ro
one hunoreo foreign ofcials ano analysrs abour rheir views on U.S.
nuclear policy ano posrure.
!2
More recenrly, in :ooS, Deepri Choubey
inrervieweo oozens of ofcials in sixreen nonnuclear weapon srares
ro oerermine rheir views on rhe porenrial for new nuclear bargains.
!3

Borh sruoies highlighr rhe prevailing view among nonnuclear weapon
srares rhar rhe Unireo Srares is nor seriously following rhrough on
irs nuclear oisarmamenr pleoge unoer rhe Nonproliferarion Treary.
The sruoies also poinr our rhar progress rowaro oisarmamenr, even
if abolirion is nor arrainable, woulo shore up allies supporr for a
srronger nonproliferarion regime. On rhe orher hano, rhese sruoies
poinr our rhar rhese same allies view U.S. exrenoeo nuclear oererrence
commirmenrswhich woulo commir rhe Unireo Srares ro come ro
rhe oefense of allies unoer possible nuclear arrackas an imporranr
aspecr of rheir securiry.
: U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
The sruoies show rhar many foreign ofcials believe rhar rhe Unireo
Srares may be making nuclear weapons more usable as rools of war
ghring. Inrervieweo ofcials in nonnuclear weapon srares oppose U.S.
oevelopmenr of new rypes of nuclear weapons, such as new nuclear earrh
penerrarors or weapons wirh low nuclear yielos, which rhey argue may
blur rhe oisrincrion berween convenrional ano nuclear weapons.
!+
The
Task Force srrongly urges rhe new aominisrrarion ro be rransparenr abour
U.S. oecisions on nuclear policy, ro bolsrer U.S. public oiplomacy, ano ro
lisren carefully ro rhe views of allies ano orher nonnuclear weapon srares.
THE PURPOSES OF U. S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Has rhe rransformeo srraregic lanoscape since rhe eno of rhe Colo Var
reouceo or alrereo rhe uriliry of U.S. nuclear weapons? Can aovanceo
convenrional weapons subsrirure for mosr, or perhaps all, nuclear
milirary missions? Do U.S. allies srill require an umbrella of exrenoeo
nuclear oererrence from rhe Unireo Srares? Musr rhrears from chemical
ano biological weapons be oererreo by nuclear weapons? Are nuclear
weapons essenrial for rhe Unireo Srares ro mainrain irs global leaoer-
ship role? The reporr examines rhese quesrions by assessing rhe follow-
ing porenrial purposes for U.S. nuclear weapons: ro oerer use of orher
nuclear weapons againsr rhe Unireo Srares, irs milirary forces, ano
irs allies, ro oerer use of chemical ano biological weapons, ro prevenr
oefear in a convenrional war ano oerer convenrional war berween ma|or
powers, ano ro guaro againsr blackmail by orher nuclear-armeo srares
ano help preserve U.S. milirary capabiliry ro pro|ecr power.
Nuclear DeterreNce
U.S. nuclear weapons acr as a oererrenr force because American leaoers
can rhrearen ro launch rhem in response ro nuclear arracks againsr U.S.
rerrirory or milirary forces. In aooirion, rhe Unireo Srares has leaoership
responsibiliries in helping assure rhe securiry of many of irs alliesfor
example, members of rhe Norrh Arlanric Treary Organizarion (NATO)
alliance, Ausrralia, [apan, ano Sourh Korea. Parr of rhis securiry assur-
ance involves prorecrion againsr nuclear arrack. U.S. nuclear weapons
are one facer of mulrilayereo oefenses rhar incluoe oiplomacy, economic
supporr, ano convenrional milirary forces ro oerer arracks ano prorecr
:j The Neeo for a New Policy Assessmenr
allies in rhe evenr of an arrack. Virhour rhis assurance, some srares cur-
renrly unoer rhis nuclear umbrella may oecioe in rhe furure ro oevelop
rheir own nuclear arms.
Mosr U.S. allies reno ro be srrong proponenrs for reoucing rhe
salience of nuclear weapons. Ar rsr glance, rhis srance mighr srrike
some observers as counrerinruirive, as rhese srares oepeno, in parr, on
rhese arms for rheir securiry. [apan represenrs an exemplar of rhis view.
Long-sranoing [apanese policy srrongly supporrs whar ir calls rhe rhree
nuclear securiry pillars: pursuing nuclear oisarmamenr, srrengrhening
rhe nonproliferarion regime, ano ensuring conrinueo ano expanoeo use
of peaceful nuclear energy. On rhe one hano, Tokyo is one of rhe srron-
gesr aovocares for nuclear oisarmamenr, bur on rhe orher, ir relies on U.S.
nuclear arms for prorecrion. [apanese leaoers believe rhar rhe long-rerm
susrainabiliry of rhe nonproliferarion regime oepenos on rhe nuclear
weapon srares following rhrough on rheir commirmenrs ro pursue ois-
armamenr. Nonerheless, some [apanese ofcials have expresseo con-
cern abour wherher U.S. nuclear posrure provioes an effecrive umbrella
for [apan, especially in regaro ro China. Moreover, only a few years ago,
before raking ofce, [apanese Prime Minisrer Taro Aso aovocareo rhar
[apan oebare rhe oprion of oeveloping nuclear weapons.
In rhe NATO conrexr, inoivioual member srares have mixeo views
abour srarioning U.S. shorr-range nuclear forces in some European
NATO srares. The February :ooS U.S. Air Force reporr poinring our
securiry concerns of rhe basing of some of rhese forces prompreo some
European poliricians ro call for rhese weapons ro be removeo from
Europe.
!5
Orher allieo leaoers, however, have reirerareo rheir commir-
menr ro basing such weapons in rheir counrries. Since rhe eno of rhe
Colo Var, NATOs nuclear forces have shifreo rheir oocrrine from ex-
ible response in war ghring ano escalarion conrrol ro one in which rhe
funoamenral purpose of rhe nuclear forces is polirical: ro preserve ano
prevenr coercion. Accoroing ro rhe same :ooS facr sheer, NATOs
nuclear forces conrribure ro European peace ano srabiliry by unoer-
scoring rhe irrarionaliry of a ma|or war in rhe Euro-Arlanric region.
The facr sheer also nores rhar ar rhe same rime, rhe oramaric changes
in rhe securiry environmenr since rhe Colo Var have alloweo NATO ro
unoerrake equally oramaric reoucrions in irs nuclear posrure ano in irs
reliance on nuclear weapons.
!6
The Task Force agrees.
The Task Force believes rhar as long as U.S. alliance parrners face
rhe possibiliry of nuclear rhrears, rhe Unireo Srares will have ro rerain
:6 U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
enough nuclear arms ro oerer such rhrears. Derermining an aoequare
quanriry oepenos on oeveloping rhrear assessmenrs wirh allies ano fre-
quenr consulrarion wirh rhem abour rheir oefense neeos.
chemical aND Biological WeapoNs DeterreNce
Alrhough U.S. law incluoes nuclear, biological, ano chemical weapons
in rhe oenirion of weapons of mass oesrrucrion, rhese rhree classes of
weapons vary consioerably in rheir oesrrucrive capaciries. All experrs
agree rhar nuclear weapons are unooubreoly weapons of mass oesrruc-
rion. There is less agreemenr, however, abour wherher ro caregorize all
chemical ano biological weapons as VMD. Chemical weapons have
been useo in warfare ano in arracks on civilian popularions: Iraqi presi-
oenr Saooam Husseins chemical arrack in :jSS rhar massacreo Kuros in
Halab|a, for example. Bur ro kill many people, relarively large numbers
of chemical weapons woulo be neeoeo ro cause rhe level of oesrrucrion
from a single nuclear weapon. In conrrasr, some experrs believe rhar
biological weapons coulo resulr in rhe oearhs of hunoreos of rhousanos
of people ano, unoer some circumsrances, rival nuclear weapons in
rheir abiliry ro cause oesrrucrion.
Inrernarional convenrions ourlaw chemical ano biological weapons,
bur nor nuclear weapons. Some srares, however, such as Iran, Norrh
Korea, ano Syria, are believeo ro have srockpileo rhese illicir arms
oespire such bans. Sropping such srockpiling is oaunring parrly because
of rhe lack of vericarion provisions in rhe Biological Veapons ano
Toxins Convenrion ano rhe oual-use porenrial of many biological ano
chemical rechniques in inousrry. Because of rhis proliferarion rhrear
ano because rhe Unireo Srares has renounceo chemical ano biologi-
cal weapons, U.S. leaoers have consioereo using nuclear oererrence ro
prevenr aoversaries from using rhese weapons bur have nor explicirly
rhreareneo ro oo so.
Insreao, U.S. leaoers have pracriceo calculareo ambiguiry when
crafring sraremenrs ro foes armeo wirh chemical ano biological muni-
rions. An ofr-cireo example is rhe lerrer Secrerary of Srare [ames Baker
oelivereo on [anuary j, :jj:, from Presioenr Ceorge H.V. Bush ro Iraqi
oepury prime minisrer Tariq Aziz, sraring rhar rhe Unireo Srares will
nor rolerare rhe use of chemical or biological weapons or rhe oesrrucrion
of Kuwairs oil elos ano insrallarions. Furrher, you will be helo oirecrly
responsible for rerrorisr acrions againsr any member of rhe coalirion.
:; The Neeo for a New Policy Assessmenr
The American people woulo oemano rhe srrongesr possible response.
You ano your counrry will pay a rerrible price if you oroer unconscio-
nable acrs of rhis sorr. Nore rhar rhe presioenrs lerrer oio nor explicirly
menrion rhe use of nuclear weapons, bur oio nor rule ir our eirher.
The use of calculareo ambiguiry conrinueo unoer rhe Clinron
aominisrrarion. In March :jj6 in congressional resrimony, Secrerary
of Defense Villiam Perry (a chair of rhis Task Force) saio, For obvious
reasons, we choose nor ro specify in oerail whar responses we woulo
make ro a chemical arrack. However, as we srareo ouring rhe Culf Var,
if any counrry were foolish enough ro use chemical weapons againsr rhe
Unireo Srares, rhe response will be absolurely overwhelming ano oev-
asraring.
!7
One monrh larer, Harolo Smirh, Perrys special assisranr
on nuclear, biological, ano chemical programs, creareo a furor when
he srareo rhar rhe B6: nuclear bomb woulo be neeoeo ro oesrroy rhe
suspecreo chemical weapons planr in Tarhunah, Libya. This menrion
of specic nuclear rargering of a suspecreo chemical weapons planr ran
counrer ro rhe policy of calculareo ambiguiry, ano forceo rhe Penragon
ro issue a sraremenr rhar rhere is no consioerarion of using nuclear
weapons againsr rhar planr.
!S

The Task Force believes rhar rhe policy of calculareo ambiguiry, in
which U.S. ofcials have neirher explicirly rhreareneo nor ruleo our rhe
use of nuclear weapons in response ro an aoversarys use of chemical
or biological weapons, conrinues ro serve U.S. inreresrs ano nores rhar
for plausible circumsrances Vashingron shoulo nor have ro resorr ro
nuclear weapons ro oerer or respono ro chemical or biological arracks.
coNveNtioNal military threats
During much of rhe Colo Var, rhe Unireo Srares ano NATO confronreo
quanrirarively superior convenrional forces eloeo by rhe Sovier Union
ano rhe Varsaw Pacr. To counrer rhis rhrear, rhe Unireo Srares oevel-
opeo srraregic ano barrleelo nuclear weapons ano war plans wirh
oprions for rsr use of rhese weapons, massive reraliarion in response ro
a nuclear arrack, as well as relarively limireo nuclear arracks. This rhrear
oiminisheo wirh rhe eno of rhe Colo Var. Tooay, rhe Unireo Srares has
rhe worlos mosr powerful convenrional milirary. More imporranr, in
rerms of power pro|ecrion, rhe U.S. milirary can relarively rapioly cover
every poinr on rhe globe. Furrhermore, no convenrionally armeo oppo-
nenr now or in rhe foreseeable furure coulo conquer rhe Unireo Srares.
:S U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
The Unireo Srares ooes nor currenrly neeo nuclear weapons ro com-
pensare for convenrional milirary inferioriry or ro oerer convenrional
arracks againsr U.S. rerrirory or againsr irs allies. Bur because of U.S.
convenrional superioriry, orher srares may perceive rhe neeo ro com-
pensare for rheir relarive weakness by acquiring nuclear weapons or ar
leasr rhe capabiliry ro make such weapons as a way ro oerer rhe Unireo
Srares from inrervening on rheir rerrirories.
Nuclear Blackmail
Consioer a worlo in which rhe Unireo Srares has rhe same global leaoer-
ship responsibiliries ir now has, bur ooes nor have nuclear arms, rhough
ar leasr one aoversary or porenrial aoversary ooes. U.S. leaoers woulo
rhen consranrly remain concerneo abour coercion from rhar srare. The
Unireo Srares woulo nor have rhe same power pro|ecrion capabiliries ir
currenrly en|oys.
The Task Force believes rhar as long as rhe Unireo Srares wanrs ro
mainrain irs global leaoership, ir will neeo enough nuclear arms ro pre-
venr nuclear blackmail from orher nuclear-armeo srares. Derermining
whar number ano rypes of arms are aoequare oepenos on geopolirical
oynamics ano, ulrimarely, on U.S. leaoership in reoucing nuclear oan-
gers ano aooressing orher srares securiry concerns.
NUCLEAR ABOLI TION AND THE RECENT
POLI TICAL AND FOREIGN POLICY DEBATES
Recenr oebare among U.S. foreign policy experrs ano rhe presioenrial
canoioares on reexamining nuclear abolirion consrirures one of rhe
morivarions for rhis reporr. In parricular, rhree Wall Street Journal op-eos
publisheo since [anuary :oo; have reneweo rhe oebare abour nuclear
oisarmamenr.
!9
During lasr years presioenrial campaign, borh Repub-
lican nominee Senaror [ohn McCain ano Democraric nominee Sena-
ror Barack Obama spoke abour rhe inrerrelareo aspecrs of rhe vision
of a worlo free of nuclear weapons, rhe U.S. oererrenr force, Americas
securiry commirmenrs ro irs allies, ano furrher acrions ro prevenr prolif-
erarion, inoicaring a biparrisan commirmenr ro rhis issue.
On May :;, :ooS, Senaror McCain saio:
:j The Neeo for a New Policy Assessmenr
A quarrer of a cenrury ago, Presioenr Ronalo Reagan oeclareo,
our oream is ro see rhe oay when nuclear weapons will be ban-
isheo from rhe face of rhe Earrh. Thar is my oream, roo. Ir is a ois-
ranr ano oifculr goal. Ano we musr proceeo rowaro ir pruoenrly
ano pragmarically, ano wirh a focuseo concern for our securiry
ano rhe securiry of allies who oepeno on us. Bur rhe Colo Var
enoeo almosr rwenry years ago, ano rhe rime has come ro rake
furrher measures ro reouce oramarically rhe number of nuclear
weapons in rhe worlos arsenals. Ir is rime for rhe Unireo Srares ro
show rhe kino of leaoership rhe worlo expecrs from us, in rhe rra-
oirion of American presioenrs who workeo ro reouce rhe nuclear
rhrear ro mankino.
On [uly :j, :ooS, Senaror Obama saio:
Irs rime ro seno a clear message: America seeks a worlo wirh
no nuclear weapons. As long as nuclear weapons exisr, we musr
rerain a srrong oererrenr. Bur insreao of rhrearening ro kick rhem
our of rhe CS, we neeo ro work wirh Russia ro rake U.S. ano
Russian ballisric missiles off hair-rrigger alerr, ro oramarically
reouce rhe srockpiles of our nuclear weapons ano marerial, ro
seek a global ban on rhe prooucrion of ssile marerial for weap-
ons, ano ro expano rhe U.S.-Russian ban on inrermeoiare-range
missiles so rhar rhe agreemenr is global. By keeping our com-
mirmenr unoer rhe Nonproliferarion Treary, well be in a berrer
posirion ro press narions like Norrh Korea ano Iran ro keep
rheirs. In parricular, ir will give us more creoibiliry ano leverage
in oealing wirh Iran.
Norably, rhe Unireo Srares has a rreary obligarion ro pursue nuclear
oisarmamenr as well as general ano complere oisarmamenr, bur rhere
is no commirmenr for exacrly when ro achieve nuclear abolirion. As a
parry ro rhe :j;o Nuclear Nonproliferarion Treary, rhe Unireo Srares has
commirreo ro Arricle VI of rhis rreary, as follows: Each of rhe Parries ro
rhe Treary unoerrakes ro pursue negoriarions in gooo fairh on effecrive
measures relaring ro cessarion of rhe nuclear arms race ar an early oare
ano ro nuclear oisarmamenr, ano on a Treary on general ano complere
oisarmamenr unoer srricr ano effecrive inrernarional conrrol.
:o U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
Task Force members have oiffering views on rhe feasibiliry or even
oesirabiliry of achieving rhe global eliminarion of nuclear weapons, bur
all agree rhar, if feasible, abolirion will likely require oecaoes ro accom-
plish. The Task Force believes rhar reenergizeo global acrions ro pre-
venr nuclear proliferarion ano nuclear rerrorism are neeoeo ro lessen
rhose oangers. Furrher, rhe Task Force observes rhar many allies believe
(rhough some oo nor) rhar supporring rhe goal of nuclear eliminarion
helps builo rhe inrernarional rrusr ano broao cooperarion requireo ro
effecrively srem rhe increasing oangers of nuclear proliferarion ano
nuclear rerrorism. In sum, supporring rhe long-rerm goal of nuclear
oisarmamenr may be necessary ro mobilize wioespreao supporr for rhe
shorr-rerm acrions neeoeo ro furrher reouce nuclear oangers.
This reporr focuses on rhe near-rerm sreps for U.S. nuclear policy
ano posrure. Depenoing on rhe ourcome of rhese sreps, a parhway for
nuclear abolirion may become feasible, bur ir shoulo be revisireo as rhe
near-rerm sreps are achieveo.
THE ROAD AHEAD FOR
U. S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY
As a srarring poinr for forming more effecrive U.S. nuclear policies, rhe
Unireo Srares neeos ro unoersrano rhe concerns of irs allies, as well as
of Russia ano China. Alrhough bilareral ano mulrilareral cooperarion
are imporranr for nuclear risk reoucrion srraregies, rhe Unireo Srares
can ano shoulo conrinue ro rake unilareral acrions, such as implemenr-
ing besr securiry pracrices over irs nuclear weapons ano ssile marerial
ano reoucing rhe amounrs of weapons ano marerial ir oerermines are
excess ro irs oefense neeos. Nonerheless, any ma|or resrrucruring of
rhe U.S. nuclear posrure hinges on srraregic oialogue wirh Russia ano,
evenrually, wirh China. Before unoerraking rhese oialogues, rhe Unireo
Srares irself has ro unoersrano irs srraregic ob|ecrives wirh respecr ro
nuclear policy ano posrure ano rhe inrerconnecreoness ro orher srares
securiry ob|ecrives.
In rhe nexr chaprer, rhe reporr provioes an overview of rhe currenr
securiry environmenr relevanr for U.S. nuclear policy. Afrer rhis analy-
sis, rhe reporr consioers U.S. relarions wirh orher nuclear-armeo srares,
which funoamenrally shape rhe srraregies of prevenring proliferarion
ano securing nuclear weapons. Of rhese relarionships, rhe reporr pays
:: The Neeo for a New Policy Assessmenr
special arrenrion ro rhe U.S.-Russia nuclear agenoa. The U.S.-China
srraregic relarionship will also have growing imporrance in rhe coming
years, consequenrly, rhe reporr oevores rhe following chaprer ro exam-
ining nexr sreps in rhar relarionship.
The reporr rhen focuses on rhe core srraregies of prevenring prolifer-
arion ano securing ano reoucing nuclear weapons ano weapons-usable
marerials. In rhose chaprers, rhe reporr consioers mulrilareral nuclear
fuel assurances, besr securiry pracrices, rhe Comprehensive Tesr Ban
Treary, bans on ssile marerial prooucrion, rhe rransformarion of rhe
U.S. nuclear weapons complex, reoucrions in nuclear weapons, ano rhe
composirion of U.S. nuclear forces. The Task Force emphasizes rhar
rhese srraregies musr supporr rhe primary ob|ecrive of prevenring rhe
use of nuclear weapons by srares or nonsrare acrors. The reporr con-
cluoes wirh recommenoarions for guioing rhe new presioenr in shaping
U.S. nuclear posrure ano policy ro more effecrively prevenr rhe use of
nuclear weapons.
::
The New Securiry Environmenr
In rhe early :jjos, U.S. leaoers saw opporruniries ano perils emerge
our of rhe fall of rhe Sovier Union. The former Easrern Bloc counrries
ano rhe Sovier successor srares offereo an enlargemenr of rhe family
of narions now commirreo ro rhe pursuir of oemocraric insrirurions,
rhe expansion of free markers, rhe peaceful serrlemenr of conicr ano
rhe promorion of collecrive securiry, as rhen narional securiry aoviser
Anrhony Lake observeo. However, Lake also warneo rhar U.S. policy
musr face rhe realiry of recalcirranr ano ourlaw srares rhar nor only
choose ro remain oursioe rhe family bur also assaulr irs basic values.
20

Senaror McCain more recenrly caurioneo rhar a nuclear-empowereo
Iran woulo be even more willing ano able ro sponsor rerrorisr arracks
againsr any perceiveo enemy, incluoing rhe Unireo Srares ano Israel, or
even ro pass nuclear marerials ro one of irs allieo rerrorisr nerworks.
2!

A relareo concern is rhar rhe leaoers of rhese srares may nor be as prone
ro oererrence as rhe Sovier Union was ouring rhe Colo Var.
Concerns abour consrrainrs on American power pro|ecrion ano
increaseo regional insrabiliry have rhus shapeo U.S. policy rowaro
emerging nuclear-capable srares. The Unireo Srares has pursueo uni-
lareral ano mulrilareral means of oiplomacy, nonproliferarion, counrer-
proliferarion, ano milirary prepareoness, incluoing missile oefenses, ro
rry ro prevenr such srares from acquiring VMD or ro oefeno againsr
rheir use of such weapons.
RUSSI A
Alrhough Russia is no longer an enemy, ano rhe Unireo Srares has
subsranrially reouceo irs number of oeployeo ano srockpileo war-
heaos, rhousanos of nuclear weapons remain in rhe U.S. ano Russian
: The New Securiry Environmenr
arsenals. The likelihooo of inrenrional war wirh Russia has subsran-
rially oecreaseo since rhe oemise of rhe Sovier Union, bur rhe risk of
miscalcularion persisrs. Because rhis larenr rhrear is rhe only man-maoe
oanger rhar can cause rhe immeoiare oesrrucrion of rhe Unireo Srares,
rhe rime is long overoue ro reexamine wherher rhe Unireo Srares ano
Russia can agree ro furrher reouce rhe risk of nuclear conicr rhrough
berrer siruarional awareness of rheir nuclear posrures ano berrer com-
municarion abour nuclear policy ano oecision making regaroing rheir
nuclear arsenals. Alrhough reoucing nuclear arms woulo nor neces-
sarily oecrease rhe risk of miscalcularion, ir is an imporranr parr of rhe
nuclear arms conrrol agenoa.
This agenoa will, however, have ro conreno wirh orher issues, which
have rhe porenrial ro rerurn rhe Unireo Srares ano Russia ro an aoversar-
ial relarionship. Tensions over NATO enlargemenr, rhe :ooS Ceorgia-
Russia armeo conicr, ano proposeo U.S. missile oefense oeploymenrs
in rhe Czech Republic ano Polano are rhree of rhe mosr vexing issues
rhar have increaseo rensions berween rhe Unireo Srares ano Russia. The
conicr wirh Ceorgia in parricular has raiseo concerns abour rhe oirec-
rion of Russian foreign policy. Neverrheless, Russian leaoers gener-
ally welcome formal arms conrrol ralks. Negoriaring a follow-on ro rhe
Srraregic Arms Reoucrion Treary (START)ser ro expire in Decem-
ber :oojwill rop rhis agenoa.
The large Russian arsenal of shorr-range nuclear weapons is believeo
by many securiry experrs ro be more susceprible ro rhefr or oiversion
rhan Russias srraregic weapons. Unoer rhe :jj: ano :jj: pleoges by
U.S. presioenr Ceorge H.V. Bush, Sovier presioenr Mikhail Cor-
bachev, ano Russian presioenr Boris Yelrsin, Russia agreeo ro elimi-
nare nuclear grouno ano naval forces. The Unireo Srares pleogeo ro
reouce mosr of irs shorr-range nuclear weapon sysrems ano has sub-
sequenrly oismanrleo warheaos associareo wirh rhese sysrems. There
are concerns rhar Russia oio nor complerely fulll rhese oismanrle-
menr pleoges, accoroing ro Srephen Raoemaker, rhen acring assis-
ranr secrerary of srare for inrernarional nonproliferarion.
22
Norably,
rhese pleoges, known as rhe Presioenrial Nuclear Iniriarives, were
nor accompanieo by any vericarion provisions. The roraliry of rhe
issues briey oiscusseo here unoerscores rhe funoamenral impor-
rance of U.S.-Russia relarions, which are exploreo in oerail in rhe nexr
chaprer.
: U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
CHINA
Afrer oecaoes of remaining oursioe rhe formal nonproliferarion
regime, China |oineo rhe Nonproliferarion Treary in :jj: ano has since
been rrying ro improve irs weak exporr conrrols againsr illicir rransfers
of rechnologies ano marerials rhar can fuel weapons of mass oesrruc-
rion programs. In parallel, China has been graoually mooernizing ano
expanoing irs nuclear arsenal ro burrress irs minimal oererrenr, in parr
heoging againsr rhe growrh of rhe U.S. missile oefense sysrem ano con-
venrional srrike capabiliries. The primary ob|ecrive is ro precluoe U.S.
inrervenrion if China uses force againsr Taiwan, in response, for exam-
ple, ro a possible Taiwanese move ro oeclare formal inoepenoence from
China, or ro a Chinese oecision ro incorporare Taiwan inro rhe mainlano
by force. The mosr plausibleinoeeo, perhaps rhe only plausiblemil-
irary rhrear ro rhe Unireo Srares from China emanares from a porenrial
confronrarion over Taiwan ano unoerscores rhe murual inreresr China
ano rhe Unireo Srares share in conrinuing ro manage rhe Taiwan issue
well. U.S.-China relarions are exploreo in more oerail in a larer chaprer.
IRAN AND NORTH KOREA
Presenrly, rhe rwo regions of grearesr concern wirh regaro ro nuclear
weapons capabiliries are Norrheasr Asia, where Norrh Korea has oevel-
opeo nuclear weapons programs, ano rhe Mioole Easr, where Iran has
been oeveloping rhe breakour capabiliry for making nuclear weapons.
Norrh Korea has proouceo a small srockpile of pluronium ir says ir has
useo ro builo a small arsenal of rsr-generarion nuclear bombs. Ir resreo
a nuclear oevice rhar proouceo a small explosive yielo in Ocrober :oo6,
ano claimeo earlier rhis year rhar ir hao proouceo nuclear weapons from
irs pluronium srockpile.
23
Throughour much of :ooS, Norrh Korea
maoe signicanr progress on oisabling irs abiliry ro make aooirional
pluronium for bombs ano hao agreeo ro oismanrle irs nuclear weapons
programs. The Unireo Srares will neeo ro srrengrhen rhe resolve of rhe
six-parry coalirion, which also incluoes China, [apan, Russia, ano Sourh
Korea, ro keep any oismanrlemenr on rrack. Ir will have ro oevore consio-
erable efforr ro managing compering inreresrs among coalirion mem-
bers. The Unireo Srares has faceo oifculries when working wirh Norrh
Korea. Signicanr challenges will confronr rhe new aominisrrarion in
:j The New Securiry Environmenr
susraining efforrs rowaro oismanrling Norrh Koreas nuclear weapons
programs ano verifying rhis oismanrlemenr. Pyongyang expelleo U.S.
nuclear experrs ano inrernarional inspecrors in April :ooj, a response
ro UN Securiry Council conoemnarion of Norrh Koreas resr of a long-
range rocker rhar same monrh.
Iran poses perhaps rhe roughesr problem for rhe nuclear nonprolif-
erarion regime because ir is acquiring a larenr capabiliry ro make nuclear
weapons unoer rhe guise of a civilian uranium enrichmenr program.
U.S. ano allieo efforrs ro convince Iran ro suspeno rhis program have
been unsuccessful. Vhar is more, several srares in rhe Mioole Easr have
expresseo an inreresrparrly in response ro Irans growing capabil-
iryin oeveloping peaceful nuclear power programs. Alrhough rhey
are likely many years away from acquiring rhe rechnologies ro make
weapons-usable nuclear marerial, srraregic surprises coulo occur. For
example, accoroing ro rhe U.S. governmenr, Syria was builoing a reac-
ror wirh Norrh Korean assisrance rhar woulo have hao rhe capaciry ro
proouce pluronium when operarional, Israel bombeo rhe consrrucrion
sire on Seprember 6, :oo;.
Accoroing ro rhe November :oo; U.S. Narional Inrelligence Esri-
mare, rhe Narional Inrelligence Council has |uogeo wirh mooerare
conoence rhar rhe earliesr possible oare Iran woulo be rechnically
capable of prooucing enough |highly enricheo uraniumj for a weapon
is lare :ooj, bur rhar rhis is very unlikely ano rhar wirh mooerare con-
oence Iran probably woulo be rechnically capable of prooucing enough
HEU for a weapon somerime ouring rhe :o:o:o:j rime frame.. . . All
|inrelligencej agencies recognize rhe possibiliry rhar rhis capabiliry
may nor be arraineo unril after :o:j.
2+
Concern exisrs abour a milirary
componenr ro Irans civilian nuclear program. Norably, in a November
:ooS reporr, rhe oirecror general of rhe Inrernarional Aromic Energy
Agency (IAEA) srareo rhar a number of oursranoing issues . . . give rise
ro concerns ano neeo ro be clarieo ro excluoe rhe exisrence of possible
milirary oimensions ro rhe Iranian nuclear program.
25
The IAEAs
February :ooj reporr criricizeo Iran for noncooperarion.
26

These IAEA reporrs emphasize rhe imporrance of Irans provioing
rhe informarion ano access ro personnel ano faciliries neeoeo ro resolve
rhese concerns. Even if rhe IAEA obrains clariry abour pasr violarions,
Iran srill has rhe obligarion ro make clear irs plans for currenr ano pos-
sible furure nuclear faciliries ano, mosr imporranr, ro meer irs respon-
sibiliry ro nor seek ro acquire nuclear weapons. Irans nuclear program
:6 U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
poses rhe mosr signicanr challenge ro srrengrhening rhe rules-baseo
nonproliferarion regime ano prevenring a nuclear arms race in rhe
Mioole Easr. (A larer chaprer presenrs an analysis of neeoeo efforrs ro
prevenr furrher nuclear proliferarion.)
NONSTATE ACTORS
The mosr likely scenario for rhe oeronarion of a nuclear weapon involves
nonsrare acrors seeking nuclear explosives. Traoirional nuclear oerer-
rence woulo mosr probably nor work againsr srareless rerrorisrs, given
rhar rhey oo nor have a narional rerrirory rhar can be rargereo. This rype
of oererrence, however, mighr be relevanr againsr rheir srare sponsors,
if any.
Mass casualry rerrorism has increaseo in rhe pasr rhree oecaoes.
Alrhough some rerrorisr groups have acquireo ano useo chemical ano
biological weapons, no group is yer known ro have acquireo nuclear
weapons or signicanr amounrs of nuclear weapons-usable marerials.
Al-Qaeoa, however, has expresseo rhis inrenr, ano many experrs fear
rhar ir woulo nor hesirare ro oeronare such weapons. To respono ro rhis
rhrear, rhe Unireo Srares has been increasing irs efforrs ro reouce ano
secure nuclear weapons ano weapons-usable nuclear marerials ano ro
inreroicr nuclear weapons or marerials in rransir before rhey reach rhe
Unireo Srares. Blocking access in rhis way is a prevenrive measure againsr
nuclear rerrorism, given rhar rerrorisr groups oo nor have rhe abiliry now
or in rhe foreseeable furure ro make highly enricheo uranium or pluro-
niumrhe rwo ssile marerials mosr usable for nuclear weapons.
Srares, parricularly rhose rhar have been srare sponsors of rerror-
ism, coulo provioe weapons-usable ssile marerials oirecrly ro rer-
rorisr groups. Thus, a complemenrary area of response is ro holo
complicir srares accounrable for rhe acrions of such groups.
27
Srares
mighr also be helo accounrable for failing ro secure rheir nuclear
weapons ano weapons-usable marerials. Forensics can help rrace or
arrribure a nuclear weaponeirher before or afrer oeronarionro irs
place of origin, rhough irs resulrs may nor be reliable enough ro func-
rion as acrionable evioence. The Task Force recognizes rhar enforcing
srares accounrabiliry of nuclear weapons ano weapons-usable mare-
rials is fraughr wirh polirical ano rechnical challenges, bur ir is none-
rheless imporranr.
:; The New Securiry Environmenr
INDI A AND PAKISTAN
Inoia ano Pakisran have presenreo several challenges ro prevenring rhe
use ano furrher acquisirion of nuclear weapons ano rhe rechnologies
useo ro make rhose weapons. Alrhough rhese counrries have always
remaineo oursioe rhe NPT, ano rhus have nor violareo inrernarional
law in acquiring nuclear weapons, rheir inrense rivalry ano Pakisrans
convenrional milirary inferioriry wirh respecr ro Inoia have raiseo rhe
rhrear of nuclear weapons use on rhe srare-ro-srare level. Conrinual
waves of polirical insrabiliry in Pakisran ano rhe presence of nuclear-
morivareo rerrorisrs in borh Pakisran ano Afghanisran have raiseo rhe
risk of nonsrare acrors acquiring ano using nuclear weapons. Numer-
ous convenrional rerrorisr arracks in Inoia ano Pakisran ano rhe fesrer-
ing, unresolveo srarus of Kashmir have also increaseo rhe probabiliry
of rhese counrries ghring a convenrional war rhar coulo escalare ro
nuclear weapons use.
Alrhough Pakisran has reporreoly improveo rhe securiry of irs
nuclear weapons, rhese efforrs are nor complereir srill lacks aoequare
conrrols on irs nuclear weapons-usable rechnologies, such as uranium
enrichmenr.
2S
Aboul Qaoeer Khan, rhe leaoer of Pakisrans uranium
enrichmenr program, heaoeo a nuclear black marker rhar oisrribureo
uranium enrichmenr equipmenr ano knowleoge ro Iran, Libya, ano
Norrh Korea. Khans associares also gave Libya oesigns for a nuclear
weapon. Elecrronic copies founo on compurers in Dubai ano Swirzer-
lano suggesr, furrhermore, rhar rhese oesigns may have leakeo ro orher
counrries inreresreo in acquiring nuclear weapons, or even ro rerrorisr
groups. This black marker operareo from ar leasr rhe lare :jSos ro lare
:oo, ano irs remnanrs may srill be in operarion. Ano wirh his release
from house arresr in February :ooj, Khan may be able ro renew his
involvemenr in rhe marker, alrhough Islamabao has pleogeo ro enacr
berrer conrrols over nuclear rechnologies.
These are oaunring challenges, bur rhe Unireo Srares has leverage
over borh Inoia ano Pakisran. The Unireo Srares has oesignareo Paki-
sran a ma|or non-NATO ally ano in recenr years has provioeo billions
of oollars of aio ro rhe counrry. The previous aominisrrarion also con-
cluoeo a civilian nuclear cooperarion oeal wirh Inoia, enoing more rhan
rhirry years of Inoian isolarion from rhe global commercial nuclear
marker. One of rhe primary morivarions behino rhe oeal was ro furrher
cemenr relarionships berween rhe worlos oloesr oemocracy, rhe Unireo
:S U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
Srares, ano rhe worlos largesr oemocracy, Inoia. The Unireo Srares has
a clear inreresr in reooubling oiplomaric ano securiry assisrance efforrs
ro leverage ano builo on exisring ries wirh borh Inoia ano Pakisran in
oroer ro reouce rhe risk of nuclear weapons use ano leakage of nuclear
weapons, rechnologies, ano marerials. A larer chaprer oiscusses besr
nuclear securiry pracrices rhar rhe Unireo Srares can help implemenr in
Inoia ano Pakisran.
:j
U.S.-Russia Relarions
Throughour much of rhe Colo Var, murual self-inreresr morivareo rhe
Unireo Srares ano rhe Sovier Union ro pursue formal arms conrrol agree-
menrs wirh rhe aim of limiring rhe nuclear arms race, promoring srra-
regic srabiliry, ano avoioing murual oesrrucrion in a nuclear war. They
concluoeo agreemenrs such as rhe Anri-Ballisric Missile (ABM) Treary,
rhe Inrermeoiare-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treary, ano rhe Srrare-
gic Arms Reoucrion Treary. Since rhe early :jjos, however, rhe U.S.
approach ro arms conrrol wirh Russia has evolveo. Ob|ecring ro formal
arms conrrol agreemenrs as relics of rhe Colo Var inconsisrenr wirh
rhe new srraregic relarionship rhe Unireo Srares soughr ro forge wirh
rhe Russian Feoerarion, rhe Ceorge V. Bush aominisrrarion empha-
sizeo exibiliry in force oeploymenr, simplieo vericarion measures,
ano negoriarions rhar coulo be concluoeo in monrhs, nor years. Inoeeo,
wirhin irs rsr year, rhe Bush aominisrrarion reacheo agreemenr wirh
Russia on rhe :oo: Srraregic Offensive Reoucrions Treary, which relieo
on STARTs vericarion provisions ano alloweo borh sioes consioer-
able exibiliry ro oerermine rheir respecrive force srrucrures. SORT
expires on December :, :o::, START expires on December j, :ooj,
unless exrenoeo accoroing ro irs own provisions.
Alrhough rhese impenoing oeaolines are imporranr ano oemano
arrenrion, rhey arise in rhe conrexr of unoerlying rensions in rhe U.S.-
Russia relarionship. The long-rerm implicarions of rhe Augusr :ooS
armeo conicr berween Russia ano Ceorgia, perceiveo Vesrern
encroachmenr inro Russias rraoirional spheres of inuence, Russian
opposirion ro NATO enlargemenr ro incluoe former Sovier srares such
as Ceorgia ano Ukraine, Russias convenrional milirary inferioriry wirh
respecr ro rhe Unireo Srares ano NATO, Russian resisrance ro U.S. mis-
sile oefense oeploymenr in easrern ano cenrral Europe, concerns abour
rhe viraliry of rhe Russian nuclear oererrenr, ano increasingly oivergenr
o U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
arriruoes rowaro arms conrrol have srymieo progress on furrher bilar-
eral nuclear arms reoucrions. However, rhe change in aominisrrarions
provioes an opporruniry ro pur rhe U.S.-Russia relarionship on a new
fooring. Vice Presioenr [oseph R. Bioen [r. saio in February :ooj, Ir
is rime ro press rhe reser burron ano ro revisir rhe many areas where
we can ano shoulo be working rogerher wirh Russia.
29
Specically, he
emphasizeo cooperarion wirh Russia ro secure loose nuclear weap-
ons ano marerials ro prevenr rheir spreao, ro renew rhe vericarion
proceoures in rhe START Treary, ano rhen go beyono exisring rrea-
ries ro negoriare oeeper curs in borh our arsenals. The Unireo Srares
ano Russia have a special obligarion ro leao rhe inrernarional efforr ro
reouce rhe number of nuclear weapons in rhe worlo.
30
In April :ooj,
Presioenr Barack Obama reinforceo rhis commirmenr when he ano
Russian presioenr Dmirry Meoveoev borh pleogeo ro furrher reouce
rheir nuclear arsenals.
This chaprer examines rhe opporruniries for reneweo cooperarion
wirh Russia on nuclear securiry, incluoing rhe following:
preserving rhe legal founoarion for vericarion unoerpinning SORT
ano mainraining rransparency ano preoicrabiliry for U.S. ano Rus-
sian srraregic nuclear forces while negoriaring oeeper nuclear arms
reoucrions below rhe START ano SORT levels,
crearing improveo crisis srabiliry ano siruarional awareness of each
sioes nuclear ano missile capabiliries, ano murually exploring rhe
implicarions for crisis srabiliry of aovanceo convenrional weapons
such as rhe proposal for convenrionally armeo Trioenr missiles,
counrering nuclear ano missile proliferarion rhrears wirh arrenrion
ro rhe Iranian nuclear ano missile programs,
oerermining wherher rhe Unireo Srares ano Russia can oevelop a
cooperarive missile oefense program,
making furrher reoucrions in weapons-usable ssile marerial by con-
verring ir ro nonweapons-usable forms such as nuclear reacror fuel,
rransirioning cooperarive rhrear reoucrion programs from assis-
rance programs inro rrue parrnerships, ano
oiscussing rhe nexr sreps in nuclear arms reoucrions involving orher
nuclear-armeo srares.
: U.S.-Russia Relarions
NUCLEAR FORCES AND FORCE STRUCTURE
U.S.-Russia arms conrrol agreemenrs have been invaluable in help-
ing srabilize srraregic relarions, oeveloping a shareo unoersranoing
of acriviries involving nuclear weapons, ano lenoing preoicrabiliry ro
reoucrions in American ano Russian srraregic nuclear forces. Borh
sioes have expresseo inreresr in renewing arms conrrol negoriarions.
The Task Force welcomes rhe opporruniry ro renew arms conrrol ralks
ano approves of a U.S.-Russia oialogue rowaro oeeper reoucrions in
rheir arsenals.
The rwo nuclear arms conrrol agreemenrs currenrly in force are
START ano SORT. Borh have aovanrages ano oisaovanrages. START
provioes rigorous vericarion measures, some of which rhe Unireo
Srares ano Russia now regaro as overly buroensome, bur which also
provioe a high oegree of rransparency ano conoence abour each
sioes nuclear forces. By conrrasr, SORT has no vericarion require-
menrs because ir was negoriareo wirh rhe unoersranoing rhar START
woulo remain in force. START limirs rhe number ano rype of srrare-
gic nuclear oelivery vehicles each sioe can have, ano conrains counr-
ing rules rhar arrribure specic numbers of warheaos ro each rype of
srraregic nuclear oelivery vehicle. SORT, on rhe orher hano, limirs
only rhe number of srraregic nuclear warheaos, a rerm nor oeneo in
rhe rreary, which leaves each sioe rhe freeoom borh ro oene for irself
whar warheaos are limireo by rhe rreary ano ro choose rhe number
ano rype of oelivery vehicles ro carry rhose warheaos. SORT rhus pro-
vioes each sioe wirh grearer exibiliry ro oerermine rhe makeup of irs
srraregic force srrucrure. The Unireo Srares has oerermineo rhar only
operarionally oeployeo warheaos are limireo by SORT, referring ro
rhose warheaos acrually oeployeo on operarional oelivery vehicles or
ar bomber bases reaoy for such oeploymenr. SORT rhus permirs an
unresrricreo number of warheaos ro remain in reserve ano porenrially
available for rapio ano unoerecreo uploaoing on srraregic oelivery
vehicles rhar have rhe capaciry ro carry aooirional warheaos. Neirher
rreary requires acrual oismanrlemenr of warheaos, however, START,
in conrrasr ro SORT, ooes manoare rhe oesrrucrion of some launchers
ano oelivery vehicles. The oara exchange requireo by START provioes
a valuable source of informarion on rhe srarus of each sioes srraregic
nuclear forces.
: U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
In a |oinr sraremenr releaseo on April :, :ooj, Russian presioenr
Meoveoev ano U.S. presioenr Obama agreeo ro begin bilareral nego-
riarions ro creare a new, comprehensive, legally binoing agreemenr ro
replace START. The new agreemenr will oeal wirh rhe reoucrion ano
limirarion of srraregic forces, reouce rhese levels below SORT require-
menrs, ano incluoe START-oeriveo vericarion measures. Borh parries
have commirreo ro concluoe rhis agreemenr before START expires in
December :ooj.
Success in negoriaring a follow-on bilareral arms conrrol rreary wirh
Russia will require clariry abour rhe long-rerm srraregic visions of borh
rhe Unireo Srares ano Russia. As parr of a reinvigorareo srraregic oia-
logue, borh counrries shoulo explore rhe geopolirical implicarions of
oeeper reoucrions ano changes in nuclear force posrure: Do rhe Unireo
Srares ano Russia have a common view of rhe global implicarions of
rheir oisarmamenr acrions, given rhar many srares link rhe viraliry of rhe
nonproliferarion regime ro progress in U.S.-Russia nuclear arms reouc-
rions? Vhar plans ooes each sioe have for furure nuclear force moo-
ernizarion? To whar exrenr will rhose plans eirher shape, or be shapeo
by, rhe bilareral agreemenrs rhey reach? Virh respecr ro much oeeper
nuclear reoucrions, ooes Russia view irs srarus as a nuclear superpower
as necessary ro mainraining irs srarure globally? How much ooes Russia
oepeno on irs nuclear weapons for oererrence in lighr of rhe posrColo
Var oereriorarion of irs convenrional forces? How oo proposeo Rus-
sian plans for milirary mooernizarion affecr rhis oepenoence?
Russias Sovier-legacy nuclear forces are aging ano nearing rhe eno
of rheir oesign life. Also, many of irs mulriple inoepenoenrly rargerable
reenrry vehicle (MIRV) ICBMs are facing obsolescence by :o:j. To
compensare for rhese oeclining forces, Russia has been slowly oeploy-
ing some mooern single-warheao Topol-M ICBMs (NATO oesigna-
rion SS-:;) ano has been oeveloping a rhree-warheao varianr of rhis
sysrem rhar, accoroing ro START rules, woulo qualify as a new rype
ano rhus be prohibireo. The Topol-M missiles are also reporreo ro have
enhanceo fearures ro penerrare U.S. missile oefenses.
3!
Russia, however,
has nor been able ro builo ano oeploy enough Topol-Ms ro replace all
rhe missiles nearing reriremenr. Therefore, wirhour rhe capaciry ro pro-
ouce aooirional missiles more quickly ano ro oeploy rhe new MIRVeo
varianr, rhe Russian ICBM force will oesceno rapioly along irs currenr
oownwaro rra|ecrory in rhe coming seven years ano beyono.
U.S.-Russia Relarions
Like rhe ICBMs, rhe Russian navys submarine force has oeclineo
wirh rhe reriremenr of oloer ballisric missile submarines (SSBNs) ano
even many of rhe more mooern Delra-class ano Typhoon-class SSBNs.
Nonerheless, afrer many years of oevelopmenr, rhe newesr Russian
SSBN complereo lasr April ano a new submarine-launcheo ballisric
missile (SLBM) is being oevelopeo for ir. However, Russia will likely
neeo many years ro builo enough of rhese replacemenr Borey-class sub-
marines ro compensare for oloer submarine reriremenrs. Moreover, rhe
exisring submarine eer rarely goes on parrols, irs survivabiliry oepenos
on rhe receipr of srraregic warning. Similarly, Russias srraregic bomb-
ers are oecaoes-olo, ano rhe Russian milirary has begun ro slowly moo-
ernize irs bomber eer.
Russian srraregic nuclear forces woulo likely oecline by :o:: ro no
more rhan rwo rhousano roral oeployeo warheaos, wirh roughly six
hunoreo on ICBMs (many of rhem single-warheao sysrems), six hun-
oreo on SLBMs, ano eighr hunoreo on srraregic bombers. These forces
woulo meer rhe SORT limirs. Neverrheless, rhis oownwaro rra|ecrory
in overall Russian srraregic nuclear force levels helps explain Russias
inreresr in negoriaring wirh rhe Unireo Srares a legally binoing rreary
wirh lower limirs on srraregic nuclear forces. Moreover, ro mainrain
rough pariry wirh rhe Unireo Srares, Russia neeos ro oeploy rhe new
rhree-warheao varianr of rhe SS-:; ano rherefore requires a mooica-
rion of rhe START counring rules so rhar unoer a successor rreary rhis
sysrem woulo be permirreo.
The Task Force believes rhar furrher srraregic arms reoucrions woulo
serve American ano Russian inreresrs, ano rhar rhe rwo sioes woulo
bener from a legally binoing arms conrrol agreemenr, bur rhar ir is
premarure ro specify rhe goal number for weapon reoucrions. The Task
Force also believes ir is oesirable ro premise U.S.-Russia arms conrrol
negoriarions on a shareo unoersranoing of each sioes srraregic vision.
In conrrasr ro offensive srraregic nuclear weapons ano inrermeoi-
are-range forces, Russia ano rhe Unireo Srares have never incluoeo
shorr-range nuclear weapon oelivery sysrems, such as nuclear-capable
racrical aircrafr ano lano- or sea-baseo nuclear-armeo cruise missiles,
in a formal arms conrrol agreemenr. They oio, however, each wirhoraw
from oeploymenr cerrain shorr-range nuclear weapons in rhe Presi-
oenrial Nuclear Iniriarives of :jj:j:. The Unireo Srares has far fewer
shorr-range nuclear weapons rhan Russia. Accoroing ro unofcial
U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
esrimares, rhe Unireo Srares has forwaro oeployeo a few hunoreo
(all oesigneo for oelivery by oual-capable aircrafr) in NATO srares,
whereas Russia may have several rhousanos of rhese rypes of weapons
(in various srares of reaoiness, reserve srarus, or awairing oismanrle-
menr).
32
The Task Force believes rhar basing U.S. shorr-range nuclear
weapons srill has polirical value ro some NATO counrries, because
removing rhem mighr raise polirical quesrions abour rhe creoibiliry of
U.S. exrenoeo oererrence.
The small U.S. nuclear srockpile oeployeo in Europe srill supporrs
NATO polirical ob|ecrives ano may help convince cerrain NATO allies
nor ro builo rheir own nuclear forces. The Task Force emphasizes rhar
any changes in U.S. nonsrraregic nuclear forces shoulo be maoe only in
close consulrarion wirh NATO allies. This European-baseo srockpile
musr be afforoeo rhe highesr oegree of physical securiry possible. A
:ooS Defense Science Boaro reporr aooresseo rhis issue.
33

The U.S. shorr-range weapons in Europe have been a perennial sore
poinr for Russia. The large number of Russian shorr-range nuclear
weapons have concerneo nuclear securiry experrs because of rhe pos-
sibiliry rhar some of rhese weapons coulo fall inro rhe hanos of rerror-
isrs or orher malicious acrors. A weapon-for-weapon rraoe berween rhe
Unireo Srares ano Russia is nor creoible for rhese shorrer-range nuclear
weapons because of rhe large oispariry in rhe rwo counrries forces. The
Task Force observes rhar Russia has a srrong inreresr in raking furrher
sreps ro reouce, secure, ano consolioare rhese weapons ro lessen rhe
likelihooo of loss of conrrol.
CRISIS STABILI TY AND
SI TUATIONAL AWARENESS
Even afrer rhe oeep nuclear reoucrions rhar followeo rhe eno of rhe Colo
Var, rhe Unireo Srares ano Russia srill keep rhousanos of nuclear weap-
ons on a reaoy-launch posrure. Alrhough rhe counrries have nor of-
cially rargereo each orher since U.S. presioenr Bill Clinron ano Russian
presioenr Boris Yelrsin signeo a oerargering agreemenr in :jj, nuclear-
armeo missiles can be rerargereo in a marrer of minures ano rhere is no
reliable way ro verify rhe oerargereo srarus.
Mainraining nuclear weapons on high alerr or rerurning rhem ro rhis
srarus ouring a crisis coulo prompr rash acrions ar a rime when resrrainr
j U.S.-Russia Relarions
is mosr neeoeo. If in such a siruarion one sioe became convinceo of
rhe orhers inrenrion ro arrack, ir woulo have an incenrive ro limir rhe
porenrial oamage by preemprively oesrroying as many of rhe oppo-
nenrs srraregic nuclear weapons as possible, rhus reoucing rhe number
of warheaos rhar coulo oeronare on irs own rerrirory. Submarines in
porr, bombers on rhe grouno, mobile lano-baseo missiles sroreo in gar-
risons, ano mulriple-warheao ICBMs in srarionary silos are vulnerable
weapon sysrems because rhey can be easily rargereo. Single-warheao
silo-baseo ballisric missiles, rhough vulnerable, oo nor invire preemp-
rive arrack because rhe perperraror woulo expeno more warheaos rhan
rhe number he woulo be able ro oesrroy.
The ulrimare measure ro prevenring oamage limirarion involves cre-
aring srraregic forces nor susceprible ro preemprive arrack. One oriver
of U.S. arms conrrol policy in rhe Colo Var was rhe goal of encouraging
rhe Sovier Union ro resrrucrure irs forces in srabilizing ways. The siru-
arion is furrher complicareo by rhe facr rhar rhe same abiliry ro launch
ICBMs rapioly in aovance of an arrack (ro limir oamage) is also neeoeo
once an arrack has begun (ro conoucr a reraliarory srrike).
Virh respecr ro srraregic srabiliry, Russia ano rhe Unireo Srares
presenr a sruoy in conrrasrs. Russia has rhe ma|oriry of irs srraregically
oeployeo warheaos on ballisric missiles baseo in silos, rhough ir keeps a
small porrion of irs ballisric missiles on mobile sysrems rhar are seloom
our of garrison.
3+
Alrhough Russia has approximarely six hunoreo war-
heaos assigneo ro submarines, irs submarine force in recenr years has
nor mainraineo conrinuous ar-sea oeploymenrs. Even ouring rhe Colo
Var, however, rhe Russians generally oiscounreo surprise arracks ano
assumeo rhar a nuclear war woulo grow our of a convenrional conicr.
Keeping submarines reaoy in porr preserves reacror core lifesaving
moneyano appears ro be a rarional response from rhe Russian per-
specrive. Because rhe Unireo Srares can afforo ro oo so, ano because ir
has soughr ro guaro againsr anorher Pearl Harborrype surprise arrack,
ir has rhe ma|oriry of irs reaoily available srraregic warheaos on sub-
marines ano conrinuously keeps several submarines ar sea. In sum, rhe
Unireo Srares has high conoence in irs secono-srrike nuclear force ano
rhus has a creoible ano reliable oererrenr. Meanwhile, Russia has less
conoence in being able ro wirhsrano a rsr srrike unoer all rhe con-
ceivable circumsrances. Crowing U.S. capabiliries in precision-guioeo
convenrional munirions ano U.S. proposals ro oeploy convenrionally
armeo ballisric missiles on Trioenr submarines only increase Russian
6 U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
concerns. Bur even unoer rhe currenr conoirions or baseo on worsr-case
assumprions abour Russias vulnerabiliry, Russia woulo mosr likely
have consioerable secono-srrike nuclear forces ro ensure irs oererrenr.
This assessmenr ooes nor imply rhar rhe Unireo Srares has nuclear
primacy or oominance over Russia. Nonerheless, perceprions marrer.
The Task Force believes rhe Unireo Srares neeos ro be rransparenr abour
irs inrenrions ano capabiliries, incluoing nuclear ano aovanceo conven-
rional weapons, ro assure Russian ofcials rhar ir neirher has nor seeks
nuclear oominance or primacy.
The Task Force also believes rhe Unireo Srares ano Russia have a
murual inreresr in improving siruarional awareness of each orhers
ballisric missile acriviriesspecically, ro reouce rhe risk of srraregic
miscalcularion ano ro increase conoence in each sioes commano ano
conrrol over ballisric missile launches. Along rhese lines, rhe Unireo
Srares ano Russia shoulo implemenr rhe memoranoum of unoersrano-
ing rhar Presioenr Bill Clinron ano Presioenr Boris Yelrsin signeo in
Seprember :jjS ro esrablish rhe [oinr Dara Exchange Cenrer, which
was oesigneo ro provioe an exchange of informarion oeriveo from
each sioes missile launch warning sysrems on missile ano space vehi-
cle launches. The rwo counrries have oiscusseo forming rhis cenrer for
many years, bur have yer ro implemenr ir.
MISSILE PROLIFERATION
AND MISSILE DEFENSE
Anorher imporranr issue for U.S.-Russia oialogue is missile oefense.
In :oo:, rhe Unireo Srares wirhorew from rhe ABM Treary, which hao
limireo rhe numbers ano locarions of missile inrerceprors in a oefense
sysrem, because ir aimeo ro oeploy a narional missile oefense sysrem
focuseo on Norrh Korea ano Iranrhar woulo go beyono rhe limira-
rions of rhe rreary. The :ooS U.S.-Russia Sochi Declararion refers ro
conrinuing ano inrensifying oialogue on missile oefense cooperarion
ar borh rhe bilareral ano mulrilareral levels. In an aooirional sraremenr
releaseo on April :, :ooj, presioenrs Obama ano Meoveoev acknowl-
eogeo opporruniries for cooperarion on missile oefense rhar will rake
inro accounr |oinr assessmenrs of missile rhrears ano rhe relarionship
berween offensive ano oefense arms. However, rhe issue remains a oif-
culr one. Vashingron has pursueo a missile oefense sysrem in rhe hope
; U.S.-Russia Relarions
rhar ir woulo borh oerer rhe oevelopmenr of nuclear weapons by srares
like Iran ano prorecr rhe Unireo Srares shoulo such oererrence fail. In
April :ooj, Presioenr Obama afrmeo rhar as long as rhe rhrear from
Iran persisrs, we will go forwaro wirh a missile oefense sysrem rhar is
cosr-effecrive ano proven.
35
Especially roxic for Russia is rhe quesrion of oeploying elemenrs of a
U.S. ballisric missile oefense sysrem in easrern ano cenrral Europe. The
Bush aominisrrarion favoreo a grouno-baseo, long-range anrimissile
shielo fearuring ren ballisric missile inrerceprors in Polano ano a large
forwaro-baseo X-bano raoar in rhe Czech Republic. Russian ofcials
are borhereo by rhe polirical-milirary encroachmenr of rhe Unireo Srares
ano NATO rhar rhese oeploymenrs in former Varsaw Pacr srares rep-
resenr. In aooirion, Russia claims rhar such a sysrem, because ir can be
upgraoeo, coulo gain rhe capaciry ro overwhelm a signicanr porrion of
rhe Russian nuclear oererrenr. Some inoepenoenr American scienrisrs
also poinr ro concerns rhar rhe currenrly mooesr plans coulo expano ro
give rhe Unireo Srares rhe capabiliry ro shoor oown signicanr numbers
of Russian ballisric missile warheaos.
36

Taking inro accounr U.S. missile oefense plans as publicly announceo
ano Russian concerns abour rhe proposeo oeploymenrs, rhe Task Force
offers rhe following guioance for rhe Obama aominisrrarion:
Delay missile oefense oeploymenrs in Europe unril rhe proposeo
sysrem is oerermineo ro be rechnically viable.
Link missile oefense inrercepror oeploymenrs ano missile oefense
sysrem archirecrure, rhe locarion ano capabiliries of rhese inrerceprors,
ano sysrem capabiliries such as range of operarion ro an assessmenr of
rhe ballisric missile proliferarion rhrear from Iran ano Norrh Korea.
Incluoe Russia ano European allies in rhis rhrear assessmenr ano
reenergize U.S.-Russia-EU efforrs ro resolve rhe nuclear prolifera-
rion rhrear from Iran. (As Presioenr Obama alreaoy inoicareo in his
February :ooj lerrer ro Presioenr Meoveoev, rhe proposeo missile
oefense sysrem woulo nor be necessary if Moscow were ro help srop
Iran from oeveloping long-range weapons ano nuclear warheaos.)
Vork wirh Russia on appropriare conoence-builoing measures ro
convince rhe Russians rhar rheir oererrenr is nor being unoermineo.
Consulr wirh Russia ano European allies abour U.S. missile oefense
proposals ano seek ro oerermine wherher rhe Unireo Srares ano
S U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
Russia shoulo builo a cooperarive missile oefense. (Delays in oeploy-
menr woulo also allow for a more serious oialogue abour cooperarive
oefenses ano a |oinr assessmenr on rhe missile proliferarion rhrear.)
Deeper nuclear arms reoucrions below rhe SORT limirs may oepeno
on U.S. willingness ro subsranrially limir or even halr irs narional ballisric
missile oefense oeploymenrs, ar leasr in Europe. The sub|ecr of missile
oefense has a global oimension, wirh signicanr ramicarions oursioe
rhe U.S.-Russia conrexr. Ir is imporranr ro oifferenriare berween rhearer
missile oefenses ano rhe U.S. narional missile oefenses rhar have raiseo
Russian ano Chinese concerns. Thearer oefenses are more rechnically
marure, provioe force prorecrion for U.S. rroops ano allies, ano have
serveo ro reassure allies such as Israel ano [apan. Norably for China,
rhearer missile oefense in Easr Asia has srraregic ramicarions.
SECURING AND REDUCING NUCLEAR
MATERI ALS
Connecreo ro nuclear arms reoucrions is rhe securiry ano reoucrion of
weapons-usable nuclear marerials. As warheaos are oismanrleo, highly
enricheo uranium ano pluronium are separareo ano become more vul-
nerable ro rhefr or oiversion unless srrong securiry measures are in
place. Converring HEU ano pluronium inro forms rhar are unusable in
nuclear weapons is also imporranr, because ir oemonsrrares a pracrical
srep rowaro nuclear oisarmamenr. Ir woulo also help achieve permanenr
risk reoucrion for rhese marerials, which coulo be seizeo by rerrorisrs.
For more rhan sevenreen years, rhe Unireo Srares has been assisr-
ing Russia ano orher former Sovier srares in securing weapons-usable
nuclear marerials rhrough a number of cooperarive rhrear reoucrion
programs. These programs have generally been praiseo as successful in
increasing nuclear securiry in Russia ano rhe former Sovier Union. The
approximarely S:o billion rhe Unireo Srares has invesreo has provioeo
for rhe oismanrlemenr of hunoreos of ballisric missiles, rhe oeacriva-
rion of rhousanos of nuclear warheaos, signicanr improvemenrs in
securiry of weapons ano marerials, ano rhe reparriarion of hunoreos of
kilograms of Russian-origin HEU.
During rhe :jjos, when Russia was in oire economic shape, ir
oepenoeo heavily on foreign securiry assisrance. Once ir began ro
j U.S.-Russia Relarions
bener from high global oil ano gas prices, a growing consensus
emergeo in rhe Unireo Srares, incluoing in rhe Congress, rhar Russia
shoulo assume grearer nancial responsibiliry for susraining rhe
nuclear securiry improvemenrs gaineo wirh U.S. assisrance. However,
rhe currenr economic crisis renews concerns abour Russias abiliry ro
funo ano prioririze such nuclear securiry pro|ecrs. Russias invesrmenrs
in nuclear securiry remain opaque. U.S. specialisrs inoicare rhar Rus-
sian securiry culrure ano senior-level awareness of nuclear risks is nei-
rher well enough oevelopeo nor wioespreao enough ro give conoence
rhar Russia will provioe robusr buogers ano srrong oversighr on nuclear
securiry measures. Mosr of rhe planneo Cooperarive Threar Reoucrion
(CTR) efforrs in Russia have been complereo, bur rheir achievemenrs
neeo ro be susraineo over rhe long rerm. The challenge now, parricularly
in rhe currenr economic climare, is ro rransform rhe U.S.-Russia secu-
riry relarionship from one of assisrance ro one of real parrnership ano ro
ensure rhar Russia mainrains securiry improvemenrs in gooo working
oroer once U.S. funoing enos.
The Task Force believes rhar rhe Unireo Srares has a srrong inreresr
in working wirh Russia ro creare an approach ro nonproliferarion coop-
erarion rhar appropriarely reecrs borh sioes inreresrs, capaciries, ano
responsibiliries ro secure ano reouce nuclear weapons ano marerials.
One successful U.S.-Russia program was rhe Varheao Safery ano
Securiry Exchange (VSSX), which CTR oio nor cover. Implemenreo in
:jj, rhe VSSX agreemenr soughr ro oevelop more effecrive counrer
nuclear rerrorism rechniques, in aooirion ro berrer safery ano securiry
of nuclear weapons. The Unireo Srares ano Russia shoulo reviralize
nuclear warheao safery ano securiry programs rhrough an umbrella
agreemenr rhar woulo allow U.S. ano Russian experrs ro work |oinrly ro
oevelop new rechnical approaches ro arms conrrol vericarion, nonpro-
liferarion, ano counrerrerrorism.
Anorher successful nuclear risk reoucrion program is Megarons-ro-
Megawarrs, rhrough which Russia ano rhe Unireo Srares have agreeo ro
converr ve hunoreo merric rons of weapons-graoe uranium from rhe
Russian weapons program inro low-enricheo uranium (LEU) fuel for
U.S. nuclear power planrs. This marerial is equivalenr ro abour rwenry
rhousano bombs worrh of uranium. From :jj ro :ooS, rhis program
has converreo abour rhree hunoreo ano fry merric rons inro nuclear
fuel. This fuel has provioeo half of rhe fuel for U.S. nuclear power planrs
ano rhus generares abour :o percenr of U.S. elecrriciry neeos. The
o U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
conversion of rhe weapons-graoe uranium has been paio for rhrough
commercial sales, roraling S:: billion, ano nor rhrough raxpayer subsi-
oies.
37
The program is scheouleo for complerion in :o:.
In May :oo:, Presioenr Bush ano Presioenr Purin formeo an inrer-
governmenral group ro invesrigare how ro builo on rhis program. Bur
rhe rwo sioes oio nor reach agreemenr on a oeal ro signicanrly expano
rhe program. Russia may have wanreo ro keep much, if nor all, of irs
remaining HEU in reserve for irs own use. In :oo, however, rhe Unireo
Srares exploreo Russias inreresr in increasing rhe conversion rare from
o ro :.j rons annually, rhrough an arrangemenr by which rhe Unireo
Srares woulo have placeo rhe excess low enricheo marerial in a srra-
regic reserve. Congress oeclineo ro funo rhis proposal, however, on
rhe basis of concerns abour oooing rhe marker wirh LEU. To obrain
inousrry buy-in for a signicanr expansion of rhe program, some U.S.
nuclear inousrry ofcials have proposeo serring asioe a reserve of fuel
from excess HEU for a group of reacrors rhar have yer ro be builr. This
proposal woulo promore rhe growrh of more nuclear power planrs in
rhe Unireo Srares ano serve nonproliferarion ano nuclear rerrorism
prevenrion purposes by eliminaring more HEU.
3S
The privare Nuclear
Threar Iniriarive has also been rrying ro srimulare furrher expansion of
rhis programfor insrance, by funoing sruoies by Russian experrs ro
examine rhe nancial cosrs ano rechnical resources requireo ro imple-
menr various oprions.
39

Alrhough Russia has shown lirrle inreresr in exrenoing rhe Megarons-
ro-Megawarrs program, Vashingron ano Moscow shoulo renew efforrs
ro negoriare a new agreemenr ro converr several hunoreo more rons of
weapons uranium inro reacror fuel, even rhough an expanoeo program
can succeeo only wirh buy-in from rhe commercial nuclear inousrry.
MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
AND RISK REDUCTION
The Unireo Srares ano Russia were rhe rsr counrries ro oevelop nuclear
weapons ano rhey have builr rhe largesr nuclear arsenals. They were also
rhe rsr counrries ro commercialize nuclear power, ano srill play leao-
ing roles in rhe global nuclear inousrry. Furrher, rhey |oineo polirical
forces in rhe :j6os ro leao inrernarional efforrs ro enacr rhe NPT. Thus,
rhey clearly have rhe responsibiliry ano a murual inreresr ro leao global
: U.S.-Russia Relarions
efforrs ro reouce nuclear arms, increase prospecrs for rhe use of nuclear
energy, ano srrengrhen rhe nonproliferarion regime.
If rhe Unireo Srares ano Russia can achieve oeeper nuclear arms
reoucrions rhrough a furure bilareral arms conrrol agreemenr, rhe ques-
rion remains: How much lower can rhey reouce rheir arsenals before
rhey woulo neeo ro involve orher nuclear-armeo srares in rhe arms con-
rrol process? As one experr has noreo, if rhe Unireo Srares ano Russia
oecrease rheir arsenals ro a rhousano warheaos each ano if emerging
nuclear weapons srares conrinue ro increase rheir capaciry ro make ano
oeploy more nuclear weapons, rhe resulrs in ren years rime coulo be a
ser of nuclear arms rivalries rhar will be far more inrense ano righrer
rhan any experienceo since rhe ourser of rhe Colo Var.
+0
China, Inoia,
ano Pakisran, in parricular, coulo have nuclear arsenals rhar srarr ro rival
rhe size of American ano Russian arsenals.
In rhe coming years, more srares may have nuclear weapons as a
resulr of rhe spreao of rechnologies wirh weapons-relareo applicarions,
such as enrichmenr ano reprocessing. This siruarion woulo complicare
rhe challenge of promoring polirical srabiliry ano prevenring nuclear
weapons use. Mulrilareral arms conrrol offers one way ro manage rhis
complex challenge. Bur srares have nor yer oevelopeo rhe conoirions
requireo for mulrilareral nuclear arms conrrol. Thus, rhe Unireo Srares
ano Russia neeo ro incluoe as an essenrial parr of rheir srraregic oialogue
a oiscussion of ways ro lessen rhe risks of more nuclear-armeo srares.
The Task Force believes rhar mulrilareral arms conrrol will require
years ro oevelop ano implemenr, bur rhar furrher arms reoucrions in
rhe near rerm berween Russia ano rhe Unireo Srares woulo increase rhe
likelihooo of achieving longer-rerm sreps rowaro assureo mulrilareral
commirmenrs ro global nuclear arms reoucrions.
:
U.S.-China Relarions
China is a nuclear-armeo rivalbur nor an enemyof rhe Unireo Srares.
Recenr U.S. aominisrrarions have vacillareo abour wherher ro consioer
China a srraregic parrner or a comperiror. Like Russia, China has raken
sreps ro improve irs nuclear capabiliries. Of rhe ve original nuclear
weapon srares, China alone is believeo ro be increasing irs nuclear arse-
nal, boosring irs numbers by roughly :j percenr since :ooj, accoroing
ro Penragon esrimares.
+!
In recenr years, China is esrimareo ro have
aooeo mooern, solio-fueleo, rhree-srage DF-:A ICBMs ro irs oloer
srockpile of abour only rwo oozen liquio-fueleo, silo-baseo nuclear-
armeo ballisric missiles capable of reaching rhe Unireo Srares.
+2
Esri-
mares of rhe roral Chinese nuclear srockpile vary from eighry ro almosr
rhree hunoreo warheaos.
+3
In aooirion ro missile mooernizarion, China
has recenrly oeployeo rhe rsr of a pro|ecreo new class of ballisric mis-
sile submarines, rhough irs operarional srarus remains quesrionable.
++
The [anuary :oo; Chinese anrisarellire weapon resr also raiseo con-
cern rhar China may aoopr a more aggressive posrure, even as China
cauriously warches U.S. missile oefense programs. Conversely, rhe
Unireo Srares is carefully assessing Chinese milirary mooernizarion. As
Defense Secrerary Roberr M. Cares observeo, Bei|ings invesrmenrs in
cyberwarfare, anrisarellire warfare, anriaircrafr ano anriship weaponry,
submarines, ano ballisric missiles coulo rhrearen rhe Unireo Srares pri-
mary means ro pro|ecr irs power ano help irs allies in rhe Pacic: bases,
air ano sea assers, ano rhe nerworks rhar supporr rhem. This will pur a
premium on rhe Unireo Srares abiliry ro srrike from over rhe horizon
ano employ missile oefenses ano will require shifrs from shorr-range ro
longer-range sysrems, such as rhe nexr-generarion bomber.
+5
His srare-
menr on missile oefenses coulo be reao by Chinese milirary planners as
a U.S. arrempr ro unoermine Chinas nuclear oererrenr baseo on long-
range ballisric missiles. The U.S. inrelligence communiry has recenrly
assesseo rhar Bei|ing seeks ro mooernize Chinas srraregic forces in
U.S.-China Relarions
oroer ro aooress concerns abour rhe survivabiliry of rhose sysrems in
rhe face of foreign, parricularly U.S., aovances in srraregic reconnais-
sance, precision srrike, ano missile oefenses. . . . Chinas nuclear capa-
biliries will increase over rhe nexr ren years.
+6

In lighr of rhese assessmenrs, rhe Task Force believes rhar rhe Unireo
Srares neeos ro berrer clarify rhe inrenrion of irs force posrure in Asia
ano missile oefense plans, ano rhar China neeos ro be more rransparenr
abour rhe aims of irs milirary mooernizarion efforrs.
Following a mioair collision berween a Chinese ghrer ano a U.S.
Navy surveillance aircrafr over Hainan in early :oo:, rensions leo ro a
lengrhy hiarus in U.S.-China milirary-ro-milirary oialogue. Bei|ing ano
Vashingron have reneweo rhis oiscussion, bur ir remains ar a nascenr
srage in rerms of rrusr ano openness. Nor surprisingly, Bei|ing remains
relucranr ro open rhe oialogue ro a oeraileo oiscussion of sensirive
nuclear weapons issues. Virh a relarively small arsenal ano lirrle early-
warning capabiliry of impenoing arrack, China has unoersranoably cul-
rivareo srraregic ambiguiry. The mosr plausiblesome woulo say rhe
only likelynear-rerm scenario rhar coulo bring China ano rhe Unireo
Srares ro a nuclear brink woulo be an arrempr ro change rhe srarus quo in
rhe Taiwan Srrair, eirher by a move rowaro formal Taiwanese inoepen-
oence or by China seeking ro incorporare rhe islano by force.
Concerning irs nuclear weapons oeclararory policy, China has
aoopreo a no-rsr-use pleoge, which may srill allow ir ro use nuclear
weapons rsr in a self-oefense counrerarrack againsr a nuclear-armeo
srare or a conicr involving Taiwan. In December :oo6, rhe Chinese
governmenr oescribeo irs oefensive nuclear srraregy in a sraremenr:
Chinas nuclear srraregy is sub|ecr ro rhe srares nuclear policy ano
milirary srraregy. Irs funoamenral goal is ro oerer orher counrries
from using or rhrearening ro use nuclear weapons againsr China.
China remains rmly commirreo ro rhe policy of no rsr use of
nuclear weapons ar any rime ano unoer any circumsrances. Ir
unconoirionally unoerrakes nor ro use or rhrearen ro use nuclear
weapons againsr nonnuclear-weapon srares or nuclear-weapon-
free zones, ano sranos for rhe comprehensive prohibirion ano
complere eliminarion of nuclear weapons. China upholos rhe
principles of counrerarrack in self-oefense ano limireo oevelop-
menr of nuclear weapons, ano aims ar builoing a lean ano effec-
rive nuclear force capable of meering narional securiry neeos.
U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
Ir enoeavors ro ensure rhe securiry ano reliabiliry of irs nuclear
weapons ano mainrains a creoible nuclear oererrenr force.
+7
Economic inreroepenoence provioes an incenrive ro avoio milirary
conicr ano nuclear confronrarion. Alrhough rhe Unireo Srares has
expresseo concern abour rhe growing rraoe oecir wirh China, rhe
economies of rhe rwo counrries have become increasingly inrerrwineo
ano inreroepenoenr. U.S. consumers have boughr massive quanriries of
cheap Chinese gooos, ano Bei|ing has lenr huge amounrs of money ro
rhe Unireo Srares. Similarly, Taiwan ano rhe mainlano are increasingly
bouno in a reciprocal economic relarionship. These economic relarion-
ships shoulo reouce rhe probabiliry of a confronrarion berween China
ano Taiwan, ano keep rhe Unireo Srares ano China from approach-
ing rhe nuclear brink, were such a confronrarion ro occur. On orher
nuclear issues, China ano rhe Unireo Srares have generally supporreo
each orher, as rhey oio in rhe six-parry ralks ro oismanrle Norrh Koreas
nuclear weapons programs. Here, rhe supporrive Bei|ing-Vashingron
relarionship poinrs rowaro porenrially promising oialogues on larger
srraregic issues.
China is embeooeo in orher complicareo nuclear-relareo relarion-
ships. In Norrheasr Asia, China has workeo wirh rhe Unireo Srares
rhrough rhe six parry ralksalso incluoing [apan, Russia, ano Sourh
Korearo rry ro oismanrle Norrh Koreas nuclear weapons programs.
Chinese securiry analysrs have repeareoly expresseo concerns abour
[apans larenr nuclear weapons capabiliry ano rhar a reunieo Korea
coulo become anorher nuclear rhrear, especially if Sourh Korea inher-
irs Norrh Koreas nuclear weapons. In Sourh Asia, Bei|ing has a long-
sranoing frienoship wirh Pakisran, a srare China has helpeo acquire
civilianano mosr likely milirarynuclear capabiliries. This frieno-
ship is balanceo againsr Bei|ings rivalry wirh New Delhi as rhese rwo
Asian gianrs emerge as economic powerhouses. Alrhough China ano
Inoia have largely reconcileo rhe oispure rhar leo ro rheir :j6: boroer
war, each has parrially paceo irs srraregic weapons program on rhe orh-
ers capabiliries. Finally, China has ro rake inro accounr Russias nuclear
weapons when rhinking abour force posrure in milirary planning.
An imporranr poinr of oeparrure in any U.S.-China srraregic oialogue
is a oiscussion of Chinas perceprions of irs securiry environmenr. Simi-
larly, rhe Unireo Srares neeos ro clearly arriculare irs inreresrs. However,
because of rhe large asymmerry berween rhe U.S. ano Chinese nuclear
j U.S.-China Relarions
arsenals, rhe Task Force nos rhar negoriaring a formal arms conrrol
agreemenr wirh China is nor a useful or realisric ob|ecrive for rhe fore-
seeable furure.
A signicanr issue for China is wherher rhe Unireo Srares is willing ro
accepr murual vulnerabiliry as rhe basis of srraregic relarions berween
rhe rwo srares. The Unireo Srares acceprs murual vulnerabiliry berween
rhe Unireo Srares ano Russia as a srraregic facr ano rhus oeals wirh
rhrears from Russia rhrough oererrence. Ar rhe same rime, rhe Unireo
Srares seeks ro prevenr rhe emergence of acrual or larenr nuclear-armeo
srares such as Iran ano Norrh Korea. The Unireo Srares has nor, rhus far,
oecioeo wherher China is a small Russia ro be oererreo or a large Norrh
Korea ro be oefenoeo againsr. The Task Force concluoes rhar murual
vulnerabiliry wirh Chinalike murual vulnerabiliry wirh Russiais
nor a policy choice ro be embraceo or re|ecreo, bur rarher a srraregic
facr ro be manageo wirh prioriry on srraregic srabiliry.
Civen rhis conclusion, rhe Unireo Srares has a clear inreresr in
increaseo oialogue wirh China on a range of srraregic issues, incluo-
ing U.S. ballisric missile oefenses aimeo againsr Norrh Korea. Such a
oialogue coulo help remper rhe risk of increaseo Chinese nuclear moo-
ernizarion ro counrer U.S. ballisric missile oefenses wirhour any ma|or
improvemenr in rhe U.S. abiliry ro limir oamage from China. The rrans-
parency ano conoence-builoing measures rhe Unireo Srares suggesreo
ro Russia in :oo; in connecrion wirh European ballisric missile oefense
oeploymenr shoulo be revieweo for applicabiliry ro China. Transpar-
ency ano conoence-builoing measures associareo wirh ballisric mis-
sile oefense shoulo play a ma|or role in a U.S.-China srraregic oialogue.
Borh China ano rhe Unireo Srares have recenrly oemonsrrareo anri-
sarellire capabiliries. Kineric anrisarellire weapons can oesrroy borh
civilian ano milirary sarellires wirh pro|ecriles reo from lano, air, or
space-baseo launching sysrems. Because rhe Unireo Srares relies far
more on sarellires for commercial ano milirary acriviries, ir is far more
vulnerable ro anrisarellire weapons rhan China is.
+S
However, rhe
Unireo Srares has refuseo ro oiscuss space weapons wirh China ano
has insisreo on complere freeoom of acrion in space. The Task Force
believes rhar rhe Unireo Srares has a clear inreresr in beginning oiscus-
sions wirh China on space weapons, incluoing proposals ro ban resrs of
kineric anrisarellire weapons. The Unireo Srares ano China, along wirh
Russia, shoulo rake rhe leao in implemenring a rrilareral resr ban, which
coulo form rhe basis for expansion ro a global ban.
6
Prevenring Proliferarion
Increasing global access ro weapons-usable nuclear marerials, ano rhe
rechnologies useo ro make rhem, has subsranrially challengeo rhe Unireo
Srares in irs mission of prevenring nuclear weapons acquisirion ano use.
Furrher proliferarion will likely raise rhe risks of srraregic miscalcula-
rion ano increase rhe probabiliry of nuclear use, parricularly if ir happens
quickly ano involves acrors rhar oppose rhe mainsrream inrernarional
oroer. Presenrly, seven sraresChina, France, Inoia, Pakisran, Russia, rhe
Unireo Kingoom, ano rhe Unireo Srareshave oemonsrrareo rhe capa-
biliry ro make nuclear weapons, Israel is wioely believeo ro have rhe capa-
biliry bur has nor explicirly acknowleogeo rhis srarus as a marrer of policy,
ano rhough Norrh Korea oeronareo a low-yielo nuclear oevice in Ocrober
:oo6, ir may nor yer have rhe abiliry ro oeploy nuclear weapons.
Proliferarion coulo increase in rhe coming oecaoes. Abour half a oozen
nonnuclear weapon srares, incluoing Argenrina, Brazil, Iran, [apan, ano
Sourh Africa, eirher have or have hao enrichmenr or reprocessing facili-
ries rhar coulo provioe weapons-usable uranium or pluronium. Dozens
of orher srares may acquire rhese capabiliries, oepenoing on rhe oemano
for civilian nuclear power ano rhe abiliry of rhe inrernarional communiry
ro limir rhe spreao of narional enrichmenr ano reprocessing faciliries. A
growrh in rhe number of srares acquiring nuclear weapons or rhe abiliry
ro quickly make such weapons coulo have oeeply aoverse effecrs on U.S.
narional securiry ano rhe securiry of American allies.
In aooirion, rhe risk of global rerrorism may increase wirh furrher
nuclear weapons proliferarion. Terrorisrs seeking nuclear weapons
coulo look ro srare faciliries ro acquire weapons-usable ssile mare-
rial ro make improviseo nuclear explosives or ro acquire inracr nuclear
weapons. Veapons-usable ssile marerialshighly enricheo uranium
ano pluroniumoo nor exisr in narure. To make rhese marerials, cer-
rain srares have invesreo signicanr nancial ano inousrrial resources in
rwo rechnologies: enrichmenr ano reprocessing. Enrichmenr increases
; Prevenring Proliferarion
rhe concenrrarion of rhe ssile isorope of uranium. Ar low enrich-
menrs, rhe uranium can be useo only ro fuel nuclear reacrors. Ar higher
enrichmenr, rhe uranium becomes weapons-usable.
+9
Vhar is parricu-
larly problemaric in rerms of proliferarion prevenrion is rhar rhe same
rechnology useo ro proouce low-enricheo uranium (LEU) can also be
useo ro make HEU for weapon purposes. Even a pilor-scale enrichmenr
planr like rhe one Iran has builr can proouce ar leasr enough HEU for
one bomb per year.
50

As for reprocessing, ro proouce enough pluronium for ar leasr one
bomb annually, a srare woulo neeo ar leasr a meoium-sizeo nuclear reac-
ror ano a reprocessing planr ro separare rhe pluronium from spenr nuclear
fuel. As wirh enrichmenr, reprocessing is a oual-use rechnology. Ir makes
eirher nuclear fuel for reacrors or ssile marerial for nuclear weapons.
Terrorisrs now ano for rhe foreseeable furure oo nor have rhe where-
wirhal ro enrich rheir own uranium or proouce rheir own pluronium.
Insreao, rhey woulo have ro rarger srare srockpiles of rhese marerials.
To acquire nuclear weapons, a rerrorisr group coulo rry ro buy or sreal
exisring weapons or weapons-usable ssile marerial, or convince or
coerce a governmenr cusrooian ro hano over rhese assers.
The overarching srraregy ro prevenr rerrorisrs ano more srares from
acquiring nuclear weapons involves srrengrhening rhe nonproliferarion
regime, sropping rhe prooucrion of ssile marerial for weapons pur-
poses, conrrolling rhe spreao of enrichmenr ano reprocessing rechnolo-
gies, ano securing ano reoucing, as much as possible, nuclear weapons
ano weapons-usable marerials. This chaprer presenrs analysis ano no-
ings on all of rhese efforrs, excepr for securing ano reoucing weapons ano
marerials, a sub|ecr aooresseo in rhe nexr chaprer. To furrher reouce rhe
risk of nuclear rerrorism, ir is also imporranr ro inreroicr rhese weapons
ano marerials if rhey fall inro rerrorisr hanos ano ro rake broao counrerrer-
rorism measures, bur such srraregies are beyono rhe scope of rhis reporr.
ENSURING A SUCCESSFUL
NONPROLIFERATION TREATY REVIEW
CONFERENCE
In rhe :j6os, rhe Unireo Srares leo global efforrs ro creare rhe nuclear
Nonproliferarion Treary. In irs preamble, rhe NPT, which enrereo inro
force in :j;o, unoerscores rhe oevasrarion rhar woulo be visireo upon
S U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
all mankino by a nuclear war ano rhe consequenr neeo ro make every
efforr ro averr rhe oanger of such a war . . . |anoj rhar rhe proliferarion
of nuclear weapons woulo seriously enhance rhe oanger of nuclear
war. The NPT has rhree main ob|ecrives: ro keep as many srares as
possible from becoming nuclear-armeo, ro conrribure ro rhe spreao of
peaceful nuclear rechnology, ano ro commir nuclear ano nonnuclear
weapon srares ro pursue negoriarions in gooo fairh on effecrive mea-
sures relaring ro cessarion of rhe nuclear arms race ar an early oare ano
ro nuclear oisarmamenr, ano a Treary on general ano complere oisar-
mamenr unoer srricr ano effecrive inrernarional conrrol. As an incen-
rive for nonnuclear weapon srares ro nor acquire nuclear weapons, rhe
NPT provioes for access ro peaceful nuclear rechnologies conringenr on
rhese srares nor seeking ro oevelop nuclear weaponry ano mainraining
safeguaros on rheir civilian nuclear programs.
Every ve years, parries ro rhe NPT convene ro review rhe rrearys
viraliry. In :jjj, rhe Unireo Srares ano orher nuclear weapon srares
helpeo win rhe inoenire exrension of rhe rreary by reafrming rheir
gooo fairh commirmenr ro pursue oisarmamenr ano sraring rhar rhey
woulo rry ro complere rhe Comprehensive Tesr Ban Treary (CTBT)
negoriarions no larer rhan :jj6. Ar rhe :ooo NPT Review Conference,
rhe Unireo Srares ano orher nuclear weapon srares once again afrmeo
rheir commirmenr ro work in gooo fairh rowaro nuclear oisarmamenr
ano saio rhar rhey soughr ro wirhour oelay ano wirhour conoirions
. . . achieve rhe early enrry inro force of rhe Comprehensive Nuclear
Tesr Ban Treary. Bur rhe Senare voreo againsr aovice ano consenr of
rhe CTBT in :jjj, ano rhe Bush aominisrrarion oecioeo nor ro pursue
raricarion.
Ar rhe :ooo conference, rhe Unireo Srares ano orher NPT member
srares, especially rhe nonnuclear weapon srares, supporreo a ser of pro-
posals known as rhe rhirreen sreps:
achieving rhe CTBTs enrry inro force,
mainraining rhe morarorium on nuclear resring,
negoriaring a prooucrion ban on ssile marerial for weapons pur-
poses wirhin ve years in rhe Conference on Disarmamenr,
esrablishing a commirree in rhe Conference on Disarmamenr ro
aooress nuclear oisarmamenr,
applying rhe principle of irreversibiliry ro nuclear arms reoucrions,
j Prevenring Proliferarion
commirring rhe nuclear weapon srares ro accomplishing rhe roral
eliminarion of rheir nuclear arsenals,
calling on rhe Unireo Srares ano Russia ro implemenr START II,
concluoe START III, ano preserve rhe Anri-Ballisric Missile (ABM)
Treary,
implemenring rhe Trilareral Iniriarive among rhe Unireo Srares,
Russia, ano rhe IAEA,
calling on rhe nuclear weapon srares ro promore inrernarional secu-
riry, in parr rhrough furrher nuclear arms reoucrions ano increaseo
rransparency abour rheir nuclear weapons programs,
placing excess ssile marerial slareo for weapons unoer moniroring
by rhe IAEA,
reafrming general ano complere oisarmamenr unoer effecrive
inrernarional conrrol,
issuing regular reporrs by rhe nuclear weapon srares on rhe imple-
menrarion of nuclear oisarmamenr, ano
oeveloping vericarion capabiliries ro assure compliance wirh oisar-
mamenr agreemenrs.
None of rhese sreps has been fully carrieo our, rhough signicanr
progress has been maoe on some of rhem. Virh respecr ro nuclear arms
conrrol, rhe Unireo Srares ano Russia oio nor implemenr START II ano
III, bur insreao formeo rhe :oo: Treary of Moscow, a less consrraining
ano less formal rreary, as oiscusseo earlier in rhis reporr. The Unireo
Srares lefr rhe ABM Treary ro oevelop ano oeploy a narional missile
oefense sysrem, bur conrinueo ro reouce rhe number of nuclear war-
heaos oeployeo on srraregic oelivery sysrems ano ro oismanrle rerireo
warheaos. Since rhe rhirreen sreps were issueo, rhe Unireo Srares has
oeclareo aooirional ssile marerial as nor necessary for weapons pur-
poses. Alrhough rhe Unireo Srares ano Russia oio begin ro creare a veri-
carion sysrem for weapon origin ano orher excess ssile marerial unoer
rhe Trilareral Iniriarive wirh rhe IAEA, rhe iniriarive sralleo because rhe
rwo counrries were nor convinceo ir woulo improve rhe nonprolifera-
rion sysrem. The Unireo Srares shoulo leao by example on sreps rhar
specically call for making furrher nuclear arms reoucrions, raking irre-
versible acrions on nuclear warheao oismanrlemenr, ano increasing rhe
rransparency of nuclear weapons posrure ano policy.
jo U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
Before rhe :ooj conference, rhe rreary was challengeo by oevelop-
menrs in Iran ano Norrh Korea ano by rhe inabiliry of orher NPT mem-
bers, especially rhe nuclear weapon srares, ro aoopr sriff measures ro
enforce compliance or punish noncompliance. Iran has srareo rhar ir
is oeveloping a peaceful nuclear program, bur has acquireo as parr of
rhar program rhe means ro enrich uranium ano is obraining a rype of
reacror oprimally suireo for weapons-graoe pluronium prooucrion.
Some of Irans acriviries involving irs nuclear program have violareo irs
safeguaros agreemenr unoer rhe NPT, for which ir has been sancrioneo
by rhe UN Securiry Council. The Iranian nuclear program coulo also
srimulare furrher proliferarion in rhe Mioole Easr as neighboring srares
heoge againsr Irans growing nuclear capabiliry. In :oo, Norrh Korea
became rhe rsr signarory srare ro leave rhe rreary. Ir has since proceeoeo
ro separare more pluronium for weapons ano in :oo6 resreo a nuclear
oevice. The Obama aominisrrarion has |usr over a year ro prepare for
rhe :o:o NPT Review Conference. The Task Force urges rhe new
aominisrrarion ro move quickly in oecioing on irs posirions, musrering
rhe oiplomaric efforrs requireo ro avoio failure ar rhe conference, ano
leaoing efforrs ro srrengrhen rhe nonproliferarion regime. A successful
conference woulo require rhar rhe Unireo Srares rrear ir nor as a per-
funcrory inrernarional meering, bur insreao as an opporruniry ro exerr
U.S. leaoership ano bring rogerher nuclear ano nonnuclear weapon
srares ro rhink abour rheir inreresrs ano rhe global changes neeoeo ro
srrengrhen inrernarional securiry. The parries ro rhe conference have a
srrong inreresr in reexamining ano reafrming rhe righrs ano responsi-
biliries of borh nuclear ano nonnuclear weapon srares.
In regaro ro rhe responsibiliry of nuclear weapon srares ro pursue ois-
armamenr in gooo fairh, rhe Unireo Srares neeos ro ensure rhar concerns
abour irs oisarmamenr recoro oo nor precluoe irs abiliry ro aovance an
appropriare agenoa ouring rhe conference. The Unireo Srares has ofren
founo irself on rhe oefensive, accuseo of nor ooing enough ro reouce
nuclear arms. Recognizing rhar rhe polirical conoirions rhar will leao
ro abolirion are rarher oaunring, rhe Unireo Srares can srill leao on rhis
ob|ecrive by having serious oiscussions abour conoirions for achiev-
ing furrher nuclear arms reoucrions. Ir can pur rhe onus on irself ano all
counrries inreresreo in oisarmamenr ro provioe insighrs abour neces-
sary polirical, securiry, ano rechnical preconoirions. The Unireo Srares
has a srrong inreresr in explaining rhe signicanr sreps ir has alreaoy
raken rowaro nuclear oisarmamenr ano in reafrming irs commirmenr
j: Prevenring Proliferarion
ro oerermining whar rype of securiry environmenr coulo ensure rhar
nuclear weapons are never useo.
The nonproliferarion regime serves rhe inreresrs of rhe nonnuclear
weapon srares by helping ensure rhar rheir neighbors, rivals, ano
enemies oo nor acquire nuclear weapons. These srares neeo ro rsr
acknowleoge rhe principle rhar rhey have responsibiliries for ano a sig-
nicanr narional securiry inreresr in mainraining rhe nonproliferarion
regime ano rhen, wirh rhe nuclear weapon srares, properly inrerprer
rhe righrs ano responsibiliries. Arricle IV of rhe NPT, which speaks of
an inalienable righr ro civilian nuclear rechnologies, is sub|ecr ro rwo
obligarions. Firsr, ir is conringenr on a nonnuclear weapon srare aoher-
ing ro Arricle II sripularions nor ro manufacrure or orherwise acquire
nuclear weapons or orher nuclear explosive oevices, ano nor ro seek
or receive any assisrance in rhe manufacrure of nuclear weapons or
orher nuclear explosive oevices. Secono, rhis righr is conringenr on
mainraining safeguaros on nuclear programs in accoroance wirh rhe
Srarure of rhe Inrernarional Aromic Energy Agency ano rhe Agencys
safeguaros sysrem. Any srare founo in noncompliance wirh irs safe-
guaros agreemenr is sub|ecr ro acrion from rhe UN Securiry Council.
Thiro, all srares, incluoing nonnuclear weapon srares, share rhe Arricle
VI obligarion ro pursue nuclear oisarmamenr.
The Task Force concluoes rhar rhe Unireo Srares has an inreresr in
leaoing srares ar rhe :o:o NPT Review Conference ro shore up rhe
Arricle IV provision for access ro peaceful nuclear rechnologies. Srares
woulo reafrm rhar rhis access oepenos on mainraining rigorous safe-
guaros ano on conoence rhar no acrion ro acquire nuclear explosive
oevices has been raken. By making rhis afrmarion, rhe nonnuclear
weapon srares will also unoerscore rheir commirmenr ro pursuing
nuclear oisarmamenr.
To make such a reafrmarion even more meaningful, more rigor-
ous safeguaros can be placeo on all srares civilian nuclear programs. In
parricular, rhe IAEA has oevelopeo rhe Aooirional Prorocol ro srares
comprehensive safeguaros agreemenrs.
5!
Unoer rhe Aooirional Pro-
rocol, inspecrors are requireo ro assess wherher a srare has any unoe-
clareo nuclear faciliries or marerials. One of rhe Bush aominisrrarions
lasr acrs was ro enrer inro force rhe U.S. raricarion of rhe Aooirional
Prorocol, which ir oio on [anuary j, :ooj. Alrhough abour ninery srares
have signeo rhe Aooirional Prorocol, rhe boaro of governors has yer ro
make ir a manoarory requiremenr on srares, some ma|or oeveloping
j: U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
narions, such as Brazil ano Egypr, view ir as an aooirional ano unneces-
sary buroen. Encouragingly, rhe srares of Cenrral Asia recenrly enacreo
a nuclear weaponfree zone rhar legally requires rhem ro apply rhe
Aooirional Prorocol.
The Task Force believes rhar rhe Aooirional Prorocol shoulo become
manoarory for any srare oesiring access ro commercial nuclear power,
ano rhar rhis issue oeserves arrenrion ar rhe :o:o NPT Review Confer-
ence. Bur rhe Unireo Srares may nor be able ro win enough supporr for
rhis move in rime for rhe review conference because leaoing oeveloping
srares have alreaoy resisreo a similar proposal. The Aooirional Prorocol
is also nor a miracle cure for safeguaros problems. A srare sub|ecr ro
ir coulo srill oevelop a clanoesrine nuclear weapons program, rhough
hioing such acriviries woulo be more oifculr. In aooirion, ro allow rhe
IAEA ro cur cosrs, srares rhar have unoergone rhe inspecrion process
ano have a gooo rrack recoro of compliance wirh safeguaros are sub-
|ecr ro fewer inspecrions. However, ro help oerer any oeceprion, even an
upsranoing srare shoulo conrinue ro be sub|ecr ro periooic inspecrions.
The Task Force supporrs ensuring rhar rhe IAEAs safeguaros oeparr-
menr has aoequare nancial resources ro carry our rhis imporranr |ob by
making each srares conrriburion ro rhe safeguaros buoger oirecrly pro-
porrional ro irs use of nuclear power ano rhe amounr of irs nuclear mare-
rials sub|ecr ro safeguaros.
52
Furrher, rhe Task Force urges rhe Unireo
Srares ro iniriare oiscussions berween ano research by borh nuclear
ano nonnuclear weapon srares abour improving safeguaros beyono rhe
Aooirional Prorocol. Such improvemenrs shoulo incluoe more research
ano oevelopmenr on wioe-area moniroring for rhe presence of clanoes-
rine enrichmenr ano reprocessing planrs, ano rhe applicarion of near-
real-rime moniroring of nuclear faciliries ano marerials.
Also in neeo of arrenrion is rhe risk rhar a srare can wirhoraw from rhe
rreary, keep nuclear rechnologies ano marerials acquireo as a member,
ano use rhese capabiliries ro make nuclear weapons. Specically, Arricle
X allows a srare ro wirhoraw from rhe rreary afrer giving rhree monrhs
norice, if ir oecioes rhar exrraoroinary evenrs, relareo ro rhe sub|ecr
marrer of rhis Treary, have |eoparoizeo rhe supreme inreresrs of irs
counrry. To prevenr use of nuclear rechnologies ano marerials in weap-
ons programs, because rhe NPT is by oesign effecrively impossible ro
ameno, challenges poseo by srares like Norrh Korea, which wirhorew
from rhe rreary, musr be oealr wirh by new mechanisms rhar are oursioe
rhe rreary bur consisrenr wirh ir.
j Prevenring Proliferarion
Many nonnuclear weapon srares oo nor wanr ro be buroeneo wirh
aooirional rules imposeo on rhem. Bur rhe NPT member srares ano rhe
nonproliferarion sysrem as a whole bener when rhe rules are righr-
eneo ano clarieo. Thus, rhe member srares have an inreresr in carefully
assessing how ro upoare rhe rules in lighr of experience ano rechnologi-
cal oevelopmenrs, in general, ano ro clarify rhe process of wirhorawal,
in parricular. The UN Securiry Council has rhe responsibiliry ro work
wirh rhese srares in enforcing rhese rules.
Two caregories of srares coulo express inreresr in exercising rhe
wirhorawal clause: rhose in compliance ano rhose nor in compli-
ance wirh rheir safeguaros commirmenrs. For borh, rhe UN Securiry
Council has an inreresr in assessing rhe circumsrances of wirhorawal
ano oerermining wherher rhe srare can be convinceo ro remain insioe
rhe rreary. For rhose srares nor in compliance when expressing inrer-
esr in wirhorawal, rhe Securiry Council has a clear inreresr in calling
for special inspecrions ro oerermine wherher a clanoesrine weapons
program exisrs. The Securiry Council ano rhe NPT Review Confer-
ence arrenoees coulo consioer an even more conrroversial rerurn ro
senoer proposal. They coulo require rhar nuclear marerials ano rech-
nologies acquireo while rhe wirhorawing srare was noncomplianr be
rerurneo ro rhe counrries of origin. Alrhough rhe Securiry Council
woulo no ir oifculr ro achieve, rhis acrion lies clearly in rhe inreresrs
of inrernarional securiry.
The Unireo Srares coulo also submir a noing ar rhe NPT Review
Conference rhar rhe rhree-monrh wirhorawal perioo sripulareo by Arri-
cle X ooes nor allow srares enough rime ro resolve problems rhar leo ro
rhe exrraoroinary evenrs provoking wirhorawal, as oemonsrrareo in
rhe recenr pasr. The noing coulo propose, insreao, an agreemenr rhar
woulo lengrhen rhis wirhorawal perioo ro one year.
Alrhough srares have rhe sovereign righr ro invoke rhe supreme
narional inreresr clause ro exir rhe NPT or orher arms conrrol rrearies,
rhe Unireo Srares has an inreresr in leaoing srares ar rhe forrhcoming
conference ro correcr weaknesses in rhe Arricle X wirhorawal clause.
The Unireo Srares shoulo propose rhar any wirhorawing srare rerurn
nuclear rechnologies ano marerials acquireo while in noncompliance ro
counrries of origin ano rhar rhe UN Securiry Council pass a resolurion
ro esrablish a special inspecrions ream ro moniror marerials before rhey
are rerurneo ro rhe srares of origin. The ream woulo ensure rhar wirh-
orawing srares oio nor misuse rechnologies ano marerials acquireo ro
j U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
proouce nuclear weapons. Enforcing rhese proposeo correcrions ro rhe
Arricle X wirhorawal clause woulo be oifculr bur worrhwhile.
COMPREHENSI VE TEST BAN TREATY
The Comprehensive Tesr Ban Treary, a long-sranoing issue on rhe
nuclear arms conrrol agenoa, woulo ban all nuclear resr explosions
worlowioe if ano when ir enrers inro force. For rhis ro happen, all forry-
four of rhe Annex : srares, which have signicanr nuclear capabiliries,
musr rarify rhe rrearya challenging prospecr.
53
Though rhirry-ve
of rhese srares have complereo raricarion (as of Ocrober :ooS), sev-
eral imporranr narions remain oursioe rhe folo. China ano rhe Unireo
Srares have signeo rhe rreary bur nor rarieo ir. Inoia, Norrh Korea,
ano Pakisran, who have oone neirher, have all resreo nuclear weapons
since :jjS. None of rhe oe |ure nuclear weapon srares has conoucreo
a nuclear weapons resr since :jj6. Inoia ano Pakisran, however, which
have conoucreo relarively few resrs, woulo likely welcome rhe oppor-
runiry ro renew resring if rhe oe facro morarorium were lifreo ano rhe
inrernarional norm againsr resring weakeneo or collapseo.
The rreary offers oisrincr rechnical ano polirical beners. Of rhe rech-
nical aovanrages, rhe CTBT woulo make ir haroer for a nuclear-armeo
srare ro oevelop new aovanceo nuclear weapons, such as rhermonu-
clear warheaos or miniarurizeo weapons. Bur ir woulo nor prevenr all
mooernizarion or refurbishmenr of exisring nuclear arsenals. Nuclear-
armeo srares mainrain rhe viraliry of rhese arsenals using many rools
shorr of nuclear resring. The CTBT woulo also have lirrle or no effecr
in halring rhe oevelopmenr of rsr-generarion uranium-baseo nuclear
weapons, such as rhe aromic bomb oeronareo on Hiroshima. Enrry inro
force woulo provioe rhe rechnical bener of on-sire inspecrions, espe-
cially in rhe evenr of a suspecreo nuclear resr.
Arguably, rhe grearesr near-rerm aovanrage of enrry inro force is
rhar Inoia ano Pakisran woulo nor resume nuclear resring ano rhereby
expano rheir arsenals wirh rhermonuclear weapons, which are more
lerhal rhan rhe oevices currenrly in rheir respecrive srockpiles. Inoe-
penoenr experrs have expresseo consioerable ooubr rhar rhe rounos of
Sourh Asian nuclear resrs in May :jjS oemonsrrareo rhermonuclear
capabiliries. In facr, some Inoian ano Pakisrani poliricians ano nuclear
scienrisrs have expresseo inreresr in aooirional nuclear resrs. New Delhi
jj Prevenring Proliferarion
ano Islamabao have rherefore resisreo even signing rhe rreary. Rarica-
rion by China ano rhe Unireo Srares, however, will apply polirical pres-
sure on Inoia ano Pakisran ro oo rhe same, rhough rhere is no guaranree
rhar rhey woulo oo so.
Anorher bener woulo be ro raise rhe cosr of nuclear weapons acqui-
sirion for Tehran. If Iranian leaoers oecioeo ro builo nuclear weapons,
rhey coulo ar some poinr seek ro resr rhemro gain presrige, ro signal in
a crisis, or ro builo rhe rechnical conoence requireo ro proouce a creo-
ible arsenal. Tesring unoer a CTBT woulo be a srark violarion of a new
inrernarional rreary enoorseo by rhe enrire worlo ano woulo risk losr
presrige, isolarion, ano sancrions, whereas resring in a worlo where rhe
Unireo Srares (ano Israel) conrinueo ro block a CTBT woulo leave reaoy
excuses for srares ro look rhe orher way.
Virh regaro ro long-rerm rechnical beners, rhe CTBT woulo place
an aooirional hurole in rhe way of srares seeking nuclear weapons. Fol-
lowing rhe rules of Arricle X, a governmenr inreresreo in nuclear weap-
ons woulo have ro eirher oevelop a coverr program or wirhoraw from rhe
NPT. The CTBTs enrry inro force woulo also provioe an exrra oegree
of rechnical consrrainr. Proliferarors woulo no longer be cerrain rhar
rheir nuclear weapons work, unless rhey are willing ro rely on unresreo
rsr-generarion weapons.
The CTBTs enrry inro force coulo shore up supporr among U.S. allies
ano orher nonnuclear weapon srares ro furrher srrengrhen rhe nonprolif-
erarion regime. Alrhough rhe CTBT irself woulo nor srop a oerermineo
proliferaror, irs conclusion ano U.S. supporr for ir were clearly linkeo ro
rhe inoenire exrension of rhe NPT. Thus, U.S. raricarion has become,
in rhe eyes of many srares, a lirmus resr for U.S. leaoership in rhe overall
global efforr ro prevenr rhe use ano spreao of nuclear weapons. Alrhough
ir woulo nor ensure enrry inro force, U.S. raricarion woulo pur Vashing-
ron in a posirion ro pressure holoour srares ro rarify rhe rreary. Furrher-
more, U.S. raricarion woulo promore inrernarional norm builoing rhar
woulo srigmarize srares rhar conoucr nuclear resring, ir woulo increase
rhe likelihooo rhar srares rhar violare rhis norm woulo be punisheo.
The enrry inro force of rhe CTBT woulo also oerer a srare from con-
oucring resrs as a form of blackmail, inrimioarion, or polirical posruring.
For example, rhe primary purpose of rhe Norrh Korean resr may have
been ro blackmail China, rhe Unireo Srares, [apan, ano Sourh Korea for
more aio. The Inoian resrs in May :jjS are also wioely believeo ro have
been a means ro consolioare supporr for rhe narionalisr Bharariya [anara
j6 U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
Parry, which hao risen ro power |usr a few monrhs before rhe resrs ano
hao maoe resring parr of irs polirical campaign plarform.
Civen rhe oaunring, if nor impossible, rask of oelinking rhe CTBT
from rhe nonproliferarion regime, whar oprions are in U.S. inreresrs?
For one, rhe Unireo Srares coulo conrinue irs resring morarorium wirh-
our raricarion. This oprion woulo obviously nor bring rhe CTBT
inro force ano woulo nor garner rhe polirical ano rechnical beners
oiscusseo.
Because nuclear resrs woulo provioe conoence rhar replacemenr
warheaos are in working oroer, rhe Unireo Srares has rhe oprion unoer
inrernarional lawbecause ir has nor yer rarieo rhe rrearyof ooing a
rouno of proof resrs. Congress, however, woulo almosr cerrainly refuse
ro permir rhis. Furrhermore, rhere has been no supporr for ir wirhin rhe
weapons oesign communiry. Proponenrs of rhese warheaos, rherefore,
supporr rheir oevelopmenr wirhour nuclear resring. Even if rhe Unireo
Srares oio rarify rhe rreary, ir coulo wirhoraw unoer rhe exrraoroinary
evenrs clause if Vashingron hao reason ro suspecr rhar irs nuclear oerer-
renr was ar risk because enough warheaos in rhe arsenal were nor safe
or reliable. A rerurn-ro-resring oprion, however, carries huge polirical
risks. The Unireo Srares woulo open rhe ooor for China, Inoia, Paki-
sran, ano Russia ro also conoucr resrs, ano woulo risk losing inrerna-
rional supporr on improving rhe nonproliferarion regime.
Presioenr Obama has calleo for rhe Unireo Srares ro rarify rhe rreary.
The CTBTs raricarion oepenos srrongly on rhe prevailing poliri-
cal climare. In Ocrober :ooS, Secrerary of Defense Cares expresseo
supporr for raricarion, as long as concerns abour vericarion can
be aooresseo, ano offereo his view rhar a creoible oererrenr cannor
be mainraineo wirhour evenrually resorring ro resring or pursuing a
nuclear weapons complex mooernizarion program. He aovocareo
rhe larrer oprion ano specically proposeo builoing replacemenr war-
heaos.
5+
Furrher, an aooirional oecaoes experience wirh srockpile
srewaroship (oiscusseo in rhe nexr chaprer) ano wirh vericarion may
mirigare rhe subsranrive concerns of rreary opponenrs. Conversely,
few senarors pay close arrenrion ro arms conrrol issues ano rhus woulo
require exrensive briengs abour rhe signicance, provisions, ano veri-
carion measures of rhe CTBT.
CTBT crirics are concerneo rhar a srare coulo mufe a resr in an
unoergrouno caviry, known as oecoupling, or chear rhe sysrem some
orher way. A [uly :oo: Narional Acaoemy of Sciences panel reporr
j; Prevenring Proliferarion
concluoeo rhar vericarion capabiliries for rhe rreary are berrer rhan
generally supposeo, U.S. aoversaries coulo nor signicanrly aovance
rheir nuclear weapons capabiliries rhrough resrs below rhe rhresholo
of oerecrion, ano rhe Unireo Srares has rhe rechnical capabiliries ro
mainrain conoence in rhe safery ano reliabiliry of irs exisring weapons
srockpile wirhour periooic nuclear resrs.
55
Norably, rhe exisring moni-
roring sysrem oerecreo rhe low-yielo Norrh Korean resr in Ocrober
:oo6. Looking forwaro, rhe CTBT Prepararory Commirree commis-
sioneo a pro|ecr in March :ooS ro scienrically evaluare rhe reaoiness
ano capabiliry of rhe CTBT vericarion regime.
56
In rhe meanrime, rhe
Obama aominisrrarion shoulo secure a separare agreemenr wirh Russia
ro permir on-sire moniroring ro ensure rhar rhe oecoupleo resrs banneo
by rhe CTBT are nor being conoucreo.
There are also concerns abour prorecring rhe U.S. nuclear oererrenr
unoer rhe CTBT. Before rhe :jjj vore, rhe Clinron aominisrrarion pro-
poseo six safeguaros.
57
The aominisrrarion, in irs review, ano rhe Senare,
ouring irs consioerarion of aovice ano consenr, may neeo ro srrengrhen
or mooify some of rhese safeguaros ano even incluoe aooirional ones.
The Task Force consioers ir imporranr rhar rhe Unireo Srares rerain rhe
capabiliry, if necessary, ro improve rhe reliabiliry of exisring warheaos,
ro incorporare mooern safery ano securiry fearures, ano ro exercise
occasionally rhe oesign skills of weapon scienrisrs. The Task Force
also favors having rhe execurive branch provioe a oeraileo reporr ro rhe
Senare ar leasr every four yearsro ensure rhar an assessmenr occurs
ouring each presioenrial rermon wherher rhe CTBT conrinues ro
meer U.S. securiry inreresrs.
If rhe Unireo Srares is ro rarify rhe CTBT, ir woulo be useful ro be ar
or near raricarion by rhe :o:o Review Conference ro gain relareo, sub-
sranrive polirical beners. Because rhorough Senare consioerarion will
be imporranr, borh rechnically ano polirically, rhis suggesreo rarica-
rion riming inoicares rhar Senare hearings neeo ro begin by lare :ooj.
PRODUCTION OF FISSILE MATERI AL
FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES
Virhour ssile marerial, a srare cannor make nuclear weapons. Virhour
access ro rhis marerial manufacrureo by srares, a nuclear rerrorisr group
cannor make an improviseo nuclear oevice. Consequenrly, ro prevenr
jS U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
borh srare proliferarion ano nuclear rerrorism, conrrolling ssile mare-
rial prooucrion is imporranr. This secrion focuses on ssile marerial
proouceo by srares ro oevelop weapons. The following secrion exam-
ines ssile marerial in nonweapons applicarions rhar can srill power
nuclear explosive oevices.
Signicanr global progress has alreaoy been maoe in halring rhe pro-
oucrion of ssile marerial for weapons purposes. France, Russia, rhe
Unireo Kingoom, ano rhe Unireo Sraresfour of rhe ve oe |ure nuclear
weapon srareshave ofcially oeclareo rhe eno of rheir ssile marerial
prooucrion. Russia, rhe Unireo Kingoom, ano rhe Unireo Srares have
also oeclareo rhar rheir reserves of HEU ano pluronium exceeo rheir
oefense neeos by many rons, ano have been working rransparenrly ro
make much of rhis marerial unusable for weapons purposes.
The srares holoing our on oeclaring an eno ro ssile marerial proouc-
rion for weapons purposes are China, Inoia, Israel, Norrh Korea, ano
Pakisran. The opaciry of Israels nuclear weapons programs has maoe ir
oifculr ro oerermine wherher Israel is prooucing ssile marerial. Israel
is believeo, however, ro have proouceo ssile marerial for weapons ar irs
Dimona nuclear faciliry, which is nearing rhe eno of irs funcrionaliry.
The penoing closure of rhis faciliry coulo presenr an opporruniry for
Israel ro invire rhe IAEA ro cerrify Dimonas oecommissioning ano ro
refrain from builoing a new ssile marerial prooucrion faciliry. Thus,
wirhour making a formal announcemenr abour any pasr ssile marerial
prooucrion, by oecommissioning Dimona ano refraining from builoing
a similar replacemenr reacror, Israel coulo signal ro orher srares in rhe
region irs inreresr in supporring a ssile marerial curoff.
5S

The Task Force supporrs rhe Obama aominisrrarions working
closely wirh parrners ro keep Norrh Korea ro irs commirmenr ro veri-
ably oismanrle all irs nuclear weapons programs. Norrh Korea hao
halreo pluronium prooucrion ar Yongbyon as a resulr of rhe six-parry
ralks, bur ir is unclear wherher ir has proouceo or is prooucing highly
enricheo uranium. Pyongyang recenrly rrieo ro conoirion irs com-
mirmenr ro eno ssile marerial prooucrion ano oismanrlemenr of irs
nuclear weapons programs on having access ro Sourh Korea ro verify
rhe absence of U.S. nuclear weapons rhere. However, rhe Unireo Srares
removeo all of irs nuclear weapons on rhe Korean Peninsula in rhe early
:jjos, unoer rhe oroers of rhen presioenr Ceorge H.V. Bush. More-
over, rhe Unireo Srares has reafrmeo repeareoly rhis srano-oown of irs
forces. In aooirion, Norrh Korean leaoers know rhar rhe Unireo Srares
jj Prevenring Proliferarion
can srrike Norrh Korea wirh nuclear weapons using long-range bomb-
ers such as rhe B: ano long-range ballisric missiles such as Minureman
III or Trioenr missiles. Changes in U.S. nuclear posrure woulo likely
have lirrle or no oirecr inuence on Norrh Koreas meering irs obliga-
rion ro srop ssile marerial prooucrion ano veriably oismanrle irs
nuclear weapons programs.
In conrrasr, U.S. acrions on nuclear posrure ano missile oefense have
a oirecr bearing on Chinas oecisions on irs nuclear force srrucrure ano
rhus irs ssile marerial prooucrion. China is a parricularly pivoral srare
in rhis respecr because of irs quaorangular relarionship wirh Inoia, Paki-
sran, ano rhe Unireo Srares. Vhile U.S.-China nuclear relarions are ois-
cusseo in more oeprh in rhe previous chaprer, rhe salienr poinrs here
are rhar China has a relarively small nuclear arsenal, especially inrer-
conrinenral ballisric missiles, compareo ro rhe Unireo Srares, Chinese
milirary planners have expresseo concern abour U.S. missile oefense
capabiliries againsr Chinas relarively small (for now) long-range mis-
sile force, ano China, oepenoing on rhe evolurion of srraregic relarions
wirh rhe Unireo Srares, may wanr ro increase rhe size of irs nuclear arse-
nal in rhe coming oecaoes. Faceo wirh rhis securiry environmenr wirh
respecr ro rhe Unireo Srares, ir is unoersranoable rhar China woulo nor
wanr ro make any formal oeclararion abour ssile marerial prooucrion.
The U.S. Defense Inrelligence Agency recenrly oerermineo rhar China
likely has proouceo enough weapons-graoe ssile marerial ro meer irs
neeos for rhe immeoiare furure.
59
Chinas ssile marerial srarus has a oirecr effecr on Inoia. Alrhough
rhe rwo counrries have oramarically improveo relarions wirh each
orher since rheir :j6: boroer war, rhey conrinue ro be rivals. Fur-
rhermore, Inoian milirary planners have parrly linkeo Inoias nuclear
oererrenr ro Chinas. If China conrinues ro builo up irs nuclear
forcesrhough rhis may be in response ro rhe Unireo SraresInoia
will likely feel compelleo ro follow suir. This may leao, in rurn, ro
Pakisran increasing irs prooucrion of ssile marerial, given rhe Inoia-
Pakisran nuclear arms race.
China has linkeo rhe proposeo Fissile Marerial Curoff Treary
(FMCT), which rhe Unireo Srares has supporreo, ro rhe orafr rreary
Prevenrion of an Arms Race in Ourer Space, which rhe Unireo Srares
has opposeo. This impasse has conrribureo ro rhe complicareo ser of
polirical facrors rhar have oeaolockeo FMCT negoriarions in rhe UN
Conference on Disarmamenr, a mulrilareral arms conrrol forum baseo
6o U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
in Ceneva rhar requires consensus ro even begin negoriarions. Because
rhe mechanism of rhe Conference on Disarmamenr has leo ro a srale-
mare on oiscussion of an FMCT, rhe Unireo Srares woulo obrain berrer
rracrion by iniriaring parallel oiscussions wirh China, Inoia, Pakisran,
ano orher nuclear-armeo srares.
Alrhough rhe Unireo Srares has aovocareo for a ban on ssile mare-
rial prooucrion, rhe Bush aominisrrarion concluoeo rhar effecrive veri-
carion measures for such a rreary were nor feasible. The May :oo6 orafr
FMCT conrains no vericarion provisions, an omission rhar has orawn
criricism from inrernarional nonproliferarion aovocares.
The Task Force recognizes rhar alrhough an FMCT faces oaunr-
ing polirical ano rechnical huroles, rhe Unireo Srares has an inreresr in
efforrs ro ban rhe prooucrion of ssile marerial for weapons purposes.
Alrhough an FMCT is nor as meaningful as reoucrions in rhe srockpiles
of ssile marerial, ir is an imporranr srep rowaro rhar ob|ecrive, espe-
cially for srares rhar are conrinuing rheir prooucrion of ssile mare-
rial for weapons purposes. The Unireo Srares shoulo renew rechnical
sruoies ro assess rhe feasibiliry of an effecrively veriable FMCT. The
issue of vericarion, however, is of less concern rhan rhe opposirion of
China, Inoia, ano Pakisran ro an FMCT. The Task Force acknowleoges
rhar rhe impeoimenrs ro bringing abour an FMCT will nor be resolveo
by rhe :o:o NPT Review Conference, bur ir supporrs rhe Unireo Srares
raking rhe leao in calling for a morarorium on ssile marerial proouc-
rion before rhe conference. Such a call alone will nor convince China,
Inoia, ano Pakisran ro supporr an FMCT, bur ir coulo help rally many
srares ro supporr furrher srrengrhening rhe nonproliferarion regime
for insrance, by shoring up Arricle IV commirmenrs.
FISSILE MATERI AL IN NONWEAPONS
APPLICATIONS
The proposeo FMCT applies only ro ssile marerial proouceo for weap-
ons purposes. Bur nonweapons HEUfor insrance, rhe approximarely
fry merric rons of HEU useo in rhe civilian secrorcoulo srill pose
securiry problems.
60
The Unireo Srares ano Russia have hao programs
since rhe lare :j;os ro phase our rhe use of HEU in civilian research
reacrors. In :oo, rhe Bush aominisrrarion reenergizeo rhese programs
ano placeo rhem unoer rhe umbrella Clobal Threar Reoucrion Iniriarive
6: Prevenring Proliferarion
(CTRI). CTRI ooubleo rhe pace of HEU removal operarions compareo
ro rhe previous program. Bur more rhan half of rhe ioenrieo marerial
remains ro be secureo ano removeo. In early :ooj, rhe CTRI oevelopeo
an acrion plan for accomplishing irs remaining mission wirhin rhe nexr
four years, Presioenr Obamas rarger rime frame for securing loose
nuclear marerial. In aooirion, rhe CTRI has speo up rhe conversion of
HEU-fueleo research reacrors ro use low-enricheo uranium fuels ano
has supporreo aooirional research inro oeveloping new high oensiry
LEU fuels ro converr reacrors rhar cannor use exisring LEU fuels.
6!
The
Unireo Srares has converreo mosr of irs HEU-fueleo reacrors.
The Task Force believes rhe Unireo Srares has a srrong inreresr in
expanoing ano oevoring enough nancial ano human resources ro rhe
Clobal Threar Reoucrion Iniriarive ro cover more HEU reacrors, con-
verr rhe remaining HEU reacrors as quickly as rechnically feasible, ano
complere HEU securiry ano removal operarions by rhe eno of :o::.
Despire rhis progress, signicanr impeoimenrs remain. Russia con-
rinues ro use HEU in research reacrors (none of which are slareo ro be
converreo ro LEU), crirical assemblies (a rype of resr reacror), ano ice-
breakers (which, inoepenoenr sruoies inoicare, can be converreo ro use
LEU fuel).
62
Though rhere are some rechnical challenges ro conversion,
rhe main obsracles are polirical. To facilirare conversion or oecommis-
sioning, Russia shoulo be offereo incenrives, such as scienric coopera-
rion in curring-eoge compurer simularions ro subsrirure for rhe crirical
assemblies ano rhe consolioarion of as many HEU faciliries as possible
inro a few research cenrers wirh enhanceo securiry fearures.
Canaoa, Belgium, rhe Nerherlanos, ano Sourh Africa also conrinue
ro use HEU in prooucing meoical isoropes, on which millions across
rhe globe rely. Converring ro LEU prooucrion rargers is rechnically
feasible.
63
The real pushback comes from manufacrurers, who are con-
cerneo abour rhe cosrs of conversion ano rhe aooeo wasre from LEU
rarger processing. U.S. ano inrernarional efforrs shoulo conrinue ro
promore ano funo more research on rhe use of nonweapons-usable ura-
nium in civilian applicarions such as meoical ano commercial isorope
prooucrion, ano rhe Unireo Srares shoulo work wirh rhese prooucers ro
oerermine a oesirable yer cosr-effecrive package of incenrives ro facili-
rare isorope prooucrion conversion ro low-enricheo uranium.
Even if rhese commercial concerns were resolveo, rhe Unireo Srares
woulo conrinue ro face polirical resisrance from Sourh Africa on phas-
ing our irs HEU srockpile. Sourh Africa has an esrimareo srockpile of six
6: U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
hunoreo kilograms of HEUenough ro make ar leasr a oozen nuclear
bombswhich ir veriably oismanrleo by rhe early :jjos. As rhe only
srare rhar has complerely oismanrleo a nuclear weapons program,
Sourh Africa perceives irself as a leaoing narion in championing nuclear
oisarmamenr. Ir has also srooo up for rhe righrs of oeveloping coun-
rries ro use peaceful nuclear rechnologies, incluoing isorope proouc-
rion for commercial purposes. Sourh Africa has rherefore resisreo calls
from rhe Unireo Srares ro give up irs HEU srockpile. Ir believes rhar rhe
Unireo Srares ano rhe orher nuclear-armeo srares neeo ro rsr oo more
ro reouce rheir own HEU srockpiles ano pursue nuclear oisarmamenr.
Bur Prerorias abiliry ro secure irs HEU was pur in quesrion when irs
Pelinoaba faciliry suffereo a (forrunarely unsuccessful) breach of secu-
riry in November :oo;. Alrhough Sourh Africa has receiveo securiry
assisrance from rhe IAEA, rhe Unireo Srares shoulo work wirh Sourh
Africa ro oerermine wherher aooirional securiry measures are neeoeo
ro guaro Sourh African HEU in rhe conrexr of a larger oialogue ro oerer-
mine wherher a global ban on civilian HEU is feasible.
[usr as ir ooes nor apply ro rhe civilian use of highly enricheo uranium,
rhe FMCT ooes nor apply ro rhe civilian use of reacror-graoe pluronium,
which can also be useo in nuclear explosives. Inrernarional Aromic
Energy Agency safeguaros on faciliries rhar enrich uranium ano repro-
cess spenr nuclear fuel ro exrracr pluronium provioe some assurances
rhar rhese marerials are nor oiverreo inro weapons programs. Some
of rhese faciliriessuch as Tokai-mura in [apan ano Sellaelo in rhe
Unireo Kingoom, which hanole several rons of pluronium annually
have signicanr quanriries of ssile marerial rhar are unaccounreo for,
because rhis marerial has mosr likely cakeo on rhe pipes ano walls of
rhese faciliries. (Eighr kilograms of pluronium, consioereo a signicanr
quanriry by rhe IAEA, provioes enough marerial for ar leasr one bomb.)
The inevirable oifculry in accounring for all of rhis marerial coulo mask
rhe oiversion of small quanriries ro weapons prooucrion.
THE EXPANSION OF NUCLEAR
POWER AND ENRICHMENT
AND REPROCESSING FACILI TIES
Alrhough U.S. nuclear weapons policy ooes nor have a oirecr link ro
counrries inreresreo in commercial nuclear power, rhe porenrial for a
ma|or expansion of nuclear energy worlowioe has orawn rhe arrenrion
6 Prevenring Proliferarion
of rhe Task Force. Concerns abour energy securiry ano rhe risks of
global warming have reviveo inreresr in commercial nuclear power
arouno rhe worlo. Ar rhe same rime, increases in elecrriciry oemano are
pro|ecreo for oeveloping economies in Asia, Africa, ano Larin America.
Thus, many experrs are pro|ecring a possible growrh of nuclear power
reacrors in rhese regions from fewer rhan rwenry reacrors rooay ro more
rhan rhree hunoreo reacrors by rhe mioole of rhe cenrury (excluoing
[apan, Sourh Korea, ano Taiwan).
6+
Unril now, however, no counrry
excepr Inoia has oiverreo ssile marerial from irs civilian nuclear power
faciliries for rhe prooucrion of nuclear weapons.
The challenge is ro conrinue srrengrhening rhe separarion berween
nuclear weapons ano nuclear power globally. This enrails a global efforr
ro ensure rhar rhe nuclear power fuel cycle is nor useo as a source of
weapons-usable ssile marerial. The grearesr proliferarion risk comes
from rwo elemenrs of rhe fuel cycle: enrichmenr of narural uranium ro
proouce nuclear fuel, ano reprocessing of rhe spenr reacror fuel ro sepa-
rare pluronium.
Presenrly, relarively few counrries enrich uranium for commercial
purposes. The main commercial enrichmenr faciliries are locareo in
France, Cermany, rhe Nerherlanos, Russia, rhe Unireo Kingoom, ano
rhe Unireo Srares. All bur rhe U.S. faciliry, operareo by rhe Unireo Srares
Enrichmenr Corporarion, are fully or parrially owneo by governmenrs.
Brazil, China, ano [apan have smaller enrichmenr faciliries, ano Argen-
rina, Canaoa, ano Sourh Africa have recenrly expresseo inreresrin
response ro rhe porenrial for increaseo oemano for nuclear fuel in rhe
fururein operaring commercial enrichmenr faciliries. Orher srares
coulo |oin rheir ranks as well. Civen rhe increaseo inreresr in expano-
ing uranium enrichmenr ro new srares, rhe Unireo Srares has an inrer-
esr in working wirh parrner srares ro esrablish global rules on uranium
enrichmenr ro reouce rhe proliferarion risks. Exrensive srare ownership
of uranium enrichmenr planrs gives rhe governmenrs in quesrion con-
sioerable leverage in conrrolling rhe furure oirecrion of rhis inousrry,
for insrance, governmenrs coulo make furure licensing of rhese planrs
conringenr on mulrilareral ownership ano conrrol.
To heao off rhe furrher spreao of enrichmenr faciliries, several fuel
cycle assurances have been proposeo.
65
The core concepr is ro offer
mulriple riers of fuel availabiliry. The exisring nuclear fuel marker woulo
comprise rhe rsr rier. A secono rier coulo consisr of a virrual fuel bank
of enrichmenr bonos rhar woulo offer insurance coverage ano a polirical
commirmenr by suppliers governmenrs ro ensure fuel supplies as long
6 U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
as recipienr srares mainrain aoequare safeguaros on rheir nuclear pro-
grams. A rhiro rier coulo consisr of an acrual bank of enricheo uranium
fuel in case rhe orher riers fail.
66
Mosr of rhe proposals woulo favor mul-
rinarional ownership of faciliries bur woulo resrricr access ro rhe acrual
enrichmenr or reprocessing rechnologies by employing black box
rechniques. Thus, counrries buying inro rhe faciliries woulo have guar-
anreeo access ro rhe fuel proouceo, bur neeo nor, as a consequence, be
appriseo of merhoos of replicaring rhe rechnologies in overr or coverr
narional faciliries. Personnel securiry programs woulo be requireo ro
help prorecr rhis knowleoge from unaurhorizeo access.
Despire fuel service proposals, some counrries may oecioe ro pursue
fuel-making for a variery of reasons: narional prioe ano presrige, rhe
belief rhar near-rerm capiral expenoirure on fuel cycle faciliries will pay
off in rhe long rerm, rhe view rhar an inoigenous fuel cycle enhances
energy securiry, a oefense (by nonaligneo movemenr counrries) of rhe
inalienable righr unoer Arricle IV of rhe NPT ro pursue peaceful nuclear
acriviries, ano a heoge againsr real ano perceiveo securiry rhrears by
mainraining rhe larenr capaciry ro make ssile marerial for bombs. Iran
exemplies all of rhese facrors. Brazil has expresseo consioerable prioe
in irs enrichmenr accomplishmenrs ano conoence rhar rhis invesrmenr
will evenrually pay off, oespire rhe uncerrainry of irs commercial via-
biliry. Nonerheless, fuel service proposals are worrh pursuing because
several counrriesespecially rhose rhar will acquire only a few reac-
rorswill likely no rhe economic incenrives of refraining from fuel-
making arrracrive.
Srares can rake furrher sreps ro prevenr rhe spreao of narionally con-
rrolleo enrichmenr ano reprocessing faciliries. The Task Force favors a
freeze on all new narional enrichmenr faciliriesrhar is, rhose unoer
rhe conrrol or ownership of a single governmenrano supporrs gov-
ernmenrs using rheir aurhoriry ro license faciliries ro implemenr rhis
freeze. Mulrinarional ownership alreaoy exerrs conrrol over many of
rhe exisring ma|or enrichmenr planrs. Alrhough inrernarional conrrol
of enrichmenr ano reprocessing is nor foolproof, rhe resulranr rrans-
parency of rhese acriviries is a heoge againsr rheir oiversion inro rhe
prooucrion of ssile marerial for weapons purposes. This oepenos, of
course, on rhe resrricrion of access ro rhe rechnologies ano rhe imple-
menrarion of enhanceo personnel securiry checks ro prevenr insioers
from rransferring rhe rechnologies ro unaurhorizeo users. The Unireo
Srares also has an inreresr in working wirh orher uranium enrichmenr
6j Prevenring Proliferarion
suppliers, in consulrarion wirh rhe IAEA, ro provioe enricheo uranium
ar a cosr rhar woulo eliminare rhe perceiveo prors of enrichmenr, bur
rhe Task Force is norably nor favoring subsioizeo enrichmenr. Ir nores
rhar presenrly ano for rhe foreseeable furure, reprocessing ooes nor
make economic sense compareo ro enrichmenr.
67
Anorher mechanism
ro srem rhe proliferarion rhrear rhar aooirional narional enrichmenr or
reprocessing faciliries pose is ro incluoe an incenrive in bilareral nuclear
cooperarion agreemenrs. Thar is, fuel suppliers woulo offer mulriple-
riereo fuel guaranrees in exchange for clienr srares agreeing ro refrain
from builoing rhese faciliries. A caurionary poinr is rhar many clienr
srares are concerneo abour relinquishing rheir asserreo righrs ro all
peaceful nuclear rechnologies, incluoing enrichmenr ano reprocessing.
As oiscusseo earlier, rhis righr is conringenr on a counrry mainraining
aoequare safeguaros on irs nuclear program ano nor seeking ro acquire
nuclear explosives. These srares are rhus mosr receprive ro bilareral
nuclear cooperarion agreemenrs rhar leave open rhe possibiliry of a
srare builoing enrichmenr or reprocessing faciliries in rhe furure. In rhis
regaro, rhe U.S. nuclear cooperarion agreemenr wirh rhe Unireo Arab
Emirares is a useful preceoenr for furure nuclear power oevelopmenr in
rhe Mioole Easr ano orher parrs of rhe worlo, rhe emirares pleogeo ro
forgo oeveloping narional enrichmenr faciliries as long as ir is assureo
nuclear fuel from oursioe suppliers.
Anorher preceoenr for rhe furure is Russias insisrence, before sup-
plying fuel for rhe Bushehr reacror, on reaching an agreemenr wirh
Iran ro rerurn rhe spenr fuel ro Russia, alrhough rhe Iran-Russia agree-
menr ooes nor commir Iran ro refrain from enriching irs own uranium.
Russia began offering such fuel-leasing services ro clienr srares ouring
rhe Sovier era. Irs fuel supply services ano spenr fuel rake-back agree-
menr wirh Iran supporrs rhe nonproliferarion regime, ano is a souno
mooel for orher srares in a similar posirion. However, oomesric polirical
concerns have prevenreo rhe Unireo Srares, France, ano orher fuel sup-
pliers from making rhis offer. Their legislarures oo nor wanr ro aoo ro
rhe volume of nuclear wasre on rheir rerrirories. No counrry has irself
openeo a permanenr reposirory for high-level nuclear wasre.
Anorher possible preceoenr involves programs, incluoing rhe
Clobal Threar Reoucrion Iniriarive, rhar facilirare rhe rerurn of U.S.-
ano Russian-origin HEU spenr fuel from research reacrors. Alrhough
HEU spenr fuel is small in weighr, volume, ano raoioacriviry conrenr
compareo ro commercial spenr fuel, rhis program has illusrrareo rhe
66 U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
imporrance of removing marerials rhar can pose a proliferarion rhrear.
In rhar respecr, a fuel-leasing offer rhar incluoes spenr fuel rake-back
has merir. However, any such offer woulo likely win supporr in Con-
gress only if ir were oone for narional securiry reasons. Similar ro rhe
srrucrure of uranium enrichmenr assurances, spenr fuel rake-back
offers will garner rhe supporr of borh spenr fuel recipienrs ano spenr
fuel clienrs only if rhey are srrucrureo such rhar savings from nor sror-
ing spenr fuel in rhe clienr srare pay for hanoling in rhe srares sroring
ir. A furrher incenrive woulo be ro incluoe mulriple parrners rhar can
safely ano securely srore spenr fuel.
6;
Securiry Pracrices ano rhe Furure
of rhe U.S. Nuclear Veapons Complex
This chaprer aooresses rwo funoamenral pillars of narional ano inrer-
narional sysrems ro prevenr rhe use of nuclear weapons: implemenr-
ing besr securiry pracrices ano ensuring a safe, secure, ano reliable
U.S. nuclear arsenal. Any counrry wirh nuclear weapons ano mareri-
als has rhe responsibiliry ro mainrain rhem wirh rhe highesr securiry
sranoaros. Bur as rhis chaprer makes clear, rhis securiry sysrem neeos
ro be srrengrheneo furrher. The imporrance of implemenring such a
sysrem cannor be oversrareo. Srronger securiry over nuclear weapons
ano marerials is rhe mosr effecrive way ro srop rerrorisrs from gaining
access ro nuclear capabiliries.
The secono pillar provioes rhe Unireo Srares ano irs allies who oepeno
on exrenoeo oererrence wirh high conoence in a creoible nuclear
oererrenr. As oiscusseo, creoible exrenoeo oererrence helps reassure
allies who may feel rhreareneo by nuclear arracks rhar rhey oo nor neeo
ro acquire rheir own nuclear weapons. This pillar rhus serves U.S. non-
proliferarion inreresrs. However, a perceprion rhar rhe Unireo Srares is
seeking ro aoo new nuclear missions, is lowering rhe nuclear rhresholo,
or is mainraining a nuclear srockpile rhar is roo large for U.S. ano allieo
oefense neeos may erooe supporr for rhe nonproliferarion regime,
especially among rhose allies ano frienos who believe srrongly in work-
ing rowaro evenrual nuclear oisarmamenr. The Task Force unoerscores
rhar rransparency in inrenrions ano acrions ano frequenr consulrarions
wirh allies abour any proposeo changes ro rhe U.S. nuclear weapons
complex serves U.S. inreresrs.
NUCLEAR TERRORISM: WHY BETTER
NUCLEAR SECURI TY IS NEEDED
In rhe lasr rhree oecaoes, mass casualry rerrorism has grown. This ren-
oency has been fueleo by a number of facrors, incluoing rhe upsurge
6S U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
in religious exrremism following rhe :j;j Islamic Revolurion in Iran,
srare sponsorship of some mass casualry rerrorism, ano rhe increase
in apocalypric ano millennial rerrorisr culrs. To oare, all acrs of mass
casualry rerrorism have useo convenrional rechniques, such as rruck
bombs, as well as airplane bombings ano crashes ro achieve high oearh
rolls. Alrhough mosr rerrorisr groups are nor morivareo ro acquire or
use weapons of mass oesrrucrion, some have useo chemical ano bio-
logical weapons. For example, Aum Shinrikyo, an apocalypric culr
heaoquarrereo in [apan, arrackeo rhe Tokyo subway sysrem in :jjj wirh
sarin gas, killing rwelve ano in|uring more rhan a rhousano people. In
rhe :jjos, Aum Shinrikyo soughr ro acquire nuclear weapons. Simi-
larly, al-Qaeoa, which perperrareo rhe jj:: arracks on New York ano
Vashingron, has been seeking ro acquire nuclear ano orher weapons of
mass oesrrucrion since rhe early :jjos. Virhour quesrion, rhe Unireo
Srares faces rhe clear ano presenr oanger of rerrorisr enemies srriving
ro obrain nuclear weapons.
Alrhough rerrorisrs face signicanr huroles in rrying ro sreal or buy
eirher a nuclear bomb or rhe marerials ro consrrucr an improviseo
nuclear oevice, rhis hugely consequenrial acr cannor be ruleo our.
6S

If a reasonably rechnically skilleo rerrorisr group acquireo enough
weapons-usable highly enricheo uranium, ir woulo likely be able
ro consrrucr a gun-rype nuclear bomb, which coulo compare ro rhe
oesrrucrive force of rhe Hiroshima bomb. Consequenrly, rhe Task
Force unoerscores rhar blocking rerrorisr access ro nuclear weapons
ano marerials is an urmosr prioriry.
A nuclear ano raoiarion oerecrion capabiliry may complicare nuclear
rerrorisr planning because ir coulo force rerrorisrs ro use more raoia-
rion shieloing ro hioe nuclear marerials or convince rhem ro employ
alrernare, ano perhaps more complex, roures ro oeliver a nuclear explo-
sive oevice ro a rarger. The Unireo Srares has been spenoing billions of
oollars on nuclear ano raoiarion oerecrion equipmenr ro rry ro inrer-
oicr nuclear ano raoiological marerials ar boroers ano porrs. Ir has also
been working wirh orher governmenrs ro increase inrelligence shar-
ing. Norably, along rhese lines, rhe Ceorge V. Bush aominisrrarion
launcheo rhe Proliferarion Securiry Iniriarive ano rhe Clobal Iniriarive
ro Combar Nuclear Terrorism, involving oozens of counrries in such
cooperarive acriviries.
Traoirional means of oererrencein which an enemys valueo rer-
rirory ano assers are helo ar riskare unlikely ro work againsr srareless
6j Securiry Pracrices ano rhe Furure of rhe U.S. Nuclear Veapons Complex
rerrorisr groups. Inoirecr oererrence, however, coulo help reouce rhe
likelihooo of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable marerials falling inro
rhe hanos of rerrorisrs, especially by oirecr weapon or marerial rrans-
fers from srares ro rerrorisrs. In parricular, if rhe Unireo Srares ano irs
parrners oevelop a srronger capabiliry ro arrribure such weapons ano
marerials ro rheir counrries of origin rhrough nuclear forensics ano
orher rools of arrriburion, rhose counrries mighr be helo accounrable.
Bur ensuring rhis accounrabiliry is challenging. Many experrs agree, for
insrance, rhar grearer focus on crearing incenrives for srares ro coop-
erare in sharing nuclear oara wirh rhe Unireo Srares is appropriare.
69

However, an overr or racir rhrear of use of nuclear weapons againsr rhe
counrries of origin woulo oecrease rhose counrries incenrives ro coop-
erare. Moreover, rhe U.S. abiliry ro conoucr arrriburion suffers from a
lack of rraineo personnel ano auromareo equipmenr.
70
U.S. leaoers also
neeo ro berrer unoersrano rhe scienric oifculries ano inherenr limira-
rions in analyzing nuclear explosive oebris ano orher forensic evioence
ro no rhe culprir of rhe arrack ano ro recognize rhe relarively long rime
rhar nuclear forensics may require. Traoirional law enforcemenr ano
inrelligence assessmenrs will also play a crirical role in rracking oown
rhe perperrarors of a nuclear arrack.
U.S. nuclear weapons have essenrially no purpose in oirecrly oerer-
ring srareless rerrorisr groups. To increase rhe likelihooo of ioenrifying
rhe origin of ssile marerial rhar composes inrercepreo or oeronareo
improviseo nuclear oevices, rhe Unireo Srares shoulo inrensify inrer-
narional cooperarive efforrs ro builo a library of ssile marerial ano
increase oomesric ano inrernarional nuclear forensic capabiliries, even
rhough acring on nuclear forensic informarion enrails signicanr poliri-
cal ano rechnical uncerrainries.
BEST SECURI TY PRACTICES
Virh growing concerns abour rhe rransfer of nuclear marerials ro rerror-
isrs, rhe Unireo Srares has increaseo irs efforrs oomesrically ano inrer-
narionally ro improve rhe securiry of rhese marerials. Ir has maoe ma|or
invesrmenrs in improving rhe securiry of Russian nuclear weapons ano
nuclear marerials ano has leo efforrs rhrough rhe IAEA ro ameno rhe
Convenrion on Physical Prorecrion of Nuclear Marerial (CPPNM) ro
srrengrhen irs securiry requiremenrs, ro improve nuclear securiry in
;o U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
oozens of counrries, ano ro supporr rhe work of rhe Nuclear Securiry
Deparrmenr of rhe Inrernarional Aromic Energy Agency.
Nonerheless, much more work is neeoeo. Despire rrying ro ameno
rhe CPPNM, governmenrs have yer ro agree on binoing inrernarional
securiry sranoaros ro boosr securiry of weapons-usable nuclear mare-
rial ro rhe securiry of nuclear weapons rhemselves. The Unireo Srares
is one of rhe ma|or oonors ro rhe IAEAs nuclear securiry funo, bur rhis
funoar less rhan a few rens of millions of oollars annuallyis srarveo
for resources. Ir is imporranr ro recognize rhar rhe IAEA ooes nor have
a role ro play in securing nuclear weapons or in oeveloping besr secu-
riry pracrices for rhem. Primarily composeo of nonnuclear weapon
srares, rhe IAEA is resrricreo in accessing oesign-relareo informarion
on nuclear weapons. Ir ooes, however, have a signicanr role in assisring
member srares in oeveloping besr securiry pracrices on weapons-usable
nuclear marerials.
The Task Force urges rhe Unireo Srares ro reoouble irs ano inrerna-
rional efforrs ro achieve rhe enrry inro force of rhe amenoeo CPPNM,
ro srrengrhen rhe IAEAs capabiliries ro work wirh member srares ro
enhance nuclear securiry, ano ro esrablish ano conrinue ro improve
global securiry sranoaros for weapons-usable nuclear marerials. More-
over, nonnuclear weapon srares have a clear inreresr in implemenring
besr securiry pracrices on rheir nuclear marerials ano making rhis issue
a prioriry ouring rhe upcoming :o:o NPT Review Conference.
The Task Force welcomes rhe recenr launch of rhe Vorlo Insrirure
for Nuclear Securiry (VINS), which emergeo from collaborarion
among rhe Nuclear Threar Iniriarive, rhe Insrirure for Nuclear Mare-
rials Managemenr, ano rhe U.S. Deparrmenr of Energys Narional
Nuclear Securiry Aominisrrarion, wirh rhe assisrance of rhe IAEA.
VINS will bring rogerher pracririonersrhe professionals respon-
sible for on-rhe-grouno securiry pracricesro collecr rhe worlos besr
pracrices in nuclear marerials securiry ano ro share rhar informarion
wirh faciliries rhar are responsible for prorecring rhe worlos mosr oan-
gerous nuclear marerials.
7!
The srrongesr physical securiry of nuclear
weapons-usable marerials everywhere is in U.S. ano global inreresrs,
ano rhe Task Force urges rhe conrinueo supporr of VINS by borh gov-
ernmenr ano privare enriries.
Concerning rhe securiry of nuclear weapons rhemselves, rhe Unireo
Srares has oevelopeo a number of merhoos ro guaro againsr borh rhefr
ano unaurhorizeo use. These incluoe cooeo swirches or permissive
;: Securiry Pracrices ano rhe Furure of rhe U.S. Nuclear Veapons Complex
acrion links, unique signal generarors rhar prevenr srray elecrronic sig-
nals, noise, or inrerference from inaoverrenrly arming rhe weapon, ano
environmenral sensing oevices rhar prevenr oeronarion unless a specic
sequence of exrernal changes occurs (for example, parricular accelera-
rions ouring free fall of a graviry bomb). Reporreoly, orher counrries
have oevelopeo similar securiry merhoos, somerimes assisreo by rhe
Unireo Srares.
Sharing rhe oerails of rhese merhoos raises securiry concerns (some
such rechniques are highly classieo) ano may pose legal problems
unoer rhe NPT or U.S. nonproliferarion law if shareo wirh srares orher
rhan nuclear weapons srares unoer rhe NPT. Orher areas of nuclear
securiry cooperarion are nor nearly as sensirive. For insrance, rhe
Unireo Srares has oevelopeo personnel reliabiliry programs ro moni-
ror securiry guaros ano orher people who have access ro nuclear weap-
ons ro help ensure rhar rhey meer high sranoaros of rrusrworrhiness.
The Unireo Srares has also shareo rechniques of marerial prorecrion,
conrrol, ano accounring wirh Russia. Moreover, rhe Unireo Srares can
consioer sharing irs know-how on forming nuclear emergency search
reams, which consisr of specialisrs who can ioenrify wherher a rerrorisr
rhrear ro oeronare a nuclear weapon is creoible, ano assess ano oefuse
rerrorisrs improviseo nuclear oevices. The Unireo Srares has a clear
inreresr in sharingro rhe exrenr possiblerhese nonsensirive secu-
riry rechniques.
In general, rhe Unireo Srares ano orher nuclear-armeo srares can
learn from each orher in oeveloping besr securiry pracrices. Nonerhe-
less, cerrain srares are exrremely relucranr ro aomir when rhey have
hao nuclear securiry lapses or breaches. Securiry oiscussions rherefore
neeo ro be caurious abour poinring ro or even referring ar all ro specic
incioenrs in rhe srares in quesrion. In many cases, ir will be necessary ro
limir oiscussions ro general principles ano besr pracrices (an approach
rhe Unireo Srares has raken wirh Russia). Vhere ir appears oesirable ro
be more explicir, nuclear-armeo srares coulo form a buooy sysrem in
which a srare can work closely on securiry efforrs wirh allieo srares. For
example, China may feel mosr comforrable working wirh Pakisran, ano
rhe Unireo Srares wirh rhe Unireo Kingoom. Such a pairing of frienos,
however, ooes nor remove rhe responsibiliry from rhe srare irself in
ensuring rhe physical securiry of irs nuclear weapons ano marerials.
If rhe Unireo Srares is ro be effecrive in leaoing orher srares ro
improve nuclear securiry, irs own pracrices musr bein facr ano in
;: U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
perceprionabove reproach. The Benr Spear incioenr in Augusr :oo;,
in which six U.S. nuclear-armeo cruise missiles were own across rhe
Unireo Srares wirhour aurhorizarion, raiseo concerns abour rhe effec-
rive aominisrrarive conrrol of U.S. nuclear weapons. Afrer invesrigar-
ing rhis incioenr, rhe Defense Science Boaros permanenr rask force
on nuclear weapons surery founo rhar rhere was nor a clear unoer-
sranoing regaroing who has explicir responsibiliry ano accounrabiliry
for any movemenr of special weapons oursioe rhe nuclear weapons
srorage area ano founo signicanr confusion abour oelegarion of
responsibiliry ano aurhoriry for movemenr of nuclear weapons.
72
The
borrom line, rhe invesrigarion noreo, was rhar rhe oecline in focus |of
rhe nuclear enrerprisej has been more pronounceo rhan realizeo ano
roo exrreme ro be acceprable.
73

These concerns were conrmeo by a Deparrmenr of Defense rask
force on nuclear weapons managemenr chaireo by former secrerary of
oefense [ames R. Schlesinger. The rask force founo rhar rhere has been
an unambiguous, oramaric, ano unacceprable oecline in rhe Air Forces
commirmenr ro perform rhe nuclear mission ano, unril very recenrly,
lirrle has been oone ro reverse ir.
7+
Borh of rhese rask forces maoe a
number of specic recommenoarions for improvemenr, as oio an inrer-
nal Air Force invesrigarion.
75
The Air Force subsequenrly aoopreo rhose
recommenoarions.
Alrhough rhere was no rhrear ro rhe securiry of rhe nuclear weap-
ons involveo, rhis incioenr oamageo rhe creoibiliry of rhe Unireo Srares
ano revealeo signicanr proceoural weaknesses. The seriousness wirh
which ir was raken, however, coupleo wirh rhe openness of rhe invesri-
garions, can serve as an example ro orher srares oealing wirh securiry
problems. This is parricularly rrue because rhe issues oo nor primar-
ily resulr from rhe rechnical oerails of U.S. weapons, bur rarher from
organizarional ano personnel failures rhar may have analogs in orher
counrries. The governmenr agencies involveo in inrernarional nuclear
securiry shoulo use rhe lessons learneo from rhe Benr Spear incioenr ro
improve global securiry pracrices.
In sum, rhe Task Force urges rhe Unireo Srares ro leao nuclear-armeo
srares in esrablishing more effecrive securiry of nuclear weapons by ois-
cussing rhe evolving rhrear, evaluaring rhe means ro aooress rhe rhrear,
ano oeveloping guioelines rhar all srares wirh nuclear weapons woulo
agree ro implemenr.
; Securiry Pracrices ano rhe Furure of rhe U.S. Nuclear Veapons Complex
CURRENT STATUS, RECENT REDUCTIONS,
AND NEAR-FUTURE PROJECTIONS
Since rhe eno of rhe Colo Var, rhe Unireo Srares has signicanrly
reouceo rhe number of lano-, air-, ano sea-baseo ballisric missile oeliv-
ery sysrems. In parricular, rhe Unireo Srares has complerely rerireo rhe
MXjPeacekeeper ICBM sysrem, which carrieo up ro ren warheaos per
missile, rerireo rhe Minureman II ICBM, reouceo rhe number of Min-
ureman III ICBMs from ve hunoreo ro four hunoreo ano fry, ano
reouceo rhe number of ballisric missile submarines (SSBNs) by con-
verring four of rhe eighreen SSBNs exisring ar rhe eno of rhe Colo Var
ro nonnuclear weapons plarforms. Reoucrions have been maoe in rhe
number of warheaos carrieo aboaro rhose fourreen submarines ano on
rhe Minureman III ICBMs. In aooirion, in Ocrober :jj;, all B:-B bomb-
ers were relegareo ro convenrional operarions only ano subsequenrly
oecerrieo for nuclear weapons. Moreover, shorrer-range rhearer-
baseo nuclear-capable sysrems have been reouceo oramarically. As a
oirecr resulr of Presioenr Ceorge H.V. Bushs iniriarives in :jj: ano
:jj:, rhe Unireo Srares has eliminareo mosr classes of rhese sysrems,
wirh only an esrimareo several hunoreo remaining graviry bombs ano
nonoeployeo submarine-launcheo cruise missiles.
The Unireo Srares has nor builr or oeployeo a new nuclear warheao
since rhe eno of rhe Colo Var, when rhe VSS warheao enrereo service
in :jjo.
76
Alrhough srraregic oelivery sysremsTrioenr submarines,
B-: ano B-j: bombers, ano Minureman III ICBMshave nor changeo
in ourwaro appearance, rhe Unireo Srares has conrinually mooernizeo
rhese plarforms ro make rhem more accurare ano reliable ano ro exreno
rheir lifespan.
Accoroing ro rhe Deparrmenr of Defense ano rhe Deparrmenr of
Energy, rhe Unireo Srares is heaoing rowaro having rhe following srra-
regic nuclear weapon oelivery plarforms in :o::: four hunoreo ano fry
Minureman III ICBMs, fourreen Ohio Class SSBNs (rhe ma|oriry of
which are on acrive parrol ar any given rime), ano rwenry B-: ano fry-
six B-j: bombers. The November :ooS sraremenr on rhis plan by rhe
secreraries of rhese rwo oeparrmenrs noreo rhar rhis force srrucrure
allows rhe oeploymenr of :,;oo ro :,:oo warheaos, provioes exibil-
iry ro ao|usr rhe loaoing of warheaos among rhe rhree legs of rhe rriao
in response ro rechnical concerns or operarional neeos, ano provioes
; U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
sufcienr capaciry ro increase rhe number of oeployeo warheaos in
response ro aoverse geopolirical oevelopmenrs.
77
In aooirion ro oeployeo srraregic warheaos, rhe Unireo Srares main-
rains a few rhousano reserve, nonoeployeo warheaos.
7S
The November
:ooS |oinr sraremenr unoerscoreo rhar because rhe Unireo Srares ooes
not have rhe abiliry ro proouce new warheaos, a pool of non-oeployeo
warheaos is reraineo ro be useo in cases of reliabiliry failures ano as a
heoge againsr aoverse polirical oevelopmenrs.
79
Finally, rhe Unireo
Srares is esrimareo ro have abour ve hunoreo warheaos oevoreo ro
shorrer-range weapon oelivery sysrems, incluoing Tomahawk subma-
rine launcheo cruise missiles (none of which are oeployeo) ano B6:-j
racrical bombs.
S0
The Task Force srrongly supporrs rhe subsranrial nuclear arms
reoucrions rhar rhe Unireo Srares has accomplisheo since rhe eno of
rhe Colo Var ano believes rhar rhe new aominisrrarion, in rhe forrh-
coming nuclear posrure review, has a srrong inreresr in assessing whar
furrher reoucrions can be maoe by rhe Unireo Srares alone ano whar
reoucrions woulo neeo ro occur in parallel wirh comparable Russian
reoucrions.
DECOMMISSIONING AND DISMANTLING
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Reoucing ano eliminaring nuclear weapons means consioerably more
rhan rransferring oeployeo nuclear warheaos from milirary unirs ro
a secure srorage faciliry. Eliminaring rhe oesrrucrive porenrial of rhe
weapon requires a sysremaric process ro oecommission ano oismanrle
rerireo oevices. This process proceeos rhrough several srages: oecom-
missioning rhe weapon ano rransferring ir ro srorage or reserve srarus,
oismanrling rhe weapon, incluoing separaring high explosives from
rhe nuclear marerial ano oesrroying rhe fusing ano weapon housing,
sroring ano breaking up rhe pluronium pir ano orher nuclear marerial
componenrs, such as highly enricheo uranium in rhe seconoary rher-
monuclear parr of rhe weapon, ano ulrimarely rransforming rhe plu-
ronium ano orher weapons-usable ssile marerial in reacrors or orher
oevices ro make rhem unusable in nuclear weapons.
Ar each srage of rhe process, ir is progressively more oifculr ro recon-
srirure a nuclear weapon. The specrrum of porenrial weaponizarion
;j Securiry Pracrices ano rhe Furure of rhe U.S. Nuclear Veapons Complex
is complerely avoioeo only afrer rhe srraregic nuclear marerial is
oesrroyeo.
Currenr U.S. efforrs focus on increasing rhe pace of oismanrlemenr.
This is complicareo by rhe facr, as menrioneo early in rhis reporr, rhar
rhe same faciliryrhe Panrex planr in Texasrhar oismanrles war-
heaos for eliminarion also oisassembles ano reassembles warheaos for
rourine surveillance or life exrensions. Thus, rhere is an inherenr ren-
sion berween oismanrling rhe large number of weapons aurhorizeo
for reriremenr ano mainraining rhe currenr srockpile. In recenr years,
rhe Narional Nuclear Securiry Aominisrrarion (NNSA), a semiauron-
omous agency wirhin rhe Deparrmenr of Energy, has signicanrly
increaseo rhe rare of processing warheaos ar rhe Panrex planr, which is
now essenrially operaring ar maximum capaciry.
S!

Ar presenr, rhe Unireo Srares musr rerain rhe pluronium pirs from
rerireo weapons, penoing rhe consrrucrion of faciliries ro eliminare
excess pluronium. Alrhough some excess HEU will be blenoeo oown
for use in commercial reacrors, mosr will be reraineo ro meer furure
oemanos for fuel for rhe Navys nuclear-powereo submarines ano air-
crafr carriers. This plan will precluoe for more rhan half a cenrury any
neeo ro proouce HEU for propelling milirary ships.
A proper assessmenr of progress on reoucing or eliminaring nuclear
weapons requires consioerarion of each srage of rhe process. Relarively
lirrle informarion is available abour rhe srarus or cosr of oecommis-
sioning rhe rerireo nuclear weapons invenrory of rhe Unireo Srares or
of orher counrries. Secrecy abour rhe size ano characrer of a nuclear
weapons invenrory gives rise ro suspicion abour rhe realiry of weapons
reoucrionsrhar is, how easily rerireo weapons coulo be rerurneo ro
operarional srarus. Transparency is rherefore neeoeo ro esrablish con-
oence abour rhe characrer of nuclear weapons srockpiles ano rhe prog-
ress rowaro effecrive reoucrions.
The Task Force believes rhar increaseo rransparency abour irs nuclear
weapons invenrory aovances U.S. nonproliferarion ob|ecrives by ser-
ring an inrernarional sranoaro. In parricular, rhe Unireo Srares shoulo
reveal in a public sraremenr rhe numbers ano rype of weapons awairing
oismanrlemenr.
The Unireo Srares has a srrong inreresr in acceleraring rhe pace of
oismanrlemenr of irs several rhousano rerireo warheaos ro oemon-
srrare leaoership in reoucing possible securiry risks of excess warheaos.
However, because of rhe oual narure of rhe Panrex warheao processing
;6 U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
faciliry, rhe Unireo Srares faces a oilemma: slow oown life exrensions on
rhe remaining warheaos or speeo up oismanrlemenr of rhe rerireo war-
heaos. The Task Force urges rhar any warheaos scheouleo for oisman-
rlemenr shoulo irreversibly remain in rhar srarus ano rhar rhe Unireo
Srares shoulo sruoy, as parr of rhe :ooj nuclear posrure review, wherher
ano how ro accelerare rhe process of oismanrling rerireo warheaos.
ENSURING SAFE, SECURE, AND RELI ABLE
U. S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
As long as rhe Unireo Srares has nuclear weapons, ir musr mainrain
conoence in rheir safery, securiry, ano reliabiliry. The nuclear weap-
ons complex helps provioe rhar conoence. Ir consisrs of rhree nuclear
weapons laborarories, four prooucrion faciliries, ano rhe Nevaoa Tesr
Sire (all operareo by rhe NNSA), nuclear weapons launching sysrems,
incluoing submarines, lano-baseo ballisric missiles, long-range bomb-
ers, ano aircrafr for shorr-range nuclear weapons, ano rhe commano
ano conrrol sysrems rhar link rhese plarforms wirh higher aurhoriries
(all operareo by rhe Deparrmenr of Defense, ano several orher supporr-
ing Deparrmenr of Energy ano Deparrmenr of Defense faciliries).
During rhe Colo Var, rhe nuclear weapons complex was conrinu-
ously oeveloping ano prooucing new weapons, wirh unoergrouno
nuclear resring provioing a ma|or rool for unoersranoing weapons
performance. This sysrem ensureo a conrinuous supply of weapons
oesigners, who learneo rheir crafr rhrough an apprenriceship sysrem,
ano passeo along much of irs knowleoge rhrough racir learning berween
senior weapon scienrisrs ano rheir |unior colleagues.
S2
Because many
of rhese senior scienrisrs have rerireo in recenr years, ano because rheir
younger colleagues oo nor have experience wirh rhe oevelopmenr cycle
for a new weapon or wirh nuclear resring, rhere are concerns abour
ensuring rhe highesr caliber workforce ar rhe weapons laborarories.
The Colo Var nuclear arms race fearureo rhe frequenr replacemenr
of weapons wirh newer oesigns. As a resulr, concern abour componenr
aging ano irs long-rerm effecr on rhe reliabiliry of parricular oesigns
was minimal. Virh rhe eno of rhe Colo Var, however, rhe conrinuous
oesign ano oeploymenr cycle rhar hao organizeo rhe weapons pro-
gram ceaseo abruprly. Furrher, in :jj:, rhe Unireo Srares imposeo an
inoenire morarorium on unoergrouno nuclear resring. The weapons
;; Securiry Pracrices ano rhe Furure of rhe U.S. Nuclear Veapons Complex
communiry was faceo wirh a neeo ro mainrain ano cerrify rhe long-rerm
reliabiliry of rhe srockpile wirhour resring or replacemenrs planneo for
any exisring weapons.
The weapons labs responoeo ro rhis challenge by crearing rhe Srock-
pile Srewaroship Program ano rhe warheao Life Exrension Program.
Srockpile Srewaroship (inirially calleo Science-Baseo Srockpile Srew-
aroship) useo a combinarion of nonnuclear experimenrs (many involv-
ing new scienric rools, such as aovanceo raoiography), subcrirical
experimenrs (involving nuclear marerials bur nor prooucing nuclear
yielo), careful reassessmenr of previous nuclear resrs, ano increases in
compuring power of over a millionfolo ro provioe assessmenrs of rhe
nuclear performance of exisring weapons in rhe absence of nuclear
resring. The Life Exrension Program involveo rhe ma|or refurbishmenr
of various warheao rypes wirh rhe aim of resroring rhem ro an as-builr
conoirion. One of rhe goals of Srockpile Srewaroship was ro ensure rhar
rhe inevirable small changes rhar accumulare from warheao refurbish-
menr oio nor affecr nuclear performance.
To oare, rhe Srockpile Srewaroship Program ano rhe warheao Life
Exrension Program have hao remarkable success ano, in rurn, have
provioeo conoence in rhe safery ano reliabiliry of rhe arsenal since rhe
U.S. nuclear resring morarorium began in :jj:. Each subsequenr year,
rhe secreraries of oefense ano energy, baseo on inpur from rhe rhree
weapons laborarory oirecrors ano rhe commanoer of U.S. Srraregic
Commano (STRATCOM), have formally cerrieo rhar rhe srockpile
remains safe, secure, ano reliable, ano rhar a resumprion of nuclear resr-
ing is nor requireo. Baseo on rhese cerricarions, rhe Ceorge V. Bush
aominisrrarion conrinueo rhe morarorium even as ir opposeo rarica-
rion of rhe Comprehensive Tesr Ban Treary.
During rhe rsr rerm of rhe Bush aominisrrarion, rhe oirecrors of rhe
rhree weapons laborarories expresseo growing concern over rhe long-
rerm abiliry of Srockpile Srewaroship ro allow rhe conrinueo cerrica-
rion of rhe srockpile. They caurioneo rhar uncerrainries in performance
oue ro componenr aging ano rhe small changes inrroouceo ouring refur-
bishmenr of aging componenrs coulo grow fasrer rhan rhe abiliry of rhe
Srockpile Srewaroship Program ro unoersrano rhose uncerrainries.
S3

In :ooj, following informal briengs on rhis concepr, Represenrarive
Davio Hobson (R-OH) ano Senaror Pere Domenici (R-NM) inrroouceo
legislarion ro have rhe weapons labs research a new warheao, calleo rhe
reliable replacemenr warheao (RRV).
S+
Their inrenrion, like rhar of rhe
;S U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
Bush aominisrrarion, was nor ro have rhe RRV rake on new milirary
missions bur insreao ro heoge againsr rhe failure of Colo Var legacy
warheaos. In aooirion, because rhe Unireo Srares has nor builr a new
warheao since rhe lare :jSos, research on RRV woulo help mainrain
essenrial warheao oesign ano engineering capabiliries ar rhe narional
laborarories. Borh Congress ano rhe Bush aominisrrarion maoe ir clear
rhar RRV woulo be oevelopeo ano eloeo only if ir coulo be oone wirh-
our resorring ro unoergrouno nuclear resring. Despire rhis, some crirics
are concerneo rhar rhe Deparrmenr of Defense woulo require rhe RRV
ro be resreo ro inoucr rhis weapon sysrem inro rhe milirary, rhereby
opening rhe ooor for orher counrries ro resr ano rhus improve rheir own
nuclear capabiliries.
The RRV is relareo ro a larger proposeo mission ro rransform rhe
nuclear weapons complex. On December :6, :ooS, NNSA issueo rwo
recoros of oecision for rhis rransformarion.
S5
Proponenrs claim rhar rhe
ulrimare rransformarion will save rhe Unireo Srares billions of oollars
ano signicanrly reouce rhe foorprinr of rhe enrire complex. However,
crirics are concerneo rhar rhe parallel implemenrarion of srockpile srew-
aroship ano complex rransformarion will be unafforoable, given likely
buoger consrrainrs, ano will resulr in unacceprable curs ro rhe science
programs ar rhe weapons laborarories. Some crirics also believe rhar
oecisions on complex rransformarion are premarure unril more funoa-
menral issues of nuclear policy are resolveo.
The Task Force believes rhe following principles shoulo guioe rhe
Obama aominisrrarion in irs oecision making on complex rransforma-
rion ano proposals on replacemenr warheaos:
The Unireo Srares neeos ro have conrinueo high conoence rhar irs
warheaos are safe, secure, ano reliable, ano rhar rhe nuclear weapons
complex is oprimizing cosr savings while meering irs mission.
Alrhough rhe Srockpile Srewaroship Program ano rhe Life Exrension
Program have mainraineo rhe U.S. governmenrs conoence for rwo
oecaoes rhar U.S. warheaos are safe, secure, ano reliable, a oeraileo
cosr-bener analysis on rhe aging of all legacy warheao componenrs,
borh rheir nuclear ano nonnuclear parrs, ano on any proposals for
oeveloping ano builoing replacemenr warheaos, woulo provioe a
basis for making a souno oecision. This examinarion is crirical in an
era of economic crisis.
;j Securiry Pracrices ano rhe Furure of rhe U.S. Nuclear Veapons Complex
The weapons labs neeo ro exercise rhe ralenrs of scienric, engi-
neering, ano managerial sraff. Alrhough oesign work has alreaoy
begun on replacemenr warheaos, rhe involveo personnel neeo ro be
challengeo ro conrinue invesrigarions on orher porenrial warheao
oesigns, ways ro counrer nuclear ano nonnuclear weapons rhar can
be useo by rerrorisrs, ano rhe vericarion issues surrounoing war-
heao oismanrlemenr.
Any new warheao oesigns shoulo meer four crireria: no requireo new
nuclear resring, no aooirional milirary capabiliries, enhanceo safery
ano securiry fearures, ano enough conoence in rhe oesigns ano manu-
facruring processes ro allow for oeep reoucrions in reserve warheaos.
MANAGING THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
COMPLEX
Effecrive managemenr of rhe nuclear weapons enrerprise is a prerequi-
sire for effecrive nuclear policy. In :ooo, Congress creareo rhe Narional
Nuclear Securiry Aominisrrarion wirhin rhe Deparrmenr of Energy.
Some believe rhar NNSA ooes nor have enough auronomy ano has nor
been as effecrive as necessary. The resulring proposeo remeoy is rhar
NNSA ano irs srockpile managemenr responsibiliry shoulo be raken our
of rhe Deparrmenr of Energy ano eirher rransferreo ro rhe Deparrmenr
of Defense or esrablisheo as an inoepenoenr agency.
The Task Force nores rhar rhe organizarional locarion of rhe agency
responsible for managing rhe weapons complex is nor crirical ro U.S.
nuclear policy or ro rhe size ano composirion of rhe nuclear forces nec-
essary ro supporr rhar policy. The Task Force has rherefore nor consio-
ereo possible mooicarions ro rhe NNSA aurhorizing legislarion, bur is
exrremely skeprical of any proposal ro rransfer rhe weapons program ro
rhe Deparrmenr of Defense for rhe following reasons.
Firsr, rhe currenr arrangemenrs provioe for effecrive inpur from rhe
Deparrmenr of Defense. The Deparrmenr of Defense Srraregic Com-
mano ano Nuclear Veapons Council are rhe oecisive voices in serring
requiremenrs for rhe Deparrmenr of Energys nuclear weapons pro-
gram. These mechanisms are inrenoeo ro ensure rhar rhe Deparrmenr
of Energy weapons complex is responsive ro oefense neeos, ano rhar
buoger rraoe-offs are consioereo.
So U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
Secono, rhe secrerary of oefense alreaoy has exrraoroinarily broao
managerial responsibiliries. Transferring rhe weapons complex ro rhe
Deparrmenr of Defense woulo nor necessarily resulr in berrer senior
civilian managemenr oversighr or in grear efciency of operarion.
Inoeeo, such a rransfer coulo make ir easier ro slighr long-rerm neeos
in favor of shorr-rerm prioriries. Furrher, some believe rhar rhe Deparr-
menr of Defense is nor as well suireo as rhe Deparrmenr of Energy ro
manage science laborarories.
Thiro, such a rransfer woulo eliminare rhe inoepenoenr voices in rhe
process of annual srockpile cerricarion rhar come from involving rwo
separare agencies.
Fourrh, rhe rransfer woulo furrher separare nuclear weapons acrivi-
ries from rhe managemenr of oefense-relareo nuclear wasre.
Finally, rhe rhree ma|or weapons laborarories, Los Alamos, Liver-
more, ano Sanoia, are calleo narional laborarories because rheir sig-
nicanr rechnology base has conrribureo ano shoulo be expecreo ro
conrribure ro many missions, incluoing nonnuclear oefense neeos, non-
proliferarion, homelano securiry, inrelligence supporr, energy research
ano oevelopmenr, ano basic science. Inregraring rhese laborarories inro
rhe Deparrmenr of Defense woulo make rhese missions more oifculr
ro supporr.
Thus, rhe Task Force woulo oppose any rransfer of rhe srockpile
managemenr program or rhe Narional Nuclear Securiry Aominisrra-
rion ro rhe Deparrmenr of Defense.
S:
Recommenoarions
The Task Force believes srrongly in a nuclear securiry sysrem in which
righrs come wirh responsibiliries. All srares have rhe responsibiliry
ro ensure rhar nuclear weapons are never useo again, ro prevenr rhe
furrher spreao of nuclear weapons ano nuclear weapons capabiliries
ro more srares, ano ro block rerrorisr access ro nuclear weapons ano
weapons-usable marerials. Unoer rhe rheme of responsible nuclear
securiry, rhe recommenoarions are frameo in rerms of rhe following
principles ano ob|ecrives:
reenergizing funcrioning ano communicarive polirical relarionships
wirh ma|or nuclear-armeo powers, wirh emphasis on srraregic oia-
logue wirh Russia ano China as well as rhe ob|ecrive of a new legally
binoing ano veriable arms conrrol agreemenr berween rhe Unireo
Srares ano Russia,
prevenring rhe proliferarion of nuclear weapons ano know-how ro
aooirional srares ano nonsrare acrors by boosring rhe healrh of rhe
inrernarional nuclear nonproliferarion regime,
reafrming ano mainraining U.S. exrenoeo oererrence commir-
menrs ro allies,
ensuring rhar rhe U.S. nuclear srockpile is safe, secure, ano reliable ro
mainrain rhe creoibiliry of rhe U.S. nuclear oererrenr, ano
implemenring besr securiry pracrices for nuclear weapons ano
weapons-usable marerials worlowioe ro prevenr unaurhorizeo
access ano loss of conrrol ro nonsrare acrors such as rerrorisr
groups.
S: U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
STRATEGIC DI ALOGUE AND ARMS CONTROL
Polirical relarionships funoamenrally marrer in reoucing rhe likelihooo
of nuclear weapons use. Obviously, an inrenrional nuclear war is far
more likely ro occur wirh an ioeological foe rhan wirh a nuclear-armeo
frieno. Specically, rhe oemise of rhe Sovier Union in :jj: mosr cer-
rainly lowereo rhe prospecrs of nuclear war berween rhe Unireo Srares
ano Russia, rhe main Sovier successor srare. A ma|or srraregic miscalcu-
larion, however, coulo conceivably leao ro rhe use of nuclear weapons.
Almosr rwenry years afrer rhe eno of rhe Colo Var, Russia remains a
srare in rransirion ano conrinues ro exerr power over irs rraoirional sphere
of inuence. In parricular, rhe war berween Ceorgia ano Russia in :ooS
has worrieo some American poliricians ano analysrs rhar Russia may
reverr ro Colo Var pracrices. Russia perceives irself in a posirion of con-
venrional inferioriry ano milirary encirclemenr in respecr ro rhe Unireo
Srares ano NATO. Consequenrly, Moscow has mainraineo racrical
nuclear weapon sysrems for possible war ghring roles, expresseo oppo-
sirion ro NATO enlargemenr ro incluoe Ceorgia ano Ukraine, opposeo
oeploymenr of a U.S. missile oefense sysrem in rhe Czech Republic ano
Polano, announceo plans ro begin large-scale milirary mooernizarion by
:o::, ano expresseo concern abour prompr global srrike convenrional
arms, such as rhe porenrial arming of rhe U.S. Trioenr submarine mis-
sile wirh convenrional munirions, ciring perceiveo rhrears ro Russias
nuclear oererrenr ano rhe porenrial for srraregic miscalcularion.
Despire rhese apparenr impeoimenrs, Moscow has usually shown
srrong inreresr in nuclear arms conrrol. Russia ano rhe Unireo Srares
have a special responsibiliry in rhe nuclear arena. They were rhe rsr
rwo nuclear-armeo srares ano rhe rsr rwo counrries ro commercialize
nuclear energy. They borh have an aooirional vesreo inreresr in non-
proliferarion, having |oineo polirical forces in rhe :j6os ro push for rhe
enacrmenr of rhe NPT in :j;o.
Alrhough rhe Bush aominisrrarion oiscusseo rhese impeoimenrs
ano areas of common inreresr wirh rhe Purin ano Meoveoev aominis-
rrarions, rhe rwo sioes oio nor resolve rhe impasse over nexr sreps. The
Obama aominisrrarion has an opporruniry for a fresh srarr wirh Russia.
The Task Force offers rhe following aovice:
Premise reneweo srraregic oialogue berween rhe Unireo Srares ano
Russia on rhe common inreresrs of prevenring rhe use of nuclear
weapons, srrengrhening rhe nonproliferarion regime, securing
S Recommenoarions
nuclear marerial worlowioe, ano increasing rhe prospecrs of safe ano
secure use of peaceful nuclear energy.
Provioe for a START-rype legal ano vericarion founoarion for
uninrerrupreo regularion, rransparency, ano preoicrabiliry for U.S.
ano Russian nuclear forces while negoriaring a follow-on rreary ro
START ano SORT.
Negoriare a legally binoing follow-on rreary on srraregic weapons rhar
woulo reecr currenr oefense neeos ano realiries ano woulo resulr in
oeeper arms reoucrions. The Task Force ooes nor wanr ro pre|uoge
rhe acrual magniruoe of reoucrions or orher changes in nuclear pos-
rure. Insreao, rhe Task Force unoerscores rhe value of rsr having
meaningful srraregic oialogue berween rhe Unireo Srares ano Russia
abour rhrear assessmenrs ano perceiveo oefense neeos.
Incluoe, as an imporranr parr of srraregic oialogue, oiscussions on
missile oefense, nonoeployeo warheaos, nonsrraregic nuclear forces,
ano prompr convenrional srrike weapons. (Deeper reoucrions
beyono whar will likely be agreeo on for rhe immeoiare posr-SORT
agreemenr will hinge on rhe unoersranoing oevelopeo rhrough rhese
oiscussions.)
Be rransparenr abour U.S. inrenrions ano capabiliries. Vork coop-
erarively ro ensure unimpeoeo siruarional awareness, given rhe fun-
oamenral link berween rransparency ano crisis srabiliry. Implemenr
rhe [oinr Dara Exchange Cenrer promprly.
Delay ballisric missile oefense oeploymenrs in Europe unril rhis
oefense sysrem is rechnically viable ano shown ro be neeoeo. Equally
imporranr, perform a |oinr missile rhrear assessmenr. (The proposeo
missile oefense sysrem is being oesigneo ro counrer an emerging
Iranian ballisric missile rhrear. More effecrive cooroinareo efforrs
berween rhe Unireo Srares ano Russia, in cooperarion wirh Euro-
pean allies ano China, ro resolve rhe Iranian nuclear rhrear coulo pre-
cluoe oeploymenr of a missile oefense sysrem in Europe.)
Builo on rhe success of rhe Cooperarive Threar Reoucrion Pro-
gram, orher cooperarive rhrear reoucrion programs such as rhe Var-
heao Safery ano Securiry Exchange agreemenr, rhe Clobal Threar
Reoucrion Iniriarive, ano rhe Megarons-ro-Megawarrs agreemenr ro
achieve berrer securiry of ano much larger reoucrions in weapons-
usable nuclear marerials. (CTR began in :jj: ano has provioeo sub-
sranrial assisrance ro Russia ano former Sovier successor srares, ano
S U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
was recenrly exrenoeo ro orher srares, ro secure weapons of mass
oesrrucrion ano rhe marerials ro make rhose weapons. The challenge
ano opporruniry now is ro rransform rhe various cooperarive rhrear
reoucrion programs inro a rrue parrnership berween rhe Unireo
Srares ano Russia.)
Reviralize nuclear warheao safery ano securiry programs rhrough
an umbrella agreemenr rhar woulo allow U.S. ano Russian experrs
ro work |oinrly ro oevelop new rechnical approaches ro arms conrrol
vericarion, nonproliferarion, ano counrerrerrorism.
Develop a new approach or agreemenr wirh Russia ro converr hun-
oreos of aooirional rons of weapons-graoe Russian uranium inro
nonweapons-usable nuclear fuel. (The Megarons-ro-Megawarrs
agreemenr srarreo in :jjj ro converr ve hunoreo merric rons of
weapons-graoe Russian uraniumenough marerial ro make rwenry
rhousano nuclear warheaosinro nonweapons-usable nuclear reac-
ror fuel. This marerial has been fueling half of all U.S. nuclear power
planrs, provioing approximarely :o percenr of rhe elecrriciry gener-
areo in rhe Unireo Srares. The conversion of rhis weapons-origin
uranium is ser ro be complereo by rhe eno of :o:. Ir is esrimareo
rhar Russia has hunoreos of more rons of weapons-graoe uranium.
Russia woulo likely ob|ecr ro conrinuing rhe rerms of rhis agreemenr,
however. Thus, when negoriaring a new agreemenr, rhe Unireo Srares
shoulo lisren anew ro Russian concerns ano inregrare rhe inreresrs of
rhe commercial nuclear inousrry.)
Alrhough rhe U.S.-Russia relarionship is ripe for a new formal arms
conrrol agreemenr, rhe U.S.-China relarionship is nor, given rhe cur-
renr large asymmerry berween U.S. ano Chinese nuclear forces. The
rise of China as a global economic power, however, rhe mooernizarion
of Chinas nuclear forces, rhe imperarive ro cooperare on a new secu-
riry archirecrure for Easr Asia in anriciparion of evenrual Korean reuni-
carion, murual inreresrs wirh respecr ro nonproliferarion, ano rhe
:oo; resr of a Chinese anrisarellire weapon are all ample reasons why
rhe Unireo Srares ano China shoulo oevelop a much berrer srraregic
unoersranoing. In parricular, Chinese nuclear force mooernizarion is
likely oriven in parr by irs concerns abour rhe currenr ano furure capa-
biliries ano inrenrions of rhe Unireo Srares, incluoing missile oefense.
China has also resisreo announcing a formal halr ro rhe prooucrion of
ssile marerial for nuclear weapons. As wirh rhe U.S.-Russia srraregic
Sj Recommenoarions
oialogue, a U.S.-China nuclear ano srraregic oialogue musr begin wirh a
clear explanarion of each sioes inreresrs ano concerns. The Task Force
furrher recommenos rhe following sreps for rhe Unireo Srares:
Conoucr frequenr milirary-ro-milirary oiscussions wirh China on
nuclear securiry issues.
Be rransparenr wirh China abour U.S. inrenrions ano capabiliries
wirh missile oefense. Offer an agreemenr for formal rransparency
ano conoence-builoing measures on rhis issue.
Propose a rrilareral ban wirh China ano Russia on resrs of kineric
anrisarellire weapons rhar can oesrroy borh civilian ano milirary sar-
ellires wirh pro|ecriles reo from lano-, air-, or space-baseo launch-
ing sysrems. Discuss wirh China ano Russia how ro expano such a
ban ro rhe global level ano rhe broaoer issue of space weapons.
NONPROLIFERATION
Failure ro resolve rhe Iranian ano Norrh Korean proliferarion chal-
lenges coulo leao ro more srares acquiring nuclear weapons or rhe
capabiliries ro make rhose weapons. The more srares rhere are wirh
nuclear weapons, rhe more likely ir is rhar rhese weapons will be useo
eirher inrenrionally or rhrough srraregic miscalcularion, or suffer loss
of conrrol. An increase in rhe number of srares wirh nuclear weapons or
weapons-usable marerials also heighrens rhe risk of rerrorisr access ro
rhese srockpiles.
The Task Force emphasizes rhar rhe mosr effecrive way ro prevenr
nuclear rerrorism is ro reouce rhe amounrs ano availabiliry of weapons-
usable nuclear marerialwherher in weapons programs or civilian
applicarionsano ro provioe rhe highesr sranoaros of securiry for whar
remains. In parricular, as rhe Unireo Srares ano Russia rake furrher sreps
ro oismanrle rheir nuclear weapons, rhey shoulo ensure rhar rhe ssile
marerial removeo from rhese weapons is eirher processeo as quickly as
possible inro nonweapons-usable form or is sub|ecr ro rhe srrongesr
securiry measures while in weapons-usable form.
Iran poses rhe roughesr proliferarion challenge. Unoer rhe guise of a
peaceful nuclear program, rhe Iranian aurhoriries have been obraining
rhe larenr abiliry ro make nuclear weapons. Ar presenr (early :ooj), rhe
Iranian uranium enrichmenr program is capable of prooucing ar leasr
S6 U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
one weapons worrh of highly enricheo uranium wirhin a few monrhs, if
Tehran were ro oecioe ro leave rhe NPT or operare a clanoesrine nuclear
weapons program in furrher violarion of irs safeguaros agreemenr wirh
rhe IAEA. Iran has oeeo UN Securiry Council resolurions ro suspeno
irs uranium enrichmenr program. The Obama aominisrrarion hopes
ro aooress rhese challenges by opening a oialogue wirh Iran baseo on
murual inreresrs ano respecr, ano employing all available rools ro resolve
rhe impasse.
Civen rhe scope of rhis reporr, rhe Task Force has focuseo on srrengrh-
ening rhe nonproliferarion regime as a way ro conrain rhe Iranian prolif-
erarion rhrear, rarher rhan oeliberare rhe possible polirical ano milirary
solurions ro rhis problem. A nuclear-armeo or even a nuclear-weapons-
capable Iran mighr leao orher narions in rhe Mioole Easr ano surrouno-
ing regions ro acquire rheir own nuclear weapons or rhe capabiliries ro
reaoily make rhem. In recenr years, abour a oozen counrries in rhese
regions have expresseo inreresr in nuclear power programs. Alrhough
rhe acquisirion of nuclear power planrs alone woulo nor presenr a seri-
ous oanger of proliferarion, ir coulo evenrually leao rhese counrries
rowaro uranium enrichmenr ano reprocessing of spenr nuclear fuel ro
separare pluroniumborh weapons-usable rechnologiesunless rhese
counrries have incenrives nor ro pursue rhese rechnologies.
The aominisrrarion will have ro acr quickly ro prepare for rhe May
:o:o NPT Review Conference, a ma|or opporruniry ro leao inrerna-
rional efforrs in srrengrhening rhe nuclear securiry sysrem. In rhis area,
rhe Task Force urges rhe Obama aominisrrarion ro leao ano work coop-
erarively wirh orhers by unoerraking rhe following sreps:
Prepare a high-level oiplomaric ream, as soon as possible, for rhe
leao-up ro rhe conference. The aominisrrarion has alreaoy formally
announceo rhe nominarion of a U.S. special represenrarive of rhe
presioenr ro rhe conference ano oesignareo rhis posr as ambassaoo-
rial in rank, borh promising signs. Before rhe conference, rhis ream
shoulo meer wirh high-level foreign governmenr ofcials ro elevare
rhe level of focus on rhe NPT in foreign capirals away from nonpro-
liferarion oiplomars ro senior ofcials who can besr appreciare how
rhe NPT increases rheir overall narional securiry. The Unireo Srares
shoulo generally emphasize rhe rheme rhar rhe righrs given ro any
NPT member are conringenr on rhe member honoring irs commir-
menrs ano responsibiliries unoer rhe rreary.
S; Recommenoarions
Ensure rhar counrries wirh nuclear power planrs are provioeo wirh
mulriple assurances of nuclear fuel supplies, rhrough rhe exisr-
ing marker, polirical commirmenrs, insurance coverage, ano fuel
banks, ro oemonsrrare a reouceo incenrive ro builo narional uranium
enrichmenr faciliries. The Unireo Srares shoulo work wirh exisring
uranium enrichmenr suppliers ro oerermine wherher ano how ro
supply nuclear fuel in a cosr-neurral way such rhar rhe cosr of pro-
oucrion equals rhe price paio by clienrs, so as ro remove rhe perceiveo
economic bener of becoming a fuel supplier ano rhus ro furrher
oecrease rhe incenrive for aooirional srares ro builo rheir own enrich-
menr planrs.
Freeze rhe consrrucrion of new narionally owneo ano operareo ura-
nium enrichmenr planrs. Any new planrs shoulo require inrerna-
rional ownership, wirh personnel ano physical securiry measures
implemenreo ar rhe planrs ro prevenr unaurhorizeo access or rrans-
fer of enrichmenr rechnologies.
Ser up a fuel-leasing program rhar woulo allow rhe Unireo Srares ro
reouce rhe risk of a srare reprocessing spenr fuel ro separare pluro-
nium by accepring spenr nuclear fuel from srares rhar have newly
acquireo nuclear power planrs. Alrhough Congress may ar rsr balk
ar such a proposal because of consriruenrs concerns abour accepr-
ing foreign nuclear wasre, rhe Task Force nores rhar rhe Ceorge V.
Bush aominisrrarions Clobal Threar Reoucrion Iniriarive accepreo
U.S.-origin research reacror spenr fuel conraining highly enricheo
uranium ro precluoe irs rhefr. The new aominisrrarion has expresseo
inreresr in conrinuing rhe CTRI. The Task Force also recommenos
rhar rhe Obama aominisrrarion encourage Russia ro conrinue irs
policy of requiring rhe reparriarion of spenr fuel, as ir oio Iran regaro-
ing spenr fuel from rhe Bushehr nuclear power planr.
Make rhe Aooirional Prorocol, a more rigorous applicarion of IAEA
safeguaros, a prerequisire for srares ro obrain commercial nuclear
power rechnologies. These srares musr also oemonsrrare rhar rhey
are fully complianr wirh rheir exisring safeguaros agreemenrs. The
Aooirional Prorocol, however, has some gaps. Ir ooes nor prevenr
srares from builoing clanoesrine nuclear faciliries. Also, in srares
wirh a gooo rrack recoro wirh rhe nonproliferarion regime, rhe
number of inspecrions is reouceo as a cosr-curring measure for rhe
IAEA. The IAEA neeos aoequare analyric ano inspecrion resources
SS U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
ro periooically moniror all srares wirh signicanr nuclear power pro-
grams regaroless of compliance recoro.
Develop ano implemenr more effecrive safeguaros rechniques, in-
cluoing wioe-area environmenral sampling ano near-real-rime mon-
iroring of nuclear faciliries, incluoing by U.S. inrelligence agencies.
Vork wirh ano encourage rhe IAEAs boaro of governors ro have
aovanceo safeguaros rechniques aoopreo as universal sranoaros.
Provioe increaseo ano susrainable funoing ro rhe IAEAs safeguaros
ano nuclear securiry oeparrmenrs ro march rhe increaseo use of
nuclear power ano increaseo amounr of nuclear marerial. Because
safeguaros ano nuclear securiry acriviries are ofren lookeo on as a
buroen by oeveloping srares, rhere is a corresponoing neeo ro ensure
rhar rhe IAEAs rechnical cooperarion buoger is commensurarely
increaseo. A srares assesseo conrriburion ro rhese buogers shoulo be
proporrionare ro rheir use of peaceful nuclear power.
Correcr weaknesses in rhe NPT rhar permir a srare ro leave rhe rreary
while unoer violarion of irs safeguaros agreemenr. The Task Force
recognizes ano supporrs rhe supreme narional inreresr clause allow-
ing a srare ro exir rhe NPT or orher arms conrrol rrearies, bur ir cau-
rions rhar a srare coulo use rhis clause as a loophole ro exir rhe rreary
while unoer srrong suspicion of oeveloping a nuclear weapons pro-
gram. Having en|oyeo rhe beners of rhe NPT, a wirhorawing srare
founo in violarion of irs safeguaros agreemenr shoulo be requireo ro
rerurn ro rhe counrries of origin rhe nuclear marerials ano rechnolo-
gies ir obraineo while a member of rhe rreary. In aooirion, rhe UN
Securiry Council shoulo seek ro conoucr a special inspecrion of rhar
srare ro oerermine wherher any safeguaroeo marerials or rechnolo-
gies have been useo in weapons programs. The Task Force acknowl-
eoges rhar rhe Unireo Srares or rhe UN Securiry Council cannor
coerce or orherwise force a srare ro remain insioe rhe NPT ano rhar ir
woulo be oifculr ro enforce rhese proposeo measures.
Increase narional ano inrernarional efforrs rowaro enrry inro force
of rhe Comprehensive Tesr Ban Treary, which woulo ban nuclear
resring worlowioe. Vhile a srare coulo oevelop a rsr-generarion
Hiroshima-rype nuclear bomb wirhour nuclear resring, rhe CTBT
woulo prevenr a srare from gaining guaranreeo rechnical assurance
rhrough nuclear resring rhar aovanceo nuclear weapons woulo work
reliably. The polirical bener of rhe CTBT is rhar ir has been srrongly
Sj Recommenoarions
linkeo ro rhe viraliry of rhe nonproliferarion regime. The Task Force
believes rhar rhe beners ourweigh rhe cosrs ano rhar rhe CTBT is
in U.S. narional securiry inreresrs. The Senare shoulo consioer aooi-
rional safeguaros, incluoing a more effecrive nuclear srockpile refur-
bishmenr program. The Senare shoulo also consioer requiring rhe
execurive branch ro provioe a oeraileo reporr ar leasr every four years
on wherher rhe CTBT conrinues ro serve U.S. inreresrs. If ano when
rhe Senare raries rhe CTBT, rhe Unireo Srares shoulo reoouble
efforrs ro work wirh allies ro urge remaining holoour srares of China,
Egypr, Inoia, Inoonesia, Iran, Israel, Norrh Korea, ano Pakisran ro
rarify rhis rreary ano help secure irs enrry inro force.
Reoouble inrernarional efforrs ro phase our highly enricheo ura-
nium in civilian applicarions, such as in research reacrors, isorope
prooucrion reacrors, ano icebreakers. HEU is rhe nuclear marerial
rhar is rhe easiesr ro use ro make an improviseo nuclear oevice, rhe
rype of nuclear explosive rhar rerrorisrs woulo mosr likely rry ro
builo. The Clobal Threar Reoucrion Iniriarive has reouceo rhe use
of HEU in research ano isorope prooucrion reacrors. As parr of rhis
iniriarive, rhe Unireo Srares workeo cooperarively wirh Russia ano
oozens of orher counrries ro reparriare Sovier-origin HEU ro Russia
ano U.S.-origin HEU ro rhe Unireo Srares. The program has also
leo ro rhe conversion of many reacrors from HEU ro nonweapons-
usable low-enricheo uranium. However, alrhough rhe Unireo Srares
has converreo mosr of irs HEU-fueleo reacrors ro LEU, Russia has
yer ro converr any of irs oozens of HEU-fueleo isorope-prooucrion,
research, ano resr reacrors. Overcoming Russian resisrance ro con-
verring irs reacrors is a challenge for rhe Obama aominisrrarion.
Incenrives ro reouce Russias use of civilian HEU shoulo incluoe
nancial assisrance ro oecommission oloer HEU-using faciliries, rhe
involvemenr of Russian nuclear scienrisrs in research acriviries rhar
oo nor involve use of HEU, ano, as a rransirional ob|ecrive, rhe con-
solioarion of oozens of such reacrors ano crirical assemblies inro a
hanoful wirh enhanceo securiry fearures.
Demonsrrare rhrough rransparency of inrenrions ano acrions rhar rhe
Unireo Srares has raken signicanr sreps rowaro reoucing irs nuclear
srockpile, ano afrm ouring rhe conference rhar ir will conrinue ro
make a gooo-fairh efforrcalleo for by Arricle VI of rhe NPTro
pursue nuclear oisarmamenr. Presioenr Obama has saio rhar as long
jo U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
as nuclear weapons exisr, well rerain a srrong oererrenr. Bur well
make rhe goal of eliminaring all nuclear weapons a cenrral elemenr
in our nuclear policy. Concerns remain, however, rhar complere
nuclear oisarmamenr is neirher feasible nor oesirable. To rhis eno,
rhe Unireo Srares shoulo ask for ano oerermine rhe views of orher
srares as ro whar polirical ano securiry conoirions as well as verica-
rion proceoures woulo be necessary ro abolish nuclear weapons.
Call for a global morarorium on rhe prooucrion of ssile marerial for
weapons purposes before rhe conference. The Obama aominisrra-
rion offering rhis proposal woulo nor by irself convince China, Inoia,
Israel, ano Pakisranrhe ma|or holoour sraresro supporr a ssile
marerial curoff. Nonerheless, rhe aominisrrarion shoulo leverage rhis
call for acrion ro rally many allies ro supporr rhe srrengrhening of rhe
nonproliferarion regime. Also, rhe Task Force recognizes rhar rhe
mechanism of rhe Conference on Disarmamenr has leo ro a srale-
mareo oiscussion on rhe proposeo Fissile Marerial Curoff Treary. The
Task Force rherefore urges rhe aominisrrarion ro rry ro gain berrer
rracrion by iniriaring parallel oiscussions wirh rhe aforemenrioneo
srares. Moreover, rhe Obama aominisrrarion shoulo reexamine rhe
previous aominisrrarions conclusion rhar rhere are no appropriare
vericarion provisions for rhe FMCT. The Task Force believes rhar
rhe Unireo Srares shoulo rrear rhe FMCT, rhough ir is an imporranr
iniriarive, as a lower prioriry rhan rhe CTBT ar rhe conference.
EXTENDED DETERRENCE
The Unireo Srares ooes nor neeo nuclear weapons ro compensare for
convenrional milirary inferioriry ano has no reason ro fear a conven-
rionally armeo foe. Bur U.S. allies, incluoing members of rhe NATO alli-
ance, Ausrralia, [apan, ano Sourh Korea, oepeno on securiry assurances
from rhe Unireo Srares. A componenr of rhese assurances is prorecrion
againsr nuclear arrack. U.S. nuclear weapons represenr one facer of
mulrilayereo oefensesincluoing oiplomacy, economic supporr, ano
convenrional milirary forcesrhar oerer arracks ano oefeno allies in
rhe evenr of an arrack. Virhour rhe nuclear aspecr of rhese assurances,
some U.S. allies may oecioe in rhe furure ro acquire nuclear weapons.
The Task Force srrongly supporrs mainraining ano enhancing, where
j: Recommenoarions
necessary, U.S. securiry assurances ro allies. Virh respecr ro rhe nuclear
aspecr of rhese assurances, rhe Task Force aovises rhe Obama aominis-
rrarion ro unoerrake rhe following sreps:
Reafrm U.S. commirmenr ro securiry assurances, incluoing ex-
renoeo nuclear oererrence, ro allies.
Consulr wirh allies ro oerermine rheir views abour rhe creoibiliry of
rhe nuclear role in securiry assurances ro assess wherher any ao|usr-
menrs in nuclear ano convenrional capabiliries are necessary.
Keep rhe relarively small U.S. nuclear srockpile in Europe as long as
rhis force supporrs NATO polirical ob|ecrives in reassuring allies
ano acrs as a oisincenrive for NATO allies ro builo rheir own nuclear
forces.
CREDIBLE NUCLEAR DETERRENT
A creoible U.S. nuclear oererrenr oepenos on mainraining a safe, secure,
ano reliable nuclear arsenal, incluoing warheaos ano weapon oelivery
sysrems. As long as rhe Unireo Srares mainrains nuclear weapons, ir
musr ensure rhar rhe weapons complex has enough human ano rech-
nical resources. In recenr years, however, concerns have been raiseo
abour rhe long-rerm viabiliry of rhe nuclear weapons complex. Since
:jj:, when rhe Unireo Srares lasr conoucreo a nuclear resr, rhe weap-
ons labs ano rhe associareo marerial ano manufacruring faciliries have
applieo rhe Srockpile Srewaroship Program ano rhe Life Exrension
Program ro mainrain legacy nuclear warheaos from rhe Colo Var. The
Unireo Srares has nor oesigneo or builr a new warheao since rhe Colo
Var. Each srraregic weapon oelivery sysrem has rwo rypes of warheaos
ir can use, ano rhe Unireo Srares has been mainraining several rhousano
reserve warheaos. The Unireo Srares spenos several billion oollars annu-
ally on srockpile srewaroship. These conoirions have leo ro rhree ma|or
concerns: how ro arrracr rop scienric ralenr ro rhe weapons labs in an
era of no nuclear resring ano no oevelopmenr of new warheaos, how
ro rransform rhe weapons complex ro save subsranrial cosrs in rhe long
rerm ano ro creare rhe conoirions for subsranrial reoucrions in reserve
warheaos, ano how ro ensure rhe safery, securiry, ano reliabiliry of rhe
remaining warheaos ano oelivery sysrems.
j: U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
In recenr years, one of rhe mosr conrroversial proposals has been ro
builo rhe reliable replacemenr warheao. Proponenrs claim rhar rhe RRV
woulo incluoe aovanceo safery ano securiry fearures ano orher measures
ro ensure reliabiliry wirhour crearing aooirional milirary capabiliries or
requiring nuclear resring. To improve workers safery, ir woulo also reouce
rhe amounr of roxic marerials as compareo ro rhe componenrs in legacy
warheaos. The Los Alamos ano Lawrence Livermore labs have unoergone
a oesign comperirion for a proposeo replacemenr warheao. However, rhe
RRV has nor been aurhorizeo for oevelopmenr or even for a cosr-ano-
feasibiliry sruoy. Congress srareo rhar such acrion was premarure unril
more funoamenral policy quesrions were aooresseo. Some crirics are
concerneo rhar rhe milirary will nor have conoence in rhese warheaos
absenr resring ano, in rurn, rhar U.S. resring woulo open rhe ooor for
orher nuclear-armeo srares ro resr. They also worry rhar rhe oevelopmenr
of rhe RRV may be perceiveo by orher srares as a new weapons sysrem
ano rhus unoermine U.S. efforrs ro rally supporr among many allies for
srrengrhening rhe nonproliferarion regime. Presioenr Obama has srareo
rhar his aominisrrarion will nor oevelop new nuclear weapons, ano Sec-
rerary Cares has been on rhe recoro as supporring rhe RRV.
S6
The Task
Force offers rhe following guioance on rhe nuclear weapons complex:
Ensure rhar rhe srockpile srewaroship program has rhe resources ano
ralenr ir neeos ro mainrain rhe safery, securiry, ano reliabiliry of rhe
remaining warheaos in rhe arsenal.
Mainrain a reaoiness ro mooernize or replace rhe U.S. arsenal,
incluoing weapon oelivery sysrems, oaring from rhe Colo Var, as
necessary.
Be rransparenr abour any proposeo changes ro rhe nuclear weapons
complex. This means rhar any oecision for or againsr a parricular
program, such as rhe reliable replacemenr warheao, shoulo be cou-
pleo wirh vigorous oiplomaric ourreach ro allies ro explain clearly
why rhese oecisions were maoe.
Couple oecisions abour proposeo weapons complex changes ro a
rigorous assessmenr of rhe furure roles of U.S. nuclear weapons ano
srraregic oialogue wirh Russia ano China.
Conoucr a comprehensive cosr-bener assessmenr of proposals ro
rransform rhe weapons complex. This assessmenr is viral in an era of
economic crisis.
j Recommenoarions
Implemenr an inregrareo approach ro weapons complex rransforma-
rion rhar assesses rhe full range of nuclear securiry acriviries. Thar
is, rhe Task Force supporrs a nuclear weapons securiry enrerprise
rhar srresses rhe equal imporrance of nonproliferarion, prevenrion
of nuclear rerrorism, mainrenance of a creoible nuclear arsenal, ano
sreps rowaro nuclear oisarmamenr.
Do nor move nuclear warheao mainrenance responsibiliries or rhe
managemenr of rhe Deparrmenr of Energys Narional Nuclear Secu-
riry Aominisrrarion ro rhe Deparrmenr of Defense.
Exercise rhe inrellecrual capaciry of rhe rechnically ralenreo people
ar rhe weapons labs, incluoing rigorous invesrigarions inro counrer-
ing rerrorisrs weapons, borh nuclear ano nonnuclear. Renew lab
research on rhe vericarion challenges of ensuring oismanrlemenr of
orher counrries nuclear warheaos.
BEST SECURI TY PRACTICES
A counrry wirh nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear mareri-
als has a special responsibiliry ro prorecr rhem againsr unaurhorizeo
access or orher loss of conrrol. Because rerrorisr groups wirhour srare
assisrance are unlikely ro have rhe means ro proouce ssile marerial for
nuclear weapons, rhey woulo have ro rarger srare-proouceo srockpiles,
wherher in rhe milirary or civilian secrors, ro make a nuclear oevice.
Terrorisrs coulo also rry ro sreal inracr nuclear weapons. Ir is essenrial,
rherefore, ro implemenr besr securiry pracrices. The Task Force sup-
porrs rhe pleoge maoe ouring rhe presioenrial campaign by rhen presi-
oenrial canoioare Obama ro secure all loose nuclear marerials in rhe
worlo wirhin four years.
The Task Force nos rhar rhough many places worlowioe require
aooirional nuclear securiry, rhe siruarion in Pakisran is in neeo of par-
ricular arrenrion. Many of rhe rerrorisrs who seek nuclear weapons or
ssile marerial are especially acrive in Pakisran ano rhe surrounoing
region. In aooirion, because Pakisran has a hisrory of polirical insrabil-
iry ano has baseo irs weapons program mainly on highly enricheo ura-
nium, which can be useo mosr easily ro make nuclear oevices, rhe Task
Force urges rhe Obama aominisrrarion ro reoouble efforrs ro work
wirh Pakisran ro improve nuclear securiry. Islamabao, meanwhile, has
j U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
been wary of assisrance rhar mighr reveal sensirive informarion abour
rhe oesigns ano locarions of irs nuclear weapons or rhar mighr pub-
licly suggesr rhar ir is beholoen ro Vashingron for nuclear securiry.
Virh respecr ro rhese concerns, rhe Task Force recommenos rhar rhe
Unireo Srares offer, if ir has nor alreaoy oone so, securiry cooperarion
rhar incluoes generic physical securiry proceoures, unclassieo mili-
rary hanobooks, porral conrrol equipmenr, sophisricareo vaulrs ano
access ooors, ano personnel reliabiliry programs, while srriving ro nor
increase rhe likelihooo of nuclear war in Sourh Asia, harm relarions
wirh Inoia, or unoermine rhe Pakisrani governmenr. Similarly, because
of rerrorisr acriviries in Inoia, rhe Unireo Srares shoulo work wirh New
Delhi in a cooperarive manner ro share lessons learneo abour oevelop-
ing besr securiry pracrices.
The Unireo Srares irself has recenrly raken acrion ro ensure aurho-
rizeo conrrol of irs nuclear weapons. In Augusr :oo;, rhe U.S. Air
Force oio nor exercise aoequare conrrol over six nuclear-armeo cruise
missiles rhar were own across rhe Unireo Srares wirhour proper
aurhorizarion. Secrerary Cares acreo quickly ano appropriarely ro
insrill berrer oiscipline ano professionalism in rhe Air Forces nuclear
commano. The Task Force recommenos rhar rhe Unireo Srares applies
rhe lessons learneo from rhis incioenr ro irs cooperarive global work in
improving accounrabiliry over nuclear weapons ano weapons-usable
marerials.
In rhe issue area of implemenring besr securiry pracrices, rhe Task
Force calls on rhe Obama aominisrrarion ro unoerrake rhe following
sreps:
Holo a presioenrial summir wirh Russian presioenr Meoveoev ro
secure a |oinr U.S.-Russia commirmenr ro leao global efforrs ro
implemenr besr nuclear securiry pracrices. This summir will builo
ano expano on rhe Bush-Purin summir helo in Brarislava in Febru-
ary :ooj, in which borh Russia ano rhe Unireo Srares commirreo ro
srrengrhen cooperarive efforrs ro counrer nuclear rerrorism.
Follow rhrough on Presioenr Obamas pleoge ro convene a global
conference wirhin rhe rsr year of rhe aominisrrarion on nuclear rer-
rorism prevenrion. This conference will provioe an opporruniry ro
convince all srares wirh nuclear weapons-usable marerials ro imple-
menr besr securiry pracrices wirhin rhe presioenrs goal oare of :o::.
jj Recommenoarions
Implemenr expeoiriously rhe Narional Nuclear Securiry Aominis-
rrarions acrion plan ro secure ano remove, where feasible, weapons-
usable nuclear marerials, especially highly enricheo uranium ar
oozens of sires worlowioe.
Increase rransparency abour rhe srarus of rhe U.S. nuclear weap-
ons invenrory. The purpose of rhis policy is ro ser an inrernarional
sranoaro for reporring on nuclear weapons srarusrhereby encour-
aging orher narions ro oo rhe same. This woulo reinforce rhe impor-
rance of accounrabiliry ano srewaroship of all weapons in a narions
possession.
Commir rhe Unireo Srares ro publishing an annual reporr oerailing irs
nuclear oismanrlemenr acriviries, incluoing rhe number ano rype of
warheaos formally rerireo ano awairing oismanrlemenr. The Unireo
Srares shoulo encourage orher nuclear-armeo narions ro reporr on
rheir progress in rhese efforrs.
Increase, as much as possible, rhe rare ar which U.S. nuclear war-
heaos slareo for oismanrlemenr are oisassembleo.
Dispose of ssile marerial, incluoing highly enricheo uranium ano
pluronium, in excess of U.S. oefense neeos inro nonweapons-usable
forms ano provioe high securiry for rhe reraineo marerial.
Share as much informarion as possible, consisrenr wirh legal ano
classicarion requiremenrs, wirh orher nuclear-armeo srares, ro
encourage equipping all nuclear weapons wirh mechanisms ano pro-
ceoures ro prevenr unaurhorizeo use.
Share lessons learneo from rhe Unireo Srares own securiry lapses
in conoenrial oiscussionsas an imporranr srep in encouraging rhe
highesr sranoaros of nuclear cusrooianship.
Vork wirh member srares of rhe IAEA ro move rhe IAEAs nuclear
securiry program inro rhe organizarions regular buoger. In rhis
way, rhe program woulo bener from a larger ano more preoicable
resource base rhan whar irs currenr volunrary characrer allows for.
This acrion shoulo nor precluoe aooirional volunrary conrriburions
(as wirh rhe rechnical cooperarion program in rhe regular buoger)
rhar srares may choose ro make. This recommenoarion inrenos ro
ensure rhar rhe IAEAs nuclear securiry program receives funoing
ro a level commensurare wirh rhe large amounr of nuclear marerial
requiring prorecrion worlowioe.
j6 U.S. Nuclear Veapons Policy
Reoouble oiplomaric efforrs ro bring inro force rhe amenoeo Con-
venrion on rhe Physical Prorecrion of Nuclear Marerial, which
requires srares ro enhance rhe securiry of nuclear marerial in oomes-
ric use as well as in inrernarional rransir.
U. S. LEADERSHIP
The Task Force unoerscores rhar posrColo Var changes in rhe securiry
environmenr call for reneweo American leaoership ro shape U.S. nuclear
weapons policy ano posrure. Many compering inreresrs will oemano
Presioenr Obamas arrenrion. However, urgenr nuclear policy issues in-
cluoe rhe impenoing expirarion of START, rhe nuclear posrure review,
ano rhe prepararion for rhe :o:o NPT Review Conference. Presioenr
Obama has shown an early commirmenr ro rhis issue wirh his hisroric
pronouncemenrs in Europe in April :ooj ano his call for U.S. leaoership
on nuclear arms reoucrion ano nonproliferarion efforrs. The Task Force
recommenos rhar rhe presioenr, rhe Narional Securiry Council, rhe oe-
parrmenrs of Srare, Defense, ano Energy, rhe Narional Nuclear Securiry
Aominisrrarion, ano rhe inrelligence communiry shoulo rrear rhe forrh-
coming nuclear posrure review as a rhoughrful ano serious expression
of U.S. nuclear policy, nor merely as a bureaucraric exercise, ano rhar rhe
review shoulo give appropriare weighr ro nonproliferarion, nuclear rerror-
ism prevenrion, arms conrrol, ano rhe creoibiliry of rhe U.S. oererrenr.
The presioenrs involvemenr wirh nuclear weapons policy shoulo nor
srop when rhe review is complereo. He ano his senior aovisers shoulo
receive periooic oeraileo briengs (annually, unless rhere is an unusual
evenr requiring more frequenr upoares) abour nuclear weapons posrure
ano rargering, as well as rhe srarus of narional ano inrernarional efforrs
ro reouce ano secure nuclear weapons-usable marerials. In rhe review
ano follow-on assessmenrs, rhe Task Force calls on rhe aominisrrarion
ro oerermine where rhe Unireo Srares can exerr even more leaoership
by reoucing, via unilareral acrion, rhe amounrs of nuclear weapons ano
ssile marerial oeemeo excess ro oefense neeos.
Ir is roo early ro know how Presioenr Obamas recenr grounobreak-
ing oeclararions will play our, bur ir is rhe Task Forces sincere hope
rhar U.S leaoership on rhis issue will leno creoibiliry ro U.S. ano global
efforrs ro prevenr rhe use of nuclear weapons, curb proliferarion, ano
reouce rhe rhrears poseo by nuclear weapons ano marerials.
j;
Aooirional or Dissenring Views
The key poinrs rhar I founo compelling in rhe Task Force oeliberarions
are: (:) rhe Unireo Srares will neeo ro mainrain a creoible nuclear oerer-
renr for rhe foreseeable furure, (:) rhe nuclear srockpilesoeployeo
warheaos, rerireo weapons awairing oismanrlemenr, ano srraregic
nuclear marerialof rhe Unireo Srares, Russia, ano orher counrries,
can ano shoulo be reouceo, () ir is in rhe inreresr of rhe Unireo Srares
for rhese srockpile reoucrions ro rake place in a rransparenr manner, ()
rhe Unireo Srares musr engage Russia ano China on nuclear issues if
progress is ro be maoe on reoucing srockpiles ano slowing prolifera-
rionfor example, by Iran ano Norrh Korea, (j) prevenring or revers-
ing a counrrys move rowaro rhe bomb is besr achieveo by aooressing
rhe counrrys securiry concerns, coercive inrernarional agreemenrs are
seconoary, (6) rhe U.S. Deparrmenr of Energy musr aoopr a compre-
hensive plan ro supporr rhe faciliries ano people of irs nuclear securiry
enrerprise rhar is responsible for weapons R&D, marerials prooucrion,
naval nuclear reacrors, associareo oefense nuclear wasre managemenr,
ano counrerproliferarion acriviries.
[ohn Deurch
Vhile I supporr rhe many useful recommenoarions incluoeo in rhis
reporr, ir fails in whar I believeo was ro have been irs primary goal: ro
provioe a clear ano acrionable sraremenr of rhe purposes serveo by
nuclear weapons. A consensus view of rhis Task Force coulo have been,
I believe, a signicanr conrriburion ro rhe currenr global oebare on
nuclear weapons policy, ano I am oisappoinreo rhar rhis opporruniry
was misseo.
Laura S.H. Holgare
jS Aooirional or Dissenring Views
This reporr unoerscores rhe imporrance of a srrong nuclear oerer-
renr ar rhe core of a comprehensive srraregy rhar incluoes valuable
sreps such as conrinuing START, securing nuclear weapons ano
ssile marerial, exploring missile oefense, ano rransforming coop-
erarive rhrear reoucrion programs. Every proposal in rhe reporr, how-
ever, runs a serious risk rhar ir will nor work our as inrenoeo. One is
reminoeo of rhe :jj: Korean Denuclearizarion Agreemenr, wirh irs
ban on enrichmenr ano reprocessing ano aooirional inspecrion mea-
sures rhar offereo an NPT-plus regime, which is srill soughr for
rroubleo regions. Eighreen years ano four aominisrrarions larer, rhe
Unireo Srares has insreao exposeo irs inabiliry ro enforce compliance
even wirh basic NPT obligarions.
In a worlo of rapio polirical ano rechnical change, governmenrs are
having oifculry making realisric risk assessmenrs, ro say norhing of
noing workable solurions ro complex polirical ano rechnological oilem-
mas. Failure on Iran ano Norrh Korea now will have grear implicarions
for rhe furure. Orher issues may be seconoary bur remain imporranr.
For example, START follow-on woulo bener from a reexaminarion
of how START I ano II aooresseo srabiliry ano vericarion. Qualirarive
arms conrrol, such as rhar in rhe CTBT ano whar woulo be incluoeo in a
formal anrisarellire ban, are likely ro have signicanr uninrenoeo conse-
quences as oual-use rechnology aovances.
This reporr leaves several funoamenral quesrions unanswereo.
Shoulo rhe nuclear posrure review nor allow for exibiliry in rhe rypes
of warheaos ro be rerireo, if such exibiliry coulo save money or improve
safery ano securiry? Aooirionally, rhough rhe oownsioes of moving rhe
U.S. weapons complex ro rhe Deparrmenr of Defense are clear, whar
shoulo be oone ro aooress currenr oysfuncrions?
Ronalo F. Lehman II
The oisclaimer ar rhe beginning of rhis reporr, ano rhe language
acknowleoging oifferences among Task Force members in imporranr
places wirhin rhe reporr, makes ir unnecessary for me ro oissenr. I woulo
like briey ro argue, however, rhar rhe oiscussion of rhe purposes of
U.S. nuclear weapons ooes nor persuasively make rhe case for rheir role
beyono oererring rhrears ro narional survival, nor ooes ir make rhe case
for rhe neeo ro oevelop new nuclear weapons, an oprion rhar rhe reporr
jj Aooirional or Dissenring Views
ooes nor excluoe. Tooay, only nuclear weapons, ano only nuclear weap-
ons of a quanriry ano qualiry wieloeo by srares, pose such rhrears. Orher
rhrears oiscusseo in rhe reporrconvenrional milirary forces, chemical
ano porenrial biological weapons, rerrorism, ano blackmailare nor of
a scale or narure ro |usrify U.S. rerenrion of a oeployeo nuclear arsenal.
To assume orherwise is ro miss an opporruniry for rhe Unireo Srares ro
leao orhers in rrying ro creare rhe conoirions necessary ro srrengrhen
rhe inrernarional nonproliferarion regime ano oevelop robusr verica-
rion ano enforcemenr pracrices rhar coulo, in oecaoes hence, enable rhe
eliminarion of all nuclear arsenals.
As long as orhers possess nuclear weapons or rhrearen ro acquire
rhem, rhe Unireo Srares will rerain an effecrive nuclear oererrenr. Bur
rhis reporr allows for rhe unhelpful ano unnecessary perceprion rhar rhe
Unireo Srares shoulo be more concerneo abour perperuaring irs nuclear
arsenal rhan ir is abour crearing rhe conoirions rhar woulo allow all srares
ro live free from rhe rerrifying rhrear of nuclear war.
Ceorge R. Perkovich
I enoorse rhe general policy rhrusr of rhis reporr wirh one exceprion. The
reporr srares rhar rhe currenr U.S. nuclear oocrrine of calculareo ambi-
guiryor rhrearening ro use nuclear weapons in response ro a chemical
or biological arrackconrinues ro serve U.S. inreresrs. I oo nor believe
rhar ro be rhe case rooay. In his April j, :ooj, speech in Prague, Presi-
oenr Barack Obama promiseo rhar ro pur an eno ro Colo Var rhink-
ing, |rhe Unireo Sraresj will reouce rhe role of nuclear weapons in |irsj
narional securiry srraregy ano urge orhers ro oo rhe same. The besr way
ro reouce rhe role of nuclear weapons in U.S. narional securiry srrar-
egy woulo be ro srare clearly rhar rhe purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons
is ro oerer rhe use of orher srares nuclear weapons againsr rhe Unireo
Srares, irs allies, ano irs rroops overseas. The currenr policy of calcu-
lareo ambiguiry is also inconsisrenr wirh U.S. negarive securiry pleoges
given ro nonnuclear weapon srares ar NPT review conferences. Furrher,
ir encourages orher nuclear weapon srares ro aoopr similar oocrrines,
rarher rhan encouraging rhem ro reouce rhe roles rhar nuclear weapons
play in rheir narional securiry policy.
Scorr D. Sagan
:oo Aooirional or Dissenring Views
This reporr covers a number of sub|ecrs in oeprh ano presenrs many
consrrucrive recommenoarions. However, ir leaves open rhe possibil-
iry of new warheao oevelopmenr. Vhile I supporr a variery of means
for mainraining rhe exisring nuclear srockpile, I srrongly feel rhar rhese
shoulo nor incluoe complere replacemenr or new weapons. Ir is my
opinion rhar rhe reporr implies rhe possible necessiry of new warheao
oesigns, a specic poinr on which I musr oissenr.
Benn Tannenbaum
:o:
Enonores
:. Some oocumenrs suboivioe rhe srockpile inro acrive ano inacrive elemenrs. The acrive
srockpile is fully funcrional, incluoing warheaos conraining rririum, ano incluoes all
operarionally oeployeo warheaos. Inacrive warheaos are nor fully funcrional, nor-
mally because rhe rririum has been removeo. These caregories are imporranr for lo-
gisrical purposes bur are nor useful for rhe Task Forces analysis ano are nor useo in
rhis reporr.
:. The Vhire House, The Agenoa, Foreign Policy, hrrp:jjwww.whirehouse.govj
agenoajforeign_policy.
. Barack Obama, Remarks by Presioenr Barack Obama (speech, Hraocany Square,
Prague, Czech Republic, April j, :ooj), hrrp:jjwww.whirehouse.govjrhe_press_
ofcejRemarks-by-Presioenr-Barack-Obama-in-Prague-as-Delivereo.
. For views on a srraregy rowaro Iran, see Iran: Time for a New Approach, Inoepenoenr
Task Force Reporr No. j: (New York: Council on Foreign Relarions Press, :oo),
chaireo by Zbigniew Brzezinski ano Roberr M. Cares. In :ooj, CFR also launcheo an
Inoepenoenr Task Force on Korea.
j. Remarks by Presioenr Barack Obama, April j, :ooj.
6. FAS Srraregic Securiry Blog, Unireo Srares Reaches Moscow Treary Varheao Limir
Early, February j, :ooj, hrrp:jjwww.fas.orgjblogjsspj:oojjo:jsorr.php.
;. The Vhire House, The Agenoa, Foreign Policy.
S. Remarks by Presioenr Barack Obama, April j, :ooj.
j. All quores from rhe Bush aominisrrarions nuclear posrure review are from Nuclear
Posrure Review |Excerprsj, [anuary :oo:, hrrp:jjwww.globalsecuriry.orgjwmoj
libraryjpolicyjooojnpr.hrm.
:o. UK Minisrry of Defence, The Future of the United Kingdoms Nuclear Deterrent, CM
6jj (Lonoon: The Srarionary Ofce, December :oo6).
::. See, for example, Roberr V. Nelson, Low-Yielo Earrh-Penerraring Nuclear Veap-
ons, Science & Global Security vol. :o, no. : (:oo:), pp. ::o.
::. Lewis A. Dunn, Cregory Ciles, [effrey Larsen, ano Thomas Skypek, Foreign Perspec-
tives on U.S. Nuclear Policy and Posture: Insights, Issues and Implications (Forr Belvoir, VA:
Defense Threar Reoucrion Agency, :oo6).
:. Deepri Choubey, Are New Nuclear Bargains Attainable? Carnegie Enoowmenr Reporr
(Vashingron, DC: Carnegie Enoowmenr for Inrernarional Peace, Ocrober :ooS).
:. The Bush aominisrrarion never soughr ro oevelop low-yielo nuclear weapons, rhough
rhe perceprion rhar ir oio is wioespreao borh in rhe Unireo Srares ano abroao.
:j. Ma|or Ceneral Polly A. Peyer, chair, Air Force Blue Ribbon Review of Nuclear Weapons
Policies and Procedures (Vashingron, DC: Heaoquarrers U.S. Air Force, :ooS).
:6. Norrh Arlanric Treary Organizarion, NATOs Nuclear Forces in rhe New Secu-
riry Environmenr (facr sheer, [uly :, :ooS), hrrp:jjwww.naro.inrjissuesjnuclearj
sec-environmenr.hrml.
:o: Enonores
:;. Senare Commirree on Foreign Relarions, Convention on Chemical Weapons (Treary
Doc. :o-::), prepareo sraremenr by Villiam [. Perry, :orh Cong., :o sess., March :S,
:jj6, p. ::.
:S. Charles Aloinger, U.S. Rules Our Nuclear Arrack on Libya Planr, Washington Post,
May S, :jj6, p. A:. For furrher analysis of rhis issue see, for example, Scorr Sagan,
The Commirmenr Trap: Vhy rhe Unireo Srares Shoulo Nor Use Nuclear Threars ro
Derer Biological ano Chemical Veapon Arracks, International Security vol. :, no
(Spring :ooo), pp. Sj::j.
:j. Ceorge P. Shulrz, Villiam [. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, ano Sam Nunn, A Vorlo Free
of Nuclear Veapons, Wall Street Journal, [anuary , :oo;, Harolo Brown ano [ohn
Deurch, The Nuclear Disarmamenr Fanrasy, Wall Street Journal, November :j, :oo;,
Ceorge P. Shulrz, Villiam [. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, ano Sam Nunn, Towaro a
Nuclear-Free Vorlo, Wall Street Journal, [anuary :j, :ooS.
:o. Anrhony Lake, Confronring Backlash Srares, Foreign Affairs, MarchjApril :jj.
::. [ohn McCain, An Enouring Peace Builr on Freeoom: Securing Americas Furure,
Foreign Affairs, NovemberjDecember :oo;.
::. Russia Failing ro Meer Nuclear Disarmamenr Obligarions, U.S. Srare Deparrmenr
Ofcial Says, Global Security Newswire, April :, :oo6, hrrp:jjwww.nri.orgjo_
newswirejissuesj:oo6jj:jb;:f;;;-o:e-aS-bS;-jooojoo6foe.hrml.
:. Selig Harrison, a U.S. experr on Norrh Korea, saio Norrh Korean ofcials rolo him
rhar Pyongyang hao converreo sixry-eighr pounos of pluronium inro weapons form.
See Blaine Haroen, N. Korea Discoroanr on Obama Era, Nuclear Arsenal, Wash-
ington Post, [anuary :S, :ooj, Korean Cenrral News Agency, DPRK ro Scrap All
Poinrs Agreeo wirh S. Korea over Polirical ano Milirary Issues (press release, [anu-
ary o, :ooj).
:. U.S. Narional Inrelligence Council, Iran: Nuclear Inrenrions ano Capabiliries, Na-
tional Intelligence Estimate, November :oo; (iralics in rhe original), hrrp:jjwww.oni.
govjpress_releasesj:oo;::o_release.pof.
:j. Boaro of Covernors, Implemenrarion of rhe NPT Safeguaros Agreemenr ano Rele-
vanr Provisions of Securiry Council Resolurions :;; (:oo6), :;; (:oo;), :So (:ooS),
ano :Sj (:ooS) in rhe Islamic Republic of Iran (reporr, Inrernarional Aromic Energy
Agency, November :j, :ooS), hrrp:jjwww.isis-online.orgjpublicarionsjiranjiaea-
iranreporr-:::joS.pof.
:6. Boaro of Covernors, Implemenrarion of rhe NPT Safeguaros Agreemenr ano Rele-
vanr Provisions of Securiry Council Resolurions :;; (:oo6), :;; (:oo;), :So (:ooS),
ano :Sj (:ooS) in rhe Islamic Republic of Iran (reporr, Inrernarional Aromic Energy
Agency, February :j, :ooj), hrrp:jjwww.isis-online.orgjpublicarionsjiranjIAEA_
Iran_Reporr_:jFeb:ooj.pof.
:;. For a more oeraileo analysis of rhis issue, see Michael A. Levi, Deterring State Spon-
sorship of Nuclear Terrorism, Council Special Reporr No. j (New York: Council on
Foreign Relarions Press, :ooS).
:S. See, for example, Davio Sanger, Pakisran, Nuclear Nighrmare, New York Times Mag-
azine, [anuary S, :ooj.
:j. Helene Cooper ano Nicholas Kulish, Bioen Signals U.S. Is Open ro Russia Missile
Deal, New York Times, February S, :ooj.
o. [oseph R. Bioen [r., Remarks by Vice Presioenr Bioen ar rhe jrh Munich Confer-
ence on Securiry Policy, (speech, Munich, Cermany, February ;, :ooj), hrrp:jjwww.
whirehouse.govjrhe_press_officejRemarksbyVicePresioenrBioenarjrhMunich
ConferenceonSecuriryPolicy.
:. Russia May Deploy New-Cenerarion Ballisric Missiles by :o:;, RIA Novosri, De-
cember :, :oo;.
:o Enonores
:. In a November :;, :oo;, meering of rhe Nuclear Srraregy Forum, rerireo senior Rus-
sian milirary ofcers srareo rhar rhe Russian nonsrraregic arsenal incluoeo ,Soo war-
heaos, of which :,:oo were air oefense weapons.
. Defense Science Boaro Permanenr Task Force on Nuclear Veapons Surery, U.S. De-
parrmenr of Defense, Reporr on rhe Unaurhorizeo Movemenr of Nuclear Veapons
(Vashingron, DC, February :ooS), hrrp:jjwww.fas.orgjnukejguioejusajoocrrinej
usafjMinor_DSB-o:oS.pof.
. In rhe U.S.-Russia conrexr, many experrs have specically aoviseo rhe rwo sioes ro re-
frain from placing mulriple warheaos on silo-baseo ICBMs. The oesrabilizing fearure
is rhar one weapon rargereo on a single silo coulo oesrroy mulriple warheaos, rhus cre-
aring a use-or-lose siruarion in a crisis. Unoer START II, which never came inro force,
borh sioes woulo have been requireo ro arm ICBMs only wirh single warheaos. Borh
counrries regaro START II as oeao, alrhough ir inuenceo U.S. force planning rhrough
rhe reriremenr of rhe MXjPeacekeeper ICBM ano parrial oe-MIRVing of rhe Minure-
man III force, ano may have inuenceo Russian planning as well. The ma|oriry of U.S.
ICBMs carry only one warheao.
j. Remarks by Presioenr Barack Obama, April j, :ooj.
6. Ceorge N. Lewis ano Theooore A. Posrol, European Missile Defense: The Techno-
logical Basis of Russian Concerns, Arms Control Today vol. ;, no. S (Ocrober :oo;),
pp. ::S.
;. For more oerails of rhis program, see hrrp:jjwww.usec.comjmegaronsromegawarrs.
hrm.
S. Phil Sewell, Anorher Approach ro Reoucing Access ro Veapons-Craoe Nuclear
Srockpiles (paper presenreo ro rhe Tenrh Annual Inrernarional Nuclear Marerials
Policy Forum, December :j, :oo).
j. Laura S. H. Holgare, Acceleraring rhe Bleno-oown of Russian Highly Enricheo Ura-
nium (paper presenreo ar rhe annual meering of rhe Insrirure for Nuclear Marerials
Managemenr, [uly :ooj), Michael Knapik, NTI Sruoy Presenrs Clearer Picrure of
Russian HEU Downblenoing, NuclearFuel, Augusr :j, :ooj, p. ::.
o. Henry Sokolski, The Nexr Arms Race (orafr paper, Nonproliferarion Policy Eouca-
rion Cenrer, November ::, :ooS).
:. Roberr S. Norris ano Hans M. Krisrensen, Chinese Nuclear Forces :ooS, Nuclear
Notebook vol. 6, no. ([ulyjAugusr :ooS), p. :, ciring Ofce of rhe Secrerary of De-
fense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China (Vash-
ingron, DC: U.S. Deparrmenr of Defense, :ooS), p. j6.
:. Michael D. Maples, Direcror of rhe Defense Inrelligence Agency, Annual Threar
Assessmenr, Sraremenr before rhe Commirree on Armeo Services, Unireo Srares
Senare, :::rh Cong., :sr sess., March :o, :ooj, hrrp:jjarmeo-services.senare.govj
sraremnrj:oojjMarchjMaples:oo-:o-oj.pof.
. [effrey Lewis, The Minimum Means of Reprisal: Chinas Search for Security in the Nuclear
Age (Cambrioge, MA: MIT Press, :oo;), Norris ano Krisrensen, Chinese Nuclear
Forces :ooS.
. Ofce of rhe Secrerary of Defense, Annual Report, p. :.
j. Roberr M. Cares, A Balanceo Srraregy: Reprogramming rhe Penragon for a New
Age, Foreign Affairs, [anuaryjFebruary :ooj.
6. Dennis C. Blair, Direcror of Narional Inrelligence, Annual Threar Assessmenr of rhe
Inrelligence Communiry for rhe Senare Armeo Services Commirree, :::rh Cong., :sr
sess., March :o, :ooj, hrrp:jjinrelligence.senare.govjojo:::jblair.pof.
;. Peoples Republic of China, Chinas Narional Defense in :oo6 (Bei|ing: Informarion
Ofce of rhe Srare Council, December :j, :oo6), hrrp:jjwww.fas.orgjnukejguioej
chinajoocrrinejwp:oo6.hrml.
:o Enonores
S. Bruce V. MacDonalo, China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security, Council Special
Reporr No. S (New York: Council on Foreign Relarions Press, :ooS).
j. The oivioing line berween low-enricheo ano highly enricheo uranium is a :o percenr
concenrrarion of rhe ssile isorope uranium-:j. As enrichmenr increases above rhis
level, rhe more weapons-usable rhe enricheo uranium becomes. Veapons-graoe ura-
nium rypically has an enrichmenr of jo percenr or grearer of uranium-:j.
jo. Cary Samore, eo., Irans Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment (Lonoon:
Rourleoge, Seprember :ooj).
j:. The Aooirional Prorocol was formeo in response ro rhe safeguaros crisis of rhe :jSos
ano early :jjos involving Iraqs nuclear program. Afrer rhe :jj: Culf Var, UN inspec-
rors oiscovereo rhar Iraq was perhaps wirhin monrhs of oeveloping nuclear weapons
oespire rhe facr rhar comprehensive safeguaros hao been applieo ro Iraqs oeclareo
nuclear program. The problem was rhar rhe comprehensive safeguaros agreemenr
oio nor require Iraq ro ler inspecrors inro irs unoeclareo faciliries, which happeneo in
many cases ro be nexr ro oeclareo faciliries. Nonerheless, rhe IAEA hao srarurory au-
rhoriry ro requesr a special inspecrion of rhe unoeclareo faciliries, bur rhe IAEA boaro
of governors hao been relucranr for polirical reasons ro allow inspecrors ro make such
inspecrions.
j:. For a relareo view, see Thomas Shea, Financing IAEA Vericarion of rhe NPT (paper
presenreo ar rhe NPECjFRS Conference, November :::, :oo6).
j. Annex : srares musr meer rhe crireria of having been a member of rhe Conference on
Disarmamenr on [une :S, :jj6, ano of being on rhe IAEA lisrs of srares wirh nuclear
power reacrors or research reacrors. Using rhese crireria, Annex : incluoes all of rhe
non-NPT srares as well as all srares wirh breakour capabiliry ro make nuclear weapons.
j. Roberr M. Cares, Nuclear Veapons ano Dererrence in rhe ::sr Cenrury (speech oe-
livereo ar rhe Carnegie Enoowmenr for Inrernarional Peace, Ocrober :S, :ooS), hrrp:jj
www.carnegieenoowmenr.orgjlesj:o:S_rranscrip_gares_checkeo.pof.
jj. The Narional Acaoemies, Acaoemy Aooresses Technical Issues in Nuclear Tesr
Ban Treary (press release, [uly :, :oo), full reporr, Technical Issues Relareo
ro rhe Comprehensive Nuclear Tesr Ban Treary, hrrp:jjwww.nap.eoujcaralog.
php?recoro_io=:o;:#roc.
j6. The Prepararory Commission nores rhar rhe planneo sruoies will highlighr prog-
ress maoe in seismology, hyoroacousrics, infrasouno, ano raoionuclioes moniroring.
CTBTO Prepararory Commission, Vanr ro [oin a Clobal Scienric Pro|ecr? Inrerna-
rional Scienric Sruoies ro Evaluare rhe CTBT Vericarion Regime, April :ooS, hrrp:jj
www.crbro.orgjleaominjconrenrjreferencejourreachj:oooS_issleaer_web.pof.
j;. Safeguaro A: conoucr a Science Baseo Srockpile Srewaroship program ro ensure a safe,
secure, ano reliable nuclear arsenal, Safeguaro B: mainrain mooern nuclear laborarory
faciliries ano programs, Safeguaro C: mainrain rhe capabiliry ro resume nuclear resr
acriviries, Safeguaro D: improve rreary moniroring via a comprehensive research ano
oevelopmenr program, Safeguaro E: assess rhrough a vigorous inrelligence program
rhe srarus of nuclear weapons programs worlowioe, ano Safeguaro F: unoersrano rhar
rhe presioenr, in consulrarion wirh Congress, woulo be prepareo ro wirhoraw from rhe
rreary if rhe secreraries of oefense ano energy inform rhe presioenr rhar rhey coulo no
longer cerrify a high level of conoence in rhe safery or reliabiliry of a nuclear weapon
rype oeemeo crirical ro rhe U.S. oererrenr force.
jS. See, for example, Henry Sokolski ano Parrick Clawson, eos., Getting Ready for a Nu-
clear Iran (Carlisle, PA: Srraregic Sruoies Insrirure, :ooj).
jj. Michael D. Maples, Direcror of rhe Defense Inrelligence Agency, Annual Threar As-
sessmenr, Sraremenr before Commirree on Armeo Services, Unireo Srares Senare,
March :o, :ooj.
:oj Enonores
6o. Davio Albrighr ano Kimberly Kramer, Civil HEU Varch: Tracking Invenrories of
Civil Highly Enricheo Uranium, in Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials (In-
rernarional Insrirure for Science ano Inrernarional Securiry, February :ooj), hrrp:jj
www.isis-online.orgjglobal_srocksjeno:oojcivil_heu_warch:ooj.pof.
6:. Narional Nuclear Securiry Aominisrrarion, Clobal Threar Reoucrion Iniriarive: Srra-
regic Plan (Vashingron, DC: U.S. Deparrmenr of Energy, [anuary :ooj).
6:. See, for example, Anaroli C. Diakov, Alexanoer M. Dmirriev, [ungmin Kang, Alexey M.
Shuvayev, ano Frank N. von Hippel, Feasibiliry of Converring Russian Icebreaker Re-
acrors from HEU ro LEU Fuel, Science and Global Security vol. : (:oo6), pp. S.
6. Commirree on Meoical Isorope Prooucrion Virhour Highly Enricheo Uranium, Na-
rional Research Council, Medical Isotope Production Without Highly Enriched Uranium
(Vashingron, DC: Narional Acaoemy of Sciences Press, :ooj).
6. Nuclear Energy Agency, Nuclear Energy Outlook , NEA No. 6S (Paris: OECD
Publishing, :ooS).
6j. For a oeraileo oiscussion of rhese fuel cycle proposals, see, for example, U.S. Commir-
ree ano Russian Commirree on rhe Inrernarionalizarion of rhe Civilian Nuclear Fuel
Cycle, Narional Acaoemy of Sciences ano Russian Acaoemy of Sciences, Internation-
alization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges (Vashingron, DC:
The Narional Acaoemies Press, :ooj).
66. [ames E. Coooby, Inrernarionalizing rhe Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, Seprember , :ooS, hrrp:jjwww.rhebullerin.orgjweb-eoirionjop-
eosjinrernarionalizing-rhe-nuclear-fuel-cycle.
6;. Marrhew Bunn, Bob van oer Zwaan, [ohn P. Holoren, ano Sreve Ferrer, The Economics
of Reprocessing vs. Direct Disposal of Spent Fuel (Cambrioge, MA: Reporr for Pro|ecr
on Managing rhe Arom, Belfer Cenrer for Science ano Inrernarional Affairs, Harvaro
Kenneoy School, December :oo).
6S. Charles D. Ferguson, Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism, Council Special
Reporr No. :: (New York: Council on Foreign Relarions Press, :oo6).
6j. Levi, Deterring State Sponsorship of Nuclear Terrorism.
;o. For oerails, see Nuclear Forensics: Role, State of the Art, and Program Needs, |oinr work-
ing group of rhe American Physical Sociery ano rhe American Associarion for rhe Ao-
vancemenr of Science, :ooS.
;:. Nuclear Threar Iniriarive, NTI in Acrion: Vorlo Insrirure for Nuclear Securiry,
hrrp:jjwww.nri.orgjb_abournrijb;_wins.hrml.
;:. DSB Permanenr Task Force on Nuclear Veapons Surery, Reporr on rhe Unaurhor-
izeo Movemenr of Nuclear Veapons (Vashingron, DC: Defense Science Boaro, Feb-
ruary :ooS), p. ;, hrrp:jjwww.acq.oso.miljosbjreporrsj:ooS-o-Nuclear_Veapons_
Surery.pof.
;. Ibio, p. j.
;. Secrerary of Defense Task Force on Nuclear Veapons Managemenr, Phase I: The Air
Force Nuclear Mission, Seprember :ooS, p. :.
;j. Peyer, U.S. Air Force Blue Ribbon Review.
;6. The VSj, Bjo, ano Vj: were canceleo in :jj: ano :jj:. Kevin ONeill, Builoing rhe
Bomb, chaprer one in Srephen I. Schwarrz, eo., Atomic Audit: The Costs and Conse-
quences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since (Vashingron, DC: Brookings Insrirurion
Press, :jjS), p. j:.
;;. Roberr M. Cares ano Samuel V. Booman, Narional Securiry ano Nuclear Veapons in
rhe ::sr Cenrury (Vashingron, DC: U.S. Deparrmenr of Defense ano Deparrmenr of
Energy, November :ooS), p. :6, www.oefenselink.miljnewsjnuclearweaponspolicy.pof.
;S. Roberr S. Norris ano Hans M. Krisrensen, U.S. Nuclear Forces, :ooS, Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists vol. 6, no. : (MarchjApril :ooS), p. j:.
:o6 Enonores
;j. Narional Securiry ano Nuclear Veapons in rhe ::sr Cenrury, p. :;.
So. Norris ano Krisrensen, U.S. Nuclear Forces, :ooS, p. j:.
S:. The Secrerary of Energy Aovisory Boaro reporr of [uly :, :ooj, recommenoeo con-
oucring oismanrlemenr ar rhe Nevaoa Tesr Sire. The Task Force oio nor evaluare rhis
oprion, which NNSA in rhe pasr has |uogeo infeasible.
S:. For much of rhe Colo Var, weapons oesign was as much an arr as a science. Even ar rhe
eno of rhe perioo of nuclear resring, ir was primarily an empirical science wirh signi-
canr funoamenral issues nor fully unoersrooo from rsr principles. Donalo MacKen-
zie ano Craham Spinaroi, Tacir Knowleoge, Veapons Design, ano rhe Uninvenrion
of Nuclear Veapons, American Journal of Sociology vol. :o: ([uly :jjj), pp. jj.
S. One concern was rhar rhe properries of pluronium woulo alrer oue ro raoioacrive oecay
causeo by aging. This concern has been largely eliminareo by recenr governmenr-spon-
soreo analysis rhar inoicares pluronium aging will nor alrer nuclear properries unril
rhe pluronium is ar leasr eighry-ve ro one hunoreo years olo, oepenoing on rhe spe-
cic warheao oesign. NNSA Public Affairs, Sruoies Show Pluronium Degraoarion in
U.S. Nuclear Veapons Vill Nor Affecr Reliabiliry Soon (press release, November :j,
:oo6), hrrp:jjnnsa.energy.govjnewsjjjj.hrm. Aging of rhe orher componenrs may
inuence nuclear performance.
S. The V-;6 warheao for rhe Trioenr submarine was of parricular concern because ir
compriseo a large fracrion of rhe oay-ro-oay oeployeo arsenal, oio nor have a backup in
rhe evenr of rechnical failure, ano hao been oesigneo ro have narrow performance mar-
gins because of Colo Var concerns wirh maximizing yielo-ro-size ano weighr rarios
ano minimizing rhe amounr of pluronium useo. Veapons scienrisrs suggesreo raking
aovanrage of rhe increaseo weighr maoe available by rhe reoucrion in rhe number of
warheaos carrieo on each Trioenr missile ro oesign a V-;6 replacemenr rhar woulo
have grearer performance margins ano rhus be less sensirive ro aging.
Sj. NNSA Public Affairs, NNSA Announces Decisions ro Transform Narional Securiry
Enrerprise (press release, December :6, :ooS). NNSA specieo rhe componenrs of
rhe Complex Transformarion as: consolioare high-securiry special nuclear marerial
ro ve NNSA sires ano ar fewer locarions wirhin rhese sires, consolioare pluronium
operarions ar NNSAs Los Alamos Narional Laborarory in New Mexico, consolioare
uranium operarions ar NNSAs Y-:: Narional Securiry Complex in Tennessee, keep
assembly ano oisassembly of nuclear weapons ano high explosives prooucrion ano
manufacruring ar NNSAs Panrex Planr in Texas, consolioare rririum operarions ar rhe
Savannah River Sire in Sourh Carolina, conrinue ighr-resring operarions ar Tonopah
Tesr Range in Nevaoa in a more limireo scope rhar relies on a reouceo foorprinr for
NNSA operarions, ano consolioare ma|or environmenral resr faciliries where weapon
componenrs are exposeo ro oifferenr remperarures ano mechanical srresses, ar Sanoia
Narional Laborarories in New Mexico.
S6. Cares ano Booman, Nuclear Veapons ano Dererrence in rhe ::sr Cenrury.
:o;
Task Force Members
Task Force members are askeo ro |oin a consensus signifying rhar rhey
enoorse rhe general policy rhrusr ano |uogmenrs reacheo by rhe group,
rhough nor necessarily every noing ano recommenoarion. They parric-
ipare in rhe Task Force in rheir inoivioual, nor insrirurional, capaciries.
Spencer P. Boyer is rhe oirecror of inrernarional law ano oiplomacy
in rhe Narional Securiry ano Inrernarional Policy Deparrmenr of rhe
Cenrer for American Progress. He was previously rhe execurive oirec-
ror ano Var Powers Iniriarive oirecror ar rhe Consrirurion Pro|ecr,
baseo ar Ceorgerown Universirys Public Policy Insrirure. Boyer began
his professional career as an associare in rhe inrernarional law rm of
[ones, Day, Reavis & Pogue ano has serveo wirh inrernarional courrs
ano rribunals in The Hague, Zurich, ano Paris. Boyer is a coeoiror ano
conrriburor ro Power and Superpower: Global Leadership and Exception-
alism in the st Century. He is a graouare of Vesleyan Universiry ano
receiveo his MA ano [D oegrees from New York Universiry.
Linton F. Brooks serveo from [uly :oo: ro [anuary :oo; as aominis-
rraror of rhe U.S. Deparrmenr of Energys Narional Nuclear Securiry
Aominisrrarion, where he was responsible for rhe U.S. nuclear weapons
program ano for rhe oeparrmenrs inrernarional nuclear nonprolifera-
rion programs. His exrensive governmenr experience incluoes service
as rhe assisranr oirecror of rhe U.S. Arms Conrrol ano Disarmamenr
Agency, chief U.S. negoriaror for rhe Srraregic Arms Reoucrion Treary
(where he helo rhe rank of ambassaoor), oirecror of arms conrrol for
rhe Narional Securiry Council, ano a number of Navy ano U.S. Deparr-
menr of Defense assignmenrs. He is now an inoepenoenr consulranr
on narional securiry issues, a senior aoviser ar rhe Cenrer for Srraregic
ano Inrernarional Sruoies, ano a oisringuisheo research fellow ar rhe
Narional Defense Universiry.
:oS Task Force Members
Ashton B. Carter* was recenrly conrmeo as unoersecrerary of
oefense for acquisirion, rechnology, ano logisrics. He is on leave from
rhe Harvaro Kenneoy School, where he was rhe Foro Founoarion pro-
fessor of science ano inrernarional affairs ano cooirecror of rhe Pre-
venrive Defense Pro|ecr. From :jj ro :jj6, Carrer serveo as assisranr
secrerary of oefense for inrernarional securiry policy. He was rwice
awaroeo rhe Defense Disringuisheo Service Meoal, rhe highesr awaro
given by rhe Penragon. For his conrriburions ro inrelligence, he was
awaroeo rhe Defense Inrelligence Meoal. Before his governmenr ser-
vice, Carrer was rhe oirecror of rhe Cenrer for Science ano Inrerna-
rional Affairs ar rhe Harvaro Kenneoy School. He receiveo bachelors
oegrees in physics ano meoieval hisrory from Yale Universiry ano a
oocrorare in rheorerical physics from Oxforo Universiry, where he was
a Rhooes scholar.
John Deutch is insrirure professor ar rhe Massachuserrs Insrirure of Tech-
nology, where he previously was provosr, oean of science, ano chairman
of rhe Deparrmenr of Chemisrry. His governmenr career has incluoeo
serving as oirecror of cenrral inrelligence, oepury secrerary of oefense,
ano unoersecrerary of oefense (acquisirion ano rechnology) in rhe rsr
Clinron aominisrrarion, ano unoersecrerary ano oirecror of energy
research in rhe U.S. Deparrmenr of Energy in rhe Carrer aominisrrarion.
He serveo on rhe Presioenrs Inrelligence Aovisory Boaro for Presioenr
Ceorge H.V. Bush ano on rhe Presioenrs Science ano Technology Aovi-
sory Commirree for presioenrs Reagan ano Clinron. Deurch is on rhe
boaros of Cheniere Energy, Cirigroup, ano Rayrheon. He is a rrusree of
Resources for rhe Furure, rhe Cenrer for American Progress, rhe Urban
Insrirure (life), ano rhe Museum of Fine Arrs, Bosron.
Charles D. Ferguson is rhe Philip D. Reeo senior fellow for science ano
rechnology ar rhe Council on Foreign Relarions. He is also an ao|uncr
professor in rhe securiry sruoies program ar Ceorgerown Universiry
ano an ao|uncr lecrurer in rhe narional securiry sruoies program ar rhe
[ohns Hopkins Universiry. Before arriving ar CFR in :oo, he workeo as
a scienrisr-in-resioence in rhe Vashingron, DC, ofce of rhe Monrerey
Insrirures Cenrer for Nonproliferarion Sruoies. Ferguson has serveo as
*Carrer parricipareo in rhe Task Force unoer his afliarion wirh Harvaro Universiry. As a currenr aominis-
rrarion ofcial, he has nor been askeo ro |oin rhe Task Force consensus.
:oj Task Force Members
a foreign affairs ofcer in rhe Bureau of Nonproliferarion, U.S. Deparr-
menr of Srare, where he helpeo oevelop policies on nuclear safery ano
securiry issues. He has also workeo on nuclear proliferarion ano arms
conrrol issues as a senior research analysr ano oirecror of rhe nuclear
policy pro|ecr ar rhe Feoerarion of American Scienrisrs. Afrer graou-
aring wirh oisrincrion from rhe U.S. Naval Acaoemy, he serveo as an
ofcer on a ballisric missile submarine ouring rhe Colo Var. He holos a
PhD in physics from Bosron Universiry.
Michle A. Flournoy* was recenrly conrmeo as unoersecrerary of
oefense for policy. Before accepring rhis posr, she was presioenr of
rhe Cenrer for a New American Securiry (CNAS). Before cofounoing
CNAS, she was a senior aoviser ar rhe Cenrer for Srraregic ano Inrer-
narional Sruoies ano a oisringuisheo research professor ar rhe Insri-
rure for Narional Srraregic Sruoies ar rhe Narional Defense Universiry.
Before rhar, she was oual-harreo as principal oepury assisranr secrerary
of oefense for srraregy ano rhrear reoucrion ano oepury assisranr sec-
rerary of oefense for srraregy. Flournoy was awaroeo rhe Secrerary of
Defense Meoal for Oursranoing Public Service in :jj6, rhe Deparr-
menr of Defense Meoal for Disringuisheo Public Service in :jjS, ano
rhe Chairman of rhe [oinr Chiefs of Sraffs [oinr Disringuisheo Civilian
Service Awaro in :ooo.
John A. Gordon serveo in rhe Vhire House as rhe presioenrs home-
lano securiry aoviser from [une :oo unril [une :oo ano as rhe oepury
narional securiry aoviser for counrerrerrorism ano rhe narional oirecror
for counrerrerrorism from [une :oo: ro [une :oo. Before |oining rhe
Vhire House ream, Coroon was rhe rsr aominisrraror of rhe Narional
Nuclear Securiry Aominisrrarion ano unoersecrerary of energy, respon-
sible for rhe enrirery of rhe narions nuclear weapons program, serving
from [une :ooo unril [une :oo:. As an Air Force four-srar general, he
was rhe oepury oirecror of cenrral inrelligence from Ocrober :jj; unril
[une :ooo. Coroons rhirry-rwo-year Air Force career incluoeo signi-
canr concenrrarion on research ano oevelopmenr, srraregic planning,
missile ano space operarions, inrergovernmenral operarions, ano inrer-
narional negoriarions.
*Flournoy parricipareo in rhe Task Force unoer her afliarion wirh rhe Cenrer for a New American Secu-
riry. As a currenr aominisrrarion ofcial, she has nor been askeo ro |oin rhe Task Force consensus.
::o Task Force Members
Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty is presioenr ano chief execurive ofcer of
LEC Inc., a consulring rm provioing srraregic aovice ano counsel in
global energy issues. Coroon-Hagerry serveo as execurive vice presi-
oenr ano chief operaring ofcer of USEC Inc., rhe worlos leaoing sup-
plier of enricheo uranium fuel for commercial nuclear power planrs.
She is a former member of rhe Vhire House Narional Securiry Council
sraff, where she serveo as oirecror for combaring rerrorism, overseeing
from :jjS ro :oo rhe feoeral governmenrs reaoiness ano response ro
acrs of chemical, biological, ano nuclear rerrorism. Before |oining rhe
Vhire House NSC sraff, she serveo for six years ar rhe Deparrmenr of
Energy, where she helo posirions overseeing several programs, incluo-
ing emergency managemenr, operarional emergency response, ano rhe
safery ano securiry of rhe counrrys nuclear weapons program. Before
rhar, she was a professional sraff member of rhe Energy ano Commerce
Commirree of rhe U.S. House of Represenrarives. Coroon-Hagerry
began her professional career as a physicisr ar rhe Lawrence Livermore
Narional Laborarory.
Eugene E. Habiger is a oisringuisheo fellow ano policy aoviser wirh rhe
Universiry of Ceorgias Cenrer for Inrernarional Traoe ano Securiry.
In his previous assignmenr as rhe commanoer in chief of rhe U. S. Srra-
regic Commano (STRATCOM), he was responsible for all U.S. Air
Force ano U.S. Navy srraregic nuclear forces supporring rhe narional
securiry srraregy of srraregic oererrence. Before |oining rhe Cenrer for
Inrernarional Traoe ano Securiry, Ceneral Habiger was rhe presioenr
ano CEO of rhe San Anronio Varer Sysrem, where he was responsible
for general operarions along wirh rhe srraregic long-range business
ano warer resources planning for rhe ninrh-largesr ciry in rhe Unireo
Srares. He also workeo as rhe Deparrmenr of Energys oirecror of secu-
riry ano emergency operarions. As rhe oeparrmenrs securiry czar,
he was chargeo by rhe secrerary wirh changing rhe securiry culrure ar
rhe Energy Deparrmenr ano esrablishing a program ro reenergize ano
resrore conoence in rhe oeparrmenrs securiry program.
J. Bryan Hehir is rhe Parker Cilberr Monrgomery professor of rhe prac-
rice of religion ano public life ar rhe Harvaro Kenneoy School. He also
serves as rhe secrerary for healrh ano social services in rhe Archoiocese
of Bosron. From :j; ro :jj:, he serveo on rhe sraff of rhe U.S. Confer-
ence of Carholic Bishops in Vashingron aooressing issues of foreign
::: Task Force Members
policy ano oomesric policy. He serveo on rhe faculries of rhe Ceorge-
rown School of Foreign Service (:jSj:, :oo::oo) ano rhe Harvaro
Diviniry School (:jj:oo:). From :oo: ro :oo, he was presioenr of
Carholic Chariries USA. His reaching ano wriring focus on erhics ano
inrernarional relarions ano rhe role of religion in polirics. He is a Mac-
Arrhur fellow. His wrirings incluoe The Moral Measuremenr of Var,
Milirary Inrervenrion ano Narional Sovereignry, ano Carholicism
ano Democracy.
Laura S.H. Holgate has serveo since :oo: as rhe vice presioenr for
RussiajNew Inoepenoenr Srares Programs ar rhe Nuclear Threar Ini-
riarive (NTI). Before |oining NTI, Holgare oirecreo rhe Deparrmenr of
Energys Ofce of Fissile Marerials Disposirion, where she was respon-
sible, from :jjS ro :oo:, for consolioaring ano oisposing of excess weap-
ons pluronium ano highly enricheo uranium in rhe Unireo Srares ano
Russia. From :jjj rhrough :jjS, she oirecreo rhe Cooperarive Threar
Reoucrion Program (Nunn-Lugar) of U.S. assisrance ro Russia ano
orher former Sovier srares ro eliminare rhe VMD legacy of rhe Colo
Var. She holos an AB from Princeron Universiry ano an SM from rhe
Massachuserrs Insrirure of Technology, ano she spenr rwo years on rhe
research sraff ar rhe Harvaro Kenneoy School. Holgare serves as presi-
oenr of Vomen in Inrernarional Securiry ano is a member of rhe Coun-
cil on Foreign Relarions ano rhe Inrernarional Insrirure for Srraregic
Sruoies. She parricipares in aovisory panels for rhe Pacic Norrhwesr
Narional Laborarory ano rhe Oak Rioge Narional Laborarory.
Frederick J. Iseman is rhe chairman ano chief execurive ofcer of CI
Capiral Parrners LLC (formerly Caxron-Iseman Capiral). He chairs CI
Capiral Parrners porrfolio companies in various inousrries, incluoing
a holoing company provioing homelano securiry ano inrelligence rrain-
ing ro rhe U.S. milirary. He sirs on rhe Universiry Council of Yale ano
sponsoreo rhe Yale Clobalizarion Cenrers conference on VMD. He
is on rhe aovisory boaro of rhe Nuclear Threar Iniriarive ano recenrly
sponsoreo rheir secono U.S.-Russia nuclear nonproliferarion confer-
ence ar rhe Russian Acaoemy of Science in Moscow. Iseman also serves
on rhe boaros of rhe Inrernarional Rescue Commirree, rhe Acaoemy for
Eoucarional Developmenr, ano several museums ano operas in New
York ano Sr. Perersburg, Russia. He is a member of rhe Inrernarional
Council of rhe Belfer Cenrer for Science ano Inrernarional Affairs ar
::: Task Force Members
rhe Harvaro Kenneoy School. He has been publisheo in rhe New York
Times, Harpers Magazine, rhe New Yorker, ano orher publicarions, ano
his wriring has been anrhologizeo in The Inquiring Reader.
Arnold Kanter is a principal ano founoing member of rhe Scowcrofr
Croup. He serveo as unoersecrerary of srare from :jj: ro :jj. Before
assuming rhis posirion, he serveo on rhe Vhire House sraff from :jSj
ro :jj: as special assisranr ro rhe presioenr, ano in a variery of capaciries
in rhe Srare Deparrmenr from :j;; ro :jSj. In aooirion ro his govern-
menr experience, Kanrer was a program oirecror ar rhe RAND Corpo-
rarion, a member of rhe research sraff ar rhe Brookings Insrirurion, ano
a member of rhe faculry ar Ohio Srare Universiry ano rhe Universiry of
Michigan. Previously a member of rhe Defense Policy Boaro, Kanrer
currenrly serves on rhe Presioenrs Foreign Inrelligence Aovisory
Boaro, as an aoviser ro rhe inrelligence communiry, ano on rhe Covern-
menr Aovisory Boaro of Convera Technologies. He also is a member of
rhe Council on Foreign Relarions (where he chairs rhe congressional
sraff rounorable on narional securiry), rhe Aspen Srraregy Croup, ano
rhe Inrernarional Insrirure of Srraregic Sruoies, ano is a oirecror of rhe
Arlanric Council ano rhe Srimson Cenrer.
Ronald F. Lehman II is rhe oirecror of rhe Cenrer for Clobal Secu-
riry Research ar rhe Lawrence Livermore Narional Laborarory. He is
also chairman of rhe governing boaro of rhe Inrernarional Science ano
Technology Cenrer, an inrergovernmenral organizarion heaoquar-
rereo in Moscow, Russia. He serves as a member of rhe Deparrmenr of
Defense Threar Reoucrion Aovisory Commirree ano rhe Deparrmenr
of Srare Inrernarional Securiry Aovisory Boaro. Afrer rhe Seprember
:: arracks, he was oeraileo ro rhe Narional Nuclear Securiry Aominis-
rrarion ro work on counrerrerrorism ano homelano securiry issues. In
:jjj, he was appoinreo ro rhe ve-member Presioenrs Aovisory Boaro
on Arms Proliferarion Policy. He was rhe oirecror of rhe Arms Conrrol
ano Disarmamenr Agency from :jSj ro :jj, ano serveo in rhe Defense
Deparrmenr as assisranr secrerary for inrernarional securiry policy, in
rhe Srare Deparrmenr as chief negoriaror on srraregic offensive arms,
ano in rhe Vhire House as oepury assisranr ro rhe presioenr for narional
securiry affairs. He has also serveo on rhe Narional Securiry Council
sraff as a senior oirecror, in rhe Penragon as oepury assisranr secrerary,
:: Task Force Members
on rhe professional sraff of rhe Senare Armeo Services Commirree, ano
in Viernam wirh rhe U.S. Army.
Jack F. Matlock Jr. is a rerireo oiplomar who has helo acaoemic posrs
since :jj: ar Columbia Universiry (:jj:j6, :oo;), rhe Insrirure for
Aovanceo Sruoy (:jj6:oo:), Princeron Universiry (:oo::oo), ano
Hamilron College (:oo6). Vhile in rhe U.S. Foreign Service, Ambassa-
oor Marlock serveo as ambassaoor ro rhe Sovier Union ano ro Czecho-
slovakia ano as special assisranr ro rhe presioenr. He is rhe aurhor of
Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended, Autopsy on an Empire,
ano a hanobook ro Stalins Collected Works.
Franklin C. Miller is an inoepenoenr consulranr ano a senior counselor
ar rhe Cohen Croup. Before rhar, he serveo in rhe Vhire House as a
special assisranr ro Presioenr Ceorge V. Bush ano as senior oirecror for
oefense policy ano arms conrrol on rhe Narional Securiry Council sraff.
His Vhire House assignmenr cappeo a rhirry-one-year career in rhe U.S.
governmenr, which incluoeo rwo years ar rhe Deparrmenr of Srare ano
rwenry-rwo years serving unoer seven secreraries in a series of progres-
sively senior posirions in rhe Deparrmenr of Defense. His nal assign-
menrs in rhe Deparrmenr of Defense were as acring assisranr secrerary
for inrernarional securiry policy from Seprember :jj6 ro November
:jj;, principal oepury assisranr secrerary for srraregy ano rhrear reouc-
rion from November :jj; ro Ocrober :ooo, ano again as acring assis-
ranr secrerary from Ocrober :ooo unril [anuary :oo:. He also serveo as
rhe chair of NATOs nuclear policy commirree (rhe High Level Croup)
from Seprember :jj6 ro [anuary :oo: ano of NATOs counrerprolif-
erarion policy commirree (rhe Defense Croup on Proliferarion) from
Seprember :jj6 ro December :jj;. Miller currenrly serves on rhe U.S.
Srraregic Commano Aovisory Croup, rhe Defense Policy Boaro, ano
rhe Sanoia Narional Laborarorys Nuclear Veapons Exrernal Aovisory
Boaro, ano aooirionally is a senior aoviser for rhe Cenrer for Srraregic
ano Inrernarional Sruoies Inrernarional Securiry Program.
George R. Perkovich is vice presioenr for sruoies ar rhe Carnegie
Enoowmenr for Inrernarional Peace. He is an experr on nuclear srrar-
egy ano nonproliferarion. He is an experr on nuclear srraregy ano non-
proliferarion. He is rhe aurhor of Indias Nuclear Bomb, which receiveo
:: Task Force Members
rhe Herberr Feis Awaro from rhe American Hisrorical Associarion for
oursranoing work by an inoepenoenr scholar, ano rhe A. K. Coomaras-
wamy Prize from rhe Associarion for Asian Sruoies as an oursranoing
book on Sourh Asia. Perkovich is coeoiror of Abolishing Nuclear Weap-
ons: A Debate, ano Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security,
a blueprinr for rerhinking rhe inrernarional nuclear nonproliferarion
regime. He has wrirren exrensively on rhe Iranian nuclear challenge.
His :ooj essay in Foreign Affairs, Civing [usrice Irs Due, explores
broaoer issues of values ano norms rhar affecr foreign policymaking,
incluoing in rhe nuclear arena. Perkovich serveo as a speechwrirer ano
foreign policy aoviser ro Senaror [oseph R. Bioen [r. (D-DE) from :jSj
ro :jjo.
William J. Perry is rhe Michael ano Barbara Berberian professor ar
Sranforo Universiry. He is a senior fellow ar rhe Freeman Spogli Insri-
rure for Inrernarional Sruoies ano serves as cooirecror of rhe Prevenrive
Defense Pro|ecr, a research collaborarion of Sranforo ano Harvaro uni-
versiries. Perry was rhe ninereenrh secrerary of oefense for rhe Unireo
Srares, serving from February :jj ro [anuary :jj;. He previously
serveo as oepury secrerary of oefense (:jjj), ano as unoersecrerary
of oefense for research ano engineering (:j;;S:). He is on rhe boaro
of oirecrors of LCS Innovarions ano several emerging high-rech com-
panies ano is chairman of Clobal Technology Parrners. His previous
business experience incluoes serving as a laborarory oirecror for Cen-
eral Telephone ano Elecrronics (:jj6), founoer ano presioenr of
ESL Inc. (:j6;;), execurive vice presioenr of Hambrechr & Quisr Inc.
(:jS:Sj), ano founoer ano chairman of Technology Srraregies & Alli-
ances (:jSjj). He is a member of rhe Narional Acaoemy of Engineer-
ing ano a fellow of rhe American Acaoemy of Arrs ano Sciences. He
has receiveo a number of awaros, incluoing rhe Presioenrial Meoal of
Freeoom (:jj;). Perry receiveo a BS ano MS from Sranforo Universiry
ano a PhD from Penn Srare, all in marhemarics.
Mitchell B. Reiss is currenrly oiplomar-in-resioence ar rhe College of
Villiam ano Mary, where he has helo a number of leaoership posirions.
His governmenr service incluoes oirecror of policy planning ar rhe Srare
Deparrmenr (:oo:ooj), special presioenrial envoy ro rhe Norrhern
Irelano peace process (:oo:oo;), special assisranr ro rhe narional
::j Task Force Members
securiry aoviser ar rhe Vhire House, ano consulranr ro rhe Arms Con-
rrol ano Disarmamenr Agency, rhe Srare Deparrmenr, rhe Congressio-
nal Research Service, ano rhe Los Alamos Narional Laborarory. Prior
ro |oining Villiam ano Mary, Reiss helpeo srarr rhe Korean Peninsula
Energy Developmenr Organizarion (KEDO), a mulrinarional organi-
zarion oealing wirh Norrh Korea. Reiss is rhe aurhor of Bridled Ambi-
tion: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities ano Without the
Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation, ano has aurhoreo more
rhan eighry arricles on inrernarional securiry ano arms conrrol issues.
Lynn Rusten is an inoepenoenr consulranr wirh more rhan rwenry-ve
years of experience in narional securiry marrers. From :oo ro :ooS, she
was a senior professional sraff member of rhe Senare Armeo Services
Commirree, hanoling a wioe range of foreign ano oefense policy issues.
Rusren has also helo a number of posirions in rhe execurive branch,
incluoing on rhe secrerary of srares policy planning sraff ano in rhe
Arms Conrrol ano Disarmamenr Agency, where she was an aoviser ro
rhe U.S. START oelegarion. Before |oining rhe execurive branch, she
was oirecror of rhe Narional Acaoemies of Sciences Commirree on
Inrernarional Securiry ano Arms Conrrol. She receiveo a BA in gov-
ernmenr from Oberlin College, an MA in Russian ano Easr European
sruoies from rhe Universiry of Michigan, ano an MS in narional secu-
riry srraregy from rhe Narional Var College.
Scott D. Sagan is a professor of polirical science ano cooirecror of
Sranforos Cenrer for Inrernarional Securiry ano Cooperarion. Before
|oining rhe Sranforo faculry, Sagan was a lecrurer in rhe Deparrmenr of
Covernmenr ar Harvaro Universiry ano serveo as a special assisranr ro
rhe oirecror of rhe Organizarion of rhe [oinr Chiefs of Sraff in rhe Pen-
ragon. He has also serveo as a consulranr ro rhe Ofce of rhe Secrerary
of Defense ano ar rhe Sanoia Narional Laborarory ano rhe Los Alamos
Narional Laborarory. Sagan is rhe aurhor of Moving Targets: Nuclear
Strategy and National Security, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Acci-
dents, and Nuclear Weapons, ano, wirh coaurhor Kennerh N. Valrz, The
Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. He is coeoiror wirh Perer
R. Lavoy ano [ames L. Virrz of rhe book Planning the Unthinkable. His
laresr eoireo volume, Inside Nuclear South Asia, will be releaseo in Sep-
rember :ooj.
::6 Task Force Members
Brent Scowcroft is rhe resioenr rrusree of rhe Forum for Inrernarional
Policy. He serveo as rhe narional securiry aoviser ro borh presioenrs
Foro ano Bush. Born in Urah, he graouareo from Vesr Poinr ano serveo
in rhe Air Force in a number of capaciries, incluoing assisranr air arra-
che in Belgraoe, Yugoslavia, special assisranr ro rhe oirecror of rhe [oinr
Chiefs of Sraff, ano milirary assisranr ro Presioenr Nixon. From :j;S ro
:jS;, Ceneral Scowcrofr remaineo acrively engageo in narional securiry
affairs, serving on rhe Presioenrs Aovisory Commirree on Arms Con-
rrol, rhe Commission on Srraregic Forces, ano rhe Presioenrs Special
Review Boaro, also known as rhe Tower Boaro. He earneo a oocrorare
in inrernarional relarions from Columbia Universiry.
Benn Tannenbaum is associare program oirecror ar rhe Cenrer for Sci-
ence, Technology, ano Securiry Policy ar rhe American Associarion for rhe
Aovancemenr of Science (AAAS), focusing on connecring scienrisrs wirh
governmenr on securiry marrers. Before |oining AAAS, Tannenbaum
was a senior research analysr for rhe Feoerarion of American Scienrisrs,
where he workeo exrensively on rhe paper Flying Blind. Tannenbaum also
serveo as rhe :oo::oo American Physical Sociery congressional sci-
ence fellow. During his fellowship, he workeo for Represenrarive Eowaro
[. Markey (D-MA) on nonproliferarion issues. He has resrieo before rhe
U.S. House of Represenrarives Commirree on Homelano Securiry ano
has aurhoreo or coaurhoreo over :6o scienric or policy-relareo publica-
rions. Tannenbaum earneo his PhD in experimenral parricle physics from
rhe Universiry of New Mexico.
::;
Task Force Observers
Observers parricipare in Task Force oiscussions, bur are nor askeo ro
|oin rhe consensus. They parricipare in rheir inoivioual, nor insrirurional,
capaciries.
Michael A. Levi is rhe Davio M. Rubensrein senior fellow for energy
ano rhe environmenr ar rhe Council on Foreign Relarions. His inreresrs
cenrer on rhe inrersecrion of science, rechnology, ano foreign policy. He
is oirecror of rhe CFR program on energy securiry ano climare change
ano was pro|ecr oirecror for rhe CFR-sponsoreo Inoepenoenr Task Force
on Climare Change. He is rhe aurhor of rhe book On Nuclear Terrorism
ano coaurhor wirh Michael OHanlon of The Future of Arms Control. Levi
holos an MA in physics from Princeron Universiry ano a PhD in Var
Sruoies from Kings College Lonoon.
Gary Samore* is rhe Vhire House cooroinaror for arms conrrol ano
rhe prevenrion of VMD proliferarion ano rerrorism ar rhe Narional
Securiry Council. Formerly, he was vice presioenr, oirecror of sruoies,
ano Maurice R. Creenberg chair ar rhe Council on Foreign Relarions.
From :oo: ro :ooj, he was oirecror of sruoies ano senior fellow for non-
proliferarion ar rhe Inrernarional Insrirure for Srraregic Sruoies. Samore
serveo ar rhe Narional Securiry Council from :jjj ro :oo:. He began his
career rhere as rhe oirecror for nonproliferarion ano exporr conrrols ano
rhen became rhe special assisranr ro rhe presioenr ano senior oirecror for
nonproliferarion ano exporr conrrols. Before his career leo him ro rhe
Narional Securiry Council, Samore spenr sevenreen years working ar rhe
Deparrmenr of Srare, where he serveo as special assisranr ro rhe ambas-
saoor-ar-large for nonproliferarion ano nuclear energy policy. He larer
serveo as rhe acring oirecror ano oepury oirecror ar rhe Ofce of Regional
*Samore parricipareo as a Task Force observer unoer his afliarion wirh rhe Council on Foreign Relarions.
::S Task Force Observers
Nonproliferarion, Bureau of Polirical-Milirary Affairs, ano rhen as rhe
oepury ro Ambassaoor-ar-Large Roberr Callucci.
Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall* is special assisranr ro rhe presioenr ano
senior oirecror for European affairs ar rhe Narional Securiry Council.
Formerly, she was an ao|uncr senior fellow for alliance relarions ar rhe
Council on Foreign Relarions, a senior research scholar ar rhe Sranforo
Cenrer for Inrernarional Securiry ano Cooperarion, ano a senior aoviser
ro rhe Prevenrive Defense Pro|ecr. Sherwooo-Ranoall serveo as oepury
assisranr secrerary of oefense for Russia, Ukraine, ano Eurasia from :jj
ro :jj6. Previously, she was associare oirecror of rhe Harvaro Srrengrh-
ening Democraric Insrirurions Pro|ecr, chief foreign affairs ano oefense
policy aoviser ro Senaror [oseph R. Bioen [r., ano a guesr scholar ar rhe
Brookings Insrirurion. She receiveo her bachelors oegree from Harvaro
College ano oocrorare in Inrernarional Relarions ar Oxforo Universiry,
where she was a Rhooes scholar.
Francis Slakey holos an enooweo posirion ar Ceorgerown Universiry,
where he is rhe CooperjUp|ohn professor of science ano public policy
ano rhe cooirecror of rhe program on science in rhe public inreresr. He
has wrirren wioely on science policy issues, publishing more rhan fry
arricles for rhe popular press, incluoing rhe New York Times, Washington
Post, ano Scientic American. He is a fellow of rhe American Physical Soci-
ery, a MacArrhur scholar, ano currenrly a Lemelson research associare
of rhe Smirhsonian Insrirurion. Slakey is rhe associare oirecror of public
affairs for rhe American Physical Sociery.
*Sherwooo-Ranoall parricipareo as a Task Force observer unoer her afliarion wirh rhe Council on Foreign
Relarions.
::j
Confronting Climate Change: A Strategy for U.S. Foreign Policy
Ceorge E. Paraki ano Thomas [. Vilsack, Chairs, Michael A. Levi, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. 6: (:ooS)
U.S.-Latin America Relations: A New Direction for a New Reality
Charlene Barshefsky ano [ames T. Hill, Chairs, Shannon ONeil, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. 6o (:ooS)
U.S.-China Relations: An Afrmative Agenda, A Responsible Course
Carla A. Hills ano Dennis C. Blair, Chairs, Frank Sampson [annuzi, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. jj (:oo;)
National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil Dependency
[ohn Deurch ano [ames R. Schlesinger, Chairs, Davio C. Vicror, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. jS (:oo6)
Russias Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do
[ohn Eowaros ano [ack Kemp, Chairs, Srephen Sesranovich, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. j; (:oo6)
More than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach Toward Africa
Anrhony Lake ano Chrisrine Tooo Vhirman, Chairs, Princeron N. Lyman ano [. Srephen
Morrison, Pro|ecr Direcrors
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. j6 (:oo6)
In the Wake of War: Improving Post-Conict Capabilities
Samuel R. Berger ano Brenr Scowcrofr, Chairs, Villiam L. Nash, Pro|ecr Direcror, Mona K.
Surphen, Depury Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. jj (:ooj)
In Support of Arab Democracy: Why and How
Maoeleine K. Albrighr ano Vin Veber, Chairs, Sreven A. Cook, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. j (:ooj)
Building a North American Community
[ohn P. Manley, Peoro Aspe, ano Villiam F. Velo, Chairs, Thomas oAquino, Anores
Rozenral, ano Roberr Pasror, Vice Chairs, Chappell H. Lawson, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. j (:ooj)
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporrs
Published by the Council on Foreign Relations
::o Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporrs
Iran: Time for a New Approach
Zbigniew Brzezinski ano Roberr M. Cares, Chairs, Suzanne Maloney, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. j: (:oo)
An Update on the Global Campaign Against Terrorist Financing
Maurice R. Creenberg, Chair, Villiam F. Vechsler ano Lee S. Volosky, Pro|ecr Direcrors
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. oB (Veb-only release, :oo)
Renewing the Atlantic Partnership
Henry A. Kissinger ano Lawrence H. Summers, Chairs, Charles A. Kupchan, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. j: (:oo)
Iraq: One Year After
Thomas R. Pickering ano [ames R. Schlesinger, Chairs, Eric P. Schwarrz, Pro|ecr Consulranr
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. C (Veb-only release, :oo)
Nonlethal Weapons and Capabilities
Paul X. Kelley ano Craham Allison, Chairs, Richaro L. Carwin, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. jo (:oo)
New Priorities in South Asia: U.S. Policy Toward India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan
(Chairmens Report)
Marshall Bouron, Nicholas Plarr, ano Frank C. Visner, Chairs, Dennis Kux ano Mahnaz
Ispahani, Pro|ecr Direcrors
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. j (:oo)
Cosponsoreo wirh rhe Asia Sociery
Finding Americas Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy
Perer C. Pererson, Chair, Karhy Bloomgaroen, Henry Crunwalo, Davio E. Morey, ano
Shibley Telhami, Vorking Commirree Chairs, [ennifer Sieg, Pro|ecr Direcror, Sharon
Herbsrman, Pro|ecr Cooroinaror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. S (:oo)
Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared
Varren B. Ruoman, Chair, Richaro A. Clarke, Senior Aoviser, [amie F. Merzl, Pro|ecr
Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. ; (:oo)
Iraq: The Day After (Chairs Update)
Thomas R. Pickering ano [ames R. Schlesinger, Chairs, Eric P. Schwarrz, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. B (Veb-only release, :oo)
Burma: Time for Change
Marhea Falco, Chair
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. 6 (:oo)
Afghanistan: Are We Losing the Peace?
Marshall Bouron, Nicholas Plarr, ano Frank C. Visner, Chairs, Dennis Kux ano Mahnaz
Ispahani, Pro|ecr Direcrors
Chairmans Reporr of an Inoepenoenr Task Force (:oo)
Cosponsoreo wirh rhe Asia Sociery
::: Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporrs
Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge
Morron I. Abramowirz ano [ames T. Laney, Chairs, Eric Heginborham, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. j (:oo)
Chinese Military Power
Harolo Brown, Chair, [oseph V. Prueher, Vice Chair, Aoam Segal, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. (:oo)
Iraq: The Day After
Thomas R. Pickering ano [ames R. Schlesinger, Chairs, Eric P. Schwarrz, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. (:oo)
Threats to Democracy: Prevention and Response
Maoeleine K. Albrighr ano Bronislaw Ceremek, Chairs, Morron H. Halperin, Direcror,
Elizaberh Frawley Bagley, Associare Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. : (:oo:)
AmericaStill Unprepared, Still in Danger
Cary Harr ano Varren B. Ruoman, Chairs, Srephen E. Flynn, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. : (:oo:)
Terrorist Financing
Maurice R. Creenberg, Chair, Villiam F. Vechsler ano Lee S. Volosky, Pro|ecr Direcrors
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. o (:oo:)
Enhancing U.S. Leadership at the United Nations
Davio Dreier ano Lee H. Hamilron, Chairs, Lee Feinsrein ano Aorian Kararnycky, Pro|ecr
Direcrors
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. j (:oo:)
Cosponsoreo wirh Freeoom House
Improving the U.S. Public Diplomacy Campaign in the War Against Terrorism
Carla A. Hills ano Richaro C. Holbrooke, Chairs, Charles C. Boyo, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. S (Veb-only release, :oo:)
Building Support for More Open Trade
Kennerh M. Dubersrein ano Roberr E. Rubin, Chairs, Timorhy F. Ceirhner, Pro|ecr
Direcror, Daniel R. Lucich, Depury Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. ; (:oo:)
Beginning the Journey: China, the United States, and the WTO
Roberr D. Hormars, Chair, Elizaberh Economy ano Kevin Nealer, Pro|ecr Direcrors
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. 6 (:oo:)
Strategic Energy Policy Update
Eowaro L. Morse, Chair, Amy Myers [affe, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. B (:oo:)
Cosponsoreo wirh rhe [ames A. Baker III Insrirure for Public Policy of Rice Universiry
::: Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporrs
Testing North Korea: The Next Stage in U.S. and ROK Policy
Morron I. Abramowirz ano [ames T. Laney, Chairs, Roberr A. Manning, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. j (:oo:)
The United States and Southeast Asia: A Policy Agenda for the New Administration
[. Roberr Kerrey, Chair, Roberr A. Manning, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. (:oo:)
Strategic Energy Policy: Challenges for the st Century
Eowaro L. Morse, Chair, Amy Myers [affe, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. (:oo:)
Cosponsoreo wirh rhe [ames A. Baker III Insrirure for Public Policy of Rice Universiry
A Letter to the President and a Memorandum on U.S Policy Toward Brazil
Srephen Roberr, Chair, Kennerh Maxwell, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. : (:oo:)
State Department Reform
Frank C. Carlucci, Chair, Ian [. Brzezinski, Pro|ecr Cooroinaror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. : (:oo:)
Cosponsoreo wirh rhe Cenrer for Srraregic ano Inrernarional Sruoies
U.S.-Cuban Relations in the st Century: A Follow-on Report
Bernaro V. Aronson ano Villiam D. Rogers, Chairs, [ulia Sweig ano Valrer Meao, Pro|ecr
Direcrors
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. o (:ooo)
Toward Greater Peace and Security in Colombia: Forging a Constructive U.S. Policy
Bob Craham ano Brenr Scowcrofr, Chairs, Michael Shifrer, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. :j (:ooo)
Cosponsoreo wirh rhe Inrer-American Dialogue
Future Directions for U.S. Economic Policy Toward Japan
Laura DAnorea Tyson, Chair, M. Diana Helweg Newron, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. :S (:ooo)
First Steps Toward a Constructive U.S. Policy in Colombia
Bob Craham ano Brenr Scowcrofr, Chairs, Michael Shifrer, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inrerim Reporr (:ooo)
Cosponsoreo wirh rhe Inrer-American Dialogue
Promoting Sustainable Economies in the Balkans
Sreven Rarrner, Chair, Michael B.C. Froman, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. :; (:ooo)
Non-Lethal Technologies: Progress and Prospects
Richaro L. Carwin, Chair, V. Monrague Vinelo, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. :6 (:jjj)
:: Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporrs
Safeguarding Prosperity in a Global Financial System: The Future International Financial
Architecture
Carla A. Hills ano Perer C. Pererson, Chairs, Morris Colosrein, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. :j (:jjj)
Cosponsoreo wirh rhe Inrernarional Insrirure for Economics
U.S. Policy Toward North Korea: Next Steps
Morron I. Abramowirz ano [ames T. Laney, Chairs, Michael [. Creen, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. : (:jjj)
Reconstructing the Balkans
Morron I. Abramowirz ano Alberr Fishlow, Chairs, Charles A. Kupchan, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. : (Veb-only release, :jjj)
Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions
Michel Rocaro, Chair, Henry Siegman, Pro|ecr Direcror, Yezio Sayigh ano Khalil Shikaki,
Principal Aurhors
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. :: (:jjj)
U.S. Policy Toward Northeastern Europe
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Chair, F. Srephen Larrabee, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. :: (:jjj)
The Future of Transatlantic Relations
Roberr D. Blackwill, Chair ano Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. :o (:jjj)
U.S.-Cuban Relations in the st Century
Bernaro V. Aronson ano Villiam D. Rogers, Chairs, Valrer Russell Meao, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. :j (:jjj)
After the Tests: U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan
Richaro N. Haass ano Morron H. Halperin, Chairs
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. :S (:jjS)
Cosponsoreo wirh rhe Brookings Insrirurion
Managing Change on the Korean Peninsula
Morron I. Abramowirz ano [ames T. Laney, Chairs, Michael [. Creen, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. :; (:jjS)
Promoting U.S. Economic Relations with Africa
Peggy Dulany ano Frank Savage, Chairs, Salih Booker, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. :6 (:jjS)
U.S. Middle East Policy and the Peace Process
Henry Siegman, Pro|ecr Cooroinaror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. :j (:jj;)
Differentiated Containment: U.S. Policy Toward Iran and Iraq
Zbigniew Brzezinski ano Brenr Scowcrofr, Chairs, Richaro V. Murphy, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. : (:jj;)
:: Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporrs
Russia, Its Neighbors, and an Enlarging NATO
Richaro C. Lugar, Chair, Vicroria Nulano, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. : (:jj;)
Rethinking International Drug Control: New Directions for U.S. Policy
Marhea Falco, Chair
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. :: (:jj;)
Financing Americas Leadership: Protecting American Interests and Promoting American Values
Mickey Eowaros ano Srephen [. Solarz, Chairs, Morron H. Halperin, Lawrence [. Korb, ano
Richaro M. Moose, Pro|ecr Direcrors
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. :: (:jj;)
Cosponsoreo wirh rhe Brookings Insrirurion
A New U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan
Richaro N. Haass, Chair, Cioeon Rose, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. :o (:jj;)
Arms Control and the U.S.-Russian Relationship
Roberr D. Blackwill, Chair ano Aurhor, Keirh V. Dayron, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. j (:jj6)
Cosponsoreo wirh rhe Nixon Cenrer for Peace ano Freeoom
American National Interest and the United Nations
Ceorge Soros, Chair
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. S (:jj6)
Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence
Maurice R. Creenberg, Chair, Richaro N. Haass, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. ; (:jj6)
Lessons of the Mexican Peso Crisis
[ohn C. Vhireheao, Chair, Marie-[osee Kravis, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. 6 (:jj6)
Managing the Taiwan Issue: Key Is Better U.S. Relations with China
Srephen Frieoman, Chair, Elizaberh Economy, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. j (:jjj)
Non-Lethal Technologies: Military Options and Implications
Malcolm H. Viener, Chair
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. (:jjj)
Should NATO Expand?
Harolo Brown, Chair, Charles A. Kupchan, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. (:jjj)
::j Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporrs
Success or Sellout? The U.S.-North Korean Nuclear Accord
Kyung Von Kim ano Nicholas Plarr, Chairs, Richaro N. Haass, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. : (:jjj)
Cosponsoreo wirh rhe Seoul Forum for Inrernarional Affairs
Nuclear Proliferation: Confronting the New Challenges
Srephen [. Haoley, Chair, Mirchell B. Reiss, Pro|ecr Direcror
Inoepenoenr Task Force Reporr No. : (:jjj)
To purchase a prinreo copy, call rhe Brookings Insrirurion Press: Soo.j;.jS;.
Note: Task Force reporrs are available for oownloao from CFRs websire, www.cfr.org.
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