161 Oppo To Omnibus & Joinders - Redacted

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Colbern C. Stuart III
Email: Cole.Stuart@Lexevia.com
4891 Pacific Highway Ste. 102
San Diego, CA 92110
Telephone: 858-504-0171
Facsimile: 619-231-9143
In Pro Se

Dean Browning Webb (pro hac vice)
Email: ricoman1968@aol.com
Law Offices of Dean Browning Webb
515 E 39th St.
Vancouver, WA 98663-2240
Telephone: 503-629-2176

Eric W. Ching, Esq. SBN 292357
5252 Balboa Arms Dr. Unit 132
San Diego, CA 92117
Phone: 510-449-1091
Facsimile: 619-231-9143
Attorneys for Plaintiffs California Coalition for Families and Children, PBC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CALIFORNIA COALITION FOR
FAMILIES AND CHILDREN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY BAR
ASSOCIATION, et al.,

Defendants

Case No. 13-cv-1944-CAB (BLM)
Judge: Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo

PLAINTIFFS JOINT OPPOSITION TO
OMNIBUS MOTION TO DISMISS
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
JOINDERS

Date: June 6, 2014
Time: 2:00 p.m.
Courtroom:4C

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
SUBJECT TO COURT APPROVAL

Complaint Filed: August 20, 2013

Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 161 Filed 05/16/14 Page 1 of 184

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................................................... 2
I. The Action ............................................................................................................ 2
II. Superior Court Motion to dismiss ........................................................................ 2
III. Commission Motion To Dismiss ....................................................................... 4
IV. Other Defendants Motions, Extensions ............................................................. 4
V. December 19, 2013 hearing .................................................................................. 5
DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................ 7
I. ANALYSIS OF THE OMNIBUS ........................................................................ 7
A. Rule 41(b) Sanction is Frivolous ....................................................................... 7
B. Statutes Of Limitations Bar No Claim ............................................................ 28
C. Rooker-Feldman Bars No Claim ..................................................................... 44
D. Eleventh Amendment Bars No Claim ............................................................. 49
E. Color of Law Authority ................................................................................... 67
F. Lanham Act ..................................................................................................... 83
G. RICO ................................................................................................................ 89
II. ATTACKS BY COUNT .................................................................................. 110
A. Count 2 (State Law Claims) .......................................................................... 110
B. Count 3 (Malicious Prosecution) ................................................................... 111
C. Count 4 (Nesthus Obstruction of Justice) ..................................................... 120
D. Count 6 (Supervisory Liability) .................................................................... 121
E. Count 7 (Municipal Liability) ....................................................................... 127
F. Count 8 (Respondeat Superior) ..................................................................... 131
G. Count 9 (42 U.S.C. 1985) ........................................................................... 133
H. Count 10 (42 U.S.C. 1986) ......................................................................... 140

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I. Counts 11, 12, 14, 15 (Doyne Terrorism): .................................................... 142
J. California Constitution Article I, sec. 26 Claims .......................................... 145
K. Prospective Relief Counts ............................................................................. 146
III. OTHER AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES ......................................................... 150
A. Domestic Relations Exception to Jurisdiction ........................................... 151
B. Quasi-Judicial Immunity: .............................................................................. 152
C. California Tort Claims Act Defense .............................................................. 158
D. State Constitutional Immunities Do Not Protect Ultra Vires Conduct ......... 158
E. Noerr-Pennington Bars No Claim ................................................................. 159
F. California Civil Code 47 Litigation Privilege ........................................ 161
G. RICO Claims Do Not Depend on Duties to Third Parties ............................ 161
H. Personal Jurisdiction and Venue ................................................................... 161
I. California Coalitions Capacity to Sue .......................................................... 162
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 164


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CASES
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) ............................................... 67, 68
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987) .. 29, 30
Aguilar v. Mega Lighting, Inc. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28348 (C.D. Cal April 6,
2009)....................................................................................................................... 105
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) .................................................................. 52
American Automotive Accessories v. Fishman, 175 F.3d 534, 542 (7th Cir. 1998) ... 93,
95
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 693 (1992) ................................................. 152
Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 432 (1993). ........................... 46, 114
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006) ................................................... 151
Arena v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Nassau Cnty., 216 F. Supp. 2d 146, 153-54 (E.D.N.Y.
2002)....................................................................................................................... 115
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664, (2009) ............................................... 10 et passim
Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986) ...................................... 47 et passim
Ateeq v. Najor, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1351 (1993) ....................................................... 35, 44
Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 603 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2010) .. 31
Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935) ................................... 136
Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988) .................................... 32
Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370 (9th Cir. 1994) ............................................................ 61
Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) ....... 50, 106
Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001) ................ 56
BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002) ................................................... 160
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959 ........................................... 136
Beane v. Paulsen, 21 Cal. App. 4th 89 (1993) ............................................................. 38
Beard v. Udall, 648 F.2d 1264 ............................................................................. 46, 113
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, (2007) .......................... 9 et passim
Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 326 (2d Cir. 1996) ...................................................... 21

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Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764, 767 (9th Cir.2004) ...................................................... 107
Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank of Fla., Inc., 906 F.2d 1546 (11
th

Cir. 1990). ................................................................................................................ 33
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) .................................... 145
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) .................................................................. 68, 72
Board of County Commissioners v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 352 ........................ 29
Borchardt v. Reid, CV 08-3086 DOC, 2008 WL 4810791 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2008) 54
Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) ......................................... 66, 141
Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2244 (2009) ................................................. 99
Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1991) ...................................................... 81
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) ................................................................. 66
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 267 (1993) .................... 137
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 531 U.S.
288 (2001) .......................................................................................................... 68, 72
Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist. No. 46 of Lawrence County, Ark., 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir.
1956). ..................................................................................................................... 136
Brummett v. Camble, 946 F.2d 1178, 1184 (5th Cir. 1991). ........................... 33, 44, 67
Bryant v. Mattel, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13851 (C.D. Calif., 2 August 2010) .......... 93
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 275 (1993) ................................................... 153
Burke v. Dowling, 944 F.Supp. 1036 (D.C.N.Y. 1995) .............................................. 25
Burke v. Dowling, 944 F.Supp. 1036, 1049 (D.C.N.Y. 1995) ..................................... 26
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 498 (1991) .................................................................. 153
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) .......................... 68
Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1021 (9th Cir. 2002) ............................................ 50, 112
Butz v. Economou, 438 US 478, 519 (1978) .............................................................. 120
Cacy v. United States, 298 F.2d 227, 229 (9th Cir.1961) ............................................ 95
Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir.
2011)..................................................................................................................... 6, 23

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Canyon County v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 519 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2008) .................... 97
Caproni v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 15 F.3d 614, 618 (6th Cir. 1994) ............................ 30
Carrigan v. California State Legislature, 263 F.2d 560 (9
th
Cir. 1959) ...................... 26
Catalan v. Vermillion Ranch Ltd. Partnership, 2007, 2007 WL 38135, *5 (D.C.
Colo.) ........................................................................................................................ 25
Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. Don King Promotions, Inc., 533 U.S. 158, 161
(2001). .................................................................................................................... 100
Chenault v. Cobb, C 13-03828 MEJ, 2013 WL 6072025 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013).
................................................................................................................................ 131
Chicago Miracle Temple Church, Inc. v. Fox, 901 F. Supp. 1333, 1347 (N.D. Ill.
1995)....................................................................................................................... 134
Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir.1999) ............................................... 106
citing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1 (1989) ......................................... 50
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). ......................................................... 107
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988). ............................................... 107
Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 202 (1985) ....................................................... 115
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, (1957) .................................................................... 9
Conmar Corp. v. Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc., 858 F.2d 499, 505 (1988) ................... 36
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350 (2011) ........................................................... 128
Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern California Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d
242, 247 (9th Cir.1990) ............................................................................................ 22
Cooper v. Molko, 512 F. Supp. 563, 568 (N.D. Cal. 1981) ......................................... 67
Cousins v. Lockyear, 568 F.3d 1063 (9
th
Cir. 2009) .................................................. 146
Crumpacker v. Civiletti, 90 F.R.D. 326, 329 (D.C. Ind.1981) ........................ 14, 25, 26
Dahl v. City of Huntington Beach, 84 F.3d 363, 366 (9th Cir. 1996) ..................... 8, 20
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) ...................................................... 136
Daniels Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir.2010) ....................... 11
Deeths v. Lucile Slater Packard Children's Hosp. at Stanford, 1:12-CV-02096-LJO,

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2013 WL 6185175 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2013) ......................................................... 22
Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank, A.G., 2006 WL 4749756 **4041 (C.D.Cal.2006) .. 41
Del Campo v. Kennedy, 517 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2008) .............................. 52, 61
Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27, (1980) .................................................................. 67
Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2005) .............................................................. 103
Doe v. Dep't of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1115 (D.C.Cir.1985) .................................... 42
Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963) ........................................................................... 55
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) ............................................................ 55
Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1065-1066 9 (9th Cir. 2004) ............... 88
E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs., 153 Cal. App. 4th 1308, 1317-18 (2007) ..... 38
Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 1985) ...................... 35, 44
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) ............................................................. 9
Ervin v. Los Angeles Cnty., 848 F.2d 1018, 1019 (9th Cir. 1988) .............................. 34
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 348-349 (1880) ...................................... 60, 116, 118
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 15556 (1908) ......................................................... 60, 61
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 286 (2005) ............... 45
Fid. Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. Castle, 2011 WL 6141310 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ...................... 24
Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C.Cir.1996) ....................................... 42
Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164, (1978) ......................................... 68
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) ................................................................. 21
Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) ..................... 51
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 222 (1988) ............................................................. 46
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) ........................................................... 115
Fox v. Ethicon EndoSurgery, Inc., 35 Cal.4th 797, 806 (2005) .......................... 34, 38
Fraklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 445 (9th Cir. 2002). ..................................................... 81
Friedman v. 24 Hour Fitness Co., 580 F.Supp.2d 985 (C.D. Calif. 2008) ................ 99
Gaglione v. Coolidge, 134 Cal.App.2d 518, 527 (1955 .............................................. 35
Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) ................... 81

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Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 636 (9th Cir. 2005). ..................................... 153
Gibbs v. Haight, Dickson, Brown & Bonesteel, 183 Cal.App.3d 716, 228 Cal.Rptr.
398, 402 (1986) ........................................................................................................ 44
Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856 (9th Cir.1999) ........................... 75
Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir.1997) ............................... 51
Giuliano v. Everything Yogurt, Inc., 819 F.Supp. 240 (D.C.N.Y.1993) ..................... 26
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 ......................................................................... 121
Graham v. Taubman, 610 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.1979) ............................................. 28, 112
Gray v. Evercore Restructuring L.L.C., 544 F3d 320, 324 (1st Cir. 2008) ......... 51, 113
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116, (1972) .......................................... 160
Greater Los Angeles Council of Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 607 F. Supp. 175, 179 (C.D.
Cal. 1984) ................................................................................................. 50 et passim
Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (1974) ................................................................ 114
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, (1971) ............................................ 135, 140
Grisham v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 40 Cal.4th 623, 637, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 735, 151
P.3d 1151 (2007) ................................................................................................ 36, 38
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 39697 (1957) ........................................ 31
Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 706-07 (9th Cir. 2006). .......................................... 41
Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1914) ...................................................... 66, 121
Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2006) ......................................... 45
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989) .......................... 97
H.T. v. Ciavarella, No. 3:09-cv-0357 (ARC) (M.D. Pa.) ............................................ 60
Han v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 1993 WL 13011266 (C.A.9) ......................................... 61
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890) ........................................................................ 49
Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 404 (7th
Cir. 1984) ................................................................................................................. 93
Harris v. Deveaux, 780 F.2d 911, 915 (11th Cir. 1986) ............................................ 114
Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 1997) ........................................... 81

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Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir.1997) ............................................ 81
Hearns v. San Bernardino Police Dep't, 530 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2008) .......... 24
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) ................................................................... 120
Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 513 U.S. 30 (1994).............. 50, 51
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (U.S. 2013) .................................................. 66
Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 100304 (9th Cir.2006) ................. 42
Ikuno v. Yip, 912 F.2d 306, 309 (9th Cir. 1990) .......................................................... 98
In re Credit Industrial Corp., 366 F.2d 402, 411 (2d Cir. 1966) ................................ 22
In re George, 322 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2003) ........................................................... 8
In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Secs. Litigation, 2003 WL 22999478 (D.C.N.Y.) .......... 25
Indus. Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 278 F. Supp. 938, 949 (C.D. Cal.
1967)......................................................................................................................... 20
Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980) ....................... 42, 112
Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir.2001) .................................................. 123
Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989) ........................................ 106
Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) .................................................. 69
Johnson v. Haberman & Kassoy, 201 Cal. App. 3d 1468, 247 Cal. Rptr. 614 (2d Dist.
1988)................................................................................................................... 33, 39
Johnson v. Hawe, 388 F.3d 676, 686 (9th Cir.2004) ................................................. 107
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975) ................................. 29
Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) .............................................. 35, 44
Junho Hyon v. Sei Shimoguchi, No. CIV 12-1235 JAM EFB PS, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 74100 at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 29, 2012) ........................................................ 54
Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997) ................................................................... 153
Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988) ..... 7, 11
Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of California, 29 Cal. 4th 300 (2002) ......................... 119
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) ............................................ 56
Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1996) .......................................... 118, 121

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Kleinecke v. Montecito Water Dist., 147 Cal.App.3d 240, 245 (1983) ....................... 35
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 21 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) .............. 151
Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004) ................................. 46
Kournikova v. General Media Communications, Inc., 278 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (C.D.
Cal. 2003) ................................................................................................................. 88
Kunik v. Racine County, 946 F.2d 1574, 1580 (7th Cir.1991) ................................... 76
Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 720 (1983) ..................................................... 135, 137
Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Am. Sec. Bank, N.A., 890 F.2d 456, 463 n. 11
(D.C.Cir.1989) ......................................................................................................... 42
Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391 (1979)
.................................................................................................................................. 51
Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1991)
................................................................................................................................ 106
Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 31 Cal.4th 363, 370 (2003) ................................................. 34
Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir.1991) ............................... 123
Larsen v. Lauriel Investments, Inc., 161 F. Supp.2d 1029, 1042 (D. Ariz. 2001) 93, 95
Lauter v. Anoufrieva, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (C.D. Cal. 2009) .................. 31, 36, 41, 44
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. NarcoticsIntelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163 (1993) ................................................................................................ 69 et passim
Lewis v. News-Press & Gazette Co., 782 F. Supp. 1338, 1341 (W.D. Mo. 1992) .... 135
Lewis v. Sprock, 612 F. Supp. 1316, 1324 (N.D. Cal. 1985) ....................................... 90
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014)......... 84
Life Ins. Co. of North America v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 505 (9th Cir.1979) ....... 138
Life Insurance Co. of North America v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 501 (9th Cir.1979)
.................................................................................................................................. 68
Living Designs Inc., v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co., 431 F.3d 353, 361, 364 (9th
Cir. 2005) ................................................................................................................. 97
Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours, 431 F.3d 353, 361 (9th Cir. 2005)

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Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229 (7th Cir.) ....................................................... 114
Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) ...................................................... 67
Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 981 (9
th
Cir.2004). ........................................................ 106
Maduka v. Sunrise Hosp., 375 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 2004) ................................... 122
Manning v. Ketcham, 58 F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1932); Restatement (Second) of Torts
162 (1965) ...................................................................................................... 113, 120
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803) ......................................................... 50
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1946) ........................................................ 68
Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 305 (2006)....................................................... 152
McCarthy v. Fuller, 2010 WL 2243354, *1 (S.D. Ind. 2010) ..................................... 25
McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. 270, 276 (1830) ............................................................ 28
McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 614-17 (D.C.Cir.1980) ......................................... 135
McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 673-674 (1991) ............................... 34
McHenry v. Renne, 74 F.3d 1172, 1177-80 (9th Cir. 1996) .................................... 6, 19
Meek v. Cnty. of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 1999) ................................. 115
Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802, 804 (9th Cir. 1976) ............................................... 68
Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802, 804 (9th Cir.1976) ................................................ 67
Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1301-02 (9th Cir. 1999) 75
Mendoza v. Wilmington Fin., C-10-5792 SC, 2011 WL 2182914 (N.D. Cal. June 6,
2011)......................................................................................................................... 42
Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2002) .................................... 103
Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1149 (9th Cir.2005) ................................ 123
Merrill v. Abbott (In re Indep. Clearing House Co., 77 B.R. 843, 860 (D.Utah 1987)
.................................................................................................................................. 96
Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir.1988)
.................................................................................................................................. 61
Mollnow v. Carlton, 716 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1983) ............................................ 135

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Monell v. Dept of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) .............. 50, 106
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961) ............................................................ 30
Monteagudo v. Alksne, 11-CV-1089, at 4:4-7:9, 8:2-21 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 6, 2011) ...... 48
Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 614 F.3d 145, 150 (5th Cir. 2010) .. 139
Moor v. Alameda Cnty., 411 U.S. 693, 717 (1973) ..................................................... 50
Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1996) ........................................... 116
Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2000) ........................ 34
Moreno v. Sanchez, 106 Cal.App.4th 1415 (2003) ................................................ 33, 39
Morgan v. Kobrin Secs., Inc., 649 F.Supp. 1023, 1027 (D.C.Ill.1986) ....................... 25
Morgan v. Regents of University of Cal., 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 6364 (2000) .............. 41
Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) ..................... 10 et passim
Murray v. Sevier, 993 F.Supp. 1394 (D.C.Ala. 1997) ................................................. 26
Musick v. Burke, 913 F.2d 1390, 1398 (9th Cir. 1990) ............................................. 104
N. Ins. Co. of New York v. Chatham Cnty., Ga., 547 U.S. 189, 194 (2006) ............... 52
National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994) ...................... 163
Natural Resources Defense Council v. California Dept. of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 422
(1996) ....................................................................................................................... 61
Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) .............................................. 9, 10
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1999) ....................................................... 96
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, (1989) ............................................................. 9
Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981)....................... 6
New York Cent. & H.R.R. Co. v. Kinney, 260 U.S. 340, 346 (1922) ........................... 35
Niles v. Nelson, 72 F.Supp.2d 13 (D.C.N.Y.1999 ) ..................................................... 26
Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1162-64 (9th Cir. 2003) ................................................ 46
Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 876-77 (9th Cir. 2002) .......................................... 120
Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 21 Cal.4th 383, 397 (1999). ............................................. 34, 38
North Georgia Finishing, Incorporated v. Di-Chem, Incorporated, 419 U.S. 601
(1975) ................................................................................................................. 68, 72

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Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California v. E.E.O.C., 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977) ........... 29
Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541 (9th Cir. 2007) ........................................... 98
Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 782 (9th Cir. 2002) ....................................... 94
OSU Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2012) ........... 11 et passim
Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 825 (9th Cir. 2007) ....................................................... 97
Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir.1992) .............................................. 107
Pace Indus., Inc. v. Three Phoenix Co., 813 F.2d 234, 237 (9th Cir. 1987). .............. 31
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989) ......... 19
People United for Children, Inc. v. City of New York, 108 F. Supp. 2d 275, 286
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) ..................................................................................................... 115
Perez-Falcon v. Synagro West, LLC, 2011 WL 6752533, *3 (E.D. Cal. 2011) .......... 25
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1082 (9th Cir. 2012) ................................................. 66
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) ....................................................... 102
Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v. United States, 648 F.3d 708, 721 (9th Cir.2011) .................. 11
Precision Inst. Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814
(1945) ................................................................................................................. 35, 44
Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 143
(1993) ....................................................................................................................... 52
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984) ......................................................... 116
Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1980) ........................................ 47, 113
Recorder v. Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 72 Cal. App. 4th 258 (1999) ........... 158
Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.1991) ..................... 123
Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911 (9
th
Cir. 1982) .................................................. 47
Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1982) ....................................... 115
Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 976 (S.D. Cal. 1998) .................................. 53
Riddell v. Riddell Washington Corp., 866 F.2d 1480, 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ............ 36
Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F.2d 649, 654 (10th Cir. 1990) ........................................... 31
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 650 (1996) ................................................................. 66

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Rosen v. Cmty. Educ. Ctrs., Inc., CV-10-0584, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *7-9 (D.
Ariz. Oct. 8, 2010) ................................................................................................. 137
Ruiz v. Scriber, C 07-00020 WHA, 2007 WL 2790203 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2007) . 145
Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co., 576 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir.1978) ... 38
Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 524 (9th Cir.1999); ...................... 123
Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997) ............................................................. 102
Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 6165 (1997) ................................... 76, 101, 108
Sathianathan v. Smith Barney, Inc., C 04-2130 SBA, 2004 WL 3607403 (N.D. Cal.
June 6, 2005) ............................................................................................................ 25
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974 ................................................................. 9
Schmidt v. Herrmann, 614 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1980 .......................................... 6
Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.1975) ............................... 67
Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) .................................. 112, 150
Screws v. U.S., 325 U.S. 91 (1945) .............................................................. 66, 121, 142
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985) ................................. 110
Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) .................... 138, 140
Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), 95
Shaw v. State of California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788 F.2d 600,
603 (9th Cir.1986) ................................................................................................ 4, 55
Sherman v. Yakahi, 549 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1977) ......................................... 134
Smith v. Berg, 247 F.3d 532 (3rd Cir. 2001), ............................................................ 103
Sosa v. DIRECTV. Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 929 (9th Cir. 2006) ...................................... 159
Soto v. Schembri, 960 F. Supp. 751, 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ....................................... 134
Sparkman v. McFarlin, Civ. No. F 75-129 (ND Ind., May 13, 1976) ....................... 114
Spencer v. Kemma, 523 U.S. 1, 19 (1998); ................................................................ 120
Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1214 (9th Cir. 2011) .................................................... 10
Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 2011) ............................................... 11
State ex rel. Metz v. CCC Information Services, Inc., 149 Cal.App.4th 402, 418

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(2007) ....................................................................................................................... 41
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Ammann, 838 F.2 4 (9
th
Cir. 1987) ........................ 33
Sterlin v. Biomune Systems, 154 F.3d 1191, 1201 (10th Cir.1998) ............................. 33
Stewart v. Baldwin County Board of Education, 908 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1990)
.................................................................................................................................. 61
Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999) ................................................. 36
Stump v. Sparkman, 35 U.S. at 360 ........................................................................... 113
Sun Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 194 (9th Cir. 1987) ................... 110
Sun Sav. and Loan Assoc. v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187 (9th Cir.1987) ....................... 106
Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir.1995). ............. 34
Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 731 (1980) .................... 114
Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 720
(1980) ....................................................................................................................... 46
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, n. 1, (2002) ........................ 9, 14, 51
Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) ................................................... 122
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) ....................................................... 55, 143
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 484, (1953) ................................................................. 68
Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 113940 (9th Cir.2000)
................................................................................................................................ 147
Thomas v. Miller, 928 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1991 ........................................................... 33
Thompson v. Housing Auth. of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986) .......... 8
Thorman v. American Seafoods Co., 421 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir.2005) ................. 38
Thornton v. Brown, 11-56146, 2013 WL 7216368 (9th Cir. July 31, 2013). ............ 120
Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Florida, 937 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1991) ........................... 97
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) .................................................................... 140
Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir.2012) ............................... 68
Tuveson v. Florida Governor's Council on Indian Affairs, Inc., 734 F.2d 730, 732
(11th Cir.1984) ......................................................................................................... 61

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United States ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir.
2003)....................................................................................................................... 124
United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1999) ....................................... 116, 118
United States. v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003) ............ 25
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588-89 (1981) ............................................ 109
United States v. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705 (3d Cir. 2013) ......................................... 61
United States v. Robertson, 514 US. 669 (1995) ...................................................... 105
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544, 183 L. Ed. 2d 574 (2012) ............. 160
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) ............................................... 66
United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928
(1980) ....................................................................................................................... 94
United States v. Bucci, 839 F.2d 825, 829 (1st Cir. 1988 ............................................ 31
United States v. Buckley, 689 F.2d 893, 897-98 (9th Cir.1982) .................................. 94
United States v. Buckley, 689 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1982) ...................................... 95
United States v. Ciccone, 219 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 2000) .................................. 96
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 .............................................................. 121
United States v. Craft, 105 F.3d 1123, 1125 (6th Cir. 1997) ...................................... 31
United States v. Doherty, 867 F.2d 47 (1
st
Cir. 1989) ............................................... 105
United States v. Dowling, 739 F.2d 1445, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1984) ............................ 94
United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648 (9th Cir, 1988) ........................................... 100
United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2004) ...................................... 103
United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1230 (9
th
Cir.2004), ............................. 108
United States v. Galiffa, 734 F.2d 306, 311 (7th Cir. 1984) ...................................... 102
United States v. Green, 592 F.3d 1057, 1060-1071 (9th Cir. 2010) ............................ 94
United States v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1997) ...................... 105
United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1248 (8th Cir. 1976) ................................. 94
United States v. National Medical Enters., Inc., 792 F.2d 906, 913 (9th Cir.1986) ... 20
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 795 (1966) ........................................................ 67

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United States v. Ripinsky, 109 F.3d 1436, 1444 (9th Cir.1997) ................................ 105
United States v. Robinson, 763 F.2d 778 (6
th
Cir. 1985) ........................................... 105
United States v. Rogers, 321 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1993) .................................... 96
United States v. Schaflander, 717 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir. 1983), ..................................... 96
United States v. Shipsey, 363 F.3d 962, 971 (9th Cir. 2004) ....................................... 94
United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2003) ............................................ 105
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (U.S. 1981) ........................................... 98
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (9th
Cir.1989) .................................................................................................................. 33
v. 99
Vasquez v. Rackauckas, 734 F.3d 1025, 1037 (9th Cir. 2013) .................................... 48
Venegas v. Wagner, 704 F.2d 1144, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983) .......................................... 32
Vernon v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1274, 1278 (9th Cir.1987) ............................................. 42
Vierria v. California Highway Patrol, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1240 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
.......................................................................................................................... 60, 158
Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, (2000) ......................................... 137
Wallace v. Powell, 3:09-cv-00268-ARC ................................................................... 113
Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir.2003) ................................................. 106
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) .............................................................................. 67
Westways World Travel v. AMR Corp., 182 F. Supp.2d 952, 957 (C.D. Calif. 2001)
.................................................................................................................................. 93
Westways World Travel v. AMR Corp., 182 F. Supp.2d 952 (C.D. Calif. 2001) ........ 21
White v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2012) ..................... 55, 58, 105
White v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 926-27 (9th Cir. 2012) ............................ 144
Wilbur v. United States, 281 U.S. 206, 218 (1930) ..................................................... 61
Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, N.A., 815 F.2d 522, 531, n. 7 (9th Cir.
1987)......................................................................................................................... 96
Williams-Jones v. LaHood, 656 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67-68 (D.D.C. 2009) ....................... 42

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Wilson v. Toussie, 260 F. Supp.2d 530, n 5 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) .................................... 90
Windsor v. The Tennessean, 719 F.2d 155, 161 (6th Cir.1983), ............................... 135
Witt v. Dep't of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 817 (9th Cir. 2008) .................................... 66
Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 363-64 (9th Cir. 2004) ...................................... 147
Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 364 (9th Cir. 2004) .............................................. 50
Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir.2004) .................................................. 25
Wyshak v. City Nat. Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 826-27 (9th Cir. 1979) ......................... 21, 28
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) ................................................................... 66
Yourish v. Calif. Amplif., 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir.1999) ......................................... 8
Zatkin v. Primuth, 551 F. Supp. 39, 42 (S.D. Cal. 1982) ............................................ 92
Zeller v. Rankin, 451 U.S. 939 (1981) ................................................................. 47, 113

STAVROP STATUTES
15 U.S.C. 1127 .......................................................................................................... 85
15 U.S.C. 1116(a) ........................................................................................... 61, 147
15 U.S.C. 1116(a), .................................................................................................. 61
18 U. S. C. 242 .......................................................................................................... 64
18 U.S.C. 1951 ........................................................................................................ 108
18 U.S.C. 1964(a) ....................................................................................... 61, 62, 147
18 U.S.C. 3282 .......................................................................................................... 31
18 U.S.C. 2261(a)(1) ....................................................................................... 58, 105
28 U.S.C. 1337 .................................................................................................. 61, 147
28 U.S.C. 1361 .......................................................................................................... 61
28 U.S.C. 1738 .................................................................................................. 58, 105
28 U.S.C. 2201-2202 ...................................................................................... 61, 147
28 U.S.C.A. 2071 ................................................................................................ 19, 20
42 U.S.C. 1983 ........................................................................................... 6, et passim

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42 U.S.C. 1988(a) ............................................................................................. 61, 147
42 U.S.C. 2000d-7..................................................................................................... 58

TREATISES
Weinstein & Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform: Drafting Pleading Rules, 57
Colum. L.Rev. 518, 520 521 (1957) ...................................................................... 11


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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs California Coalition for Families and Children, PBC (CALIFORNIA
COALITION) and Colbern Stuart (STUART) hereby jointly oppose Defendants
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 131)
(OMNIBUS) and Joinders (Doc. Nos. 134-152).
To manage the substantial overlap in Defendants attacks, Plaintiffs offer this
single combined Opposition in three sections:

Section I responds to the OMNIBUS in the same organization and order it is
brought, and incorporates responses to various joinders that expand on OMNIBUS
attacks.
Section II responds to attacks from joinders which are not raised in the
OMNIBUS. The section collects from the joinders all attacks on a particular Count,
recites each attack, then responds in defense of the Count. For example, the CITY
ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS and GROCH, represented by different counsel, both
attack Count 3 in separate joinders. This Opposition responds to both attacks in one
section collecting all attacks on Count 3: Section II, B. Similar organization-by-
Count is followed throughout Section II.
Section III responds to all other attacks not raised in the OMNIBUS and not
specific to a Count, such as blanket affirmative defenses applicable to all counts
such as immunity, privilege, or capacity. Section III is organized by topic of the
attack.
Defendants had opportunity to file one 30 page OMNIBUS and ten pages for
each of 18 joinders, for a total of 210 pages of opportunity. Plaintiffs had similar
opportunity. Defendants used less space than permitted, as does this combined
Opposition.

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I. THE ACTION
Plaintiffs filed the initial complaint on August 20, 2013 asserting violations of
42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, and 1986 (Civil Rights Act), 15 U.S.C. 1125 (Lanham
Act), 18 U.S.C. 1962 (RICO), and seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. 2201 (Declaratory
Judgment Act). Plaintiffs are a legal and social services organization providing
representing the interests of family court litigants and its President. Plaintiffs sue the
San Diego County Bar Association, Family Justice Center Alliance, divorce
attorneys, forensic psychologists, family court judges, and others which organize,
certify, and support the divorce industry. Plaintiffs also sue various governmental
entities such as the San Diego Superior Court and its judges, and other governmental
elements working within the divorce industry such as the Administrative Office of the
Courts, Judicial Council, and its leaders. Plaintiffs also sue employees of the
Commission on Judicial Performance who have facilitated the criminal behavior
described herein.
As Plaintiff was proceeding with service of the initial complaint, two groups of
defendants filed motions to dismiss; one by a group of California Superior Court
Judicial Defendants (Superior Court Defendants) (Doc. No. 16), and one by the
Commission on Judicial Performance and its employee defendants (Commission
Defendants) (Doc. No. 22). The motions attacked the complaint broadly and
vigorously as follows:
II. SUPERIOR COURT MOTION TO DISMISS
The Superior Courts Motion to Dismiss (MTD) attacked on fourteen grounds,
including: (1) capacity and representation of the corporate plaintiffs, (2) standing, (3)
sovereign immunity, (4) judicial immunity, (5) qualified immunity, (6) statute of
limitations, (8) Rooker-Feldman, (9) failure to state cognizable claims for (a) RICO
and (b) 42 U.S.C. 1985 and 1986, (c) Lanham Act (d) conspiracy under Twombly,
and (e) a bucket of mud attack under rule 8(a). MTD 4:4-5:9. Defendants sought

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only dismissal with prejudice. MTD 5:8-9. Superior Court Defendants filed a
Request for Judicial Notice attaching nine exhibits.
Upon receiving the MTD, STUART prepared and on October 28, 2013
delivered letter to the Superior Court Defendants requesting to meet and confer
regarding the attacks of the MTD. (M&C). To assist defendants in understanding
the complex complaint, the M&C disclosed the factual legal basis for the case,
offered supporting citation and analysis, additional exhibits, and responded to each of
the criticisms raised in the MTD. The M&C requested a personal conference to
advance a dialogue, and requested the parties discuss a stipulation to amend the
Complaint to resolve certain fairly-taken allegations of insufficient fact pleading, that
certain frivolous grounds in the MTD be withdrawn prior to expenditure of additional
court and party resources, for brief leave to permit the corporate plaintiffs to complete
Mr. Webbs pro hac vice admission, and that the RJN be withdrawn as evidentiary
and controversial.
Two days after receiving the M&C, Superior Court Defendants categorically
rejected Plaintiffs invitation. Voluminous briefing followed.
Plaintiff opposed the MTD on grounds that (1) the MTDs argued controversial
facts; (2) the Complaint admitted no immunity defenses, (3) Rooker-Feldman was
inapplicable and (4) the RICO and civil rights claims were adequately pled and
supported. Plaintiff acknowledged the statutes of limitations and corporate Plaintiffs
representation issues, and requested leave to cure with details regarding equitable
tolling and estoppel, and to complete Mr. Webbs pro hac vice application. Plaintiff
countered Defendants Request for Judicial notice with a Motion to Strike
controversial evidence and testimony therein.
The Superior Court alone filed a motion for sanctions under Rule 11(b),
asserting that the Complaint was entirely frivolous and filed for no purposed other
than to harass the Superior Court. Plaintiff STUART filed a separate Rule 11 motion
directed to portions of the MTD as frivolous and intended for delay.

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III. COMMISSION MOTION TO DISMISS
Commission Defendants asserted only sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment. The Commission made no attempt at a factual showing to establish that
it was an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, instead
relying on this Circuits precedent in cases extending Eleventh Amendment Immunity
to the Commission without performing an arm of the state analysis required under
Supreme Court and this Circuits precedents. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Greater Los Angeles Council on
Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1987); Shaw v. State of California
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788 F.2d 600, 603 (9th Cir.1986).
Plaintiff opposed arguing the Commissions failure to establish it is a state or
arm of the state, that Commission employees were acting ultra vires, and noted that
dismissal of individual capacity claims is unavailable after Ex Parte Young.
Commission Oppo. 21:4-24:11.
IV. OTHER DEFENDANTS MOTIONS, EXTENSIONS
Other Defendants filed vigorous attacks on multiple substantive grounds in
separate motions to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1), (6), some of which attached
exhibits, effectively converting those motions to Rule 56 motions for summary
judgment. These Motions asserted attacks parallel to the Superior Court MTD and
added numerous attacks specific to each Defendant, including a Noerr-Penington
attack, a res judicata attack, a domestic relations exception attack, assertion of state
tort claims presentation defects, and various individualized particularity, more
definite statement, conclusory allegations, and insufficient facts grounds under
Rules 8(a), 9(b), and 12(e).
Ten Defendants, including lead Defendant San Diego County Bar Association
and several divorce law firms sought and received from Plaintiffs a stipulation to
extend time to respond to the Complaint until disposition of the two pending motions
to dismiss. The Court granted these extensions, relieving these ten defendantsall

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who so requestedof obligation to respond to the Complaint. Numerous other
Defendants joining the OMNIBUS were not named or served in the first round and
have not responded before the OMNIBUS. The OMNIBUS Motion lead by San
Diego County Bar Association is its, and every other Defendantssave the
Commission and Superior Court Defendantsfirst contested response to any
complaint.
V. DECEMBER 19, 2013 HEARING
At hearing on December 19, 2013, the Court dismissed claims against the
Commission and its employees in official capacity with prejudice as immune under
the Eleventh Amendment. The Court denied the Commissions motion with respect to
the individual capacity claims against Simi and Battson, and dismissed the claims
against the Superior Court with leave to amend.
The Court provided guidance to Plaintiffs in amending the Complaint:
1. Corporate Plaintiffs: The Court found that counsel for Corporate Plaintiffs,
Mr. Dean Browning Webb, was listed on the Complaint caption, but did not sign the
Complaint. The Court dismissed the Corporate Plaintiffs Complaint, ruling: No
counsel appeared for California Coalition or Lexevia at the motions hearing held
December 19, 2013. Because plaintiffs California Coalition and Lexevia do not
appear through counsel, the court DISMISSES their claims without prejudice.
2. Plaintiff Stuart: The Court found that the Complaint regarding Stuart failed
to comply with Rule 8(a) for three reasons:
First, the Court found that because the Corporate Plaintiffs claims were then
dismissed, the remaining portions of the Complaint failed to satisfy Rule 8.
[B]ecause plaintiffs assert most of their claims on behalf of all three plaintiffs,
neither the court nor defendants can distinguish Stuarts asserted harm from the
corporations. The Court stated that because the corporate plaintiffs were dismissed,
the remaining portion of the Complaint relevant to Stuart does not set forth plain
statements of his claims showing that he is entitled to relief.

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Second, the Court found that Stuart fails to clearly identify each separate
claim for relief. The Court identified the caption for Count One, which identified
the Count was brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, identified the various constitutional
provisions which the claim asserted (U.S. Const. 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 14th
Amend.), and included a notation to Supplemental State Claims
The Court stated that this structure of caption for the Count failed to specify
just how many separate state and federal claims Stuart intends to assert here. The
Court also found that the Count fails to connect his factual allegations to the
numerous causes of action identified. The Court directed: If Stuart sincerely means
to assert that defendants violated his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, he must identify the factual allegations that support
each alleged violation.
Third, the Court noted that while length or verbosity alone are not
inappropriate, dismissal on Rule 8 grounds where the complaint is argumentative,
prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely irrelevant; McHenry v. Renne, 74 F.3d
1172, 1177-80 (9th Cir. 1996); verbose, confusing and conclusory, Nevijel v. North
Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981); or where it is impossible to
designate the cause or causes of action attempted to be alleged in the complaint,
Schmidt v. Herrmann, 614 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1980). The Court
characterized the Complaint generally: plaintiffs complaint here is confusing,
redundant, conclusory, and buries its factual allegations in pages of generalized
grievances about the family courts. The prolixity and inscrutability of plaintiffs
complaint is unduly prejudicial to defendants, who face the onerous task of combing
through [plaintiffs lengthy complaint] just to prepare an answer that admits or denies
such allegations and to determine what claims and allegations must be defended or
otherwise litigated. Order at 7:14 (quoting Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4
Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2011).
The Courts dismissal was without prejudice and with leave to amend, with

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the following exceptions. The exceptionsdismissals with prejudicewere for
claims against the defendant judges for damages arising out of judicial acts within
the jurisdiction of their courts and claims against the Commission on Judicial
Performance and against its officials, Simi and Battson, to the extent the latter are
sued for damages in their official capacity. (Order 7:5-8).
Consistent with Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623
(9th Cir. 1988), the Court provided plaintiff a statement of the complaint's
deficiencies and instructed: (1) Heed the statute of limitations for Title 42 claims
which is generally two years and To the extent Stuart contends that equitable
tolling should apply, he must set forth specific allegations in his amended complaint
to support such a theory and (2) that Stuart appropriately and coherently identifies
his causes of action and the specific defendants he alleges liable for his asserted
damages without unnecessary verbiage, argument, and rhetoric. Order at 9:3.
The Court denied Defendant Superior Court of San Diego Countys motion for
sanctions under Rule 11 and deemed withdrawn ten other motions to dismiss,
providing no adjudication or direction regarding the withdrawn matter. At hearing
on February 26, 2014, the Court denied Plaintiffs Rule 11 motion nunc pro tunc
effective December 19, 2013.

DISCUSSION
I. ANALYSIS OF THE OMNIBUS
A. Rule 41(b) Sanction is Frivolous
Defendants invite the Court to commit clear error of law in seeking sanctions
in a first response to a Complaint.
1
The faithless litigation maneuver is not merely
frivolous, but a sad benchmark in the depravity, disrespect, color of law harassment,
and invidious discrimination these defendants have wrought upon the institutions they
today represent and the citizens they serve. Though sworn to the highest of standards

1
All Defendants but Superior Court Defendants (a portion of JUDICIAL
DEFENDANTS), BATTSON, and SIMI appear in opposition for the first time in the
Omnibus. See Procedural History Sec. IV, V.

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for obedience to principle and fairness, Defendants today deploy the lowest of
litigation tactics and abuse.
Unwarranted is the kindest characterization of Defendants attempt to lead
this Court into abuse of the power to sanction litigation conduct. If the plaintiff fails
to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to
dismiss the action or any claim against it. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). A sanction of
dismissal under Rule 41(b) is so harsh a penalty it should be imposed as a sanction
only in extreme circumstances. Dahl v. City of Huntington Beach, 84 F.3d 363, 366
(9th Cir. 1996). Before imposing dismissal as a sanction, the district court must
weigh several factors: the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; the
court's need to manage its docket; the risk of prejudice to the defendants; the public
policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and the availability of less drastic
sanctions. Thompson v. Housing Auth. of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir.
1986) (per curiam), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 829 (1986); In re George, 322 F.3d 586,
591 (9th Cir. 2003). [T]he district court should make explicit findings concerning
each factor before dismissing an action for a party's failure to comply with court
orders. Dismissal (or another terminating sanction) is proper where at least four [of
the five] factors support dismissal, or where at least three factors strongly support
dismissal. Yourish v. Calif. Amplif., 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir.1999) (internal
citations omitted).
1. Plaintiffs Have Not Violated Any Rule or Order
Rule 41(b) is appropriate only upon a finding of failure to comply with these
rules or a court order. Defendants assert three failures: (1) that the FAC fails to
comply with Rule 8(a)(2) and (e)
2
requiring a short plain statement of a claim and

2
Defendants inaccurately recite Rules 8(a) and (e). OMNIBUS at 2:13-15 recites Rule 8(a) as
follows: a pleading "shall" contain a "short and plain statement of the grounds on which the court's
jurisdiction depends" ... and a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief. ... ". This recitation is error. Accurately recited, Rule 8(a) provides: A pleading
that states a claim for relief must contain: (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief. (emphasis added). Defendants also improperly recite Rule

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that allegations be simple, concise, and direct. (2) that the FAC fails to comply with
the Courts December 13, 2013 Order, and (3) the FAC fails to comply with other
orders. OMNIBUS at 2:12-8:16.
The FAC does not fail to comply with any rule or order.
a. Rule 8 Generally
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). The claim need only give the
defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47, (1957)). When ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must
accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Twombly at
555 556 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, n. 1, (2002);
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, (1989); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
(1974)). Dismissal is proper only where there is no cognizable legal theory or an
absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory. Navarro v.
Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). However, allegations consisting of nothing
more than a formulaic recitation of the elements' of a constitutional discrimination
claim alone do not satisfy Rule 8. Such allegations are not to be discounted
because they are unrealistic or nonsensical, but rather because they do nothing
more than state a legal conclusion. . . . Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969

8(e). Defendants claim: Rule 8(e) states a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.
OMNIBUS at 2:15-16 (emphasis added). This is inaccurate. Accurately recited, Rule 8(e) provides:
Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice. Defendants may have intended to cite Rule
8(d)(1), though they improperly recite that rule as well. Rule 8(d) governs pleadinga verb, not
a nounand provides in relevant part: (1) In General. Each allegation must be simple, concise,
and direct. No technical form is required. (emphasis added). Rule 8(d)s requirement of simple,
concise and direct modifies allegations, not an entire pleading. Defendants incorrectly interpret
the term pleading in the subsection (d) subtitle Pleading to be Concise and Direct (emphasis
added) as a noun rather than a verb. Similarly, Rule 8(a)s requirement of a short, plain statement
modifies claims, not the entire pleading. This is, and has been the standard for federal pleading for
at least 65 years. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).

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(9th Cir. 2009).
b. Rule 8(a) Plausibility Attacks
Each Defendant asserts one or more plausibility attacks under Twombly. To
enable analysis of these attacks, the following analytical framework is offered.
Defendants alone bear the burden of establishing entitlement to relief in any
pleading motionincluding establishing a failure to comply with Rule 8. Navarro v.
Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). The analytical framework for a plausibility
attack was recently articulated in Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 970 (9th
Cir. 2009) (Moss I), and later elaborated at Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 675 F.3d 1213,
1226 (9th Cir. 2012) amended, 711 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2013) (Moss II), and cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 677, (U.S. 2013) (argued March 26, 2013) (Moss III). Moss I
adopted the Supreme Courts suggested framework from Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 664, (2009) to evaluate a plausibility attack:
[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by
identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.
When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
to relief.
Moss I at 970 (quoting Iqbal at 1950). The Court of Appeals reduced the
analysis to three stages: (1) identification of mere conclusions then (2) evaluate
Plaintiffs' specific factual allegations to determine whether we can reasonably infer a
[constitutional] violation from those facts. and (3) compare alternative explanations.
Id.; Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1214 (9th Cir. 2011) (The Court first identified
allegations not entitled to the presumption of truth . . . then determined whether the
remaining assumed to be true plausibly suggested an entitlement to relief.).
Traversing the first identification stage alone is insufficient to succeed in the

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defense because the existence of conclusions in virtually any pleading is inevitable.
[I]t is virtually impossible logically to distinguish among ultimate facts,
evidence, and conclusions. Essentially any allegation in a pleading must be an
assertion that certain occurrences took place. The pleading spectrum, passing from
evidence through ultimate facts to conclusions, is largely a continuum varying only in
the degree of particularity with which the occurrences are described. Karim-Panahi
v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Weinstein &
Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform: Drafting Pleading Rules, 57 Colum.
L.Rev. 518, 520 521 (1957)).
Moreover, the second and third stage require a comparison between a
plaintiffs allegations alleged to be conclusory (e.g., discriminatory animus
(Iqbal), or restraints effected by a contract, combination, or conspiracy (Twombly)),
and defendants alternative innocent explanation (e.g. normal parallel market
behavior (Twombly), or combatting terrorism reasonably resulting in a higher
proportion of middle eastern prisoners (Iqbal)). Where defendants cannot present an
innocent alternative in stage three, the plausibility attack fails and the conclusory
allegation is entitled to the presumption of truth. See Moss I multi-stage analysis,
supra. In Starr v. Baca, the court added to this analysis: If there are two alternative
explanations, one advanced by defendant and the other advanced by plaintiff, both of
which are plausible, plaintiff's complaint survives. Starr at 1215-16. cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012). See also Moss I, II, III, infra; Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v. United
States, 648 F.3d 708, 721 (9th Cir.2011) (allegation that product performed below
industry standards certainly sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion); Daniels
Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir.2010); OSU Student Alliance v.
Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2012) (allegation that decision to destroy college
newspaper bins was within college administrations control was conclusory but
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c. Example Analysis: Moss I:
Moss I demonstrates the analytical progression. Moss plaintiffs were protesters
opposing President Bush while he dined at a Portland, Oregon restaurant. Two
groups of protestersone pro-Bush and one anti-Bushhad formed near a patio
where the President was seated. After the President was seated, the anti-Bush
protesters were moved by U.S. Secret Service agents to a location further away.
Pro-Bush protesters also situated nearby, but in a different location, were not
moved. The anti-Bush protestors alleged the move was motivated by viewpoint
discrimination against their anti-Bush viewpoint in violation of the First
Amendment. Moss I at 971.
Stage One: Identification of bald allegations: In carrying their burden in
their Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Moss I Defendants identified two conclusions in the
complaint they asserted were implausible conclusions: (1) impermissible motive on
the Agents part and (2) Agents acted in conformity with an officially-authorized
sub rosa Secret Service policy of suppressing speech critical of the President. Id. at
970.
Stage Two: Evaluate Supporting Factual Allegations: [O]ur next step is to
evaluate Plaintiffs' specific factual allegations to determine whether we can
reasonably infer a First Amendment violation from those facts. In this step, a court
examines the factual content of a challenged claim. A claim has facial plausibility
. . . when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at
969. In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory
factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly
suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief. Id. at 969
Stage Three: Compare Competing Innocent Alternatives: The Moss
Plaintiffs identified two sets of facts that plausibly suggested improper motive: (a) the
relocation of anti-Bush demonstrators while leaving the pro-Bush demonstrators in

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place, and (b) diners and guests inside the restaurant were not ordered to leave the
restaurant despite even closer proximity to the President. Id. at 971. The Secret
Service asserted an alternative explanation: The agents were following content
neutral policies, and that the move was motivated by legitimate security concerns.
Plaintiffs contended that the formal policy was a sham. Id. at 966.
The Court analyzed the alternatives. On the first set of factsrelocation of
only the anti-Bush demonstratorsthe Court of Appeals relied on admissions in the
complaint that plaintiffs were moved an equal distance from the President, and
suffered no diminished ability to exercise their rights. The court reasoned that if the
agents motive was suppression of Plaintiffs' anti-Bush message, then they would
have moved plaintiffs to an area where the President could not hear their
demonstration, or at least to an area farther from the Inn then the position that the
pro-Bush demonstrators occupied. Id. at 971. Because the complaint admitted the
agents instructed to move the protesters to an equidistant location, the facts alleged
even if entirely truedid not burden expression on viewpoint.
On the second set of factsdiners inside the restaurant were not movedthe
Court of Appeals reasoned that the different treatment of diners and guests in the Inn,
who did not engage in expressive activity of any kind and were not located in the
public areas outside of the Inn, however, offers little if any support for such an
inference. Id. at 971.
The Court of Appeals concluded the complaints allegation of viewpoint
discrimination was not supported by alleged facts making the allegation plausible. Id.
It offered that the plaintiffs could possibly allege additional facts to support their
conclusion, and remanded with instructions that plaintiffs could amend. Id. at 975.
As will be seen, present Defendants neither erect nor traverse Moss Is multi-
stage framework. Most defendants ignore their burden of identifying conclusory
allegations, instead merely denying concepts such as conspiracy. Because at this
stage Defendants alone bear the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under the

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Rules they assert, all motions which fail to traverse the multi-step analysis must be
denied on this failure alone. Navarro, supra at 732.
2. The OMNIBUS Fails to Establish a Violation of Rules 8(a) and (e)
The OMNIBUS fails to erect the relevant test for analysis of claims under Rule
8. The Omnibus focusses its attack other features of the FAC, such as exhibits, or the
FAC as a whole. Such criticism, even if true, fails to establish a violation of these
Rules under Rule 41(b). Rule 8(a)(2) governs claims, not pleadings or exhibits.
Rule 8(a)(2) speaks of a short and plain statement of each claim, not a short and
plain pleading. Crumpacker v. Civiletti, 90 F.R.D. 326, 329 (D.C. Ind.1981) (citing
5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 1217 (1969)). The test of
a claim is whether it gives the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)
(emphasis added); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).
The OMNIBUS attacks the FAC on numerous points irrelevant to analysis
under of a claim: The FACs length (251 pages long with over 1250 pages of
attachments); dissatisfaction with the number and organization of exhibits (The
attachments appear to be exhibits but are not readily identifiable, indexed, marked, or
organized); the number of defendants (The FAC identifies over 58 defendants);
California Coalitions date of incorporation (OMNIBUS 5:5-8), that the FAC
mentions Lexevia while Lexevia is not a named plaintiff (OMNIBUS 5:2-4);
California Coalitions local and pro hac vice counsel (OMNIBUS 2:25-3:3); the use
of acronyms to identify groups of defendants (The list of Stuart Assault Coordinator
Defendants, named in numerous claims, is buried somewhere among numerous
acronyms and disorganized lists scattered throughout the FAC.); and even authors an
evidentiary soliloquy disparaging Plaintiff California Coalitions counsel (OMNIBUS
2:21-3:3). None of these attackseven if accurateare relevant to analysis of the
subject matter of Rule 8(a) and (e): claims.
To the extent Defendants do focus on claims, they highlight claim structures

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that are entirely permissible, such as multi-theory combination-claim or over 130
titled claims and many of those contain multiple sub-claims shotgun style . . .
OMNIBUS at 3:9. Multiple-party claims and multiple-claim complaints are
permissible: [M]ultipary, multiclaim complaints . . . should be stated as succinctly
and plainly as possible. Crumpacker at 329. Multiple-theory claims are also
permitted. See Rule 8(d)(2) Alternative Statements of a Claim or Defense.
Though the present FAC satisfies the relevant notice standard of Rule 8, and
though defendants may far more efficiently resolve these issues through discovery,
Plaintiff represents a present ability, though no desire, to separate multiparty and
multi-theory claims into numerous independent claims, and hereby request leave to
amend should the Court determine such protraction is necessary.
3. The FAC Complies With the Courts December 23, 2013 Order
The OMNIBUS incorrectly asserts the FAC fails to comply with the Courts
December 23 Order in three ways (OMNIBUS 5:19-6:6):
1. It is pages longer: The Courts December Order explicitly disclaimed any
limitation on length. Citing McHenry, the Court acknowledged that length or
verbosity alone are not inappropriate. A complaint that is pages longer, is
prolix, or contains verbosity cannot be a violation of the December 23, 2013
Order or any Rule.
Though not required, Plaintiffs did eliminate some passages which were not
strictly necessary to support claims, such as the table articulating the Family Federal
Rights in the original complaint, and certain of the more argumentative passages.
Plainitffs intent was to delete passages that were not absolutely necessary to support
claims. As will be seen in rebutting defendants plausibility attacks below, every
remaining passage is necessary factual context required under Twombly and Iqbal.
There are no extraneous passages in the FAC. Indeed, Defendants presently
attack the FAC for not supplying enough factual detail, and insist on even more.
2. It adds new defendants: The December Order included no restriction from

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adding Defendants. In fact, the December Order directed Plaintiff STUART to add
details supporting tolling and equitable estoppel defenses which also form the basis
for the new defendants To the extent Stuart contends that equitable tolling should
apply, he must set forth specific allegations in his amended complaint to support such
a theory. Order at 8:21. Plaintiffs complied by adding 30 pages of facts with
COUNT 3 detailing the MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, and various other factual
support for other claims elsewhere, such as COUNT 1 detailing each Defendants
behavior in the STUART ASSAULT, breaking out each state law claim in COUNT
2, expanding details against SIMI and BATTSON in COUNT 5 to address the
Eleventh Amendment defense they asserted, and the Court granted in part, in their
original motion. Each of these additions was required by the Court or Defendants
after the initial round of pleadings, and as Plaintiff warned, each response lengthened
the pleading. Because these facts also support claims for deprivation of rights and
racketeering against the CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS and GROCH, Plaintiff
added claims on these facts rather than filing a separate action in due course.
3. It contains a whole new set of claims for obstruction of justice:
The December Order did not prohibit Plaintiff from adding claims. The events
alleged in Count 4 NESTHUS OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE occurred after the
August 20, 2013 filing of the initial Complaint and obviously could not be included
in that pleading. The allegations are further instances of the illegal HARASSMENT
AND ABUSE by the ongoing criminal enterprises set forth in the initial Complaint,
and are properly pled in this Action. See, Doc. No. 4, Ex Parte Applicaiotn for
Emergency Harassment Restraining Order.
Exclusion of verbiage, argument, and rhetoric Risks Error
Defendants recite the Order directing Plaintiff to state claims without
unnecessary verbiage, argument, and rhetoric." Doc. No. 88, p. 9. Plaintiffs
respectfully submit that the FAC does not contain such matter, and to the extent
Defendants complain otherwise, this cannot be grounds to dismiss.

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Plaintiff suggests that the Court and Defendants have mischaracterized as
verbiage or rhetoric matter that is necessary to support claimsparticularly after
Twombly heightened pleading burdens for complaints. The FAC alleges numerous
conspiracies and enterprises under complex laws necessitating detailed pleading. The
tension between Rule 8s short, plain statement and Twomblys sufficient factual
detail requirements are in tension here as in many other recent cases grappling with
Twomblys new pleading burdens.
The claims are drafted in a uniform fashion which Plaintiff STUART and
counsel Webb have utilized in dozens collective years pleading matters in United
States District Court. Every claim begins with a first paragraph specifying (1) the
party/ies asserting the claim, (2) the defendant/s the claim is asserted against, and (3)
a general description of the facts, and (4) the authority asserted in the claim. For
example, Claim 1.1, 153 reads: This is a Claim by STUART against Defendants
ODO and ODO DOES 1 and 2, for deprivation of rights under color of law pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Cal. Const. art. I, 26.
Every claim concludes with a paragraph reciting the language of the statute or
law asserted, and identifying the party/ies injured. For example, Claim 1.1, 165:
In so acting, Defendants CULPABLY and UNREASONABLY breached one or
more PROFESSIONAL DUTIES, causing foreseeable injury to STUART in
deprivation of STUARTS right to not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States and Article I 7(a) and 26 of the Constitution of
the State of California (SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS).
The body of each claim contains paragraphs alleging details relevant to the
claim, and incorporates by reference to specific prior passages (identified by
acronyms) containing relevant allegations. For example, Claim 3.2 against GARSON
is six paragraphs. Paragraph 478 details GARSONS wrongdoing by referencing
acronyms which incorporate facts earlier alleged, such as GARSON PERJURY

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ONE which is defined at paragraph 378.
Defendants attack this use of acronyms within claims to reference lengthy
passages alleged elsewhere. By setting forth and labeling the passages outside of
claims, subsequent claims are considerably more short and plain, and substantial
duplication of long passages is avoided. Plaintiffs invite and would eagerly consider
any superior suggestion to accomplish short, plain pleading of claims.
Defendants Invitation to Modify Rule 8s Notice Standard Risks Error
Plaintiff respectfully suggests that Defendants assertion of the Courts
instruction to eliminate unnecessary verbiage, argument, and rhetoric invites a
substantial deviance from notice pleading standard of Rule 8. Modifying Rule 8 by
local rule or order is specifically prohibited by the Rules Enabling Act to the Rules
of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. 2072, provides in part:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of
practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States
district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and
courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.
(emphasis added). The substantive rights which the Rules may not abridge include
constitutional rights of free speech, due process, and jury trial. See Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 47073 (1965) (rules may not violate the Constitution); U.S. v.
Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir.1996) (local rule void for vagueness in violation
of Fifth Amendment due process); Standing Comm. on Discipline of U.S. Dist. Court
for Cent. Dist. of California v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1436-37 (9th Cir. 1995) (local
rule prohibiting courtroom speech overbroad because it purports to punish a great
deal of constitutionally protected speech, including true statements reflecting
adversely on the reputation or character of federal judges.). While insubstantial
burdens on rights may be appropriate if they pass some level of scrutiny, substantial
burdens are not. Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987); Bus. Guides, Inc. v.

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Chromatic Commc'ns Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 558 (1991) (Rule 11 sanctions
permitted only if sanctions insubstantial burden on Fifth and Seventh Amendment
rights).
Adding a prohibition for unnecessary verbiage, argument, and rhetoric
nowhere found in Rule 8 impermissibly modifies the unambiguous language of the
Rule. We give the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain meaning. Pavelic &
LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989). Indeed, Rule 8
prohibits nothing, but unambiguously requires merely that a pleading contain a short
plain statement of a clam. (emphasis added)
The Courts authority to fashion local rules is similarly restricted. Fed.R. Civ.
Pro. Rule 83(a)(2) provides: (2) Requirement of Form. A local rule imposing a
requirement of form must not be enforced in a way that causes a party to lose any
right because of a nonwillful failure to comply. Section (b) provides: No sanction
or other disadvantage may be imposed for noncompliance with any requirement not
in federal law, federal rules, or the local rules unless the alleged violator has been
furnished in the particular case with actual notice of the requirement. All said
about the rules of a district court must of course apply a fortiori to the rules of an
individual judge. 1988 Commentary to 28 U.S.C.A. 2071 (West)
Prohibiting verbiage, argument, or rhetoric is also another way of prohibiting
length (McHenry v. Renne, 74 F.3d 1172, 1177-80 (9th Cir. 1996)) is inconsistent
with the unambiguous Rule, (McCarthy, 2010 WL 2243354 at *1), deprives
Plaintiffs First, Fifth, and Seventh Amendment rights, and would constitute an abuse
of discretion by committing an error of law.
Other Orders or Rules are Irrelevant
Defendants claim Stuart has violated other Rules since day one. OMNIBUS
6:9. Rule 41(b) does not permit sanctions for violating other rules but these
Rulesthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants assert violations of other
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District Court for the Southern District, and this Courts Civil Case Procedures
regarding hearing scheduling rules (OMNIBUS 6:17-27),. These are not the relevant
Rules. 1988 Commentary to 28 U.S.C.A. 2071 (West).
3

Defendants citation to Yourish (docketed minute order held to be a formal
order) and World Thrust Films (Rule 41(b) dismissal for plaintiffs contumacious
disobedience of two docketed scheduling orders and one order to show cause
reversed because less drastic sanctions available) (OMNIBUS at 7:3-6) does not
expand the terms rule and order in Rule 41(b) to include violations of local
rules, oral orders or institutional General Orders of this District Court.
Public Policy, Prejudice, Simple Remedies
Though the OMNIBUS fails to carry any burden here as Defendants must
(Yourish at 990), the remaining factors of the Rule 41(b) analysis weigh against a
sanction. In cases that implicate important public policy concerns, the court should
weigh the public interest in the case and the preference for disposing of cases on their
merits prior to granting dismissal. United States v. National Medical Enters., Inc.,
792 F.2d 906, 913 (9th Cir.1986). In Dahl v. City of Huntington Beach, 84 F.3d 363,
366 (9th Cir. 1996) the Court of Appeals reversed a dismissal sanction despite a
documented history of discovery abuse and numerous prior sanctions against
plaintiffs counsel. Id. The underlying claim of police brutality in this case is a
serious one, calling into question the manner by which the state exercises its
monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Thus, the public has an interest in having
this case decided on the merits. See also Indus. Bldg. Materials, Inc. v.
Interchemical Corp., 278 F. Supp. 938, 949 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (drastic remedy of
sanction only appropriate where no less drastic measures available).

3
Plaintiffs have elsewhere petitioned that including Defendants home addresses in the initial
Complaint is not a violation of General Order 550, and Government Code 6254.1 is invalid ab
initio as a matter of law. See, Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application for Emergency Harassment
Restraining Order, Doc. No. 4. Superior Court employee Ms. Kristine Nesthus threats to retaliate
for Plaintiffs initiation of this Action is an indictable crime, and Ms. Nesthuss threats fall
somewhat short of an Order of a United States District Court Judge.

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This Action involves issues of public policy at least as important as police
brutalitythe integrity and obedience to fundamental state and federal laws of our
statewide family courts, their in-house private forensic psychology enterprises,
prevention of thousands of divorce lawyers in extorting and defrauding unwary
families and children in the crisis of a domestic dispute, the City of San Diego and
its City Attorneys Office and county law enforcement deploying violence under
color of law to persecute an officer of this Court for his support and advocacy for
federal processes and institutions and enforcement of the rights of his clients and
families and children statewide to equal rights, privileges and immunities under state
and federal law. More precious public interests are difficult to imagine.
Defendants have not and cannot establish prejudice at their first opposition to a
pleading; they have been on notice of Plaintiffs efforts and the CLAIM AND
DEMAND for years and have well-documented their own deplorable behavior in
public records now in their possession. This action is in its infancy, and the present
motions are most defendants first contesting appearance. In the absence of prejudice
to the opposing party, leave to amend must be freely granted. Foman v. Davis, 371
U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Wyshak v. City Nat. Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 826-27 (9th Cir.
1979).
The request for dismissal as a sanction nothing less than frivolous harassment
and expense-inducing delay. Numerous less drastic remedies such as clarification
through discovery and re-visitation through Rule 56 pruning motions are available
and far more efficient under these circumstances. [I]t would be burdensome to have
the district court prune a complaint at the pleading stage by making a determine
action with regard to each allegation within a cause of action that is legally
cognizable when viewed in its totality. Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 326 (2d Cir.
1996); Westways World Travel v. AMR Corp., 182 F. Supp.2d 952 (C.D. Calif. 2001).
Such an analysis is better done in the context of a motion for summary judgment
where the true facts, as opposed to the presumed facts, are established. Id.

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Conclusory allegation attacks are modernly addressed at the pleading stage through
the Moss I multi-stage analysis.
To the extent Defendants accuse particular claims of inconsistencies between
the claim title and defendants named in the Complaint (e.g. OMNIBUS at 4:5-6:8),
such inconsistencies are far more efficiently resolved through discovery or by
amendment. The purpose of Rule 8(a)(2) is to provide liberal pleading guidelines so
that the merits of plaintiffs' claims will not be decided on technicalities. In re Credit
Industrial Corp., 366 F.2d 402, 411 (2d Cir. 1966). To the extent that the pleadings
can be cured by the allegation of additional facts, the plaintiff should be afforded
leave to amend. Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern California Collection Serv.
Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir.1990) (citations omitted); Deeths v. Lucile Slater
Packard Children's Hosp. at Stanford, 1:12-CV-02096-LJO, 2013 WL 6185175
(E.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2013). Plaintiffs represent an ability, though no desire, to amend
to address Defendants complaints, and should the Court desire hereby request leave
to do so.
4. Dismissal With Prejudice is Not Discretionary
Defendants assert that, as an additional ground for dismissal, the court has
discretion to dismiss for Rule 8 and 9 pleading failures without leave to amend, and
that discretion is particularly broad where, as here, plaintiff has previously amended
the complaint. OMNIBUS 7:7-8:16. They cite Rules 8 and 9 for authority for such
discretion, and assert such that such discretion is supported by Metzler, Cafasso,
and Nevijel.
This assertion is frivolously inaccurate. Defendants previously asserted Rule 8
as a basis for dismissal with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). Superior Court
Defendants Motion to Dismiss, Doc. No. 16-1, 9-10. In opposition, Plaintiffs noted
that Rule 8 is not an appropriate ground for dismissal with prejudice under 12(b)(6),
and that Superior Court Defendants overreached in insisting on dismissal with
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Defendants motion on this ground. Doc. No. 88, 8:24-9:6.
Defendants OMNIBUS re-casts this earlier failed attempt under Rule 12(b)(6)
as a frivolous request for a sanction under Rule 41(b), and also at the courts
discretion. They assert the same arguments and authority, now asserting not Rule
12(b)(6), but purely by a phantom discretion to dismiss. The authority to support a
discretionary dismissal is even less persuasive than under Rule 12(b)(6): Metzler
was a dismissal on a third attempt to amend to plead the same missing elements three
times. At each dismissal the court specified what elements plaintiffs were required,
but failed, to plead. Metzler at 1062 (loss causation, strong inference of scienter
and falsity). Id. at 1060. Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637
F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2011) was on plaintiffs Rule 15 motion for leave to amend
after defendants brought a successful Rule 12(c) motion to dismiss. Plaintiff had
amended three times and conducted two years of acrimonious discovery in which
plaintiff expressly admitted that her amended complaint did not assert a false claim.
Id. Plaintiff attempted to recover by moving under Rule 15 and proffering a 733 page
third amended complaint, yet the proffered pleading still failed to allege even a single
false claim. Id.
In Nevijel plaintiffs conceded (perhaps unwisely) that their third complaint did
not comply with Rule 8, and sought leave to amend again. On plaintiffs concession
of noncompliance, the district court dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs on appeal
contended that that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the case
under Rule 41(b) because less drastic alternatives were available. The Court of
Appeals found that given Plaintiffs admission of noncompliance with Rule 8, and the
aggravating circumstances of three other cases brought by the same plaintiff in
different state and federal venues against the same insurance defendants on the same
legal theories that had been dismissed for the same reasons, the district court did not
abuse its discretion to dismiss rather than search for less drastic alternatives. Id.
Nevijals bizarre facts are not present here. Rule 41(b) is directed to a

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plaintiffnot his counsel. Whatever inaccurate and unprofessional aspersions Mr.
Lucas craves to cast upon counsel for California Coalition, Mr. Webb, the remarks
are irrelevant under Rule 41(b) as Plaintiffs Stuart and California Coalition have
brought no prior suit on any present defendant on any present claim in this or any
other court, and may not be sanctioned. See Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery
filed herewith.
Moreover, Nevijel has been repeatedly diminished as authority. Since 1981,
this Circuit and others have found that even verbose, prolix, and conclusory
complaints and voluminous exhibits fully compliant with Rule 8. In Hearns v. San
Bernardino Police Dep't, 530 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2008) the Court of Appeals
revisited Nevijels application of the abuse of discretion standard under Rule 41(b):
We review a Rule 41(b) dismissal for abuse of discretion. To do so, we must
necessarily consider the legal question of whether the district court correctly
dismissed without prejudice the original complaint on Rule 8 grounds. A district
court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law. Id. at 1129
(internal citations omitted). Declining to follow Nevijel, the Court of Appeals in
Hearns reversed the district courts dismissal of a complaint under Rule 41(b) as an
abuse of discretion because, by misapplying Rule 8, the district court committed an
error of law which is, by definition, an abuse of discretion. Id.
Contemporary courts have also specifically declined to follow Nevijal,
following instead the analysis in McHenry and Hearns. In Fid. Nat. Title Ins. Co. v.
Castle, 2011 WL 6141310 (N.D. Cal. 2011) defendants attacked a RICO complaint
against 52 defendants, 12 counts, 44 pages, 565 pages of exhibits, 13 plaintiffs, with
claims broken into parts and in which plaintiffs regularly refer to defendants'
without specifying exactly which defendant or defendants is liable for the alleged
acts. [T]he Court finds no fault with the length and complexity of the complaint, as
that is a necessary consequence of the number and complexity of the schemes
alleged. Id. Dismissal as a sanction is particularly inappropriate plaintiff is

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proceeding in pro se. See Sathianathan v. Smith Barney, Inc., C 04-2130 SBA, 2004
WL 3607403 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2005), n. 15 (declining to follow Nevijel where
plaintiff proceeding in pro se). See also, Karim-Panahi, supra at 623 (declining to
follow Nevijel where plaintiff proceeds pro se).
5. Contemporaneous Analysis of Similar Complaints Held Satisfactory
Contemporary analysis within this Circuit and others has rejected length or
complexity as a violation of Rule 8. Perez-Falcon v. Synagro West, LLC, 2011 WL
6752533, *3 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (motion to dismiss denied because although plaintiffs
complaint was hardly a model of clarity or elucidation, it gave defendant fair notice
of claim); U.S. v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003) (Some
complaints are windy but understandable. Surplusage can and should be ignored.);
Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir.2004) (lengthy complaint not so
confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any,
is well disguised) (internal quotation omitted); See also McCarthy v. Fuller, 2010
WL 2243354, *1 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (complaint should not be dismissed if it is windy,
but understandable. [The] judge should bypass the dross and get on with the case);
Catalan v. Vermillion Ranch Ltd. Partnership, 2007, 2007 WL 38135, *5 (D.C.
Colo.) (74 pages total, 65 page statement of facts, ten claims, six plaintiffs, seven
defendants, RICO allegations) (The length of the Complaint appears to be a result of
the number of Plaintiffs and complexity of the claims, rather than a problem with the
Complaint being disorganized and repetitive.); In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Secs.
Litigation, 2003 WL 22999478 (D.C.N.Y.) (326 pages, 840 paragraphs, myriad
defendants, particularly complex accounting fraud held understandable that the
complaint was quite large); Burke v. Dowling, 944 F.Supp. 1036 (D.C.N.Y. 1995)
(115 pages, 231 paragraphs, seven causes of action, ten defendants); Morgan v.
Kobrin Secs., Inc., 649 F.Supp. 1023, 1027 (D.C.Ill.1986); Crumpacker v. Civiletti,
90 F.R.D. 326, 329 (N.D.Ind.1981) (80 pages, certainly prolix); ReSource N.E. of
Long Island, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, D.C.N.Y.2000, 80 F.Supp.2d 52 (court

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declined to dismiss needlessly prolix and redundant 49 page complaint because it was
not so opaque as to defy understanding or prevent defendants from answering); Niles
v. Nelson, 72 F.Supp.2d 13 (D.C.N.Y.1999 ) (accepting lengthy, rambling complaint
because defendant was able to comprehend plaintiffs causes of action fully and
submit answer); Murray v. Sevier, 993 F.Supp. 1394 (D.C.Ala. 1997) (adopting state
courts lack of concern over complaints length and format); Burke v. Dowling, 944
F.Supp. 1036, 1049 (D.C.N.Y. 1995) (Absent extraordinary circumstances,
however, it is an abuse of discretion for a court to dismiss a complaint under Rule 8
without granting leave to amend.); Giuliano v. Everything Yogurt, Inc., 819 F.Supp.
240 (D.C.N.Y.1993) (when pleading contains too much detail, the appropriate
remedy is to strike immaterial or redundant allegations, rather than dismiss
complaint); Carrigan v. California State Legislature, 263 F.2d 560 (9
th
Cir. 1959),
cert. denied 79 S.Ct. 901, (1959).
6. Defendants Demonstrate Abundant Ability to Defend
Defendants own behavior demonstrates they are quite able to defend
aggressively. Crumpacker v. Civiletti, 90 F.R.D. 326, 329 (D.C.Ind.1981) (Given
Kobrin's well-briefed Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it is clear he is fully apprised of the
charges against him.). The OMNIBUS accurately identifies over 130 "titled" claims
and many of those contain multiple sub-claims, (OMNIBUS 3:4-10), numerous
claims against all defendants under 42 U.S. 1983 (OMNIBUS 13:24-25), 31
RICO claims alleged against the SDCBA (OMNIBUS 15:21), new claims in the
FAC (OMNIBUS 1:12); The list of Stuart Assault Coordinator Defendants, named
in numerous claims, (OMNIBUS 9:11); plural damage claims (OMNIBUS 5:5,
12:16); plaintiffs' claims are alleged violations of their civil rights actionable under
42 U.S.C. 1983 (OMNIBUS 13:9-10). One hundred eighty pages of joinders
attacking dozens of claims on dozens of issues demonstrates that though these
defendants have certainly failed to understand and comply with the laws they violate
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of any pleadings inscrutability. More likely they are deterred by the complexity of
the statutes posed against them,
4
and by what must be an unpleasant task of
accounting for years of compounded criminality they have inflicted on their own
fiduciaries, clients, justice systems, and tens of thousands of families and children
state and nationwide.
7. Defendants Improperly Introduce Extrinsic Evidence
Plaintiff has separately objected and moved to take testimony from Mr. Lucas
regarding his substantive witness testimony regarding Rule 8 issues. The scurrilous
characterizations of Mr. Webb are unprofessional, vigorously contested, and
extraneous to any issue relevant in this proceeding. See Motion for Leave to Conduct
Early Discovery. Defendants have injected Mr. Lucas testimony as a percipient and
expert witness into a motion that cannot weight evidence. In so doing, they prejudice
Plaintiffs rights to a fair hearing on this motion in violation of the Rules of Civil
Procedure and constituting a deprivation of Plaintiffs Fifth and Seventh Amendment
rights under the Constitution of the United States. The proscribed remedy for such
irregular procedure is to convert the present motion into a Rule 56 motion, permit
cross examination of the proposed evidence under Rule 45, and subpoena Mr. Lucas
to testify at hearing. Fed.R. Civ. Pro. 56(d). In the event Mr. Lucas declaration is
submitted in bad faith, sanctions may be sought. Fed.R. Civ. Pro. 56(h). Plaintiffs
hereby and by accompanying motion so move.

4
42 U.S.C. 1985(1), (2), and (3) is drafted as a single sentence of 590 words in six
paragraphs. It has been generously assailed by Justice Stevens as somewhat difficult to parse.
Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 724, (1983). RICO has been bewailed as "arcane," "tormented,"
"complicated," "agonizingly difficult" and "fraught with arcane mysteries." Bryant v. Yellow
Freight Sys., 989 F. Supp. 966, 968 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Macy's E., Inc. v. Emergency Envtl. Servs.,
Inc., 925 F. Supp. 191, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("arcane eccentricities of RICO jurisprudence");
Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 677 (4th Cir. 1989) (a "tormented statute"); Sadighi v.
Daghighfekr, 36 F. Supp. 2d 267 (D.S.C. 1999) (noting statute's "torment"); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493
U.S. 455, 465 (1990); Cent. Distribs. of Beer [,] Inc. v. Conn., 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir. 1993) ("one
of the most complex statutes ever enacted by Congress"); Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1435
(7th Cir. 1990) (a complex statute); Murray v. Midwest Real Estate Inv. Co., No. 98C1569, 1998
WL 919694, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 1998) ("exceedingly complicated").

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B. Statutes Of Limitations Bar No Claim
All Defendants assert statute of limitations defenses. OMNIBUS Doc. No. 131
at 7; JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS Doc. No. 139, 8:16-25; GORE Doc. No. 141-1, 2:6-
23; DOYNE Doc. No. 143-1, 3-5:15; FEDERAL Doc. No. 145, 2:17, 4:16. Statute of
Limitations is an affirmative defense for which Defendant bear the burden of proof.
Wyshak v. City Nat. Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 826-27 (9th Cir. 1979). A Defendant
asserting a statute of limitations attack must address three variables: (1) the length of
the relevant limitations period for the claim (term), (2) the date the period began to
run (accrual), and (3) the date the action is deemed filed. At the Rule 12 stage,
Defendants bear the burden of proving each element from the face of the Complaint.
Graham v. Taubman, 610 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.1979). If those variables indicate a
limitation period has expired, a party facing a properly-established limitation defense
may assert statutory or equitable relief including for present purposes (a) tolling and
(b) estoppel.
5

Defendant offer scant analysis, mistaking this case for a single incident
scenario. Plaintiffs offer the Court a more robust analysis.
1. Term
Civil Rights Claims: Defendants assert terms of two years applicable to section
1983 and 1985 actions (OMNIBUS 11:1-26; Sup.Ct. 8:22-25; DOYNE Doc. No.
143-1, 4:1-3), others parallel. Californias two year statute of limitations for personal
injuries has been identified as generally applicable, but determining which state
claim is most analogous requires examination of each claim. McCluny v. Silliman,
28 U.S. 270, 276 (1830) (federal courts look to the specific injury asserted to
determine the state law to apply). [T]he Court has not mechanically applied a state
statute of limitations simply because a limitations periods is absent from the federal
statute. State legislatures do not devise their limitations periods with national interests

5
A table Court and counsel may find useful in analysis of statutes of limitations issues is
available at 4 Am. Jur. Trials 441, VII, Solving Statutes of Limitation Problems.

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in mind, and it is the duty of the federal courts to assure that the importation of state
law will not frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national policies.
Although state law is our primary guide in this area, it is not, to be sure, our exclusive
guide. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975).
Claims most closely analogous to the present claims subject to longer terms
under California law, include actions for breach of written contract (Counts 2, 11)
C.C.P. 337 (three years); actions based upon fraud, duress, mistake (Counts 2, 11)
C.C.P. 338(d) (four years); and liability created by statute C.C.P. (three years).
6

Borrowing Any Limitation Is Unnecessary, and Would Frustrate Purposes
Adoption of a two year statutory period in this case would frustrate the
purposes of the Civil Rights Act. State limitations periods will not be borrowed if
their application would be inconsistent with the underlying policies of the federal
statute. Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., supra, 383 U.S. at 701; Board of
County Commissioners v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 352; Occidental Life Ins. Co.
of California v. E.E.O.C., 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977). The Court may decline to
borrow state law when the applicable state limitations period would have frustrated
the policy of the federal statute, concluding that in such a case no limitations period
governs the suit. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S.
143, 157 (1987).
The purpose of the Civil Rights Act was to prohibit precisely the abuse of State
authority here allegedconspiracy to deprive United States citizens of equal
protection of the laws. There can be no doubt at least since Ex parte Virginia, that
Congress has the power to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against
those who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity,
whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it. . . . First, it might, of
course, override certain kinds of state laws. . . . Second, it provided a remedy where
state law was inadequate. . . . The third aim was to provide a federal remedy where

66
BIERER asserts Californias one year statute for legal malpractice claims is analogous. Doc.
No. 135-1, 5:11-21. No plaintiff asserts legal malpractice in this action.

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the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice. The
opposition to the measure complained that It overrides the reserved powers of the
States. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961) (internal citations omitted).
The FAC details coordinated malingering of petulant state and local officials
deploying state-sponsored violence in concert with private wealth to impede, delay,
and obstruct Plaintiffs efforts to redress grievances in state and federal executive and
law enforcement agencies, state courts, and in this United States District Court
precisely the evils the Civil Rights Act was provided to prohibit and remedy. To
appease such belligerence by gratuitously borrowing from their own forums
abbreviated personal injury limitations statute to cut off this action rewards the
behavior the statutes were intended to deteran ongoing, coordinated, highly
effective pestilence onto tens of thousands of United States citizens whose interests
are today present, and perpetrate an obscene affront to our most cherished civic
values of liberty and equal justice under law. This Court is bound by no state or
federal limitations term, and it need not, and should not, borrow Californias or any
states law that would countenance those very state actors criminal violations of
federal law in oppression of some of the States most vulnerable citizens.
United States courts have reasoned that parties asserting federal rights should
not be handicapped simply because they assert federal law claims that could also be
brought under state law. The purpose of the longer limitation period is to give a
person with a federal claim at least as long an opportunity to sue as a person with a
state claim. Herm, 663 F.2d at 681. Caproni v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 15 F.3d 614,
618 (6th Cir. 1994). Though many Section 1983 actions are based upon facts
alleging personal injury, for actions sounding in other state law causes of action, the
federal limitations period should be no shorter than a period for the state law tort. Id.
RICO: There is no limitation term for RICO. District courts may, but need
not, borrow the four year limitation period of the Clayton Act. Agency Holding
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987). Extortion claims are

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subject to a five year limitations period of the Hobbs Act under 18 U.S.C. 3282.
United States v. Bucci, 839 F.2d 825, 829 (1st Cir. 1988).
7

Lanham Act: Like RICO, district courts may borrow state limitations
periods for fraud (C.C.P. 338(d)). Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am.,
Inc., 603 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010).
2. Accrual
The OMNIBUS focuses on the April 15, 2010 STUART ASSAULT as the sole
accrual event relevant for its statute of limitations defense. Superior Court identifies
an April 10, 2008 date regarding DOYNE in Count 11. Doc. No. 139, 8:22-25.
These events are not the appropriate accrual date for any claim.
Federal Law Claims: Though date of injury is an accrual event for single-
incident claims, the last overt act rule is used in continuing conspiracy claims.
Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F.2d 649, 654 (10th Cir. 1990) (continuing conspiracy
where defendants out to get plaintiff); Lauter v. Anoufrieva, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1060
(C.D. Cal. 2009). A continuing conspiracy claim arises where defendants behavior
is an ongoing or series of wrongs, such as an ongoing refusal to perform according to
duty. Pace Indus., Inc. v. Three Phoenix Co., 813 F.2d 234, 237 (9th Cir. 1987).
This is not a single incident action. All authority cited by Defendants relies on
single incident scenarioswhere a plaintiff experiences a single injury and later
brings suit challenged as untimely.
Similarly under RICO, each new, overt act that is calculated to effect the object
of the conspiracy renews the running of the statute. Grunewald v. United States, 353
U.S. 391, 39697 (1957); United States v. Craft, 105 F.3d 1123, 1125 (6th Cir. 1997).
FAC Continuing Conspiracy Allegations: Almost every claim in the FAC is

7
DOYNE asserts that RICO claims are subject to a California medical malpractice limitations
period under C.C.P. 340.5. Doc. No. 143-1, 4:3-5. DOYNE is not a health care provider but a law
enforcement investigator. In this case he was hired as a mediator. FAC 215, 814. BIERER
asserts that the limitations term for RICO claims based on the STUART ASSAULT are subject to
California law. Doc. No. 135-1, 5:26-28. BIERER and DOYNES citation to state law for RICO
claims is inaccurateRICO borrows from federal law. Agency Holding, supra.

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alleged in conspiracy.
8
The conspiracies are themselves alleged as interrelated;
STUART ASSAULT is alleged but one set of events in a series of engagement
between Plaintiffs and various elements of ongoing racketeering enterprises. The
FAC alleges the series as including the 2007-2009 mail fraud, (RICO COUNTS 1-2),
the DOYNE TERRORISM in 2008-09 (COUNT 11), the STUART ASSAULT in
2010, the MALICIOUS PROSECUTION in 2011-2013, and the COMMISSIONS
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE in 2008 and the NESTHUS OBSTRUCTION OF
JUSTICE in 2013. Each conspiracy furthered a pattern of HARASSMENT AND
ABUSE. FAC 1194. Stuart has remained at jeopardy or under execution of
sentence on these false charges until May 15, 2013, and remains at jeopardy under
two illegal protective orders to this day. FAC 419-466. As each of these crimes
were committed in concerted efforts, they are alleged, as they must be, as multiple
conspiracies and enterprises.
The relevant date for accrual for acts in conspiracy and enterprise is the last
overt act of commission; in this case no earlier than the most recent NESTHUS
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE occurring on September 19, 2013. FAC 537. Even
accepting arguendo Defendants assertion that a two year statute applies, any action
filed before September 19, 2015 is timely.
RICO accrual: Accrual restarts each time a plaintiff experiences a new and
independent injury. Venegas v. Wagner, 704 F.2d 1144, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983).
Fraud claims (Racketeering Counts 1, 2) accrue upon date of discovery of all
elements of the fraud. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1102 (2d Cir.
1988). Subsequent injury from the same conspiracy resets the accrual date. Thomas

8
FAC 145, 147, 310, 370 (STUART ASSAULT COORDINATORS), 368 COUNT 3
(MALICIOUS PROSECUTION/PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT/FALSE
IMPRISONMENTS), 495 (GROCH/CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS), 509 (NESTHUS
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE), 553 (BATTSON/SIMI), 639 (SUPERVISING
DEFENDANTS), COUNTS 9, 10 (1985, 86 COLOR OF LAW DEFENDANTS), 808 (DOYNE
TERRORISM), COUNT 12, 913 (LANHAM ACT), 926, 955, 1041, 1141, 1152, 1165, 1182
(ALL RICO COUNTS), RICO COUNTS 8, 9, 10 (RICO CONSPIRACIES), 1184-86 (FICO
CONSPIRACIES).

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v. Miller, 928 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1991); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge
Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (9th Cir.1989) ("To be liable, each participant in the
conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each participant must at
least share the common objective of the conspiracy."). Bankers Trust at 1103
(RICO); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Ammann, 838 F.2 4 (9
th
Cir. 1987).
Accrual for the Racketeering claim (as opposed to the predicate act claim) does not
occur until the plaintiff discovers both the injury and pattern. Bivens Gardens Office
Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank of Fla., Inc., 906 F.2d 1546 (11
th
Cir. 1990).
Here, the complex mail and honest services fraud schemes were well-disguised
by fiduciaries to STUART: DOYNE, BLANCHET, VIVIANO, WOHLFEIL and
SCHALL. Moreno v. Sanchez, 106 Cal.App.4th 1415 (2003) (color of law actors are
fiduciaries to citizens). Discovery of the fraudulent schemes could not have occurred
before the April 10, 2010 STUART ASSAULT.
Claims based on COUNT 3 (MALICIOUS PROSECUTION and all federal
claims dependent thereon) cannot accrue before the prosecution has ended. Brummett
v. Camble, 946 F.2d 1178, 1184 (5th Cir. 1991).
Fraud ClaimsDelayed Discovery: In addition to enabling an equitable
estoppel, fraudulent concealment delays accrual until a plaintiff in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, should have discovered the facts underlying the alleged fraud.
Sterlin v. Biomune Systems, 154 F.3d 1191, 1201 (10th Cir.1998). Most Defendants
owe one or more special duties to Plaintiff, imposing additional duties of disclosure
and delay for breach of such duties. FAC COUNT 12 (PROFESSIONAL
DUTIES). Delayed accrual of a cause of action is viewed as particularly
appropriate where the relationship between the parties is one of special trust such as
that involving a fiduciary, confidential or privileged relationship. Moreno v.
Sanchez, 106 Cal.App.4th 1415 (2003); Johnson v. Haberman & Kassoy, 201 Cal.
App. 3d 1468, 247 Cal. Rptr. 614 (2d Dist. 1988).
The FAC alleges ongoing fraudulent concealment of the ENTERPRISES and

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CONSPIRACIES operating as a cabal (FAC 948), as well as policies, habits, and
customs to deprive Plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws (COUNT 9). Defendants
have not asserted a date of discovery for concealed claims, as they must to carry their
burden at this stage or any stage, a date of discovery. Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co.,
614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980).
The OMNIBUS fails to identify any overt acts other than the STUART
ASSAULT, citing McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 673-674 (1991)
and claiming a statute begins to run when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of
the injury. McDougal neither holds nor discusses such a rule. McDougal holds that
both Sections 1985 and 1983 run from an accrualit does not articulate that
accrual occurs upon knowledge or reason to know of injury.
State Law Claims: Californias discovery rule delays accrual until a plaintiff
discovers all elements of the cause of action. Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 35
Cal.4th 797, 806 (2005); Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 21 Cal.4th 383, 397 (1999). All
claims in Counts 2, each assertion of Cal. Const. Art. I sec. 26, and the unjust
enrichment and state law fraud and breach of contract claims (Counts 9-11) are
subject to state law statutes of limitation which, like the federal law analysis above,
could not have begun to run before the NESTHUS OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE.
3. Tolling
Tolling and estoppel are derived from state law. Morales v. City of Los
Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2000). Motions to dismiss cannot be granted
"if the factual and legal issues are not sufficiently clear to permit [the court] to
determine with certainty whether the doctrine [of equitable tolling] could be
successfully invoked." Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1207
(9th Cir.1995). Running of a limitations period is tolled where defendants had notice
of a claim, pursued the claim reasonably and in good faith, the defendants have not
been prejudiced by the delay. Ervin v. Los Angeles Cnty., 848 F.2d 1018, 1019 (9th
Cir. 1988); Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 31 Cal.4th 363, 370 (2003). SAC and CITY

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ATTORNEY Defendants received notice STUARTS claim in April, 2010, with the
CLAIM AND DEMAND. FAC 353. COUNT 3. Plaintiffs delay in pursuing this
Action was reasonable and in good faithit was caused entirely by Defendants
threats, HARASSMENT AND ABUSE, and heinous illegal persecution and FALSE
IMPRISONMENTS in People v. Stuart. No Defendant can claim prejudice as most
facts underlying these allegations are preserved in their own business files and public
records. Precision Inst. Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 814 (1945); Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 1985).
Statutes are also tolled during the disability of imprisonment. C.C.P. 335.1;
Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). As STUART was illegally
imprisoned or under suspended sentence from about February 21, 2011 until May
15, 2013, no term could have run during that time. FAC 402.
4. Estoppel
It is well settled that where delay in commencing an action is induced by the
conduct of the defendant, he cannot avail himself of the defense of the statute [of
limitations]. Precision Inst. Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324
U.S. 806, 814 (1945); Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir.
1985); Gaglione v. Coolidge, 134 Cal.App.2d 518, 527 (1955). [W]hen a defendant
has had notice from the beginning that the plaintiff sets up and is trying to enforce a
claim against it because of specified conduct, the reasons for the statute of limitations
do not exist, and we are of opinion that a liberal rule should be applied. New York
Cent. & H.R.R. Co. v. Kinney, 260 U.S. 340, 346 (1922). Statutes of limitations are
not so rigid that under certain circumstances principles of equity and justice will not
allow them to be extended or tolled. Kleinecke v. Montecito Water Dist., 147
Cal.App.3d 240, 245 (1983). Equitable estoppel will preclude a defendant from
pleading the bar of the statute of limitations where the plaintiff was induced to refrain
from bringing a timely action by the fraud, misrepresentation or deceptions of
defendant. Ateeq v. Najor, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1351, 1356 (1993). Equitable tolling

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applies when the plaintiff is prevented from asserting a claim by wrongful conduct on
the part of the defendant, or when extraordinary circumstances beyond the plaintiff's
control made it impossible to file a claim on time. Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238,
1242 (9th Cir. 1999).
United States District Courts within California apply tolling principles
consistent with California law. A defendant may also be estopped from asserting the
statute of limitations as a defense to an untimely action under a theory of equitable
estoppel, if his conduct actually and reasonably induced a plaintiff to forbear filing
suit within the applicable limitations period. Lauter v. Anoufrieva, 642 F. Supp. 2d
1060, 1101 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Ateeq v. Najor, supra). [M]isleading, deceptive
or otherwise contrived action or scheme, in the course of committing the wrong, that
is designed to mask the existence of a cause of action tolls the running of a statute
while defendants engage in the scheme. Riddell v. Riddell Washington Corp., 866
F.2d 1480, 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1989). A defendant's fraud in concealing a cause of
action against him will toll the statute of limitations, and that tolling will last as long
as the plaintiff's reliance on the misrepresentations is reasonable. Grisham v. Philip
Morris USA, Inc., 40 Cal.4th 623, 637, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 735, 151 P.3d 1151 (2007). A
plaintiff alleging fraudulent concealment must establish that his failure to have notice
of his claim was the result of the affirmative conduct by the defendant, or
extraordinary circumstances beyond the plaintiffs control Conmar Corp. v. Mitsui
& Co. (U.S.A.), Inc., 858 F.2d 499, 505 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1010 (1989);
Stroll at 1242.
Analysis: The FAC alleges Defendants have undertaken extensive efforts in
collaboration to delay and prevent Plaintiffs from braining this action. Allegations in
the FAC relevant to estoppel are identified as MALICIOUS PROSECUTION (FAC
349, 351, 353-467), OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE (FAC 509-539, 551-634,
RACKETEERING COUNT 5) DOYNE TERRORISM (FAC 808-830), FALSE
ADVERTISING (FAC 904-914), FRAUDS AND SWINDLES (FAC 1003-

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1030), HONEST SERVICES FRAUD (FAC 1034-1037), KIDNAPPING
(RACKETEERING COUNT 3), EXTORTION (RACKETEERING COUNT 4), and
various specific allegations described therein as duress fraud undue influence.
In short, Defendants, in conspiracy and enterprise have wrongfully and violently
impeded, oppressed, and delayed STUART from pursuing this Action, the CLAIM
AND DEMAND, DUE COURSE OF JUSTICE, and PUBLIC BENEFIT
ACTIVITIES sufficient to estop each of them from asserting any statute bar, and such
circumstances are extraordinary and beyond plaintiffs control. Stroll at 1242.
Lawyer Defendants assert "Nowhere does the FAC allege that wrongful
conduct by the Lawyer Defendants prevented plaintiffs from asserting a claim. 149-
2, 3:22-23. This assertion ignores the alleged collaboration between Lawyer
Defendants as STUART ASSAULT COORDINATORS and SDCBA, FEDERAL,
CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS, and the enterprise-level collaborations. See
Enterprise Level Collaboration under Color of Law Allegations, Sec. I.E.2 below.
5. Specific Defenses:
Several Defendants raise special statute of limitations arguments:
Criminal Trespass Statute of Limitations
Defendants reliance on the statute of limitations relevant to criminal trespass
is no help. FEDERALS threat to prosecute a criminal trespass was amplified by
GARSON during the People v. Stuart matter into a threat of felony stalking, (FAC
367-454). It was further elaborated with Ms. Stuarts false threats of a purported
F.B.I. investigation of Stuart for harassing judges. FAC 450.
9
California Penal

9
FAC 365 (bunch of angry judges), 389 (really pissed off on this one for something
you did at a bar association meeting), 390 (theyre going to throw everything they can at you on
this one), (bump it up to a felony), 393, 395 (taking an unusually hard line on the case),
(seeking to add new stalking charges as a felony), 400 (they want you to serve time on this one
and you really made them angry), 406 (holding additional charges for felony stalking relating to
the bar association), 420 (better lay off on whatever you were doing and to not piss these
guys off again.), 427 (youve really stirred up some anger down there), 436 (theyre really
out to get you!), 437 (working for the F.B.I. to investigate for harassing judges and
participating in an investigation with the F.B.I. and the City Attorney involving potential federal

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Code section 646.9 may be charged as a felony, in which case Californias three year
statute of limitations period applies. Cal. Pen.C. 646.9 (felony stalking), 801
(three year statute of limitations). Given the harassing judges threats were made in
the GARSON PERJURY 3 in the April-June, 2012 Arrest Under Suspended
Sentence allegations, the weight of those threats remains very real. FAC 433-442.
VIVIANO/BLANCHET/WOHLFEIL/SCHALL/DOYNE Terrorism, Fraud,
Duress and Undue Influence
VIVIANO, DOYNE, BLANCHET, WOHLFEIL and SCHALL are special
cases because of their fiduciary and professional relationships, which create special
tolling rules for both active and passive concealment, duress and undue influence, and
expand the accrual date by the delayed discovery rule. E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants,
Inc. Servs., 153 Cal. App. 4th 1308, 1317-18 (2007). For attorneys, continuing
representation tolls the term until end of representation. Beane v. Paulsen, 21 Cal.
App. 4th 89 (1993); Grisham v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 40 Cal.4th 623, 637, 54
Cal.Rptr.3d 735, 151 P.3d 1151 (2007). Where a defendant is in a special
relationship even passive concealment will toll the statute. Thorman v. American
Seafoods Co., 421 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir.2005); Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose &
Rubber Co., 576 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir.1978).
Under state and federal law, the term for claims against fiduciaries does not run
upon injury, but upon plaintiffs discovery of all facts relevant to each claim.
Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at the time when the cause of action
is complete with all of its elements. Code Civ. Proc., 312; Fox v. Ethicon Endo
Surgery, Inc., 35 Cal.4th 797, 806 (2005). An exception to the general rule for
defining the accrual of a cause of actionindeed, the most important oneis the
discovery rule. C.C.P. 340.6; Norgart v. Upjohn Co.. 21 Cal.4th 383, 397 (1999).

criminal charges), 450 (you better not blink an eye or theyll go after you again and strong
suggestion that STUART leave the State of California and return to his boyhood home in Arkansas
immediately upon his release.), 457 (since hes no longer employable as a lawyer) and
inducement of state bar proceedings, and repeated false arrests (FALSE ARRESTS 1-6).


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Delayed accrual of a cause of action is viewed as particularly appropriate where the
relationship between the parties is one of special trust such as that involving a
fiduciary, confidential or privileged relationship . . . against professionals. Moreno
v. Sanchez, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 1423, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 684; Johnson v.
Haberman & Kassoy, 201 Cal. App. 3d 1468, 247 Cal. Rptr. 614 (2d Dist. 1988).
Also relevant to the BLANCHET/DOYNE TERRORISM claims is subsequent
discovery of additional causes of action. Where a plaintiff asserts one of several
causes of action, but later discovers she also has additional causes of action, the
running of the term is be tolled for the newly-discovered causes of action. Fox, supra
at 813. A second, independent claim for fraud or concealment has a later accrual
date. Snow v. A.H. Robins Co., 165 Cal.App.3d 120, 134 (1985).
DOYNE sets up an accrual date of March, 2009 based on discovery of
underlying acts of DOYNE. DOYNE Doc. 143-1, 3:18. DOYNE is involved in
the STUART ASSAULT (COUNT 1) occurring in April, 2010, and the DOYNE
TERRORISM (COUNT 11) occurring throughout 2009, and all claims dependent
thereon.
Plaintiff has pled the special relationships with DOYNE, BLANCHET, and
VIVIANO, and their fraudulent concealment and undue influence in COUNTS 11,
15, and RACKETEERING COUNTS 1 and 2. Additional duress and undue
influence inflicted by DOYNE directly in the STUART ASSAULT and indirectly
through the MALICIOUS PROSECUTION and NESTHUS OBSTRUCTION OF
JUSTICE extend the tolling and estoppel against for DOYNE and BLANCHET until
no sooner than September, 2013.
VIVIANO/BIERER & BLANCHET/DOYNE/FRITZ Fraud and Extortion
Conspiracy Accrual
Running of the term for claims against DOYNE, BLANCHET, VIVANO,
BIERER, and FRITZ are also tolled during the term of their conspiracies to defraud
and extort STUART. COUNTS 11, 13, 15; RACKETEERING COUNTS 1-4, 7-10.

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The FAC alleges Doyne acted in conspiracy with Blanchet to fraudulently induce,
defraud, and extort STUART. COUNT 11. When STUART alerted BLANCHET to
concerns, BLANCHET furthered the conspiracy by fraudulently inducing STUART
to delay in violation of her fiduciary and attorney-client PROFESSIONAL
DUTIES.
10
BLANCHET further induced delay by extorting STUART will threats of
loss of custody his son by retribution by DOYNE. STUART did delay action against
DOYNE.
DOYNE was a participant in the STUART ASSAULT, and has been a central
target of California Coalitions FFRRESA. His co-conspirators in the STUART
ASSAULT COORDINATOR group furthered that delay by committing the STUART
ASSAULTS, then exerting influence through C. GOLDSMITHS husband and co-
conspirator J. GOLDSMITH and GARSON in the MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
and PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, delaying the initiation of this Action
during the illegal persecution and false imprisonment of STUART. COUNT 3.
Acting on behalf of all defendants the NESTHUS DEFENDANTS continued to
further illegally impede STUART from pursuing this action through the NESTHUS
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, and continues in their efforts through assertion of
frivolous defenses to this day. COUNT 4, Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application for
Emergency Harassment Restraining Order, Doc. No. 4; Plaintiffs Motion to Strike,
Doc. No. 19; Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions, Doc. No. 39; Plaintiffs Opposition to
Superior Courts Motion for Sanctions, Doc. No. 56.
These events delayed accrual until the last act of the conspiracy, or September,
2013. No limitations term has run.
Doynes Inequitable Conduct: DOYNE asserts that the FAC does not allege
undue influence against him. 143-1, 4:26-28. He asserts that because STUART filed
a lawsuit against BLANCHET, his claims to being reasonably delayed are incredible.
143-1, 5:11-15. This attack fails. First, the presumed-true allegations of the FAC

10
Thats how it is FAC 911; take it or leave it FAC 949; 1009-1018; DOYNE thats not
how it works, if your son is important to you, and get with the program FAC 1022-1029.

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allege that DOYNE and BLANCHET acted in conspiracy to defraud, conceal, and
divert STUART from discovery and further action. In conspiracy cases, a limitation
period begins to run from the time of the last overt act committed in furtherance of
the conspiracy. People v. Zamora, 18 Cal.3d 538, 548 (1976); State ex rel. Metz v.
CCC Information Services, Inc., 149 Cal.App.4th 402, 418 (2007). The continuing
violations doctrine creates an equitable exception to the timely filing requirement.
Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank, A.G., 2006 WL 4749756 **4041 (C.D.Cal.2006)
(quoting and citing Morgan v. Regents of University of Cal., 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 63
64 (2000)). Lauter v. Anoufrieva, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1100 (C.D. Cal. 2009)
The conspiracy allegations are sufficient to plead notice of an equitable
estoppel issue at this stage. Equitable estoppel, also termed fraudulent concealment,
halts the statute of limitations when there is active conduct by a defendant, above
and beyond the wrongdoing upon which the plaintiff's claim is filed, to prevent the
plaintiff from suing in time. The plaintiff must demonstrate that he relied on the
defendant's misconduct in failing to file in a timely manner and must plead with
particularity the facts which give rise to the claim of fraudulent concealment.
Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 706-07 (9th Cir. 2006).
Plainitffs have pled facts to support an estoppel by conspiracy between
DOYNE and BLANCHET. BLANCHET participated in the referral to DOYNE in
breach of her fiduciary duties and in commission of honest services fraud. RICO
COUNTS 1, 2. She concealed the nature of Doynes fraud and threatened and
oppressed STUART with loss of custody of his son when STUART raised his
concerns regarding DOYNE. This activity constitutes conspiracy to defraud and
conceal in enterprise with DOYNE in breach of both of their fiduciary duties above
and beyond the DOYNE TERRORISM.
DOYNES claim that STUART was not delayed from taking formal action
against DOYNE (143-1, 5:3-15) attacks STUARTS credibility in asserting he was in
fact terrorized by DOYNE. Credibility attacks are inappropriate for disposition at the

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rule 12 stage. When a motion to dismiss is based on the running of the statute of
limitations, it can be granted only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the
required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.
Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980). Generally, the
applicability of equitable tolling depends on matters outside the pleadings, so it is
rarely appropriate to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (where review is limited
to the complaint) if equitable tolling is at issue. Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
465 F.3d 992, 100304 (9th Cir.2006); Vernon v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1274, 1278 (9th
Cir.1987). Mendoza v. Wilmington Fin., C-10-5792 SC, 2011 WL 2182914 (N.D.
Cal. June 6, 2011). Because statute of limitations issues often depend on contested
questions of fact, however, the court should hesitate to dismiss a complaint on statute
of limitations grounds based solely on the face of the complaint. Firestone v.
Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C.Cir.1996). Rather, the court should grant a
motion to dismiss only if the complaint on its face is conclusively time-barred. Id.;
Doe v. Dep't of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1115 (D.C.Cir.1985). If no reasonable
person could disagree on the date on which the cause of action accrued, the court
may dismiss a claim on statute of limitations grounds. Smith v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 3 F.Supp.2d 1473, 1475 (D.D.C.1998) (citing Kuwait Airways Corp.
v. Am. Sec. Bank, N.A., 890 F.2d 456, 463 n. 11 (D.C.Cir.1989)). Williams-Jones v.
LaHood, 656 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67-68 (D.D.C. 2009). Doyne is entitled to explain to a
jury why his false child abuse reports, threats, extortion, violence, imprisonment, and
disbarment of his client in retaliation for protests about his legal services could not
have reasonably caused Stuart fear and imposed delay.
DOYNE As a Health Care Provider
DOYNE asserts the Court must borrow the one year statutory period under
California Code of Civil Procedure 340.5 applicable to health care providers
applicable to an action for injury or death against a health care provider based upon
such person's alleged professional negligence. . . . This Action does not assert

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ordinary negligence against DOYNE, but extreme and outrageous deprivation, fraud,
extortion, bribery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, racketeering, and false
advertising, in conspiracy, under federal law. Section 340.5 simply has no
application to suits for violations of federal constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
1983. Ellis v. City of San Diego, Cal., 176 F.3d 1183, 1191 (9th Cir. 1999).
The actions of DOYNE accused were not health care, but dispute resolution
serviceshe was hired to mediate a dispute.
11
His profession of forensic
psychology purports to exercise the authority of law enforcement, judges, and the
science of psychology. A more preposterous concept has never appeared on the
shores of any free nation, and by grace of God such evil will soon be gone and never
appear on any shores anywhere ever again. DOYNES forensic psychology
profession renders neither health nor care, but fraud, abuse, extortion, and oceans of
cruelty, hypocrisy, and pain onto families already in crisis who are compelled to
entrust such unrepentant evil with their futures. Whatever this Courts judgment of
DOYNES conduct as culpable, innocent, inequitable, or otherwise, Plaintiffs are
certain it will not be the final word.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS assert a two year limitations period
against the MALICIOUS PROSECUTION Counts accrued on March 11, 2011, and
an expiration of March 11, 2013. This analysis rests on two single incident accrual
cases: Usher v. Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 558 (9th Cir. 1987) and Stavropoulos v.
Superior Court of the Los Angeles County, 141 Cal. App.4th 190 (2006). The
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION is a conspiracy furthered by each act subsequent to
the March, 2011 termination of proceedings in STUARTS favor, including FALSE
IMPRISONMENT 5 (FAC 421); the Prosecution Within The State Bar FAC
426-432, 455-460; collaboration with the FBI and Ms. Stuart to procure GARSON

11
DOYNES Opposition falsely asserts he was appointed by reference to a controversial
exhibit. 143-1, 2:4. He was not appointed, but hired in a private commercial transaction. See
Motion to Conduct Early Discovery.

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PERJURY 3, and evidence in the Arrest Under Suspended Sentence (FAC 433-
447); inducement and threats to leave California (FAC 448-451), and illegal
Domestic Violence Protective Orders FAC 461-466. The MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION was also furthered by subsequent conspiracies, including the
NESTHUS OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE. No claim relating to the MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION accrued before September, 2013.
Similar facts constitute duress and undue influence to toll and estop CITY
ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS from asserting a statute bar in this case. CITY
ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS illegally prosecuted the People v. Stuart matter
without probable cause, using manufactured evidence, false testimony, sought an
illegal sentence and restraining orders. FAC 375, 461-466; Precision Inst. Mfg.
Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945); Ellenburg v.
Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 1985); Brummett v. Camble, 946 F.2d
1178, 1184 (5th Cir. 1991). See also tolling, estoppel analysis under Ateeq v. Najor,
15 Cal. App. 4th 1351, 1356 (1993) and Lauter v. Anoufrieva, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1060,
1101 (C.D. Cal. 2009) above. While CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS may assert
some of their illegal acts are immune from civil liability under the Civil Rights Act,
the tolling and estoppel effects of such illegal conduct are in no way diminished. See
Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004).
Finally, malicious prosecution claims are tolled during an appeal from the
judgment. Gibbs v. Haight, Dickson, Brown & Bonesteel, 183 Cal.App.3d 716, 228
Cal.Rptr. 398, 402 (1986). STUART timely filed an appeal from the People v. Stuart
matter, which was pending at the time this Action was filed. FAC 449.
For all of the above reasons, every claim built on the MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION and PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT was tolled until after this
action was filed.
C. Rooker-Feldman Bars No Claim
Various defendants invoke a bankrupt Rooker-Feldman doctrine. OMNIBUS

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11:1-28; Sup. Ct. (Doc. No. 139) 8:16-28; DOYNE 143-1, 6:8-7:14; BLANCHET
Doc. No. 146, 8:1-16; CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS Doc. No. 151, 2:1-3:11.
To invoke Rooker-Feldman, a defendant must show that (1) there was a final
judgment of a state court, and (2) the federal court action seeks a reversal of that final
judgment. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 286 (2005).
A suit brought in federal district court is a "de facto appeal" forbidden by Rooker-
Feldman when "a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous
decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that
decision." Noel v. Hall, 341 F.c3d 1148, 1164 (2003).
Defendants identify no judgment or order, instead referencing sections from
the FAC describing People v. Stuart and Stuart v. Stuart, and making a sweeping
assertion that the FAC is nothing more than de facto appeals from state court
judgments and orders. OMNIBUS 11:8-9, Sup. Ct. (Doc. No. 139, 9:25-10:4. This
fails.
People v. Stuart: Defendants cannot identify a final judgment, decision, or
order in People v. Stuart. FAC 449. Under Exxon Mobil, the RookerFeldman
doctrine only applies to cases brought after the state proceedings have ended. 125
S.Ct. at 1526. Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2006). A state
court proceeding is not final for purposes of Rooker-Feldman until all appeals from
such proceedings are final. Id. Where plaintiff initiates federal proceedings prior to
the entry of final judgment in the state proceeding, the collateral federal proceedings
cannot be an appeal from a final judgment of a state court because the state court
judgment is not final until the conclusion of the appeal process. Id.
Stuart v. Stuart: Nor can defendants identify a relevant final judgment,
decision, or order in Stuart v. Stuart. Family Courts purport only to exercise limited
jurisdiction over issues of property division, child custody, and spousal support
between the parties. This Action seeks no relief altering any final judgment,
decision, or order of a domestic courts decision. To the extent that claims in Count

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9, the DOYNE TERRORISM, relate to the Stuart v. Stuart matter, they do not seek
reversals of a final judgment, decision, or order, but arise from behavior of parties to
that action external to the proceedingsfraud, extortion, breach of contract, bribery,
and other crimes not within the jurisdiction of domestic courts. Kougasian v. TMSL,
Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004). Rooker-Feldman also does not bar a
federal court action that "asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission
by an adverse party [during the state court action.] Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148,
1162-64 (9th Cir. 2003). All actions alleged against DOYNE, SCHALL,
WOHLFEIL and others are ultra vires, collateral, or criminal acts which are never
part of any proceeding. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, (1879), Cal. Const. Art. I.
sec. 26.
The OMNIBUS recasting of the referral to DOYNE as an interlocutory
order or non-final judgment omits the distinction between judicial acts and other
functions of a judge. OMNIBUS 11:16-18. The FACs claims against WOHLFEIL
and SCHALL relate to their referral to and administrative oversight of DOYNEa
third party to the litigationduring the course of the Stuart v. Stuart proceedings.
Referral and oversight are not adjudicationstheyre at best administrative or
ministerial acts, more likely coram non judice. Defendants cite no authority for the
proposition that a referral or oversight to a mediator originating from a domestic
court is a judicial act that is inextricable to a final order. Abundant authority
holds otherwise. See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435 (1993)
(oversight of court staff); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 222 (1988); Supreme
Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 720 (1980)
(judges disciplining judges); Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229 (7th Cir. 1980)
(oversight of prosecutor), cert. dismissed, 449 U.S. 1028 (1980); Beard v. Udall, 648
F.2d 1264 (judge as investigator); Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir.

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1980), cert. denied Zeller v. Rankin, 451 U.S. 939 (1981), overruled
12
by Ashelman v.
Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986); Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911 (9
th
Cir.
1982) (judges overseeing judges).
Further, DOYNES accused acts are themselves not judicial acts. DOYNE
was hired as a private mediator, and is accused of defrauding STUART in procuring
a contract, extortive threats in attempts to obtain money, and false reports of child
abuse to county workers who determined DOYNES reports to be false. These events
occurred outside of the domestic court proceeding. FAC 1027.
The Napolitano case cited by Defendants is no help. There the Court of
Appeals examined whether actual interlocutory orders considering contested motions
on fully-briefed legal issues by a state court were inextricably intertwined with an
actual final order that expressly incorporated those legal findings. The Court of
Appeals found that the state courts denial of a pretrial motion was an interlocutory
order because it considered and rejected legal argument, and the final order was
based in part on the order denying the motion. If no consideration has been given,
or any decision on the matter is ambiguous, it is unlikely that the issues presented to
the state high court and to the federal court are so inextricably intertwined that the
federal court cannot take jurisdiction. Napolitano at 1029. The FAC does not allege
consideration or disposition of legal argument because none occurred or could have
occurred.
Finally, to fall within Rooker-Feldmans jurisdictional analysis, the
interlocutory order must inextricably intertwined with a final order. Id.
Interlocutory orders that are not intertwined with a final order are not Rooker-
Feldman questions, but preclusion or estoppel questions which require identity of

12
Ashelmans overruling of Rankin v. Howard appears improvident in light of the
Supreme Courts denial of certiorari in Zeller v. Rankin. Plaintiffs assert Rankin as
good law under the denial of certiorari on this point and reserve the issue for appeal.

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issues or parties between proceedingsneither of which is presented here.
13

Superior Court Defendants assert Rooker-Feldman bars prospective relief
claims: Insofar as Stuart may claim that he may be subject to orders in the future in
his dissolution proceeding that he believes to be unlawful . . . an attack on such orders
would clearly be barred by Rooker-Feldman. 9:25-28 (citing Monteagudo v. Alksne,
11-CV-1089, at 4:4-7:9, 8:2-21 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 6, 2011).
14
Whatever may be the
outcome in some future attack on such orders in the future, today the FAC does
not attack any order of any court. Rule 65 injunctions may be sought against
enforcement of a state court retraining orders for a variety of reasons. See Vasquez v.
Rackauckas, 734 F.3d 1025, 1037 (9th Cir. 2013); Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
Doc. No. 109.
DOYNE also asserts an attack on Prospective Relief Count 2 as barred by
Rooker-Feldman because it seeks order finding that orders of the superior court in
family law matters are unconstitutional and thereby invalid. 143-1, 7:4-6.
Prospective Relief Count 2 does not seek to invalidate any order of a domestic court;
it seeks orders declaring certain California state laws as invalid under the United
States Constitution (FAC 1201), and enjoining enforcement of certain laws,
policies, and practices (FAC 1202). Injunctions do not overturn orders, and thus
cannot be an effective appeal of any state court judgment. See, e.g., Vasquez v.
Rackauckas, 734 F.3d 1025, 1037 (9th Cir. 2013).
CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS reliance on Cooper v. Ramos does not
help. Doc. No. 151, 2:11. The plaintiff in Cooper was a convicted prisoner who,
years after his conviction and habeus appeals were exhausted, filed a motion in state
court for post-conviction DNA testing of evidence used to obtain his conviction. The

13
See Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75 (1984); White v.
City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2012). SCHALL, WOHLFEIL, and DOYNE were
not parties in Stuart v. Stuart; Ms. Stuart is not a party here; this Action does not seek re-litigation
of any issue resolved in Stuart v. Stuart.
14
This Order was not attached with a request for judicial notice under Rule of Evidence 201 and
is objected to for lack of notice and opportunity to be heard. Fed.R. Evid. 201(e).

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state court denied his motion. Rather than appealing the denial to the California
Supreme Court, Cooper filed a section 1983 claim in federal court against the district
attorney alleging conspiracy to manipulate the inculpatory evidence used against him.
The district court dismissed the case and the Court of Appeals agree the 1983 claim
was barred by Rooker-Feldman because the attack in federal court was a direct
horizontal appeal on the state courts final denial of his motion to test evidence.
Moreover, in Cooper the Court of Appeals acknowledged that Rooker-Feldman
does not preclude a plaintiff from bringing an "independent claim" that, though
similar or even identical to issues aired in state court, was not the subject of a
previous judgment by the state court. Skinner, 131 S.Ct. at 1297. The FAC asserts
claim against CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS based on action independent of
their functions as prosecutors, including the Malicious Prosecution Within State Bar
FAC 426-432, 455-460; collaboration with the FBI and Ms. Stuart to procure false
testimony and evidence in the Arrest Under Suspended Sentence FAC 433-447;
inducement and threats to leave California FAC 448-451, and illegal Domestic
Violence Protective Orders FAC 461-466. None of these claims were inextricably
intertwined with a final order of any court, and could not be an appeal from People
v. Stuart because this action was field before People v. Stuart could become final.
D. Eleventh Amendment Bars No Claim
JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS assert an Eleventh Amendment Attack on Count 7
on behalf of Superior Court, Judicial Council, and Administrative Office of the
Courts. Doc. No. 139, 5:20-6:12. BATTSON and SIMI attack at Doc. No. 134, 2.
The attacks are analyzed jointly here.
The Supreme Court has construed the Eleventh Amendment to restrict federal
jurisdiction over sovereign States unless the State consents.
15
Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U. S. 1 (1890); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).

15
Immunity is a misnomer. Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is jurisdictional
doctrine. States remain fully liable for their wrongdoing, but are not amenable to suit
for injuries therefrom in federal courts, absent waiver or consent.

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This construction is contrary to the clear language of the Eleventh Amendment, yet
tolerated by some. Justice Stevens has described Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
as creating "two Eleventh Amendments, one narrow and textual and the othernot
truly a constitutional doctrine at allbased on prudential considerations of comity
and federalism. Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 513 U.S. 30, 52
(1994) (Stevens, J, concurring) (citing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1,
23-29 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens teaches that fictitious
construction is not merely misguided as a matter of constitutional law; it is also an
engine of injustice. . . . [T]hroughout the doctrine's history, it has clashed with the just
principle that there should be a remedy for every wrong. See, e. g., Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803). Sovereign immunity inevitably places a lesser
value on administering justice to the individual than on giving government a license
to act arbitrarily. Arising as it did from the peculiarities of political life in feudal
England . . . sovereign immunity is a doctrine better suited to a divinely ordained
monarchy than to our democracy. Hess at 53-54.
Entities beneath state level are not co-equals with the United States, and may
not escape the jurisdiction of federal courts. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397 (1997); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S.
658 (1978); Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103,
1110 (9th Cir. 1987). When an entity attempts to assert itself as a sovereign, it must
establish its status. Id.; Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 364 (9th Cir. 2004). A
government entity that is not a state may is not entitled to State status unless it is
simply the arm or alter ego of the State. Moor v. Alameda Cnty., 411 U.S. 693, 717
(1973). Alter-ego is a question of fact, the burden of proving which rests with the
party asserting it. Id.; Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1021 (9th Cir. 2002). We must
look behind the pleadings to determine whether a decree in the case would operate in
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treasury, the action is barred. Zolin at 1110. A trier of fact must look to whether the
beneath State level entity is accused for activity that is (1) a State level function,
(2) controlled by the State, (3) for which the State is liable and (4) the State will be
bound for any injunctive remedy sought. Id.; Ford Motor Co. v. Department of
Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). This analysis is necessary for any beneath
State level entityboth individuals and municipalitiesaccused of a function that is
an arm of the State: Where such facts are not apparent from the face of the
Complaint, the defense is not apparent with certitude. Gray v. Evercore
Restructuring L.L.C., 544 F3d 320, 324 (1st Cir. 2008). Where facts necessary to
prove an element of a claim are beyond control of a Plaintiff, they may be alleged
generally, and a motion to dismiss prior discovery is inappropriate. Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002); Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249
(9th Cir.1997).
Federal courts approach assertions of Eleventh Amendment immunity with
suspicion. "By its terms, the protection afforded by [the Eleventh] Amendment is
only available to one of the United States. It is true, of course, that some agencies
exercising state power have been permitted to invoke the Amendment in order to
protect the state treasury from liability that would have had essentially the same
practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself. But the Court has
consistently refused to construe the Amendment to afford protection to political
subdivisions such as counties and municipalities, even though such entities exercise a
`slice of state power.' " Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 400-401 (1979). In Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson
Corporation, 513 U.S. 30 (1994), the Supreme Court declined to extend Eleventh
Amendment immunity to an entity owned and operated by two States, reasoning that
entities not subject to the unilateral control of any one of the States that compose the
federal system were too distant from voters who may exercise their will to direct
state policy, and thus not entitled to the cloak of sovereign immunity. Id. at 42.

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Such joint control entitieseven though operated by States themselvesare not
entitled to immunity [u]nless there is good reason to believe that the States
structured the new agency to enable it to enjoy the special constitutional protection of
the States themselves, and that Congress concurred in that purpose. Id. at 43-44
(citing Lake County, supra). Both Courts in Lake County and Hess declined to extend
Eleventh Amendment immunity to State-level entities despite complete control by the
States. Id.
16

In our own Circuit, extending Eleventh Amendment immunity to non-State
entities has been described as strong medicine, and has been undertaken with
caution by federal courts. See, e.g., Del Campo v. Kennedy, 517 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th
Cir. 2008); N. Ins. Co. of New York v. Chatham Cnty., Ga., 547 U.S. 189, 194 (2006);
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999); Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v.
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 143 (1993). Caution in doing so her would seem
wise.

16
Defendants assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity in this case is similarly
inappropriate. The interpretation offered by the Commissionrecently rationalized through an un-
enacted judicial policy of dignity of a sovereign (See Federal Maritime Commission v. South
Carolina State Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743 (2002))cannot justify the effective exemption of an
entity so independent as the San Diego Superior Court and various county court administrative
employees. Whatever rationale for extending immunity to a State because of its dignity, the
these Defendants fall short of parity with the United States, and are entitled to no such dignity
particularly when the net effect of such a policy amounts to nothing more than a coerced hometown
forum selection clause. If anything, exempting Defendants from accountability to the citizens who
created them in a neutral forum is itself an affront to whatever dignity these Defendants aspire to,
and even to the lay intelligence of the governed.
In good faith advocacy for a correction in the misguided machinery of 20th Century Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence, and in good faith obedience to the wisdom of a name that will be cited
long after most who have sat on the same bench, Plaintiff respectfully submits that Defendants
assertion that the Eleventh Amendment bars citizen claims against their own State in federal court is
inconsistent with the language of that Amendment, inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment
governing States, and requests Defendants motion be denied on that basis along to reserves the
issue for appeal. See John Paul Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant?, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1121, 11241125
(1993); Scott Dodson, Dignity: The New Frontier of State Sovereignty. 56 Okla. L. Rev. 777, 808-
823 (2003); Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L. J. 1 (1924); Kenneth Culp Davis,
Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 Admin. L. Rev. 383 (1970); Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the
Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1342 (1989); Vicki Jackson, The Supreme
Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 Yale L. J. 1 (1988); Akhil Reed
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L. J. 1425 (1987).

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1. Defendants Fail to Establish Sovereignty
Entities that are not States, but seek to defend themselves as if they were a
State, must prove entitlement to State status in two steps: The first step of the
analysis concerns how the State has structured the entity. Fresenius Med. Care
Cardiovascular Res., Inc. v. Puerto Rico & Caribbean Cardiovascular Ctr. Corp.,
322 F.3d 56, 65 (1st Cir. 2003). Relevant factors include (a) the extent of state
control over the entity, (b) whether the state appoints controlling members, (c) how
the enabling legislation characterizes the entity, (d) whether the state has veto
power over the entitys actions, (e) whether the entity's functions are readily
classifiable as state functions or non-state (local or non-governmental) functions, and
(f) whether the state bore legal liability for the entity's debts. Hess at 4446. In the
second step, the vulnerability of the state's purse is the most salient factor in the
Eleventh Amendment determination. Where it is clear that the state treasury is not at
risk, then the control exercised by the state over the entity does not entitle the entity
to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Fresenius 65.
The OMNIBUS (Doc. No. 131-1, 12:1-12), BATTSON and SIMI (Doc. No.
134, 2-3), and the SUPERIOR COURT, AOC, and JUDICIAL COUNCIL separately
(Doc. No. 139, 5:20-6:12) fail to traverse this analysis to make the factual showing to
establish status as a sovereign.
Sovereignty Cannot Be Established by Preclusion
Instead of traversing the analysis, some Defendants cite other district court
adjudications of Eleventh Amendment issues for the proposition that it is well-
established that such entities are arms of the state. The tactic invites clear error.
SIMI and BATTSON cite district court opinions which involved their
employerthe Commission on Judicial Performancenot its individual employees.
Moreover, the cases cited involved unsophisticated pro se plaintiffs, the courts were
not asked, and did not conduct, a real party in interest analysis. In Ricotta v.
California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 976 (S.D. Cal. 1998) this District Court was not

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requested to perform analysis of the relationship between the Commission and the
State of California. This lack of analysis appears to follow from a poorly-pled
complaint by a near-hysterical pro se plaintiff. The opinion reflects no awareness,
much less analysis, of the Commissions status as a below-State level entity
aspiring to Eleventh Amendment immunity as an arm of the state. As the pro se
plaintiff failed to recognize the issue, the court extended Eleventh Amendment
immunity to the Commission on the Commissions motion to dismiss, with no
substantive analysis of the Pennhurst or Zolin real party in interest test. Id.
In Junho Hyon v. Sei Shimoguchi, No. CIV 12-1235 JAM EFB PS, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 74100 at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 29, 2012), plaintiff pro se proceeding in
forma pauperis, alleged a Commission staff counsel was negligent in performing
her duties in violation of Federal Rule 1.01. Without reaching the issue of whether
there was, in fact, a Federal Rule 1.01, the District Court determined that [t]he
claim against Shimoguchi is also barred by the Eleventh Amendment since plaintiff's
claims against Shimoguchi are based entirely on Shimoguhi's conduct in carrying out
his/her official duties . . . . Id. at *5. Like Ricotta, the pro se plaintiff failed to
allege activity other than negligent performance of ordinary job responsibilities,
and the court undertook no substantive analysis of the State level issue not raised
by plaintiff. Id.
Similarly, in Borchardt v. Reid, CV 08-3086 DOC, 2008 WL 4810791 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 31, 2008) a pro se plaintiff sued various entities including the Judicial
Council, Commission on Judicial Performance, AOC and county officials. Id. at *3.
Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment.
In granting the motions, the District Court performed no arm of the state analysis
under Zolin, Pennhurst, and Hess whatsoever, merely summarily concluding
plaintiff has sued the following state officials and listing each defendant
including even the county officials which are clearly not arms of the state. Id. at *3.
Borchardts summary analysis is error in light of Zolin, Hess, and Pennhursts arm

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of the state test. Defendants assertions that cases which failed to adjudicate the
arm of the state test settle any Eleventh Amendment issue is frivolous. See
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (no preclusion absent an adjudication on
the merits).
BATTSON and SIMIS employer can clearly notch its belt for deflecting a
series of pro se plaintiff cases with motions to dismiss similar to the one it presents
herewithout any argument relating to the critical arm of the state test it must
achieve. See Zolin, Pennhurst, supra. The streak ends here.
Defendants cite these prior rulings not as legal authority, but in a reach for an
issue preclusion here. In order to preclude litigation of the Eleventh Amendment
affirmative defense not previously litigated here or anywhere between these parties,
defendants must establish parities of parties, facts, or issues necessary for a
preclusion. They cannot, and the rulings of other district courts are a nullity in this
courthouse. See White v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2012).
Defendants Cannot Establish State Level Status On the Present Record
The FAC does not name the State of California, does not concede that the State
is the alter ego of any defendant, or that any defendant is the State of Californis
arm. Defendants therefore are faced with the burden of proving that the face of the
FAC establishes that they are otherwise entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity
with certitude. Gray v. Evercore, supra. Defendants burden in proving an
entitlement to immunity will be significant. They must establish:
(i) State Financial Liability: The general rule is that a suit is against the
sovereign if the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or
domain, or interfere with the public administration, or if the effect of the judgment
would be to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act. Dugan v.
Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); Pennhurst, supra; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663
(1974); Shaw v. State of California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788
F.2d 600, 603 (9th Cir.1986).

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(ii) State Authority: The legal authority or jurisdiction, if any, the entity or
individual asserting immunity is acting under, both generally and with respect to the
specific acts accused. The scope of the authority and nature of the acts and other
facts relating to the alleged malfeasance has also been an issue often in contention.
Zolin, supra;
(iii) State is Bound: Whether any equitable relief on the individual would
effectively bind the State of California. Pennhurst, Zolin, supra.
Defendants have failed this undertaking, and their motions may be denied on
this basis alone.
2. Defendants Have Waived or Consented to Federal Jurisdiction in Due Process and
Equal Protection Claims
Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from
suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language
of the statute. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000). The
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, sec. 1. The
Amendment, passed by representatives of the States in the Senate, and Congress as a
whole in 1868, nearly 84 years after the 1795 ratification of the Eleventh Amendment
constitutes unequivocal consent by the states, through their representatives in the
Senate, to be bound by this federal law. The Amendment specifically prohibits
States, and specifically grants rights to citizens of the United States.
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce
the substantive guarantees contained in 1 by enacting appropriate legislation.
Amend. XIV, 5; Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365
(2001). The subsequent passage of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, modernly codified as

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sections 1981-1988 of Title 42 containing the sections 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988
under which this Action is brought, also enacted through a majority of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, was a specific embodiment of Congress power under
section 5, empowering citizens to bring suit under the Fourteenth Amendment, and
further articulating the States consent to be sued in federal court for its violations of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
3. States are Not immune under the Eleventh Amendment for Discrimination
Title 42 U.S.C. 2000d-7 provides:
(a) General provision
(1) A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. 794], title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], the Age
Discrimination Act of 1975 [42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.], title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], or the provisions of any other
Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial
assistance.
(emphasis added). The States of California receives generous funding from federal
taxation through sources far too numerous to list, including interstate highways,
education, agriculture, housing and urban development, energy, justice, labor, social
insurance and welfare, and medical insurance, subsidies, and special funding. Many
of these federal funds find their way directly to present defendants in programs
relating to child care, social services, domestic violence (VAWA) programs,
incentive matching payments to States for child support enforcement and family
programs under Titles I, IV-A and D, X, XI, XIV and XVI of the Social Security
Act and the Act of July 5, 1960 (24 U.S.C. chapter 9)funds delivered directly to
Family Court government entities administering the policies, conspiracies, and
enterprises accused herein. Family Court orders enjoy full faith and credit

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recognition and enforcement in all States under 28 U.S.C. 1738 (Acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of any State ... of the United States ... shall have the same full
faith and credit in every court within the United States ... as they have by law or
usage in the courts of such State ... from which they are taken.) and in federal courts
and military courts under 18 U.S.C. 2261(a)(1), 2265 (FAC 962). White v. City
of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2012). Family Court child support orders
may be enforced in foreign Countries through bilateral international treaty between
the United States and foreign nations, and are enforceable by the U.S. State
Department in refusing to issue, honor, or revoking passports of U.S. citizens. 42
U.S.C. 652(k), 654(31). There are perhaps no local government entities more
tightly interwoven with and dependent upon United States laws, treaties, and
institutions for funding, operation, and enforcement for their orders and decrees than
Family Courts.
17

As present defendants are recipients of federal financial assistance, they are
subject to suit in federal court for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment for
Actions brought under the Civil Rights Acta Federal statute prohibiting
discrimination. 42 U.S.C. 2000d-7. This Action asserts numerous such violations
against the EQUAL PROTECTION CLASSES. FAC 163, and each section 1983
Claim. As Defendants in their official capacities have received abundant benefits of
federal resources and laws, they have subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of that
sovereign in claims they have not administered those resources according to federal
law. Even if mere arms of the state, all defendants are subject to suit in this
courthouse.
4. Individual Defendants Have Not Shown Entitlement to Sovereignty for Their

17
As Defendants bear the burden of proving the source of their funding is state coffers under
assertion of an Eleventh Amendment defense (Pennhurst, supra), they should not be heard to
contest this assertion at the Rule 12 stage. If necessary, Plaintiffs proffer to amend to plead
additional facts, presumed true at this stage, establishing the abovereferenced extensive federal
funding.

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Specific Functions As Being State Functions
BATTSON, SIMI and certain individual JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS appear to
assert status as sovereigns. Individuals face even greater challenges to invoke the
misguided engine of injustice of the Eleventh Amendment. They must show that
the specific functions they are alleged to have performed are State level functions,
making them an arm of the state. Pennhurst, Zolin, supra. Such a proposition is
plainly futile on the present record, and would appear to be so on any.
In Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103,
1106 (9th Cir. 1987), the plaintiff, a public interest organization for the deaf, sued the
Los Angeles County Superior Court and its Jury Commissioner alleging injury
caused by the defendants refusal to provide sign-language interpreters to enable deaf
citizens to serve as jurors. Id. at 1107. The District Court tried the case (Greater Los
Angeles Council of Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 607 F. Supp. 175, 179 (C.D. Cal. 1984)),
finding that the County would be answerable to any damages charged to individual
employee defendants. The Court of Appeals found that on these facts, the individual
court employees were not entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereignty status. A
functional approach governs the eleventh amendment's application to actions for
money damages against state officials. Such actions are considered to be suits against
the state, and thus barred, if the state is the real, substantial party in interest. Id. at
1110 (citing Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)).
Because facts at trial showed that the state treasury is not in jeopardy for the
specific functions performed, the individual employees were not entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Zolin, 812 F.2d at 1110.
Ultra Vires Acts Are Not Immune
The FAC avers numerous ultra vires acts, criminal acts, and acts in furtherance
of conspiracy. Each claim asserting California Constitution Article I, sec. 26 is an
assertion of ultra vires activity that cannot be actions of the State of California.
California Constitution Art I, 26 (Count 13, FAC 493). See Ex parte Virginia,

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100 U. S. 339, 348-349 (1880); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 15556 (1908). Further,
even while performing an official task, to the extent any individual defendant was
furthering a criminal enterprise or conspiracy, each ceased acting in his official
capacity when he actively participated in the criminal conspiracy among defendants.
Vierria v. California Highway Patrol, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1240 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
While arguably certain individual activities were innocent official duties, the FAC
alleges many that were not.
Individual Defendants have not, and cannot carried the significant burden they
faces in achieving sovereignty Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Participation in Private Enterprise Not a State Central Function
Individual Defendants are alleged to be participants in the criminal RICO
ENTERPRISES relating to the Domestic Dispute Industry. Acts in furtherance of a
commercial psychology enterprise are not central functions of the State of
California or any Stateand are as such should not be shielded by the fiction of
immunity. The Complaint accuses the peculiar practice of the San Diego County
Superior Court Defendants in embarking on an entrepreneurial frolic to operate a for-
profit psychological enterprise purposed to privately evaluate parent and children
litigants in a cloistered, off the record, no-holds-barred forum in which they are
stripped of all of fundamental rights as litigants, citizens, and parentsand extorted
with threats of manipulation of process utter even a hint of autonomy. Such practice
is notand by grace of God shall never bea central function of any government
created to serve its people. Recent atrocities by state court judges acting in criminal
enterprise with private co-conspirators to abuse the most vulnerable of litigants
childrenindecently, cavalierly, baselessly, and willfully . . . for personal gain
have recently been exposed, condemned, and rightfully severely punished in our
federal justice system. See H.T. v. Ciavarella, No. 3:09-cv-0357 (ARC) (M.D. Pa.)
(November 20, 2009 Memorandum and Order, p. 19). The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the criminal RICO conviction of a Pennsylvania state court judge

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involved in that kids for cash public corruption in United States v. Ciavarella,
716 F.3d 705 (3d Cir. 2013) (RICO criminal conviction of honest services and mail
fraud affirmed). See Plaintiffs RJN Ex. A.
Our own Circuit has wisely rejected extension of sovereign immunity to state
actors conspiring with private commercial enterprises. See, e.g., Del Campo v.
Kennedy, 517 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2008); Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community
College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir.1988). Courts in other Circuits are
similarly wary of defendants invocation of the misguided engine of injustice of
Eleventh Amendment immunity to shield governments entrepreneurial aspirations.
See, e.g., Stewart v. Baldwin County Board of Education, 908 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th
Cir.1990); Tuveson v. Florida Governor's Council on Indian Affairs, Inc., 734 F.2d
730, 732 (11th Cir.1984).
5. All Beneath State Level Defendants Are Subject to Prospective Relief
As the Complaint articulates several bases for invoking equitable remedies
against all Defendants, Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity cannot shield them
from this Courts plenary jurisdiction to enforce federal law. 18 U.S.C. 1964(a); 28
U.S.C. 2201-2202; 28 U.S.C. 1337; 15 U.S.C. 1116(a), 1117, 1118; 42
U.S.C. 1988(a); Fed.R.Civ.P. 57, 65. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar
actions for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers in their
official capacities for violations of federal law. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 155
56 (1908); Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984);
Natural Resources Defense Council v. California Dept. of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 422
(1996). Injunctive relief may include both declaration, injunction, and mandamus
against federal officers failing to act in the face of a clear duty to do so. 28 U.S.C.
1361; Han v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 1993 WL 13011266 (C.A.9) at *16; Barron v.
Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1994); Wilbur v. United States, 281 U.S. 206, 218
(1930). False description of services and facilitation of unfair business practices may
be enjoined in federal court. 15 U.S.C. 1116(a), 1117, 1118, 1125; Bus & Prof. C.

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17200, 17500. Racketeering is subject to prohibition, mandamus, divestiture, and
other equitable remedies exclusive to United States courts. 18 U.S.C. 1964(a), (c),
and (d).
Standing to Issue Injunctions
BATTSON and SIMI assert an attack in their Eleventh Amendment
jurisdictional defense analysis that should be asserted through an attack on Plaintiffs
standing to assert prospective relief. Because Defendants raise it here it is addressed
here.
SIMI and BATTSON assert that this Court lacks the authority to force
Defendants Simi and/or Battson to take any particular action (BATTSON, SIMI
Doc. No. 134, 2, fn. 2) citing Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
The assertion that a United States District Court cannot enjoin color of state law
actors from violating citizen rights is staggering. Linda R.S. did not re-write the
Fourteenth Amendment, but is an early case in what was in 1973 the Supreme
Courts developing Article III standing doctrine on the third speculative prong,
later articulated in more mature form in Lujan, infra.
In Linda R.S., Plaintiff, an unwed mother, was unsuccessful in obtaining child
support from her childs father. She sought assistance from authorities to prosecute
the father under a Texas child support enforcement law. The District Attorney
refused to prosecute, articulating the despicable proposition that Texas courts
construed the law to apply only to the benefit of legitimate children.
Plaintiff filed suit in district court, requesting an injunction running against
the district attorney forbidding him from declining prosecution on the ground that the
unsupported child is illegitimate. Linda R.S. at 616. She asserted an equal
protection violation against a prosecutorial policy discriminating against
illegitimate children. Id. The Court declined to reach the equal protection
question, instead holding that Plaintiff lacked standing to force prosecution of the
father because she made an insufficient showing of a direct nexus between the

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vindication of her interest and the enforcement of the State's criminal laws. In other
words, she could not show that enforcement of the law (jailing the childs father), and
the vindication of her interest in the care of her childthe fathers payment of
child support.
This nexus argument was developed in subsequent decisions in L.A. v Lyons
and B.C. v. Plumas, and is today recognizable as the third speculative prong
described in Lujan. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative,
that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
18

BATTSON and SIMI appear hopeful of establishing a rule that state
administrators cannot be liable or subject to injunction for policies to refrain from
enforcing equal protection laws on the behavior of those over whom they have the
power and duty to control if, so long as possible injuries from unequal treatment are
speculative. This of course ignores the fact that the very existence of behaviors
and policies depriving a vulnerable class of citizens equal protection of the laws is in
and of itself an outrageous affront to equal justice. Whether a plaintiff can prove
injury from such an outrage is a response that only a lawyerand deprived one even
at that standardcould celebrate.
Moreover, in addition to being an outrageous insult to perhaps the most
fundamental of our nations civic values of equal protection of the law (See Ex parte
Commonwealth of Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879), U.S. Const., Amend XIV), is
inconsistent with the ruling in Linda R.S. First, BATTSON and SIMI are not

18
The evolution from nexus to speculative is mapped at fn. 20 in Lyons: [A] court must
determine that there is an available remedy which will have a substantial probability, Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, [508] (1975), of redressing the plaintiff's injury. This latter concern is merely
a recasting of the causal nexus, supra, at 16781679, that must exist between the alleged injury and
the action being challenged, and ensures that the granting of judicial relief will not be an exercise in
futility. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, [74] (1978). These
considerations are summarized by the requirement that a plaintiff need only allege an injury that is
legally redressable. Jenkins, supra, 395 U.S., at 424, 89 S.Ct., at 1850 (emphasis added). City of
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 129, fn. 20. (1983).

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prosecutorstheyre administrative supervisors who, like any supervisor, may
discipline their subordinates. While judges are perhaps entitled to a higher degree of
autonomy for acts within their judicial discretion (none of which are accused in this
Action), the act of policymaking, administering courts, a forensic psychology
commercial enterprise, family law facilitator offices, equal protection violations, state
constitutional violations, and crime, are not within judicial discretion, are not judicial
functions, and are properly the subject of judicial discipline regardless of amenability
to suit for civil damages or injunction. See, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424
(1976) (We emphasize that the immunity of prosecutors from liability in suits under
1983 does not leave the public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that
which occurs. This Court has never suggested that the policy considerations which
compel civil immunity for certain governmental officials also place them beyond the
reach of the criminal law. Even judges, cloaked with absolute civil immunity for
centuries, could be punished criminally for willful deprivations of constitutional
rights on the strength of 18 U. S. C. 242, the criminal analog of 1983.). A
citizens imposed incapacity to protect herself does not excuse others who can from
their duty to enforce the laws equally. In fact, their failure in conspiracy or as a
policy, habit, or custom is itself actionable and indictable. See Count 10, below.
19

In addition, the speculative issue is not present in this case. In Linda R.S.
Justice Marshall rationalized his decision that plaintiff lacked standing because
prosecuting delinquent child support debtors of illegitimate children could assure
such delinquent parents were jailedbut Justice Marshall reasoned it was too
speculative to presume it would have an effect on their willingness to pay child
support. That condition does not exist in this Action against SIMI and BATTSON.
An illegal policy, habit, or custom of not prosecuting judges for abusing a class
litigants directly and foreseeably will lead to more abuse. The condition Justice

19
Plaintiffs have separately filed a tort claim against the United States Attorney for her failures
to police present defendnats. See http://wp.me/p4aG7J-O9

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Marshall identifieda policy of not prosecuting person A for As not doing
something A should (pay person B) was speculative to person Bs injury because
even if person A was jailed, he may or may not pay person B.
That disjunction in proximity is not present here. The question is: Do
BATTSON and SIMIS activities in refraining from policing judges for abusing a
class of citizens foreseeably set in motion more abuse that class of citizens? The
answer is clear, and well-articulated by Justice White, joined by Justices Douglas,
Blackmun, and Brennan, in the dissent from Linda R.S.:
[W]hy should only an actual or potential criminal defendant have a
recognizable interest in attacking this allegedly discriminatory statute and not
appellant and her class? They are not, after all, in the position of members of
the public at large who wish merely to force an enlargement of state criminal
laws. Appellant, her daughter, and the children born out of wedlock whom she
is attempting to represent have all allegedly been excluded intentionally from
the class of persons protected by a particular criminal law. They do not get the
protection of the laws that other women and children get. Under Art. 602, they
are rendered nonpersons; a father may ignore them with full knowledge that he
will be subjected to no penal sanctions. . . . I had always thought our
civilization has assumed that the threat of penal sanctions had something more
than a speculative effect on a person's conduct. This Court has long acted on
that assumption in demanding that criminal laws be plainly and explicitly
worded so that people will know what they mean and be in a position to
conform their conduct to the mandates of law. Certainly Texas does not share
the Court's surprisingly novel view. It assumes that criminal sanctions are
useful in coercing fathers to fulfill their support obligations to their legitimate
children. . . .
If a State were to pass a law that made only the murder of a white person a
crime, I would think that Negroes as a class would have sufficient interest to

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seek a declaration that that law invidiously discriminated against them.
Appellant and her class have no less interest in challenging their exclusion
from what their own State perceives as being the beneficial protections that
flow from the existence and enforcement of a criminal child-support law.
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 620-21 (1973) (White, J. dissenting).
Courts in the United States have repeatedly found government actors liable for
creating policies and conditions which foreseeably permit others to cause injury. See
Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982). When that policy, habit, or
custom of permitting crime, causing a deprivation of liberty, property, speech, or
other fundamental rights, or works against a class, the policy is a violation of equal
protection under state and federal constitutions. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.
456, 465 (1996); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United States,
238 U.S. 347 (1914); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326; Screws v. U.S., 325
U.S. 91 (1945).
As the interests and numerous fundamental rights of classes no less important
than families and children are present here, their equal treatment in crisiswhen they
need the fair protection of the law the mostdeserves federal attention. Families are
our nations core and future. They are clearly identifiable, and deserve at least as
much protection as other groups, who have achieved recognition for class-based
discrimination against them. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 441 (1985) (illegitimacy a recognized intermediate scrutiny class); Witt v.
Dep't of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 817 (9th Cir. 2008) (9
th
Circuit modern standard for
equal protection analysis of intermediate scrutiny class); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d
1052, 1082 (9th Cir. 2012) cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (U.S. 2012) and vacated and
remanded sub nom, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (U.S. 2013) (modern
standard for rational basis scrutiny); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 650 (1996);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (strict scrutiny). They speak
today through a powerless representative, but do not assert disgruntled litigant

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claimsbut clearly demonstrable commercial fraud, extortion, deprivation, and
abuse committed on an enterprise scale.
In the event that SIMI or BATTSON are or become aware of de facto
discrepancies or de jure policies in how family court judges or family court litigant
complaints are handled, Plaintiffs will look forward to offering further analysis on
this topic. For present purposes, the claims are adequately pled.
E. Color of Law Authority
Multiple private Defendants assert a plausibility attack on the FAC allegations
that the private entities are liable under section 1983 as color of law actors.
OMNIBUS (Doc. No. 131-1) 12:24, 13:26, 14:3-5; BIERER (Doc. 135-1) 3:28-4:1,
4:13-17; JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS (Doc. 139) 6:27-7:2, 7:14-20; GORE (Doc.
141-1); FEDERAL Doc. No. 145, 4:25-5:18; LAWYER DEFENDANTS (Doc. 149-
2) 4:2-6:15. Defendants focus on conspiracy, alleging only that there are no specific
facts showing an agreement between all these private parties and any state actor
acting under color of law. OMNIBUS 13:25-27. While direct interaction between a
private party and a state actor is one foundation for liability, there are many:
Conspiracy between public and private actors. Adickes v. S. H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27, (1980)
(conspiracy between private actors and prosecutors); Brummett v. Camble, 946 F.2d
1178, 1184-85 (5th Cir. 1991).
Private action in concert with state officials. United States v. Price,
383 U.S. 787, 795 (1966); Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (2002); Cooper v.
Molko, 512 F. Supp. 563, 568 (N.D. Cal. 1981);
State actors delegating authority to private actors: West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42 (1988);
Private party invoking state procedure or authority in private action:
Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802,
804 (9th Cir.1976); Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.1975),

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and cases cited therein at n. 6; Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164,
(1978).
Private actors carrying out a public function: See Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461, 484, (1953) (Clark, J., concurring); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507-
08 (1946).
Private action compelled by state actors: Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970).
Pervasive entanglement between public authority and private actors:
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 531 U.S.
288 (2001).
Exercise of government-created framework for private action: North
Georgia Finishing, Incorporated v. Di-Chem, Incorporated, 419 U.S. 601 (1975);
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (private party liable where state and party
form a symbiotic relationship or state coerces or provides significant
encouragement to private actors).
Private entities such as SDCBA and FEDERAL enacting or enforcing
policies in concert with authority in violation of plaintiffs rights may be liable under
Monell. Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir.2012).
1. Color of Law is a Question of Fact
Defendants must establish that the FAC fails to allege facts supporting any of
the numerous grounds for state action. Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 382-83
(9th Cir. 1983). The analysis is complex, involving sifting facts and weighing
circumstances. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961);
Life Insurance Co. of North America v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 501 (9th Cir.1979);
Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802, 804 (9th Cir. 1976). Discovery will cement what
is today apparent and properly alleged: The domestic dispute industry is a criminal
enterprise operating in coordination with color of authority to exploit domestic
dispute litigants, by fraud, extortion, and violence through abuse of the public powers

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and authority of Californiasand our nationsdomestic relations courts. FAC
63-75; 929-1000,
2. Color of Law Allegations from FAC
The OMNIBUS asserts a general plausibility attack on color of law allegations:
the occasional conclusory phrase can be found to the effect that defendants all
conspired with each other. OMNIBUS 14:3-5. This sweeping characterization of
facts as mere boiler-plate-conclusory statements is insufficient to carry the
movants burden under a plausibility attack. See multi-stage analysis, supra.
Information and Belief Allegations In Plausibility Attacks
In this and other plausibility attacks the OMNIBUS ignores facts alleged on
information and belief. Information and belief allegations are appropriate when
alleging facts out of a plaintiffs control. The existence of a subjective belief will
frequently turn on factors which a plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to know.
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512, (Before discovery has unearthed
relevant facts and evidence, it may be difficult to define the precise formulation of the
required prima facie case in a particular case.). See also Starr Baca, 652 F.3d
1202, 1204-1205; Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v. United States, 648 F.3d 708, 721 (9th
Cir.2011) (allegation that product performed below industry standards certainly
sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion); Daniels Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n,
629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir.2010); OSU Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1058
(9th Cir. 2012); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 167 (1993). Information and belief claims are particularly
appropriate where parties maintain duties to perform control or agency relationships
with other Defendants. Allegations of wrongful conduct which sets in motion acts
by others causing injury are sufficient to establish liability. Johnson v. Duffy, 588
F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011).

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a. Enterprise-Level Integration
Defendants themselves provide the best evidence of their operation as
public/private enterprise, variously describing themselves as a Family Law
Community or Family Law System. FAC 62, 66. In San Diego, top certified
family law specialists regularly meet with Superior Court leaders to set and
administer policy for the Family Law System.
20
The FAC alleges the California
Domestic Dispute Industry is a highly integrated partnership between private and
public actors, functions, powers, and control. Id., FAC Ex. 1, 2. The FAC
summarizes the abundant evidence of Defendants unhidden collaboration:
California legal institutions such as family courts and the legal community,
professional institutions such as the state bar and
psychology boards, and criminal justice institutions
have in the recent decade gradually combined to
cultivate a joint enterprise forum in which
widespread family practice exceptions to the rule
of law are not only tolerated, but increasingly
encouraged. Count 7. Its members also operate
private networks to pursue their commercial
purposes and collaborate toward those ends in the form of a cabal FAC 946-949.
They collaborate in mutual referral networks (Racketeering Count 2) and coordinate
their public commercial advertising to support one anothers fraud (FAC 949,
Count 15). Private entities collaborate with public entities to create and police a
commercial market for illegal, unnecessary, and even harmful domestic relations
legal services (FAC 933-36, 953), maintain the long-term viability of the market
in collaborative pacts (FAC 956-61), and compete unfairly with any disfavored
competitors in the same marketplace, including California Coalition. FAC 913,

20
KPBS interview by Maureen Cavanaugh of Shawn Weber, Esq., CFLS Cuts To San Diego
County Courts Are Affecting Families, December 3, 2012, available at
http://www.kpbs.org/audioclips/16090/

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950, 951. By agreement and abuse of process in knowing collaboration with public
entities, private entities invoke public authority, police powers, and the criminal
justice system to protect their markets (FAC 952).
21
Each of these allegations is an
independent basis for color of law liability.
Defendant ALLIANCE operates a family justice center business model in
San Diego and throughout the nation based on public/private colocation. This
collaboration is a central pillar of the SD-DDICE, DDI-IACE, and a major pillar of
the DDICE. FAC 937, Ex. 1. This model coagulates public officials under a
public/privately funded alliance to create and disseminate illegal policies,
indoctrinate officials away from settled law, establish practice-level protocols,
share public/private infrastructure and technical assistance research, and enforce
compliance (FAC 938, Ex. 1, P6-7, P47-71, P72-90, P97-104, P127, P292-306,
P441-447, P448-456, P457, P460-467).
22
The vertical integration of Family Courts
and Criminal Courts explained by Dr. Baskerville in Ex. 13 further describes the
integration of Divorce Industry lawyers, social workers, police, family courts, and
criminal courts in abundant detail.
SDCBA is another pillar of the SD-DDICE. Through meetings such as the
SDCBA SEMINAR (and numerous others not specifically alleged) it coordinates
dissemination of illegal policy, custom, and practice and direction throughout the
Family Law Community utilizing SDCBA premises and infrastructure. In California
such policies include the Domestic Dispute Industrys Pit (FAC 964-974),
collaborate with state and county defendants to invoke The Pits domestic violence
restraining orders and other abuses to commit fraud and extortion (FAC 937-939,

21
To assist the court in its plausibility analysis, details the enterprise-level
collaboration have been generously provided by Plaintiffs affiliates from
DivorceCorp available here: . The entire film is available
for purchase at www.weightiermatter.com. If desired, PLAINTIFFS hereby proffer
and request leave to amend to plead this detail.
22
Further analysis that may be pled on leave to amend is located within FAC Ex. 1
Exs. A, B, and B.1, and at Plaintiffs website here: http://wp.me/p4aG7J-8y

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975-76; Doc. No. 109), abuse of process by SDCB members using SDCBA-
maintained listervs (FAC Exhibit 2 re: Lesh/Doyne). The SD-DDICE has created
and maintains an extensive fraudulent forensic psychology commercial enterprise
(FAC 940-942, 977-983, FAC Ex. 2) and utilize public licenses in collaboration
with knowing but illegal abstention of judicial officers to conduct False Flag fraud
(FAC 984-999). Federal provides insurance and financial and legal backing to
these illegal enterprises (FAC 30), and coordinates their legal defense to include in
this case collaboration with CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS in the MALICIOUS
PROSECUTIONS. All Defendants invoke police powers and the criminal justice
system regularly and illegally to enrich and defend their public-private enterprise
industry. See STUART ASSAULT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION,
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE (Count 4), NESTHUS OBSTRUCTION OF
JUSTICE, EQUAL PROTECTION CONSPIRACIES, RACKETEERING COUNTS,
FICRO CONSPIRACIES. Defendants Superior Court, COUNTY, SDSD, and CITY
ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS implement the enforcement element of these
enterprises through illegal abuse of color of law authority. See, FICRO
CONSPIRACIES.
The framework, policies, and legal tools for this collaboration fall within the
symbiosis, entanglement, and state constructed framework models for state
actor liability disclosed in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School
Athletic Association, 531 U.S. 288 (2001), North Georgia Finishing, Incorporated v.
Di-Chem, Incorporated, 419 U.S. 601 (1975) and Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991
(1982) above. Specific deployments of this framework in both enterprise and
conspiracy are identified elsewhere in the FAC and below. All Defendants operate
and profit from this entanglement, and are therefore color of law actors for all
purposes. See Stuart Decl. for multimedia explanations of additional element should
the Court desire additional pleading to support these allegations.

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b. Harassment And Abuse Collaboration
The FAC describes a history between Domestic Dispute Industry Defendants
and California Coalition and its community of parents and children that has devolved
into nothing short of concerted warfare on Plaintiffs by private and public
collaboration. The FAC details how the enterprise-level collaboration above has
graduated to focus its ominous machinery of criminal and civil justice systems,
private wealth, connections, and know-how in conspiracy and enterprise to
specifically target California Coalitions reform efforts, exercise and advocacy for
federal supremacy, and support of candidates, processes, and institutions of the
United States (FFRRESA).
c. Racketeering Collaboration
The collaboration between various defendants is also described by their use of
specific types of schemes and artifices to defraud and tools of extortion to commit
racketeering, extortion, bribery, fraud, and multiple acts of violence to crush
Plaintiffs attempts to compete with and reform a heinous domestic dispute industry.
See, COUNTS 1, 3, RACKETEERING COUNTS 3, 6. Such crimes would not be
possible absent common observance and coordinated policing of extra-legal policies
or customs utilizing the coercive tools of domestic courts and law enforcement
which, though perhaps immune from civil rights lawsuits, are nevertheless illegally
deployed onto the targets of the crime: Families. The heinous tools deployed in such
schemes include issuance of illegal DVILS ORDERS,
23
disobedience of state and
federal constitutional protections for litigants, deployment of illegal forensic
psychology commercial enterprises
24
, disregard of ordinary rules of evidence in
violation of state statutes, caselaw,
25
to equal protection, enforcement of illegal
attorney fees awards, and wide-scale and shameful judicial abstention and

23
See, e.g., Doc. No. 109, fn. 11 for detail on constitutional violations.
24
See http://wp.me/p4aG7J-OR for detail on this issue and a forthcoming motion for
preliminary injunction.
25
See Elkins v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 483, 492-94 (2007).

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acquiescence by judges under whose noses the practice occurs daily. FAC 984-
999. In just this case Defendants have acted in highly-coordinated conspiracy and
enterprise over the past six years to conduct and participate in the racketeering
enterprises and conspiracies to combat Plaintiffs competition and reform, including
illegally imprisoning CALIFORNIA COALITIONS leader, and threatening dozens
of its members with similarly deplorable retaliation. See, NESTHUS
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE; RICO COUNTS 3-10; DDI Marketplace allegations;
Doc. No. 4.
d. Stuart Assault Coordinator Collaboration
The FAC details sufficient collaboration between public and private actors at
the STUART ASSAULT to invoke liability under section 1983. Paragraph 294
alleges: [d]efendants inflicted the above-described injury on Plaintiffs while
formally assembled under color of law as judges, peace officers, officers of the court,
and their agents, while bearing the color of their honorable titles, regalia, and
designations of authority, including judicial robes, uniforms, armory, and badges of
authority, and exercised the same in all activities. This collaborative assemblythe
SDCBA SEMINARwas organized, planned, and conducted by SDCBA on
SDCBA property using SDCBA infrastructure. See COUNT 1. The purpose of the
SDCBA SEMINAR was to collaborate regarding policy and practice for the SD-
DDICEs use of Professional Services for Defendants DOYNE, LOVE, SIMON,
and others. FAC 109-111.
Each SAC Defendant collaborated with or exercised color of law authority in
the STUART ASSAULT. See COUNT 1. The STUART ASSAULT and its public
entity elements were backed and defended by SDCBAs insurer, FEDERAL.
COUNT 3. STUART and CALIFORNIA COALITION were persecuted in
collaboration between the SAC Defendants, including SDCBA and FEDERAL,
through the MALICIOUS PROSECUTION and PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCTS in retaliation for and to thwart the CLAIM AND DEMAND and

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Plainitffs PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITIES hostile to the industry as a whole.
The FAC alleges California Coalitions assertion of federal remedies to redress
injuries caused by the present public-private enterprises was also attacked by the
NESTHUS DEFENDANTSincluding each SAC and CITY ATTORNEY
DEFENDANTS in the OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE. It was executed in
collaboration between SAC Defendants in retaliation for Plaintiffs FFRRESA and
DUE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE and DDIJO COMPLAINTS against
COLOR OF LAW ACTORS WOHLFEIL, SCHALL, DOYNE, and others. FAC
79-85, 91-97.
SDCBA is alleged as a backbone infrastructure element of the SD-DDICE,
and an aider and abettor in the STUART AHCE (and thousands of other AHCEs in
San Diego County yet unnamed) and DDI-FICE, functioning to facilitate the
extensive collaboration and operation of the SD-DDICE, and to support and defend
the fraud, extortion, and obstruction of justice of the black hat criminal elements
that have overtaken the San Diego Family Law Community. FAC 63, 66, 68, 931-
936, 953-961, Ex. 2. SDCBA, along with each SAC, PLANNED AND
DELIVERED the SDCBA SEMINAR at which the SDCBA ENGAGEMENT was
targeted. FAC 108-116. FEDERAL is an enterprise-level financial backer,
supporter, and defender of SDCBA and each several alleged enterprises and
conspiracies to deprive the EQUAL PROTECTION CLASSES of rights. FAC 30,
257, 288, 351-372, 764-799.
3. Conspiracy Attacks
Several Defendants attack adequacy of the FAC conspiracy pleading. The
elements of a civil rights conspiracy are simplean agreement to perform the act
alleged. Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1301-02 (9th Cir.
1999). Agreement may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence explicit
agreement, or simply a meeting of the minds to collaborate. Gilbrook v. City of
Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856 (9th Cir.1999). A showing that the alleged

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conspirators have committed acts that are unlikely to have been undertaken without
an agreement may allow a jury to infer the existence of a conspiracy. Kunik v.
Racine County, 946 F.2d 1574, 1580 (7th Cir.1991). RICO conspiracies require only
agreement to facilitate operation or management of the enterprise. A defendant is
guilty of conspiracy to violate 1962(c) if the evidence shows that he or she
knowingly agreed to facilitate a scheme that includes the operation or management of
a RICO enterprise. United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1230 (9th Cir.2004),
cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1043 (2005). Agreement to facilitate is sufficient--a plaintiff
need not plead or prove any act in furtherance of the agreement. Salinas v. United
States, 522 U.S. 52, 6165 (1997).
26

California law does not require that each defendant charged with conspiracy
have committed an overt act; it is sufficient that at least one co-conspirator have
committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Cal. Pen.C. 184 (overt
act must be committed "by one or more of the parties to such agreement"); People v.
Russo, 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1135 (2001) ("Moreover, any one of the conspirators, and
not necessarily the charged defendant, may commit the overt act to consummate the
conspiracy."). It is unclear, however, whether the overt act must be committed while
the defendant is a part of the conspiracy in order for it to be used against him.
Compare CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL 6.10 ("It is not necessary to
the guilt of any particular defendant that he personally committed an overt act, if he
was one of the conspirators when the alleged overt act was committed.") (alternative
pronouns omitted), with 1 WITKIN & EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW
(3d ed. 2000) Elements 95 ("[O]ne who joins with the existing conspirators in the
criminal plan does not create a new conspiracy but becomes a member of the existing
conspiracy. Hence, an overt act committed prior to the new member joining will be
just as effective against him or her as against the prior parties....").

26
Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instructions:
http://www.akd.uscourts.gov/docs/general/model_jury_civil.pdf

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FEDERAL: FEDERAL cites Wasco Products for the proposition that a federal
plaintiff must allege the basic elements of a conspiracy of formation and
operation, wrongful acts pursuant thereto, and damages." FEDERAL Doc. No. 145,
5:2-3. Wasco Products analyzed the required elements of conspiracy under
California state law commercial damages claims. Wascoe at *12. The relevant
allegations against FEDERAL allege a civil rights conspiracy under federal law
civil rights and RICO.
FEDERAL also claims the conspiracy claim lacks an underlying tort.
FEDERAL is accused of numerous violations of law both independently and as the
underlying tort.
FEDERAL asserts the FAC is defective because it does not satisfy this
Courts published pleading standards for RICO claims, referencing exhibit 2 to its
RJN consisting of this Courts RICO Case Statement form. 145, 5:20. This Courts
RICO Case Statement is not a pleading standard but an optional form the Court
may instruct Plaintiffs to complete during pleading or discovery. Many Courts use
them, and Plaintiffs counsel is well-familiar with the format and process, which is
often helpful in complex cases such as this one. Should the Court require Plaintiffs to
complete such a form, Plaintiff will of course comply. Until such an order issues,
FEDERALS attack fails.

4. SDCBA-FEDERAL-CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS Collaboration
The OMNIBUS asserts a special attack on behalf of SDCBA and FEDERAL
that Count 3 simply lumps together City Attorney defendants with the SDCBA and
numerous private party defendants for deprivation of rights under color of law with
no facts establishing the necessary elements of an agreement or conspiracy.
FEDERAL makes a similar allegation at Doc. No. 145, 3:25-4:15.
The FAC alleges numerous specific acts by FEDERAL and SDCBA in
conspiracy and collaboration during exercise of state power, entanglement, and

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enterprise sufficient to provide abundant foundation for private defendants liability
for abuse of color of law authority. Count 3 alleges Stuart delivered the CLAIM
AND DEMAND to SDCBA, which delivered it to FEDERAL. 353, 355.
FEDERAL identified itself as an agent of SDCBA and all parties and insureds
including all SAC. FEDERAL stated it was considering prosecution of STUART
for criminal trespass if STUART pressed further. 355, 359, 364, 366-70.
FEDERAL identified a bunch of angry judges as damage caused by STUART
which FEDERAL intended to assert in its defense of the CLAIM AND DEMAND,
and suggested STUART drop it. FAC 366. The FAC identifies these facts as
supporting a conclusion that a FEDERAL had joined the STUART ASSAULT
COORDINATORS in conspiracy: The FEDERAL representative indicated what
appeared to be a conspiracy between FEDERAL, SDCBA, and one or more of the
STUART ASSAULT COORDINATORS, including powerful San Diego judicial
officials. FAC 368. FEDERAL cannot prosecute crimes, but represented a
relationship with other SAC judicial officers and the City Attorney enabling it to do
so. FAC 364-368.
The FAC alleges collaboration between SDCBA (as a Stuart Assault
Coordinator), FEDERAL, and CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS. Facts
supporting this conclusion include providing or generating false or misleading
information, testimony, documents and other evidence to other Defendants. FAC
471. The false or misleading information was conveyed to GARSON, who used it
in the MALICIOUS PROSECUTION to threaten prosecution not merely for the
criminal trespass charge, but GARSON amplified the charge to one for felony
stalking of judges the MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. FAC 367-454. She later
amplified it further by suborning perjury to threaten STUART with an investigation
by the F.B.I. for harassing judges. FAC 437.
5. BIERER Color of Law Attack:
BIERER comes closest to traversing the analysis, but fails to identify a

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conclusory allegation in the FAC to attack. She instead misrepresents the FAC in a
generalization, then attacking the misrepresentation:
Plaintiffs allege that everyone and anyone involved in the family law process is
part of a grandiose scheme against them and their rights. Put simply, there are
no factual allegations in the FAC to support this contention against any of the
defendants, let alone Bierer. The lack of factual allegations aside, the alleged
scheme and conspiracy against Plaintiffs is so implausible as to borderline
on ludicrous. Instead, a much more likely explanation is that Plaintiffs,
including Colbern Stuart, had poor experiences with the family law system,
and now hold a grudge against the system as a whole.
135-1, 3:10-17.
This is an inaccurate. The FAC alleges specific conspiracies detailed above in
which BIERER is involved, including the STUART ASSAULT Claim 1.8, identifies
her as a member of the STUART ASSAULT COORDINATOR group, a participant
in four ENTERPRISES, and details her liability through several Racketeering Claims
for Relief. These allegations are supported by significant factual detail. To
overcome the presumption of truth of the conspiracy and enterprise allegations,
BIERER must respond with a more plausible explanation. Here she misses the
mark: Plaintiffs hold a grudge against the system as a whole. A plaintiffs motives
in bringing a lawsuit are irrelevant to a Twombly plausibility analysis. Instead
BIERER must identify an alternative explanation for her own behavior other than, for
example, knowingly furthering the STUART ASSAULT by alerting SDCBA DOE 1
and SDSD of STUARTS location at the SEMINAR, as alleged at FAC 242, 243.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567. She will also have opportunities to
explain her participation with the domestic dispute industry criminal enterprises, the
forensic investigator criminal enterprise, and the STUART-AHCE criminal
enterprises by collaborating with others in the abundant frauds, extortion, and violent
crimes alleged against her.

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6. Lawyer Defendants Color of Law Attack
Lawyer Defendants assert a plausibility attack on the FAC alleging they have
acted under color of law. Doc. No. 149-2, 5:10-6:15. Lawyer Defendants are part of
the STUART ASSAULT COORDINATOR group. The FAC alleges color of law
generally at FAC 150 and against these defendants in the STUART ASSAULT as
Defendants inflicted the above-described injury on Plaintiffs while formally
assembled under color of law as judges, peace officers, officers of the court, and their
agents, while bearing the color of their honorable titles, regalia, and designations of
authority, including judicial robes, uniforms, armory, and badges of authority, and
exercised the same in all activities alleged. FAC 294. Specific facts demonstrating
collaboration in the STUART ASSAULT include the PLANNING AND DELIVERY
(Claim 1.12, FAC 179-182, 288), selection of timing for the STUART ASSAULT
to maximize chilling and personal and competitive injury (FAC 291), collaborating
and communicating with one another upon learning of the ENGAGEMENT, and
agreeing to affiliate and support the STUART ASSAULT (FAC 140-144),
collaborating with SDCBA and SDCBA DOE 1 in preparing, conducting the
SEMINAR and identifying STUART (FAC 189-193), alerting one another and
SDSD to STUARTS presence and location (FAC 198), inducing breach of contract
and competitive injury (Count 2), furthering harm and injury and ratifying the
STUART ASSAULT by defaming Plaintiffs and their cause (FAC 134),
collaborating with FEDERAL and SDCBA in fabrication and destruction of evidence
in response to the CLAIM AND DEMAND and DUE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE (FAC 367, 370-71, 470), collaborating with of other STUART
ASSAULT COORDINATORS and the CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS in the
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION by providing or generating false or misleading
information, testimony, documents and other evidence to other Defendants,
precipitating acts in the MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, and foreseeably causing the
FALSE IMPRISONMENTS and other subsequent events (FAC 414, 471),

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Lawyer Defendants are also alleged as participants in the DDICE and SD-
DDICE. As participants in the public/private enterprises they also act under color of
law. FAC 929, 932, 935, 944, and RACKETEERING COUNTS.
Lawyer Defendants Invalid Analysis of Conspiracy Elements
Lawyer Defendants assert To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff alleging
conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights must include in his complaint
nonconclusory allegations with evidence of unlawful intent citing Harris v.
Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir.1997) and Fraklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 445
(9th Cir. 2002). This citation to Fox simply distinguishes purely private action from
color of law authority. Franklin furthered that statement to specify four categories of
substantial degree of cooperation which could subject private actors to liability
under section 1983. The Supreme Court has articulated four tests for determining
whether a private individual's actions amount to state action: (1) the public function
test; (2) the joint action test; (3) the state compulsion test; and (4) the governmental
nexus test. Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 444-45 (9th Cir. 2002). This case fits
several of those categories.
Lawyer Defendants claim that Plaintiffs civil rights claims must satisfy a
heightened pleading standard for unlawful intent citing Harris v. Roderick, 126
F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 1997) is abrogated law. 149-2, 5:26-28, Harriss
heightened pleading holding followed Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir.
1991), which first established the heightened pleading requirement. Branchs
heightened pleading requirement has been abrogated at both the United States
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit. In light of CrawfordEl and Swierkiewicz, we
must conclude that Branch I and II are no longer good law to the extent that they
require heightened pleading of improper motive in constitutional tort cases.
Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002). Today, the
appropriate analysis is the plausible pleading requirement for conclusory
allegations detailed in Twombly. See I.A.1(b) supra.

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7. CORRIGAN and LOVE Color of Law Attacks
CORRIGAN and LOVE identify four of the several tests relevant for holding
private entities liable for association with color of law authority. LOVE 144, 5:21-
8:23. The State Compulsion Test of Blum v. Yaretsky and joint action test of
Franklin v. Fox is met by the FAC allegations that Defendants claim thats how it
is (FAC 911). BLANCHET and ABC&K have described The Pit as coercive: Of
course theyre unconstitutionaltheyre illegal as Hell, but they know its expensive
to fight it, so they strike first, throw you in The Pit and make you pay or work to
climb your way out (FAC 969).
27
The STUART ASSAULTS PLANNING AND
DELIVERY in which LOVE and CORRIGAN participated was carried out at the
direction of ALKSNE. FAC 180-181. DOYNE and BLANCHET conveyed state
coercion to waive fundamental rights as thats just how it is, take it or leave it,
and if you ever want to see your son again (FAC 949, 1035).
CORRIGAN and LOVE contest the public function test and the
governmental nexus tests. The FAC alleges the Family Law System has
supplanted traditional state functions administered according to state and federal
constitutional restrictions and due process with enterprises operating according to
policies directed to deprive, extort, and defraud those seeking traditional public
functions of principled dispute resolution according to law. The Jackson and Sturm
cases cited at 144, 7:7-23 involve genuinely distinct private entities acting under
licenses or regulations according to law. The allegations were that by acting
according to regulation, the entities were color of law actors. The FAC does not rely
solely on public license or adherence to a regulatory scheme, but that DDICE entities
act inconsistent with law according to unreacted policies and quid-pro-quo
exchanges. E.g., FAC 948, RACKETEERING COUNT 2.

27
STUART hereby represents an ability to plead numerous additional statements by Defendants
in his own case and in many others detailing judicial policymaking, direction, conspiracy, and
coercion if granted leave. The issue of industrywide disregard of professional and fiduciary duties
will also be the subject of Plaintiffs expert witness testimony.

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Color of Law Conclusion
Defendants are bound by numerous PROFESSIONAL DUTIES including the
strictest fiduciary and legal representative obligations to protect their clients and
citizen rights to due process and equal protection, including rights to evidentiary
protections, privacy, and procedural protections available to every other civil
litigant.
28
While perhaps immune, the acts are nonetheless illegal. It is
inconceivable that an entire class of lawyers, psychologist, and judge could violate
their professions clear PROFESSIONAL DUTIES to openly participate in vast
deprivation, commercial fraud, and unveiled extortion
29
that has become de rigueur in
family court without intelligent direction, collaboration, and reinforcement. Such
deplorable collaboration is precisely the illegal collusion that subjects the commercial
Divorce Industry bar to liability as state actors, and precisely the behavior this Action
is aimed to remedy.
F. Lanham Act
Several Defendants attack Plaintiffs Lanham Act claim (Count 15). Lawyer
Defendants assert the FAC fails to assert (1) a commercial injury based upon a
misrepresentation about a product; and (2) that the injury is competitive, or harmful
to the plaintiff's ability to compete with the defendant. Doc. No. 149-2, 8:20-26.
OMNIBUS asserts (The fatal flaw here is plaintiffs' allegation at FAC paragraph 912
that 'plaintiffs compete with defendants for provision of legal services" 14:19-15:19.
BIERER asserts There are also no factual allegations as to how Plaintiffs compete in
the same marketplace as Bierer. Doc. No. 135-1, 5:6-9. COUNTY similarly
attacks: No claim is stated because the County of San Diego and the Sheriff do not
engage in the advertisement or sale of goods or services; are not involved in interstate
commerce; and the County defendants do not compete with plaintiffs in any

28
The instances of Family Courts illegal divergence from the California Code of Civil
Procedure are well documented in California. See Elkins v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 483,
492-94 (2007).
29
See Stuart Declaration in Support of Preliminary Injunction, discussion of extortion
counseled in AAML article by Leonard Karp, 17-31; fraud counseled by Christopher Zopatti.

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commercial activity. Doc. 141-1, 7:1-17.
These attacks fail. Plaintiffs do compete with Defendants for citizens seeking
domestic dispute resolution services in the DDI Marketplace, and the FAC alleges
those facts. FAC 913, 935-36, 950, 952-961. Moreover, recent caselaw makes the
attacks moot.
1. Lexmark v. Static Controls
These assertions excusably omit a recent Supreme Court decision which
overturns the line of Ninth Circuit precedent on which Defendants rely. In Lexmark
Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014) the Court settled
on the broadest of several tests for determining Article III standing in Lanham Act
claimsthe zone of interest test. In so doing, the Court overturned the Waits
30
line
of cases on which defendants rely for the proposition that only competitors have
standing to assert Lanham Act claims.
After Lexmark, any party suffering foreseeable commercial injury by false
advertisingeven a non-competitorhas standing under the Lanham Act. The issue
in Lexmark was whether Static Controls, a toner cartridge component part
manufacturer, could sue Lexmark, a toner cartridge manufacturer and competitor of
Static Controls customers, for false advertising about Lexmarks own products.
Lexmark alleged Static Controls lacked standing because Static Controls did not
directly compete with Lexmark. Id. at 1384.
The Court adopted the broad zone of interest test: The plaintiff must have
suffered or be imminently threatened with a concrete and particularized injury in
fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014)
(citing Lujan). [T]he test is not especially demanding. [W]e have often

30
Waits v. FritoLay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1108 (9
th
Cir. 1992) (OMNIBUS citation at 15:3-6 is
to Jurin v. Google Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122 (E.D. Cal. 2010). Jurin is derived from Jack
Russell Terrier Network of Northern California v. American Kennel Club, Inc., 407 F.3d 1027,
1037. Jack Russell is turn founded on Waits. The entire line is abrogated.

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conspicuously included the word arguably in the test to indicate that the benefit of
any doubt goes to the plaintiff, and have said that the test forecloses suit only when
a plaintiff's interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes
implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that. Id. at 1389.
Looking to the Lanham Acts statutory statement of purpose at 15 U.S.C. 1127, the
Court identified the broad intent to protect persons engaged in such commerce
against unfair competition. Id. at 1389. The Court held: a plaintiff must allege an
injury to a commercial interest in reputation or sales . . . flowing directly from the
deception [of plaintiffs consumers] wrought by the defendant's advertising . . causes
[plainitffs consumers] to withhold trade from the plaintiff. Id. at 1390.
2. The FAC Alleges Zone of Interest and Foreseeable Commercial Injury
The FAC allegations satisfy this test. The FAC describes the common
Domestic Dispute Industry Market and its Domestic Dispute Industry Litigants
(DDIL) which Lawyer Defendants and Plaintiffs serve: DDIL are ordinarily families
in crisis seeking to resolve their personal difficulties by altering relationships. In
doing so they must often seek the involvement of the state. For contested or unusually
complex matters, DDIL enlist experts to help navigate . . . Hence, a market for
family law experts to assist in navigating the complexity and/or maximizing outcome
exists. (DDI MARKET). FAC 953. The processes are described at FAC 64 as
governmental, and justice system process concerning domestic relations, child
rearing, parenting, constitutional law, child custody, and domestic violence. FAC
953-961.
Defendants services in that market are alleged at FAC 63, 66, 69, 107
(Defendants are owners, associates, participants, collaborators, affiliates,
benefactors, associates of entities providing traditional professional, legal, social,
and government services as part of the Domestic Dispute Industry.). Their
anticompetitive behavior is described generally: They have acted aggressively and
illegally against Plaintiffs to commit criminal and civil violations of Plaintiffs state

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and federal rights, obstruct justice, abuse process, interfere with existing and
prospective business relations, and commit civil and criminal violations federal law
as detailed herein.
Plaintiffs commercial presence in the DDIL Market is described as
COMMERCIAL PURPOSES and BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES
beginning at FAC 70, 74, and 98: [CALIFORNIA COALITION] is a public
benefit corporation educating, supporting, protecting, and promoting parents and
childrens rights and interests which are presently under- or misrepresented by
existing marketplace or government institutions, particularly in domestic dispute and
child custody matters. Since 2008 CALIFORNIA COALITION has assisted mothers,
fathers, and children in defending and supporting family autonomy in relations with
one another and government interests with related jurisdiction); FAC 99
(CALIFORNIA COALITIONS commercial activities have been directed toward
educating, empowering, supporting, and representing parents and children to
withstand and eventually reverse this well-armed invidious bureaucratic menace
eroding parents and childrens welfare.); FAC 100 (CALIFORNIA COALITION
works closely with national parenting organizations such as the National Parents
Organization, ACFC, and Up To Parents to provide healthy, safe, and legal
counseling, resources, representation, services, and support alternatives to traditional
domestic dispute services.); FAC 102 (Lexevias public interest or pro bono
engagements have included numerous Civil Rights and Constitutional Law matters,
including representation of CALIFORNIA COALITION and numerous parents
affiliated therewith); FAC 104 (independent parent-child-oriented private support
networks and services to share resources, improve awareness, advance joint social,
political, and legal goals, protect and promote the independent interests of families
and children in domestic dispute matters, develop superior, more efficient, safer, and
legal alternatives to traditional family law practices, and to improve the visibility of
parent-child interests to legal institutions including policymakers, law enforcement,

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and courts. Recognizing abundant opportunity to fill a demand for more efficient,
safe, and legal services within the family law community, CALIFORNIA
COALITIONS early business development efforts focused on gaining intelligence
about the Domestic Dispute Industry to better understand the existing business
structures and thereon reform and/or influence and build more efficient, effective,
safe, and legal services for parents and children who have no effective advocates in
the present industry. These goals include improving professional standards of care for
DDI professionalsincluding lawyer, professional service providers, judicial
officials, social workers, law enforcement, and others, providing consumer-oriented
legal and government services, inform and improve industry governance, improve
licensing, certification, discipline, oversight standards, from consumer (parents and
childrens) perspectives, and develop or assist in developing superior service products
to compete in that healthier environment.); FAC 105, 959 (educating the DDIL
marketplace to improve awareness and thereby eliminate the competitive advantage
of illegal black hat operators has been a central theme both in Plaintiffs FFRRESA
and BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT.).
Defendants deception of Plaintiffs consumers causing foreseeable injury is
described: at FAC 912-13: Plaintiffs, their clients, and affiliates provide safe,
legal, efficient, and healthier competing professional services in compliance with law.
Defendants, by virtue of their illegal collusion, conspiracy, and coordination are
competitively advantaged to overcharge for harmful, inefficient, oppressive, and
unhealthy services. To protect such inefficient, illegal, and anticompetitive activities,
Defendants have and continue to mislead consumers of PLAINTIFFS and
DEFENDANTS services in their COMMERCIAL SPEECH. Plaintiffs reasonably
believe they are likely to be mislead and damaged by such COMMERCIAL SPEECH
again in the future. See additional detail at FAC 935-936, 947, 949-52, 957, 959,
1034, 1064, 1076, 1081.

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3. Lanham Act Pleading Standard
OMNIBUS 15:7-10 incorrectly cites Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d
1058, 1065-1066 9 (9th Cir. 2004) for the proposition that a Lanham Act claims is
also subject to the heightened pleading standard for fraud 8 under FRCP 9(b).
Edwards did not involve Lanham Act pleading standards, but RICO Fraud pleading
standards. Defendants citation is inaccurate. Yet even so, given RICOs relaxed
fraud pleading standards, the Lanham Act claims would satisfy RICO pleading under
Rule 9(b). See RICO, Sec. I.G., infra.
4. Other Lanham Act Attacks:
a. Specific Misleading Words and Phrases
BIERER asserts the FAC lacks factual allegations against Bierer as to what
words, terms, names, symbols, and devices were used by Bierer and how they were
false or misleading; 135-1, 6:2-6. She cites no requirement for such specificity, and
none is required. Fed.R.Civ. Pro 8(a). The FAC alleges these matters with
specificity to provide notice at FAC 906-907, subsections (a), and 911, and
specifically against BIERER at (g) and Exhibit 48 (BIERERS Internet website).
FEDERAL asserts the Lanham Act claims do not plead elements required
under Kournikova v. General Media Communications, Inc., 278 F. Supp. 2d 1111
(C.D. Cal. 2003). FEDERAL Doc. No. 145, 5:24-26. FEDERAL does not identify
any element it alleges is missing, but Kournikova is explicitly based on Waits, which
was recently abrogated under Lexmark Controls. Kournikova at 1117-18. The FAC
properly pleads a claim under the relevant authority. See Lexmark v. Static Controls
analysis above.
COUNTY asserts that GORE and COUNTY do not advertise or compete.
Doc. 141-1, 12-15. COUNTYS website actively promotes its dispute resolution
services and family law facilitator offices. FAC 907(e), 464, 65,1, 653, 677, 679-
80, 694, 700, 705, 724, 739, (DDI-IACE ENTERPRISE). It uses those services to
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providers, including specifically Defendant Alliance, provides misinformation to
legal consumers about the legality, safety, and effectiveness of legal consumers, fails
to warn legal consumers of the enormous dangers of using the services of the Family
Law Facilitator Offices services and Domestic Dispute Industry Criminal Enterprise
fraud and extortion. Rather than directing the attention of its law enforcement
resources to protecting families in crisis by arresting the operatives of a criminal
syndicate residing in its own courthouse, the COUNTY devotes a substantial portion
of its website to referral and cross-promotion of family law services to entities it
knows or should know constitute a despicable for-profit fraud and extortion crime
ring harming thousands of county citizens including children.
All Defendants advertise the tools used by the DDICE enterprises as safe,
legal, and health methods of dispute resolution. FAC 907. They represent that the
rights of California families are protected under Californias administration of its
family code. They fail to warn of the abundant deprivations of civil rights, fraud,
extortion, invasions of privacy, and harm that befall families in crisis upon hiring the
private services they advertise and cross-promote. These abundant and shameful
failures to warn, misrepresentations, and referral and cross-promotional quasi-private
behavior and its co-promotion of it on private and county websites (FAC 653-654,
906-907, 911, 983, 1071, DDI-FICE, DDI-IACE allegations), and may be alleged
with even more particularity should the Court desire.
Plaintiff did not intend the FAC to be construed to assert a Lanham Act claim
against GORE or SDSD, and hereby disclaims any such Lanham Act claim.
G. RICO
Lawyer Defendants attack RICO alleging they are accused in no predicate
crimes. BIERER makes a similar challenge. These challenges omit to acknowledge
they are accused as SAC Defendants as well as RICO co-conspirators and aiders and
abettors, accused in RACKETEERING COUNTS 2-10 and numerous predicate
crimes alleged therein.

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The OMNIBUS, BIERER, DOYNE and LAWYER DEFENDANTS attack
more generally that the RICO Counts lack specificity. These attacks appear to
misunderstand the expansive scope and flexibility of RICO pleading.
1. The RICO Claims Satisfy Rule 8
SDCBAS attack that the RICO claims must meet a specificity standard is
inaccurate. OMNIBUS Doc. No. 131, 15:25-26. Most of the RICO claims are
subject only to Rule 8s short plain statement requirement. The specificity
pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) apply only to predicate crimes of mail and wire
fraud. See Lewis v. Sprock, 612 F. Supp. 1316, 1324 (N.D. Cal. 1985) ("[I]f the
racketeering acts are not frauds, the general principles of pleading embodied in Rule
8 apply."). Rule 9(b) thus only applies to RACKETEERING COUNT 1. Allegations
of the enterprises, schemes, markets, interstate commerce, longevity, pattern,
conspiracy, and aiding and abetting are subject to Rule 8. See 11 Wright & Miller,
Federal Practice & Procedure, Civ.3d 1251.1, RICO Act, p. 343, footnote 14,
(Conspiracy claims not subject to Rule 9(b)); Wilson v. Toussie, 260 F. Supp.2d 530,
n 5 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (home buyers RICO conspiracy claim build on fraud not
required to meet Rule 9(b); Rule 8(a) applies to RICO conspiracy claim); Toto
v.McMahon, Brafman, Morgan & Co., Case No 93 Civ 5894, 1995 US Dist LEXIS
1399, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec L Rep (CCH) 98.639 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 7, 1995)
(RICO 1962(d) conspiracy claim neednt meet Rule 9(b) specificity).
Consistent with the claim format for the Civil Rights Act claims pled under
Rule 8(a) detailed in Section I.A.1 above, each RACKETEERING COUNT and
Claim for Relief specifies the accused Defendants and asserted predicate and RICO
statutes. For example:

RACKETEERING COUNT 1
(FAC p. 209)
Entire heading:
18 U.S.C. 1962(c), (d)
Frauds and Swindles
18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343, 1344
Against Defendants DOYNE INC,
BLANCHET, VIVIANO, FRITZ

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Line 1:
Count (or Claim) Title
Line 2:
RICO Statutes asserted:
1962(c)
(conduct of or participation in a
racketeering enterprise)
&
1962(d)
(conspiracy to commit racketeering)
18 U.S.C. 1962(c), (d)

Line 3:
Title of Predicate Crime
(Mail Fraud)
Frauds and Swindles
Line 4:
Predicate Crime Statute
(Mail Fraud)
18 U.S.C. 1341
Line 5:
Defendants Accused
Against Defendants DOYNE INC,
BLANCHET, VIVIANO, FRITZ
Where more detail is appropriate for multiple defendants, groups of defendants or
multiple events, the Racketeering Count is further broken down into specific
Racketeering Claims for Relief, also identifying predicate crimes, RICO section,
defendants accused. The body of the claim contains supporting facts. For example,
Racketeering Count 3 alleges kidnapping premised on state law predicate crimes
under 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(A). It is based on several eventsthe STUART
ASSAULT, FALSE ARRESTS, and MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. Each separate
event of kidnapping is broken down into subordinate Claims such as Claim 3.1, based
on the STUART ASSAULT events:

Racketeering Claim for Relief 3.1
Kidnapping
Cal. Pen. C. 207(a)
Against STUART ASSAULT COORDINATORS

This Claim (and every other claim) proceeds to identify Defendants by group
(STUART ASSAULT COORDINATOR DEFENDANTS), sets forth a short, plain

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incorporation by reference of the STUART ASSAULT facts, recites the language of
the kidnapping statute (Cal. Pen. C. 207(a)), and articulates existence of injury to
Plaintiffs to be proven at trial. FAC 1045-1048. The Claim totals four paragraphs.
Because of the efficiencies enabled by the use of acronyms earlier in the FAC, most
Racketeering Claims are similarly short and plain. Its difficult to imagine a form
of pleading claims more compliant with Rule 8.
2. Defendants Fail to Traverse any Moss I Plausibility Attack
SDCBA dismissively characterizes: [t]o the extent plaintiffs allege RICO
claims on non-fraudulent acts, the claims are deficient under Rule 12(b)(6) for failing
to state facts, as opposed to conclusory statements, that would support relief.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557. OMNIBUS 16:5-7. This appears to aspire toward a
Moss I multi-stage plausibility attack under which Defendants bear the analytical
burden.
However, the attack fails to cite specific Claims for Relief or analyze
supporting facts pled within the claim, most often identified by acronym. E.g.
STUART ASSAULT is the foundation for numerous claims. Nor do Defendants
offer more plausible alternative explanations.
The RICO claims satisfy Rule 8(a).
3. Relaxed Pleading Under Rule 9(b) for RICO
Rule 9(b) must be applied flexibly in accordance with Rule 8(a)'s liberal
pleading standards and cannot be used to subvert Congress' liberal construction
mandate for RICO. Rule 9(b) does not contradict notice pleading embraced by
Rule 8(a), which requires that all averment be "simple, concise and direct" and that
the Ninth Circuit has consistently taken the approach of "reading the two rules in
conjunction." Zatkin v. Primuth, 551 F. Supp. 39, 42 (S.D. Cal. 1982). See also 11
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Civ.3d 1233, Pleading Claim for
Relief, _____ Conspiracy, pp. 370, 374-376, footnotes 7- 14, RICO conspiracy
claims not subject to Rule 9(b)(see cases identified therein); no pleading of

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evidentiary facts required); See Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of
Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 404 (7th Cir. 1984), affirmed, 473 U.S. 606, 105 S. Ct. 3291,
87 L.Ed.2d 437 (1985)(We see no grounds for demanding that a civil RICO plaintiff
essentially plead evidence and prove the case in the complaint.); Larsen v. Lauriel
Investments, Inc., 161 F. Supp.2d 1029, 1042 (D. Ariz. 2001) (The plaintiff need not
show that each individual defendant personally used the mail or wire services, but
only that he caused the mail or wire service to be used by acting with the knowledge
that their use would follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use
could reasonably be foreseen. American Automotive Accessories v. Fishman, 175
F.3d 534, 542 (7th Cir. 1998)).
Once a court is satisfied that a complaint properly pleads one predicate act, the
remaining claims may be admitted with minimal examination. Westways World
Travel v. AMR Corp., 182 F. Supp.2d 952, 957 (C.D. Calif. 2001) (The Court has
already concluded that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged the predicate act of extortion for
a Section 1962(c)) claim. This Court need not prune the FAC of any allegations of
mail fraud as another predicate act in determining whether the motion to dismiss
should be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court has already concluded Plaintiffs
sufficiently pled at least one type of predicate act. Therefore, the Court will deny
Defendants motion to dismiss the second claim on this basis.). See also Bryant v.
Mattel, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13851 (C.D. Calif., 2 August 2010) (finding the
allegations sufficiently pleaded to satisfy claim pleading for purposes of FRCP 8(a),
FRCP 9(b)).
In light of Westways the plaintiff is not required to plead to Rule 9(b)
particularity for every RICO predicate act, and mail and wire fraud may be pled
generally.
4. Pleading Mail and Wire Fraud Under RICO
Section 1341 of Title 18 United States Code provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to

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defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises . for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or
authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent
or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any
matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial
interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or
knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier according to the
direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the
person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
The elements of mail and wire fraud are: (1) a scheme or artifice devised with
the (2) specific intent to defraud and (3) use of the mail or interstate telephone wires
in furtherance of such a scheme. See Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 782 (9th
Cir. 2002); United States v. Green, 592 F.3d 1057, 1060-1071 (9th Cir. 2010). Wire
fraud similarly is pled: (1) a scheme to defraud; (2) use of wires in furtherance of the
scheme; and (3) a specific intent to deceive or defraud. United States v. Shipsey, 363
F.3d 962, 971 (9th Cir. 2004).
Fraud is defined broadly under federal law as a calculated effort to use
misrepresentations or other deceptive practices to induce the innocent or unwary to
give up some tangible interest. United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1248 (8th
Cir. 1976). Fraud may be an active representation or a failure to disclose. It is
settled in this Circuit that a scheme to defraud need not be an active
misrepresentation. See United States v. Buckley, 689 F.2d 893, 897-98 (9th
Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1086 (1983); United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d
1167, 1172 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928 (1980). A duty to disclose material
facts arises in the context of a special relationship. United States v. Dowling, 739
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duty outside of special relationship).
STUARTS pleading burden is even lower because DOYNE, BLANCHET,
and VIVIANO owed fiduciary and other PROFESSIONAL DUTIES to Stuart.
JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS and specifically WOHLFEIL and SCHALL owed
STUART fiduciary duties to disclose the dangers associated with their forensic
psychology operations. United States v. Buckley, 689 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1982)
(Public officials duties are fiduciary in nature.). Sellers owe affirmative duties to
disclose to buyers. Cacy v. United States, 298 F.2d 227, 229 (9th Cir.1961).
Use of mails or wires is pled generally. The plaintiff need not show that each
individual defendant personally used the mail or wire services, but only that he
caused the mail or wire service to be used by acting with the knowledge that their use
would follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use could reasonably
be foreseen. Larsen v. Lauriel Investments, Inc., 161 F. Supp.2d 1029, 1042 (D.
Ariz. 2001); American Automotive Accessories v. Fishman, 175 F.3d 534, 542 (7th
Cir. 1998)). Rule 9(b) requires plaintiffs to plead with particularity the
"circumstances" of the alleged fraud in order to place the defendants on notice of the
precise misconduct with which they are charged. . . . it is certainly true that
allegations of "date, place or time" fulfill these functions, but nothing in the rule
requires them. Plaintiffs are free to use alternative means of injecting precision and
some measure of substantiation into their allegations of fraud." Seville Indus. Mach.
Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1211 (1985). Seville is followed in this Circuit. In re National Mortgage Equity
Corp. Mortgage Pool Certificates Securities Litigation, 636 F. Supp. 1138,
1158(C.D. Calif. 1986) (Bank of America's RICO complaint complied with Rule
9(b), and noting that Bank of America's RICO complaint "contain[ed] multi-
paragraph sections that identify the role of each defendant in the alleged fraud in a
manner sufficient to allow defendants to prepare a responsive pleading,").
Intent to defraud may be inferred from circumstances. United States v. Rogers,

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321 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1993). Mere recklessness satisfies a RICO fraud intent
element. In re Phillips Petroleum Securities Litigation, 881 F.2d 1236 (3rd Cir.
1989) (federal mail fraud allegations in civil RICO case can be proven by evidence of
reckless disregard for the truth as well as by proof of specific intent to defraud;
United States v. Schaflander, 717 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1216 (1984) (same). Courts have held that the mere existence of a scheme is
sufficient to demonstrate intent to defraud. See Hayes v. Palm Seedlings Partners (In
re Agric. Res. & Tech., 916 F.2d 528, 536 (9th Cir.1990) (existence of Ponzi scheme
sufficient to establish actual intent to defraud). See also Merrill v. Abbott (In re
Indep. Clearing House Co., 77 B.R. 843, 860 (D.Utah 1987) (citations omitted).
Justifiable reliance is not required for RICO fraud. See Neder v. United States, 527
U.S. 1, 24-25 (1999); United States v. Ciccone, 219 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 2000)
(proof of justifiable reliance not required); Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon,
N.A., 815 F.2d 522, 531, n. 7 (9th Cir. 1987).
The FAC mail and wire fraud COUNTS more than satisfy this permissive
threshold. Allegations regarding timing and use of mails are detailed in
RACKETEERING COUNT 1. Specific misrepresentations are detailed at COUNT
11 (FAC 1029, 808-888). Schemes used include The PIT (FAC 964-974),
Forensic Custody Evaluator scheme (FAC 977-979); Custody Evaluator Abuse
of Process scheme (FAC 980-983); False Flag Breach of PROFESSIONAL
DUTIES scheme (FAC 984-995). Misrepresentations by advertising are pled at
COUNT 15.
If the Court desires, Plaintiffs hereby represent an ability to plead additional
details from Exhibits 1-3, and incorporating the DivorceCorp multimedia descriptions
of the DDICE, SD-DDICE, DDI-FICE, and DDI-IACE ENTERPRISES at
http://wp.me/p4aG7J-Y8, FAC Ex. 3 (P652-668). Additional Domestic Dispute
Industry publications describing Forensic Investigator Fraud are analyzed by
Plaintiffs are located at http://wp.me/p4aG7J-OR. DDI-FICE Fraud is explained at

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Doc. No. 109-2 26-30; DDI-IACE extortion is explained at Doc. No. 109-2 17-
25. DDI-Ad Hoc Criminal Enterprise schemes are detailed in a publication entitled:
A Promise to Ourselves: A Journey Through Fatherhood and Divorce, Baldwin, A.,
ISBN-10: 0312586019, FAC 943, Ex. 32. Plaintiff hereby requests leave to amend
to plead these details, should the Court desire.
5. Pattern Of Racketeering Is Necessary and Properly Pled
The OMNIBUS criticizes the FACS reference to past acts of racketeering in
FAC 1000. These predicate acts are not alleged as part of claim for relief,
apparently to Defendants displeasure: allegations of violations of "tens of
thousands" of laws including "Enticement into slavery," "Sale into involuntary
servitude," and "Service on vessels in slave trade." [FAC Doc. 90 at pp. 208-209.]
OMNIBUS Doc. No. 131, 15:22-24.
This listing of past acts of Racketeering (FAC 1000) establishes the scope of
the enterprises, and is relevant to elements of RICO, including longevity and
pattern of racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. 1961(5). H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989). To prove pattern a plaintiff
must "show that the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or
pose a threat of continued criminal activity." Id. at 239. The relationship requirement
is satisfied by a showing that the racketeering predicates "have the same or similar
purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events." Id. at 240.
Similarly, to satisfy the continuity prong of the pattern test, plaintiff must
show that the predicates pose a threat of continued criminal activity, such as when the
illegal conduct is "a regular way of conducting [a] defendant's ongoing legitimate
business." Id. at 243. See also Canyon County v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 519 F.3d 969
(9th Cir. 2008); Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 825 (9th Cir. 2007); Living Designs
Inc., v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co., 431 F.3d 353, 361, 364 (9th Cir. 2005);
Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Florida, 937 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1991).

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Technically, the pattern may be established by only two acts in the past ten
years. See, Ikuno v. Yip, 912 F.2d 306, 309 (9th Cir. 1990); Odom v. Microsoft
Corp., 486 F.3d 541 (9th Cir. 2007). The paragraph 1000 allegations are therefore
not required, but support the pattern of racketeering activity, enterprises, and
longevity requirements for every claim. Moreover, because this case is alleged
against defendants in several enterprises, the identification the scope of their illegal
activity supports existing and future claims. The enterprises track record of
criminality also establishes grounds for declaratory and injunctive remedies,
appropriate scope of discovery, and foundation for identifying additional DOE
defendants.
More specifically, each Defendant is named in at least two predicate acts,
establishing pattern for every Defendant. All defendants are named in
RACKETEERING COUNTS 7-10, and each Defendant is alleged in at least one
other predicate crime in RACKETEERING COUNT 1-6. This satisfies pattern.
6. Enterprise
DOYNE at 143-1, 10:8-11 attacks:
Here, there is no enterprise. The complaint fails to allege sufficient facts
demonstrating the existence of a continuing unit separate and apart from the
ambiguously alleged predicate acts, and thus the elements of a RICO claim
cannot be met.
DOYNE doesnt appear to assert a plausibly challenge, and cant argue evidence, so
the attack is taken as FAC doesnt allege enterprise. Having only asserted a
presence of allegation attack, DOYNE accurately cites United States v. Turkette,
452 U.S. 576, 583 (U.S. 1981) for its open-ended description one of the several ways
a plaintiff can prove enterprise: "proved by evidence of an ongoing organization,
formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a
continuing unit. Turkette at 583.
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association-in-fact enterprise requires no entity, structure, or hierarchy, but only
(1) common purpose, and (2) continuity. Odom v. Microsoft, 486 F.3d 541, 551;
Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2244 (2009). The common purpose need
not be illegal or economic. U.S. v. Turkette. ). A mere contractual relationship is
sufficient to establish enterprise. Odom v. Microsoft, 486 F.3d 541, 551;
Countrywide Financial Corp. Mortgage Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation,
601 F. Supp.2d 1201, 1212-1213 (S.D. Calif. 2009) (co-promotion enterprise);
Republic of Colombia v. Diageo North America Inc., 531 F.Supp.2d 365 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) (individuals, corporations, and governmental entities with common purpose
sufficient). Continuity requires no specific duration, constancy, or end.
In Boyle, the Court explained what is not required for an enterprise:
[A]n association-in-fact enterprise . . . . need not have a hierarchical structure
or a chain of command; decisions may be made on an ad hoc basis and by
any number of methods by majority vote, consensus, a show of strength, etc.
Members of the group need not have fixed roles; different members may
perform different roles at different times. The group need not have a name,
regular meetings, dues, established rules and regulations, disciplinary
procedures, or induction or initiation ceremonies. While the group must
function as a continuing unit and remain in existence long enough to pursue a
course of conduct, nothing in RICO exempts an enterprise whose associates
engage in spurts of activity punctuated by periods of quiescence. Nor is the
statute limited to groups whose crimes are sophisticated, diverse, complex, or
unique; for example, a group that does nothing but engage in extortion through
old-fashioned, unsophisticated, and brutal means may fall squarely within the
statutes reach.
See also Bryant v. Mattel, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103851, ** 14-19, (C.D. Calif., 2
August 2010); Friedman v. 24 Hour Fitness Co., 580 F.Supp.2d 985 (C.D. Calif.
2008) (plaintiff must plead a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct

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between defendants and advertising agency; United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648
(9th Cir, 1988); Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours, 431 F.3d 353, 361
(9th Cir. 2005); Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. Don King Promotions, Inc., 533
U.S. 158, 161 (2001).
Enterprise From the FAC
Against LAWYER DEFENDANTS, the FAC alleges participation in the
DDICE and SD-DDICE. Against BIERER the FAC alleges participation in the
DDICE, SD-DDICE, DDI-FICE, and STUART-AHCE. Against DOYNE the FAC
alleges four enterprises, all of which allege a common purpose generally at FAC
946-952, and specifically for each ENTERPRISE as follows:
DDICE:
930. These entities, acting concert with one another, are organized and
maintained by and through a consensual hierarchy of agents, partners,
managers, directors, officers, supervisors, agents, deputies, and/or
representatives that formulate and implement policies, practices, relationships,
rules, and procedures related to Domestic Dispute Law.
SD-DDICE:
932. SD-DDICE utilize and share private and SDCBA, SAN DIEGO
SUPERIOR COURT, STUART ASSAULT COORDINATOR, DDIPS and
others communications systems, offices, fixtures and equipment, professional
and personal networks, certification mills, campaign and lobbying vehicles
and personnel, and political organizations and networks. The DDICE and SD-
DDICE also conspires to promote Defendants CIVIL CONSPIRACIES,
HARRASSMENT AND ABUSE, agenda detailed above for the benefit of the
enterprise and detriment of the DDIL.
933. The DDICE and SD-DDICE have been in existence for as long as
the Family Law Community has been organizeddating back far longer than
ten years. . DDI-FICE: organized and maintained by and through a consensual

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hierarchy of, managers, directors, officers, supervisors, agents, deputies, and/or
representatives that formulate and implement policies relative to providing the
rendition of forensic psychology services to the public, including, but not
restricted to, DDIL, their lawyers, judges, and others in the field of family law,
child custody, and domestic relations.
DDI-FICE:
941. The DDI-FICE ENTERPRISE Defendants engage in a course of
conduct designed and intended to conspire to commit one or more SAD,
deprive of Family Federal Rights and CFR, and commit HARASSEMENT
AND ABUSE as described herein through the rendition of fraudulent, illegal,
and harmful forensic psychology services, including custody evaluation,
mediation, and parent coordination by use of one or more SAD, fraud,
extortion, abuse of process, kidnapping, unfair competition, and obstruction of
justice.
942. The DDI-FICE commercial purpose is to generate revenue and
income within this District committing one or more SAD, false
COMMERCIAL SPEECH, and HARASSMENT AND ABUSE of DDIL,
including Plaintiffs.
Continuity is alleged in several places, including generally at FAC 963. These
allegations more than sufficiently plead enterprise.
7. RICO 1962(d) Conspiracy, Aiding and Abetting
All Defendants are accused of conspiracy to commit racketeering, aiding and
abetting, and aiding and abetting a racketeering conspiracy under RACKETEERING
COUNTS 7-10. These Counts alone satisfy the two-predicate act minimum
requirement of pattern.
Under 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) a racketeering conspiracy may be plead by (1) an
agreement and (2) an act in furtherance. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 6165
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conspiracy claims are brought under the Pinkerton Doctrine. Pinkerton v. United
States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) and Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997). Under
Pinkerton, anyone joining a conspiracy is liable for offenses other conspirators
committed to advance the objectives of their agreement. Pinkerton at 647. The mere
act of agreeing to the commission of certain crimes sufficesno act in furtherance is
required. Further, one can aid and abet a crime without agreeing to its commission.
See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975). However, aiding and abetting
requires some act to further the criminal ventureit is not sufficient to merely agree.
See United States v. Galiffa, 734 F.2d 306, 311 (7th Cir. 1984). Thus, virtually any
positive association with an existing enterprise or conspiracy-whether by aiding it
without an intent, or intending its commission without aiding it, or both, exposes one
to liability for the crime under these three related RICO doctrines. This alignment
of a defendant with others committing a crime constitutes mediate causation
element required under the Pinkerton doctrine.
This act [affiliating with another for a criminal purpose] satisfies the criteria for
imposing accountability under the traditional criminal law standard of personal
liability: affiliating with another for criminal purposes is a voluntary act
committed with a culpable mental state, or mens rea, that causes a prohibited
social harm. In either of its guises, as Pinkerton liability or as complictious
liability, this act is clearly more culpable than the act that suffices for
imposition of vicarious liability in civil law. . . . The only element of criminal
liability that is attenuated under Pinkerton is causation, which receives the
same treatment accorded it under the kindred doctrine of accomplice liability.
Liability can attach under either form of affiliative liability without showing
that the affiliative act actually caused commission of certain crimes. (footnote
omitted). And because the affiliative act is a wrong in itself, liability can attach

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even though the target crime was not accomplished.
31

The Court of Appeals has recognized this concept of guilt by association in
Smith v. Berg, 247 F.3d 532 (3rd Cir. 2001), and followed and with approval in
United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2004).
Simply by being affiliated with the Domestic Dispute Industry, each Defendant
satisfies this guilt by association test.
8. Business or Property Loss
CHUCAS and GRIFFIN attack Plaintiffs have not alleged harm to a specific
business or property interestor a "concrete financial loss"as required under RICO
caused by either Mr. Chucas or Ms. Griffin. Id. at 975. As a result, they do not have
the requisite standing to sue under RICO. CHUCAS Doc. No. 150, 9:8-11.
The FAC alleges property loss in several ways, including payments to
DOYNE, BLANCHET, and VIVIANO (COUNT 11, RACKETEERING COUNT 1),
lost business revenue for California Coalition, demands for payment of sums to
BIERER and FRITZ (RACKETEERING COUNTS 3, 4). Moreover, lost income is a
cognizable property loss under RICO. See Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d
1163 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding plaintiffsillegal agricultural laborers alleging losses
from defendants' hiring practices to pay plaintiffs at below market wageshad
alleged a sufficient property interest for RICO purposes : the "legal entitlement to
business relations unhampered by schemes prohibited by the RICO predicate
statutes." 301 F.3d at 1168 n.4); Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam) (en banc) (plaintiffs falsely accused, tried, convicted, and sentenced as a
result of LAPD evidence fabrication sufficiently alleged property loss of lost wages
by their false imprisonment for RICO purposes; plaintiffs' alleged wage losses
constituted property because their interests in wages were protected under applicable
California state law causes of action for intentional interference with contract of

31
See Susan W. Brenner, Of Complicity and Enterprise Criminality: Applying Pinkerton
Liability to RICO Actions, 56 MO. L. Rev. 931, 963-64 (1991).

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business relations; in particular, the majority opinion rejected the position of the
dissenting judges that, to allege a RICO claim, the alleged business or property
interest must have been the "direct target" of defendant's predicate act. 420 F.3d at
898, 900-901, 902).
The FAC alleges lost income to STUART, California Coalition, and Lexevia.
FAC 326, 334, 341, 348, 599.
9. BIERER Attack
BIERER asserts the FAC fails to state any specific facts regarding the alleged
predicate acts of Bierer. In fact, the only references to actions by Bierer are found in a
count that Plaintiffs do not bring against Bierer. BIERER Doc. No. 135-1, 7:7-11.
She cites FAC 1007-1008, describing VIVIANOS execution of the False Flag
scheme with BIERER. BIERER accurately states that STUART has omitted to asset
a mail and wire fraud claim directly against BIERER. However by virtue of her
interaction with VIVIANO, BLANCHET, DOYNE, FRITZ, Ms. Stuart, and others,
STUART has asserted an Honest Services Fraud claim against her
(RACKETEERING COUNT 2), as well as aiding and abetting and conspiracy claims
(RACKETEERING COUNTS 7-10). As a STUART ASSAULT COORDINATOR
she is named as a Defendant in RICO Claims for Relief 3.1, 3.6, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.5,
5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, 5.10, and RACKETEERING COUNT 6.
10. Nexus to Interstate Commerce:
BIERER asserts that the widespread criminal elements of the $50 Billion
annual revenue Domestic Dispute Industry
32
do not have a de minimus impact
interstate commerce. BIERER Doc. No. 135-1, 7:12-8:2. BIERER cites a standard
from a 1990 case, Musick v. Burke, 913 F.2d 1390, 1398 (9th Cir. 1990), that has
been interpreted by numerous courts, all of which articulate a de minimus impact
standard. [W]here the regulated activity is commercial in nature, the government

32
New Documentary Sheds Light On $50-Billion Divorce Industry Huffington
Post, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/06/divorce-
documentary_n_4550450.html. (May 10, 2014, 4:00 p.m.)

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need only prove that the individual transactions in this case each had a minimal effect
on interstate commerce that, through repetition by others similarly situated, could
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. United States v. Ripinsky, 109 F.3d
1436, 1444 (9th Cir.1997). Ripinsky, Rone, and Musick, all support our holding that
the interstate commerce connection in a RICO prosecution may be de minimis.
United States v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Shryock, 342 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2003) (de minimis impact); United States v.
Robertson, 514 US. 669 (1995) (de minmis impact required); United States v.
Doherty, 867 F.2d 47 (1
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Cir. 1989) (no more than a slight effect); United States v.
Robinson, 763 F.2d 778 (6
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Cir. 1985) (minimal impact); United States v.
Muskovsky, 863 F.2d 1319 (7
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Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1067 (1989)
(minimal effect). BIERER incorrectly analyzes the impact issue by looking only
to the predicate acts instead of the enterprise as a whole. Instead, RICO requires
that the activities of the enterprise, not each RICO predicate act, affect interstate
commerce. Aguilar v. Mega Lighting, Inc. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28348 (C.D. Cal
April 6, 2009).
FAC 962 alleges at least a de minimus impact on interstate and indeed
international commerce. Family court orders enjoy full faith and credit recognition
and enforcement in all States under 28 U.S.C. 1738 (Acts, records, and judicial
proceedings of any State ... of the United States ... shall have the same full faith and
credit in every court within the United States ... as they have by law or usage in the
courts of such State ... from which they are taken.) and in federal courts and military
courts under 18 U.S.C. 2261(a)(1), 2265 (FAC 962). White v. City of Pasadena,
671 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2012). Child Support awards may be enforced in foreign
Countries through bilateral international treaty between the United States and foreign
nations, and are enforceable by the U.S. State Department in refusing to issue, honor,
or revoking passports of U.S. citizens. 42 U.S.C. 652(k), 654(31). The scope and
size of the Domestic Dispute Industry is more than sufficient to establish a basis for

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federal jurisdiction.
11. Municipalities Can Form Sufficient Intent Under RICO
COUNTY asserts that a RICO claim may not be asserted against a
municipality, citing Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d
397, 404 (9th Cir. 1991). GORE 141-1, 8:812. In Lancaster the plaintiffs sued a
municipality as a RICO enterprise
33
, alleging RICO claims based on mail fraud,
alleging an intentional scheme to misappropriate public funds. The Court of Appeals
confirmed the district courts dismissal of the RICO claims asserting a general notion
that government entities are incapable of forming a malicious intent. Lancaster at
404. The court pointed to other cases involving municipalities such as Sun Sav. and
Loan Assoc. v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187 (9th Cir.1987), reasoning that a specific
intent to deceive is an element of the predicate act, mail fraud, on which Lancaster's
RICO claim is based. Lancaster at 404.
The Court of Appeals reasoning in 1987 is no longer an accurate statement of
the intent necessary to prove mail fraud; Malicious intent and intent to deceive
are sufficient intent to find mail fraud, but they are not necessary. See Mail Fraud
analysis, Section II.G, supra. Municipalities are modernly treated as persons
fully capable of forming intent. Monell v. Dept of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S.
658, 691 (1978); Bd. of County Commrs of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397, 403 (1997). Moreover, a municipality may be liable for the acts of its final
policymaker. Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 981 (9
th
Cir.2004). See also Jett v. Dallas
Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989). [A] municipality can be liable for an
isolated constitutional violation when the person causing the violation has final
policymaking authority. Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir.1999)
(citations omitted), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 928 (1999). See also Webb v. Sloan, 330
F.3d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir.2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1141 (2004). The final

33
Here COUNTY is not alleged to be an enterprise, but sued as a RICO Person,
a participant within the DDICE and SD-DDICE, and a conductor of the DDI-IACE,
and DDI-FICE. Municipalities are recognized as persons under 1983. Monell.

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policymaker for SDSD is GORE, and he is certainly capable of forming criminal
intent to enable liability of the COUNTY.
A municipality may also be liable where a final policymaker ratifies a
subordinate's unconstitutional action and the basis for it. Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d
1231, 1239 (9th Cir.1999). To show ratification, a plaintiff must prove that
authorized policymakers approve a subordinate's decision and the basis for it. Id. at
1239 (quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). Deliberate
indifference and failure to train can also impute liability to a municipality. [A]
local governmental body may be liable if it has a policy of inaction and such inaction
amounts to a failure to protect constitutional rights. Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470,
1474 (9th Cir.1992), citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). The
policy of inaction must be a conscious or deliberate choice among various
alternatives. Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764, 767 (9th Cir.2004); Johnson v. Hawe, 388
F.3d 676, 686 (9th Cir.2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1048 (2005).
Clearly, municipalities can form intenteven if not malicious intent
necessary to impose punitive damages. The proper analysis then is to examine
whether COUNTY is capable of forming the type of intent necessary to establish
liability for the predicate crimes it is accused of. In this case, COUNTY is named in
RACKETEERING COUNTS 2 (Honest Services Fraud), and 7-10 (aiding and
abetting and conspiracy to commit Racketeering). Thus, if the COUNTYS policies,
training, deliberate indifference, or the acts of GORE, TRENTACOSTA, RODDY, or
others directly, by dereliction of duty, or by their involvement in policy, training, and
indifference, set in motion acts which would foreseeably lead to a predicate crime,
the COUNTY may be directly liable as a principal, co-conspirator, and aider and
abettor. COUNTY fails to conduct this analysis that is their burden at this stage.
Malicious intent or intent to deceive is simply not an element of any crime
charged in any Count. Extortion requires simply obtaining property from another
with their consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence,

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or fear, or under color of official right. 18 U.S.C. 1951. Kidnapping requires no
intentsimply use of force or fear to move someone a substantial distance. Cal.
Pen.C. 207(a). Obstruction of justice is knowingly using force or threat of force
to impede the due course of justice, or taking any act to retaliate against someone
for cooperating with authorities. Aiding and abetting requires no criminal intent at
allsimply intending to aid another in so doing. Intent is not required. Conspiracy
requires knowingly agreed to facilitate a scheme that includes the operation or
management of a RICO enterprise. United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1230
(9
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Cir.2004), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1043 (2005). The conspirator need not have
committed or agreed to commit the two or more predicate acts, such as bribery,
requisite for a substantive RICO offense under 1962(c). Salinas v. United States,
522 U.S. 52, 6165 (1997).
Because GORE is the COUNTYS final policymaker in issues of judicial
official security, and because he is alleged to be directly involved in the STUART
ASSAULT the COUNTY is also liable for GORES direct acts, which include his
behavior in the STUART ASSAULT and all follow-on conspiracies. These
allegations form the basis of RACKETEERING COUNTS 3 (Kidnapping), 5
(Obstruction of Justice), 6 (Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering).
TRENTACOSTA and RODDY are also alleged as final policymakers for the
SUPERIOR COURT, which is a COUNTY entity. FAC 669-70, Claims 6.5, 6.10.
As the COUNTYS policymaker with regard to the DDI-FICE and DDI-IACE, the
COUNTY is liable for their actions relating to the Family Law Facilitator Offices,
and the forensic child custody evaluator commercial enterprise. Count 6.
Each is alleged to be involved in policymaking, training, oversight, discipline
and enforcement of the DDI-FICE and DDI-IACE operations. Those operations are
alleged to have set in motion acts of racketeering. Thus, each policymaker may be
liable for their own involvement in the polices, as well as their failures to comport the
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crimes.
12. RICO Conclusion
All RICO claims are adequately pled under Rule 8 and 9(b). Courts permit
generous pleading of RICO because of the pernicious nature of the criminal elements
the statute is targeted to eradicate. The statement of findings that prefaces the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 reveals that Congress enacted RICO to redress
a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains
billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal
use of force, fraud, and corruption using social exploitation deriving
money and power . . . increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate
business . . . and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes. The breadth of
the organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the
Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations,
interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce,
threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation
and its citizens.
Congress enacted RICO in 1970 intending to improve enforcement of fraud and
extortion laws that were not being enforced by state authorities under which
organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering
process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence
necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and
remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.
84 Stat. 922923. U.S. v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588-89 (1981).
Defendants schemes in this case are exactly the intended targets of RICO
widespread collaboration to commit fraud and extortion by sophisticated interrelated
schemes to defraud, launder the money and/or use it to corrupt others, use the ill-
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corrupt the entities and governments assigned to their oversight, and persecution of
the victims who reach out to federal authorities for assistance. The FAC is
adequately pled to give abundant notice of claims, and further amendment
unnecessary. Although RICO cases may be pesky, courts should not erect artificial
barriersmetaphysical or otherwiseas a means of keeping RICO cases off the
federal dockets Sun Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 194 (9th Cir.
1987) (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985)).
II. ATTACKS BY COUNT
A. Count 2 (State Law Claims)
CHUCAS attacks that Count 2 fails to state a defamation claim. CHUCAS is a
member of the FAC, which orchestrated the removal of STUART from a meeting of
a group of professionals of which he is a member. Doc. No. 150, 5:1. STUART
ASSAULT. Several SDCBA panel speakers joked during the Seminar I guess he
got what he asked for and lets see if that gets them any publicity. They made
puns about STUART and CALIFORNIA COALITION as THE Litigants Behaving
Badly, calling STUART and CALIFORNIA COALITION a bunch of borderlines
crazy parents and stating thats why we have to do what we do. FAC 134.
Participating in an assault and forced ejection of a person from a meeting of his
colleague professionals, then joking about it while criticizing their sanity and motives
is defamatory, extreme and outrageous, and properly pled. CHUCAS involvement
in the activity subjects him to liability.
LAWYER DEFENDANTS attack Count 2 for failing to establish a link
between a defendant's business practice or act and the alleged harm. Doc. No. 149-
2, 6:23-16. They attack similarly that STUART fails to allege lost money or
property as a result of the unfair competition. Doc. 149-2, 7:13.
The FAC alleges California Coalition is a competitor in the DDI
Marketplace with Defendants for domestic dispute industry litigants. California
Coalition as present at the SEMINAR for COMMERCIAL PURPOSES. Removing

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STUART from the SEMINAR caused injury to California Coalitions and Lexevias
revenues, reputation and existing and potential business interests. FAC 312-351.
The racketeering and illegal persecution of STUART, California Coalition, and
Lexevia have devastated all three. FAC 334.
Plaintiffs submit the FAC adequately pleads each Claim in Count 2. In the
event the Court determines otherwise, Plaintiffs represent a present ability to remedy
and hereby request leave to amend.
B. Count 3 (Malicious Prosecution)
1. Superior Court Defendants
Superior Court Defendants attack Count 3 on behalf of C. GOLDSMITH
asserting it fails to allege that any conduct by Judge Goldsmith violated any rights
secured by the Constitution or federal laws, let alone that Judge Goldsmith caused the
deprivation of such rights. Doc. No. 139, 2:25-3:28. They also attack on behalf of
GROCH that all claims in Count 3 are barred by the doctrine of judicial
immunit[y.] Doc. No. 139, 3:9-10.
a. C. GOLDSMITH Participated in the STUART ASSAULT, Was A Complaining
Witness in People v. Stuart, Co-Conspirator in NESTHUS OBSTRUCTION,
and Conductor/Participant Several DDICE
The FAC alleges C. GOLDSMITH violated Plaintiffs rights by participating
in the STUART ASSAULT under color of law in the complete absence of
jurisdiction. FAC 898, 899. FAC facts supporting allegations directed at C.
GOLDSMITH are too voluminous to detail, but include acts and failures to act in
dereliction of duty depriving Stuart of rights under the California and United States
Constitutions in the STUART ASSAULT (Claim 1.5) acting as a complaining
witness, supervisor, and collaborator in the MALICIOUS PROSECUTION (FAC
349, 351, 381-383, 463, 488, Count 3), collaborating with NESTHUS and all
defendants in the NESTHUS OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE and RETALIATION
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enterprises and activity, and in related FICRO CONSPIRACIES (FAC 1187-1190).
Each of the civil rights claims against C. GOLDSMITH alleges C. GOLDSMITH
caused deprivation of specific rights. E.g. FAC 201, 211.
b. GROCHS Monstrous Criminal Behavior and Conspiracies Are Not Immune
JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS make a bare assertion that the claims against
Judge Groch, all of which arise out of his presiding over Stuarts criminal action . . .
are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity (3:9-10) and the FAC fails to
identify any acts of Judge Groch beyond those exercised in his judicial capacity.
Defendants do not identify any claim or allegation. They do not describe or even
assert GROCHS jurisdiction. They do not propose that any of GROCHS many acts
alleged in the FAC are judicial acts. JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS fail to make any
showing toward their burden on the affirmative defense of judicial immunity.
GROCH has not, and cannot, establish the affirmative defense of immunity.
Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1021 (9th Cir. 2002) (Government officials sued in
their individual capacities under 1983 may raise the affirmative defenses of
qualified or absolute immunity. GROCH fails to address his burden in asserting
immunity, asserting: The FAC, however, fails to identify any acts of Judge Groch
beyond those exercised in his judicial capacity. Doc. No. 139, 3:25-27. Defendant
must plead any matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense Fed.Rule
Civ.Proc. 8(c). Affirmative defenses may be raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion only
when the if based on some non-controversial preclusive legal defense. Scott v.
Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984). A defendant may bring a Rule
12(b)(6) motion based upon an affirmative defense in unusual circumstances, such as
when the face of the Complaint admits the defense. See, e.g., Jablon v. Dean
Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980) (If the running of the statute is
apparent on the face of the complaint, the defense may be raised by a motion to
dismiss.); Graham v. Taubman, 610 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.1979). A Rule 12(b)(6)
motion asserting that the complaint admits a defense must show the defense is (i)

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definitively ascertainable from the complaint and other allowable sources of
information, and (ii) suffice to establish the affirmative defense with certitude.
Gray v. Evercore Restructuring L.L.C., 544 F3d 320, 324 (1st Cir. 2008).
The analysis necessary to determine existence of judicial immunity is
evidentiary, and if not apparent on the fact of the complaint, the defense is
unavailable. Id. To prove entitlement to judicial immunity, GROCH must establish:
(1) each act against him was within the scope of his authority and (2) each act alleged
against him was a judicial act. Stump v. Sparkman, 35 U.S. at 360; Ashelman v.
Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1986); Beard v. Udall, 648 F.2d 1264 (9th
Cir.1981); Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied Zeller
v. Rankin, 451 U.S. 939 (1981), overruled
34
by Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th
Cir. 1986). Conspiracies outside of court setting in motion deprivation in court are
not immune. Wallace v. Powell, 3:09-cv-00268-ARC, Document # 1510, filed 9
January 2014 (Plaintiffs Request for Judicial Notice Ex. A); Rankin at 847
(Although a party conniving with a judge to predetermine the outcome of a judicial
proceeding may deal with him in his judicial capacity, the other party's expectation,
i. e., judicial impartiality, is actively frustrated by the scheme. In any event, the
agreement is not a function normally performed by a judge. It is the antithesis of
the principled and fearless decision-making that judicial immunity exists to
protect.). Actions by a judge under color of law in the absence of authority are void
as coram non judice, and a defendant causing injuries while in coram non judice is
entitled to no immunity whatsoever, but is strictly liable as a trespasser. Manning v.
Ketcham, 58 F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1932); Restatement (Second) of Torts 162 (1965).
GROCH Cannot Establish His Jurisdiction
Establishing jurisdiction requires reference to facts and law. In Stump, the
Supreme Court analyzed an extensive record developed in the district court to

34
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determine Judge Stumps jurisdiction. Stump at 356, fn 4 (citing the analysis in the
district court in Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F. 2d 172 (CA7 1977): In approving the
petition, Judge Stump cited no statutory or common law authority under which he
was purporting to act. Moreover, counsel has not during the course of this litigation
cited any specific statutory or common law basis under which a court can order the
sterilization of a child simply upon the petition of a parent. Sparkman v. McFarlin,
Civ. No. F 75-129 (ND Ind., May 13, 1976)). In Mireless v. Waco Judge Mireless
was sued for having a public defender assaulted in the same courthouse. The judge
established jurisdiction under Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. 128(5) because the public
defender was deemed a ministerial officer of the court. By contrast, in Gregory v.
Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (1974) a judges actions in assaulting a litigant in his
courtroom was neither within the judges jurisdiction or a judicial act, and the judge
was not entitled to immunity. Id.
JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS havent attempted to establish GROCHS
jurisdiction over any person or act in the FAC, and thus have not carried the first
prong of the defense.
GROCH Has Not Identified a Judicial Act Which Could Be Immune
The second prong requires the party asserting immunity to identify a precise
act that was a judicial act. Ashelman at 1076. Judicial acts are acts requiring
exercise of discretion in the independent decision-making adjudication of
controversies. Id.; Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 731
(1980); Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 432 (1993). A judge is
only immune for acts which are only performed by judges. Stump at 362; Gregory
v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (Judges eviction of a litigant from his courtroom was law
enforcement act, not a judicial act); Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229 (7th Cir.) ,
cert. dismissed, 449 U.S. 1028 (1980) (Judge bringing charges functioning as a
prosecutor not a judicial act); Harris v. Deveaux, 780 F.2d 911, 915 (11th Cir. 1986).
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denied judicial immunity. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988); Meek v.
Cnty. of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 1999); Richardson v. Koshiba, 693
F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1982) (These [executive] functions bear little resemblance to
the characteristic of the judicial process that gave rise to the recognition of absolute
immunity for judicial officers: the adjudication of controversies between
adversaries.).
The analysis necessary to resolve the second judicial act prong is complex,
evidentiary, and is certainly not derivable from the FAC. This test considers (i) the
adversary nature of the process, (ii) the correctability of error on appeal, (iii) the
importance of precedent, and (iv) the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for
private damage actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct.
Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 202 (1985); Arena v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of
Nassau Cnty., 216 F. Supp. 2d 146, 153-54 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). It seems unlikely that
JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS will identify authority for a judge to banish an adult from
his home State to reside in another. Nor would it seem likely that similar authority
exists permitting a judge to place a litigant under house arrest during trial without
bringing charges or finding a litigant in contempt. Whatever the nature of these acts
and their relationship to constitutional authority, these and every other act of a Family
Court judge are not acts of a court of competent jurisdiction. See People United for
Children, Inc. v. City of New York, 108 F. Supp. 2d 275, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Here, JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS fail even to attempt their burden. Count 3
alleges facts as foundation for the civil rights and other claims against many
defendants including GROCH. FAC 350. These allegations are foundation for
tolling and estoppel (FAC 466), claims against other defendants which may not
assert personal immunities (claims 3.1FEDERAL; 3.6Chilling; Count 4; Claims
5.1, 5.2, 5.5BATTSON, SIMI; Count 6Supervisory Liability of
TRENTACOSTA, J. GOLDSMITH, CANTIL-SAKAUYE, JAHR, and RODDY;
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DIEGO, SAN DIEGO SUPERIOR COURT; Count 9 for Section 1985 liability; and
Count 10 for Section 1986 liability. The MALICIOUS PROSECUTION and
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT allegations are also relevant to numerous civil
rights claims to which immunity is never a defense, including deprivation of equal
protection (Count 9) and all acts outside the scope of judicial power as provided in
California Constitution Art I, 26 (Count 13, FAC 493). See Ex parte Virginia,
100 U. S. 339, 348-349 (1880). Judicial immunity is not a defense to civil rights and
racketeering crimes. See U.S. v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1999); Imbler v.
Patchman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); 18 U.S.C. 241, 242.
c. Judicial Immunity Does Not Bar Prospective Relief
Neither GOLDSMITH nor GROCH is entitled to immunity from claims for
prospective relief. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984) (judicial immunity
is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in her
judicial capacity.). GROCH asserts otherwise, claiming Judicial immunity is not
limited to suits for damages, but extends to actions for declaratory, injunctive and
other equitable relief citing Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir.
1996). Doc. No. 138, 3:21-23. This is inaccurate. Moore v. Brewster stands for
exactly the opposite proposition. Correctly recited, Moore v. Brewster holds:
The judicial or quasi-judicial immunity available to federal officers is not
limited to immunity from damages, but extends to actions for declaratory,
injunctive and other equitable relief. Mullis v. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1394 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1040 (1988). Cf. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984) (state officials
enjoy judicial or quasi-judicial immunity from damages only).
Moore at 1243-44 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). GROCH is a county
judge. FAC 26.
GROCHS crimes and their consequences are unshielded when lurking from
beyond the short fiction of immunity. Claim 3.5 sets forth the core civil rights claim

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against GROCH, and expressly limits the claim to non-immune acts: the attempt to
coerce, induce, or wrongfully persuade STUART to leave this District, the state of
California, and return to live in Arkansas after his release from imprisonment, (FAC
493), identifies harm consisting of obstruction of the CLAIM AND DEMAND, the
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, and FALSE
IMPRISONMENTS (FAC 496) and constitutional injury consisting of a
deprivations relating to SEARCH AND SEIZURE; SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS; EXPRESSION, PRIVACY, and
ASSOCIATION; ACCESS TO JUSTICE; EXCESSIVE FORCE; and CRUEL
AND/OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT (defined at FAC 164) resulting therefrom.
Subsequent claims of Counts 4, 9, 10 against GROCH are based on the non-immune
acts in Claim 3.5 and describe the subsequent deprivations set in motion thereby.
Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202,
1207 (9th Cir. 2011). While JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS may reasonably stand
agape at their colleagues ignorance of laws clearly-established for over one hundred
years criminalizing such deplorable conduct, they cannot credibly claim that the FAC
fails to give notice of the non-immune portions of that illegal course of conduct.
Establishing otherwise is Defendants burden. JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS fail.
2. CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS Litigation Privilege Defense
CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS assert that they call a litigation
privilege, citing Fry v. Melarango, 939 F.2d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 1991). Fry involved
a Bivens action against IRS attorneys who had prosecuted a civil claim in tax court
against a man accused of underpayment of taxes. The tax court defendant sued the
IRS attorneys for violation of his constitutional rights in the tax court proceeding.
The IRS attorneys asserted qualified and absolute immunity, analogizing their work
in a civil tax proceeding to a criminal prosecutor. The Court of Appeals agreed
holding that IRS attorneys actually litigating the civil claim were analogous to
prosecuting attorneys, and therefore entitled to the same immunity as criminal

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prosecutors under Imbler v. Pachtman. The court held that other actions by the
attorneys akin to investigation were only entitled to qualified immunity under Butz
and Harlow. Thus Fry establishes that IRS attorneys prosecuting a tax claim enjoy
the same level of immunity as criminal prosecutors when performing prosecutorial
functions, and the same qualified immunity when performing all other functions.
CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS dont need Frys holdingtheyre
entitled to immunity under the superior authority of Imbler for their prosecutorial
acts. COUNT 3 recognizes that immunity and pleads around it. Oddly, CITY
ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS bare claws to fit Fry when they might have lounged
into Imbler.
CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS cite a state law immunity defense under
Govt Code 821.6, Miller v. Filter, and Gillan v. City of San Marino at 4:26. These
cases ponder state law immunities. Californias girding of its stock class of
government criminals with state immunities is invisible to federal law. Government
code 821.6 is presently irrelevant. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.
1996).
On the relevant analysis under Imbler, the FAC alleges liability that could
never be shielded under state or federal law. First, immunity is personal, and the
CITY can assert no immunity for municipal or policymaker supervisory claims.
Second, immunity is no defense to racketeering crime or equal protection violations.
See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 348-349 (1880) (equal protection violations of
a prosecutor not immune); U.S. v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1999) (judicial
immunity no defense to racketeering); Imbler v. Patchman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); 18
U.S.C. 241, 242 (FICRO CONSPIRACIES). Second, the FAC alleges functions
which are not prosecutorial, were pre-litigation, investigative, collateral, or post-
litigation functions not protected by prosecutorial immunity, though possibly eligible
for a qualified immunity. This collateral conduct includes the out-of-court portions
of the PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT FAC 373-414; Malicious Prosecution

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Within State Bar FAC 426-432, 455-460; collaboration with the FBI and Ms.
Stuart to procure false testimony and evidence in the Arrest Under Suspended
Sentence FAC 433-447; inducement and threats to leave California FAC 448-
451, and illegal Domestic Violence Protective Orders FAC 461-466.
CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS bear the burden of establishing the scope
of any personal immunities of GARSON. To do so they must establish the authority
GARSON claims to be exercisinga question of factthat she has act within such
authority, and that her actions were intimately associated with the criminal
prosecution. Imbler, supra. The analysis follows that outlined for GROCH above,
and requires attention to each act alleged which GARSON claims is immune.
Defendants fail here.
Further, even for actions potentially falling within prosecutorial functions, the
FAC alleges CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS actions in prosecuting People v.
Stuart were in knowing violation of STUARTS equal protection and due process
rights. FAC 479. As such, even would CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS
identify authority to prosecute STUART, their actions in doing so in violation of the
California Constitution were ultra vires and therefore void ab initio. As we
observed more than a century ago, [e]very constitutional provision is self-executing
to this extent, that everything done in violation of it is void. Oakland Paving Co. v.
Hilton, 69 Cal. 479, 484 (1886); Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of California, 29 Cal.
4th 300, 307, 58 P.3d 339, 342 (2002); Cal. Const. Art. I, sec. 26. Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (If the act which the state attorney general seeks to
enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer, in proceeding under
such enactment, comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution,
and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is
subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The state has
no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority
of the United States.). An officer operating off the reservation exceeds his

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authority, and is naked to those injured by his frolic. Butz v. Economou, 438 US 478,
519 (1978); Manning v. Ketcham, 58 F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1932); Restatement (Second)
of Torts 162 (1965).
Heck v. Humphrey
CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS attack asserting Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477 (1994). Doc. No. 151, 7:21-8:21. Heck bars claims which necessarily
attack the validity or duration of a prisoners confinement. Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477, 486 (1994); Thornton v. Brown, 11-56146, 2013 WL 7216368 (9th Cir.
July 31, 2013). Heck is a defense to claims by an imprisoned plaintiff who bypasses
a habeus petition in favor of a Section 1983 claim on the same grounds. Spencer v.
Kemma, 523 U.S. 1, 19 (1998); Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 876-77 (9th Cir.
2002) ([g]iven the Courts holding that petitioner does not have a remedy under the
habeas statute, it is perfectly clear . . . that he may bring an action under 42 U.S.C.
1983.). STUARTS illegal incarceration ended in May, 2013. He has no habeus
remedy, and Heck cannot be a bar. Spencer v. Kemna, supra at 21 (Souter, J,
concurring). Because STUART is not imprisoned, he has no habeus standing, and his
present claims could not interfere with a habeus petition. Further, the instant action
will not necessarily imply the invalidity of a state court final conviction because
STUART was acquitted of the charges against his free speech he asserts were
maliciously prosecuted. There is no final judgment of a state court to interfere with
because the final judgment in People v. Stuart agrees with STUART. FAC 416.
Heck can bar no claim.
C. Count 4 (Nesthus Obstruction of Justice)
Judicial Defendants attack Count 4 asserting (1) there is no private cause of
action for obstruction of justice (2) Ms. Nesthus demands were entirely proper
under California Law, and (3) Nesthus demands are protected by Californias
litigation privilege under Cal.Civ.C. 47.
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the term Obstruction of Justice to refer to the claims of Count 4. The title is
irrelevant to the substance of the claim, which identifies 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Cal.
Const. art. I, 26 in each claim. FAC 541, 543, 545, 547, 549. Count 4 alleges
Nesthus interference with Plaintiffs and their members rights to access justice in
this courthouse after this Action was filed. These facts are the basis for two sets of
claims; Civil Rights Act claims for deprivation of First, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh
amendment rights to SPEECH, PRIVACY, and ASSOCIATION; SEARCH AND
SEIZURE; ACCESS TO JUSTICE; and SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS as well as
the racketeering claims for Obstruction of Justice under Title 18, sections 1503, 1505,
1512, and 1513 (RACKETEERING COUNT 5). One title is used for convenience.
(2) Nesthus Demands Entirely Proper Under State Law or Privileged:
Defendants assert a state Government Code provision as a defense deprivation of
federal civil rights. It has been settled for well over a century that state laws do not
authorize deprivation of state or federal constitutional rights. Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1914); United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326; Screws v. U.S., 325 U.S. 91 (1945). It works the opposite
way. Californias litigation privilege cannot immunize any entity for violations of
federal law. Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1996) (Because the
existence of 1983 immunities is a matter of federal law, the district court erred in
determining that the Attorney Defendants were entitled to litigation immunity
pursuant to Cal.Civ.Code 47(b)). Defendants are entitled to explain the state law
defense to a jury to support a good faith immunity, but the defense does not erect an
immunity. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640; Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c).
35

D. Count 6 (Supervisory Liability)
SUPERIOR COURT asserts Count 6 does not allege that any supervisor
Judicial Defendants were personally involved in any purported constitutional

35
These events have been previously briefed in this litigation in an emergency motion for
restraining order. Doc. No. 4. Should the Court desire to consider this affirmative defense,
Plaintiffs incorporate herein that pleading in its entirety.

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deprivation, or that there is a causal connection between the supervisor Judicial
Defendants actions and any alleged constitutional injury. Doc. No. 139, 5:14-18.
GORE asserts contains no factual allegations against William Gore on which federal
or state tort liability can attach, characterizing Claim 6.3 as a respondeat superior
claim. COUNTY Doc. No. 141-1, 4:17-24. CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS
attack there are no allegations regarding the City Attorneys personal involvement in
the prosecution of Plaintiff Stuart, or any causal connection between the City
Attorneys conduct and the violation. CITY ATTORNEY Doc. No. 151, 5:14-16.
In general, supervisory liability may be adequately pled alleging minimal facts:
(1) the supervisor acted under color of law, (2) the supervisors subordinates deprived
plaintiff of rights, and (3) defendant directed the subordinate, set in motion events
leading to, or knew but failed to prevent the subordinates acts causing deprivation.
Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Jury Instructions, Instruction 9.3 Claim Against
Supervisory Defendant in Individual Capacity; Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045
(9th Cir.1989).
1. SUPERIOR COURT/JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS
Supervisory liability is properly pled generally because a plaintiff rarely has
sufficient knowledge of internal policies, training, and past acts necessary to plead
with specificity. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011); Maduka v.
Sunrise Hosp., 375 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 2004); Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. 506, 513.
Count 6 alleges generally that each Supervisory Defendant acted under color of law
(FAC 150). Each claim identifies the scope of their authority and their subordinate
co-defendants (e.g., TRENTACOSTA, FAC 668-673; GORE, FAC 657, 171),
and specific supervisory duties regarding each subordinate (e.g., TRENTACOSTA,
FAC 673). Each claim against each supervisor includes an allegation that the
supervisor failed to perform own PROFESSIONAL DUTIES and one or more
SUPERVISORY DUTY over his or her subordinates, setting in motion the
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alleged, causing injury in a nature and amount to be proven at trial. (e.g.,
TRENTACOSTA, FAC 674).
Superior Court Defendants assert a lack of causal connection (Doc. No. 139,
5:11). The causation element is satisfied by the identification of the supervisors
subordinates, and the allegation that the subordinates acts caused deprivation as
elsewhere alleged. See, e.g., FAC 648, 654, 658).
Though the above allegations satisfy the minimal pleading requirements for a
supervisory liability case, the FAC also pleads claims with more specificity under the
several theories of supervisory liability, including failures to train at FAC 640-641,
682. See, e.g., Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1149 (9th Cir.2005)
([s]upervisory liability is imposed against a supervisory official in his individual
capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control
of his subordinates, for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivations of which
the complaint is made, or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference
to the rights of others.). The FAC also alleges the supervisors policymaking
activity as direct action at FAC 637-643. See, e.g, Ruvalcaba v. City of Los
Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 524 (9th Cir.1999); Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 915 (9th
Cir.2001); Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.1991) (en
banc)). The FAC alleges failure to control subordinates (Larez v. City of Los
Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir.1991) and Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207
(9th Cir. 2011)) (FAC allegations of supervisors knowledge of prior violations of
law and deprivations by their subordinates (FAC 639), duties to remedy their
subordinates behavior (FAC 641), and breach of duties (FAC 642, 43; e.g.
TRENTACOSTA 674; ALKSNE: STUART ASSAULT).
Each allegation in each count is relevant to one of the several foundations for
supervisory liability. To the extent Defendants assert the claims assert too many
allegations, they are incorrect. In any event, surplussage can and should be
ignored. U.S. ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir.

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2003). The Count is properly pled.
2. GORE
GORES assertion that the FAC contains no factual allegations supporting
liability against his is inaccurate. GORE Doc. No. 141-1, 4. The FAC alleges
GORES personal involvement in the STUART ASSAULT at FAC 181(f), (h),
191, 205, 216, 274-284. His relationships and authority over subordinates SDSD
DOES 1-15, SMITH, MARCQ, CSB-INVESTIGATIONS, and all other members of
his department are alleged. FAC 170-175, 124-134, 275, 276, 637, 657. The FAC
alleges facts that GORE knew or had reason to know of PLAINTIFFS reform
activities (FAC 639), the operation of the ENTERPRISES including each SCHEME
AND ARTIFICE TO DEFRAUD (FAC 639, 928-999), the planned
ENGAGEMENT (FAC 117-118), planning for the STUART ASSAULT (FAC
179-181), the CLAIM AND DEMAND (for post-CLAIM AND DEMAND counts)
(FAC 142), and prior breaches of his subordinates own PROFESSIONAL DUTIES
(FAC 640). This knowledge combined with the power to control gives rise to
duties to exercise his powers to prevent or aid in the prevention of injury to others. .
Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011); 42 U.S.C. 1986. The FAC
alleges the fact that GORE failed to do. FAC 643, Count 10. These facts support
the conclusion that GORE breached his own PROFESSIONAL DUTIES, setting in
motion deprivation and injury. FAC 283.
The FAC also pleads details of GORES direction acts in participation in and
planning for the STUART ASSAULT, including communicating with one or more
STUART ASSAULT COORDINATORS regarding response to the
ENGAGEMENTS and preparation for the STUART ASSAULT (FAC 279),
altering the SDSD DOES security detail in response (FAC 280(a)), advising his
deputies of PLAINTIFFS, their FFRRESA, the DDIJO COMPLAINTS, and the
STUART ASSAULT COORDINATORS disfavor for such actions (FAC 280(b)),
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coordinating with the CITY OF SAN DIEGO, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CITY
ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS to plan for the STUART ASSAULT (FAC 280(d)),
instructing deputies to act under the direction of the STUART ASSAULT
COORDINATORS in the STUART ASSAULT (FAC 280(e)), and supervising,
planning, and participating in the STUART ASSAULT (FAC 280(f), 171, Count
1.12, 1.13). The FAC specifically pleads six false arrests and false imprisonments by
deputies under GORES control while GORE knew or had reason to know of the
illegal nature of these false arrests and imprisonments. FAC 657, 384, 392, 398,
402, 421, 453. GORE participated in the line drawing and policymaking of the
COUNTY and SUPERIOR COURT alleged in the municipal claims against them.
FAC 726, 746, 747, 748. GORE is identified as a RICO Person and participant
in the DDICE, SD-DDICE, and STUART-AHCE Enterprises. FAC 926, 931, 943.
These fundamental acts and derelictions of duty are the foundational facts for
the various plausible legal conclusions that GORE acted UNREASONABLY and
CULPABLY in the numerous civil rights claims against him (e.g., FAC 283, 284,
658, etc.), and committed the crimes alleged in the racketeering and conspiracy
counts, including the aiding and abetting claims of Racketeering Count 10. As
Defendants have offered no alternative solution at all, they have certainly failed to
prove that PLAINTIFFS conclusions of law are implausible. See Moss I multi-stage
analysis, supra.
GORE characterizes the FAC allegations against him as respondeat superior.
The FAC pleads STUART was in custody of GORE. FAC 392, 398, 417, 421.
This is not an allegation of derivative liability, but based on GORES delegation of
authority to his deputies to take custody of persons in a courtroom. At each
FALSE IMPRISONMENT, STUART was remanded to custody of the Sheriff by a
superior court judge. GORE is The Sheriff. GORE apparently delegates whatever
authority he exercises to execute courtroom custody powers to his deputies, all of
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duty to control his subordinate officers, including policy, training, discipline, of such
deputies. See, e.g., Starr, supra. If necessary, Plaintiff proffers to amend to specify
DDISO DOES (FAC 922) as Defendants in the Count 3 claims.
3. CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS
CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS assert that Claim 6.7 for Supervisory
liability against City Attorney J. GOLDSMITH (supervisor to GARSON and
unknown others) under Section 1983 does not state a claim because there are no
allegations regarding the City Attorneys personal involvement in the prosecution of
Plaintiff Stuart, or any causal connection between the City Attorneys conduct and
the violation. CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS Doc. No. 151, 5:14-16. This is
inaccurate. The FAC asserts both wrongful acts and personal involvement against J.
GOLDSMITH at 688-689: [J. GOLDSMITH] directly oversaw, supervised,
guided, and approved all acts of GARSON in the MALICIOUS PROSECUTION,
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, GARSON PERJURIES 1-4, and each FALSE
IMPRISONMENT as elsewhere alleged and that J. GOLDSMITH CULPABLY
and UNREASONABLY failed to perform his own PROFESSIONAL DUTIES and
one or more SUPERVISORY DUTY over his subordinates, setting in motion the
subordinates acts as elsewhere alleged . . . FAC 637, 638 detail J.
GOLDSMITHS supervisory duties, 639, 630 his knowledge of prior wrongful
acts of his subordinates including GARSON and each ENTERPRISE PERSON,
(639 A, B, E), 641 alleges a duty to remedy based upon such knowledge, 642
implementation of customs, policies and practices leading to injury, and 643 failure
to implement preventative measures despite such knowledge and ability. Specific
allegations against GARSON and J. GOLDSMITH include communications between
GARSON and STUART as well as STUARTS attorneys Chang and Turner. FAC
387-401, 404-07, 413-14, 420, 425 (Chang), 436-37, 441-42, 446, 447, 450 (Turner),
455-460, 466.
As GARSONS Supervisor, GOLDSMITH would be liable for his deliberate

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indifference and failure to train her setting in motion her actions as well as for his
personal interactions with her in her accused behavior. Taylor v. Swift, supra. The
FAC alleges GARSON collaborated, agreed, affiliated, and conspired with her boss,
San Diego City Attorney and former San Diego Superior Court Family Division
judge Jan Goldsmith, and her bosss wife, sitting Family Division judge, and instant
Defendant Christine Goldsmith and that C. Goldsmith and J. Goldsmith supervised,
directed, encouraged, facilitated, and tolerated GARSON PERJURY ONE and TWO
to interfere with and retaliate for Plaintiffs PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITIES and the
DUE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE and GARSON, J. GOLDSMITH, and C.
GOLDSMITH did so with the knowledge and support of SCHALL and WOHLFEIL,
all of whom acted with the specific intent to retaliate against STUART for the DDIJO
COMPLAINTS I and II against them. FAC 381-382. Similar allegations are
contained at FAC 483 (J. GOLDSMITHS supervision of GARSON), 488 (C.
GOLDSMITHS familial and work relationships with J. GOLDSMITH and
GARSON). He is also directly liable for his conspiracies with GROCH. FAC
494-95.
City Defendants also assert state law defenses to supervisory liability under the
California Tort Claims Act. CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS Doc. No. 151, 5:3-
16. The FAC federal law supervisory liability claims under Section 1983 are not
subject to the CTCA, and Art. I 16 of the California Constitution. See Kimes,
supra.
To the extent these allegations are not pled to the Courts satisfaction, Plaintiff
hereby proffers to plead more detail on all issues and requests leave to amend.
E. Count 7 (Municipal Liability)
1. COUNTY
GORE and COUNTY assert a plausibility attack on Count 7 generally:
Plaintiffs allegations that the County and Sheriffs Department maintain a culture of
deliberate indifference, fail to train and supervise, make policies for the States

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judiciary, operate the courts, and had power to supervise the Doyne corporation are
but conclusions without factual support and thus insufficient to state a claim. GORE
Doc. No. 141-1, 3:14-4:16. They target Claim 7.4 a Monell claim directed to the
Countys operations of the Superior Courts (FAC 716, 745) and Claim 11.11 a
supervision claim directed to the Countys oversight of its forensic psychology
enterprise in which DOYNE is a participant ( 873, 875).
Claim 7.4 Monell Claim Against Superior Court and SDSD: Municipal liability
claims may be pled generally. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508
(2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 167 (1993). Count 7 is plead to comply with Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals Model Jury Instruction 9.4 and Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1214 (9th Cir.
2011). Instruction 9.4 requires (1) color of law action (2) deprivation of right (3) the
actor was behaving pursuant to policy. Instruction 9.7 for failure to train adds (4)
defendants training was inadequate, leading to the deprivation. See also Connick v.
Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350 (2011).
Here GORE and COUNTY effectively assert that a Twombly plausibility attack
converts Monells Rule 8 notice standard for pleading policy, deliberate indifference,
supervision and training, into a Rule 9(b) specificity standard. Doc. No. 141-1, 5:5
(The first amended complaint should be dismissed as to William Gore because there
is no factual basis for personal liability.). This is error. Monell and supervisor
claims are adjudged under ordinary Rule 8 notice standards, not Rule 9(b).
Leatherman 507 U.S. 163, 167 (1993). Because municipal and supervisory policies
and practices are not within a plaintiffs control, specificity is not required. Id.
GORES attack under Twombly and Iqbal requires tighter aim than his shotgun
approach. He must direct the Court through the Moss I multi-stage analysis of
identifying a truly conclusory allegation, identify the supporting facts of any
conclusory allegations, and to identify defendants innocent alternative
explanations. In the case of Monell and supervisory claims, the plaintiffs

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supporting facts such as authority to issue policies, control subordinates, and
knowledge of prior incidents, are satisfactory even if pled generally. See, e.g., Starr
v. Baca, supra, OSU v. Ray, supra.
Claim 7.4 is Adequately Pled
The FAC alleges with requisite specificity the existence of policies, training,
and deliberate indifference of the municipal entities. 716-718. Claim 7.4 further
details the scope of each municipal entitys authority over specifically-identified
subordinates, the categories of policies, and types of operations accused, and each
municipalitys relationship to various enterprises (e.g., 745), the control of the
Sheriffs Department ( 746), oversight of GORE and SDSD DOES 1-15 (STUART
ASSAULT DOES) and ties them to the STUART ASSAULT, MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION, FALSE IMPRISONMENTS four enterprises, and the
RACKETEERING of each. ( 747, 748). Factual details of the underlying wrong
are in the passages elsewhere (e.g., MALICIOUS PROSECUTION at FAC 349-
467). This is abundant detailfar more than adequate to plead Monell liability.
More importantly, GORE and COUNTY offer no second-stage alternative
explanation to the conclusions they target. To do so they must, for example, provide
an innocent explanation for their operation of a fraudulent forensic psychology
enterprise. See, e.g., FAC 977-983, Ex. 2.
Claim 11.11 COUNTY Supervision of DOYNE is Adequately Pled
COUNTY attacks Claim 11.11 similarly. Claim 11.11 is pled to accompany
the DOYNE TERRORISM facts, separate from Counts 6 and 7 but alleging
municipal and supervisory liability consistent with and incorporating the supervisory
and municipal general allegations. Claim 11.11 alleges acts and omissions in
dereliction of duty to supervise DOYNE, following Starr v. Baca at and Model Jury
Instruction 9.3 (see law detail regarding Claim 6). Supervisory liability is imposed
on a supervisor for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or
control of his subordinates. Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th

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Cir. 1991).
The FAC pleads these defendants powers and duties to control both Dr. Doyne
individually (DOYNE) and his professional corporation (DOYNE INC) ( 875), prior
knowledge of DOYNES criminal behavior ( 879), failure to discipline, train or
remedy DOYNE and DOYNE INC ( 880-883), policies ( 884), and injury caused
thereby in the STUART ASSAULT and DDIJO COMPLAINTS ( 883). The FAC
alleges abundant factual detail elsewhere, yet for this supervision claim the minimal
allegations are sufficient. Further, COUNTY offer no innocent alternative in what
appears to be a plausibility attack.
2. CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS
CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS assert the FAC does not allege entity
liability against the City of San Diego under Monell, claiming the FAC alleges only
a single, isolated or sporadic incident and is thus merely a respondeat superior
claim. CITY ATTORNEY Doc. No. 151, 5:26-6:4.
The CITY claims it cannot identify a claim asserted against it as an entity.
The entity liability claim relevant to the CITY is Claim 7.5 (FAC 713-718, 750-
753). The Claim is not a challenge to identify:
Claim 7.5
42 U.S.C. 1983 and Cal. Const. art. I, 26
CITY OF SAN DIEGO
The Claim alleges the CITY created, maintained, and enforced policies, customs,
rules, procedures, traditions, practices, including line-drawing activities as
elsewhere detailed (policies) and permitted and directed behaviors by policymakers
themselves, causing or permitting deliberate indifference and a culture of deliberate
indifference to foreseeable constitutional injury of the type caused to Plaintiffs in the
DDIJO and DOYNE, INC. COMPLAINTS, STUART ASSAULT, MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION, and PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, and NESTHUS
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE and failed to train J. GOLDSMITH and GARSON

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constituting deliberate indifference (FAC 716, 717). The FAC alleges numerous
prior similar incidents giving rise to a duty to train at FAC 639-40 (supervisory
knowledge incorporated by reference). Claim 7.5 incorporates allegations regarding
the DDIJO COMPLAINTS and past events relevant to BATTSON and SIMIS
knowledge are also relevant. FAC 578, 605-07.
F. Count 8 (Respondeat Superior)
FEDERAL attacks Claim 8.2, which alleges FEDERAL is liable for the acts of
its employee identified as CHUBB DOE 1 under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. FEDERAL does not dispute that CHUBB DOE 1 is its employee, but only
that there is no independent cause of action for respondeat superior. The FAC alleges
an independent claims against CHUBB DOE 1 at COUNT 3, FAC 349, 356
(MALICIOUS PROSECUTION), 931 (DDICE participation), 944 (SD-DDICE
participation), RACKETEERING COUNT 3 (Kidnapping), RACKETEERING
COUNT 4 (Extortion, Robbery), RACKETEERING COUNT 5 (Obstruction of
Justice), RACKETEERING COUNT 6 (Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering).
Respondeat Superior Independent Claim 8.2: Plaintiffs acknowledge the 2013
holding cited by FEDERAL that California does not recognize a cause of action for
respondeat superior; rather, it is merely a theory of liability. Chenault v. Cobb, C 13-
03828 MEJ, 2013 WL 6072025 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013). PLAINTIFFS maintain
that FEDERAL is liable for the acts of its agents and employees, including each
STUART ASSAULT COORDINATOR and CHUBB DOE 1, hereby withdraw
Claim 8.2 as an independent claim, and request leave to amend Claim 3.1 in
incorporate the respondeat superior liability allegations directly into that claim.
FEDERALS Agency: FEDERAL asserts a plausibility attack on the FAC
assertion at paragraphs 760-762 that [FEDERAL] DOE 1 is the agent of the CITY
ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS and STUART ASSAULT COORDINATORS.
FEDERAL Doc. No. 145, 3:25-4:15. The factual allegations supporting agency are
contained throughout COUNT 3. The FAC alleges that FEDERAL was the insurer of

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SDCBA representing SDCBA in handling the CLAIM AND DEMAND, that
FEDERAL insured or was on tender to defend the STUART ASSAULT
COORDINATORS, that FEDERAL recognized that the $10,000,000 CLAIM AND
was a serious threat to FEDERALS insureds, additional insureds, and other parties
that FEDERAL represented all parties, that STUART should direct all claims to
him, stated Im handling the Claim for all parties. FAC 359. FEDERAL
threatened to prosecute STUART for criminal trespass, referenced his damage as
angry judges, and indicated he was destroying or falsifying evidence which
implicated each STUART ASSAULT COORDINATOR. FAC 360-366. The FAC
concludes, as did STUART, that FEDERAL was working on behalf of the each
STUART ASSAULT COORDINATOR to thwart the CLAIM AND DEMAND.
FAC 368-372.
The FAC alleges convergence between FEDERALS work for the SAC and the
involvement of the CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS at FAC 373-408. C.
GOLDSMITH is an SAC, a complaining witness and initiator of the People v. Stuart
matter, a collaborator in the CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS group, and wife of
J. GOLDSMITH. The CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS joined FEDERALS and
SACS effort to thwart the CLAIM AND DEMAND by escalating an already-illegal
prosecution. In about July, 2010 GARSON communicated the collaboration between
the CITY ATTORNEY and CHUBBS threats through her own threat to bump it up
to a felony for charges relating to the criminal trespass. FAC 387-391.
Through the course of prosecution, GARSON escalated the criminal trespass to
stalking and harassment for something about the bar association. These efforts
created an agency between FEDERAL and the CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS
on behalf of an in agency with the SAC defendants to thwart the CLAIM AND
DEMAND in which all three groups shared an interest. FAC 394-466. See also
Color of Law at Section I.E. supra.
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liability for section 1983 claims, and the FAC contains no such claims. The FAC
alleges against FEDERAL Monell-type claims for FEDERALS independent liability
for its policies, practices, training, and deliberate indifference relating to their state
law actor collaborators for their violations of section 1983. See, e.g., Walker v.
Gates, CV 01-10904GAF(PJWX), 2002 WL 1065618 (C.D. Cal. May 28, 2002);
Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir.2012).
G. Count 9 (42 U.S.C. 1985)
JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS attacks Count 9 on 3 grounds: (1) Failure to
allege facts with sufficient particularity showing a conspiracy involving any Judicial
Defendant (Doc. No. 139, 7:14-16), (2) that Stuart does not and cannot allege he is
an employee of the federal government, or that he is authorized to perform any
official federal duties (Doc. No. 139, 8:1-2), and (3) FAC offers no factual
allegations showing that any Judicial Defendants acted with a discriminatory
animus. Sup. Ct. Doc. No. 139, 8:12-13. Other Defendants pose similar attacks.
GORE Doc. No. 141-1, 5:6-6:25; CHUCAS/GRIFFIN 150, 5:8-18; CITY
ATTORNEY Doc. No. 151, 8:22-9:22.
(1) Conspiracy: Defendants appear to assert a plausibility attack on the
conspiracy foundation for Section 1985 claims. As a plausibility attack, it must be
analyzed under Moss Is multi-stage process. Defendants do not specify which of the
several conspiracies alleged they attack, making a plausibility analysis impossible.
For example, Claim 9.4 794 is the introductory paragraph identifying each
conspiracy and group: This is a Claim for conspiracy to deprive persons of civil
rights under 42 U.S.C. 1985(3)(b) against STUART ASSAULT COORDINATOR
Defendants based on the STUART ASSAULT in Count 1, CITY ATTORNEY
DEFENDANTS and GROCH based on the non-immune acts in the MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION and PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT in Count 3, NESTHUS
Defendants based on the OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE in Count 4, BATTSON and
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and 7. Defendants fail to identify which conspiracy they attack.
Defendants also fail to undertake the second step in the Moss I multi-stage
analysis: Identify the factual support for the various conspiracies, and compare the
FAC allegation of conspiracy and their alternative explanation. JUDICIAL
DEFENDANTS fail to traverse the plausibility analysis.
GORE asserts the FAC fails to allege with specificity facts showing a meeting
of the minds. CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS similarly allege a plaintiff must
allege each element with particularity. Doc. No. 151, 8:24-25. These attacks
confuse Rule 9(b)s specificity standard for Rule 8 and his burden in a plausibility
attack. Conspiracy claims are properly alleged under a notice standard, and GORES
burden is to erect and traverse Moss I Multi-Stage attack. Leatherman, 507 U.S. 163,
167 (1993), Iqbal, supra. Facts supporting the conspiracy allegations are detailed
throughout this pleading, and specific for GORE include those identified in analysis
under Attacks on Count 6 supra.
CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS attack similarly, citing two pre-Twombly
casesSherman v. Yakahi, 549 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1977), Soto v. Schembri,
960 F. Supp. 751, 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), and Chicago Miracle Temple Church, Inc. v.
Fox, 901 F. Supp. 1333, 1347 (N.D. Ill. 1995) for the proposition that In order to
successfully state a section 1985 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege each
element with particularity. Doc. No. 151, 8:24. These pre-Twombly and pre-
Leatherman
36
cases are no longer persuasive authoritythe proper procedure today is
to traverse the Moss I multi-stage analysis. Further, Chicago Temples 1995 holding
was an appeal from a Rule 56 motion to dismiss on evidentiary standards inapplicable
to the present stage.
The FAC pleads abundant facts supporting each alleged 1985 conspiracy in far
too much detail to include here. In the event the Court determines otherwise,

36
Sotos comment re: particularity was single sentence dicta, citing only Leon v. Murphy, 988
F.2d 303, 31011 (2d Cir.1993)a pre-Leatherman case.

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Plaintiffs hereby request leave to amend to cure.
(2) 1985(1) office, trust, or place of confidence:
JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS (Doc. No. 139, 7:21-8:3), GORE (Doc. No. 141-1,
5), and CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS (Doc. 151, 9:3-4) seek to narrow the
unambiguous language of section 1985(1), which prevents interference, injury, or
harassment of one holding any office, trust, or place of confidence under the United
States from discharging duties or leaving any state, district or place. 42 U.S.C.
1985(1). Defendants do not, and cannot cite a case construing section 1985(1) to
permit only federal employees, a United States officer, an officer holding
federal office or persons authorized to perform . . . federal duties or The
Supreme Court has stated that 1985 is to be accorded a sweep as broad as its
language. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971); Kush v. Rutledge, 460
U.S. 719, 724 (1983). Courts of appeal have recognized that 1985(1) is a statute
cast in general language of broad applicability and unlimited duration. Stern v.
United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1335 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
975, 98 S.Ct. 533, 54 L.Ed.2d 467 (1977). See also Windsor v. The Tennessean, 719
F.2d 155, 161 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984). Under Griffin and its
progeny, courts have applied section 1985(1) to protect both state and federal actors
in performance of duties under federal law. Mollnow v. Carlton, 716 F.2d 627, 630
(9th Cir. 1983) (tax collector); Lewis v. News-Press & Gazette Co., 782 F. Supp.
1338, 1341 (W.D. Mo. 1992) (state judge); McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 614-17
(D.C.Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981).
Defendants attempt to cabin the sweeping language of section 1985(1) is
inconsistent with the language and statutory intent of the statute. Protection of a broad
class persons acting under the United States was the express intent of Congress in
enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1871. McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 615 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (statutory history); Griffon v. Congress of Racial Equality, 221 F.Supp.
899 (E.D.La.1963); Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist. No. 46 of Lawrence County, Ark.,

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238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956).
37

The FAC describes Plaintiffs status at the time of the STUART ASSAULT as
an officer of the federal courts of five federal districts in three states including
California and this District, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, his status as a party and witness in the DUE COURSE OF JUSTICE, and
federal law practice including numerous civil rights and constitutional law pro bono
and commercial client matters. In this matter such activity includes his founding,
participation, and leadership of a public benefit corporation to support education,
exercise, enforcement, and reform of federal family civil rights (FFRRESA) in both
his personal and official capacity as an officer of the corporate Plaintiffs on behalf of
their clients and affiliates. Further, the injury alleged herein occurred while and
because all Plaintiffs were specifically engaged in such activity. FAC 324.
Any narrowing construction of the unambiguous terms of section 1985(1) at
this or any stage would be inappropriate. U.S. Const., Amend VII, V; Baltimore &
Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 656 (1935); Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 371 (1996) (the first issue in a patent case,
construing the patent, is a question of law, to be determined by the court. The second
issue, whether infringement occurred, is a question of fact for a jury.). To the extent
that the statutory terms office trust and place of confidence are ordinary
language terms capable of comprehension by a jury, no question of law exists.
Markman, supra; Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Dairy
Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).

37
The 1871 Reconstruction Congress clearly intended the broad sweep of section 1985 to
protect any personofficial or otherwisewith any affiliation to the Union who operates inside
what was then recently-quelled enemy territory: States that had mobilized their institutions and
society into violent hostility to the Constitution, laws, and institutions of the United States. That
precise sentiment of institutional hostility to equal protection and due process is the crux of this
lawsuit. STUARTS actions as a formal officer of this Court asserting the equal protection rights of
an oppressed class of families and children within an unrepentant hostile territory of the State of
California would without question satisfy the 1871 Congress as being action taken through an
office, trust, or place of confidence under the United States.

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Whether STUART, in his actions as an attorney admitted to practice before this
and numerous other United States District Courts, in representing a class of citizens
in the very act of protecting their rights, privileges, and immunities under the United
States Constitution, qualifies as one holding an office, trust, or place of confidence
is a question of fact, and Defendants are entitled to a day in court at the appropriate
time to make their claims to the contrary. The statutes meaning in 1871 can be
construed no differently todayunder the broad sweep of a statute intended to
protect the rights of an oppressed class, the FAC adequately states a claim under
Section 1985(1).
(3) Discriminatory Animus: JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS assert FAC offers
no factual allegations showing that any JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS acted with a
discriminatory animus. Doc. No. 139, 8:12-13. CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS
pose a similar attack. Doc. No. 151, 9:5-17. Others join more generally.
The existence of class-based invidious intent is a question of fact not properly
resolved at the Rules 12 stage. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S.
263, 267 (1993). The FAC alleges intent sufficient to provide notice under Rule 8:
Plaintiffs are members of and/or advocates for each of the following three classes
subject to historic de facto and de jure invidious discrimination in violation of the 5
th

and 14th Amendment rights to Equal Protection of the Laws (collectively EQUAL
PROTECTION CLASSES) FAC 777. Specific details of invidious intent are
alleged as incorporated at FAC 781-83, Exs. 1, 2, 13. Class of one claims (FAC
784-85) do not require invidious intent. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.
562, 564, (2000). Similarly, support and advocacy claims (COUNTS 9, 10;
FFRRESA, FAC 76-97, 146, 148, 161, 800, 1198) require no invidious intent.
Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 720 (1983).
JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS cite Rosen v. Cmty. Educ. Ctrs., Inc., CV-10-0584,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *7-9 (D. Ariz. Oct. 8, 2010) as rejecting Section 1985(3)
claim based on gender discrimination. Rosen stands for exactly the opposite

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proposition, citing Life Ins. Co. of North America v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 505
(9th Cir.1979), which acknowledged gender as a 1985(3) class, with approval. See
also Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (it is well
established that gender-based classifications may result in invidious discrimination.).
In Rosen the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff did not state a claim for class
discrimination because plaintiff does not offer factual allegations to back up her
hypothetical discriminatory animus that motivated the alleged deprivation of her
rights. Rosen at *3. California Coalitions 1985(3) equal protection claims are not
speculative, but backed up by extensive research. FAC 781-85, Exs. 1 (P15-17,
47-71, 72-104), 2, 13. Moreover, the FAC pleads that the Parent-Child class and
Domestic Relations Class have been previously identified by courts and legislatures
as classes. FAC 778, 779, Ex. 2 (P577-651).
CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS citations of Miller and Mears impose
nothing more than a requirement that animus must be alleged. Doc. No. 151, 9:12-
17. The FAC alleges animus. FAC 99, 105, 427, 630-31, 777, 781-83, 997.
(4) Party or Witness in Any Court of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1985(2))
CHUCAS and GRIFFIN attack FAC Claim 9.2 brought under 1985(2). Doc.
No. 150, 5:19-16. They assert first that the FAC does not allege PLAINTIFFS
testimony or appearance in federal court citing Timmerman v. US. Bank, N.A., 483
F.3d 1106, 1124 (10th Cir. 2007). Section 1985(2) imposes liability more broadly
than this citation.
In Justice Stevenss classic parsing of the 590-word long run-on single
sentence that is section 1985, Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 724 (1983), he
explained that paragraph (2) imposes liability for interference with (b) the
administration of justice in federal courts; (c) the administration of justice in state
courts. Section (b) holds liable persons who hampered the claimant's ability to
present an effective case in federal court or because they attended or testified in
federal court. Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 348 (5th Cir.1981) (en

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banc). If parties and witnesses ... have not yet testified in the proceeding ... the
conspirator must injure the party or witness in order to deter him from attending or
testifying in federal court. . . The section would not reach every conspiracy that
affected a federal right, but only a conspiracy whose predominant purpose was to
deter or punish the exercise of the federal right. Kinney, 367 F.3d at 355 n. 22
(quoting Guest, 383 U.S. at 760, 86 S.Ct. 1170). Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package
Sys., Inc., 614 F.3d 145, 150 (5th Cir. 2010).
The FAC identifies Plaintiffs relationship with relevant federal proceedings
generally as the DUE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (FAC 77-97).
California Coalition members have actively pursued numerous matters with
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS. FAC 83. The DUE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE includes STUARTS engagement of the U.S.
Attorneys Office, which redirected him from filing an action in U.S. District Court to
the Commission on Judicial Performance; delivering DDIJO Complaints I and II to
the United States Attorney, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Grand Jury for
the Southern District of California; the filing of this action (COUNT 4).
Further, by the delegation of authority to the Commission on Judicial
Performance for investigation and enforcement of federal criminal laws including 18
U.S.C. 241, 242, and 371, the Commission on Judicial Performance is effectively a
proceeding before a court of the United States for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1985(2)
(COUNT 5).
CHUCAS and GRIFFINS interference includes their membership in the
STUART ASSAULT as well as the acts in furtherance conspiracies of the
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (COUNT 3) and the (OBSTRUCTION OF
JUSTICE) (COUNT 4). These allegations establish sufficient relationships with
federal institutions.
CHUCAS and GRIFFIN also attack absence allegations of invidious
discrimination necessary under 1985(2) second part. Doc. 150, 6:12-16. Invidious

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discrimination against EQUAL PROTECTION CLASSES and intent to interfere by
virtue of advocacy for and membership in is abundantly alleged at FAC 163, 289,
629-632, and 777. Invidious discrimination is not necessary for a class of one
claim. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, (2000). Interference with
relevant state (and federal) proceedings are alleged as the DUE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE. CHUCAS and GRIFFINS interference and retaliation are alleged as
their involvement in the STUART ASSAULT and conspiracies in furtherance.
1985(3) Attacks:
CHUCAS and GRIFFIN attack (i) conspiracy, (ii) deprivation, and (iii) class-
based discrimination. CHUCAS Doc. No. 150, 6:25-7:2. Conspiracy (i) is alleged
against CHUCAS and GRIFFIN by virtue of their membership in the SAC group and
all allegations against that group (FAC 141-152, 286-348), and further liability for
conspiracies in furtherance of the STUART ASSAULT (MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION, NESTHUS OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, RACKETEERING
COUNTS). Deprivation is specified in each claim in each of the above counts.
Invidious discrimination to satisfy 1985(3), Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102,
(1971), and Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (it is
well established that gender-based classifications may result in invidious
discrimination.) is alleged at FAC 777 (Parent-Child Class See FAC 778,
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Domestic Relations Class See FAC 779-
782, Cal. Fam. C. 6211, Pen. C. 13700, FAC Ex. 1; Gender Class See Sever,
supra, FAC 783, Ex. 13. Class of One does not require invidious discrimination.
See STUART ASSAULT, FAC 786, 787. These allegations sufficiently allege
CHUCAS and GRIFFINS liability under section 1985(3).
H. Count 10 (42 U.S.C. 1986)
Several Defendants attack Count 10 arguing that it fails because of their attacks
on section 1985. A conspiracy under 1985 is therefore a prerequisite to a valid
claim under 1986. Because no section 1985 claim is stated, the section 1986 claim

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also fails. CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS 151, 9:18-22. Because Defendants
attacks on the 1985 claims fail, their attacks on the 1986 claim fails.
In addition, SDSD DOES and GORE possess unique duties as peace officers
sworn to uphold state and federal law. See COUNT 12. These officers recognized
the illegal behavior of their co-Defendants in the STUART ASSAULT and the
subsequent illegal persecution of STUART. FAC 126-133 (SDSD); 193-197.
Their duties were then, as they are now, to act immediately to prevent abuse of color
of law authority committed by those in their presenceincluding private security
guards, judges, lawyers, and other peace officers. Their and their co-defendants
failures to protect families from harm caused within the Family Court System at the
direction of others even acting under color of law is a uniquely appropriate subject for
this and future litigation. See Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982)
(We do not want to pretend that the line between action and inaction, between
inflicting and failing to prevent the infliction of harm, is clearer than it is. If the state
puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect him,
it will not be heard to say that its role was merely passive; it is as much an active
tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit.); Johnson v. City of Seattle, 474
F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (creation of danger). Moreover, protection from abuse
of authority by authority is a guarantee. We held that immunity from any such
discrimination is one of the equal rights of all persons, and that any withholding it by
a State is a denial of the equal protection of the laws, within the meaning of the
amendment. We held that such an equal right to an impartial jury trial, and such an
immunity from unfriendly discrimination, are placed by the amendment under the
protection of the general government and guaranteed by it. Ex parte Commonwealth
of Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345, 25 L. Ed. 676 (1879). GORE has not option to sit by
while authority is abusedhe must act, and his failure to act alone is independent
foundation for liability under the Civil Rights Act..
It is well-settled in our State and our Union that orders in violation of citizen

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rights have no effect: As we observed more than a century ago, [e]very
constitutional provision is self-executing to this extent, that everything done in
violation of it is void. (Oakland Paving Co. v. Hilton (1886) 69 Cal. 479, 484, 11 P.
3.). Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of California, 29 Cal. 4th 300, 307, 58 P.3d 339,
342 (2002); Cal. Const. Art. I, sec. 26. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60, 28 S.
Ct. 441, 454, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1908). Law enforcement can be confident that orders
from a gowned criminal offer no more immunity than do orders from a masked one.
See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 126 (1945); Ex parte Young at 167
(The state cannot, in either case, impart to the official immunity from responsibility
to the supreme authority of the United States.).
These claims are adequately pled on the STUART ASSAULT facts through the
1985(2) and (3) claims of Count 9. If requested by the Court, Plaintiff proffers an
ability to plead them at more length and detail.
I. Counts 11, 12, 14, 15 (Doyne Terrorism):
BLANCHET attacks Counts 11. 12. 14. and 15 are State Claims for Legal
Malpractice. VIVIANO is represented by the same counsel and attacks similarly.
Doc. No. 148, 3:19-6:12. JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS attack on Rooker-Feldman is
analyzed under OMNIBUS Sec. C, their attack on statute of limitations at Sec. B.
These Counts are built on the DOYNE TERRORISM allegations that DOYNE,
BLANCHET and others conspired to defraud and extort STUART. While they might
also be stated as legal malpractice, the level of wrongdoing alleged far exceeds
mere negligence. They are not malpractice claims, and BLANCHETS arguments at
pages 4-7 regarding federal preemption of state malpractice claims are wildly off-
mark.
38

38
Defendants, who presently and abundantly insult the Complaint and First Amended
Complaint as a bucket of mud and incomprehensible rambling, appear also confused regarding
the distinction between federal preemption and federal supremacy. This confusion perhaps helps in
understanding how the Divorce Industrys lawyers and related California institutions have wandered
so astray from any semblance of authority within our federal constitutional system. If it need be
saidand perhaps among some California divorce attorneys and government employees today it

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The Claims Against BLANCHET are Not Barred by Res Judicata
BLANCHET asserts that a 2010 lawsuit for legal malpractice is res judicata to
the present federal law racketeering, civil rights, and false advertising claims. Doc.
No. 146, 7:1-8:16. The FAC identifies the Stuart Dissolution, which involved only
questions of property division, child custody, and support. Without analysis,
BLANCHET asserts that a subsequent legal malpractice action brought by Stuart
asserted that ABC&K and Blanchet committed malpractice relating to DOYNE.
The preclusive effect of a judgment is defined by claim preclusion and issue
preclusion, which are collectively referred to as res judicata. Taylor v. Sturgell,
553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008). [C]laim preclusion is the doctrine providing that a final
judgment forecloses successive litigation of the very same claim, whether or not
relitigation of the claim raises the same issues as the earlier suit. Id. (quoting New
Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001)) Issue preclusion, in contrast, bars
successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a
valid court determination essential to the prior judgment, even if the issue recurs in
the context of a different claim. Id. (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting
New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 74849; White v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 926-

should bethe Constitution of the United States pre-empted State law in 1788 upon the States
ratification of a Constitution of the United States containing a supremacy clause at Article VI,
clause 2. This supremacy concept was confirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Ware v.
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) and has achieved noncontroversial statusat least outside of the
State of Californiain thousands of matters since. After a dispute over the supremacy concept
occurring from1861 until 1865, States through the Senate and Congress re-confirmed the
Constitutions supremacy to State laws in 1868 with the States ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Section 1, clause 2 provides: No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. Though the fact is often lost
among many present, almost every American family is comprised of United States citizens. The
Civil Rights Act passed by the States through the Senate and Congress in 1871 enabled U.S.
citizens in every Stateincluding even Californiato enforce their rights under the United States
Constitution over any State laws to the contrary. This supremacy concept of the United States
Constitution to State law has been recognized on many occasions since. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). An excellent primer for those who may
wish to explore the supremacy concept further in performance of their duties and aid of their
clients and fiduciaries is available for free. See The Federalist Papers, (1788), Essay No. 33
(Hamilton, A) and Essay No. 44 (Jefferson, T).

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27 (9th Cir. 2012).
Against Blanchet this Action asserts only federal questionsracketeering, and
false advertisingwhich were not, and could not be litigated in California state court.
This Action asserts damages against Blanchet for conspiracies in collaboration with
defendants who were notand could not beparties to a malpractice action against
Blanchet. This Action seeks special equitable and prospective remedies under 42
U.S.C. 1988, 15 U.S.C. 1125, 28 U.S.C. 2201, and 18 U.S.C. 1964 which
were notand could not beobtained from a California court. This Action asserts
events which occurred after 2010 when BLANCHET was sued for malpractice which
were notand could not beasserted in the 2010 malpractice action. In short, the
claims against Blanchet in this Action are notand cannot bebarred by any prior
litigation in a California county courthouse. Moreover, BLANCHET could not erect
a preclusion as the claim was not adjudicated on the merits. BLANCHET asserted an
immunity under state law, which cannot bar a federal claim. See Kimes, supra.
Further, STUART did not and could not have understood the depth of collusion
constituting the Domestic Dispute Industry in 2010. The complexity of the
enterprises operated by present Defendants has been revealed to STUART through
the STUART ASSAULT, the subsequent highly-integrated interactions between the
SDCBA, FEDERAL, CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS, and GROCH in
committing deprivation upon-deprivation to retaliate and oppress Plaintiffs for their
reform activity, one element of which includes STUARTS action against
BLANCHET, BATTSON and SIMIS outrageous impotence to remedy these obvious
violations of state and federal law through 2011-2013; all of which have occurred or
come to light after 2010.
Moreover, preclusion is an equitable doctrine. BLANCHETS unclean hands in
the course of dealings with STUART should prohibit her asserting any equitable
remedies in this Action, including equitable estoppels and statutes of limitation. This
maxim closes the doors of a court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or

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bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks relief, however improper may have
been the behavior of the defendant. Precision Inst. Mfg. Co. v. Automotive
Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945); Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763
F.2d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 1985). Blanchet is alleged to be the primary conductor of
the mail fraud and extortion racketeering activity involving DOYNE (STUART-
AHCE) that has incompetently demolished the futures of at least one small family
likely dozens morea CFLS level conductor in the San Diego Domestic Dispute
Industry Enterprise (SD-DDICE) which operates the Godless shams to defraud and
extort San Diego families of their and their childrens futures, a participant in the
California Domestic Dispute Industry Enterprise (DDICE) that fuels a $50 Billion
annual state-supported crime ring, and leading facilitator, inducer, aider, and abettor
to the Domestic Dispute Industry Forensic Investigator Enterprise (DDI-FICE) that is
the outcast bastard of the of the American psychology profession. She actively
induced STUART to hire DOYNE based on knowingly fraudulent and malicious
misrepresentations, and then actively oppressed and defrauded his efforts to take
action. She lied, cajoled, threatened, and even laughed at STUARTS insistence that
DOYNES behavior was irregular. FAC 1021-1030. To permit her to assert the
product of her misdeeds as a defense here because they were highly successful in
delaying STUART would constitute error. Ruiz v. Scriber, C 07-00020 WHA, 2007
WL 2790203 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2007) aff'd sub nom. Ruiz v. Scribner, 341 F. App'x
278 (9th Cir. 2009).
J. California Constitution Article I, sec. 26 Claims
Each claim asserting liability against state color of law actors under the Civil
Rights Act is also asserted as a state law constitutional claim under California
Constitution Article I, Section 26. Section 26 claims are the California equivalent of
claims against the federal color of law actors under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of California, 29 Cal.
4th 300, 307, 58 P.3d 339, 342 (2002). Because the pleading and proof analysis of

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Article I, Section 26 claims and 1983 claims are similar, they are pled together.
FEDERAL claims the FAC fails to specifically identify what acts violated
Art. I. 26 of the California Constitution. Doc. No. 145, 5:22. FEDERAL cites
Cousins v. Lockyear, 568 F.3d 1063 (9
th
Cir. 2009) in which a prisoner alleged
violation of broad federal constitutional right to be free from wrongful
incarceration Id. at 1070. The Court of Appeals dismissed the federal claims, citing
the caselaw requiring a civil rights plaintiff to allege violation of a right with
specificity. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). Finding no broad federal
constitutional right to be free from wrongful incarceration, the Court of Appeals
found defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Cousins at 1070.
FEDERALS assertion that Saucier governs Section claims is without
authority. Cousins analyzed the prisoner claims in that case differently, finding that
even though the prisoner couldnt state a federal claim for the broad right, his state
law claims on the same broad right were cognizable under Californias broader
Constitutional provisions. Cousins at 1070-71. See also Katzberg (describing
analysis of Art. I 26 claims under California law). Moreover, even if Saucier were
applied to state law, PLAINTIFFS have pled the constitutional rights FEDERAL has
violated with specificity. FAC 158-165; and as further specified in each Claim
naming FEDERAL.
K. Prospective Relief Counts
Several Defendants pose similar attacks on Plaintiffs standing to seek
prospective relief analyzed together here. JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS Doc. No. 139,
9:1-10:4; BIERER; LAWYER DEFENDANTS; COUNTY Doc. No. 141-1, 9:11-23.
LAWYER DEFENDANTS and BIERER assert the FACs prayer for Prospective
Relief do not assert concrete and particularized legal harm, coupled with a
sufficient likelihood that they will again be wronged in a similar way sufficient to
plead prospective relief. LAWYER DEFENDANTS Doc. No. 149-2, 10:14-22;
BIERER Doc. No. 135-1 8:3-9:3. BIERER claims that the FAC alleges only desires

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to have this countrys laws and Constitution upheld. BIERER 135-1, 8:20-21.
BATTSON and SIMI attack the Supreme Courts decisions consistently hold that a
citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he
himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution. Citing Linda R. S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Doc. No. 134, 2:25-28. JUDICIAL
DEFENDANTS attack: Absent from the FAC are any allegations that Plaintiffs are
likely to be wronged in the future by any Judicial Defendants. Doc. No. 139, 9:22-
10:23. These attacks are inaccurate.
The FACs two prospective relief counts request orders enjoining the patterns
of activity described in the civil rights, racketeering, and Lanham Act counts, and
declaring such patterns and related laws invalid, or federal law superior. Such relief
is provided under 18 U.S.C. 1964(a); 28 U.S.C. 2201-2202; 28 U.S.C. 1337;
15 U.S.C. 1116(a), 1117, 1118; 42 U.S.C. 1988(a); Fed.R.Civ.P. 57, 65.
Standing Attacks
There are three elements to standing. First injury in factan invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained ofthe injury has to be
fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result
[of] the independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be
likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). A
plaintiff can establish standing by demonstrating he has previously engaged in the
sort of activity in which he now claims he will engage again if not prohibited by the
statute he seeks to challenge. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 363-64 (9th Cir.
2004). One can also establish standing to sue by demonstrating a history of
enforcement against oneself and others. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 113940 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc) (pattern of enforcement of

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a statute is shows likelihood of future enforcement and injury); AmericanArab Anti
Discrimination Comm. v. Thornburgh, 970 F.2d 501, 508 (9th Cir.1992) (threat of
injury was not speculative because the plaintiffs had been previously charged under
the challenged statute).
(1) Harm and (2) Cause: The FAC alleges numerous concrete and
particularized injuries. Each of the STUART ASSAULT, CHILLING, BREACH
OF CONTRACT and UNFAIR COMPETITION, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION,
COMMISSION and NESTHUS OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, DOYNE
TERRORISM, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, FALSE ADVERTISING, and each act of
RACKETEERING are alleged to have caused concrete and particularized harm (e.g.,
FAC 167: As an actual and foreseeable result, Plaintiffs have been deprived of
state and federal constitutional rights, damaged, and injured in a nature and amount to
be proven at trial.).
(3) Non-Speculative: The FAC also alleges these concrete injuries are related to
ongoing policies, habits, customs, enterprises, conspiracies and courses of conduct
likely to continue if not enjoined. The FAC alleges a continuing concerted course of
conduct to harass, interfere with, intimidate, harm, and retaliate for Plaintiffs
protected activities reiterated throughout the FAC as HARASSMENT AND ABUSE
(FAC 1194; See also Doc. No. 4 Ex Parte Application for Emergency Harassment
Restraining Order, COUNT 4); that Defendants have consistently denied the
existence of and refused to assert Plaintiffs Family Federal Rights in family court
proceedings (FAC 1198-99); deprived, injured, and punished Plaintiffs and the
class of U.S. Citizens similarly situated of the same (FAC 1199); asserted,
threatened to assert, and enforced laws and procedures against Plaintiffs which
Plaintiffs contend, and Defendants deny, are unconstitutional (FAC 1199, 1200);
STUART was and in fact remains intimidated, oppressed, fearful, and under duress
from GARSONs and Judge GROCHS illegal activity (FAC 452); STUART is
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The FAC alleges standing as a class as Plaintiffs have experienced and are in fear of
further harassment, threats, and intimidation (FAC 1196); the DVILS today remain
a tool in widespread use, and daily form the basis of state family courts issuing illegal
and highly invasive DVILS ORDERS (FAC 965-68); STUART and
CALIFORNIA COALITION have been injured by and remain at jeopardy for
making complaints to the Commission on Judicial Performance (FAC 593-94, 599,
Count 5). These allegations establish a sufficient likelihood that they will again be
wronged in a similar way (Lujan, supra) and establish a pattern of enforcement of
illegal laws and virtual certainty they will be enforced again (Strankman, supra).
Association Standing
Plaintiffs also have standing as representatives of similarly-situated
individuals. Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 344
(1977). Such association standing exists when (a) its members would otherwise
have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are
germane to the organizations purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the
relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. Id.
California Coalition is an association of mothers, fathers, and children who
have withstood abundant hardship resulting from the current practices of . . . the
Family Law Community. These injuries and insults include fraudulent, inefficient,
harmful, and even dangerous services; an institutionalized culture of deliberate
indifference toindeed contempt forclearly-established liberties; insults to the
autonomy and dignity of parents and children; and extortion, robbery, and abuse
founded upon such illegal color of law crime, delivered at the hands of eager
institutional operators within the Family Law Community. (FAC 64). Plaintiffs
have organized to confront the State of Californias dispossession of law and reason
by engaging those within the Domestic Dispute Industry who administer the decay
family court judges. An astonishingly vast judicial administrative bureaucracy,
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nearly imperceptible deliberate indifference to the creeping deprivations of parental
rights is leaving the family cupboard nearly bare. FAC 69. Plaintiffs efforts on
behalf of parents and children have included increasing public and governmental
awareness of family rights, representing and supporting parents and children in
exercising and enforcing such rights, lobbying state and federal, policymakers to
improve protections for federal rights under state law, and undertaking litigation,
complaints, or other formal and informal engagements with state and federal
authorities to assert, exercise, communicate regarding, educate, inform, establish and
defend such rights with the goal of enabling parental autonomy and empowerment
through reform state of California domestic dispute laws, practices, and institutions.
(FAC 70).
Each mother, father, child, and member of each EQUAL PROTECTION
CLASS represented here would have standing to sue in their own right for
abundant wrongs committed against them by various defendants present. The
Prospective relief counts seek to protect interests germane to the organizations
purpose. No claims asserted requires the participation of individual members in the
lawsuit other than STUART.
III. OTHER AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Defendants assert various affirmative defenses at the pleading stage.
Affirmative defenses may not be raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion unless based on a
non-controversial legal defense. Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir.
1984). None of Defendants affirmative defenses are stated on the face of the
complaint, and their extrinsic evidence is controversial. See Objections to RJN.
defenses here are non-controversial. The burden of pleading and proving any
affirmative defense rests with the defendant. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c). A defendant may
bring a Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on an affirmative defense in unusual
circumstances: where the face of the Complaint admits the defense. Graham v.
Taubman, 610 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.1979). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion asserting that the

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complaint admits a defense must show the defense is (i) definitively ascertainable
from the complaint and other allowable sources of information, and (ii) suffice to
establish the affirmative defense with certitude. Gray v. Evercore Restructuring
L.L.C., 544 F3d 320, 324 (1st Cir. 2008).
A. Domestic Relations Exception to Jurisdiction
DOYNE asserts this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the federal law
racketeering, unfair competition, and civil rights claims because of a domestic
relations exception, citing Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1968).
143-1, 5:16-6:7. DOYNE does not move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), but assets
simply that The burden of establishing federal court jurisdiction falls on the party
seeking to invoke jurisdiction citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America,
511 21 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). This form of jurisdictional challenge is procedurally
disordered, and may be denied for that reason alone.
This courts subject matter jurisdiction is firmly rooted through 28 U.S.C.
1331 (federal question) 1337 (regulation of interstate commerce), 2201 (declaratory
judgment) and 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). FAC 1. DOYNE is sued for his
fraudulent commercial transactions, extortion, abuse of process, and conspiring with
others to commit violence and oppression within this District. This Action does not
assert diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332. To assert an absence of
jurisdiction DOYNE must abide the procedural requirements, and his failure to do so
is grounds for denial alone. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006)
(drive-by jurisdictional rulings should be accorded no precedential effect).
39

DOYNES attempted drive-by assertion of a domestic relations exception
is specious at best, and not supported even by the case he cites. In Beuchold v. Ortiz
the Court of Appeals declined to exercise diversity jurisdiction over a case behalf of a
German citizen against a citizen of California involving paternity and child support.

39
The Kokkonen case DOYNE cites is wildly inapposite, involving the issue of whether a
district court may assert jurisdiction over a settlement agreement entered into by parties to a prior
federal case who dismissed the original case voluntarily under Rule 41 (a)(1)(ii). Kokkonen at 378.

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This is not a diversity case, and plaintiffs do not assert any claims relating to paternity
or child support. Oddly, DOYNE claims there is no indication in Mr. STUART's
complaint as to why he cannot seek relief in the state court. DOYNE perhaps
omitted a glance at paragraph 1 of the FAC asserting exclusive federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and substantive federal law. This matter is
brought under the constitution and laws of the United States. No Plaintiff asserts
state domestic law. Plaintiffs challenges the constitutionality of state policies and
laws are within this Courts Public Health and Welfare jurisdiction under Title 42.
The Domestic Relations Exception referred to by DOYNE is a narrow
exception to diversity jurisdiction which even our Supreme Court has doubted. In
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 693 (1992) the Court defined the Domestic
Relations Exception to exist only within federal diversity jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. 1332. Its inapplicability to federal question jurisdiction has been recently
confirmed in a case originating out of our neighboring Central District, Marshall v.
Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 305 (2006). This case does not rely on diversity jurisdiction.
B. Quasi-Judicial Immunity:
DOYNE asserts quasi-judicial immunity for his acts as a private mediator.
Doc. 143-1, 7:15-9:10. First, immunities are personal; entities are not entitled to
assert them. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997). Doyne, Inc. is thus not
protected. Second, because the controversial extrinsic evidence controverts the FAC
allegation that DOYNE was hired, not appointed, as a mediator, the motion may be
denied on that basis alone. See, Objections to Requests for Judicial Notice; Motion to
Conduct Early Discovery. DOYNE offers extrinsic evidence claiming he was court
appointed to act as a mediator in the Stuart Dissolution. Doc. No. 143-1, 7-17. The
assertion is based entirely on controversial extrinsic evidence that directly
contravenes DOYNES assertion as well as the FAC. See Objections to Request for
Judicial Notice. The FAC alleges WOHLFEIL recommended and offered to
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and referral to DOYNE. FAC 809-812. Further, the document DOYNE offers
via his Request for Judicial Notice (143-3) is not an order. See Objections to RJN.
The assertion of immunity may also be denied on each of those bases alone.
Doyne Ignores the Function Test
DOYNES reach for quasi-judicial immunity cites cases which have been
modernly synthesized into the function test initially articulated in Burns v. Reed,
500 U.S. 478, 498 (1991) and subsequently synthesized into the modern function
doctrine through Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 275 (1993), Kalina v.
Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997), and in our own District in Genzler v. Longanbach,
410 F.3d 630, 636 (9th Cir. 2005).
These cases refute the immunity outcome DOYNE pursues here. Modernly
courts analyze immunity claims by distinguishing between judicial functions such
as ruling on motions, advocating at trial, and trial testimony, which are given absolute
immunity. Other functions such as investigative ministerial administrative or
otherwise are not absolutely immune even if related to a judicial function. The single
exception for out-of-court functions entitled to absolute immunity applies to criminal
prosecutors in activity that is intimately related to the criminal prosecution. See,
Imbler v. Pachtman, supra. Even for prosecutors, investigative, administrative,
ministerial, or other functions not in the form of advocacy during the criminal
prosecution are not entitled to absolute immunity. Genzler, 410 F.3d 630, 636 (9th
Cir. 2005).
The function test as applied to social workers was adopted in this Circuit in
the lead case DOYNE cites, Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 898-900 (9th Cir.
2003). Following the Burns v. Reed function analysis, the Court of Appeals
considered a claim by social workers in a court dependency proceeding to take
custody away from parents that they were entitled to an absolute immunity. Id. at
898. In the district court, the social workers asserted prosecutorial immunity in a
Rule 12 motion to dismiss. Id. at 894. The district court declined to grant or deny

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the motion to dismiss the Rule 12 motion because it was not clear at the pleading
stage whether the social workers were performing prosecutorial or investigative
functions. The court granted leave to conduct limited discovery. The social workers
immediately appealed. The Court of Appeals agreed with the district courts
reasoning:
Here, the district court was obligated to examine the functions [defendant
social workers] Gammie and Zito performed; however, those functions were
unclear. Moreover, the defendants bear the burden of showing that their
respective common-law functional counterparts were absolutely immune. It
would appear that the critical decision to institute proceedings to make a child
a ward of the state is functionally similar to the prosecutorial institution of a
criminal proceeding. The decision, therefore, is likely entitled to absolute
immunity. It also may be that some submissions to the court by social workers
are functionally similar to the conduct recognized at common law to be
protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity. To the extent, however, that
social workers also make discretionary decisions and recommendations that are
not functionally similar to prosecutorial or judicial decisions, only qualified,
not absolute immunity, is available. Examples of such functions may include
decisions and recommendations as to the particular home where a child is to go
or as to the particular foster parents who are to provide care. On this record, we
cannot make that determination.
Miller at 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). The Court of Appeals
remanded to the district court to permit discovery on defendants functions. Miller v.
Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003).
DOYNES functions in this case are apparent from the FAC: He was hired as a
private mediatorhe had no authority to undertake any judicial, investigative, or
other potentially immune act. Unlike social workers in dependency proceedings in
which the state takes away custody from parents, mediators in a dissolution

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proceeding do not advocate for the state, either party, or the child. Moreover, even
social workers appointed by a court or agency who function as prosecutors are only
entitled to immunity for prosecutorial, and not investigative acts. Genzler, supra.
DOYNE cannot establish immunity here because there is no state-advocacy role of
a prosecutor role to play in a dissolution. At best, appointed child custody evaluators
might function as police investigators eligible for a qualified immunity. See, e.g.,
Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 642 (9th Cir. 2005); Broam v. Bogan, 320
F.3d 1023, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003); Hoffman v. Harris, 511 U.S. 1060 (1994) (An
official seeking such immunity, however, must at the outset show that a counterpart
to the privilege he asserts was recognized at common law in 1871, for [w]here we
have found that a tradition of absolute immunity did not exist as of 1871, we have
refused to grant such immunity under 1983.). On the FAC or any set of facts,
DOYNE cannot achieve immunity here.
Evidence Code 730 Appointments: DOYNE references California Evidence
Code section 730 describing the functions of court-appointed 730 expert. (143-1,
9:4-10) yet makes no claim that he was in fact appointed pursuant to Evidence Code
section 730, because he was not.
Even so, DOYNEs claim that an appointment of an investigator under
California Evidence Code section 730 extends judicial immunity to an appointee is
preposterous. DOYNES assertion would mean that county judge could use an
Evidence Code provision to extend absolute immunity under the Constitution and
laws of the United States, to hoist not only psychologists, but also police, criminal
investigators, prison wardens, even social workers working at the feet of a county
judge to operate above United States law. Such a fantastic vision is uniquely
appealing perhaps to present defendants who nourish conflict among a childs blood
relations to inject a paid surrogate from the sciences of forensic child custody
evaluation into a familys affairs. To those not bestowed with such visions, the
suggestion would be reasonably received as treason.

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No Foundation for Immunity
Like GROCH, DOYNE must establish the scope of any authority he was
operating under, which is a question of fact. See Sec. II.B.1(b)-(e), supra. The FAC
alleges he has acted ultra vires under color of law, and thus cannot assert immunity
for violating STUARTS rights. California Const. Art. I sec. 26. Any officer who
acts in excess of his jurisdiction is operating off the reservation and is not protected
by any immunity. Butz v. Economou, 438 US 478, 519 (1978); Ex Parte Virginia,
supra. The FAC alleges that DOYNE violated STUARTS rights under the
California. As a color of law actor exercising authority in excess of his jurisdiction,
he was at all relevant times acting in coram non judice, and may not assert immunity,
but is strictly liable for any injuries he has caused. Manning v. Ketcham, 58 F.2d 948
(6th Cir. 1932); Restatement (Second) of Torts 162 (1965).
Finally, DOYNES crimes can never achieve immunity, nor can his violations
of due process and equal protection. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 348-349
(1880) (equal protection violations of a prosecutor not immune); U.S. v. Frega, 179
F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1999) (judicial immunity no defense to racketeering); Imbler v.
Patchman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); 18 U.S.C. 241, 242. None of DOYNES acts are,
and God willing will never be, beyond the law of any state or nation. Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803).
No Witness Immunity
Doyne cites Briscoe v. LaHue and Kurazawa, which concern witness
immunity. Doc. No. 143-1, 7-8. In both cases the witness performed work both
inside and outside of court, but the liability claims were focused on in-court
proceedings. Neither case immunizes non-testimonial investigative activity. Briscoe
at 342. While DOYNE certainly committed perjury, the civil rights claims against
him are not based on his perjury, but abundant other illegal behavior. Racketeering
claims under 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(A) and (B) or 1962 (d) are not subject to witness
immunity. E.g. RACKETEERING COUNTS 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10.

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No Mandatory Reporter Immunity
DOYNE asserts a California state law immunity for mandatory reporters
making negligent reports of suspected child abuse under California Penal Code
11172. He directs the immunity to paragraph 817 of the FAC, which alleges
numerous misrepresentations and wrongdoing by DOYNE in procuring mediation
services, billing, protracting a mediation in weekly sessions over months to generate
fees, conducing unauthorized activities beyond the contract, inserting himself into
non-custody issues to create conflict, failing to follow through with promises made in
the procurement of the mediation contract (FAC 814), and generally manipulating
the mediation process to increase hostilities, expand and extend the conflict, and
increase his fees. When STUART objected to this process and refused to pay for any
more sessions, DOYNE immediately filed a false report with CPS that STUART
held his son upside down over a balcony. These reports were determined to be
false, and DOYNE knew them to be false when he made them. FAC 821. The
claims against DOYNE are not for reporting activity, but commercial activity, fraud,
breach of contract, unfair business practices based on bribery and extortion, state
constitutional violations, and federal constitutional violations, and RICO (DOYNE
TERRORISM). DOYNE does not identify which claim he attacks, but none of the
claims in the FAC which are based on the DOYNE TERRORISM, including fraud,
extortion, assault, kidnapping and deprivation of rights in are vulnerable to a state law
defense against negligent reporting of child abuse. Immunity is not a defense to
crime. U.S. v. Frega, supra. DOYNE is also sued for false advertising (COUNT 15)
and prospective relief, to which no immunity can apply.
DOYNE asserts he is a mandatory reporter under Penal Code section
11165.7(21), which describes health care providers. He presumably relies on that
categorys inclusion of psychologist or therapist. Mediators are not identified as
mandatory reporters. The FAC does not assert DOYNE provided health care,
therapy, or counseling services. DOYNE is not entitled to immunity as a mandatory

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reporter.
Further, state immunities are never a defense to liability for constitutional
violations. In Buckheit v. Dennis, 713 F. Supp. 2d 910, 925 (N.D. Cal. 2010) the
Northern District rejected the same argument DOYNE makes here, holding that
section 11172 does not shield a defendant from deprivation under section 1983.
C. California Tort Claims Act Defense
COUNTY, GORE, and CITY ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS assert failure to
plead filing of state tort claims act claims. COUNTY Doc. No. 141-1, 2:25; CITY
ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS Doc. No. 151, 6:5-27. Timely claims were filed with
all Defendants. Plaintiffs hereby request leave to amend to plead this fact. Tolling
and estoppel principles relevant to statute of limitations analysis above also toll claim
filing deadlines such that all recently-filed claims are timely. Addison v. State of
California, 21 Cal. 3d 313, 321, 578 P.2d 941, 945 (1978).
D. State Constitutional Immunities Do Not Protect Ultra Vires Conduct
SIMI and BATTSON assert immunity under Article VI, 18(h) of the
California Constitution. Doc. No. 134, 3:1-15.
40
For the same reasons that
Defendants criminal and ultra vires frolics are not protected by immunity under
federal law, they are not acts undertaken in the course of their official duties and
are thus not protected by the immunity granted by Article VI, 18(h). Recorder v.
Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 72 Cal. App. 4th 258 (1999); Vierria v. California
Highway Patrol, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1240 (E.D. Cal. 2009). Defendants complain
that the FAC fails to allege specific facts showing the conduct of Defendants was
outside the course of their official duties. Doc. No. 134, 3:15. This is untrue; the
FAC alleges ultra vires activity in all counts asserting violations of California
Constitution Art. I, sec., 26. Against BATTSON and SIMI these include the facts of
Count 5, Claims 5.1-5.6, and each claim dependent thereon.

40
BATTSON and SIMI raised the same argument in their initial motion, which
this Court denied. Doc. No. 88.

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E. Noerr-Pennington Bars No Claim
Several Defendants represented by Mr. Grebing assert an identical Noerr-
Pennington defense. BLANCHET Doc. No. 146, 8:17-10:6; ALLIANCE Doc. No.
147 3:13-5; VIVIANO Doc. No. 148, 6:13-8:2. In so doing, Defendants advance the
proposition that uniform practices constituting coordinated extortion, fraud, violence,
and obstruction of justice inflicted on their own clients is necessary to protect their
ability to practice before family courts, and is therefore petitioning activity. This
admission that fraud and extortion is essential to their practices is insightful, and
certainly information Sharon Blanchet, Ashworth, Blanchet, Christenson, &
Kalemkiarian, LLP, Lori Clark Viviano, and Dr. Stephen Doyne of San Diego should
perhaps pass on to their clients seeking information or reviews of these attorneys
before being retained.
Defendants cite Sosa v. DIRECTV. Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 929 (9th Cir. 2006). In
Sosa, DIRECTV send pre-lawsuit demand letters to thousands of individuals who
owned descrambling boxes. DIRECTV believed the individuals were using the boxes
to illegally access DIRECTVs proprietary satellite television broadcasts. DIRECTV
asserted in the district court that pre-lawsuit demand letters was protected
petitioning under the First Amendments petition clause.
To fit the present Action within Noerr-Pennington, Defendants must establish
that the activity they are accused of is petitioning activity protected by the First
Amendment. Defendants fail to undertake this first stepbypassing any First
Amendment analysis, and moving on to describing the relationship between the
necessity for their illegal fraud and extortion on their own clients is to their ability to
practice family law before their co-defendants in this lawsuit. This failure alone is
sufficient grounds for denial.
But even a cursory review of the FAC reveals that it asserts acts that are not
protected speech: Commercial fraud in engaging expert witnesses, extortion in
secluding and enforcing the scheme, and violence against those who identify it upon

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revelation. Such is not protected petitioning activity BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB,
536 U.S. 516 (2002), (emphasis added). Noerr-Pennington is a constitutional
doctrine, and its immunities can be no broader than the First Amendment on which it
is based. Extortion and robbery (Count 11, Racketeering Count 4), fraud (Count 11,
Racketeering Counts 1, 2), and defamation (Count 2) are not protected by the First
Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544, 183 L. Ed. 2d
574 (2012) (content-based restrictions on speech have been permitted, as a general
matter, only when confined to the few historic and traditional categories [of
expression] long familiar to the bar, Among these categories are . . . speech
integral to criminal conduct, . . . fraud, true threats. . .) (internal citations omitted).
Needless to sayor perhaps it is appropriate to remind some presentassault (Count
1), kidnapping (Racketeering Count 3), kidnapping, false imprisonment, and related
violence (Racketeering Counts 4, 5, 6) would exceed the behavior the Constitution
tolerates as expression. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116, (1972)
(Of course, where demonstrations turn violent, they lose their protected quality as
expression under the First Amendment.); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336
U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (speech incident to criminal conduct); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (regulation of non-expressive elements of expression
permitted). Moreover, even if purely expressive, the most protection afforded to the
fraudulent counsel accused in this case is that for commercial speech. See, e.g.,
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447
U.S. 557 (1980), which permits a balancing test nothing close to blanket petitioning
immunity sought by Defendants.
Finally, to the extent Defendants will insist that the Court of Appeal in Sosa
extended First Amendment protection to fraud and extortion crimes under the federal
criminal code, Defendants interpretation stands in conflict with Supreme Court
precedent spanning decades. See, e.g., Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).

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F. California Civil Code 47 Litigation Privilege
Fritz asserts his actions are immunized under a state law litigation privilege
under California Civil Code section 47. FRITZ Doc. No. 138, 2:26-4:4. See also,
Nesthus litigation privilege attack, supra. Fritz is not sued under any state law or for
malpractice, but for federal law racketeering crimes and false advertising. FAC
907, 929 (DDICE), 931 (SD-DDICE), 940 (DDI-FICE), 944 (STUARTAHCE),
RACKETEERING COUNT 1 (mail fraud), 1019-1020, RACKETEERING
COUNT 2 (honest services fraud), RACKETEERING COUNT 4 (extortion) all
aiding and abetting and conspiracy RACKETEERING COUNTS 7-10. Californias
litigation privilege is not a defense to liability under federal law. Kimes v. Stone,
84 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1996) (Because the existence of 1983 immunities is a
matter of federal law, the district court erred in determining that the Attorney
Defendants were entitled to litigation immunity pursuant to Cal.Civ.Code 47(b)).
No privilege or immunity is a defense to racketeering. U.S. v. Frega, supra.
G. RICO Claims Do Not Depend on Duties to Third Parties
Fritz claims he cannot be liable for racketeering because he never owed a duty
to STUART and was STUARTs litigation adversary, citing California courts of
appeals cases involving attorney malpractice claims. Doc. No. 138, 4:6-27. RICO
does not depend on a duty of care, and may be asserted even against adversaries.
Where a defendants racketeeringincluding fraud on a third partycauses
foreseeable property loss to another, the injured party has standing to sue under
RICO. See Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 498 (2000); Bridge v. Phoenix Bond &
Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008). Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient foreseeable
property loss due to Defendants abundant malfeasance.
H. Personal Jurisdiction and Venue
ACFEI and OBlock attack on personal jurisdiction and improper venue
grounds. Doc. No. 137, 5:9-6:3. They cite Rules 12(b)(2) and (3), but no other law.
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are located or reside in this District, and a substantial part of the events and omissions
giving rise to Plaintiffs Claims occurred in this District. Jurisdiction is appropriate
for the same reasons. The FAC alleges OBlock is the President of ACFEI. ACFEI
does business in this District as, in their words, the largest forensic science
membership association, forensics education, credentials, courses, training and
membership for forensics examiners. FAC 53, 54, 907, Ex. 43. They sell
memberships and distribute magazines into this District, train and certify forensic
examiners in forensic psychology, forensic mental health, forensic counseling
forensic accounting, forensic dentistry, forensic engineering and technological
discipline, forensic medicine, forensic nursing, forensic social workers, and
recorded evidence all within this District. FAC 909. They offer advanced
training and certifications in such disciplines, through a website accessible from this
District conducing commerce within this District. FAC 909. They are alleged do
have conspired with DOYNE and others through the Domestic Dispute Industry
Forensic Investigator Criminal Enterprise to commit and aid and abet fraud in their
advertising and sale of their own goods and services, and to facilitate the fraudulent
advertisement and sale of the goods and services of others including DOYNE in this
District. FAC 53-54, 907, 909, 929, 940, RACKETEERING COUNTS 7-10. If
necessary, Plaintiffs are capable of amending to add details regarding Mr. OBlocks
and ACFEIS abundant related business activities within this District, including their
certifications of numerous San Diego city and county employees.
I. California Coalitions Capacity to Sue
COUNTY argues California Coalition lacks capacity to sue because California
Coalition PBC was formed after certain of the injuries claimed were suffered. Doc.
No. 141-1. California Coalition, PBC is the successor in interest to Plaintiff
STUARTs former law firm, Lexevia, PC (FAC 103), the entity representing
California Coalition, Inc. and a number of parents in the DUE COURSE OF
JUSTICE and at the STUART ASSAULT. FAC 101, 102, Ex. 24. It is also a

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successor-in-interest to California Coalition, Inc. which, due entirely to the criminal
anticompetitive and racketeering behavior of Defendants alleged herein, and illegal
imprisonment of its President, Plaintiff Colbern Stuart, was inoperative until revived
upon Stuarts release from illegal imprisonment by the COUNTY on May 14, 2013.
STUART promptly revived the corporation by forming and merging California
Coalitions meager existence with a new public benefit entity, and asserts its standing
herein. See also, National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249
(1994) (womens civil rights organization has standing to assert injuries to class of
abortion clinics and women seeking abortion).
California Coalition and the hundreds of thousands of families and children it
speaks for today and for years prior have abundant reason and legal status to explain
to a jury in this courthouse how defendants collectively operate a despicable crime
ring under color of law, comprised of evil hearts guided by deviant minds depriving
millions of American families of their health, independence, livelihoods, and their
childrens futures. Defendants day of reckoning to the victims of their heinous
predation must, and will soon come.


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CONCLUSION
The claims of the First Amended Complaint are pled fully compliant with the Rules
of Civil Procedure. Defendants attack fails to carry the heavy analytical burden at
this stage of identifying implausible claims and provided more plausible innocent
alternatives. Plaintiffs proffer a present ability to amend to cure any defects, and
respectfully request leave to do so.

Respectfully Submitted:

DATED: May 16, 2014 By: /s/

Colbern C. Stuart, III, President,
California Coalition for Families and
Children, PBC
in Pro Se

DATED: May 16, 2014 By: /s/__________________________
Dean Browning Webb, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff, California
Coaliton for Families and Children, PBC

Dean
Browning Webb

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that all counsel of record who are deemed to have
consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this document via the
court's CM-ECF system per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b )(2)(E). Any other
counsel of record will be served by facsimile transmission and/or first class mail this
16
th
day of May, 2014.

By: /s/

Colbern C. Stuart, III, President,
California Coalition for Families and
Children, PBC
in Pro Se


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