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html For Immediate Release Report From Iron Mountain: On the Possibility and Desirability of Peace

REPORT FROM IRON MO NT!IN: ON T"E PO##I$I%IT& !ND DE#IR!$I%IT& OF PE!'E

(ith introductory material by %eonard '. %e)in The Dial Press* Inc. +,-. Ne) &or/... %ibrary of 'on0ress 'atalo0 card Number -.12.334 Printed in the .#. 'ONTENT#: For)ard 11 5ii $ac/0round Information 11 65ii #tatement by 78ohn Doe7 11 666i The Report of the #pecial #tudy 9roup %etter of Transmittal 11 4 Introduction 11 . #ection +. #cope of the #tudy 11 ++ #ection 2. Disarmament and the Economy 11 +. #ection 4. Disarmament #cenarios 11 24 #ection :. (ar ; Peace as #ocial #ystems 11 2. #ection 3. The Functions of (ar 11 44 #ection -. #ubstitutes for the Functions of (ar 11 3. #ection .. #ummary and 'onclusions 11 ., #ection <. Recommendations 11 ,3 NOTE# 11 +=4

FORE(ORD
78ohn Doe*7 as I )ill call him in this boo/ for reasons that )ill be made clear* is a professor at a lar0e uni5ersity in the Middle (est. "is field is one of the social sciences* but I )ill not identify him beyond this. "e telephoned me one e5enin0 last )inter* >uite une6pectedly? )e had not been in touch for se5eral years. "e )as in Ne) &or/ for a fe) days* he said* and there )as somethin0 important he )anted to discuss )ith me. "e )ouldn@t say )hat it )as. (e met for lunch the ne6t day at a midto)n restaurant. "e )as ob5iously disturbed. "e made small tal/ for half an hour* )hich )as >uite out of character* and I didn@t press him. Then* apropos of nothin0* he mentioned a dispute bet)een a )riter and a prominent political family that had been in the headlines. (hat* he )anted to /no)* )ere my 5ie)s on 7freedom of information7A "o) )ould I >ualify themA !nd so on. My ans)ers )ere not

memorable* but they seemed to satisfy him. Then* >uite abruptly* he be0an to tell me the follo)in0 story: Early in !u0ust of +,-4* he said* he found a messa0e on his des/ that a 7Mrs. Potts7 had called him from (ashin0ton. (hen he returned the call* a M!N ans)ered immediately* and told Doe* amon0 other thin0s* that he had been selected to ser5e on a commission 7of the hi0hest importance.7 Its obBecti5e )as to determine* accurately and realistically* the nature of the problems that )ould confront the nited #tates if and )hen a condition of 7permanent peace7 should arri5e* and to draft a pro0ram for dealin0 )ith this contin0ency. The man described the uni>ue procedures that )ere to 0o5ern the commission@s )or/ and that )ere e6pected to e6tend its scope far beyond that of any pre5ious e6amination of these problems. 'onsiderin0 that the caller did not precisely identify either himself or his a0ency* his persuasi5eness must ha5e been a truly remar/able order. Doe entertained no serious doubts of the bona fides of the proBect* ho)e5er* chiefly because of his pre5ious e6perience )ith the e6cessi5e secrecy that often surrounds >uasi10o5ernmental acti5ities. In addition* the man at the other end of the line demonstrated an impressi5ely complete and surprisin0ly detailed /no)led0e of Doe@s )or/ and personal life. "e also mentioned the names of others )ho )ere to ser5e )ith the 0roup? most of them )ere /no)n to Doe by reputation. Doe a0reed to ta/e the assi0nment 111 he felt he had no real choice in the matter 111 and to appear the second #aturday follo)in0 at Iron Mountain* Ne) &or/. !n airline tic/et arri5ed in his mail the ne6t mornin0. The cloa/1and1da00ar tone of this con5ocation )as further enhanced by the meetin0 place itself. Iron Mountain* located near the to)n of "udson* is li/e somethin0 out of Ian Flemin0 or E.Phillips Oppenheim. It is an under0round nuclear hideout for hundreds of lar0e !merican corporations. Most of them use it as an emer0ency stora0e 5ault for important documents. $ut a number of them maintain substitute corporate head>uarters as )ell* )here essential personnel could presumably sur5i5e and continue to )or/ after an attac/. This latter 0roup includes such firms as #tandard Oil of Ne) 8ersey* Manufacturers "ano5er Trust* and #hell. I )ill lea5e most of the story of the operations of the #pecial #tudy 9roup* as the commission )as formally called* for Doe to tell in his o)n )ords C7$ac/0round Information7D. !t this point it is necessary to say only that it met and )or/ed re0ularly for o5er t)o and a half years* after )hich it produced a Report. It )as this document* and )hat to do about it* that Doe )anted to tal/ to me about. The Report* he said* had been suppressed 111 both by the #pecial #tudy 9roup itself and by the 0o5ernment INTER!9EN'& committee to )hich it had been submitted. !fter months of a0oniEin0* Doe had decided that he )ould no lon0er be party to /eepin0 it secret. (hat he )anted from me )as ad5ice and assistance in ha5in0 it published. "e 0a5e me his copy to read* )ith the e6press understandin0 that if for any reason I )ere un)illin0 to become in5ol5ed* I )ould say nothin0 about it to anyone else. I read the Report that same ni0ht. I )ill pass o5er my o)n reactions to it* e6cept to say that the un)illin0ness of Doe@s associates to publiciEe their findin0s became readily understandable. (hat had happened )as that they had been so tenacious in their determination to deal comprehensi5ely )ith the many problems of transition to peace that the ori0inal >uestions as/ed of them )ere ne5er >uite ans)ered. Instead* this is )hat they concluded: %astin0 peace* )hile no theoretically impossible* is probably unattainable? e5en if it could be achie5ed it )ould almost certainly not be in the best interestes of a stable society to achie5e it. That is the 0ist of )hat they say. $ehind their >ualified academic lan0ua0e runs this 0eneral ar0ument: (ar fills certain functions essential to the stability of our society? until other )ays of fillin0 them are de5eloped* the )ar system must be maintained 11 and impro5ed in effecti5eness.

It is not surprisin0 that the 9roup* in its %etter of Transmittal* did not choose to Bustify its )or/ to 7the lay reader* une6posed to the e6i0encies of hi0her political or military responsibility.7 Its Report )as addressed* deliberately* to unnamed 0o5ernment administrators of hi0h ran/? it assumed 1 considerable politicial sophistication from this select audience. To the 0eneral reader* therefore* the substance of the document may be e5en more unsettlin0 than its conclusions. "e may not be prepared for some of its assumptions 11 for instance* that most medical ad5ances are 5ie)ed more as problems than as pro0ress? or that po5erty is necessary and desirable* public postures by politicians to the contrary not)ithstandin0? or that standin0 armies are* amon0 other thin0s social1)elfare institutions in e6actly the same sense as are old1people@s homes and mental hospitals. It may stri/e him as odd to find the probably e6planation of 7flyin0 saucer7 incidents disposed of en passant in less than a sentence. "e may be less surprised to find that the space pro0ram and the 7contro5ersial antimissile missile and fallout shelter pro0rams are understood to ha5e the spendin0 of 5ast sums of money* not the ad5ancement of science or national defense* as their principal 0oals* and to learn that 7military7 draft policies are only remotely concerned )ith defense. "e may be offended to find the or0aniEed repression of minority 0roups* and e5en the reestablishment of sla5ery* seriously Cand on the )hole fa5orably discussed as possible aspects of a )orld at peace. "e is not li/ely to ta/e /indly to the notion of the deliberate intensification of air and )ater pollution Cas part of a pro0ram leadin0 to peaceD* e5en )hen the reason for considerin0 it is made clear. That a )orld )ithout )ar )ill ha5e to turn sooner rather than later to uni5ersal test1 tube procreation )ill be less disturbin0* if no more appealin0. $ut fe) readers )ill not be ta/en abac/* at least* by a fe) lines in th Report@s conclusions* repeated in its formal recommendations* that su00est that the lon01ran0e plannin011and 7bud0etin07 11 of the 7optimum7 number of li5es to be destroyed annuallly in o5ert )arfare is hi0h on the 9roup@s list of priorities for 0o5ernment action. I cite these fe) e6amples primarily to )arn the 0eneral reader )hat he can e6pect. The statesmen and strate0ists for )hose eyes the Report )as intended ob5iously need no such protecti5e admonition. This boo/* of course* is e5idence of my response to Doe@s re>uest. !fter carefully considerin0 the problems that mi0ht confront the publisher of the Report* )e too/ it to The Dial Press. There* its si0nificance )as immediately reco0niEed* and* more important* )e )ere 0i5en firm assurances that no outside pressures of any sort )ould be permitted to interfere )ith its publication. It should be made clear that Doe does not disa0ree )ith the substance of the Report* )hich represents as 0enuine consensus in all important respects. "e constituted a minority of one 11 but only on the issue of disclosin0 it to the 0eneral public. ! loo/ at ho) the 9roup dealt )ith this >uestion )ill be illuminatin0 The debate too/ place at the 9roup@s last full meetin0 before the Report )as )ritten* late in March* +,--* and a0ain at Iron Mountain. T)o facts must be /ept in mind* by )ay of bac/0round. The first is that the #pecial #tudy 9roup had ne5er been e6plicitly char0ed )ith or s)orn to secrecy* either )hen it )as con5ened or at any time thereafter. The second is that the 9roup had ne5erthe1less operated as if it had been. This )as assumed from the circumstances of its inception and from the tone of its instructions. CThe 9roup@s ac/no)led0ment of help from 7the many persons....)ho contributed so 0reatly to our )or/7 is some)hat e>ui5ocal? these persons )ere not told the nature of the proBect for )hich their special resources of information )ere solicited.D Those )ho ar0ued the case for /eepin0 the Report secret )ere admittedly moti5ated by fear of the e6plosi5e political effects that could be e6pected from publicity. For e5idence* they pointed to the suppression of the far less contro5ersial report of then1#enator "ubert "umphrey@s subcommittee on disarmament in +,-2. C#ubcommittee members had reportedly feared that it mi0ht be used by 'ommunist propa0andists* as #enator #tuart #ymin0ton put it* to 7bac/ up the Mar6ian theory that )as production )as the reason for the success of capitalism.7D #imilar political precautions had

been ta/en )ith the better1/no)n 9aither Report in +,3.* and e5en )ith the so1called Moynihan Report in +,-3. Furthermore* they insisted* a distinction must be made bet)een serious studies* )hich are normally classified unless and until policy ma/ers decide to release them* and con5entional 7sho)case7 proBects* or0aniEed to demonstrate a political leadership@s concerns about an issue and to deflect the ener0y of those pressin0 for action on it. CThe e6ample used* because some of the 9roup had participated in it* )as a 7(hile "ouse 'onference7 on intended cooperation* disarmament* etc.* )hich had been sta0ed late in +,-3 to offset complaints about escalation of Fietnam (ar.D Doe ac/no)led0es this distinction* as )ell as the stron0 possibility of public misunderstandin0. $ut he feels that if the sponsorin0 a0ency had )anted to mandate secrecy it could ha5e done so at the outset. It could also ha5e assi0ned the proBect to one of the 0o5ernment@s established 7thin/ tan/s*7 )hich normally )or/ on a classified basis. "e scoffed at fear of public reaction* )hich could ha5e no lastin0 effect on lon01ran0e measures that mi0ht be ta/en to implement the 9roup@s proposals* and derided the 9roup@s abdication of responsibility for its opinions and conslusions. #o far as he )as concerned* there )as such a thin0 as a public ri0ht to /no) )hat )as bein0 done on its behalf? the burden of proof )as on those )ho )ould abrid0e it. If my account seems to 0i5e Doe the better of the ar0ument* despite his failure to con5ince his collea0ues* so be it. My participation in this boo/ testifies that I am not neutral. In my opinion* the decision of the #pecial #tudy 9roup to censor its o)n findin0s )as not merely timid but presumptuos. $ut the refusal* as of this )ritin0* of the a0encies for )hich the Report )as prepared to release it themsel5es raises broader >uestions of public policy. #uch >uestions center on the continuin0 use of self1ser5e definitions of 7security7 to a5oid possible political embarrassment. It is ironic ho) oftern this practice bac/fires. I should state* for the record* that I do not share the attitudes to)ard )ar and peace* life and death* and sur5i5al of the species manifested in the Report. Fe) readers )ill. In human terms* it is an outra0eous document. $ut it does represent a serious and challen0in0 effort to define an enormous problem. !nd it e6plains* or certainly appears to e6plain* aspects of !merican policy other)ise incomprehensible by the ordinary standars of common sense. (hat )e may thin/ of these e6planations is somethin0 else* but it seems to me that )e are entitled to /no) not only )hat they are but )hose they are. $y 7)hose7 I don@t mean merely the names of the authors of the Report. Much more important* )e ha5e a ri0ht to /no) to )hat e6tent their assumptions of social necessity are shared by the decision1 ma/ers in our 0o5ernment. (hich do they accept and )hich do they reBectA "o)e5er disturbin0 the ans)ers* only full and fran/ discussion offers any concei5able hope of sol5in0 the problems raised by the #pecial #tudy 9roup in their Report from Iron Mountain. %.'.%. Ne) &or/ 8une +,-.

$!'G9RO ND INFORM!TION
HThe follo)in0 account of the )or/in0s of the #pecial #tudy 9roup is ta/en 5erbatim from a series of taperecorded inter5ie)s I had )ith 78ohn Doe.7 The transcript has been edited to minimiEe the intrusion of my >uestions and comments* as )ell as for len0th* and the se>uence has been re5ised in the interest of continuity. %.'.%.I "O( (!# T"E 9RO P FORMEDA ...The 0eneral idea for it* for this /ind of study dates bac/ at least to +,-+. It started )ith some of the ne) people )ho came in )ith the Gennedy administration* mostly* I thin/* )ith McNamara*

$undy* and Rus/. They )ere impatient about many thin0s....One of them )as that no really serious )or/ had been done about plannin0 for peace111a lon01ran0e peace* that is* )ith lon01 ran0 plannin0. E5erythin0 that had been )ritten on the subBect Hbefore +,-+I )as super1 ficial. There )as insufficient appreciation of the scope of the problem. The main reason for this* of course* )as that the idea of a real peace in the )orld* 0eneral disarmament and so on* )as loo/ed on as utopian. Or e5en crac/1 pot. This is still true* and it@s easy enou0h to understand )hen you loo/ at )hat@s 0oin0 on in the )orld today....It )as reflected in the studies that had been made up to that time. They )ere not realistic... The idea of the #pecial #tudy* the e6act form it )ould ta/e* )as )or/ed out early in @-4...The settlement of the 'uban missile affair had somethin0 to do )ith it* but )hat helped most to 0et it mo5in0 )ere the bi0 chan0es in military spendin0 that )ere bein0 planned.....Plants bein0 closed* relocations* and so forth. Most of it )asn@t made public until much later.... HI understandI it too/ a lon0 time to select the people for the 9roup. The calls didn@t 0o out until the summer...... ("O M!DE T"E #E%E'TIONA That@s somethin0 I can@t tell you. I )asn@t in5ol5ed )ith the preliminary plannin0. The first I /ne) of it )as )hen I )as called myself. $ut three of the people had been in on it* and )hat the rest of us /no) )e learned from them* about )hat )ent on earlier. I do /no) that it started 5ery informally. I don@t /no) )hat particular 0o5ernment a0ency appro5ed the proBect. (O %D &O '!RE TO M!GE ! 9 E##A !ll ri0ht111I thin/ it )as an ad hoc committee* at the cabinet le5el* or near it. It had to be. I suppose they 0a5e the or0aniEational Bob11ma/in0 arran0ements* payin0 the bills* and so on111to somebody from the #tate or Defense of the National #ecurity 'ouncil. Only one of us )as in touch )ith (ashin0ton* and I )asn@t the one. $ut I can tell you that 5ery* 5ery fe) people /ne) about us....For instance* there )as the !c/ley 'ommittee. It )as set up after )e )ere. If you read their report111the same old tune111economic recon5ersino* turnin0 s)ord plants into plo)share factories...I thin/ you@ll )onder if e5en the President /ne) about our 9roup. The !c/ley 'ommittee certainly didn@t. I# T"!T PO##I$%E* RE!%%&A I ME!N T"!T NOT EFEN T"E PRE#IDENT GNE( OF &O R 'OMMI##IONA (ell* I don@t thin/ there@s anythin0 odd about the 0o5ernment attac/in0 a problem at t)o different le5els. Or e5en about t)o or three H0o5ernmentI a0encies )or/in0 at cross1purposes. It happens all the time. Perhaps the President did /no). !nd I don@t mean to deni0rate the !c/ley 'ommittee* but it )as e6actly that narro)ness of approach that )e )ere supposed to 0et a)ay from....... &ou ha5e to remember 11 you@5e read the Report111that )hat they )anted from us )as a different /ind of thin/in0. It )as a matter of approach. "erman Gahn calls is 7$yEantine711no a0oniEin0 o5er cultural and reli0ious 5alues. No moral posturin0. It@s the /ind of thin/in0 that Rand and the "udson Institure and I.D.!. CInstitute for Defense !nalysis.D brou0ht into )ar plannin0...(hat they as/ed up to do* and I thin/ )e did it* )as to 0i5e the same /ind of treat1 ment to the hypothetical nuclear )ar...(e may ha5e 0one further than they e6pected* but once you establish your premises and your lo0ic you can@t turn bac/.... Gahn@s boo/s* for e6ample* are misunderstood* at least by laymen. They shoc/ people. $ut you see* )hat@s improtant about them is not his conclusions* or his opinions. It@s the method. "e has done more than anyone else I can thin/ of to 0et the 0eneral public accustomed to the style of modern military thin/1 in0.....Today it@s possible for a columnist to )rite about 7counterforce strate0y7 and

7minimum deterrance7 and 7credible firststri/e capability7 )ith1 out ha5in0 to e6plain e5ery other )ord. "e can )rite about )ar and strate0y )ithout 0ettin0 bo00ed do)n in >uestions or morality....... The other bi0 difference about or )or/ is breadth. The Report spea/s for itself. I can@t say that )e too/ e5ery rele5ant aspect of life and society into account* but I don@t thin/ )e missed anythin0 essential... ("& (!# T"E PRO8E'T 9IFEN TO !N O T#IDE 'OMMI##IONA ("& 'O %DN@T IT "!FE $EEN "!ND%ED $& !N !PPROPRI!TE 9OFERNMENT !9!N'&A I thin/ that@s ob5ious* or should be. The /ind of thin/in0 )anted from our 9roup Bust isn@t to be had in a formal 0o5ernment operation. Too many cont1 straints. Too many inhibitions. This isn@t a ne) problem. (hy else )ould outfits li/e Rand and "udson stay in businessA !ny assi0nment that@s at all sophisticated is almost al)ays 0i5en to an outside 0roup. This is true e5en in the #tate Department* in the 70ray7 operations* those that are supposed to be unofficial* but are really as official as can be. !lso )ith the '.I.!.... For our study* e5en the pri5ate research centers )ere too institutional... ! lot of thou0ht )ent into ma/in0 sure that our thin/in0 )ould be unrestricted. !ll /inds of little thin0s. The )ay )e )ere called into the 9roup* the places )e met* all /inds of subtle de5ices to remind us. For instance* e5en our name* the #pecial #tudy 9roup. &ou /no) 0o5ernment names. (ouldn@t you thin/ )e@d ha5e been called 7Operation Oli5e $ranch*7 or 7ProBect Pacifica*7 or somethin0 li/e thatA Nothin0 li/e that for us111too allusi5e* too su00esti5e. !nd no minutes of our meetin0s111too inhibitin0.... !bout )ho mi0ht be readin0 them. Of course* )e too/ notes for our o)n use. !nd amon0 oursel5es* )e usually called oursel5es 7The Iron Mountain $oys*7 or 7Our Thin0*7 or )hate5er came to mind........ ("!T '!N &O TE%% ME !$O T T"E MEM$ER# OF T"E 9RO PA I@ll ha5e to stic/ to 0eneralities....There )ere fifteen of us. The important thin0 )as that )e represented a 5ery )ide ran0e of disciplines. !nd not all academic. People from the natural sciences* the social sciences* e5en the humanities. (e had a la)yer and a businessman. !lso* a professional )ar planner. !lso* you should /no) that e5eryone in the 9roup had done )or/ of distinction in at least t)o different fields. The interdisciplinary element )as built in..... It@s true that there )ere no )omen in the 9roup* but I don@t thin/ that )as si0nificant.....(e )ere all !merican citiEens* of course. !nd all* I can say* in 5ery 0ood health* at least )hen )e be0an.... &ou see* the first order of business* at the first meetin0* )as the readin0 of dossiers. They )ere 5ery detailed* and not Bust professional* but also personal. They included medical histories. I remember one 5ery curious thin0* for )hate5er it@s )orth. Most of us* and that includes me* had a record of abnormally hi0h uric acid con1 centrations in the blood...... None of us had e5er had this e6perience* of a public inspection of credentials* or medical reports. It )as 5ery disturbin0... $ut it )as deliberate. The reason for it )as to emphasiEe that )e )ere supposed to ma/e !%% our o)n decisions on procedure* )ithout outside rules. This included Bud0in0 each other@s >ualifications and ma/in0 allo)ances for possible bias. I don@t thin/ it affected our )or/ directly* but it made the point it )as supposed to ma/e...... That )e should i0nore absolutely nothin0 that mi0ht concei5ably affect our obBecti5ity. H!t this point I persuaded Doe that a brief occupational description of the indi5idual members of the 9roup )ould ser5e a useful purpose for readers of the Report. The list )hich follo)s )as )or/ed out on paper. CIt mi0ht be more accurate to say it )as ne0otiatedDJ. The problem )as to 0i5e as much rele5ant information as possible )ithout 5iolatin0 Doe@s commitment to protect his collea0ues@ anonymity. It turned out to be 5ery difficult* especially in the cases of those members )ho are 5ery )ell /no)n. For this reason* secondary areas of achie5ement or repu1 tations are usually not sho)n.

The simple alphabetical 7names7 )ere assi0ned by Doe for con5enient reference? they bear no intended relation to actual names. 7!ble7 )as the 9roup@s (ashin0ton contact. It )as he )ho brou0ht and read the dossiers* and )ho most often acted as chairman. "e* 7$a/er*7 and 7'o67 )ere the three )ho had been in5ol5ed in the preliminary plannin0. There is no other si0nificance to the order of listin0. 7!rthus !ble7 is an historian and political theorist* )ho has ser5ed in 0o5ernment. 7$ernard $a/er: is a professor of international la) and a consultant on 0o5ernment operations. 7'harles 'o67 is an economist* social critic* and bio0rapher. 78ohn Doe.7 7Ed)ard Ellis7 is a sociolo0ist often in5ol5ed in public affairs. 7Fran/ Fo67 is a cultural anthropolo0ist. 79eor0e 9reen7 is a psycholo0ist* educator* and de5eloper of personnel testin0 systems. 7"arold "ill7 is a psychiatrist* )ho has conducted e6tensi5e studies of the relationship bet)een indi5idual and 0roup beha5ior. 78ohn 8ones7 is a scholar and literary critic. 7Martin Miller7 is a physical chemist* )hose )or/ has recei5ed inter1 national reco0nition at the hi0hest le5el. 7Paul Peters7 is a biochemist* )ho has made important disco5eries bearin0 on reproducti5e processes. 7Richard Roe7 is a mathematician affiliated )ith an independent (est 'oast research institution. 7#amuel #mith7 is an astronomer* physicist* and communications theorist. 7Thomas Taylor7 is a systems analyst and )ar planner* )ho has )ritten e6tensi5ely on )ar* peace* and international relations. 7(illiam (hite7 is an industrialist* )ho has underta/en many special 0o5ernment assi0nments.I "O( DID T"E 9RO P OPER!TEA I ME!N* ("ERE !ND ("EN DID &O MEET* !ND #O FORT"A (e met on the a5era0e of once a month. sually it )as on )ee/ends* and usually for t)o days. (e had a fe) lon0er sessions* and one that lasted only four hours. .... (e met all o5er the country* al)ays at a different place* e6cept for the first and last times* )hich )ere at Iron Mountain. It )as li/e a tra5elin0 seminar....#ometimes at hotels* sometimes at uni5ersities. T)ice )e met at summer camps* and once at a pri5ate estate* in Fir0inia. (e used a business place in Pittsbur0h* and another in Pou0h/eepsie* HNe) &or/I....(e ne5er met in (ashin0ton* or on 0o5ernment property

any)here....!ble )ould announce the times and places t)o meetin0s ahead. They )ere ne5er chan0ed..... (e didn@t di5ide into subcommittees* or anythin0 else that formal. $ut )e all too/ indi5idual assi0nments bet)een meetin0s. ! lot of it in5ol5ed 0ettin0 information from other people.... !mon0 the fifteen of us* I don@t thin0 there )as anybody in the academic or professional )orld )e couldn@t call on if )e )anted to* and )e too/ ad5anta0e of it..... (e )ere paid a 5ery modest per diem. !ll of it )as called 7e6penses7 on the 5ouchers. (e )ere told not to report it on our ta6 returns.... The chec/s )ere dra)n on a special account of !ble@s at a Ne) &or/ ban/. "e si0ned them....I don@t /no) )hat the study cost. #o far as our time and tra5el )ere concerned* it couldn@t ha5e come to more than the lo) si61fi0ure ran0e. $ut the bi0 item must ha5e been computer time* and I ha5e no idea ho) hi0h this ran...... &O #!& T"!T &O DON@T T"ING &O R (ORG (!# !FFE'TED $& PROFE##ION!% $I!#. ("!T !$O T PO%ITI'!% !ND P"I%O#OP"I'!% $I!#A I# IT PO##I$%E TO DE!% (IT" K E#TION# OF (!R !ND PE!'E (IT"O T REF%E'TIN9 PER#ON!% F!% E#A &es* it is. I can understand your s/epticism. $ut if you had been at any of our meetin0s you@d ha5e had a 5ery hard time fi0urin0 out )ho )ere the liberals and )ho )ere the conser5ati5es* or )ho )ere ha)/s and )ho )ere do5es. There I# such a thin0 as obBecti5ity* and I thin/ )e had it... I don@t say no one had any emotional reaction to )hat )e )ere doin0. (e all did* to some e6tent. !s a matter of fact* t)o members had heart attac/s after )e )ere finished* and I@ll be the first to admit it probably )asn@t a coincidence. &O #!ID &O M!DE P &O R O(N 9RO ND R %E#. ("!T (ERE T"E#E 9RO ND R %E#A The most important )ere informality and unanimity . $y informality I mean that our discussions )ere open1ended. (e )ent as far afield as any one of us thou0ht )e had to. For instance* )e spent a lot of time on the relationship bet)een military recruitment policies and industrial employment. $efore )e )ere finished )ith it* )e@d 0one throu0h the history of )estern penal codes and any number of comparati5e psychiatric studies Hof draftees and 5olunteersI. (e loo/ed o5er the or0aniEation of the Inca empire. (e determined the effects of automation on underde5eloped societies....It )as all rele5ant.... $y unanimity* I don@t mean that )e /ept ta/in0 5otes* li/e a Bury. I mean that )e stayed )ith e5ery issue until )e had )hat the Kua/ers call a 7sense of the meetin0.7 It )as time1consumin0. $ut in the lon0 run it sa5ed time. E5entually )e all 0ot on the same )a5elen0th* so to spea/..... Of course )e had differences* and bi0 ones* especially in the be0innin0... For instance* in #ection I you mi0ht thin/ )e )ere merely clarifyin0 our instructions. Not so? it too/ a lon0 time before )e all a0reed to a strict interpretation.... Roe and Taylor deser5e most of the credit for this... There are many thin0s in the Report that loo/ ob5ious no)* but didn@t seem so ob5ious then. For instance* on the relationship of )ar to social systems. The ori0inal premise )as con5entional* from 'lause)itE. .... That )ar )as an 7instrument7 of broader political 5alues. !ble )as the only one )ho challen0ed this* at first. Fo6 called his position 7per5erse.7 &et it )as Fo6 )ho furnished most of the data that led us all to a0ree )ith !ble e5entually. I mention this be1 cause I thin/ it@s a 0ood e6ample of the )ay )e )or/ed. ! triumph of method o5er cliche...... I certainly don@t intend to 0o into details about )ho too/ )hat side about )hat* and )hen. $ut I )ill say* to 0i5e credit )here due* that only Roe* !ble* "ill and Taylor )ere able to see* at the be0innin0* )here our method )as ta/in0 us.

$ T &O !%(!&# RE!'"ED !9REEMENT* EFENT !%%&A &es. It@s a unanimous report... I don@t mean that our sessions )ere al)ays harmonious. #ome of them )ere rou0h. The last si6 months there )as a lot of >uibblin0 about small points... (e@d been under pressure for a lon0 time* )e@d been )or/in0 to0ether too lon0. It )as natural.....that )e 0ot on each other@s ner5es. For a )hile !ble and Taylor )eren@t spea/in0 to each other. Miller threatened to >uit. $ut this all passed. There )ere no important differences... "O( (!# T"E REPORT !'T !%%& (RITTENA ("O DID T"E (RITIN9A (e all had a hand in the first draft. 8ones and !ble put it to0ether* and then mailed it around for re5ie) before )or/in0 out a final 5ersion... The only problems )ere the form it should ta/e and )hom )e )ere )ritin0 it for. !nd* of course* the >uestion of disclosure.... HDoe@s comments on this point are summariEed in the introduction.I &O MENTIONED ! 7PE!'E 9!ME#7 M!N !%. ("!T !RE PE!'E 9!ME#A I )anted to say somethin0 about that. The Report barely mentions it. 7Peace 0ames7 is a method )e de5eloped durin0 the course of the study. It@s a forecastin0 techni>ue* an information system. I@m 5ery e6cited about it. E5en if nothin0 is done about our recommendations11)hich is concei5able11 this is somethin0 that can@t be i0nored. It )ill re5olutioniEe the study of social problems. It@s a by1 product of the study. (e needed a fast* dependable procedure to appro6imate the effects of disparate social phenomena on other social phenomena. (e 0ot it. It@s in a primiti5e phase* but it )or/s. "O( !RE PE!'E 9!ME# P%!&EDA !RE T"E& %IGE R!ND@# (!R 9!ME#A &ou don@t 7play7 peace 0ames* li/e chess or Monopoly* any more than you play )ar 0ames )ith toy soldiers. &ou use computers. It@s a pro0rammin0 system. ! computer 7lan0ua0e*7 li/e Fortran* or !l0ol* or 8o5ial.... Its ad5anta0e is its superior capacity to interrelate data )ith no apparent common points of reference.... ! simple analo0y is li/ely to be misleadin0. $ut I can 0i5e you some e6amples. For instance* supposin0 I as/ed you to fi0ure out )hat effect a moon landin0 by .#. astronauts )ould ha5e on an election in* say* #)eden. Or )hat effect a chan0e in the draft la)11a specific chan0e11)ould ha5e on the 5alue of real estate in do)nto)n ManhattanA Or a certain chan0e in colle0e entrance re>uirements in the nited #tates on the $ritish shippin0 industryA &ou )ould probably say* first* that there )ould be no effect to spea/ of* and second* that there )ould be no )ay of tellin0. $ut you@d be )ron0 on both counts. In each case there )ould be an effect* and the peace 0ames method could tell you )hat it )ould be* >uantitati5ely. I didn@t ta/e these e6amples out of the air. (e used them in )or/in0 out the method....Essentiallly* it@s an elaborate hi0h1speed trial1and1error system for determinin0 )or/in0 al0orithms. %i/e most sophisticated types of computer problem1sol5in0... ! lot of the 70ames7 of this /ind you read about are Bust 0lorified and con5ersational e6ercises. They really are 0ames* and nothin0 more. I Bust sa) one reported in the 'anadian 'omputer #ociety $ulletin* called a 7Fietnam Peace 9ame.7 They use simulation techni>ues* but the pro0rammin0 hypotheses are speculati5e.... The idea of a problem1sol5in0 system li/e this is not ori0inal )ith us. !RP! Cthe !d5anced Research ProBects !0ency* of the Department of Defense DoD.D has been )or/in0 on somethin0 li/e it. #o has 9eneral Electric* in 'alifornia. There are others..... (e )ere successful not because )e /no) more than they do about pro0rammin0* )hich )e don@t* but because )e leaned ho) to formulate the problems accurately. It 0oes bc/ to the old sa). &ou can al)ays find the ans)er if you /no) the ri0ht >uestion.....

# PPO#IN9 &O "!DN@T DEFE%OPED T"I# MET"OD. (O %D &O "!FE 'OME TO T"E #!ME 'ON'% #ION# IN T"E REPORTA 'ertainly. $ut it )ould ha5e ta/en many times lon0er..$ut please don@t misunderstand my enthusiasm Habout the peace 0ames methodI. (ith all due respect to the effects of computer technolo0y on modern thin/in0* basic Bud0ments must still be made by human bein0s. The peace 0ames techni>ue isn@t responsible for our Report. (e are.

#T!TEMENT $& 78O"N DOE7

'ontrary to the decision of the #pecial #tudy 9roup* of )hich I )as a member* I ha5e arran0ed for the 0eneral release of our Report. I am 0rateful to Mr. %eonard '. %e)in for his in5aluable assistance in ma/in0 this possible* and to The Dial Press for acceptin0 the challen0e of publication. Responsibility for ta/in0 this step* ho)e5er* is mine and mine alone. I am )ell a)are that my action may be ta/en as a breach of faith by some of my former collea0ues. $ut in my 5ie) my responsibility to the society for )hich I am a part supersedes any self1assumed obli0ation on the part of fifteen indi5idual men. #ince our Report can be considered on its merits* it is not necessary for me to disclose their identity to accomplish my purpose. &et I 0ladly abandon my o)n anonymity it is )ere possible to do so )ithout at the same time comprisin0 theirs* to defend our )or/ publicly if and )hen they release me from this personal bond. $ut this is secondary. (hat is needed no)* and needed badly* is )idespread public discussion and debate about the elements of )ar and the problems of peace. I hope that publication of this Report )ill ser5e to initiate it.

T"E REPORT OF T"E #PE'I!% #T D& 9RO P

%ETTER OF TR!N#MITT!% To the con5ener of this 9roup: !ttached is the Report of the #pecial #tudy 9roup established by you in !u0ust* +,-4* +D to consider the problems in5ol5ed in the conti0ency of a transition to a 0eneral condition of peace* and 2D to recommend procedures for dealin0 )ith this contin0ency. For the co5enience of nontechnical readers )e ha5e elected to submit our statistical supportin0 data* totalin0 -=: e6hibits* separately* as )ell as a preliminary manual of the 7peace 0ames7 method de5ised durin0 the course of our study. (e ha5e compelted our assi0nment to the best of our ability* subBect to the limitations of time and resources a5ailable to us. Our conclusions of fact and our recommendations are unanimous? those of use )ho differ in certain secondary respects from the findin0s set forth herein do not consider these differences sufficient to )arrant the filin0 of a minority report. It is our earnest hope that the fruits of our deliberations )ill be of 5alue to our 0o5ernment in its efforts to pro5ide leadership to the nation in sol5in0 the comple6 and far1reachin0 problems )e ha5e e6amined* and that our recommendations for subse>uent Presidential action in this area )ill be adopted. $ecause of the unusual circumstances surroundin0 the establishment of this 9roup* and in 5ie) of the nature of its findin0s* )e do not recommend that this Report be released for publication. It is our affirmati5e Bud0ment that such action )ould not be in the public interest. The uncertain ad5anta0es of public discussion of our conclusions and recommendations are* in our opinion* 0reatly out)ei0hed by the clear and predictable dan0er of a crisis in public confidence )hich untimely publication of this Report mi0ht be e6pected to pro5o/e. The li/elihood that a lay reader* une6posed

to the e6i0encies of hi0her political or military responsibility* )ill misconstrue the purpose of this proBect* and the intent of its participants* seems ob5ious. (e ur0e that circulation of this Report be closely restricted to those )hose responsibilities re>uire that they be apprised of its contents. (e deeply re0ret that the necessity of anonymity* a prere>uisite to our 9roup@s unhindered pursuit of its obBecti5es* precludes proper ac/no)led0ment of our 0ratitude to the many persons in and out of 0o5ernment )ho contributed so 0reatly to our )or/. FOR T"E #PE'I!% #T D& 9RO P Hsi0nature )ithheld for publicationI 4= #EPTEM$ER* +,-INTROD 'TION The Report )hich follo)s summariEes the results of a t)o1and1a1half1year study of the broad problems to be anticipated in the e5ent of 0eneral trans1 formation of !merican society to a condition lac/in0 its most critical current characteristics: its capability and readiness to ma/e )ar )hen doin0 so is Bud0ed necessary or desirable by its political leadership. Our )or/ has been predicated on the belief that some /ind of 0eneral peace may soon be ne0otiable. The de facto admission of 'ommunist 'hina into the nited Nations no) appears to be only a fe) years a)ay at most. It has become increasinly manifest that conflicts of !merican national interest )ith those of 'hina and the #o5iet nion are susceptible of political solution* despite the superficial contraindictions of the current Fietnam )ar* of the threats of an attac/ on 'hina* and of the necessarily hostile tenor of day1to1day forei0n policy statements. It is also ob5ious that differences in5ol5in0 other nations can be readily resol5ed by the three 0reat po)ers )hene5er they arri5e at a stable peace amon0 themsel5es. It is not necessary* for the purposes of our study* to assume that a 0eneral detente of this sort )ill come about111and )e ma/e no such ar0ument11but only that it may. It is surely no e6a00eration to say that a condition of 0eneral )orld peace )ould lead to chan0es in the social structures of the nations of the )orld of unparalleled and re5olutionary ma0nitude. The economic impact of 0eneral disarmament* to name only the most ob5ious conse>uence of peace* )ould re5ise the production and distribution patterns of the 0lobe to a de0ree that )ould ma/e chan0es of the past fifty years seem insi0nificant. Political* sociolo0ical* cultural* and ecolo0ical chan0es )ould be e>ually far1reachin0. (hat has moti5ated our study of these contin0encies has been the 0ro)in0 sense of thou0htful men in and out of 0o5ernment that the )orld is totally unprepared to meet the demands of such a situation. (e had ori0inally planned* )hen our study )as initiated* to address oursel5es to these t)o broad >uestions and their components: (hat can be e6pected if peace comesA (hat should )e be prepared to do about itA $ut as our in5esti0ation proceeded* it became apparent that certain other >uestions had to be faced. (hat* for instance* are the real functions of )ar in modern societies* beyond the ostensible ones of defendin0 and ad5ancin0 the 7national interests7 of nationsA In the absence of )ar* )hat other institutions e6ist or mi0ht be de5ised to fulfill these functionsA 9rantin0 that a 7peaceful7 settlement of disputes is )ithin the ran0e of current international relationships* is the abolition of )ar* in the broad sense* really possibleA If so* is it necessarily desirable* in terms of social stabilityA If not* )hat can be done to impro5e the operation of our social system in respect to its )ar1readinessA The )ord peace* as )e ha5e used it in the follo)in0 pa0es* describes a permanent* or >uasi1 permanent* condition entirely free from the national e6ercise* or contemplation* of any form of the or0aniEed social 5iolence* or threat of 5iolence* 0enerally /no)n as )ar. It implies total and 0eneral disarmament. It is not used to describe the more familiar condition of 7cold )ar*7 7armed peace*7 or other mere respite* lon0 or short* from armed conflict. Nor is it used simply as a synonym for the political settlement of international differences. The ma0nitude of modern means of mass

destruction and the speed of modern communications re>uire the un>ualified )or/in0 definition 0i5en abo5e? only a 0eneration a0o such an absolute description )ould ha5e seemd utopian rather than pra0matic. Today* any modification of this definition )ould render it almost )orthless for our purpose. $y the same standard* )e ha5e used the )or/ )ar to apply interchan0eably to con5entional C7hot7D )ar* to the 0eneral condition of )ar preparation or )ar readiness* and to the 0eneral 7)ar system.7 The sense intended is made clear in conte6t. The first section of our Report deals )ith its scope and )ith the assumptions on )hich our study )as based. The second considers the effects of disarmament on the economy* the subBect of most peace research to date. The third ta/es up so1called 7disarmament scenarios7 )hich ha5e been proposed. The fourth* fifth* and si6th e6amine the nonmilitary functions of )ar and the problems they raise for a 5iable transition to peace? here )ill be found some indications of the true dimensions of the problem* not pre5iously coordinated in any other study. In the se5enth section )e summariEe our findin0s* and in the ei0ht )e set forth our recommendations for )hat )e belie5e to be a practical and necessary course of action. #E'TION + 1 #'OPE OF T"E #T D& (hen The #pecial #tudy 9roup )as established in !u0ust* +,-4* its members )ere instructed to 0o5ern their deliberations in accordance )ith three principal criteria. $riefly stated* they )ere these: +D military1style obBecti5ity? 2D a5oidance of preconcei5ed 5alue assumptions? 4D inclusion of all re5elant areas of theory and data. These 0uideposts are by no means as ob5ious as they may appear at first 0lance* and )e belie5e it necessary to indicate clearly ho) they )ere to inform our )or/. For they e6press succinctly the limitations of pre5ious 7peace studies*7 and imply the nature of both 0o5ernment and unofficial dissatisfaction )ith these earlier efforts. It is not our intention here to minimiEe the si0nificance of the )or/ of our predecessors* or to belittle the >uality of their contributions. (hat )e ha5e tried to do* and belie5e )e ha5e done* is e6tend their scope. (e hope that our conclusions may ser5e in turn as a startin0 point for still broader and more detailed e6aminations of e5ery aspect of the problems of transition to peace and of the >uestions )hich must be ans)er1 ed before such a transition can be allo)ed to 0et under )ay. It is a truism that obBecti5ity is more often an intention e6pressed than an attitude achie5ed* but the intention111conscious* unambi0uous* and constantly self1critical 11 is a precondition to its achie5ement. (e belie5e it no accident that )e )ere char0ed to use a 7military contin0ency7 model for our study* and )e o)e a considerable debt to the ci5ilian )ar plannin0 a0encies for their pioneerin0 )or/ in the obBecti5e e6amination of the contin0encies of nuclear )ar. There is no such precedent in the peace studies. Much of the usefulness of e5en the most elaborate and carefully reasoned pro0rams for economic con5ersion to peace* for e6ample* has been 5itiated by a )ishful ea0erness to demonstrate that peace is not only possible* but e5en cheap or easy. One official report is replete )ith references to the critical role of 7dynamic optimism7 on economic de5elopments* and 0oes on to submit* as e5idence* that it 7)ould be hard to ima0ine that the !merican people )ould not respond 5ery positi5ely to an a0reed and safe0uarded pro0ram to substitute an internatinal rule of la) and order*7 etc. !nothe line of ar0ument fre>uently ta/en is that disarmament )ould entail comparati5ely little disruption of the economy* since it need only be partial? )e )ill deal )ith this approach later. &et 0enuine obBecti5ity in )ar studies is often critiEed as inhuman. !s "erman Gahn* the )riter on strate0ic studies best /no)n to the 0eneral public* put it: 7'ritics fre>uently obBect to the icy rationality of the "udson Institute* the Rand 'orporation* and other such or0aniEations. I@m al)ays tempted to as/ in reply* L(ould you prefer a )arm* human errorA Do you feel better )ith a nice emotional mista/e.@7 !nd* as #ecretary of Defense Robert #. McNamara has pointed out* in reference to facin0 up to the possibility of nuclear )ar* 7#ome people are afraid e5en to loo/ o5er the ed0e. $ut in a thermonuclear )ar )e cannot afford any political acrophobia.7

#urely it )ould be self1e5ident that this applies e>ually to the opposite prospect* but so far no one has ta/en more than a timid 0lance o5er the brin/ of peace. !n intention to a5oid preconcei5ed 5alue Bud0ments is if anythin0 e5en more producti5e of self1 delusion. (e claim no immunity* as indi5iduals* from this type of bias* but )e ha5e made a continuously self1conscious effort to deal )ith the problems of peace )ithout* for e6ampel* considerin0 that a condition of peace is per se 70ood7 or 7bad.7 This has not been easy* but it has been obli0atory? to our /no)led0e* it has not been done before. Pre5ious studies ha5e ta/en the desirability of peace* the importance of human life* the superiority of democratic institutions* the 0reatest 70ood7 for the 0reatest number* the 7di0nity7 of the indi5idual* the desirability of ma6imum health and lon0e5ity* and other such )ishful premises as a6iomatic 5alues necessary for the Bustification of a study of peace issues. (e ha5e not found them so. (e ha5e attempted to apply the standards of physical science to our thin/in0* the principal characteristic of )hich is not >uantification* as is popularly belie5d* but that* in (hitehead@s )ords* 7...it i0nores all Bud0ments of 5alue? for instance* all esthetic and moral Bud0ments.7 &et it is ob5ious that any serious in5esti0ation of a problem* ho)e5er 7pure*7 must be informed by some normati5e standard. In this case it has been simply the sur5i5al of human society in 0eneral* of !merian society in particular* and* as a corollary to sur5i5al* the stability of this society. It is interestin0* )e belie5e* to note that the most dispassionate planners of nuclear strate0y also reco0niEe that the stability of society is the one bedroc/ 5alue that cannot be a5oided. #ecretary McNamara has defended the need for !merican nuclear superiority on the 0rounds that it 7ma/es possible a strate0y desi0ned to preser5e the fabric of our societies if )ar should occur.7 ! former member ofthe Department of #tate policy plannin0 staff 0oes further. 7! more precise )ord for peace* in terms of the practical )orld* is stability. ... Today the 0reat nuclear panoplies are essential elements in such stability as e6ists. Our present purpose must be to continue the process of learnin0 ho) to li5e )ith them.7 (e* of course* do not e>uate stability )ith peace* but )e accept it as the one common assumed obBecti5e of both peace and )ar. The third criterion1breadth1has ta/en us still farther afield from peace studies made to date. It is ob5ious to any layman that the economic patterns of a )arless )orld )ill be drastically different from those )e li5e )ith today* and it is e>ually ob5ious that the political relationships of nations )ill not be those )e ha5e learned to ta/e for 0ranted* sometimes described as a 0lobal 5ersion of the ad5ersary system of our common la). $ut the social implications of peace e6tend far beyond its putati5e effects on national economics and international relations. !s )e shall sho)* the rele5ance of peace and )ar to the internal political or0aniEation of societies* to the sociolo0ical relationships of their members* to psycholo0ical moti5ations* to ecolo0ical processes* and to cultural 5alues is e>ually profound. More important* it is e>ually critical in assayin0 the conse>uences of a transition to peace* and in deter1 minin0 the feasibility of any transition at all. It is not surprisin0 that these less ob5ious factors ha5e been 0enerally i0nored in peace research. They ha5e not lent themsel5es to systematic analysis. They ha5e been difficult* perhaps impossible* to measure )ith any de0ree of assurance that estimates of their effects could be depended on. They are 7intan0ibles*7 but only in the sense that abstract concepts in mathematics are intan0ible compared to those )hich can be >uantified. Economic factors* on the other hand* can be measured* at least superficialy? and international relationships can be 5erbaliEed* li/e la)* into lo0ical se>uences. (e do not claim that )e ha5e disco5ered an infallible )ay of measurin0 these other factors* or of assi0nin0 them precise )ei0hts in the e>uation of transition. $ut )e belie5e )e ha5e ta/en their relati5e importance into account to this e6tent: )e ha5e remo5ed them from the cate0ory of the 7intan0ible*7 hence scientifically suspect and therefore someho) of secondary importance* and brou0ht them out into the realm of the obBecti5e. The result* )e belie5e* pro5ides a conte6t of realism for the discussion of the issues relatin0 to the possible transition to peace )hich up to no) has been missin0.

This is not to say that )e presume to ha5e found the ans)ers )e )ere see/in0. $ut )e belie5e that our emphasis on breadth of scope has made it at least possible to be0in to understand the >uestions. #E'TION 2 1 DI#!RM!MENT !ND T"E E'ONOM& In this section )e shall briefly e6amine some of the common features of the studies that ha5e been published dealin0 )ith one or another aspect of the e6pected impact of disarmament on the !merican economy. (hether disarmament is considered as a by1product of peace or as its precondition* its effect on the national economy )ill in either case be the most immediately felt of its conse>uences. The >uasi1mensurable >uality of economic manifestations has 0i5en rise to more detailed speculation in this area than in any other. 9eneral a0reement pre5ails in respect to the more important economic problems that 0eneral disarmament )ould raise. ! short sur5ey of these problems* rather than a detailed criti>ue of their comparati5e si0nificance* is sufficient for our purposes in this Report. The first factor is that of siEe. The 7)orld )ar industry*7 as one )riter has aptly caled it* accounts for appro6imately a tenth of the output of the )orld@s total economy. !lthou0h this fi0ure is subBect to fluctuation* the causes of )hich are themsel5es subBect to re0ional 5ariation* it tends to hold fairly steady. The nited #tates* as the )orld@s richest nation* not only accounts for the lar0est sin0le share of this e6pense* currently up)ard of M-= billion a year* but also 7...has de5oted a hi0her proportion Hemphasis addedI of its 0ross national product to its military establishment than any other maBor free )orld nation. This )as true e5en before our increased e6penditures in #outheast !sia.7 Plans for economic con5ersion that minimiEe the economic ma0nitude of the problem do so only by rationaliEin0* ho)e5er persuasi5ely* the maintenance of a substantial residual military bud0et under some euphemiEed classification. 'on5ersion of military e6penditures to other purposes entails a number of difficulties. The most serious stems from the de0ree of ri0id specialiEation that characteriEes modern )ar production* best e6emplified in nuclear and missile technolo0y. This constituted no fundamental problem after (orld (ar II* nor did the >uestion of free1mar/et consumer demand for 7con5entinal7 items of consumption111those 0ood and ser5ices consumers had already been conditioned to re>uire. Today@s situation is >ualitati5ely different in both respects. This infle6ibility is 0eo0raphical and occupational* as )ell as industrial* a fact )hich has led most analysts of the economic impact of disarmament to focus their attention on phased plans for the relocation of )ar industry personnel and capital installations as much as on proposals for de5elopin0 ne) patterns of consumption. One serious fla) common to such plans is the /ind called in the natural sciences the 7macroscopic error.7 !n implicit presumption is made that a total national plan for con5ersion differs from a community pro0ram to cope )ith the shuttin0 do)n of a 7defense facility7 only in de0ree. (e find no reason to belie5e that this is the case* nor that a 0eneral enlar0ement of such local pro0rams* ho)e5er )ell thou0ht out in terms of housin0* occupational retrainin0* and the li/e* can be applied on a national scale. ! national economy can absorb amost any number of subsidiary reor0aniEations )ithin its total limits* pro5idin0 there is no basic chan0e in its o)n structure. 9eneral disarmament* )hich )ould re>uire such basic chan0es* lends itself to no 5alid smaller1scale analo0y. E5en more >uestionable are the models proposed for the retainin0 labor for nonarmaments occupations. Puttin0 aside for the moment the unsol5ed >uestions dealin0 )ith the nature of ne) distribution patterns111retrainin0 for )hatA11 the increasin0ly specialiEed Bob s/ills associated )ith )ar industry production are further depreciated by the acceleratin0 inroads of the industrial techni>ues loosely described as 7automation.7 It is not too much to say that 0eneral disarmament )ould re>uire the scrappin0 of a critical proportion of the most hi0hly de5eloped occupational specialites in the economy. The political difficulties inherent in such an 7adBustment7 )ould ma/e

the outcries resultin0 from the closin0 of a fe) obsolete military and na5al installatins in +,-: sound li/e a )hisper. In 0eneral* discussions of the problem of con5ersion ha5e been characteriEed by an un)illin0ness to reco0niEe its special >uality. This is best ecemplified by the +,-3 report of the !c/ley 'ommittee. One critic has tellin0ly pointed out that it blindly assumes that 7...nothin0 in the arms economy11 neither its siEe* nor its 0eo0raphical concentration* nor its hi0hly specialiEed nature* nor the peculiarties of its mar/et* nor the special nature of much of its labor force111endo)s it )ith any uni>ueness )hen the necessary time of adBustment comes.7 %et us assume* ho)e5er* despite the lac/ of e5idence that a 5iable pro0ram for con5ersion can be de5eloped in the frame)or/ of the e6istin0 economy* that the problems noted abo5e can be sol5ed. (hat proposals ha5e been offered for utiliEin0 the producti5e capabilities that disarmament )ould presumably releaseA The most common held theory is simply that 0eneral economic rein5estment )ould absorb the 0reater part of these capabilities. E5en thou0h it is no) lar0ely ta/en for 0ranted Cand e5en by today@s e>ui5alent of traditional laisseE1faire economistsD taht unprecedented 0o5ernment assistance Cand con1 comitant 0o5ernment controlD )ill be needed to sol5e the 7structural7 problems of transition* a 0eneral attitude of confidence pre5ails that ne) consumption patterns )ill ta/e up the slac/. (hat is less clear is the nature of these patterns. One school of economists has it that these patterns )ill de5elop on their o)n. It en5isa0es the e>ui5alent of the arms bud0et bein0 returned* under careful control* to the consumer* in the form of ta6 cuts. !nother* reco0niEin0 the undeniable need for increased 7consumption7 in )hat is 0enerally considered the public sector of the economy* stresses 5astly increased 0o5ernment spendin0 in such areas of national concern as health* education* mass transportation* lo)1cost housin0* )ater supply* control of the physical en5ironment* and* stated 0enerally* 7po5erty.7 The mechanisms proposed for controllin0 the transition to an arms1free economy are also traditional11chan0es in both sides of the federal bud0et* manipulation of interest rates* etc. (e ac/no)led0e the undeniable 5alue of fiscal tools in a normal cyclical economy* )here they pro5ide le5era0e to accelerate or bra/e an e6istin0 trend. Their more committed proponents* ho)e5er* tend to lose si0ht of the fact that there is a limit to the po)er of these de5ices to influence fundamental economic forces. They can pro5ide ne) incenti5es in the economy* but they cannot in themsel5es transform the production of a billion dollars@ )orth of missiles a year to the e>ui5alent in food* clothin0* prefabricated houses* or tele5ision sets. !t bottom* they reflect the economy? they do not moti5ate it. More sophisticated* and less san0uine* analysts contemplate the di5ersion of the arms bud0et to a non1military system e>ually remote from the mar/et economy. (hat the 7pyramid1builders7 fre>uently su00est is the e6pansion of space1research pro0rams to the dollar le5el of current e6penditures. This approach has the superficial merit of reducin0 the siEe of the problem of transferability of resources* but introduces other difficulties* )hich )e )ill ta/e up in section -. (ithout sin0lin0 out any one of the se5eral maBor studies of the e6pected impact of disarmament on the economy for special criticism* )e can summariEe our obBections to them in 0eneral terms as follo)s: +. No proposed pro0ram for economic con5ersion to disarmament sufficiently ta/es into account the uni>ue ma0nitude of the re>uired adBustments it )ould entail. 2. Proposals to transform arms production into a beneficent scheme of public )or/s are more the products of )ishful thin/in0 than of realistic understandin0 of the limits of our e6istin0 economic system. 4. Fiscal and monetary measures are inade>uate as controls for the process of transition to an arms1free economy.

:. Insufficient attention has been paid to the political acceptability of the obBecti5es of the proposed con5ersion models* as )ell as of the political means to be employed in effectuatin0 a transition. 3. No serious consideration has been 0i5en* in any proposed con5ersion plan* to the fundamental nonmilitary function of )ar and armaments in modern society* nor has any e6plicit attempt been made to de5ise a 5iable substitute for it. This criticism )ill be de5eloped in sections 3 and -. #E'TION 4 1 DI#!RM!MENT #'EN!RIO# #'EN!RIO#* as they ha5e come to be called* are hypothetical constructions of future e5ents. Ine5itably* they are composed of 5aryin0 proportions of established fact* reasonable inference* and more or less inspired 0uess)or/. Those )hich ha5e been su00ested as model procedures for effectuatin0 international arms control and e5entual disarmament are necessarily ima0inati5e* althou0h closely reasoned? in this respect they resemble the 7)ar 0ames7 analyses of the Rand 'orporation* )ith )hich they share a common conceptual ori0in. !ll such scenarios that ha5e been seriously put forth imply a dependence on bilateral or multilateral a0reement bet)een the 0reat po)ers. In 0eneral* they call for a pro0ressi5e phasin0 out of 0ross armaments* military forces* )eapons* and )eapons technolo0y* coordinated )ith elaborate matchin0 procedures of 5erification* inspection* and machinery for the settlement of international disputes. It should be noted that e5en proponents of unilateral disarmament >ualify their proposals )ith an implied re>uirement of reciprocity* 5ery much in the manner of a scenario of 0raduated response in nuclear )ar. The ad5anta0e of unilateral initiati5e lies in its political 5alue as an e6pression of 0ood faith* as )ell as in its diplomatic function as a catalyst for formal disarmament ne0otiations. The RE!D model for disarmament Cde5eloped by the Research Pro0ram on Economic !dBustments to DisarmamentD is typical of these scenarios. It is a t)el5e1year pro0ram* di5ided into three1year sta0es. Each sta0e includes a separate phase of: reduction of armed forces? cutbac/s of )eapons production* in5entories* and forei0n military bases? de5elopment of international inspection procedures and control con5entiona? and the buildin0 up of a so5erei0n international disarmament or0aniEation. It anticipates a net matchin0 decline in .#. defense e6penditures of only some)hat more than half the +,-3 le5el* but a necessary redeployment of some fi5e1si6ths of the defense1 dependent labor force. The economic implications assi0ned by their authors to 5arious disarmament scenarios di5er0e )idely. The more conser5ati5e models* li/e that cited abo5e* emphasiEe economic as )ell as military prudence in postulatin0 elaborate fail1safe disarmament a0encies* )hich themsel5es re>uire e6penditures substantially substitutin0 for those of the displaced )ar industries. #uch pro0rams stress the ad5anta0es of the smaller economic adBustment entailed. Others emphasiEe* on the contrary* the ma0nitude Cand the opposite ad5anta0esD of the sa5in0s to be achie5ed from disarmament. One )idely read analysis estimates the annual cost of the inspection function of 0eneral disarmament throu0hout the )orld as only bet)een t)o and three percent of current military e6penditures. $oth types of plan tend to deal )ith the anticipated problem of economic rein5estment only in the a00re0ate. (e ha5e seen no proposed disarmament se>uence that correlates the phasin0 out of specific /inds of military spendin0 )ith specific ne) forms of substitute spendin0. (ithout e6aminin0 disarmament scenarios in 0reater detail* )e may characteriEe them )ith these 0eneral comments: +. 9i5en 0enuine a0reement of intent amon0 the 0reat po)ers* the schedulin0 of arms control and elimination presents no inherently insurmountable procedural problems. !ny of se5eral

proposed se>uences mi0ht ser5e as the basis for multilateral a0reement or for the first step in unilateral arms reduction. 2. No maBor po)er can proceed )ith such a pro0ram* ho)e5er* until it has de5eloped an economic con5ersion plan fully inte0rated )ith each phase of disarmament. No such plan has yet been de5eloped in the nited #tates. 4. Furthermore* disarmament scenarios* li/e proposals for economic con5ersion* ma/e no allo)ance for the non1military functions of )ar in modern societies* and offer no surro0ate for these necessary functions. One partial e6ception is a proposal for the 7unarmed forces of the nited #tates*7 )hich )e )ill consider in section -. #E'TION : 1 (!R !ND PE!'E !# #O'I!% #&#TEM# (e ha5e dealt only s/etchily )ith proposed disarmament scenarios and economic analyses* but the reason for our seemin0ly casual dismissal of so much serious and sophisticated )or/ lies in no disrespect for its competence. It is rather a >uestion of rele5ance. To put it plainly* all these pro0rams* ho)e5er detailed and )ell de5eloped* are abstractions. The most carefully reasoned disarmament se>uence ine5itably reads more li/e the rules of a 0ame or a classroom e6ercise in lo0ic than li/e a pro0nosis of real e5ents in the real )orld. This is as true of today@s comple6 proposals as it )as of the !bbe de #t. Pierre@s 7Plane for Perpetual Peace in Eurpope7 23= years a0o. #ome essential element has clearly been lac/in0 in all these schemes. One of our first tas/s )as to try to brin0 this missin0 >uality into definable focus* and )e belie5e )e ha5e succeeded in doin0 so. (e find that at the heart of e5ery peace study )e ha5e e6amined11from the modest technoli0ical proposal Ce.0.* to con5ert a poison 0as plant to the production of 7socially useful7 e>ui5alentsD to the most eleborate scenario for uni5ersal peace in out time11lies one common fundamental misconception. It is the source of the miasma of unreality surroundin0 such plans. It is the incorrect assumption that )ar* as an institution* is subordinate to the social systems it is belie5ed to ser5e. This misconceptino* althou0h profound and far1reachin0* is entirely comprehensible. Fe) social cliches are so un>uestionin0ly accepted as the notion that )ar is an e6tension of diplomacy Cor of politics* or of the pursuit of economic obBecti5esD. If this )ere true* it )ould be )holly appropriate for economists and political theorists to loo/ on the problems of transition to peace as essentially mechanical or procedural111as indeed they do* treatin0 them as lo0istic corollaries of the settlement of national conflicts of interest. If this )ere true* there )ould be no real substance to the difficulties of transition. For it is e5ident that e5en in today@s )orld there e6ist no concei5able conflict of interest* real or ima0inary* bet)een nations or bet)een social forces )ithin nations* that cannot be resol5ed )ithout recourse to )ar11if such resolution )ere assi0ned a priority of social 5alue. !nd if this )ere true* the economic analyses and disarmament proposals )e ha5e referred to* plausible and )ell concei5ed as they may be* )ould not inspire* as they do* an inescapable sense of indirection. The point is that the cliche is not true* and the problems of transition are indeed substanti5e rather than merely procedural. !lthou0h )as is 7used7 as an instrument of national and social policy* the fact that a society is or0aniEed for any de0ree of readiness for )ar supersedes its political and economic structure. (ar itself is the basic social system* )ithin )hich other secondary modes of social or0aniEation conflict or conspire. It is the system )hich has 0o5erned most human societies of record* as it is today. Once this is correctly understood* the true ma0nitude of the problems entailed in a transition to peace111itself a social system* but )ithout precedent e6cept in a fe) simple preindustrial societies111 becomes apparent. !t the same time* some of the puEElin0 superficial contradictions of modern societies can then be readily rationaliEed. The 7unnecessary7 siEe and po)er of the )orld )ar industry? the preeminence of the military establishment in e5ery society* )hether open or concealed? the e6emption of military or paramilitary institutions from the accepted social and le0al standards of beha5ior re>uired else)here in the society? the successful operation of the armed forces and the

armaments producers entirely outside the frame)or/ of each nation@s economic 0round rules: these and other ambi>uities closely associated )ith the relationship of )ar to society are easily clarified* once the priority of )ar1ma/in0 potential as the principal structurin0 force in society is accepted. Economic systems* political philosophies* and corpora Bures ser5e and e6tend the )ar system* not 5ice 5ersa. It must be emphasiEed that the precedence of a society@s )ar1ma/in0 potential o5er its other characteristics is not the result of the 7threat7 presumed to e6ist at any one time from other societies. This is the re5erse of the basic situation? 7threath7 a0ainst the 7national interest7 are usually created or accelerated to meet the chan0in0 needs of the )ar system. Only in comparati5ely recent times has it been considered politically e6pedient to euphemiEe )ar bud0ets as 7defense7 re>uirements. The necessity for 0o5ernments to dis1 tin0uish bet)een 7a00ression7 CbadD and 7defense7 C0oodD has been a by1product of risin0 literacy and rapid communication. The distinction is tactical only* a concession to the 0ro)in0 inade>uacy of ancient )ar1or0aniEin0 political rationales. (ars are not 7caused7 by international conflicts of interest. Proper lo0ical se>uence )ould ma/e it more often accurate to say that )ar1ma/in0 societies re>uire111and thus brin0 about111such conflicts. The capacity of a nation to ma/e )ar e6presses the 0reatest social po)er it can e6ercise? )ar1 ma/in0* acti5e or contemplated* is a matter of life and death on the 0reatest scale subBect to social control. It should therefore hardly be surprisin0 that the military institutions in each society claim its hi0hest priorities. (e find further that most of the confusion surroundin0 the myth that )ar1ma/in0 is a tool of state policy stems from a 0eneral misapprehension of the functions of )ar. In 0eneral* these are concei5ed as: to defend a nation from military attac/ by another* or to deter such an attac/? to defend or ad5ance a 7national interest711economic* political* idealo0ical? to maintain or in1 crease a nation@s military po)er for its o)n sa/e. These are the 5isible* or ostensible* functions of )ar. If there )ere no others* the importance of the )ar establishment in each society mi0ht in fact decline to the subordinate le5el it is belie5ed to occupy. !nd the elimination of )ar )ould indeed be the procedural matter that the disarmament scenarios su00est. $ut there are other* broader* more profoundly felt functions of )ar in modern societies. It is these in5isi5le* or implied* functions that maintain )ar1readiness as the dominant force in our societies. !nd it is the un)illin0ness or inability of the )riters of disarmament scenarios and recon5ersion plans to ta/e them into account that has so reduced the usefulness of their )or/* and that has made it seem unrelated to the )orld )e /no). #E'TION 3 1 T"E F N'TION# OF (!R !s )e ha5e indicated* the preeminence of the concept of )ar as the principal or0aniEin0 force in most societies has been insufficiently appreciated. This is also true of its e6tensi5e effects throu0hout the many nonmilitary acti5ities of society. These effects are less apparent in comple6 industrial socie1 ties li/e our o)n than in primiti5e cultures* the acti5ities of )hich can be more easily and fully comprehended. (e propose in this section to e6amine these nonmilitary* implied* and usually in5isible functions of )ar* to the e6tent that they bear on the problems of transition to peace for our society. The military* or ostensible* function of the )ar system re>uires no elaboration? it ser5es simply to defend or ad5ance the 7national interest7 by means of or0aniEed 5iolence. It is often necessary for a national military establishment to create a need for its uni>ue po)ers11to maintain the franchise* so to spea/. !nd a healthy military apparatus re>uires 7e6ercise*7 by )hate5er rationale seems e6pedient* to pre5ent its atrophy. The nonmilitary functions of the )ar system are more basic. They e6ist not merely to Bustify themsel5es but to ser5e broader social purposes. If and )hen )ar is eliminated* the military functions it has ser5ed )ill end )ith it. $ut its nonmilitary functions )ill not. It is essential*

therefore* that )e understand their si0nificance before )e can reasonably e6pect to e5aluate )hate5er institutions may be proposed to replace them.
E'ONOMI'

The production of )eapons of mass destruction has al)ays been associated )ith economic 7)aste.7 The term is peBorati5e* since it implies a failure of function. $ut no human acti5ity can properly be considered )asteful if it achie5es its conte6tual obBecti5e. The phrase 7)asteful but necessary*7 applied not only to )ar e6penditures but to most of the 7unproducti5e7 commercial acti5ities of our society* is a contradiction in terms. 7...The attac/s that ha5e since the time of #amuel@s criticism of Gin0 #aul been le5eled a0ainst military e6penditures as )aste may )ell ha5e concealed or misunderstood the point that some /inds of )aste may ha5e a lar0er social utility.7 In the case of military 7)aste*7 there is indeed a lar0er social utility. It deri5es from the fact that the 7)astefulness7 of )ar production is e6ercised entirely outside the frame)or/ of the economy of supply and demand. !s such* it pro5ides the only critically lar0e se0ment of the total economy that is subBect to complete and arbitrary central control. If modern industrial societies can be defined as those )hich ha5e de5eloped the capacity to produce more than is re>uired for their economic sur5i5al Cre0ardless of the e>uities of distribution of 0oods )ithin themD* military spendin0 can be said to furnish the only balance )heel )ith sufficient inertia to stabiliEe the ad5ance of their economies. The fact that )ar is 7)asteful7 is )hat enables it to ser5e this function. !nd the faster the economy ad5ances* the hea5ier this balance )heel must be. This function is often 5ie)ed* o5ersimply* as a de5ice for the control of surpluses. One )riter on the subBect puts it this )ay: 7(hy is )ar so )onderfulA $ecause it creates artificial demand...the only /ind of artificial demand* moreo5er* that does not raise any political issues: )ar* and only )ar* sol5es the problem of in5entory.7 The reference here is to shootin0 )ar* but it applies e>ually to the 0eneral )ar economy as )ell. 7It is 0enerally a0reed*7 concludes* more cautiously* the report of a panel set up by the .#. !rms 'ontrol and Disarmament !0ency* 7that the 0reatly e6panded public sector since (orld (ar II* resultin0 from hea5y defense e6penditures* has pro5ided additional protection a0ainst depressions* since this sector is not responsi5e to con1 traction in the pri5ate sector and has pro5ided a sort of buffer or balance )heel in the economy.7 The principal economic function of )ar* in our 5ie)* is that it pro5ides Bust such a fly)heel. It is not to be confused in function )ith the 5arious forms of fiscal control* none of )hich directly en0a0es 5ast numbers of control* none of )hich directly en0a0es 5ast numbers of men and units of production. It is not to be confused )ith massi5e 0o5ernment e6penditures in social )elfare pro0rams? once initiated* such pro0rams normally become inte0ral parts of the 0eneral economy and are no lon0er subBect to arbitrary control. $ut e5en in the conte6t of the 0eneral ci5ilian economy )ar cannot be considered )holly 7)asteful.7 (ithout a lon01established )ar economy* and )ithout its fre>uent eruption into lar0e1 scale shootin0 )ar* most of the maBor industrial ad5ances /no)n to history* be0innin0 )ith the de5elopment of iron* could ne5er ha5e ta/en place. (eapons technolo0y structures the economy. !ccordin0 to the )riter cited abo5e* 7Nothin0 is more ironic or re5ealin0 about our society than the fact that hu0ely destructi5e )ar is a 5ery pro0ressi5e force in it. ... (ar production is pro0ressi5e because it is production that )ould not other)ise ha5e ta/en place. CIt is not so )idely appreciated* for e6ample* that the ci5ilian standard of li5in0 rose durin0 (orld (ar II.D7 This is not 7ironic or re5ealin0*7 but essentially a simple statement of fact. It should also be noted that the )ar production has a dependably stimulatin0 effect outside itself. Far from constitutin0 a 7)asteful7 drain on the economy* )ar spendin0* considered pra0matically* has been a consistently positi5e factor in the rise of 0ross national product and of indi5idual producti5ity. ! former #ecretary of the !rmy has carefully phrased it for public consumption thus: 7If there is* as I suspect there is* a direct relation bet)een the stimulus of lar0e defense spendin0 and a substantially increased rate of 0ro)th of 0ross national product* it >uite simply follo)s that

defense spendin0 per se mi0ht be countenanced on economic 0rounds alone Hemphasis addedI as a stimulator of the national metabolism.7 !ctually* the fundamental nonmilitary utility of )ar in the economy is far more )idely ac/no)led0ed than the scarcity of such affirmations as tha >uoted abo5e )ould su00est. $ut ne0ati5ely phrased public reco0nitions of the importance of )ar to the 0eneral economy abound. The most familiar e6ample is the effect of 7peace threats7 on the stoc/ mar/et* e.0.* 7(all #treet )as sha/en yesterday by ne)s of an apparent peace feeler from North Fietnam* but s)iftly reco5ered its com1 posure after about an hour of sometimes indiscriminate sellin0.7 #a5in0s ban/s solicit deposits )ith similar cautionary slo0ans* e.0.* 7If peace brea/s out* )ill you be ready for itA7 ! more subtle case in point )as the recent refusal of the Department of Defense to permit the (est 9erman 0o5ernment to substitute nonmilitary 0oods for un)anted armaments in its purchase commitments from the nited #tates? the decisi5e consideration )as that the 9erman purchases should not affect the 0eneral CnonmilitaryD economy. Other incidental e6amples are to be found in the pressures bro0ht to bear on the Department )hen it announces plans to close do)n an obsolete facility Cas a 7)asteful7 form of 7)aste7D. and in the usual coordination of stepped1up mililtary acti5ities Cas in Fietnam in +,-3D )ith dan0erously risin0 unemployment rates. !lthou0h )e do not imply that a substitute for )ar in the economy cannot be de5ised* no combination of techni>ues for controllin0 employment* production* and consumption has yet been tested that can remotely compare to it in effecti5eness. It is* and has been* the essential economic stabiliEer of modern societies.
PO%ITI'!%

The political functions of )ar ha5e been up to no) e5en more critical to social stability. It is not surprisin0* ne5ertheless* that discussions of economic con5ersion for peace tend to fall silent on the matter of political implementation* and that disarmament scenarios* often sophisticated in their )ei0hin0 of international political factors* tend to disre0ard the political functions of the )ar system )ithin0 indi5idual societies. These functions are essentially or0aniEational. First of all* the e6istence of a society as a political 7nation7 re>uires as part of its definition an attitude of relationship to)ard other 7nations.7 This is )hat )e usually call a forei0n policy. $ut a nation@s forei0n policy can ha5e no substance if it lac/s the means of enforcin0 its attitude to)ard other nations. It can do this in a credible manner only if it implies the threat of ma6imum political or0aniEation for this purpose11)hich is to say that it is or0aniEed to some de0ree for )ar. (ar* then* as )e ha5e defined it to include all national acti5ities that reco0niEe the possibility of armed conflict* is itself the definin0 ele1 ment of any nation@s e6istence 5is1a15is any other nation. #ince it is historically a6iomatic that the e6istence of any form of )eaponry insures its use* )e ha5e used the )or/ 7peace7 as 5irtually synonymous )ith disarmament. $y the same to/en* 7)ar7 is 5irtually synonymous )ith nationhood. The elimination of )ar implies the ine5itable elimination of national so5erei0nty and the traditional nation1state. The )ar system not only has been essential to the e6istence of nations as independent political entities* but has been e>ually indispensable to their stable internal political structure. (ithout it* no 0o5ernment has e5er been able to obtain ac>uiescence in its 7le0itimacy*7 or ri0ht to rule its society. The possibility of )ar pro5ides the sense of e6ternal necessity )ithout )hich nor 0o5ernment can lon0 remain in po)er. The historical record re5eals one instance after another )here the failure of a re0ime to maintain the credibility of a )ar threat led to its dissolution* by the forces of pri5ate interest* or reactions to social inBustice* or of other disinte0rati5e elements. The or0aniEation of a society for the possibility of )ar is its principal political stabiliEer. It is ironic that this primary function of )ar has been 0enerally reco0niEed by historians only )here it has been e6pressly ac/no)led0ed11in the pirate societies of the 0reat con>uerors. The basic authority of a modern state o5er its people resides in its )ar po)ers. CThere is* in fact* 0ood reason to belie5e that codified la) had its ori0ins in the rules of conduct established by

military 5ictors for dealin0 )ith the defeated enemy* )hich )ere later adapted to apply to all subBect populations.D On a day1to1day basis* it is represented by the institution of police* armed or0aniEations char0ed e6pressly )ith dealin0 )ith 7internal enemies7 in a military manner. %i/e the con5entional 7e6ternal7 military* the police are also substantially e6empt from many ci5ilian le0al restraints on their social beha5ior. In some countries* the artificial distinction bet)een police and other military forces does not e6ist. On the lon01term basis* a 0o5ernment@s emer0ency )ar po)ers 11 inherent in the structure of e5en the most libertarian of nations 11 define the most si0nificant aspect of the relation bet)een state and citiEen. In ad5anced modern democratic societies* the )ar system has pro5ided political leaders )ith another political1economic function of increasin0 importance: it has ser5ed as the last 0reat safe0uard a0ainst the elimination of necessary social classes. !s economic producti5ity increases to a le5el further and further abo5e that of minimum subsistence* it becomes more and more difficult for a society to maintain distribution patterns insurin0 the e6istence of 7he)ers of )ood and dra)ers of )ater7. The further pro0ress of auto1 mation can be e6pected to differentiate still more sharply bet)een 7superior7 )or/ers and )hat Ricardo called 7menials*7 )hile simultaneously a00ra5atin0 the problem of maintainin0 an uns/illed labor supply. The arbitrary nature of )ar e6penditures and of other military acti5ities ma/e them ideally suited to control these essential class relationships. Ob5iously* if the )ar system )ere to be discarded* ne) political machinery )ould be needed at once to ser5e this 5ital subfunction. ntil it is de5eloped* the continuance of the )ar system must be assured* if for no other reason* amon0 others* than to preser5e )hate5er >uality and de0ree of po5erty a society re>uires as an incenti5e* as )ell as to maintain the stability of its internal or0aniEation of po)er.
#O'IO%O9I'!%

nder this headin0* )e )ill e6amine a ne6us of functions ser5ed by the )ar system that affect human beha5ior in society. In 0eneral* they are broader in application and less susceptible to direct obser5ation than the economic and political factors pre5iously considered. The most ob5ious of these functions is the time1honored use of military institutions to pro5ide antisocial elements )ith an acceptable role in the social structure. The disinte0rati5e* unstable social mo5ements loosely described as 7fascist7 ha5e traditionally ta/en root in societies that ha5e lac/ed ade>uate military or paramilitary outlets to meet the needs of these elements. This function has been critical in periods of rapid chan0e. The dan0er si0nals are easy to reco0niEe* e5en thou0h the sti0mata bear different names at different times. The current euphemistic cliches117Bu5enile delin>uency7 and 7alienation7 11 ha5e had their counterparts in e5ery a0e. In earlier days these conditions )ere dealt )ith directly by the military )ithout the complications of due process* usually throu0h press 0an0s or outri0ht ensla5ement. $ut it is not hard to 5isualiEe* for e6ample* the de0ree of social disruption that mi0ht ha5e ta/en place in the nited #tates durin0 the last t)o decades if the problem of the socially disaffected of the post1(orld (ar II period had been foreseen and effecti5ely met. The youn0er* and more dan0erous* of these hostile social 0roupin0s ha5e been /ept under control by the #electi5e #er5ice #ystem. This system and its analo0ues else)here furnish remar/ably clear e6amples of dis0uised military utility. Informed persons in this country ha5e ne5er accepted the official rationale for a peacetime draft11military necessity* preparedness* etc. 11as )orthy of serious consideration. $ut )hat has 0ained credence amon0 thou0htful men is the rarely 5oiced* less easily refuted* proposition that the institution of military ser5ice has a 7patriotic7 priority in our society that must be maintained for its o)n sa/e. Ironically* the simplistic official Bustification for selecti5e ser5ice comes closer to the mar/* once the non1military functions of military institutions are understood. !s a control de5ice o5er the hostile* nihilistic* and potentially unsettlin0 elements of a society in transition* the draft can a0ain be defended* and >uite con5incin0ly* as a 7military7 necessity.

Nor can it be considered a coincidence that o5ert military acti5ity* and thus the le5el of draft calls* tend to follo) the maBor fluctuations in the unemployment rate in the lo)er a0e 0roups. This rate* in turn* is a timetested herald of social discontent. It must be noted also that the armed forces in e5ery ci5iliEation ha5e pro5ided the principal state1supported ha5en for )hat )e no) call the 7unemployable.7 The typical European standin0 army Cof fifty years a0oD consisted of 7...troops unfit for employment in commerce* industry* or a0riculture* led by officers unfit to practice any le0itimate profession or to conduct a business enterprise.7 This is still lar0ely true* if less apparent. In a sense* this function of the military as the custodian of the economically or cuturally depri5ed )as the forerunner of most contemporary ci5ilian social1)elfare pro0rams* from the (.P.!. to 5arious forms of 7socialiEed7 medicine and social security. It is interestin0 that liberal sociolo0ists currently proposin0 to use the #electi5e #er5ice #ystem as a medium of cultural up0radin0 of the poor consider this a no5el application of military practice. !lthou0h it cannot be said absolutely that such critical measures of social control as the draft re>uire a military rationale* no modern society has yet been )illin0 to ris/ e6perimentation )ith any other /ind. E5en durin0 such periods of comparati5ely simple social crisis as the so1called 9reat Depression of the +,4=s* it )as deemed prudent by the 0o5ernment to in5est minor ma/e1)or/ proBects* li/e the 7'i5ilian7 'onser5ation 'orps* )ith a military character* and to place the more ambitious National Reco5ery !dministration under the direction of a professional army officer at its inception. Today* at least one small Northern European country* pla0ued )ith uncontrollable unrest amon0 its 7alienated youth*7 is considerin0 the e6pansion of its armed forces* despite the problem of ma/in0 credible the e6pansion of a non1e6istent e6ternal threat. #poradic efforts ha5e been made to promote 0eneral reco0nition of broad national 5alues free of military connotation* but they ha5e been ineffecti5e. For e6ample* to enlist public support of e5en such modest pro0rams of social adBustment as 7fi0htin0 inflation7 or 7maintainin0 physical fitness7 it has been necessary for the 0o5ernment to utiliEe a patriotic Ci.e. militaryD incenti5e. It sells 7defense7 bonds and it e>uates health )ith military preparedness. This is not surprisin0? since the concept of 7nationhood7 implies readiness for )ar* a 7national7 pro0ram must do li/e)ise. In 0eneral* the )ar system pro5ides the basic moti5ation for primary social or0aniEation. In so doin0* it reflects on the societal le5el the incenti5es of indi5idual human beha5ior. The most important of these* for social purposes* is the indi5idual psycholo0ical rationale for alle0iance to a society and its 5alues. !lle0iance re>uires a cause? a cause re>uires an enemy. This much is ob5ious? the critical point is that the enemy that defines the cause must seem 0enuinely formidable. Rou0hly spea/in0* the presumed po)er of the 7enemy7 sufficient to )arrant an indi5idual sense of alle0iance to a society must be proportionate to the siEe and comple6ity of the society. Today* of course* that po)er must be one of unprecedented ma0nitude and fri0htfulness. It follo)s* from the patterns of human beha5ior* that the credibility of a social 7enemy7 demands similarly a readiness of response in proportion to its menace. In a broad social conte6t* 7an eye for an eye7 still characteriEes the only acceptable attitude to)ard a presumed threat of a00ression* despite con1 trary reli0ious and moral precepts 0o5ernin0 personal conduct. The remoteness of personal decision from social conse>uence in a modern society ma/es it easy for its members to maintain this attitude )ithout bein0 a)are of it. ! recent e6ample is the )ar in Fietnam? a less recent one )as the bombin0 of "iroshima and Na0asa/i. In each case* the e6tent and 0ratuitousness of the slau0hter )ere abstracted into political formulae by most !mericans* once the proposition that the 5ictims )ere 7enemies7 )as established. The )ar system ma/es such an abstracted response possible in nonmilitary conte6ts as )ell. ! con5entional e6ample of this mechanism is the inability of most people to connect* let us say* the star5ation of millions in India )ith their o)n past conscious political decision1ma/in0. &et the se>uential lo0ic lin/in0 a decision to res1 trict 0rain production in !merica )ith an e5entual famine in !sia is ob5ious* unambi0uous* and unconcealed. (hat 0i5es the )ar system its preeminent role in social or0aniEation* as else)here* is its unmatched authority o5er life and death. It must be emphasiEed a0ain that the )ar system is not a mere social

e6tension of the presumed need for indi5idual human 5iolence* but itself in turn ser5es to rationaliEe most nonmilitary /illin0. It also pro5ides the precedent for the collecti5e )illin0ness of members of a society to pay a blood price for institutions far less central to social or0aniEation that )ar. To ta/e a handy e6ample...7rather than accept speed limits of t)enty miles an hour )e prefer to let automobiles /ill forty thousand people a year.7 ! Rand analyst puts it in more 0eneral terms and less rhetorically: 7I am sure that there is* in effect* a desirable le5el of automobile accidents111 desirable* that is* from a broad point of 5ie)? in the sense that it is a necessary concomitant of thin0s of 0reater 5alue to society.7 The point may seem too ob5ious for iteration* but it is essential to an understandin0 of the important moti5ational function of )ar as a model for collecti5e sacrifice. ! brief loo/ at some defunct premodern societies is instructi5e. One of the most note)orthy features common to the lar0er* more comple6* and more successful of ancient ci5iliEations )as their )idespread use of the blood sacrifice. If one )ere to limit consideratin to those cultures )hose re0ional he0emony )as so complete that the prospect of 7)ar7 had become 5irtually inconcei5able 111as )as the case )ith se5eral of the 0reat pre1'olumbian societies of the (estern "emisphere111it )ould be found that some form of ritual /illin0 occupied a position of paramount social importance in each. In5ariably* the ritual )as in5ested )ith mythic or reli0ious si0nificance? as )ill all reli0ious and totemic practice* ho)e5er* the ritual mas/ed a broader and more important social function. In these societies* the blood sacrifice ser5ed the purpose of maintainin0 a 5esti0ial 7earnest7 of the society@s capability and )illin0ness to ma/e )ar11 i.e.* /ill and be /illed111in the e5ent that some mystical11i.e.* unforeseen 11circumstance )ere to 0i5e rise to the possibility. That the 7earnest7 )as not an ade>uate substitute for 0enuine military or0aniEation )hen the unthin/able enemy* such as the #panish con>uistadores* actually appeared on the scene in no )ay ne0ates the function of the ritual. It )as primarily* if not e6clusi5ely* a symbolic reminder that )ar had once been the central or0aniEin0 force of the society* and that this condition mi0ht recur. It does not follo) that a transition to total peace in modern societies )ould re>uire the use of this model* e5en in less 7barbaric7 0uise. $ut the historical analo0y ser5es as a reminder that a 5iable substitute for )ar as a social system cannot be a mere symbolic charade. It must in5ol5e ris/ of real personal destruction* and on a scale consistent )ith the siEe and comple6ity of modern social systems. 'redibility is the /ey. (hether the substitute is ritual in nature or functionally substanti5e* unless it pro5ides a belie5able life1 and1death threat it )ill not ser5e the socially or0aniEin0 function of )ar. The e6istence of an accepted e6ternal menace* then* is essential to social cohesi5eness as )ell as to the acceptance of political authority. The menace must be belie5able* it must be of a ma0nitude consistent )ith the comple6ity of the society threatened* and it must appear* at least* to affect the entire society.
E'O%O9I'!%

Men* li/e all other animals* is subBect to the continuin0 process of adaptin0 to the limitations of his en5ironment. $ut the principal mechanism he has utiliEed for this purpose is uni>ue amon0 li5in0 creatures. To forestall the ine5itable historical cycles of inade>uate food supply* post1Neolithic man destroys surplus members of his o)n species by or0aniEed )arfare. Etholo0ists ha5e often obser5ed that the or0aniEed slau0hter of members of their o)n species is 5irtually un/no)n amon0 other animals. Man@s special propensity to /ill his o)n /ind Cshared to a limited de0ree )ith ratsD may be attributed to his inability to adapt anachronistic patterns of sur5i5al Cli/e primiti5e huntin0D to his de5elopment of 7ci5iliEations7 in )hich these patterns cannot be effecti5ely sublimated. It may be attributed to other causes that ha5e been su00ested* such as a maladapted 7territorial instinct*7 etc. Ne5ertheless* it e6ists and its social e6pression in )ar constitutes a biolo0ical control of his relationship to his natural en5ironment that is peculiar to man alone.

(ar has ser5ed to help assure the sur5i5al of the human species. $ut as an e5olutionary de5ice to impro5e it* )ar is almost unbelie5ably inefficient. (ith fe) e6ceptions* the selecti5e processes of other li5in0 creatures promote both specific sur5i5al and 0enetic impro5ement. (hen a con5entionally adapti5e animal faces one of its periodic crises of insufficiency* it is the 7inferior7 members of the species that normally disappear. !n animal@s social response to such a crisis may ta/e the form of a mass mi0ration* durin0 )hich the )ea/ fall by the )ayside. Or it may follo) the dramatic and more efficient pattern of lemmin0 societies* in )hich the )ea/er members 5oluntarily disperse* lea5in0 a5ailable food supplies for the stron0er. In either case* the stron0 sur5i5e and the )ea/ fall. In human societies* those )ho fi0ht and die in )ars for sur5i5al are in 0eneral its biolo0ically stron0er members. This is natural selection in re5erse. The re0ressi5e 0enetic effort of )ar has been often noted and e>ually often deplored* e5en )hen it confuses biolo0ical and cultural factors. The disproportionate loss of the biolo0ically stron0er remains inherent in traditional )arfare. It ser5es to underscore the fact that sur5i5al of the species* rather than its impro5ement* is the fundamental purpose of natural selection* if it can be said to ha5e a purpose* Bust as it is the basic premise of this study. $ut as the polemolo0ist 9aston $outhoul has pointed out* other institutions that )ere de5eloped to ser5e this ecolo0ical function ha5e pro5ed e5en less satisfactory. CThey include such established forms as these: infanticide* practiced chiefly in ancient and primiti5e societies? se6ual mutilation? monasticism? forced emi0ration? e6tensi5e capital punishment* as in old 'hina and ei0hteenth1 century En0land? and other similar* usually localiEed* practices.D Man@s ability to increase his producti5ity of the essentials of physical life su00ests that the need for protection a0ainst cyclical famine may be nearly obsolete. It has thus tended to reduce the apparent importance of the basic ecolo0ical function of )ar* )hich is 0enerally disre0arded by peace theorists. T)o aspects of its remain especially rele5ant* ho)e5er. The first is ob5ious: current rates of population 0ro)th* compounded by en5ironmental threat to chemical and other contaminants* may )ell brin0 about a ne) crisis of insufficiency. If so* it is li/ely to be one of unprecedented 0lobal ma0nitude* not merely re0ional or temporary. 'on5entional methods of )arfare )ould almost surely pro5e inade>uate* in this e5ent* to reduce the consumin0 population to a le5el consistent )ith sur5i5al of the species. The second rele5ant factor is the efficiency of modern methods of mass destruction. E5en if their use is not re>uired to meet a )orld population crisis* they offer* perhaps parado6ically* the first opportunity in the history of man to halt the re0ressi5e 0enetic effects of natural selection by )ar. Nuclear )eapons are indiscriminate. Their application )ould brin0 to an end the disproportionate destruction of the physically stron0er members of the species Cthe 7)arriors7D in periods of )ar. (hether this prospect of 0enetic 0ain )ould offset the unfa5orable mutations anticipated from postnuclear radioacti5ity )e ha5e not yet determined. (hat 0i5es the >uestion a bearin0 on our study is the possibility that the determination may yet ha5e to be made. !nother secondary ecolo0ical trend bearin0 on proBected population 0ro)th is the re0ressi5e effect of certain medical ad5ances. Pestilence* for e6ample* is no lon0er an important factor in population control. The problem of increased life e6pectancy has been a00ra5ated. These ad5ances also pose a potentially more sinister problem* in that undesirable 0enetic traits that )ere formerly self1 li>uidatin0 are no) medically maintained. Many diseases that )ere once fatal at preprocreational a0s are no) cured? the effect of this de5elopment is to perpetuate undesirable susceptibilities and mutations. It seems clear that a ne) >uasi1eu0enic function of )ar is no) in process of formation that )ill ha5e to be ta/en into account in any transition plan. For the time bein0* the Department of Defense appears to ha5e reco0niEed such factors* as has been demonstrated by the plannin0 under )ay by the Rand 'orporation to cope )ith the brea/do)n in the ecolo0ical balance anticipated after a thermonuclear )ar. The Department has also be0un to stoc/pile birds* for e6ample* a0ainst the e6pected proliferation of radiation1resistant insects* etc.

' %T R!% !ND #'IENTIFI'

The declared order of 5alues in modern societies 0i5es a hi0h place to the so1called 7creati5e7 acti5ities* and an e5en hi0her one to those associated )ith the ad5ance of scientific /no)led0e. (idely held social 5alues can be translated into political e>ui5alents* )hich in turn may bear on the nature of a transition to peace. The attitudes of those )ho hold these 5alues must be ta/en into account in the plannin0 of the transition. The dependence* therefore* of cultural and scientific achie5ement on the )ar system )ould be an important consideration in a transition plan e5en is such achie5ement had no inherently necessary social function. Of all the countless dichotomies in5ented by scholars to account for the maBor differences in art styles and cycles* only one has been consistently unambi0uous in its application to a 5ariety of forms and cultures. "o)e5er it may be 5erbaliEed* the basic distinction is this: Is the )or/ )ar1 oriented or is it notA !mon0 primiti5e peoples* the )ar dance is the most important art form. Else)here* literature* music* paintin0* sculpture* and architecture that has )on lastin0 acceptance has in5ariably dealt )ith a theme of )ar* e6pressly or implicitly* and has e6pressed the centricity of )ar to society. The )ar in >uestion may be national conflict* as in #ha/espeare plays* $eetho5en@s music* or 9oya@s paintin0s* or it may be reflected in the form of reli0ious* social* or moral stru00le* as in the )or/ of Dante* Rembrandt* and $ach. !rt that cannot be classified as )ar1oriented is usually described as 7sterile*7 7decadent*7 and so on. !pplication of the 7)ar standard7 to )or/s of art may often lea5e room for debate in indi5idual cases* but there is no >uestion of its role as the fundamental determinant of cultural 5alues. !esthetic and moral standards ha5e a common anthropolo0ical ori0in* in the e6altation of bra5ery* the )illin0ness to /ill and ris/ death in tribal )arfare. It is also instructi5e to note that the character of a society@s culture has borne a close relationship to its )ar1ma/in0 potential* in the conte6t of its times. It is no accident that the current 7cultural e6plosion7 in the nited #tates is ta/in0 place durin0 an era mar/ed by an unusually rapid ad5ance in )eaponry. This relationship is more 0enerally reco0niEed than the literature on the subBect )ould su00est. For e6ample* many artists and )riters are no) be0innin0 to e6press concern o5er the limited creati5e options they en5isa0e in the )arless )orld they thin/* or hope* may be soon upon us. They are currently preparin0 for this possibility by unprecedented e6perimentation )ith meanin0less forms? their interest in recent years has been increasin0ly en0a0ed by the abstract pattern* the 0ratuitous emotin* the random happenin0* and the unrelated se>uence. The relationshp of )ar to scientific research and disco5ery is more e6plicit. (ar is the principal moti5ational force for the de5elopment of science at e5ery le5el* from the abstractly conceptual to the narro)ly technolo0ical. Modern society places a hi0h 5alue on 7pure7 science* but it is historically inescapable that all the si0nificant disco5eries that ha5e been made about the natural )orld ha5e been inspired by the real or ima0inary military necessities of their epochs. The conse>uences of the disco5eries ha5e indeed 0one far afield* but )ar has al)ays pro5ided the basic incenti5e. $e0innin0 )ith the de5elopment of iron and steel* and proceedin0 throu0h the disco5eries of the la)s of motion and thermodynamics to the a0e of the atomic particle* the synthetic polymer* and the space capsure* no important scientific ad5ance has not been at least indirectly initiated by an implicit re>uirement of )eaponry. More prosaic e6amples include the transistor radio Can out0ro)th of military communications re>uirementsD* the assembly line Cfrom 'i5il (ar firearms needsD* the steel1frame buildin0 Cfrom the steel battleshipD* the canal loc/* and so on. ! typical adaptation can be seen in a de5ice as modest as the common la)nmo)er? it de5eloped from the re5ol5in0 scythe de5ised by %eonardo da Finci to precede a horse1po)ered 5ehicle into enemy ran/s. The most direct relationship can be found in medical technolo0y. For e6ample* a 0iant 7)al/in0 machine*7 and amplifier of body motions in5ented for military use in difficult terrain* is no) ma/in0 it possible for many pre5iously con1 fined to )heelchairs to )al/. The Fietnam )ar alone has led to spectacular impro5ements in amputation procedures* blood1handlin0 techni>ues* and

sur0ical lo0istics. It has stimulated ne) lar0e1scale research on malaria and other typical parasite diseases? it is hard to estimate ho) lon0 this tA !moould other)ise ha5e been delayed* despite its enormous nonmilitary importance to nearly half the )orld@s population.
OT"ER

(e ha5e elected to omit from our discussion of the nonmilitary functions of )ar those )e do not consider critical to a transition pro0ram. This is not to say they are unimportant* ho)e5er* but only that they appear to present no special problems for the or0aniEation of a peace1oriented social system. They include the follo)in0: (ar as a 0eneral social release. This is a psychosocial function* ser5in0 the same purpose for a society as do the holiday* the celebration* and the or0y for the indi5idual111the release and redistribution of undifferentiated tensions. (ar pro5ides for the periodic necessary readBustment of standards of social beha5ior Cthe 7moral climate7D and for the dissipation of 0eneral boredom* one of the most consistently under5alued and unreco0niEed of social phenomena. (ar as a 0enerational stabiliEer. This psycholo0ical function* ser5ed by other beha5ior patterns in other animals* enables the physically deterioratin0 older 0eneration to maintain its control of the youn0er* destroyin0 it if necessary. (ar as an idealo0ical clarifier. The dualism that characteriEed the traditional dialectic of all branches of philosophy and of stable political relationships stems from )ar as the prototype of conflict. E6cept for secondary considerations* there cannot be* to put it as simply as possible* more than t)o sides to a >uestion because there cannot be more than t)o sides to a )ar. (ar as the basis for the international understandin0. $efore the de5elopment of modern communications* the strate0ic re>uirements of )ar pro5ided the only substantial incenti5e for the enrichment of one national culture )ith the achie5ements of another. !ltou0h this is still the case in many international relationships* the function is obsolescent. (e ha5e also for0one e6tended characteriEation of those functions )e assume to be )idely and e6plicitly reco0niEed. !n ob5ious e6ample is the rold of )ar as controller of the >uality and de0ree of unemployment. This is more than an economic and political subfunction? its sociolo0ical* cultural* and ecolo0ical aspects are also important* althou0h often teleonomic. $ut none affect the 0eneral problem of substitution. The same is true of certain other functions? those )e ha5e included are sufficient to define the scope of the problem. #E'TION - 1 # $#TIT TE# FOR T"E F N'TION# OF (!R $y no) it should be clear that the most detailed and comprehensi5e master plan for a transition to )orld peace )ill remain academic if it fails to deal forthri0htly )ith the problem of the critical nonmilitary functions of )ar. The social needs they ser5e are essential? if the )ar system no lon0er e6ists to meet them* substitute institutions )ill ha5e to be established for the purpose. These surro0ates must be 7realistic*7 )hich is to say of a scope and nature that can be concei5ed and implemented in the conte6t of present1day social capabilities. This is not the truism it may appear to be? the re>uirements of radical social chan0e often re5eal the distinction bet)een a most conser5ati5e proBection and a )ildly utopian scheme to be fine indeed. In this section )e )ill consider some possible substitutes for these functions. Only in rare instances ha5e they been put forth for the purposes )hich concern us here* but )e see no reason to limit oursel5es to proposals that address themsel5es e6plicitly to the problem as )e ha5e outlined it. (e )ill disre0ard the ostensible* or military* functions of )ar? it is a premise of this study that the transition to peace implies absolutely that they )ill no lon0er e6ist in any rele5ant sense. (e )ill also disre0ard the noncritical functions e6emplified at the end of the precedin0 section.

E'ONOMI'

Economic surro0ates for )ar must meet t)o principal criteria. They must be 7)asteful*7 in the common sense of the )ord* and they must operate outside the normal supply1demand system. ! corollary that should be ob5ious is that the ma0nitude of the )aste must be sufficient to meet the needs of a particular society. !n economy as ad5anced and comple6 as our o)n re>uires the planned a5era0e annual destructoin of not less than += percent of 0ross national product if it is effecti5ely to fulfill its stabiliEin0 function. (hen the mass of a balance )heel is inade>uate to the po)er it is intended to control* its effect can be self1defeatin0* as )ith a runa)ay locomoti5e. The analo0y* thou0h crude* is especially apt for the !merican economy* as our record of cyclical depressions sho)s. !ll ha5e ta/en place durin0 periods of 0rossly inade>uate military spendin0. Those fe) economic con5ersion pro0rams )hich by implication ac/no)led0e the nonmilitary economic function of )ar Cat least to some e6tentD tend to assume that so1called social1)elfare e6penditures )ill fill the 5acuum created by the disappearance of military spendin0. (hen one considers the bac/lo0 of un1 finished business111proposed but still une6ecuted111in this field* the assumption seems plausible. %et us e6amine briefly the follo)in0 list* )hich is more or less typical of 0eneral social )elfare pro0rams. "E!%T". Drastic e6pansion of medical research* education* and trainin0 facilities? hospital and clinic construction? the 0eneral obBecti5e of complete 0o5ernment10uaranteed health care for all* at a le5el consistent )ith current de5elopments in medical technolo0y. ED '!TION. The e>ui5alent of the fore0oin0 in teacher trainin0? schools and libraries? the drastic up0radin0 of standards* )ith the 0eneral obBecti5e of ma/in0 a5ailable for all an attainable educational 0oal e>ui5alent to )hat is no) considered a professional de0ree. "O #IN9. 'lean* comfortable* safe* and spacious li5in0 space for all* at the le5el no) enBoyed by about +3 percent of the population in this country Cless in most othersD. TR!N#PORT!TION. The establishment of a system of mass public transportation ma/in0 it possible for all to tra5el to and from areas of )or/ and recreation >uic/ly* comfortably* and con5eniently* and to tra5el pri5ately for pleasure rather than necessity. P"&#I'!% ENFIRONMENT. The de5elopment and protection of )ater supplies* forests* par/s* and other natural resources? the elimination of chemical and bacterial contaminants from air* )ater* and soil. POFERT&. The 0enuine elimination of po5erty* defined by a standard consistent )ith current economic producti5ity* by means of a 0uaranteed annual income or )hate5er system of distribution )ill best assure its achie5ement. This is only a sampler of the more ob5ious domestic social )elfare items* and )e ha5e listed it in a deliberately broad* perhaps e6tra5a0ant* manner. In the past* such a 5a0ue and ambitious1soundin0 7pro0ram7 )ould ha5e been dismissed out of hand* )ithout serious consideration? it )ould clearly ha5e been* prima facie* far too costly* >uite apart from its political implications. Our obBecti5e to it* on the other hand* could hardly be more contradictory. !s an economic substitute for )ar* it is inade>uate because it )ould be far too cheap. If this seems parado6ical* it must be remembered that up to no) all proposed social1)elfare e6penditures ha5e had to be measured )ithin the )ar economy* not as a replacement for it. The old slo0an about a battleship or an I'$M costin0 as much as 6 hospitals or y schools or E homes ta/es on a 5ery different meanin0 if there are to be more battleships or I'$M@s. #ince the list is 0eneral* )e ha5e elected to forestall the tan0ential contro5ersy that surrounds arbitraty cost proBections by offerin0 no indi5idual cost estimates. $ut the ma6imum pro0ram that could be physically effected alon0 the lines indicated could approach the established le5el of military spendin0 only for a limited time11in our opinion* subBect to a detailed cost1and1feasibility analysis* less than ten years. In this short period* at this rate* the maBor 0oals of the pro0ram )ould ha5e been achie5ed. Its capital1in5estment phase )ould ha5e been completed* and it )ould ha5e

established a permanent comparati5ely modest le5el of annual operatin0 cost11)ithin the frame)or/ of the 0eneral economy. "ere is the basic )ea/ness of the sociel1)elfare surro0ate. On the short1term basis* a ma6imum pro0ram of this sort could replace a normal military spendin0 pro0ram* pro5ided it )as desi0ned* li/e the military model* to be subBect to arbitrary control. Public housin0 starts* for e6ample* or the de5elopment of modern medical centers mi0ht be accelerated or halted from time to time* as the re>uirements of a stable economy mi0ht dictate. $ut on the lon01term basis* social1)elfare spendin0* no matter ho) often redefined* )ould necessarily become an inte0ral* accepted part of the economy* of no more 5alue as a stabiliEer than the automobile industry or old a0e and sur5i5ors@ insurance. !part from )hate5er merit social1)elfare pro0rams are deemed to ha5e for their o)n sa/e* their function as a substitute for )ar in the economy )ould thus be self1li>uidatin0. They mi0ht ser5e* ho)e5er* as e6pedients pendin0 the de5elopment of more durable substitute measures. !nother economic surro0ate that has been proposed is a series of 0iant 7space research7 pro0rams. These ha5e already demonstrated their utility in more modest scale )ithin the military economy. (hat has been implied* althou0h not yet e6pressly put forth* is the de5elopment of a lon01ran0e se>uence of space1research proBects )ith lar0ely unattainable 0oals. This /ind of pro0ram offers se5eral ad5anta0es lac/in0 in the social )elfare model. First* it is unli/ely to phase itself out* re0ardless of the predictable 7surprises7 science has in store for us: the uni5erse is too bi0. In the e5ent some indi5idual proBect une6pectedly succeeds there )ould be no dearth of substitute problems. For e6ample* if coloniEation of the moon proceeds on schedule* it could then become 7necessary7 to establish a beachhead on Mars or 8upiter* and so on. #econd* it need be no more dependent on the 0eneral supply1demand economy than its military prototype. Third* it lends itself e6traordinarily )ell to arbitrary control. #pace research can be 5ie)ed as the nearest modern e>ui5alent yet de5ised to the pyramid1buildin0* and similar ritualistic enterprises* of ancient societies. It is true that the scientific 5alue of the space pro0ram* e5en of )hat has already been accomplished* is substantial on its o)n terms. $ut current pro0rams are absurdly ob5iously disproportionate* in the relationship of the /no)led0e sou0ht to the e6penditures committed. !ll but a small fraction of the space bud0et* measured by the standards of comparable scientific obBecti5es* must be char0ed de facto to the military economy. Future space research* proBected as a )ar surro0ate* )ould further research* proBected as a )ar surro0ate* )ould further reduce the 7scientific7 rationale of its bud0et to a minuscule percenta0e indeed. !s a purely economic substitute for )ar* therefore* e6tension of the space pro0ram )arrants serious consideraton. In #ection 4 )e pointed out that certain disarmament models* )hich )e called conser5ati5e* postulated e6tremely e6pensi5e and elaborate inspection systems. (ould it be possible to e6tend and institutionaliEe such systems to the point )here they mi0ht ser5e as economic surro0ates for )ar spendin0A The or0aniEation of failsafe inspection machinery could )ell be ritualiEed in a manner similar to that of established military processes. 7Inspection teams7 mi0ht be 5ery li/e )eapons. Inflatin0 the inspection bud0et to military scale presents no difficulty. The appeal of this /ind of scheme lies in the comparati5e ease of transition bet)een t)o parallel systems. The 7elaborate inspection7 surro0ate is fundamentally fallacious* ho)e5er. !lthou0h it mi0ht be economically useful* as )ell as politically necessary* durin0 the disarmament transition* it )ould fail as a substitute for the economic function of )ar for one simple reason. Peace1/eepin0 inspection is part of a )ar system* not of a peace system. It implies the possibility of )eapons maintenance or manufacture* )hich could not e6ist in a )orld at peace as here defined. Massi5e inspection also implies sanctions* and thus )ar1readiness. The same fallacy is more ob5ious in plans to create a patently useless 7defense con5ersion7 apparatus. The lon01discredited proposal to build 7total7 ci5il defense facilities is one e6ample? another is the plan to establish a 0iant antimissile missile comple6 CNi/e1N* et al.D. These pro0rams*

of course* are economic rather than strate0ic. Ne5ertheless* they are not substitutes for military spendin0 but merely different forms of it. ! more sophisticated 5ariant is the proposal to establish the 7 narmed Forces7 of the nited #tates. This )ould con5eniently maintain the entire institutional military structure* redirectin0 it essentially to)ard social1)elfare acti5ities on a 0lobal scale. It )ould be* in effect* a 0iant military Peace 'orps. There is nothin0 inherently un)or/able about this plan* and usin0 the e6istin0 military system to effectuate its o)n demise is both in0enious and con5enient. $ut e5en on a 0reatly ma0nified )orld basis* social1)elfare e6penditures must sooner or later reenter the atmosphere of the normal economy. The practical transitional 5irtues of such a scheme )ould thus be e5entually ne0ated by its inade>uacy as a permanent economic stabiliEer.
PO%ITI'!%

The )ar system ma/es the stable 0o5ernment of societies possible. It does this essentially by pro5idin0 an e6ternal necessity for a society to accept political rule. In so doin0* it establishes the basis for nationhood and the authority of 0o5ernment to control its constituents. (hat other institution or combination of pro0rams mi0ht ser5e these functions in its placeA (e ha5e already pointed out that the end of the )ar means the end of national so5erei0nty* and thus the end of nationhood as )e /no) it today. $ut this does not necessarily mean the end of nations in the administrati5e sense* and internal political po)er )ill remain essential to a stable society. The emer0in0 7nations7 of the peace epoch must continue to dra) political authority from some source. ! number of proposals ha5e been made 0o5ernin0 the relations bet)een nations after total disarmament? all are basically Buridical in nature. They contemplate institutions more or less li/e a (orld 'ourt* or a nited Nations* but 5ested )ith real authority. They may or may not ser5e their ostansible post1military purpose of settlin0 internatinal disputes* but )e need not discuss that here. None )ould offer effecti5e e6ternal pressure on a peace1)orld nation to or0aniEe itself politically. It mi0ht be ar0ued that a )ell1armed international police force* operatin0 under the authority of such a supranational 7court*7 could )ell ser5e the function of e6ternal enemy. This* ho)e5er* )ould constitute a military operation* li/e the inspection schemes mentioned* and* li/e them* )ould be inconsistent )ith the premise of an end to the )ar system. It is possible that a 5ariant of the 7 narmed Forces7 idea mi0ht be de5eloped in such a )ay that its 7constructi5e7 Ci.e.* social )elfareD acti5ities could be combined )ith an economic 7threat7 of sufficient siEe and credibility to )arrant political or0aniEation. (ould this /ind of threat also be contradictory to our basic premiseA11that is* )ould it be ine5itably militaryA Not necessarily* in our 5ie)* but )e are s/eptical of its capacity to e5o/e credibility. !lso* the ob5ious destabiliEin0 effect of any 0lobal social )elfare surro0ate on politically necessary class relationships )ould create an entirely ne) set of transition problems at least e>ual in ma0nitude. 'redibility* in fact* lies at the heart of the problem of de5elopin0 a political substitute for )ar. This is )here the space1race proposals* in many )ays so )ell suited as economic substitutes for )ar* fall short. The most ambitious and unrealistic space proBect cannot of itself 0enerate a belie5able e6ternal menace. It has been hotly ar0ued that such a menace )ould offer the 7last* best hope of peace*7 etc.* by unitin0 man/ind a0ainst the dan0er of destruction by 7creatures7 from other planets or from outer space. E6periments ha5e been proposed to test the credibility of an out1of1our1)orld in5asion threat? it is possible that a fe) of the more difficult1to1e6plain 7flyin0 saucer7 indicents of recent years )ere in fact early e6periments of this /ind. If so* they could hardly ha5e been Bud0ed encoura0in0. (e anticipate no difficulties in ma/in0 a 7need7 for a 0iant super space pro0ram credible for economic purposes* e5en )ere there not ample precedent? e6tendin0 it* for political purposes* to include features unfortunately associated )ith science fiction )ould ob5iously be a more dubious underta/in0.

Ne5ertheless* an effecti5e political substitute for )ar )ould re>uire 7alternate enemies*7 some of )hich mi0ht seem e>ually farfetched in the conte6t of the current )ar system. It may be* for instance* that 0ross pollution of the en5ironment can e5entually replace the possibility of mass destruction by nuclear )eapons as the principal apparent threat to the sur5i5al of the species. Poisonin0 of the air* and of the principal sources of food and )ater supply* is already )ell ad5anced* and at first 0lance )ould seem promisin0 in this respect? it constitutes a threat that can be dealt )ith only throu0h social or0aniEation and political po)er. $ut from present indications it )ill be a 0eneration to a 0eneration and a half before en5ironmental pollution* ho)e5er se5ere* )ill be sufficiently menacin0* on a 0lobal scale* to offer a possible basis for a solution. It is true that the rate of pollution could be increased selecti5ely for this purpose? in fact* the mere modifyin0 of e6istin0 pro0rams for the deterrence of pollution could speed up the process enou0h to ma/e the threat credible much sooner. $ut the pollution problem has been so )idely publiciEed in recent years that it seems hi0hly improbably that a pro0ram of deliberate en5iron1 mental poisonin0 could be implemented in a politically acceptable manner. "o)e5er unli/ely some of the possible alternate enemies )e ha5e mentioned may seem* )e must emphasiEe that one must be found* of credible >uality and ma0nitude* if a transition to peace is e5er to come about )ithout social disinte0ration. It is more probably* in our Bud0ement* that such a threat )ill ha5e to be in5ented* rather than de5eloped from un/no)n conditions. For this reason* )e belie5e further speculation about its putati5e nature ill1ad5ised in this conte6t. #ince there is considerable doubt* in our minds* that any 5iable political surro0ate can be de5ised* )e are reluctant to compromise* by premature discussion* any possible option that may e5entually lie open to our 0o5ernment.
#O'IO%O9I'!%

Of the many functions of )ar )e ha5e found con5enient to 0roup to0ether in this classification* t)o are critical. In a )orld of peace* the continuin0 stability of society )ill re>uire: +D an effecti5e substitute for military institutions that can neutraliEe destabiliEin0 social elements and 2D a credible moti5ational surro0ate for )ar that can insure social cohesi5eness. The first is an essential element of social control? the second is the basic mechanism for adaptin0 indi5idual human dri5es to the needs of society. Most proposals that address themsel5es* e6plicitly or other)ise* to the post)ar problem of controllin0 the socially alienated turn to some 5ariant of the Peace 'orps or the so1called 8ob 'orps for a solution. The socially disaffected* the economically unprepared* the psycholo0ically unconformable* the hard1core 7delin>uents*7 the incorri0ible 7sub5ersi5es*7 and the rest of the unemployable are seen as someho) transformed by the disciplines of a ser5ice modeled on military precedent into more or less dedicated social ser5ice )or/ers. This presumption also informs the other)ise hardheaded ratiocination of the 7 narmed Forces7 plan. The problem has been addressed* in the lan0ua0e of popular sociolo0y* by #ecretary McNamara. 7E5en in our abundant societies* )e ha5e reason enou0h to )orry o5er the tensions that coil and ti0hten amon0 underpri5ile0ed youn0 people* and finally flail out in delin>uency and crime. (hat are )e to e6pect.. )here mountin0 frustrations are li/ely to fester into eruptions of 5iolence and e6tremismA7 In a seemin0ly unrelated passa0e* he continues: 7It seems to me that )e could mo5e to)ard remedyin0 that ine>uity Hof the #electi5e #er5ice #ystemI by as/in0 e5ery youn0 person in the nited #tates to 0i5e t)o years of ser5ice to his country11)hether in one of the military ser5ices* in the Peace 'orps* or in some other 5olunteer de5elopmental )A !mat home or abroad. (e could encoura0e other countries to do the same.7 "ere* as else)here throu0hout this si0nificant speech* Mr.McNamara has focused* indirectly but unmista/ably* on one of the /ey issues bearin0 on a possible transition to peace* and has later indicated* also indirectly* a rou0h approach to its resolution* a0ain phrased in the lan0ua0e of the current )ar system.

It seems cleara that Mr.McNamara and other proponents of the peace1corps surro0ate for this tar function lean hea5ily on the success of the paramilitary Depression pro0rams mentioned in the last section. (e find the precedent )holly inade>uate in de0ree. Neither the lac/ of rele5ant precedent* ho)e5er* nor the dubious social )elfare sentimentality characteriEin0 this approach )arrant its reBection )ithout careful study. It may be 5iable 111 pro5ided* first* that the military ori0in of the 'orps format be effecti5ely rendered out of its operational acti5ity* and second* that the transition from paramilitary acti5ities to 7de5elopmental )A !7 can be effected )ithout re0ard to the attitudes of the 'orps personnel or to the 75alue7 of the )or/ it is e6pected to perform. !nother possible surro0ate for the control of potential enemies of society is the reintroduction* in some form consistent )ith modern technolo0y and political processes* of sla5ery. p to no)* this has been su00ested only in fiction* notably in the )or/s of (ells* "u6ley* Or)ell* and others en0a0ed in the ima0inati5e anticipation of the sociolo0y of the future. $ut the fantasies proBected in $ra5e Ne) (orld and +,<: ha5e seemed less and less implausible o5er the years since their publication. The traditional association of sla5ery )ith ancient preindustrial cultures should not blind us to its adaptability to ad5anced forms of social or0aniEation* nor should its e>ually traditional incompatibility )ith (estern moral and economic 5alues. It is entirely possible that the de5elopment of a sophisticated form of sla5ery may be an absolute prere>uisite for social control in a )orld at peace. !s a practical matter* con5ersion of the code of military discipline to a euphemiEed form of ensla5ement )ould entail surprisin0ly little re5ision? the lo0ical first stepmoould be the adoption of some form of 7uni5ersal7 military ser5ice. (hen it comes to postulatin0 a credible substitute for )ar capable of directin0 human beha5ior patterns in behalf of social or0aniEation* fe) options su00est themsel5es. %i/e its political function* the moti5ational function of )ar re>uires the e6istence of a 0enuinely menacin0 social enemy. The principal difference is that for purposes of moti5atin0 basic alle0iance* as distinct from acceptin0 political authority* the 7alternate enemy7 must imply a more immediate* tan0ible* and directly felt threat of destruction. It must Bustify the need for ta/in0 and payin0 a 7blood price7 in )ide areas of human concern. In this respect* the possible enemies noted earlier )ould be insufficient. One e6ception mi0ht be the en5ironmental1pollution model* if the dan0er to society it posed )as 0enuinely imminent. The ficti5e models )ould ha5e to carry the )ei0ht of e6traordinary con5iction* underscored )ith a not inconsiderable actual sacrifice of life? the construction of an up1to1date mytholo0ical or reli0ious structure for this purpose )ould present difficulties in our era* but must certainly be considered. 9ames theorists ha5e su00ested* in other conte6ts* the de5elopment of 7blood 0ames7 for the effecti5e control of indi5idual a00ressi5e impulses. It is an ironic commentary on the current state of )ar and peace studies that it )as left not to scientists but to the ma/ers of a commercial film to de5elop a model for this notion* on the implausible le5el of popular melodrama* as a ritualiEed manhunt. More realistically* such a ritual mi0ht be socialiEed* in the manner of the #panish In>uisition and the less formal )itch trials of other periods* for purposes of 7social purification*7 7state security*7 or other rationale both acceptable and credible to post)ar societies. The feasibility of such an updated 5ersion of still another ancient institution* thou0h doubtful* is considerably less fanciful than the )ishful notion of many peace planners that a lastin0 condition of peace can be brou0ht about )ithout the most painsta/in0 e6amination of e5ery possible surro0ate for the essential functions of )ar. (hat is in5ol5ed here* in a sense* is the >uest for (illiam 8ame@s 7moral e>ui5alent of )ar.7 It is also possible that the t)o functions considered under this headin0 may be Bointly ser5ed* in the sense of establishin0 the antisocial* for )hom a control institution is needed* as the 7alternate enemy7 needed to hold society to0ether. The relentless and irre5ersible ad5ance of unemployability at all le5els of society* and the similar e6tension of 0eneraliEed alienation from accepted 5alues may ma/e some such pro0ram necessary e5en as an adBunct to the )ar system. !s before* )e )ill not speculate on the specific forms this /ind of pro0ram mi0ht ta/e* e6cept to note that there is a0ain

ample precedent* in the treatment meted out to disfa5ored* alle0edly menacin0* ethnic 0roups in certain societies durin0 certain historical periods.
E'O%O9I'!%

'onsiderin0 the shortcomin0s of )ar as a mechanism of selecti5e population control* it mi0ht appear that de5isin0 substitutes for this function should be comparati5ely simple. #chematically this is so* but the problem of timin0 the transition to a ne) ecolo0ical balancin0 de5ice ma/es the feasibility of substitution less certain. It must be remembered that the limitation of )ar in this function is entirely eu0enic. (ar has not been 0enetically pro0ressi5e. $ut as a system of 0ross population control to preser5e the species it cannot fairly be faulted. !nd* as has been pointed out* the nature of )ar is itself in transition. 'urrent trends in )arfare11the increased strate0ic bombin0 of ci5ilians and the 0reater mililtary importance no) attached to the destruction of sources of supply Cas opposed to purely 7military7 bases and personnelD111stron0ly su00est that a truly >ualititati5e impro5ement is in the ma/in0. !ssumin0 the )ar system is to continue* it is more than probably that the re0ressi5ely selecti5e >uality of )ar )ill ha5e been re5ersed* as its 5ictims become more 0enetically representati5e of their societies. There is no >uestion but that a uni5ersal re>uirement that procreation be limited to the products of artificial inseminatin )ould pro5ide a fully ade>uate substitute control for population le5els. #uch a reproducti5e system )ould* of course* ha5e the added ad5anta0e of bein0 susceptible of direct eu0enic mana0ement. Its predictable further de5elopment111conception and embryonic 0ro)th ta/in0 place )holly under laboratory conditions11)ould e6tend these controls to their lo0ical conclusion. The ecolo0ical function of )ar under these circumstances )ould not only be superseded but surpassed in effecti5eness. The indicated intermediate step11total control of conception )ith a 5ariant of the ubi>uitous 7pill*7 5ia )ater supplies or certain essential foodstuffs* offset by a controlled 7antidote7111is already under de5elopment. There oould appear to be no foreseeable need to re5ert to any of the outmoded practices referred to in the pre5ious section Cinfanticide* etc.D as there mi0ht ha5e been if the possibility of transition to peace had arisen t)o 0enerations a0o. The real >uestion here* therefore* does not concern the 5iability of this )ar substitute* but the political problems in5ol5ed in brin0in0 it about. It cannot be established )hile the )ar system is still in effect. The reason for this is simple: e6cess population is tar material. !s lon0 as any society must comtemplate e5en a remote possibility of)ar* it must maintain a ma6imum supportable population* e5en )hen so doin0 critically a00ra5ates an economic liability. This is parado6ical* in 5ie) of )ar@s role in reducin0 e6cess population* but it is readily understood. (ar controls the 0eneral population le5el* but the ecolo0ical interest of any sin0le society lies in maintainin0 its he0emony 5is1a15is other societies. The ob5ious analo0y can be seen in any free1enterprise economy. Practices dama0in0 to the society as a )hole11both competiti5e and monopolistic11are abetted by the conflictin0 economic moti5es of indi5idual capital interests. The ob5ious precedent can be found in the seemin0ly irrational political difficulties )hich ha5e blac/ed uni5ersal adoption of simple birth1control methods. Nations desperately in need of increasin0 unfa5orable production1 consumption ratios are ne5ertheless un)illin0 to 0amble their possible military re>uirements of t)enty years hence for this purpose. nilateral population control* as practiced in ancient 8apan and in other isolated societies* is out of the >uestion in today@s )orld. #ince the eu0enic solution cannot be achie5ed until the transition to the peace system ta/es place* )hy not )aitA One must >ualify the inclination to a0ree. !s )e noted earlier* a real possibility of an unprecedented 0lobal crisis of insufficiency e6ists today* )hich the )ar system may not be able to forestall. If this should come to pass before an a0reed1upon transition to peace )ere completed* the result mi0ht be irre5ocably disastrous. There is clearly no solution to this dilemma? it is a ris/ )hich

must be ta/en. $ut it tends to support the 5ie) that if a decision is made to elminate the )ar system* it )ere better done sooner than later.
' %T R!% !ND #'IENTIFI'

#trictly spea/in0* the function of )ar as the determinant of cultural 5alues and as the prime mo5er of scientific pro0ress may not be critical in a )orld )ithout )ar. Our criterion for the basic nonmilitary functions of )ar has been: !re they necessary to the sur5i5al and stability of societyA The absolute need for substitute cultural 5alue1determinants and for the continued ad5ance of scientific /no)led0e is not established. (e belie5e it important* ho)e5er* in behalf of those for )hom these functions hold subBecti5e si0nificance* that it be /no)n )hat they can reasonably e6pect in culture and science after a transition to peace. #o far as the creati5e arts are concerned* there is no reason to belie5e they )ould disappear* but only that they )ould chan0e in charactermand relati5e social importance. The elimination of )ar )ould in due course depri5e them of their principal conati5e force* but it )ould necessarily ta/e some time for the transition* and perhaps for a 0eneration thereafter* themes of sociomoral conflict inspired by the )ar system )ould be increasin0ly transferred to the idiom of purely personal sensibility. !t the same time* a ne) aesthetic oould ha5e to de5elop. (hate5er its name* form* or rationale* its function )ould be to e6press* in lan0ua0e appropriate to the ne) period* the once discredited philosophy that art e6ists for its o)n sa/e. This aesthetic oould reBect une>ui5ocally the classic re>uirement of paramilitary conflict as the substanti5e content of 0reat art. The e5entual effect of the peace1)orld philosophy of art )ould be deomcratiEin0 in the e6treme* in the sense that a 0enerally ac/no)led0ed subBecti5ity of artistic standards )ould e>ualiEe their ne)* content1free 75alues.7 (hat may be e6pected to happen is that art )ould be reassi0ned the role it once played in a fe) primiti5e peace1oriented social systems. This )as the functin of pure decoration* entertainment* or play* entirely free of the burden of e6pressin0 the sociomoral 5alues and conflicts of a )ar1oriented society. It is interestin0 that the 0round)or/ for such a 5alue1free aesthetic is already bein0 laid today* in 0ro)in0 e6perimentation in art )ithout content* perhaps in anticipation of a )orld )ithout conflict. ! cult has de5eloped around a ne) /ind of cultural determinism* )hich proposes that the technolo0ical form of a cultural e6pression determines its 5alues rather than does its ostensibly meanin0ful content. Its clear implication is that there is no 70ood7 or 7bad7 art* only that )hich is appropriate to its Ctechnolo0icalD times and that )hich is not. Its cultural effect has been to promote circumstantial constructions and unplanned e6pressions? it denies to art the rele5ance of se>uential lo0ic. Its si0nificance in this conte6t is that it pro5ides a )or/in0 model of one /ind of 5alue1free culture )e mi0ht reasonably anticipate in a )orld at peace. #o far as science is concerned* it mi0ht appear at first 0lance that a 0iant space1research pro0ram* the most promisin0 amon0 the proposed economic surro0ates for )ar* mi0ht also ser5e as the basic stimulator of scientific research. The lac/ of fundamental or0aniEed social conflict inherent in space )or/* ho)e5er* )ould rule it out as an ade0uate moti5ational substitute for )ar )hen applied to 7pure7 science. $ut it could no doubt sustain the broad ran0e of technolo0ical acti5ity that a space bud0et of military dimensions oould re>uire. ! similarly scaled social1)elfare pro0ram could pro5ide a comparable inpetus to lo)1/eyed technolo0ical ad5ances* especially in medicine* rationaliEed construction methods* educational psycholo0y* etc. The eu0enic substitute for the ecolo0ical function of )ar oould also re>uire continuin0 research in certain areas of the life sciences. !part from these partial substitutes for )ar* it must be /ept in mind that the momentum 0i5en to scientific pro0ress by the 0reat )ars of the past century* and e5en more by the anticipation of (orld (ar III* is intellectually and materially enormous. It is our findin0 that if the )ar system )ere to end tomorro) this momentum is so 0reat that the pursuit of scientific /no)led0e could reasonably be e6pected to 0o for)ard )ithout noticeable diminution for perhaps t)o decades. It )ould then

continue* at a pro0ressi5ely decreasin0 tempo* for at least another t)o decades before the 7ban/ account7 of today@s unresol5ed problems )ould become e6hausted. $y the standards of the >uestions )e ha5e learned to as/ today* there )ould no lon0er be anythin0 )orth /no)in0 still un/no)n? )e cannot concei5e* by definition* of the scientific >uestions to as/ once those )e can no) comprehend are ans)ered. This leads una5oidably to another matter: the intrinsic 5alue of the unlimited search for /no)led0e. (e of course offer no independent 5alue Bud0ments here* but it is 0ermane to point out that a substantial minority of scientific opinion feels that search to be circumscribed in any case. This opinion is itself a factor in considerin0 the need for a substitute for the scientific function of )ar. For the record* )e must also ta/e note of the precedent that durin0 lon0 periods of human history* often co5erin0 thousands of years* in )hich no intrinsic social 5alue )as assi0ned to scientific pro0ress* stable societies did sur5i5e and flourish. !lthou0h this could not ha5e been possible in the modern industrial )orld* )e cannot be certain it may not a0ain be true in a future )orld at peace. #E'TION . 1 # MM!R& !ND 'ON'% #ION#
T"E N!T RE OF (!R

(ar is not* as is )idely assumed* primarily an instrument of polcy utiliEed by nations to e6tend or defend their e6pressed political 5alues or their economic interests. On the contrary* it is itself the principal basis of or0aniEatin on )hich all modern societies are constructed. The common pro6imate cause of )ar is the apparent interference of one nation )ith the aspirations of another. $ut at the root of all ostensible differences of national interest lie the dynamic re>uirements of the )ar system itself for periodic armed conflict. Readiness for )ar characteriEes contemporary social systems more broadly than their economic and political structures* )hich it subsumes. Economic analyses of the anticipated problems of transition to peace ha5e not reco0niEed the broad preminence of )ar in the definition of social systems. The same is true* )ith rare and only partial e6ceptions* of model disarmament 7scenarios.7 For this reason* the 5alue of this pre5ious )or/ is limited to the mechanical aspects of transition. 'ertain features of these models may perhaps be applicable to a real situation of con5ersion to peace? this till depend on their compatibility )ith a substanti5e* rather than a procedural* peace plan. #uch a plan can be de5eloped only from the premise of full understandin0 of the nature of the )ar system it proposes to abolish* )hich in turn presupposes detailed comprehension of the functions the )ar system performs for society. It )ill re>uire the construction of a detailed and feasible system of substitutes for those functions that are necessary to the stability and sur5i5al of human societies.
T"E F N'TION# OF (!R

The 5isible* military function of )ar re>uires no elucidation? it is not only ob5ious but also irrele5ant to a transition to the condition of peace* in )hich it )ill by definition be superfluous. It is also subsidiary in social si0nificance to the implied* nonmilitary functions of )ar? those critical to transition can be summariEed in fi5e principal 0roupin0s. +. E'ONOMI'. (ar has pro5ided both ancient and modern societies )ith a dependable system for stabiliEin0 and controllin0 national economies. No alternate method of control has yet been tested in a comple6 modern economy that has sho)n itself remotely comparable in scope or effecti5eness. 2. PO%ITI'!%. The permanent possibility of )ar is the foundation for stable 0o5ernment? it supplies the basis for 0eneral acceptance of political authority. It has enabled societies to maintain necessary class distinctions* and it has ensured the subordination of the citiEen to the state* by 5irtue of the residual )ar po)ers inherent in the concept of nationhood. No modern political rulin0 0roup has successfully controlled its constituency after failin0 to sustain the continuin0 credibility of an e6ternal threat of )ar.

4. #O'IO%O9I'!%. (ar* throu0h the medium of military institutions* has uni>uely ser5ed societies* throu0hout the course of /no)n history* as an indispensible controller of dan0erous social dissidence and destructi5e antisocial tendencies. !s the most formidable of threats to life itself* and as the only one susceptible to miti0ation by social or0aniEation alone* it has played another e>ually fundamental role: the )ar system has pro5ided the machinery throu0h )hich the moti5ational forces 0o5ernin0 human beha5ior ha5e been translated into bindin0 social alle0iance. It has thus ensured the de0ree of social cohesion necessary to the 5iability of nations. No other institution* or 0roups of institutions* in modern societies* has successfully ser5ed these functions. :. E'O%O9I'!%. (ar has been the principal e5olutionary de5ice for maintainin0 a satisfactory ecolo0ical balance bet)een 0ross human population and supplies a5ailable for its sur5i5al. It is uni>ue to the human species. 3. ' %T R!% !ND #'IENTIFI'. (ar1orientation has determined the basic standards of 5alue in the creati5e arts* and has pro5ided the fundamental moti5ational source of scientific and technolo0ical pro0ress. The concepts that the arts e6press 5alues independent of their o)n forms and that the successful pursuit of /no)led0e has intrinsic social 5alue ha5e lon0 been accepted in modern societies? the de5elopment of the arts and sciences durin0 this period has been corollary to the parallel de5elopment of )eaponry.
# $#TIT TE# FOR T"E F N'TION# OF (!R: 'RITERI!

The fore0oin0 functions of )ar are essential to the sur5i5al of the social systems )e /no) today. (ith t)o possible e6ceptions they are also essential to any /ind of stable social or0aniEation that mi0ht sur5i5e in a )arless )orld. Discussion of the )ays and means of transition to such a )orld are meanin0less unless aDsubstitute institutions can be de5ised to fill these functions* or bD it can reasonably be hypothecated that the loss or partial loss of any one function need not destroy the 5iability of future societies. #uch substitute institutions and hypotheses must meet 5aryin0 criteria. In 0eneral* they must be technically feasible* politically acceptable* and potentially credible to the members of the societies that adopt them. #pecifically* they must be characteriEed as follo)s: +. E'ONOMI'. !n acceptable economic surro0ate for the )ar system )ill re>uire the e6penditure of resources for completely nonproducti5e purposes at a le5el comparable to that of the military e6penditures other)ise demanded by the siEe and comple6ity of each society. #uch a substitute system of apparent 7)aste7 must be of a nature that )ill permit it to remain independent of the normal supply1demand economy? it must be subBect to arbitrary political control. 2. PO%ITI'!%. ! 5iable political substitute fir )ar must posit a 0eneraliEed e6ternal menace to each society of a nature and de0ree sufficient to re>uire the or0aniEation and acceptance of political authority. 4. #O'IO%O9I'!%. First* in the permanent absence of )ar* ne) institutions must be de5eloped that )ill effecti5ely control the socially destructi5e se01 ments of societies. #econd* for purposes of adaptin0 the physical and psycholo0ical dynamics of human beha5ior to the needs of social or0aniEation* a credible substitute for )ar must 0enerate an omnipresent and readily understood fear of personal destruction. This fear must be of a nature and de0ree sufficient to ensure adherence to societal 5alues to the full e6tent that they are ac/no)led0ed to transcend the 5alue of indi5idual human life. :. E'O%O9I'!%. ! substitute for )ar in its function as the uni>uely human system of population control must ensure the sur5i5al* if not necessarily the impro5ement* of the species* in terms of its relations to en5ironmental supply. 3. ' %T R!% !ND #'IENTIFI'. ! surro0ate for the function of )ar as the determinant of cultural 5alues must establish a basis of sociomoral conflict of e>ually compellin0 force and

scope. ! substitute moti5ational basis for the >uest for scientific /no)led0e must be similarly informed by a comparable sense of internal necessity.
# $#TIT TE# FOR T"E F N'TION# OF (!R: MODE%#

The follo)in0 substitute institutions* amon0 others* ha5e been proposed for consideration as replacements for the nonmilitary functions of )ar. That they may not ha5e been ori0inally set forth for that purpose does not preclude or in5alidate their possible application here. +. E'ONOMI'. aD ! comprehensi5e social1)elfare pro0ram* directed to)ard ma6imum impro5ement of 0eneral conditions of human life. bD ! 0iant open1end space research pro0ram* aimed at unreachable tar0ets. cD ! permanent* ritualiEed* ultra1elaborate disarmament inspection system* and 5ariants of such a system. 2. PO%ITI'!% aD !n omnipresent* 5irtually omnipotent international police force. bD !n established and reco0niEed e6traterrestrial menace. cD Massi5e 0lobal en5ironmental pollution. dD Fictitious alternate enemies. 4. #O'IO%O9I'!%: 'ONTRO% F N'TION. aD Pro0rams 0enerally deri5ed from the Peace 'orps model. bD ! modern* sophisticated form of sla5ery. MOTIVATIONAL FUNCTION. aD Intensified en5ironmental pollution. bD Ne) reli0ions or other mytholo0ies. cD #ocially oriented blood 0ames. dD 'ombination forms. :. E'O%O9I'!%. ! comprehensi5e pro0ram of applied eu0enics. 3. ' %T R!%. No replacement institution offered. SCIENTIFIC. The secondary re>uirements of the space research* social )elfare* and J or eu0enics pro0rams.
# $#TIT TE# FOR T"E F N'TION# OF (!R: EF!% !TION

The models listed abo5e reflect only the be0innin0 of the >uest for substitute institutions for the functions of )ar* rather than a recapitulation of alternati5es. It )ould be both premature and inappropriate* therefore* to offer final Bud0ments on their applicability to a transition to peace and after. Furthermore* since the necessary but comple6 proBect of correlatin0 the compatibility of proposed surro0ates for different functions could be treated only in e6emplary fashion at this time* )e ha5e elected to )ithhold such hypothetical correlations as )ere tested as statistically inade>uate. Ne5ertheless* some tentati5e and cursory comments on these proposed function1al 7solutions7 )ill indicate the scope of the difficulties in5ol5ed in this area of peace plannin0. E'ONOMI'. The social1)elfare model cannot be e6pected to remain outside the normal economy after the conclusion of its predominantly capital1in5estment phase? its 5alue in this function can therefore be only temporary. The space1research substitute appears to meet both maBor criteria* and should be e6amined in 0reater detail* especially in respect to its probable effects on other )ar functions. 7Elaborate inspection7 schemes* althou0h superficially attracti5e* are inconsistent )ith the basic premise of a transition to peace. The 7unarmed forces7 5ariant* lo0istically similar* is subBect to the same functional criticism as the 0eneral social1)elfare model. PO%ITI'!%. %i/e the inspection1scheme surro0ates* proposals for plenipoteniary international police are inherently incompatible )ith the endin0 of the )ar system. The 7unarmed forces7 5ariant* amended to include unlimited po)ers of economic sanction* mi0ht concei5ably be e6panded to constitute a credible e6ternal menace. De5elopment of an acceptable threat from 7outer space*7 presumably in conBunction )ith a space1research surro0ate for economic control* appears unpromisin0 in terms of credibility. The en5ironmental1pollution model does not seem sufficiently responsi5e to immediate social control* e6cept throu0h arbitrary acceleration of current polution trends? this in turn raises >uestions of political acceptability. Ne)* less re0ressi5e* approaches to the creation of fictitious 0lobal 7enemies7 in5ite further in5esti0ation.

 #O'IO%O9I'!%: 'ONTRO% F N'TION. !lthou0h the 5arious substitutes proposed for this function that are modeled rou0hly on the Peace 'orps appear 0rossly inade>uate in potential scope* they should not be ruled out )ithout further study. #la5ery* in a technolo0ically modern and conceptually euphemiEed form* may pro5e a more efficient and fle6ible institution in this area. MOTIVATIONAL FUNCTION. !%thou0h none of the proposed substitutes for )ar as the 0uarantor of social alle0iance can be dismissed out of hand* each presents serious and special difficulties. Intensified en5ironmental threats may raise ecolo0ical dan0ers? mythma/in0 dissociated from tar may no lon0er be politically feasible? purposeful blood 0ames and rituals can far more readily be de5ised than implemented. !n institution combinin0 this function )ith the precedin0 one* based on* but not necessarily imitati5e of* the precedent of or0aniEed ethnic repression* tarrants careful consideration. E'O%O9I'!%. The only apparent problem in the application of an ade>uate eu0enic substitute for )ar is that of timin0? it cannot be effectuated until the transition to peace has been completed* )hich in5ol5ed a serious temporary ris/ of ecolo0ical failure. ' %T R!%. No plausible substitute for this function of )ar has yet been proposed. It may be* ho)e5er* that a basic cultural 5alue1determinant is not necessary to the sur5i5al of a stable society. SCIENTIFIC. The same mi0ht be said for the function of )ar as the prime mo5er of the search for /no)led0e. "o)e5er* adoption of either a 0iant space1research pro0ram* a comprehensi5e social1)elfare pro0ram* or a master pro0ram of eu0enic control )ould pro5ide moti5ation for limited technolo0ies.
9ENER!% 'ON'% #ION#

It is apparent* from the fore0oin0* that no pro0ram or combination of pro0rams yet proposed for a transition to peace has remotely approached meetin0 the comprehensi5e functional re>uirements of a )orld )ithout )ar. !lthou0h one proBected system for fillin0 the economic function of )ar seems promisin0* similar optimism cannot be e6pressed in the e>ually essential political and sociolo0ical areas. The other maBor nonmilitary functions of )ar111ecolo0ical* cultural* scientific111raise 5ery different problems* but it is least possible that detailed pro0rammin0 of substitutes in these areas is not prere>uisite to transition. More important* it is not enou0h to de5elop ade>uate but separate surro0ates for the maBor )ar functions? they must be fully compatible and in no de0ree self1 cancelin0. ntil such a unified pro0ram is de5eloped* at least hypothetically* it is impossible for this or any other 0roup to furnish meanin0ful ans)ers to the >uestions ori0inally presented to us. (hen as/ed ho) best to prepare for the ad5ent of peace* )e must first reply* as stron0ly as )e can* that the )ar system cannot responsibly be allo)ed to disappear until +D )e /no) e6actly )hat it is )e plan to put in its place* and 2D )e are certain* beyond reasonable doubt* that these substitute institutions )ill ser5e their purposes in terms of the sur5i5al and stability of society. It )ill then be time enou0h to de5elop methods for effectuatin0 the transition? procedural pro0rammin0 must follo)* not precede* substanti5e solutions. #uch solitions* if indeed they e6ist* )ill not be arri5ed at )ithout a re5olutionary re5ision of the modes of thou0ht heretofore considered appropriate to peace research. That )e ha5e e6amined the fundamental >uestions in5ol5ed from a dispassionate* 5alue1free point of 5ie) should not imply that )e do not appreciate the intellectual and emotional difficulties that must be o5ercome on all decision1ma/in0 le5els before these >uestions are 0enerally ac/no)led0ed by others for )hat they are. They reflect* on an intellectual le5el* traditional emotional resistance to ne) Cmore lethal and thus more 7shoc/in07D forms of )eaponry. The understated comment of then1#enator "ubert "umphrey on the pub1 lication of ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR is still 5ery mcuh to the point: 7Ne) Thou0hts* particularly those )hich appear to contradict current assumptions* are al)ays painful for the mind to contemplate.7

Nor* simple because )e ha5e not discussed them* do )e minimiEe the massi5e reconciliation of conflictin0 interests )ith domestic as )ell as international a0reement on proceedin0 to)ard 0enuine peace presupposes. This factor )as e6cluded from the pur5ie) of our assi0nment* but )e )ould be remiss if )e failed to ta/e it into account. !lthou0h no insuperable obstacle lies in the path of reachin0 such 0eneral a0reements* formidable short1term pri5ate10roup and 0eneral1class interest in maintainin0 the )ar system is )ell established and )idely reco0niEed. The resistance to peace stemmin0 from such interest is only tan0ential* in the lon0 run* to the basic functions of )ar* but it )ill not be easily o5ercome* in this country or else)here. #ome obser5ers* in fact* belie5e that it cannot be o5ercome at all in our time* that the price of peace is* simply* too hi0h. This bears on our o5erall conclusions to the e6tent that timin0 in the transference to substitute institutions may often be the critical factor in their political feasibility. It is uncertain* at this time* )hether peace )ill e5er be possible. It is far more >uestionable* by the obBecti5e standard of continued social sur5i5al rather than that of emotional pacifism* that it )ould be desirable e5en if it )ere demonstrably attainable. The )ar system* for all its subBecti5e repu0nance to important sections of 7public opinion7 has demonstrated its effecti5eness since the be0innin0 of recorded history? it has pro5ided the basis for the de5elopment of many impressi5ely durable ci5iliEations* includin0 that )hich is dominant today. It has consistently pro5ided unambi0uous social priorities. It is* on the )hole* a /no)n >uantity. ! 5iable system of peace* assumin0 that the 0reat and comple6 >uestions of substitute institutions raised in this Report are both soluble and sol5ed* )ould still constitute a 5enture into the un/no)n* )ith the ine5itable ris/s attendant on the unforeseen* ho)e5er small and ho)e5er )ell hed0ed. 9o5ernment decision1ma/ers tend to choose peace o5er )ar )hene5er a real option e6ists* because it usually appears to be the 7safer7 choice. nder most immediate circumstances they are li/ely to be ri0ht. $ut in terms of lon01ran0e social stability* the opposite is true. !t our present state of /no)led0e and reasonable inference* it is the )ar system that must be identified )ith stability* the peace system that must be identified )ith social speculation* ho)e5er Bustifiable the speculation may appear* in terms of subBecti5e moral or emotional 5alues. ! nuclear physicist once remar/ed* in respect to a possible disarmament a0reement: 7If )e could chan0e the )orld into a )orld in )hich no )eapons could be made* that )ould be stabiliEin0. $ut a0reements )e can e6pect )ith the #o5iets )ould be destabiliEin0.7 The >ualification and the bias are e>ually irrele5ant? any condition of 0enuine total peace* ho)e5er achie5ed* )ould be destabiliEin0 until pro5ed other)ise. If it )ere necessary at this moment to opt irre5ocably for the retention or for the dissolution of the )ar system* common prudence )ould dictate the former course. $ut it is not yet necessary* late as the hour appears. !nd more factors must e5entually enter the )ar1peace e>uation than e5en the most determined search for alternati5e institutions for the functions of )ar can be e6pected to re5eal. One 0roup of such factors has been 0i5en only passin0 mention in this Report? it centers around the possible obsolescence of the )ar system itself. (e ha5e noted* for instance* the limitations of the )ar system in fillin0 its ecolo0ical function and the declinin0 importance of this aspect of )ar. It by no means stretches the ima0ination to 5isualiEe comparable de5elopments )hich may compromise the efficacy of )ar as* for e6ample* an economic controller or as an or0aniEer of social alle0iance. This /ind of possibility* ho)e5er remote* ser5es as a reminder that all calculations of contin0ency not only in5ol5e the )ei0hin0 of one 0roup of ris/s a0ainst another* but re>uire a respectful allo)ance for error on both sides of the scale. More e6pedient reason for pursuin0 the in5esti0ation of alternate )ays and means to ser5e the current functions of )ar is narro)ly political. It is possible that one or more maBor so5erei0n nations may arri5e* throu0h ambi0uous leadership* at a position in )hich a rulin0 administrati5e class may lose control of basic public opinion or of its ability to rationaliEe a desired )ar. It is not hard to ima0ine* in such circumstances* a situation in )hich such 0o5ernments may feel forced to initiate serious full1scale disarmament proceed1 in0s Cperhaps pro5o/ed by 7accidental7 nuclear e6plosionsD* and that such ne0o1 tiations may lead to the actual disestablishment of military institutions. !s our Report has made clear* this could be catastrophic. It seems e5ident that* in the

e5ent an important part of the )orld is suddenly plun0ed )ithout suffi1 cient )arnin0 into an inad5ertent peace* e5en partial and inade>uate prepara1 tion for the possibility may be better than none. The difference could e5en be critical. The models considered in the precedin0 chapter* both those that seem promisin0 and those that do not* ha5e one positi5e feature in common11an inher1 ent fle6ibility of phasin0. !nd despite our strictures a0ainst /no)in0ly pro1 ceedin0 into peace1 transition procedures )ithout thorou0h substanti5e prepara1 tion* our 0o5ernment must ne5ertheless be ready to mo5e in this direction )ith )hate5er limited resources of plannin0 are on hand at the time111if circum1 stances so re>uireO. !n arbitrary all1or1nothin0 approach is no more realistic in the de5elopment of contin0ency peace pro0rammin0 than it is any)here else. $ut the principal cause for concern o5er the continuin0 effecti5eness of the )ar system* and the more important reason for hed0in0 )ith peace plannin0* lies in the bac/)ardness of current )ar1 system pro0rammin0. Its controls ha5e not /ept pace )ith the technolo0ical ad5ances it has made possible. Despite its unar0uable success to date* e5en in this era of unprecedented potential in mass destruction* it continues to operate lar0ely on a laisseE1faire basis. To the best of our /no)led0e* no serious >uantified studies ha5e e5en been conducted to determine* for e6ample: 111optimum le5els of armament production* for purposes of economic control* at any 0i5en relationship bet)een ci5ilian production and consumption patterns: 111correlation factors bet)een draft recruitment policies and mensurable social dissidence? 111minimum le5els of population destruction necessary to maintain )ar1threat credibility under 5aryin0 political conditions? 111optimum cyclical fre>uency of 7shootin07 )ars under 5aryin0 circumstances of historical relationship. These and other )ar1function factors are fully susceptible to analysis by today@s computer1based systems* but they ha5e not been so treated? modern ana1 lytical techni>ues ha5e up to no) been rele0ated to such aspects of the osten1 sible functions of )ar as procurement* personnel deployment* )eapons analysis* and the li/e. (e do not dispara0e these types of application* but only deplore their lac/ of utiliEation to 0reater capacity in attac/in0 problems of broader scope. Our concern for efficiency in this conte6t is not aesthetic* economic* or humanistic. It stems from the a6iom that no system can lon0 sur5i5e at either input or output le5els that consistently or substantially de5iate from an optimum ran0e. !s their data 0ro) increasin0ly sophisticated* the )ar system and its functions are increasin0ly endan0ered by such de5iations. Our final conclusion* therefore* is that it )ill be necessary for our 0o5ern1 ment to plan in depth for t)o 0eneral contin0encies. The first* and lesser* is the possibility of a 5iable 0eneral peace? the second is the successful contin1 uation of the )ar system. In our 5ie)* careful preparation for the possibility of peace should be e6tended* not because )e ta/e the position that the end of )ar )ould necessarily be desirable* if it is in fact possible* but because it may be thrust upon us in some form )hether )e are ready for it or not. Plannin0 for rationaliEin0 and >uantifyin0 the )ar system* on the other hand* to ensure the effecti5eness of its maBor stabiliEin0 functions* is not only more promis1 in0 in respect to anticipated results* but is essential? )e can no lon0er ta/e for 0ranted that it )ill continue to ser5e our purposes )ell merely because it al)ays has. The obBecti5e of 0o5ernment policy in re0ard to )ar and peace* in this perios of uncertainty* must be to preser5e ma6imum options. The recomenda1 tions )hich follo) are directed to this end. #E'TION <
RE'OMMEND!TION#

+. (e propose the establishment* under e6ecuti5e order of the President* of a permanent (!RJPE!'E Research !0ency* empo)ered and mandated to e6ecute the pro0rams described in C2D and C4D belo). This a0ency CaD )ill be pro5ided )ith nonaccountable funds

sufficient to implement its responsibilities and decisions at its o)n discretion* and CbD )ill ha5e authority to preempt and utiliEe* )ithout restriction* any and all facilities of the e6ecuti5e branch of the 0o5ernment in pursuit of its obBecti5es. It )ill be or0aniEed alon0 the lines of the National #ecurity 'ouncil* e6cept that none of its 0o5ernin0* e6ecuti5e* or operatin0 personnel )ill hold other public office or 0o5ernmental responsibility. Its directorate )ill be dra)n from the broadest practicable spectrum of scientific disciplines* humanistic studies* applied creati5e arts* operatin0 technolo0ies* and other)ise unclassified professional occupations. It )ill be responsible solely to the President* or to other officers of 0o5ernment temporarily deputiEed by him. Its operations )ill be 0o5erned entirely by its o)n rules of procedure. Its authority )ill e6pressly include the unlimited ri0ht to )ithhold information on its acti5ities and its decisions* from anyone e6cept the President* )hene5er it deems such secrecy to be in the public interest. 2. The first of the (arJPeace Research !0ency@s t)o principal responsibilities )ill be to determine all that can be /no)n* includin0 )hat can reasonably be inferred in terms of rele5ant statistical probabilities* that may bear on an e5entual transition to a 0eneral condition of peace. The findin0s in this Report may be considered to constitute the be0innin0 of this study and to indicate its orientation? detailed records of the in5esti0ations and findin0s of the #pecial #tudy 9roup on )hich this Report is based* )ill be furnished the a0ency* alon0 )ith )hate5er clarifyin0 data the a0ency deems necessary. This aspect of the a0ency@s )or/ )ill hereinafter be referred to as 7Peace Research.7 The !0ency@s Peace Research acti5ities )ill necessarily include* but not be limited to* the follo)in0: CaD The creati5e de5elopment of possible substitute institutions for the principal nonmilitary functions of )ar. CbD The careful matchin0 of such institutions a0ainst the criteria summariEed in this Report* as refined* re5ised* and e6tended by the a0ency. CcD The testin0 and e5aluation of substitute institutions* for acceptability* feasibility* and credibility* a0ainst hypothecated transitional and post)ar conditions? the testin0 and e5aluation of the effects of the anticipated atrophy of certain unsubstantiated functions. CdD The de5elopment and testin0 of the corelati5ity of multiple substitute institutions* )ith the e5entual obBecti5e of establishin0 a comprehensi5e pro0ram of compatible )ar substitutes suitable for a planned transition to peace* if and )hen this is found to be possible and subse>uently Bud0ed desirable by appropriate political authorities. CeD The preparatin of a )ide1ran0in0 schedule of partial* uncorrelated* crash pro0rams of adBustment suitable for reducin0 the dan0ers of unplanned transition to peace effected by force maBeure. Peace Research methods )ill include but not be limited to* the follo)in0: CaD The comprehensi5e interdisciplinary application of historical* scientific* technolo0ical* and cultural data. CbD The full utiliEation of modern methods of mathematical modelin0* analo1 0ical analysis* and other* more sophisticated* >uantitati5e techni>ues in process of de5elopment that are compatible )ith computer pro0rammin0. CcD The heuristic 7peace 0ames7 procedures de5eloped durin0 the course of its assi0nment by the #pecial #tudy 9roup* and further e6tensions of this basic approach to the testin0 of institutional functions. 4. The (!RJPE!'E Research !0ency@s other principal responsibility )ill be 7(ar Research.7 Its fundamental obBecti5e )ill be to ensure the continuin0 5iability of the )ar system to fulfill its essential nonmilitary functions for as lon0 as the )ar system is Bud0ed necessary to

or desirable for the sur5i5al of society. To achie5e this end* the (ar Research 0roups )ithin the a0ency )ill en0a0e in the follo)in0 acti5ities: CaD Kuantification of e6istin0 application of the non1military functions of )ar. #pecific determinations )ill include* but not be limited to: +. the 0ross amount and the net proportion of nonproducti5e military e6penditures since (orld (ar II assi0nable to the need for )ar as an economic stabiliEer? 2. the amount and proportion of military e6penditures and destructin of life* property* and natural resources durin0 this period assi0nable to the need for )ar as an instrument for political control? 4. similar fi0ures* to the e6tent that they can be separately arri5ed at* assi0nable to the need for )ar to maintain social cohesi5eness? :. le5els of recruitment and e6penditures on the draft and other forms of personnel deployment attributable to the need for military institutions to control social disaffectin? 3. the statistical relationship of )ar casualties to )orld food supplies? -. the correlation of military actions and e6penditures )ith cultural acti5ities and scientific ad5ances Cincludin0 necessarily the de5elopment of mensurable standards in these areasD. CbD Establishment of a priori modern criteria for the e6ecution of the non1 military functions of )ar. These )ill include* but not be limited to: +. calculation of minimum and optimum ran0es of military e6penditure re>uired* under 5aryin0 hypothetical conditions* to fulfill these se5eral functions* separately and collecti5ely? 2. determination of minimum and optimum le5els of destruction of LIFE* PROPERTY* and NATURAL RESOURCES prere>uisite to the credibility of e6ternal threat essential to the political and moti5ational functions? 4. de5elopment of a ne0otiable formula 0o5ernin0 the relationship bet)een military recruitment and trainin0 policies and the e6i0encies of social control. CcD Reconciliation of these criteria )ith pre5ailin0 economic* political* sociolo0ical* and ecolo0ical limitations. The ultimate obBect of this phase of (ar Research is to rationaliEe the heretofore informal operations of the )ar system. It shoud pro5ide practical )or/in0 procedures throu0h )hich responsible 0o5ernmental authority may resol5e the follo)in0 )ar1function problems* amon0 others* under any 0i5en circumstances: +. ho) to determine the optimum >uantity* nature* and timin0 of military e6penditures to ensure a desired de0ree of economic control? 2. ho) to or0aniEe the recruitment* deployment* and ostensible use of military personnel to ensure a desired de0ree of acceptance of authoriEed social 5alues? 4. ho) to compute on a short1term basis* the nature and e6tent of the LOSS OF LIFE and other resources )hich SHOULD BE SUFFERED andJorINFLICTED DURING any sin0le outbrea/o of hostilities to achie5e a desired de0ree of internal political authority and social alle0iance? :. ho) to proBect* o5er e6tended periods* the nature and >uality of o5ert )arfare )hich must be planned and bud0eted to achie5e a desired de0ree of conte6tual stability for the same purpose? factors to be determined must include fre>uency of occurence* len0th of phase* INTENSITY OF PHYSICAL

DESTRUCTION* e6tensi5eness of 0eo0raphical in5ol5ement* and OPTIMUM MEAN LOSS OF LIFE? 3. ho) to e6trapolate accurately from the fore0oin0* for ecolo0ical purposes* the continuin0 effect of the )ar system* o5er such e6tended cycles* on population pressures* and to adBust the plannin0 of casualty rates accordin0ly. (ar Research procedures )ill necessarily include* but not be limited to* the follo)in0: CaD The collation of economic* military* and other rele5ant date into uniform terms* permittin0 the re5ersible translation of heretofore discrete cate0ories of information. CbD The de5elopment and application of appropriate forms of cost1effecti5eness analysis suitable for adaptin0 such ne) constructs to computer terminolo0y* pro0rammin0* and proBection. CcD E6tension of the 7)ar 0ames7 methods of systems testin0 to apply* as a >uasi1 ad5ersary proceedin0* to the nonmilitary functions of )ar. :. #ince $oth Pro0rams of the (!RJPE!'E RE#E!R'" !0ency )ill share the same purpose111to maintain 0o5ernmental freedom of choice in respect to )ar and peace until the direction of social sur5i5al is no lon0er in doubt 11 it is of the essence of this proposal that the a0ency be constituted )ithout limitation of time. Its e6amination of e6istin0 and proposed institutions )ill be self1li>uidatin0 )hen its o)n function shall ha5e been superseded by the historical de5elopments it )ill ha5e* at least in part* initiated. NOTE#......... #E'TION + +. The Economic and #ocial 'onse>uences of Disarmament: .#.Reply to the In>uiry of the #ecretary19eneral of the nited Nations C(ashin0ton* D.'.: #9PO* 8une +,-:D* pp. <1,. 2. "erman Gahn* Thin/in0 !bout the nthin/able CNe) &or/: "oriEon* +,-2D* p.43. 4. Robert #. McNamara* in an address before the !merican #ociety of Ne)s1 paper Editors* in Montreal* P.K.* 'anada* +< May +,--. :. !lfred North (hitehead* in 7The !natomy of #ome #cientific Ideas*7 in1 cluded in The !ims of Education CNe) &or/: Macmillan* +,2,D. 3. !t !nn !rbor* Michi0an* +- 8une +,-2. -. %ouis 8. "alle* 7Peace in Our TimeA Nuclear (eapons as a #tabiliEer*7 The Ne) Republic C2< December +,-4D. #E'TION 2 +. Genneth E. $ouldin0* 7The (orld (ar Industry as an Economic Problem*7 in Emile $enoit and Genneth E. $ouldin0 Ceds.D* Disarmament and the Economy CNe) &or/: "arper ; Ro)* +,-4D. 2. McNamara* in !#NE Montreal address cited. 4. Report of the 'ommittee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament C(ashin0ton: #9PO* 8uly +,-3D. :. #umner M. Rosen* 7Disarmament and the Economy*7 (arJPeace Report CMarch +,--D. #E'TION 4 +. Fide (illiam D. 9rampp* 7False Fears of Disarmament*7 "ar5ard $usiness Re5ie) C8an.1 Feb.+,-:D for a concise e6ample of this reasonin0.

2. #eymour Melman* 7The 'ost of Inspection for Disarmament*7 in $enoit and $ouldin0* op. cit. #E'TION 3 +. !rthur I. (as/o)* To)ard the narmed Forces of the nited #tates C(ash1 in0ton: Institute for Policy #tudies* +,--D* p.,. CThis is the unabrid0ed edition of the te6t of a report and proposal prepared for a seminar of strate1 0ists and 'on0ressman in +,-3? it )as later 0i5en limited distribution amon0 other persons en0a0ed in related proBects.D 2. Da5id T. $aEelon* 7The Politics of the Paper Economy*7 'ommentary CNo51 ember +,-2D* p.:=,. 4. The Economic Impact of Disarmament C(ashin0ton: #9PO* 8anuary +,-2D* p.:=,. :. Da5id T. $aEelon* 7The #carcity Ma/ers*7 'ommentary COctober +,-2D* p. 2,<. 3. Fran/ Pace* 8r.* in an address before the !merican $an/er@s !ssociation* #eptember +,3.. -. ! random e6ample* ta/en in this case from a story by Da5id Deitch in the Ne) &or/ "erald Tribune C, February +,--D. .. Fide %. 9umplo)icE* in 9eschichte der #taatstheorien CInnsbruc/: (a0ner* +,=3D and earlier )ritin0s. <. G.Fischer* Das Militar CPurich: #teinmetE Ferla0* +,42D* pp.:21:4. ,. The ob5erse of this phenomenon is responsible for the principal combat problem of present1day infantry officers: the un)illin0ness of other)ise 7trained7 troops to fire at an enemy close enou0h to be reco0niEable as an indi5idual rather than simply as a tar0et. +=. "erman Gahn* On Thermonuclear (ar CPrinceton* N.8.* Princeton ni5ersity Press* +,-=D* p.:2. ++. 8ohn D. (illiams* 7The Nonsense about #afe Dri5in0*7 Fortune C#eptember +,3<D. +2. Fide most recently G.%orenE* in Das #o0enannte $ose: Eur Natur0eschichte der !0ression CFienna: 9. $orotha1#choeler Ferla0* +,-:D. +4. $e0innin0 )ith "erbert #pencer and his contemporaries* but lar0ely i0nor1 ed for nearly a century. +:. !s in recent draft1la) contro5ersy* in )hich the issue of selecti5e deferment of the culturally pri5ile0ed is often carelessly e>uated )ith the preser5ation of the biolo0ically 7fittest.7 +3. 9.$outhol* in %a 9uerre CParis: Presses uni5ersitairies de France* +,34D and many other more detailed studies. The useful concept of 7polemolo0y*7 for the study of )ar as an independent discipline* is his* as is the notion of 7demo0raphic rela6ation*7 the sudden temporary decline in the rate of popula1 tion increase after maBor )ars. +-. This seemin0ly premature statement is supported by one of our o)n test studies. $ut it hypothecates both the stabiliEin0 of )orld population 0ro)th and the institution of fully ade>uate en5ironmental controls. nder these t)o conditions* the probability of the permanent elimination of in5oluntary 0lobal famine is -< percent by +,.- and ,3 percent by +,<+. #E'TION +. This round fi0ure is the median ta/en from our comuptations* )hich co5er 5aryin0 contin0encies* but it is sufficient for the purpose of 0eneral dis1 cussion. 2. $ut less misleadin0 than the more ele0ant traditional metaphor* in )hich )ar e6penditures are referred to as the 7ballast7 of the economy but )hich su00ests incorrect >uantitati5e relationships. 4. Typical in 0enerality* scope* and rhetoric. (e ha5e not used any pub1 lished pro0ram as a model? similarities are una5oidably coincidental rather than tendentious. :. Fide the reception of a 7Freedom $ud0et for all !mericans*7 proposed by !. Philip Randolph et al? it is a ten1year plan* estimated by its sponsors to cost M+<3 billion.

3. (as/o)* op.cit. -. $y se5eral current theorists* most e6tensi5ely and effecti5ely by Robert R. "arris in 7The Real Enemy*7 an unpublished doctoral dissertation made a5ail1 able to this study. .. In !#NE* Montreal address cited. <. The Tenth Fictim. ,. For an e6amination of some of its social implications* see #eymour Ruben1 feld* Family of Outcasts: ! Ne) Theory of Delin>uency CNe) &or/: Free Press* +,-3D. +=. !s in NaEi 9ermany? this type of 7ideolo0ical7 ethnic repression* direc1 ted to specific sociolo0ical ends* should not be confused )ith traditional economic e6ploitation* as of Ne0roes in the .#.* #outh !frice* etc. ++. $y teams of e6perimental biolo0ists in Massachusetts* Michi0an* and 'alifornia* as )ell as in Me6ico and the .#.#.R. Preliminary test applications are scheduled in #outheast !sia* in countries not yet announced. +2. E6pressed in the )ritin0s of ". Marshall Mc%uban* in nderstandin0 Media: The E6tensions of Man CNe) &or/: Mc9ra)1"ill* +,-:D and else)here. +4. This rather optimistic estimate )as deri5ed by plottin0 a three1dimen1 sional distribution of three arbitratily defined 5ariables? the macro1structur1 al* relatin0 to the e6tension of /no)led0e beyond the capacity of conscious e6perience? the or0anic* dealin0 )ith the manifestations of terrestrial life as inherently comprehensibel? and the infra1particular* co5erin0 the subconcep1 tual re>uirements of natural phenomena. Falues )ere assi0ned to the /no)n and un/no)n in each parameter* tested a0ainst data from earlier chronolo0ies* and modified heuristically until predictable correlations reached a useful le5el of accuracy. 7T)o decades7 means* in this case* 2=.- years* )ith a standard de5iation of only +.< years. C!n incidental findin0* not pursued to the same de0ree of accuracy* su00ests a 0reatly accelerated resolution of issues in the biolo0ical sciences after +,.2.D #E'TION . +. #ince they represent an e6amination of too small a percenta0e of the e5entual options* in terms of 7multiple matin0*7 the subsystem )e de5eloped for this application. $ut an e6ample )ill indicate ho) one of the most fre>uen1 tly recurrin0 correlation problems11chronolo0ical phasin011)as brou0ht to li0ht in this )ay. One of the first combinations tested sho)ed remar/ably hi0h coefficients of compatibility* on a post hoc static basis* but no 5ariations of timin0* usin0 a thirty1 year transition module* permitted e5en mar0inal synchroniEation. The combination )as thus dis>ualified. This )ould not rule out the possible ade>uacy of combinations usin0 modifications of the same fac1 tors* ho)e5er* since minor 5ariations in a proposed final condition may ha5e disproportionate effects on phasin0. 2. Ed)ard Teller* >uoted in (arJPeace Report CDecember +,-:D. 4. E.0.* the hi0hly publiciEed 7Delphi Techni>ue7 and other* more sophisti1 cated procedures. ! ne) system* especially suitable for institutional analysis* )as de5eloped durin0 the course of this study in order to hypothecate mensur1 able 7peace 0ames7? a manual of this system is bein0 prepared and )ill be sub1 mitted for 0eneral distribution amon0 appropriate a0encies. For older* but still useful* techni>ues* see Norman '. Dal/ey@s 9ames and #imulations C#anta Monica* 'alif.:Rand* +,-:D. #E'TION < +. ! primer1le5el e6ample of the ob5ious and lon0 o5erdue need for such translation is furnished by Gahn Cin Thin/in0 !bout the nthin/able*p.+=2D. nder the headin0 7#ome !)/)ard 'hoices7 he compares four hypothetical poli1 cies: a certain loss of M4*===? a .+ chance of loss of M4==*===? a.=+ chance of loss of M4=*===*===? and a .==+ chance of loss of M4*===*===*===. ! 0o5ernment decision1ma/er )ould 75ery li/ely7 choose in that order. $ut )hat if 7li5es are at sta/e rather than

dollarsA7 Gahn su00ests that the order of choice )ould be re5ersed* althou0h current e6perience does not support this opinion. Rational )ar research can and must ma/e it possible to e6press* )ithout ambi0uity* li5es in terms of dollars and 5ice 5ersa? the choices need not be* and cannot be* 7a)/)ard.7 2. !0ain* an o5erdue e6tension of an ob5ious application of techni>ues up to no) limited such circumscribed purposes as impro5in0 /ill1ammunition ratios determinin0 local choice bet)een precision and saturation bombin0* and other minor tactical* and occasionally strate0ic* ends. The slo)ness of Rand* I.D.!.* and other responsible analytic or0aniEations to e6tend cost1effecti5eness and related concepts beyond early1phase applications has already been )idely re1 mar/ed on and critiEed else)here. 4. The inclusion of institutional factors in )ar10ame techni>ues has been 0i5en some rudimentary consideratin in the "udson Institute@s #tudy for "ypo1 thetical Narrati5es for se in 'ommand and 'ontrol #ystems Plannin0 Cby (illiam Pfaff and Edmund #tillman? Final report published in +,-4D. $ut here* as )ith other )ar and peace studies to date* )hat has bloc/ed the lo0ical e6tension of ne) analytic techni>ues has been a 0eneral failure to understand and properly e5aluate the non1military functions of )ar. 1EOF1 'reator of ori0inal document retains full intellectual property ri0ht. (4 pa0e maintained by The #cribe 11111 6html +.= compliant archi5e