a) Yes there exists a perfect matching with no strong instability.

This is proved by the

mt denotes the list of men tied for men to propose. Initialize each person to be free. While (some man is free and hasn't proposed to every woman) { Choose such a man m w = a woman on ms first preference (or) a random woman on m's tied list to whom m has not yet proposed if (w is free) assign m and w to be engaged else if (w prefers mt1 to her fianc m' (or) w prefers mtm to her fianc m') assign any random mtm and w to be engaged, and m' to be free else w rejects m } following algorithm Men has list of tied women to propose. Men would be happy for any random woman in the tied list for which she accepts him. Hence there is no strong instability b) Yes, there exists a perfect matching which is indifferent with options making them weak instability. From the above algorithm Let m1, m2 be the list of men and w1 , w2 be the list of women. (m1, m2) indicates men whose preference is tied. (w1 , w2 ) indicates women whose preference is tied. (m1, m2)1 indicates subset of men whose preference is tied (w1 , w2 )1 indicates subset of women whose preference is tied. 1st (w1 , w2 ) (w1 , w2 ) 1st 2nd (w1 , w2 )1 (w1 , w2 )1 2nd

m1 m2

w1 w2

(m1 , m2 ) (m1 , m2 )

(m1 , m2 )1 (m1 , m2 )1

In this scenario If m1 proposes w1 and m2 proposes w2, they would accept. If m1 proposes w2 and m2 proposes w1, they would accept. So m 1 and m2 are happy with either of the women making them indifferent with the options they select. This indicates a weak instability