The United States

and Coercive Diplomacy

edi ted by Robert J. Art
and Patri ck M. Croni n
UNI T ED STAT ES I NST I T UT E OF PEACE PRESS
Washi ngton, D.C.
The vi ewsexpressed i n thi sbook are those of the authorsalone. Theydo not
necessari lyreflect vi ewsof the Uni ted StatesI nsti tute of Peace.
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2003 by the Endowment of the Uni ted StatesI nsti tute of Peace, except for
chapter 4, The Deli cate Balance between Coerci on and Di plomacy: The Case
of Hai ti , 1994, 2003 byRobert Pastor.
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Fi rst publi shed 2003
Pri nted i n the Uni ted Statesof Ameri ca
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The Uni ted Statesand coerci ve di plomacy/ edi ted byRobert J. Art and Patri ck
M. Croni n
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I ncludesbi bli ographi cal referencesand i ndex.
I SBN 1-929223-45-5 (cloth : alk. paper) I SBN 1-929223-44-7 (paper : alk.
paper)
1. Uni ted StatesForei gn relati ons1993-2001. 2. Di plomacy. 3. Aggressi on
(I nternati onal law) I . Art, Robert J. I I . Croni n, Patri ck M., 1958-
JZ1480.U553 2003
327.73009049dc21
2003041666
I
RAQ HAS BEEN A RATHER PECULI AR FOE of the United States. Badly
mismatched in terms of population, wealth, military strength, or
almost any other conceivable measure, I raq seems poorly posi-
tioned to win anyconfrontation. Equallyunclear iswhyI raq would want
to provoke a confrontation with the United States. There isno ideolog-
ical imperative to do so, and the countriesarguablyshare an interest in
a constant and stable flow of oil out of I raq and itsoil-rich neighbors.
How much more puzzli ng, then, that I raq hasemerged asone of
the longer-runni ng securi ty challengesfor the Uni ted Statesand bat-
tlefi eld opponent for U.S. mi li tary forces. For the past twelve years,
U.S. offi ci alshave tri ed, wi th varyi ng degreesof i nternati onal cooper-
ati on and wi th varyi ng degreesof success, to use the theori esof coer-
cive diplomacyto counter I raqi threats. The successof such a strategy
i s unclear, because i t i s i mpossi ble to know what I raq mi ght have
done had the Uni ted Statespursued another strategy. But two thi ngs
are relati vely clear. The fi rst i s that the outcome of the past twelve
yearsno seri ousattack by I raq on i tsnei ghborsand no substanti al
gai ns i n i ts nuclear, bi ologi cal, and chemi cal weapons programs
would have been one of the more opti mi sti c predi cti ons of I raqi
behavi or i n the early 1990s. The effortsof the past twelve yearshave
not all been i n vai n. Equally i mportant, though, another twelve years
275
7
Coercive Diplomacy
against Iraq, 199098
JON B. ALTERMAN

of the same poli ci es could scarcely be expected to produce si mi lar

results. By the fi rst yearsof the twenty-fi rst century, sancti onswere
vi si bly frayi ng, asi nternati onal resolve di mi ni shed and I raqi offi ci als
became i ncreasi ngly adept at ci rcumventi ng restri cti ons on thei r
countrys i ncome and spendi ng. A new strategy would need to be
found.
Thi s chapter concentrates on epi sodes i n the 1990s i n whi ch
the U.S. government attempted to use coerci ve di plomacy agai nst
I raq. Such a poli cy took place i n the context of a broader poli cy of
contai nment and deterrencea poli cy that enjoyed far wi der i nterna-
ti onal support than U.S. efforts to coerci vely i nduce speci fi c I raqi
acti ons. Thi s chapter seeks to understand how coerci ve di plomacy
mi ght have been appli ed better i n the yearsfollowi ng the I raqi i nva-
si on of K uwai t. I t also seeksto explai n how the Uni ted Statesshould
approach i tsfuture poli cy toward di lemmasli ke those posed by I raqi
behavi or i n the peri od under study.
The chapter concludesthat several aspectsof the I raqi case made
i t a poor candi date for coerci ve di plomacy after the early 1990sand
that the appropri ateness of such a poli cy only decli ned over ti me.
These aspectsi nclude but are not li mi ted to the drawn-out nature of
the confli ct, the relati vely large number of confrontati ons, the nature
of the target regi me, li mi ted wi ll i n the Uni ted States for coerci ve
measures, and the di ffi culti esof coali ti on mai ntenance.
Few of those factors, however, were predictable from the outset. I n
addi ti on, U.S. poli cy toward I raq wasparti cularly burdened by an
expanding set of increasinglyill-defined goals. I t isfar easier to use coer-
cive diplomacyto achieve a limited, positive outcome in the short term
than to manage a number of competing goalsover more than a decade.
The passage of time undermines both coalition maintenance and
resolve at home, which in turn make application of a coercive diplo-
macystrategyextraordinarilydifficult.
The coerci ve di plomacy di scussi on i n thi schapter dealspri mari ly
wi th the peri od from August 1990 to December 1998. Before August
1990 U.S. poli cy wasto engage I raq, not coerce i t. I raq had seemed to
emerge contrite from a long and bloodywar with I ran, and the widely
shared vi ew i n the i nternati onal communi ty wasthat Saddam Hus-
sei n was followi ng a more moderate path.
1
After December 1998
276 Jon B. Alterman
U.S. poli cy was not to coerce the regi me i n Baghdad but rather to
remove i t. That month, hi gh-ranki ng U.S. offi ci alsannounced that a
pri mary goal of U.S. poli cy wasto achi eve regi me change i n I raq.
Gi ven the repressi veness of the regi me at home and i ts i solati on
abroad, regi me change would seem to represent a death sentence for
Baghdads brutal leaders. Although Alexander George notes that
regi me change i sa potenti al goal of coerci ve di plomacy, i t i shard to
i magi ne that he i sreferri ng to casesi n whi ch regi me change would
almost certai nly be sui ci dal for the current leadershi p. I n such condi -
ti ons, i t seemsi mpossi ble to construct a set of consequencesmore di re
than removi ng the leadershi p from power.
2
The round of coerci ve di plomacy that ended wi th a U.S.-led mi li -
tary attack i n March 2003 confi rmsthe di ffi culty of coerci ng regi me
change i n casesli ke I raq. The Bush admi ni strati on, however, avoi ded
many of the pi tfalls outli ned i n thi s chapter by keepi ng di plomati c
confrontati onsfocused and li mi ted i n ti me.
I R AQ A N D C O E R C I V E D I P L O M AC Y
George envisionsthree possible goalsfor coercive diplomacy: to use the
threat of force or limited force to persuade an adversaryto stop short
of the goal of an action currentlyunder way; to persuade the adversary
to undo an action alreadycarried out; and to achieve a cessation of the
opponentshostile behavior through a demand for change in the com-
position of the adversarysgovernment or in the nature of the regime.
3
From 1990 to 1998 the United Statessought explicitlyto use the threat
of force or limited force to achieve the first two goals. While changing
the regime in Baghdad wasa desire of the U.S government throughout
that period, itseffortswere generallydirected not so much at persuad-
ing the I raqi government to be more inclusive or to change itsnature
asat removing the government itself.
The episodesof coercive diplomacy did not occur in isolation but
rather were one tool among manythat the United Statesemployed. I n
that regard, U.S. ambassador April Glaspieswidelycriticized demarche
to Saddam Hussein a week before I raqs invasion of K uwait was
diplomacy, but it does not appear to have been coercive. According
to I raqi transcripts of the discussion, which the State Department
Iraq, 199098 277
reportedlyhasnot contested, Glaspie expressed her concern over the
situation on I raqssouthern border but never threatened anysort of mil-
itary, economic, or political response if I raq were to crossinto K uwait.
4
By contrast, Operati on Desert Storm wascoerci ve, but i t wasnot
di plomacy. Whi le a great deal of di plomacy went i nto assembli ng a
coali ti on of a score of countri esto confront I raq, on the I raqi end the
war was a pure exerci se of overwhelmi ng mi li tary force. The alli ed
forcesdi d not fi ght a li mi ted war wi th the goal of li berati ng K uwai t;
rather, alli ed forces conti nued to fi ght the I raqi army i n retreat,
although they di d stop short of destroyi ng the Republi can Guard or
marchi ng on Baghdad. I n thi s, pressure from Arab (and especi ally
Saudi and Egypti an) coali ti on alli esstrongly i nfluenced U.S. gov-
ernment deci si on maki ng. The peace that emerged wasnot so much
negoti ated asaccepted by the I raqi s, and i t amounted to acceptance
of relevant UN Securi ty Counci l resoluti ons.
D esert S h i eld an d I ts A fterm ath
From August 2, 1990the day the I raqi army i nvaded K uwai tunti l
the bombsbegan falli ng on January 16, 1991, i t wasnot clear that
force would be requi red to coerce I raqi troopsi nto wi thdrawi ng.
5
I ndeed, at the ti me of the I raqi i nvasi on U.S. poli cy had been leani ng
the other way, favori ng engagement wi th I raq rather than sancti ons
agai nst i t. Nati onal Securi ty Di recti ve 26, si gned by Presi dent Bush on
October 2, 1989, called for expanded economi c and poli ti cal i ncen-
ti vesfor I raq and concluded that normal relati onsbetween the Uni t-
ed Statesand I raq would serve our longer-term i nterestsand promote
stabi li ty i n both the Gulf and the Mi ddle East.
6
Although the actual
ai d extended to I raq wasrelati vely meagermostly i n the form of Com-
modi ty Credi t Corporati on guaranteesand Export-I mport Bank devel-
opment loan credi tsthe gestureswere enough to set off alarm bellsi n
Congress. I n the fi rst half of 1990, the admi ni strati on curtai led i ts
courtshi p of I raq, partly i n response to congressi onal pressure and
partly i n response to I raqsweaponsdevelopment effortsand i tsopen
threatsdi rected at nei ghbori ng states.
The I raqi i nvasi on of K uwai t on August 2 forced a complete
rethi nki ng of U.S. poli cy toward I raq. George Bush wasa former per-
manent representati ve to the Uni ted Nati onsand a dedi cated i nter-
278 Jon B. Alterman
nati onali st, and hi sfi rst i nsti nct wasto bui ld an i nternati onal coali -
ti on. He called hi sambassador to the Uni ted Nati ons, ThomasPi ck-
eri ng, i mmedi ately upon learni ng of the i nvasi on and urged hi m to try
to convene an emergency meeti ng of the Securi ty Counci l to con-
demn the I raqi move. Bushsearly ti lt toward the Uni ted Nati onspai d
off wi th the rapi d adopti on of sweepi ng UN sancti onsagai nst I raq just
four daysafter the i nvasi on. I n addi ti on, Bush rapi dly bui lt up alli ed
(and especi ally Ameri can) forces i n the Arabi an Peni nsula i n the
weeksand monthsfollowi ng. Under Operati on Desert Shi eld, more
than forty thousand U.S. troopswere i n place i n the regi on wi thi n a
month of the I raqi i nvasi on, and four hundred thousand were i n place
by November 1990.
George Bushsacti onsi n the weeksi mmedi ately before the i nva-
si on do not appear to represent an appli cati on of coerci ve di plomacy.
AsI raqi troopsand materi el gathered on the K uwai ti border i n July
1990 the U.S. government heeded the advi ce of i ts alli es to tread
softly and not aggravate the si tuati on.
7
Whether or not a demon-
strati on of force could have deterred Saddam Hussei n from i nvadi ng
K uwai t i sunclear, but the Uni ted Statesclearly chose not to try. Of
course, Saddamsi nvasi on wasnot completely predi ctable, and U.S.
acti on must be seen wi thi n the framework of the prevai li ng uncer-
tai nty of the ti me.
Followi ng the i nvasi on, the coerci ve elementsof U.S. poli cy took
some ti me to fall i nto place. Nati onal Securi ty Advi ser Brent Scow-
croft asked hi s seni or Mi ddle East ai de on the Nati onal Securi ty
Counci l (NSC) to draft an overvi ew memo i n the i mmedi ate after-
math of the i nvasi on. That memo advi sed, We dont need to deci de
where to draw any li nesjust yet, but we do need to take stepsmov-
i ng forces, pressi ng alli esand reluctant Arabs, etc. that would at least
gi ve usa real choi ce i f current effortsfall short.
8
The clear i mpli ca-
ti on i sthat the Uni ted Statesbegan to deploy troopsmore to preserve
U.S. opti onsthan to provoke a preci se I raqi response, whi ch an ortho-
dox appli cati on of coerci ve di plomacy would requi re. I n thi sway, U.S.
acti onswere along the li nesof one of Georgesalternati ve nonmi li tary
strategi es, namely, buyi ng ti me to explore a negoti ated settlement.
9
One might make the case that the UN sanctionsplayed a role in con-
vincing Saddam to stop short of moving from K uwait into Saudi Arabia.
Iraq, 199098 279
Assuch, the UN sanctions(which the United Statestook the lead on
i mposi ng) would represent a successful use of coerci ve di plomacy
because the target state stopped short of itsgoal. Such a case istenu-
ous, however. Although U.S. officialsclearlyfeared an I raqi invasion of
Saudi Arabia, there isno evidence in the public domain to suggest that
such an invasion wasin the offing.
10
I nterestingly, Secretaryof State JamesA. Baker I I I explicitlystatesin
hismemoirsthat the U.S. governmentsactionsin August 1990 were
intended to deter an I raqi move into Saudi Arabia . . . [ and undo] I raqs
invasion of K uwait by the pursuit of a policy of coercive diplomacy
against Saddam Hussein (emphasisadded). Asenvisioned byBaker,
carrying out such a plan meant we would begin with diplomatic pres-
sure, then add economic pressure . . . and finallymove toward military
pressure bygraduallyincreasing American troop strength in the Gulf.
11
Although i t may be only a questi on of nuance, Bakersconceptu-
ali zati on of coerci ve di plomacy di ffers from Alexander Georges i n
thi si nstance. Baker emphasi zesa ratcheti ng up process, a sort of
try-and-see approach to tacti csother than war, whi le retai ni ng war
asan ulti mate possi bi li ty. Although Baker clearly targetsI raqi behav-
i or, he doesnot acti vely seek to understand the moti vati onsbehi nd
that behavi or. Georges concept of strategi c di plomacy, however, i s
carefully constructed around the i dea of understandi ng onesadver-
sary. George suggeststhat poli cymakersattempti ng to apply coerci ve
di plomacy need to accompli sh four tasks: assi gn valuesto the vari -
ablesi n the coerci ve di plomacy model, settle on what vari ant of coer-
ci ve di plomacy to pursue, replace the assumpti on of a rati onal
opponent wi th an empi ri cally deri ved model, and take contextual
vari ablesi nto account.
The keyin all of thisisto understand how the adversaryperceives
hisinterests. The task ishard enough with most adversaries, but when
one comesfrom a cultural, familial, and political background asforeign
to most U.S. analystsasSaddam Husseins, the task iseven harder. One
cannot know at thispoint what U.S. government assessmentsof I raqi
intentions, likelyreactions, and pressure pointshad been, or how the
Bush administration used such assessments. Yet the memoirsof U.S.
officialssuggest theygave greater emphasisto building an anti-Saddam
280 Jon B. Alterman
coalition and to following a try-and-see approach than to calculating
how keypressure pointsmight persuade Saddam to disgorge K uwait.
Diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict took center stage in No-
vember, when the Soviet Union emerged asa keyintermediarybetween
the United Statesand I raq. Effortsto bring I raqi foreign minister Tariq
Aziz to Washington and send Baker to Baghdad foundered on dis-
agreementsover agendas, dates, and participants. Aslate asJanuary9
Baker met with Aziz in Geneva and attempted to deliver a letter of
warning from George Bush to Saddam Hussein.
12
Aziz read the letter
and refused to conveyit on the groundsthat itstone was contraryto
the traditionsof correspondence between headsof state.
13
Whi le U.S. and alli ed threatsto Saddam Hussei n before the out-
break of war were not speci fi c, thei r tone wasclear. Bushsletter of
January 9 stated baldly, What i s at i ssue here i s not the future of
K uwai ti t wi ll be free, i tsgovernment wi ll be restoredbut rather the
future of I raq. . . . I raq cannot and wi ll not be able to hold on to
K uwai t or exact a pri ce for leavi ng.
14
I t i spossi ble that I raqi offi ci als
judged that the threats of the Uni ted States and the i nternati onal
communi ty were not credi ble. I t i s also possi ble that they beli eved
that the costsof complyi ng wi th those threatsi n termsof both i nter-
nati onal presti ge and domesti c poli ti csoutwei ghed the costsof non-
compli ance. I n any event, the Uni ted Statesand i tsalli esappear to
have deli vered the threat of the use of force clearly.
AsU.S. mi li tary capabi li ti esi n the regi on expanded i nto the wi n-
ter, U.S. poli cy began to look more and more li ke an appli cati on of
coerci ve di plomacy. The demands were clear, and the threat was
di rect, credi ble, and potent. The deci si on faci ng I raqi offi ci alswi th-
drawal or wargrew more stark, and whi le they chose the latter, i t was
not because of a lack of evi dent alli ed resolve.
When the threatswere not heeded, alli ed forcesbegan a month-
long ai r campai gn wi th approxi mately one hundred thousand sorti es,
followed by a 100-hour ground war. There are varyi ng esti matesof
I raqi casualti es, rangi ng from twenty-fi ve thousand to asmany asone
hundred fiftythousand. I raq also lost a sizable portion of itsweaponry,
and when the dust settled, only 15 percent of i tselectri cal gri d was
sti ll operati onal.
15
Iraq, 199098 281
Thi slast epi sode, Operati on Desert Storm, representsnot coerci ve
di plomacy but pure coerci on. Unable to wi n I raqi wi thdrawal through
di plomati c acti vi ty, sancti ons, or threats, the Uni ted States and i ts
alli estook to the battlefi eld and won deci si vely. Rather than serve as
a successful model of coerci ve di plomacy, Operati on Desert Storm
was i ntended i n part to bui ld credi bi li ty so that the next adversary
mi ght prove more suscepti ble to si mi lar ulti mata i n the future.
16
What
wasnot anti ci pated wasthat the target of such ulti mata would agai n
be Saddam Hussei n and that the confrontati on would follow ri ght
after the end of the war.
One can speculate endlessly about why coerci ve di plomacy fai led
to wi n Saddamswi thdrawal from K uwai t. Absent much better i nfor-
mati on than exi sts about I raqi i nternal deci si on maki ng, hard and
fast conclusi onsare di ffi cult. One possi ble conclusi on i sthat coerci ve
di plomacy fai led because Saddam Hussei n si mply mi scalculated the
li keli hood of massi ve mi li tary acti on or the outcome of such acti on.
Gi ven what we know about hi si mpati ence wi th confli cti ng vi ews, i t
i scertai nly possi ble that he blundered i nto war. I f that i sthe case,
i t i sunclear what the Uni ted Statesor i tsalli escould have done to
i mprove I raqi analysi s. I raqi deci si on maki ng i sa notori ously closed
process, and i ndi vi duals effortsto i nfluence i t are carri ed out at thei r
peri l.
Another possi bi li ty i s that Saddam Hussei n concluded that he
would pay the greatest pri ce i f he succumbed to U.S. and alli ed
threats. Because Saddam had been so bold i n hi sproclamati on that
K uwai t waspart of I raq, he may have judged that hi si nternal posi ti on
would be untenable i f he were to collapse i n the face of forei gn pres-
sure. I f that were the case, Saddam would have been suscepti ble to
U.S. carrots that would have supported hi s i nternal posi ti on i n
exchange for retreati ng from K uwai t. Were one to adjudge that Sad-
damsoverri di ng i nterest wasto stay i n power, a U.S. poli cy that pre-
served hi sabi li ty to stay i n power i f he wi thdrew i mmedi ately from
K uwai t and threatened hi spower were he to remai n there mi ght have
di slodged I raqi troops wi thout fi ri ng a shot. Such a poli cy, though,
may have been anathema to the Bush admi ni strati on. Asthe cri si s
conti nued there were si gnsthat a key Bush admi ni strati on goal was,
282 Jon B. Alterman
i n fact, to end the regi me, maki ng such offersout of the questi on. The
admi ni strati ons ni ghtmare scenari o appears to have been parti al
I raqi compli ance wi th coali ti on demands, whi ch would have under-
mi ned coali ti on resolve to go to war.
17
S afe H aven s 1 9 91 )
I n the daysfollowi ng the offi ci al end of hosti li ti esi n the Gulf War,
upri si ngsbegan i n the K urdi sh north and the Shi i te south of I raq.
I nspi red i n part by George Bushsadmoni ti on to take mattersi nto
thei r own hands, local mi li ti asbegan to take on government forces.
The upri si ngs posed a quandary for U.S. poli cymakers. I n one
respect, anythi ng that created problemsfor Saddam wasgood. But the
separati st movements were also deeply problemati c for the Uni ted
States and i ts alli es i n the regi on. Turki sh offi ci als were reportedly
concerned that K urdi sh separati sm i n I raq would spi ll over i nto the
K urdi sh regi onsof Turkey; U.S. offi ci alsand some regi onal alli eswere
also concerned by the possi bi li ty that I rani an-backed Shi i tesi n the
south could form a breakaway alli ance wi th I ran. Upri si ngsi n both
regi onsrai sed the possi bi li ty that the Uni ted Stateswould be drawn
i nto an open-ended war wi th I raq i mmedi ately after war had just
ended. Such a war would have had a di ffi cult ti me fi ndi ng publi c sup-
port i n the Uni ted States. Fi nally, U.S. deci si on makerswanted I raq
weakened but not destroyed so that i t could remai n a check
agai nst I rani an power i n the regi on.
I n the event, the Bush admi ni strati on admoni shed the I raqi sthat
i t would attack any I raqi uni tsusi ng chemi cal weaponsbut went no
further. Such a warni ng wasconsonant wi th earli er U.S. warni ngsthat
the admi ni strati on would not tolerate the use of chemi cal or bi olog-
i cal weaponsagai nst alli ed troopsi n the war. When Saddam began to
use heli copters to battle the upri si ngs, the U.S. government com-
plai ned that he had vi olated the termsof the cease-fi re but took no
i mmedi ate acti on agai nst hi m.
Partly at the urgi ng of Turkey, alli ed forcesdi spatched more than
twenty thousand soldi ersto the north of I raq i n Apri l 1991 to create
a safe haven for K urdi sh populati ons. Under Operati on Provi de Com-
fort, the ti de of more than two mi lli on K urdi sh refugees streami ng
Iraq, 199098 283
i nto Turkey and I ran wasstemmed, and K urdseven began to return
to northern I raq. I raq massed troopson the border of the northern
enclave in the autumn of 1991, but after several initial confrontations
the I raqis backed off (until moving on the enclave in August 1996,
described later). The northern zone, which existed into 2003, hasbeen
a strange hybrid. I t hashad no legal standing asa separate entity, but it
isnot controlled bythe government of I raq. Since May1991 the United
Nationshascontrolled the disbursement of relief supplies.
Thi s i nci dent i s a more li mi ted example of coerci ve di plomacy,
si nce the Uni ted States and i ts alli es made few demands on I raq.
Rather, the Uni ted States, France, and Bri tai n moved troopsi nto the
north and establi shed refugee camps, whi le the I raqi sagreed not to
challenge the northern zone.
Saddam made no such efforts to cease hi s attacks i n the south,
where forei gn i nacti on wasdri ven by di scomfort wi th a possi ble I ra-
ni an hand i n the upri si ngs. Consequently, the government of I raq was
able to brutally suppress the Shi i tes and even drai n the marshes
where many revolti ng Shi i te communi ti es were based. I n August
1992, the Uni ted States and the Uni ted K i ngdom created a no-fly
zone i n southern I raq, but that move may have been i ntended more
to restrai n future I raqi threatsagai nst i tsnei ghborsthan to protect the
Shi i te populati on.
C on fron tati on s over N o-F ly Z on es
an d I n sp ecti on s 1 991 93)
The government of I raq agreed to thorough armscontrol i nspecti ons
asa condi ti on of the 1991 cease-fi re but di d so under duress. Even
early on i n the i nspecti on processi t became clear that whi le I raq was
forthcomi ng about some elementsof i tsarsenal, i t conti nued to hold
a good deal back. I n July 1991 I raqi troops fi red warni ng shots at
i nspectorsseeki ng to i ntercept truckscarryi ng calutrons, whi ch are
used i n nuclear programs. Two months later weapons i nspectors
located a cache of documentsi ndi cati ng that the I raqi swere devel-
opi ng a clandesti ne nuclear program. I n a bi zarre standoff, the
i nspectors refused to surrender the documents back to the I raqi s,
and for four days the I raqi s deni ed them permi ssi on to leave the
284 Jon B. Alterman
parking lot of the building theyhad just inspected. The I raqisrelented
after the SecurityCouncil threatened to use force, and the United States
announced the di spatch of ni nety-si x Patri ot mi ssi lesand addi ti onal
troopsto Saudi Arabi a.
On other occasi ons i n the subsequent months, I raqi troops
obstructed i nspectorsand even blocked them from destroyi ng equi p-
ment asspeci fi ed i n the 1991 cease-fi re. I raqi acti onsdrew a con-
demnati on from the Securi ty Counci l i n February 1992, whi ch
declared I raq i n materi al breach of the UN resoluti onsand prom-
i sed seri ous consequences i f I raq di d not desi st. I n thi s matter, the
I raqi sbacked down three daysafter bei ng offi ci ally i nformed of the
Securi ty Counci lsdeci si on. There wasalso a seventeen-day standoff
outsi de the Mi ni stry of Agri culture i n July 1992, whi ch Uni ted
Nati onsCommi ssi on on I raq (UNSCOM) i nspectorswere seeki ng to
enter for evi dence of I raqsballi sti c mi ssi le development program. I n
thi scase the i nspectorswi thdrew.
Tensi onspeaked i n the fi nal daysof the Bush admi ni strati on. I n
January 1993 I raq moved surface-to-ai r mi ssi lesi nto the southern
no-fly zone and argued that UNSCOM i nspectorscould travel only
on I raqi government planesto enter I raq and conduct thei r i nspec-
ti ons. At the same ti me there were reports of ski rmi shes between
K uwai ti and I raqi troopson the border, and I raqi troopsmoved i nto
the DM Z to retri eve Si lkworm mi ssi les they had left behi nd i n
the war.
I n response, more than one hundred French, Bri ti sh, and U.S.
planes bombed targets on January 13. On January 17 forty U.S.-
launched Tomahawk mi ssi lesattacked the Dji lah I ndustri al Park i n
Zafarani yya, whi ch wasthought to be connected to the I raqi nuclear
program; the next day seventy-fi ve Bri ti sh, French, and U.S. ai rcraft
bombed si tesi n the southern no-fly zone. On January 19 Saddam
Hussei n announced a uni lateral cease-fi re to mark the end of the
Bush admi ni strati on.
The Uni ted Statesdoesappear to have been engaged i n an exer-
ci se of coerci ve di plomacy on these occasi ons, wi th mi xed results.
Clear demandswi th broad i nternati onal support were often effecti ve
i n reversi ng I raqi acti ons. Yet whi le the Uni ted States and i ts alli es
Iraq, 199098 285
were able to reverse these i ndi vi dual I raqi acti ons, they were unable
to reverse I raqi behavi or. I ndeed, rather than movi ng toward cooper-
ati on wi th the i nternati onal communi ty, I raqi behavi or duri ng thi s
peri od appearsto have been a carefully cali brated mechani sm to test
Western responsesand wear down Western resolve.
O p erati o n Vi gi lan t Warri o r 1 9 9 4)
On October 5, 1994, U.S. intelligence analystsnoted the massing of two
I raqi Republican Guard armored divisions near the K uwaiti border,
numbering some fifty thousand soldiers. The massing of troops was
accompanied by I raqi threatsto expel UNSCOM weaponsinspectors
from I raq. The move became public on October 7. I n response to the
I raqi troop movement, the United Statesswiftlydeployed thousandsof
troops to the area and began movi ng tens of thousands more.
T he Uni ted K i ngdom and France also sent token naval assets to
the Gulf. The administration made itsmove public byleaking it to CNN
correspondent Wolf Blitzer on the morning of October 9. The next day
I raq announced that the troopswere being withdrawn from the border
area, but the United Statesexpressed skepticism, continued itsdeploy-
ment, and announced that it would send hundredsof additional aircraft
to the Gulf. Whether the I raqi deployment represented a testing of the
waters or was merely a feint to show bravado is unclear. What was
clearer wasthat the United Statestook the threat seriouslyand acted to
move forceswith extreme speed. Because of the forward deployment of
so much materiel in the region, a U.S. threat to meet an I raqi invasion
forcefullywascredible.
Perhaps more than any other epi sode i n the U.S. confrontati on
wi th I raq, Operati on Vi gi lant Warri or appears to have been a suc-
cessful appli cati on of coerci ve di plomacy, even though i t li esbetween
coerci ve di plomacy and deterrence (si nce i t waschi efly i ntended to
preempt a future I raqi acti on, rather than curtai l or roll back an acti on
that had already taken place). The U.S. acti on took place i n a rela-
ti vely confi ned ti me frame, the demandswere speci fi c, and the threat
of force wasreal. Whi le we cannot understand Saddamsmoti vati ons
for massi ng troops, he clearly calculated that he wasbetter off retreat-
i ng than pushi ng the exerci se to i tsconclusi on.
286 Jon B. Alterman
I raq i T h ru st i n to th e N o rth 1 9 9 6)
I n August 1996 fi ghti ng escalated between two ri val K urdi sh facti ons,
the Patri oti c Uni on of K urdi stan (PUK ) and the K urdi stan Demo-
crati c Party (K DP). The PUK , whi ch wasrecei vi ng some support from
I ran, was maki ng stri des. I n response to a request for assi stance
agai nst the PUK from K DP leader Massoud Barzani , I raqi troops
entered the safe haven area of the north on August 29 and occu-
pi ed the local capi tal of I rb l two dayslater. The I raqi army swept i n
wi th thi rty thousand to forty thousand troopsand extensi ve poli ce and
i ntelli gence personnel. They ki lled more than one hundred li ghtly
armed K urdi sh troopsand arrested ni neteen membersof the oppo-
si ti on group, the I raqi Nati onal Congress(I NC), who were never seen
agai n. Accordi ng to at least one account, CI A offi cerswho were work-
i ng wi th I NC members i n Salahuddi n fled just ahead of the I raqi
tanks, leavi ng thei r cli entsto the I raqi s.
18
I n response to the I raqi offensi ve, the Uni ted Stateslaunched forty-
four crui se mi ssi lesagai nst targetsfour hundred mi lessouth of the
zone of fi ghti ng on September 3 and expanded the southern no-fly
zone by seventy mi les, from the 32d parallel to the 33d. The Uni ted
Statesdi d not provi de ai r cover for the PUK fi ghtersand ensured that
i ts mi li tary i nterventi on remai ned well outsi de the zone of confli ct.
I raqi troops wi thdrew from I rb l wi thi n days of the i ni ti al i nvasi on,
thusspari ng any long-term U.S. response.
Despi te the apparent clari ty of wi nni ng an I raqi wi thdrawal from
the north after the U.S. mi ssi le stri ke, thi sepi sode doesnot appear to
have been a successful appli cati on of coerci ve di plomacy for two rea-
sons. Fi rst, the I raqi swere arguably able to achi eve thei r goalsi n the
bri ef ti me they were i n I rb l, roundi ng up opposi ti oni stsand neutral-
i zi ng any i nsurgency. Vi ewed i n thi sli ght, the I raqi retreat wasnot a
response to U.S. threats or U.S. force but a si gn that i ts goals had
alreadybeen accomplished. Anypresumptive U.S. victorywasillusory,
si nce the outcome of Saddamsshort stay i n I rb l wasthe destructi on
of the CI Assi gni fi cant operati onsthere. Second, there i sno evi dence
that crui se mi ssi le attackson targetsi n the south were ei ther suffi -
ci ently puni shi ng i n and of themselvesor i ndi cati ve of enough future
Iraq, 199098 287
puni shment to sway I raqi behavi or. More than the previ ous con-
frontati ons, Saddamsi ncursi on i nto I rb l suggeststhat he had begun
to understand U.S. di plomacy and the use of force and had begun to
take acti onsthat served hi si nterestswhi le li mi ti ng the U.S. response.
D efi an ce o f U N S C O M 1 9 979 8)
As UNSCOM i nspecti ons of I raq progressed, i nspectors came to
beli eve that I raq wasi mplementi ng a concerted program of obstruc-
ti on, decepti on, and outri ght li es. I n response, UNSCOM began to
concentrate on understandi ng the decepti on mechani sm, i n addi -
ti on to conducti ng i tsoverall i nspecti on work. Thi soperati on, called
Shake the Tree, wasdi rected by Scott Ri tter, a hard-chargi ng for-
mer U.S. mari ne. Relyi ng heavi ly on satelli te i magery, si gnalsi ntel-
li gence, and other assi stance from cooperati ng governments, Shake
the Tree lai d bare the pattern of I raqi decepti on, led by i ntelli gence
servi cesclose to the I raqi leadershi p. The acti onsalso antagoni zed the
government of I raq, whi ch i ncreasi ngly obstructed the i nspectorsand
deni ed them accessto si tesall over the country.
19
I n the face of such confrontati ons, the Securi ty Counci l expressed
grave and i ncreasi ng concern about I raqs clear and flagrant vi ola-
ti ons of i tsobli gati ons.
20
Despi te the Securi ty Counci lsprotests, I raq
moved to bar U.S. i nspectorsfrom parti ci pati ng i n UNSCOM acti vi ti es
on October 29, 1997, leadi ng to a wi thdrawal of all UNSCOM i nspec-
torsfrom I raq. I raq readmi tted i nspectorsthe followi ng month after
solemnly promi si ng full compli ance, but i n December 1997 I raq
constructed a category of si tes called Presi denti al and Soverei gn,
whi ch i nspectorswould not be allowed to vi si t.
Amid growing war cloudsin February 1998, UN secretary-general
K ofi Annan traveled to Baghdad to defuse the crisis. He emerged on
February 23 with a memorandum of understanding in which I raq
reconfirmed itsacceptance of the relevant SecurityCouncil resolutions
and promised to grant the inspectorsfull accessto suspect sitesin the
country.
U.S. offi ci alswere reportedly enraged by Annansefforts, beli evi ng
he had won only a Pyrrhi c vi ctory. They remai ned deeply skepti cal
that Annan had won Saddamscooperati on on i nspecti ons; i nstead,
288 Jon B. Alterman
they beli eved that Annansacti onsrepresented a hi gh watermark for
i nternati onal obstructi on of U.S. efforts to force I raqi compli ance.
I ndeed, Annansenergeti c and hi gh-profi le di plomacy (whi ch Amer-
i canswhi spered waspart of an effort to secure the Nobel Peace Pri ze
for hi mself) forcefully remi nded Ameri cans that the confrontati on
wi th Saddam Hussei nsI raq wasnot a bi lateral one wi th the Uni ted
States but a multi lateral one predi cated on Securi ty Counci l reso-
luti onsand i nternati onal law.
At the same time, evidence hasemerged to suggest that the U.S. gov-
ernment washaving second thoughtsabout coercive armscontrol in
thisperiod. Scott Ritter hascharged that between November 1997 and
August 1998 the U.S. government had called off UNSCOM inspectors
at least seven timeswhen they were on the verge of uncovering evi-
dence of I raqi noncompliance with relevant Security Council resolu-
tions, for fear that discoveryof noncompliance would precipitate a cri-
sisthat the United Stateshoped to avoid. The effect of the charge was
to further weaken the U.S. exercise of coercive diplomacy, because it
suggested a lack of U.S. resolve to back up itsthreatswith force.
O p erati o n D esert Fox 1 9 9 8)
K ofi AnnansFebruary vi ctory wasshort-li ved, asI raq suspended i ts
cooperati on wi th UNSCOM i n August 1998 and then announced
uni laterally i n October that all UNSCOM work i n I raq should cease.
The i nspectorsleft I raq on November 912. After U.S. warplaneswere
i n the ai r to bomb I raq on November 14, I raq announced that i nspec-
torscould return and that the I raqi swould cooperate fully. I nspec-
ti onsresumed on November 18, wi th a warni ng that the Uni ted States
and i ts alli es would stri ke i f, i n fact, full I raqi cooperati on was not
forthcomi ng. I n hi sreport to the Securi ty Counci l on December 15,
UNSCOM chai rman Ri chard Butler noted several i nstances(out of
several hundred i nspecti ons) i n whi ch the I raqi sdi d not fully comply
wi th UNSCOM demands. U.S.-Bri ti sh ai r stri kesbegan shortly after
mi dni ght on December 17 and lasted four days, endi ng just before the
Musli m holy month of Ramadan. I n all, somethi ng li ke si x hundred
sorti esand four hundred mi ssi le stri keswere carri ed out agai nst one
hundred or so targetsi n I raq.
Iraq, 199098 289
The eventsleading up to Operation Desert Fox mayhave marked the
death rattle of coercive diplomacy against I raq. While Saddam had
complied with UNSCOMsdemandsin limited casesunder specific mil-
itarythreat, the United Statesand itsallieswere unable to change the
overall pattern of I raqi behavior. I raq single-mindedlyworked to under-
mine both the inspectionsand the international support for sanctions
and achieved significant successin doing so. Operation Desert Fox fur-
ther undermined international support for containment of I raq and
resulted in the termination of weaponsinspections. Viewed in thislight,
Saddam Hussein mayhave made the quite rational calculation that his
defiance of U.S. demandswasin hisinterest since he could withstand
whatever the United Stateswaswilling to deliver and use such strikes
to build international support and lock in gainshe sought.
P u rsu i n g C o n tai n m en t P lu s
The United Statesappearsto have adopted a new policytoward I raq in
the aftermath of Operation Desert Fox. On the one hand, Anglo-
American air strikes against I raqi targets were increased. While the
lethalityof these strikeswasrelativelylow, the cost to I raq in termsof
prestige and of replacing destroyed facilities was high. Repeated air
strikesmade clear that I raq wasdefenselessagainst Anglo-American
assaultsand were no doubt intended to take a toll on the I raqi army.
On the other hand, the Cli nton admi ni strati on made regi me
change the centerpiece of its policy toward I raq.
21
I n so doing, the
administration made anyI raqi cooperation with U.S. demandsunlikely.
I f coercion isto work, the coerced must believe that the use of force will
stop if the offending action stops. Aslong asthe stated goal of U.S. pol-
icywasto overthrow the regime, it legitimated anyand all I raqi efforts
to defy U.S. policy since itsultimate goal wasnot disarmament, con-
tainment, or deterrence, but regime change. One can argue about
whether there were anycircumstancesunder which I raq would coop-
erate wi th U.S. di sarmament commands, and, gi ven the I raqi s past
behavior, it seemsunlikelythat theywould have fullycomplied in any
event. But an avowed policyof regime change took all carrots out of
the equation and made clear that the current regime waslocked in a
life-or-death struggle with the United States. The dynamic made I raqi
290 Jon B. Alterman
intransigence more likely, especiallygiven the U.S. inabilityto establish
a bill of particularsagainst I raqi actionsthat could galvanize the inter-
national community. Bypointedlydismissing the possibilityof offering
any carrots to the I raqi regime, the U.S. government had given up on
using coercive diplomacyto influence the regime of Saddam Hussein.
A n E lecti ve War?
When the Bush administration came into office in January 2001, it
resolved to revise U.S. policytoward I raq. I n the latter yearsof the Clin-
ton administration, the Bush administration believed, I raq policyhad
badlyunraveled. I nspectionshad ended, international support for sanc-
tionswaseroding, and the regime wasable to combine black-market
kickbacks, smuggling, sanctionsbusting, and a varietyof other tacticsto
gain accessto billionsof dollarsannually. The clear trajectorywasfor
the dismantlement of the coercive disarmament regime that had been
imposed a decade earlier, probablyin a matter of a few years.
From the begi nni ng, the Bush admi ni strati on encompassed two
schoolsof thought when i t came to I raq poli cy. One school favored
smart sancti ons, whi ch i s to say a sancti ons regi me that enjoyed
more i nternati onal support, worked more effi ci ently, and took lessof
a toll on I raqi ci vi li ans. The other favored a more robust poli cy of
regi me change and contai ned many advocatesof usi ng the fi ssi parous
I raqi expatri ate opposi ti on asa key element of that change.
The early round of the debate went to the smart sancti ons fac-
ti on, whi ch won i nternati onal approval for a new sancti onsregi me i n
May 2001. But after al Qaedascatastrophi c terrori st attack of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, the balance ti lted toward the regi me-change facti on.
The argument thi s facti on madethat Saddams unpredi ctabi li ty
made hi m undeterrable and that hi s pursui t of weapons of mass
destructi on would gi ve hi m the capabi li ty of a catastrophi c attack
even worse than that of September 11gai ned i ncreasi ng tracti on i n
a year when so much of U.S. forei gn poli cy swung behi nd the i deasof
combati ng terrori sm and preempti ng nati onal securi ty threats.
The U.S. policydebate over I raq reached something of a crescendo
in August 2002, but in a strange way: it wasnt much of a debate. Rather,
it wasa seriesof leaksand counterleaksthat seemed to indicate the
Iraq, 199098 291
creation of war plansand the movement of troops, without a debate on
the advisabilityof starting a war against I raq. Most administration offi-
cialsportrayed the conflict in solelyU.S.-I raqi terms, leaving manyerst-
while Arab and European partnersfeeling neglected and hurt.
On September 12, 2002, in a speech before the UN General As-
sembly, President Bush laid out the case for action against I raq and
invited international cooperation. After months of concern from the
international communitythat the U.S. government wasmore interested
in acting vigorouslyagainst I raq than in having international sanction
to do so, Bush said, Mynation will work with the U.N. SecurityCoun-
cil to meet our common challenge. . . . We will work with the U.N. Secu-
rityCouncil for the necessaryresolutions. Bush did not completelyfor-
swear the unilateral card, however. He added, The Security Council
resolutionswill be enforcedthe just demandsof peace and securitywill
be metor action will be unavoidable.
22
Bydemonstrating hiswilling-
nessto act unilaterally, Bush wasable to win passage of a new resolu-
tion, 1441, which codified past I raqi noncompliance and promised
seriousconsequences if full compliance were not forthcoming.
I n a way, by the fall of 2002 the Uni ted Stateshad adopted a strat-
egy of coerci ve di plomacy agai nst i tsalli es, argui ng that i t would stri ke
I raq uni laterally i f they di d not support robust and effecti ve acti on
agai nst the I raqi regi me. The i ncenti ves for the alli es to cooperate
were several, but two are clear. Fi rst, i f acti on were i nevi table, futi le
gesturesto halt such acti on would only i ncur U.S. wrath whi le pro-
vi di ng no benefi t. Second, such gestureswould hi ghli ght the i mpo-
tence, i f not i rrelevance, of the protesti ng party or parti es. Although
alli eswould not be the target of a U.S. stri ke, the potenti al blow to
thei r i nfluence and presti ge washoped to be suffi ci ent to cause them
to mute thei r cri ti ci sm and drop obstaclesto U.S. acti on agai nst I raq.
I n the event, i nternati onal cri ti ci sm persi sted, asdi d U.S. percep-
ti onsof noncompli ance, and the Uni ted Stateswent to war agai n i n
March 2003. Although some clai med that the Bush admi ni strati on
had already deci ded to go to war, and thusentered negoti ati onsi n bad
fai th, U.S. adherence to the pri nci ples of coerci ve di plomacy was
clear: the desi red acti onswere clearly speci fi ed, the threat of force was
credi ble, and the ti me allowed for compli ance wasclearly bounded.
292 Jon B. Alterman
A N A LY S I S
There are fi ve parti cular aspectsof the I raqi case that demonstrate the
di ffi culti es of the Uni ted States employi ng a strategy of coerci ve
di plomacy agai nst a determi ned adversary.
1 . U n i laterali sm , M u lti laterali sm , an d T h ei r C on trad i cti on s
Coerci on (and the threat of coerci on) i smost preci sely appli ed by uni -
tary actors, but the legi ti macy of coerci on must come from multi lat-
eral actors. The confrontati on between I raq and the i nternati onal
communi ty wasnei ther a bi lateral confli ct nor a multi lateral one, but
rather a confli ct that had bi lateral and multi lateral componentsand
that requi red thei r coordi nati on or, even better, thei r i ntegrati on.
After I raqsi nvasi on of K uwai t, the Uni ted Statesassumed the lead
role i n confronti ng and someti mesbattli ng the I raqi regi me. Thi srole
arose from U.S. global leadershi p, aswell asthe U.S. strategi c i nterest
i n protecti ng fri endly regi mesi n the Persi an Gulf and ensuri ng the
unencumbered flow of oi l from the Gulf to U.S. alli es(and, to a much
lesser extent, to the Uni ted Statesi tself). Yet the coali ti on confronti ng
I raq waxed and waned over ti me. The Desert Storm mi li tary coali ti on
gathered twenty-ni ne countri es. Whi le U.S. troopsformed the bulk of
the fi ghti ng force, the coali ti on also i ncluded major Arab powerssuch
asEgypt and Saudi Arabi a, thereby undermi ni ng any I raqi clai m that
the force represented outsi de powersi nvadi ng the Arab world. There-
after, the confli ct veered between bei ng an essenti ally bi lateral
(U.S./I raqi , or someti mesU.S.-Bri ti sh/I raqi ) confli ct and bei ng a mul-
ti lateral (coali ti on/I raqi or UN/I raqi ) confli ct.
I n the aftermath of the I raqi invasion of K uwait, the United States
worked assiduouslyto build international support for rolling back the
invasion. Part of that support came in the form of the UN sanctions
mentioned earlier. But in June 1993 the United Statesacted unilateral-
lywhen it bombed I raqi intelligence headquartersin Baghdad in retri-
bution for evidence linking I raq to a plot to assassinate former president
George Bush. The United Statesalso acted unilaterallyin October 1994
when it deployed an additional fifty-four thousand troopsto K uwait in
response to I raqi troopsmassing near the K uwaiti border. I n February
Iraq, 199098 293
1998, after I raqi obstruction of weaponsinspectors, the United States
and Britain pulled back from the brink of war after UN secretary-
general K ofi Annan negotiated a memorandum of understanding with
Baghdad that secured I raqi promises to cooperate more fully with
weaponsinspections. The U.S.-British air attacksof December 1998,
which followed within daysof a negative report from UNSCOMschair-
man regarding I raqi cooperation, appear to have been carried out
through coordination with the chairman but without the approval of the
SecurityCouncil or the secretary-general.
One i mportant questi on to be resolved i swhether multi laterali sm
hasi tsmoment i n an i nternati onal confli ct. Asthe memory of I raqi
acti ons receded and nati ons felt no i mmedi ate threat from I raq, i t
proved i ncreasi ngly di ffi cult to mai ntai n a coali ti on to support the
practi ce of coerci ve di plomacy agai nst the I raqi s. I ndeed, even the
consensusfor contai nment receded. One opti on for the Uni ted States,
adopted i n 2003, wasto abandon the desi re for Securi ty Counci l con-
sensusand i nstead to form a narrower coali ti on wi th clearer goalsand
a clearer wi ll to pursue them. Such a choi ce sacri fi cesi nternati onal
legi ti macy, but i t may be worthwhi le i f the outcome would be si g-
ni fi cantly i mproved.
2. C oerci ve D i p lom acy wi th i n C on tai n m en t an d D eterren ce
The coerci ve di plomacy aspect of poli cy toward I raq wasembedded
i n a larger poli cy based on contai nment and deterrence. Whi le the
contai nment of I raq had clear UN sancti on, the deterrent aspectsof
U.S. poli cy toward I raq had somewhat less clear UN sancti on and
were carri ed out pri mari ly by U.S., and to some degree Bri ti sh, forces.
They i ncluded the forward basi ng of troopsand equi pment i n the Gulf
regi on and aggressi ve patrolli ng of no-fly zones i n northern and
southern I raq. The deterrent elementswere ongoi ng and i ntended to
send a clear message that I raqi aggressi on agai nst nei ghbori ng states
would meet wi th a swi ft and puni shi ng response. The coerci ve di plo-
macy aspectsof U.S. poli cy were di sti ngui shed from the contai nment
and deterrence componentsi n that they were bounded i n ti me and
the i ndi vi dual acti onshad observable outcomes.
I t i s more di ffi cult to judge the long-term effi cacy of coerci ve
294 Jon B. Alterman
actions. Although individual coercive actionsmaybe successful in the
short term, theymayactuallybe a fai lure i n the longer term because
of negati ve effectson coali ti on cohesi on, target moti vati on, or even
coercer moti vati on. Coerci ve di plomacy wasonly one component of
U.S. poli cy toward I raq, and i n some casesi t undermi ned, or at least
weakened, other elementsof that poli cy. Thi swasparti cularly true i n
the way percei ved U.S. uni laterali sm vi s--vi sI raq undermi ned i nter-
nati onal support for contai nment.
3. H i gh ly I terati ve C o n fro n tati o n s
The thi rd parti cular aspect of the I raqi case wasi tsunusually i terati ve
nature. Conflictsrose to a crescendo again and again and often resulted
i n the li mi ted use of armed force. The confli ct wasstri ki ng, then, not
only for i tsdurati on but also for the repeated cyclesof vi olence short
of all-out war.
Over ti me I raq learned how to deal successfully wi th the i nterna-
ti onal communi ty. I t adopted poli ci es of cheat and retreat, testi ng
li mi ts and then qui ckly steppi ng back from the bri nk when pun-
i shment seemed i mmi nent. I n i tsi nvasi on of the K urdi sh areasi n the
north, the I raqi army made a qui ck thrust and then retreated before a
concerted alli ed response could be assembled. I raq also showed great
ski ll i n di vi di ng the i nternati onal coali ti on, publi cly offeri ng i magesof
mass I raqi sufferi ng and pri vately offeri ng remunerati on to lendi ng
nati onssuch asFrance and Russi a. Ti me after ti me Saddam Hussei n
admi tted weaponsi nspectorsuncondi ti onally and then swi ftly moved
to constrai n thei r acti vi ti es. Whi le Saddam di d not call the tune, he
became fami li ar wi th the one that wasbei ng played, and he learned to
li ve wi th i t, i f not how to make hi scountry thri ve despi te i t.
Vi ewed i n thi sli ght, Saddam Hussei n apparently used hi sseri esof
confrontati ons wi th Western coerci ve di plomacy as an educati onal
opportuni ty. He wasmore di ffi cult to coerce i n 1998 than he wasi n
1991 because he understood well the li mi tsof Western resolve and
the waysto undermi ne that resolve (through coali ti on spli nteri ng and
other tacti cs). Whi le Dani el Byman and Matthew Waxman urge that
coerci on be seen as a dynami c process, such admoni ti ons may
be i nsuffi ci ent.
23
Over ti me, repeated efforts to employ coerci ve
Iraq, 199098 295
di plomacy may ti lt the balance i n favor of the target country because
of the relati ve robustnessof possi ble counter-coerci on strategi escom-
bi ned wi th a fi ne-tuned understandi ng of li kely responsesto defi ance
by the target country.
4. A H i gh ly M o ti vated b u t D i ffi cu lt-to -U n d erstan d Ad versary
Alexander Georgesmodel of coerci ve di plomacy admi ttedly reli eson
the assumpti on of a rati onal opponent; that i s, i t assumesthat the
adversary wi ll be recepti ve to and wi ll correctly evaluate i nformati on
that i scri ti cal to the questi on of whether the costsand ri sksof not
complyi ng wi ll outwei gh the gai nsto be expected from pursui ng the
course of acti on.
24
What George really meansby rati onal, however, i s
that theori stsor poli cymakerscan anti ci pate the calculati onsof the
target country. The two are not necessari ly the same.
A leader such asSaddam Hussei n i sa parti cularly di ffi cult target
for coerci ve di plomacy. T hi sstemsi n part from hi svi olent back-
ground and i n part from the way hi si nterest i n hi sown survi val has
trumped the well-bei ng of hi s country to an overwhelmi ng extent.
U.S. modelsare predi cated on poli ti cal leaderswho seek to preserve
thei r armi es, thei r assets, and thei r i nfrastructure. I n the I raqi case,
the Uni ted Statesmay have faced an adversary who made calculati ons
based only on hi si ndi vi dual i nterestsand who controlled a poli ti cal
system ali en to anythi ng U.S. analyststhemselveshad known. Wi th
Saddam Hussei nsstatusso ti ed up i n hi saura of power and i nvi nci -
bi li ty, he may have calculated that the cost of compli ance outwei ghed
the cost of defi ance si nce si gnsof weaknessi n the i nternati onal arena
could threaten hisgrip on power at home. I n the wordsof one scholar
of I raq, si nce Saddam Hussei n came to power, whenever I raqsfor-
ei gn i nterestsclashed wi th percei ved domesti c securi ty i nterests, the
latter hasalwaysprevai led.
25
I n such ci rcumstancesnot only wasthe I raqi leadershi p unswayed
by long-runni ng sancti ons; i t may even have concluded that mai n-
tai ni ng the sancti ons; wasi n i tsi nterest. Counteri ntui ti ve though such
a prospect may be, i t hasa certai n amount of rati onali ty. The short-
agescaused by sancti onsallowed the regi me to reward and puni sh
i ndi vi duals and groups and created black markets from whi ch the
296 Jon B. Alterman
regi me could profi t. I n thi s way, sancti ons helped entrench the
regi me. The mechani sm for selli ng oi l also allowed the regi me to
enri ch i tself by pocketi ng smuggli ng proceeds, aswell to make profi ts
by mani pulati ng the pri cesof oi l futures. Fi nally, the appalli ng hu-
mani tari an si tuati on i n I raq undermi ned i nternati onal support for the
conti nued contai nment of I raq, thereby spli tti ng the anti -I raq coa-
li ti on and maki ng future mi li tary acti on lessli kely.
26
I f such calculati onswere i n play, U.S. threatsto launch crui se mi s-
si le attacksor even ai r stri kesat I raqi targetswere unli kely to yi eld
I raqi compli ance si nce the I raqi leadershi p calculated on a com-
pletely di fferentyet sti ll rati onalbasi sthan countri esare expected
to use.
5. C h an gi n g G o als an d U n ch an gi n g Au th o ri ty
A fi nal characteri sti c of the U.S.-I raqi confrontati on i sthat U.S. goals
changed but the stated authori ty for those goalsdi d not. Thi schar-
acteri sti c i speculi ar to the I raqi case, but i t may be repli cated i n si m-
i lar confrontati ons i n the future. I n parti cular, the Uni ted Nati ons
levi ed sancti onsagai nst I raq on August 6, 1990 (and revi sed them on
September 25, 1990) i n response to the I raqi i nvasi on of K uwai t.
Those same sancti ons were i nsti tuti onali zed wi th the passage of a
resoluti on on Apri l 2, 1991, followi ng the cease-fi re and fi xed to
remai n unti l I raq cooperated fully and completely wi th the UN-
di ctated arms control provi si ons. They were bei ng used a decade
later to ensure the conti nued contai nment of I raq. Si mi larly, author-
i ty for Anglo-Ameri can no-fly zonesi n the north and south of I raq
wasori gi nally granted to protect populati onsunder attack, but those
zones were clearly used later to mai ntai n pressure on the I raqi
regi me.
The compli cati on for U.S. poli cy wasthat the U.S. government had
a clear preference for coerci on backed by multi lateral support,
27
yet
that support wasi ncreasi ngly undermi ned by a reli ance on outdated
mandates. Such an envi ronment i nduced U.S. partnersto announce
thei r di stance from U.S. poli cy (asi ndeed the French, the Russi ans,
and many Arab governmentsdi d) and actually eroded the abi li ty of
the Uni ted Statesto marshal i nternati onal support for i tsacti ons.
Iraq, 199098 297
A S S E S S M E N T A N D P O L I C Y R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S
The balance sheet for coerci ve di plomacy agai nst I raq i smi xed. The
strategi es that the Uni ted States and the i nternati onal communi ty
appli ed to I raq cannot be evaluated normati vely but rather only i n
compari son wi th the li kely outcomes of alternati ve poli ci es. I n
addi ti on, the Uni ted Statesdi d not need to pursue the most effecti ve
poli cy. As Davi d Baldwi n suggests, a less effecti ve poli cy may be
preferable to a more effecti ve one i f the di fferenti al i n costsi ssuffi -
ci ent.
28
Fi nally, i t i sunclear i f the vari ousbranchesof the U.S. gov-
ernment shared a si ngle measure for success. T he mi li tary was
avowedly hosti le to bei ng held accountable for poli ti cal outcomesand
i nsi sted on bei ng judged solely on the basi sof mi ssi on completi on.
The State Department had i tsown measuresfor success(presumably
relyi ng on i ts success at wi nni ng i nternati onal support for coerci ve
moves), and the Whi te House yet others. Under such condi ti ons, any
such assessment i stenuous.
Taken on the whole and vi ewed retrospecti vely, U.S. poli cy seems
to have been a quali fi ed success. The threat of force and occasi onal
li mi ted use of force contri buted to keepi ng Saddam i n hi sbox from
1991 to 2002. Saddam someti mes threatened hi s nei ghbors, but
those threatswere li mi ted and alwayseffecti vely countered. I nspec-
ti ons revealed a great deal about I raqi weapons development pro-
gramsand certai nly slowed (i f not completely halted) I raqi effortsi n
that di recti on.
The cost of the U.S. poli cy, however, wasextremely hi gh i n terms
of dollars, troop morale, and I raqi li ves. I n order to enable the Uni ted
States to pursue the occasi onal coerci on of I raq, the Uni ted States
preposi ti oned bi lli onsof dollarsof equi pment i n the Gulf, i ncreased
i tsstandi ng force there, and peri odi cally deployed even more troops
to the regi on duri ng cri ses. Poli ci ng the no-fly zonesi n the north and
south of I raq i mposed a si gni fi cant burden on U.S. pi lotsand support
crew, who had to be away from home for monthsat a ti me and li ve
through hot Arabi an summers. Unused, coerci ve power morphsi nto
deterrent power, and the costsof mai ntai ni ng a si gni fi cant deterrent
to I raqi behavi or were hi gh.
298 Jon B. Alterman
I n addi ti on, one account esti mated that sancti onsi mposed on I raq
because of the governments efforts to develop weapons of mass
destructi on themselvescaused more deathsthan all weaponsof mass
destructi on throughout hi story.
29
Whi le U.S. poli cy was not wholly
responsi ble for i ncreased chi ld mortali ty i n I raq, that poli cy certai nly
contri buted to i t. Accordi ng to a UNI CEF survey publi shed i n August
1999, both i nfant mortali ty and under-age-fi ve mortali ty more than
doubled i n the decade of sancti onsi n those partsof I raq under Sad-
dam Hussei nscontrol.
30
Another cost was the way the past decades events undermi ned
the credi bi li ty of the Uni ted Nati ons, whi ch i nsi sted on I raqi compli -
ance but wasunwi lli ng to enforce i t. I n addi ti on, the eventsi nduced
the United Statesto have basically one-dimensional and occasionally
strai ned relati onshi ps wi th the nati ons of the Persi an Gulf, whi ch
concentrated on mi li tary threatsat the expense of domesti c develop-
ment.
Fi nally, U.S. poli cy contri buted to strengtheni ng Saddam Hus-
sei nshold on hi speople and on the presi dency of hi scountry. Whi le
U.S. poli ci esappear to have deni ed the regi me resourcesthat i t could
have used to threaten i ts nei ghbors mi li tari ly, those poli ci es also
helped provi de i t wi th the resourcesto consoli date control over i ts
own people.
C O N C L U S I O N
I raq proved to be a di ffi cult target to coerce, i n part because the gov-
ernment put such hi gh value on engagi ng i n the proscri bed behavi or.
Wi th such a hi ghly moti vated adversary acti ng over such an extended
peri od of ti me, U.S. offi ci alsfaced a di ffi cult task i n thei r effortsto
shape I raqi acti ons. The passage of ti me eroded i nternati onal consen-
suson acti onsagai nst I raq, i solati ng U.S. poli cy from the ori gi nal Gulf
War coali ti on and from the UN authori ty that gave ri se to i t.
I n thisregard, Byman and Waxmansadmonition to view coercion as
a dynamic rather than a static processseemsespeciallyapt.
31
I raq re-
sponded clearlyto U.S. strategybysplitting the United Statesoff from
itsallies. I t did so bypartial compliance with U.S. demands, byappeals
Iraq, 199098 299
for solidarity, and byhighlighting the suffering of the I raqi population.
Just asthe United Statesramped up itsforcesand hit I raqi targetstime
after time, so, too, did I raq pick off membersof the allied coalition. The
vote to establish UNMOVI C asa successor to UNSCOM in December
1999 wascertainlya great I raqi victory: the new organizationsmandate
was significantly weakened to take account of French, Russian, and
Chinese concerns, yet in the end those countriesdeclined to vote in
favor of the new organization anyway.
Asthe Uni ted Statesconti nued i tseffortsto i solate I raq, I raq suc-
ceeded i n i tseffortsto i solate the Uni ted States. The questi on i snot
what U.S. coerci ve power can achi eve, si nce i t i sclear that the Uni ted
Statesenjoysoverwhelmi ng mi li tary superi ori ty over I raq. The ques-
ti on i srather where the li mi tsof coerci ve di plomacy li e, si nce for most
of thi speri od the Uni ted Stateswasfar lessmoti vated to engage i n an
escalati on than the I raqi swere.
For coerci ve di plomacy, there are several lessons. The most i mpor-
tant i sthat coerci ve di plomacy worksbest i n the short term, for sev-
eral reasons:
the wi ll of the coercer i sthe hi ghest at that poi nt;
the coercersrepri salsfor noncompli ance are least predi ctable;
the coerced hashad the least opportuni ty to devi se counterstrat-
egi esto coerci on; and
the authori ty for acti on i s most closely tai lored to the prevai li ng
condi ti ons.
The I raq experi ence also revealed multi laterali sm to be a double-
edged sword, conferri ng legi ti macy but hamstri ngi ng i mplementati on.
Fi nally, the UN framework for confronti ng I raqi behavi or became
threadbare over time. I t wasnever devised to do what it subsequently
di d, nor to do i t for so long.
I t i s hard to i magi ne an end to the U.S. confrontati on wi th I raq
other than a change of regi me i n Baghdada change that the Bush
admi ni strati on chose to preci pi tate rather than wai t for. The benefi ts
and costsof thi schoi ce wi ll take some ti me to become apparent.
300 Jon B. Alterman
N O T E S
The author wishesto thank the editors, Daniel Byman, and Andrew Parasiliti
for their helpful commentson earlier versionsof thispaper. There remains
much with which theydisagree here.
1 . K enneth I . Juster, The Uni ted Statesand I raq: Peri lsof Engage-
ment, i n Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy,
ed. Ri chard N. Haass and M eghan L. OSulli van ( Washi ngton, D.C.:
Brooki ngsI nsti tuti on Press, 2000) , 55. For a sympatheti c assessment of
thi spoli cy, see Lauri e Mylroi e, The Baghdad Alternati ve, Orbis ( sum-
mer 1988) .
2. One could argue that the U.S. shi ft toward a poli cyof overthrow rep-
resented a conti nuati on of coerci ve di plomacy, wi th the ai m of coerci ng the
I raqi people to overthrow thei r extant government. Myown vi ew i sthat coer-
ci ve di plomacyproperlyremai nsat the state level, and that di rectlycoerci ng
populati onsveerstoward engagi ng noncombatantsi n an i nappropri ate way.
3. Alexander L. George, Coerci ve Di plomacy, i n The Limits of Coer-
cive Diplomacy, 2d ed., ed. Alexander L. George and Wi lli am Si mons(Boul-
der, Colo.: Westvi ew Press, 1994), 89.
4. The Glaspi e Transcri pt: Saddam Meetsthe Ambassador (July 25,
1990), i n The Gulf War Reader, ed. Mi cah L. Si fry and Chri stopher Cerf
(New York: Ti mesBooks, 1991), 122136.
5. See, for example, Admi ral Wi lli am Crowestesti monyto the Senate
Armed Servi cesCommi ttee on November 28, 1990, repri nted i n Si fryand
Cerf, The Gulf War Reader, 234237.
6. George Bush, quoted in Juster, The United Statesand I raq, 5556.
7. See George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed(New
York: Alfred A. K nopf, 1998), 309312; and JamesA. Baker, The Politics of
Diplomacy (New York: G. P. PutnamsSons, 1995), 271272.
8. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 322.
9. George, Coerci ve Di plomacy, 8.
1 0. One i nteresti ng possi bi li ty i sthat i n thi scase, I raq wastryi ng to
employcoercive diplomacyagainst Saudi Arabia, possiblyseeking accommo-
dation on debt repayment, oil production, or U.S. presence. Andrew Parasiliti,
personal correspondence with author, September 24, 2000.
1 1 . Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 277.
1 2. The text of the letter, whi ch suggested an alli ed attack would destroy
Iraq, 199098 301
the I raqi mi li taryestabli shment, i srepri nted i n Si fryand Cerf, The Gulf War
Reader, 178179.
1 3. Transcri pt of press conference wi th James Baker and Tari q Azi z,
repri nted i n Si fryand Cerf, The Gulf War Reader, 173.
1 4. Si fryand Cerf, The Gulf War Reader, 179.
1 5. U.S. Newsand World Report, Triumph without Victory: The Unre-
ported History of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Ti mesBooks, 1992), 410.
1 6. Ameri cans and Russi ans shared di smay at Saddam Hussei ns be-
havi or. I n August 1990 Presi dent George Bush sai d, We do have a chance
at a new world order. And I d li ke to thi nk that out of thi sdrearyperform-
ance by Saddam Hussei n there could be now an opportuni ty for peace
throughout all the Mi ddle East. Meanwhi le, Russi an forei gn mi ni ster
Eduard Shevardnadze echoed that language, termi ng Saddam Hussei ns
acti on an act of terrori sm agai nst the emergi ng new world order. Con-
frontati on i n the Gulf (pressconference excerpts), New York Times, August
31, 1992, A11; and Paul Lewi s, Confrontati on i n the Gulf, New York
Times, September 26, 1992, A1.
1 7. Alexander George, The Role of Force i n Di plomacy, i n The Use of
Force after the Cold War, ed. H. W. Brands(College Stati on: TexasA&M Uni -
versi tyPress, 2000).
1 8. Andrew Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn, Out of the Ashes: The Res-
urrection of SaddamHussein(New York: HarperCollins, 1999), 241242.
1 9. See Peter J. Boyer, Scott Ri ttersPri vate War, New Yorker, Novem-
ber 9, 1998.
20. Uni ted Nati ons Securi ty Counci l Resoluti on 1115 (unani mously
adopted on June 21, 1997).
21 . The shi ft i n strategy waspartly dri ven by congressi onal demands.
Presi dent Cli nton si gned the I raq Li berati on Act i nto law on October 31,
1998, but i t wasnot unti l earlyDecember 1998 that the admi ni strati onsfor-
mula of contai nment plus for I raq became contai nment plus regi me
change.
22. See www.whi tehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/pri nt/20020912-
1.html.
23. Dani el L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, Confronting Iraq: U.S.
Policy and the Use of Force since the Gulf War (Santa Moni ca, Cali f.: RAND,
2000), 810.
24. George, Coerci ve Di plomacy, 13.
25. Amatzi a Baram, Building toward Crisis: SaddamHusayns Strategy
302 Jon B. Alterman
for Survival ( Washi ngton, D.C.: Washi ngton I nsti tute for Near East Poli cy,
1998) , 2.
26. I am i ndebted to Ambassador Ri chard Murphy for hi sthoughtful
commentsalong these li nes.
27. See Dani el Byman and Matthew Waxman, Defeati ng U.S. Coer-
ci on, Survival 41, no. 2 (summer 1999): 108.
28. Davi d A. Baldwi n, The Sancti onsDebate and the Logi c of Choi ce,
International Security24, no. 3 (wi nter 1999-2000): 86.
29. John and K arl Mueller, The Real Weaponsof MassDestructi on,
Foreign Affairs78, no. 3 (May-June 1999): 51.
30. Three northern provi ncesare beyond the control of Saddam Hus-
sei n. Mortali tyratesi n those areas, whi le hi gher than before sancti onswere
i mposed, are si gni fi cantlylower than i n the rest of I raq. See UNI CEF, Child
and Maternal Mortality Survey: Preliminary Report (Iraq), July 1999, 9,
avai lable at www.uni cef.org/reseval/i raq.htm.
31 . Byman and Waxman, Defeati ng U.S. Coerci on, 8688.
Iraq, 199098 303