What the Iraq war taught me about Syria

By Jackson Diehl,Washington post

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The 10th anniversary of the invasion of Iraq has prompted plenty of analysis of the
mistakes made there, along with a few tendentious claims that the same people who
supported war in Iraq are now pressing for U.S. intervention in Syria. Im one of those
people. So, to paraphrase the polemicists: Did I learn nothing from the last decade?
Do I want to repeat the Iraq fiasco?

Iraq and Syria are similar in many respects. Both are unnatural creations, drawn on a
map by British and French diplomats in 1916. Both contain a potentially volatile mix of
ethnic groups and sects, including Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds and Christians. Both were held
together through the 20th century by merciless dictators who, representing a minority
sect, used repression, militarism, Arab nationalism and, when necessary, genocide to
hold their states together. Both Saddam Hussein and the Assad regime in Syria courted
terrorists and stockpiled weapons of mass destruction but the Assads, unlike
Saddam, never had to give up their chemical and biological arsenal.

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It was inevitable that, with the exhaustion of their ideologies and economic models,
these states would unravel and that Iraqs repressed Shiite majority, like Syrias
downtrodden Sunni majority, would demand redress. The difference is that the U.S.
military triggered the transformation of Iraq, quickly disposing of the old regime and
buffering the subsequent sectarian struggle. In Syria it has leaned back, providing
humanitarian aid and prodding the opposition to unify but otherwise refusing to
intervene.

The results? No U.S. soldiers have been killed or wounded in Syria, and the cost is in
the hundreds of millions rather than the hundreds of billions. But so far, the larger
humanitarian price of Syria has been far greater. With 70,000 killed in just two years,
Syria is producing fatalities at twice the rate of Iraq after the U.S. invasion; with 1.1
million people having fled to neighboring countries and 3 million expected by the end
of this year. Syria is on course to produce 50 percent more refugees than Iraq after
2003.

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In Iraq, the United States faced down al-Qaeda and eventually dealt it a decisive
defeat. In Syria, the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra is steadily gaining strength and
prompting, across the border, a revival of al-Qaeda in Iraq. The Obama administrations
hands-off approach offers no means for checking this menace or for preventing alQaeda from eventually gaining control over chemical and biological weapons.

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The Iraq war prompted low-level meddling by Iran, Syria and other neighbors but
otherwise left the surrounding region unscathed, thanks to the U.S. presence. Syrias
unchecked carnage is spilling over into Lebanon and Iraq, and it threatens U.S. allies
Israel, Turkey and Jordan. Iran, Persian Gulf states and other neighbors are pouring in
weapons and, in some cases, fighting units.

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Iraq prompted a temporary souring of relations between the United States and
France and Germany, and Arab Sunni monarchies never fully accepted the Shiite-led
government that democracy produced. But U.S. influence in the Middle East remained
strong. Now it is plummeting: Not just Britain and France but every neighbor of Syria
has been shocked and awed by the failure of U.S. leadership. If it continues, Syria not
Iraq will prove to be the turning point when America ceases to be regarded as what
Bill Clinton called the indispensable nation.

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Does all this mean that the United States should be dispatching hundreds of
thousands of troops to Syria? Of course not. The tragedy of the post-Iraq logic
embraced by President Obama is that it has ruled out not just George W. Bush-style
invasions but also the more modest intervention used by the Clinton administration to
prevent humanitarian catastrophes and protect U.S. interests in the 1990s. As in the
Balkans or Libya the limited use of U.S. airpower and collaboration with forces on
the ground could have quickly put an end to the Assad regime 18 months ago,
preventing 60,000 deaths and rise of al-Qaeda. It could still save the larger region from
ruin.

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The problem here is not that advocates of the Iraq invasion have failed to learn its
lessons. It is that opponents of that war, starting with Obama, have learned the wrong
ones.