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    Nov 2013 Lou Ref

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    The document discusses signaling and information asymmetry in various economic contexts such as job markets, matching markets, auctions, and insurance. It analyzes 13 academic papers published between 1973 and 2013 on topics like employer learning, preference signaling, pricing with frictions, gains from information asymmetry, insurance rejections, signaling in deterministic and stochastic settings, dynamic mechanism design, harmful signaling, lying and cheating, mechanism design theory, optimal auction design, signaling in dynamic labor markets, education signaling, optimal auctions with information acquisition, and the dynamics of costly signaling.

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    Nov 2013 Lou Ref

    Uploaded by

    luckyousy
    9 views1 page
    The document discusses signaling and information asymmetry in various economic contexts such as job markets, matching markets, auctions, and insurance. It analyzes 13 academic papers published between 1973 and 2013 on topics like employer learning, preference signaling, pricing with frictions, gains from information asymmetry, insurance rejections, signaling in deterministic and stochastic settings, dynamic mechanism design, harmful signaling, lying and cheating, mechanism design theory, optimal auction design, signaling in dynamic labor markets, education signaling, optimal auctions with information acquisition, and the dynamics of costly signaling.

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    The document discusses signaling and information asymmetry in various economic contexts such as job markets, matching markets, auctions, and insurance. It analyzes 13 academic papers published between 1973 and 2013 on topics like employer learning, preference signaling, pricing with frictions, gains from information asymmetry, insurance rejections, signaling in deterministic and stochastic settings, dynamic mechanism design, harmful signaling, lying and cheating, mechanism design theory, optimal auction design, signaling in dynamic labor markets, education signaling, optimal auctions with information acquisition, and the dynamics of costly signaling.

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    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    9 views1 page

    Nov 2013 Lou Ref

    Uploaded by

    luckyousy
    The document discusses signaling and information asymmetry in various economic contexts such as job markets, matching markets, auctions, and insurance. It analyzes 13 academic papers published between 1973 and 2013 on topics like employer learning, preference signaling, pricing with frictions, gains from information asymmetry, insurance rejections, signaling in deterministic and stochastic settings, dynamic mechanism design, harmful signaling, lying and cheating, mechanism design theory, optimal auction design, signaling in dynamic labor markets, education signaling, optimal auctions with information acquisition, and the dynamics of costly signaling.

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    Alos-Ferrer, C. & Prat, J. (2012) Job Market Signaling and Employer Learning.

    Journal of Economic Theory, 147 (5), 1797-1817. Coles, P., Kushnir, A. & Niederle, M. (2013) Preference Signaling in Matching Markets. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5 (2), 99-134. Delacroix, A. & Shi, S. (2013) Pricing and Signaling with Frictions. Journal of Economic Theory, 148 (4), 1301-1332. Epstein, G. S. & Mealem, Y. (2013) Who Gains from Information Asymmetry?. Theory and Decision, 75 (3), 305-337. Hendren, N. (2013) Private Information and Insurance Rejections. Econometrica, 81 (5), 1713-1762. Jeitschko, T. D. & Normann, H. (2012) Signaling in Deterministic and Stochastic Settings. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 82 (1), 39-55. Kakade, S. M., Lobel, I. & Nazerzadeh, H. (2013) Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design and the Virtual-Pivot Mechanism. Operations Research, 61 (4), 837-854. Kubler, D., Muller, W. & Normann, H. (2008) Job Market Signaling and Screening: An Experimental Comparison. Games and Economic Behaviour, 64 (1), 219-236. Kushnir, A. (2013) Harmful Signaling in Matching Markets. Games and Economic Behaviour, 80 (0), 209-218. Molho, I. (1997) The Economics of Information: Lying and Cheating in Markets and Organisations. Oxford and Malden, 262. Mishra, D. (2008) An Introduction to Mechanism Design Theory. Indian Economic Journal, 56 (2), 137-165. Myerson, R. B. (1981) Optimal Auction Design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6 (1), 58-72. Noldeke, G. & van Damme, E. (1990) Signaling in a Dynamic Labour Market. Review of Economic Studies, 57 (1), 1-23. Ragev, T. (2012) Education Signaling with Uncertain Results. B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 12 (1). Shi, X. (2012) Optimal Auctions with Information Acquisition. Games and Economic Behaviour, 74 (2), 666-686. Spence, M. (1973) Job Market Signalling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87 (3), 355374. Troger, T. & Mylovanov, T. (2008) Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Private Information. Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, 28. Wagner, E.O. (2013) The Dynamics of Costly Signaling. Games, 4 (2), 163-181.

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