1 An Analysis of Kargil Shaukat Qadir Introduction

The purpose of deterrence is to deter.

In May 1998 India tested its nuclear weapons, and Pakistan, despite the half hearted attempts of the international community to prevent it, soon followed suit. hile many analysts viewed this development as dan!erous, there were almost an e"ually lar!e num#er, which felt that it was really for the #est, since this #rou!ht deterrence fully in to place. It was not to #e lon! #efore they were to #e rudely shocked out of their assessment. In $e#ruary 1999, %tal &ihari 'a(pyee, the Indian Prime Minister, visited Pakistan, as part of the much touted )#us diplomacy*, with !reat pomp and show, on the invitation of his counterpart, Mr +awa, Sharif, little knowin! that -ar!il had #een, or was #ein! occupied. In early May 1999, the Indian army learnt of some intruders, who had occupied the hei!hts close to .ras. % patrol of ten soldiers sent to investi!ate was wiped out. /ver the ne0t few days the Indian army, without yet reportin! to their political leadership 1as any other army would do2, proceeded to first attempt the eviction of the intruders and, on failin! to do so, assess the e0tent of their intrusion. Somewhere at this point in time, they went to the political leadership to inform them of the intrusion. %n event that sent shock waves round the world, accordin! to some analysts, almost led to a nuclear war, resulted in a military intervention in Pakistan and, is still an on!oin! process, the final outcome of which will #e assessed at some date in the not too distant future1. $or 'a(payee, this was a particularly un3propitious moment in time when he was headin! an interim !overnment, comin! up for reelection in a few months, and (ust after his return from a coura!eous trip to 4ahore, in the teeth of opposition from all his collea!ues5. India has carried out an assessment of this event in )6he -ar!il 7eport*, #ut Pakistan has neither attempted to produce a similar document, nor is likely to do so. hile I have no intention of fillin! that particular vacuum, I have felt, for a lon! while, that some kind of an o#(ective analysis is essential, to understand what transpired 1if not the e0act events, since these are unlikely to #e made availa#le within the foreseea#le future, then the likely course that events could or should have possi#ly taken2, analy,e them and draw lessons therefrom. 6his is what I plan to undertake in this effort. 4et me state at the outset that, while I have considera#le knowled!e of the course of events, pieced to!ether from private discussions with friends and collea!ues in positions of authority, who played a role, I have neither the official Pakistani version nor, "uite o#viously, any input from the Indian side. 6here is, therefore, some con(ecture in what I relate. /nly the actual actors will #e a#le to (ud!e the accuracy of this con(ecture.
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6hou!h I do not su#scri#e to the view that India and Pakistan were on the ver!e of a nuclear war, for reasons that will emer!e later, #ut it did lead to the military takeover in Pakistan and is still an on!oin! process. 5 6he fact that the -ar!il episode, in fact, resulted in his political #enefit #y returnin! him to the office of prime minister is irrelevant. +either he, nor India has yet overcome the personal sense of #etrayal.

5 8owever, I will #e less than fair to myself, were I not to add that the con(ecture is #ased on my personal knowled!e of the terrain of that area, the character of the principal actors in the Pakistan army 1whom I know fairly well2, my knowled!e of the decision makin! process in the Pakistan army, havin! served in command and staff assi!nments of a lar!e variety, and my knowled!e of the collective character of the Pakistan army, on which #asis I also (ud!e the Indian army, #ein! essentially no different. I state this at the very outset, since the task I have set myself is challen!in! enou!h in itself, to #e considered dauntin!. I would find it impossi#le, were it to #e challen!ed for authenticity. 6o the sceptic, I state it contains considera#le con(ecture. 6o the #eliever, )take it with a pinch of salt*. If you wonder why I should undertake a venture, for which I possess, what mi!ht #e, insufficient information9 there is pro#a#ly enou!h accuracy in it to draw lessons from, #ut even more importantly, it mi!ht result in more open de#ates on su#(ects, that have hitherto, #een sacrosanct from pu#lic knowled!e and de#ate in Pakistan, as elsewhere. Background ithout !oin! into all the details of the process of the partition, of what was, &ritish India, and how it was undermined #y the machinations of 4ord Mount#atten, when the &ritish finally decided to leave India in 19:;, they decided the territories of India and Pakistan, #ut left it to the )Princely States* to take their own choice. <una!arh, a predominantly 8indu state, with a Muslim ruler, opted for Pakistan, #ut was forci#ly occupied #y India on the principle that the population was predominantly 8indu. 8ydera#ad chose independence, #ut was a!ain forced into the Indian =nion. 6he territories that formed the state of <ammu and -ashmir, were !overned #y a Sikh ruler, who kept delayin! his decision until 19:8, when finally some tri#al lashkars 1a loosely !rouped force2 decided to intervene on #ehalf of their Muslim #rethren. 8e then announced his accession to India over the radio, and Indian troops were air lifted into -ashmir, to reinforce those already there, ostensi#ly to defend the Prince. Interestin!ly, India claims that the Mahara(ah 1Prince2 also si!ned the document of accession, #ut the document has not yet #een seen #y any#ody. Indian troops mana!ed to evict the lashkars from the valley of Srina!ar, #ut could not do so from the hei!hts they occupied, thus creatin!, what was later to #e called the 4ine of >ontrol 14/>2?. India moved the =+, which unanimously passed a resolution in favour of self3determination #y the people of -ashmir, #ut while +ehru, the Indian Prime Minister accepted the resolution, and promised to a#ide #y it, he later rene!ed. -ashmir #ecame )disputed territory*, divided into Indian 8eld -ashmir 1I8-2 and Azad 1free2 <ammu and -ashmir 1%<@-, or %-2, as the Pakistanis learnt to refer to them. Pakistan and India have fou!ht three wars. /f these, two were fou!ht over -ashmir, the one in 19:8 and 19AB, when Pakistan decided to attempt to li#erate the people of
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PakistanCs Dovernor Deneral, <innah, had ordered Den Dracy, the >ommander in >hief of the Pakistan army to send in troops in support of the Lashkars when India started movin! troops in, #ut he refused on the plea that he mi!ht #e faced with &ritish troops from India, since at that time #oth India and Pakistan still had a smatterin! of &ritish officers. hile that mi!ht have #een a consideration, in which case he could have sent troops from units which did not have &ritish officers, the real reason as 4ord Mount#attenCs support to the operation. 8e was Dovernor Deneral, India, royalty, popular with parliament, and no &ritish officer could survive, if he !ot on his wron! side.

? -ashmir. 6he 19;1 war was, in fact, imposed #y India, to li#erate East Pakistan, now &an!ladesh. -ar!il was one of the numerous mini3wars, #etween the two. %part from the wars, #oth sides have, at every !iven opportunity taken advanta!e where they could. India occupied the vacant hei!hts at Siachin !lacier in 198:, leadin! to an annual e0chan!e at the hi!hest #attle !round of the world, which lasts to date. Pakistan too, has sei,ed every opportunity. Interestin!ly, -ar!il was, in fact on the Pakistani side of the 4/> until 19;1, when the Indians evicted the troops there #y a surprise attack. The Terrain %mon!st the most #eautiful in the world, #ut also amon!st the most difficult to conduct military operations in. 6he -ar!il war was fou!ht over an area e0tendin! from .ras to -ar!il and &atalik, an area spannin! a#out a hundred kilometers in len!th. >ra!!y peaks a#ound the re!ion, ran!in! in hei!ht from 1?FFF feet to 18FFF feet, with the floor of the valleys at around ;FFF feet. Each crest line is followed #y another, with ravines in #etween and, even alon! the crest line of one continuous feature, there are fre"uent depressions, which could ran!e from a few hundred feet in depth, to a few thousand. Makin! infantry attacks, unless #acked #y surprise, an un#elieva#ly costly venture and, almost certainly doomed to failure:. 6he e0tremely harsh and inhospita#le nature of the terrain was the reason for the Indian troops takin! a )calculated risk*, leavin! it unoccupied durin! winters, and returnin! at the advent of sprin!. hat are referred to as roads, are usually tracks, which can take heavy traffic, particularly of military vehicles. 6hey invaria#ly run alon! valleys and, in this case ran from .ras to -ar!il fairly close to the hei!hts, in fact, at .ras, the road curves ri!ht under the dominatin! hei!htsB, makin! the entire Main Supply 7oute 1MS72 feedin! the area #eyond, includin! Siachin vulnera#le to interdiction, even with small arms. Most valleys in the re!ion ran!e in span from a few hundred meters to a couple of thousand. %t .ras the valley is at its widest, ran!in! #etween five to seven thousand meters, which ena#les it to house a small cantonment. It is from this cantonment that troops move in to occupy the hei!hts they have vacated in winters, at the advent of sprin!. Preliminaries Somewhere towards mid +ovem#er 1998, 4t Den Mahmud, then commandin! 1F >orps sou!ht an appointment with the >hief of %rmy Staff 1>/%S2, Den Perve, Musharaf, throu!h the >hief of Deneral Staff 1>DS2, 4t Den %,i,. hen he went to see him, he was accompanied #y the Deneral /fficer >ommandin! 1D/>2, $rontier >onsta#ulary of the +orthern %reas 1$>+%2, Ma(or Deneral 1now 4t Den2 <aved 8assan.
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6he si,e of the hi!hest point on the feature usually dictates the num#er of soldiers it can accommodateG usually #etween : to 15 per post. 6he si,e of the cra!!y approach to the top, dictates the num#er of soldiers that can approach it a#reast, usually #etween 8 to 5F, thus heavily wei!htin! the num#ers !ame in favour of the defenders. %part from this, the final approach in the attack, throu!h what is known to the military as the )killin! !round* is made, not only when the attackin! soldier is most tired, #ut at the most difficult part of the clim#, reducin! the attackers to virtually, )ducks in a #arrel*. B %mon!st the hei!hts occupied #y Pakistan, this was the most threatenin! location from the Indian point of view, a fact that dictated su#se"uent events.

: 6hey sou!ht permission to e0ecute a plan, which had #een made earlier, as military plans often are, and shelved. 6he plan essentially visuali,ed occupyin! terrain in the .ras3 -ar!il sector, which the Indians were known to vacate every winter, and reoccupy at the advent of summer. 6he rationale was that it would provide a fillip to the -ashmiri freedom movement. 6he plan was approved in principle, with instructions to commence preparations, #ut confine the knowled!e of this plan to the four people present, for the time #ein!. I interrupt the se"uence of events here to draw #rief pen3pictures of these four characters, as I know them, so as to #etter understand the Pakistani adventure in -ar!il, since their characters played a prime role in the events to follow. /#viously, these will #e incomplete, focusin! essentially on the traits relevant to the events at -ar!il. E"ually o#vious is the fact that the assessment of their characters is mine and, only as accurate as my knowled!e of them, and my a#ility to assess another human #ein!. Gen Pervez MusharafG % sharp and intelli!ent, artillery officer, who has commanded infantry formations from #ri!ade upwards, and held a lar!e variety of staff and instructional appointments. % #old commander, who takes pride in #ein! decisive, "uick to take decisions 1a fact he took pains to hi!hli!ht after his takeover, #ut cannot #e accused of in political matters2 and, therefore, a !ood commander of troops and keen to assume responsi#ility. Lt Gen Mahmud AhmedG %!ain an artillery officer, with a wide variety of e0perience. 8e is sharp and intelli!ent, with a touch of arro!ance that kept !rowin! till it #ecame overwhelmin! towards the end of his career, and a stron! sense of ri!ht and wron!. % stron!, forceful, decisive and hi!hly am#itious individual, who was secular, #ut )discovered* the force of Islam late in life. >onse"uently he tends to see everythin! in life is starkly either, #lack or white. /n those occasions, as dan!erous as any other )who #elieves himself to #e incapa#le of !oin! wron!*. Lt Gen Muhammed AzizG More than anyone else, he has #een painted the villain, and the )fundo*, which he is not. .eeply reli!ious, #ut very #alanced, he is #orn -ashmiri, and has served in some of the most ru!!ed reaches of it, at various sta!es of his career. Stron!ly patriotic and deeply committed to the cause of -ashmir, #ut not to the e0tent that it mi!ht (eopardi,e Pakistan. 8e is intelli!ent, sharp, very #alanced, pro!ressive and dynamic. Major General aved !assanG % hi!hly intelli!ent and well3read officer, who is more an academician than a commander, and #ears that reputation. 8e was the only one, with a point to prove. hile preparations for e0ecutin! the plan #e!an in +ovem#erH .ecem#er 1999, the su#(ect was casually #roached with the Prime Minister, +awa, Sharif, some time in .ecem#er, presentin! the same ar!ument that the freedom stru!!le in -ashmir needed a fillip, which could #e provided #y an incursion into these territories, left unoccupied #y the Indians durin! winters. It would also repay them for their incursion into Siachin. In fact, it would hurt them more. +awa, Sharif, #ein! the kind of person he is, accepted the statement at face value. +or did the military leadership, as it is supposed to, present a complete analysis of the scale of the operation or its possi#le outcome, with a political aim, and how the military operation would achieve the political aim. 6hus far, the rest of the army was unaware of the operation, as indeed were the >hief of %ir Staff 1>%S2 and the >hief of +aval Staff 1>+S2, and preparations proceeded in

B secret. Personally, I do not think that the operation was intended to reach the scale that it finally did. In all likelihood, it !rew in scale as the troops crept forward to find more unoccupied hei!hts, and finally were overlookin! the valley. In the process, they had ended up occupyin! an area of a#out 1?F s"uare kilometers over a front of over 1FF kilometers and depth ran!in! #etween ; to 1B kilometers. 6hey were occupyin! 1?5 posts of various si,esA. hereas, the total num#er occupyin! these posts, never e0ceeded 1FFF all ranks, #ut four times this num#er provided the lo!istical #ackup to undertake the operation. hile the occupants were essentially soldiers of the +orthern 4i!ht Infantry 1+4I2, there were some local Mujahideen assistin! as la#our to carry lo!istical re"uirements. It was at this sta!e, in March 1999, that the leadership of the army was apprised of the operation and the Military /perations 1M/2 .irectorate in D8Q was tasked to evolve a strate!ic operational plan, which would have a military aim to fulfill a political o#(ective. Diven the fact that they were evolvin! a plan to (ustify an operation already underway, the response was no less than #rilliant. Diven the total ratio of forces of India and Pakistan, which was a#out 5 IG 1,; the M/ concluded that the initial Indian reaction would #e to rush in more troops to I8-, further erodin! their offensive capa#ilities a!ainst Pakistan. %s a conse"uence, they concluded that India would not undertake an all3out offensive a!ainst Pakistan, since #y doin! so it would run the risk of endin! in a stalemate, which would #e viewed as a victory for Pakistan 8. 6his is the cause for my #ein! in a one3man3minority amon!st the analysts, that war, let alone nuclear war, was never a possi#ility. hile the political aim spelt out was, )6o seek a (ust and permanent solution to the -ashmir issue in accordance with the wishes of the people of -ashmir*, the military aim leadin! up to the political aim was, )6o create a military threat that could #e viewed as capa#le of leadin! to a military solution, so as to force India to the ne!otiatin! ta#le from a position of weakness9*. 6he operational plan visuali,ed the IndianCs amassin! troops at the 4/> to deal with the threat at -ar!il, resultin! in a vacuum in their rear areas. &y <uly, the Mujahideen would step up their activities in the rear areas, threatenin! the Indian lines of communication, at pre3desi!nated tar!ets, which would help isolate
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Posts in such areas house #etween : to 15 soldiers per post. It is !enerally accepted that the re"uired ratio for a force launchin! an offensive to have chances of success is ?G1. 8owever, in mountainous terrain the re"uired ratio may #e many times more. It is my opinion that over the last decade the conventional military capa#ilities of #oth Pakistan and India have eroded, #ut the erosion has #een more in India than Pakistan, due to their dependence on Soviet support. If the present total military capa#ilities, includin! "uality, "uantity, num#ers, etc were "uantified, I would support the estimate that M/ came up with in 1999. 8owever, this relationship is not permanent, and, !iven their proposed military spendin!, will under!o a drastic chan!e in favour of India in a year or two. 8 % lar!e num#er of analysts were of the view that nuclear deterrence, coupled with the resultant diplomatic milea!e was the cause of Indian restraint after Pakistan occupied the hei!hts of -ar!il. 6hou!h diplomatic milea!e was a ma(or consideration, #ut I tend to a!ree with the conclusions of M/. It is my view that India toyed with the idea of an all3out war in late MayHearly <une, #ut the military leadership could not !uarantee the defeat of Pakistan. >onse"uently, it was decided to confine the war in space or, in other words )escalate on the vertical scale rather than the hori,ontal one*. 6his view is #orne out #y the su#se"uent de#ate, which started in India, that -ar!il proved the possi#ility of a )limited war*, under the nuclear um#rella. 9 My input on the su#(ect is from a num#er of hi!hly placed sources, on the condition of anonymity, durin! and immediately after the episode. 8owever, it was ver#al, thou!h I made my notes after the conversation. >onse"uently, I cannot vouch for the accuracy of the words, #ut can vouch for the essence of the two statements.

A pockets, forcin! the Indian troops to react to them. 6hus creatin! an opportunity for the forces at -ar!il to push forward and pose an additional threat, this would force India to the ne!otiatin! ta#le. hile it is useless to speculate on whether it could in fact have succeeded, theoretically the plan was faultless, the initial e0ecution, tactically #rilliant. 6he only flaw was that it had not catered for the )environment1F*. Quite clearly, it was an a#erration to the environment, and the international reaction soon left little dou#t of that. Soon thereafter, the first formal #riefin! of the entire operation was made for the #enefit of the prime minister in %pril, in the presence of the other services. Since the >+S was on a visit a#road, the navyCs reaction was voiced cautiously, #ut the >%S was openly critical and skeptical of the conclusion that India would not opt for an all3out war. 8e also voiced the view that in the event of war, the air force would not #e a#le to provide the support that the army mi!ht #e seekin!11.

The Battle &y the third week of May, the Indian leadership #e!an to have some idea of the e0tent of the penetration, and from their initial #oastful claims of oustin! the intruders in a matter of days, they moved to weeks, then months, and finally they hoped that they mi!ht #e a#le to evict them #efore the onset of winters, #ut were not certain. Meantime, in Pakistan, the decision had #een taken to disclaim the intrusion as havin! #een perpetrated #y military troops and lay the #lame on the Mujahideen12. In the period upto the third week of May, the Indian army made numerous unsuccessful forays and suffered heavy losses. %t a#out this time, the Indians decided to escalate the war vertically, #y usin! air power. 6hey also decided to #rin! in their :FF odd )&ofors !uns 1?*. In fact only a#out 1;F were inducted, #ut these were destined to play a decisive role.
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%t the +ational .efence >olle!e, while teachin! operational plannin!, the first factor to #e considered is )environment*. It is meant to view the national and international aspects of the environment, so as to decide whether the political aim could #e accepta#ly achieved, and if so, to evolve a military plan that could succeed within the !iven environment. 11 In the interest of #revity, the other #riefin!s are not #ein! outlined. 8owever, there were three others, the second in May, two weeks after the Indians had started their response, without any success in which the >+S continued to e0press his astonishment at the undertakin!. 8owever, the >%S modified his opposition and decided that he would !o alon!, which mi!ht not say much for him #ut, in all fairness, it must #e stated that the second one took place at the corps 8Q, instead of D8Q, where a num#er of (unior officers attended, makin! it very awkward for senior officers to e0press reservations, which could #e interpreted as cowardly. 6he last #riefin! was in <une, after Pakistan lost four posts to Indian attacks, durin! which the >/%S told the prime minister that he was )prepared to pull #ack if the political leadership wanted the army to do so*. Diven the fact that some posts had #een lost, +awa, SharifC confidence was further shattered #y this comment, forcin! him to head for ashin!ton. 15 It is my understandin! that this decision was taken #y the then political leadership, #ut the military was also favoura#ly inclined towards avoidin! direct responsi#ility. 6hey had pro#a#ly reali,ed that the operation was likely to prove em#arrassin!. 6he sheer idiocy of the decision, which was o#viously un#elieva#le, only added to the diplomatic em#arrassment of Pakistan. 1? Swedish made field howit,ers. %lthou!h these were in #ad shape due to lack of spares and parts, followin! a #ri#ery scandal, these were the only weapons li!ht and porta#le enou!h to #e inducted into -ashmir over the kinds of roads that e0isted. >onse"uently, the Indian !overnment paid for the parts and ammunition at e0or#itant rates and inducted them into the area.

; 6he inclusion of air power was not very successful. ithin a few days two MIDs were shot down #y Pakistan on May 58th and two helicopters on May 59th. 6heir lack of success was no aspersion on their effort, #ut the nature of terrain was such that #om#in! had little chance of success, unless it was laser3!uided, the only kind that could #e accurate in this terrain. Since it was not possi#le for the Indians to put troops on !round for this purpose, they tried usin! helicopters, #ut they had to e0pose themselvesG thus the losses. Early in <une the &ofors !uns #e!an to arrive, since .ras was the locality where Indians were most vulnera#le, they decided to start here. Since the depth of the valley was also the !reatest here, there was the necessary space for deployment. hile only forty or so !uns could #e deployed here, they were sufficient. =nder cover of their fire, elements of 5 7a(putana 7ifles captured, what the Indians called 6ololin! top on <une 15th, Point :B9F1:, the most dominatin! hei!ht directly overlookin! .ras, and an ad(acent post on <une 1?th, and 6i!er 8ills 1point B1:F2, another dominatin! hei!ht on <une 5Fth. ithout in any way underminin! the coura!e and determination of the Indian soldier, the deployment of the &ofors could not #ut result in the capture of these peaks, as is !raphically depicted #elow, #ut could not have had the same military outcome in other places, merely due to the nature of the terrain, and the lack of space and depth to deploy the &ofors. %s $i!ure 1 #elow shows, in accordance with the laws of physics, a !un deployed at a distance of 5;FF m from a mountain :FFF m hi!h will fire at an an!le of AF o #ut will ricochet off the top. hereas, with a distance of :FFF m it !ets an an!le of :B o and will #e a#le to en!a!e the top, and anythin! further will ena#le the !un to en!a!e lower hei!hts and move upward ahead of attackin! troops, providin! what is called )coverin! fire* for infantry attacks, without which, an attack in this terrain is #ound to fail. $i!ure 5 also shows why hei!hts in depth, even if !reater than the ones in front are impossi#le to en!a!e. 6his was the si!nificance of the depth of the valley at .ras1B.

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Point hei!hts indicate the hei!ht of the feature in meters. .urin! my service I have served in nei!h#ourin! areas of -ashmir, where we have deployed artillery pieces on hei!hts, #oth manually, with the help of mules, and with helicopters, and used them as direct firin! weapons with devastatin! effect, as also have the Indians, wherever they could. It is, however a time consumin! and !ruelin! e0perience, impossi#le to mana!e manually in less than three months per piece, manually. ith helicopters, it is e0tremely difficult, since it involves more than one helicopter, #ut even more important is the fact that the approach to the top must #e secure. It cannot #e done under fire of direct weapons #y the opponents.

:FFF m AFo 5;FFm

"igure #

:BFF m

:FFF m :Bo :FFF m ;FFF m "igure $ ?Fo

The Aftermath +awa, Sharif, who had #een !loatin! over the dru##in! that the Indians were !ettin!, #e!an to feel uncomforta#le. In all fairness to him, the military leadership had failed to apprise him of the politico3diplomatic fallout and he, #ein! the kind of person he was, had made no effort to analy,e this aspect. 6he international pressure was #ecomin! un#eara#le and, when the posts at .ras fell, without appreciatin! the military causes of it1A, he #e!an lookin! for an escape route, #ut he was very worried a#out the reaction of the military leadership and apprehended that a withdrawal mi!ht result in his untimely ouster. 8e, therefore, dispatched his #rother, Shah#a, Sharif to ashin!ton, where, after a series of meetin!s, he mana!ed to !et the %merican esta#lishment to issue a warnin! that a military coup in Pakistan would #e unaccepta#le to them. +ot only did this serve to warn the military leadership of +awa,C fears, it also shed some li!ht on the possi#le
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I have no evidence that any level of the military leadership even tried to e0plain this to him, thou!h it mi!ht have made no difference to the events that followed even if they had.

9 course he mi!ht pursue later. 6he Indian leadership had #een offerin! +awa, an )out*, #y sayin! that the Pakistani army had undertaken the operation without political sanction1;. 8ad +awa, picked up on this offer in time, he mi!ht have survived, even thou!h it would have made him look foolish, #ut he lacked the political acumen. &y the time he did pick it up, after his ouster, he found few #elievers. Meantime, in the last #riefin! in late <une, the >/%S told +awa, that, while there were no military apprehensions of IndiaCs succeedin! in oustin! Pakistanis from the posts they were holdin!18, if the !overnment so desired, the army would pull #ack 19. %fter some frantic telephone calls conveyin! his desperate straits to >linton, +awa, went to ashin!ton, met >linton on <uly :th, and with !uarantees of his support, returned to announce the withdrawal of the )freedom fi!hters* occupyin! -ar!il5F. 8owever, +awa, was still apprehensive and uncertain of his a#ility to survive his decision to pull #ack. 8ad he not #een, thin!s mi!ht have !one on in routine, and we may still have #een saddled with him 1ni!htmarish thou!htJ2. 8e therefore, #e!an to call upon the >/%S to proceed a!ainst the principal actors in this episode and !et rid of them. 8e also convinced Mr +ia, +aik51 to !ive an interview to &&> statin! that India and Pakistan had #een workin! towards a peaceful solution of -ashmir, which was hi(acked #y -ar!il. >onscious that, in fact, if heads were to roll, they should #e!in with his own, the >/%S resisted. +awa, hatched his plot to !et rid of him, and the rest is history. +awa, went into the past tense and Musharaf into the present and future55. %s already stated, PakistanCs first error of (ud!ment was to undertake the operation at a (uncture when the entire international community was #ound to condemn it. +ot only was the )4ahore process* #ein! viewed with hope, India had returned to the limeli!ht in =.S.C eyes, and 'a(payee was makin! a place for himself. -ar!il had the capacity for creatin! political chaos in India, which was the last thin! the world wanted. If it had succeeded, the %dvanis and Deor!e $ernandesC would have #een IndiaCs futureG disaster for everyone includin! Pakistan. 6he timin! was wron!. If it had taken place a year earlier, the reaction mi!ht have #een less adverse. %s if this was not enou!h, Pakistan decided, for some ine0plica#le reason to disclaim responsi#ility for the incursion, which was totally un#elieva#le. +ot only did this cause considera#le politico3diplomatic em#arrassment to Pakistan, it also made other truthful
1;

% full pa!e advertisement was pu#lished in newspapers in ashin!ton and 4ondon, depictin! the Pakistan army as a )ro!ue army*, which acted independent of political control. 18 6he army had continued to assert that no posts had fallen to the Indians, which reaffirms the contention that no effort was made to e0plain such a loss, or why it could not recur. 8owever, in this case, it appears that +awa, found the Indian claims more credi#le than the Pakistan armyCs denials. 19 It is my distinct impression that #y this sta!e the army leadership had also reali,ed that the operation was a mistake. 6hou!h they do not admit to the fact to date, #ut it is my impression that they too were lookin! for a way out, without acceptin! their mistake. 6his statement was the closest they could !et to the admission, and it succeeded in conveyin! the messa!e. 5F +ot only did he call for their withdrawal, there#y !ivin! the lie to his own assertions that Pakistan did not know who they were, nor have any influence over them, #ut his entire conduct of seekin! the statement from =.S. a!ainst a military takeover, and the a#(ectness with which he sou!ht >lintonCs support cost him whatever pu#lic ima!e he en(oyed, and made it easier for the military to e0ecute the /cto#er coup. +o wonder people cele#rated his departure #y distri#utin! sweetsJ 51 %n e03forei!n secretary of Pakistan involved in )track two* diplomacy with India. 55 $or the record, I am a stron! democrat and opposed to a military rule. Even now, my fears are the form of democracy we mi!ht #e faced with at the end of this year. 8owever, when I think of the possi#ility of either +awa, or &ena,ir havin! to face the challen!e of the last few months, I thank Dod for Musharaf.

1F assertions suspect. %merican intelli!ence confirmed military presence there, tapes of a conversation #etween the >/%S, on a visit to >hina and the >DS in Pakistan only reconfirmed the fact. 6o top it all, Pakistan was !ivin! away !allantry awards, includin! the hi!hest military award in Pakistan to soldiers who, we averred, were not fi!htin! a warJ $inally, havin! suffered the condemnation and the em#arrassment of #ein! cau!ht in an un#elieva#le falsehood, if the plannin! of the complete operation was as meticulous as I have #een !iven to understand, it mi!ht have #een #etter to allow it to run its course. It was indeed #rilliantly planned. hen it comes to )what mi!ht have #een, ifK.*, then the conclusions are often too speculative. 8owever, if the military leadership was convinced 1and some of them mana!ed to convince me2 of the possi#ilities of its success, it mi!ht have #een #etter to see it to its lo!ical conclusion. &ut then, we shall never know the answer to that, will weL 6he military takeover was )written on the walls of -ar!il*. Even if +awa, had succeeded in his endeavours to oust Musharaf, he could not have lasted. +o political !overnment could survive the sackin! of two army chiefs in one term5? in PakistanG an unfortunate reality. It now appears that Pakistan will return to some sort of )controlled democracy*, whatever that means, with Musharaf as the ultimate untrammeled )check and #alance* to a puppet !overnment, for a minimum of five years. hereas, his steps so far are apprecia#ly in the ri!ht direction, whether a#solute power will corrupt a#solutely, time will tell. Even if it turns out for the #est, the idea of democratic dictatorship is unpleasant. Mes, -ar!il is an on!oin! process, with the ultimate outcome still awaited.

5?

In /cto#er 1998, +awa, sou!ht and o#tained the resi!nation of Den <ehan!ir -aramat, then >/%S, over a disa!reement, when he pu#licly recommended the formation of a +ational Security >ouncil.