Title Thirteen CRIMES AGAINST HONOR Chapter One. Libel Section One.

Definition, forms and punishment of this crime Article 353. Libel Article 354. Requirement for publicit Article 355. Libel b means of !ritin"s or similar means Article35#. $hreatenin" to publish and offer to present such publication for a compensation Article 35%. &rohibited publication of acts referred to in the course of official proceedin"s Article 35'. Slander Article 35(. Slander b deed Section $!o. )eneral &ro*isions Article 3#+. &ersons responsible Article 3#,. &roof of the truth Article 3#-. Libelous remar.s Chapter $!o. /ncriminator 0achinations Article 3#3. /ncriminatin" innocent persons Article 3#4. /ntri"uin" a"ainst honor

5Defamation6 is the proper term for libel as used in Art. 353. 5Libel6 strictl is a defamation committed b means of !ritin", printin", litho"raph , en"ra*in", radio, phono"raph 7. or an similar means. 8hen the defamation is oral, it is called 5slander6. Seditious libel is punished not in this chapter but in Art. ,4- 9/ncitin" to sedition:. $est of defamator character of !ords used3 A char"ed is sufficient if the !ords are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person a"ainst !hom the !ere uttered !as "uilt of certain offenses, or are sufficient to impeach his honest , *irtue or reputation, or to hold him up to public ridicule. $he meanin" of the !riter is immaterial. /t is not the intention of the !riter or spea.er, or the understandin" of the plaintiff or of an hearer or reader b !hich the actionable qualit of the !ords is to be determined, but the meanin" that the !ords in fact con*e ed on the minds of persons of reasonable understandin", discretion and candor, ta.in" into consideration the surroundin" circumstances !hich !ere .no!n to the hearer or reader. 2L202;$ ,3 /0&<$A$/O; 2=amples3 > /mputation of a *ice imputin" upon a person lasci*ious and immoral habits in an article > /mputation of an act or omission 5? borro!s mone !ithout intention to pa , she had her breasts au"mented !ithout pa in" the doctor6 > /mputation of condition, status or circumstance callin" another a bastard or man".u.ulam 2L202;$ -3 &<@L/CA$/O; &ublication is the communication of the defamator matter to some third person or persons. Aence, sendin" a latter in a sealed en*elope throu"h a messen"er is not publication. @ut sendin" to the !ife, a letter defamator of her husband, is sufficient publication. 9$he person defamed is the husband and the !ife is alread considered a 3rd person: /f the defamator imputation is not published there is ;O crime. $he la! permits us to thin. C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 154

Article 353. Definition of Libel A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a *ice or defect, real or ima"inar , or an act, omission, condition, status, or circumstances tendin" to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or 1uridical person, or to blac.en the memor of one !ho is dead. 2lements3 ,. $here must be an imputation of a crime, or of a *ice or defect, real or ima"inar , or an act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance4 -. $he imputation must be made publicl 4 3. /t must be malicious4 4. $he imputation must be directed at a natural or 1uridical person, or one !ho is dead4 5. $he imputation must tend to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of the person defamed. $here must be a defamator imputation. $he imputation ma co*er3 a. crime alle"edl committed b the offended part 4 b. *ice or defect, real or ima"inar , of the offended part 4 or c. an act or omission, condition, status of, or circumstance relatin" to the offended part .

as badl as !e please of our nei"hbors so lon" as !e .eep our uncharitable thou"ht to oursel*es. 2L202;$ 33 0AL/C2 0alice is used to indicate that the offender is prompted b personal illB!ill or spite and spea.s merel to in1ure the reputation of the person defamed. 0alice ma be inBfact or inBla!. Malice in fact B must be pro*ed b a sho!in" of illB!ill, hatred or purpose to in1ure Malice in law B is presumed from a defamator imputation proof of malice is not required 9$he distinction e=ists for purposes of determinin" 8O; there is defamation !here pri*ile"ed communication is in*ol*ed thus3: As a "eneral rule, malice in la! is presumed from a defamator imputation. @ut !here pri*ile"ed communication is in*ol*ed, malice 9in la!: is ;O$ presumed the plaintiff must pro*e malice in fact. /n either case, !here malice in fact is present, 1ustifiable moti*es cannot e=ist and the imputations become actionable. 2L202;$ 43 /D2;$/C/CA$/O; /t must be sho!n that at least a 3rd person could identif the offended part as the ob1ect of the libelous publication. @ut libel published in different parts ma be ta.en to"ether to establish the identification of the offended part . 2L202;$ 53 D/SAO;OR, D/SCR2D/$, CO;$20&$ Dishonor D dis"race, shame, i"nomin Discredit D loss of credit or reputation4 disesteem Contempt D state of bein" despised $here are as man offenses as there !ere persons defamed 9&& *s. Del Rosario:. 8hen the alle"ed slanderous utterances !ere committed on the same date and at the same place, but a"ainst t!o different persons, the situation has "i*en rise to t!o separate and indi*idual causes for prosecution, !ith respect to each of the persons defamed.
Mercado vs. CFI Petitioner was charged with libel for imputing to Mrs. Virginia Mercado acts constituting enrichment thru corrupt practices. The offensive telegram which contained the allegations was addressed to the Secretary of the, Department of Public Wor s and !ommunications purportedly in line with President Marcos" appeal to the public to give information on undesirable employees in the

government service to achieve the ob#ectives of the $ew Society. %e filed an MTD on the ground of the telegram being privileged communication. &fter the same was denied, a MT', alleging that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, was filed but when the same again met with a denial, the present action was instituted to annul the aforesaid orders. (espondents, in their !omment, stressed there was absence of any privilege, there being malice and bad faith, petitioner having been motivated by vengeance and ill)will in ma ing the said communication as established by his previous conduct vi* a vi* the private respondent+ the filing of several complaints, both administrative and criminal aimed to malign her good character and reputation which were subse,uently dismissed or closed for lac of merit and-or insufficiency of evidence. %./D+ Petition dismissed. 'ualified privilege communication may be lost by proof of malice. The prosecution should be given the opportunity of proving malice in view of petitioner"s conduct towards private respondent which casts doubt on his good faith. Agbayani vs. Sayo Mahinan, manager of the !agayan Valley 0ranch of the 1S2S at !auayan, 2sabela, file at 0ayombong, $ueva Vi*caya a complaint for written defamation against 3 subordinates. The 3 accused filed a MT', contending that the !42 $ueva Vi*caya has no #urisdiction over the case. %./D+ The proper venue of Mahinan5s criminal action against the petitioners is the !42 2sabela, since as 1S2S branch manager, he was a public officer stationed at !auayan, 2sabela and that alleged libel was committed when he was in the public service. ewswee! vs. IAC &n article entitled 6&n 2sland of 4ear7 was published in $ewswee . The author wrote that that the island province of $egros 8ccidental is a place dominated by big landowners who not only e9ploited the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane laborers, but also brutali*ed and illed them with impunity. The sugarcane planters instituted a class action for libel. %./D+ To maintain a libel suit, a victim must be identifiable. Defamatory matter which does not reveal the identity of the person upon whom the imputation is cast affords no ground of action unless it can be shown that the readers of the libel could have identified the personality of the individual defamed. Defamatory remar s directed at a group of persons is not actionable unless the statements are all)embracing or sufficiently specific for the victim to be identifiable. Lacsa vs. IAC /acsa and Mar,ue* were officers of the Philippine !olumbian &ssociation. /acsa uncovered a glitch in the ,ualification of Mar,ue* to be president. %e addressed a letter to Mar,ue* in the ff. tenor+ that Mar,ue* should step down from the presidency, because the position is open only for proprietary members and Mar,ue* has failed to show any proof of his proprietary membership, that in view of these, he has been holding the position in a de facto

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capacity. This letter was published in the publication of the association. %./D+ The test of libelous meanings is not the analysis of a sentence into component phrases with the meticulous care of the grammarian or stylist, but the import conveyed by the entirety of the language to the ordinary reader. The Sol1en is correct in holding that the imputation of being called a de facto president is tantamount to being ac nowledged as a pretender or impostor.

%./D+ The public article is but a faithful reproduction of a pleading filed before a ,uasi)#udicial body. There are no embellishments, wild imputations etc. calculated to damage the reputation of the offended parties and e9pose them to public contempt. $o valid cause of action to institute an action for libel e9ists. Sa%on vs. CA %./D+ When the imputation is already held defamatory, malice on the part of the defendant >malice)in)fact? need not be proved because the law already presumes that the imputation is malicious >malice)in)law?. Defamatory remar s and comments on the conduct or acts of public officers which are related to the discharge of their duties will not constitute libel if the defendant proves that truth of the imputation >thus a form of privileged communication?, but any attac on the private capacities of a public officer clearly beyond the scope of his official duties may constitute libel. .ven if the article falls under the cloa of privileged communications, it will not discount the fact that he wrote the same with malice, due to grudges an ill)will attendant in the circumstances surrounding the facts. &as'#e% vs. CA %./D+ 2f the defamatory statement is made against a public official with respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the allegation is shown, the accused will be entitled to an ac,uittal even though he doesn5t prove that the imputation was published with good motives and for #ustifiable ends. >0ecause, upon proof of truth, the burden of proving that the offender acted with malice would be on the public officer? &ctual Malice (ule : .ven if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with nowledge that it was false or with rec less disregard of whether it was false or not. avare$$e vs. CA

Soriano vs. IAC Soriano5s criminal liability was based on an article published in 6The 1uardian7, of which he is the editor. The basis of the article was a press release prepared in Tacloban and delivered to various newspapers. The intended circulation of 6The 1uardian7 is nationwide. The libel case was doc ed at the (T! /etye. Soriano filed n MT' on the basis of improper venue. %e argues that the /eyte court had no #urisdiction because the publication house of 6The 1uardian7 was located in 'ue*on !ity and that Tantuico also holds office in '!. %./D+ /ocal #urisprudence follow the 6multiple publication7 rule : that each and every publication of the same libel suit constitutes a separate offense, and warrants a separate cause of action for filing a libel suit. %owever, the publication re,uirement set forth by (P!;<= refers to the 6publication7 >the official circulating organ? and not the 6press release7. 2n harmoni*ing (P!;<= with the 6multiple publication7 rule, the 6press release7 is not the document to be e9amined. Since the official publication is produced in '! and was not proven to have been produced-copied in /eyte or elsewhere, the trial should have been handled by a '! court. "#lle$in vs. oel The article contained statements to the effect that &merican influence was a significant driver of the political ascendancy of the Mindalanos of /anao. !omplainants claimed this was an insulting statement that damaged the social standing of the clan. %./D+ The published wor alleged to contain the libelous e9cerpt must be e9amined and viewed as a whole. Titles of royalty and nobility are not generally recogni*ed or ac nowledged socially in the national community. Personal hurt or embarrassment, even if real, is not automatically e,uivalent to defamation. The law against defamation protects the interest of a person in ac,uiring, retaining, and en#oying a reputation as good as one5s character and conduct warrant in the community. 2t is the community standards, not personal or family standards, that a court must refer in evaluation a publication claimed to be defamatory. San$os vs. CA The article published was a verbatim copy of a complained filed by Sande#as with the S.! against the bro erage firm of !arlos Sison.

Petitioner claims that private respondent alluded to him when she said the words @stupid@, @bastards@, @swindlers@, and @plunderers@ while testifying on the Deed of Sale with (ight of (epurchase sub#ect of a civil case. 2n her &nswer, private respondent cited decisions of the Supreme !ourt to the effect that no action for libel or for damages may be founded on utterances made in the course of #udicial proceedings. %./D+ 2t is a settled principle in this #urisdiction that s$a$emen$s made in $(e co#rse o) *#dicial +roceedings are absol#$ely +rivileged. This absolute privilege remains regardless of the defamatory tenor and the presence of malice if the same are relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in hand or sub#ect of the in,uiry. Thus, the person ma ing these statements such as a #udge, lawyer or witness does not thereby incur the ris of being found liable thereon in a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages.

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The statements made during the course of #udicial proceedings en#oy the shield of absolute privilege. The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the public service and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of public welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature, #udges of courts, #urors, lawyers and witnesses may spea their minds freely and e9ercise their respective functions without incurring the ris of a criminal prosecution or an action for damages. 2n determining the issue of relevancy of statements made in #udicial proceedings, courts have adopted a liberal attitude by resolving all doubts in favor of relevancy. Without ,uestion, the use of blatantly defamatory language li e @stupid@, @bastards@, @swindlers@, and @plunderers@ in describing the adverse parties detract from the honor and dignity that befits a court proceeding and should have been stric en out of the records. The foregoing notwithstanding, the !ourt finds that the terms used by the private respondent in her pleading and in her testimony cannot be the basis for an award of moral damages and attorney"s fees in favor of petitioner. -alandoni vs. .rilon (espondents here were accused of printing libelous matter in newspapers. The matter pertained to actions by Aalandoni as member of the P!11 alleged to be illegal and unauthori*ed >sold certain shares of a company at undervalued prices to (!0! thereby defrauding the government?. Austice secretary reversed the findings of prosecutors and dismissed the complaints. %./D+ &rticles are not libelous. &rticles merely stated insinuations on the deal between (!0! and Aalandoni as part of the P!11. 2t #ust served to inform the public of irregularities in the transaction. 2n libels against public officers, to be liable, libel must relate to official conduct, even if the statement is false, unless officer proves that it was made with actual malice >with nowledge that it was false or not?. "or*al vs. CA 0or#al wrote a series of articles in his column about a certain 6.dsa hero who is organi*ing conferences and seminars and soliciting money in the name of the President and D8T! secretary without the latter5s consent and authority. Wenceslao filed a case for libel saying that he felt alluded to in the articles as the organi*er and that he was almost certain that it was him. %./D+ $o libel. 2n libel, it is essential that the victim be identifiable even if not actually named. 2t is not sufficient that the victim himself made the identification, but it is necessary that at least the victim be identifiable by a ;rd person. !&0, no sufficient identification. Victim was not named, there were many .dsa heroes and many organi*ers of the seminars. &nd even the victim was not absolutely sure that it was him being alluded to. For$ic( vs. /alleron

4ortich is a salesman of San Miguel. %is supervisor 1alleron suspected him of misappropriating the collections he received retailers and buyers, so an investigation was conducted on the matter. 1alleron submitted an inter) office memorandum containing the results of his investigation. The memo was addressed to the (egional Sales Manager and contained this paragraph+ 62n addition, 2 would li e to further inform management that S-M Stanley 4ortich is an avid mah#ong player and a coc fighting enthusiast. 2n spite of several advices, there seems to be no change in his lifestyle. &lso, respondent had a similar case last September BB, BCDE.7 %./D+ The controversial paragraph is not libelous. 4irst, the memo was part and parcel of the investigation on 4ortich5s non)remittance of collections. Secondly, the memo was notcirculated or publici*ed, much less read by officers of the corporation other than those involved in the investigation or those directly supervising the petitioner"s wor . More importantly, 4ortich was unable to prove that the issuance of the memo was motivated by malice. While malice is presumed in every defamatory imputation, there are certain e9ceptions to this rule. The memo falls under the privileged communication rule. & privileged communication is one made bona fide upon any sub#ect matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty. 2n the case at bar, 1alleron, being 4ortich5s supervisor, was charged with the duty to carry out and enforce company rules and policies, including the duty to underta e initial investigation of possible irregularities in customer accounts. The memo was an official act done in good faith, an honest innocent statement arising from a moral and legal obligation which the private respondent certainly owed to the company in the performance of his duties. Salcedo01r$ane% vs. CA (afael filed an action for annulment of his marriage to Teresita. &mong the evidence presented by (afael in the trial court were several tape recordings of telephone conversations between Teresita and unidentified persons. The recordings were obtained when (afael allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone. %./D+ (ep. &ct $o. 3F== entitled @&n &ct to Prohibit and Penali*e Wire Tapping and 8ther (elated Violations of the Privacy of !ommunication, and for other purposes@ e9pressly ma es such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. &bsent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed to recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the sub#ect tapes is mandatory under (ep. &ct $o. 3F==. 2eo+le v. 1gie .ia% 320045 The last element of libel is that the victim is identified or identifiable from the contents of the libelous article. 2n order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary that the person be named. 2t is enough if by intrinsic reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters of description or reference to facts and circumstances from which others reading the article may now the person alluded to, or if the latter is pointed out by e9traneous

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circumstances so that those nowing such person could and did understand that he was the person referred to. Gun le v. !ablenews)&merican and /yons laid the rule that this re,uirement is complied with where a third person recogni*ed or could identify the party vilified in the article.

B usuall limited to le"islati*e and 1udicial proceedin"s and other acts of state 9-: Conditional or qualified B not actionable <;L2SS made !ith malice or bad faith B this class includes those communications mentioned as e=ceptions in Art. 354 R23 &ar. , 9&ri*ate communication made b an person to another7: /llustration3 ? files a complaint in "ood faith a"ainst a priest to his ecclesiastical superior alle"edl for ta.in" indecent liberties of !omen pri*ate communication in the performance of a moral dut pri*ile"edH <nnecessar publicit destro s "ood faith. So for e=ample, if a cop of the complaint abo*e is sent to a ne!spaper for publication, the pri*ile"e is destro ed. $hat the statement is a pri*ile"ed communication is a matter of defense and, li.e all other matters of defense, must be established b the accused. $apos, if the accused sets up pri*ile"ed communication as a defense, to o*ercome it, the prosecutions must pro*e that 9,: the defendant acted !ith malice in fact 9because the pri*ile"ed onl ne"ates the presumption of malice in la!:, or 9-: there is no reasonable "round for belie*in" the char"e to be true. /llustration of 5no reasonable "round for belie*in" the char"e to be true63 ? admitted that he had personall made no in*esti"ation !ith reference to the truth of man of the statements made in the communication to the Secretar of Iustice, especiall !ith reference to the statements based on rumors that a 1ud"e recei*ed a bribe for dismissin" a murder case. R23 &ar. - 9Cair and true report of official proceedin"s7: Defamator remar.s and comments on the conduct or acts of public officers !hich are related to the dischar"e of their official duties !ill not constitute libel if the defendant pro*es the truth of the imputation. $he conduct of public officers !hich are related to the dischar"e of their official duties are matters of public interest, and it is a defense to an action for libel or slander that the !ords complained of are a fair comment on a matter of public interest.

Article 35 . Re!"ire#ent for $"blicit% 2*er defamator imputation is presumed to be malicious, e*en if it be true, if no "ood intention and 1ustiable motice for ma.in" it is sho!n, e=cept in the follo!in" cases3 ,. A pri*ate communication made b an person to another in the performance of an le"al, moral, or social dut 4 -. A fair and true report, made in "ood faith, !ithout an comments or remar.s, of an 1udicial, le"islati*e, or other official proceedin"s !hich are not of confidential nature, or of an statement, report or speech deli*ered in said proceedin"s, or of an other act performed b public officers in the e=ercise of their functions. $he t!o e=ceptions in Art. 354 are the soB called pri*ile"ed communications. 8hen pri*ile"ed communication is in*ol*ed, malice in fact must be pro*ed to con*ict the accused. /llustration of Art. 3543 A tells C that @ is a thief. $he fact is @ is reall is a thief, because he !as pre*iousl con*icted of theft. Can it be presumed that the imputation b @ is maliciousE Fes, because Art. 354 sa s that 5e*er defeamator imputation is presumed to be malicious e*en if it be true.6 @ut the presumption of malice is rebutted if A can sho! 9,: "ood intention and 9-: 1ustifiable moti*e for ma.in" the imputation. $hus, if @ is appl in" for a position of securit "uard in the store of C, brother of A, and the purpose of A is to protect his brother from undesirable emplo ees, then malice cannot be presumed. $!o .inds of pri*ile"ed communication3 9,: Absolute B not actionable, 2G2; /C its author acted in bad faith B this class includes statements made b members of Con"ress in the dischar"e of their functions as such, alle"ations in pleadin"s made b parties or their counsel, ans!ers "i*en b !itnesses in repl to questions propounded to them 9pro*ided the ans!ers are responsi*e and the alle"ations are rele*ant:

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8hat is a fair commentE /f the comment is an e=pression of an opinion, based upon pro*en facts, then it is no matter that the opinion happens to be mista.en so lon" as it mi"ht be reasonabl inferred from the facts. Comment ma be fair, althou"h !ron". @ut an attac. upon the private character of the public officer on matters !hich are not related to the dischar"e of their official functions, ma constitute libel. ;o one has the ri"ht to in*ade anotherJs pri*ac . Rule on selfBdefense D A person libeled is 1ustified to hit bac. !ith another libel. @ut the defamator statements made b the accused must be a fair ans!er to the libel made b the offended part and must be related to the imputation made. $he ans!er should not be unnecessaril libelous. /llustration3 A to @, C K D3 5Fou pimp, !omen of ill repute, thie*es, paramours of m husband6. @ to A3 5Fou are a !oman of the street, ou smell bad, and our mone !as stolen from the &CA<6 L C to A 5Fou are shameless, blac.mailer, murderer6 L D to A 5Fou ha*e a thic. face, ou are not le"all married, ou are the paramour of Cather @alu ut.6 Aeld3 $o repel attac., the defendant ma ma.e an e=planation of the imputation, and it is onl !here, if b e=plainin", he must of necessit ha*e to use scurrilous and slanderous remar.s, that he ma le"all be allo!ed to do so !ithout placin" himself under criminal prosecution. Aere, @, C, DJs remar.s !ere unnecessaril scurrilous. Article 355. Libel b% Mean& of 'ritin(& or Si#ilar Mean& A libel ma be committed b means of B ,. 8ritin"4 -. &rintin"4 3. Litho"raph 4 4. 2n"ra*in"4 5. Radio4 #. &hoto"raph4 %. &aintin"4 '. $heatrical e=hibition4 (. Cinemato"raphic e=hibition4 or ,+. An similar means. Defamation throu"h amplifier is not libel, but oral )efa#ation. $he !ord MradioJ should be considered in relation to the terms !ith !hich it is associated D all of !hich ha*e a common characteristic, namel , their permanent nature as a means of publication.

@ut defamation made in a $G pro"ram is libel. /t easil qualifies under the "eneral pro*ision 5or an similar means6.
Magno v. 2eo+le 3200,5 Sending an unsealed libelous letter to the offended party constitutes publication. "#a$is v. 2eo+le 3200,5 4acts+ 8ne lawyer sent another an insulting letter, in closing saying, 6Hours in Satan5s name7. %eld+ There is publication in this case. 2n libel, publication means ma ing the defamatory matter, after it is written, nown to someone other than the person against whom it has been written. 2e$i$ioner7s s#b*ec$ le$$er0re+ly i$sel) s$a$es $(a$ $(e same was co+y )#rnis(ed $o all concerned. Also8 +e$i$ioner (ad dic$a$ed $(e le$$er $o (is secre$ary. I$ is eno#g( $(a$ $(e a#$(or o) $(e libel com+lained o) (as comm#nica$ed i$ $o a $(ird +erson. 4urthermore, the letter, when found in the mailbo9, was open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public. While Vaca case is for violation of 0.P. FF, we find the reasons behind the im+osi$ion o) )ine ins$ead o) im+risonmen$ a++licable $o +e$i$ioner7s case o) libel. We note that this is petitioner5s first offense of this nature. %e never new respondent prior to the demand letter sent by the latter to Mrs. 'uingco who then sought his assistance thereto. %e appealed from the decision of the (T! and the !& in his belief that he was merely e9ercising a civil or moral duty in writing the letter to private complainant. 2n fact, petitioner could have applied for probation to evade prison term but he did not do so believing that he did not commit a crime thus, he appealed his case. We believe that the State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social organi*ation against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other social ends. !onse,uently, we delete the prison sentence imposed on petitioner and instead impose a fine of si9 thousand pesos. This is not the first time that we removed the penalty of imprisonment and imposed a fine instead in the crime of libel. 2n Sazon v. Court of Appeals, petitioner was convicted of libel and was meted a penalty of imprisonment and fineI and upon a petition filed with us, we affirmed the findings of libel but changed the penalty imposed to a mere fine.

Article 35*. Threatenin( to $"bli&h an) Offer to $re+ent S"ch $"blication for A Co#,en&ation Acts punished ,.$hreatenin" another to publish a libel concernin" him, or his parents, spouse, child, or other members of his famil 4

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-. Offerin" to pre*ent the publication of such libel for compensation or mone consideration. @lac.mail B /n its metaphorical sense, blac.mail ma be defined as an unla!ful e=tortion of mone b threats of accusation or e=posure. $!o !ords are e=pressi*e of the crime B hush mone . /n !hat felonies is blac.mail possibleE @lac.mail is possible in 9,: li"ht threats under Article -'34 and 9-: threatenin" to publish, or offerin" to pre*ent the publication of, a libel for compensation, under Article 35#. Article 35-. $rohibite) $"blication of Act& Referre) to in the Co"r&e of Official $rocee)in(& 2lements ,. Offender is a reporter, editor or mana"er of a ne!spaper, dail or ma"aNine4 -. Ae publishes facts connected !ith the pri*ate life of another4 3. Such facts are offensi*e to the honor, *irtue and reputation of said person. $he pro*isions of Art. 35% constitute the soB called .Ga( Law/. ;e!spaper reports on cases pertainin" to adulter , di*orce, issues about the le"itimac of children etc., !ill necessaril be barred from publication. $he prohibition applies e*en thou"h said publication be made in connection !ith or under the prete=t that it is necessar in the narration of an 1udicial or administrati*e proceedin"s !herein such facts ha*e been mentioned. /llustration3 A uttered defamator remar.s callin" a priest a sa*a"e and that he had a concubine. 8hile the case !as pendin" trial, a ne!spaper published the complaint *erbatim includin" the defamator e=pressions of A. RA,4%% D $he publisher, editor, columnist or reporter of an periodical of "eneral circulation cannot be compelled to re*eal the source of an ne!s report or information appearin" in said publication !hich !as related in confidence to such publisher etc. unless the court or a Aouse or committee of Con"ress finds that such re*elation is demanded b the securit of the State, !ithout pre1udice to the publisherJs etc. liabilit under ci*il and criminal la!s. Article 350. Slan)er

Slander is oral defamation. $here are to! .inds of oral defamation3 9,: Simple slander4 and 9-: )ra*e slander, !hen it is of a serious and insultin" nature. Cactors that determine the "ra*it of oral defamation3 ,. e=pressions used -. personal relations of the accused and the offended part 3. circumstances surroundin" the case /llustration of "ra*e slander3 5Fou sold the union. Fou s!indled the mone of the members and recei*ed bribe mone in the amount of &,+O76 /llustration of simple slander3 An accusation that the offended part has been li*in" successi*el and !ith se*eral men uttered before se*eral persons, !hen intended to correct an improper conduct of the offended part , a .in of the accused, is onl simple slander. $he slander need not be heard b the offended part , because a manJs reputation is the estimate in !hich other hold him, not the "ood opinion !hich he has of himself.
2eo+le vs. 2elayo Pelayo told !lapano >councilor?, within the hearing of three people, that in one of his investigations on illegal gambling, an operator, /im Peng, told him &lmendras >governor? received PJ== from said operator as protection money. The following day, Pelayo delivered a privileged speech in the !ity !ouncil5s session where it could be inferred that he was referring to &lmendras as a 6tong collector7. %./D+ 4acts of the case do $8T constitute intriguing against honor where the source of the derogatory information cannot be determined and defendant borrows the same without subscribing to the truth thereof, passes it to others. The information allegedly came from a definite source >/im Peng? which he adopted as his, passed it to another for the purpose of causing dishonor to the other5s reputation. The act is slander >light oral defamation?. &ic$orio vs. CA 4ather and son Victorio were overheard by people to have uttered defamatory words against &tty. (ui* after a hearing where &tty. (ui* moved for contempt of the counsel of Victorio. They were found guilty of 1rave 8ral Defamation. %./D+ 8ral defamation or slander has been defined as the spea ing of base and defamatory words which tend to pre#udice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood. The special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between offended and offender, which might tend to prove intention of offender at the time, aside from the sense and grammatical meaning

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of the defamatory words are considered as guidelines in determining whether the offense is serious or slight. &ttributing to a prominent lawyer a crime >estafa? is a serious and insulting imputation that stri es deep into the character of the victim. $o special circumstance need be shown for defamatory words to be considered grave oral defamation. That defamatory words were uttered in the heat of anger cannot lie where there was no reason or lawful cause to be angry against (ui* who was merely performing his duties aw a lawyer in defense of client, and no provocation. 2eo+le vs. 1rc#llo Audge 8rcullo dismissed the case for oral defamation against Peralta >she imputed adultery and prostitution against 4lores? on the ground that it was a private crime to be instituted by the offended party. S! reinstated case for trial. %./D+ The words said by Peralta are indubitably imputation of the crime of prostitution, which can be prosecuted de oficio and not adultery. !onnotation of hostess is notoriously referred to prostitutes. 8nly when derogatory remar s clearly and categorically reflect the elements constituting adultery would the complainant for libel by the offended party be necessary to commence prosecution &illan#eva v. 2eo+le 3200,5 The !ourt does not condone the vilification or use of scurrilous language on the part of petitioner, but following the rule that all possible circumstances favorable to the accused must be ta en in his favor, it is our considered view that the slander committed by petitioner can be characteri*ed as slight slander following the doctrine that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party, constitutes only a light felony. Figeroa v. 2eo+le 3200,5 While it is true that a publication"s libelous nature depends on its scope, spirit and motive ta en in their entirety, the article in ,uestion as a whole e9plicitly ma es mention of private complainant (ivera all throughout. 2t cannot be said that the article was a mere general commentary on the alleged e9isting state of affairs at the aforementioned public mar et because (ivera was not only specifically pointed out several times therein but was even tagged with derogatory names. 2ndubitably, this name)calling was, as correctly found by the two courts below, directed at the very person of (ivera himself.

Slander b deed refers to performance of an act, not use of !ords. $!o .inds of slander b deed ,. Simple slander b deed4 and -. )ra*e slander b deed, that is, !hich is of a serious nature. 8hat is slander b deedE /t is a crime a"ainst honor !hich is committed b performin" an act !hich casts dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another person. /llustrations3 slappin" the face of another if the intention is to cause shame and humiliation, fi"htin" another !ith intention to humiliate him *s. Act& of la&ci+io"&ne&& Oissin" a "irl in public and touchin" her breasts without lewd designs, committed b a re1ected suitor to cast dishonor on the "irl is slander b deed ;O$ acts of lasci*iousness. *s. Maltreat#ent $he nature and effects of the maltreatment determine the crime committed. /f the offended part suffered from shame or humiliation caused b the maltreatment, it is slander b deed.
2n3"&t +e4ation Slan)er b% Act& of )ee) la&ci+io"&ne&& /rritation or anno ance L 8ith publicit L presence of and dishonor or the contempt circumstances pro*ided for in R&C 335 on rape 9force or intimidation, unconscious etc.: to"ether !ith le!d desi"ns

2eo+le vs. Mo$i$a Motita used a mirror to view reflection of private parts of /etada. !rowd nearby were laughing with their eyes directed towards her. %./D+ !rime committed was slander by deed.

Article 351. Slan)er b% Dee) 2lements ,. Offender performs an act not included in an other crime a"ainst honor4 -. Such act is performed in the presence of other person or persons4 3. Such act casts dishonor, discredit or contempt upon the offended part .

Kn#ust ve9ation is committed when the offender5s act caused annoyance, irritation, ve9ation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed. 2f there was attendant publicity and dishonor or contempt in addition to the irrigation or annoyance, offense would be slander by deed as in this case. 2f any of the circumstances provided for rape together with lewd designs were present in addition to the annoyance, the offense would be act of lasciviousness.

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Article 3*5. $er&on& re&,on&ible $he persons responsible for libel are3

$here is no remed for dama"es for slander or libel in case of absolutel pri*ile"ed communication. Article 3*6. $roof of the tr"th /n e*er criminal prosecution for libel, the truth ma be "i*en in e*idence to the court and if it appears that the matter char"ed as libelous is true, and, moreo*er, that it !as published !ith "ood moti*es and for 1ustifiable ends, the defendant shall be acquitted. &roof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constitutin" a crime shall not be admitted, unless the imputation shall ha*e been made a"ainst the )o*ernment emplo ees !ith respect to facts related to the dischar"e of their duties. /n such cases, if the defendant pro*es the truth of the imputation made b him, he shall be acquitted. &roof of truth is admissible in an follo!in"3 of the

1.

2. 3.
4.

$he person !ho publishes, exhibits or causes the publication or exhibition of an defamation in !ritin" or similar means4 $he author or editor of a boo. or pamphlet4 $he editor or business manager of a dail ne!spaper ma"aNine or serial publication4 $he o!ner of a printin" plant !hich publishes a libelous article !ith his consent and all other persons !ho in an !a participate in or ha*e connection !ith its publication.

Genue of criminal and ci*il actions for dama"es in cases of !ritten defamations 9/n case one of the offended parties is a pri*ate indi*idual: ,. -. 8here the libelous article is printed and first published4 or 8here an of the offended parties actuall resides at the time of the commission of the offense.

1.

8here one of the offended parties is a public officer, the action shall be filed in the CC/ 9,: of the pro*ince or cit !here he held office at the time of the commission of the offense OR 9-: !here the libelous article is printed and first published. $he ci*il action shall be filed in the same cdourt !here the criminal action is filed and *ice *ersa. $he court !here the criminal action or ci*il action for dama"es is ,st filed shall acquire 1urisdiction to the exclusion of other courts. /f the defamation consists in the imputation of a crime !hich cannot be prosecuted de oficio 9adulter , concubina"e, seduction, abduction and acts of lasci*iousness:, then the offended part must a complaint. R23 DA0A)2S reco*erable Actual dama"es need not be pro*ed, at least 9,: !here the publication is libelous per se or 9-: !hen the amount of the a!ard is more or less nominal, because libel, b its nature, causes in1ur to the reputation of the offended part .

2.

8hen the act or omission imputed constitutes a crime re"ardless of !hether the offended part is a pri*ate indi*idual or a public officer4 8hen the offended part is a Government employee, e*en if the act or omission imputed doesnJt constitute a crime, pro*ided, it is related to the dischar"e of his official duties.

/llustration3 A said that @, a "o*Jt official, !as in the habit of drin.in" durin" office hours and that he !as al!a s in a boisterous condition. /s proof of truth allo!ed in case @ should file a complaint a"ainst A for defamationE Fes. @oth public interest and the "ood of the ser*ice demand that a drun.ard be barred from the ser*ice. @ut !hen the imputation in*ol*es the pri*ate life of @ !hich is not related to the dischar"e of his official duties, the offender cannot pro*e the truth thereof. Another illustration3 A made se*eral imputations a"ainst C, a pri*ate indi*idual, some of !hich insinuated the commission of crimes and some did not. /s proof of truth allo!edE /t depends. $he defendant !ill be allo!ed to pro*e the truth of the imputations constitutin" crimes but he !ill not be allo!ed to pro*e the truth of the imputations not constitutin" crimes.

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 D2C2;S2 in defamation, requisities3 ,. $ruth -. 0atter !as published !ith moti*es 3. Cor 1ustifiable ends

"ood

himself of !ritten or spo.en !ords in besmirchin" the *ictimJs reputation ;ot required

spo.en, are a*ailed of

Retraction ma miti"ate dama"es. @ut in order to ha*e the desired effect, the retraction should contain an admission of the falsit of the libelous publication and e*ince a stron" desire to repair the !ron" occasioned thereb . Article 3*7. Libelo"& re#ar8& Libelous remar.s or comments connected !ith the matter pri*ile"ed under the pro*isions of Article 354, if made !ith malice, shall not e=empt the author thereof nor the editor or mana"in" editor of a ne!spaper from criminal liabilit . $hus, the author of a publication !ho distorts or discolors official proceedin"s reported b him, or adds comments thereon to cast aspersion on the character of the parties concerned, is "uilt of libel, not!ithstandin" that the defamator matter is published in connection !ith a pri*ile"ed matter. Article 3*3. $er&on& Incri#inatin( Innocent

/mputation must be public and malicious K must be calculated to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of the a""rie*ed part

$eo,le +&. Ala(ao /s there a comple= crime of incriminatin" an innocent person throu"h unla!ful arrestE A2LD3 Fes. $he t!o acts imputed to the accused closel follo!ed each other, the unla!ful arrest bein" a necessar means to plant the incriminator e*idence. <nder the circumstances of the case, the accused had to arrest 0 because it !as the onl !a that the could !ith facilit detain him, search his person or effects and, commin"le there!ith the mar.ed peso bill. A comple= crime !as committed. H"((lan) +&. Lantin Audge /antin was arrested for bribery for allegedly having received mar ed money amounting to PJ,=== from one Magdalena %uggland who was implicated in a criminal case. The PJ,=== was allegedly part of the PFJ,=== being as ed by Audge /antin for the cancellation of the hold departure order issued against Ms. %uggland. The issue is whether this is case of entrapment or planting of evidence. %./D+ This is a case of entrapment. /et us distinguish entrapment from planting of evidence. 2n en$ra+men$, the criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused and the law enforcement officials merely facilitate the commission of the offense, the accused cannot #ustify his conduct. 2lan$ing o) evidence or incriminating innocent person is committed by performing an act by which the offender directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a crime. 4rom the testimonial and documentary evidence submitted by the parties, there is reason to believe that indeed, this is a case of entrapment not planting of evidence. The conclusion is based on the following+ >B? The subpoena was illegally issuedI >F? The Motion to 'uash %old Departure 8rder and the 8rder of !ancellation of the %old Departure 8rder were prepared and typewritten by the respondentI and >;? The Money used in the entrapment operation was recovered from one of the left drawers of the respondent"s table.

2lements ,. Offender performs an act4 -. @ such an act, he incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a crime4 3. Such act does not constitute per1ur . $his article is limited to 5plantin"6 e*idence and the li.e, !hich do not in themsel*es constitute false prosecutions but tend directl to cause false prosecution.
Incri#inatin( an innocent ,er&on Committed b performin" an act b !hich the offender directl incriminates another Limited to the act of plantin" e*idence $er3"r% b% #a8in( fal&e acc"&ation $he "ra*amen is the imputation itself, falsel made before an officer )i*in" of false statement under oath or ma.in" a false affida*it, imputin" to another the commission of a crime Defa#ation 8ords, !ritten or

Article 3* . Intri("in( a(ain&t Honor $his crime is committed b an person !ho shall ma.e an intri"ue !hich has for its principal purpose to blemish the honor or reputation of another person.

Incri#inator% #achination& Offender doesnJt a*ail

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Incri#inatin( an innocent ,er&on Offender performs an act b !hich he directl incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a crime Defa#ation Done b a*ailin" directl of &,o8en wor)& e=., "ossipin" Slan)er $he source of the info can be ,in,ointe) and the defendant, adoptin" as his o!n the information he has obtained, passes the same to another for the purpose of causin" dishonor to complainantJs reputation

Intri("in( a(ain&t Honor Offender resorts to an intri("e for the purpose of blemishin" the honor or reputation of another person

c)

for any person !ho willfully or knowingly does or !ho shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the acts declared to be unlawful or who violates the provisions of the following section or of any order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation.

/t is not unla!ful3 Intri("in( a(ain&t Honor Committed b means !hich consists of some tric8% an) &ecret ,lot Intri("in( a(ain&t Honor $he source or the author of the dero"ator info cannot be )eter#ine) and the defendant borro!s the same, and !ithout subscribin" to the truth thereof, passes it to others

a)

RE$29LIC ACT No.

755

AN ACT TO $ROHI9IT AND $ENALI:E 'IRE TA$$ING AND OTHER RELATED ;IOLATIONS O< THE $RI;AC= O< COMM2NICATION> AND <OR OTHER $2R$OSES /t shall be unla!ful3

a)

for any person, not bein" authoriNed b all the parties to an pri*ate communication or spo.en !ord, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spo.en !ord b usin" a de*ice commonl .no!n as a dictaphone or dicta"raph or dictaphone or !al.ieBtal.ie or tape recorder, or ho!e*er other!ise described4 for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penaliNed in the ne=t precedin" sentence, 9,: to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of an communication or spo.en !ord secured either before or after the effecti*e date of this Act in the manner prohibited b this la!4 or 9-: to replay the same for any other person or persons; or (3) to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or (4) to furnish transcriptions thereof, !hether complete or partial, to an other person. $ro+i)e), $hat the use of such record or an copies thereof a& e+i)ence in an% ci+il> cri#inal in+e&ti(ation or trial of offen&e&, shall not be co*ered b this prohibition4

for an peace officer, !ho is authoriNed b a !ritten order of the Court, to e=ecute an of the acts declared to be unla!ful in cases in*ol*in" the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined b the Re*ised &enal Code, and *iolations of Common!ealth Act ;o. #,#, punishin" espiona"e and other offenses a"ainst national securit 3 $ro+i)e), $hat &"ch written or)er &hall onl% be i&&"e) or (rante) ",on written a,,lication an) the e4a#ination "n)er oath or affir#ation of the a,,licant an) the witne&&e& he #a% ,ro)"ce an) a &howin(? 9,: that there are reasonable "rounds to belie*e that an of the crimes enumerated hereinabo*e has been committed or is bein" committed or is about to be committed3 $ro+i)e)> howe+er> $hat in cases in*ol*in" the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authorit shall be "ranted onl upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case ma be, ha*e actuall been or are bein" committed4 9-: that there are reasonable "rounds to belie*e that e*idence !ill be obtained essential to the con*iction of an person for, or to the solution of, or to the pre*ention of, an of such crimes4 and 93: that there are no other means readil a*ailable for obtainin" such e*idence.

b)

2ffect of *iolation of the la!3 An communication or spo.en !ord, or the e=istence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meanin" of the same or an part thereof, or an information therein contained obtained or secured b an person in *iolation of this Act &hall not be a)#i&&ible in e+i)ence in an% 3")icial> !"a&i@3")icial> le(i&lati+e or a)#ini&trati+e hearin( or in+e&ti(ation.

/aanan vs. IAC &tty. Pinto filed a complaint for direct assault against &tty. /aconico. Pintor, through phone, offered to withdraw the complaint for consideration. &tty. 1aanan was able to overhear this conversation through a telephone e9tension. Pinto was arrested for e9tortion. 0ut 1aanan and /aconico

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were charged with violation of (&3F== and found guilty by the lower court. %./D+ The phrase 6any other device or arrangement7 in the &nt)Wiretapping /aw doesn5t cover an e9tension line. The law refers to a tap of a wire or cable or the use of a device or arrangement for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording the communication. There must be the physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept or record the spo en words. The e9tension here was not installed for the purpose but for ordinary office use. &lso, an e9tension phone is an instrument which is very common, not what the law refers to in which the presence of such devices cannot be presumed by the party being overheard. Ramire% vs. CA (amire* field a civil case for damages against 1arcia. 2$ support of her claim, she produced a verbatim transcript of the confrontation with 1arcia where the latter allegedly ve9ed, insulted and humiliated her. The transcription on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. &s a result of the recording, 1arcia filed a criminal case against (amire* for violation of (& 3F==. %./D+ The law ma es no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penali*ed by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute5s intent to penali*e all persons unauthori*ed to ma e such recording is underscored by the use of the ,ualifier 6any7. !onse,uently, as respondent !& correctly concluded, even a person privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the nowledge of the latter >will? ,ualify as a violator under the provisions of (&3F==. The lawma ers contemplated to ma e illegal unauthori*ed taped recording of private conversation or communication ta en by either of the parties themselves of by third persons. The nature of the conversation is immaterial for conviction of the crime and communication as used includes conversation.

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