Usha Mahabir Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use pgs 1-5 It is only in use that the proposition has its

s sense.

If there is a failure of sense, failure is not due to the Satz (proposition the e pression of a thought!, but the use "e #a$e of it.

When Wittgenstein says that su%h e#ploy#ents of language are nonsense, he belie&es that they are nonsense be%ause of an incompatibility bet"een the Satz and the %onte t in use. In other "ords, the Satz (nature of so#ething said! and the nature of the %onte t in "hi%h it is said do not fit together.

Wittgenstein's %harge is not dire%ted against the intelligibility of "hat is said, but against the intelligibility of the atte#pt to assert it on su%h an unsuitable o%%asion.

(.g. fro# )hilosophi%al In&estigations I thought related to the abo&e* +he "ord ,( %alibur,, say, is a proper na#e in the ordinary sense. The sword Excalibur consists of parts combined in a particular way . If they are %o#bined differently ( %alibur does not e ist. -ut it is %lear that the senten%e ,( %alibur has a sharp blade, #a$es sense "hether ( %alibur still "hole or is bro$en up. -ut if ,( %alibur, is the na#e of an ob.e%t, this ob.e%t no longer e ists "hen ( %alibur is bro$en in pie%es/ and as no ob.e%t "ould then %orrespond to the na#e it "ould ha&e no #eaning. -ut then the senten%e ,( %alibur has a sharp blade, "ould %ontain a "ord that had no #eaning, and hen%e the senten%e "ould be nonsense. But it does make sense; so there must always be something corresponding to the words of which it consists.