Standard Oil Co. of New York vs Jaramillo concerned a document executed by Gervasia dela Rosa purporting to convey her leasehold interest in land and building in Manila to Standard Oil Co. via a chattel mortgage. When presented for recording, the register of deeds refused on the grounds that the interests did not seem to be personal property. The court held that (1) the duties of a register of deeds in registration are purely ministerial and they have no power to determine the nature of documents, and (2) whether property is considered real or personal can be determined by agreement of the parties to the contract, not the register of deeds, and is an issue ultimately for the courts.
Standard Oil Co. of New York vs Jaramillo concerned a document executed by Gervasia dela Rosa purporting to convey her leasehold interest in land and building in Manila to Standard Oil Co. via a chattel mortgage. When presented for recording, the register of deeds refused on the grounds that the interests did not seem to be personal property. The court held that (1) the duties of a register of deeds in registration are purely ministerial and they have no power to determine the nature of documents, and (2) whether property is considered real or personal can be determined by agreement of the parties to the contract, not the register of deeds, and is an issue ultimately for the courts.
Original Description:
Standard Oil Co. of New York vs Jaramillo PROPERTY DIGEST
Standard Oil Co. of New York vs Jaramillo concerned a document executed by Gervasia dela Rosa purporting to convey her leasehold interest in land and building in Manila to Standard Oil Co. via a chattel mortgage. When presented for recording, the register of deeds refused on the grounds that the interests did not seem to be personal property. The court held that (1) the duties of a register of deeds in registration are purely ministerial and they have no power to determine the nature of documents, and (2) whether property is considered real or personal can be determined by agreement of the parties to the contract, not the register of deeds, and is an issue ultimately for the courts.
Standard Oil Co. of New York vs Jaramillo concerned a document executed by Gervasia dela Rosa purporting to convey her leasehold interest in land and building in Manila to Standard Oil Co. via a chattel mortgage. When presented for recording, the register of deeds refused on the grounds that the interests did not seem to be personal property. The court held that (1) the duties of a register of deeds in registration are purely ministerial and they have no power to determine the nature of documents, and (2) whether property is considered real or personal can be determined by agreement of the parties to the contract, not the register of deeds, and is an issue ultimately for the courts.
FACTS: Gervasia dela Rosa executed a document in the form of a Chattel Mortgage purporting to convey to Standard Oil Co. by way of mortgage both the leasehold interest of the land she leases in Manila and the building which stands thereon.
The clauses in said document describe the property as personal including the right, title and interest of the mortgagor in and to the contract of lease and also the building of the said premises therein.
After said document had been duly acknowledge and delivered, the petitioner presented it to Joaquin Jaramillo, as register of deeds of the City of Manila, for the purpose of having the same recorded. The respondent opined that it was not a chattel mortgage for the interests mortgaged did not appear to be personal property within the meaning of the Chattel Mortgage Law and registration was refused on this ground only. HELD: The duties of a register of deeds in respect to the registration of chattel mortgages are of purely ministerial character and no provision of law can be cited which confers upon him any judicial or quasi- judicial power to determine the nature of any document of which registration is sought as a chattel mortgage. The efficacy of the act of recording a chattel mortgage consists in the fact that it operates as constructive notice of the existence of the contract, and the legal effects of the contract must be discovered in the instrument itself in relation with the fact of notice. Registration adds nothing to the instrument, considered as a source of title, and affects nobodys rights except as a species of notice.
The parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property and it is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real property for purposes of taxation which on general principle might be considered personal property.
It is unnecessary to determine whether or not the property described in the document is real or personal. The issue is to be determined by the Court and not by the register of deeds.