WHICH KINDS OF FRIGATES FOR EUROPEAN NAVIES ?

2003 -2014

T T U

French La Fayette-class frigate (DCN)

E D I T O R I A L
After a TTU special issue in 2002 devoted to the threat of theatre ballistic missiles, another exceptional topic warranted a new supplement. The vast frigate and destroyer renewal phase, which mainly involves the British, French and Italian navies, with some 70 ships planned over the next 20 years, gives rise to many questions. What is the best way to manage such an undertaking, given very tight budgets? How to benefit from this window of opportunity for multinational collaboration, knowing that such an opportunity will not come along again before at least another 30 years? And how to design these frigates, the mainsprings of modern navies, while taking into account the redefinition of the navys role since the end of the Cold War?

S U M M A R Y
ON THE EVE OF A MAJOR ERA OF RENEWAL THE WORLD HAS CHANGED OPPOSING CONCEPTIONS CHALLENGE OF COOPERATION FINANCING A SHIP CHALLENGE OF INTEROPERABILITY

P3 P4 P6 P8 P11 P14 P16

Today, discussions seem more geared around the way of designing frigates, which play a very different role now than they did during the Cold War. As ships are increasingly systems of systems, a new global approach appears more appropriate. Technologically speaking, onboard data processing and modern weapon systems offer a modularity and a versatility that was until now unimaginable, but which is essential in order to face unpredictable threats. Moreover, a new fact is that the choice of specific systems has an impact on the overall architecture of the ships. Fitting a multifunction radar on the mast or vertical launchers on the bridge has consequences on a ships design. Should we not take advantage of this forced breakaway in the definition of frigates to rethink the process of design, construction, repair and modernisation during the overall life span of a ship? Only concrete possibilities for cost reduction can allow the acquisition of important classes of ships as planned.
Guy Perrimond

VERTICAL LAUNCHERS CONTROLING ACCESS TO THEATRE OPERATIONS LAND ATTACK OPERATIONS

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Supplement of TTU International Bimonthly Newsletter on Defence and Strategy published by Certes capital : 40 155 Head Office - 25, rue du Louvre - 75001 Paris Phone : +33 1 40 26 03 03 - Fax :+33 1 40 26 18 59 E-mail : ttuw@newedge.fr Editor : Guy Perrimond - Publishing Director : Clment Mnasc Staff writers : Paul Merlon, Charles Maisonneuve Lay out by : Adeline Prvost Printed in France by : Quebecor World N Commission paritaire 0902I79878 TTU - Certes 2003 - All rights reserved

On the eve of a major era of renewal

European navies have recently resumed major investments in large air defence ship programmes. These include 12 Type 45 destroyers for the Royal Navy, eight Horizon/Orizzonte frigates for the French and Italian navies as well as the entry into service of the first German (F-124) and Dutch (LCF) anti-air warfare (AAW) frigates. Still, behind these emblematic programmes, it appears that European nations will need no less than 87 multi-mission frigates over the period 2008-2020. The British, French and Italian navies account for the lions share of these renewal orders, with total requirements for 47 frigates, i.e. one-half of the European forecast. Of these, France and Italy are driven by a strong desire to cooperate, as revealed by the FREMM European multi-mission frigate programme (a new name bringing together the French FMM and the Italian FNG designations). The British FSC programme will certainly offer some opportunities for cooperation with regards to systems, but on a slightly different schedule. Regarding other European countries, Germany and the Netherlands have also expressed a need for multi-mission vessels equipped with ATBM capabilities. These are expected to be based on the American doctrine, and a cooperation between the two countries sounds possible. The strong implantation of American
The Limburg is destroyed by fire. This attack underlines the need to protect maritime routes, on which 80 per cent of commercial trade is transported.(AFP)

industrials in the Spanish naval sector over the past year considerably decreases the feasibility of any cooperation with Spain. As for the 27 remaining frigates in other European coun-

tries, most of them appear to have a lighter tonnage compared with the FMM, FNG and FSC. However some technical parts, such as systems or sub-systems, could be jointly developed.

Needs within Europe

Number
GERMANY BELGIUM DENMARK SPAIN FRANCE GREECE ITALY NETHERLANDS PORTUGAL UNITED KINGDOM SWEDEN TURKEY

Name F 125

Principal Missions SS + ATBM ASW 2 GP & 4 ASW AD 8 ASW, 9 DS

Service Date

8 4 6 5 17 4 10 4 3 20 2 4

F 100 FREMM

FREMM Q

4 ASW, 6 GP ASW + ATBM 2 AD, 1 ASW DS

FSC

FS 2000

AD

> 2014 > 2009 > 2008 > 2008 > 2010 > 2013 -

Among European navies there will be a need for 87 frigates over the 2008-2020 period

TOTAL = 87

SS (surface-surface), ATBM (anti ballistic missile) ASW (anti-submarine warfare), DS (deep strike), AD (air defence), GP (general purpose)

The world has changed...

A new role
One of the consequences of the end of the Cold War is the appearance throughout the world of endemic crises, which call for close monitoring before they turn into armed conflicts.
The new vocation of European navies is to shift from the Cold War scheme of fighting in open seas to green water operations and, in particular, air-land operations. For the worlds major navies, this involves shifting from preparation of engagements in the high seas to a littoral warfare environment. In a changing world with rapidly evolving threats, the best starting point for attacking land, appears to be the sea and its international waters, which cover three quarters of the earth. It should be noted that 75 per cent of the worlds population lives less than 300 nautic miles from the coast and 80 per cent of the worlds industries are located within 180 km of a shore. Naval platforms have the advantage of offering mobile launching pads, less vulnerable to air attacks than land bases and not burdened by diplomatic complications such as overflight and access authorisations. Combat ships are both a valuable means of gathering information for situation analysis (radar monitoring, COMINT...) and an effective means of command offering the possibility of immediate action with onboard armaments. Naval platforms can be pre-stationed in high risk zones or be quickly deployed, with the benefit of considerable flexibility and strong political and military significance. The Afghan and the Gulf experiences underline the need for naval forces capable of carrying out long-term operations anywhere in the world on short notice, since today a crisis can very quickly escalate into a conflict that is costly both in resources and in human terms. The redirecting of naval missions to coastal water operations entails a change in the type of threats they may face. Although different from threats faced on the open sea these new threats are nonetheless dangerous. Finally, engagement in land attack actions requires embarked capabilities.

80 per cent of the worlds industries are located within 100 nautical miles of a coast

The USS Stark, severely damaged by an Iraqi Exocet. This demonstrates the need for escort ships to be equipped with protection against all kinds of air threats. (AFP)

A quantitative and qualitative problem

This redefinition of naval missions towards force projection operations affects the size of combat fleets. The diversification of missions such as long-term embargo or surveillance missions, pre-positioning in high-risk zones, relief units... requires having a significant number of ships. This implies halting structural disarmament, a phenomenon due to the exponential increase in costs which, in Western countries, made it impossible during the Cold War to replace entire arsenals of weapons with newer versions, considering the higher costs of successive generations of equipment. Today, navies must find a way to replace the older generation equipment with the same number of newer ships, without having to dramatically increase their budgets. Moreover, the only reasonable answer to the unpredictability of threats lies in the acquisition of means offering the most versatility and modularity possible. The flexibility and the adaptability of ships

according to need must enable them to meet requirements that differ from one conflict to another. Their multi-purpose aspect also permits regular adaptation to evolving threats throughout the ships lifespans. But how do you build more ships with increasingly powerful and versatile weapon systems with limited budgets? This is a challenge faced by all European navies.

The cargo liner Winner, transporting drugs, is apprehended by a French navy aviso. This success, thanks to international cooperation, illustrates a new role for the French navy. (AFP)

General remarks on frigate development

Almost all cooperation projects undertaken to develop completely identical ships fitted with the same systems have failed (notably NATOs NFR 90 frigate and the tripartite Horizon project) due to the difficulty of reaching an agreement between the various industrials involved regarding their differing operational needs. On the other hand, cooperation projects based on the definition of a standard propelled hull built in each country have been successful, with each participant choosing its own systems and equipment. Examples of these are the tripartite mine hunter programme (France, Belgium and the Netherlands) and the German-Dutch frigate programme. Consideration must also be given to the method used in designing ships. Upstream integration, i.e. the definition of ships, as well as operating, maintenance, repair and modernisation constraints, represent vast opportunities for possible savings over the life of the vessels. However this presupposes a concerted policy allowing the navy to jointly redefine the planned lifespan, midlife updates and the number of times a vessel must undergo modernisation to determine the initial military capabilities necessary and plan those required over time. Similarly, the development and ownership costs for new weapon systems are so high that it is much more favourable to have a maximum of multi-purpose systems, declined in joint-forces and European variations. The British, French and Italian navies have clearly paved the way with SAAM and PAAMS naval systems of the Aster family of systems. These have been jointly developed by three European nations and have the possibility of declining the Scalp EG/Storm Shadow into a family of air-to-ground missiles, already in service in the three air forces, which have a naval land attack missile version.

The damaged hull of the USS Cole, in Aden. This terrorist attack illustrates the need to reinforce security measures for ships in high risk seaports. (AFP)

Opposing conceptions
Three different classes of ships for the U.S. navy
It is via stealth, land attack operation and the integration of all of its ships in a real time communications network benefiting all that the U.S. navy hopes to maintain its operational advantage over all potential enemies
Regarding surface combat, the U.S. navy today plans to build its future around three new classes of ships: CG(X), DD(X) and LCS. Future class cruisers CG(X) or CG21 will ensure the replacement of the current Ticonderoga-class Aegis cruisers, i.e. both for area air defence and anti-ballistic missile theatre defence. Regarding the DD(X) of the Zumwalt class, they will ensure land attack missions (against coastal areas), now considered essential. Finally, the LCS, will handle battles in littoral zones. The current schedule gives a priority to the DD(X) programme. This programme will provide a 12,000-tonne multi-mission ship primarily developed for blue- to green-water operations (the vessels weight is 25 per cent less than the initial DD21 project abandoned few months ago). The ship also features electric propulsion (pods are inside the hull) with a speed of 30 knots. Fitted with an integrated underwater warfare system, DD(X) will be capable of receiving an AGS (Advanced Gun System) of 1,200 shells for the support of land troops, as well as some 128 vertical cruise missile launching cells. These tubes will be scattered around the hull in order to reduce the degree of destruction in case the ship is hit. In addition, the hull will be designed to strongly reduce EM and IR signatures. The DD(X) will be simultaneously capable of carrying on its quarterdeck two helicopters or drones. The studies and development phase has been underway since 29 April, under the responsibility of Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, assisted by Raytheon. However, the contract provides that Bath Iron Works, the competitor which lost the invitation to tender, will participate as a major subcontractor. This choice was made in order to maintain a competition for the attribution of the next phases of construction. For now, the construction of a first section of eight DD(X) is planned by 2005. The first will be delivered by 2009 and brought into service in 2011. The current studies refer to a total series of 32 ships. By 2014, about 30 CG(X) are expected to be ordered. Thus, the U.S. acquisition is expected to involve almost 70 ships between 2005 and 2025.

The future CG(X), DD(X) and LCS of the U.S. navy. This illustration shows the technological leap that will be made by the U.S. with this new class of ship.

The third unit of the family, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), is expected to be ordered in the longer run, with the acquisition of 30 to 60 units. The similarities among the LCS and the European corvettes of the Visby and Skjold classes are obvious. Last summer these ships took part, along with the American catamaran HSV-X1 and Lockheed Martins Sea Slice, in experiments organised on the behalf of the U.S. navy near San Diego. The LCS, according to the U.S. navys wishes, should be a fast combat ship (between 50 and 60 knots in order to improve its survivability and to reduce its transfer times to the theatre of operations) weighing between 1,500 and 4,000 tonnes. Stealthy, highly automated and of small dimensions, it is designed to handle operations close to shore, which are risky for heavier ships. Among the missions planned for the LCS, American admirals have mentioned the war against mines in shallow water (remotely-piloted machines), surveillance/reconnaissance (underwater drones) and the fight against small vessels carrying out offensive actions using rapid fire gun radar-guided Phalanx. The LCS will constitute the advanced units of the C4ISR information and command network of a land attack naval force or even of a joint-theatre command. For now, a prototype is scheduled to be manufactured by 2005. The LCS programme, like the JSF, is a sort of Trojan horse, attracting various European investments. With the risk of seeing the U.S. resolve European divergences regarding the LCS concept, thus killing other programmes.

The requirement for modularity in Europe

The trend towards greater ship tonnages has become generalised alongside the move towards lengthening vessels, in particular to allow ships to be equipped with a hangar as well as a bridge for helicopters. This explains why future 12,000-tonne U.S. DD(X) destroyers are classified in the cruiser category. Regarding the 7,000-tonne Horizon frigates, they are, according to NATO standards, considered destroyers, similar to former light cruisers. Although an increase in a ships weight which affects the organisation of the internal volumecomes at a higher cost, it is compensated by easier repairs and subsequent modernisation.

The second important trend lies in the new platform design (FREMM, DD(X), K-130, F-125) with new deep strike capabilities. Within this framework, the challenge for naval armament is to combine defensive systems designated to establish a protection sphere against enemy weapons capable of reaching the ships, and offensive systems capable of taking part in ground operations, based on naval artillery, ground attack missiles, UAV monitoring in addition to aircraft carrier capabilities. The concept of use of future frigates, cornerstones of the navy, can be declined over a broad spectrum going from the use of a single ship to a complete air and sea force deployment. In addition, France and the U.K. have the additional task of supporting Strategics SSBN (FOST) missions. To meet the needs of these different scenarios, several kinds of responses are necessary.

The solution chosen by France and Italy with the FREMM is the result of the balance between standardisation and specialisation, with the design of a single class of ship of the 5,000-tonne class, based on the same hull and having as many common elements as possible regarding the combat system, and declined in only two versions: Anti-SubmarineWarfare (ASW) on one hand, and Deep Strike (DS), or General Purpose (GP), to use the Italian term, on the other. The clear intention, in particular for the French navy, is to benefit from a rapid development of major series, and to move away from the costly mistakes made with ships of former classes, built in small series that were more or less successful, prototypes, or series that were reduced to only two ships.

A French Lafayette frigate. Its radar signature is equivalent to that of a trawler. (Marine nationale)

The first solution is to come up with several classes of ships adapted to each scenario. However, this choice does not allow any large scale production benefits and presents difficulties in sizing each class.

On the other hand, it is possible to design only one class of general-purpose ship, by equipping them with all the weapons systems they need to fulfil any kind of mission during a single operation. This solution leads to ships greater than 10,000-tonnes, such as the American DD(X), which far exceeds European budgets.

This new concept of industrialisation in series will allow, regarding French-Italian cooperation, the construction of 27 units, including 17 French FREMMs (eight ASW and nine DS) and 10 Italian FREMMs (eight ASW and six GP), to replace five classes of ships: two F-67s, six F-70s and nine A-69s in France, two Lupos and eight Maestrales in Italy. It is logical to think for the FREMM design, that maximum use will be made of development studies already carried out on the ambitious Horizon programme, from its origins as a British-FrenchItalian programme before the Royal Navy decided to develop its Type 45 destroyer.

The option of smaller ships, with the same hull and combat system, and which can be reconfigured thanks to specific mission kits according to different scenarios is feasible. Although interesting, this option entails many difficulties in terms of advance planning required according to the time needed for reconfiguration time as well as the storage and maintenance of unused capabilities

In the same way, for the post-2015 British Future Surface Combatant (FSC) programme, studies also plan to take advantage of developments on the Type 45 destroyer, itself inspired from Horizon studies, and decline around a common core a shortened general purpose version with ASW specialisation, and a lengthened land attack version with additional vertical launchers, a largecalibre gun as well as more space to embark helicopters and UAVs.

Challenge of cooperation

European navies, faced with reality, appear today more open to the idea of acquiring ships and weapons systems within the framework of international cooperation. With programmes such as Horizon or the future FMM, this is now a reality. Nevertheless, multilateral cooperation presents certain challenges.

European navies : cloning or organ bank ?

The advantages of European cooperation in the development of combat ships are obvious and well known (major differences with regards to missions and technological choices makes a European-American cooperation in this field highly unlikely) . In fact, conceiving of and building with several partners a single class of ships allows the sharing of both complementary skills and the financing of development costs. It also allows partners to benefit from economies of scale due to larger series. Beyond that, one could even imagine, for future programmes, decreases in operating costs made possible by common training of crews and support personnel. Finally, within the context of a multinational naval action, having ships from the same class, rather than having to align diversified forces, is obviously a major operational advantage. However, even if cooperation is likely easier in the naval field than in other areas, it is often risky, especially in terms of schedule differences. The potential partners might have different schedule priorities, either for budgetary reasons or for reasons to do with a ships lifespan, For example, the British FSC programme lags the FMM programme by seven to eight years. In addition, on-board life is frequently different from one navy to another as a result of centuries-old traditions, especially in Europe. Another factor is the availability or not of conscript resources. While the Italian navy would like to have a crew of 130 men for its future multi-mission frigates (FMM), its French partner, whose human resources have become rare since conscription was abandoned, wants only 90 men in its crew. Furthermore, for the same class of ships, the missions and concepts of use can vary significantly from one navy to another. Taking the FMM as an example, the Italian navy aims to use it in the Adriatic Sea while the French navy plans to use it in seas and oceans worldwide. This is not without consequence on the end product. The Italian navy would prefer from the start a strongly armed ship whereas the French, to guarantee the acquisition of the number of requested vessels, would be satisfied with reduced weapon systems, with allowances for upgrades (volumes, wiring, etc), to be fitted with new systems later on during a mid-life modernisation operation. Obviously, these differences in approach are not without impact. They influence the design of the ships interior and the volumes assigned to each function. This obliges the partners to reach a more or less satisfactory compromise...! Nevertheless, these differences in approach exist and weigh heavily on the success or failure of potential cooperation projects. This explains, for instance, the British withdrawal from the Horizon programme or the incompatibility of Franco-Italian FMM and British FSC programmes. In this case, the incompatibility was both in terms of schedule as well as capabilities: the British consider, for example, naval support for land operations to an inland distance of 180 km instead of 100 km by the French. Finally, even when cooperation is successful, such as the Franco-Italian Horizon/Orizonte programme, the implementation of common state and industrial structures (which does not facilitate a simplification, and obviously increases the costs) and learning how to work together despite different methods and industrial traditions still remain. The challenge for this specific programme appears likely to be won. French and Italian

Within the context of a multinational naval action, having ships of the same class, as opposed to having to align diverse forces, is obviously a major operational advantage

The Horizon frigate programme, which began with three countries, has been declined in a Franco-Italian version and a British version. It reveals the pitfalls of cooperation in developing similar ships. (DCN)

French and Italian cooperation on the same ship programme will allow a 27- ship class of frigate. (DCN)

anti-aircraft frigates will be very similar. Nevertheless, in the longer term, it could end up being more judicious to take into greater account the concept of modular cooperation, i.e. structured around certain systems or major subsystems without resulting in identical ships in terms of hulls, interior installations and capabilities. This is, for example, the case of the PAAMS anti-aircraft system, core of the Horizon/Orizzonte frigates but also of the future British Type 45, in spite of their significant differences regarding the hull, installations, capabilities and missions. It is also the

route chosen by Berlin, Madrid and The Hague, for their new anti-aircraft frigates (4 LCF for the Netherlands, 3 F-124 for Germany and 4 F-100 for Spain). Having a common bank of systems and equipment in which each could pick and choose what they need to build a ship best suited to its national needs, offers interesting prospects for the future. The respect of traditions and needs of each partner would thus be ensured while guaranteeing the division of development costs for many systems and the undeniable benefits of series production.

Fortunately, the trend towards an increase in tonnage offers a better adaptation, making it easier to satisfy the contradictory needs of navy partners

Electric Propulsion: Following the path of the civil sector

Electric propulsion, which has only recently appeared in the naval military field (it originated in the civil sector with large cruise liners at the end of the 1980s), breaks away from the traditional architectural design of combat ships. Electric propulsion allows the mechanical division of the energy generation and propulsion functions, and thus the removal of the long shaft, which takes up a lot of space and is noisy. While energy generation (thermal engine) remains in the centre of the hull, the steering function can be integrated with external moving pods fixed to the hull which include the electric engine as well as the propeller. Consequently, naval architects can more easily organise the hulls inside volume. Moreover, energy efficiency appears much better. For the same quantity of fuel, electric propulsion allows a higher autonomy compared with traditional propulsion. Other advantages: improved security and a reduction in the size of the crew. Naturally, this technology transfer was first fitted on amphibious ships (Dutch LPD Rotterdam-class, British ALSL Albion-class and American LHD), which have an architecture similar to civil steamers. France will adopt electric propulsion for the first time on the BPC (batiment de projection et de commandement) Mistral and Tonnerre, which will enter in service in 2005 and 2006 respectively. Requiring no particular reinforcement in terms of sound proofing or shock resistance, civilian pods need to be adapted only slightly. However military forces are currently studying the adaptation

Challenge of cooperation

France will adopt electric propulsion for the first time on the PBC (LHD) Mistral and Tonnerre
of this sort of propulsion for combat ships. Hence, the future British Type 45 Daring-class navy destroyers will be equipped with it (Alstom engine providing 20 MW). In France, it could equipped on the FREMM. However, this kind of pod raises several problems. The first one concerns the pods mass. On the FREMM frigate, in order to reach a speed of 30 knots, the pod must provide 20 MW and weigh 250 tonnes. Hence the ratio between the pods mass and the ships speed is very different between a LPD and a frigate. In addition, pod design must be well adapted to the hull, and the pod needs to have good shock resistance. In other words, while electric propulsion undoubtedly offers many advantages and constitutes a true technological breakthrough that military naval architecture must take into consideration, the specific use of warships prevents the simple transposition of civil pods to frigates. Significant adaptation work must first be realised.
A Royal Navy Type 45 AAW destroyer (DR)

The Dutch navys De Zeven Provincien frigate. Whereas this class was initially a joint programme with Germany, in the end, cooperation dealt only with common systems.

Illustration showing the rear view of a multi-mission frigate. An electric propulsion pod would have an impact on the hull design. (DCN)

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Financing a ship
The truth about prices!
The French navy often encounters difficulties in the production of complete series because of poor financial estimates regarding the true manufacturing costs or because of budgetary cuts arising during the course of the programme. A review of escort ship classes launched during the last 30 years is very revealing. The only series completed is the A-69 with 17 vessels. Proof of this recurring difficulty is the fact that the last class of La Fayette frigates was reduced to five ships instead of six as initially planned. The impoverishment of a class of ships, in terms of equipment, due to budgetary reasons, is the other danger faced by the major frigate programmes. The case of the La Fayette frigates is a particularly good example. Whereas the Saudi La Fayettes are equipped with Aster missiles and vertical launchers, French ships do not have even one. Even if the plan is to fit this combat system at mid-life, the high cost of such a modernisation is likely to push it aside. The French navy is not the only one to suffer from this phenomenon. During the Falklands war, the Royal Navy stressed that budgetary cuts experienced over several years had reduced the defensive capabilities of its ships. The Sheffield class (Type 42) thus saw its tonnage go from 3,500 tonnes to 3,880 tonnes in order to be able to offer a better stability but also to embark and store more Sea Dart missiles. Today, 50 per cent of the overall cost of a ship lies in its operations: the cost of manpower is high for modern navies. The French navy has already made significant efforts in this field, having fewer men aboard its preceding generation ships than Royal Navy vessels of the same tonnage. The type 42 had a crew of 280 men, against 230 for the F-70. This effort was reinforced for the next generation of ships: the Horizon, which will weigh 5,500 tonnes, will have only 190 men aboard, whereas equivalent ships, such as Tourville, had a crew of nearly 300.

Budgetary issues are at the heart of the major navies concerns. Once the expression of need has been made, the budgetary aspect remains the most determining factor in the development of a combat ship. This will certainly be the case for multi-mission frigates.
The French Motte-Piquet frigate returning to Toulon from the Herakles mission, at the beginning of July 2002. Built over a 15-year period, production of the F-70 did not allow cost reduction. (DR)

The other lesson lies in the need to quickly complete the ship series in order to minimise production costs and to ensure a maximum of communality. A closer look at the F-70 class (seven units brought into service between 1979 and 1990) shows that due to a long production time (more than 10 years), even the major systems fitted on these vessels are different. Taking the radar as an example, George Leygues, as well as the three ships which followed it, are equipped with a DRBV 26 A, whereas the next three in the series, starting with the Primauguet, are equipped with a DRBC 33 A. It is possible to save nearly 5 per cent on the overall manufacturing price if the 17 FMM are built over ten years. In addition, DCN, the French shipbuilder, and its partners, associated in the definition of this programme study, are currently preparing proposals for the staffs on this subject. The defence allocation plan over 2003-2008 provides for the delivery of these frigates from 2008 until 2017. DCNs capability to produce between three and four ships per year is however limited by budgetary constraints.

Today, 50 per cent of the overall cost of a ship lies in its operations. The cost of manpower is high for modern navies

The Sheffield destroyer, hit in a deadly strike by an Exocet missile during the Falklands war in May 1982. The British navy issued a statement saying that budgetary cuts on this programme had a detrimental effect on the Type 42s self defence capabilities. (AFP)

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Financing a ship

Combat systems represent 50 per cent of a ships total manufacturing costs

The French navy has also chosen to improve the management of its ships in terms of revalorization. Previously, the ships underwent a complete refit of their equipment at mid-life. This is very expensive, though, particularly considering the regular upgrading of data processing, which resulted in entire parts of the combat system architecture being completely transformed. Combat systems represent 50 per cent of the total manufacturing costs of a ship, which gives a fairly accurate idea of the mid-life revalorization costs. A visit to the command centre of a Tourville frigate class, and then a La Fayette, is enough to realise the impact of the revolution in telecommunications and data processing. As a result of this rapid progress, some ships cannot be updated sufficiently to meet the new standards, the obsolescence of a system condemning the entire platform. This is notably the case of the two anti-aircraft Cassard-class frigates, whose SM1 MR surface-to-air system will

not be modernised, following an American decision. As a result, since they cannot be adequately upgraded, the ships will end up being quickly withdrawn from service, even though they only have about twenty years of service in the navy. Thus, because it was not planned during the construction phase, it is economically impossible to fit a PAAMS system with the A50 vertical launcher due to lack of space. This example illustrates the need to provide for modularity in the ships during their development. This is the only way to manage technologies which have much faster improvement cycles. Whereas the hulls and the propulsion system are generally operational over more than 30 years, the combat systems elements must be changed every ten years in order to remain interoperable with other navies. The only solution, inspired from the British model of "incremental approach", is to provide at the beginning of the ships development, for conti-

Cassard, an air defence frigate, on its way back to Toulon from the Herakles mission in July 2002. The non-revalorization of the U.S. SM1MR missile, will considerably reduce the life span of this class. (DR)

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nuous innovations and to take care in choosing systems and not effectively rule out too many future options so as to be able to adapt new solutions. This approach presupposes the integration, from the very beginning of the project, of major equipment suppliers in industrial studies. Renaults technical centre in Guyancourt is a reference regarding the dialogue between a system architect and its suppliers. This model is undoubtedly serving as inspiration for the partners of the multi-mission frigates definition study: several workshops have been set up between Armaris, which brings together Thales and DCN, and the Orrizzonte joint venture, regrouping Finmeccanica and Fincantieri. The Paris workshop is in charge of managing the project, while that of Lorient is elaborating the design. Concerning the Italian part of the project, Genoa is working on the platform while Rome is dealing with the combat systems.

Overall cost of ownership (in %)

5% 1% 3% 29%

9%

53%

Contactorship and development Design Development

Upgrading Logistic support Exploitation

The Maestrale Frigate is a good example of the Italian navys difficulties. The Lupo-class had to be completely revised before it could be fitted with more efficient equipment. (AMS)

13

The setting-up of an efficient data exchange network among the various sensors of an air and sea force increases the operational effectiveness of the force. However, with the current development of land attack missions, as well as the direct fire support of land forces, more and more Western navies will express the need to integrate a land component in their tactical situations real time presentation. It is an objective still far from being achieved.

The challenge of interoperability

C4ISRs interoperability challenge
The operational effectiveness of a combat ship largely relies on the crews awareness of the tactical situation in which it finds itself. A self-evident The embarked data processing and fusion system SENIT on the French ships, CEC on American ships and several British shipsallows the on-board operations room OR to show a tactical situation opened to the entire zone covered by air and sea forces. In addition, target locations, thanks to the reshuffling of detection data coming from various distributed sensors, offer more precise configuration settings on OR screens. The network is also less vulnerable to jamming effects. It is even possible to carry out interceptions of air and sea targets from a platform (ship or aircraft) with sensors shut off so as to avoid detection. However, the platforms OR has all the necessary fire data provided in real time by the various sensors of other network players. Although this concept does restrict the platforms own independence, it gives the force commander a precise, real-time tactical vision, optimising every means of the force. Moreover, the command of such a naval force could be carried out from a ground-based OR located thousands of kilometres from the operations zone, connected by a high-speed satellite connectiona more comfortable and efficient OR, with more numerous staff and equipment, far from any military risk. Moreover, this OR could be in the same location as the joint theatre HQ. Here lies one of the main future challenges. Although the current information processing systems offer an air and sea tactical situation, it will be necessary, on the longer run, within the framework of amphibious operations or ground forces support, to integrate the air/land tactical situation on the coast and even beyond, on land. However, this integration presents a danger: having a system overloaded by too much data. The same problem will be raised with the digitalisation process underway in the land forces. In France, two BPCsships designed to allow an on-board joint HQ to ensure the force command, even on land, will soon enter in service, raising the question of the compatibility with the army CIS systems (SICF, SIR and SIT), even with those of the air force (SCCOA). The major

Illustration showing the operational room of a latest generation frigate. These large screens are revolutionary compared with current ones. (Thales)

truth worth recalling. However, this awareness is obviously restricted by the performance of the ships embarked sensors as well as by the earths roundness, and, in particular within the framework of littoral operationsby the masks that islands and coasts can constitute. Admittedly, for about 30 years, Link 11 allowed Western ships to jointly operate and exchange tactical data. But Link 11 (HF and UHF) suffers from vulnerability to jamming, reduced flow, positioning errors of the detected studs generated as well as the lack of capability allowing the setting up of a real time network opened to a large number of players. This is why Link 16 or JTIDS are currently being considered within NATO. Less vulnerable to jamming, this UHF datas automatic transmission appears definitely more precise and, in particular, allows a more significant number of players to operate in a common network. Equipped with such a system, ships and aircraft are capable of communicating the data collected by their sensors to the network while at the same time benefiting from information coming from other players.

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challenge is to develop the connection between these systems in order to enable them to communicate. The same kind of connection will need to be developed in order for a multinational naval force to be able to reduce differences among the various information processing systems and thus to work in an optimised network. These challenges are still far from being completely overcome.

Thaless ARBB-36 on a Cassard-class frigate. Electronic warfare plays an increasingly important role in naval operations. (Thales)

London and Washington agreed on the CEC network

The Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy reached an agreement in July 2000 to use the same Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), the new embarked data processing system developed by Lockheed Martin. Considered by its architects as the most advanced system of its kind in the world, CEC, which integrates all the targets of an air and sea task force into a dense data exchange and processing network, allows a near real-time presentation of an air and sea and air-surface tactical situation with a nearly perfect global-positioning correlation of detected targets. In other words, CEC would eliminate a wellknown phenomenon: namely, that which results from the detection of the same target by various sensors, each one having a sufficient margin of error in the positioning so that a traditional system of data processing shows an uncertainty with regards to the actual numbers plotted. This can appear awkward when the plotting board in question involves missiles or planes... In addition, CEC offers the advantage of being able to achieve tracking by amalgamating packets of detection from various sensors, data which, considered individually, would not justify the presentation of a tracking path. In April 2002, the Pentagon gave its green light for the integration of CEC on approximately 250 ships, surveillance aircraft and testing bases. A CEC Block 2 is being studied in order to allow collected data regarding detection of ballistic missiles to be integrated into the JCTN (joint communication theatre network). Raytheon and Lockheed Martin are in competition to obtain the prime contractorship of Block 2. A decision is expected at the end of this year. The U.K. will fit CEC Block 1 on its Type 23 frigates by 2008, and on its Type 45 AAW destroyers four years later. The result is that British and American ships will be able to integrate within an allied operational network, well adapted for littoral operations and ground forces support, as well as within antiaircraft and antiballistic missions. In France, the DGA (French procurement agency) has just launched a study on a cooperative combat system.

CEC: Cooperative Engagement Capability, the new embarked data processing system developed by Lockheed Martin

Frigate Lafayettes OR allows a reduced crew compared with the preceding generation of ships. (Marine nationale)

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Vertical launchers

Vertical launch systems (VLS) are increasingly part of new programmes. Of equal tonnage, they reinforce a frigates armament, help clear the bridges, improve stealth, flexibility and adaptation to the mission, thanks to an assortment of missiles fitted.

Two approaches to vertical launching exist today. The first is to design vertical single-missile launching modules to launch existing self-defence anti-aircraft missiles by adapting them for vertical firing. This formula was developed by Raytheon for the Sea Sparrow (Mk 48 launcher), by MBDA for the Sea Wolf and by IAI/Rafael for the Barak. It relies on a specific technique, wherein the conduit for outflow is integrated into each container-launcher. This solution can be set up rapidly but does not allow much versatility.

The other approach is to develop a multi-missile launcher that is both modular and evolutionary, and well adapted to the greatest possible number of future missiles over the long term. Technically based on a hot launch, it has a conduit for gases consisting of, in the lower part, a receptacle for gases common to all container-launchers (called plenum,) and in the upper part, a centrally positioned chimney in the vertical launching module.

With the Mk 41 launcher, the U.S. was the forerunner of this type of installation

The American Mk 41 launcher

Developed in 1977 by Lockheed Martin Naval Electronics and Surveillance Systems (NE&SS), the Mk 41 launcher is composed of eight cell modules. The line includes three types of modules:

A Tactical version, 6.7 metres long, well adapted to the Standard medium-range surfaceto-air missile SM-2 Block III and to the ASROC anti-submarine missile, The Strike version, 7.6 metres long, designed to launch the Tomahawk cruise missile, as well as preceding missiles.
The main customer is obviously the U.S. Navy, which in 1986 began to equip its AEGIS Ticonderoga class anti-aircraft cruise missiles, then its DDG-51 Arleigh Burkeclass destroyers. Commercially manufactured for over 15 years, the Mk 41 has become a reference in the field. According to Lockheed Martin, it is found on nearly 160 ships in 16 different classes. Production in Baltimore has reached a rate of 5 to 6 modules per month.

A Self-Defence version, 5.2 metres tall, to launch Sea Sparrow or ESSM (Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile) anti-aircraft self-defence missiles,

The Bundesmarines Brandenburg frigate. Launched in 1994, this ship is fitted with Mk 41 missile launchers, capable of firing 16 Sea Sparrow missiles.

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A50 launcher. Fitted on Horizon frigate, it will be capable of firing Aster 15 and 30 missiles .

A European alternative to the Mk 41

The Sylver family of launchers

The Aster 15 and 30 missile programmes allowed the development of an alternative to the nearmonopoly of the American situation, thanks to the development by DCN of the Sylver VLS with eight missiles, very similar to the Mk 41. Since its development, it has been provided in different variants. The first variants, known as A 43 (for missiles up to 4.3 metres length), is dedicated to self-defence of combat ships. Its development is closely related to MBDAs Aster 15 missile, intended for close anti-aircraft and anti-missile defence. It is thus part of the vast Franco-Italian cooperation surrounding the SAAM surface-to-air anti-missile system. The Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier is equipped with four A 43 modules (each with eight missiles). It embarked its first missiles on 1 December 2001 and carried out its first Aster 15 operational firing from an A 43 launcher on 30 October 2002, on its return from the Hrakls mission in the Indian Ocean. The A 43 launcher also equips the three F 3000 S frigates in the Sawari 2 programme, built by DCN for the Royal Saudi Naval Forces at a rate of two modules per frigate (each with eight missiles). The second Italian aircraft carrier, Andrea Doria, will be equipped with four A 43 modules. The new version of the Sylver A 50 is a lengthened variant intended to fire missiles of 5 meters in length or less. It offers a dual missile capacity with the Aster 15 and Aster 30. Its development is related to the PAAMS programme (Principal AntiAir Missile System), a trilateral project intended for the Royal Navys Type 45 AAW destroyers and for the Franco-Italian frigates Horizon and Orizzonte. The A 50 thus marks the extension of FrancoItalian cooperation within the United Kingdom. This launcher was selected for the PAAMS at the end of a competition between various launchers. Developed more recently than the Mk 41, the Sylver benefits from a higher firing rate as well as a lighter weight per module. The design of the Sylver A 50currently an Aster 15 and 30 twin-missile variant, also takes into consideration the capability to fire different types of missiles, such as the Naval Polyphem or the future Aster developments regarding the ATBM in Block 1 or Block 2 versions. The eight-missile A 50 launcher already equips frigates already ordered in the PAAMS programme. Upcoming orders will allow a faster rate of production. The Sylver family will soon be upgraded with the new A 70 launcher, capable of firing a 7-metre long missile, while still being capable of launching munitions of the A 43 and A 50 launchers. MBDA and DCN are currently studying the third member of the Sylver family, notably intended for future FREMM frigates, capable of launching naval missiles such as Scalp Naval.

The Aster 15 and 30 missile programmes allowed the development of an alternative to the near-monopoly of the American situation

DCNs corvette. Vertical launchers can even be adapted on ships of small tonnage.

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Controling access to theatre operations

Anti-aircraft defence
Implementing a total protection in circles, with: in the first circle, the requirement for any combat ship being the capability for self defence against both missiles and aircraft in the second circle, local area defence in the third circle, naval area defence
Although the Falklands war is slowly fading from memory, its scenario is still relevant today. Even though the Argentinean air force suffered tough losses, the Super Etendard, with air-to-sea Exocet missiles, sank two major ships: the AAW destroyer HMS Sheffield, and the Atlantic Conveyor, a container ship transformed into an aircraft carrier, which went down with almost all the U.K.s heavy transport helicopters. A preventive attack cannot guarantee the destruction of the entire enemy fleet either. Fired by some courageous captains or coastal batteries, as the Falklands also revealed with the surprise attack of the HMS Glamorgan, anti-ship missiles represent a dangerous residual threat. Lessons from the Falklands showed the pressing need to beef up anti-missile defences, by implementing a total protection in circles, with, in the first circle, the requirement for any combat ship being the capability for self defence against both missiles and aircraft, either in isolated operation (crisis prevention mission or active missions) or within a group of vessels. In the second circle, every frigate should have the capability to ensure the anti-missile defence of entrusted to AAW frigates, the capability to cover the entire fleet within a medium- long-range must absolutely be renewed. Technically starting from a clean slate, the development of the Aster missile family, a tri-national programme involving France, Italy and the United Kingdom, allows a conceptual and technological leap. Aster-based systems are optimised in their design to intercept all kind of missiles and are designed to destroy them by direct impact (Hit-toKill) to ensure destruction of their warheads. In addition, they can engage all types of aircraft. With the SAAM surface-to-air anti-missile system, based on the Naval Aster 15, the traditional SHORAD mission, called point defence (Point Defence Missile System, or PDMS), is having its range extended up to 30 km (i.e. two or three times the maximum range of preceding systems) and widened by the possibility, for the first time ever, of protecting neighbouring ships against low-level anti-ship missiles in a 7-km circle around the launching ship.

The SAAM system has been ensuring the protection of the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier since December 2001. It will also equip the second Italian aircraft carrier, Andrea Doria by 2008. Its The Saudi navys Al Riyadh installation is underway on three frigate. This ship is the first non-European vessel equipped F-1300S Sawari 2 frigates of the with an Aster system. Saudi naval forces, Al Riyadh, Makkah et Al Dammal. The Franco-Italian FREMM should receive an Aster 15 missile system. The dangers of littoral warfare (coastal batteries of Chinese antiship missiles in the Persian Gulf, for instance) make local area defence missions imperative as they are the only ones capable of protecting commercial vessel convoys or landing ships in the closed waters of a Gulf. With the Principal Anti-Air Missile System (PAAMS), based on the Aster 15 and 30 missiles, the former mediumrange defence (Medium Range-Surface-to-Air Missile, or MR-SAM) mission is strengthened by a multi-layered defence, ensuring defence by

unarmed ships located nearby (which was the case of the Atlantic Conveyor) according to the concept known as local area defence. Finally, in the third circle, the naval area defence, a mission

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integrating Naval Aster 15s additional capabilities for self-defence and local area defence and those of the Naval Aster 30 (navalisation of the ground version of the Aster 30) for a naval area defence exceeding 120 km range with a ceiling of 20 km. PAAMS has been adopted by air defence ships of the British, French and Italian navies. A PAAMS (S) version with Sampson radar, will be fitted on the Royal Navys 12 Type 45 Daring Class destroyers. A PAAMS (E) version with the EMPAR radar will equip the AAW horizon/ Orizzonte frigates.

Illustration showing a Type 45 destroyer launching its Aster missiles. Cooperation with the British on the PAAMS system offers many further possibilities for cooperation in this sector.

Anti-submarine action confronted with a renewed threat

The French and Italian navies share the same vision of a frigate version specialised in ASW. Their main mission will be the protection of an air and sea group against the threat of the nuclear attack submarines (SSN) or even modern diesel propulsion submarines (SSK), the main threat today. The problems of ASW action have changed a lot since the Cold War. Submarine threats have decreased without totally disappearing in open seas. On the other hand, today the proliferation of modern and silent SSKs are a major threat: there are approximately 350 SSKs in 40 navies. The innovation lies in the fact that a growing number of countries are willing to acquire SSKs, in particular among those wishing to control a maritime area, such as a strait. The most frequently exported models are those of Russia (Kilo class) and Germany (209 or 1700 family). New technologies (anaerobic propulsion AIP, acoustic and stealth radar) make their detection more difficult. Shallow coastal waters are acoustically difficult for passive means of detection, mainly due to significant interference. Regarding active means, the propagation of waves varies from one place to another, depending on the coastal environment: currents, variations in temperature and salinity, interference, sea-bed reverberation ASW detection either in open seas or coastal waters, requires specific equipment in order to meet SNA and SSK threats. Since the mid1990s, low frequency active sonar (LF), which are under development, appear particularly adapted to shallow waters. Their energy benefits from better propagation than high frequency (HF), offering better remote echoes. However, the definition, which allows the classification of echo, is better with HF and fake echoes with LF are more frequent. The perfect combination appears to be a passive sonar for panoramic monitoring and an active sonar for classifying the detected subject. All French-Italian frigates are expected to be fitted with a hull-sonar, the ASW specific equipment being a towed LF sonar. ASW armament results from long-standing cooperation between France and Italy. The light MU 90 Impact torpedo, which will equip embarked NH 90 helicopters, was developed by the two countries within the Eurotorp JV. The MILAS torpedo carrying missile is derived from the Otomat French-Italian sea-to-sea missile, whose warhead and antiship homing head have been replaced by a MU 90 (or Mk 46 Mod 5). This weapon system produced by MBDA can strike from up to 30 nautical miles (55 km) at Mach 0.89, with a very fast reaction time, while allowing the surface ship to remain out of the range of torpedoes from the enemy submarine, offering protection and dissuasion.

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Land attack operations

A new dimension at the core of frigate programmes is land attack operations. The coastal operation is divided between naval support fire, where naval artillery and tactical missiles play a role, and deep strikes with cruise missiles.

Tactical naval fire support in littoral warfare

The first conceptual debate relates to the maximum range of naval fire support, as the Royal Navy calls it. The figures put forth run from 100 kilometres to 100 nautical miles (180 km). On a technical level, naval fire support in these littoral missions is twofold: naval artillery, for heavy saturating fires with future guided shells with a lengthened range and the new sea-to-ground missiles, for specific surgical strikes. This explains why a new version of the Mk45 127-mm turret, known as Mod4, is also under development. Italy is the other large supplier of 127-mm turrets with OtoMelara, which is developing a new 127/64 LW with lengthened and strengthened tube for the 10 Italian FREMM frigates. Two new types of ammunition are under development: an unguided one with a 70-km range, plus a sub-calibre GPS guided ammunition with 120-km range, called Vulcano. The latter is the product of a cooperation with the Netherlands. In addition, while Giat Industries has undertaken a feasibility study for a naval version of its 155/52 mm-gun and is working on a GPS-guided ammunition called Pelican, BAe Systems is studying a naval version of the Braveheart AS90 self-propelled 155/52-mm gun for fitting aboard Daring class (Type 45) destroyers. The 155-mm calibre, however, appears difficult to implement on European ships, mainly due to size. Hence, there is little chance of a 155-mm gun being fitted on the FREMM. This renewal of naval artillery raises many technical questions, such as the overheating of chambers due to the more powerful energy powders used or tube wear caused by sub-calibre sabot ammunition. Moreover, even with an inertial/GPS guidance, the best CEP (Circular Error Probability) offered for the next decade is about 20 m at 120 km, which makes it necessary to use fragmentation shells fitted with sub ammunitions. The need for longrange precision (a CEP of 700 metres at 120 km for a 127-mm calibre shell is too imprecise to be efficient) has a strong impact on the system and ammunitions. Upgrading the 127-mm gun to the new standard seems more appropriate, considering the high number of turrets and classic shells already in service to engage targets of lesser interest.

Effect of Bonus shell on armoured units. The interest in having a 155-mm calibre is the possibility to use the wide variety of existing ammunitions.

A renewed interest in artillery systems

The existing calibres are characterised by their modest range (27 km for the 127-mm) in horizontal direct shooting but have a rapid firing rate (45 fires/minute for the 127-mm), as they are mainly descendants of the anti-aircraft artillery which equipped older ships. The current debates relate to range, precision and killing potential in order to optimise the current naval artillery for a role in littoral fire support. The U.S. Navy has adopted the most ambitious path with the Advanced Gun System (AGS). The 155-mm (AGS) is a unit which weighs nearly 300 tonnesturret and 750-round magazine included. Each DD(X) will be capable of embarking two AGSs! With regular ammunition, the AGS will be able to strike from 40 km. By 2012, the development of the Long-Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP) should be able to reach 180 km, featuring rocket propulsion and a GPS guidance system. However, the AGS will not find its place on ships other than 10,000-tonne DD(X)s.

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The British navys HMS Iron Duke frigate with its helicopter. This tandem will be on the front lines for littoral actions.

Fire support missiles

The immediate suppression of an enemys means of command is a powerful way to paralyse an enemy force and to change the local forces ratio. In this respect it appears particularly necessary to be able to engage widely differing targets with a single weapon . To meet these operational requirements, Germany, France and Italy are jointly elaborating a project concerning a fibre-optic missile system called Polyphem, intended for both naval and ground missions. Polyphems ability to strike a target from a distance of 60 km largely exceeds the capabilities of current naval artillery (27 km for a 127-mm gun). The decimetre precision is obtained thanks to navigation by hybridisation of both the inertial and GPS guidance. The operator at the ground station receives infrared images made by a camera in the tip of the missile via the optical fibre located behind the missile. Its purpose is to monitor the engagement phase as well as to validate target identification before impact in order to confirm or modify the target. Contrary to what is commonly thought, the operator does not control the missileits flight is completely automatic. Finally, the warhead can be adapted depending on the selected target. This extreme precision allows the size of the warhead to be reduced, while guaranteeing its efficiency for a wide range of targets, thanks to its multiple effects (hollowcharge and blast-fragmentation). For navies, Polyphem offers an identical system that can fulfil two missions: littoral fire support from ships as well as new generation light antiship missiles fired from helicopters. In this latter role, Polyphem is capable of destroying or neutralising small and medium naval targets in littoral water (fast attack ships, patrol vessels...) even within intense sea traffic, thanks to its ability to

confirm the identification of the target on sight via the optical fibre. The Polyphem system was selected by the German navy to equip its five K130 corvettes, optimised for littoral war. A programme was launched to study the possibility of integrating the Polyphem launcher aboard the FREMM. The installation of GPS guidance on next-generation anti-ship missiles (Exocet Block III, Harpoon 2000, RBS 15 Mk3...) will give these missiles a littoral striking capability against ships or targets located in seaports, roads or targets along the coast (such as radars or coastal batteries) as well as against fixed inland-based installations.

Illustration showing the Polyphem missile. Its main advantage lies in its extreme precision, which allows the disarming of an enemy holed up in a bunker, for instance.

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Land attack operations

Europe on time for Deep Strike

Europe has been slower than the United States in embarking on the revolution taking place in long distance precision strike capabilities, mainly for budgetary reasons, but also because the Cold War focused European countries on tactical problems. New dimensions of conflicts, either operative or strategic, have been progressively discovered in the various crises throughout the 1990s. But their implications have not yet given birth to well-adapted programmes and realities. Cruise missiles have been identified as a capability need within the framework of a European Fast Reaction Force laid out in the European Capability Action Plan. The most advanced European cruise missile programme is undoubtedly the Franco-British Scalp-EG/Storm Shadow, with nearly 2,000 units acquired by the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Greece in the airborne version. Conflicts such as the Gulf war, Kosovo, Afghanistan, have confirmed the interest in a programme for cruise missile with a lengthened range and a military charge. Already in service within the Royal Air Force, this missile has begun its entry in service in the French air force. With the Scalp EG, MBDA has reached a key position in this strategic missile segment and appears as the only one offering a European choice as an alternative to the U.S. offer. Recent conflicts have also emphasised the need to be able to launch cruise missiles from naval platforms. This capability gives those countries which have it a major political and military role in key areas, such as planning and targeting functions in commanding an allied operationfrom the start of operations to completion. As the key point of the future French navy programmes (FREMM, Barracuda submarine) the need for a navy cruise missile was expressed in 2001. The Scalp Naval feasibility study was thus launched in February 2002 by the French minister of defence. The Scalp Naval is a very long-range cruise missile with autonomous cruise capability thanks to the combination of inertial guidance, terrain following system and GPS. Its main asset is to offer a very high terminal accuracy, independent of the GPS system, thanks to a homing head with infrared imagery. Its warhead enables it to neutralise various types of targets. This missile is based on technologies developed for the airborne version Scalp-EG/ Storm Shadow. It has the same key functionalities, such as infrared final guidance, the warhead, motorisation, mission preparation... These functions are fitted in an airframe within a circular segment well adapted to firing from naval platforms, i.e. vertical launching from frigates as well as fire from torpedo tubes for Barracuda submarines. The feasibility phase is underway (over the period 2002-2004), with a demonstration and risks reduction programme (PDRR) geared toward new aspects: vertical firing from both a multimissile Sylver A70 launcher and a submarines torpedo

The most advanced European cruise missile programme is undoubtedly the Franco-British Scalp-EG/ Storm Shadow

The Scalp Naval will enter service within the French navy in 2011.

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tube. MBDA benefits from the experience of both the Aster 15 and 30 for the vertical launching and from the Exocet SM 39 for firing from submarines. Technical demonstrations are expected to take place during this risk reduction phase. The full development will follow this phase and is expected to give FREMM deep strike capabilities by 2011. The Naval Scalp will equip all FREMM frigates, (8 F-ASM and 9 F-AVT). However only the F-AVT will be equipped with mission preparation systems. The acquisition of 250 Scalp Navals, including 50 adapted to firing from a submarine, is provided by the Defence allocation plan, with an entry in service by 2011 for the FREMM and 2013/2015 for the Barracuda. Considering the similarities between the French and Italian capabilities need, as well as the cooperation on the FREMM, the same naval cruise missile should equip all frigates. In this

respect, the Scalp is open to international cooperation. The Royal Navy is looking for a long-range cruise missile to equip its FSC, in a slightly delayed schedule compared with the FrancoItalian FREMM. At the same time, it will also seek to replace the Tomahawks equipping its submarines. Hence, the selected cruise missile could meet both needs.

Multi-mission frigate firing a Scalp Naval cruise missile. This armament gives a strategic dimension to this class of ship.

The evolution of the TACTOM concept of use

The Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM), or the TLAM Block IV is expected to enter in service within the U.S. Navy by 2004 (1343 missiles over 5 years). This new version is aimed at reducing the cost as well as offering more flexibility in its tactical use, thanks to a data link, which allows the TACTOM to change its target during flight, allowing it to engage time-critical targets, i.e. mobile target. The first demonstration flight took place from the ground in August 2002, after the programme experienced some problems with the propulsion, resulting in the replacement of the Teledyne J402 turbojet by a Williams F-122. Another objective of TACTOM is cost reduction. Within this context, the U.S. Navy decided to limit the submarines capacity to the vertical launching of TACTOM. But this unilateral American decision effectively prevented the United Kingdom from acquiring additional Tomahawks, the British submarines being capable of firing only Tomahawk Block IIIs horizontally from a torpedo tubes. Under pressure from the British MoD, the American DoD granted a contract to Raytheon to validate a Torpedo-Tube Launch version (TTL) that could be fired from Los Angeles- and Seawolf-class submarines of the U.S. Navy, as well as the British SSN Trafalgar and Astute. This validation of a horizontal launcher will undoubtedly increase the cost.

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Type 45

La Fayette

La Fayette

Corvette C1200

Corvette C1800

Sawari 2

Photos : AFP - DCN - AMS - D.R -

TTU - Certes 2003