The Evolutionary Theory of V. Gordon Childe Author(s): Henry Orenstein Source: Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 10, No.

2 (Summer, 1954), pp. 200-214 Published by: University of New Mexico Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3628826 Accessed: 09/10/2009 17:15
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=unm. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

University of New Mexico is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Southwestern Journal of Anthropology.

http://www.jstor.org

THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF V. GORDON CHILDE1 HENRY ORENSTEIN OAS AND HIS STUDENTS were credited,earlierin the presentcentury, with dethroningthe ideasof culturalevolutionand progressfrom the dominant positionin anthropology whichthey enjoyedin the latter half of the preceding century.After a period of disgrace,however,these ideas have returned to and haverecentlyacquired considerable and supportamong prominence acceptance It appears,on looking back at the earlierdispute about the matanthropologists. whichBoas and his associateslevelledat evolutionisttheory ter, that the criticisms wereneitherthoroughenoughnor constructive enough to convincea later generation of students that the theory was untenable. Kenneth Bock remarks,with referenceto one of the morearticulateof the presentday evolutionists,"The fact that White's position has not receivedthe summaryrefutation that might have beenexpectedfor a completelydefunct and disprovedtheorytestifiesthat he raises issuesthat have not been satisfactorilyexploredand resolved,"2 and this observation applies with equal force to many other contemporary synthesizers. Vere GordonChilde is probablythe most Of all the presentday evolutionists, the most empirical,and among the most insistent.Furthermore, he sophisticated, is an outstandingprehistorian, and, as such, controls unusuallywell the archaeological data of long-rangecultural history.If there is any value in evolutionary theory, any evidence for the idea of progress,then it should be apparentin his this paperis an attemptto analyzeChilde'suse of the concepts writings.Primarily of evolutionand progressto see to what degreethey are dependenton his data and to what degreehe has simplyimposedthem on his material.The beliefs of a few other evolutionistswill also be touched upon, but only lightly and usually parenthetically. Childe's ideas have changed from time to time as those of any productive scholarpresumably would,but I shall ignorethese changesand any seeminginconsistencieswhichmay resultwith the intentionof concentrating on the evolutionary ideas as such, ratherthan chroniclingChilde's personalintellectualhistory. The ideas found in Childe'swork are also found in the writingsof other evolutionary
1 I am indebted very much to John H. Rowe for his many constructivesuggestions on both theoreticaland stylistic matters in the preparationof this paper. 2 Kenneth E. Bock, Evolution and Historical Process (American Anthropologist, vol. 54, pp. 486-495, 1952), p. 486. 200 VOL. 10, 1954

EVOLUTIONARYTHEORY OF V. GORDON CHILDE

201

evolutionists,though often somewhatdifferentlypresented,and this paper is an evaluationof ideas, not people. Similarly,no discussionof Childe's notable conto prehistoric tributions and the detailedinterpretation of archaeologiarchaeology cal evidenceis relevanthere, although this work is at least as importanta part of his contribution as his theoreticalformulations to anthropology are. have traditionallyclassifiedthe archaeologicalcultures they rePrehistorians coverinto ages or stages, conceived,since the nineteenthcenturybeginningsof the discipline,as an evolutionarysequenceof progressivephases through which man has passedin his "ascentto civilization." Childe follows this practice,incorporating in differentworksearlierschemestaken from the nineteenthcenturyevolutionists. Thus, he has suggested reviving the Three-Age system of Thomsen: Stone, Bronze,and Iron ages,3as well as the seven fold systemput forwardby Morgan.4 He also uses the modifiedand expandedform of the Thomsen system generally but with some alterationsof his own. He takes the currentamong prehistorians, Palaeolithic,Neolithic, BronzeAge, and Early Iron Age of this scheme,appends to it a Feudal period and a phase of bourgeois capitalism,and leaves out the Mesolithic.5 These categoriesare not meant to be a system of classificationof "historyas actuality";they are put forward as "generalizedhistory."White describesthis evolutionistargument: would describe no actualseriesof eventsany Of course,a law of culturalevolution morethanthe lawof Newtondescribes anyparticular fallingbody.But infinitevariety of particulars How quaintthen to expecta scientific doesnot preclude universals. law, a statement of the universal to describe this and that particular.6 Childe appearsto agree with him on this point: in detailthat Tylor is studyingthe evolution not of religion, White has demonstrated De Morthe historyof any given religion .... The same is true of archaeologists. in France tillet'sclassification doesnot purport to set forththe historyof Technology in the abstract.7 or anywhere of Technology else,but the development
3 Vere Gordon Childe, Archaeological Ages as Technological Stages (Huxley Memorial Lecture, Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, London, 1944), p.l. 4 V. Gordon Childe, Archaeology and Anthropology (Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, vol. 2, pp. 243-251, 1946), p. 251. 5 V. Gordon Childe, What Happened in History (New York: Penguin Books, 1946), pp. 17-20. His displeasurewith the Mesolithic category may be due in part to its "unprogressive" features. 6 Leslie A. White, The Science of Culture (New York: Farrar,Strauss, 1949), p. 408. 7 Childe, Archaeology and Anthropology, p. 245.

202

SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

Both authorsspeak as if this distinctionanswersthe objectionsby critics of evolutionthat evolutionarytheorydoes not fit the facts of cultural histories.But If the anti-evolutionists are not answered. Abstractions are made from particulars. is a if the "scientific it historical "in law," progress actuallydescribes developments abstract,"then it must have some relationto the eventsof historyand prehistory. Childe repeatedly refersto discretehistoricalphenomena the theory in expounding of progress.But the questionis whetherthe particulars presentedactuallydo support the generalization;and whetherso many facts have been ignored that the "statementof the universal"subsumesonly a very few exceptionalcases. Proponentsof this type of theorymust point to some body of data, some area of historical reality which can serve as convincingevidencefor it or accept the charge that it is an a prioriconstruct,attractivechieflybecauseit puts our own cultureat the top of the pyramid. In adducingempiricalevidencein supportof their theories,evolutionistsoften deal with differentunits of study. They sometimesspeak of evolutionas obtaining in culture as a whole, i.e., their approachis what Steward has called "Universal If the sequenceof stages is meant to apply to the totality of culEvolutionism."8 ture,then its empirical supportmust be found in this unit, and it can be applicable to this unit only. However,in othercontextswe find evolutionistsreferringnot to the totality of culturebut to the development of particular cultures.When the sequenceis meant to be applicableto all cultures,we may call the theories"UnilinearEvolutionism." must be deSuch schemes,if they are to be valid for particularculture-histories, of the historicaldevelopments of a sizeablesampleof the rivedfrom a comparison world'scultures.On the other hand, if an evolutionary schemerefers to a limited class of cultures,then the data need only refer to a convincingsampleof the class in question.In such cases we may apply Steward'sterm "MultilinearEvolutionism." Strangeto say, one can discernin the writingsof Childe suggestionsof each of the three types of evolutionism.As with so many evolutionists,he speaks inconbetweenthem. Each sistentlyof one type and then the otherwithoutdistinguishing of these three types, as Childe employsthem, includessome notion of the idea of wherehe practicesmultilinear evoprogress, thoughthe idea is muchless noticeable lutionism.We shall discusseach in turn.
8 Julian H. Steward, "Evolution and Progress" (in A. L. Kroeber, ed., Anthropology Today, pp. 313-326, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 315. The body of this paper was written before reading Steward's article on the subject. We arrived at the same classification of evolutionismas Steward and will use his terms.

EVOLUTIONARYTHEORY OF V. GORDON CHILDE

203

At times explicitly and more often implicitly, Childe refers to culture as a whole for evidence for his theory of progressivestages. Sometimeshe contends that culturesare not isolable.He speaksof the "illusion... of a multiplicityof and contemporaries 'civilizations,' any of which can be isolated from forerunners and still continueto behaveas a living organism."9His position, indeed, emphasizes diffusion. The discoveries and inventions and complex implicitin metalworkingare so abstruse that independent originat severalpoints. .. is excludedas fantastically improbable; of the essential in the Old Worldhavebeendiffusedfromsome knowledge techniques centre.10 All cultures,he insists, are interdependent parts composinga single whole-Culture. Even a comparative of generalrulesand a gensociology aimingat the establishment eral scheme recurrentin many "instances" the differencesbetweenwhich can be On the one hand the numberof observed and ignored... can make little headway. observable instances is very limited;on the otherhand it is questionable how far any humansocietyis reallycomparable to any distinctcorpseand not ratherto someorgan or member of one body.1l There seemslittle questionthat progressis thought of as occurringin culture as a whole.Each step may be taken by any one of the societieson earth;the invention can then be diffusedto anothersocietywhich can, in turn, take the next step. Thus, first labelingthe traditionalthree ages as simply stages in the development of cultures,as havingno referenceto particulartimes; he goes on: If the whole long processdisclosedin the archeological and literaryrecordsbe surin the economic trendis mostobvious veyed,a singledirectional spherein the methods In this the most domainit will be possocieties secure livlihood. a whereby progressive sibleto recognize radicaland indeedrevolutionary innovations.... These revolutions can ... be usedto markoff phasesor stagesin the historical process....12 With our purposesin mind, it would be wise to neglect the vagariesand moral connotationsof the term "progress." We may then agree that somethinglike this in the has occurred of process history technology-if the unit of study is culture consideredas a totality. Inventionsoccur in the course of specific historiesand
p. 3. 9 Vere GordonChilde,The Historyof Civilization vol. 15, pp. 1-14, 1941), (Antiquity,

10 VereGordon Childe,The Bronze Age (Cambridge: University Press,1930), p. 10. 11 VereGordon Cobbett Childe,History (London: Press,1947), pp. 2-3. 12 Childe,What Happened in History,p. 17: emphasis mine.For a similarstatement see Childe,Archaeological Ages as Technological Stages,p. 1.

204

SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

diffuse to differentculturestaking part in the development.Inventionand diffusion are concretephenomena; and the over-alldirectionin technologyhas been toward greater complexityand efficiency.One could hardly deny this. But the decisionis what is to be done with the generalproposiimportantmethodological tion. If it stimulatesinquiryinto the determinants of technologicalinventionand then in the of diffusion, concept progress technologymay be said to serve as a for It may be said to composeone probscientific historicalresearch. springboard lem-center about whichnumerousspecifichistoricalinvestigations might cluster.13 From this perspective we estimateits value as greaterin proportionas the investigations yield pertinent conclusions.Childe does attempt to use the concept of progressin this way, and we shall reviewhis conclusionsshortly. could be understoodby But, on the other hand, the definitionof "progress" some theoristsas one end of research. And Childe appearsto acceptthis position, too. For example,in advocatingthe ComparativeMethod for ethnology he says that "this method offers the brightestprospectfor reachinggeneral laws indicative of the directionof historicprogress.""4 And again: One [of the functions To ask of archaeology andhistory]is surelyto defineprogress. "havewe progressed" in can be answered is of course, meaningless-thequestion only the affirmative. It is for historyto say whatthis progress in and to prohas consisted vide standards for determining it.15 if we are prone to stop when such If this is one of the goals of anthropology, then our informationis gatheredand ordered, aspirationsare indeed meager for when consideredas an end in itself is the data of history.The "law of progress" rationalization. little more than a culturalconceit,an ethnocentric societies Here we come to the nature of such schemes.The "less progressive" culture. of our day are as mucha part of the totality of cultureas is Euroamerican Each society has changed,each in its own way. Certain changes which have occurredin the historyand prehistoryof mankindas a whole can be consideredas steps towardthe presentconditionof each and every culture on earth. This must be grantedif one admitsthat all cultureshave histories.If cultureshave changed in some respects,then if each society were interested,it could find a "trend"extending from the beginning of man's history-granted that it were known to them-to theirpresentstate. For, given the entirelife-historyof the whole of man13 This point has been well made by Melville Jacobs (Further Comments on Evolutionism in Cultural Anthropology, American Anthropologist, vol. 50, pp. 564-568, 1948, p. 565). 14 Childe, Archaeology and Anthropology, p. 251. 15 Vere Gordon Childe, Changing Methods and Aims in Prehistory. Presidential Address for 1935 (Proceedings,PrehistoricSociety, n.s., vol. 1, pp. 1-15, Cambridge), p. 11.

EVOLUTIONARYTHEORY OF V. GORDON CHILDE

205

for progress and kind,it seemslikelythateachculturecan haveits owncriteria of the cultures on its ownevolution, and can placeitself alwaysat the pinnacle in cycleswouldselect facetsof culture earth-if it wishes.Societies interested then which would narratives. is in "progress," Butif theinterest givethemcyclical of a simple-to-complex is the outcome; with appropriate definitions development and "complex." The sequence needonlypassfromwhatis mostunlike "simple" theirownculture, thosethat are similarto it, up to the apex,whether through or Hollywood. Hopi,Hottentot, fuan inexorable But, it mightbe saidthat fromsuchworkone can predict ture-a condition toward whichmanis drawn"against his will."'6A discipline whose wasthiswouldbe quitepeculiar, Likeastrology indeed. andpalmpurpose it a could amuse man's knowlbut it would advance istry fairlylargefollowing; of the world and his if control it if over at all. However, we do edge verylittle, this what kind of can we make? grant purpose, predictions we cansaypractically about thepresent stateof ourknowledge, Given nothing morecomplex hasbecome the future.Because "inthe long run,"and technology futuredate, thatat someundetermined we canconclude culture as a whole, taking will become morecomplex somewhat at someunknown technology placeon earth, threethousand thanit is now.For all we knowwe mightbe facedwithanother this most is consummated. Mesolithic before the And, important, year process as so not to be uninformative is rather improved upon long we likely prediction of cultureas one to workin "longruns"and to studythe "progress" continue The timesor before. couldhavebeenmadein Thomsen's unit.Sucha prediction with for be made less difference is that the must now; at prediction precision only to disor otherirregularities did not havethe Mesolithic that timeprehistorians of the of progressive So it seems thatthe precision turbtheirnotion development. is likelyto be inversely to the prehistorian's proportional evolutionary predictions affairs. state of his accumulated a of data-hardly very"progressive" magnitude of progressive We mustrepeatthat Childedoesnot say that an elucidation trends is the onlygoal for archaeology Therecan be no doubtthat and history. It the statement of technological leadshim to ask a furtherquestion. progress have advances leadshimto inquire intothe conditions underwhichtechnological In thiscontext taken The Three-Age scheme serves as a heuristic the device. place. in culture as a wholeis morelegitimate of progress andmoreuseful. discussion witha Marxian He contends to solvethe problem Childeattempts analysis.
16 This is Leslie White's position (The Science of Culture, pp. 330-359). Childe explicitly denies that this can be done (History, pp. 82-83).

206

SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

that each stage in the history of mankindis markedoff by a revolution.17 And he are antecedents of revolutions. "contradictions," implies, necessary At a certainstage in theirdevelopment the productive forcesof a societycome into with . . the property withinwhichthey have workedbefore. contradiction relations to allow of furthertechnicalprogress,. . . Marx and ... In such circumstances, was necessary . in the senseof desirable or essentialfor Engelsheld, a revolution furtherprogress.18 In interpreting the data of historyaccordingto the Marxianformula, Childe frequentlyemploys a rather common belief involving population and economic constructedby the author,one always finds surplus.Behind the "contradictions" the notion that populationwill increaseand continueincreasinguntil limited by the subsistenceeconomyor other externalfactors. Thus, the Palaeolithiccontradiction involved a limitationon the size of the populationimposedby the economy. Too much wealth was devoted to supportingthe magiciansand too little to the subsistenceeconomy.l9The Neolithic contradictionentailed in part an increasein population.Geographicalexpansionbecamenecessaryand war was the inevitableoutcome.20 The contradictionin the Bronze Age economy is seen as the outcomeof a concentration of wealth in the hands of a few men. The population increased to a size greaterthan could be supportedby the subsistence economy and again geographicalexpansionand war resulted.21 These propositionsare apparentlyintendedto explain the destructionof "high civilizations." In proposingthese "explanations" Childe has recourseto rathertenuous estimates of fluctuationsin the populationsof prehistorictimes. Actually we know verylittle aboutthe magnitudeof prehistoric populationsand at presenthave few, Childe's method seems to be, at if any, accuratemethodsfor making appraisals. infer size social from and economic conditions, e.g., the to times, population existenceof cities.22Such inferenceslend little credibilityto explanationsof the destructionof these same social and economicconditionsin terms of population fluctuation. However,even if we ignorethe absenceof good evidencefor the computation of populations, we still havea questionable boundup in Childe'sefforts assumption
17 Childe, What Happened in History, p. 17. 18 Childe, History, pp. 72-73. 19 Childe, What Happened in History, pp. 37-38. 20 Idem, p. 59. 21 Idem, p. 177. 22 Vere Gordon Childe, "A Prehistorian'sInterpretationof Diffusion" (in Independence, Convergenceand Borrowing in Institutions, Thought and Art, Harvard Tercentenary Publications, Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1937), pp. 15-16.

EVOLUTIONARYTHEORY OF V. GORDON CHILDE

207

at explanation.What concreteevidencewould lead us to believe that populations do in fact continuallypress the limits of their available provisions?It is quite likely that such conditionshave prevailedin many areas at many times. But the natureof the relationship betweendemographic factors and cultural ones, includis not too clear. Before this can be used in an explanatory ing technics, relationship it must be and clarified confirmed. proposition Not only is the attemptedexplanation of the "declineand fall" of "high civilizations"open to doubt, but we find that Childe fails to come to grips with their ascension.He assertsthat each age of prehistorywas enabledto appearby virtue of an antecedentrevolution;and these in turn occur when men are faced with economicand social contradictions. But he does not in fact explainrevolutions. He seemsto assumesomerelationship betweenthe hypotheticalcontradictions and the succeedingrevolutions.He nowhereactually attempts to establishsuch relationship. Contradictions,indeed, often have a different locale from associated revolutions.For example,the Bronze Age contradictionoccurredin Egypt and while the revolutionwhich supposedlyushered in the Mesopotamiaprimarily,23 Iron Age started in Greece, Phoenicia, and Etruria.24In order to comply with Childe'stheory,the alleged contradiction in the organizationof Egyptian society would have had to induce a revolutionin Greece. In reality,Childe never does explainthe appearance of the stages of technology. He only states that revolutionsare essential in order to "allow of further technical progress."25 But this is the very point: why does technical progress occur? Is it due to an assumed"instinct"for progress?Is there an instinct impelling men to reorganizetheir society when faced by a contradictionin their socio-economic organization,thus permittinga more "progressive" system to prevail? Of course,the authorwould not openly espousesuch an absurdity. He does argue that major inventionsin the historyof technologyappearin a order. necessary is an individual wholein whichthe invention of a new way of hafting an ax Progress formeda necessary of the steam-engine or the aeroplane. In preludeto the invention the firstinnovations the germsof all subsequent werelatent... 26 improvement He claims that the "sequenceof historical events" involved in the progression
from the Palaeolithic to our contemporary culture" . . . not only did but also 23 Childe,WhatHappened in History,Chapter 8, pp. 184.185. 24 Idem,Chapter 9. 25 For complete see p. 206 of this paper. quotation, 26 Vere Gordon Civilization Childe,The Dawn of European (4th ed., New York: Alfred A. Knopf,1948), p. xv.

208

SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

oneanother in justthisorder." "Each invention is determined and must,succeed conditioned events. The is its and is by preceding sequence necessary necessity intelligible."27 Firstweshould notethatthenecessity of theorder of stagesis a matter of disEach be a necessary for the following one. pute. stepmaynot always precondition Kroeber hasargued thatthe invention of bronze beforeiron convincingly casting wasnot unavoidable; rather it seems to havebeenan accident of history.8 casting Butevenif weagree thattheorder of theinventions wasnecessary, oneshould not thinkthatthisgivesan explanation for technological advance. (Childeis not as to whether he believes a can explicit this.) For, necessary sequence giveus only antecedents for we do not ascertain the sufficient necessary inventions; thereby conditions for theiroccurrence. We can only conclude that the causesof techadvance havenotyetbeenrevealed.29 nological Childeis not interested in explaining He also wishes only technical progress. to enhance ourunderstanding of somecharacteristics of the non-material aspects of culture. to hissatisfaction, theprocesses in theproinvolved Havingdiscovered, of technology andthe necessary order of change he gressive development therein, theprimacy of technology in history. It is, he says,the "foundagoeson to uphold tionof history," because "thepossibility of historical on ... the change depends meansof production."30 "All ... so calledspiritual resultsof man'shistorical arein the long rundetermined forcesof production."31 activity by the material The relations of production, Childe must be transformed intoideasand concedes, ideals-and whenthustransformed a certain historical they"acquire independent Sentiment and"therelation of ideology to reality." maythusimpede "progress," the productive forcesmaybe rather remote." But Childeinsiststhroughout that
changesin ideologyare ultimatelybasedon technology.32
27 Childe, History, p. 10. 28 A. L. Kroeber,Anthropology (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1948), pp. 726-728. 29 There is one further type of explanationof technical inventions which may be involved in some of Childe's assumptions.It is in some respects similar to the explanationof the destruction of "high civilizations" by reference to population expansion which we discussed on pages 206-207 of this paper. In this instance,the continuouspressureof population growth on economic resourcesis supposed to create a need for economic innovations. This need, in turn, impels the invention of technical devices. Such typically functional explanations of inventions have been fairly popular in anthropology. One of the best refutations was put forward, ironically enough, by the arch-functionalist,Durkheim (Emile Durkheim, The Rules of SociologicalMethod, G. E. G. Catlin, ed., S. H. Solovay and J. H. Mueller, translators,8th ed., Glencoe: Free Press, 1938; reprinted 1950), pp. 90-92. 30 Childe, History, pp. 69-70. 31 Idem, pp. 71-72: emphasis mine. 32 Idem, pp. 75-76.

EVOLUTIONARYTHEORY OF V. GORDON CHILDE

209

The hierarchical of culturesconstructedby the nineteenthcenarrangements were often based on an implicit assumptionof economicor tury anthropologists determinism. has Childe technological performed for us the service of openly for the But he offers little evidenceor convincingargumentin arguing conception. its behalf. He appearsto base his belief on the fact that "to be able to act at all men must live," and "the 'meansof production'at the disposalof society.. . constitute the equipment that enableshumanbeingsto procure[all the things] necesand multiplicationof our species."33 sary for life and the reproduction His contentionseems to be that technologyis the most significantcasual element in society becauseit is absolutelynecessaryif men are to live. But, it has neverbeendemonstrated that the greatestnecessitiesin life are the most efficacious factorsinducingculturalchangeor stability.Further,we may assumethis, and still once a necessityis compliedwith, thereis no reasonto assumethat it will dominate man's social life. What a sociologisthas had to say about economicdeterminism is pertinenthere: we are justifiedin assuming. . . that some degreeof economic Certainly surplusis for in culture.But, oncethis minimum condition is necessary anykindof achievement met we are likelyto find that different ranksof circumstances-moral, social,psychological-tend to becomecrucialand that these may exist, variably,in settings of relative economic miseryor prosperity.34 Even if there were a society living on a sub-human subsistencelevel, the proposition would not be relevant.Sexual reproduction, at least, is anotherprerequisite for societal survival;and one could make a case for sexual determinismon this logic as easily as for technologicaldeterminism. Childe's a priori argumentfor economicdeterminism is not convincing.Further, we contendthat the positionis one that cannot be validated,even whereempirical documentationis used, if definition is impreciseand methodologylacks narrativemethodsof historicaland prehistorical rigor.The ordinary synthesiswill not suffice.For example,Childe and other Marxiansoften state that the technolin the long run35-and the long run can be ogy or the economyis the determinant made just as long as is necessaryto "prove"the proposition.Each change in any of the aspectsof a culture is always precededby changes in other aspects which have occurredat some time in the culture'shistory.The aspect which the student
33 Idem, p. 70. 34 Robert A. Nisbet, Review of The Rise and Fall of Civilization: an Inquiry into the Relationship between Economic Development and Civilization by Shepard B. Clough (American Journal of Sociology, vol. 57, pp. 524-526, 1952), p. 526. 35 See page 208 of this paper.

210

SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

as causal by simplyexbelievesto be causalcan, therefore,alwaysbe "confirmed" can the historical record. One of a go as far back in time amining largerportion as one likes to show that the chosenbehavioris ultimatelyprimary.Such methods neitherprovenor disprove.They are the ritualincantationsof cultists.Their outcome can not be scientificlaws, but faiths. Though Childe's Marxian explanationof the stages of prehistorydoes not measureup to scientificstandards,this does not mean that the questionmust remain moot. Furtherinquiry into geographic,demographic,economic,and other factorsmay eventuallygive a solution.The problemis meaningfuland significant. But we must understand that it is but one problemfor scientifichistory.Emphasis will narrowthe scope of historical on it to the exclusionof otherhistoricalresearch inquiryexcessively.Each time any culture of the world takes a step beyond the technologicallevel achievedby any cultureup until then, it is recordedas progress for cultureas a whole.Meanwhile,in the historyof this unit innumerable changes may have taken place. Some particularculturescan change radicallyas respects theircosmologies. Some may have violentchangesin art style. Other societiesmay their rearrange kinship systems,alter child-rearing practices,adopt new religions, different alter foods, accept funerarycustoms,change their patternsof sex relations; or, in fact, they may accept a basicallynew economy,political system, or But if none of these changesis the sort which Childe defines social organization. as "progressive" they are not includedas data for his theory.The scope of historical inquiryis thus greatly restricted.Researchcannotbe so restrictedif we are to of the past in its relationto the presentconditionsof life. achievean understanding A crucialambiguityin the theory of progressinvolvesthe nature of the unit to which the abstract"law of progress" of observation allegedly refers. We have just reviewedChilde'scase for the idea of progressconceivedas pertainingto the whole of culture.In differentparts of his writingshe refersnot to Culture,but to the historiesof particularculturesor regions.When he takes this position he of courseacceptsculturesas isolable. Mankinddoes not form one societytodaybut is dividedinto manydistinctsocieties; wasnot lessbut evengreaterin the evidence all the available suggeststhat the division Eachsociety. . has preserved, transmitted can penetrate. past as far as archaeology traditions.36 and builtup its ownpeculiar The systemof progressive ages is now intendedto refer to many distincthistories. have built up a classification of culOn the basisof materialremains archaeologists
36 Childe, What Happened in History, p. 12.

EVOLUTIONARYTHEORY OF V. GORDON CHILDE

211

turesin technological stagesthat do follow one anotherin the sameorderin quite a number of regions; homotaxial but not necessarily theyareeverywhere contemporary.37 The concept of homotaxis,borrowedfrom biology, is meant to indicate that the sequencesare the same "all over the globe";but "it did not follow that they must everywhere occupy the same positions if aligned accordingto the series of solar years."38 Such statementsas these are not quite clear; one could possiblyconstruethem as a type of unilinearevolutionism not much differentfrom that practicedby the theoristsof the precedingcentury.CertainlyChilde has nowhereexplicitlydistinguished this position from the earliertheorists'beliefs. And yet, when we keep in it seems inmind that Childe is intimatelyacquaintedwith the data of prehistory, conceivablethat he should believe that any of the suggestedsequencesare actually ubiquitousand invariable.His positiononly becomesclear when we consider furtherstatements. of the conceptof homotaxis. The key to the difficultylies in his interpretation In Social Evolutionhe says that ages are everywhere homotaxialin that "each... always occupiesthe same relative position in the sequencewhereverthe full sequence is available. (In New Zealand, for example,the sequenceis incomplete, sincethe BronzeAge is missing.)"39 of the Three-Ageor any otherclassiIn this light we can see that the derivation fication from a comparisonof many cultural historiesis not meant in the same senseas that intendedby the earlyunilinearevolutionists. The Three-Agesequence without our the be confirmed to observe having passage of each and every may "civilized"culture through all three ages-because "incompletesequences"are excepted.One may phrasethe argumentas follows: that wheneverboth the Bronze and Iron Ages obtainedin the historyof a culture, then the Bronze Age always precededthe Iron Age. Similarlywith all of the categories:wheneverany two, or all three, of the stages in the Stone-Bronze-Iron hierarchyhave obtained in the a then the lower of culture, history stage alwaysprecedesthe higherone. Thus only when substantially modifiedcan we say that the sequenceis a valid historicalgeneralization.If we are to avoid ambiguityand unnecessary dissidence,we must be careful clearly to differentiatesuch generalizationsfrom those proposedby the nineteenthcenturysystematizers.
37 Childe, Archaeology and Anthropology, p. 249. 38 Childe, ArchaeologicalAges as TechnologicalStages, p. 1. 39 Vere Gordon Childe, Social Evolution (London: Watts, 1951), p. 20: emphasis mine. For a similar statement see page 29, same book.

212

SOUTHWESTERN

JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

There is one point in his theoreticalwork whereChilde turns to inductiveempiricism;he actually comparescultural histories.Here the approachis that of multilinearevolutionism.He does not deal with the alleged order of the major stages of culture growth. Rather, he examinesinformationavailable on culture changewithinstages or, if you will, types of culturesand attemptsto discernregularities.He firstsummarizes "in a very abstractway successive steps throughwhich barbarian culturesactuallypassedon the roadto civilizationin contrasted environThe sequencesare compared,and he finds that the start and finish of ments."40 each display some similarities;e.g., the same species of cereals were used at the of economicand political power obtainedin start, and an effectiveconcentration the final result."But the interveningsteps in developmentdo not exhibiteven abstractparallelism..... They cannotthereforebe used to definestages commonto all sequencesexamined."41 However, they do display what Childe calls the processes of divergenceand convergence. Divergence is explainedas adaptationsof one type of rural economyto differentnatural environments. Convergenceis exIt involves the addition of similar traits to plained by the facts of diffusion.42 differentsocieties and the integrationof the traits into the respectivesocieties. Thus, the societiesbecomemore alike without losing their distinctiveindividualities.43 When the authordoes not attemptto defend a thesis,and insteadempirically his conclusions are muchmorein keepingwith the attemptsto derivea hypothesis, in data to whichthey pertain.Here we have revealedno sequences,no regularities the accumulation of traits,but ratherrepetitiveprocesses of history. For one, his interpretation of divergence However,there are some deficiences. the modification. Childe contendsthat requires processis due to variationin habifor one so well versed in archaeologicalfact. tat, a surprisingoversimplification betweencultureswhichdisplayover-allsimilarities can be underSome differences but certainlythe entireprostood by examiningvariationin naturalenvironment; cess of divergencein art style, religion,social organization,etc. cannot be so understood.It is probablethat some aspectsof divergenceare due to diffusionfrom differentsources.And further,we may state with confidence that therewill remain
40 Idem, Chapters VI-XI. For one area Childe does not have an actual sequence. The cultures were more or less contemporary,but are arranged in a series in accordancewith their complexity. See pages 119-120 for this unfortunate methodological lapse in an otherwise acceptable study. 41 Idem, pp. 161, 162. 42 Idem, pp. 161-163, 173. 43 Idem, pp. 166-167.

EVOLUTIONARYTHEORY OF V. GORDON CHILDE

213

a residue of differencesafter diffusion and the environmentalfactor have accountedfor theirshareof culturaldifferentiation; this too will requireexplanation. A further defect of Childe's generalizations is their vagueness.Greater specificitywould be much more enlightening.For example:Can the two processesbe distinguishedin terms of the types of cultural milieux in which they take place? Are there differencesin and between the rates of convergenceand divergence underdifferentconditions?These questions,if answered, will help to place historical anthropologyon firm theoreticalfoundations. Our examination of Vere GordonChilde'sevolutionism has yielded both positive and negative results. The Thomsen categories,the Morgan scheme,and the more common archaeologicalclassificationcan be applied to the past without qualification only if the historiesof all culturesare consideredas a single unit. In this case, the classificatory system acts as a guide for investigators.It sets up a specificproblemfor solution: "Under what conditionsdid the particularstages in questioncome to be"?Though Childe'sdialecticalmaterialistapproachis unsatisfactory, the problem is an importantone which requires further research and analysis.Thus, the presentpracticeof classifyingculture as a whole into ages or stages is valuableheuristicallyand should be maintained. of all None of the systemsis valid, however,if they are intendedas summaries or most of the historiesof the world'scultures.For in this case, the historiesdo not schemes.The Three-Agesystemcan be construedas conformto the classificatory a historicalgeneralizationonly when substantiallymodified,only when "incomare excluded.But neitherthis nor the other sequentialclassificaplete sequences" tions are tenableas statementsof invariantsequence-or for that matter, as universalgeneralizations to which only a few exceptionscan be attributed. Childe's comparisonof culture histories within the "Barbarian"stage is another matter. The elucidationof such processesas these is one of the major goals of historicalanthropology. There is one overallobjectionto Childe'swork;the informationupon whichhe relies in theory constructionis unfortunatelyrestrictedas to area. He tends to slight historicalsequencesin the Far East and almost totally ignores the facts of Whatever the evolutionaryframework-uniNew World culturaldevelopments. or multilinear-these data are pertinent,particularlyso in the versal, unilinear, instancesof historical case of the Americaswhichgive us presumably independent sequences. In spite of their faults, Childe's evolutionarytheoriescan be said to contain valuableinsightsand useful hypotheses.But we must keep in mind that there are

214

SOUTHWESTERN

JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

otherproblemsto be solved and otherapproaches to employin the scientificstudy of history.The workof Crawfordand Fox on ecologicalfactorsin culturehistory is illustrative. The methodological suggestionsof Taylor appearvaluablein many studies of diffusion are excellenthistoricalanthropology. Kroerespects.Hodgen's ber and Richardson's work on fashionchangeand the acculturation studies of the Herskovitsfor instance,are otherexamplesof promisingmethods. ethnohistorians, These methods,involving rigorousinductivework in the historicand prehistoric studiesby the records,should be pursuedalongsidethe more intensiveshort-range social anthropologists. It is by these meansthat we will achievean adequategeneral theoryof culturechange.
CALIFORNIA BERKELEY,