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20 Arguments For Gods Existence

0123 120 425 637 by .r8 Peter 7reeft !iled under ,he Existence of God 669 omments

48 ,he Argument from hange 68 ,he Argument from Efficient ausality 28 ,he Argument from ,ime and ontingency 18 ,he Argument from .egrees of Perfection :8 ,he .esign Argument 08 ,he 7alam Argument ;8 ,he Argument from ontingency 98 ,he Argument from the <orld as an )nteracting <hole 58 ,he Argument from Miracles 438 ,he Argument from onsciousness 448 ,he Argument from ,ruth 468 ,he Argument from the =rigin of the )dea of God 428 ,he =ntological Argument 418 ,he Moral Argument 4:8 ,he Argument from onscience 408 ,he Argument from .esire 4;8 ,he Argument from Aesthetic Experience 498 ,he Argument from 'eligious Experience 458 ,he ommon onsent Argument 638 Pascal>s <ager In this section you will find arguments of many different kinds for the existence of God. And "e ma&e to you? the reader? an initial appeal8 <e reali@e that many people? both believers and nonbelievers? doubt that God>s existence can be demonstrated or even argued about8 Aou may be one of them8 Aou may in fact have a fairly settled vie" that it cannot be argued about8 But no one can reasonably doubt that attention to these arguments has its place in any boo& on apologetics8 !or very many have believed that such arguments are possible? and that some of them actually "or&8 ,hey have also believed that an effective rational argument for God>s existence is an important first step in opening the mind to the possibility of faithBin clearing some of the roadbloc&s and rubble that prevent people from ta&ing the idea of divine revelation seriously8 And in this they have a real point8 $uppose our best and most honest reflection on the nature of things led us to see the material universe as selfCsufficient and uncausedD to see its form as the result of random motions? devoid of any plan or purpose8 <ould you then be impressed by reading in an ancient boo& that there exists a God of love? or that the heavens proclaim his gloryE <ould you be disposed to ta&e that message seriouslyE More li&ely you "ould excuse yourself from ta&ing seriously anything claimed as a communication from the reator8 As one person put itF ) cannot believe that "e are children of God? because ) cannot believe there is anyone to do the adopting8 It is this sort of cramped and constricted hori on that the proofs presented in this chapter are trying to expand. ,hey are attempts to confront us "ith the radical insufficiency of "hat is finite and limited? and to open minds to a level of being beyond it8 )f they succeed in thisBand "e can say from experience that some of the proofs do succeed "ith many peopleBthey can be of very great value indeed8 Aou may not feel that they are particularly valuable to you8 Aou may be blessed "ith a vivid sense of God>s presenceD and that is something for "hich to be profoundly grateful8 But that does not mean you have no obligation to ponder these arguments8 !or many have not been blessed in that "ay8 And the proofs are designed for themBor some of them at leastBto give a &ind of help they really need8 Aou may even be as&ed to provide help8

Besides? are any of us really in so little need of such help as "e may claimE $urely in most of us there is something of the s&eptic8 ,here is a part of us tempted to believe that nothing is ultimately real beyond "hat "e can see and touchD a part loo&ing for some reason? beyond the assurances of $cripture? to believe that there is more8 <e have no desire to ma&e exaggerated claims for these demonstrations? or to confuse Ggood reasonG G"ith scientific proof8G But "e believe that there are many "ho "ant and need the &ind of help these proofs offer more than they might at first be "illing to admit8 A word a!out the organi ation of the arguments. <e have organi@ed them into t"o basic groupsF those "hich ta&e their data from "ithoutBcosmological argumentsBand those that ta&e it from "ithinBpsychological arguments8 ,he group of cosmological arguments begins "ith our versions of A*uinas>s famous Gfive "ays8G ,hese are not the simplest of the arguments? and therefore are not the most convincing to many people8 =ur order is not from the most to the least effective8 ,he first argument? in particular? is *uite abstract and difficult8 Not all the arguments are e*ually demonstrative8 =ne HPascal>s <agerI is not an argument for God at all? but an argument for faith in God as a G"ager8G Another Hthe ontological argumentI "e regard as fundamentally fla"edD yet "e include it because it is very famous and influential? and may yet be saved by ne" formulations of it8 =thers Hthe argument from miracles? the argument from religious experience and the common consent argumentI claim only strong probability? not demonstrative certainty8 <e have included them because they form a strong part of a cumulative case8 <e believe that only some of these arguments? ta&en individually and separately? demonstrate the existence of a being that has some of the properties only God can have Hno argument proves all the divine attributesID but all t"enty ta&en together? li&e t"ined rope? ma&e a very strong case8

". #he Argument from $hange

(back to top) #he material world we know is a world of change. ,his young "oman came to be :>6G? but she "as not al"ays that height8 ,he great oa& tree before us gre" from the tiniest acorn8 No" "hen something comes to be in a certain state? such as mature si@e? that state cannot bring itself into being8 !or until it comes to be? it does not exist? and if it does not yet exist? it cannot cause anything8 As for the thing that changes? although it can be "hat it "ill become? it is not yet "hat it "ill become8 )t actually exists right no" in this state Han acornID it "ill actually exist in that state Hlarge oa& treeI8 But it is not actually in that state no"8 )t only has the potentiality for that state8 %ow a &uestion' #o explain the change( can we consider the changing thing alone( or must other things also !e in)ol)ed* =bviously? other things must be involved8 Nothing can give itself "hat it does not have? and the changing thing cannot have no"? already? "hat it "ill come to have then8 ,he result of change cannot actually exist before the change8 ,he changing thing begins "ith only the potential to change? but it needs to be acted on by other things outside if that potential is to be made actual8 =ther"ise it cannot change8 Nothing changes itself8 Apparently selfCmoving things? li&e animal bodies? are moved by desire or "illBsomething other than mere molecules8 And "hen the animal or human dies? the molecules remain? but the body no longer moves because the desire or "ill is no longer present to move it8

%ow a further &uestion' Are the other things outside the changing thing also changing* Are its movers also movingE )f so? all of them stand in need right no" of being acted on by other things? or else they cannot change8 No matter ho" many things there are in the series? each one needs something outside itself to actuali@e its potentiality for change8 ,he universe is the sum total of all these moving things? ho"ever many there are8 ,he "hole universe is in the process of change8 But "e have already seen that change in any being re*uires an outside force to actuali@e it8 ,herefore? there is some force outside Hin addition toI the universe? some real being transcendent to the universe8 ,his is one of the things meant by GGod8G +riefly( if there is nothing outside the material uni)erse( then there is nothing that can cause the uni)erse to change. But it does change8 ,herefore there must be something in addition to the material universe8 But the universe is the sum total of all matter? space and time8 ,hese three things depend on each other8 ,herefore this being outside the universe is outside matter? space and time8 )t is not a changing thingD it is the unchanging $ource of change8

2. #he Argument from Efficient $ausality

(back to top) <e notice that some things cause other things to be Hto begin to be? to continue to be? or bothI8 !or example? a man playing the piano is causing the music that "e hear8 )f he stops? so does the music8 %ow ask yourself' Are all things caused to exist !y other things right now* $uppose they are8 ,hat is? suppose there is no -ncaused Being? no God8 ,hen nothing could exist right no"8 !or remember? on the noCGod hypothesis? all things need a present cause outside of themselves in order to exist8 $o right no"? all things? including all those things "hich are causing things to be? need a cause8 ,hey can give being only so long as they are given being8 Everything that exists? therefore? on this hypothesis? stands in need of being caused to exist8 But caused by "hatE Beyond everything that is? there can only be nothing8 But that is absurdF all of reality dependentBbut dependent on nothingJ ,he hypothesis that all being is caused? that there is no -ncaused Being? is absurd8 $o there must be something uncaused? something on "hich all things that need an efficient cause of being are dependent8 Existence is like a gift gi)en from cause to effect. )f there is no one "ho has the gift? the gift cannot be passed do"n the chain of receivers? ho"ever long or short the chain may be8 )f everyone has to borro" a certain boo&? but no one actually has it? then no one "ill ever get it8 )f there is no God "ho has existence by his o"n eternal nature? then the gift of existence cannot be passed do"n the chain of creatures and "e can never get it8 But "e do get itD "e exist8 ,herefore there must exist a GodF an -ncaused Being "ho does not have to receive existence li&e usBand li&e every other lin& in the chain of receivers8 ,uestion "' <hy do "e need an uncaused causeE <hy could there not simply be an endless series of things mutually &eeping each other in beingE -eply' ,his is an attractive hypothesis8 ,hin& of a single drun&8 He could probably not stand up alone8 But a group of drun&s? all of them mutually supporting each other? might stand8 ,hey might even ma&e their "ay along the street8 But noticeF Given so many drun&s? and given the steady ground beneath them? "e can understand ho" their stumblings might cancel each other

out? and ho" the group of them could remain HrelativelyI upright8 <e could not understand their remaining upright if the ground did not support themBif? for example? they "ere all suspended several feet above it8 And of course? if there "ere no actual drun&s? there "ould be nothing to understand8 ,his brings us to our argument8 ,hings have got to exist in order to be mutually dependentD they cannot depend upon each other for their entire being? for then they "ould have to be? simultaneously? cause and effect of each other8 A causes B? B causes ? and causes A8 ,hat is absurd8 ,he argument is trying to sho" "hy a "orld of caused causes can be givenBor can be thereBat all8 And it simply points outF )f this thing can exist only because something else is giving it existence? then there must exist something "hose being is not a gift8 =ther"ise everything "ould need at the same time to be given being? but nothing Hin addition to GeverythingGI could exist to give it8 And that means nothing "ould actually be8 ,uestion 2' <hy not have an endless series of caused causes stretching bac&"ard into the pastE ,hen everything "ould be made actual and "ould actually beBeven though their causes might no longer exist8 -eply' !irst? if the &alam argument Hargument 0I is right? there could not exist an endless series of causes stretching bac&"ard into the past8 But suppose that such a series could exist8 ,he argument is not concerned about the past? and "ould "or& "hether the past is finite or infinite8 )t is concerned "ith "hat exists right no"8 Even as you read this? you are dependent on other thingsD you could not? right no"? exist "ithout them8 $uppose there are seven such things8 )f these seven things did not exist? neither "ould you8 No" suppose that all seven of them depend for their existence right no" on still other things8 <ithout these? the seven you no" depend on "ould not existBand neither "ould you8 )magine that the entire universe consists of you and the seven sustaining you8 )f there is nothing besides that universe of changing? dependent things? then the universeBand you as part of itBcould not be8 !or everything that is "ould right no" need to be given being but there "ould be nothing capable of giving it8 And yet you are and it is8 $o there must in that case exist something besides the universe of dependent thingsBsomething not dependent as they are8 And if it must exist in that case( it must exist in this one. )n our "orld there are surely more than seven things that need? right no"? to be given being8 But that need is not diminished by there being more than seven8 As "e imagine more and more of themBeven an infinite number? if that "ere possibleB"e are simply expanding the set of beings that stand in need8 And this needBfor being? for existenceBcannot be met from "ithin the imagined set8 But obviously it has been met? since contingent beings exist8 ,herefore there is a source of being on "hich our material universe right no" depends8

.. #he Argument from #ime and $ontingency

(back to top) 48 <e notice around us things that come into being and go out of being8 A tree? for example? gro"s from a tiny shoot? flo"ers brilliantly? then "ithers and dies8 68 <hatever comes into being or goes out of being does not have to beD nonbeing is a real possibility8 28 $uppose that nothing has to beD that is? that nonbeing is a real possibility for everything8 18 ,hen right no" nothing "ould exist8 !or

:8 )f the universe began to exist? then all being must trace its origin to some past moment before "hich there existedBliterallyBnothing at all8 But 08 !rom nothing nothing comes8 $o ;8 ,he universe could not have begun8 98 But suppose the universe never began8 ,hen? for the infinitely long duration of cosmic history? all being had the builtCin possibility not to be8 But 58 )f in an infinite time that possibility "as never reali@ed? then it could not have been a real possibility at all8 $o 438 ,here must exist something "hich has to exist? "hich cannot not exist8 ,his sort of being is called necessary8 448 Either this necessity belongs to the thing in itself or it is derived from another8 )f derived from another there must ultimately exist a being "hose necessity is not derived? that is? an absolutely necessary being8 468 ,his absolutely necessary being is God8 ,uestion "' Even though you may never in fact step outside your house all day? it "as possible for you to do so8 <hy is it impossible that the universe still happens to exist? even though it "as possible for it to go out of existenceE -eply' ,he t"o cases are not really parallel8 ,o step outside your house on a given day is something that you may or may not choose to do8 But if nonbeing is a real possibility for you? then you are the &ind of being that cannot last forever8 )n other "ords? the possibility of nonbeing must be builtCin? Gprogrammed?G part of your very constitution? a necessary property8 And if all being is li&e that? then ho" could anything still exist after the passage of an infinite timeE !or an infinite time is every bit as long as forever8 $o being must have "hat it ta&es to last forever? that is? to stay in existence for an infinite time8 ,herefore there must exist "ithin the realm of being something that does not tend to go out of existence8 And this sort of being? as A*uinas says? is called Gnecessary8G

/. #he Argument from 0egrees of 1erfection

(back to top) 2e notice around us things that )ary in certain ways. A shade of color? for example? can be lighter or dar&er than another? a freshly ba&ed apple pie is hotter than one ta&en out of the oven hours beforeD the life of a person "ho gives and receives love is better than the life of one "ho does not8 $o "e arrange some things in terms of more and less8 And "hen "e do? "e naturally thin& of them on a scale approaching most and least8 !or example? "e thin& of the lighter as approaching the brightness of pure "hite? and the dar&er as approaching the opacity of pitch blac&8 ,his means that "e thin& of them at various GdistancesG from the extremes? and as possessing? in degrees of GmoreG or Gless?G "hat the extremes possess in full measure8 $ometimes it is the literal distance from an extreme that ma&es all the difference bet"een GmoreG and Gless8G !or example? things are more or less hot "hen they are more or less distant from a source of heat8 ,he source communicates to those things the *uality of heat they possess in greater or lesser measure8 ,his means that the degree of heat they possess is caused by a source outside of them8

%ow when we think of the goodness of things( part of what we mean relates to what they are simply as !eings. <e believe? for example? that a relatively stable and permanent "ay of being is better than one that is fleeting and precarious8 <hyE Because "e apprehend at a deep Hbut not al"ays consciousI level that being is the source and condition of all valueD finally and ultimately? being is better than nonbeing8 And so "e recogni@e the inherent superiority of all those "ays of being that expand possibilities? free us from the constricting confines of matter? and allo" us to share in? enrich and be enriched by? the being of other things8 )n other "ords? "e all recogni@e that intelligent being is better than unintelligent beingD that a being able to give and receive love is better than one that cannotD that our "ay of being is better? richer and fuller than that of a stone? a flo"er? an earth"orm? an ant? or even a baby seal8 But if these degrees of perfection pertain to being and being is caused in finite creatures? then there must exist a Gbest?G a source and real standard of all the perfections that "e recogni@e belong to us as beings8 ,his absolutely perfect beingBthe GBeing of all beings?G Gthe Perfection of all perfectionsGBis God8 ,uestion "' ,he argument assumes a real Gbetter8G But aren>t all our Kudgments of comparative value merely subKectiveE -eply' ,he very as&ing of this *uestion ans"ers it8 !or the *uestioner "ould not have as&ed it unless he or she thought it really better to do so than not? and really better to find the true ans"er than not8 Aou can spea& subKectivism but you cannot live it8

3. #he 0esign Argument

(back to top) #his sort of argument is of wide and perennial appeal. Almost everyone admits that reflection on the order and beauty of nature touches something very deep "ithin us8 But are the order and beauty the product of intelligent design and conscious purposeE !or theists the ans"er is yes8 Arguments for design are attempts to vindicate this ans"er? to sho" "hy it is the most reasonable one to give8 ,hey have been formulated in "ays as richly varied as the experience in "hich they are rooted8 ,he follo"ing displays the core or central insight8 48 ,he universe displays a staggering amount of intelligibility? both "ithin the things "e observe and in the "ay these things relate to others outside themselves8 ,hat is to sayF the "ay they exist and coexist display an intricately beautiful order and regularity that can fill even the most casual observer "ith "onder8 )t is the norm in nature for many different beings to "or& together to produce the same valuable endBfor example? the organs in the body "or& for our life and health8 H$ee also argument 98I 68 Either this intelligible order is the product of chance or of intelligent design8 28 Not chance8 18 ,herefore the universe is the product of intelligent design8 :8 .esign comes only from a mind? a designer8 08 ,herefore the universe is the product of an intelligent .esigner8 #he first premise is certainly true4e)en those resistant to the argument admit it. ,he person "ho did not "ould have to be almost pathetically obtuse8 A single protein molecule is a thing of immensely impressive orderD much more so a single cellD and incredibly much more so an organ li&e the eye? "here ordered parts of enormous and delicate complexity "or& together "ith

countless others to achieve a single certain end8 Even chemical elements are ordered to combine "ith other elements in certain "ays and under certain conditions8 Apparent disorder is a problem precisely because of the over"helming pervasiveness of order and regularity8 $o the first premise stands8 )f all this order is not in some "ay the product of intelligent designBthen "hatE =bviously? it GKust happened8G ,hings Kust fell out that "ay Gby chance8G Alternatively? if all this order is not the product of blind? purposeless forces? then it has resulted from some &ind of purpose8 ,hat purpose can only be intelligent design8 $o the second premise stands8 It is of course the third premise that is crucial. -ltimately? nonbelievers tell us? it is indeed by chance and not by any design that the universe of our experience exists the "ay it does8 )t Kust happens to have this order? and the burden of proof is on believers to demonstrate "hy this could not be so by chance alone8 But this seems a bit bac&"ard8 )t is surely up to nonbelievers to produce a credible alternative to design8 And GchanceG is simply not credible8 !or "e can understand chance only against a bac&ground of order8 ,o say that something happened Gby chanceG is to say that it did not turn out as "e "ould have expected? or that it did turn out in a "ay "e "ould not have expected8 But expectation is impossible "ithout order8 )f you ta&e a"ay order and spea& of chance alone as a &ind of ultimate source? you have ta&en a"ay the only bac&ground that allo"s us to spea& meaningfully of chance at all8 )nstead of thin&ing of chance against a bac&ground of order? "e are invited to thin& of orderCover"helmingly intricate and ubi*uitous orderCagainst a random and purposeless bac&ground of chance8 !ran&ly? that is incredible8 ,herefore it is eminently reasonable to affirm the third premise? not chance? and therefore to affirm the conclusion? that this universe is the product of intelligent design8 ,uestion "' Hasn>t the .ar"inian theory of evolution sho"n us ho" it is possible for all the order in the universe to have arisen by chanceE -eply' Not at all8 )f the .ar"inian theory has sho"n anything? it has sho"n? in a general "ay? ho" species may have descended from others through random mutationD and ho" survival of these species can be accounted for by natural selectionBby the fitness of some species to survive in their environment8 )n no "ay does itBcan itBaccount for the ubi*uitous order and intelligibility of nature8 'ather? it presupposes order8 ,o *uote a famous phraseF G,he survival of the fittest presupposes the arrival of the fit8G )f .ar"inians "ish to extrapolate from their purely biological theory and maintain that all the vast order around us is the result of random changes? then they are saying something "hich no empirical evidence could ever confirmD "hich no empirical science could ever demonstrateD and "hich? on the face of it? is simply beyond belief8 ,uestion 2' Maybe it is only in this region of the universe that order is to be found8 Maybe there are other parts un&no"n to us that are completely chaoticBor maybe the universe "ill one day in the future become chaotic8 <hat becomes of the argument thenE -eply' Believers and nonbelievers both experience the same universe8 )t is this "hich is either designed or not8 And this "orld of our common experience is a "orld of pervasive order and intelligibility8 ,hat fact must be faced8 Before "e speculate about "hat "ill be in the future or "hat may be else"here in the present? "e need to deal honestly "ith "hat is8 <e need to recogni@e in an unflinching "ay the extentBthe over"helming extentBof order and intelligibility8 ,hen "e can as& ourselvesF )s it credible to suppose that "e inhabit a small island of order surrounded by a vast sea of chaosBa sea "hich threatens one day to engulf usE

+ust consider ho" in the last decades "e have strained fantastically at the limits of our &no"ledgeD "e have cast our vision far beyond this planet and far "ithin the elements that ma&e it up8 And "hat has this expansion of our hori@ons revealedE Al"ays the same thingF moreBand not lessBintelligibilityD moreBand not lessBcomplex and intricate order8 Not only is there no reason to believe in a surrounding chaos? there is every reason not to8 )t flies in the face of the experience that all of usBbelievers and nonbelieversBshare in common8 5omething similar can !e said a!out the future. <e &no" the "ay things in the universe have behaved and are behaving8 And so? until "e have some reason to thin& other"ise? there is every reason to believe it "ill continue on its orderly path of running do"n8 No speculation can nullify "hat "e &no"8 And? any"ay? exactly "hat sort of chaos is this *uestion as&ing us to imagineE ,hat effect precedes causeE ,hat the la" of contradiction does not holdE ,hat there need not be "hat it ta&es for some existing thing to existE ,hese suggestions are completely unintelligibleD if "e thin& about them at all? it is only to reKect them as impossible8 an "e imagine less orderE Aes8 $ome rearrangement of the order "e experienceE Aes8 But total disorder and chaosE ,hat can never be considered as a real possibility8 ,o speculate about it as if it "ere is really a "aste of time8 ,uestion .' But "hat if the order "e experience is merely a product of our mindsE Even though "e cannot thin& utter chaos and disorder? maybe that is ho" reality really is8 -eply' =ur minds are the only means by "hich "e can &no" reality8 <e have no other access8 )f "e agree that something cannot exist in thought? "e cannot go ahead and say that it might nevertheless exist in reality8 Because then "e "ould be thin&ing "hat "e claim cannot be thought8 $uppose you claim that order is Kust a product of our minds8 ,his puts you in a very a"&"ard position8 Aou are saying that "e must thin& about reality in terms of order and intelligibility? but things may not exist that "ay in fact8 No" to propose something for consideration is to thin& about it8 And so you are sayingF HaI "e must thin& about reality in a certain "ay? but HbI since "e thin& that things may not in fact exist that "ay? then HcI "e need not thin& about reality the "ay "e must thin& about itJ Are "e "illing to pay that high a price to deny that the being of the universe displays intelligent designE )t does not? on the face of it? seem cost effective8

6. #he 7alam Argument

(back to top) ,he Arabic "ord &alam literally means Gspeech?G but came to denote a certain type of philosophical theologyBa type containing demonstrations that the "orld could not be infinitely old and must therefore have been created by God8 ,his sort of demonstration has had a long and "ide appeal among both hristians and Muslims8 )ts form is simple and straightfor"ard8 48 <hatever begins to exist has a cause for its coming into being8 68 ,he universe began to exist8 28 ,herefore? the universe has a cause for its coming into being8 Grant the first premise8 HMost peopleBoutside of asylums and graduate schools "ould consider it not only true? but certainly and obviously true8I

Is the second premise true* .id the universeBthe collection of all things bounded by space and timeBbegin to existE ,his premise has recently received po"erful support from natural scienceBfrom soCcalled Big Bang osmology8 But there are philosophical arguments in its favor as "ell8 an an infinite tas& ever be done or completedE )f? in order to reach a certain end? infinitely many steps had to precede it? could the end ever be reachedE =f course notBnot even in an infinite time8 !or an infinite time "ould be unending? Kust as the steps "ould be8 )n other "ords? no end "ould ever be reached8 ,he tas& "ouldBcouldBnever be completed8 But "hat about the step Kust before the endE ould that point ever be reachedE <ell? if the tas& is really infinite? then an infinity of steps must also have preceded it8 And therefore the step Kust before the end could also never be reached8 But then neither could the step Kust before that one8 )n fact? no step in the se*uence could be reached? because an infinity of steps must al"ays have preceded any stepD must al"ays have been gone through one by one before it8 ,he problem comes from supposing that an infinite se*uence could ever reach? by temporal succession? any point at all8 %ow if the uni)erse ne)er !egan( then it always was. )f it al"ays "as? then it is infinitely old8 )f it is infinitely old? then an infinite amount of time "ould have to have elapsed before HsayI today8 And so an infinite number of days must have been completedBone day succeeding another? one bit of time being added to "hat "ent beforeBin order for the present day to arrive8 But this exactly parallels the problem of an infinite tas&8 )f the present day has been reached? then the actually infinite se*uence of history has reached this present pointF in fact? has been completed up to this pointBfor at any present point the "hole past must already have happened8 But an infinite se*uence of steps could never have reached this present pointBor any point before it8 $o? either the present day has not been reached? or the process of reaching it "as not infinite8 But obviously the present day has been reached8 $o the process of reaching it "as not infinite8 )n other "ords? the universe began to exist8 ,herefore? the universe has a cause for its coming into being? a reator8 ,uestion "' hristians believe they are going to live forever "ith God8 $o they believe the future "ill be endless8 Ho" come the past cannot also be endlessE -eply' ,he *uestion really ans"ers itself8 hristians believe that their life "ith God "ill never end8 ,hat means it "ill never form an actually completed infinite series8 )n more technical languageF an endless future is potentiallyBbut never actuallyBinfinite8 ,his means that although the future "ill never cease to expand and increase? still its actual extent "ill al"ays be finite8 But that can only be true if all of created reality had a beginning8 ,uestion 2' Ho" do "e &no" that the cause of the universe still existsE Maybe it started the universe going and then ceased to be8 -eply' 'emember that "e are see&ing for a cause of spatioCtemporal being8 ,his cause created the entire universe of space and time8 And space and time themselves must be part of that creation8 $o the cause cannot be another spatioCtemporal being8 H)f it "ere? all the problems about infinite duration "ould arise once again8I )t must someho" stand outside the limitations and constraints of space and time8 )t is hard to understand ho" such a being could GceaseG to be8 <e &no" ho" a being "ithin the universe ceases to beF it comes in time to be fatally affected by some agency external to it8 But

this picture is proper to us? and to all beings limited in some "ay by space and time8 A being not limited in these "ays cannot GcomeG to be or GceaseG to be8 )f it exists at all? it must exist eternally8 ,uestion .' But is this cause GodBa he and not a mere itE -eply' $uppose the cause of the universe has existed eternally8 $uppose further that this cause is not personalF that it has given rise to the universe? not through any choice? but simply through its being8 )n that case it is hard to see ho" the universe could be anything but infinitely old? since all the conditions needed for the being of the universe "ould exist from all eternity8 But the &alam argument has sho"n that the universe cannot be infinitely old8 $o the hypothesis of an eternal impersonal cause seems to lead to an inconsistency8 Is there a way out* 8es( if the uni)erse is the result of a free personal choice. ,hen at least "e have some "ay of seeing ho" an eternal cause could give rise to a temporally limited effect8 =f course? the &alam argument does not prove everything hristians believe about God? but "hat proof doesE #ess than everything? ho"ever? is far from nothing8 And the &alam argument proves something central to the hristian belief in GodF that the universe is not eternal and "ithout beginningD that there is a Ma&er of heaven and earth8 And in doing so? it disproves the picture of the universe most atheists "ish to maintainF selfCsustaining matter? endlessly changing in endless time8

9. #he Argument from $ontingency

(back to top) ,he basic form of this argument is simple8 48 68 28 18 )f something exists? there must exist "hat it ta&es for that thing to exist8 ,he universeBthe collection of beings in space and timeBexists8 ,herefore? there must exist "hat it ta&es for the universe to exist8 <hat it ta&es for the universe to exist cannot exist "ithin the universe or be bounded by space and time8 :8 ,herefore? "hat it ta&es for the universe to exist must transcend both space and time8 5uppose you deny the first premise. ,hen if L exists? there need not exist "hat it ta&es for L to exist8 But G"hat it ta&es for L to existG means the immediate conditionHsI for L>s existence8 Aou mean that L exists only if A8 <ithout A? there can be no L8 $o the denial of premise 4 amounts to thisF L existsD L can only exist if A existsD and A does not exist8 ,his is absurd8 $o there must exist "hat it ta&es for the universe to exist8 But "hat does it ta&eE <e spo&e of the universe as Gthe collection of beings in space and time8G onsider one such beingF yourself8 Aou exist? and you are? in part at least? material8 ,his means that you are a finite? limited and changing being? you &no" that right no"? as you read this boo&? you are dependent for your existence on beings outside you8 Not your parents or grandparents8 ,hey may no longer be alive? but you exist no"8 And right no" you depend on many things in order to existBfor example? on the air you breathe8 ,o be dependent in this "ay is to be contingent8 Aou exist if something else right no" exists8 +ut not e)erything can !e like this. !or then everything "ould need to be given being? but there "ould be nothing capable of giving it8 ,here "ould not exist "hat it ta&es for anything to

exist8 $o there must be something that does not exist conditionallyD something "hich does not exist only if something else existsD something "hich exists in itself8 <hat it ta&es for this thing to exist could only be this thing itself8 -nli&e changing material reality? there "ould be no distance? so to spea&? bet"een "hat this thing is and that it is8 =bviously the collection of beings changing in space and time cannot be such a thing8 ,herefore? "hat it ta&es for the universe to exist cannot be identical "ith the universe itself or "ith a part of the universe8 ,uestion "' But "hy should "e call this cause GGodGE Maybe there is something un&no"n that grounds the universe of change "e live in8 -eply' ,rue8 And this Gun&no"nG is God8 <hat "e humans &no" directly is this sensible changing "orld8 <e also &no" that there must exist "hatever it ta&es for something to exist8 ,herefore? "e &no" that neither this changing universe as a "hole nor any part of it can be itself "hat it ta&es for the universe to exist8 But "e have no" such direct &no"ledge of the cause of changing things8 <e &no" that there must exist a causeD "e &no" that this cause cannot be finite or materialBthat it must transcend such limitations8 But "hat this ultimate cause is in itself remains? so far? a mystery8 ,here is more to be said by reasonD and there is very much more God has made &no"n about himself through revelation8 But the proofs have given us some real &no"ledge as "ellF &no"ledge that the universe is createdD &no"ledge that right no" it is &ept in being by a cause unbounded by any material limit? that transcends the &ind of being "e humans directly &no"8 And that is surely &no"ledge "orth having8 <e might figure out that someone>s death "as murder and no accident? "ithout figuring out exactly "ho did it and "hy? and this might leave us frustrated and unsatisfied8 But at least "e "ould &no" "hat path of *uestioning to pursueD at least "e "ould &no" that someone did it8 5o it is with the proofs. ,hey let us &no" that at every moment the being of the universe is the creative act of a GiverBA Giver transcending all material and spiritual limitations8 Beyond that? they do not tell us much about "hat or "ho this Giver isBbut they point in a very definite direction8 <e &no" that this -ltimate 'ealityBthe Giver of beingBcannot be material8 And "e &no" the gift "hich is given includes personal beingF intelligence? "ill and spirit8 ,he infinite transcendent cause of these things cannot be less than they are? but must be infinitely more8 Ho" and in "hat "ay "e do not &no"8 ,o some extent this Giver must al"ays remain un&no"n to human reason8 <e should never expect other"ise8 But reason can at least let us &no" that Gsomeone did it8G And that is of great value8

:. #he Argument from the 2orld as an Interacting 2hole

(back to top) Norris lar&e? "ho taught metaphysics and philosophy of religion for many years at !ordham? has circulated privately an intriguing version of the design argument8 <e present it here? slightly abridged and revisedD for your reflection8 5tarting point. #his world is gi)en to us as a dynamic( ordered system of many acti)e component elements. ,heir natures Hnatural propertiesI are ordered to interact "ith each other in stable? reciprocal relationships "hich "e call physical la"s8 !or example? every hydrogen atom in our universe is ordered to combine "ith every oxygen atom in the proportion of 6F4 H"hich implies that every oxygen atom is reciprocally ordered to combine "ith every hydrogen atom in the proportion of 4F6I8 $o it is "ith the chemical valences of all the basic elements8 $o too all

particles "ith mass are ordered to move to"ard every other according to the fixed proportions of the la" of gravity8 )n such an interconnected? interloc&ing? dynamic system? the active nature of each component is defined by its relation "ith others? and so presupposes the others for its o"n intelligibility and ability to act8 ontemporary science reveals to us that our "orldCsystem is not merely an aggregate of many separate? unrelated la"s? but rather a tightly interloc&ing "hole? "here relationship to the "hole structures and determines the parts8 ,he parts can no longer be understood apart from the "holeD its influence permeates them all8 Argument. In any such system as the a!o)e ;like our world< no component part or acti)e element can !e self4sufficient or self4explanatory. !or any part presupposes all the other parts Bthe "hole system already in placeBto match its o"n relational properties8 )t can>t act unless the others are there to interact reciprocally "ith it8 Any one part could be selfCsufficient only if it "ere the cause of the "hole rest of the systemB"hich is impossible? since no part can act except in collaboration "ith the others8 Nor can the system as a "hole explain its o"n existence? since it is made up of the component parts and is not a separate being? on its o"n? independent of them8 $o neither the parts nor the "hole are selfCsufficientD neither can explain the actual existence of this dynamically interactive system8 #hree $onclusions 48 $ince the parts ma&e sense only "ithin the "hole? and neither the "hole nor the parts can explain their o"n existence? then such a system as our "orld re*uires a unifying efficient cause to posit it in existence as a unified "hole8 68 Any such cause must be an intelligent cause? one that brings the system into being according to a unifying idea8 !or the unity of the "holeBand of each one of the overarching? cosmicC"ide? physical la"s uniting elements under themselvesBis "hat determines and correlates the parts8 Hence it must be someho" actually present as an effective organi@ing factor8 But the unity? the "holeness? of the "hole transcends any one part? and therefore cannot be contained in any one part8 ,o be actually present all at once as a "hole this unity can only be the unity of an organi@ing unifying idea8 !or only an idea can hold together many different elements at once "ithout destroying or fusing their distinctness8 ,hat is almost the definition of an idea8 $ince the actual parts are spread out over space and time? the only "ay they can be together at once as an intelligible unity is "ithin an idea8 Hence the system of the "orld as a "hole must live first "ithin the unity of an idea8 No" a real idea cannot actually exist and be effectively operative save in a real mind? "hich has the creative po"er to bring such a system into real existence8 Hence the sufficient reason for our ordered "orldCsystem must ultimately be a creative ordering Mind8 A cosmicC"ide order re*uires a cosmicC"ide =rderer? "hich can only be a Mind8 28 $uch an ordering Mind must be independent of the system itself? that is? transcendentD not dependent on the system for its o"n existence and operation8 !or if it "ere dependent on Bor part ofBthe system? it "ould have to presuppose the latter as already existing in order to operate? and "ould thus have to both precede and follo" itself8 But this is absurd8 Hence it must exist and be able to operate prior to and independent of the system8 ,hus our material universe necessarily re*uires? as the sufficient reason for its actual existence as an operating "hole? a ,ranscendent reative Mind8

=. #he Argument from >iracles

(back to top) 48 A miracle is an event "hose only ade*uate explanation is the extraordinary and direct intervention of God8 68 ,here are numerous "ellCattested miracles8 28 ,herefore? there are numerous events "hose only ade*uate explanation is the extraordinary and direct intervention of God8 18 ,herefore God exists8 =bviously if you believe that some extraordinary event is a miracle? then you believe in divine agency? and you believe that such agency "as at "or& in this event8 But the *uestion isF <as this event a miracleE )f miracles exist? then God must exist8 But do miracles existE 2hich e)ents do we choose* In the first place( the e)ent must !e extraordinary. But there are many extraordinary happenings He8g8? numerous stones dropping from the s&y in ,exasI that do not *ualify as miracles8 <hy notE !irst? because they could be caused by something in nature? and second? because the context in "hich they occur is not religious8 ,hey *ualify as mere oddities? as Gstrange happeningsGD the sort of thing you might expect to read in Believe )t or Not? but never hear about from the pulpit8 ,herefore the meaning of the event must also be religious to *ualify as a miracle8 $uppose that a holy man had stood in the center of Houston and saidF GMy dear brothers and sistersJ Aou are leading sinful livesJ #oo& at yourselvesBdrun&enJ dissoluteJ God "ants you to repentJ And as a sign of his displeasure he>s going to sho"er stones upon youJG ,hen? moments laterBthun&J thun&J thun&JBthe stones began to fall8 ,he "ord GmiracleG might very "ell spring to mind8 %ot that we would ha)e to !elie)e in God after witnessing this e)ent. But still? if that man in ,exas seemed utterly genuine? and if his accusations hit home? made us thin& GHe>s right?G then it "ould be very hard to consider "hat happened a deception or even an extraordinary coincidence8 ,his means that the setting of a supposed miracle is crucially important8 Not Kust the physical setting? and not Kust the timing? but the personal setting is vital as "ellBthe character and the message of the person to "hom this event is specially tied8 ,a&e? for example? four or five miracles from the Ne" ,estament8 'emove them completely from their context? from the teaching and character of hrist8 <ould it be "rong to see their religious significance as thereby greatly diminishedE After all? to call some happening a miracle is to interpret it religiously8 But to interpret it that "ay demands a context or setting "hich invites such interpretation8 And part of this setting usually? though not al"ays? involves a person "hose moral authority is first recogni@ed? and "hose religious authority? "hich the miracle seems to confirm? is then ac&no"ledged8 Abstract discussions of probability usually miss this factor8 But setting does play a decisive role8 Many years ago? at an other"ise dull convention? a distinguished philosopher explained "hy he had become a hristian8 He saidF G) pic&ed up the Ne" ,estament "ith a vie" to Kudging it? to "eighing its pros and cons8 But as ) began to read? ) reali@ed that ) "as the one being Kudged8G ertainly he came to believe in the miracleCstories8 But it "as the character and teaching of hrist that led him to accept the things recounted there as genuine acts of God8 5o there is not really a proof from miracles. )f you see some event as a miracle? then the activity of God is seen in this event8 ,here is a movement of the mind from this event to its

proper interpretation as miraculous8 And "hat gives impetus to that movement is not Kust the event by itself? but the many factors surrounding it "hich inviteBor seem to demandBsuch interpretation8 But miraculous events exist8 )ndeed? there is massive? reliable testimony to them across many times? places and cultures8 ,herefore their cause exists8 And their only ade*uate cause is God8 ,herefore God exists8 #he argument is not a proof( !ut a )ery powerful clue or sign. H!or further discussion? see chap8 : on miracles from Handbook of Catholic Apologetics8I

"0. #he Argument from $onsciousness

(back to top) 2hen we experience the tremendous order and intelligi!ility in the uni)erse( "e are experiencing something intelligence can grasp8 )ntelligence is part of "hat "e find in the "orld8 But this universe is not itself intellectually a"are8 As great as the forces of nature are? they do not &no" themselves8 Aet "e &no" them and ourselves8 ,hese remar&able factsBthe presence of intelligence amidst unconscious material processes? and the conformity of those processes to the structure of conscious intelligenceBhave given rise to a variation on the first argument for design8 48 <e experience the universe as intelligible8 ,his intelligibility means that the universe is graspable by intelligence8 68 Either this intelligible universe and the finite minds so "ell suited to grasp it are the products of intelligence? or both intelligibility and intelligence are the products of blind chance8 28 Not blind chance8 18 ,herefore this intelligible universe and the finite minds so "ell suited to grasp it are the products of intelligence8 #here are o!)ious similarities here to the design argument( and many of the things "e said to defend that argument could be used to defend this one too8 !or no" "e "ant to focus our attention on step 28 'eaders familiar "ith 8 $8 #e"is>s Miracles "ill remember the po"erful argument he made in chapter three against "hat he called GnaturalismGF the vie" that everythingBincluding our thin&ing and KudgingBbelongs to one vast interloc&ing system of physical causes and effects8 )f naturalism is true? #e"is argued? then it seems to leave us "ith no reason for believing it to be trueD for all Kudgments "ould e*ually and ultimately be the result of nonrational forces8 No" this line of reflection has an obvious bearing on step 28 <hat "e mean by Gblind chanceG is the "ay physical nature must ultimately operate if GnaturalismG is trueBvoid of any rational plan or guiding purpose8 $o if #e"is>s argument is a good one? then step 2 standsF blind chance cannot be the source of our intelligence8

<e "ere tempted? "hen preparing this section? to *uote the entire third chapter of Miracles8 ,his sort of argument is not original to #e"is? but "e have never read a better statement of it than his? and "e urge you to consult it8 But "e have found a compelling? and admirably succinct version H"ritten almost t"enty years before MiraclesI in H8 <8 B8 +oseph>s $ome Problems in Ethics H=xford -niversity Press? 4524I8 +oseph "as an =xford don? senior to #e"is? "ith "hose "ritings #e"is "as certainly familiar8 And undoubtedly this statement of the argument influenced #e"is>s later? more elaborate version8 If thought is laryngeal motion( how should any one think more truly than the wind !lows* All movements of bodies are e*ually necessary? but they cannot be discriminated as true and false8 )t seems as nonsensical to call a movement true as a flavor purple or a sound avaricious8 But "hat is obvious "hen thought is said to be a certain bodily movement seems e*ually to follo" from its being the effect of one8 ,hought called &no"ledge and thought called error are both necessary results of states of brain8 ,hese states are necessary results of other bodily states8 All the bodily states are e*ually real? and so are the different thoughtsD but by "hat right can ) hold that my thought is &no"ledge of "hat is real in bodiesE !or to hold so is but another thought? an effect of real bodily movements li&e the rest8 8 8 ,hese arguments? ho"ever? of mine? if the principles of scientific MnaturalismN888 are to stand unchallenged? are themselves no more than happenings in a mind? results of bodily movementsD that you or ) thin& them sound? or thin& them unsound? is but another such happeningD that "e thin& them no more than another such happening is itself but yet another such8 And it may be said of any ground on "hich "e may attempt to stand as true? Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis aevum MG)t flo"s and "ill flo" s"irling on foreverG HHorace? Epistles? )? 6? 12IN8 H$ome Problems in Ethics? pp8 41B4:I

"". #he Argument from #ruth

(back to top) ,his argument is closely related to the argument from consciousness8 )t comes mainly from Augustine8 48 68 28 18 =ur limited minds can discover eternal truths about being8 ,ruth properly resides in a mind8 But the human mind is not eternal8 ,herefore there must exist an eternal mind in "hich these truths reside8

#his proof might appeal to someone who shares a 1latonic )iew of knowledgeB"ho? for example? believes that there are Eternal )ntelligible !orms "hich are present to the mind in every act of &no"ledge8 Given that vie"? it is a very short step to see these Eternal !orms as properly existing "ithin an Eternal Mind8 And there is a good deal to be said for this8 But that is Kust the problem8 ,here is too much about the theory of &no"ledge that needs to be said before this could "or& as a persuasive demonstration8

"2. #he Argument from the ?rigin of the Idea of God

(back to top) #his argument( made famous !y -ene 0escartes( has a kinship to the ontological argument ;".<. )t starts from the idea of God8 But it does not claim that real being is part of the content of

that idea? as the ontological argument does8 'ather it see&s to sho" that only God himself could have caused this idea to arise in our minds8 )t "ould be impossible for us to reproduce the "hole context .escartes gives for this proof Hsee his third MeditationI? and fruitless to follo" his scholastic vocabulary8 <e give belo" the briefest summary and discussion8 48 68 28 18 :8 08 ;8 98 <e have ideas of many things8 ,hese ideas must arise either from ourselves or from things outside us8 =ne of the ideas "e have is the idea of GodBan infinite? allCperfect being8 ,his idea could not have been caused by ourselves? because "e &no" ourselves to be limited and imperfect? and no effect can be greater than its cause8 ,herefore? the idea must have been caused by something outside us "hich has nothing less than the *ualities contained in the idea of God8 But only God himself has those *ualities8 ,herefore God himself must be the cause of the idea "e have of him8 ,herefore God exists8

$onsider the following common o!@ection. ,he idea of God can easily arise li&e thisF "e notice degrees of perfection among finite beingsBsome are more perfect Hor less imperfectI than others8 And to reach the idea of God? "e Kust proKect the scale up"ard and out"ard to infinity8 ,hus there seems to be no need for an actually existing God to account for the existence of the idea8 All "e need is the experience of things varying in degrees of perfection? and a mind capable of thin&ing a"ay perceived limitations8 But is that really enoughE Ho" can "e thin& a"ay limitation or imperfection unless "e first recogni@e it as suchE And ho" can "e recogni@e it as such unless "e already have some notion of infinite perfectionE ,o recogni@e things as imperfect or finite involves the possession of a standard in thought that ma&es the recognition possible8 0oes that seem farfetched* )t does not mean that toddlers spend their time thin&ing about God8 But it does mean that? ho"ever late in life you use the standard? ho"ever long before it comes explicitly into consciousness? still? the standard must be there in order for you to use it8 But "here did it come fromE Not from your experience of yourself or of the "orld that exists outside you8 !or the idea of infinite perfection is already presupposed in our thin&ing about all these things and Kudging them imperfect8 ,herefore none of them can be the origin of the idea of GodD only God himself can be that8

".. #he ?ntological Argument

(back to top) #he ontological argument was de)ised !y Anselm of $anter!ury ;"0..4""0=<( who wanted to produce a single( simple demonstration which would show that God is and what God is. $ingle it may be? but far from simple8 )t is? perhaps? the most controversial proof for the existence of God8 Most people "ho first hear it are tempted to dismiss it immediately as an interesting riddle? but distinguished thin&ers of every age? including our o"n? have risen to defend it8 !or this very reason it is the most intensely philosophical proof for God>s existenceD its place of honor is not "ithin popular piety? but rather textboo&s and professional Kournals8 <e include it? "ith a minimum of discussion? not because "e thin& it conclusive or irrefutable? but for the sa&e of completeness8

AnselmAs Bersion 48 68 28 18 )t is greater for a thing to exist in the mind and in reality than in the mind alone8 GGodG means Gthat than "hich a greater cannot be thought8G $uppose that God exists in the mind but not in reality8 ,hen a greater than God could be thought Hnamely? a being that has all the *ualities our thought of God has plus real existenceI8 :8 But this is impossible? for God is Gthat than "hich a greater cannot be thought8G 08 ,herefore God exists in the mind and in reality8 ,uestion "' $uppose ) deny that God exists in the mindE -eply' )n that case the argument could not conclude that God exists in the mind and in reality8 But noteF the denial commits you to the vie" that there is no concept of God8 And very fe" "ould "ish to go that far8 ,uestion 2' )s it really greater for something to exist in the mind and in reality than in the mind aloneE -eply' ,he first premise of this argument is often misunderstood8 People sometimes sayF G)sn>t an imaginary disease better than a real oneEG <ell it certainly is betterBand so a greater thingB for you that the disease is not real8 But that strengthens Anselm>s side of the argument8 'eal bacteria are greater than imaginary ones? Kust because they have something that imaginary ones lac&F real being8 ,hey have an independence? and therefore an ability to harm? that nothing can have "hose existence is "holly dependent on your thought8 )t is this greater level of independence that ma&es them greater as beings8 And that line of thin&ing does not seem elusive or farfetched8 ,uestion .' But is real being Kust another GthoughtG or GconceptGE )s Greal beingG Kust one more concept or characteristic Hli&e GomniscienceG or GomnipotenceGI that could ma&e a difference to the &ind of being God isE -eply' 'eal being does ma&e a real difference8 ,he *uestion isF .oes it ma&e a conceptual differenceE ritics of the argument say that it does not8 ,hey say that Kust because real being ma&es all the difference it cannot be one more *uality among others8 'ather it is the condition of there being something there to have any *ualities at all8 <hen the proof says that God is the greatest being that can be Gthought?G it means that there are various perfections or *ualities that God has to a degree no creature possibly could? *ualities that are supremely admirable8 But to say that such a being exists is to say that there really is something "hich is supremely admirable8 And that is not one more admirable *uality among others8 Is it greater to exist in reality as well as in the mind* =f course? incomparably greater8 But the difference is not a conceptual one8 And yet the argument seems to treat it as if it "ereBas if the believer and the nonbeliever could not share the same concept of God8 learly they do8 ,hey disagree not about the content of this concept? but about "hether the &ind of being it describes really exists8 And that seems beyond the po"er of merely conceptual analysis? as used in this argument? to ans"er8 $o *uestion 2? "e thin&? really does invalidate this form of the ontological argument8 >odal Bersion

harles Hartshorne and Norman Malcolm developed this version of the ontological argument8 Both find it implicitly contained in the third chapter of Anselm>s Proslogion8 48 ,he expression Gthat being than "hich a greater cannot be thoughtG HG B? for shortI expresses a consistent concept8 68 G B cannot be thought of asF a8 necessarily nonexistentD or as b8 contingently existing but only as c8 necessarily existing8 28 $o G B can only be thought of as the &ind of being that cannot not exist? that must exist8 18 But "hat must be so is so8 :8 ,herefore? G B Hi8e8? GodI exists8 ,uestion' +ust because G B must be thought of as existing? does that mean that G B really existsE -eply' )f you must thin& of something as existing? you cannot thin& of it as not existing8 But then you cannot deny that G B existsD for then you are thin&ing "hat you say cannot be thought Bnamely? that G B does not exist8 1ossi!le 2orlds Bersion ,his variation on the modal version has been "or&ed out in great detail by Alvin Plantinga8 <e have done our best to simplify it8 0efinitions' >aximal excellence' ,o have omnipotence? omniscience and moral perfection in some "orld8 >aximal greatness' ,o have maximal excellence in every possible "orld8 48 ,here is a possible "orld H<I in "hich there is a being HLI "ith maximal greatness8 68 But L is maximally great only if L has maximal excellence in every possible "orld8 28 ,herefore L is maximally great only if L has omnipotence? omniscience and moral perfection in every possible "orld8 18 )n <? the proposition G,here is no omnipotent? omniscient? morally perfect beingG "ould be impossibleBthat is? necessarily false8 :8 But "hat is impossible does not vary from "orld to "orld8 08 ,herefore? the proposition? G,here is no omnipotent? omniscient? morally perfect beingG is necessarily false in this actual "orld? too8 ;8 ,herefore? there actually exists in this "orld? and must exist in every possible "orld? an omnipotent? omniscient? morally perfect being8

"/. #he >oral Argument

(back to top) 48 'eal moral obligation is a fact8 <e are really? truly? obKectively obligated to do good and avoid evil8 68 Either the atheistic vie" of reality is correct or the GreligiousG one8 28 But the atheistic one is incompatible "ith there being moral obligation8 18 ,herefore the GreligiousG vie" of reality is correct8

2e need to !e clear a!out what the first premise is claiming. )t does not mean merely that "e can find people around "ho claim to have certain duties8 Nor does it mean that there have been many people "ho thought they "ere obliged to do certain things Hli&e clothing the na&edI and to avoid doing others Hli&e committing adulteryI8 ,he first premise is claiming something moreF namely? that "e human beings really are obligatedD that our duties arise from the "ay things really are? and not simply from our desires or subKective dispositions8 )t is claiming? in other "ords? that moral values or obligations themselvesBand not merely the belief in moral valuesB are obKective facts8 No" given the fact of moral obligation? a *uestion naturally arises8 .oes the picture of the "orld presented by atheism accord "ith this factE ,he ans"er is no8 Atheists never tire of telling us that "e are the chance products of the motion of matterBa motion "hich is purposeless and blind to every human striving8 <e should ta&e them at their "ord and as&F Given this picture? in "hat exactly is the moral good rootedE Moral obligation can hardly be rooted in a material motion blind to purpose8 5uppose we say it is rooted in nothing deeper than human willing and desire. )n that case? "e have no moral standard against "hich human desires can be Kudged8 !or every desire "ill spring from the same ultimate sourceBpurposeless? pitiless matter8 And "hat becomes of obligationE According to this vie"? if ) say there is an obligation to feed the hungry? ) "ould be stating a fact about my "ants and desires and nothing else8 ) "ould be saying that ) "ant the hungry to be fed? and that ) choose to act on that desire8 But this amounts to an admission that neither ) nor anyone else is really obliged to feed the hungryBthat? in fact? no one has any real obligations at all8 ,herefore the atheistic vie" of reality is not compatible "ith there being genuine moral obligation8 <hat vie" is compatibleE =ne that sees real moral obligation as grounded in its reator? that sees moral obligation as rooted in the fact that "e have been created "ith a purpose and for an end8 <e may call this vie"? "ith deliberate generality? Gthe religious vie"8G But ho"ever general the vie"? reflection on the fact of moral obligation does seem to confirm it8 ,uestion "' ,he argument has not sho"n that ethical subKectivism is false8 <hat if there are no obKective valuesE -eply' ,rue enough8 ,he argument assumes that there are obKective valuesD it aims to sho" that believing in them is incompatible "ith one picture of the "orld? and *uite compatible "ith another8 ,hose t"o pictures are the atheisticCmaterialistic one? and the Hbroadly spea&ingI religious one8 Granted? if ethical subKectivism is true? then the argument does not "or&8 Ho"ever? almost no one is a consistent subKectivist8 HMany thin& they are? and say they areB until they suffer violence or inKustice8 )n that case they invariably stand "ith the rest of us in recogni@ing that certain things ought never to be done8I And for the many "ho are notBand never "ill beBsubKectivists? the argument can be most helpful8 )t can sho" them that to believe as they do in obKective values is inconsistent "ith "hat they may also believe about the origin and destiny of the universe8 )f they move to correct the inconsistency? it "ill be a move to"ard the religious vie" and a"ay from the atheistic one8 ,uestion 2' ,his proof does not conclude to God but to some vague GreligiousG vie"8 )sn>t this GreligiousG vie" compatible "ith very much more than traditional theismE -eply' Aes indeed8 )t is compatible? for example? "ith Platonic idealism? and many other beliefs that orthodox hristians find terribly deficient8 But this general religious vie" is incompatible

"ith materialism? and "ith any vie" that banishes value from the ultimate obKective nature of things8 ,hat is the important point8 )t seems most reasonable that moral conscience is the voice of God "ithin the soul? because moral value exists only on the level of persons? minds and "ills8 And it is hard? if not impossible? to conceive of obKective moral principles someho" floating around on their o"n? apart from any persons8 But "e grant that there are many steps to travel from obKective moral values to the reator of the universe or the triune God of love8 ,here is a vast intellectual distance bet"een them8 But these things are compatible in a "ay that materialism and belief in obKective values are not8 ,o reach a personal reator you need other arguments Hcf8 arguments 4C0I? and to reach the God of love you need revelation8 By itself? the argument leaves many options open? and eliminates only some8 But "e are surely "ell rid of those it does eliminate8

"3. #he Argument from $onscience

(back to top) 5ince moral su!@ecti)ism is )ery popular today( the follo"ing version of? or t"ist to? the moral argument should be effective? since it does not presuppose moral obKectivism8 Modern people often say they believe that there are no universally binding moral obligations? that "e must all follo" our o"n private conscience8 But that very admission is enough of a premise to prove the existence of God8 )sn>t it remar&able that no one? even the most consistent subKectivist? believes that it is ever good for anyone to deliberately and &no"ingly disobey his or her o"n conscienceE Even if different people>s consciences tell them to do or avoid totally different things? there remains one moral absolute for everyoneF never disobey your o"n conscience8 %ow where did conscience get such an a!solute authorityBan authority admitted even by the moral subKectivist and relativistE ,here are only four possibilities8 48 68 28 18 !rom something less than me HnatureI !rom me HindividualI !rom others e*ual to me HsocietyI !rom something above me HGodI

#et>s consider each of these possibilities in order8 48 Ho" can ) be absolutely obligated by something less than meBfor example? by animal instinct or practical need for material survivalE 68 Ho" can ) obligate myself absolutelyE Am ) absoluteE .o ) have the right to demand absolute obedience from anyone? even myselfE And if ) am the one "ho loc&ed myself in this prison of obligation? ) can also let myself out? thus destroying the absoluteness of the obligation "hich "e admitted as our premise8 28 Ho" can society obligate meE <hat right do my e*uals have to impose their values on meE .oes *uantity ma&e *ualityE .o a million human beings ma&e a relative into an absoluteE )s GsocietyG GodE 18 ,he only source of absolute moral obligation left is something superior to me8 ,his binds my "ill? morally? "ith rightful demands for complete obedience8

#hus God( or something like God( is the only ade&uate source and ground for the absolute moral obligation "e all feel to obey our conscience8 onscience is thus explainable only as the voice of God in the soul8 ,he ,en ommandments are ten divine footprints in our psychic sand8 Addendum on Religion and Morality In drawing this connection !etween morality and religion( "e do not "ant to create any confusion or misunderstanding8 <e have not said that people can never discover human moral goods unless they ac&no"ledge that God exists8 =bviously they can8 Believers and nonbelievers can &no" that &no"ledge and friendship? for example? are things that "e really ought to strive for? and that cruelty and deceit are obKectively "rong8 =ur *uestion has beenF "hich account of the "ay things really are best ma&es sense of the moral rules "e all ac&no"ledgeBthat of the believer or that of the nonCbelieverE )f "e are the products of a good and loving reator? this explains "hy "e have a nature that discovers a value that is really there8 But ho" can atheists explain thisE !or if atheists are right? then no obKective moral values can exist8 .ostoyevs&y said? G)f God does not exist? everything is permissible8G Atheists may &no" that some things are not permissible? but they do not &no" "hy8 $onsider the following analogy. Many scientists examine secondary causes all their lives "ithout ac&no"ledging the !irst ause? God8 But? as "e have seen? those secondary causes could not be "ithout the !irst ause? even though they can be &no"n "ithout &no"ing the !irst ause8 ,he same is true of obKective moral goods8 ,hus the moral argument and the various metaphysical arguments share a certain similarity in structure8 Most of us? "hatever our religious faith? or lac& of it? can recogni@e that in the life of someone li&e !rancis of Assisi human nature is operating the right "ay? the "ay it ought to operate8 Aou need not be a theist to see that $t8 !rancis>s life "as admirable? but you do need to be a theist to see "hy8 ,heism explains that our response to this believer>s life is? ultimately? our response to the call of our reator to live the &ind of life he made us to live8 #here are four possi!le relations !etween religion and morality( God and goodness. 48 'eligion and morality may be thought to be independent8 7ier&egaard>s sharp contrast bet"een Gthe ethicalG and Gthe religious?G especially in !ear and ,rembling? may lead to such a supposition8 But HaI an amoral God? indifferent to morality? "ould not be a "holly good God? for one of the primary meanings of GgoodG involves the GmoralGBKust? loving? "ise? righteous? holy? &ind8 And HbI such a morality? not having any connection "ith God? the Absolute Being? "ould not have absolute reality behind it8 68 God may be thought of as the inventor of morality? as he is the inventor of birds8 ,he moral la" is often thought of as simply a product of God>s choice8 ,his is the .ivine ommand ,heoryF a thing is good only because God commands it and evil because he forbids it8 )f that is all? ho"ever? "e have a serious problemF God and his morality are arbitrary and based on mere po"er8 )f God commanded us to &ill innocent people? that "ould become good? since good here means G"hatever God commands8G ,he .ivine ommand ,heory reduces morality to po"er8 $ocrates refuted the .ivine ommand ,heory pretty conclusively in Plato>s Euthyphro8 He as&ed Euthyphro? G)s a thing pious because the gods "ill it? or do the gods "ill it because it is piousEG He refuted the first alternative? and thought he "as left "ith the second as the only alternative8

28 But the idea that God commands a thing because it is good is also unacceptable? because it ma&es God conform to a la" higher than himself? a la" that overarches God and humanity ali&e8 ,he God of the Bible is no more separated from moral goodness by being under it than he is by being over it8 He no more obeys a higher la" that binds him? than he creates the la" as an artifact that could change and could "ell have been different? li&e a planet8 18 ,he only rationally acceptable ans"er to the *uestion of the relation bet"een God and morality is the biblical oneF morality is based on God>s eternal nature8 ,hat is "hy morality is essentially unchangeable8 G) am the #ord your GodD sanctify yourselves therefore? and be holy? for ) am holyG H#ev8 44F11I8 =ur obligation to be Kust? &ind? honest? loving and righteous Ggoes all the "ay upG to ultimate reality? to the eternal nature of God? to "hat God is8 ,hat is "hy morality has absolute and unchangeable binding force on our conscience8 #he only other possi!le sources of moral o!ligation are'

My ideals? purposes? aspirations? and desires? something created by my mind or "ill? li&e the rules of baseball8 ,his utterly fails to account for "hy it is al"ays "rong to disobey or change the rules8 My moral "ill itself8 $ome read 7ant this "ayF ) impose morality on myself8 But ho" can the one bound and the one "ho binds be the sameE )f the loc&smith loc&s himself in a room? he is not really loc&ed in? for he can also unloc& himself8 Another human being may be thought to be the one "ho imposes morality on meBmy parents? for example8 But this fails to account for its binding character8 )f your father commands you to deal drugs? your moral obligation is to disobey him8 No human being can have absolute authority over another8 G$ocietyG is a popular ans"er to the *uestion of the origin of morality Gthis or that specific personG is a very unpopular ans"er8 Aet the t"o are the same8 G$ocietyG only means more individuals8 <hat right do they have to legislate morality to meE /uantity cannot yield *ualityD adding numbers cannot change the rules of a relative game to the rightful absolute demands of conscience8 ,he universe? evolution? natural selection and survival all fare even "orse as explanations for morality8 Aou cannot get more out of less8 ,he principle of causality is violated here8 Ho" could the primordial slime pools gurgle up the $ermon on the MountE

Atheists often claim that $hristians make a category mistake in using God to explain nature. ,hey say it is li&e the Gree&s using Oeus to explain lightning8 )n fact? lightning should be explained on its o"n level? as a material? natural? scientific phenomenon8 ,he same "ith morality8 <hy bring in GodE Because morality is more li&e Oeus than li&e lightning8 Morality exists only on the level of persons? spirits? souls? minds? "illsBnot mere molecules8 Aou can ma&e correlations bet"een moral obligations and persons He8g8? persons should love other personsI? but you cannot ma&e any correlations bet"een morality and molecules8 No one has even tried to explain the difference bet"een good and evil in terms? for example? of the difference bet"een heavy and light atoms8 5o it is really the atheist who makes the same category mistake as the ancient pagan who explained lightning !y the will of Ceus. ,he atheist uses a merely material thing to explain a spiritual thing8 ,hat is a far sillier version of the category mista&e than the one the ancients madeD for it is possible that the greater HOeus? spiritI caused the lesser HlightningI and explains itD but it is not possible that the lesser HmoleculesI ade*uately caused and explains the greater

HmoralityI8 A good "ill might create molecules? but ho" could molecules create a good "illE Ho" can electricity obligate meE =nly a good "ill can demand a good "illD only #ove can demand love8

"6. #he Argument from 0esire

(back to top) 48 Every natural? innate desire in us corresponds to some real obKect that can satisfy that desire8 68 But there exists in us a desire "hich nothing in time? nothing on earth? no creature can satisfy8 28 ,herefore there must exist something more than time? earth and creatures? "hich can satisfy this desire8 18 ,his something is "hat people call GGodG and Glife "ith God forever8G #he first premise implies a distinction of desires into two kinds' innate and externally conditioned( or natural and artificial. <e naturally desire things li&e food? drin&? sex? sleep? &no"ledge? friendship and beautyD and "e naturally shun things li&e starvation? loneliness? ignorance and ugliness8 <e also desire Hbut not innately or naturallyI things li&e sports cars? political office? flying through the air li&e $uperman? the land of =@ and a 'ed $ox "orld championship8 No" there are differences bet"een these t"o &inds of desires8 <e do not? for example? for the most part? recogni@e corresponding states of deprivation for the second? the artificial? desires? as "e do for the first8 ,here is no "ord li&e G=@lessnessG parallel to Gsleeplessness8G But more importantly? the natural desires come from "ithin? from our nature? "hile the artificial ones come from "ithout? from society? advertising or fiction8 ,his second difference is the reason for a third differenceF the natural desires are found in all of us? but the artificial ones vary from person to person8 #he existence of the artificial desires does not necessarily mean that the desired o!@ects exist. $ome doD some don>t8 $ports cars doD =@ does not8 But the existence of natural desires does? in every discoverable case? mean that the obKects desired exist8 No one has ever found one case of an innate desire for a nonexistent obKect8 ,he second premise re*uires only honest introspection8 )f someone denies it and says? G) am perfectly happy playing "ith mud pies? or sports cars? or money? or sex? or po"er?G "e can only as&? GAre you? reallyEG But "e can only appeal? "e cannot compel8 And "e can refer such a person to the nearly universal testimony of human history in all its great literature8 Even the atheist +eanCPaul $artre admitted that Gthere comes a time "hen one as&s? even of $ha&espeare? even of Beethoven? >)s that all there isE>G #he conclusion of the argument is not that e)erything the +i!le tells us a!out God and life with God is really so. <hat it proves is an un&no"n L? but an un&no"n "hose direction? so to spea&? is &no"n8 ,his L is moreF more beauty? more desirability? more a"esomeness? more Koy8 ,his L is to great beauty as? for example? great beauty is to small beauty or to a mixture of beauty and ugliness8 And the same is true of other perfections8 But the GmoreG is infinitely more? for "e are not satisfied "ith the finite and partial8 ,hus the analogy HL is to great beauty as great beauty is to small beautyI is not proportionate8 ,"enty is

to ten as ten is to five? but infinite is not to t"enty as t"enty is to ten8 ,he argument points do"n an infinite corridor in a definite direction8 )ts conclusion is not GGodG as already conceived or defined? but a moving and mysterious L "hich pulls us to itself and pulls all our images and concepts out of themselves8 In other words( the only concept of God in this argument is the concept of that "hich transcends concepts? something Gno eye has seen? nor ear heard? nor the human heart conceivedG H4 or8 6F5I8 )n other "ords? this is the real God8 8 $8 #e"is? "ho uses this argument in a number of places? summari@es it succinctlyF G reatures are not born "ith desires unless satisfaction for these desires exists8 A baby feels hungerD "ell? there is such a thing as food8 A dolphin "ants to s"imD "ell? there is such a thing as "ater8 Men feel sexual desireD "ell? there is such a thing as sex8 )f ) find in myself a desire "hich no experience in this "orld can satisfy? the most probable explanation is that ) "as made for another "orld8G HMere Christianity? B&8 )))? chap8 43? GHopeGI ,uestion "' Ho" can you &no" the maKor premiseBthat every natural desire has a real obKectB is universally true? "ithout first &no"ing that this natural desire also has a real obKectE But that is the conclusion8 ,hus you beg the *uestion8 Aou must &no" the conclusion to be true before you can &no" the maKor premise8 -eply' ,his is really not an obKection to the argument from desire only? but to every deductive argument "hatsoever? every syllogism8 )t is the old sa" of +ohn $tuart Mill and the nominalists against the syllogism8 )t presupposes empiricismBthat is? that the only "ay "e can ever &no" anything is by sensing individual things and then generali@ing? by induction8 )t excludes deduction because it excludes the &no"ledge of any universal truths Hli&e our maKor premiseI8 !or nominalists do not believe in the existence of any universalsBexcept one Hthat all universals are only namesI8 #his is )ery easy to refute. <e can and do come to a &no"ledge of universal truths? li&e Gall humans are mortal?G not by sense experience alone Hfor "e can never sense all humansI but through abstracting the common universal essence or nature of humanity from the fe" specimens "e do experience by our senses8 <e &no" that all humans are mortal because humanity? as such? involves mortality? it is the nature of a human being to be mortalD mortality follo"s necessarily from its having an animal body8 <e can understand that8 <e have the po"er of understanding? or intellectual intuition? or insight? in addition to the mental po"ers of sensation and calculation? "hich are the only t"o the nominalist and empiricist give us8 H<e share sensation "ith animals and calculation "ith computersD "here is the distinctively human "ay of &no"ing for the empiricist and nominalistEI <hen there is no real connection bet"een the nature of a proposition>s subKect and the nature of the predicate? the only "ay "e can &no" the truth of that proposition is by sense experience and induction8 !or instance? "e can &no" that all the boo&s on this shelf are red only by loo&ing at each one and counting them8 But "hen there is a real connection bet"een the nature of the subKect and the nature of the predicate? "e can &no" the truth of that proposition by understanding and insightBfor instance? G<hatever has color must have si@e?G or? GA Perfect Being "ould not be ignorant8G

,uestion 2' $uppose ) simply deny the minor premise and say that ) Kust don>t observe any hidden desire for God? or infinite Koy? or some mysterious L that is more than earth can offerE -eply' ,his denial may ta&e t"o forms8 !irst? one may say? GAlthough ) am not perfectly happy no"? ) believe ) "ould be if only ) had ten million dollars? a #ear Ket? and a ne" mistress every day8G ,he reply to this is? of course? G,ry it8 Aou "on>t li&e it8G )t>s been tried and has never satisfied8 )n fact? billions of people have performed and are even no" performing trillions of such experiments? desperately see&ing the everCelusive satisfaction they crave8 !or even if they "on the "hole "orld? it "ould not be enough to fill one human heart8 8et they keep trying( !elie)ing that DIf only... %ext time ...D ,his is the stupidest gamble in the "orld? for it is the only one that consistently has never paid off8 )t is li&e the game of predicting the end of the "orldF every batter "ho has ever approached that plate has struc& out8 ,here is hardly reason to hope the present ones "ill fare any better8 After trillions of failures and a one hundred percent failure rate? this is one experiment no one should &eep trying8 A second form of denial of our premise isF G) am perfectly happy no"8G ,his? "e suggest? verges on idiocy or? "orse? dishonesty8 )t re*uires something more li&e exorcism than refutation8 ,his is Meursault in amus>s ,he $tranger8 ,his is subhuman? vegetation? pop psychology8 Even the hedonist utilitarian +ohn $tuart Mill? one of the shallo"est Hthough cleverestI minds in the history of philosophy? said that Git is better to be $ocrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied8G ,uestion .' ,his argument is Kust another version of Anselm>s ontological argument H42I? "hich is invalid8 Aou argue to an obKective God from a mere subKective idea or desire in you8 -eply' No? "e do not argue from the idea alone? as Anselm does8 'ather? our argument first derives a maKor premise from the real "orld of natureF that nature ma&es no desire in vain8 ,hen it discovers something real in human natureCnamely? human desire for something more than natureC"hich nature cannot explain? because nature cannot satisfy it8 ,hus? the argument is based on observed facts in nature? both outer and inner8 )t has data8

"9. #he Argument from Aesthetic Experience

(back to top) ,here is the music of +ohann $ebastian Bach8 ,herefore there must be a God8 Aou either see this one or you don>t8

":. #he Argument from -eligious Experience

(back to top) 5ome sort of experience lies at the )ery core of most peopleAs religious faith. Most of our readers have very li&ely had such an experience8 )f so? you reali@e? in a "ay no one else can? its central importance in your life8 ,hat reali@ation is not itself an argument for God>s existenceD in fact? in the light of it you "ould probably say that there is no need for arguments8 But there is in fact an argument for God>s existence constructed from the data of such experiences8 )t is not an argument "hich moves from your o"n personal experience to your o"n affirmation that God

exists8 As "e said? you most probably have no need for such an argument8 )nstead? this argument moves in another directionF from the "idespread fact of religious experience to the affirmation that only a divine reality can ade*uately explain it8 It is difficult to state this argument deducti)ely. But it might fairly be put as follo"s8 48 Many people of different eras and of "idely different cultures claim to have had an experience of the Gdivine8G 68 )t is inconceivable that so many people could have been so utterly "rong about the nature and content of their o"n experience8 28 ,herefore? there exists a GdivineG reality "hich many people of different eras and of "idely different cultures have experienced8 0oes such experience pro)e that an intelligent $reator4God exists* =n the face of it this seems unli&ely8 !or such a God does not seem to be the obKect of all experiences called Greligious8G But still? he is the obKect of many8 ,hat is? many people understand their experience that "ayD they are Gunited "ithG or Gta&en up intoG a boundless and over"helming 7no"ledge and #ove? a #ove that fills them "ith itself but infinitely exceeds their capacity to receive8 =r so they claim8 ,he *uestion isF Are "e to believe themE ,here is an enormous number of such claims8 Either they are true or not8 )n evaluating them? "e should ta&e into accountF 48 the consistency of these claims Hare they selfCconsistent as "ell as consistent "ith "hat "e &no" other"ise to be trueEID 68 the character of those "ho ma&e these claims Hdo these persons seem honest? decent? trust"orthyEID and 28 the effects these experiences have had in their o"n lives and the lives of others Hhave these persons become more loving as a result of "hat they experiencedE More genuinely edifyingE =r? alternatively? have they become vain and selfCabsorbedEI8 $uppose someone says to youF GAll these experiences are either the result of lesions in the temporal lobe or of neurotic repression8 )n no "ay do they verify the truth of some divine reality8G <hat might your reaction beE Aou might thin& bac& over that enormous documentation of accounts and as& yourself if that can be right8 And you might concludeF GNo8 Given this vast number of claims? and the *uality of life of those "ho made them? it seems incredible that those "ho made the claims could have been so "rong about them? or that insanity or brain disease could cause such profound goodness and beauty8G It is impossi!le to lay down ahead of time how in)estigation into this record of claims and characters will affect all indi)iduals. Aou cannot say ahead of time ho" it "ill affect you8 But it is evidenceD it has persuaded manyD and it cannot be ignored8 $ometimesBin fact? "e believe? very oftenBthat record is not so much faced as dismissed "ith vivid trendy labels8

"=. #he $ommon $onsent Argument

(back to top) ,his proof is in some "ays li&e the argument from religious experience H49I and in other "ays li&e the argument from desire H40I8 )t argues thatF

48 Belief in GodBthat Being to "hom reverence and "orship are properly dueBis common to almost all people of every era8 68 Either the vast maKority of people have been "rong about this most profound element of their lives or they have not8 28 )t is most plausible to believe that they have not8 18 ,herefore it is most plausible to believe that God exists8 E)eryone admits that religious !elief is widespread throughout human history. But the *uestion arisesF .oes this undisputed fact amount to evidence in favor of the truth of religious claimsE Even a s&eptic "ill admit that the testimony "e have is deeply impressiveF the vast maKority of humans have believed in an ultimate Being to "hom the proper response could only be reverence and "orship8 No one disputes the reality of our feelings of reverence? attitudes of "orship? acts of adoration8 But if God does not exist? then these things have never onceBnever onceBhad a real obKect8 )s it really plausible to believe thatE ,he capacity for reverence and "orship certainly seems to belong to us by nature8 And it is hard to believe that this natural capacity can never? in the nature of things? be fulfilled? especially "hen so many testify that it has been8 ,rue enough? it is conceivable that this side of our nature is doomed to frustrationD it is thin&able that those millions upon millions "ho claim to have found the Holy =ne "ho is "orthy of reverence and "orship "ere deluded8 But is it li&elyE It seems far more likely that those who refuse to !elie)e are the ones suffering from deprivation and delusionBli&e the toneCdeaf person "ho denies the existence of music? or the frightened tenant "ho tells herself she doesn>t hear cries of terror and distress coming from the street belo" and? "hen her children a"a&en to the sounds and as& her? G<hy is that lady screaming? MommyEG tells them? GNobody>s screamingF it>s Kust the "ind? that>s all8 Go bac& to sleep8G ,uestion "' But the maKority is not infallible8 Most people "ere "rong about the movements of the sun and earth8 $o "hy not about the existence of GodE -eply' )f people "ere "rong about the theory of heliocentrism? they still experienced the sun and earth and motion8 ,hey "ere simply mista&en in thin&ing that the motion they perceived "as the sun>s8 But if God does not exist? "hat is it that believers have been experiencingE ,he level of illusion goes far beyond any other example of collective error8 )t really amounts to collective psychosis8 !or believing in God is li&e having a relationship "ith a person8 )f God never existed? neither did this relationship8 Aou "ere responding "ith reverence and love to no oneD and no one "as there to receive and ans"er your response8 )t>s as if you believe yourself happily married "hen in fact you live alone in a dingy apartment8 %ow we grant that such mass delusion is concei)a!le( !ut what is the likely story* )f there "ere no other bits of experience "hich? ta&en together "ith our perceptions of the sun and earth? ma&e it most li&ely that the earth goes round the sun? it "ould be foolish to interpret our experience that "ay8 Ho" much more so here? "here "hat "e experience is a relationship involving reverence and "orship and? sometimes? love8 )t is most reasonable to believe that God really is there? given such "idespread belief in himBunless atheists can come up "ith a very persuasive explanation for religious belief? one that ta&es full account of the experience of believers and sho"s that their experience is best explained as delusion and not insight8 But atheists have never done so8

,uestion 2' But isn>t there a very plausible psychological account of religious beliefE Many nonbelievers hold that belief in God is the result of childhood fearsD that God is in fact a proKection of our human fathersF someone Gup thereG "ho can protect us from natural forces "e consider hostile8 -eply A' ,his is not really a naturalistic explanation of religious belief8 )t is no more than a statement? dressed in psychological Kargon? that religious belief is false8 Aou begin from the assumption that God does not exist8 ,hen you figure that since the closest earthly symbol for the reator is a father? God must be a cosmic proKection of our human fathers8 But apart from the assumption of atheism? there is no compelling evidence at all that God is a mere proKection8 )n fact? the argument begs the *uestion8 <e see& psychological explanation only for ideas "e already &no" Hor presumeI to be false? not those "e thin& to be true8 <e as&? G<hy do you thin& blac& dogs are out to &ill youE <ere you frightened by one "hen you "ere smallEG But "e never as&? G<hy do you thin& blac& dogs aren>t out to &ill youE .id you have a nice blac& puppy onceEG -eply +' ,hough there must be something of God that is reflected in human fathers Hother"ise our symbolism for him "ould be inexplicableI? hristians reali@e that the symbolism is ultimately inade*uate8 And if the -ltimate Being is mysterious in a "ay that transcends all symbolism? ho" can he be a mere proKection of "hat the symbol representsE ,he truth seems to beBand if God exists? the truth isBthe other "ay aroundF our earthly fathers are pale proKections of the Heavenly !ather8 )t should be noted that several "riters He8g8? Paul (it@I have analy@ed atheism as itself a psychic pathologyF an alienation from the human father that results in reKection of God8

20. 1ascalAs 2ager

(back to top) 5uppose you( the reader( still feel that all of these arguments are inconclusi)e. ,here is another? different &ind of argument left8 )t has come to be &no"n as Pascal>s <ager8 <e mention it here and adapt it for our purposes? not because it is a proof for the existence of God? but because it can help us in our search for God in the absence of such proof8 As originally proposed by Pascal? the <ager assumes that logical reasoning by itself cannot decide for or against the existence of GodD there seem to be good reasons on both sides8 No" since reason cannot decide for sure? and since the *uestion is of such importance that "e must decide someho"? then "e must G"agerG if "e cannot prove8 And so "e are as&edF <here are you going to place your betE If you place it with God( you lose nothing( e)en if it turns out that God does not exist. But if you place it against God? and you are "rong and God does exist? you lose everythingF God? eternity? heaven? infinite gain8 G#et us assess the t"o casesF if you "in? you "in everything? if you lose? you lose nothing8G onsider the follo"ing diagramF

,he vertical lines represent correct beliefs? the diagonals represent incorrect beliefs8 #et us compare the diagonals8 $uppose God does not exist and ) believe in him8 )n that case? "hat a"aits me after death is not eternal life but? most li&ely? eternal nonexistence8 But no" ta&e the other diagonalF God? my reator and the source of all good? does existD but ) do not believe in him8 He offers me his love and his life? and ) reKect it8 ,here are ans"ers to my greatest *uestions? there is fulfillment of my deepest desiresD but ) decide to spurn it all8 )n that case? ) lose Hor at least seriously ris& losingI everything8 #he 2ager can seem offensi)ely )enal and purely selfish. But it can be reformulated to appeal to a higher moral motiveF )f there is a God of infinite goodness? and he Kustly deserves my allegiance and faith? ) ris& doing the greatest inKustice by not ac&no"ledging him8 ,he <ager cannotBor should notBcoerce belief8 But it can be an incentive for us to search for God? to study and restudy the arguments that see& to sho" that there is $omethingBor $omeone B"ho is the ultimate explanation of the universe and of my life8 )t could at lease motivate G,he Prayer of the $&epticGF GGod? ) don>t &no" "hether you exist or not? but if you do? please sho" me "ho you are8G Pascal says that there are three kinds of people: those who have sought God and found him, those who are seeking and have not yet found, and those who neither seek nor find. The first are reasonable and happy, the second are reasonable and unhappy, the third are both unreasonable and unhappy. If the Wager stimulates us at least to seek, then it will at least stimulate us to be reasonable. And if the promise Jesus makes is true, all who seek will find !t "#"$%&, and thus will be happy.