Curitiba

IPPUC:
The Untold Secret of Curitiba

In-House Technical Capacity for
Sustainable Environmental Planning
by Tim Campbell, PhD
Urban Age Institute
3
The Urban Sustainability initiative
This paper is written in support of an initiative into the concept of
urban sustainability being carried out by the National Academy of Sci-
ences, the University of California at Berkeley, the Healthy Communi-
ties Foundation, and the Urban Age Institute. The initiative aims to
develop tools and methods to achieve sustainable cities. Companion
pieces to this paper, Learning Cities: Acquiring Knowledge, Intel-
ligence, and Identity in Complex Systems (Campbell 2006) and Les-
sons from Pittsburghs Water and Sewerage Crisis (Feller and Feller
2006) are published separately by the Urban Age Institute.
The author wishes to acknowledge the support of the Gordon and Betty
Moore Foundation for this work. The author is grateful also for the as-
sistance of Gordon Feller and Yuan Xiao of the Urban Age Institute.
Urban Age Institutue
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San Rafael, Calronia 94903 - USA
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email: info@UrbanAge.org
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4
Campell: IPPUC: The Untold Secret of Curitiba
Contents
05 Executive Summary
06 Introduction
07 Founding Moments: Responding to Growth Pressures
12 Mechanisms of Success in Sustainability: Channeling Advice to the City
12 1. Establishing Rudiments of Urban Form: 1967-1972
13 2. Structuring the Transport System: 1972-1983
16 3. From Broad Strategy to Contraction:
Inflation and Social Issue 1983-1989
18 4. Revival and New Powers. Surface Metro and Consolidation
of the Social Sector; 1989-1994
23 Conclusions: Factors in the Feasibility of an Urban Think Tank
23 1. Origins
25 2. Internal and External Factors
26 Annex: Time Line of IPPUC
27 Bibliography

5
Secondary cities are emerging as critical players in the quest for urban
development that is sustainable, that improves the lives of residents
without compromising the prospects for future residents. In Curitiba,
Brazil ,the Institute of Research and Urban Planning (Instituto da
Pesquisas and Planejamento Urbano da Curitiba) has helped the city
innovate in such areas as transport, solid waste, land use, environmen-
tal quality, and social programs. IPPUC is a dedicated agency with a
tight mandate focused on planning and implementation of sustainable
development. Tis paper, prepared in tandem with Learning Cities: Acquiring Knowledge,
Intelligence, and Identity in Complex Systems (Campbell 2006), examines in detail the case of
a central think tank that has provided strategic inputs in technical and policy judgment to city
leadership for more than 30 years. Tough receptiveness to its work has varied over successive
political administrations, these inputs have been a key factor in the many successful
innovations of the city.
Te secret to success in this planning arrangement include the following:
An institutional capability to oer high level technical and analytical
inputs to the city
Long term continuity in the mandate and organizational arrangements
Independence in function and autonomy in internal management
(including personnel and salaries)
Presence of foreign sta and national sta who were widely traveled
International nancial support for projects
Close relationship between successive elected o cials and their connections
with higher levels of government.
Continuous interplay between participation of the public in the
implementation of plans
Te innovations have been bolstered by continued political support across municipal
administrations and by the positive eects of Curitibas relations with the state and central
governments as well as with other cities.
Curitibas many innovations evolved in mutually reinforcing ways. For instance, the public
transit and road system helped both to increase transit ow and to provide an organizing
framework for integrated land use planning. Te public transport system in turn relies on
buses and public-private partnership that shares risk and reward.
Executive Summary
6
Tese innovations have resulted in tangible economic and environmental benets for Curitiba.
Although there are more than 500,000 private cars in a city of 1.6 million people, three
quarters of commuters take the bus. Aordable fares mean that the average low-income family
spends only about 10 percent of its income on transport, which is low for Brazil. Te ecient
system improves productivity by speeding the movement of people, goods, and services.
In terms of environmental benets, the city has achieved a 25 percent reduction in fuel
consumption with related reductions in automotive emissions. Te transport system is directly
responsible for the city having one of the lowest rates of ambient air pollution in Brazil.
Introduction
Around 4000 cities around the globe have reached the population range of 100,000 or more
in size. Tey are also expanding in territorial terms. In addition, more than 70 countries are
decentralizing at a time when globalization of trade is transforming the role of cities and
states. Tese demographic and political phenomena prompt renewed attention to a quest
for environmental balance and sustainability. It is timely and prudent to adopt a local rather
national perspective
How does urban institutional tissue get formed, achieve a self-conscious identity, become
accepted as valuable and endorsed by the broad community, and take on the policy and
practical tasks of achieving sustainable development? A previous paper (Campbell 2006)
reviews a decade of research and analytical work in academic and development agencies on
the importance of learning modalities for rms, university researchers, venture capitalists,
innovators, regions, and cities and presents a rough typology of learning cities.
Te organizing principle of that typology is the focus held by the learning agent (whether a
rm, a city or a region). Agents can be tightly focused on the business of a city, as in the case
of Curitiba, Brazil, or loosely interested but available, as are some universities in cities. At the
other extreme, a municipality may have no dedicated agency and indeed no long term strategy
or program. Rather, like most of the local governments around the world, the city takes part in
catch-as-catch-can opportunities to acquire skills in specic sectors of interest whenever they
might be presented.
Te long tenure and multi-sectoral nature of the Curitiba case provides an example of a city
technical agency focused on city development. As with the cases explored in the Learning
Cities paper (Campbell 2006), IPPUC in Curitiba shows how dedicated attention can build a
shared vision over time and create self-aware organizations.
7
Founding Moments: Responding to Growth Pressures
Capital of the state of Parana and neighbor to Sao Paulo in south central Brazil, Curitiba has
1.6 million inhabitants in the city itself, 2.3 million in the metropolitan area, From the 1950s
to the 1970s, it was Brazils fastest growing city. Beginning the 1940s with the collapse of
coee prices, mechanization in agriculture, and de-industrialization in neighboring industrial
powerhouse of Sao Paulo, strong migratory pushed the growth of Curitiba to rates of over 7
percent during some decades between 1950s and 1980s.

Curitibas position as the states capital and center of services, together with its central geo-
graphical location linking agricultural production areas in the West to the main port on the
Atlantic coast helped to fuel the citys growth, from 140,000 inhabitants in 1940 to 180,000
in 1950, and 360,000 by the 1960s. According to Lowry, in 1961 nearly 70 percent of the states
population lived in rural areas, and by 1991 nearly 75 percent of the population lived in urban
places (Lowry 2002).
Rapid growth brought problems and environmental challenges typical of many cities in Latin
America during its period of high rural to urban migration. Te city suered from excessive
spillovers in contaminants and congestion on the one hand, and on the other, shortage of
facilities, infrastructure, and services. Incoming populations began to settle in oodplains
surrounding the city, resulting in recurring losses of property and life.

Te political context during this period was an important factor in shaping options for cities.
Just as Curitiba was about to give birth to a master plan and to conceive IPPUC, Brazil was
entering a military dictatorship (1964 to 1979). Under military rule, cities were expected to
follow the dictates of central government irrespective of local sentiment. Cities were nancially
dependent on the state and federal governments, making them vulnerable to changing
macroeconomic and political conditions. Cities had very little autonomy to launch initiatives
or follow independently establish their own priorities. Second, at the outset of the era, the mass
media was under censorship, and public participation was minimal throughout the country.
Participation came to be a hallmark of Curitibas planning style, yet it was frowned upon in the
early years of the dictatorship. Public involvement would gradually increase (afer 1979), but
participatory planning of the kind practiced in many cities today was not possible in Curitiba
in the 1960s.

Tird, the military government gradually replaced import substitution policies with inows of
foreign capital and major infrastructure projects, including an increase in urban investment.
Most Brazilian cities took advantage of that investment to build motorways and viaducts, thus
establishing the predominance of the private car. Curitiba, however, developed an alternative
course of action.

8
Planning Process: the Agache Plan
Te course Curitiba chose was begun two decades earlier in the 1940s with the Agache Plan,
the rst formal attempt to respond to urban growth in Curitiba. Te Agache Plan, named afer
French urban planner Alfred Agache in 1943, proposed a well-dened central area surrounded
by residential zones, with a trac system composed of concentric (ring) roads linked to the
central area by radial avenues the spoke-
and-wheel design. Tis design reected a
classic planning concept. But planners failed
to predict the powerful impact that the
boom in private automobiles would have on
city growth during the 1950s. However, the
plan did foresee the need for transit rights of
way, and fortunately for the city, some of the
radial avenues were built and rights of way
preserved. Tough the city subsequently
grew beyond the physical limits envisaged
by the Agache Plan, the rough outline for
access to the periphery were put in place.
In the 1960s when the pressures of growth were being felt acutely in the city, Mayor Ivo Aruza
Prereira commissioned a new urban plan for the city adapted to modern needs. In his words:
One of the sharpest needs felt by the population was a revision of the Agache plan, not
because it had defects, but because (with the growth of the city and state interference) it had
become obsolete. (IPPUC website, 2005).
In addition to the basic radial
pattern, a key legacy of the
Agache Plan the perception
that planning could help
solve urban growth-related
problems. Tis perception
was acted upon in 1964
when the city government
organized a competition for the preparation of the
Preliminary Urban Plan, which later became the Curitiba Master Plan.
Towards the end of the 1940s into the mid 1950s there began a note-
worthy transformation in Curitiba with the implementation of the Prelimi-
nary Urban Plan. At this time, Architect and City Planner Alfredo Agache,
the co-founder of the French Society of Urban Studies, wanted to intro-
duce a new standard of urban space design. Agache was commissioned to
create an urban plan for Curitiba and designed a development scheme
that gave priority to public services such as sanitation, easing trafc
congestion and creating centers that enabled the growth of both social
life and commerce. After two years of preparation, economic setbacks
curtailed the full implementation of the plan. However, initial parts of his
plan that include large avenues, an obligatory setback of ve meters from
the curb as a buffer zone for new buildings, an industrial district, the civic
center and the municipal market remain. While the Agache Plan was not
constructed completely, from its inception it is evident that city planners
in Curitiba were willing to develop the city in accordance with his vision.
Santoro (2001)
Tese central tenets of the Curitiba Master
Plan laid the groundwork for a range of
transport innovations, among them that
commerce, services, and residences should
expand in a linear manner from the city
center along structural axes.
9
Curitiba Master Plan.
Curitibas preliminary urban plan was developed in 1964 by SERETE (Society of Studies and
Projects), and Jorge Wilheim-Associated Architects, with the collaboration of local techni-
cians. Among these technicians were Lubomir Ficinski and Jaime Lerner, key gures whose
vision of planning was to endure for three decades in Curitiba. Within a year, a series of public
debates and seminars were organized in partnership with the mayors oce and civil society
on the topic of Curitiba Tomorrow. Tese events brought the plan into public debate: its
objectives of open and transparent planning engaged the local population.
Te general approach of the new plan was to improve the quality of life in the city, and in
particular, to create an integrated transport system coordinated with land use. Tese ideas were
designed to reduce congestion and preserve the traditional center of the city, to contain the
growth of the city within its physical and territorial limits, and to create supportive economic
conditions for urban development in the city.
Tese central tenets of the Curitiba Master Plan laid the groundwork for a range of transport
innovations, among them that commerce, services, and residences should expand in a linear
manner from the city center along structural axes. Te plan laid out guidelines to:
1. Change the radial urban growth trend to a linear one by integrating the road
network, transport, and land use,
2. Decongest the central business district while preserving its historic center,
3. Manage, not prevent, population growth,
4. Provide economic support to urban development, and
5. Support greater mobility by improving infrastructure.
Profile and Governance of IPPUC.
Created in 1965 to implement the Master Plan, IPPUC was founded as a municipal autarchy,
giving it certain administrative and functional independence (as per Law 2660, of December
1st, 1965, and regulated by Decree 19l0, of December 7, 1965).
In the formation of IPPUC, then mayor Ivo Arzua, believing that a mere advisory oce would
not be sucient to lead the reforms foreseen in the Plan, made sure the new agency had
specic duties related to implementation of the plan. He sought, and obtained the support of
the association of architects, commercial associations and other interested groups.
1
1
Among the many supporters contracted were Jaime Lerner, Luis
Fortes Neto, Joel Ramalho, Jos Gandol, who were later absorbed
by City Hall.
10
Te Institute was governed by a Board of Directors, a Deliberative Council, chaired by the
mayor, and a President. Te Board was composed mainly of the directors of departments in
city hall, city council representatives (2), and the Institutes president, an appointment of the
mayor. At the heart of IPPUC were three technical departments (superintendencias), one in
planning, another for project execution, and a third for urban research. In addition, support
structures, including administration and nance, handled the internal mechanisms of the
institutions operation. A Center of Data Processing (CPD), was in charge of processing the
data needed for municipal planning and administration.
Broad membership of political leaders and technical professionals on the Board and Council
favored approval of IPPUCs policies. Te Deliberative Council was empowered to propose
laws on matters that were important but not considered in the master plan, such as land
density regulations and scal mechanisms. In addition, the Council supervised the work of
IPPUC in implementing the plan. Te Institute was created with its own pay roll, separated
from the pay roll of the municipal government. IPPUC expenses were approved by the board.
Tese features of personnel and legal status made it possible to escape the deadening impact
ofen seen in quasi-public agencies in Latin American cities.
With its independence, it was possible for IPPUC to both attract and contract professionals,
including foreign experts. According to Santoro (2001), experts from Brazil and abroad
enriched the original proposals foreseen in the Plan. Within a few years of its founding, more
than 60 technicians were working in IPPUC. Among them there were architects, engineers,
lawyers, sociologists, and educators. Tey were Polish, Chilean, Argentine, Bolivian, French, all
of them well traveled and for the most part hired on a competitive basis.
Te Institutes duties, according to Law 2660, of December 1st, 1965, were:
1. to elaborate and direct to the Executive branch a bill establishing
Curitibas Urban Plan;
2. to promote studies and research of an integrated plan for the development
of the municipality of Curitiba;
3. to judge bills and administrative measures that could impact the
municipalitys development in all of its aspects;
4. to create conditions for implementation and continuity, which would
allow a constant adaptation of sectoral and global plans to the dynamics
of municipal development;
5. to make the local plan compatible to regional or state plan guidelines.
11
IPPUCs rst bylaws, approved by Decree 1910/65, added other duties, such as :
6. preparation of studies aiming at the improve adaptation of municipal
works to the Municipal Master Guiding Plan tax or administrative
restrictions and incentives needed for the implementation of the Master
Plan, and exploring the feasibility of sectoral programs;
7. the promotion of agreements with technical entities and universities for
the training of professionals;
8. oering internships to university students; and
9. the execution of other activities linked to urban development.
In 1966. Curitibas city council approved the Citys master plan prepared by IPPUC and in
October of the following year, an agreement was ratied between the State of Parans govern-
ment and ten municipalities that were part of Curitibas metropolitan region. Tis resulted in
the creation of the Metropolitan Council, of which IPPUC was a part, and which considered
development issues over the entire urbanized region of greater Curitiba. IPPUCs participation
in this agreement allowed it prepare technical studies and program works related to integrated
regional planning, in addition to coordinating works, projects, services, and activities of
interest to the whole region. With a simple organizational structure, IPPUC was able to
develop proposals and projects without problems of partisan political interference.
Tus, by the end of 1967, Curitiba had created an agency not only engaged in the mechanics
of urban growth but also able to take initiative on issues and practices that could aect the
sustainability of development over a wide area. Directly linked to the mayors oce with a
status above municipal departments (Secretrios do Municpio), IPPUC was capable of
following and studying as well as providing for the implementation through project
contracting of all of the major elements in the citys growth process. Tough not conceived
as an institution dedicated to sustainability, IPPUC had in its founding terms of reference
all the elements the institution needed to achieve sustainability (Oliveira 2001).
12
Mechanisms of Success in Sustainability:
Channeling Advice to the City
Tough it moved through various phases at rst active, then quiet in the face of public
reaction, then active again IPPUC created a long record of contributions to various aspects
of urban development in the city. Santoro (2001) and Oliveira (2001) see the early years in
several distinct phases. An initial period that Oliveira calls institutionalization (1962-1966,
see above) was followed by an incubation period (196570), at which time conicts arose
over vision and strategy of projects conceived by IPPUC on the one hand, and on the other,
those developed by the municipal administration. During this period, in Oliverias words,
IPPUC was in the icebox, its actions and activity on hold (Oliveria 2001: 99). During this
period, IPPUC developed projects under its director Jaime Lerner. Beginning in 1970 with the
appointment of Lerner as mayor, IPPUC launched its rst important phase of implementation.
Succeeding sections of this paper discuss four key phases in which IPPUC was active in the
decades following its founding. Te rough chronological order follows the evolution of
thinking and trial and error concerning land use, transport, and social and environmental
issues in Curitiba. Each section illustrates a modality of action and innovative solutions to
problems that are common in fast-growing cities.
1. Establishing Rudiments of Urban Form: 1967-1972
Te use of land and a special program for vehicles and pedestrian circulation became the focus
of attention under Mayors Ivo Arzua and Jaime Lerner, with engineers Jos Portella and Cssio
Tanigushi directing the Institute, respectively. IPPUC began to plan radical changes for the
city. Te key features of restructuring would be linear access routes radiating out from the city
along which new residential and commercial establishments would be directed with the help of
land use controls, zoning measures, and building regulations.
One of the most dicult, but seminal proposals advanced by IPPUC was a large sidewalk mall
in the middle of downtown, later to become Flower Street. Te idea was to keep the block free
from automobiles and reserved for pedestrians. Tough common now, the idea of a pedestrian
mall in the city center was unheard of in Brazil at that time. Initially, the IPPUC proposal
aroused sti opposition from commercial businesses in the city center, which felt that their
success depended upon access by and parking spaces for private automobiles. In contrast, IP-
PUC and Lerner felt that the rst step in gaining control over the automobile was the creation
of a downtown pedestrian mall.
Many meetings were required with the chamber of commerce and others before the technical
arguments of IPPUC could persuade the chamber of commerce and others that the proposed
13
closing of downtown streets made sense. Te rst element of the argument was that Flower
Street was not to be an isolated project, but rather was part of a larger scheme to manage trac
ows in and out of the city. Te IPPUC plan would divert trac ow to parallel streets. Later
on, one-way parallel routes were created for the trac ows crossing Curitibas
traditional downtown.
In fact, according to Santoro, the transportation plan created too many lanes for the circula-
tion at that time (Santoro 2001). Fast routes ran from neighborhoods to downtown, greatly
facilitating access to the downtown area. Busses were given
dedicated lanes; small curbs were built to help ward o
intruding automobile trac. Running parallel to them were
single lanes that functioned as access ways for neighborhood
trac. Tough the ideas were not complicated technically,
developing the understanding and achieving consensus took
IPPUC and the administration three years for the plan to
become reality.
Along with the technical innovations of IPPUC came a publicity campaign to educate the
population about the need to use the public transportation system more ofen and to explain
the emerging patterns of land use for commercial and real estate along the access into the city.
IPPUC thus undertook to become its own advocate, taking part in, even dening, the terms of
the public debate in the city.
With these main components of the trac management plan, the rudimentary elements of
Latin Americas rst rapid bus transit system were put in place. Te dominance of the auto-
mobile was about to be broken in Curitiba. More important, a platform was established that
enable much more elaborate and larger scale systems to be put in place in the following years.
2. Structuring the Transport System: 1972-1983
Te next phase of development in IPPUC and the city of Curitiba is marked by three factors.
Te rst is the appointment, by the governor, of two technicians as mayorsJaime Lerner
and Saul Ruizboth of whom were familiar with and relied
upon the planning, urban development, and expertise in
implementation of IPPUC. Both retained the same director,
Lubomir Ficinski. Tis continuity of thought and personnel
helped to build out the land use and transportation system in
Curitiba.
Te remaining factors helping to dene this phase originated outside Curitiba. In 1973, the oil
crisis brought a doubling of gasoline prices. Te price shocks for Curitiba helped to strengthen
14
the conviction of the city leadership to support extensive public transportation for eciency
and equity reasons. IPPUC would play a key role in meeting this challenge. Not long aferward
(1975), Curitiba felt the eects of the second exogenous inuence: the city became one of the
beneciaries of proceeds from a World Bank loan to improve public transit in cities of Brazil.
Again IPPUC was called upon to play a critical role.
Tese circumstances new and experienced leadership together with new pressures and new
resources contributed to deepening and strengthening the land and transport achievements
of the previous period. In particular, the second phase brought:
Conscientious integration of land use planning with density gradients
matching road design and public transport,
Joint public-private operation,
Capacity-expanding measures (special buses, new connecting routes), and
Emphasis on equity and aordability (measures to keep costs down and
ensure high-quality service to the poor and to the less-populated
areas of the city).
Integration of land use and public transport. IPPUC technicians began to develop a road
scheme that took advantage of the basic premise of integrated road and land use. An express
route for exclusive use of busses ran north and south forming the central axis between the fast
lanes already developed. With 30 meter widths, the lanes provided ample volume for through
trac. At the same time, pedestrian and slower trac was accommodated on parallel strips.
At the same time, a new land use plan was approved. It established building regulations that
permitted construction of up to 22 times the areal size of the land between the fast routes.
Te master plan required that buildings facing streets of
public transportation have a xed percentage of their areas
dedicated to commercial establishments. Streets crossing fast
lines, construction was allowed up to 12 times the area of the
land; with ve meter setbacks. In this way a pyramid of land
use density was being formed. With trial and error, IPPUC
and other technicians determined that it was desirable to
increase the density of built-up areas even further (Rabino-
vitch and Letimann, 1996; Santoro and Leitmann, 2004)
Other initiatives addressed parking and created a beltway around the city center to relieve
pressure from trac cutting through the downtown center merely to get to the other
side of town.
DEDICATED BUS LINE
ONE-WAY STREET
15
Tese home-grown solutions began to attract the attention of the state and federal govern-
ments, and this exposure enhanced the role and legitimacy given to IPPUC. A short time later,
Curitiba received US$54 million as a part of
proceeds from a World Bank loan. IPPUC
was made the supervising agency for the
money and was responsible for the presenta-
tion of projects to the federal transport
authorities (EBTU). In the years that
immediately followed, these proceeds allowed
IPPUC and the city to accelerate projects
that had already been startedfor instance
in road paving, public lighting, and transport
terminals. As a consequence, Curitiba sprang
forward relative to its own timetable and
relative to other cities taking part in the
EBTU World Bank urban transport project.
In eect, IPPUCs presence appeared to prove
the value of the internal think tank..
With each expansion and improvement, it
became possible to build on a new platform
of innovations, in signaling, busses, and
taris. IPPUC was instrumental in creating
a trac control center and planning and
constructing more neighborhood terminals.
With the help of foreign technicians, IPPUCs
technical department created a trac control
center, an electronically coordinated signaling
system that transformed trac lights into green waves, conveying speedier trac ow. With
the help of TV cameras and electronic scanners installed in the roadway at strategic places in
the main intersections in town, computerized control allowed automatic trac counting and
regulation of trac lights for special periods during the day.
One of the most important innovations was in bus fares. Partly due to the pressure of the oil
crisis, IPPUC began work on a unied tari scheme for public transport. In 1979, a system
of single taris was established across the city, the Integrated Transportation Network (RIT).
Tis innovation made it possible for operators of small bus lines, including feeder and transfer
lines on the periphery where little money could be made, to stay in service. A cross-subsidy
built into the integrated transportation network favored operators on smaller and less popular
routes, while larger ones running bus routes in the more lucrative downtown areas could
still turn a prot.
16
Coordinating and Managing Public Works.
In March 1977 the municipality signed an agreement that drew
upon IPPUCs comparative advantage in data gathering and man-
agement to improve coordination of public works and services.
IPPUCs Data Processing Center together with other units devel-
oped a management system of public works on roads. Later they
began to compile an urban infrastructure information system. The
management and information systems were intended to increase
the efciency of the supervision process, improve production of
reports, and streamline evaluation of contractors and cadastre
information by tracking subterranean networks of water pipes,
drainage and sewerage lines, underground wires, gas lines and
other infrastructure. IPPUC created and maintained an up-to-date
data-base of urban spaces. With the introduction of computers,
IPPUC could authorize works almost immediately and inform
contractors and state agencies about the subterranean networks
existing in the section, thus avoiding accidental destruction and
breakdowns. The data base grew to include bus routes in service,
open markets, schools, parking lots, gas stations and hospitals.
Details of transport planning in IPPUC.
For more than 20 years, (1966 to 1988) transportation planning was handled in the Superin-
tendency of Planning in IPPUC. For most of this period, the overall objective was the planning
of the public transit system, from large scale
conception to routes, connections, and
schedules. Afer land use, these detailed
planning tasks were among the most
important of the analytical (as opposed to
works supervision) functions in IPPUC. Te
Municipal transit company (URBS) was re-
sponsible for regulatory issues and inspected
all facets of the system. Bus service itself
was provided by nine companies. In the
beginning, even the location of stops as well
as the extensions of routes proposed by the
users was planned in the Superintendency
of Planning, which with the advent of the
integrated transport network in 1978, also
took over the functions of tari calculation.
3. From Broad Strategy to Contraction: Inflation and Social Issues 1983-1989
Beginning in the 1980s, Brazil was about to encounter two new and powerful currents of
change. First, a protracted period of hyperination drove the cost of living up by thousands
of percentage points per annum.
Brazils macro economic perfor-
mance, and particularly its eorts
to control ination, became
all-consuming eort through
the decade. Second, Brazil was
entering a period of political and
administrative decentralization,
in which a new constitution and reforms of the state were to bring about popular election of
mayors and new powers and prerogatives in planning, spending, and management for all of
Brazils local governments. Te rst elections in this new regime were held in 1983.
Despite the success of the city during the previous decades in managing growth and imple-
menting many innovations, particularly in transport, the city elected two consecutive populist
governments that took charge of the municipality through 1988. According to Santoro, this
was a period marked by strong partisan political inuences, and IPPUC, being identied with
partisan inuences not favored in the election, began to assume a protective stance. Partly as
Brazil was entering a period of political
and administrative decentralization, in
which a new constitution and other
reforms were to bring about popular
election of mayors
17
an adaptive strategy, IPPUC shifed from its previous character of broad strategic view and
strong technical prole. In keeping with the newly elected leadership of the city, IPPUC began
to explore innovative ways to address social
issues. Te rationale was to nd ways to
alleviate some of the harshest impacts of
ination on the poor.
Under mayors Maurcio Fruet and Roberto
Requio, the Institutes operational structure
turned away from strategic planning and
concentrated on more detailed technical
services in order to address and solve the
citys problems. Te larger structural and
visionary ideas of IPPUC began to be
ignored. Furthermore, IPPUC was down-
graded, from a semi-autonomous agency
directly linked to the mayor, to a typical
municipal bureau (secretariat), on par with
planning, public works, and engineering.
Many foreign technicians lef the Institute.
It became more dicult to obtain data for
its operations. During this period, shifs in
political environment at the national level
inuenced the allocation of international
nancial assistance to other cities.
Partly to preserve its technical and
institutional integrity, and partly to align
with the social concerns of the new govern-
ments, IPPUC turned its attention to social policies for the city. IPPUC had gathered very
good baseline data on needs for schools, health clinics, and day care centers in each of seven
homogeneous regions that had been identied by socio-economic and research units. In 1985,
IPPUC participated in the census of Curitiba together with the Brazilian Institute of Statistics
(IBGE). A new data management unit was created (SCITAN), and it mapped highly detailed
information for every city block. Today, IPPUCs data is the basis for cadastre registers (land
ownership and value) for the municipality and an important input to the Brazilian Institute of
Statistics (IBGE) for the national census on residential housing carried out every ten years.

At about the same time, the structuring of neighborhood associations began to be encouraged
and consolidated, and IPPUC began to deal directly with these associations. About 500
Social Innovations
IPPUC analysts were involved directly and indirectly in the cre-
ation of numerous innovations to solve typical urban problems.
Besides the Trash that isnt Trash program, several others
programs helped to solve the problems of congestion and choking
of downtown streets by street vendors. Others addressed issues
of transport tokens and transportation for the handicapped.

Street Vendors. The problem of street vendors was at its peak in
the mid 1980s. IPPUC participated in the organization of these
small-scale (often called informal sector) merchants into
an association, in which 600 people were registered. A visual
communication program was launched to support a project
to design and build 600 metal carts. These were attractively
painted and covered with small awnings and placed in regu-
lated parking lots in 200 corners in the downtown area. The
carts were leased at low rates to the vendors, who themselves
prevented new informal vendors form establishing them-
selves in the downtown area.
Transport Vouchers. In 1985, a compulsive transportation vouch-
er, to be deducted from worker payrolls, was established by
federal law. Curitiba was well prepared to implement this poli-
cy. Transportation vouchers in coins had already been created.
These were sold beforehand and kept their value for public
transit, in spite of constant increases in the cost of living.

Physically and mentally handicapped. All of the schools teaching
handicapped students were registered with the city. Busses
already going out of the regular routes, established a regular
line for those schools, with public servants working as atten-
dants in these buses in the home to school and school to home
directions. Later, a special transfer terminal was established
so that the distance traveled by these buses was reduced.
18
neighborhood associations were organized, and IPPUC played a role in exploring or creating
site-specic solutions in each case. For instance, about 50 day care centers and 25 health clinics
were created in several areas of town. IPPUCs technical units in social analysis began to work
more closely with municipal bureaus of health, youth, and education.
IPPUC also participated in planning for upgrading for several slums. Te Superintendencies of
Execution and Planning proposed and eventually implemented a program for the re-location
of the needy population living near rivers and ravines to other parts of the municipality, using
a temporary ownership period (in a program known as Programa Pr-Locar). About 300
families were relocated and several ravines were urbanized.
Among the many social innovations generated by IPPUC during this period
(see sidebar, previous page) the Trash that isnt Trash program is one of the most notable.
Squatter settlements in Curitiba, as in most cities of Latin America, form high density settle-
ments in areas such as hillsides and ood plains. In these areas it is hard to use customary
mechanized methods of solid waste removal. In the IPPUC program called Trash that isnt
Trash, a publicity and education campaign helped to persuade residents to separate their trash
into organic and inorganic waste. Te recyclable waste was collected by a private contractor
once a week, and taken to a processing center owned by the city. Te facility employed
homeless people and recovering alcoholics to sort the trash into dierent types of materials.
Te trash-purchase scheme and the Trash that isnt Trash program were linked. Te proceeds
from the sale of the recycled materials went to nance the purchase of surplus food from
farmers. Te food is given in exchange for trash (Biller 1994: 92).
4. Revival and New Powers. Surface Metro and Consolidation
of the Social Sector:1989-1994
With the return of Jaime Lerner as mayor in 1989, IPPUC gained a new impetus from one
its main protagonists and started not only a revival of IPPUCs stature and innovation in the
city, but also the projection outward to national and international inuence. Te return of
Lerner meant also a return of familiar hands managing IPPUC, this time by Cssio Tanigushi,
engineer. Te two former colleagues formed a technical team, already twice named by the state
and federal governments to create and execute the guidelines and basic works of Curitibas
master plan. Te technical strength built up over the previous period in socio-demographic
and geographic data was extended, and Lerner focused once again on solving emerging
problems in both social development and transport.
With smoother political relationships with the state, Lerner was able to engineer a return to
IPPUC of strategic control over public transportation. Equally important was the re-engage-
ment by IPPUC in decision making in spending in the city. Together with the other bureaus,
IPPUC set the priorities for the US$20 million in annual capital investment.
19
Increase in trac over the previous decade had outgrown the innovative solutions from earlier
periods. Te main arteries had become overloaded, and because the system was operating at its
capacity, long lines and trac jams were forming within the
central beltway and at the main terminals in town during the
morning and evening rush hours.
Various elements of the solution involved creative thinking
and innovation on the part of IPPUC. One of the most
notable innovations was the tube station. Shaped like a long
cylinder (see illustration), the station is an above-grade
loading platform where people embark and disembark at
level equal to the bus carriage, much like a metro station. Bus fares are purchased in advance
inside the tube. Tese two innovations level of entry and pre-paid fares greatly accelerate
the transit time of bus stops. A second innovation, small express busses (ligeirinhos) were
added on fast routes with fewer stops. Te combination of these changes helped solved the
problems of trac jams.
Another improvement was the addition of bi-articulated buses, introduced on the heavier
north-south routes. Te articulated busses have a larger capacity (about 270 passengers per
bus), allowing up to 11,000 passengers per hour in one
direction during rush hour.
Step by step, with critical inputs by IPPUC, a new and
innovative form of public rapid transit was invented in
Curitiba and is being replicated in many cities in Latin
America and elsewhere. In eect, the Curitiba system is a bus
system that runs on the surface in a way similar to metro rail
systems underground. Dedicated lanes and structural axes
were formed in the 1970s, data on ridership, social needs, and
costs, along with integrated controls, were added in the 1980s, and larger and faster vehicles
(like the tri-articulated buses shown in the graphic) with loading stations and low transaction
times complemented the system in the early 1990s. IPPUC technical and policy analysts played
important roles every step of the way, even during periods of political disfavor.
Meanwhile IPPUC remained active in social areas and environmental planning. IPPUCs
social research and planning department extended its work with municipal health clinic
system, setting up small clinics in populous neighborhoods of the city. Tey function 24 hours
a day and help alleviate pressures on traditional city hospitals. IPPUC also played a role in
the planning and construction of day care centers and centers for extending learning hours in
elementary education.

20
Flood Control and Parks
Te return of favorable political relations with the state and federal governments enhanced
Curitibas access to state programs. Te city took advantage of these circumstances to consoli-
date ood control, a challenge that had been with the city since the 1950s.
With the help of another international loan from the World Bank, Curitiba was able to solve
the problems of low-lying valleys and the ood areas of the municipality. Several parks were
established, the two larger ones measuring 630,000 m2; this time they were built closer to the
housing projects of the periphery, in green preserved areas. Te amount of this loan is about
US$ 30 million; besides executing the
projects, IPPUC charged 5 percent for the
management of the program.
With the expansion of park and ood
control areas, Curitiba increased green
space per capita by a factor of 10, giving
the city claim to being an ecological city.
Oliveira (2001) challenges this claim,
suggesting that environmental sustainability
of parkland, solid waste, and transport were
more of a packaged aferthought than an
explicit objective driving these programs.
Whether premeditated or not, the progress
and innovative solutions to typical urban
problems produced results that are studied
and replicated in many cities in Latin
America.
Te administrative and organizational
arrangements in the late 1990s bear a strong
resemblance to the key features of IPPUC
when it was founded. Te research, land use
and transport planning, data and analysis,
project implementation, and public commu-
nications units appear in the organizational
graphic (following page).
Curitiba is the birthplace of the Iguacu River, which ows into the
Parana River at the border between Brazil, Paraguay, and
Argentina. The Iguacus northern section is the site of numerous
springs that are vital for Curitibas water supply. Many smaller
tributaries of the Iguacu also cut through Curitiba. When the city
was small, the rise of these rivers during the rainy season was
uneventful because a wide oodplain handled the oods. Starting
in the 1950s, the citys horizontal expansion encroached on this
oodplain and caused severe ooding problems.
Engineering solutions to this problem were unsuccessful because
channeling the rivers simply transferred the oods to other areas.
City authorities realized that it was necessary to recover the ood-
plain. A concerted effort to expropriate areas along the courses
of the rivers and build small dams led to the creation of large
parks and lakes that today are Curitibas main recreational sites.
Concurrently, new land use regulations regarding the division of
land into plots for housing development prohibit the construction
of streets and buildings in strips subject to ooding.
Another park (the Passauna Park) was also created to protect a
river and its system of springs that supply one-third of Curitibas
water. The area was declared an environmental protection area
under legislation that grants tax incentives for preservation of
forest cover. Further, the law allows only up to 30 percent of the
area to be used for construction. The choice of sites and the build-
ing parameters are subject to district approval. Similarly, new
housing developments in non-drainage areas must dedicate 35
percent of the land area to the public domain for environmental
purposes.

The overall result is a city with one of the highest ratios of green
areas per capita (50 square meters per inhabitant) among
Western cities, providing its citizens ample recreational and
cultural sites, more than 140 km of bicycle paths, neighborhood
parks, and in-city forest reserves.
Source Biller, 1994
21
1
4 8
7 5
3 9
President
Dir. of Information and Database
Dir. for Historically Significant Buildings
Dir. of Administration and Finance
Dir. of Strategic Planning
Dir. of Projects
Dir. of Urban Development
Dir. of Instituntional Relations
Dir. of International Relations
Dir. for the City University
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
6
6.1
6.2
6.3
2.1
3.1
1.3 1.2
1.1
1.4
1.5
4.1
5.1
5.2
7.1
8.1
9.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
10.1
2
10
Oganization of Modern-Day IPPUC
22
National and International Influences.
Te achievements of IPPUC and Curitiba began to attract national and international attention
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Among other things, they showed how planning could be
eectively integrated across administrative and conceptual boundaries with eective results.
ICLEI has documented the innovative management of Curitiba, and the case has been written
up in numerous journals and books (Santoro and Leitmann 2004, MacLeod, 2002; Walljasper,
2001; Ravazzani and Afgani 1999). Tlaiye and Biller (1994) saw IPPUC as an example of
a home-grown institution that could help correct imperfections in the market that cause
environmental damage. In their terms, government environmental institutions work among
multiple agents, imperfect information, and across sectoral and administrative boundaries.
Using both corrective and preventive strategies, and working with both command and control
or market-based incentives, institutions like IPPUC are able to guarantee distribution of rights,
regulate externalities, and achieve optimal use of resources.
Beginning in the 1990s, the state of Parana upgraded its agency for municipal assistance,
FAMEPAR, under the leadership that once launched IPPUC in Curitiba. Now as governor,
Jaime Lerner appointed Lubomir Ficinski to head up the agency. It in turn began to facilitate
the nancing and development of local governments with an approach to planning, land use,
and transport similar to the one pioneered in Curitiba. FAMEPAR managed one of the most
successful state-wide programs in municipal development in the World Banks portfolio.
According to Lowry (2002), IPPUCs political and institutional capital was indispensable in
running programs like FAMEPAR at the state level in later years (Lowry 2002).
In 1992, the Curitiba Resolution was one of the founding documents of Rio Habitat Confer-
ence. Tat meeting, and the Local Agenda 21 that emanated from it, have set the stage for local
government action in sustainable urban development for the past two decades.
23
Conclusions
Factors in the Feasibility of an Urban Think Tank
What factors noticed in the course of this analysis might bear on the feasibility of establishing
an urban think tank? Many factors, both internal and external to IPPUC, help to explain its
origins, its institutional character, and likelihood of replicability. External factors have also
played an extremely important role in inuencing the direction, the pace, and the opportuni-
ties for IPPUC to survive and grow.
1. Origins
Planning activities in Curitiba, like IPPUC itself, were founded under circumstances that are
not always common in developing world. As ofen with cases of innovation and leadership,
the triggering conditions were a sense of crisis of health care, scal pressure, or natural
calamity (Campbell and Fuhr 2004). Leaders in Curitiba were inuenced to some degree
by the rapidity of growth, the press of congestion, and the
recurrent issue of ooding. Many key leaders had faith in
urban planning as a solution to these problems. In Brazil and
much of Latin America in the 1960s, following extremely
high rates of urban growth, rates far higher than are seen in
most cities in the coming decades, planning was an accepted
activity and even a promise of relief if not salvation. Tese
same circumstances may not be so readily apparent today.
In Latin America for instance, many urbanists are now accustomed to the consequences of
past rapid urban growth, meaning disjointed and disordered cities and aging infrastructure.
In China, the speed of growth is not of demand in population movements as much as it is
from supply of infrastructure. Tese circumstances put more emphasis on the need to rein in
the private sector, and particularly public private arrangements in land conversion, and guide
them more eectively to public uses. But whether pressure is demographic or of exuberant
infrastructure, one lesson from Curitiba is that wide recognition of a problem needs to be felt
across a spectrum of political and social domains.
Te Setting and Context Curitibas capacity to innovate has been assisted by wise planning
and institutional development. It has also been inuenced by political continuity and the
ability to forge cross-jurisdictional relations. During the era of action, the city beneted from a
succession of mayors, beginning with Jaime Lerner in 1971, who consolidated, maintained,
and added to key innovations.
24
Te relationship between the city and other levels of government has also changed over
time and inuenced Curitibas approach to urban development. Te military dictatorship
from 1964 to 1979 had a telling eect on IPPUC at its formation. Curitiba responded by
developing creative and self-nancing programs so that it could gradually implement its own
ideas particularly those in land use and transport without assistance from higher levels of
government.

In general, the metropolitan level of government in Brazil failed to bridge the horizontal
gaps between local mayors, and the vertical distance between mayors and state governments.
Curitiba was an exception because of demographic and economic advantages: Curitibas
population was more than twice that of all other metropolitan municipalities combined, and
its status as the state capital lent it economic weight. Because of these advantages, Curitiba has
managed to achieve a higher degree of coordination with neighboring municipalities than the
Brazilian norm.
2. Internal and External Factors
Beyond the contextual factors that helped to shape the founding of IPPUC, a variety of
internal and external factors exerted inuence on the pace and direction of its growth over the
decades. Many similar factors could play a role in similar agencies in the future.
Internal structure. IPPUCs internal struc-
ture and mandate were critical factors in its
success, especially in the early years when the
institute was attempting to meet a challenge
of legitimacy and technical competence. Te
degrees of functional autonomy provided
some insulation from political interference in connection with choice of issues and scope of
intervention. Fortunately for Curitiba, many of the outcomes related to these issues were
favorable, and to some degree, management control by the governing council, with broad
based linkages to stakeholders, helped to maintain its autonomy.
Independence in internal organization oered IPPUC advantages in personnel stang
at above public sector salaries on a competitive basis. Tis exibility must be counted as
a singular factor of importance in the ability of the agency to conduct is work eectively.
Experts were hired representing many nationalities and large accumulated experience from
travel abroad. Also, IPPUC could ramp up manpower quickly when necessary. Tese policies
are unusual by standards of urban agencies in Latin America
IPPUC was designed to cover a wide scope of work, ranging from strategic planning to project
implementation and supervision, and to serve as the coordinating agency in a multi-jurisdic-
Population pressures, ooding,
trac congestion, and the oil
crisis all tested IPPUCs
capacity to help the city.
25
tional environment. Tis reach across bureaucratic and governmental boundaries provided
the one dimension of strategic growth that set IPPUC apart from a typical planning unit.
IPPUC did not have the scope of vision held by, say the development agencies in Bilbao or
London. IPPUCs view has been tempered by practical, operational considerations. Another
of IPPUCs comparative advantages was its ability to integrate the ideas from many parts
of government and to provide analysis quickly and objectively. Community education and
publicity campaignswith high tech graphics and presentational facilitieshelped IPPUC
explain and sell its ideas both to city as well as metropolitan stakeholders and government
ocials at all levels.
Because the basics of data gathering and management seem so fundamental, they are ofen
overlooked in the search for success in planning and management of cities in the developing
world. Tis factor, basic information concerning demographics, income, economic fundamen-
tals, and environmental quality, should not be overlooked in establishing criteria for replicabil-
ity of IPPUC. Gathering and handling basic socio economic data helped IPPUC become
partner with national authorities in housing census, in transport vouchers, and in scoping out
the dimensions of programs and costs. IPPUCs data-base on infrastructure deserves greater
scrutiny.

External factors. Twists and turns of political and technological change brought both chal-
lenges as well as opportunity to IPPUC, and in both kinds of circumstances, these helped to
reinforce the legitimacy of the institution.
Population pressures, ooding, trac congestion, and the oil crisis all tested IPPUCs capacity
to help the city. For the most part, IPPUC met the tests. Each challenge became a proving
ground for IPPUC. In a similar way, when new resources became available from outside the
city, for instance through the national government or the World Bank, IPPUC was ready to
take advantage quickly. IPPUC proved able also to convert its investment in basic data to
advantage in diagnostic work, speeding implementation of transport services for the disad-
vantaged, and to facilitate the national housing census, all examples of proving institutional
eectiveness to higher levels of government. In each of these instances, IPPUC used the
opportunity to rise above other cities taking part in the same or similar programs, and in so
doing, rearmed its value to the city.
Te success of IPPUC is due in some part also to its longevity, and this in turn depended
importantly on individuals politicians who believed in the institution and who appeared and
reappeared to help sustain it. Jaime Lerner, Casio Tanagushci, and Lubomir Ficinski all helped
create and reinforce the institution. Conversely, on some occasions, the Institute was obliged
to shif course as part of adaptive strategy of survival, for instance with the election of populist
governments.
26
Annex
Time Line of IPPUC in Curitiba
1943 Agache Plan created
1965 IPPUC Created
1966 Master plan approved
1967 Creation of pedestrian mall in city center
1972 Law extends IPPUC remit to include continuous planning
1977 IPPUC helps to coordinate interdepartmental procedures
1978 Integrated transport network devised
World Bank agreement on loan signed by mayor
1978-1982 Neighborhood bus terminals created
1981 Management system developed to track public works
1982 Change of political administration
1983 IPPUC downgraded to municipal department objectives shifted to social concerns
1985 IPPUC participates in the national census for the city
Transportation vouchers introduced
1987 Further personnel reforms; technicians begin to leave
1988 IPPUC becomes advisory arm of the ofce of mayor
1989 Lerner elected to ofce of mayor
1992 Curitiba Resolution, one of founding documents for Agenda 21 of UN
1996-1997 Revitalization of historic quarter in city
2000 Intensication of participation of public and linking city to citizen
27
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Learning Cities: Acquiring Knowledge,
Intelligence, and Identity in Complex Systems.
Processed. Urban Age Institute.
Campbell, T and H. Fuhr 2004
Leadership and Innovation in Subnational Govern-
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Bank Institute Development Series. Washington,
DC: World Bank. 450 p.
HORIZON Solutions Site, 2003
Efcient transportation for successful urban
planning in Curitiba. Published as Case study.
IPPUC Website, 2005
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IPPUC.
Lowry, Ira S. 2002
Municipal Development in Parana: Policies and
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MacLeod, Kirsteen 2002
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ment Success, International Council for Local
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