Criterion Vol 3 No 3

Criterion
July/September 2008 Volume 3, Number 3
Editorial New Government, Old Problems
S. Iftikhar Murshed
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Interview with Justice Khalil-ur-Rahman Ramday Jinnahs World View/Outlook on World Affairs The MQM and Identity Politic in Pakistan Transformation of Al Qaeda Patterns of Regional Cooperation: Options for Pakistan Nation of Saints and Scholars: a Portrait of Ireland Essays The Status of Women in Pakistan: A Ray of Hope FATA at the Crossroads A.G. Noorani Niloufer Siddiqui Khaled Ahmed
24 41 62
Shahwar Junaid 107
Toheed Ahmad 130
Talat Farooq 155 Ayaz Wazir 166
Publisher S. Iftikhar Murshed Editor-in-Chief S. Mushq Murshed Executive Advisers S. Mashkoor Murshed Riaz Khokhar Aziz Ahmad Khan Fiazullah khilji Editors Talat Farooq (Executive) Navid Zafar (Research) Iffat Rashed Director Finance Ismet Murshed
Marketing Coordinator Aman Abbasi Cover Design by Fariha Rashed Printers Lawyersown Press 28, alfalah Askaria Plaza, Committee Chowk, Rawalpindi. Contact Editor The Criterion House 16, Street 15, F-6/3, Islamabad Tel: +92-51-2822659 Fax: +92-51-2822689
Criterion is a quarterly magazine which aims at producing well researched articles for a discerning readership. The editorial board is neutral in its stance. The opinions expressed are those of the writers. Contributions are edited for reasons of style or clarity. Great care is taken that such editing does not affect the theme of the article or cramp its style. Quotations from the magazine can be made by any publisher as long as they are properly acknowledged. We would also appreciate if we are informed. Subscription: Pakistan, Bangladesh & India Rs. 195 (Local Currency) Overseas US $ 15 The Annual Subscription Price is Rs. 700 or US $ 50 plus postage Price: Rs 195 US $ 15
Editorial IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT
The four-party ruling coalition announced on 7 August 2008 that President Pervez Musharraf would be impeached and this would be followed by the restoration of the pre-3 November 2007 judiciary. No timeframe for the impeachment has been specified and neither is there any indication whether the judges will be reinstated through a simple executive order or through a constitutional amendment. In an interview to a Singapore newspaper before the 18 February elections, Musharraf said that he would step down if the new government decided to impeach him and elaborated with his usual blustering selfconfidence: If that happens, let me assure you that Id be leaving office before they would do anything. If they won and they formed a government that had the intention of doing this, I wouldnt like to stick around. However, the experience of this country is that its leaders, past and present, seldom live up to their pledges. After a near five-month slumber the coalition seems to have woken up to the grave political and economic crises confronting the country. The president is accused of various acts of commission and omission such as striving to derail the transition to democracy, weakening the federation and bringing the country to the verge of economic collapse. The process could be protracted and will start with the adoption of resolutions by the provincial assemblies seeking the impeachment of the president. The federal parliament will then deliberate upon the charges and initiate the proceedings.
Editorial
Under article 47 of the constitution the president can be removed on grounds of mental or physical incapacity and impeached because of violating the constitution or gross misconduct. Coalition leaders claim that they have more than the required 295 votes i.e., the two-thirds majority required from a joint Senate-National Assembly session. The move to impeach the president is unprecedented in Pakistans brief history. At issue here is much more than the mere impeachment of an individual, albeit the president of the country, it is a question of the precedent it will establish and whether or not such a precedent is based on principles and conducive to the long-term stability of the country. In an interview to the BBC on 16 November 2007 Musharraf admitted that the imposition of the 3 November 2007 emergency and the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) constituted infringements of the constitution and were therefore illegal. Despite this, his actions were validated by the Supreme Court whose judges had taken oaths under the PCO as did the members of the coalition government. The Supreme Court, in effect, validated the extra-constitutional steps of the Proclamation of Emergency of the 3rd day of November 2007, the Provisional Constitution Order No. 1 of 2007, the Provisional Constitutional (Amendment) Order, 2007, the Oath of Office (Judges) Order 2007 and the Presidents Order No. 5 of 2007. The formulation, extra-constitutional, thus enabled the Court to avoid describing the measures as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court Order was tempered with the requirement that the validation was subject to the condition that the country shall be governed, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the Constitution and that the period of constitutional deviation should be brought to an end at the earliest. The validation was not open ended and the Court may, at any stage, re-examine the continuation of the Proclamation of Emergency if the circumstances so warrant. Perhaps the most controversial part of the validation was that in accordance with the principle of salus populi lex or, let the welfare of the
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CRITERION Volume 3 No.2
Editorial
people be the supreme law, Musharraf was empowered to perform, all acts or legislative measures which are in accordance with, or could have been made under the 1973 Constitution, including the power to amend it. The amendments would be resorted to only if the Constitution fails to provide a solution for the attainment of the declared objectives of the Chief of Army Staff/President. Thus of the seven constitutional amendments introduced by Musharraf, the new article 270 AAA validated the Proclamation of Emergency, promulgation of the Provisional Constitution Order and all acts done by him on or after 3 November. He could therefore violate the provisions of the constitution that disallows government officials from contesting elections for two years after their retirement. The amendment to article 270 (c) allowed the judges who had taken oath under the Oath of Office (Judges) Order 2007 to be deemed to have been appointed under the Constitution whereas those who had not taken the oath were considered to have ceased to hold office as a judge. Although Zia-ul-Haqs martial law had to be validated by the 8th Amendment and Musharrafs 1999 coup by the 17th Amendment of the Constitution, the Attorney General declared that the Proclamation of the 3 November 2007 emergency cannot be challenged in parliament. Against this background it would have been politic to first restore the pre-3 November judiciary in accordance with the Murree Declaration of 9 March 2008 and the main plank of the PML (N)s election pledge and then, if the need arose, to initiate proceedings for the presidents impeachment. The Supreme Courts validation of the 3 November emergency implies that there are no legal grounds for Musharrafs impeachment as per the provisions of article 47 of the Constitution. It is tragically ironical that the ruling coalition which wants to impeach Musharraf for the economic and political plight of the country is itself culpable of doing little to remedy these ills in the five months that it has been in power. The economy is in shambles as is evident from its rapidly decelerating growth, depleting foreign exchange reserves, soaring inflation, falling exports, flight of capital, plunging exchange
CRITERION April/June 2008
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Editorial
rates and burgeoning external and internal debt. The writ of the state is being eroded in the face of recurring acts of terrorism and militancy. The argument that these are problems inherited from the previous dispensation is no longer convincing. One hopes that the impeachment process whatever its outcome will be completed quickly. The summer vacations in Dubai and London for the leadership of the coalition is over. It is time for a hands on approach to deal with the serious challenges that confront the country.
Interview
with
Justice Khalil-ur-Rahman Ramday
Justice Khalil-ur-Rahman Ramday gave a three-hour interview to Criterion in Lahore on 19 July 2008 on the eve of the anniversary marking the one year anniversary of the historical Supreme Court judgment that reinstated Chief Justice IftikharMuhammad Chaudhry. Justice Ramday who was the presiding judge of the Supreme Court bench hearing the case, was subsequently removed from office, along with the other judges who refused to take oath under the PCO on 3 November 2007. Justice Ramdays replies to some of the important issues raised with him are given below almost verbatim from a recording of the interview. The Criterion team consisted of Ms. Talat Farooq, Mr. Navid Zafar and Mr. Mushfiq Murshed. Q: Looking at the 61 years of legal history in Pakistan, what are your views on the present day scenario? Do you think it was a natural outcome or has something suddenly gone wrong? A: The courts in any country reflect the aspirations, expectations or, to be more precise, the conduct of the people themselves. The courts of law are not equipped with tanks and guns and fighter planes. Their strength lies in the people and the public. So its always the strength of the public or the weakness of the public which determines the strength or weakness of the judiciary in any country at any time. Ive always said that the county judge who summoned President Nixon or the county judge who summoned President Clinton was not made of steel. He was also made of the same flesh and bones as I am. The difference, however, was that that this petty county judge in Washington knew that he was summoning the President of the United States of America , the
Interview
most powerful man on this planet, and he knew that he would come. The reason was that they both knew that the people of the country were standing behind that county judge and the President, despite all the power and might he enjoyed, dare not disregard the summons from the court. Do you see the difference? Unfortunately, the situation here has been worsening day by day. There was a time when the judge of the Lahore High Court summoned the Marshal Law Administrator, a three star general, and that three star general came to the court. Weve also seen times when two years back the court summoned a retired army officer who was the secretary of a housing scheme and he refused to come. So the judiciary is what the public and the people are because their strength lies in the public. The difference is simple and apparent. At the time the three star General was summoned, the man knew that the public would not accept his defiance of the court summons. So the effectiveness of the courts depends on how weak or strong public opinion is. There have been, on occasions, individual judges who have showed strength of character but then they just fizzled out. People forgot about them. It was as if they never even existed or as if they had never done anything commendable for the people, the nation or the constitution. So unless there is awakening and awareness amongst the people that this institution belongs to them and that they need this institution to protect them from any aggression or any encroachments and unless the people show their determination to stand behind the judiciary, the courts will become ineffective. Q: By peoples strength do you mean the laws of the parliament, the peoples representatives or people in the street? A: The public at large. Q: How does the public at large support the law? A: Like theyve done since the 9th of March. In 61 years this is the first time that people have expressed their concern for the judiciary and expressed and displayed their determination that they are behind the judiciary and if anybody plays around with the judiciary they will not accept it.
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Interview with Justice Khalil-ur-Rahman Ramday
Q: The judges and the people have intermingled so much A: They have not intermingled. Its not intermingling. Its not an interaction between the judges and the people. There never has been any interaction anywhere in the world. The institution of the judiciary belongs to the people. And like any other institution its the people who have to own that institution and declare and demonstrate the determination that they are prepared to make any sacrifice and go to any length to defend the judiciary and nobody dare touch it. Q: This has happened for the last 18 months but do you think A: These things dont only happen in Pakistan. They have been going on all over the world. Ill tell you something very interesting. Now UK, for instance, is known as the mother of liberties and all rights. There the judges used to be appointed and removed at the whims of the crown. Towards the end of the 17th century, the people put their foot down. There was a famous Chief Justice Coke who was sought to be removed. The people had had enough and opposed this. Eventually an act of parliament, the Act of Settlement, was passed in the year 1700 where the crown felt compelled to ensure security of tenure, salaries and wages, etc., for the judges. So people had to fight for this. Nobody gives anybody anything on a platter. You have to fight for your rights. In the US as well there was a tussle between the executive and the judiciary after the constitution had been framed. Washington D.C. had been built: Capital Hill had been built, the Whitehouse had been built, the secretariat and other offices had been built. Everything had been built except the Supreme Court building. A 40 ft by 50 ft room was taken from the Congress and that is where the Supreme Court functioned for all those years. So whatever is happening here is nothing unheard of nor is it something which has never happened anywhere else in the world before. Then there were other battles that followed such as those of John Marshall and Chief Justice Ray. This is exactly what went on in India as well. So, throughout history the judiciary has struggled all over the world.
CRITERION July/September 2008
Interview
The judiciary has not been set up and the courts have not been set up to pay for the bread and butter of the judges and lawyers. The courts have been set up as one of three pillars of the state that secure and guarantee the rights of the people. Its an institution owned by the people. So the people have to decide finally that they will not let anyone encroach their institution. No institution can function without public/ civil support, including the army. We had one of the best trained armies of the world, yet they could not fight in East Pakistan even for a day. This was not because there was anything wrong with our soldiers but because the public support was not there for them. Its only when the public decides to protect and defend their institutions that these kind of encroachments, assaults, interventions and interferences cease to exist. Q: In the present scenario does the PCO have to be ratified by the assembly as it had been in 2000? A: It has today become a political issue and as people think that I am still a judge I would not like to express my opinion about this. What I can safely tell you, however, is what happened in earlier situations. The two earlier martial laws in 1977 and in 1999 were validated by the Supreme Court. Despite this validation by the Supreme Court the parliament ratified it through the 8th amendment in 1985 and through the 17th amendment in 2002. Now you can ask that when the Supreme Court had validated it then why was it felt necessary for the parliament to ratify it? Or why did the ones imposing the martial law feel compelled to secure an amendment of the constitution for it? The reason is that on both these occasions when the Supreme Court granted validation the constitution was not in force. The constitution was suspended. As a student of law we know that howsoever independent and powerful the Supreme Court may be, it cannot say anything that is in derogation of the clear command of the constitution. The Supreme Court has no such power. Now lets say that the constitution says that our president has to be a Muslim who is at least 45 years of age, the Supreme Court cannot pass a judgment stating that a Hindu wants to be or a Christian wants to be the President so let him be one. Now at that time - when the martial law was validated - the validation stemmed out of something absolutely contradictory to what the constitution had said. The constitution does
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not permit an army chief to start ruling the country or suspend the constitution. However, at the time of the validation, the constitution was suspended. The day the constitution gets revived then everything which is repugnant or offensive to the commands of the constitution disappears automatically. Like darkness disappears from the emergence of the sun. So that Supreme Court validation was given when the constitution was not in force and since the validation was contradictory to the commands of the constitution, when the constitution re-emerges and re-surfaces the validation by the Supreme Court disappears because whatever the Supreme Court had done was absolutely offensive to the constitution. Therefore, the constitution needs to validate that act. Q: Historically speaking judges have been taking oath under the PCO. What is so different about this one? A: As I look at it, I have no reluctance and hesitation in saying that I also took an oath under the PCO in the year 2000. The reason is that certain things at certain stages in ones individual or national life are condonable or acceptable but the same things in another situation become absolutely repulsive and unacceptable. And these situations do change with time. We know that there was a time when the Quaid-e-Azam was a member of the Congress party and it was after quite a while that he switched from his stance of Hindu-Muslim unity. Nobody accused the Quaide-Azam that before you were a member of the Indian Congress and you were talking of Hindu-Muslim unity and today youve joined the Muslim League and youve started talking about two separate states and the two nation theory. The reason is that the situation at times demands a change. So what was okay or acceptable or condonable 30, 20 or 10 years back may not be acceptable in todays set up. There are two obvious reasons that I understand behind what you asked me. In 1999, 1977 and in 1958 the imposition or coup was for political reasons and not with the object or purpose of crushing the judges who were about to deliver a judgment in a matter in which the one imposing the martial law was himself a party. And on all those three previous occasions which I witnessed, even the 58 martial law, I was then 12 or 13 yrs old, rightly or wrongly, fortunately or unfortunately,
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Interview
the steps taken by the army chiefs were generally welcomed, not just accepted but generally welcomed by the public at large. Of course some of the judges, as I mentioned earlier, showed their character and refused to take oath under the PCO. But generally, since everybody seemed to have accepted it - the whole nation seemed to have accepted the imposition of those martial laws - the judges also went along. Technically of course there was reason for not doing it but generally, politically and according to the atmosphere the taking oath of the judges was never really ever an issue. Q: So the Doctrine of Necessity made sense then? A: Call it Doctrine of Necessity, but generally taking of oath by the judges was never an issue. And people never looked down upon or said anything to the judges who took oath. The public, the political leaders and everybody accepted it and it was never an issue. This time, for the first time in the history of Pakistan, this had become an issue and this was in fact the only issue because the public, including the judges themselves, thought that this was not a political act but an assault to destroy the institution of the judiciary. People are also attempting to confuse the issue. Now some leader says that Ramday also took an oath. The issue is not my oath. The issue is an act of somebody else which he took on the 3rd of November. That is the issue. I have not been thrown out of service or office because Ive taken an oath in 2002 or 2000. This is not the issue. The issue is whether what was done to me on the 3rd of November valid? Was it valid morally, ethically, legally, constitutionally or by any standard? Was it a valid act? That is the issue. If the nation or someone thinks that I should not have taken oath in 2000, alright prosecute me for it or hang me for it. But first decide whether my removal from office on 3 November was a valid step. Could it be justified by any constitutional, moral, legal, ethical norms? Let the people decide on this and if they say that this act was unconstitutional then undo whatever has been done. And then if somebody thinks that I had committed a misconduct or I had done something wrong in the year 2000 for taking oath under the PCO, alright hang me for it. I dont mind. Why is the fact that I also took
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an oath an issue right now? Right now the issue is the action taken by somebody on the 3rd of November. What is the validity of that action? Q: So what you are saying is that the main difference between the previous PCOs and this one is public support and right now the support is not there. A: Yes. That is number one. And secondly, and more importantly, this was an assault on the judiciary. Those martial laws were not an assault on the judiciary. And people have reacted. I was locked up. I did not take out any procession. The ones agitating are not the judges. I have not agitated or even addressed any bar of the law courts despite invitations. I am not agitating. The people are agitating against what was done on the 3rd of November. How could you remove all these judges from their offices, especially the judges who were about to deliver or take a decision in a matter in which you were involved? How can you do it? If I had taken a wrong oath then I should have been removed ten years ago. They should have taken me out when Musharraf came into power in 1999. Or remove me now for it. If that was a misconduct, I am ready to face those charges. But that is not the issue. Some people are trying to confuse the issue. They want to dilute this issue. Q: Has the judiciary played a part in the perpetuation of military intervention? If we look at the doctrine of necessity (Justice Munir), do you think in some level we can hold the judiciary responsible? A: Yes you could. I will not deny it. But one may have a difference of opinion on the reasons which led to that action. Its a debatable issue. Some say that it was absolutely foolish on the part of the judiciary to validate martial law each time. There are others who justify it. But the fact is that the judiciary did say that we validate this and we were a party to the imposition of Martial law. So I cant deny it. The thrust in each of those judgments was that the whole nation had accepted it, so much so that the leaders had not even raised a petition. I remember in 77 the whole nation was on the streets and clamoring that a martial law should be imposed. Your political leaders wrote letters
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Interview
to the army chief. The people of the nation had taken out rallies and processions asking the army to come in. The people had accepted it. Technically, in an absolute puritan theory, one may not agree with it. Q: This is the second time that the judiciary and the executive have been at logger heads with each other: first Nawaz and then Musharraf. Where does this problem stem from? Are the roles not clearly defined in the constitution? Is it the individuals involved? Is it something else? A: The existing case, first the chief justice one and then the other one, has nothing to do with the executive or any other institution. This is the act of one individual. A President filed a reference. The question was whether it was validly made. And the question also was in the manner in which the reference should have been made. Is this the manner permitted by the constitution to remove a judge or a chief Justice? That you put him behind bars and you lock up his entire family. So I dont understand where this clash between the judiciary and the executive come in? It was an act of one individual which came up to the court for a decision and the court decided. So where is the clash? I said this in court also on the 20th of July last year. There was a statement made by Chaudhry Shujaat after the 9th of March (2007) saying that this is between the judiciary and the army. I said what a silly thing to say. You are putting two institutions very important and impressive institutions of the country- on a war path. How was it a clash between the army and the judiciary? This was a reference sent by the president of the country. The one against whom the reference was sent, he questioned it. The court gave a decision. So where is the clash between the army and the judiciary or between the executive and the judiciary? Q: So you dont think that it is necessary to add any special provisions in the Constitution. A: What is the need for it? These two cases were just ordinary cases involving an individual or an act of the President or the eligibility of a certain individual to contest for a certain office. That is the end of the matter. I dont look at it as being anything else beyond that. Now if
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some individual wants to make it a clash then it is his choice. Q: One objection is that the lawyers movement has been politicized by various political parties. What is your view regarding this? A: Is the issue of the judiciary and the constitution an issue of just the lawyers? It is an issue which involves the public. Yes the lawyers gave a lead. But then what is politics? Politics is the public. Why should the public not come in? Why should they have stayed back? If it was an issue just pertaining to Khalil Ramday or Latif Khosa or some other lawyer then it is fine. Then why would Nawaz Sharif or Asfandyar Wali or Qazi Hussain get involved? It would be our personal issue. But this is an issue pertaining to one of the pillars of your state. Do you want this pillar of the state to exist or do you want it demolished? That is the issue. Now if that is the issue then why shouldnt the public be involved. If the public wasnt involved then I wouldnt consider this an issue. And if the public is going to get involved then the political parties who are the representatives or agents of the public will of course also have to come in on one side or the other. Whichever side they want to take, they should come in. If I was in the Bar I would not be embarrassed if the public came in. This not an issue just pertaining to the judges and the lawyers, it is an issue of the public. Tomorrow if, God forbid, somebody assaults the army then why shouldnt the public rise. The people of Pakistan who made the constitution have said in it that we want a certain type of judiciary. In my judgment that is not being delivered. An issue raised in my draft is wheter access to justice a fundamental right of the people or are the courts and judiciary just something that involve and interest the judges and the lawyers? The impression that the courts are established by the nation, the state and the people to only please the judges and the lawyers should not be there. This is not the reason why courts were set up; so that Khalil Ramday would get a salary. These courts are made for the people. You will find judgments before that of 20 July (2007) where it is stated that access to justice and to have justice delivered and administered is the fundamental right of the people. So if you interfere with the judiciary or if it is assaulted this is in fact then an encroachment on the fundamental rights of the people and its for the people to agitate. Why should I be embarrassed if, lets say, the PPP
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Interview
went to a certain procession or rally or why did the Maulvi participate or why did Nawaz Sharrif participate? The issue is actually theirs. The lawyers as a Bar have nothing to do with the issue except as individuals and citizens of this country. This issue is the publics. It is a matter of the public and its for the public to decide. Q: When the Supreme Court becomes a victim then who do they turn to? A: The answer is, to the people. Q: Is the check of the Supreme Court also the people? A: That is what I told you earlier. It is only the people that can defend these institutions, protect these institutions and claim supremacy and sovereignty of these institutions. Otherwise who am I? The reason that I am in this house is the people. Whenever they tell me to leave a procession comes and stops the eviction. They were about to throw my belongings out from my Islamabad residence. Everyone turned up there. I was here (in Lahore) watching the proceedings on TV and wondering what was going on. Now if you start pulling the hair of the chief justice and a soldier slaps him then the chief justice will accept the slap. He cant take on the soldier. Or if I, being 60 or 61 years old, am attacked by a soldier then I would not be able to fight back. Its for the people to defend me if they want to defend me. This is a test of the people. Q: You delivered a historic judgment on July 20th 2007. What influenced your decision? A: Actually I received undue credit only because of I was the captain. But the match is never won by the captain alone. Some other player makes the century and some other player, Wasim Akram, takes the wickets. Some names of players are not even remembered but the fame goes to Imran Khan because in the end he is holding the cup. He is the captain. The real credit actually and honestly goes to the 10 judges who withstood pressure and stress yet they stood by what was right. It was just a coincidence that I happened to be a senior amongst those judges.
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The hearing started on the 15th of May (2007) and the judgment was delivered on the 20th of July (2007). I can only give you my perspective and not of the other judges. My opinion was that the manner of seeking the removal of the chief justice was not the one which was envisaged by the constitution. You are sitting in the army house. It was very forcefully and rightly argued that if the issue was regarding the reference of the chief justice then the law minister, attorney general, law secretary should have been present there. Those are the relevant people and not the heads of the intelligence agencies. So what had remained with me was that it appeared that the purpose of this exercise was not the purpose envisaged or admitted by the constitution. The purpose was not as was indicated from whatever transpired on the 9th and thereafter that theres a judge who should be removed due to misconduct. If this was the purpose then the reference should have come in routine. It should have come to the Supreme Judicial Council and the Supreme Judicial Council should have taken a decision on this. The whole exercise appeared to have been done not for the purposes permitted by law but for the purposes extraneous to the constitution. It appeared that you just wanted to get rid of somebody for whatever reason but the purpose was not of getting rid of a misconducting judge. Q: When a government changes the attorney general also resigns. This is the first time that the AG continued in the office. What are your views on that? A: I dont think that I will comment on this. This is for the people to decide for themselves. Usually the first day a new government takes over the attorney general is changed because attorney general is not a beaurocrat. He is the lawyer of the executive. Usually, one would presume that you keep a lawyer that is in your confidence. Q: Regarding the present situation, under what law can a single individual make the decision and how can you undo that? A: I dont want to comment on this because I may have a biased opinion as I am one of the victims or sufferers of that scenario. I would not be the proper person to answer that.
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Q: Do you think the 1973 constitution answers the situation that we are in? A: Absolutely. And let me also tell you one basic fact that you must remember. It used to be one of the topics of debate in college and it is that there is no system which is good or bad. Now we have nations before us who have no written constitution and they are surviving and not just surviving but thriving. And the most powerful of nation today has the briefest of constitutions. The American constitution is the shortest and most brief constitution that you could ever come across and it is working. So for the constitution to work you need a political will to run that system on those lines which are the basic fundamental principles. You must have heard of constitutional conventions. No matter how detailed you write the constitution or how much you explain it, the fact remains that its a human effort. It can never be all pervasive. There are always things lacking or things deficient but with consensus, conventions and true political will it can work. Let me give you an example. There were no fundamental rights in the American constitution. They were subsequently added. And when they were added they were without any rider. These fundamental rights, basic rights guaranteed in the American constitution even today, are unrestricted. It is written in it, for example, that the people will have the right of association. There is no limitation on it. Now how will the country run if there is no limitation on it? If the constitution has said that this is the absolute right and there can be no limitation or restriction on it then how will the country run? The Supreme Court, therefore, recognized the police powers of the state and supplied whatever was deficient. They said that even though there was no mention of limitations in the constitution this didnt mean that these rights were absolute and could not be limited or restricted. The state can always put reasonable restriction on these. This they called the police powers of the state. So if there is a will to work things out then issues are gradually settled. Q: How do you see the future of the judiciary in Pakistan? A: There are lots of forces working on either side. This is the defining
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moment. Out of this melting pot you will either get a judiciary which will be the pride of the people or you will get a judiciary only in name. When I was studying in Gordon College we used to go to Zumzum caf to drink tea. The unique thing of that caf was that the owner had an amazing collection of Urdu, Punjabi and Indian records. Some people who frequented the caf regularly were given the privilege of requesting songs that that the owner would then play. Correlating that to the present scenario, let us see what we get. Will we get courts or a Zumzum cafe where only some privileged peoples requests are catered to? People have been clamoring for courts for the past one year. This is the first time in 61 years that the people have identified their rights and they have raised their voices for it. Q: What is the solution, in your opinion, to the present judicial crisis? A: One should go with whatever the people or nation think is the right path. Governance is never through cleverness. Governance is always through wisdom and wisdom always lies in following the right path. It is just a question of putting two and two together. What is the cause? What is the irritant? The cause of this entire crisis is the action taken on the 3rd of November. Give a decision on whether this decision was right or wrong and implement it. Thats it. When one starts getting clever and wants to please everyone, be it Musharraf or Khalil Ramday, etc., there can be no solution. The intensity of this movement may decrease but it will never die out. It will come back one day or the other and when it comes back it may be with very disastrous consequences. One should not let that stage be reached. Q: Certain organization and people are demanding Shariah. What are your views on that? A: I am glad that youve asked me that. We have unfortunately coined a very simple equation which is that since these laws were made by the
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Interview
British and since the British were kafirs and not Muslims, therefore, all these laws must be non-Muslim and un-Islamic. This equation and the formula or the presumptions on which this situation was founded were based on absolute ignorance. The result was that ever since 1947 or ever since I can remember one has heard in every sermon and in every dua (prayer) the desire to bring the Islamic system and law. Influenced by this, Gen. Zia-ul-Haq created the Federal Shariat Court in 1981. One of the tasks assigned by the constitution to this Federal Shariat Court which was to examine all laws, federal, provincial and local, which were in force in the country and to determine whether any of those laws or any provision in those laws were against the injunctions of Islam. If it was found that there was any provision or any law that was offensive to the injunctions of Islam then that law was to be struck down. Fortunately or unfortunately, I was then assistant advocate aeneral, Punjab. I was deputed by the Punjab government to appear in the Federal Shariat Court during this exercise. This Court took up laws starting with 1841 down to 1983 or 84. We went through each and every law and each and every provision. Let me tell you, the court could find hardly anything offensive to the Islamic injunctions in all the laws. And whatever little un-Islamic provisions were found, unfortunately were the ones enacted after 1947 and not by the British. In the Quran, if one has read it, there is no civil procedure code, no criminal procedure code, no Pakistan penal code, no rent laws, etc. There are very few dos and donts which are culpable, very few. The rest the Quran and Allah only say, go and do justice. Allah with His infinite wisdom knew that these demands or dictates of justice and the justice perspective would change from time to time, society to society and people to people so Allah couldnt have given a hard and fast law saying that this is it. Allah only says go and do justice. All these AngloSaxson laws advance the cause of justice and there is hardly anything un-Islamic about that. Let me tell an interesting incident. It was the year 1983 or 1984. At around 9 or 10 at night I receive a packet through special dispatchers. What I received in that bundle was a draft law. It was a draft of the Law of Evidence which was proposed to be promulgated by the federation.
20
The federal government had sent the draft to the Punjab government, along with the other provincial governments, to get their views on it. A note in the package said that there would be a meeting with the chief secretary the next morning at 10 to discuss the same. I panicked as I knew that I could not go over the whole draft in one night. However, as I started reading the draft at night I was relieved. I went through the draft and the next morning I went to the meeting. Everyone was asked their opinion and when my turn came I said, Sir if you ask me you should write a very short and simple note and send it to the federal government saying that the government of Punjab has no objection to the renumbering of the provisions of the old Evidence Act. I brought the old Act and the new draft to the meeting. The old was promulgated by the British in 1872 by the Kafir, by the non-Muslim. This was the height of intellectual dishonesty. Some people had convinced the president that the law was un-Islamic, so they made it Islamic by a verbatim reproduction of the provisions of the Evidence Act of 1872 which was said to be a non-Muslim Act. They only rearranged the provisions. They have promulgated that law now. They have changed the name to a Muslim name. Instead of Evidence Act it has been named Qanoon-eshahadat Ordinance. Get hold of the old Evidence Act of 1872 and pick up this new Qanoon-e-shahadat of 1984. Its a verbatim reproduction. They got away with it. This is a trait slogan of our religious leadership and there is nothing to it really. Now they are saying that we want Islamic law in Swat/Dir; or the other place, Malakand. What sort Shariah has been imposed there? What have they changed? For instance, the additional sessions judge is called additional zillah qazi and the civil judge has been renamed illaqa qazi and the sessions judge has been renamed zillah qazi. Thats all. And the maulvis are happy thinking that all has been Islamized and so are the others. Whatever system that is in force in this country or has been in force in this country ever since the British rule, is not any offensive or contradictory or even a deviation from any Islamic injunction. Id like to see one provision in any law which somebody could show me as being repugnant to Islamic injunctions. This is a challenge coming from a person who has been a student of law for the last 40 yrs. However, no
21
Interview
one questions this. Out of fear or ignorance nobody actually asks what is un-Islamic in these laws. Q: They ask why dont you cut hands and stone people? A: The provision is there. It is there in the law. Right or wrong it is there. But the thing is that even if you look at that. I am sure you know that Hazrat Umar, there was no one as severe as him, in his time abolished the punishment of amputating hands for theft. Now this is a fact acknowledged by the maulvis, known to maulvis. This is not something which is unknown to people. You see the thing is that you should see the spirit of Islam. Q:What is your opinion on Blasphemy law? A: There is logical reason behind the blasphemy law and not a religious one. The reason is that every society has basic norms. In pre 91 or 92 communist Russia, for instance, could anybody be permitted to abuse Stalin or Lenin? Would any of their laws permit this? Before the Cultural Revolution in China would any law permit criticism or abuse of Mao? Does any country allow you to talk against its constitution? So irrespective of whether a country is in the West or the East or whether a country is Islamic or otherwise, there are always certain basic foundations of a society or state that are sacrosanct. This is a basic norm universally acknowledged and practiced. So what is my religion? My religion, faith and belief stems from the Quran. My Islam is what the Quran tells me. Now I did not receive the Quran directly from Allah through TCS. Neither is there any certification from Allah or a seal saying that this message is from Allah. Then why do I believe the Quran as being the Quran? Only because there was a person in Arabia who said that this is a book or message from Allah. I believe that the Quran is genuine because Muhammad told me that this is Allahs book. So my entire Islam depends on Muhammad. If Muhammads zat (person) is doubtful then my Quran will be doubtful. I believe in the Quran and believe that it is the book of Allah because Muhammad has told me so. So if Muhammads zat (person) becomes controversial or his integrity or his character becomes controversial then
22
the Quran will also become doubtful. Therefore, for my faith or my belief it is the person of Muhammad which is pivotal. I dont know Allah. Why do I accept Allah as Allah? Because Muhammad has told me so. I have never seen Allah and neither has Allah ever spoken to me. So, therefore, before Muhammad became a prophet, Allah had the entire society within which he lived admit that the prophet was Sadiq and Ameen (honest and trustworthy). This was acknowledged before he was appointed a prophet and before the revelations commenced. He was accepted by the entire Meccan society as Sadiq and Ameen. Hence the indispensable reason to protect the person of Muhammad. Otherwise Islam would finish. I, not as a maulvi or fundo, but as a man who looks at it through reason would say that if any community, society or state takes any steps to protect its foundation then Ill have no objection to it. The educated person has to explain this. The maulvi can never do it. One has to explain it through reason and logic. Other countries also protect their foundations and defend them. And Islams pivot is this. Minus the Prophets person therell be no Islam. And I think logically this point should be understood. Now, regarding its implementation and enforcement. Look there is no law in the world that cannot be abused. What do you think of all the cases of murder cases against people? Do you think they are all true and there is no abuse? I dont have statistics but Im telling you of what Ive seen in the last 20 years as a judge. One person has died and one bullet has been used and 15 or 20 people have been accused of the crime. This is one of the widely abused provisions. Just because of this should we just do away with murder as an offence? If a provision is being abused the cure is not to do away with the provision but to check the abuse. And I agree with you that the Blasphemy Law has been mostly used for being abused. This is true. I have seen such cases. However, the cure is not in its removal but in checking the abuses.
23
JINNAHS WORLD VIEW/OUTLOOK ON WORLD AFFAIRS

A.G. Noorani*
Abstract
(Jinnahs vision of Pakistans foreign policy had elements of both idealism (joint defence with India) and realism (the need for alliances). The policies Nehru and he pursued rendered the ideal irrelevant. Both countries turned to realpolitik in pursuit of their respective national interests. Author). The worst kind of diplomatists are missionaries, fanatics and lawyers; the best kind are the reasonable and humane sceptics.1 For four good reasons, a study of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnahs outlook on world affairs is relevant and necessary. First, for its sheer intrinsic interest; the fascinating evolution of the world view of a brilliant lawyer-politician who did not claim deep interest, let alone expertise, in the subject. He missed no opportunity to ridicule Jawaharlal Nehru for his obsession with it. You very honestly say that your mind is obsessed with the international situation and the terrible sense of impending catastrophe that hangs over the world so you are thinking in terms entirely diverse from realities which face us in India Jinnah wrote to Nehru on 12 April 1938.2 Nehru did not conceal his disdain for Jinnahs limitations in his Autobiography and his book Democracy of India. Immediately before and after independence the clash between the two gifted narcissists shaped the relations between their two countries with consequences that blight them still. Volumes have been written on Nehru. Jinnah remains
* A.G. Noorani is an eminent Indian scholar, legal expert and a noted columnist.
Jinnahs World View/Outlook on World Affairs
neglected. The second reason is that Jinnahs world view shaped his vision of Indo-Pak relations. Thirdly, it is necessary to ask how far it affected Pakistans foreign policy. In India, a bunch of self-proclaimed realists joined hands with the Hindu-revivalist BJP to demolish Nehrus legacy in foreign affairs. Lastly, the aws in the notions entertained by the leaders of yore in this realm must be acknowledged to appreciate why they acted as they did. Jinnahs outlook cannot be discussed in isolation from the conditions of his times, especially the outlook of his contemporaries. In South Asia, the study of world affairs is affected by chauvinism and blighted by state patronage. The region has produced world class historians, economists, scientists and writers. Signicantly, it has not produced to this day a single scholar of world class in international relations. Global affairs, the origin and course of the Cold War remain neglected by academics who produce works like court historians, or in sheer self-absorption, to support the nations case. Jinnah was but a product of his times. The Indian National Congress of which he was a member till 1920 passed resolutions on foreign affairs since 1885, condemning British expansionism in the region. The All India Muslim League, which he joined in 1913 became engrossed in the travails of the Ottoman Empire. In later years Nehru emerged as the foremost expert and drafted resolutions galore on foreign affairs. In a devastating critique justly titled They were ignorant of international politics, Nirad C. Chaudhuri wrote The most unexpected aspect of the ignorance was its extent in the two Cambridge men in the Indian nationalist movement, Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Bose, who were always talking about the international situation. They were also regarded by their political colleagues as expert authorities on international politics. In spite of all that, not only their knowledge but also their approach were wholly unreal. Both of them saw it in the light of their personal predilections which were shaped by their temperaments and feelings. And their predominant feeling was hatred of British rule in India. In short, their ideas on international politics were only a projection of their
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nationalism, which prevented their seeing any international situation for what it was.3 To think these men gave a call for Quit India in August 1942 after the US and the Soviet Union had joined the war against Hitler. Nehru told the Congress Working Committee at Allahabad (27 April 1 May 1942) that it is Gandhijis feeling that Japan and Germany will win. This feeling unconsciously governs his decision.4 Gandhi did not expect to be arrested after the Quit India resolution was passed by the AICC on 8 August 1942. He told his secretary, Mahadev Desai, After my last nights speech, they will never arrest me.5 After the boundary dispute with China erupted in 1959 Nehru repeatedly said that any war between the two countries would mean a world war.6 Evidently the literature on limited war had escaped his notice. Denis Healeys seminal article, The Bomb that Didnt Go Off, had appeared in Encounter in July 1955. Henry A. Kissingers book, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, published in 1957, aroused interest for its exposition of the concept of limited war the war of 1962 was just that. Jinnahs limited intellectual equipment on foreign affairs and neglect of the military aspect proved as fateful. He received his rst shock upon discovering that Pakistan was militarily incapable of securing the accession of Junagadh.7 This is astonishing in a man who always took a keen interest in defence. As far back as on 18 March 1918 he said in the Imperial Legislative Council it is absolutely essential that the Government and the military authorities should recognize that we should have a citizen army as soon as possible, because India must recognize that there are possibilities of external as well as internal danger.8 The Sapru Report acknowledged Jinnahs consistent advocacy of Indianisation of the army and admiringly quoted his speech at the Round Table Conference in London in 1930. Britain was expected to hand over the defence of India as soon as possible to India.9 He evidently did not anticipate that India would send its army to Junagadh or to Jammu
26
& Kashmir, after the tribal raid from Pakistan; or to Hyderabad to foil its plans for independence. This was particularly strange in a lawyer who, unlike most of the tribe, was alive to the play of power. In his presidential address at the Lucknow Session of the Muslim League in October 1937, Jinnah noted with the stark realism for which he was famous, that all safeguards and settlements would be a scrap of paper unless they are backed by power. Politics means power.10 This realism about power deserted him when he dealt with foreign affairs. By then he had become the advocate par excellence. Reckless assertions, false analogies and far-fetched precedents came handy to prove a point. Jinnah supported the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia in 1938, comparing them to Muslims of India, at a session of the Sindh Muslim League on 8 October 1938. The notorious Munich Pact was signed on 30 September 1938. This is how he explained the upheaval. It was because the Sudeten Germans were forced under the heels of the majority of Czechoslovakia, who oppressed them, suppressed them, maltreated them and showed a brutal and callous disregard for their rights and interests for two decades hence the inevitable result that the Republic of Czechoslovakia is now broken up and a new map will have to be drawn. Just as the Sudeten Germans were not defenceless, and survived the oppression and persecution for two decades, so also the Mussalmans are not defenceless, and cannot give up their national entity and aspirations in this great continent.11 Khaled Ahmed recalled in The Friday Times of 1 November 2003 that Czechoslovakia abstained from voting in the General Assembly on Pakistans admission to the United Nations and in 1976 its President Gustav Husak refused to accept a commemorative medal issued by Pakistan on the centenary of Jinnahs birth. As everyone knew, the Sudeten Germans campaign was fomented by Hitler. He marched into Prague on 15 March 1939. Jinnah told Beverly Nichols on 18 December 1943 when Ireland was separated from Britain, the document embodying the terms of separation was approximately ten lines all the details were left to the future.12 That document, Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between
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Great Britain and Ireland, signed on 6 December 1921 far exceeded approximately ten lines. It ran into 18 articles over 5 pages.13 During their talks in Bombay, Jinnah wrote to Gandhi on 17 September 1944 by all canons of International Law we are a nation. That is a misnomer. International law covers inter-State relations. It denes states, not nations. The concept of nation belongs to the discipline of political science. No lawyer familiar with this highly specialized branch of the law will speak of its canons; only of its rules or principles.14 Whatever led men of stature like Gandhi, Jinnah and Nehru to blind themselves to the realities? What is it that drove a person of sterling integrity and high sense of responsibility like Jinnah to become so reckless in his advocacy of the cause of Pakistan? We must answer these questions but we do not. South Asians like to see such men either as saints or demons; not humans of great qualities and grave failings. Britains debt to Winston Churchill did not prevent Geoffrey Wheatcroft from tearing him apart, not least for his proneness to lying.15 As on domestic affairs, Jinnahs rich, myth-studded record must be studied as a whole. Contrary to myth he was an ardent supporter of the Khilafat cause from the very outset. He parted company once Mustafa Kamal abolished the Caliphate and Gandhi and the Ali Brothers meshed the movement with Gandhis non-cooperation movement. Prof. Naeem Qureshi characterizes him as a sincere Pan-Islamist.16 On 14 November 1946 Jinnah dismissed Pan-Islam as an exploded bogey. On 21 May 1947 he repeated the theory of Pan-Islamism has long ago exploded.17 Of a piece with his stand on Khilafat was his equally ardent espousal of the cause of Indians abroad from the outset of his political career till the partition and beyond; regardless of the religious divide. Palestine tted in this scheme of things. The ardour on the Khilafat was manifest even in the days when he was an Indian nationalist of the front rank. Jinnah spoke at the Lucknow session of the League in 1916 with circumspection. His constituency was Muslim. He shared its sentiments but was careful not to stir up emotions. May I, therefore, urge that
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the Government should have regard for their dearest and most sacred religious feelings and under no circumstances interfere with the question of the future of the Caliphate. It should be left entirely to the Mussalmans to acknowledge and accept their own Caliph. I do not desire to dilate on this grave and delicate subject, but much deeper currents underlie this exceptional exhortation of mine, which I have ventured to make both in the interests of the Mussalmans and the Government of Great Britain, than it would be expedient at present to discuss on a public platform.18 This is where admirers and detractors alike went hopelessly wrong. Jinnah did not stride from Indian nationalism into Muslim communalism. He was a fervent Indian nationalist who espoused the Muslims genuine claims and sought Hindu-Muslim unity on this basis. He was not an Uncle Tom. Nor was he sectarian. Those who drove him to extremes in 1939 and who wrecked accord with him on a united India in 1946 bear a heavy responsibility. It is in this context that his vision of world affairs before and after 1940 must be judged. Jinnah led the Leagues delegation to present a Memorandum to Prime Minister Lloyd George on 17 August 1919. For generations past the Muslims of India generally have recognized the Khilafat of the House of Osman and Constantinople as Darul-Islam and Khilafat (the seat of Islam and the Khalifa). For many centuries the Sultan of Turkey has been recognized as the Servant of the Holy Places of Islam and their custodian by all the Muslims of the world, including the Shareef of Mecca. Whenever Turkey has been in trouble a reaction of it has been felt in India, and the Muslims have done all to help the Sultan of Turkey as the head of Islam to maintain his spiritual and temporal honour and position. More than once the Government of India itself encouraged the Muslims in that sympathy. The greater the danger for Turkey the more concerned Muslims have felt. So much so that in modern times during the Balkan Wars, the Muslims of India organized a Red Crescent fund for Turkey at a very great cost. The relations between the Muslims of India and the Sultan of Turkey have always been a recognized and established fact. As late as 27th January 1909 when a deputation of the London Muslim League
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waited upon Lord Morely, the then Secretary of State for India, his reply contained these words: I know very well that any injustice any suspicion that we were capable of being unjust to Mohammadans in India would certainly have a very severe and injurious reaction in Constantinople.19 He was a signatory to the address presented to the Viceroy on 19 January 1920. In his presidential address to the Leagues special session at Calcutta on 7 September 1920 he said rst came the Rowlatt Act accompanied by the Punjab atrocities and then came the spoliation of the Ottoman Empire and the Khilafat. The one attacks our liberty, the other our faith notwithstanding the unanimous opinion of the Musalmans, and in breach of the Prime Ministers solemn pledges, un-chivalrous and outrageous terms have been imposed upon Turkey and the Ottoman Empire has served for plunder and been broken up by the Allies under the guise of Mandates. This, thank God, has at last convinced us, one and all, that we can no longer abide our trust either in the Government of India or in the Government of His Majesty the King of England to represent India in matters international. The Indian press is ooded by accounts of occurrences in the colonies which show but too well how India is sacriced to the individual interests of these Englishmen who have settled in these colonies which Indias manpower and Indias work power have built. In one of the most important speeches Jinnah delivered, he said One degrading measure upon another, disappointment upon disappointment, and injury upon injury, can lead a people to only one end. It led Russia to Bolshevism. It has led Ireland to Sinn Feinism. May it lead India to freedom And what of the sacred land of the Crescent and Star and the blue and golden Bosphorus its capital seized and the Khalifa virtually a prisoner, its territories overrun by Allied troops groaning under the imposition of impossible terms. It is a death warrant, not a treaty. These are the enormities crying aloud, and we have met today face to face with a dangerous and most unprecedented situation. The solution is not easy and the difculties are great. But I cannot ask the people
30
to submit to wrong after wrong. Yet I would still ask the Government not to drive the people of India to desperation, or else there is no other course left open to the people except to inaugurate the policy of noncooperation though not necessarily the programme of Mr. Gandhi. From a purely Musalman point of view the Khilafat question was a matter of life and death.20 At its Nagpur session in December 1920, the Congress endorsed Gandhis programme. Jinnah was a brave solitary dissenter; denounced by the audience, respected by posterity. But unlike Annie Besant, Jinnah was not fundamentally opposed to non-cooperation. I see no other way except the policy of cooperation he told the Congress session at Calcutta the very next day on 8 September 1920. But he counselled against making a declaration which you have not the means to carry out. Advocacy of the Khilafat cause continued. He told a London audience on 23 June 1921 what must be the feeling of a Mussulman who poured out his money, who poured his blood, who willingly allowed his sons to go and ght in the different battleelds, when today he nds his Holy Places under I do not speak disrespectfully of any religion but under a Christian religion? What must be the feeling of a Mussulman when he nds today that those dear Turkish homelands are handed over to Greece, and Constantinople today stands as purely a mortgage security for the Allies, under the guns of Britain and her Allies? He met the Viceroy Lord Reading on 1 November 1921 who reported to London he holds strong views about the acceleration of Swaraj, redress of Punjab wrongs and is in favour of Khilafat agitation.21 One of Jinnahs earliest reported speeches was at the Anjumane-Islam Hall in Bombay in July 1908 denouncing the Asiatic Law Amendment Act and the Immigration Restriction Bill of the Transvaal government. He began his innings in the Imperial Legislative Council on 25 February 1910 with a speech on Indentured labour for Natal in which he clashed with the Viceroy, Lord Minto, who was in the Chair. I must call the Honble gentleman to order. I think that is rather too strong a word, cruelty. The Honble Member must remember that he is talking of a friendly part of the Empire, and he must really adapt his language to the circumstances. Jinnah: Well, my Lord, I should feel
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inclined to use much stronger language, but I am fully aware of the constitution of this Council, and I do not wish to trespass for one single moment, but I do say this that the treatment that is meted out to Indians is the harshest which can possibly be imagined, and, as I said before, the feeling in this country is unanimous. Jinnahs record of support to Indians abroad is striking in Kenya (August 1923), in South Africa (14 September 1925, and 25 March 1926), Ceylon (11 February 1930); Zanzibar (September 1937); Burma (1938); South Africa (24 May 1939); sympathies with the Indian nationals who had settled down in Java, Burma, Malaya, and Singapore who suffered shameful discrimination; South Africa (15 April 1943 and 10 April 1946); Ceylon (17 July 1946). The Lahore resolution on Pakistan in 1940 did not affect Jinnahs stand. In some of these cases he got the League to pass resolutions. The Leagues Council which met in Bombay, on 27-29 July 1946 to withdraw its acceptance of the Cabinet Missions Plan and pass the resolution on Direct Action also adopted a resolution asking the Big Powers of the UN to accept the demands for national freedoms and independence of Indonesia, Indo-China, Malaya, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Sudan, Egypt, Libya, Tripolitania, Tunis, Algeria, Riff & Morocco. A separate resolution expressed solidarity with the Musalmans of Iran and Turkey then facing threats from Stalin in the Cold War that had begun in earnest. The Council conveys its message to the Turkish and Iranian brethren that the salvation and security of Muslim peoples all over the world in particular, and of Asiatic peoples in general, lies in their unity and solidarity and it is time the Muslim peoples revive the spirit of Islamic brotherhood and rise as one man for the defence of the rights and interests of renascent Islamdom from the East to the West and from one corner of the world to the other. It was a blend of attack on colonialism with advocacy of Muslim unity that was to mark Pakistans foreign policy. On very many issues India and Pakistan spoke and voted in harmony in the UN General Assembly.
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The cause of Palestine received support from the Congress as well as the League. In his presidential address to the historic League session in 1937 Jinnah said The whole policy of the British Government has been a betrayal of the Arabs, from its very inception. As GovernorGeneral of Pakistan he sent a cable to President Truman on 8 December 1947 expressing his shock at the UN General Assemblys decision to enforce partition of Palestine. It was ultra vires of the UNs Charter and was immoral, besides. In the intervening decade the criticism never ceased. The Viceroy was told on 5 September 1939, that London should try and meet all reasonable national demands of the Arabs in Palestine. At a public meeting in Bombay on 8 November 1945 he said I have no enmity against Jews. I know they were treated very badly in some parts of civilized Europe. But why should Palestine be dumped with such a large number of Jews? Why should the Arabs be given a threat which will wipe them out of Palestine? If the Jews want to re-conquer Palestine, let them face the Arabs without British or American help. Jinnahs perspicacity deserves praise. He foresaw the parlous plight to which Palestinians would be reduced if the US and the UK pursued those policies. Truman pressed the British to allow 1,000,000 Jews into Palestine, while he had agreed after a long period of vacillation to allow only 100 Indians to immigrate into the US Why does not President Truman take 1,000,000 Jews into the U.S.? he asked. The two World Wars played havoc with the Muslim world. In October 1916, Jinnah denounced Prussian militarism while demanding the Indianisation of the armed forces. In June 1940 the League denounced Nazi aggression. In their aftermath the European powers outed the pledges made during the war. A long statement which Jinnah issued to the press on 3 June 1945 on Algeria, Syria and Lebanon testied not only to the depth of his commitment but his close attention to world affairs. General de Gaulle should be dealt with in the same way as the war criminals.22 Indonesias struggle for freedom received Jinnahs enthusiastic
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support. He met its rst Prime Minister Sultan Shahriar in New Delhi on 26 July 1947 and denounced the Dutch Governments resort to attack with armed forces. No Muslim leader won as much admiration as Mustafa Kamal Ataturk did. He read a review of H.C. Armstrongs biography Grey Wolf in The Literary Supplement of The Times in London in November 1932 and bought a copy. Hector Bolitho writes For two days Jinnah was absorbed in the story of Kemal Ataturk: when he had nished, he handed the book to his daughter then aged thirteen and said, read this, my dear, it is good. For many days afterwards he talked Kemal Ataturk; so much that his daughter chaffed him and nicknamed him Grey Wolf. 23 On his death Jinnah praised him on 10 November 1938 as the greatest Musalman in the modern Islamic world. He pleaded for solidarity of Muslims when Pakistan was no more than a dream. He said on 2 November 1940 It is duty to help our Muslims brethren wherever they are, from China to Peru, because Islam enjoins that it is our duty to go to the rescue of our Muslim brethren We have not got arms and ammunition but we can in a thousand and one ways help our Muslim brethren if they are stricken. Genuine sentiments; but expectation of reciprocal support could not have been absent altogether. An interview to the Arab News agency on 7 November 1946 concerned the conference in New Delhi of Muslim countries Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Levant and all other countries where Muslims predominate. Jinnah met the Mufti of Palestine, Muhammad Amin El-Husseni, in Cairo in December 1946. In the context of his policy towards Muslims states, Afghanistans cynical revival of its demand for Pakhtoonistan just as the British were about to transfer power in 1947 must have come as a rude shock to Jinnah. He did his best to avert a rift and sent Saidullah Khan to Kabul as his Personal Representative. The Prime Minister, Shah Wali Khan, met him on 30 September 1947 and asked him to give us the whole of the North-West Frontier Province and the tribal areas as a proof of your large-heartedness. The course events took thereafter is outside the scope of this article as indeed, is Jinnahs vision of Pakistan in its
34
entirety or the place of Muslim minorities in India in that vision. It is enough to say that from the outset he visualized joint defence between the two States of the sub-continent and cited the Monroe Doctrine. A.S.R. Chari, a noted Communist lawyer was correspondent of the British Communist daily The Daily Worker. His memoirs record Jinnahs courtesy when he met him on 5 October 1944, Jinnah declared We will say Hands off India to all outsiders. Pakistan will not tolerate any outside design or aggression on this sub-continent. We will observe something like the Monroe Doctrine.24 The Doctrine was revived at a press conference on 14 November 1946. The editor of The Statesman, Arthur Moore, was told on 22 January 1946 We would cooperate in world affairs and have a common policy. The Cabinet Mission was assured on 4 April 1946 that he would agree to a defensive alliance.25 That was not to be. India and Pakistan were born in acrimony and were instantly overwhelmed by disputes that grip them still. But Jinnah persisted in his vision of old. He told Eric Streiff correspondent of the Neue Zurcher Zeitung of Zurich on 10 March 1948: it is of vital importance to Pakistan and India as independent sovereign states to collaborate in a friendly way jointly to defend their frontiers both on land and sea against any aggression. But this depends entirely on whether Pakistan and India can resolve their own differences and grave domestic issues in the rst instance. In other words, if we put our house in order internally, then we may be able to play a very great part externally in all international affairs.26 In contrast, Nehru was impatient to play a role in world affairs. There was something wildly unreal about his initial approach. On 11 March 1947, when the country, torn by strife and pressing issues of domestic concern, cried for attention, Nehru minuted: India cannot be indifferent to the future of Germany. In a note on Indias candidature in the elections to the United Nations Security Council, he wrote on 30 October 1946: India can no longer take up an attitude other than that demanded by her geographical position, by her great potential and by
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the fact that she is the pivot round which the defence problems of the Middle East, the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia revolve. This is far from true even now. In 1946, it verged on the ludicrous. To M.C. Chagla, a member of the rst delegation he sent to the U.N. General Assembly in 1946, Nehru wrote (October 3): We want to make a splash at this General Assembly meeting.27 Nehru nailed his colours to the mast of non-alignment. He sought an alliance with the US in 1948 privately but was rebuffed.28 Pakistan did the same. It sought the US help but, till the military pact with the US, pursued a policy of non-alignment. Which brings us to the question: What was Jinnahs outlook on alliances? The record shows that he very much had it in mind. His interview to Doon Campbell of Reuters on 21 May 1947 received much notice because Jinnah said Yes when asked whether he would demand a corridor between the two parts of Pakistan. But far more important were his remarks on foreign policy on the eve of the partition. Pakistan would be the weaker for the partition of Punjab and Bengal. A weak Pakistan and a strong Hindustan will be a temptation for the strong Hindustan to try to dictate. I have always said that Pakistan must be viable and sufciently strong as a balance vis-a-vis Hindustan. That balance cannot be ensured without an alliance. Hence his remark Pakistan cannot live in isolation, nor can any other nation do so today. We shall have to choose our friends and I trust, wisely.29 Donald Edwards of the BBC had been given the same line on alliances when they met on 2 April 1946.30 The preferred ally was Britain. Jinnah told Lord Ismay, Mountbattens Chief of Staff, on 9 April 1947 who recorded: Pakistan could not stand alone. They would require to be friends with a big power. Russia had no appeal for them. France was weak and divided; there remained only England and America, and of these the former was the natural friend. Apart from anything else he added jokingly the devil you know is better than the devil you dont.31 A week later the stand with the same joke was repeated to Sir Terence Shone the British High Commissioner in Delhi.32 Jinnah was, however, too well aware of the Soviet Unions interest in the region to overlook the worth of the Russian card. It emerged in
36
an interview to Norman Cliff of the News Chronicle on 12 April 1946. Inevitably, notes Mr. Norman Cliff, Russia came into our discussion, and Mr. Jinnah saw in this problem only another strong reason for Pakistan. Russia means trouble as far as I can judge, he said, and I think the sooner you agree to Pakistan the better it will be for you and us. No Muslim state can look on with complacency if Russia establishes a stronghold in Persia and one thing is certain that the entire Muslim bloc will stand together in its own interests. As soon as we become selfgoverning and have Pakistan there will be powerful and friendly state. Asked if secure defence was possible in terms of modern warfare, Mr. Jinnah said : Even a mouse can free a Lion.33 In a press interview on 3 September 1946 to a foreign news agency Jinnah said: I do believe that Russia has more than a spectators interest in Indian affairs, and she is not very far from India either. It is a serious menace if Britain pursues her present policy of completely eliminating the Muslims not only in India but in the entire Middle East. In my opinion, it is a very dangerous policy to pursue.34 During a cabinet meeting on 7 September 1947, Jinnah said: Pakistan (is) a democracy and communism (does) not ourish in the soil of Islam. It (is) clear therefore that our interests (lie) more with the two great democratic countries, namely the UK and the USA, rather than with Russia.35 The memorandum which the Government of Pakistan gave to the US State Department in October 1947 said, In its external and defence policy , the proximity and vulnerability of Western Pakistan to Russia, is the most dominant factor If Pakistan yielded to any external threat, the defence of India will become almost an impossibility. If Pakistan is to become strong enough to defend itself, even with the generous assistance of and close collaboration with Great Britain and the United States of America, it will rst need to be economically developed and extensively improved, the existing air and military bases modernized and expanded, and new ones established, the production of essential arms and ammunitions enlarged and speeded up.36
37
A.G. Noorani
Yet, when one reads the minutes of Jinnahs talks with Hyderabads delegation in Delhi on 4 August 1947 the detachment from the realities is so stunning as to prompt one to ask whether he spoke as an advocate or as a statesman: If it came to the worst, one should die ghting rather than yield on a point of fundamental principle. Mr. Jinnah gave the illustration of what he called the greatest martyrdom in history, the example of Imam Hussain standing for what was right and giving his life for it. All the sanctions in the world then existing were applied against him and his followers but they withstood them and suffered wholesale butchery. It was a moral triumph and they gave their lives for it. That should be the attitude which the Nizam and his advisers and people should adopt. If it came to the worst, rather than yield to coercion or to the surrender of what was right, he should be prepared to abdicate and go in the last resort and show to the world that he had fought uncompromisingly for right as against might. Mr. Jinnah said that, in our own times, England had done the same against the heaviest odds. Her people had fought till the end and had reversed the position, by perseverance and conviction, from defeat to victory. If Hyderabad was short of petrol or kerosene, it would not matter if, on the other hand, Hyderabad had abundance of rmness, perseverance and courage. The Russians were threatened by a blockade against them but they won the war. If Hyderabad was similarly threatened, there would be other ways to ght, not necessarily with guns if there were no guns, and not necessarily with mechanized transport if there was no petrol. But he astutely refrained from giving any rm assurance of support. As regards His Exalted Highness question as to how far Pakistan would be able to assist Hyderabad economically or politically or with troops or arms and equipment and the like, Mr. Jinnah said that it was not possible for him at present to give any specic undertaking but that, generally speaking, he was condent that he and Pakistan would come to the help of Hyderabad in every way possible. There should be no doubt on that point. He said that even countries with long-established Governments could not give specic undertakings of the nature desired except by reference to the situation as it developed. The unreal far-fetched analogies must be put down to the advocates
38
zeal. Jinnahs vision of Pakistans foreign policy had both elements idealism (joint defence with India) and realism (the need for alliances). The policies Nehru and he pursued rendered the ideal irrelevant. Both countries turned to realpolitik in pursuit of their respective national interests. The realpolitik as conceived by the masters they little understood. The national interest was narrowly dened. Still, Jinnahs outlook on world affairs merits close study, closer than what this writer has attempted. His legacies of legalism and exaggerated reliance on tactical skills hampered Pakistans foreign policy. His vision was forgotten. Harold Nicolson would have disapproved of the legalism and Jinnahs passion for tactics. He would have lauded Jinnahs vision.
References:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Nicolson, Harold; Diplomacy; Oxford University Press, 1969, p.24. Pirzada, Syed Sharifuddin (ed.); Quaid-i-Azam Jinnahs Correspondence; East and West Publishing, Karachi, 1977, p.267. The Times of India, 28 February 1982. Congress Responsibility for the Disturbances 1942-43, Government of India, 1943, p.43. Tendulkar, G.D.; Mahatma; Vol. VI, p.216. Manchester Guardian, 23 October 1961; also in parliament on 6 December 1961. Jalal, Ayeshah; The State of Martial Rule; Cambridge University Press; 1990; p.44. Ahmad, Riaz; The Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah; National Institute of Pakistan Studies; Quaid-i-Azam University; Islamabad; Vol. IV, p.393. Constitutional Proposals of the Sapru Committee; 1945; p.278. Ahmed, Jamiluddin; Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah; Vol. I. p.30; see also p.43: a denite share in power. Bolitho, Hector; Jinnah; p.118. Ali, Mehrunisa (ed.); Jinnah on World Affairs, Selected Documents 1908-1948, Pakistani Study Centre; University of Karachi; 2007; p.229. (This outstanding document will be cited hereafter rather than the primary sources it draws on. Other excellent compilations are: Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada (ed.), The Collected Works of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Vols. 1-3, Karachi; Waheed Ahmad, The Nations Voice, Vols. I-VII, Quaid-i-Azam Academy, Karachi; and the compilation by Riaz Ahmad noted earlier). Keith, Arthur Barriedale; Speeches and Documents on the British Domains, 1918-1931; Oxford University Press; 1932; pp.77-82. Jinnah-Gandhi Talks, Central Ofce, All India Muslim League, 1944, p.22. Vide Churchill and His Myths, The New York Times Review of Books, 29 May 2008. Jinnah and the Khilafat Movement, 1918-1924, Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies, Vol. I No. 2, pp.82-107. Ali; pp. 326 and 378 respectively.
13 14 15 16 17
39
A.G. Noorani
18 19 20 21 22 Ali; p.68. Ali; pp.72-73. Ali; pp.90-91. Qureshi; p.97. Ali; p.252 (I advisedly refrain from citing pages from her compilation in some smaller matters in order not to clutter up the text. She has drawn from other compilations and the sources are easy to nd out). Jinnah; p.102. Jinnah-Gandhi Talks; p.80. Ali; pp.277 and 289 respectively. Dawn; 12 March 1948. Vide the writers article, Task of Democracy, Frontline. 21 December 2007. M.S.Venkataramani, An elusive military relationship, Frontline, 9 April 1999, 23 April 1999, 7 May 1999 and 21 May 1999. They are based on archival material. Ali; pp.377-380. Ali; p.287. Ali; p.360. Ali; p.366. Ali; p.296. Ali; p.320. Kux, Denis; United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies, Oxford University Press, p.20. Ali; p.583.
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
40
THE MQM AND IDENTIY POLITIC IN PAKISTAN

Niloufer Siddiqui*
Abstract.
(The MQM, Pakistans third largest political party, was formed in the mid-1980s as the Mohajir Qaumi Mahaz to represent the interests of the Mohajir (migrant) community. Its success in tapping into an increasing sense of Mohajir insecurity was evident upon its formation as the party gained, almost overnight, the support of the majority of the Mohajir community. Socio-economic factors were integral both to the MQMs immediate impact and to the cementing of a common notion of Mohajir identity, as was the failure of successive governments to achieve their goals of state-building and nation-building. Both Z.A. Bhutto and Ziaul-Haq struggled to deal effectively with increasing demands made on ethnic grounds, particularly on behalf of Sindhis. Over the years, the party-cum-political movement has seen a change not only in its name (becoming the Muttahida Qaumi Movement), but also ostensibly its central ideology. While the partys support base remains strong, and the following of its leader, Altaf Hussain, borders on god-like veneration and reverence, many others view the MQM as a fascist organization and accuse it of employing terrorist techniques to achieve its aims. The mobilization of Mohajir identity, and the MQMs role in this identity formation, is a valuable case study of the means by which ethnicity can become a symbol of identity when threatened and how in the face of failure to provide for basic socioeconomic needs, a political party based on ethnic mobilization can gain ground. Author). On 12 May 2007, 48 people were killed and hundreds injured
* Niloufer Siddiqui is an MA candidate at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington DC.
Niloufer Siddiqui
in Karachi as riots broke out during the visit of chief justice Iftikhar Chaudhry who was, at the time, facing a presidential reference. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), then a coalition partner of the government in Sindh and generally considered as the government of Karachi,1 held a rally against what it termed as the politicization of the chief justice issue. Opposition parties responded in kind. The ensuing tragedy was integral to the broader political instability which reected growing resentment of the Musharraf administration. It was the precursor to a series of events that led to the declaration of national emergency on 3 November 2007. The violence captured on television and the print media propelled, not for the rst time, the MQM to the centre of peoples mind, some even went so far as to brand it a terrorist organization. The recurring unrest and violence in Karachi over the last three decades has been linked by many to the emergence of the MQM, which in itself was partly a consequence of riots in the city in the early 1980s. The MQM, the countrys third largest political party, was created in 1984 as the Mohajir Qaumi Mahaz to represent the interests of the Mohajir, or migrant, community. The brainchild of Altaf Hussain, the MQM aimed to have the Mohajirs recognized as a fth ethnicity in Pakistan in addition to the Punjabis, Pashtuns, Sindhis and Balochis. According to the 1951 Census, A Mohajir is a person who has moved into Pakistan as a result of Partition or for fear of disturbances connected therewith.2 However, the term today has come to refer specically to the non-Punjabi migrants who moved from India to West Pakistan after Partition and settled in Sindh, primarily in the urban centres of Hyderabad and Karachi.3 The majority of the migrants from India who came from East Punjab, settling and assimilating into life in West Punjab, arent included in contemporary discussions of the Mohajir movement.4 Rather, discussion centres on only those migrants who, despite being from distinct ethnic groups, gravitated towards a singular Urdu-speaking identity. Even though these groups comprised only 20 percent of the migrants from India, they radically altered the ethnic composition of Sindh.5 This ethnicity, however, became a central means of identication only as the Mohajirs began losing the socioeconomic privileges they initially possessed. According to the 1951
42
The MQM and Identity Politic in Pakistan
Census, the Mohajirs made up 6.3 million of the 33.7 million people in West Pakistan, about one-fth of the population.6 Another 700,000 settled in East Pakistan. Only 14.28 percent of the residents in Karachi spoke Sindhi as a rst language in 1951 as opposed to 58.7 percent who spoke Urdu as their mother tongue.7 By 1981, according to census data, the citys population was made more diverse by later migrations of other ethnic groups and stood at 61 percent Mohajir, 16 percent Punjabi, 11 percent Pashtun, 7 percent indigenous Sindhi and 5 percent Balochi.8 Today, the gures represent a similar pattern of linguistic composition; according to the 1998 census, while Urdu-speakers make up only 7.57 percent of Pakistans population, the distribution in Karachi is 48 percent Urdu speaking, 14 percent Punjabi, 7 percent Sindhi, 11 percent Pashtu and 4 percent Balochi.9 It isnt surprising that this city, the original capital of the new state of Pakistan, became the locale of most of the unrest, and has remained so till this day. As Yunas Samad argues, the emergence of Mohajir identity politics has been synonymous with ethnic conict in Karachi.10 While the growing importance of Mohajir identity and the creation of the MQM should not be viewed as identical processes, as they represent differing approaches to ethnic conguration,11 they are nonetheless inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing. The success of the MQM in tapping into an increasing sense of Mohajir insecurity was evident upon its formation, as the party gained, almost overnight, the support of the majority of the Mohajir community. In 1988, the MQM won a landslide electoral victory in municipal elections in Hyderabad and Karachi. By 1991, it had established a virtual monopoly over representation of the Urdu-speaking community in urban Sindh.12 Socio-economic factors were integral to the rather drastic switch from supporting a Pakistani notion of identity to rallying behind a Mohajir identity. Yet, any analysis of this transformation needs to take into account the broader failure of the federal government in achieving either its goals of state-building or nation-building, creating a vacuum which was lled by ethnic groups and political parties based on ethnic mobilization. That the MQM has substantially altered its political agenda during its short period of existence indicates, however, a limitation to its ethnic
43
Niloufer Siddiqui
basis of support as well as a recognition of broad political gains that could be achieved through expansion. As the change in the organizations name suggests, the MQM has transformed from a political movement that represents solely the interests of a particular ethnic group to one which is attempting to solidify its position as a mainstream political party with support bases around the country. Its lack of success in achieving the latter, as seen in its recent failure to grab seats in non-Mohajir areas in the February 2008 election, is indicative of a fundamental contradiction in its very political existence. Julian Richards argues to this effect when he states, the party remains somewhere between a traditional political party, with seats in local and national parliaments, and a spiritual ethnonationalist movement with little to offer beyond protection against the opposing other.13 The Stimulus for Organization Many scholars, notably Farhat Haq, have analyzed the Mohajir situation in Pakistan as tting within a framework of relative deprivation. According to Ted Gurr, tension leading to violence can develop where a discrepancy exists between what a collective group believes they should have and what they actually have. The point of reference is what the group had in the past, an abstract ideal or standards articulated by a leader.14 Mohajirs, primarily in Karachi, have gradually lost the privileged position both economic and political which they possessed immediately after independence, giving way in relative terms to other ethnic groups in the country. The independence struggle for Pakistan, engineered and propelled by Muhammed Ali Jinnahs Muslim League, had drawn the basis of its support from Muslims living in areas that remained part of India following Partition. The indigenous Pakistanis Muslims living in parts of British India that became Pakistan played a much smaller role in the struggle for a Muslim homeland. Aside from the Punjabis, who were the majority ethnic group in West Pakistan, these groups received few immediate benets upon the creation of the country. In fact, pockets of resistance in Sindh, Balochistan and the NWFP provided early challenges to the edgling government, with many groups viewing the Muslim League and the Mohajirs as akin to foreign colonizers.
44
The vagueness of the call for independence in the 1940s had resulted in different groups, both in East and West Pakistan, attaching different meanings to what the new state for Muslims was meant to achieve.15 For the Pakistanis of the west wing, and particularly for the muhajirs, Pakistan was a state in which the Muslim nation would reach fullment, developing its strength on the basis of Islam and Islamic solidarity.16 In being premised upon a two-nation theory which rendered Muslims a distinct nation of their own, Pakistan was created on the basis of a united religious identity. The Mohajirs notion of national identity t with that put forward by Jinnah; the importance given to distinct ethnicities was, therefore, antithetical to what the Mohajirs stood for. They clashed with other ethnic groups on such issues as further migration of Indian Muslims, local languages and provincial autonomy, and supported initially the religious political party, the Jamaat-i-Islaami.17 After independence, Mohajirs continued to occupy a privileged position in the new Pakistan government. Both the rst Governor-General and Prime Minister were Mohajir, and Mohajirs held 21 percent of the jobs in the Pakistan Civil Service. By 1973, they held 33.5 percent of all senior jobs in the federal bureaucracy and 20 percent in the Secretariat group in 1974.18 Mohajirs also dominated business and industry in the early years of Pakistans industrialization. Many were of an urban and professional background and were able to ll the gap that Hindus had left after migrating to India post-Partition. Their position remained strong through Ayub Khans rule, and the bureaucratic-military alliance which dominated politics in Pakistan was in turn characterized by a PunjabiMohajir nexus.19 Land policies further privileged the Mohajirs at the expense of Sindhis, as refugees were given land to compensate for their losses in India.20 These early skirmishes over who was entitled to land left by evacuees from West Pakistan worked to create an initial divide between migrants and indigenous Pakistanis.21 By the end of the 1950s, however, the rising power of the military, which was beginning to become more dominated by Punjabis and Pashtuns, began to push the Mohajir elites into a subordinate position. Many Mohajirs contested the decision to move the federal capital from Karachi to Islamabad, but continued to hold many prominent policyCRITERION July/September 2008
45
Niloufer Siddiqui
making positions.22 It was primarily after the separation of East and West Pakistan, as Prime Minister Zulkar Ali Bhutto, himself a Sindhi, began implementing his policies of Islamist socialism, that much of the antagonism in Sindh against Mohajirs came to the fore. Many Sindhis expected Bhutto to rectify what they perceived as a longstanding socioeconomic imbalance. In the initial years of Bhuttos rule, in 1973, Mohajirs, while still about 7 percent of the population, occupied 33.5 percent of the posts in the bureaucracy.23 Sindhi agitation led to Bhuttos recognition of Sindhi as an ofcial language in the province as well as the imposition of a quota on the number of Urdu-speakers entering the Pakistan Civil Service.24 Bhuttos nationalization policies resulted in a drop in business condence and industrial growth stalled, with the Gujarati-speaking community particularly harmed by these policies.25 The language issue was a source of much agitation, rst on the part of the Sindhis, for whom the imposition of Urdu was seen as discriminatory and served as a signicant disadvantage in terms of education and jobs. Bhuttos support of the Language Bill was couched in ethnic terms. In a speech, he spoke about how the Sindhis had given our lands; we have given our homes; we have given our lives . . to people from all parts . . living in Sindh. What else can we do to show our loyalty . .?26 The Language Bill required Sindhi to be taught as a second language to those students for whom Sindhi wasnt a rst language and for all provincial government ofcials to learn the language.27 While this could hardly be seen as a threat to the dominance of the Urdu language, the bill and resulting controversy became symbolic of more than the dispute itself, as had the language issue in the crisis of East Pakistan/Bangladesh. In 1972, language riots broke out, and worked to further divide the two communities. According to a biographical account, Altaf Hussain points to these Sindhi-Mohajir language riots as a turning point; it was then that he began to fully realize the need for Mohajirs to organize on an ethnic basis if their rights were to be protected.28 The implementation of the quota system was another central source of contention and unrest, leading directly to a decline in Mohajir socioeconomic status. The quota system differentiated between the rural and urban and meant an ethnic quota for Sindhis (rural) and Urduspeaking Mohajirs (urban).29 Allocation was made based on 60 percent
46
rural and 40 percent urban domiciles in Sindh.30 11.4 percent of the seats in the federal bureaucracy were reserved for indigenous Sindhis and strict rules were laid down for the denition of a rural Sindhi.31 The very notion of a quota system ew in the face of what the Mohajirs stood for because Pakistan had been created on the basis of a united identity, to have quotas in place which questioned where you were from in your own land and assigned opportunities on the basis of this designation seemed unwarranted.32 The quotas ensured that the Mohajirs lost in relative, not absolute, terms. However, the prominent role which the Mohajirs saw themselves as having played in the independence struggle is integral to contemporary notions of superiority and is used to justify claims that the Mohajirs are entitled to, and deserve, certain preferential treatment for all that they wagered and lost. Azim Ahmed Tariq, the former chairman of the MQM, effectively conveyed this emotion in a 1991 interview when he stated, We thought, we had given such sacrices: two million were killed in the Partition.33 Altaf Hussain too has been quoted as saying, What have we gained after sacricing 2 million lives for the creation of Pakistan?34 As with any discussion of ethnicity, the mythic components of collective solidarity are integral to understanding what transforms a latent ethnicity into a central means of identication. In the case of the Mohajirs, this is based on the idea that they, more than any group, were committed to the idea of the nation of Pakistan and hence, should be treated as such. The hope that General Zia-ul-Haqs coming to power would reverse these policies and reinstate the Mohajirs to their traditional place of power was soon thwarted when Zia retained many of Bhuttos policies. Zias deeply held religious beliefs and emphasis on a Pakistani culture with a strong Islamic basis, and above all his determination to defuse Sindhi nationalism encouraged many Mohajirs to place their support behind him.35 However, his retention of seat reservations in the federal and provincial bureaucracy and institutions of higher education worked against the Mohajirs, and solidied Punjabi dominance.36 The inability of both the Bhutto and Zia administrations to provide for the needs of either the Mohajir or Sindhi groups was partly a result of the leaders
47
Niloufer Siddiqui
pitting groups against one another to serve their own political needs. Bhuttos inconsistency with presenting the PPP as a national party while also appealing to his own Sindhi identity served to spread nationalist feelings among Mohajirs. Additionally, allegations abound that Zia played a key role in promoting the MQM as a counterweight to the PPP.37 The growing inuence of the Pashtuns in the military, partly due to Pakistans intervention in Afghanistan, during Zias time meant that the Mohajirs had another ethnic group to contend and compete with.38 In fact, these patterns of migration, particularly to Karachi, played a dening role in the citys continually changing demography and in turn, the relative privileges received by various ethnic groups. Waseem characterizes four waves of migration into Karachi: Mohajirs in the 1940s-50s, Punjabis and Pashtuns in 1960s-80s, Sindhis in the 1970s-90s, and foreigners in the 1980s-90s. By 1998, migrants as a proportion of the total population amounted to 22 percent. Of these, 31 percent had arrived from outside the country.39 The initial wave of Mohajir migration is differentiated from the later wave of the Punjabis and Pashtuns. The latter migration, referred to as circular migration, is characterized by migrants maintaining relations with their families back home and visiting often.40 This difference has enabled the Mohajirs to consider themselves natives of Karachi and Sindh and to effectively pursue a sons of the soil movement. Mohajirs and Sindhis have even managed to ally with one another against these later migrants, although each alliance has been politically motivated and short-lived. Riots and Unrest A series of riots broke out between Mohajir and Pashtun migrants in Karachi during the mid-1980s. During 1985, the Karachi police recorded 608 cases of rioting, which resulted in 56 deaths,41 and between January 1986 and August 1987, there were 242 incidents of rioting.42 One of the most signicant incidents between the two groups was what became known as the Bushra Zaidi affair of April 1985. A young Mohajir schoolgirl was hit and killed by a Pashtun bus driver and within two days, clashes erupted between Pashtuns, who owned and operated the
48
minibuses, and Mohajirs, the passengers of these minibuses.43 Violence continued in Karachi after the Sohrab Goth operation of December 1986, whereby government security forces bulldozed the homes of mostly Pashtun residents in an apparent cleanup of drugs.44 The Operation was followed by rumors alleging that it had been launched at the behest of the Mohajirs. Seen as a plan to remove Pashtuns from Karachi, the Pashtuns in a call to attack (that) was couched in highly emotive language provoking the pride and dignity of Pashtun manhood45 attacked Mohajir neighbourhoods. The riots were induced in part by the socioeconomic crises of state, including transport problems and lack of basic public services such as water and housing, lending credence to the argument that the demonstrations and unrest were consequences of direct or indirect government actions.46 Built-up frustration at the lack of socio-economic opportunities and the Mohajirs relative decline in power soon became politicized and it was in this context that the precursor to the MQM, the All Pakistan Mohajir Students Organization (APMSO) was formed. Created by Altaf Hussain and other students who felt victimized by the quota system in place at Sindh University, the party also represented the Mohajir students need to contend with a host of student organizations organized on a linguistic or ethnic bases, from which they felt excluded.47 The religious parties student wings, to whom the Mohajirs had initially shown allegiance, were denounced as Punjabi-dominated organizations, effectively dividing student political life on stark ethnic lines. In this way, the university represented a microcosm of Pakistani society and indicated to the Mohajirs the need to unite around an identity of their own. By 1986, Mohajirs share of senior jobs in federal bureaucracy had fallen to 18.3 percent from 33.5 percent in 1973, and to 14.3 percent of jobs in the Secretariat group from 20 percent in 1974.48 The partys Karadad-i-Maguasid, or Charter of Demands, demanded among other things, increased representation of the Mohajirs in the university and the administration, a change in the denition of domiciled in Sindh to refer to only those who had been living there for the last twenty years, the repatriation of Biharis to Pakistan, and nationalization of local bus services.49 The question of Biharis remained a source of much contention for many years, partly for humane reasons but also
49
Niloufer Siddiqui
on the basis of a politico-strategic recognition that moving the 250,000 Biharis into Karachi would increase the MQMs support base. In an essay written just a couple of years after the inception of the MQM, Farida Shaheed described the creation of the party in clear-cut terms: Sub-state nationalities have become so important that the multi-ethnic mohajirs have declared a nationality by the recently formed Mohajir Qaumi Mahaz (Refugee Peoples Front).50 Political Leanings From the very beginning, the MQM showed itself to be politically malleable. Its denition of Mohajirs was largely in terms of what Mohajirs are NOT rather than in terms of what they are. In his autobiography, Hussain denes Mohajirs as those who do not belong to any of the other ethnonationalities of Pakistan; in other words, that they are neither Punjabi, Sindhi, Balochi nor Pashtun.51 Altaf Hussain has even gone so far as to admit that the banner of Mohajir nationality was indeed a reaction to the slogan of the other four nationalities.52 While the party cannot be perceived as anti-state in the sense that it denounces Pakistani nationalism, there has nonetheless been some separatist talk, even mention of the creation of a Karachisubha or Urdu Desh.53 On 25 March 2007, a statement by Hussain on the MQM website warned the government that if provincial autonomy would not be given to the provinces the slogan of autonomy could turn into the demand for the right for self-determination.54 The extreme irony of this position (albeit more rhetoric than reality) is clear as Mohajir identity has historically been premised on a commitment to the nation of Pakistan and the Mohajirs own complaints against ethnic groups in Pakistan were on the grounds of their separatist tendencies. In a speech in Delhi in 2007, Altaf Hussain labeled the very creation of Pakistan a blunder, although he spent many subsequent months distancing himself from his comments. Hussains controversial rhetoric serves to emphasize the sometimes inconsistent and contradictory aims of the MQM, as well as the extent to which the party is itself continually developing and evolving its goals. This inconsistency is seen partly in the MQMs many political alliances. Because it was dened primarily as a party in opposition
50
to others, the MQM was able to capitalize on different ethnic groups insecurities by forming alliances of convenience. In 1988, it entered into a tenuous alliance with the PPP, at the time led by Benazir Bhutto, despite the Mohajirs resentment of Sindhis and the many years during which the two ethnic groups had stood opposed to one another. The alliance was couched in terms of countering a Punjabi-dominated centre and proved possible due to the dramatic success of the MQM immediately upon its creation, winning 13 seats in the National Assembly in 1988. This consistent electoral success has, in fact, been the primary reason that the larger parties have had to engage with the MQM; the partys seats have proved vital to helping the larger parties gain a parliamentary majority.55 The 1988 PPP-MQM alliance was short-lived, despite a 59-point Karachi Accord that was signed between the parties. It broke down in just a matter of months over the contentious issue of repatriating Biharis from Bangladesh and general MQM resentment at non-implementation of the agreement.56 This served to once again exacerbate tensions between the Mohajirs and Sindhis, which worsened when the MQM joined the Ittihad Jamhouri Ijtehad (IJI) headed by Nawaz Sharif. This alliance was majority Punjabi and seen by supporters of the government as antiSindhi.57 Tension between Mohajirs, on the one hand, and Punjabis and Pashtuns, on the other, however, worked to strain the alliance between the MQM and IJI.58 Thus, while ethnic tensions interfered with the functioning of political alliances, the political alliances themselves had little lasting impact on easing ethnic relations. Bitter conict and a power struggle continued in Karachi, with Samad arguing that a process of ethnic cleansing took place.59 Throughout this decade of democracy, the MQM made politically strategic partnerships, as the various governments at the centre struggled to control the increasing violent nature of politics and ethnic conict in Karachi.60 In 1992, in the infamous Operation Clean-Up, the military moved against the MQM, a decision taken by the army and prompted in part by increasing concern that the MQM was beginning to take control of the state machinery.61 The military used the MQMs separatist rhetoric as a justication for the operation and also unearthed 22 MQM torture cells.62 At this time, the MQM split into two parties, with the breakaway party attaching the term Haqiqi (meaning real) to their acronym. The
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Niloufer Siddiqui
ideological battle over the partys goals and objectives found its way on to the streets, making Karachi a turbulent and violent city for most of the 1990s.63 The army employed a strategy of divide-and-conquer by initially supporting the Haqiqi group and then arresting its leadership and militants. It hoped to rid the country of Altaf Hussains MQM, but instead worked to de-legitimize the Haqiqi faction in the eyes of the Mohajir supporters, who viewed it as a puppet of the government.64 MQM: Political Movement or Political Party? The internal division of the MQM centred partly upon Altaf Hussains decision to alter the partys outlook from one representing only Mohajirs to one which represented all of Pakistans poor and oppressed. This transformation has been partial at best; the MQMs actions have conicted starkly with its rhetoric and even today, it has been unable to move away from being seen primarily as a Mohajir party. Because the MQMs leadership and support, however, have both stemmed from the lower-middle and working class segments of the Mohajir population, it has allowed for a smoother transition than may otherwise have been possible. Because it was the middle and lowermiddle class Mohajirs who faced the brunt of the quota system, while the upper and upper-middle classes continued to fare well, unemployed Mohajir youth and students historically held the central executive and leadership position in the party.65 A signicant source of the MQMs support stems from these class origins, which are in sharp contrast to the feudal leadership which has historically dominated rural Sindh. Even the national mainstream parties, such as the PML and the PPP, have at their helm well-off, prominent families. Altaf Hussains lower-middle class background contrasts sharply with the privileged position of these leaders and his personal history sheds light on the creation of the MQM. According to his autobiography available on the ofcial MQM website, Altaf Hussain in his mid twenties not only saw and felt the unfairness of the admission policies in schools but also in the broader spectrum he saw and felt the unfair feudal framework consisting of only 2 percent of the elites who were busy in writing the fate of 98 percent of the middle and lower middle
52
classes of the country. In general, a son of an immigrant started a struggle of awareness against the unfair feudal system of Pakistan.66 Hussains complete dominance of the MQM since its inception, despite being in self-imposed exile in England since 1992, effectively represents the notion of cult of personality. Referred to as the Quaid, a term which means founder but is usually used in association with Muhammed Ali Jinnah, Altaf Hussain is often seen as the spiritual leader and is also referred to as pir. Videos of him speaking demonstrate the extent to which his oratorical skills and personal charisma are central to the partys support. Richards argues, The party demonstrates a curious combination of nationalist, secular, ethnic-chauvinist, and socialist tendencies, all led by an unelected spiritual gurehead more Pir than President with whom the party is inextricably associated. A party with almost fascist tendencies, the MQMs training pamphlet requires from its supporters blind faith in the partys leadership and elimination of individuality.67 A strong belief in the partys ideological base is also required, and in the case of the MQM, this ideological base is tied strongly to the opinions of Altaf Hussan. A common slogan at the time of the 1988 elections, loosely translated from Urdu, demonstrates this: Any person that betrays the Quaid deserves death by execution. The MQMs 1998 agenda purports to outline its main goals, but is couched in vague jargon Ideologically speaking, MQM is not a proponent of Socialism, Communism or unbridled Capitalism. It only believes in Realism and Practicalism which prevents it from being too closely aligned with any specic ideology. The 1998 agenda does not associate the MQM with representing the interests of any specic ethnic group, nor does it propound a unitary Pakistani identity. Rather, it states: MQM wholeheartedly accepts the cultural, linguistic, regional, racial and religious identities of all citizens of the state. To deny such distinctions and identications is tantamount to denying reality. . . It is therefore imperative to recognise and accept the constitutional rights of Sindhi, Punjabi, Pakhtoon, Mohajir, Baloch, Saraiki, Brohi, Makrani and all other nationalities, fraternities, lingual,
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Niloufer Siddiqui
cultural and religious units to provide them justice so that the fervour of national integration could grow and kinship develop.68 The MQMs website makes its transformation as a party representing the poor clear: To further the programme of national development and a nation-wide campaign against feudal domination, Mohajir Quami Movement was formally transformed into Muttahida Quami Movement on 26 July 1997. In an interview, Altaf Hussain outlined his partys goals as such: Our immediate political objective is to change the corrupt medieval feudal-military political system of Pakistan. We are, therefore, the only genuine party of the lower and middle classes, totally devoid of feudal lords and army Generals.69 However, the party has lacked any programs or policies aimed at the direct alleviation of poverty, land reform, or change in the social order.70 In addition, when politically expedient, the party maintains ethnic divisions and rhetoric, even if this requires pitting the poor of two ethnic groups against one another. A determining factor in changing the name and ideology of the organization was a simple recognition of political reality. Having become the third largest party in the country and having already achieved a loyal and substantial Mohajir support base, the MQM saw an opportunity to expand its inuence in other provinces. In addition, its reputation as an anti-state organization had landed it in trouble in the past and it used this opportunity to tone down its divisive rhetoric.71 Yet, much of the speculation regarding the change in nomenclature, and ostensibly ideology, is difcult to conjecture partly because of the revisionist history that the party has engaged in. By revising the very discourse surrounding its creation, the MQM has effectively shed any initial linkages to its exclusive Mohajir ethnicity, allowing that to take the back-seat. In an open letter written by Altaf Hussain about the events of 12 May 2007 and posted on the MQM website, for instance, the MQMs origins are described as such: Following the Constitution and the law of the land, in the history of the country, poor, middleclass and educated people broken away from the traditional and hereditary politics to establish the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM). The formation of the MQM by the poor and middleclass people was not liked by the Establishment
54
and feudalistic hereditary politicians and the parties on the payroll of the Establishment and all such political and religious parties formed an alliance against the MQM. In fact, this letter contains no mention of the Mohajir community at all, even in discussion of how the party came into being. Hussain similarly rallied other ethnic groups in a speech made on 15 April 2008. He appealed to the Sindhi, Baloch, Punjabi, Pakhtoon, Seraiki, Hazarewal, Kashmiri and minority workers of the MQM to fully play their role and maintaining the peace and law and order, refrain from emotional reactions, observe and demonstrate peace and patience.72 The MQM is still today, however, referred to in common parlance as the Mohajir party. Although the MQM is now a central player in Pakistans political system, it continues to function as much outside the system as a pressure group as within it. It has resorted to underhanded measures including street tactics. These have included targeting the press, such as burning thousands of copies of the widely-circulated Dawn newspaper and attacking the houses of journalists, as well as torturing those Mohajirs who hadnt pledged allegiance to the MQM. The MQM today propounds an anti-Islamist stance, and is quick to portray itself along liberal and anti-terrorist lines.73 That its main constituents are people who once provided support to religious political parties such as the Jamaat-iIslaami indicates the tenuous nature of issue-based politics in Pakistan. Hussain had justied the MQMs retention of pressure group methods by distinguishing the MQM from other political parties, arguing that it has a higher purpose: Explaining the difference between a Movement and a Political Party, Mr Hussain said that sometimes a Movement is compelled to participate in politics, however, its aim remains the completion of its mission, whereas, the purpose of a political party is to get into power.74 Constantly changing roles? A look to the future Mohammed Waseem has termed the Mohajir identity an ethnicityin-making and other scholars have similarly hesitated in classifying the Mohajir question in Pakistan as a straightforward ethnic dispute. This reects, to an extent, the articial nature of the Mohajir ethnic
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construction which lacks a singular origin and a common language. Yet, more signicant is the manner in which ethnicity becomes a symbol of identity when threatened and how, in the face of state and federal failure to provide for basic socioeconomic needs, a political party based on ethnic mobilization can gain ground. With the advent of a new ruling coalition government in Pakistan following the 18 February 2008 elections, the political scene in Pakistan remains far from certain. Questions regarding the future of President Musharraf and the reinstatement of the judiciary, continue to be, at the time of writing, unresolved issues. On 29 April the PPP and MQM nally reached a power-sharing agreement for the Sindh Cabinet, whereby the MQM would be given 13 ministries.75 The MQM has shown that, despite its political ideology, it is willing to form alliances and engage in coalitions with various power holders in the country. These coalitions have allowed the MQM to come to power at the provincial level and have helped establish it as the third largest party in Pakistan, although it is often regarded with suspicion by other parties and groups. No discussion of Pakistans political future is complete without a serious reckoning of Hussains party. However, what the MQMs precise ideology is has been subject to change over the years, and is likely to continue evolving with the political climate in Pakistan. Table I
Patterns of Migration Number of Regugees 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Pakistan East Bengal W. Pakistan Punjab Sindh (ex K) Karachi 7.22 million 0.7 million 6.52 million 5.3 million 0.55 million 0.61 million Share of Refugees 100 9.67% 90.3% 73% 7.6% 8.53% Ratio in Total Population 10% 1.7% 20% 25.6% 11.7% 55%
Source: Census of Pakistan 1951, Vol. I, Table 19-A, Vol. 6, p. 65.
Taken from: Mohammad Waseem, Ethnic Conict in Pakistan: The
56
Case of MQM. The Pakistan Development Review. 35:4 Part II (Winter 1996). Table II Population by mother tongue
(In percent) Administrative Unit Pakistan Rural Urban NWFP Rural Urban FATA Rural Urban Punjab Rural Urban Sindh Rural Urban Balochistan Rural Urban Islamabad Rural Urban Urdu 7.57 1.84 20.22 0.78 0.24 3.47 0.18 0.18 0.18 4.51 1.99 10.05 21.05 1.62 41.48 0.97 0.21 1.42 10.11 2.33 14.18 Punjabi Sindhi 44.15 42.51 47.56 0.97 0.24 4.58 0.23 0.18 1.85 75.23 73.63 78.75 6.99 2.68 11.52 2.52 0.43 9.16 71.66 83.74 65.36 14.1 16.46 9.20 0.04 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.01 * 0.13 0.15 0.09 59.73 92.02 25.79 5.58 5.27 6.57 0.56 0.08 0.81 Pushto Balochi Saraiki Others 15.42 18.06 9.94 73.9 73.98 73.55 99.1 99.15 97.0 1.16 0.87 1.81 4.19 0.61 7.96 29.64 32.16 21.61 9.52 7.62 10.51 3.57 3.99 2.69 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 * 0.66 0.90 0.14 2.11 1.50 2.74 54.76 57.55 45.84 0.06 0.02 0.08 10.53 12.97 5.46 3.86 3.99 3.15 17.36 21.44 8.38 1.0 0.32 1.71 2.42 1.87 4.16 1.11 0.3 1.53 4.66 4.53 4.93 20.43 21.52 15.11 0.45 0.43 0.96 0.95 1.02 0.78 4.93 1.25 8.80 4.11 2.51 9.24 6.98 5.91 7.53
* Refers to a very small proportion Source: Population Census Organization, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Statistics, Government of Pakistan. Available on the World Wide Web at URL:
http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/statistics/statistics.html
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Table III Results of National Elections in Pakistan and Provincial Elections in Sindh
Year 1988 1990 1993 1997 2002 2008 National Elections: Number of Seats 13 15 Boycott 12 17 25 28 28 42 51 Provincial Elections: Number of Seats 31
References:
1 2 3 4 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Carnage in Karachi: A City Under Siege 12/05/07. Available on the World Wide Web at URL: http://www.hrcp-web.org/pub_ home12-05-07.cfm South Asia Forum for Human Rights, The Mohajirs of Pakistan. Available on the World Wide Web at URL: http://www.safhr.org/refugee_watch14_5.htm This paper, too, will use the term Mohajir (alternative spellings include Muhajir) to refer to the specic ethnonationalist subset of people to which the MQM appeals. The situation diered between the various migrants for a number of reasons. The Mohajirs who migrated to Sindh diered substantially from the indigenous Sindhis in terms of linguistic, cultural and historical background. On the other hand, Muslims migrating from East Punjab found more cultural similarities with their counterparts in West Punjab. Rehman, J. Self-Determination, State-Building and the Muhajirs: An International Legal Perspective of the Role of Indian Muslim Refugees in the Constitutional Development of Pakistan. Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 3, Issue 2, 1994. Rashid, Abbas and Farida Shaheed. Pakistan: Ethno-Politics and Contending Elites. Discussion Paper No. 45, June 1993. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Available on the World Wide Web at URL: http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/ website/document.nsf/240da49ca467a53f80256b4f005ef245/49e58dad1f9390b6802 56b6500565470/$FILE/dp45.pdf Jarelot, Christophe. A History of Pakistan and its Origins. Wimbeldon Publishing Company, London, 2002. Page 34. See Table I. Mohammad Waseem, Ethnic Conict in Pakistan: The Case of MQM. The Pakistan Development Review. 35:4 Part II (Winter 1996). Page 620. Jarelot. A History of Pakistan and its Origins. Ibid. Page 34. The rural-urban linguistic divide in Sindh is also clear: while 92percent of the people in rural Sindh speak Sindhi and only 1.62percent speak Urdu, in urban Sindh, there are 42percent Urdu-speakers as opposed to 25percent Sindhi-speakers. See Table II. Popu-
6 7 8 9
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lation Census Organization, Ministry of Economic Aairs and Statistics, Government of Pakistan. Available on the World Wide Web at URL: http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/ pco/statistics/statistics.html Samad, Yunas. In and Out of Power but not Down and Out: Mohajir Identity Politics. In Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation. Ed. Christopher Jarelot. Zed Books, London, UK. 2002. Page 63. Samad distinguished between the two by arguing, One was about the construction of a community, which in Andersons terms was about imagination, and the other was the instrumental character of political organizations representing Mohajirs interests. . Ibid. Page 65. Haq, Farhat. Rise of the MQM in Pakistan: Politics of Ethnic Mobilization. Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 11, Nov. 1995. Page 991. Richards, Julien. An Uncertain Voice: the MQM in Pakistans Political Scene. Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU), Brief Number 11. 26th April, 2007. Page 4. Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1970. Cohen, Stephen. The Idea of Pakistan. Brookings Institution Press, USA. September 2004. Oldenburg, Philip. A Place Insuciently Imagined: Language, Belief and the Pakistan Crisis of 1971. The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 44, No. 4, August 1985. Waseem, Ethnic Conict in Pakistan: The Case of MQM. Ibid. Ibid. Page 621. Samad, In and Out of Power but not Down and Out: Mohajir Identity Politics. Ibid. Page 66. Shaheed, Farida. The Pashtun-Muhajir Conicts, 1985-6: A National Perspective. In Mirrors of Violence: Communities, Riots and Survivors in South Asia. Ed. Veena Das. Oxford University Press, Delhi. 1990. Maniruzzaman, Talukder. Group Interests in Pakistan Politics, 1947 1958, Pacic Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 1/2, (Spring - Summer, 1966), pp. 83-98. Haq, Rise of the MQM in Pakistan: Politics of Ethnic Mobilization. Ibid. Page 991. Jarelot, Christophe. Nationalism without a Nation: Pakistan Searching for its Identity. In Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation?. Ed. Christophe Jarelot. Zed Books, London, UK. 2002. Page 23. Samad, In and Out of Power but not Down and Out: Mohajir Identity Politics. Ibid. Page 67. Ibid. Jarelot, Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation. Ibid. Page 23. Rashid, Abbas and Farida Shaheed. Pakistan: Ethno-Politics and Contending Elites. Discussion Paper No. 45, June 1993. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Available on the World Wide Web at URL: http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/ website/document.nsf/240da49ca467a53f80256b4f005ef245/49e58dad1f9390b6802 56b6500565470/$FILE/dp45.pdf Waseem. Ethnic Conict in Pakistan: The Case of MQM. Ibid. Haq, Rise of the MQM in Pakistan: Politics of Ethnic Mobilization. Ibid. Page 992. Ibid. Ibid. Richards, An Uncertain Voice: the MQM in Pakistans Political Scene. Ibid. Ibid. Hussain, Altaf. Life and Death of Mohajirs is Associated with Sindh Province. January 6, 2006. Available on the World Wide Web at URL: http://www.mqm.org/EnglishNews/Jan-2006/news060107.htm
10 11
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
28 29 30 31 32 33 34
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35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Rehman, J. Self-Determination, State-Building and the Muhajirs: An International Legal Perspective of the Role of Indian Muslim Refugees in the Constitutional Development of Pakistan. Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 3, Issue 2, 1994. Haq, Rise of MQM in Pakistan. Ibid. Page 993. Rashid and Shaheed. Pakistan: Ethno-Politics and Contending Elites. Ibid. Page 28. Waseem, Ethnic Conict in Pakistan: The Case of MQM. Ibid. Page 624. Ibid. Ibid. Richards, An Uncertain Voice: the MQM in Pakistans Political Scene. Ibid. Page 7. Hussain, Akmal. The Karachi Riots of December 1986: Crisis of State and Civil Society in Pakistan. In Mirrors of Violence: Communities, Riots and Survivors in South Asia. Ed. Veena Das. Oxford University Press, Delhi. 1990. Page 189. Haq, Rise of the MQM in Pakistan. Ibid. Page 990. Hussain, The Karachi Riots of December 1986: Crisis of State and Civil Society in Pakistan. Ibid. Page 187. Ibid. Haq, Rise of the MQM in Pakistan. Ibid. Waseem, Ethnic Conict in Pakistan: The Case of MQM. Ibid. Page 625. Ibid. Page 621. Rehman, J., Self-Determination, State-Building and the Muhajirs: An International Legal Perspective of the Role of Indian Muslim Refugees in the Constitutional Development of Pakistan. Ibid. Shaheed, Farida. The Pashtun-Muhajir Conicts, 1985-6: A National Perspective. Page 200. Waseem, Ethnic Conict in Pakistan: The Case of MQM. Ibid. Page 625. Ibid. Ibid. Autonomy denial can lead to demand for self-determination: Altaf. THE NATION. MARCH 25, 2007. AVAILABLE ON THE WORLD WIDE WEB AT URL: http://www.nation.com. pk/daily/mar-2007/25/index7.php See Table III. Haq, Rise of the MQM in Pakistan. Ibid. Page 999. Ibid. Ibid. Samad, In and Out of Power but not Down and Out. Ibid. Page 69. In 1997, for instance, the MQM entered an alliance with the PML(N), both at the federal level and in the Sindh province. The alliance was achieved after negotiations on continuing MQM concerns, such as the repatriation of Biharis and the quotas for Mohajirs. Samad, In and Out of Power But not Down and Out. Ibid. Page 75. Waseem, Ethnic Conict in Pakistan: The Case of MQM. Ibid. Page 627. Ibid. Why Karachi is so Violent. BBC NEWS. OCTOBER 7, 1999. AVAILABLE ON THE WORLD WIDE WEB AT URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/188644.stm Haq, Rise of the MQM in Pakistan. Ibid. Page 1001. Rashid and Shaheed. Pakistan: Ethno-Politics and Contending Elites. Ibid. Page 27. Altaf Hussain: Founder and Leader of MQM. Available on the World Wide Web at URL: http://mqmhydzone.org/Biography.htm Haq, Rise of MQM in Pakistan. Ibid. Page 1002. What Does MQM Want? MQM Manifesto. 1998. Available on the World Wide Web at URL: http://www.mqm.org/manifesto/manifesto-1998-mqmwant.htm
61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
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69 70 71 72 73 Ali, Dean. Altaf Hussain Visits India: His Keynote Speech. Chowk. November 8, 2004. Available on the World Wide Web at URL: http://www.chowk.com/articles/8314 Waseem, Ethnic Conict in Pakistan: The Case of MQM. Ibid. Page 625. Samad, In and Out of Power but not Down and Out. Ibid. Page 76. Hussain, Altaf. MQM Does Not Want Confrontation with any Party. April 15, 2008. Available on the World Wide Web at URL: http://www.mqm.com/ Others outside of the party, however, continue to deem the MQM terrorist in nature. This was evidenced in the recent legal action led by Imran Khan, leader of Tehreek-eInsaf, against Altaf Hussein, holding the MQM Chief responsible for violence in Karachi and referring to it as both fascist and terrorist. Imran Khan Plans UK Legal Action. BBC News, June 2, 2007. Available on the World Wide Web at URL: http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6714551.stm Hussain, Altaf. Life and Death of Mohajirs is Associated with Sindh Province. January 6, 2006. Available on the World Wide Web at URL: http://www.mqm.org/EnglishNews/Jan-2006/news060107.htm Ul-Ashfaque, Azfar. MQM to Join Sindh Cabinet. DAWN NEWSPAPER, APRIL 30, 2008. AVAILABLE ON THE WORLD WIDE WEB AT URL: http://www.dawn.com/2008/04/30/top15. htm
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TRANSFORMATION OF AL QAEDA
Khaled Ahmed*
Abstract.
(The paper traces the origins of Al Qaeda, details the thinking of its founders like the Palestinian Abdullah Azzam and the distant jurists in history like Ibn Taymiyya whose writings jibed with the jihad planned by Saudi-born Osama bin Laden and his deputy Egyptian Aiman Al Zawahiri. It talks about the early rifts that appeared in the organisation and the rise of the Jordanian al Zarqawi who strengthened the sectarian trend in Al Qaeda. The sectarian trend was acquired after the arrival of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the spread of its inuence inside Pakistan. It continued to patronise the jihadi outts devoted to sectarian violence without evolving a sectarian philosophy of its own. Finally al Zarqawi completed the process in Iraq and forced Al Qaeda to embrace a sectarian worldview. Author). In 2006, Al Qaeda in Iraq was killing the Shia. This was a new phase in the growth of the organisation. It came into being vaguely as a promoter of jihad against the Soviet Union, then against the United States. Its intellectual origins were confused between a sense of the global and the regional. It set off on the global level but was soon diverted to focus on the region of Islam. Its internal debate pointed it to seeking revenge against Muslim states collaborating with the United States and Israel. Thus a dynamic of change was built into its growth. It moved towards a consolidation of its identity along with the condition of change determined by the nature of the intellectual leadership offered by its charismatic leader Osama bin Laden. It is therefore wrong to be surprised that Al Qaeda is killing Muslims in Iraq. The rst deviation took place when Al Qaeda attempted to kill
* Khaled Ahmed is Consulting Editor of the Friday Times, Lahore.
Transformation of Al Qaeda
the Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and bombed the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad in 1995. But this was a Sunni-killing-Sunni trend and was justied by the salast-jahiliyya trend of thinking rampant in the Islamist radicals of Egypt. Earlier, in the 1980s, Al Qaeda had allowed, or supported, its Pakistani ancillary jihadi militias to kill the Shia of Pakistan. These killings were underpinned by fatwas issued by Pakistans Deobandi seminaries and the content of these fatwas relied heavily on the salast objection to the Shia faith by Ibn Taymiyya. Al Qaeda supported the Taliban as they destroyed the Buddhas of Bamiyan and killed the Shia Hazaras of Central Afghanistan. But when Al Qaeda killed the Sunnis of Egypt it was not yet called sectarian. It is only in Iraq that it had to accept the intellectually demeaning (among Muslims) epithet of sectarian. The rst instinct behind what later became Al Qaeda was the concept of jihad, ghting in the way of Allah. It was of a piece with the age-old motivational force of Islam as a venture, as explained by Marshall G.S. Hodgson, that is, Islam as a venture of ultimate domination1. Even the moderate Muslim clerical leaders seek domination of Islam as a religious duty albeit with peaceful means, through invitation (dawa). Sheikh Qardawi, the Qatar-based middle-of-the-road (wassatiyya) interpreter of Islam said in Ohio in 1995: We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America, not through the sword but through dawa.2 The founding genius of Abdullah Azzam In Afghanistan the Arabs changed the often peaceful efforts at conversion (dawa) to war (jihad). The man who led the new movement was Abdullah Azzam (1941-1989), a Palestinian Arab who travelled to Damascus University in Syria for higher studies and joined the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) there. He then went to Al Azhar University in Egypt and completed his PhD there in Islamic jurisprudence (qh) in 1973. He met the family of Syed Qutb, the Ikhwan leader who gave a new meaning to the concept of jahiliyya (Age of pre-Islamic Darkness) after reading it in the works of Pakistans Maulana Maududi, and by bringing it closer to the way it was earlier understood by Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab of Saudi Arabia.3 It is from Syed Qutb that Islamic
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Khaled Ahmed
radicals learned to apply it to the Muslims who actually professed to be Muslims but did not follow the true sharia. Abdullah Azzam thereafter taught at the University of Jordan in Amman but was dismissed from his job because of his involvement with the Brotherhood. After that he moved to Saudi Arabia and joined the brother of Syed Qutb, Muhammad Qutb, on the faculty of King Abdul Aziz University. It was here that Qutb and Azzam met and inuenced their pupil, Osama bin Laden. Azzam wrote his tract Defending the Land of the Muslims is Each Mans Most Important Duty and acknowledged the inuence of Hanbali-Wahhabi thinkers on his work, especially Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz, the chief mufti of Saudi Arabia, who had declared jihad obligatory on all Muslims instead of the Islamic state while addressing the mosques of Jeddah and Riyadh. Azzam also quoted Ibn Taymiyya: If the enemy enters a Muslim land, there is no doubt that it is obligatory for the closest and then the next closest to repel him, because the Muslims lands are like one land. It is obligatory to march to the territory even without permission of parents or creditors.4 It was under Azzams inspiration and a direct reference to Ibn Taymiyya that Osama bin Laden would challenge the stationing of American troops in Saudi Arabia in 1991. But by planning to strike at the enemy at his home base, he broke with Azzam, as will be seen below. The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union presented Azzam with a situation where he was able to apply his theory of jihad. After he left his position in Jeddah, the Muslim World League (Rabita Alam Islami) appointed him to the International Islamic University in Islamabad, Pakistan, in 1984, where he taught jurisprudence and his theory of jihad while handling the affairs of the Muslim World League, already a major source of funding of scholars engaged in anti-Iran and anti-Shia sectarian writings. The World Muslim League ofce was later put in the charge of the Jordanian Muhammad Abdur Rehman Khalifa who ended up marrying one of Osama bin Ladens daughters. In time the League ofce in Peshawar became a great feeding mechanism for what became Al Qaeda. Azzam also ran the Muslim Brotherhood ofce in Peshawar. Another important person who joined him in Peshawar in 1985 was Sheikh Omar Abdur Rehman the blind Egyptian cleric who would be
64
involved in the rst terrorist action against the World Trade Center by half-Kuwaiti-half-Pakistani Ramzi Yousef whose trips to Islamabad also included staying in the hostels of the International Islamic University. Rehman was apprehended in the US and Ramzi Yousef was handed over to the United States by Pakistan. Azzam opened his Maktab Khadamat al-Mujahideen (Afghan Service Bureau Front or MAK) in Peshawar and was apparently working in tandem with Pakistani authorities. Azzam worked closely with Pakistans intelligence agency the ISI while Osama bin Laden served as his deputy. They were helped signicantly by Saudi Arabia and its numerous private donors while Muslim Brotherhood remained an important background inuence. The ISI was both the CIAs conduit for arms transfer and the principal trainer of the Afghan and foreign mujahideen. The CIA provided sophisticated weaponry including ground-to-air Stinger missiles and satellite imagery of Soviet troop deployments.5 Azzam has been called the founder of Hamas too, but when he was killed in 1989 he was more convinced of ghting the global jihad than the more restricted and less effective jihad in Palestine or in Egypt. His thinking went into the founding principles of Al Qaeda when it came into being soon after his death. Another person arrived from Egypt to become close to Osama and change the direction of the new-born organisation. Aiman Al Zawahiri takes over Aiman Al Zawahiri came from a privileged family of doctors in Egypt aligned with an equally privileged family of scholars and lawyers on his mothers side, the Azzams. Himself a qualied physician, (he was to acquire a PhD in surgery [sic!] later from a Pakistani medical university while living in Peshawar6) he was inspired by the Quranic exegesis of Syed Qutb and was able to radicalise its message even further by applying violence to end the jahiliyya or Muslim societies not living under sharia. Some think that Al Zawahiri was violent right from the start and that he became a hardliner after he moved to Afghanistan. The watershed event was the assassination of President Sadat in 1981 by Gamaa Islamiyya and an alliance of extremist outts called Islamic Jihad. Hundreds of activists of both were imprisoned. Al Zawahiri was
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tortured till he betrayed his closest recruit in the Egyptian army, Al Qamari, an act that would shape his later career through contrition. The trauma bestowed on him the unbending quality that he in turn inculcated into Al Qaeda. Earlier when Gamaa Islamiyya had chosen Sheikh Omar Abdul Rehman as its leader, Al Zawahiri had protested saying the sharia did not allow a blind man to be the imam of an organisation. This was an early sign of toughness from an otherwise soft-spoken and self-effacing Al Zawahiri, an attribute that continued to arouse deep loyalty among the warriors who followed him. Al Zawahiri left Egypt because it was too free a society for his ideas to spread without being critiqued in its free press. He rst went to Saudi Arabia and joined the Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah to be with two intellectual giants of jihad, Muhammad Qutb - the brother of Syed Qutb - and Abdullah Azzam, the inspiring Palestinian thinker proled above. Al Zawahiri had already visited Afghanistan after the war there in 1980 and had worked at Seyyeda Zainab Hospital in Peshawar run by the Ikhwan. He was imprisoned for the assassination of Sadat in 1981 on his return, for three years; he came back to Afghanistan in 1986. In Afghanistan (with a free run of Pakistan too) he had to marry his plan of terrorism against Egypt with Osama bin Ladens money and his wider confrontation. (Al Zawahiri called America the far enemy; but the near enemy, Egypt, had to be attacked rst.) Abdullah Azzam however was in charge of operations in Peshawar. Al Zawahiri possibly had Azzam and his two sons murdered in Peshawar in 1989 to get the full attention of Osama bin Laden and take over the burgeoning organisation. A Gamaa member was seen having an argument with Al Zawahiri on the streets of Peshawar in the course of which Al Zawahiri accused Azzam of being an agent because he had good relations with Gamaa. He attended the funeral of the imam of the mujahideen the next day! Al Zawahiri attacked not only Gamaa for going quiescent after the 1997 massacre at Luxor, he had earlier attacked the Ikhwan in his book The Bitter Harvest for giving up violence. He held to his view that Egypt
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had to be attacked because that was where the West had to be fought rst. Located in Peshawar, he repeatedly tried to assassinate Egyptian ministers and civil servants suspected of persecuting the Islamists. His recruits narrowly missed two government gures in Cairo but killed one informer. He had accused the Egyptian Islamists of randomness but they too accused him of randomness when he tried to destroy the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad in 1995, succeeding only partially. Pursuing Osama bin Ladens agenda against the Americans after the setting up of Al Qaeda, he tried to blow up the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-usSalam in Africa in 1998, again, with only partial success. However, he was able to inict more extensive damage in Yemen and Al Khobar. Al Zawahiris redirection of Islamism Al Zawahiri and bin Laden had to leave Afghanistan in 1994 for Sudan because of the inghting among the Afghan mujahideen during the presidency of Rabbani, and returned in 1996 after striking a deal with Mulla Umar after the latters Taliban had established almost total control over Afghanistan. Pakistan was on the side of the Taliban and was weaned from it only after 9/11. It had also expressed its inability to the Clinton administration to make the Taliban expel Osama bin Laden. Al Zawahiri accepted the tough Islam of the Taliban even though it would not sit well with the Islamists back in Egypt who were liberal with regard to women. The Taliban accepted a Wahhabised radicalisation of their projection of ideological power because they got bin Ladens money in addition to the assistance they got from Islamabad. Pakistan was greatly inuenced by this Taliban-Al Qaeda fundamentalism in its own ISI-driven internal transformation into an Islamised society. Some Gamaa members of Egypt accuse Al Qaeda and especially Al Zawahiri of causing great harm to the Islamist cause. In violation of past practice, Al Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden would not own up to acts of terrorism till the 9/11 incident, when both came on TV to only hint at having done it. Al Zawahiri was accused of having miscalculated the American response after 9/11. He thought it would be like the attacks that came in the wake of the African cases, that is, bombing of Afghanistan. But a full-edged invasion of Afghanistan authorised through a Security
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Council resolution under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter had damaged the Islamist cause beyond repair. Kepel is of the opinion that Al Zawahiri began to monopolise Osama after the Arabs settled down in Peshawar with their wives and children and gradually managed to replace Azzam as Osamas spiritual mentor. He turned Osama off Azzam and his Ikhwan background by writing his anti-Brotherhood tract Sixty Years of the Muslim Brothers Bitter Harvest.7 He was not very effective when he recommended an anti-American course of action simply because the Arabs were being supplied weapons by the CIA, but later, as the Soviets prepared to leave, and the Americans looked like losing interest in Afghanistan, his argument tended to prevail. Kepel says that in this period there was a lot of violence among the Arabs and Azzam was assassinated. Bergen adds that after Azzam was gone, Arabs, inspired by Azzam originally agreed to turn the jihad against the United States, as happened in the case of Muhammad Odeh, a Jordanian citizen of Palestinian descent studying in the Philippines in the late 1980s and was inspired by a video message from Azzam. In 1998, he played a key role in the bombing of the American embassy in Kenya.8 Bergen also mentions the changing orientation of Osama because of his closeness with the Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar who was host to the Egyptian Gamaa leader Omar Abdur Rehman in Peshawar in 1985. By 2004, 25,000 Arabs had found their way to the training camps of jihad with Saudi airlines giving 75 percent discount on air travel to and from Pakistan. Gunaratna is more precise: The broad outlines of what would become Al Qaeda were formulated by Azzam in 1987 and 1988, its founding charter being completed by him in that period. He envisaged it as being an organisation that would channel the energies of the mujahideen into ghting on behalf of oppressed Muslims worldwide, an Islamic rapid reaction force ready to spring to the defence of their fellow believers at short notice. Toward the end of the anti-Soviet Afghan campaign, Osamas relationship with Azzam deteriorated, and in late 1988 and 1989, they disagreed over several issues. One of these concerned the Al Masada mujahideen training camp on the Afghan-Pakistan border. In early 1989 Osama
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asked Azzam whether it could be turned over to Al Qaeda in order to become its principal base. Azzam refused, notwithstanding Osamas continued entreaties.9 Al Zawahiris near enemy and the death of Azzam The truth is that Osama was persuaded by Zawahiris argument in favour of al adou al qareeb (enemy who is nearby) in opposition to Azzams global vision of jihad which was described to Osama as al adou al baeed (enemy who is far away). This was in effect the beginning of the narrowing of the vision of Al Qaeda. Once this strategy was adopted the jihadists or mujahideen were permitted to vent their own local and regional anger, which nally came to focus on the Shia. The Arabs at rst stayed aloof from the passions that swayed the Pakistani mujahideen whom Osama trained in his camps. The jihad that was fought against the Soviets was spearheaded by the ISI and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, neither of whom was brought up on sectarian indoctrination. But starting 1985-86, the Saudis had begun their anti-Iran campaign among the seminaries in Pakistan, mainly among the Deobandi-Ahle Hadith ones. After that, starting with the Taliban and the return to Afghanistan of Al Qaeda from Sudan, the Arabs saw a changed battlefront. The Saudis had eliminated the Iran-based Shia mujahideen from the Afghan government in exile established in Peshawar in 1989 and the ISI was ghting its own war against Iran. According to Barnett Rubin, in 1989, the Afghan mujahideen government-in-exile came into being in Peshawar after the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan. At the behest of Saudi Arabia, the exiled Shia mujahideen of Iran were not included in this government. The Saudis paid over 26 million dollars a week to the 519-member session of the Mujahideen shura (council) as a bribe for it. Each member of the shura received 25,000 dollars for the deal which was facilitated, according to Rubin, by the ISI chief General Hamid Gul.10 The Taliban were linked to the Pakistani mujahideen through their Deobandi faith mostly absorbed from the seminaries in the NWFP and the Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Fawaz A Gerges, based on his extremely informative interviews among the jihadists, gives a more intimate account of how Azzams vision was superseded within Al Qaeda:
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Azzams followers accuse Zawahiri of precipitating the nal divorce between bin Laden and Azzam by spreading rumours that Azzam was an American spy. Osama Rushdi, a leader of the Egyptian Islamic Group who knew bin Laden, Azzam, and Zawahiri, blames Zawahiri for Azzams murder. Abdullah Anas, Azzams son-in-law and a senior jihadist who fought in Afghanistan along his side, recalled that Azzam had complained bitterly to him about the backbiting troublemakers, Zawahiri in particular, who spoke against the mujahideen. In his memoirs Anas reported that Azzam would say, They have only one point, to create tna (sedition) between and these volunteers.11 Azzam was a non-terrorist internationalist. His concept of jihad did not include the killing of innocent citizens as collateral damage. With the removal of Azzam, Al Qaeda moved away from a defensive jihad against an invading Soviet Union and embraced terrorism as its methodology. Later, under the inuence of Zarqawi, it would move from the empirical to the conceptual by condemning democracy and justify the killing of the Shia in Iraq because they had embraced democracy. Gunaratna gives us yet another insight: Though Azzam was the ideological father of Al Qaeda, bin Laden gradually assumed leadership of the group. Toward the end of the antiSoviet Afghan campaign, however, bin Ladens relationship with Azzam deteriorated. The dispute over Azzams support for Ahmad Shah Massoud, who later became the leader of the Northern Alliance, caused tension. Bin Laden preferred Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, former Prime Minister and leader of the Islamic Party (Hizb-i-Islami), who was both anti-communist and anti-western. Furthermore, together with the Egyptian members of Al Qaeda, bin Laden wished to support terrorist action against Egypt and other Muslim secular regimes. Having lived in Egypt, Azzam knew the price of such actions and opposed it vehemently. Azzam and bin Laden went their separate ways. Later, Azzam was assassinated by the Egyptian members of Al Qaeda in Peshawar, Pakistan. After the Afghan victory, bin Laden was lionised in the eyes of those who fought with him in the war as a brave warrior and seless Muslim ruler.12 Through the slightly varying testimony of authors who watched Al Qaeda in that period one can draw the conclusion that Azzam was killed because of an
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internal organisational dispute, in which Al Zawahiri and Osama were able to join together to isolate him. There is also a general consensus that he was killed by members of Al Qaeda who accepted Al Zawahiris leadership. Al Qaeda allows Pakistani sectarianism At the best of times, Pakistans close relations with the Taliban did not result in the latters acceptance of Pakistans demand that sectarian killers belonging to Sipah Sahaba, Lashkar Jhangvi and Harkat Jihad Islami, who routinely escaped into Afghanistan after committing collective murders in Pakistan, be caught and surrendered to it. The Taliban themselves could not avoid a sectarian slant to their Sunni caliphate. They were not able to co-opt the Hazara Shia of Central Afghanistan in their drive to encircle and destroy the Tajik-Sunni warlord Ahmad Shah Massoud. In fact, the Taliban prejudice was quite deep-rooted and was responsible for the killing of many Hazaras who had ed into Pakistan. The siege of Bamiyan in 2001 killed thousands of Hazaras through starvation and sheer slaughter, in revenge for the 1998 massacre of the Taliban by the Hazaras when the Taliban army tried to conquer the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif and ran up against an alliance of non-Pushtun forces. The massacres were carried out with the help of Al Qaeda and members of Sipah Sahaba and Lashkar Jhangvi, the sectarian Deobandi killers of Pakistan. This explains why the Taliban never responded to Islamabads demand for the surrender of the Lashkar activists. That year the Taliban also destroyed the famous Bamiyan Buddhas after the Hazara pogroms had laid the region low. That Al Qaeda was involved in the massacre of the Shia was proved later when evidence came forth that it was Al Qaeda that had persuaded the Taliban to destroy the ancient statues situated in the territory of the Shia. Mullah Umar didnt know Osama bin Laden before he arrived from Sudan in 1996 and was given into the safe hands of Maulvi Yunus Khalis in Jalalabad by the ISI. Osama himself courted Umar with a wheedling letter which worked. They met nally after the Taliban had captured Kabul. Kathy Gannon narrates how the Taliban began by securing the Bamiyan Buddhas against vandalism by issuing edicts from Mullah
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Umar describing them as Afghanistans cultural heritage in 1999.13 In 2001 Osama bribed Umars deputy prime minister and defence minister into convincing him to issue another edict for their destruction! The Taliban seemed to be religiously tentative. The hard Islam they adopted came from three sources: their Deobandi faith, the Pakistan army and its active arm the ISI, and the Wahhabi warriors of Osama bin Laden. And the most persuasive factor here was not religious conviction but money. After the Buddhas were destroyed, the Islamabad ministry for religious affairs issued a statement saying the destruction was according to Islamic principles. Pakistan was harder in faith than the Afghan medieval marauder Mehmud Ghaznavi who had spared the Bamiyan Buddhas but destroyed some of the most prominent temples of India in 1025 AD. In 2003, the Hazaras of Quetta became victims of terrorism amid reports that some important personalities connected with Osama bin Laden were living in Quetta, including the son of the blind Gamaa leader Umar Abdur Rehman now serving a life sentence in the United States for planning the attack on World Trade Center in 1993. Osama Bin Laden was later to plan another unsuccessful terrorist-hijack plan to force America to free the blind Egyptian cleric. When the Al Qaeda number three Ramzi bin al-Shibh was captured in Karachi in 2004, the planner of 9/11, Khalid Sheikh Muhammad was with him in the same safe house. He escaped to Quetta where he sought shelter in yet another safe house of Jamaat Islami. After the defeat of the Taliban in 2001, many of its activists and the Al Qaeda Arabs ed into Pakistan. Karachi, which was to be transformed into ground zero of Pakistans sectarian massacres became home to them. They were welcomed by the seminaries already funded by Saudi Arabia and by the religious parties that ignored or encouraged the antiShia campaigns of their youths. It was here that many terrorists from the Middle East and Southeast Asia were trained and then sent out on missions of sectarian violence. The tendency of not associating the Arabs and Al Qaeda with Shia-killing in Pakistan is quite pronounced and has accounted for the states inability to effectively counter sectarianism. For instance in President Pervez Musharrafs account of how he faced
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up to the attempts made on his life by the Deobandi militias and Al Qaeda, he completely ignores the sectarian activities of these entities. In chapter 24 of his book he gives a detailed account of Amjad Faruqi the man who planned the attempts on his life in Rawalpindi in 2003 but does not refer to his links with Lashkar Jhangvi while mentioning in passing that he had links with Jaish Muhammad. In his three chapters devoted to terrorism, he simply ignored the thousands of Shia killed by the same people who had tried to kill him.14 A blanket sectarian outt General Musharraf should have got his intelligence services to give him material for at least one chapter on the Shia killed by Al Qaeda and its Deobandi protgs on his watch. Amjad Faruqi, with a bounty of Rs 20 million on his head was killed in 2004 in Sindh after a ve-hour gun battle. He was wanted for two abortive attempts on the life of Pervez Musharraf in 2003, and the murder of the American journalist Daniel Pearl who was personally beheaded by Khalid Sheikh Muhammad. His biggest link with Al Qaeda was his involvement in the 1999 hijack of the Indian airliner IC-814 which sought to free a Harkatul Mujahideen leader Masud Azhar from an Indian jail. Although Pervez Musharraf clearly refers to Jaish as a terrorist organisation, it was not seen as such by Islamabad before it attempted to take his life at the behest of Al Qaeda. As noted elsewhere, the government of Pervez Musharraf handled him as its favourite after his release from the Indian jail and let him roam freely in the country despite his avowed terrorist and sectarian links. In fact a lot of the sectarian slaughter that took place under Musharraf would have been avoided had he moved to stop Masud Azhar. Amjad Faruqi belonged to Harkat Jihad Islami, the largest jihadi organisation with its headquarters in Kandahar and the largest participation in it of the Taliban ghters who later occupied important posts in the cabinet of Mullah Umar. One reason Musharraf did not discuss Faruqi in more detail could be that Faruqis sectarian contacts went deep into the army too. A Terrorist Monitor report sketches the scene in Karachi in 2004:
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Karachi continues to be a safe haven for extremist religious groups like Lashkar Jhangvi and terrorists groups like Harkatul Mujahideen and Harkat Jihad Islami (HUJI). In fact HUJI runs 48 seminaries in Karachi. The biggest of these, Madrassa Khalid bin Walid, trains more than 500 students at any given point of time. It is the command headquarters of Karachi Muslims ghting the military regime in Burma. Their leader is Maulana Abdul Quddus a Myanmarese Muslim who ed to India and made his way to Karachi where he received his religious training before leaving for Afghanistan to join the jihad. A large number of his students fought the Northern Alliance during the Afghan wars of the 1990s. Some went to Kashmir with other HUJI members to ght Indian Security Forces but none returned to Myanmar or Bangladesh, choosing instead to make Karachi their home. Their collective objective is to turn Pakistan into another Taliban-style country.15 In 2006 a Bangladeshi suicide bomber killed the top Shia leader of Pakistan, Allama Hasan Turabi, in Karachi after telling his parents through a video message that he was promised Heaven for doing the deed. Because of the strong presence of the religious parties, their militias and the Al Qaeda Arabs, Karachi was chosen as the scene of regular Shia-killing. Akram Lahori, who took over Lashkar Jhangvi after the death in a police encounter of Riaz Basra in 2002, was involved in the assassination of several prominent Shias including the brother of the federal interior minister, General (Retired) Moinuddin Haider. He also killed 24 Shias in Mominpura in Lahore and 11 at Imambargah Najaf in Rawalpindi, but his links with Al Qaeda came into the open through Naeem Bukhari, whose involvement in the murder of Daniel Pearl was traced to the Yemeni elements of the organisation. Wilson John reports from the testimony of Fazal Karim, a Lashkar Jhangvi activist picked up in Rahimyar Khan three months after the killing of Daniel Pearl: Al Qaeda had merged with various sectarian and criminal groups in Karachi to carry out terrorist attacks in Pakistan.16 There was a strong rumour in Pakistan that nally when Amjad Faruqi was killed in Sindh it was the intelligence agencies who refused to allow him to surrender as that would have revealed the hand of the state in his sectarian crimes
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on behalf of Al Qaeda. In many accounts of the 1994 bomb attack at the mausoleum of Imam Raza in Mashhad in Iran, Al Qaedas Ramzi Yousef and Lashkar Jhangvi are referred to as the perpetrators. In fact, it shows an early penchant within Al Qaeda towards sectarianism. Lashkar Jhangvi is also mentioned separately from Sipah Sahaba, its mother organisation and other Deobandi religious parties. Suroosh Irfani notes this blurring of the boundaries between the extremist and the mainstream in the Islamist spectrum: If the JUI (Fazlur Rehman faction) allowed the SSPs leader Riaz Basra to contest the 1987 national election as its candidate both the JUI(F) and Jamaat Islami joined SSP in an effort to prevent the death sentence awarded to SSPs Haq Nawaz (for his role in the murder of the Iranian consul Sadeq Ganji) from being carried out. These Islamic parties reportedly went to the extent of demanding that if it was not possible for General Musharrafs government to pardon Haq Nawaz, he should be exiled like Nawaz Sharif to Saudi Arabia. Moreover both the extremist outts and the mainstream religio-political groups look up to bin Laden as a hero of Islam. This is borne out by the reaction of the Mutahidda Majlis Amal (MMA) to the government ads carried in the national media in June 2002 portraying bin Laden and his Al Qaeda associates as religious terrorists.17 Just as there is evidence of mainstream religious parties support to the sectarian killers, there is equally evidence of Al Qaeda supporting and patronising the sectarian outts from its very inception, and much more openly after its return to Afghanistan in 1996 when it found the hard-line Taliban ruling the country. Financial support from countries in the Gulf - where hatred of the Shia as a proxy of Revolutionary Iran was widespread dented the early Al Qaeda resolve of staying away from internecine conicts. Also, the induction of more and more Arab warriors from the Shia-hating regions into Al Qaeda gradually changed the character of the outt. Finally, it was a consequence of the decision to move from Abdullah Azzams distant enemy thesis to Al Zawahiris near enemy thesis. Abou Zahab makes the following observation:
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The links between Pakistani Sunni extremists and Arab militants were forged in the training camps of Afghanistan during the Taliban rule; Pakistani militants belonging to Sunni extremist groups were involved in the massacre of Shias in Mazar-e-Sharif in 1997 and in Bamiyan in 1998. After the fall of the Taliban the local jihadis and sectarian groups which were already linked many sectarian parties were part-time jihadis and vice versa became the voluntary foot soldiers of Al Qaeda networks in Pakistan and were instrumentalised for global interests. Some of them who seemed to work as freelancers and hired killers for foreign groups were used to launch attacks on Western targets.18 The effect of non-sectarian and less introverted Abdullah Azzam comes to the fore when one notes a lower sectarian prole of DeobandiAhle Hadith militias in Pakistan who came under his inuence. When Harvard scholar Jessica Stern asked Abdur Rehman Khaleel of Harkatul Mujahideen (HUM) what book he revered most after the Holy Quran, he chose the writings of Sheikh Abdullah Azzam.19 He then went on to praise the genius of Azzam as a thinker. Khaleels organisation has fractured under the pressure of a bifurcation it suffered in 1999 when its number two leader Maulana Masud Azhar broke off and set up his own Jaish Muhammad with the help of his teacher Mufti Shamzai of Karachis Banuri Mosque seminary. Harkat boys indulged in stray sectarian crimes only because Khaleels inuence had declined and he was not always able to keep his militants under control. Similarly, Haz Saeed of Ahle Hadith-Wahhabi Lashkar Tayba has kept himself and his outt away as much as possible from the Arabdriven sectarian wave in Pakistan. Saeed was a pupil of Azzam when he was in Saudi Arabia and was greatly inspired by him. His rst great venture in Muridke, a city-like training camp behind walls just outside Lahore, was built with funds collected by Azzam. After Azzams death he kept aloof from Shia-killing but could no longer avoid the inuence of the Arabs and Al Qaeda because of his training camps in Kunar, the headquarters of all Arab warriors. His funds kept coming steadily from the Gulf States and the Pakistani expatriate community living in the UK and the US. In the end, on the occasion of Zarqawis death in Iraq, he could no longer avoid owning up to his sectarian links when he held
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his ghaibana (in absentia) funeral in Lahore. When he moved to his new headquarters in Lahore on old Lake Road he named it Qadisiya, a symbolic anti-Iranian gesture. Zarqawi and Al Qaedas policy on Shias Al Qaeda began killing the Shias of Iraq under the local leadership of Abu Musab al Zarqawi who had fought as an Al Qaeda warrior 1990 onwards. He died in Baghdad in June 2006 with $25 million on his head. The general impression in Pakistan is that Abu Musab al Zarqawi was a soldier of Al Qaeda but was disliked by Osama bin Laden for his anti-Shia feelings. Columnist Hamid Mir wrote in Jang Lahore (12 June 2006) that Abu Musab al Zarqawi was not liked by Osama for his anti-Shia outlook but he soon gave it up and was thereafter owned by Osama. Zarqawi began his career of a jihadist in Afghanistan in the 1980s. In the 1990s he established a training camp there to prepare guerrillas for rebellion in Jordan. He was jailed in Jordan on his return for seven years but returned to Afghanistan again, was in Herat training the jihadists and was in Tora Bora with Osama bin Laden in 2001. He got injured in Kandahar during the American invasion and was evacuated through Iran by Hekmatyar who had good contacts in Tehran. He moved to Iraq after that - well in time to see the Americans invade the country - and joined the Kurd-led jihadi militia Ansarul Islam there. Ansarul Islam was founded as a terrorist group by one Mullah Krekar who came to the Islamic University of Islamabad as a lecturer in the 1980s and later joined the jihad in Peshawar. Zarqawi was born in 1966 in the town of Zarqa in Jordan as Ahmad Fadil Khalayleh and soon was seen as a bad student given to using physical violence against other boys. (He later borrowed his name Musab from a Companion of the Prophet, Musab bin Umayr who was known as the rst suicide-bomber, losing both hands in a battle.) In 1987 he was arrested for inicting a knife wound on a boy and was let off after his father paid a heavy ne. Two years later, at the age of 23, he went to Pakistan to join the jihad only to nd that the Soviet Union had already pulled out of Afghanistan. He began to frequent the inner circles of Al Qaeda which had just been founded by Osama bin Laden. He
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lived in Hayatabad, Peshawar, and met the jihadi leaders like Abdullah Azzam, Hekmatyar and Burhanuddin Rabbani. He also met for the rst time another personality who had arrived there from Jordan, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. Maqdisi was to direct Zarqawi to a polemical opposition to democracy as a system destructive of Islams cardinal principles. He was sent to Khost where he simply arrived as a victor, the Soviets having left, but he remained in Peshawar and Afghanistan till 1993, ghting against the pro-Communist factions under the Najibullah government. Maqdisi was born in 1959 in Barqa in Nablus in West Bank but was taken by his parents to Kuwait at the age of three. He was sent to Iraq to study Islam in the 1980s but his sala faith and hostility to the Baath Party caused his arrest by the government. He was deported to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, where he soon impressed with his scholastic ability and was put in charge of the World Islamic Leagues missions to Afghanistan in 1984. In 1988 he joined the Society of the Revival of Islamic Heritage in Kuwait which is today banned in Europe and the US as a terrorist organisation. Maqdisi soon became the Arab worlds leading thinker with a steady ow of tracts coming from his pen, mostly reacting to modernism as spearheaded by the West, in particular its liberal democracy which he thought as being against Islam. Eighteen of his articles were found in the personal effects of Muhammad Atta, the leader of the Hamburg Cell, who attacked the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001. Maqdisi remained in Peshawar for three years, hosted by the group Bafadat Mujahideen as a professor of religion. It is during this time that Zarqawi became a follower of Maqdisi. Brisard places Maqdisi in the ideological centre of Al Qaeda: According to the Jordanian police, in 1997 some of Maqdisis terrorist activities were personally nanced from Afghanistan by Osama bin Laden. The two men, said to be close, often met in Afghanistan at the time, especially in Pakistan, the rear base of the Arab forces. One of Osamas top associates in Afghanistan the Algerian mujahid Abdullah Anas, now in exile in London, recalls sharing a meal in Islamabad with Bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam and Maqdisi. In short Maqdisi was at the heart of Al Qaeda.20
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The inuence of Maqdisi It is important to put Maqdisi in perspective as a terrorist ideologue to be able to understand the depth and signicance of the split that took place later between him and Zarqawi. Through the 1990s Maqdisi kept writing his tracts and forming new terrorist units as an intrumentalisation of his radical-Islamist views. His name cropped up in the confessions of the four citizens arrested in 1994 following the Al Khobar attack mounted in 1994 against the headquarters of the American soldiers stationed there, in which ve Americans were killed, and for which the Saudis at rst blamed Iran. The four men had been to Pakistan for the jihad and had met Maqdisi there and read his two books Clear Evidence of the Indel Nature of the Saudi State and The Faith of Ibrahim. Brisard refers to another terrorist Azmiri who was attracted to Maqdisi after reading his Irrefutable Proof for Understanding Jihad. Azmiri was involved in the so-called 1994 Bojinka plot to crash several airplanes simultaneously over the United States which became the forerunner of 9/11. Azmiri also took part in the aborted attempt to assassinate President Clinton in 1998.21 Maqdisis second close friend in Pakistan links him to Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, the man who planned the 9/11 strikes. Muhammad Shobana published an Islamist magazine Al Bynyan al-Marsus (The Impenetrable Edice) which was supported by Khalids brother, Abid Sheikh Muhammad. It was this magazine that rst announced the foundational principles of Al Qaeda in 1989. And it was Shobana who recruited an almost illiterate Zarqawi into the magazine staff on Maqdisis recommendation. Zarqawis three sisters ended up marrying jihad veterans, including one given to a friend personally in accordance with the Arab practice of giving away sisters and daughters as tokens of friendship. It was from his base in Al Bunyan that Zarqawi was to make his way to the Sada camp of Abdur Rasul Sayyaf in Afghanistan and be in the company of Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Muhammad. It is understandable therefore that when in 1992, he returned to Jordan from Afghanistan, Zarqawi went looking for Maqdisi. Maqdisi was ready to give him the next ideological injection. He had just published
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his new book Democracy is a Religion: According to this scathing diatribe against the West and its form of government, democracy is a social innovation condemned by the Quran, one that conveys heretical message. The citizens of democratic states are indels soon to incur destruction. Democracy is a religion that is not the religion of AllahIt is a religion of pagansa religion that includes other gods in its belief In the democratic religion people are represented by their delegates to parliamentThey and their associates legislate in accordance with the religion of democracy and the laws of the constitution on which the government is based.22 Zarqawi set up a cell of Afghanistan veterans around Maqdisi in Jordan which was funded by Al Qaeda since it planned to attack important targets in Jordan, including the blowing up of the intelligence service headquarters, GID. In 1994 the leaders of the cell including Zarqawi and Maqdisi were arrested, the latter along with explosives in the false ceiling of his home. Both signed confessions that their planned terrorism was meant to target Israel and not Jordan. They were sentenced to prison for 15 years but were let out in 1999 when amnesty was offered them on the death of King Hussein and the enthronement of King Abdullah. It was in part young King Abdullahs mending of the fences with Muslim Brotherhood whose leaders he then received in audience. (King Abdullah later regretted his decision to release Zarqawi.) Maqdisi was freed but kept under surveillance and was sent back to prison in 2002 where he was at the time of this writing. In 1999, Zarqawi then made the big decision of his life: to leave Jordan and the teachings of Maqdisi behind forever. He left for Pakistan planning to stay on a six-month visa and landed in Hayatabad in Peshawar, the place of his fond memories of Afghan jihad. Once in Peshawar he was welcomed by Pakistani Wafa Organisation, later banned by the UN, which provided Al Qaeda funds and false passports for the jihadists. Finally many of the important Al Qaeda terrorists including Khalfan Ghailani, the man who had planned the attack on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, were arrested from Hayatabad in 2004. Zarqawis sister was already living in Peshawar married to a religious scholar. Zarqawis mother came up to Peshawar to see her son settled
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there in 1999 and stayed there for a month. Soon his wife and children too joined him in Hayatabad. But he had only six months to get close to Osama bin Laden and launch himself at the head of a big operation. In 1999, the international community became impatient with Pakistan and its intelligence agency, the ISI. From 1994 to 1999 almost 100,000 Pakistanis had been trained in the Afghan camps run by Al Qaeda, and the clerics of Pakistan, especially of the Deobandi variety, under the Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI), had begun to sense monetary and military advantage in aligning themselves with Osama bin Laden. Jordan too put pressure on Islamabad to arrest the planner of terrorism in Jordan, Khalil al-Deek, from his hideout in Hayatabad. When the ISI moved to arrest the Jordanian, Zarqawi too got arrested and was sent to jail. He was released after a week although he was listed as a terrorist in Jordan. With an exit permit in his hand, Zarqawi left for Karachi rst, then decided to go to Kabul instead and be one of the trainers of terrorists in Al Qaeda camps. In Kabul he was given a house before being sent to Herat as a trainer. He called his family over from Hayatabad but not before he had married a young girl aged 13 in Kabul after falling in love with her. He was to marry yet another girl of 16 in Iraq. Zarqawis opportunity in Herat The break for Zarqawi and his band of Jordanians in Afghanistan came when Al Qaeda announced a big operation in the West and asked for recruits. It was Al Qaedas famous recruiter Abu Zubayda, himself a Jordanian, who nally picked Zarqawi and his men for the important mission, lodging them in a house not far from Kabul in an area controlled by the Afghan warlord Hekmatyar.23 By the end of 1999, Zarqawi had succeeded in becoming an important mid-level leader inside Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda papers found in Jalalabad after 2001 refer to him as a friend of Maqdisi, acknowledging the intellectual inuence of Maqdisi on Al Qaeda. Later letters sent by Al Qaeda to Abu Qatada the Al Qaeda leader in the United Kingdom (now in prison there) speak well of Zarqawi as a leader in charge of the camps in Herat. Having sworn personal allegiance to Osama bin Laden, Zarqawi
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soon proved his efciency in Herat where his camp, concealed inside a religious seminary carried the signboard Tawhid wal Jihad which was to become the name of his outt in Iraq later on. He sat on the Islam Qila crossroads giving access to Turkey through Iran, on the one hand, and to Chechnya through Turkmenistan, on the other. He was closely watched by the Iranians although there was agreement between Iran and Al Qaeda on the right of passage for mujahideen. Zarqawi knew that the Iranians were nancing the Shia militias against the Taliban. Osama bin Laden was impressed with Zarqawis efforts at training jihadists in explosives and chemicals (there was even a rumour that Al Qaedas nuclear material was also stored in Herat) and therefore did not hesitate to give him $35,000 for his plan to carry out terrorist attacks in Israel in 2000. But Zarqawis Jordanian bombers were arrested in Turkey after they had crossed through Iran. Brisard explains that Zarqawis maverick nature constantly induced him to rebel against his mentors while his brave leadership kept the Jordanian Al Qaeda in Herat intact as opposed to the Algerians in Jalalabad who had gone to pieces through factional inghting. After 1999, he had said goodbye to his rst mentor Maqdisi; now in 2000 he wanted to break out of the ideological hold of Osama bin Laden and Aiman al-Zawahiri: In the past he had been careful to keep his distance from Maqdisi. Now he was trying to get free of the political line imposed by Osama himself especially by Al Zawahiri. This wish for independence was reinforced by the geographical distance of the Herat camp and the recurrent criticism of Bin Laden on the part of many jihadists. The Saudi had the reputation of constructing his own myth to the detriment of the common cause aimed at restoring the caliphate, and the two factions in Afghanistan, one of which was Zarqawis, were said to be hostile to him. But in 2000 Bin Ladens nancial and political support was still indispensable to Zarqawi, and he would have to be patient for another few months before breaking free. For it was only when he ed Afghanistan for Iran and then Syria that his expenses would be paid by his networks in Europe and the Middle East.24
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Zarqawi breaks free in Iraq Zarqawi was in Iraq in 2001 two years before the Americans invaded in March 2003 after the US Secretary of State Colin Powells public statement about him being Saddams terrorist connection. Powell also named Zarqawi, wrongly, as a Palestinian terrorist. Zarqawi was in fact busy setting up an Arab militia in Kurdistan, already softened for the purpose by Saudi Arabias generous funding there of a salast movement. Soon, the predominance of the Arabs in Krekars Ansarul Islam propelled an increasingly sidelined Krekar into making the decision to ee Iraq and seek asylum in Norway. The Islamic Movement of Kurdistan was based on the 500 Arab ghters brought in by Zarqawi. Soon however he ran into trouble with the Kurdish politician Jalal Talabani and had to ght his militia rst. In 2003 the Arabs in Kurdistan faced an American offensive and had to run away to Iran and thence to the Sunni Triangle northwest of Baghdad back in Iraq. While in the Anbar province in Iraq, Zarqawi and his Tawhid wal Jihad were to adopt a clear anti-Iran line, which simply goes once again to prove that he habitually transcended the moral demands made on him by loyalty. There is proof that Iran rejected Jordans request for his repatriation from an Iranian jail on the excuse that he was carrying a Syrian passport. (Iran repeatedly used the strategy of arresting the Al Qaeda members it was facilitating.) His Arab and Chechen trainees were allowed by Iran to routinely use its territory for transit. Irans favours also included safe haven given to the son of Osama bin Laden, Saad, through the intercession of Hekmatyar. As he embarked on his war against the Americans from Anbar, he also reached a critical stage in his relations with his mentor and guide Abu Muhammad Al Maqdisi, then in a Jordanian jail. Maqdisi was of the opinion that Zarqawi should not wage jihad as a third party when the main warring parties were both enemies of Islam. In his view Saddam Hussein and America were both enemies of Islam and Zarqawi should not help either one of them by intervening: Which Iraq are you talking about? The Baath Party of Saddam Hussein, the man who killed our clergy, who exterminated Muslims at Halabjah with his chemical gases? Where were you each time the United States supported Israel against our Muslim brothers in
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Palestine?25 But this position changed soon. Al Qaeda announced its agreement with Zarqawi and ordered its warriors to wage jihad against the Americans in Iraq. Maqdisi seemed to recant his objection even as the Americans captured many of Zarqawis warriors, including a Pakistani, Hasan Gul, from a number of places in Iraq in the autumn of 2003. Zarqawi nally struck back in April 2004, when he captured and personally beheaded the American hostage Nicholas Berg. In April he had already posted his lengthy justication for doing what he was about to do. He decided to kill Iraqi and Kurd collaborators of America as a strategy of creating chaos in Iraq. By October he had killed Shias in Nasiriyeh, Baghdad and Karbala, culminating in his murder of 50 Iraqi National Guards at a training camp in Kirkuk. (His most decisive act which unleashed the sectarian war in Iraq was the 2006 destruction of the tomb of Imam Askari in Samarra.26) He stole the salaries of the trainees in addition to getting private funding from Saudi Arabia, Jordan and remittances from the expatriate Muslim communities in Europe. In the beginning of 2004 he applied to Al Qaeda for patronage clearly from a position of strength. It must be noted that he was already a member of Al Qaeda, having sworn loyalty on the hand of Osama bin Laden. What he now demanded was a change in the over-all strategy towards Iran and the Shia. The extremism of new ideologues Al Qaeda viewed Iran as a kind of partner in its hatred of the Americans and their Saudi protgs. While it tolerated the Shia killing of its linked Pakistani jihadi organisations, it kept away from pronouncing on the grand schism. It found Iranian cooperation useful when it was inltrating into Iraq and the Caucasus. It was now swayed by Zarqawi because of his growing autonomous status and an increasing tendency among the Al Qaeda-backed Islamist jurists to persuade Muslims in the Middle East and Europe to approve Zarqawis campaign on behalf of the Arab Sunnis of Iraq. The most persuasive cleric in this regard was the Qatar-based Egyptian jurist Sheikh Yussef al-Qardawi, who had earlier approved of Al Qaedas use of suicide-bombers. The
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Sheikh, characterised as moderate by author Raymond William Baker in his overly optimistic book, was put under a partial ban by the Qatar government after this opinion, to guard itself against the protest coming from the West. But the ban was soon ignored when Qardawi gave a fatwa in September 2004 authorising abduction and killing of American civilians in order to force the American Army to withdraw. Qardawi was completely wrongly perceived by Baker as a representative of the wassatiyya school among the salasts. He called him the greatest living Muslim jurist of the 20th century because his one daughter was a PhD scholar and working in the United States and his other daughters were studying for their doctorates.27 After Qardawi, another jurist representing Al Qaeda in the United Kingdom, Abu Qatada now in a London prison too approved of Zarqawis decision to spread chaos in Iraq by attacking America together with its collaborators. Another statement by Zarqawi in October 2004 seems to conrm that Al Qaeda had nally yielded and approved of his strategy. Maqdisi was in jail in Jordan when Zarqawi obtained the acceptance of Al Qaeda and renamed his organisation as Al Qaeda of Mesopotamia. He was greatly upset over the new strategy of using suicide bombers to kill people other than the Americans. He wrote two tracts as his reaction, Al Zarqawi Advice and Support and An Appraisal of the Fruits of Jihad (July 2004) criticising Zarqawis action in Iraq. Seeing the rift, the Jordanian authorities released him in December 2004 in the hope of causing a rift in the movement. Maqdisi sent a taped message to Al Jazeera saying, My project is not to blow up a bar, my project is not to blow up a cinema, my project is not to kill an ofcer who has tortured meMy project is to bring back to the Islamic Nation its glories and to establish the Islamic state that provides refuge to every Muslim, and this is a grand and large project that does not come by small vengeful acts. It requires the education of a Muslim generation, it requires longterm planning, it requires the participation of all the learned men and sons of this Islamic Nation, and since I do not have the resources for this project then I will not implicate my brothersin a small material act that is wished for by the enemies of our nation to throw our youths behind prison bars28.
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Maqdisi warned against indiscriminate suicide-bombing and against killing the Shia. Zarqawi, now a leader many people saw well set to supersede Osama bin Laden himself, thought it was time to respond to his old mentor at the same level of polemics. He shot back a tract titled The Grandchildren of Ibn Alqema29 have Returned in which he railed against the Shia and called them reprobates and held that even if the Shia were not indels they could be killed if they came in the way of his war against the Americans. Maqdisi stated in response on Al Jazeera that on the question of the Shias he agreed with Ibn Taymiyya in not declaring Shia lay people as unbelievers, and that as [Ibn Taymiyya] says in his fatwa under the section of ghting the rebels that one should not equate [the Shia] with the Jews and the Christians as to how they are to be fought. Maqdisi warned that taking the campaign against the Shia even further would lead to tna, or upheaval, among the Muslims and would deect energy and attention from ghting the enemy. He said expansion of the eld of killing Shias and sanctioning the spilling of their blood was due to a fatwa that emerged during the Iraq-Iran War from the Sunni clerics as they defended Saddam Hussein in order to justify his war against Iran. There was no justication, according to Maqdisi, in targeting the mosques and holy places of the Shia, since the laypeople of the Shia are like the laypeople of the Sunna, I dont say 100 percent, but some of these laypeople only know how to pray and fast and do not know the details of [the Shia] sect.30 Zarqawi was cut to the quick and hit back with a vengeance. His repartee was carried by all the jihadi websites. Nibras Kazimi noted: Although maintaining a respectful tone towards his former tutor, he comes back to say that Maqdisi is essentially a relic of the past, and that Zarqawi is now a soldier of Osama bin Laden. He hints that Maqdisi is being used as a tool by the enemies of Islam who are waging the largest crusader campaign of our times. Feigning hurt and bewilderment, Zarqawi says that it is now clear to him after viewing the interview, and from the earlier letters, that the matter is beyond being a lapse of judgment on the part of his former friend. Zarqawi goes on to say that Maqdisi was but one of several early inuences on his thinking. He said that he never sought to emulate a teacher and if that had been his goal, he would have found someone more learned than Maqdisi.31 Jordanian
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authorities, who had thought the rift would weaken Al Qaeda, now saw Zarqawi emerging as the leader of jihad, reinvigorating Al Qaeda with a new agenda. They quickly put Maqdisi back in jail. Zarqawi apostatises the Shia and Iran Two months before his death on 7 June 2006, Zarqawi recorded a four-hour interview that brought out in full his sectarian worldview.32 One can say that the contents of this article by him mark a crossroads in the evolution of Al Qaeda. Zarqawi consciously ignored the earlier hesitations on the part of Al Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden to own his anti-Shia slant on the war against America in Iraq. His separation from the worldview of Al Qaeda began to take place in 2004 at the end of which he needed to ask for a re-induction into Al Qaeda on the basis of his view of the war in Iraq, which Osama bin Laden accepted. By the beginning of 2006, he was ready to launch a different kind of war in which the enemy number one was not America but the Shias of Iraq and the Shia state of Iran. It is clearly with the intent of taking the leadership role that he recorded his thoughts on the Shia creed two months before his death. If there was any hope that his death would bring Al Qaeda back on old tracks, it was soon betrayed. His successor at the head of Tawhid wal Jihad and Al Qaeda of Mesopotamia, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir (or Al Masri) immediately posted his own anti-Shia diatribe to ensure continuity to the ideology of the deceased leader. In an excellent timely article posted on the Hudson Institute Washington DC website, Nibras Kazimi quotes Zarqawi on his new strategy for Iraq and the Sunni Arab world: The Muslims will have no victory or superiority over the aggressive indels such as the Jews and the Christians until there is a total annihilation of those under them such as the apostate agents headed by the radha (rejecters or the Shia)...Jerusalem was only retrieved at the hands of Salahuddin, even though Noureddin Mahmoud [Zenki] was harsher on the Crusaders than Salahuddin. It was Allahs will that victory and the liberation of Jerusalem would come at Salahuddins hand only after he fought the Ubeidi radha [the Fatimids of Egypt] for several years,
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and totally annihilated their state and overthrew it, and from then he could focus on the Crusaders, and victory was awarded to him and he retrieved Jerusalem, which had remained captive for years under their grip because of the treachery of the rawadh. This is a very important lesson that history gives us that should not be overlooked at all: we will not have victory over the original indels [alkuffar alasliyeen] until we ght the apostate indels [alkuffar almurtaddeen] simultaneously along with the original indels. The Islamic conquests that occurred during the reign of the rashideen [the Four Righteous Caliphs] only occurred after the Arabian Peninsula was cleansed of apostates. And that is why the most hated gure among the radha is Salahuddin, and they would tolerate death rather than tolerate him.33 There is no doubt that Zarqawi relied on the anti-Shia literature produced in the Sunni Arab world to esh out his approach to jihad. Just as Abdullah Azzam and Aiman al-Zawahiri were inspired by the writings of Syed Qutb, he too was provoked by the new anger permeating the Sunni polemicists after 1979. There is a touch of Al-Zawahiri in Zarqawi in so far as the former broke from Azzams view of the global rival in the West and sought his targets nearer home, against the collaborators of the United States. Zarqawis variation on the theme was that he sought the collaborators rather ham-handedly among the Shia. The intellectually more gifted Azzam was murdered; and an equally bright Maqdisi was made to languish in jail. Al Qaedas ideological journey was nally to be contingent rather than in accordance with a wellthought out and evolved strategy. Osama bin Laden improvised in order to overcome his intellectual deciencies. One can say that, faced with practicalities, Osama bin Laden steadily allowed the non-intellectual to triumph over the intellectual in his organisation. This downward trend was encapsulated in a letter that Zarqawi wrote to Osama and Al-Zawahiri in February 2004: The radha (Shias) have declared a secret war against the people of Islam and they constitute the near and dangerous enemy to the Sunnis even though the Americans are also a major foe, but the danger of the radha is greater and their damage more lethal to the umma than the Americans.34 As if in answer, Irans rst vice president Parviz Davoudi said, When a religion is to be abused to such an extent, the so-called group, Al Qaeda, would also come forward
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and abuse Islam to take up terrorist actions.35 At rst Osama bin Laden was reluctant to accept the merger of Al Tawhid wal Jihad with Al Qaeda. He did not like that in addition to targeting the Americans in Iraq, Zarqawi was killing the Shias and the Kurds. Gerges opines: In contrast, bin Laden was not in favour of civil strife between Shiites and Sunnis, lest it distract from the confrontation against the Americans. As a militant Sala, bin Laden undoubtedly harbours anti-Shiite prejudices, but he views Iraq as a pivotal front in his global jihad and has called on Muslim Iraqis and non-Iraqis of all ethnic and linguistic backgrounds to cooperate in opposing the pro-American order being installed in Baghdad. He has shown similar indifference to ethnic, sectarian, and ideological distinctions in issuing condemnations of Iraqis, including Sunni Arabs, who collaborate with the coalition forces.36 However, in December 2004, bin Laden released a videotaped statement which accepted Zarqawis argument, saying anyone joining or collaborating with the Baghdad government set up after the 2003 invasion was fair game for Al Qaeda killers. Enter Al Gharib the ultra-sectarian The author Zarqawi appears to have followed most closely in his apostatisation of the Shia is Abdullah Muhammad al-Gharib, an Egyptian scholar, whose ideas had been expressed in his book Then Came the Turn of the Majus.37 But soon the name al-Gharib was challenged because no one with this name was writing anti-Shia tracts in Egypt, and the real author, a Syrian named Sheikh Muhammad Suroor Zein al-Abedin, was instead revealed as the real author. He had moved to Saudi Arabia to teach jurisprudence there, after which he had transferred to Kuwait, nally to settle in the United Kingdom in 1984. He may have taken a pseudonym for many reasons, one of which could be his failure to agree with the content he might have been writing for Saudi Arabia for money; or he may have felt ashamed, like most Muslim scholars, of writing on the subject of the grand Islamic schism. His rst move to Saudi Arabia and the second move to Kuwait clearly indicate that he feared being punished by the Syrian government for writing against Iran. In Kuwait, where the Shia form 35 percent of the population and nd themselves in a position
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of some inuence, he must have felt insecure, which might have caused him to decide nally to go to the United Kingdom, considered the safest place in the West for Sunni extremist elements. The UK later earned the reputation of being a Londonistan for Al Qaeda. The trend towards writing anti-Shia tracts began soon after Imam Khomeinis Islamic Revolution in 1979 and Irans efforts in the early 1980s to export the Revolution through acts of terrorism - to the Sunni Arab states in the Middle East with oppressed Shia minorities. In India, an anti- Khomeini tract was rst published in 1984 by Maulana Manzur Numani with funding received from the Saudi-backed World Muslim League. Al-Gharib is supposed to have written his book in the late 1980s, following Manzur Numanis, which was translated in many languages and distributed across the world by Saudi embassies. After that, in 1986 the major Deobandi seminaries in Pakistan (most of them funded generously by Saudi Arabia) issued fatwas of apostatisation against the Shia, which were then compiled in a separate volume by Numani again and became the basis of Shia-killing in Pakistan in the years to follow. Zarqawis scholarship on the issue of Shia apostatisation relied on other Arab authors too, mostly of recent date, and most of them writing under assumed names. One such is Mamdouh al-Harbi whose work is available only as audio les on the Internet. Harbi attacks the petition made by the Saudi Shia community to Crown Prince Abdullah in 2003 for the restoration of the Shia to normal citizenship in return for their loyalty to the House of Saud. Harbi reacted by pointing to the danger posed by Saudi Arabias Shia who are actively breeding through community-funded mass nuptials, and who seek to control strategic businesses such as bakeries and sh markets, and that the Saudi Shia are similar to the Shia all over the world with regard to their heretical doctrine, paganism and grave-worshipHe accuses the Shia of plotting to use nancial bribes to sway the rulers as well as making gifts of Persian female agents uent in Arabic and with force of character and intelligence, in addition to being beautiful.38 He uses such terms as The Protocols of the Elders of Qum behind a fty year plan being employed by the Shia to turn Sunnis to Shiism and to take over the Persian Gulf
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as well as Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq and Afghanistan. Although the level of scholarship in the tracts Zarqawi relied on is abysmal they do refer to much better regarded authorities of antiquity, such as Ibn Kathir whose book The Beginning and the End [Al-bidaya wel nihaya] describes the Shia as betrayers of Islam. Ibn Kathir (1301-1373) was born in Syrias Horan plain and allegedly studied under Ibn Taymiyya and wrote multivolume tracts on Islamic history containing virulent attacks against Shiism. Ibn Kathir is referred to by Imad Ali Abdul Sami Hussein, who also claimed that the Shia Fatimid Caliphs were not descended from the family of the Prophet but from a Jewish blacksmith! Another writer Abdul Muhsin al-Ra goes so far as to say that the Shia of Saudi Arabia were demanding their rights in order to spearhead the execution of the aforementioned plan in dismembering Saudi Arabia and bringing the Shia to power, and giving the Crusaders control of the Holy Sites as they did in Iraq, thus fullling the dream of the Jews. And Irans foreign policy encompassed a Radhi-Russian Alliance and another RadhiHindu Alliance, directed against the Muslims of the Caucasus and Central Asia along with the Muslims of the Indian Subcontinent.39 Al Qaeda descends into schism In 2007, the decline of Al Qaeda into a schismatic organisation is owed to a number of factors. First, it remained a predominantly Arab enterprise where authority was bestowed on Arabs or half-Arabs, in the latter case based on their linguistic ability. Second, it linked up in Pakistan with jihadist militias whose hinterland seminaries were already funded by Saudi Arabia to confront the sectarian challenge of Iran. Third, Al Qaeda tolerated the sectarian violence perpetrated by its jihadist protgs in a policy of laissez faire which nevertheless gave protection to them when confronted with state action from Pakistan. Fourth, because Al Qaeda relied on the approbation of the religious leaders in the Islamic world, it could not oppose their schismatic leanings, since Islamic sectarianism can be avoided only through non-religious nationalism. Fifth, because of the non-intellectual nature of Al Qaeda owing to the non-cerebral charisma of Osama bin Laden who allowed ideological transition from
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Abdullah Azzam to al Zawahiri and Al Maqdisi and other Hanbalite thinkers without analysis. Sixth, ingress into Al Qaeda of Arab ghters hostile to Iran and indoctrinated by Saudi-funded Arab literature reacting to the aggressive policy of export of Iranian Revolution since 1980. Seventh, the American invasion of Iraq and the division of Iraqi society into three sectarian and ethnic domains and the compulsion of Al Qaeda to enter Iraq and confront America there. The rst consequence of this transformation manifested itself in Pakistan where Al Qaeda completely divested itself of its earlier hesitancy to link itself with Shia-killings. Three incidents of terrorism in Karachi in 2006 the blast at the US Consulate, the Nishtar Park massacre and the murder of Allama Hasan Turabi were all carried out by the sectarian militia, Lashkar Jhangvi, and were planned in South Waziristan under the tutelage of Al Qaeda. The new combination was Lashkar Jhangvi, the Waziristan city of Wana and Al Qaeda. Lashkar Jhangvi was the blanket term used by the state for all manner of jihad in which all the Deobandi-Ahle Hadith militants made common cause. All the three incidents were staged through the device of suicide-bombings and were traced to Wana in Waziristan by the Pakistani investigating agencies. The bombing jacket of the boy who killed Allama Turabi was made in Darra Adam Khel at the behest of Al Qaeda, the new activity now spearheaded by Abdullah Mehsud who was released by the Americans from Guantanamo Bay in 2003. In 2006, too, Al Qaeda clearly chose Lashkar Jhangvi as its instrument, marking its own transformation. A fresh targeting of the Shia community was launched in the cities where they are found in large numbers: Lahore, Rawalpindi, Gujranwala, Multan, Khanewal, Layya, Bhakkar, Jhang, Sargodha, Rahimyar Khan, Karachi, Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, Kohat, Parachinar, Hangu, Hyderabad, Nawabshah, Mirpur Khas and Quetta. During the ashura of 2007, some of these cities were actually attacked, killing and injuring state functionaries who had been forewarned. A kind of sectarian war of great intensity seemed to have taken hold of cities like Gilgit, Parachinar and Bannu, marking the sectarianisation of Al Qaeda.
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Will the sectarianisation of Al Qaeda lessen its capacity to strike at the United States and its allies in Europe? The diversion of its intensity to Iran will certainly affect its original jihad but the propulsion for this diversion will come from the Muslims who accept the politics of Al Qaeda.40 The diversion will be accomplished through a paradoxical explanation of the Shia movement as a collaborator of the United States, as propounded by Zarqawi. On the other hand, the targeted Shia community will continue to think of their Sunni enemies also as collaborators of the United States. This is a typical sectarian formulation and was rst noted in Pakistan in 2004 and welcomed by most columnists there as an America-did-it explanation of the internecine sectarian violence in the country. Ahmad Rashid wrote in Sunday Telegraph that, in 2007, Al Qaeda will continue to develop its original aims of trying to defeat the West, carry out regime change in the Muslim world and increase its armies of supporters worldwide, to hasten the advent of its dream of a worldwide caliphate - Muslim state - ruled by Al Qaeda. Instead, 2007 saw an unprecedented attack inside the Iranian territory from Pakistan. In the Iranian border town of Zahidan an organisation named Jandullah, known to be linked with Al Qaeda, bombed the town on 17 February which killed thirteen people, including nine Iranian Revolutionary Guard ofcials. The attack was followed by another incident in which four people were killed, and two kidnapped from along the Pak-Iran border. Iran protested ofcially to Pakistan, but predictably, the Iranians, while executing one suspect, got the crowd to chant Death to America, implying that Al Qaeda was now a partner of the United States.41 The trend of popular support for Al Qaeda among the expatriate Muslim communities in Europe will increase, but most of it will be directed at Iraq, and after the withdrawal of the United States from Iraq, it will be directed against Iran and the Shia community. It is however possible now to argue that those who go to Iraq will target both the American troops and the Shia. An analysis of Muslim opinion in Europe reveals a very high proportion of it related to Iraq and a weakening trend in concern over Afghanistan. As far as Afghanistan is concerned, the European Muslim community was able to produce only Sunni objectors
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while the Shia stayed away. No Shia jihadist was found entering Pakistan from the Arab world or from Europe to ght the Americans in Afghanistan. This trend goes back to the period of Afghan war against the Soviet Union when Shia and Sunni jihadi militias fought separately from separate bases. The Sunni warriors were based in Peshawar in Pakistan while the Shia alliance was based inside Iran. Al Qaeda easily presided over these Sunni warriors. The Arabs among them were generally nonsectarian although those belonging to the Hanbali-Wahhabi background were open to anti-Shia thinking. On the other hand, all the militias from Pakistan after 1996 were Deobandi-Wahhabi with a highly evolved antiShia position inculcated since early the 1980s by Saudi Arabia. In Europe the Muslim reaction against American occupation of Iraq is very intense. This is a Sunni phenomenon which has been inuenced by Abu Musab al Zarqawi to a large extent. Before he died in 2006, his ability to attract funds from Europe for his Shia-killing enterprise became also the measure of how much Al Qaedas purely anti-American stance had become watered down. In the event, sheer numbers that Al Qaeda killed more Shias than it killed Americans in Iraq tell the story. Londonistan was a Sunni phenomenon and continues to be so. Before Iraq forced the sectarian obligation on the Muslims in Europe they did not consciously relate it to jihad. But they certainly felt the anti-Shia thrust of the radical Islam in the United Kingdom and in some parts of Europe. In one Pakistani TV programme meant to bring the two sects together on the day of ashura (10th of Muharram) most London-based Pakistanis rang up to criticise the Shia while there was no Shia positive response in favour of the effort being made by the channel. UK-based Pakistani youths interviewed on BBC invariably expressed their anger at the American occupation of Iraq. There is hardly any doubt that the European anger was related to Iraq at the outset and did not contain any anti-Shia element in it. But after Al Qaedas change of policy under Zarqawi, the attitude must change, and it will be made easier because of the Wahhabi-Deobandi orientation of the community. Creation of chaos and American withdrawal Another awkward conuence was in the ofng as the Americans
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prepared a change of policy in 2007. An American withdrawal from the scene would change the way Al Qaeda under Zarqawi had been projecting the conict. Out of the two adversaries only one will be left; yet, as seen above, his position was that it was the Shia and Iran that were more dangerous as foes than the Americans. After the Americans are gone, the majority population of Iraq would face the brunt of Al Qaedas revenge, and most of the recruits it will deploy would be Sunni Arabs. From Europe too the supply of suicide-bombers would come from Muslims of Arab extraction although mixed with a rare Pakistani whose passion has become redirected by Al Qaeda towards sectarianism. Because of the presence of the United States in Iraq, at least three entities (Sunnis, the Shia under Muqtada al Sadr and Abdul Aziz al Hakim, and Iran) were compelled to postpone strategy and think only of creating chaos, simply because the Americans were under an obligation to create order. Order meant the perpetuation of American control of Iraq and of the region. Chaos meant its opposite, but it also meant inability of the other parties to control Iraq. America was thus faced by three spoilers threatening discomture through internecine violence. The killing of one American a day had to be matched with 100 Iraqis a day to secure this chaos. Iran and Al Qaeda, presumably the nal protagonists of the war after the United States has left, are both spoilers and have no considered plan for creating order in Iraq. Most Muslims, including the Muslims of the United States, presume that once the American troops are withdrawn peace and order will somehow prevail in Iraq. In the words of a CAIR (Council on American-Islamic Relations) representative in Washington, if the Americans left Iraq, the Muslims would be forced to come to a peaceful consensus.42 When Iran was asked if it could cooperate with the United States to create peace in Iraq, the answer was rst the Americans should leave. Irans policy of supporting all the contenders for power except the Sunnis who will not accept any overtures from Tehran is chaotic in the extreme. It supports all the warlords that eld their militias in Iraq and are busy collecting their revenues from the various city governments and oil while being a part of the government. Its support hardly inclines the warlords to mutual adjustment as a preparation for a
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post-American situation in the country. Iran also supports the ayatollahs of Najaf but hardly does anything to protect their authority from being undermined by the radical Shia militias. The Najaf clerics are aware that Iran disagrees with their version of non-revolutionary and quietist Shiism which rejects the central concept of velayet-e-faqih of Iranian Shiism under Imam Khomeini. Iran and Syria have kept their links with the Kurds in the north as a part of their old policy of supporting anyone in Iraq persecuted by Saddam Hussein. (Iraqi Kurd president Jalal Talabani held a Syrian passport till 2006.) The Kurds will make the third side of the warlike triangle reected in the devolved 2005 Constitution of Iraq. After the American troops leave, Turkey is bound to follow an intrusive policy towards Kurdistan, thus presenting Iran with a tough policy choice if it wants to go on supporting the Kurdish cause. Did the United States know that the execution of Saddam Hussein in December 2006 would become a world-wide sectarian event, meaning that its moral and legal status would not be accepted unanimously by the Muslims of the world? It was assumed in the West that since Saddam had been an equal opportunity killer of all the sects and ethnicities, there would be a general acceptance of his execution. In fact strong public protests broke out in several countries around the world - including Iraq, Pakistan and India. Street celebrations were reported in Baghdads Shiite Sadr City slums and other predominantly Shia areas. Kuwait ofcially hailed the execution as fair and just, but its increasingly radical Islamist Sunni population was silently resentful at the rulers having leaned in favour of the 35 percent Shia population in the country. Iran called it a victory for the Iraqi people but it must have been conscious of the sectarian split the death had deepened. The Hamas-led Palestinian government denounced Saddams hanging, and Libya declared three days of ofcial mourning. The hanging of Saddam and the Islamic split In Pakistan and India the governments condemned the hanging because of their Sunni-majority Muslim populations. In India the protest was intense and much larger than in Pakistan. The Indian government ignored the fact that the Shia of India estimated to be equal to the Shia
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population of Pakistan, which is already larger than the Shia population of Iraq did not take part in demonstrations.43 The leftwing politicians of India showed solidarity with the protesting Muslims because of their anti-American stance, but had no realisation that they were taking sides in a sectarian issue. Outsiders saw the protests in India and Pakistan as an expression of anger against the United States. While it is true that the Shia communities in both countries have followed the Iranian line against the United States, they were unable to agree that this should be expressed by mourning the death of Saddam Hussein. In India the longest and most intense protest took place in the state of Jammu & Kashmir because of its Muslim-majority status and because of the strong Sunni-jihadi inuence there since 1989 when the anti-Shia Saudi-funded Deobandi freedom-ghters came in from Pakistan. The city of Lucknow saw a very large demonstration led by Sunni clerics while the Shia, who form a sizeable part of the Muslim community in this historically Shia city, kept their reactions low-key. Some Sunni clerics openly condemned the Shia together with the United States. The death of Saddam Hussein could become a catalyst of Indian Muslims sectarian tendency. Because of Indias secular constitution, the Sunni-Shia schism has not led to any widespread violence. Although accused of discrimination against the Muslims in general, the state is not inclined to favour either sect in their contention. Even though the Sunni clergy has been paying a lot of attention to the rising sectarian tension outside India, its writing of anti-Shia tracts has not led to violence, as in Pakistan. The reason for this is the non-existence, so far, of a strong jihadi core of militias in India, although this may change in the coming years. The biggest matter of concern is the tendency of the Indian Muslims to opt out of the political system. More and more of them have started following their religious leaders, as they shrink away from the secular political parties that engage the electorate in India. Sectarianism spreads only when the Muslims start following the clergy instead of the mainstream political parties. This is what is happening in the Middle East after the demise of Arab nationalism in the region. In Pakistan, the trend of not voting the clergy into power remains strong even after the great success of the clerical alliance MMA in the 2002 general election. In India, the religious leader has become a part of the Indian Muslims paraphernalia
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of withdrawal from politics. The Indian Muslim clergy has been funded by Saudi Arabia in the 1980s to produce books against Iran and Shiism, with the result that now collections of fatwas exist containing edicts of apostatisation issued against the Shia by Indias major Sunni seminaries.44 Highly regarded Indian commentator on Muslim affairs, Dr Yoginder Sikand, has noted the growth of Muslim sectarianism in India: The All India Muslim Personal Law Board had been reduced to a conservative, largely Deobandi institution that was insensitive to the concerns of other sects. Sectarian rivalry among the traditionalist ulema reects a fundamental inability to come to terms with the theological other. Whether it be the non-Muslim other or the sectarian Muslim other, they are seen and dened as enemies or deviants, threatening the faith. This also explains why the Board has been unable to solve the sectarian problem within its own ranks.45 The future of Expatriate Islam Jihad continues to be the passion of a section of the expatriate Muslims. It is from this community that a new sectarian Al Qaeda will draw its strength. In their hinterland, the mujahideen are produced by a complex interaction of Saudi money, salast indoctrination through local hard-line revivalists and even states using non-state actors to ght their covert wars. The passion of the expatriate has its birth in the question of identity, an introversion compelled by the conditions of living in alien societies. The Muslim is differentiated from other non-Muslim expatriate communities by reason of his transnational orientation. In his own country he is habituated to feeling secure or insecure on the basis of his identication with the mythical construct of the umma. This causes alienation with the nation-state that insists on a nationalism based on its self-interest. He carries abroad a dislike of his national identity and reconstructs a new identity based on the idea of the transnational umma, a function not encouraged by the nation-state but easily executed out in the alien West with full citizenship rights.46 The reconstruction of a new transnational Muslim identity in the West is assisted by the policy of multiculturalism that is, allowing
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integration through remaining separate without any obligation to imbibe Western culture. In Western Europe and the United Kingdom, the Muslims have been allowed to attain a hard-line Islamic identity more in line with the inuential, nancially-leveraged Arab Islam than the relatively moderate Islam of South and Southeast Asia. In the case of Pakistani expatriates, some pride is experienced in becoming more distinctly Muslim than the Muslims of Pakistan. The onus of discovery is then placed by the expatriate Pakistani on fellow-Muslims back home through a number of symbols, including a new style of self-grooming and dressing. The rst discovered identity is cast aside and a new one, constructed under conditions of freedom, is embraced. The truth however may be that this construction is under coercion from a group and may actually be a discovery while growing up in an expatriate Muslim home in the West.47 The new synthetic identity of the expatriate Muslim is puritanical and judgemental of other Muslims, and that tends to focus ultimately on Muslims who have been labelled heretical down the centuries. Out of the dozens of heretical communities only the Shia stand out as an emerging power in the Islamic world. The expatriate Muslim is now compelled to turn his attention to the Shia and his new identity points its animus more forcefully to the Shia and Iran than to the JudaeoChristian stronghold of the United States. Secretly observed mosques by journalists in the United Kingdom and Canada now praise Al Qaeda and the Taliban as sectarian organisations, an aspect missed or ignored in the past.48 The future of expatriate Islam will depend on how the West tackles the problems of its empowerment of Muslim communities through equality of citizenship. New, stricter laws are being enacted at the cost of civil liberties to allow the state to carry out an intrusive scrutiny of the mode of life of the Muslims. Much of the intensity of the expatriate Muslim reaction springs from the individuals awareness of his rights rights not available in indigenous Muslim societies. The success of Al Qaeda and its terrorist enterprise is integral to this civic freedom enjoyed by the expatriate Muslim communities in the West. This intensity is bound to subside under new laws at the cost of quality of life; yet the expatriate
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Muslim will continue to enjoy more rights than he would enjoy in a Muslim host state or in his home state. There will be a general lowering of the temperature of Muslim revival because of the transformation of jihad into sectarianism through the low-level intellectual legerdemain offered by Zarqawi and accepted by Al Qaeda. Sectarianism after Al Qaeda leaves Pakistan A welter of analyses is coming out of the various institutions in the United States where intelligence experts are trying to interpret the actions of Al Qaeda. It is agreed on all hands that Al Qaeda is getting ready for a new offensive against Europe and the United States. This is being predicted with the understanding that Al Qaeda has actually failed to pull off a major action after 9/11. The rare Pakistani journalist with access to Al Qaeda contacts in Pakistan is also reporting a greatly enhanced Al Qaeda capacity to plan and execute new terrorist acts. While some Pakistani sources report acquisition by Al Qaeda of missiles and chemical payloads that it can deliver against chosen targets, everyone is agreed on Europe being the immediate target rather than the United States, so that America is deprived of its allies across the Atlantic. It is assumed that, when targeted, Europe will generally move to the policy of distancing itself from America, ignoring the policy of stricter surveillance Europe is now applying to its expatriate Muslim communities. It is also agreed among experts that Al Qaedas nancial outreach has actually increased. There is also an awareness of the evolution of Al Qaeda into an anti-Iran anti-Shia organisation. It is preparing to move out of Pakistan since its target has shifted from Afghanistan to Iraq and Iran is no longer available as a transit territory for its warriors to penetrate into Iraq and the Caucasus regions of Russia. There is also a recognition that Al Qaeda has moved closer to Saudi concerns about the rise of the Shia in the region accompanied by Irans drive for hegemony in the Gulf. If that is the case, Al Qaeda is bound to lose some of its antiAmerican edge as also its involvement with the Taliban and Pakistans jihadi organisations. If it moves out of Pakistan and Afghanistan to its new base in the Anbar province in Iraq, its training facilities will be less
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easily available for Pakistani terrorists. Its exit from South and North Waziristan will change the security situation in that region of Pakistan, making it possible for Islamabad to arrive at new compacts with the local centres of power there. Reports that Al Qaeda was meeting with a lot of success in its policy of seeking new bases outside Pakistan and Afghanistan may be exaggerated since the evidence in Somalia and China so far proves otherwise. But the shifting of its base from Pakistan-Afghanistan to Iraq is feasible and is quite evident. However, it is difcult to say if the desert of Anbar would be as safe for aging Osama bin Laden and Aiman al-Zawahiri as the more salubrious environment of the Pushtun tribal areas. One important source of information from the fastness of Al Qaeda in Pakistan reports: Although many Arab ghters left Afghanistan and Pakistan after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 to join hands with the Iraqi resistance, others are now following. This will further weaken the link between al-Qaeda and the Taliban after the latters decision to strike a deal with Pakistan. When groups, parties or individuals side in any way with the state apparatus, al-Qaeda sees them as unreliable and potentially harmful to al-Qaedas mission. This has happened with the Taliban over their deal [over raids into Afghanistan across the Durand Line] with Islamabad.49 Al Qaeda has also become alienated from the largest Deobandi politico-religious party in Pakistan, the JUI whose leader has been involved in enabling the army to reach a new understanding with the Taliban50. Al Qaeda has similarly fallen foul of Pakistans premier Wahhabi jihadi outt Lashkar Tayba and its leader Haz Said51. Jihad has been a logistical achievement and Al Qaedas terrorism has depended on Pakistan as its pivot. Osama bin Laden left his headquarters in Peshawar in the early 1990s and established himself in Sudan after pressures on the political governments in Islamabad heightened from the friendly Arab states. In Sudan he could not make much headway in his enterprise of international terrorism, and with time the Sudanese leaders became less and less determined to withstand American pressure. He returned to Afghanistan after learning that the Sudanese government was thinking of selling him to the Americans. From 1996 on, Al Qaeda has operated successfully from Afghanistan, but not without a lot of logistical help from Pakistan and its jihadi militias. Most foreign
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terrorists passed through Pakistans seminaries to Afghanistan to take their training, including the 19 suicide-bombers who destroyed the Trade Center towers in New York and damaged the Pentagon in Washington DC in 2001. Will Iraq be a good geographical point from where to strike next at the United States and Europe? Iraq will lack many of the facilities that Pakistan offered. The Pakistani people are sympathetic and the Pakistani establishment was in favour of using Al Qaeda in tandem with the Taliban for achieving its strategic purposes in Afghanistan. Since Al Qaeda presided over a combination of forces doing sectarian terrorism in Pakistan and because the Shia in Pakistan were a minority and unable to hit back it remained safe in the training camps it had established inside Afghanistan. In Iraq it will have to locate itself in a province that is Sunni in population but around which there is a large Shia population willing to, and capable of, opposing it militarily. The Iraqi government will continue to be predominantly Shia with strong links to Iran. Al Qaeda will have as its neighbour Syria which is an ally of Iran and borders Lebanon where Hezbollah and its Shia hinterland will form a strong deterrent to Al Qaedas Sunni warriors. Despite proximity to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, Al Qaeda in Anbar may not have the kind of favourable environment it enjoyed in Afghanistan with Pakistans help. If the United States stays on in Iraq it will weigh in heavily on the side of the Shia. In fact conditions may be just the opposite of what they were in Pakistan where the Saudis had nanced sectarianism in the seminaries from where Al Qaeda in turn drew its recruits. Is Iraq the magnet that draws Al Qaeda? With the weakening of Pakistani support and increasingly successful efforts by Islamabad to regain control over the tribal region where Al Qaeda is compelled to base itself, it will most likely seek to relocate. The exit of Al Qaeda from Pakistan will weaken the sectarian trend in the country. Today, in 2007, almost all the sectarian violence against the Shia is being perpetrated by Lashkar Jhangvi, the only organisation left under the nancial umbrella of Al Qaeda. All other outts doing sectarian killings on the side have either been suppressed by Islamabad or have opted out. In 2006, for the rst time, Pakistan became aware that sectarianism was being driven exclusively by Al Qaeda. After the folding up of Al Qaeda camps in the
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Tribal Areas, more sectarian recruits will not be available to it in times to come. Saudi Arabia will likely divert its resources to the Anbar base and not be as deeply involved in defeating Iran in Pakistan as in the past when the Arab states were not directly threatened. By August 2007, however, it has become clear that Al Qaeda might seek to establish its permanent base in Pakistan. This has happened after its earlier plan to set up its own state in Somalia was rmly opposed by the United States and the neighbouring states of Somalia. It appears that Al Qaedas strategy in Pakistan is linked to its strategy to oust the ISAF-NATO and US forces in Afghanistan. The advantage of this strategy is that it has the popular support of the very state it is targeting. Afghanistan, once free of the protective shield of NATO, will succumb to a condominium of Al Qaeda and its ancillary Taliban, including the Pushtun tribes of Pakistan, after possibly splitting into two.52 Such a development will make Pakistan extremely vulnerable to Al Qaeda control through the Sunni religious parties and their militias.
References:
1 2 3 Marshall GS Hodgson, The Venture of Islam (In Three Volumes), University of Chicago, 1974. The author explains the title of his book in the preface. Melanie Phillips, Londonistan, Encounter Books New York 2006, p.56. Jahiliyya means darkness in Arabic and is applied to times before Islam. Maududi in India applied it to Muslim societies living without Islamic law (shariah) in the rst half of the 20th century. Syed Qutb in Egypt read it and gave it a violent turn by recommending that such societies be coerced through violence in modern times. In the 17th century, Wahhab had already applied the term to Arabian society and used violence against it. Dore Gold, Hatreds Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism, Regnery Publishing Washington DC, 2003, p.95. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, Berkley Books New York 2002, p.26. The Saudi chief of intelligence Price Turki worked closely with Osama to coordinate both the ghting and the relief efforts, while two Saudi Banks Darul Maal al-Islami founded by Prince Turkis brother Prince Muhammad Faisal in 1981; and Dalla al-Baraka founded by King Fahds brother-in-law in 1982 supported the antiSoviet campaigns. These institutions allowed MAK to develop its outreach to the US through opening of ofces. Muntassar al-Zayyat, The Road to Al Qaeda: The Story of Bin Ladens Right-Hand Man; Pluto Press, 2004. An account of Al Zawahiris career is taken from this book. Zayyats claim that he took a PhD degree in Pakistan cant be proved, but then if the ISI wanted to favour him they could have printed a special degree from any institution. Muntassar al-Zayyat of Gamaa Islamiyya published the book in 2002 as a kind of repartee after
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Aiman Al Zawahiri condemned the Gamaas decision to give up violence in the wake of the 1997 massacre of 58 Western tourists at Luxor. This was in some ways also an answer to Al Zawahiris book Knights under the Banner of the Prophet, written at Tora Bora in Afghanistan in 2001, and an attempt to disclose Al Zawahiris own deviations from views held at earlier points of time. The book is interesting in the sense that it lifts the veil from the way the Islamists in Egypt conduct themselves, the extent of their insulation from the free society of Egypt (and the consequent outlandishness of their brand of Islam) and indirectly the stamp Al Zawahiris domination of Al Qaeda left over the jihadi outts of Pakistan. Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West, Harvard University Press 2004, P.85 and p.86. Peter L Bergen, Holy War Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, Simon & Shuster 2001, p.56. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, p.28-29. Barnett R Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From buffer State to Failed State, Yale University Press, 1995, p.103. Fawaz A Gerges, Journey of the Jihadists: Inside Muslim Militancy, Harcourt Inc 2006, p.123 Rohan Gunaratna, Al Qaedas Ideology, in Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Volume One, Hudson Institute, Washington DC, 2005, p.62. Kathy Gannon, I is for Indel: from Holy War to Holy Terror, 18 Years inside Afghanistan, Public Affairs New York 2005, p.78. Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, Free Press New York 2006, p.261. Wilson John, The New Face of Al Qaeda in Pakistan, Terrorist Monitor, 7 October 2004, in Unmasking Terror: A Global Review of Terrorist Activities, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC, 2006, p.305. Ibid. p.306. Suroosh Irfani, Pakistans Sectarian Violence: Between the Arabist Shift and IndoPersian Culture, in Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia, Chapter 7, AsiaPacic Center Honolulu 2004, p.165. Mariam Abou Zahab, Sectarian Violence in Pakistan: Local Roots and Global Connections, in Global Terrorism: Genesis, Implications, Remedial and Counter-Measures, Hans Sidel Foundation & Institute of Regional Studies Islamabad 2006, p.383. Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill, Harper/Collins 2004, p.199. Jean-Charles Brisard, Zarqawi: The New Face of Al Qaeda, Other Press New York 2005, p.20. Ibid, p.21. Ibid, p.33. Abu Zubayda was arrested in Pakistan from Faisalabad in 2002, the home of the Wahhabi organisations and named after late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, after a battle with the police, in which he was wounded, before being handed over to the United States. Ibid, p.75. Ibid, p.128. Yitzhak Nakash, The Shii of Iraq, Princeton 1994, p.285: Samarra is home to the Shrines of Ali ibn Muhammad al Hadi, and his son Hasan al Askari, as well as the hiding site of Muhammad Al Mahdi, the tenth, eleventh and twelfth imams respectively. Raymond William Baker, Islam without Fear, Viva Books/Harvard 2005. This book by
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a visiting scholar at Cairos American University correctly supports the new Islamists calling themselves wassatiyya. The new Islamists claimed to go back to the thought of the great Egyptian Muhammad Abduh and the Iranian reformer Jamaluddin Afghani. A debate developed around this and went into the pages of Al Ahram. The wassatiyya were led by Ghazzali (late) and Qardawi. Their message was considered of moderation and anti-violence. Qardawi thereafter became radical within the wassatiyya of being moderate towards Islamic societies but being anti-West at the global level. Nibras Kazimi, A Virulent Ideology in Mutation: Zarqawi upstages Maqdisi, in Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Volume 2, Hudson Institute Washington DC 2005, p.66. Nibras Kazimi, Zarqawis anti-Shia Legacy: Original or Borrowed? Hudson Institute, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Volume Four, 2006, p.2: In the jihadist version of history, in 1258 the vizier Ibn Al-Alqamiallegedly a Shiaconspired with Nassireddin Al-Tusi, another Shia who acted as adviser to the Tatar commander Holaku, to attack Baghdad and topple the Abbasid Caliphate. The last caliph, Al-Mustaasim, was killed after being bundled up by the Tatars in sackcloth and trampled to death, and the city was laid to waste with hundreds of thousands of its inhabitants put to the sword or enslaved. To Zarqawi and the jihadists, Americas occupation of Baghdad in April 2003 mirrored those events many centuries ago because it also occurred through Shia collusion. Ibid, p.67. Ibid, p.67. Economist, 8 June 2006. Nibras Kazimi, Zarqawis Anti-Shia Legacy: Original or Borrowed? in Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Volume 4, 2006, p.53. Ibid, p.3. Website Iranmania.com, quoting Iranian news agency IRNA on 25 November 2005. Fawaz A Gerges, Journey of the Jihadists: Inside Muslim Militancy, Harcourt Inc, New York, 2006, p. 252. The word majus (majoos) is the Arabic rendering of Magus, singular of the Biblical Magi who came from Persia to greet Jesus Christ at his birth. Nibras Kazimi, p.60. Ibid, p.63. Gaith Abdul Ahad, The Jihad now is against the Shias, not the Americans, The Guardian, 13 January 2007. The reporter describes the redirection of Al Qaeda terrorism and its merger with the Sunni-Baathist reaction in Iraq. Daily Times, Iran decides to wall Pak-Iran border, 2 March 2007. A CAIR representative expressed this view in a discussion on C-Span TV channel on 14 December 2006. Yahoo News India, 30 December 2006. The All India Shia Personal Law Board (AISPLB) on Saturday took a rather strong stand on the execution of former Iraq president Saddam Hussein. Terming Saddams execution as justied, the AISPLB added that Saddam was tried by a court of justice and punished for his heinous crimes. Saddam should not be seen as a Muslim as he was not following true Islam, the president of AISPLBs Mumbai chapter, Sayed Mohammed Nawab, said in an ofcial release. Nawab said that Saddam was a tyrant and many other tyrants in Islamic history are prostrated by Saddami Muslims who destroyed cities and killed millions of people whom they called kars, (unbelievers). These people had imposed their own kind of terrorist Islam, he added. These are the kind of Muslims behind Saddam, praising his
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44 inhuman acts, Nawab said. (http://in.news.yahoo.com/061230/211/6apch.html). Muhammad Manzur Numani of India wrote his rst book against Iran and Imam Khomeini in 1984 titled Irani Inqilab, Imam Khomeini aur Shiiat (Iranian Revolution Imam Khomeini and Shiism), which was distributed all over the world by Saudi Embassies in translation. Then Numani called for edicts of apostatisation from all seminaries of India and Pakistan and printed them serially in a journal of Lucknow, India, Al Furqan, in 1987 and 1988. He also compiled all of them in a book issued in 1987: Khomeini aur Shia kay baray mein Ulema Karam ka Mutaqqa Faisala, (Khomeini and the Shia in the Consensual Verdict of the Ulema). Yoginder Sikand, In Indian Islams Belly, the Stirrings of Reform, Tehelka.com, 5 March 2005. Akeel Bilgrami, Notes towards a Denition of Identity, Daedalus, Journal of American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Fall 2006, p.7: Bilgrami says identity is assumed in two ways, by receiving it with dislike and by receiving it with devotion. Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: the Illusion of Destiny, Norton 2006. Sen posits discovery of identity against freedom to choose one or many identities. In his view discovery is a coercive process leading to group identication and violence. The Observer, London, Revealed: Preachers Messages of Hate, 7 January 2007; and Tarek Fatah. 8 January 2007, through email reproducing similar reports from Toronto Star, Canada. Saleem Shahzad, Al Qaedas Resurgence: Ready to take on the World, Asia Time Online, 2 March 2007. Shahzad is a Pakistani journalist with a strong religious background who has emerged as a source among the Pushtun contacts of Al Qaeda and has lately emerged a leading analyst of Al Qaeda. Ibid, Some Pakistani religious leaders have angered al-Qaeda, including the leader of the opposition in Parliament, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, who is chief of the Jamiati-Ulema-i-Islam, which in turn is part of a six-party religious alliance, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). Rahmans closeness to the Libyan government and President Muammar Gadda is one reason, and al-Qaeda believes that at the behest of the Libyans, Rehman facilitated the arrest of a Libyan group that was hiding in Pakistans North West Frontier Province, including Abu Dahda al-Barah. Mosa-i-Saiful Islam alKhayria, a Libyan welfare organization headed by Gaddas son Saiful Islam, was used as a cover for the intelligence operation. The Pakistani Taliban in the North and South Waziristan tribal areas, under the inuence of al-Qaeda, have already murdered the uncle of the MMAs chief minister of North West Frontier Province and sent death threats to Rehmans brother. Ibid, Another person to have drawn al-Qaedas ire is Haz Mohammed Said. He is suspected of embezzling about US$3 million that he was given by al-Qaeda to move Arab-Afghan families to safety after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Abu Zubayda handed over the money to Said, and when Said did not deliver on his part of the bargain, Abu Zubayda demanded that the money be returned. Then Abu Zubayda hideout in Faisalabad was exposed and he was arrested and delivered to the United States. Said is believed to have betrayed him. Daily Times, Editorial, 12 August 2007: If NATO is ousted from Afghanistan, Pakistan too will be overrun by a much strengthened Taliban-Al Qaeda combine. Just as Pakistan is hinterland to the Talibans forays into Afghanistan, Afghanistan will become hinterland to forays into Pakistan till a clerical-jihadist state is established here.
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PATTERNS OF REGIONAL COOPERATION: OPTIONS FOR PAKISTAN

Shahwar Junaid*
Abstract.
(The rst recognizable initiative towards regional cooperation appeared in Europe during the 1880s. By the 1940s an increasing number of inuential intellectuals were urging escape from a theoretical and ineffective universalism into practical and workable regionalism1 Consideration of this option was understandable, under the strain of war and, later, post-war reconstruction. Serious moves for regional cooperation emerged only after World War II. As a result of the emergence of regional groupings in many parts of the world, the region as a unit of analysis in international relations becomes important. Author). Denitions of regionalism within the global system of international relations emerge from conceptual models for the study and analysis of the subject. Such conceptual models are provided through the academic study of international relations. The number and nature of assumptions on which a theory of international relations is based tends to determine its usefulness for analytical study. International relations (IR) theories are generally divided into positivist/rationalist theories, which focus on state-level analysis and post-positivist/ reectivity theories, that incorporate broader concepts arising from experiences of the postcolonial economic and security environment as well as socio-political concerns and related phenomenon.2 A number of conicting theories exist, but the liberal and constructivist theories are in the mainstream today. Modern day functionalism is the theory of international relations
* Shahwar Junaid, a former Communications Media Consultant to the Pakistan Government, is an eminent writer and intellectual. Her latest book is titled, Terrorism and Global Power Systems, Oxford University Press, 2006.
Shahwar Junaid
that emerged from the post-World War II experience of European integration.3 Functionalism is relevant to present-day discussions of regionalism.4 One description of the term functionalism is the result of its use as an argument explaining phenomenon arising from the functions of a system: functionalist theory has been used to explain that the Westphalian international political system arose in order to protect the emerging international capitalist system.5 Functionalists give causal power to the system itself, bypassing agents of the system. This is relevant for any study of patterns of regionalism in the world today. The Thirty Years War in Europe was the culmination of a number of large and small conicts that took place on religious grounds over a period of a hundred years. Parallel economic developments had a profound impact on inter-state and intra-state relations. In 1648 the Peace of Westphalia, that followed the Thirty Years War, established that rulers had the right to determine which religion would be observed within their territories.6 By the same token it recognized the sovereignty of established states and condemned interference in their internal affairs, including trade and commerce. The Peace of Westphalia led to the establishment of nationalism as the preeminent force in international relations and the nation-state system as the accepted political order in Europe. Functionalist theory applied the same principles to later developments in international relations: it grew in diverse directions as a result of the experience of European integration in the post-World War II era.7 Instead of the self-interest of states seen in the realist theory of IR, functionalism now focused on the common interests shared by states and concluded that regional integration develops its own dynamics: as states integrate in certain elds of activity the momentum for integration in related areas will develop.8 This is known as the spill-over of regional integration. Functionalists are of the view that it becomes difcult for nationalist forces to resist integration once this stage in policy induced regional integration has been reached. According to one school of thought, the yardstick for measuring interest in international regionalism is the establishment of institutions to promote it. If institutionalization at the regional level, as opposed to institutionalization of inter-state activity
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at the international level is the yardstick for measuring interest, then it is difcult to nd evidence of regionalism prior to 1945. The InterAmerican System was an exception.9 The rst recognizable initiative towards regional cooperation appeared in Europe during the 1880s. By the 1940s an increasing number of inuential intellectuals were urging escape from a theoretical and ineffective universalism into practical and workable regionalism10 Consideration of this option was understandable, under the strain of war and, later, post-war reconstruction. Serious moves for regional cooperation emerged only after World War II. The treaty establishing the Benelux Customs Union was signed in London in 1944 by the governments in exile of Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. It entered into force in 1947. In 1952 Denmark, Iceland and Norway established the inter-parliamentary Nordic Council with the objective of forging Nordic regional cooperation. They were joined by Finland in 1955. At the time, serious attempts were made to institutionalize trade and commerce within Europe on advantageous terms. These attempts were motivated by the thought that institutionalized economic cooperation and regional interdependence would foster peace and the states of Europe would be bound so closely in economic and political ties that there would never again be a war on the European continent.11 In 1951 France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in order to pool the coal and steel resources of member states. On 25 March 1957 the same states signed the momentous Treaty of Rome which established the European Economic Community EEC). The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was established at the time in order to manage nuclear power in Europe. The EEC was to develop in multiple directions. As a result of the emergence of regional groupings in many parts of the world, the region as a unit of analysis in international relations becomes important. In widely accepted denitions an international region is considered a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence. International regionalism has been dened as the formation of interstate associations or groupings on
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the basis of regions.12Analysts stress the need to differentiate between regionalism, regional integration, regional organization, regional systems and regional cooperation:13 the existence or acceptance of one form was not a pre-condition for the existence or acceptance of other dimensions of regional phenomena.14 This is particularly relevant where the parameters of the region are not clearly dened, or, they differ in the perception of the different states of the region. Political activists in South Asia who would like to promote the post-war European model of policy induced regional integration in the sub-continent nd this aspect of regionalism difcult to accept. Study of the possibilities of various aspects of regionalism also provides insight into its limitations under various circumstances. Regionalism is the political philosophy that emphasizes the preeminence of the interest of groups of states within the region over the interests of individual states within the group and, in some cases, the international community. There have to be powerful reasons for states to even consider giving up, or sharing their political and economic space with neighbouring states: traditionally, they raise armies to protect these aspects of sovereignty from their neighbours. In post-war Europe regionalism was a reaction against forces of nationalism that had thrust the continent into two devastating wars in the space of fty years. Elsewhere, regionalism emerged as a product of forces such as decolonization that had shaped the world in the 20th century. In the postcolonial era newly independent states were faced with phenomenon related to global structural change within trading systems, political systems, governments, as well as in inter-state relations. The prospects of continuing trade and commerce with their erstwhile rulers on terms that had originally sparked movements for independence was not a feasible one. Consequently, newly independent states sought economic partners elsewhere. The restructuring of the global political system and the Cold War created a new set of constraints to free trade, since trade between entire regions became impossible for political reasons. Where there were no such constraints, regionalism was an option. Regionalism emphasized the primacy of the interests of regional groupings with common interests
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over those of individual state, and offered advantages in return. The end of the Cold War in 1989 created a broad range of new opportunities for global restructuring. The establishment of the WTO (World Trade Organization) as the successor of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) through the Uruguay Round set the stage for globalization of industry and commerce and the restructuring of terms of trade. Both events had a global impact and created waves within existing regional arrangements covering economic activity, trade and security.15 Regionalism is one of the three constituents of the international system of trade and commerce, the other two being multilateralism and unilateralism. In any study of regionalism it is tempting to measure success by quantiable advantages accruing from institutional arrangements designed to facilitate the free ow of goods and services and the coordination of economic policies between countries in the same geographic region while ignoring, or minimizing, the importance of other concerns, such as security issues and questions of sovereignty within regional arrangements at the institutional level a cumbersome task. According to one school of thought, analysis of regional trade agreements (RTAs) tends to use tools from trade theory focusing on trade creation, trade diversion and the impact of terms of trade. While these tools are sufcient for analysis of shallow integration they do not take into account the issues of deeper integration, characterized by institutionalization. Analysis of this phenomenon should include other aspects such as the relationship between trade and productivity, endogenous growth, imperfect competition, rent seeking behaviour and politico-economic considerations, including possible conicts between regionalism and multilateralism.16 The positive impact of trade liberalization on agricultural production is an important consideration within the regional trade context but there can be questions regarding fair competition in view of high tariffs, the use of domestic subsidies on agriculture inputs and special interest activism. The critical issue for developing countries interested in regional preferential trade is to use it as an element of a larger development strategy and in order to enhance stability at the regional level. The experience of policy induced regional
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integration in Europe offers invaluable insight into possibilities, but each region faces unique challenges and must nd its own response to them. The origin of regional cooperation in Europe and the America Economic regionalism is dened as a formal attempt to manage the opportunities and constraints created by global structural change after World War II, the decolonization that followed it and the bipolar world order that subsequently emerged. Several arrangements for economic integration in Europe were nalized in the decades following World War II: These arrangements were made in the context of the Cold War and parallel to regional security arrangements (such as NATO).17The strategy to reconstruct Europe after World War II was formed in a bipolar global system, under the cloud of the Cold War which dominated inter-state relations until 1989. As mentioned earlier, several arrangements for regional economic integration were established in the decades following World War II. The European Coal and Steel Community (Paris Treaty 18 April 1951) sought to bring together control of the coal and steel industries of its member states, principally France and West Germany. The Communitys founders declared it a rst step in the federation of Europe. Two additional communities were created in 1957: the European Economic Community (EEC) establishing a customs union, and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) for cooperation in developing nuclear energy. The European Free Trade Association was established in 1960.18 Finally, the European Union (EU), a supranational organization of European countries which currently has twenty seven members,19 was formed in 1993 by the ratication of the Maastricht Treaty. During the period of its transformation from the European Community into the European Union, trade of member states with countries outside the RTA (Regional Trade Agreement), shrank. Meanwhile internal trade in Europe grew from 53 percent in 1952 to 70 percent of overall trade in Europe in 1993. With almost 500 million citizens, EU member states generate an estimated 30 percent share of the worlds nominal gross domestic product (US$ 16.8 trillion in 2007). 20 The EU has developed
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a single market through a standardized system of laws which apply in all member states, guaranteeing the freedom of movement of people, goods, services and capital.21 The EU maintains a common trade policy, agricultural and sheries policies, and a regional development policy. Fifteen member states have adopted a common currency, the euro. The European Central Bank in Frankfurt governs Euro zone monetary policy. A single currency for the EU had been an ofcial objective since 1969 and work began on Economic and Monetary Union in 1990. Nine years later the euro was launched in eleven of the fteen member states as an accounting currency. This meant that national currencies remained in use but the exchange rates were locked to the euro. On 1 January 2002, euro notes and coins were issued and the national currencies were phased out in twelve countries. Currently 15 states are using the euro as their sole ofcial currency. All other EU members, except Denmark and the United Kingdom, have agreed to join as a condition of being members of the EU but dates for adopting the euro will be set later. A number of countries outside the EU, such as Montenegro, also use the euro unofcially. The euro, and the monetary policies of those who have adopted it, is controlled by the European Central Bank (ECB). The euro is designed to help build a single market in Europe by, for example, easing travel and trade, eliminating exchange rate problems, providing price transparency, creating a single nancial market and price stability. Having a currency that is used for a large amount of internal trade within the euro zone and internationally as well as protects the European Union against currency uctuations. It is also a potent political symbol of integration and stimulus for adopting others. In recent years holdings of the euro have grown, and there is some speculation that if the euro zone continues to enlarge and/or the U.S. dollar continues to fall, the euro could become the main world reserve currency.22 The European Union has developed an international presence, representing its members in the World Trade Organization, at G-8 summits and at the United Nations. Twenty-one EU countries are members of NATO. The EU has a role in justice and home affairs of member states. The abolition of passport control between many member
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states, under the Schengen Agreement has been a signicant unifying step.23 EU administration is a hybrid of inter-governmentalism and supranationalism based on consensus and the will of the people of member states. National level referendums are held in member states in order to determine the will of the people regarding proposed EU legislation on key issues. The foreign relations of the EU are primarily dealt with through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Cooperation in international trade negotiations, under the Common Commercial Policy, dates back to the establishment of the European Community in 1957. The CFSP itself has its origins in the formation of European Political Cooperation in 1970. European Political Cooperation was an informal consultation process between member states on foreign policy matters. It was introduced into the European Community through the Single European Act and subsequently renamed the Common Foreign and Security Policy through provisions in the Maastricht Treaty.24 The Maastricht Treaty gives the Common Foreign and Security Policy the task of promoting both the EUs own interests and those of the international community as a whole. This includes promoting international cooperation, respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law.25 The Amsterdam Treaty created the ofce of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (currently held by Javier Solana) to co-ordinate the EUs foreign policy. The Representative speaks on behalf of the EU in foreign policy matters and negotiates ambiguous policy positions created by disagreements among member states. The Common Foreign and Security Policy requires unanimity among the twenty seven member states. This, along with the difcult issues dealt with by the CFSP, makes disagreements, such as those which occurred over the war in Iraq, common. Finnish Prime Minister, Matti Vanhanen, cited the EUs common foreign policy as the reason why Finland is, de facto, no longer a neutral country. The EUs emerging international policy is accompanied by its growing global inuence as a consequence of the enlargement of its membership. The perceived benets of becoming a member of the EU acts as an incentive for both political and economic reform in states wishing to full the EUs
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accession criteria and is considered a major factor contributing to the reform of the former communist countries in Eastern Europe. This inuence on the internal affairs of other countries is generally referred to as soft power, as opposed to military hard power. European Union Security and Defence Policy Member states of the European Union are responsible for their own territorial defence. Many EU members are also members of NATO, the transatlantic regional security organization. The Western European Union (WEU) is a European security organization related to the EU.26 In 1992, the WEUs relationship with the EU was dened and it was assigned humanitarian missions such as peacekeeping and crisis management. Elements of the WEU are currently being merged into the EUs CFSP, and the President of the WEU is currently the CFSP High Representative. Following the Kosovo War in 1999, the European Council agreed that the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to action by NATO. To that end, a number of efforts were made to increase the EUs real military capability. The most concrete result was the EU Battlegroups initiative, with the capability to deploy about 1,500 men, at one time. EU forces have been deployed on peacekeeping missions from Africa to the former Yugoslavia and the Middle East. EU military operations are supported by a number of bodies, including the European Defence Agency, satellite centre and the military staff. Economic policy One method classifying different forms of economic regionalism is by the level of institutional integration they achieve: deep or tight integration is characterized by a high level of inter-state institutional integration through norms, principles, rules and decision-making procedures that are mutually agreed upon and tend to limit the autonomy of individual members. The EU is an example of deep integration having evolved from a limited free trade area to customs union, a common
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market and nally an economic and currency union, now on the way to evolving a common foreign policy and credible defence capability to be used by consent of member states and in their interest. Today the EU has a parliament that legislates on a broad range of issues: member states nd it advantageous to adhere to the standards it sets. Economic integration has had pronounced spill-over effects in the political, social and security arenas. Another method of classifying forms of economic regionalism is by their treatment of non-members. Trade liberalization and unconditional most-favoured-nation status in compliance with Article XXIV of GATT27 are characteristic of open regionalism that does not seek to exclude nonmembers from their markets.28 In contrast closed or exclusive forms of regionalism impose protectionist measures to limit non-members access to the markets of member states. The international trading system of the Cold War period in which competing blocs enhanced their economic power by pursuing aggressive trading policies, is one example of closed regionalism. The European Union, NAFTA29 and APEC30 have a number of institutional arrangements to encourage trade with non-member states. However, these arrangements come into play selectively and are frequently used as tools of foreign policy. NAFTA Regional arrangements across the Atlantic do not come close to matching the sophisticated balancing act that is typical of the European continent. For one, the perceived needs of the area differ. Here there is no question of moving towards a federal structure, or, for a structured convergence of security and foreign policy. Regionalism on the American continent is concerned with more pragmatic matters, such as preferential trade, the management of unemployment and the development of backward territory. International security matters are managed through multilateral security arrangements such as NATO, in the case of the United States and Canada, and bilateral arrangements or traditional international security mechanisms such as the Security Council of the United Nations. The North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a trilateral trade bloc in North America that was created by
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the governments of Canada, Mexico and the United States in December 1992. It was subject to ratication by the legislatures of all three. There was considerable opposition to NAFTA in all three countries. Nevertheless, the agreement came into effect on 1 January 1994. NAFTA has two supplements, the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC). In terms of combined purchasing power parity GDP of its members, NAFTA is the largest trade bloc in the world and second largest by nominal GDP comparison (2007). There has been some convergence of labour standards since the creation of NAFTA however the three countries in the bloc have pursued different trade policies with non-members making it difcult to create a customs union. Mexico, for example, has signed Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with more than 40 countries. NAFTA touches on very sensitive issues in trade, such as agriculture liberalization and environment regulation; therefore few countries in the region have shown interest in joining it.31 Instead, some countries, like Chile, have preferred to negotiate separate bilateral agreements with the three current NAFTA members, with different restrictions on the liberalization of industry and the regulation of environment protection. The effects of NAFTA, both positive and negative, have been quantied by several economists, whose ndings have been reported in a number of publications.32 Some argue that NAFTA has been positive for Mexico, which has seen poverty rates fall and real income rise, even after accounting for the 1944-1995 economic crisis.33 Others argue that NAFTA has been benecial to business owners and elites in all three countries, but has had negative impacts on farmers in Mexico who saw food prices fall as a result of cheap imports from U.S. agribusiness, and on US workers in manufacturing and assembly industries, who lost jobs,. Some economists believe that NAFTA has not done enough to produce economic convergence in the region, or to substantially reduce poverty rates and additional investment is required in infrastructure and agriculture.
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Trade NAFTA has not caused trade diversion, aside from a few select industries such as textiles and apparel, in which rules of origin negotiated in the agreement were specically designed to make U.S. rms prefer Mexican manufacturers.34 The World Bank reported that the collected NAFTA imports percentage growth was accompanied by an almost similar increase of non-NAFTA exports. Some groups advocate deeper integration into a North American Community. Sensitive issues have hindered that process. Agriculture was (and still remains) a controversial topic within NAFTA, as it has been with almost all free trade agreements that have been signed within the WTO framework. Agriculture is the only section that was not negotiated trilaterally in NAFTA; instead, three separate agreements were signed between each pair of parties. The CanadaU.S. agreement contains signicant restrictions and tariff quotas on agricultural products, mainly sugar, dairy, and poultry products, whereas the Mexico-U.S. pact allows for a wider liberalization within a framework of phase-out periods - it was the rst North-South FTA on agriculture to be signed. In essence this is against the spirit of regionalism and downgrades the exercise in one area to a bilateral one. On the other hand this method of dealing with a contentious issue, rather than scrapping the whole deal, represents the kind of compromises that have to be made when regional arrangements are institutionalized. A study published in the August 2008 issue of the American Journal of Agricultural Economics, stated that NAFTA has increased U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico and Canada even though most of this increase has occurred a decade after the ratication of the Agreement. The study focused on the effects that gradual phase-in periods have on trade ows, within the framework of regional trade agreements, such as NAFTA. Most of the increase in members agricultural trade, which was only recently brought under the purview of the World Trade Organization, was due to very high trade barriers prior to NAFTA. There have been controversies in many areas of economic activity under the NAFTA regime. Since there are no precedents and there is no legislation,
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litigation on many issues is pending.35 In the case of the European Union, there is detailed legislation on most issues that arise. Matters that are not covered are brought to the notice of the European Parliament which has the authority to debate and pass legislation. It is over fourteen years since NAFTA has been in force. In order to analyze its impact on the economy of the region it is necessary to consider the viewpoint of NAFTA opponents, as well as its supporters. NAFTAs opponents include many categories of labour as well as environment conservationists and consumer groups. Initially it was said that NAFTA would lead to lower wages in the United States, eliminate hundreds of thousands of U.S. jobs and undermine democratic control of domestic policy-making, threatening health, environment and food safety standards. NAFTA promoters included many of the worlds largest corporations. They were of the view that NAFTA would create hundreds of thousands of new high-wage U.S. jobs, raise living standards in the U.S., Mexico and Canada and improve environmental conditions. NAFTA was expected to transform Mexico from a poor, developing country, on the borders of the United States, into a booming new market for U.S. exports. This was expected to have a positive effect on the stability of the region. Such divergent views were to be expected because NAFTA was a radical experiment that undertook the merger of three nations with radically different levels of economic development. This had never been attempted before. Prior to NAFTA, trade agreements in the region dealt with cutting tariffs, lifting quotas and setting other similar terms of trade in goods between countries. NAFTA, on the other hand, contained 900 pages of rules to which each signatory nation was required to conform its domestic laws regardless of whether similar laws had previously been rejected by different national legislative bodies. NAFTA set quality control standards on a broad range of goods and services in all member states. Indirectly it set controls on the power of local government and sought to eliminate preferences for local products or locally-grown food through regional legislation. Its core provisions covered the relocation of industry and the privatization and deregulation of a number of essential services in the interest of the region as a whole.
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Other regional cooperation organizations The levels of regional integration promoted through the European Union and NAFTA legislation have precedents in a politicized form in the economy of the former Soviet Union. The links between the successor states of the Soviet Union, Russia, and the newly independent states of the near abroad (both European and Central Asia) are not formal. They have carried over from institutions that no longer exist. The EU and NAFTA are two of the most highly evolved regional organizations in the world today, with a politico-economic mandate. NATO is equally evolved but has a security mandate. There are about thirty, more or less active, regional groupings in the world today.36 Most have a formal or informal interest in regional security as well. Some are on the way to serious institutionalized regional integration, with allied regional security interests, such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the alliance of ten independent countries that promotes stability and economic growth in Southeast Asia. ASEAN has set up the consultative ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which has been preparing to establish a quick reaction force to combat terrorism in the region (27 July 2007). The Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation (APEC) is an organization created in 1989 for 21 Pacic-rim countries or member economies, to discuss the regional economy, cooperation, trade and investment and manage the interplay of economic, political and security factors, APEC is an attempt at regime creation. APEC membership claims to account for approximately 41 percent of the worlds population, approximately 56 percent of world GDP and about 49 percent of world trade. The activities, including yearround meetings of the members ministers, are coordinated by the APEC Secretariat in Singapore.37 APEC covers one of the worlds most economically dynamic regions at a time when the area is projected to continue its unprecedented economic growth well into the 21st century but lacks a regional institutional framework that can cope with developments in other parts of the world. Many other regional groupings across the globe are less structured,
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in a nascent experimental stage, or dormant. They are characterized by reliance on informal links, consultative mechanisms and consensus building measures. Compared to the EU, they lack binding institutional integration with shared norms, principles, rules and decision making procedures that could limit the autonomy of individual members. The economic spill-over of such integration is not attractive enough and the political will not strong enough to lead to such levels of regionalism. However the potential for protable integration exists. These regional groupings include the African Economic Community that runs parallel to the African Union (formerly the Organization of African Unity (OAU)), the Andean Community (CAN), the Arab Maghreb Union, the Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom), the Central American Common Market (CACM), the Central European Free Trade Area, the Common Market of the South Cone (Mercosur), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). WTO regimes have had an impact on these organizations but within their region they continue to serve as a cushion against the ongoing process of globalization with its internationalization of industrial norms, Total Quality Control, labour welfare concepts, the outsourcing of industrial production, nancial transactions and other aspects of trade in goods, commodities and services. The desire for regional stability and economic progress in the face of international pressures was the motivating force behind the creation of regional associations in South Asia. The Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) was a multi-governmental organization which was originally established in 1962 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey to promote the socio-economic development of member states. In 1979, this organization was dissolved. The intention in forming the organization was to foster existing, longstanding cultural and economic links between member states. The reality was that from the period of its inception to the time of its dissolution the groups secretariat proposed 81 economic projects out of which 49 were approved by member states but only 17 could be completed. RCD was replaced by the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 1985. The basic Charter of the Organization, the Treaty of Izmir was amended in 1990, providing a legal basis for the revival of the organization. In 1992, ECO accepted seven new members,
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namely Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Since its expansion in 1992, ECOs long term perspectives and sectoral priorities have been dened in two action plans and a strategy document. Transport, communication, energy, trade and investment were identied as priority areas for action. During the ECO summit in 1995, documents pertaining to six ECO institutions and 12 regional arrangements were signed. The Fourth Summit Meeting (Ashgabat, 14 May 1996) marked the completion of the ground work for ECOs reorganization and restructuring and a Memorandum of Understanding was signed. This was the second meeting of ECO marked with sharp differences between member states, namely Pakistan and Afghanistan, regarding management of regional security. Although the political leadership in both countries has changed over the years the differences are more pronounced today than ever before. As a result any meaningful dialogue between Pakistan and other member state of ECO tend to take place at the bilateral level. During the late 1970s, Bangladesh President Ziaur Rahman proposed the creation of a trade bloc consisting of South Asian countries. The proposal was accepted by India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka during a meeting held in Colombo in 1981. In August 1983, the three counties adopted the Declaration on South Asian Regional Cooperation during a summit which was held in New Delhi. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established on 8 December 1985 by India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, the Maldives and Bhutan. In April 2007, at the Associations 14th summit, Afghanistan became its eighth member at the insistence of India. The members of SAARC agreed on ve areas of cooperation: agriculture and rural development, telecommunications, science, technology and meteorology, health and population activities, transport and human resources development. SAARC has an apolitical agenda and has intentionally laid more stress on core issues related to the ve areas of cooperation agreed upon, rather than the more sensitive political issues that its members have to cope with: these sensitive issues include the Kashmir dispute and the Sri Lankan civil war. SAARC has also refrained from interfering
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in the internal affairs of member states as well as in disputes between member states. However, political dialogue is often conducted on the margins of SAARC meetings and it does help in condence building. During the 12th and 13th SAARC summits, a great deal of emphasis was laid on the need for cooperation between the SAARC members to ght terrorism. SAARCs inability to play a signicant role in integrating South Asia is laid at the door of the political and military rivalry between India and Pakistan. Due to economic, political and territorial disputes, South Asian nations have not been able to harness the benets of a unied economy. Over the years, SAARCs role in South Asia has diminished and it is thought to be a mere platform for annual talks and meetings between the representatives of member states. SAARC member states have not been willing to sign a regional free trade protocol so far. India has bilateral trade pacts with the Maldives, Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka, but similar agreements with Pakistan and Bangladesh have been stalled due to political and economic concerns on both sides. In 1993 in Dhaka, SAARC countries signed an agreement to gradually lower tariffs within the region. Eleven years later, at the 12th SAARC Summit at Islamabad, SAARC countries devised the South Asia Free Trade Agreement which created a framework for the establishment of a free trade area in South Asia. In terms of population, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation is the largest regional organization in the world. Its combined population of about 1.4 billion provides a huge market.38 The establishment of SAARC was one of the regional initiatives supported by the international community in the hope that it would help reduce tension in South Asia. A related development was the initiation of Track II (unofcial, non-governmental) diplomacy between India and Pakistan. The hitherto futile expectation of the international community was that SAARC would become the ideal vehicle to promote peace and reconciliation in South Asia and that territorial disputes such as that of Jammu and Kashmir would fade in signicance over the years in the face of economic prosperity that deep regional integration would bring. Institutionalized economic cooperation was expected to work its magic and lead to harmony in other elds. The modern functionalist theory was
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cited in support of this view.39 However, closer to the truth is that many economic and security issues continue to beset South Asia. The existing situation in the region was further complicated post-9/11 by the invasion of Afghanistan by NATO forces (ISAF) and the widening scope of the US-led war on terror, which has had a profound destabilizing effect on Pakistan. Regional cooperation took a backseat until urgent economic concerns revived interest in its possibilities recently. Several states in South Asia are confronted with conict situations: Pakistan, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka have grave security concerns that impact on their national integrity and stie their economy. They also face serious economic problems that could be eased, to an extent, through regional cooperation. Pakistan, for instance, does not have the internal resources to ease its severe power shortage but Iran is energy surplus and has recently shown its willingness to sell energy to Pakistan. However, there is international pressure on Pakistan to avoid contact with Iran. The prospective Iran-Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline, whereby Pakistan would benet both as a consumer as well as a transit point is seen as undermining US sanctions against Iran.40 Iran which shares borders and has strong cultural, economic and political links with two SAARC countries, namely, Afghanistan and Pakistan has also sought membership. On 22 February 2005 its Foreign Minister while expressing his countrys interest in joining SAARC, stated that Iran could provide the region with East-West connectivity. On 3 March 2007, Iran requested SAARC observer status and was told by Secretary-General Lyonpo Chenkyab Dorji that this would be considered at the next SAARC foreign ministers meeting. A number of other states, including the Peoples Republic of China and the Union of Myanmar, have also expressed interest in SAARC membership. More possibilities for selective institutional integration at the regional level, based on the urgent needs of member states, could arise with SAARC expansion. Major countries as well as organizations not geographically contiguous to the SAARC region have also sought observer status. These
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include the US and South Korea (April 2006) and the European Union (July 2006). On 2 August 2006, SAARC foreign ministers agreed in principle to these requests. The Russian Federation intends to become an observer as well, and is supported by India. This has raised the political prole of the organization and is indicative of intense international politicking in the volatile South Asia region. It also points to the possible creation of pressure groups within SAARC. Regional cooperation options for Pakistan are limited by the global political climate, the regional security situation as well as its own economic and security compulsions. There are several concurrent themes to be considered. Closer ties with Iran and Turkey on its western border and the Gulf Cooperation Council states towards the south make sense, but Pakistan is always pushed towards the east by the international community. In any case Iran, Turkey and the GCC have their own priorities. Throughout the world regional groupings in the economic and security spheres have overlapping and complementary footprints. Pakistan has longstanding security concerns as a result of its dispute with India over the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir. Until the perceived benets of becoming part of an institutionalized regional cooperation arrangement with India clearly outweigh the compulsions of its position on Kashmir, Pakistan will not be comfortable with the possibility of deep integration. It has been said that such an arrangement could act as an incentive for political, economic and security reform in member states but this argument has not been accepted so far. This is why moves to link up with, and draw upon, the resources of Central Asian states have always been encouraged. The bonds between the states of a region may develop or change over a period of time: integration with some states may deepen while links with others may become less important.41 For example, direct foreign investment in Pakistan by the Gulf States has led to interest in establishing links with them. The EU and NAFTA have not had to put fundamental issues of security and sovereignty before their citizens in referendums, since most territorial disputes in Western Europe were resolved at the end of World War II, while another set of territorial concerns came to an end with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989. A different kind of symbolic,
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but equally potent, sovereignty issue has been raised there: the question of whether to retain their national currency or to accept the EU currency, the euro. In a number of member states the public rejected economic union and voted to retain the national currency. Even today, only 15 of the 27 EU countries use the euro as national currency. The benets of the US $ 7.4 billion Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline include an incentive to establish a regional institution for the smooth running of its administration: this could be a test case of institutionalization in the region. Such an institution would need to have an apolitical, supranational mandate in order to be effective at all times: unresolved political and territorial issues within the sub-continent have limited cross-border cooperation since Partition and the creation of Pakistan, despite the deeply interdependent nature of the economy of the area under colonial rule. During the 1990s attempts were made to apply the experience in Europe to other regions, particularly South Asia, with its history of periodic conict over territory and issues of sovereignty. A review of regional integration initiatives in various parts of the world highlights why each initiative may require a customized approach. However there are some general guidelines that can smooth the path of regional cooperation initiatives. Devising rules and regulations covering the issues that can arise as a result of interstate economic activity under new arrangements can be a laborious and cumbersome task. Nevertheless, it is necessary in order to avoid the kind of litigation that has surfaced under NAFTA. Regional cooperation associations should consider awarding special status to countries that may not full criteria for membership but may be able to contribute to the prosperity and stability of member states. In order to avoid confrontations and deadlocks, members should have the choice of opting out of some arrangements within the framework of a regional association, which they feel unable to accept. Member states should make arrangements for the uplift of those states within the regional association that are less developed. This is bound to create goodwill and have a positive effect on regional stability.
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References:
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Carr, E.H., Nationalism and After, London, Macmillan, 1945. Reus-Smit, Christian, Constructivism, Theories of International Relations, ed., Scott Burchill (et. Al.), pp. 209, 216; Palgrave, 2005. Weber, Cynthia; International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction; 2nd. Edition, Taylor and Francis, 2004; ISBN 0415342082. Scott Burchill and others eds. Theories of International Relations, 3rd. Edition, Palgrave, 2005, ISBN 1403948666. Wallerstein, Immanuael; The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century; New York, Academic Press; 1974. Carr, E. H., Nationalism and After. London, Macmillan, 1945. Haas, Ernst B., The Challenge of Regionalism. International Organization, 12 (no.4) Autumn 1958, pp.440-458, Cambridge University Press, University of Wisconsin Press and the MIT Press. Haas, Ernst B., The Study of Regional Integration, International Organization, 24 (no.4), Autumn 1970, pp. 607-646, Cambridge University Press, University of Wisconsin Press and the MIT Press. Fawcett, Louise, Regionalism in Historical Perspective from Regional in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order, edited by Louise LEstrange Fawcett, Hurrell Fawcett, Andrew Hurrell, Oxford University Press, 1996, ISBN 0-198-28067-X. Carr, E.H., Nationalism and After, London, Macmillan, 1945. Hettne, Bjorn, Regionalism Between Politics and Economics, New directions in development economics , growth, environmental concerns and government in the 1990s, Routledge, UK, 1994, ISBN 0-415-12121-3. Nye, Joseph, Introduction, International Regionalism, Readings, edited by Joseph Nye, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1968. Haas, Ernst B., The Challenges of Regionalism, International Organization, 24 (No.4), Autumn 1958, pp. 440-458, Cambridge University Press, University of Wisconsin Press and the MIT Press. Haas, Ernst B., The Study of Regional Integration, International Organization, 24 (No. 4), Autumn 1970, pp.607-646, Cambridge University Press, University of Wisconsin Press and the MIT Press. Regionalism and the Age of Globalism: Concepts of Regionalism, Vol. 1, Edited by Lothar Honnighausen, Marc Frey, James Peacock, and Niklaus Steiner, spring 2004, p.230, distributed by the Institute of German-American Studies and the Center for the Study of Upper Midwestern Cultures, University of Wisconsin/Madison. Regionalism: Old and New, Theory and Practice, MTID Discussion Paper No.65, Mary E. Bursher, Sherman Robinson and Karen Thierfelder, February 2004, Markets, Trade and Institutions Division, International Food Policy Institute 2033 K Street, N.W. Washington D.C. 20006 U.S.A. Hettne, Bjorn, professor, University of Gothenburg, Sweden, Globalization, the New Regionalism and East Asia, selected papers from Globalism and Regionalism, edited by Toshiro Tanaka and Takashi Inoguchi, delivered at the United Nations University Global Seminar 96, Shonan Session, 2-6- September 1996, Hayama, Japan. Beach, Derek, The Dynamics of European Integration: Why and When EU Institutions Matter, p.272, Palgrave Macmillan, 12 May 2005, ISBN-10: 140393634X: ISBN-13: 978-1403936349.
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19. The member states of the European Union are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom 20. Report for Selected Country Groups and Subjects (European Union), World Economic Outlook Database, April 2008 edition, International Monetary Fund, (April 2008). 21. 1. The EU Single Market: Fewer Barriers, more opportunities, Europa, European Commission. Retrieved on 2007-09-27. 2. Activities of the European Union: Internal Market, Europa, Retrieved on 2007-06-29. 3. Jenson, Jane; Denis Saint-Martin (March 2003), Is Europe still sui generis? Signals from the White Paper on European Governance, Prepared for the Eighth Biennial International Conference, European Union Studies Association, 27-29 March 2003, Nashville Tennessee (PDF). 4. Eighth Biennial International Conference, European Union Studies Association. Retrieved on 2007-11-13. 22. Rifkin, Jeremy, (Jeremy P. Tarcher, 2004), The European Dream: How Europes Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream, ISBN 978-1-58542-345-3 (Abolition of internal borders and creation of a single EU external frontier. Europa, 2005). Retrieved on 2007-01-24. 23. McCormick, John, Understanding the European Union, 3rd edition, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, ISBN 987-1-4039-4451-1. 24. Nugent, Neil; The Government and Politics of the European Union; Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. ISBN 978-0-333-98461-1. 25. Pinder, John; The European Union: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford, 2001, ISBN 978-0-19-285375-2. 26. Weller, Geoffrey R; Scandinavian security and intelligence: the European Union, the Western European Union and NATO, an article from Scandinavian Studies, vol.v70 issue, n1, p.69; 22 March 1998, Society for the Advancement of Scandinavian Studies. 27. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 28. E. Diaz-Bonilla, S.E. Fransden, S. Robinson; WTO Negotiations and Agricultural Trade Liberalization: The Effect of Developed Countries Policies on Developing Countries; Books, p.350, Publisher CABI ( 18 September 2006); ISBN-10: 1845930509; ISBN-13: 9871845930509. 29. North Atlantic Free Trade Area. 30. Asia Pacic Economic Community. 31. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Paul L.E. Grieco; NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges, Institute of International Economics, Yee Wong, Books 15 October 2005, p.517. 32. Lederman, W. Maloney and L. Serven, Lessons from NAFTA for Latin American and the Caribbean, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, (2005). 33. Weintraub, S; NAFTAs Impact on North America: The First Decade, CSIS Press, Washington , USA, 2004. 34. Hufbauer, G.C. and Schott, J.J., NAFTA Revisited, Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C. 2005. 35. Gantz, D.A., Dispute Settlement under the NAFTA and the WTO: Choice of Forum Opportunities and Risks for the NAFTA Parties, American University International Law Review, 1999, 14(4):1025-1106. 36. Economic Regionalism, Encyclopedia Britannica, 2008, Encyclopedia Britannica on line, 19 May 2008, search . eb.com/eb/article, 9344528
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37. Vinod K. Aggarwal, Charles E. Morrison, Asia Pacic Crossroads: Regime Creation and the Future of APEC, Palgrave Macmillan, 15 May 1998, p.448; ref pp. 263,266. 38. Bannerjee, Dipankar; SAARC in the Twenty-First Century: Towards a Cooperative Future, 1 January 2002, p.362, India Research Press. 39. Haas, Ernst B., The Study of Regional Integration, International Organization, 24 (No.4), autumn 1970, 607-646, Cambridge University Press, University of Wisconsin Press and the MIT Press. 40. Khan, Jasmeen, Irans Peace Pipeline, RSIS, 21 November 2007, ETH Zurich. 41. Junaid, Shahwar, Terrorism and Global Power Systems, Oxford University Press, 2005.
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NATION OF SAINTS AND SCHOLARS: A PORTRAIT OF IRELAND

Toheed Ahmad*
Abstract
(Ireland is the only country in the world to have completely leapfrogged from the Agricultural Age to the Information Age. Within a generation this last island of Europe has progressed from being a poor, backward agrarian society to a prosperous high-tech economy. Today it is the world leader in computer software and pharmaceuticals. This Irish miracle is the subject of study at many universities and think tanks to draw lessons for a fast tracked growth in modern times. Its Celtic civilization, counted among the oldest in Europe, is sometimes traced back to the orient, even specically to the banks of River Indus. Britain ruled over both peoples for centuries. This has led to some commonalities being noted between the people of the two countries, which makes Ireland the natural partner of Pakistan in the EU. Author). Of my nation! What ish my nation! Which ish my nation! Who talks of my nation ish a villain, and a bastard, and a knave, and a rascal. (A drunken Irish soldier in Shakespeares Henry V (3.1)) No people have undergone greater persecution nor did that persecution altogether cease up to our own day. No people hate as we do in whom the past is always live, there are moments when hatred poisons my life and I accuse myself of effeminacy because I have not given it adequate expression...Then I remind myself that I owe my soul to Shakespeare, to Spenser and to Blake and to the English language in which I think, speak and write, that everything I love has come to me
* Toheed Ahmad is a former ambassador of Pakistan.
Nation of Saints and Scholars: a Portrait of Ireland
through English; my hatred tortures me with love, my love with my hate. I am like the Tibetan monk who dreams at his initiation that he is eaten by a wild beast and learns on waking that he himself is eater and eaten. This is Irish hatred and solitude, the hatred of human life that made Swift write Gulliver. W.B. Yeats, A General Introduction for My Work (1937). The Pakistanis are as superstitious as the Irish. The two nations share a phobia of spirits and witches as well as a love and reverence of hermits and healers and holy men. William Dalrymple, The Age of Kali (1998). Ireland is a graceful country which has recently declared nal peace in Northern Ireland, a portion heaved off the mainland in 1922 mainly on sectarian grounds - when Britain ended its nearly 800 years of colonial occupation of this Emerald Island. With a population roughly half that of Lahore, Ireland has become the worlds largest exporter of computer software and pharmaceuticals. The per capita income in this Celtic Tiger is some $40,000. In July 1985, it was the most highly indebted country per capita in the world; the same year at the Band Aid concert led by Sir Bob Geldof and U2 (both Irish), Ireland was the highest donor per capita. In this exploration of the Irish miracle, I will search for parallels and lessons for us. The point to note is that in the EU, English-speaking Ireland is our natural partner, not the UK (because of the burden of history and the large obstructive presence of our community) nor Germany nor France or Spain because of language difculties. With the Irish outreach in Europe and North America, our companies with a presence in Ireland can hope to break into these rich markets. W.B Yeatss claim about the Irish being haters par excellence is worth a reection. You will see that today this intriguing observation closely ts us Pakistanis. Many a writer and analyst in our media have noted the rising level of hatred among our people. We have ideologies of hate, private militias inicting death and destruction to promote their hate-lled causes, regional extremists purveying hatred to win followers and even national hatreds which have kept us bound in a chain of poverty.
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Ireland focalised its hatred on its former colonial master, it refused to join the Commonwealth and had deadly peoples militias such as the Irish Republican Army, Irish Republican Brotherhood and the Ulster Voluntary Force. India baiting has never become a national sport while our relations with London have been at best ambivalent. Perhaps that is why William Dalrymple chose to ignore this common quality between the two peoples. And not just the all-pervading sentiment of hate but also that the past is always alive with us too. Think of all the references in our religious discourse which point to a golden era in a foreign land several centuries ago. While Yeats accuses himself of not giving this adequate expression in his poetry, I can quote verse upon verse of Munir Niazi which articulate hatred, nostalgia, and solitude in equal measure. Though we dont have a Swift in our tradition, given the malaise and morbidity that gripped our writers in the last three decades, in a climate of deepening economic and social injustice, we are ready for masterworks of irony and satire in our languages. The Irish miracle is the story of the rise of this Celtic Tiger. In less than two decades, Ireland went from being a third world country with a Stone Age culture to the top three richest EU economies. Today Ireland is cited as the only country to have leap-frogged from the Agricultural Age to the Information Age. It all started in the second half of the sixties when a maverick Education Minister of Ireland, Donough OMalley, battled his way to getting secondary education in the Republic made free of cost. This set up a wind that raised all the boats in the Irish waters soon the country not only rid itself of illiteracy but also enabled a big chunk of its student population to enrol in the universities and colleges. Massive reform and upgrade of the universities soon followed. The state set up a chain of 14 Institutes of Technology all over the country to produce manpower for the high-tech industry sprouting all over Ireland. There is a great potential for institutional linkages of our universities with their Irish counterparts for win-win partnerships. With an educated youthful English-speaking population and a tax rate of mere 10 percent, later raised in the face of stiff EU opposition to 12.5 (compared with 35 percent in UK and elsewhere in Europe), Ireland set itself up as the preferred destination for US software
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companies to outsource their routine jobs. Microsoft established its European headquarters from where they produced localised versions of their computer applications in major European languages. Soon Oracle, Sun Microsystems, IBM, Motorola, Intel, Dell, America Online etc., followed and by 2004 Irelands total IT exports numbered three times that of India. Similarly the major US and European pharmaceutical companies based their manufacturing units in the southern port city of Cork, making it the pharma-capital of the world. Ireland now exports more pharmaceuticals than any other country in the world. All the worlds legitimate Viagra tablets are manufactured in Cork. Ireland was no more a poor agricultural backyard of Europe, it now had a thriving knowledge industry, full employment and a rollicking prosperity that not only reversed its brain drain but also offered employment to many a new migrant from Europe. With the governments declaration of art, music and book writing as tax free industries, a creativity storm was unleashed in the Republic. Van Morrisson, U2 and Westlife emerged as the leading music bands in the world, Irish movies like Ryans Daughter and My Left Foot won many an Oscar award and a book culture blossomed with annual Blooms Day being all over the world to honour the hero of James Joyces novel Ulysses, itself rated as the best novel of the twentieth century. The countrys transformation into a high-tech centre and a portal to Europe for foreign investors has more than once been called a miracle. Luckily, its not a literal miracle, but the result of insightful political ambition. The road that Ireland took is open to any other country that faces similar problems. While 1987 marked the bottom of a long recession, it was also the year Charles Haughey took over as prime minister and decided that the economic system should be rebuilt from scratch. He even managed to sell his idea to the opposition and to the most important interest groups, including the unions. Unlike Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain, who confronted the powerful interest groups, Haughey chose to sit down with them. What would later be called a miracle started with a social contract between the government, the employers, and the unions. The contract included tax
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cuts and some nancial support for those worst off. The public sector was quickly slimmed, and so the private sector had more room to grow. The economy accelerated. The government cut taxes for corporations and working citizens, while the jungle of regulations was cleaned up. Publicly owned banks were prepared for privatization It might seem strange that the unions would support a political agenda with tax cuts and a smaller public sector. In retrospect, however, we can conclude that the Irish employees did the right thing. Nobody was happy with the previous situation. The labour market was anything but exible, and there was no growth to distribute. The countrys openness to foreign investment was handled as onewindow operation by the Industrial Development Authority. With one percent of the total euro zone market, Ireland drew as much as a third of all US investment into Europe. The IDA built industrial parks all over the country and provided training subsidies to companies which greatly helped with up-gradation and employability of its manpower. This Irish miracle spawned a host of case studies, and no less envy, especially in the US and UK as they struggled to contain the slide of their economies. The world raced to study how the Celtic Tiger was outperforming the Tiger economies of the Far East. Ireland had become more a brand than a country, a miracle indeed. Ireland claims a place among the most ancient people of Europe. Like Pakistans, the history of the Irish people began with the rst known human settlement around 8000 BC. That was when huntergatherers arrived from Britain and continental Europe probably via a land bridge. Few archaeological traces remain of this group, but the later arrivals, the proto Celts, were traced back to Asian shores, more precisely, the Indus Valley. I heard this rst from the mayor of the Irish city of Limerick, Counsellor Diarmuid Scully, in whose ofce I was receiving the documents of the two container loads of relief goods donated by Limerickans for the victims of the 2005 earthquake. In his speech Counsellor Diarmuid said that the origins of the Irish people lay along the banks of the river Indus. Everyone in the audience, me included, were stunned. On top of that the mayor proudly declared that
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he had a Pakistani family, his maternal aunt had married a Mr. Siddiqui in London and the couple had returned to Ireland to enjoy their retirement along with their four (proto Celt) children. Following the arrival of Saint Patrick and other Christian missionaries from the UK in the early to mid-5th century A.D., Christianity became the indigenous religion by the year 600.From around 800 A.D. more than a century of Viking invasions brought havoc upon the monastic culture and on the islands various regional dynasties, yet both of these institutions proved strong enough to survive and assimilate the invaders. The strong monastic orders retreated to monasteries built on hill tops and on islands to escape destruction. Ireland, which was never a part of the Roman Empire, was spared the invasion of the Germanic hordes that ravaged the Empire. The Christian monks then alighted from their perches and travelled on the smouldering pathways of Europe to relight the candle of their faith. They studied in Arab schools in Sicily, Toledo and Cordoba, and retrieved Greek knowledge for Europe by translating Aristotle from Arabic into Latin besides several other works on alchemy and astrology. They thus became the forerunners of the rst renaissance of Europe. This fascinating story is told in a gripping book, How the Irish saved Civilization: the Untold Story of Irelands Heroic Role from the Fall of Rome to the Rise of Medieval Europe, written by Tom Cahill in 1995. Below we take a closer look at this burgeoning Irish orientalism. The Ireland of the early fth century was a brooding, dank island whose inhabitants, while carefree and warlike on the outside, lived in quaking fear within, their terror of shape-changing monsters, of sudden death and the insubstantiality of their world so acute that they drank themselves into an insensate stupor in order to sleep. Patrick, however, provided a living alternative. He was a serene man who slept well without drink, a man in whom the sharp fear of death has been smoothed away. The Christianity he proposed to the Irish succeeded because it took away the dread from the magical world that was Ireland. And once they were Christianized, the Irish founded the monastic movement, copying the books being destroyed elsewhere by Germanic invaders, eventually bringing them back to the places from which the
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books had come. And that, Mr. Cahill concludes with typically wry unabashedness, is how the Irish saved civilization. Just over a hundred years after the Battle of Hastings (1066), the English moved into Ireland beginning their 800 year rule over the island. Thousands of English and Protestant settlers were sent here under the English policy of Plantation. As military and political defeat of Gaelic Ireland became clearer, especially with the decisive Battle of Boyne (1690) when Prince William of Orange defeated his Catholic father-inlaw, James II, the role of religion as a new division in Ireland became more pronounced. From this period Catholic-Protestant conict became a recurrent theme in Irish history. By the end of the seventeenth century all Catholics, representing some 85 percent of Irelands population then, were banned from the Irish parliament. Political power rested entirely in the hands of a British settler-colony and more specically the Anglican minority while the Catholic population suffered severe political and economic privations. In 1801, this colonial parliament was abolished and Ireland became an integral part of a new United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Speaking Irish was declared an offence, Catholics were not to be admitted to schools, and saying mass was outlawed. The Westminster philosophy as encoded in these laws was that the Catholics are born to be punished. It is ironic that while the Irish were being brutalised and oppressed at home, they readily agreed to serve in the British East India Company army. My Irish friends unconvincingly claim that their ancestors merely accepted the jobs because employment opportunities were extremely scarce at home. The Irish economy and society were devastated by the famine of 1840-45 which killed a million people. Starvation and disease forced another million to emigrate. The famine was a watershed in Irish history and its effects permanently changed the islands demographic, political and cultural landscape. It is intriguing that in 1845 when the Ottoman Caliph, Abdulmajid, offered to send 10,000 Sterling for Irish farmers, he was requested by Queen Victory to slash the amount to 1000 Sterling as she had sent only 2000 Sterling. The Caliph agreed but secretly also dispatched three shiploads of food which the British tried unsuccessfully to intercept and the Ottoman sailors off-loaded the
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cargo just north of Dublin. The famine, locally called the Great Hunger, generated lasting bitterness towards the British government, whom many blamed then and now for the starvation of so many people. It is said of the British Empire that the Irish fought for it, the Welsh and the Scottish ran it, while the English proted from it. Till the 1857 War of Independence, as many as 48 percent of the British soldiery in India was Irish. Their cruelty and barbarities are legion. The commanders who ordered the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre were Irish, the butchers of the last Mughul Emperors family were Irish. The Irish fought for both sides in the American Civil War. They were enlisted in several armies of European kings and dukes giving ght to whomever their masters chose to ght. Revolutionaries at home and mercenaries abroad is how best these wild geese can be best described. In a memorable dialogue of a 1991 Irish movie, The Commitments (Director Alan Parker), a young Dublin musician reminds his fellow band player that the Irish were the niggers of Europe, Catholics the niggers of Ireland, and northsiders (the poorer but hard core Irish district of the capital city) the niggers of Dublin. Ignoring his peoples crimes against humanity in colonial India, Irish President amon de Valera, while addressing a joint session of the US Congress in 1964, recited the following stanza from a poem called Irish National Hymn, which was composed at about the same time as Brigadier Dwyer was ordering his troops to open re on unarmed civilians in Amritsar: Oh, Ireland be it thy high duty To teach the world the might of moral beauty, And stamp Gods image truly on the struggling soul. Is this a case of national hypocrisy? Do the Irish of the miracle age remember these dark episodes of their past? Such is the stuff of history, which in Irelands case, makes for an instructive reading. Although we dont have a lived past that stretches as far back as that of Ireland, by comparison, our national narrative is an innocent story.
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The Irish Parliamentary Party strove from the 1880s to attain Home rule through a parliamentary constitutional movement eventually winning the Home Rule Act which London chose to suspend at the outbreak of the First World War. This postponement led to the Easter Rising of 1916 in which a motley group of revolutionaries led an insurrection and proclaimed a Republic of Ireland. The Declaration is a sacred document of the Republic which began: In the name of God and of the dead generations from which she receives her old tradition of nationhood, Ireland, through us, summons her children to her ag and strike for her freedom. The Proclamation went on to say: We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland, and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies, to be sovereign and indefeasible. The long usurpation of that right by a foreign people and government has not extinguished the right, nor can it ever be extinguished except by the destruction of the Irish people. In every generation the Irish people have asserted their right to national freedom and sovereignty: six times during the past three hundred years they have asserted it in arms. Standing on that fundamental right and again asserting it in arms in the face of the world, we hereby proclaim the Irish Republic as a Sovereign Independent State, and we pledge our lives and the lives of our comrades-in-arms to the cause of its freedom, of its welfare, and its exaltation among the nations. It ended thus, We place the cause of the Irish Republic under the protection of the Most High God, Whose blessing we invoke upon our arms, and we pray that no one who serves that cause will dishonour it by cowardice, inhumanity, or rapine. In this supreme hour the Irish nation must, by its valour and discipline and by the readiness of its children to sacrice themselves for the common good, prove itself worthy of the august destiny to which it is called. Ringing words indeed! British bullets and bayonets put down the Rising in six days, martial law was clamped and rebel leaders were court martialled and executed. The British Army reported casualties of 116 dead, 368 wounded, Irish casualties were 318 dead and 2,217 wounded. While in Ireland 3430 men and 79 women were thrown into prison, 1480 Irishmen were detained in England under the Defence of the Realm Act. A terrible beauty is
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born sang out W.B. Yeats as the Irish nation was rudely woken up to its shackles. Todays miracle Ireland is getting ready to celebrate the centenary of the Rising in 2016. Within two years of the Rising, a Parliament of free Ireland, comprising of Irish MPs elected to Westminster in the 1918 British general election, met in Dublin and issued a Declaration of Independence. We solemnly declare foreign government in Ireland to be an invasion of our national right which we will never tolerate, and we demand the evacuation of our country by the English Garrison the Declaration demanded, adding that, for seven hundred years the Irish people has never ceased to repudiate and has repeatedly protested in arms against foreign usurpation. The Parliament went on to seek the recognition and support of every free nation in the world for Irish independence, and we proclaim that independence to be a condition precedent to international peace. Only the USSR responded by extending its recognition to the independent Ireland. London refused to recognise these Irish rebels. The Royal Irish Constabulary, the British paramilitary, had 9700 men stationed in 1500 barracks across Ireland. Soon they came under guerrilla attacks by the Irish Republican volunteers and mounted their own retaliation. The Irish public, which was initially cool to the Declaration of Independence, was increasingly won over by the British reign of terror unleashed upon them. Some 400 British barracks were burnt down by angry Irish people and the IRA volunteers. The British administration collapsed when the people refused to pay taxes and boycotted the courts which had to be closed down. Michael Collins, a leader of the pro-Treaty faction, was the main leader of this independence movement. An interesting aside to this War of Independence is provided by the mutiny of some Irish soldiers in India in 1920. On hearing of the outbreak of hostilities against the British, on 28 June, ve men of the Connaught Rangers, stationed in Jullundhur, refused to take orders from their ofcers declaring their intent not to serve the King until the British forces left Ireland. The Union Jack at Jullundhur was replaced by the ag of the Irish Republic. Led by Private James Daly, 70 Rangers joined
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the mutiny and stormed the armoury. The loyal guards successfully defended it. In all about 400 men mutinied of which 88 were courtmartialled, 14 were sentenced to death and the rest given up to 15 years in prison. In 1970 the remains of Private Daly and two others were taken back to Ireland and given a military funeral with full honours. The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 ended the war with Britain with the establishment of what was called the Irish Free State. About 1400 people died in the war between the Republicans and the Crown forces and another 557 people died in the political violence in Northern Ireland. But the victorious were divided between the opponents and proponents of the Treaty that saw the war of independence morph into a bloody civil war. The Treaty allowed Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK. Ireland was thus partitioned, a bitter legacy of the colonial rule which the Irish Republicans have ever since sought to undo. In the late 1960s Northern Ireland again erupted in a civil war that was largely of sectarian inspiration. The Irish-American community generously funded the Provisional IRA in its militant response to the Protestant violence and the British troops search and destroy operations. The Loyalist majority refused to acknowledge the rights of the Catholic minority who were suspected of acting as Dublins agents. The Good Friday Agreement of 1998, followed by St.Andrews Agreement(2006) has nally been implemented with the withdrawal of British troops, deweaponization of militias under international supervision, denitive cease-re by Provisional IRA and elections to a new regional government of power sharing between the main parties. Addressing a joint sitting of the US Congress in Washington on 30 April 2008, the outgoing Prime Minister (Taoiseach) of Ireland Bertie Ahern proudly declared: After so many decades of conict, I am so proud, Madam Speaker, to be the rst Irish leader to inform the United States Congress: Ireland is at peace. In the thirty years of troubles nearly 3600 were killed and 47000 injured. The Irish Peace Process offers a useful model for other conict areas like Kashmir, the Middle East and Sri Lanka. The following main elements of a peaceful settlement of the issue were agreed upon by the Prime Ministers of Britain and Ireland in December 1993:
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1. The British government had no selsh, strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland. 2. The British government would uphold the right of the people of Northern Ireland to decide between Union with Great Britain and a united Ireland. 3. The British and Irish governments would work for an agreement among all the people of Ireland, embracing the totality of relationships. 4. The Irish government recognized that Irish self-determination (meaning, in this context, a United Ireland) required the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. Also, for the rst time, consent of the majority of the people of the Republic of Ireland would be necessary for reunication, giving the South a say in the reunication process. 5. The Irish government would try to address Unionists fears of a united Ireland. 6. A united Ireland could only be brought about by persuasion. 7. Peace must involve a permanent end to the use of, or support for, paramilitary violence. Glencree Centre for Peace and Reconciliation located in picturesque surroundings outside Dublin runs a series of workshops and seminars for former enemy combatants of Ireland. It is patronised by the President of the Republic of Ireland and is funded by the Irish Foreign Ofce. At my request in 2005, they agreed to look at the possibility of sharing their knowledge and experience for the Kashmir conict and sent a two member team to Islamabad and Muzaffarbad in December 2006 where they met with many government and civil society personalities. A similar trip was planned for New Delhi and Srinagar. True to their psychology of denial on Kashmir, the Indian government refused their visa request. In private conversations, Glencree people conded to me that Dublin faced similar stonewalling by London to any outside help claiming that Northern Ireland was an internal issue of Britain. They pointed to the rst undertaking given by Whitehall in the 1993 Agreement that The British government had no selsh, strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland that paved the way for President Bill Clinton to appoint Senator George Mitchell as a neutral Peace Co-ordinator to
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push the peace process forward. A similar change of heart and openness to outside mediation is required of New Delhi if the Kashmir peace process is to get anywhere. Reecting on the relevance of the Irish peace process to the world, Peter Hain, former British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and current Chair of the British-Irish Inter-Parliamentary Body, wrote in the Guardian daily of 5 June 2008: Observing Northern Ireland today, its hard to recognise what was, just a decade or so ago, the theatre for such horror, barbarity, hate and bigotry. For 14 months now, old enemies have worked together - and even smiled at each other - when they had never exchanged a courtesy before. Last years historic agreement has so far stuck, and I believe will stick through ups and downs, precisely because it was brokered between the two most politically polarised positions - Ian Paisleys Democratic Unionist Party and Gerry Adams Sinn Fin. But what are the lessons for international policy in other areas still locked in similarly bitter conict and crippled by terrorism? First, a need to create space and time, free from violence, in which political capacity can develop; second, identifying key individuals and constructive forces; third, the importance of inclusive dialogue at every level, wherever there is a negotiable objective; fourth, the taking of risks to sustain political progress, including by talking with enemies; fth, the need to align national and international forces; sixth, avoiding or resolving preconditions to dialogue; seventh, gripping and micromanaging conict resolution at a high political level, not intermittently but continuously, whatever breakdowns, crises and hostilities get in the way. The west urgently needs to match its commitment to global security with a commitment to global justice and global conict resolution. The Northern Ireland experience, horrendous as it was, points to a rebalancing of foreign policy that can overcome horror with hope. Textual links between Celtic and Oriental cultures existed
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independently in native Irish and Gaelic culture as far back as Irish writing extends. Throughout the course of Irish cultural history, this unacknowledged discourse of Orientalism has served as an important imaginative and allegorical realm for Irish writers and intellectuals, states Joseph Lennon in his monumental work Irish Orientalism: A Literary and Intellectual History (Syracuse University Press, 2004). He goes on to say that the stories of Irelands ancient past and legendary Asian origins occupied a prominent place in Irish culture from the ninth through the eighteenth centuries, offering political commentary since its rst recording.The political imperative of the narrative (legitimating the Irish nation) had become bare and clearly evident to cultural nationalist writers of (Ireland). The semiotic connection between the Celt and the Oriental came to signify the dynamics of Ireland within the British Empire perhaps best understood in gradations of resistance and complicity. The origin legends became foundational to Irish cultural nationalism in the eighteenth century and developed into a literary and mystical connection during the Celtic Revival in the early twentieth of which we will speak more in later paragraphs. During my stay in Ireland, I made friends with Dr. Dennis OSullivan, an Emeritus Professor of Space Physics at the Dublin Institute of Advanced Studies. He had had some introduction to Allama Iqbal through Pakistani friends and wanted to know more. In the mail one day I received a packet sent by Dr. OSullivan containing a photocopy of a 1944 booklet titled The Story of Irish Orientalism by Dr. M. Mansoor described in the book as Examiner for the London Chamber of Commerce. Dr. Mansoor had studied at Trinity College Dublin and is described in the Introduction written by his former Trinity teacher as A native speaker of Arabic and an excellent Hebrew scholar, well versed in Aramaic and a keen student of other Semitic languages. My space physicist friend could not have given me a better gift. Dr. Mansoor notes Ireland could boast of a University early in the fourteenth century, established in Dublins St. Patrick Cathedral and that after Oxford, Dublin was not far behind as a centre of European Orientalism. Love of travel and an afnity with the East had long been part of the Irish temperament, he observes. The customs of the Celtic
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race, its tribal organisation, its tales and its traditions all embody Oriental ideas brought by Irish travellers from the most distant East. He nds evidence of this in that many of the popular tales and traditions in the folklore of Ireland are identical with those of India and Egypt. Irish writers, he claims, wrote the earliest grammars of Malayan, Aramaic, Hebrew, Arabic and Ethiopic besides those of Pashtu and Kashmiri languages. When in 1855 appointments to the Indian Civil Service and to the British Indian Army were thrown open to public competition, Trinity College Dublin (founded 1592 by Queen Elizabeth the First who in 1601 signed the charter for the East India Company) was chosen as a centre and the range of its academic curriculum was widened. Chairs of Arabic, Persian, Hindustani, and soon after of Sanskrit were founded. Mir Aulad Ali of Lucknow was one of the professors hired to man these chairs. I have the text of a fascinating two-part lecture on the mores and manners of Englishmen and life in Dublin he gave in Urdu at his native school when he was on a years home leave in Lucknow in 1861. By the end of the century over 200 graduates of Trinity College had passed into the Indian Civil Service and the Army and held important administrative and military posts. William Crooke (1848-1923) of the ICS was editor of a journal North Indian Notes and Queries, meant essentially for the use of the British residents of India, which informed its readers about various aspects of India and Indian life, ranging from archaeology to ethnography. Crooke also collected hundreds of folk tales and recorded them with the help of natives, which were recently issued as Folk Tales from Northern India (2002). However Mansoor showers his praise and admiration on Sir George Grierson (1851-1941) another Trinity graduate who served in India, as the greatest scholar of India and its languages. Among other books he wrote The Modern Vernacular Literature of Hindustani with a catalogue of 952 authors writing in the dialects used from Rajputana to the borders of Bengal. His chef doeuvre however was the 40 volume Linguistic Survey of India which took Grierson 30 years to compile. Published in 1928, the same year when Grierson issued his New English Dictionary, the Survey, hailed as one of the most remarkable feats of recent scholarship, classies and describes 179 Indian languages and 544 dialects. He was 82 years old when his last book Dictionary of the Kashmiri was published.
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Nations are born in the hearts of the poets, wrote Allama Iqbal in his 1910 diary published 51 years later as Stray Reections. This is best illustrated in the Irish literary renaissance that prepared the way for the countrys political independence in 1922 after some 800 years of punitive British colonial rule. Irelands national poet, W.B.Yeats insisted that he wrote for the coming time as did Iqbal, and went on to explain that the arts lie dreaming of what is to come and thus provide a kind of anticipatory illumination. No wonder both saw poetry as being nearer to prophecy. Political leaders of the Irish independence struggle drew greatly on the ideas of poets and playwrights. What makes the Irish Literary Renaissance such a fascinating case is the knowledge that the cultural revival preceded, and in many ways enabled, the political revolution that followed. Pakistans own freedom movement which began essentially as a struggle for cultural revival is traced back to the tracts of Sir Syed, the stirring verse of Hali and Iqbal and the aesthetic achievement of Chughtai. (This is said to be quite the opposite of the American experience in which the attainment of cultural autonomy by Whitman and Emerson followed the political Declaration of Independence by full 75 years). The Gaelic League (which advocated widespread use of the Irish language) and the Irish National Theatre were the other main channels of this Revival movement which imagined a Republic for the politicians to ght for and create. Richard Ellmann writing in his Yeats: The Man and the Masks, makes a startling claim that, Every poem (of Yeats) is a battleground and the sounds of gunre are heard throughout. One could say the same for many poems of Iqbal. A comparative study of Iqbal and Yeats (born 12 years before the Allama and outliving him by nine months) yields a wealth of insights for the understanding of these two cultural republics of the post-colonial era Pakistan and Ireland. Both poets lived in the times darkened by creeping scientism and dehumanizing capitalism (both private and public) and receding faith. Both saw the earthshaking Russian Revolution (though surprisingly, Yeats was far too involved in his loves and life to comment on it) and Europes largest civil war of 1914-1918. Both were sceptical of democracy and had a clear penchant for authoritarian rule for
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wholesome cultural, spiritual and economic development of societies. Having a common occupying power, the freedom struggles of Ireland and India had many parallels. Rabindranath Tagore spent some years in Dublin where he got a lot of support from Yeats in the campaign to get the Nobel Prize for Literature. At that time Tagore was little known in India and had no political role in his countrys emancipation movement. There were contacts between some fringe groups like the Indian National Army and the Ghadar Party with Irish activists but the Irish independence movement had played itself out by the time the Indian Muslims were politically mobilized. The period of Easter Rising and the Irish War of Independence, in India, was that of joint Hindu-Muslim political action for whatever it was worth. Mr. Jinnah was member both of the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League. The Irish, dubbed as the white niggers by the British imperialists could appreciate (that is if the Indians allow them) Mr. Jinnahs remark that the British were the white bania. Again in a 1939 interview to Manchester Guardian newspaper, Mr. Jinnah while replying to a question on democracy in India, remarked: Even Ireland, after decades of Union, did not submit to the British Parliament in spite of close afnity with English and the Scot. I may refer to Lord Morleys dictum that the fur coat of Canada would not do for the extremely tropical climate of India! Then came the Khilafat Movement which aroused Pan-Islamic feelings among the Muslims of India. This, in turn, may have been detected by Mahatma Gandhi and his cohorts who decided to abruptly end the Congress support for the Movement. The All-India Muslim League, when looking abroad, never seemed to have looked beyond the Muslim world Afghanistan, Palestine, Turkey, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Sudan. There was great interest in Asia but that too was restricted to Japan and the USSR. China for them was a non-entity and the Malay world was politically too far removed. Given the strong anti-imperialist leanings of Maulana Mohammed Ali Johar, I suspect that in the pages of his English language magazine, Comrade, he would have taken note of the British barbarities in Ireland. I scanned a selection of Comrade articles published in Lahore in the 1960s; its scope too was restricted to the Muslim world. Alas, even after independence, we continue to think
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in a minority mode and refuse to open our eyes to the wider world. This is not helpful for our younger generation who, with their wide exposure to the new media, are able to see though our minority blinkers. Unlike the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, which supported the British war effort, Ireland was opposed to sending troops in aid of the allies during the Second World War. Dublin has been following a policy of neutrality ever since independence from Britain. The Irish government vehemently protested to the Germans when Luftwaffe carried out bombing raids over Belfast, which were immediately suspended by Hitler. However Ireland wanted to maintain a public stance of neutrality and refused to close the German and Japanese embassies during the war years. Prime Minister amon de Valera even signed the book of condolence on Adolf Hitler on 2 May 1945 which greatly displeased the British and the Americans. Unlike many other noncombatant countries, Ireland did not declare war on the near-defeated Germany in order to seize German assets. Other neutral countries like Sweden and Switzerland expelled German embassy staff at the end of the war, as they no longer represented a state, but the German legation in Dublin was allowed to remain open. Ireland has kept away from NATO and all other Western European defence arrangements. During the Cold War, Dublin refused to ofcially ally either with NATO or the Warsaw Pact. It is inaccurate to describe Ireland as a neutral state in the same way as Sweden or Switzerland, it would be more accurate to describe it as a non-aligned state which takes conict participation on a case by case basis. However, Ireland takes its participation in UN Peacekeeping operations seriously and is one of the largest troop contributors to peacekeeping in Lebanon, Liberia, but, interestingly maintains a tiny presence in the ISAF contingent in Afghanistan in keeping with its UN obligations. On 31 July 2006, I was witness to a demonstration of Irelands neutral mindset while listening in to a debate in the Joint Foreign Affairs Committee of the Irish Parliament (called The Dail) on the Israeli attack on Lebanon. It was a charged atmosphere as all members of the Committee roundly condemned Tony Blair and George Bush for refusing to call for an immediate cease-re. The EU statement too was rubbished
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as deeply disappointing for not calling for an urgent halt to hostilities. Everybody came down hard on Israel and urged an economic boycott and demanded that the Jewish state respect the Geneva conventions on war and related international laws. The Socialist Party representative termed Western claim of superiority of its values as negative, militaristic, and dangerous, thus provoking a clash of civilizations. One Deputy charged that the Irish peoples abhorrence at what was happening to Lebanon was not being reected in the foreign policy of the Republic. Our neutral views are being subsumed in the European debate by the big EU members, charged another. Destruction of civilian life and property is a war crime for which there is no statute of limitation and that once a cease-re was in place, Israelis should be so charged, a Deputy shouted. If I closed my eyes, I thought, I might as well have been sitting in a gallery of the Parliament of Pakistan. President George Bush is at least as unpopular in Dublin as anywhere in Pakistan. The Irish have been opposing the US led wars against Iraq and Afghanistan. My Irish friends told me that they would not allow George Bush inside Dublin; the few times that the American President has had to come to Ireland in his two terms of ofce, he was restricted to far away country homes. On a bright and clear morning of 27 August 1979, Lord Louis Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of India and the Republics rst Governor General, put out his boat Shadow V to sea to go shing off the coast of Sligo in the northeast of Ireland. The tiny coastal village of Mullaghmore, only a few miles from the battle torn Northern Ireland, held the ancestral holiday home of his late wife Lady Edwina which was Dickies favourite shing spot. Suddenly there was a massive bang. A column of water, fragments of boat, and shattered bodies blasted into the air. People looked up in surprise as windows shook when the shock waves hit buildings located miles away. Those in the vicinity looked toward the sound in time to see the splintered remains of Shadow V fall back into the sea in a tumultuous fury of water. Louis Mountbattens body was shredded to bits together with those of his grandson and a local deckhand. An era came to end. The Provisional IRA had planted 50 kilograms of explosives under the boat engine which were remotely detonated. Three persons were charged and given varying jail terms.
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More than one taxi driver in Ireland told me that We did it for you. Craic is a typically Irish word (more a quality of the Irish race) whose dictionary meanings are, fun, enjoyment, abandonment, or light hearted mischief often in the context of drinking or music. An older, related, more widespread sense of craic is joke as in crack a joke or wise-crack. A person who is good craic is fun to be with. That is a typical Irishman for you. During the centuries of colonial oppression and rampant misery, only the Irishmans tongue was never chained. Hence they produced lot of holy men and witty writers like G.B. Shaw and Oscar Wilde and came to be called a Nation of Saints and Scholars. Dublin has the unique distinction of being home to four Nobel laureates of Literature Shaw, Yeats, Beckett and Seamus Heaney. I have heard stories of how a Pakistani somewhere in the UK is surprised when a white man walks up to him, say in a pub or a supermarket, and asks about him. This is common in Ireland today where there may be as many as 10,000 Pakistanis, principally medical doctors and their families, who have great relationships of good neighbourliness and some even share great craic with their colleagues at work. In England, for centuries Irish have been the butt of jokes, often racial and pejorative, a little like the sardarjee jokes in our Punjab. Irish funerals traditionally included a party called a Wake, when the dead body was kept in the home parlour all dressed up for burial for up to three days guarded by female relatives who keened (wailed), while the men folk stayed in the kitchen or outdoors if the weather was ne, with loads of drink and food and music. A famous Wake joke runs like this: Whats the difference between an Irish wedding and an Irish Wake? Answer: At the Wake there is one drunk less. Talking of music, Irish musicologists have found motifs in their folk music that are traced back through North Africa to the banks of Indus, especially for the ute and violin music. Pakistan-Ireland relations have always been cordial and friendly. For the rst few decades of the Kashmir conict, Dublin was rmly supportive of a plebiscite to determine the wishes of the Kashmiri people as to the nal disposition of the state. As member of the Security Council, it favoured the Pakistani resolutions, so much as to earn the visit of President Ayub Khan to Ireland in July 1964. I saw clippings of the
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newspaper coverage of the visit at the Irish Foreign Affairs Department, mostly taken from Dawn where President de Valera, Prime Minister Sean Lemass and the Foreign Minister all assured their Pakistani guests of their continued support to our stand which was based on the principle of self-determination which Ireland too championed. President John F. Kennedy, whose great grandfather had escaped with his family to the US in one of what were called the famine boats paid an emotional visit to Ireland in June 1963. In his address to a joint session of the Irish Parliament, he noted that on the world scene Ireland had been punching far above its weight, expressed admiration for it and mentioned as examples Irelands participation in UN peacekeeping operations and their support to a peaceful settlement in Kashmir. Late Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto went to Ireland in 1994 where she announced the establishment of a resident Pakistan Embassy in Dublin, which was eventually opened in 2001.Unfortunately no Irish leader has visited Pakistan, except for a brief transit of Conor Lenihan, Minister for Development Cooperation through Islamabad in 2006 to review Irish assistance for relief and rehabilitation of the victims of the earthquake. Ireland has no presence in Pakistan except for an Honorary Consulate in Karachi. Current Prime Minister Brian Cowen came to Islamabad in 2004, when he was the Foreign Minister, at the head of an EU Troika mission to Pakistan. Irelands great upset in beating the Pakistan cricket team by three wickets at the World Cup in Jamaica on 17 March (its national day called the St. Patricks Day) was a shock that Pakistanis will long remember. Ironically, after this victory, the Irish national team, comprising mainly of amateurs, disintegrated as its best players were lapped up by eager English Cricket League teams. While commiserating with me, my Irish friends never tired of reminding me of how in 1969 they beat the great Clive Loyds West Indies side by bowling them out for a mere 25 runs. They can be as unpredictable as us Pakistanis. Pakistans exports to Ireland, mainly textile based items, are slowly rising with the gradual addition of sports and surgical equipment and food and leather items. In 2006 these were worth some $ 35 million. With a population of less than ve million, Ireland, itself a small though
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rich market, offers a whole variety of strategic options for our companies wishing to look at the long term in the EU and North American markets. This portrait reveals some of the commonalities between our people that can serve as a strong foundation for friendships and partnerships of immense scope and mutual benet.
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Essays
THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN PAKISTAN:
A RAY OF HOPE
Talat Farooq*
The Aurat Foundations recent report shows a sharp increase in violence against women in Pakistan. From April to June 2008 it was as high as 1,705 cases as compared to 1,321 for the previous quarter. The incidents include murder, rape, abduction, honour killing, gang rape, custodial assault, domestic violence, burning and acid throwing. These outrages, according to the police, were prompted by accusations of illicit relations, domestic quarrels, blood feuds, land and property disputes and personal enmity. However, the Aurat Foundations report identies deep-rooted gender bias and intolerance toward women as the real causes. It states that suicides among women, 66 in the rst quarter of the current year, has almost double to 126 in the second. These statistics, grim as they are, fall short in depicting the enormity of the problem as they do not include unreported cases of violence or those pertaining to emotional abuse. The ndings of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) are no less morbid. Since 2005, the perpetration of violence, particularly against married women, has risen alarmingly. The HRCP studies show that acid throwing has become the third most common method used in these criminal acts alongside burning from stove-related incidents. These result in grievous corporal injuries and even death. The gures on the violence against women, so painstakingly collated by human rights groups, afrm the truth but not the whole truth. Statistics, by denition, are cold-blooded and can never adequately
* Talat Farooq teaches at the Bahria University, Islamabad. She is also a poet and a social worker.
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portray the suffering and anguish inicted on the victims. The persistent violation of their fundamental rights is nothing short of a crime against humanity. Mere condemnation of these infringements is not enough. It is imperative to initiate urgent remedial measures. The phenomenal increase in violence against females in Pakistan is abhorrent and indicative of the degeneration of the society. However, there could be a silver lining to this dark cloud of oppression because it symbolises a reaction to the growing awareness of women about their inalienable rights. Violence, it is said, is the last refuge of the incompetent, and in the face of resistance on the part of the victim, it is the sole recourse of the perpetrator. The civil society in Pakistan is yet to display the missionary zeal so desperately needed for female emancipation. It lacks a comprehensive strategy to combat the repression of a sizeable portion of its population. However, despite the absence of an organized movement there has been a discernable change in as much as women are increasingly becoming rights-conscious and have availed of empowerment opportunities whenever these arise. They are now beginning to play a more assertive role in such areas of national endeavour as politics, information technology, economics and the media. This needs to be deepened and broadened. On a parallel track, since the 1990s there is a growing urge among Pakistani women to acquire religious education. This is a welcome development because men have hitherto monopolized the interpretation of scriptural texts. Although the existing courses in academic institutions are intellectually inadequate and do not question the narrow-minded approach of commentators on female rights in Islam, womens involvement in the interpretation of dogma will undoubtedly enable them to determine the truth and form independent opinions. Their victimization, as during the Zia-ul-Haq era, on the false pretext of religious doctrine will no longer be possible. Zia-ul-Haqs Hudood laws, promulgated in 1979 and enforced the following year consisted of ve criminal laws which were collectively
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known as the Hudood Ordinances. Two of these placed women at an enormous disadvantage. The rst, was titled the Offense of Zina Ordinance and the second the Offence of Qazf Ordinance. The former concerned rape, abduction, adultery and fornication while the latter with false accusation of zina which is dened as including both adultery and fornication. Female rape victims thus became liable for punishment under zina unless they were able to produce four rst-hand witnesses. As a consequence a large number of women languished in prison without trial. Furthermore, under these draconian ordinances, womens testimony became unacceptable in cases involving the imposition of hudd i.e., the maximum punishment under Islamic law and consequently females could not become judges. Yet another facet of these stern laws was that the age of majority for females was reduced from 16 to the age of puberty. Thus a girl child as young as between 9 and 13 became liable to the same severe punishment awarded to adults. So powerful was the hold of self-anointed obscurantist clerics that virtually nothing was done to strike down the iniquities of the Hudood Ordinances till the adoption of the Womens Protection Act in 2006 which, though decient in many aspects, shattered the myth that the Hudood laws are sacrosanct and immutable. This has led to the decline in zina related cases registered against women and proved that if the state possesses the political will to protect its citizens, it can take on the forces of bigotry and intolerance. Unfortunately little has changed within the basic unit of society namely, the family. It is here that gender discrimination begins and thrives because of the stranglehold of tradition which is rarely, if ever, challenged by the victims. Nonetheless, minor breakthroughs have occurred, primarily because of the increasing number of females entering the legal profession. Even more signicant is the willingness of women to seek legal recourse and resort to litigation. This change, though yet incipient, is important in that it signies a departure from well-entrenched social norms under which submission and unquestioning obedience are expected from the woman.
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Through history women have been exploited, repressed and relegated to pariah status. Primitive warring tribes, in the face of recurring hostilities, excluded women from the war effort. She was to be protected because her primary role was that of procreation. Male offspring were required to secure the military advantage in the wars of the future. The social implications of warfare resulted in division of labour which gradually crystallized into womens exclusion from public participation. As physical strength was indispensible for the tribal wars, the males dominant role in primitive tribal society was soon established and consolidated. Furthermore, the post-natal incapacitation of women compelled them to depend on the male for survival. Gradually, the helplessness of females and their subordination to male authority made them increasingly vulnerable to exploitation. Male domination of society through the ages thus came to be viewed as natural. It is one of the baser traits of human nature to exploit the economic needs of weaker segments of the society. The Machiavellian scheme of manipulation and coercion is employed by the strong to attain and maintain power. This phenomenon holds true not only between men and women, but also between men and men. Those who can successfully monopolize the sources of economic empowerment invariably use the advantage for controlling others. The relegation of the female to the social backwaters in the earlier societies had its impact on later times and undermined her standing in the eyes of the religious theocracy. The male dominated priesthood increasingly equated her biological make-up to her perceived spiritual weakness and thereby accorded her an inferior position to males. Thus organized religion has been instrumental in perpetuating the dynamics of male power play and the continued subjugation of women. The Bible establishes a womans inferior status and her subservience to man as divinely ordained. The New Testament declares: Let the woman learn in silence with all subjection. But I suffer not a woman to teach, nor to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence. For Adam was rst formed then Eve. And Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived was in transgression. 2:11-14
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According to the 19th century feminist, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, the church and Bible have proved to be the greatest stumbling blocks in the way of womens emancipation. The western feminist activism that focuses on gender politics and power relations is a reaction to churchsanctioned discrimination against women. The Indian constitution gives equal rights to all citizens but femalerelated abuse, regularly reported in the newspapers, is a reection of continued gender bias at various levels of the society. This particular societal attitude has its roots in Hindu religious doctrines. The oldest Hindu religious scriptures contain discriminatory passages concerning women. The religious doctrine outlined in the Vedas encourages female infanticide, child marriage and the burning of the widow (sati). It relegates them to the position of serfs who do not possess an identity of their own and are completely dependent on the male for protection. Females, according to Hindu sacred texts, cannot own property and are unt to study the Vedas. Girls can only marry within their caste, have no right to divorce and indelity on their part carries the death sentence. The widow cannot enjoy life in public again nor can she remarry, while a widower has no such restrictions. The ideal role model is Sita, Rams wife, who proved her delity to her husband by passing through ames. Buddhism and Jainism that emerged as protests against the Hindu Vedic system did oppose the custom of Sati. However, because they professed asceticism, women were considered as deviant. Buddha is said to have warned his disciples to stay away from females and to avoid even looking at them. While conventional Islam claims to foster an avant-garde approach toward womens rights and their rightful place in society, Muslim women remain among the most oppressed. This state of affairs has arisen due to a variety of causes, the most signicant of which pertains to misconstruing Arab culture as Islamic. In Pakistan the effects of Hindu culture, based on Hindu religious decrees, are visible in the societal attitude toward women. Conventional Islam is interpreted by closed and conditioned male minds that put their faith in the books of Tradition and the narrow
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interpretations of the Quran. They maintain a stubborn belief in the infallibility of the early compilers and writers who have, at times, mixed Islamic thought with Judeo-Christian beliefs. Consequently, orthodox Islam continues to preserve and nurture misconceptions pertaining to gender parity. The female is seen as dependent on male supervision in matters of property, marriage, divorce and sustenance. She is considered emotionally imbalanced and decient in rational decision making skills. The Quran declares in unambiguous terms that men and women have equal rights and that men cannot own women as their property: Oh people! Abide by your Sustainers law, who created you from one being; from that created its partner and from them made males and females in abundance. 4:1 to men is allotted what they earn and to women is allotted what they earn 4:32 ..It is not allowed to you (men) to inherit women against their will. 4:19 In case of a breach between the two of them, appoint two arbiters from his family and two arbiters from her family 4:35 Contrary to traditional beliefs in Pakistan, both the genders are accountable with regard to modesty. It is not the sole responsibility of the female: Say to the convinced men to lower their gaze and guard their chastity. 24:30. And say to the convinced women to lower their gaze and guard their chastity. 24:31 The Quran does not give a separate value system for males. Both men and women constitute human society and equally possess the capacity to grow as balanced human beings: Verily, (for) the Muslim men and women, the convinced
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men and women, the devoted men and women, the true men and women, the steadfast men and women, the submissive (to the will of God) men and women, the truthful men and women, the self-controlling men and women, the guarding men and women of their chastity, and those men and women who remember God in abundance, Allah has prepared great reward and protection. -33-35 Since men and women are equal, the Quran does not differentiate between males and females with regard to retribution or reward: And whoever does good deeds be it male or female and has conviction, they will enter Paradise. 4:124 The fornicator - male as well as female og each of them with a hundred lashes. 24:2. In the Arabic language the masculine plural includes the feminine as well. Therefore, the Quranic decrees addressed to Muslims in general are aimed at both men and women. It is their joint responsibility to establish a just and equitable social system for collective benet, and to utilize their individual potential for personal growth. During the time of the rst Islamic state in Medina, women were not barred from participation in public affairs. Some even fought in battles alongside Muslim male soldiers. During the prophets time, women did not encounter oppression or discrimination. It was a few generations after Mohammad that the patriarchal societies adapted Islam to their own peculiar requirements. According to Karen Armstrong, the women-specic discriminatory customs were adopted by the later Muslims under the inuence of the Greek Christians of Byzantine who believed in gender segregation. Despite clear Quranic injunctions and historical examples, however, Muslim women remain chained in tradition and culture-based social expectations. The lesson of history is that the human race clings to the status quo and vehemently opposes change. All prophets and revolutionaries alike have encountered stern opposition because they sought the transformation of the society in which they lived. Familiarity breeds a sense of security;
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resistance to change, therefore, is the oldest phenomenon in human history. The Quran points out: When it is said to them:Follow what Allah has revealed. They say: Nay! We shall follow the ways of our fathers.What! Even when their fathers were void of wisdom and guidance? 2:170. The fundamentalists of the modern era are disenchanted with modernity and abhor change. They erroneously link the emancipation of women to western, secular culture and insist on conformist, traditional roles for females in clear breach of the Quranic pronouncements. The majority of religious scholars do not openly denounce the inhumane customary practices against women in the tribal areas of Pakistan as well as in its settled but feudal regions. These practices include offering young females in marriage to the enemy clan to settle family feuds or debts. Thus, to a large extent, their hypocrisy, fear of change and chauvinism are responsible for the misery of the Pakistani women. Social justice is integral to good governance and a legitimate state protects the fundamental human rights of the citizens, of which human dignity, independent of gender, religion, caste, and colour, is indispensible. The Constitution of Pakistan grants equal protection to all citizens and does not allow gender discrimination. On 6 February 1996 Pakistan also became a signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Article 10 0f CEDAW species equal opportunity in female education. Local and foreign surveys, however, reveal the backwardness of the educational system of Pakistan where 42 percent of women cannot read because access to education is denied to them. Female emancipation depends largely on education leading to changes in attitudes and mindsets. The women themselves need to understand the injustices inicted on them in the name of religion and cultural traditions. Social behaviour is dictated by social expectations. The importance of introducing a socially intelligent model of power sharing between genders, through enlightened, holistic education, cannot be overemphasized. Unless myths and misconceptions regarding women, founded largely on distortions of religion, are eliminated it will not be possible to build a healthy society. The
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government must ensure that discriminatory material and stereotypes are expunged from school and madrassah curricula right from the primary level. The madrassah system must be brought under state control by implementing the provisions of the Madrassah Ordinance. Reports and surveys cite married women to be the most vulnerable to physical and emotional abuse. Abuse directed at the mother is bound to have far-reaching negative psychological consequences on her children, the future generation of Pakistan. Conversely, there is strong evidence that social uplift and economic empowerment of women translate into happier families. The institution of marriage is meant to complement the partners and help them grow into productive members of the society. The state, with the help of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the medical community, should develop and facilitate community development programs. Such programs should include family counselling sessions for both males and females to ensure social behavioural reforms and gender parity. Gender-related education aimed at enlightening the females and sensitizing the male is of fundamental importance. Governmental and private organizations working for female emancipation should join hands to involve different sections of the civil society and help formulate a comprehensive strategy to ensure womens rights. It is the duty of the Pakistan government to ensure that the complex issue of womens rights is debated in the parliament, followed by balanced and forward looking legislations. It is even more important that laws, new and existing, are enforced with a focus on women protection. An independent judiciary is vital to ensure the implementation of the policies and curtailment of police corruption. Awareness measures, including door to door campaigns, must be undertaken by the government and the NGOs. The electronic and print media, especially the vernacular press inclusive of newspapers and periodicals, can play a pivotal role in highlighting the plight of the downtrodden. They must focus on the female predicament, especially in the far ung areas. The government should facilitate their access to the tribal and feudal regions and give them protection against reprisal. The tribal and feudal structures of
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Pakistan are relics of the past and reminders of the pre-Islam jahaliyya period. Unless the writ of the state becomes all encompassing, these structures cannot be dismantled. The problem is complex and multilayered and there are no easy solutions in sight. Yet, history tells us that a strong political will has the capacity to introduce meaningful changes. A long term strategy along with swift, surgical measures can bear fruit if public support is gained through awareness, debates and media campaigns. Human attitudes can change through awareness as well as law and policy enforcement. Both must work hand in hand. The government should take decisive measures to initiate and facilitate the process of ijtehad to ensure that the universal principles at the heart of Quranic laws are not compromised. Selective verses that can be manipulated to the advantage of an unjust male member of the society must be reviewed within contextual parameters and in conformity with the true spirit of Islam. Many Traditions emerge from specic historical contexts, narrated by unreliable sources that confuse the universal values of the Book with socio-cultural and religious values of their own time. Such time and place bound Traditions must be reevaluated to minimize prejudice and ensure justice for all. Technological advancement has accelerated the momentum of change resulting in renovation of social structures. The ongoing process of globalization is a truth that cannot be wished away. The electronic media and the internet are facilitating integration of ideas and awareness of human rights at the grass root levels. Ideas and traditions that are inexible and resistant to growth eventually wither away. The Quran is for all times to come precisely because its immeasurable potential is conducive to multiple interpretations without distorting its permanent value system. The early scholars of Islam were aware of the Quranic potential and were unafraid to resort to ijtehad. It is therefore the duty of the Pakistan government as well as all Muslim men and women to demand a fresh review of the Traditions and the reassessment of the Quranic injunctions pertaining to womens status in Islam. While the permanent values of the Quran are immutable, their implementation in the contemporary socio-economic environment must be debated and re-examined to the benet of the weaker segments of the society in accordance with the Quranic vision of social justice for all mankind. The
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implementation procedures relevant to a tribal society several centuries ago surely require unbiased and objective reviewing keeping in view the linguistic intricacies of the Arabic language. Theocracy has no place in Islam; legitimizing it gives privileged status to a social class in contravention of Islamic principles. Women themselves must be proactive and demand gender equality based on both rights and duties. Females in the legal profession as well as women scholars of the Quran and Islamic jurisprudence must become a viable part of the process of ijtehad to assist female self-determination. The government should consult the representatives of diverse sections of the society to gain insight into the nature of the complexities involved. Scientic progress has transformed many long held traditional concepts including the concept of warfare. Brute male force is no longer an indispensible social and military asset. Female soldiers, pilots and sailors in the US military, for example, are well equipped to ght wars by using modern weapon systems. American female pilots were actively involved in the post-9/11 bombing missions to Afghanistan along with their male counterpart. The knowledge revolution of the 21st century focuses on human mental and intellectual capabilities. In an increasingly competitive world, genderless knowledge-based services are required. In order for the human race to survive in the face of emerging global economic realities it will be suicidal to imprison the potential of a substantial number of human beings. The change is bound to happen; it would be sensible to learn from history and apply a visionary approach to resolve the issue. A well planned and state supervised transformation in the status of Pakistani women pertaining to their physical, psychological, emotional and economic uplift will obviate societal turmoil that accompanies cataclysmic natural changes in the society. By fullling her biological function of reproduction and physically sharing her sustenance with her unborn child a female provides the human race with the greatest example of sharing and responsibility. Powerful humans must learn from her and apply this model of sacrice to inter-gender power sharing based on mutual respect and individual dignity.
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FATA AT THE CROSSROADS

Ayaz Wazir*
With a population of over seven million, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan form a 27,220 sq. km. arch along the countrys border with Afghanistan. The terrain is rugged and mountainous. It is a region where empires once met and it was here that the British played out their Great Game of the nineteenth century which sought to contain the further expansion of imperial Russia. Afghanistan was established as a buffer state and its rulers relied heavily on the support of the erce and independent Pathan tribes straddling the Pak-Afghan border. After the ouster of king Zahir Shah in 1973, successive Afghan republican regimes, whether secular or Islamic, had to contend with the inuence of the tribes. The second half of the twentieth century saw the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan. It was from the tribal areas of Pakistan that the biggest covert war in history was launched against the occupation forces. It is ironic that the last battle of the Cold War was fought and won for the West largely by the same tribes whose territory, due to no fault of theirs, has become a haven for terrorist outts, even though terrorism is alien to the tribal culture of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border regions. The fakir of Ipi, who revolted against the British in 1936 and after the emergence of Pakistan joined the so-called Pakhtunistan movement, is reported to have stated in the nal years of his life that his jihad against the British was for freedom rather than for religion. This is probably a misquotation because the tribesmen of the area have always been motivated by religion-inspired nationalism and the thirst for freedom. It was the same quest for freedom that motivated the tribes to ght the British in the Afghan wars of the nineteenth century, the Soviets in the
* Ayaz Wazir was the rst ambassador of Pakistan from the Waziri tribe. His email address is waziruk@hotmail.com
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twentieth and the coalition forces in Afghanistan in the twenty-rst. In pursuit of its divide and rule policy, the British Raj deliberately kept FATA isolated from the rest of the country. The warrior tribes of the area which include the Wazirs, Mahsuds, Afridis, Shinwaris, Mohmands and others were segregated into seven administrative agencies, namely, Bajaur, Khyber, Kurram, Mohmand, Orakzai, North Waziristan and South Waziristan. Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan thoughtlessly continued with the British colonial policy of isolating the tribal areas. Consequently the quarantined region remained backward. The tribesmen, along with thousands of volunteers particularly Arabs, were trained, indoctrinated, nanced and armed primarily by the US, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to ght the Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan. After the successful culmination of the jihad which contributed to the collapse of communism, the region was ignored and its people forgotten. What remained were thousands of motivated ghters and the tribal areas became the epicentre of extremist and terrorist violence. The impact was felt in the seven tribal agencies. For instance Bajaur, which overlooks Afghanistans Kunar province, became known in the 1980s and 1990s as the poppy kingdom. On 13 January 2006 Ayman al-Zawahiri of the Al Qaida is reported to have survived a US attack at Damadola, which is also considered a stronghold of the Tehreeke-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi. Bajaur provides recruits for the Taliban. Maulvi Faqir of Bajaur, ranks after Baitullah Mehsud as the most inuential Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leader. Khyber, which links Peshawar and Kabul, is the base of the Lashkare-Islam led by Mangal Bagh. There has been ghting since 2005 between the Lashkar and the Ansar-ul-Islam of pir Saifur Rahman. This has been an intra-Sunni conict between the Barelvis and Deobandis. The forces loyal to Mangal Bagh advanced towards Peshawar in mid-2008 prompting a military response from the government. Mountainous Kurram, the second largest agency with its headquarters
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in Parachinar, is surrounded by Afghanistan on three sides. When the post-9/11 military action against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan started, Al Qaida elements were said to have rst ed to the Kurram agency although it was reported to be pro-Northern Alliance because of its large Shia population. There has been frequent Shia-Sunni violence in the agency. Mohmand, sandwiched, as it is by Bajaur and Khyber, had been relatively peaceful. However, Umer Khalid, a Sa tribesman of the agency has emerged after recent ghting as the third most powerful Taliban leader. He has claimed that 26,000 trained militants are under his command. Orakzai was considered to be one of the better governed agencies but it has witnessed the spill-over of the sectarian conict from Kurram. It is North and South Waziristan that has become the centre of Taliban activities. Combined the two agencies have an area of 5000 square miles. Waziristan is inhabited by the powerful Karlani Pathans, the Darwesh Khel Wazirs and the Mahsuds. Although the Wazirs and Mahsuds have ancestral links, for administrative reasons the Mahsuds are a separate tribe. Waziristan has great strategic importance and is located near the provinces of Khost, Paktika and Paktia in Afghanistan. As early as 2005, some elements of the Pakistani Taliban declared North Waziristan an Islamic state. In 2007 in South Waziristan, the Taliban loyal to Baitullah Mahsud captured more than 300 Pakistani troops. Had FATA not been isolated and divided it would have been able to better withstand the fallout of the Afghan jihad. Further more, the writ of the state would also not have been continuously eroded as is happening now. The British motivation was understandable. They had their own agenda and interests to pursue. A divided Pathan community would not be able to ght against the colonial power. The continuation of the same policies after 1947 is, however, incomprehensible. The most obvious consequence was that the people of the tribal areas were never provided the much needed opportunity to merge with the rest of Pakistan. FATAs isolation was further compounded by keeping the seven tribal
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agencies separate from each other. No roads were built to link them and the few that existed were closed to trafc. This made travel between the agencies, though they adjoin each other, extremely difcult. Prospective travellers have to rst proceed to a settled district and then travel back to the neighbouring agency. This is just one of the methods of keeping the tribes isolated. The tribesmen did not opt for isolation; it was imposed on them and continues to date. Only locals of the area are allowed to visit FATA without obtaining prior permission from the government. The people of FATA are still governed through the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) imposed on them in 1901 by the British Raj. These draconian laws should have been abolished with the emergence of Pakistan as a sovereign nation in 1947. Unfortunately, this was not to be. The sacrices of the tribesmen for the country were ignored and their fundamental right to be treated as equal citizens of Pakistan was denied. Prime minister Yusuf Raza Gilanis recent statement that the FCR will eventually be abolished is a welcome step in the right direction. It is hoped that the committee constituted for this purpose follows through and meets the expectations of the people. Governance of these areas through the FCR has been an indirect endorsement by the state of the pre-partition British policy of divide and rule. It denies the tribal agencies the opportunity to unite. Furthermore, the political agents administering them on behalf of the president have been given powers that contradict not only the constitution of Pakistan but also international conventions on human rights. The political agent is empowered to: (i) Arrest anyone under his jurisdiction for three years without assigning any reason. The period can be extended indenitely and cannot be challenged in any court of law in Pakistan. (ii) Punish the entire tribe by seizing, conscating or demolishing their properties. A crime committed by an individual becomes the responsibility of the tribe. Similarly, a tribe is responsible for its territory (landed property). It cannot be used for action against the government, otherwise, the entire tribe will be held
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responsible and punished. (iii) Nominate members of the jirga (council of elders). Their recommendations are, however, not binding on him. He has the authority to dismiss them and constitute a new jirga. His orders cannot be challenged in any court. Traditionally, a jirga is constituted to resolve disputes between individuals and tribes. The jirga system is used to address and settle all criminal and unjust acts brought to its notice. Its members are nominated by the concerned individuals or tribes. A persons wealth, status or power holds no value in the pursuit of justice. The famous tradition of nanawati (seeking help from other tribesmen) further strengthens this system. The Pathan society in general and the tribesmen in particular ensure, under this tradition that the aggressor agrees to face the jirga or else earn the enmity of fellow tribesmen. This convention ensures that all work within the system. The FCR, however, imposed its own form of jirga on the people of the tribal areas. Its members are nominated by the political agent. The political agent also has the authority to annul any decision taken by this body and replace the members of the jirga if its decision is contrary to his wishes. This form of jirga, with its handpicked members and pressure from the nominating authority, has maligned and corrupted the system which is no longer trusted. The recently concluded agreements between the government and the dissidents (Taliban) are the outcome of yet another form of government sponsored jirga which has deviated from established practices. This time the Maliks and other notables of the tribes were bypassed in the decision making process thereby further broadening the gap between contemporary practice and tradition. If the FCR is abolished then there will be a vacuum that has to be lled. How does the government tend to supplant a set of laws that have been in force for over a century? The committees appointed for this task must not disregard tribal customs and traditions in their haste to reform. The people of FATA would want the existing laws to be replaced by the Shariah. Other options that may be considered are as follows:
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1. Drastic amendments to the FCR should be carried out to make it more acceptable to the people. A key ingredient in the success of these amendments should be the curtailment of the political agents powers. He should be made accountable under the new system like any other ofcer in the settled districts of the country. 2. A new set of rules based on tribal customs and traditions should be formulated. Input from the various tribes of the area is essential for the success of such an endeavour. A 14-member subcommittee consisting of 2 representatives from each tribal agency should be constituted in order to assist the main committee in formulating these laws. 3. The laws of the land under which the rest of Pakistan functions should be extended to FATA as well. The prerequisite for this is that the concerned area is developed so that at least the basic amenities of life are at par with the rest of the country. Keeping ground realities of the region in mind, development projects would require at least 3 to 5 years to reach fruition. Regardless of the system the government will nally adopt, the crucial part of this process will be the transitional phase. Keeping in mind the volatile situation, particularly in Waziristan, it is essential to avoide creating a vacuum during the process. Anything other than a smooth transition will have disastrous consequences. The withdrawal of FCR in Malakand without providing a substitute and the subsequent misery that the people of the area faced is a prime example of this. The bureaucracy in Peshawar and Islamabad - the FATA secretariat, working under the NWFP governor, and the States and Frontier Region Division (SAFRON) - has been instrumental in keeping the tribal areas backward. They have justied their resistance to any form of political and economic development through false pretexts. They have established an understanding with a few hundred Maliks whose interests are looked after, in return for the Maliks support of their policies. The lack of development in infrastructure and industry in FATA and the resultant unemployment demonstrate the bureaucracys lack of intrest in the welfare of the people of FATA. They are the biggest hurdle in the
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way of any meaningful reforms in the tribal areas. These organizations require overhauling and reorientation to be able to play a positive role in the area. Despite funds being allocated by the federal government for development projects in FATA, the two ofces mentioned above, failed to bring about the social and economic transformation so desperately needed for the area. Presently there is talk of establishing Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) in FATA. The main purpose of this scheme is to develop the area. Although the project is yet to pass many hurdles in Washington, efforts are already underway in Peshawar to shift the ROZs to settled districts under the pretext of lack of security and instability prevailing in the tribal areas. Will these projects meet the same fate as others before them? Only time will tell. On the other side, however, one of the few reforms truly appreciated by the people of FATA was the introduction of adult franchise in 1997. If the government had consulted the usual Maliks this too would have been opposed as they prefer the old system where only they had the right to vote. The elections that followed proved that the decision was correct. Tribesmen took great interest in the electoral process. People participated in large numbers even in the problematic areas of South Waziristan. Surprisingly women also came out and voted for the candidates of their choice. This amazing phenomenon should have motivated bureaucrats and policy makers to recommend and implement similar reforms such as the extension of the Political Parties Act in FATA. After all, this is perhaps the only area in the world where adult franchise is allowed yet political parties are banned. It is essential to realize the ground realities of FATA and move to rectify and not ignore the blatant issues that need addressing. The two ofces, FATA Secretariat and SAFRON, should cater to the political aspects of the area whereas an independent organization should be established to oversee the economic and social needs of the people of FATA.
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According to ofcial statistics 60 percent of the people in FATA are living below the poverty line. Heavy investment in industry, infrastructure, education and healthcare is needed to bring the standard of living in the area at par with the rest of the country. Job opportunities will not only alleviate the misery of the poor but will also obviate recruitment of frustrated youth by militant organizations. The isolation of FATA must also end. People should be allowed to travel freely within the country. The only place that is inaccessible without prior permission from the government is the tribal belt. One fails to understand the logic behind our governments policy of keeping its own people isolated from the world. Technological advancement is transforming the world into a global village. FATA, too, should be brought out of the stone age. The people of FATA need to interact freely with the outside world. The isolation of the area has made it a recruiting centre for militants. The seven tribal agencies are now dominated and controlled by the Taliban. Taliban leaders in places like North Waziristan have gone to the extent of declaring their area an Islamic state. Pakistan needs to reconsider its policy towards the tribal areas if it wants to win the war against terror. It cannot win a war against its own people. Pakistan has already lost more soldiers in this war than the casualties it incurred in wars with India. Reassessment of the governments policies towards FATA, innovative solutions and rapid and efcient implementation of these measures are required; the consequences of complacency can be disastrous for both Pakistan and its allies.
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Criterion

July/September 2008 Volume 3, Number 3

Editorial New Government, Old Problems

Shahwar Junaid 107

Toheed Ahmad 130

Talat Farooq 155 Ayaz Wazir 166

Editorial IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT

CRITERION Volume 3 No.2

CRITERION Volume 3 No.2

Justice Khalil-ur-Rahman Ramday

CRITERION Volume 3 No.3

Interview with Justice Khalil-ur-Rahman Ramday

CRITERION July/September 2008

CRITERION Volume 3 No.3

Interview with Justice Khalil-ur-Rahman Ramday

CRITERION Volume 3 No.3

Interview with Justice Khalil-ur-Rahman Ramday

CRITERION Volume 3 No.3

Interview with Justice Khalil-ur-Rahman Ramday

CRITERION Volume 3 No.3

Interview with Justice Khalil-ur-Rahman Ramday

CRITERION Volume 3 No.3

Interview with Justice Khalil-ur-Rahman Ramday

CRITERION Volume 3 No.3

Interview with Justice Khalil-ur-Rahman Ramday

CRITERION Volume 3 No.3

Interview with Justice Khalil-ur-Rahman Ramday

CRITERION July/September 2008

JINNAHS WORLD VIEW/OUTLOOK ON WORLD AFFAIRS

Jinnahs World View/Outlook on World Affairs

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Jinnahs World View/Outlook on World Affairs

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Jinnahs World View/Outlook on World Affairs

CRITERION Volume 3 No.3

Jinnahs World View/Outlook on World Affairs

CRITERION Volume 3 No.3

Jinnahs World View/Outlook on World Affairs

CRITERION Volume 3 No.3

Jinnahs World View/Outlook on World Affairs

CRITERION Volume 3 No.3

Jinnahs World View/Outlook on World Affairs

CRITERION July/September 2008

CRITERION Volume 3 No.3

Jinnahs World View/Outlook on World Affairs

CRITERION July/September 2008

CRITERION Volume 3 No.3

THE MQM AND IDENTIY POLITIC IN PAKISTAN

CRITERION Volume 3 No.3

The MQM and Identity Politic in Pakistan

CRITERION Volume 3 No.3

The MQM and Identity Politic in Pakistan

CRITERION Volume 3 No.3

The MQM and Identity Politic in Pakistan

CRITERION Volume 3 No.3

The MQM and Identity Politic in Pakistan

CRITERION Volume 3 No.3

The MQM and Identity Politic in Pakistan

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The MQM and Identity Politic in Pakistan

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The MQM and Identity Politic in Pakistan

Source: Census of Pakistan 1951, Vol. I, Table 19-A, Vol. 6, p. 65.

Taken from: Mohammad Waseem, Ethnic Conict in Pakistan: The