ORICA VILLAWOOD SITE Prepared by: Dean Shewring 17 April 2013 Pinnacle Risk Management Pty Limited ABN 83 098 666 703
PO Box 5024 Elanora Heights NSW Australia 2101 Telephone: (02) 9913 7284 Facsimile: (02) 9913 7930 Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013
Disclaimer This report was prepared by Pinnacle Risk Management Pty Limited (Pinnacle Risk Management) as an account of work for Orica. The material in it reflects Pinnacle Risk Managements best judgement in the light of the information available to it at the time of preparation. However, as Pinnacle Risk Management cannot control the conditions under which this report may be used, Pinnacle Risk Management will not be responsible for damages of any nature resulting from use of or reliance upon this report. Pinnacle Risk Managements responsibility for advice given is subject to the terms of engagement with Orica. HAZOP Study Report, Remediation of the Former Orica Villawood Site Rev Date Description Reviewed By A 27/6/12 Draft for Comment Orica B 12/8/12 Orica Comments Included Orica C 13/8/12 Final Issue - D 16/4/13 Supplementary and Water Treatment Plant HAZOPs Added Orica E 17/4/13 Final Issue -
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013
CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................ I GLOSSARY ............................................................................................................ II 1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1 2 PROCESS DESCRIPTION AND HAZOP SCOPE .................................................. 2 3 METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................. 2 3.1 General ............................................................................................. 2 3.2 Meeting Procedures ........................................................................ 3 4 STUDY TEAM ................................................................................................. 4 5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................... 5 5.1 Analysis of Main Findings .............................................................. 5 5.2 Actions Arising from the HAZOP ................................................... 6 6 REFERENCES ................................................................................................ 7
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 HAZOP Team .................................................................................... 4
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Orica is proposing to install and operate a soil processing facility at the former Orica Villawood site. The Site contains waste byproducts of industrial activities which ceased in 2000, in particular DDT and its degradation products DDD and DDE. The contaminants will be separated from the soil and destroyed within the process. The Minister for Planning granted development consent for the Project in May, 2012. Project Development Consent Condition 21(b) requires the preparation of a Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study. Orica requested that Dean Shewring from Pinnacle Risk Management chair the HAZOP study. This report details the results of the HAZOP study in accordance with the requirements of the Department of Planning and Infrastructures HAZOP Guidelines. The main participants had appropriate experience in the design and operation of soil processing (or similar) plants. Therefore, the hazards were generally well known as well as the required control measures to reduce risk to acceptable levels. The plant design is an established design with a number of similar plants being operated throughout the world. Therefore, many of the significant potential hazardous events and operability problems were already known which reduced the demand on this study. This included incidents from recently commissioned plants for Orica and other companies.
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 ii GLOSSARY DoPI Department of Planning and Infrastructure DTD Directly-heated Thermal Desorption ECS Emission Control System FSB Feed Soil Building HAZOP Hazard and Operability Study HIPAP Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram STA Soil Treatment Area VOC Volatile Organic Compound
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 1 REPORT 1 INTRODUCTION Orica is proposing to install and operate a soil processing facility at the former Orica Villawood site. The Site contains waste byproducts of industrial activities which ceased in 2000, in particular DDT and its degradation products DDD and DDE. The contaminants will be separated from the soil and destroyed within the process. The Minister for Planning granted development consent for the project in May, 2012. Development Consent Condition 21(b) specifies the following requirements for the HAZOP study. "Prior to Site Establishment, the Proponent shall obtain the Director-Generals approval of the following study: b) a Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) chaired by an independent, qualified person or team. The independent person or team shall be approved by the Director-General. The Study shall be carried out in accordance with the Department's publication Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper (HIPAP) No. 8 - HAZOP Guidelines (Ref 1) and shall include consideration of measures to prevent any accidental spills of liquids and/ or liquid wastes on all relevant tanks and equipment used for the storage and handling of liquids or liquid wastes, including associated pipes and hoses. Orica requested that Dean Shewring from Pinnacle Risk Management chair the required HAZOP study. The approval received from the Department of Planning and Infrastructure (DoPI) for the chair of this projects HAZOP study is shown in Appendix 1. This report details the results of the HAZOP study and is written to meet the requirements of the Department of Planning and Infrastructures HIPAP Number 8 and Development Consent Condition 21(b). The HAZOP study on the main contaminant destruction process was detailed in revisions A to C of this report. Following this study, two additional HAZOPs were performed. The first additional study reviewed the air compressor for the evaporative cooler and the pugmill water system. The second additional study reviewed the waste water treatment plant. The results of these two additional studies have been added to revision D of this report. The aim of the HAZOP study is to identify potential hazardous events and significant operability problems associated with the proposed operations. This Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 2 aim is inherent for all HAZOP studies. The scope for this study is detailed in Section 2 of this report. 2 PROCESS DESCRIPTION AND HAZOP SCOPE A copy of the detailed process description for the soil treatment plant is supplied in Appendix 2. In summary, the feed soil is initially heated in a dryer to remove the volatile contaminants which are then destroyed in a directly-heated thermal desorption unit. The resultant product gases are then absorbed within a scrubber. Treated soil can then be returned to the site. In the waste water treatment plant, water from various site containments is processed via settlers, flocculation (including chemical additional and pH adjustment) and a series of filters to remove the contaminants. The purified water is discharged to sewer. Copies of the drawings used in the study which detail the process areas are supplied in Appendix 3. As the natural gas supply train to the directly-heated desorption unit will be compliant to the relevant Australian Standard then the HAZOP just considered deviations from the design intent associated with natural gas supply (rather than try to alter an Australian Standard compliant system). 3 METHODOLOGY 3.1 GENERAL A HAZOP study is a hazard study which concentrates on how the design will cope with abnormal conditions, rather than on how it will perform under normal conditions. The study is comprised of a review of each unit operation, examining each for possible causes of a wide range of process abnormalities and their consequences. HAZOP provides the opportunity for people to think creatively and examine ways in which hazards or operating problems might arise. To reduce the chance of missing something, a HAZOP is carried out in a systematic manner, using guide words to consider each pipeline and each type of hazard in turn. The study is carried out by a team so that input from all areas of functional expertise can be provided. The results of a HAZOP depend heavily upon the experience and attitudes of the team members and on the leadership style adopted. In this study, the members of the team had good experience, knowledge and skills and had the authority to approve the actions decided upon.
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 3 3.2 MEETING PROCEDURES The HAZOP study of each section of plant followed the procedure given below: The process design engineer outlined the broad purpose of the section of design under study and displayed on the relevant P&IDs on the wall. This outline included design features, operating conditions, description of fittings and details of equipment. Any general questions about the scope and intent of the design were answered. The first section or area of the design was highlighted for study, typically an area where material flows into the plant. Any general questions about this area were then answered. Minutes may be generated during this discussion. If so, they have been recorded with the guide word General Discussion. The detailed "line by line" study commenced at this point. The HAZOP leader led the group through the HAZOP guide words. Each guide word is a prompt, such as "MORE OF OR HIGH FLOW", which identifies a deviation from normal operating conditions that may lead to a hazardous event or significant operability problem. This is used to prompt discussion of the possible causes and effects of flow at an undesirably high rate. If, in the opinion of the team, the safeguards for the combination of the consequences and likelihood of a credible event are inadequate then an action is recorded in the minutes. For major risk areas the need for action is assessed quantitatively (by Hazard or Reliability Analysis). For less significant risks the need for action can be based on experience and judgement. For this study, all actions could be appropriately addressed by the nominated HAZOP team members / company. The main aim of the meeting was to find problems needing solution, rather than the actual solution. When the group became tied down by trying to resolve a problem, the issue was minuted as requiring further review outside the meeting, and the study proceeded. All changes agreed at the meeting were minuted with some being marked on the HAZOP master P&IDs. Note that all actions were recorded in the minutes as well as significant discussion points which did not result in any actions. The latter were recorded as a means to record the basis of safety for a potential hazardous event or operability problem. The guide words used during the study are listed in Appendix 4. Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 4 All actions are listed in the HAZOP minutes, contained in Appendix 5. It is noted that safeguards are only recorded by exception. It is assumed that the procedures within the Orica safety management system will be used effectively (as discussed throughout the HAZOP study). As the purpose of a HAZOP study is to identify, i.e. not necessarily solve, potential hazardous events and significant operability problems associated with the process under review, some of the actions require further review post the study. As a general rule, a HAZOP facilitator allows approximately 5 to 10 minutes to resolve any issues identified during the study. If a solution cannot be agreed to within this timeframe then the issue is minuted and the study proceeds. The reason for this approach is that a positive, open, questioning mindset is required from the team members. This allows creative brainstorming to identify possible abnormal plant conditions that may lead to potential hazardous events and/or significant operability problems. Teams that become tied down trying to resolve all issues, in particular problems that require further calculations etc, lose their creativity and hence the basis for the study effectiveness is lost. 4 STUDY TEAM The HAZOP study for the project was conducted in a number of sessions from January to November, 2012. The main HAZOP team participants had the appropriate level of experience in design and/or operation of soil processing plants (or similar processes). Table 1 shows the team members who participated in the HAZOP study. The meetings were led by Dean Shewring with the minutes being recorded by Peter ODea. Table 1 HAZOP Team HAZOP Role Name Company HAZOP Chair Dean Shewring Pinnacle Risk Management HAZOP Secretary Peter ODea Orica Project Management Peter ODea Lindsay Killin Cameron McLean Richard Giles Orica EnviroPacific EnviroPacific EnviroPacific Site Management Representative Gwenda Lister Orica Process Design and Plant Operation Representatives Brett Garton Bala Kathiravelu Rudy Maes Keith Chapman Tai Truong Pearce Anderson EnviroPacific Orica Consultant to Chapman Services Chapman Services EnviroPacific EnviroPacific Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 5 5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 5.1 ANALYSIS OF MAIN FINDINGS The HAZOP team assembled for the study was well balanced in terms of disciplines and experience. The team sizes were generally kept to the required four to eight people. This increases the ability to achieve a creative brainstorming workshop to help ensure maximum effectiveness and quality. The main participants had appropriate experience in the design and operation of soil processing (or similar) plants. Therefore, the hazards were generally well known as well as the required control measures to reduce risk to acceptable levels. The plant design is an established design with a number of similar plants being operated throughout the world. Therefore, many of the significant potential hazardous events and operability problems were already known which reduced the demand on this study. This included incidents from recently commissioned plants for Orica and other companies. Potential hazardous events concerning releases of harmful materials via gaseous, liquid or solid losses of containment were reviewed during the study. Assuming the proposed safeguards remain effective then the risk of such events should be low. Any significant changes to the HAZOP design should be separately assessed for new potential hazardous events and operability problems. This is commonly achieved by utilising a management of change programme within the project and may require further review using the HAZOP technique. During the study, industry standard operating procedures were discussed and included as potential causes for hazardous events and significant operability problems. Any significant issues identified have been recorded in the HAZOP minutes for inclusion in the final version of the standard operating procedures for the Orica facility. HAZOP studies are, by definition, a qualitative risk assessment. The decisions made by the HAZOP team members are based on their experience and knowledge of the type of processing plant under review. If the HAZOP team members determined the existing control measures were adequate then no further action is required. Significant points of discussion (generally if significant consequential impacts are possible) were recorded even though the control measures were deemed acceptable by the HAZOP team. All issues requiring a response were included in the HAZOP minutes.
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 6 5.2 ACTIONS ARISING FROM THE HAZOP Completed HAZOP actions need to be tracked within the projects HAZOP action register or equivalent. Regular project meetings should include a review of the progress of closing-out all of the actions. It is normally the responsibility of the project manager to ensure that all of the HAZOP actions are completed. The HAZOP drawings and a record of the completed actions should be retained with the plant files.
Process Description HAZOP Study Report, Remediation of the Former Orica Villawood Site Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A2.2 Appendix 2 Process Description.
1. Pre-Treatment of Materials The pre-treatment of excavated materials will be undertaken in two stages. Initially, excavated material and overlying material may be screened within the Remediation Area compound. Material required to be treated (in the Directly-heated Thermal Desorption (DTD) Plant) will be transported to the Feed Soil Building (FSB), where further handling and testing of this material will take place.
The material will be stockpiled in the FSB using a front end loader before undergoing further screening and testing for contaminant levels and other characteristics which will be required for the DTD treatment process. The material will then be blended to achieve a relatively homogenous feed material prior to being loaded into the feed hopper of the DTD Plant. Activities within the FSB, including screening and testing will take place 24 hours per day, seven days per week.
2. Feed Soil Building and Emission Control System The purpose of the FSB is to control emissions during pre-treatment activities and ensure these emissions are vented to atmosphere through an Emission Control System (ECS).
The FSB will be constructed of a steel frame with metal sheeting. The building will contain an approximate seven day working inventory of feed soil plus a sufficient buffer for soil drying and other pre-treatment activities. This inventory volume is designed to provide adequate storage capacity to feed the thermal treatment plant during periods when unforeseen conditions interfere with normal excavation activities.
The FSB will be fitted with an air-lock and automated wheel wash, louvres and an ECS for air quality control.
The FSB will be equipped with personnel entrances and truck entrances. The truck entrances will include an air-lock consisting of a small structure internal to the enclosure. The air-lock will be equipped with two doors. When a truck enters the air-lock, the outer door will open while the inside door is closed. Once the truck enters the air-lock, the outer door will close, the inner door will open and the truck will enter the enclosure. The procedure will be reversed when a truck exits the enclosure.
An ECS will be constructed and operated to preserve air quality within the building and minimise emissions (dust and organic vapours) to the atmosphere. The ECS will be operated to ensure the flow of air into the FSB (i.e. air pressure within the FSB will be slightly lower than ambient air pressure). Conceptually, the ECS will comprise an induced draft fan, duct work system, particulate control device (dust filters) and a stack.
The air exhausted from the FSB will first pass through a particulate control device to remove fugitive dust. Dust removed will be collected in enclosed drums or hoppers. When the dust collection container is taken off-line, the dust will be taken to the Soil Treatment Area (STA) for treatment.
Air will be exhausted to the atmosphere via a stack. Periodic stack testing will be undertaken in accordance with license requirements. Permanent analysers will also be installed on the stack to detect any unacceptable contaminant concentration levels. Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A2.3 3. Directly-heated Thermal Desorption Plant The DTD Plant will be located within the STA. After pre-treatment in the FSB, the excavated materials will be fed into the feed hopper located inside the FSB. The materials will be transported via a conveyor to the DTD Plant for treatment.
The DTD Plant will operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week with the seventh day typically scheduled as downtime for maintenance. The nominal maximum rate of treatment through the DTD Plant is 15 tonnes per hour.
The DTD Plant will have a footprint of approximately 50 m by 25 m. It will be established within a concrete paved and bunded area having its own internal surface water drainage control measures. Electrical power to the DTD Plant will be provided by mains power, with a diesel powered generator used as a back-up. Natural gas sourced from the mains supply, will be used to fire the heating burners of the plant.
Brief descriptions of typical key unit operations in the process are presented below.
Rotary Dryer The first step in the DTD treatment process involves the volatilisation or separation of contaminants from the material in the rotary dryer.
The rotary dryer utilises natural gas as fuel to heat the contaminated material to a temperature of approximately 350C to 450C.
In a co-current system, the contaminated material enters the rotary dryer at the end where the burner is located and the combustion gas and treated soil move in the same direction to where they exit at the opposite end of the dryer.
Contaminants desorb and volatilise as they pass through the dryer. Soil is heated in the first third of the dryer with most desorption and volatilisation occurring in the next third as contaminants reach their boiling points.
Once it has passed through the rotary dryer, the heated soil material passes to a pugmill where it is sprayed with water for cooling and rewetting. The treated material is then transferred to temporary treated soil stockpiles awaiting validation.
Cyclone The off-gases flow from the rotary dryer through a cyclone, where large dust particles are removed, to the thermal oxidiser. The dust from the cyclone is directed to the pugmill where it is mixed with the treated soil for rewetting and validation.
Thermal Oxidiser The thermal oxidiser is used to treat the gases produced through the heating of the soil material in the rotary dryer and would be designed to be Stockholm compliant, i.e. with appropriate residence time, temperature and turbulence.
The thermal oxidiser operates at a temperature of about 1,000C using natural gas. At this temperature, the contaminants present in the gas (from the feed material) oxidise or decompose forming carbon dioxide, water vapour and hydrogen chloride with small amounts of other by- products such as chlorine and sulphur compounds. Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A2.4
In order to maintain the correct temperature to maximise destruction efficiency and minimise the formation of by-products, the thermal oxidiser will be fitted with a sophisticated temperature control system which will be consistently monitored.
Quench Once gases have passed through the thermal oxidiser they must be rapidly cooled to minimise the potential for dioxin formation and allow further treatment before release to the atmosphere (as required by the Stockholm Convention).
To achieve this, the hot gases are drawn into the quench by an induced draught fan. In the quench, water is injected to rapidly cool the gases to a temperature which is suitable for further treatment.
Baghouse The cooled gas from the quench is combined with steam from the pugmill and drawn into the baghouse by an induced draught fan. The baghouse contains a series of fabric filters which remove particulates.
Acid Gas Scrubber The final step in the treatment process involves the removal of acid gases from the exhaust gas. The acid gas scrubber consists of a packed tower with a re-circulating caustic solution that reacts with any hydrogen chloride and chlorine in the exhaust gas to form a salt solution.
Following this, the clean treated gas is vented to the atmosphere via the scrubber stack which is some 30 m in height.
Treated Soil Treated soil will be stockpiled adjacent to the STA with drains and bunds provided to manage runoff. Treated materials stored in this area will undergo validation testing and reclassification. This is to determine whether the process has been effective and whether or not the materials are ready for reuse at the Site. Stockpiles will be stabilised with spray grass or other such treatment and will be wetted when necessary to control dust.
The treated, stockpiled soil will be retained until completion of remediation works at the Site when it will be transported (by truck) to the Remediation Areas for reinstatement works.
HAZOP Guide Words HAZOP Study Report, Remediation of the Former Orica Villawood Site Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A4.2 Appendix 4 HAZOP Guide Words. Note that the main headings are shown only. Some main headings included various sub-prompts as well. Line-By-Line Guide Words Continuous Fluid Systems
High Level / High Flow Low Level / Low Flow Zero Flow / Empty Reverse Flow High Pressure - Venting, relief Low Pressure - Venting, relief High Temperature Low Temperature Impurities - Gaseous, liquid, solid Change in Concentration or Composition / Two Phase Flow / Reactions Testing - Equipment / product Plant Items - Operable / maintainable Electrical Instruments
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A4.3 Overview Guide Words
Toxicity Commissioning Startup Shutdown (isolation, purging) Breakdown (including services failure) Effluent Fire and Explosion Noise / Vibration Materials of Construction Quality and Consistency Output - Reliability and Bottlenecks Efficiency Losses Simplicity
DATE: 23/1/2012 SYSTEM: Feed Supply Bin and Conveyors LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10001 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 1. General Discussion Bricks, rubble and oversized material, clay etc Feed interrupted due to blockages or equipment damage No need for hopper screen or clay breaker as pre-screening. will be done in the feed soil building No further action required - - 2. General Discussion Chemical (i.e. from the contaminated soil) attack on conveyor belts Belt failure, maintenance Will use chemical resistant belts No further action required - - 3. General Discussion Rain Increased moisture impacts process Conveyor covers to be installed No further action required - - 4. High Flow / High Level Front end loader (FEL) overfills hopper Spill to the bunded building floor DTD operator in contact with FEL operator, any spilt soil can be swept up and reprocessed Review the need for providing a mirror or screen in the FEL cabin so the FEL driver can see the level in the feed hopper LK Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.2 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012 SYSTEM: Feed Supply Bin and Conveyors LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10001 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 5. Low Flow / Low Level Soil clumps in hopper Potential to fall onto the belt below (damage) and possibly cause blockages Steep sided hopper minimises the risk of material hold-up on the hopper walls. Can adjust the gap below the hopper during commissioning No further action required - - 6. Zero Flow / Empty Hopper empty Only financial keep burning gas etc Process controls come into effect to trip downstream fired appliances No further action required - - 7. Zero Flow / Empty Feeder fails Hopper full of material. Confined space entry to unblock Routine checks on belt feeder during shutdowns, confined space risk assessment Preventive maintenance procedures to emphasise belt feed conveyor checks BG 8. Zero Flow / Empty Feeder fails (as above) Hopper full of material. Confined space entry to unblock Routine checks on belt feeder during shutdowns, confined space risk assessment Review the need for hatches etc in the feed bin walls for ease of clearing material provided they also do not hold up material LK Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.3 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012 SYSTEM: Feed Supply Bin and Conveyors LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10001 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 9. Zero Flow / Empty Spillage from conveyors Clean-up. Damage to adjacent equipment Scrapers prevent return below belt. Canopy over conveyors Provide a cover around the slinger conveyor to prevent any spilt soil damaging adjacent gas burner and other equipment
10. Zero Flow / Empty Friction, e.g. from wood stuck on belt etc Conveyor belt fire with toxic products of combustion potentially smoke logging the building Fire hose nearby. Building vented through carbon filters Include in the fire safety study assessment of belts fires and the risk to emergency responders from toxic products of combustion LK 11. Zero Flow / Empty Plant outage Potential for conveyor belt fire on restart if material dries out / solidifies Slinger conveyor can be run backwards for material to be collected in a truck, i.e. to clear the conveyors No further action required - - 12. Reverse Flow Belt stops on the inclined conveyor and runs back due to soil load Spillage at bottom requiring cleaning up Back stop provided on the conveyor No further action required - - 13. Impurities Asbestos cement sheeting pieces in the feed Exposure to personnel who contact the treated soil and maintain the plant Will be removed in accordance will agreed practices by licensed contractor No further action required - - Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.4 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012 SYSTEM: Feed Supply Bin and Conveyors LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10001 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 14. Impurities PPE disposed of via the process Possibility of embers getting to the baghouse and causing damage to the filters Will be collected and disposed of as special waste No further action required - - 15. Plant Items Lack of access for maintenance and operational checks Reduced online time Include in the project plan an operability and maintainability access review to all equipment items
16. Plant Items Feed soil building emission control system out of service Atmosphere unsuitable for personnel Likely to be confined space entry if the feed soil building emission control system fails Risk assessment, including on confined space entry, required to determine suitable safeguards for people entering the feed soil building when the emission control system fails
17. Plant Items Wayward FEL operation etc Damage to feed hopper, conveyors etc Will provide Jersey barriers No further action required - - 18. Electrical Magnetic field from tramp metal collector Impact on people with pacemakers Check impact of magnet on implanted pacemakers and any other critical electrical devices BG
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.5
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012 SYSTEM: Dryer and Cyclone LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10002 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 19. General Discussion (note the cyclones remove particles to 30 microns) LEL exceeded in the dryer Explosion With the soil at Villawood, the LEL cannot be exceeded. Therefore do not need pop-off damper and other such provisions No further action required - - 20. High Flow / High Level Knockout box blockage Dryer full of soil requiring confined space for cleaning Low soil temperature and position switches on the sluice gate or rotary valve will initiate action prior to significant consequential impact No further action required - - 21. High Flow / High Level High gas flow Overheating of materials and hence the potential for equipment damage Plant will shut down from high temperature in the flue gases (back up thermocouples provided). Steel designed for 650 deg. C No further action required - - Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.6 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012 SYSTEM: Dryer and Cyclone LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10002 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 22. Low Flow / Low Level Low solid separation in cyclones from a plant turndown Baghouse overloaded Cyclones designed for minimum turndown of the burner No further action required - - 23. Zero Flow / Empty Unplanned plant shutdown Material sitting hot in the bottom of the dryer can deform the dryer drum Drum must be able to turn Make provisions to turn the drum in case of plant, including power, shutdown, e.g. manual jogging KC 24. Reverse Flow Burner continues to run when the ID fan stops High temperature damage to the dryer or injury to personnel if flames are emitted from the dryer Run on of the fan when shutting down and the draft from the stack will initially prevent damage and the burner flame is contained within the dryer, i.e. no potential for impact on personnel No further action required - - 25. High Temperature Hot exterior of dryer and ductwork Burns to personnel Personal protection, e.g. mesh guards or insulation, will be provided for surfaces over 60 deg. C No further action required - - Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.7 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012 SYSTEM: Dryer and Cyclone LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10002 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 26. Plant Items Dryer flight breakage Equipment damage Routine maintenance checks and operator response to noise from within the dryer No further action required - - 27. Electrical Lightning Instrument damage Review the need for lightning (surge) protection of the instruments KC 28. Instruments Ensure redundant pressure transmitters on the dryer, i.e. separate transmitters for control and trip actions KC
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.8
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012 SYSTEM: Thermal Oxidiser LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10006 Rev A MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 29. General Discussion Burner continues to run when the ID fan stops High temperature damage to the burner or injury to personnel if flames are emitted from the burner Run on of the fan when shutting down and the draft from the stack will initially prevent damage and the burner flame is contained within the burner, i.e. no potential for impact on personnel No further action required - - 30. High Flow / High Level High feed rate Thermal oxidiser (TO) residence time less than design TO designed for > 2 seconds at maximum flow plus there is some extra time in the ducts to the baghouse No further action required - - 31. High Flow / High Level Buildup of slag in bottom of TO Shutdown for cleanout Special burner / inlet gas design eliminates creation of sticky particles and agglomeration No further action required - - Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.9 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012 SYSTEM: Thermal Oxidiser LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10006 Rev A MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 32. Low Pressure ID fan draws too much flow Worst case could extinguish burner Burner management system takes control, i.e. flameout detector shuts of the natural gas flow No further action required - - 33. High Temperature Too much natural gas flow due to the control temperature transmitter reading too low Equipment damage TO temperature trips plus there are also downstream temperature controls No further action required - - 34. High Temperature Refractory failure Shell temperature rises (would probably see glow on the outside of the shell) Plant operators will regularly shoot measurements with an infrared gun to detect hot spots No further action required - - 35. Low Temperature Loss of process control due to the control temperature transmitter reading too high Fail to achieve regulatory destruction temperature Thermocouples in series will pick up temperature discrepancies. Calibration instrument has been purchased No further action required - - Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.10 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012 SYSTEM: Thermal Oxidiser LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10006 Rev A MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 36. Low Temperature Emergency stop Residual material in the TO cools with potential to form other compounds, e.g. dioxins, furans Slow cooling allows plant to be purged of gases using ID fan No further action required - - 37. Plant Items Flame impingement on shell opposite burner Damage to vessel shell Burner entry is longer than burner flame length so direct flame impingement not expected No further action required - - 38. Plant Items Dust in the TO Flame detector does not see the flame and hence nuisance trips Flame sensor is self- checking and air purged. System fails safe No further action required - -
Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.11
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012 SYSTEM: Evaporative Cooler including the Air / Water Flows LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10007 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 39. General Discussion Power failure Loss of water flow leading to high temperature and hence damage to equipment, e.g. the downstream scrubber Inlet water valve fails open Show the inlet water valve on the P&ID to fail open designate as FO KC 40. General Discussion Rapid quenching does not occur Dioxin formation Design is to quench to below 200 deg. C in 1 second No further action required - - 41. High Flow / High Level False low temperature reading at the outlet duct Too much water flow resulting in pooling in the vessel bottom causing corrosion Water will evaporate. Operator is constantly observing temperature to the baghouse Review the need to install a low temperature alarm on the existing downstream thermocouple RM 42. High Flow / High Level Dilution air damper open when it should not be Nothing unsafe just a change in plant pressure Will be detected through plant pressure controls No further action required - - Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.12 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012 SYSTEM: Evaporative Cooler including the Air / Water Flows LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10007 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 43. High Flow / High Level ECU (emission control unit) water pump keeps running when the evaporative cooler is shutdown Bottom of the evaporative cooler floods Procedures dictate pumps to be manually shut down when the plant stops. Water will come out the dilution air damper and become visible No further action required - - 44. Low Flow / Low Level Loss of water flow High temperature and hence damage to equipment, e.g. the downstream scrubber Dilution air damper opens. If control not regained, plant trips Dilution air damper to be as close to the evaporative cooler outlet duct as possible for effective cooling KC 45. Low Flow / Low Level Low air flow, even if air pressure is maintained due to the air nozzle clogging Large water particles created. Inefficient cooling. Control system calls for more water Operator is constantly observing temperature to the baghouse and a low temperature alarm No further action required - - 46. Reverse Flow Hot gases out the open dilution damper??? - no record of this happening Burns to nearby personnel Damper located sufficiently high to avoid damage No further action required - - Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.13 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012 SYSTEM: Evaporative Cooler including the Air / Water Flows LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10007 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 47. Impurities Oil from the air compressor Could send some of the stack readings high The compressor will be oil-free or have a coalescing filter Confirm compressor selection and hence no oil will flow to the evaporative cooler LK 48. Change in Composition or Concentration / Two-Phase Flow / Reactions Poor spray nozzle atomisation Pooling in the vessel bottom causing corrosion Nozzles can be withdrawn and tested No further action required - - 49. Testing Bypass valves on the air or water supply left open No serious outcome Bypasses are useful for maintenance purposes and are to be retained No further action required - -
Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.14
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012 SYSTEM: Baghouse and Dust Screws LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10004 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 50. Low Flow / Low Level Inadequate air pulsing Bags become blinded High differential pressure alarm Review the air pulsing duration and frequency in the detailed design RM 51. Zero Flow / Empty Dust in the bottom of the baghouse plus moisture, e.g. during a shutdown Dust goes solid and hence maintenance access is required Procedure is to run and empty the dust screw for prolonged shutdowns No further action required - - 52. Zero Flow / Empty Backup of dust if a screw conveyor fails Dust is held-up in the system The last screw runs faster than the 2 nd last which runs faster than dust screw at the baghouse bottom to prevent dust being held- up No further action required - - 53. Impurities Torn bags falling onto the dust screw in the bottom of the baghouse Dust screw blocked A grate is provided at the bottom above the baghouse dust screw No further action required - - 54. Plant Items Bag failure Dust not collected PM10 analyser and low differential pressure alarm No further action required - - Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.15 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012 SYSTEM: Baghouse and Dust Screws LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10004 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 55. Plant Items Moisture ingress Corrosion, e.g. of the baghouse dust screw conveyor Appropriate materials of construction No further action required - -
Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.16
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012 SYSTEM: Scrubber (gas stream to atmosphere) including the Induced Draft Fan LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 56. General Discussion HCl will be present at elevated temperatures Corrosion and hence equipment damage Appropriate materials of construction will be provided No further action required - - 57. Low Flow / Low Level Low plant feed rate Low stack velocity, poor dispersion The stack top diameter will be such that the minimum velocity to ensure good dispersion will be maintained at the design plant turndown No further action required - - 58. Impurities Baghouse failure Solids through to the scrubber TDS (total dissolved solids) analyser provided No further action required - - 59. Plant Items Stack top silencer corrosion Higher risk maintenance due to work at heights Fan is silenced. Unsure if the stack top needs to include a silencer Check the need from the noise studies for a stack top silencer not preferred as it will be difficult to maintain POD 60. Plant Items Stack top silencer corrosion (as above) Higher risk maintenance due to work at heights Fan is silenced. Unsure if the stack top needs to include a silencer If uncertain about the need for a stack- top silencer, make provision for bolting one on later (including allowance for the weight) KC Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.17 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012 SYSTEM: Scrubber (gas stream to atmosphere) including the Induced Draft Fan LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 61. Plant Items Caustic leak Splashing and corrosive burns to personnel Safety showers Provide safety showers with insulated pipes (to prevent hot water flowing during high ambient temperatures), green fluoro light above the shower, a flow sensor to alarm when a person is using a shower and procedures for lone workers LK
Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.18
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 27/1/2012 SYSTEM: Scrubber Make-up Water Supply Feeds LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 62. General Discussion Dust carryover from baghouse Demister blockage and hence high scrubber differential pressure Sprays onto demister, high differential pressure alarm across the scrubber No further action required - - 63. General Discussion Power failure and the recycle pumps stop Loss of containment of acidic gases to atmosphere Emergency power generator feeds the scrubber pumps, analysers installed on the scrubber stack No further action required - - 64. General Discussion Failure of the check valve to the scrubber quench Caustic flows back to the towns water tank The makeup water supply main block valve to the scrubber quench is normally closed and will only be opened when the scrubber recycle pumps are not operating No further action required - - Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.19 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 27/1/2012 SYSTEM: Scrubber Make-up Water Supply Feeds LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 65. General Discussion Review need for the low flow alarm on the make-up water supply line to the quench as this will be a nuisance alarm during normal operation when there is no flow in this line (i.e. as above, this line is left isolated when the scrubber recycle pumps are running) RM 66. General Discussion Check with BK the reason for installing the flow meter in the make-up water supply line to the quench given the operation is manual POD 67. General Discussion Show on the P&ID the sump pump and its controls KC Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.20 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 27/1/2012 SYSTEM: Scrubber Make-up Water Supply Feeds LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 68. High Flow / High Level Solenoid valve to the scrubber sump fails open Scrubber sump fills and then overflows via the emergency overflow Sump high level alarm. pH meter will detect a drop in pH. The emergency overflow is sized for all make-up water supply flows operating together at maximum rates. Bunded area if it does overflow Show on the P&ID the 2 nd level detector in the scrubber sump to separate the control and trip functions KC 69. Zero Flow / Empty Solenoid valve to the demister sprays is stuck closed Buildup of solids on the demister resulting in high scrubber differential pressure Scrubber DP high alarm Include in the functional description a low flow alarm that is only active when the solenoid valve to demister sprays should be open (i.e. to avoid a nuisance alarm when the solenoid is meant to be closed) RM 70. Reverse Flow Acidic gases absorb back into the make- up water feed lines Corrosion of the piping and piping items Appropriate materials of construction, e.g. stainless steel or plastic No further action required - - Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.21 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 27/1/2012 SYSTEM: Scrubber Make-up Water Supply Feeds LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 71. Plant Items Control valves wrongly selected, e.g. solenoids for larger (100 to 150 mm) lines not appropriate Loss of plant control Correct valve selection Amend the P&ID to show actual types of valves: electric or pneumatic actuation KC
Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.22
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 27/1/2012 SYSTEM: Scrubber Recycle LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 72. General Discussion Scrubber recycle pump failure Plant shuts down (accepted response) Manual changeover of pumps No further action required - - 73. High Flow / High Level Pump seals fail Release of 80 C liquid.
Slow leak only expected from these types of pumps Operator regular inspection and maintenance as required No further action required - - 74. High Flow / High Level Overdosing caustic High pH no significant consequences identified pH meter will alarm high pH No further action required - - 75. Low Flow / Low Level Underdosing caustic (e.g. from pH meter drifting, failure to top up the caustic IBC) Lack of absorption of acidic gases and hence atmospheric emission Routine manual sampling of the scrubber recycle liquid. pH meter including a low alarm. CEMS stack analysers, e.g. NOx and SOx will also rise and alarm for operator response No further action required - - Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.23 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 27/1/2012 SYSTEM: Scrubber Recycle LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 76. Low Flow / Low Level Nozzles fall off the reflux distributor (screw type which can unwind) Inadequate liquid / gas contact due to channelling in the packing Nozzles to be screwed in tight and are replaceable through the side of the scrubber column No further action required - - 77. Low Flow / Low Level Loss of scrubber flow Increase in temperature in the plastic packing with possible damage Correct packing selection Ensure the scrubber packing can withstand higher temperatures due to deviations in the recycle scrubber flow rate
78. Zero Flow / Empty Valve left shut before the scrubber liquor analysers Analysers do not detect changes in pH or conductivity hence the potential for poor scrubber performance Operator observes signals not fluctuating, analysers in the stack will alarm Include in the functional description flat- line detection on the signals from the pH and conductivity analysers RM 79. Reverse Flow Recycle flow goes back to the caustic pumps Overpressure, loss of containment at the caustic IBC Pressure control valve in the common delivery line from the caustic pumps Review need for a check valve in the common caustic pump discharge line RM Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.24 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 27/1/2012 SYSTEM: Scrubber Recycle LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 80. High Temperature Hot pipelines (i.e. approximately 80 C) Burns on contact Pipes above 60 deg. C potentially in contact with personnel to be provided with personnel protection through insulation, mesh guarding, signage, etc No further action required - - 81. Impurities Iron oxide dust not collected in baghouse Blockage in the scrubber Operator checks for water discolouration No further action required - - 82. Change in Composition or Concentration / Two-Phase Flow / Reactions Solids buildup in system High conductivity but this is a slow process and can be controlled manually Manual blowdown to control conductivity is appropriate. Therefore, delete the actuated blowdown valve and upstream / downstream isolation valves
83. Testing High flow when taking samples Splashing Valves (e.g. gate type) that can be slowly cracked open, PPE No further action required - -
Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.25
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 27/1/2012 SYSTEM: Liquid Feeds to Pugmill LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10009 & C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10003 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 84. General Discussion Pump requires maintenance The pump discharge (i.e. after the check valve) needs to be flushed for maintenance Review the need for individual drain valves on the discharge of each pump (as per the scrubber recycle pumps) for maintenance purposes when the other pump is still operational
85. General Discussion Power failure Loss of water to the pugmill dust release in the area Show the flow control valve to the pugmill as fail open on the P&ID
86. General Discussion Hazop suspended until the liquid balance assessment is carried out on the liquid feeds to the pugmill. Preference is to use treated water instead of Towns Water for sustainability reasons. Note: the current design requires makeup water via the scrubber and hence excessive caustic usage will result. It is expected the liquid feed system design will change and then the HAZOP should be performed
Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.26
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 27/1/2012 SYSTEM: Soil to and from the Pugmill (including the cyclones underflow) LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10002 & C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10003 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 87. Low Flow / Low Level Rock, metal piece, etc gets into the pugmill Baghouse drive overloads and equipment damage High current detected shutting down the pugmill No further action required - - 88. Zero Flow / Empty Screw conveyor below the cyclones or rotary valve stops High dust flow to the baghouse Pressure measurements and/or operator will shut down the plant No further action required - - 89. Zero Flow / Empty Loss of water Soil too hot, potential damage to conveyor belts, burns, etc.
Potential for a build-up of solids in the dryer and hence heat damage to the dryer High temperature alarms. Camera shows high dust. Constant operator attendance. Operator shuts down pugmill if it cannot be controlled Show on the P&IDs a trip of the dryer if the pugmill is shut down RM 90. High Temperature Loss of water to the pugmill Potential for burns from the hot treated soil Temperature alarms. Operator intervention Ensure barriers, etc so people cannot come into contact with hot material LK
Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.27
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 27/1/12 SYSTEM: Overview LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: All Drawings MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 91. Toxicity No further issues identified with the overview guide words No further action required - -
Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.28
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12 SYSTEM: Caustic IBC and Pumping System LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10011 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 92. General Discussion Note only:
The caustic storage vessel will be an IBC manual changeover via hoses to a second IBC about once per week (with a portable plastic bund underneath) No further action required - - 93. General Discussion Note only:
The pumps will be diaphragm pumps with internal pressure relief, manual changeover, located in a bund and a safety shower nearby No further action required - - Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.29 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12 SYSTEM: Caustic IBC and Pumping System LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10011 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 94. General Discussion PCV 1082C to have a pressure indicator integral to the valve to allow the operators to set the pressure on the regulator and monitor its performance LK 95. High Flow / High Level Overdosing caustic pH exceeds limit In the scrubber recycle circuit no significant consequences identified pH meter and alarm (it is expected to be reliable in this service with routine maintenance) No further action required - - 96. High Flow / High Level Loss of containment, e.g. forklift tynes puncture the IBC, hose failure, etc Potential to cause injury to personnel P10 high pressure plastic piping, no joints outside the bunded area No further action required - - Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.30 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12 SYSTEM: Caustic IBC and Pumping System LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10011 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 97. High Flow / High Level Pumping caustic when the plant is shut down Scrubber sump overflow. Temperature rise due to heat of mixing High level alarm in the scrubber sump Determine the maximum temperature rise and whether there is a detrimental effect on the scrubber system materials of construction.
Calculate the volume in the scrubber sump between the normal highest level and overflow to check that a maximum of 1 m 3 from an IBC will not result in overflow from the scrubber overflow pipe.
Review the need for a hard wired trip to stop the caustic pump if being run in manual. Also, review the need for PLC alarms to indicate that the caustic pump is left running in manual and hence the control system trips etc will not be functional TT 98. High Flow / High Level Stormwater falling into the bunded area Stormwater management required Bunded area, sump, discharge to water treatment plant No further action required - - Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.31 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12 SYSTEM: Caustic IBC and Pumping System LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10011 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 99. High Flow / High Level Pipe breakage, e.g. mechanical impact Caustic leak with the potential to harm personnel Strong materials of construction for the proposed tubing Ensure that the small bore caustic piping is adequately protected from mechanical impact LK 100. Low Flow / Low Level Empty IBC, leaks, pump not fast enough Loss of acidic gas scrubbing pH alarm and interlock, scrubber stack analysers and alarms No further action required - - 101. Zero Flow / Empty Valves shut, IBC empty, pump deadheaded Potential to exceed the piping system design pressure for the deadhead case and hence result in a loss of containment of caustic which could harm personnel Internal pressure relief to be included with the pump, pH meter and alarm in the scrubber recycle circuit No further action required - - 102. Reverse Flow No credible causes identified given the safeguards Non return valve, PCV 1082C will close when the caustic pump stops, suction and discharge valves for the pump will also act to prevent reverse flow No further action required - - Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.32 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12 SYSTEM: Caustic IBC and Pumping System LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10011 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 103. Low Pressure IBC vent left closed Suck in the IBC Procedures and training for bung removal or some IBCs have vents included No further action required - - 104. High Temperature Heat of dilution with caustic and water No significant consequences identified Materials adequate for 100 deg. C No further action required - - 105. Low Temperature Standby pump freezes on cold night No caustic flow to the scrubber when pumps changed over pH alarm and interlock, scrubber stack analysers and alarms Delete the standby pump and piping and provide a spare pump in store LK 106. Low Temperature Pump pressure relief inlet and outlet lines freeze Loss of deadhead protection for the caustic pump and hence the potential for a loss of containment of caustic which could harm personnel Review the need for insulation or heat tracing on the pump pressure relief inlet and outlet lines LK 107. Plant Items IBC changeover Potential incidents associated with forklift trucks and hose disconnection and reconnection Review the layout for forklift accessibility as well as the operability of the caustic hose connections including hose draining LK
Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.33
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12 SYSTEM: Towns Water Tank LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10009 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 108. General Discussion Thoroughly flush the Towns Water supply pipe during commissioning to ensure all residual solids are removed (plus check quality of gas supply with respect to solids in the pipeline as well) GL 109. General Discussion Ensure the Towns Water pipe from the Sydney Water main is large enough to avoid the need for a booster pump, i.e. delete the booster pump and fill the Towns Water tank directly from the Sydney Water mains supply LK 110. General Discussion Show other consumers of Towns Water on the drawing, e.g. safety showers, ablutions, etc. These off-takes are to be from the supply pipe upstream of the Towns Water tank for supply quality reliability (e.g. no process contaminants due to reverse flow) LK 111. High Flow / High Level Supply pipe ruptured, e.g. by backhoe Tank fails to fill. No water flow to the ECU, pugmill, scrubber, etc Low pressure and flow alarms and trips on the downstream water users Ensure the Towns Water supply line is away from the project excavation areas LK Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.34 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12 SYSTEM: Towns Water Tank LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10009 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 112. Low Flow / Low Level Level control valve insufficiently open Tank fails to fill. No water flow to ECU, pugmill, scrubber, etc Low pressure and flow alarms and trips on the downstream water users No further action required - - 113. Reverse Flow The tank overflow is to be lower than the water inlet to ensure there the risk of reverse flow into the Towns Water supply line to the tank is as low as possible
114. Impurities Frogs, vermin, etc in tank Blockage of the water supply pumps inlet strainers Pump strainer maintenance and downstream pressure and flow alarms No further action required - - 115. Plant Items Locate the LCV close to the Towns Water tank roof manhole for ease of inspection and maintenance LK 116. Plant Items Work at heights when maintaining the tanks level transmitter Potential for falls and serious injuries Permit to work system including controls for fall prevention Use a differential pressure transmitter for tank level measurement (located at grade) in lieu of an ultrasonic transmitter on top of tank LK Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.35 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12 SYSTEM: Towns Water Tank LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10009 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 117. Plant Items Work at heights when maintaining the tanks LCV Potential for falls and serious injuries Permit to work system including controls for fall prevention Review to option for replacing the roof mounted level control valve to one at grade (i.e. eliminate the need for a float valve at the top of the tank and hence work at heights injuries) LK 118. Instruments Failure of the sight glass Water leaks Maintenance and replacement of the sight glass Review type of sight glass level indication and also the need for a sight glass for LI1074 to minimise the risk of leaks
Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.36
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12 SYSTEM: Towns Water Pumping Systems LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10009 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 119. General Discussion The scrubber blowdown (max 20-40 l/min) will go directly to the pugmill from the discharge side of the scrubber recycle pumps, not via the pugmill water supply pumps.
As this line has not been HAZOPed, perform a formal design change assessment when the final design details are known.
Therefore, pumps PUI-0907 and 0908 are duty/standby and are the same design as the other water pumpsets shown on this P&ID TT 120. General Discussion Review the need to replace the 6 Y-type strainers with 2 strainers in the common suction line to all pumpsets (ease of maintenance) TT 121. General Discussion Add an isolation valve upstream of PCV1052 (to be consistent with the other water pumping systems design) TT Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.37 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12 SYSTEM: Towns Water Pumping Systems LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10009 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 122. High Flow / High Level Running 2 pumps simultaneously No significant consequences identified Duty/standby selector switch.
Flow controls downstream will ensure the users only take what water they need No further action required - - 123. Low Flow / Low Level Blocked strainers, valves gagged, pump problems Loss of the required flow to the ECU, scrubber and pugmill (as previously HAZOPed above) Alarms and trips at each user of the water, e.g. low pressure or flow.
Critical pumps can be started manually when emergency generator started No further action required - - 124. Zero Flow / Empty Loss of water to the ECU Potential for heat damage to the water spray nozzles when the plant is tripped on low water flow Confirm that the nozzles are made from appropriate materials of construction for high temperature following a plant trip LK Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.38 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12 SYSTEM: Towns Water Pumping Systems LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10009 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 125. Reverse Flow Loss of the quench water pumps to the scrubber Potential for acidic mist to absorb into the water in the supply pipe to the scrubber and cause corrosion As per Plant Items, review the materials of construction for all equipment throughout the plant LK 126. Reverse Flow Pumps stops, e.g. loss of power Water in the pipes to the ECU and scrubber flows back and hence drawing gases from these vessels, i.e. corrosion potential as above As above, the correct materials of construction are to be confirmed No further action required - - 127. Plant Items Acidic vapours, etc throughout the plant Corrosion of equipment as above Review the materials of construction for all equipment throughout the plant LK 128. Electrical Power failure Loss of critical equipment Emergency generator Confirm the required items connected to the emergency power supply BK
Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.39
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12 SYSTEM: Instrument and Compressed Air LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10010 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 129. General Discussion Review the need for the standby air compressor, including the need for the isolation valve on the discharge of compressor AC-1002. Delete if not required LK 130. General Discussion Historical incidents involving oil filled compressors running too hot and hence cracking the oil The cracked oil can leave dust deposits within the piping system and hence is an internal dust explosion hazard Running the air compressor within the design limits, routine oil sampling and replacement The air compressor is to be oil free LK 131. General Discussion Review the final design details from vendor for the compressor and dryers (HAZOP assumes desiccant dryer) including inlet air strainer, check valve to avoid depressurisation of the air receiver when the compressors trip, dew point measurement, weatherproofing to avoid rain ingress to the compressor suction, signals to control room, functional logic, etc LK Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.40 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12 SYSTEM: Instrument and Compressed Air LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10010 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 132. General Discussion The maximum air pressure is to be designed for adequate operation of the ECU nozzles (possibly 10 barg plus) LK 133. General Discussion Update the air compressor P&ID to show all air users, e.g. the ECU LK 134. General Discussion Rationalise the number, location and set pressure for the pressure regulators (e.g. PCV1079A/B/C appear to be controlling the same pressure and hence there is the potential for these regulators to hunt). For the required pressure regulators, supply pressure indication for testing and monitoring purposes LK 135. General Discussion Make the complete system dry air (i.e. dry air is required to all users) to avoid wet air blocking the baghouse filter bags. This will remove the additional air receiver, associated equipment and controls LK Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.41 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12 SYSTEM: Instrument and Compressed Air LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10010 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 136. High Flow / High Level Regulator failure Potential for the maximum air supply pressure to be within the supply pipe to the final isolation valve at each air user Confirm that the design is rated for full air pressure to the final isolation valves for each air user LK 137. Zero Flow / Empty Loss of power No air to users Low pressure alarms and trips No further action required - - 138. High Pressure Compressor deadheaded Potential for equipment damage and possible failure leading to missiles, i.e. harm to people and damage to equipment Make sure the vendor package has appropriate safeguards for compressor deadhead and if a blow off valve / pressure safety valve is provided then it should not yield unacceptable noise levels (e.g. provide a silencer) LK 139. High Temperature Heat from 10 bar pressure requirement Potential high temperature damage to the downstream equipment Review the maximum compressor discharge temperature and ensure that adequate safeguards are included, e.g. ensure the compressor package has a cooler LK
Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.42
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12 SYSTEM: OVERVIEW LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: Caustic, Water and Air P&IDs MINUTES BY: Peter ODea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 140. Commissioning Provide high point vents and low point drains for hydrotesting once the piping layout drawings are known LK 141. Commissioning Foreign objects in the pipes during commissioning Potential to damage equipment Provide temporary cone strainers, remove sensitive instruments and valves, etc for line flushing during commissioning LK 142. Commissioning Potential for dioxin formation from the plant Impact to people and the business Incorporate the learnings from the ATMR plant commissioning especially re dioxin prevention and control TT 143. Commissioning Provide sufficient process sampling points between the main plant items to be able to measure gas composition and diagnose problems, e.g. levels of unwanted by-products LK 144. Materials of Construction Potential incompatibility of the materials of construction with the process materials Corrosion and equipment failure with a loss of containment Review the compatibility of the chosen materials of construction, including gaskets, with the process materials via the Hazard Study 1 chemicals compatibility of materials chart BK
Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.43
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong, Peter ODea, Rudy Maes, Keith Chapman
DATE: 19/10/12 SYSTEM: Air Compressor for the Evaporative Cooler LEADER: Dean Shewring
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 145. General Discussion The tag numbers on the two air compressor, e.g. hand switches, need to be unique. Mark up the P&ID accordingly KC 146. High Pressure Compressor high pressure protection for deadheading The compressor is a screw compressor and hence the potential for overpressuring the discharge piping with possible failures leading to missiles Check the vendor P&ID that high pressure protection is provided. Also, review the vendor supply details to confirm adequate controls and safeguarding is being provided, e.g. suction screen and an aftercooler and a high outlet temperature alarm KC 147. High Temperature Operating the oil flooded compressor (to be confirmed) at high temperatures Potential to crack the oil and lead to a build-up on the inside of the pipes which can explode Minute 130 (above) regarding the need for an oil free compressor is to be reconsidered. If the compressor is not oil free then provide an oil filter and confirm the operating temperature is less than 140 deg C exit the aftercooler KC Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.44 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong, Peter ODea, Rudy Maes, Keith Chapman
DATE: 19/10/12 SYSTEM: Air Compressor for the Evaporative Cooler LEADER: Dean Shewring
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 148. Low Temperature Cooling of the air in the air receiver Condensate will form and build-up within the air receiver Manual draining Install an automatic condensate drain on the receiver(s?) with an isolation valve and bypass valve for maintenance KC
Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.45
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong, Peter ODea, Rudy Maes, Keith Chapman
DATE: 19/10/12 SYSTEM: Pugmill Water System (pumps 0907 and 0908) LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-CTCU-10009 and 10003 Rev D MINUTES BY: Bala Kathiravelu
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 149. General Discussion Following discussion, the scrubber blowdown is to be sent to the effluent treatment system. The main issues being:
1. The potential for corrosion in the pugmill system, e.g. high chlorides levels in a hot, wet environment or from changes in pH 2. Contamination of the treated soil 3. The historical problems with solids in the scrubber blowdown causing blockages (e.g. of the spray nozzles) and settling (e.g. within tanks), and 4. That the treated water can be rerun and hence is not a potential loss from plant.
Therefore, Towns Water is to be used for the pugmill water spray systems. Also, provide appropriate connections for a possible future scrubber bleed blowdown tank (if required) and allow adequate space in the plot planning KC Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.46 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong, Peter ODea, Rudy Maes, Keith Chapman
DATE: 19/10/12 SYSTEM: Pugmill Water System (pumps 0907 and 0908) LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-CTCU-10009 and 10003 Rev D MINUTES BY: Bala Kathiravelu
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 150. General Discussion Need to balance flow to pugmill sprays Mark up the P&ID to show individual isolation supply valves to each pugmill spray nozzle KC 151. General Discussion P&ID correction Show PCV1052 controlling upstream pressure as this valve is used for deadhead protection for the pumps KC 152. General Discussion P&ID correction The Towns Water pumps kickback lines are to be top entry into the Towns Water tank (to prevent reverse flow issues from submerged entries). Therefore delete the isolation valves at each kickback line nozzle to the Towns Water tank and the check valve in the kickback line for pumps 0907 and 0908 KC 153. General Discussion P&ID correction FCV 1019 is to be a modulating valve and it is to fail last position on loss of air to the actuator, i.e. show a mushroom head valve and FLP on the P&ID KC 154. General Discussion P&ID correction Provide an isolation valve on PI 1019B (consistent with all PIs) KC Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.47 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong, Peter ODea, Rudy Maes, Keith Chapman
DATE: 19/10/12 SYSTEM: Pugmill Water System (pumps 0907 and 0908) LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-CTCU-10009 and 10003 Rev D MINUTES BY: Bala Kathiravelu
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 155. General Discussion P&ID correction Delete the line on P&ID 1003 shown as Cooling Water from Scrubber to the pugmill sprays (as this was formally used for return scrubber liquid no longer required) and also delete PT 1019C and the associated alarms on this line KC 156. High Flow / High Level Spray nozzle unwinding and falling off Too much water flow to the pugmill no significant consequences identified Spot weld the spray nozzles onto the pipes to prevent them from falling off KC 157. High Flow / High Level The pugmill pump stops and water syphons forward through them to the pugmill Too much water flow to the pugmill no significant consequences identified Include in the functional description the need to have FVC 1019 & SV 1019 closed when the pugmill pump stops KC 158. High Temperature Note that the scrubber blowdown is approximately 80 deg C Potential for burn injuries if personnel contact hot surfaces Provide appropriate personal protection to avoid burns for the scrubber blowdown line LK
Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.48
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong, Peter ODea, Rudy Maes, Keith Chapman
DATE: 19/10/12 SYSTEM: Overview - Air Compressor to the Evaporative Cooler and the Pugmill Water System LEADER: Dean Shewring
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 159. No further significant hazardous events or operability problems identified for these systems using the Overview guide words - -
Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.49
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12 SYSTEM: High Capacity Settling Tank LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883-301 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 160. General Discussion Delete the butterfly valve on the clarified liquid line from the settling tank as this line is free draining and hence does not need to be isolated PA 161. General Discussion Mark up the P&IDs to show all line sizes, e.g. the clarified water line from the settling tank PA 162. General Discussion Delete the additional diaphragm valve downstream of the settling tank sump gate valves. The gate valves are at ground level (i.e. accessible) and can be used for isolation for pump flushing etc instead PA 163. High Flow / High Level Losses of containment from the coagulant pumping system Potential environmental consequences of overflow to the ground System leak checked prior to operation, the coagulant IBC is bunded Ensure the coagulant pumping system is within the IBC bunded area to contain any leaks. Apply this action to all chemical dosing systems PA Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.50 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12 SYSTEM: High Capacity Settling Tank LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883-301 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 164. Zero Flow / Empty Solids fouling of the static mixer on the inlet to the settling tank Plant downtime for maintenance Delete the static mixer and add the coagulant upstream in the feed line to allow sufficient line length for mixing PA 165. Reverse Flow Confirm that design will prevent reverse flow of coagulant to the upstream sources (these upstream sources are to be shown on the P&ID) PA 166. High Pressure Deadhead of the sludge pump Potential to rupture the downstream piping system Operators to keep the isolation valves open during normal operation Replace the high pressure instrumented protection system (i.e. a potential Safety Instrumented Function to AS61511) with a suitable mechanical over-pressure device, e.g. a PRV or kick back line (Note: consider the implications of sludge fouling a PRV). Also, note that if a PRV is installed, it should be installed immediately downstream of the pump for the case where the NRV is stuck in the closed position PA 167. Plant Items Confirm all off-takes from the sludge lines are horizontal to vertical to prevent settling and compaction of solids in the branches PA Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.51 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12 SYSTEM: High Capacity Settling Tank LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883-301 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 168. Plant Items Preference is to not use PVC due to interaction between solvents and plasticiser. If used, then the preference is to use UPVC (i.e. un-plasticised PVC) PA 169. Plant Items Operator leaves the sludge pump running for too long Overfilling the sedimentation tanks Procedures and training Install a timer on the sludge pump to prevent excessive amounts of water being flushed to the sedimentation tanks and also to allow adequate flushing of sludge pump and lines during pump operation PA 170. I Plant Items Isolation of water in the aboveground piping Potential for heating by the sun and thermal overpressure, i.e. piping system failure Procedures and training Include in the SOPs the need to keep aboveground pipework open (i.e. not isolated) to prevent thermal overpressure from isolated liquid being heated by the sun PA 171. P Plant Items Solids settling in the feed lines to the settling tank Fouling of the feed lines Provide means to allow flushing of the inlet lines to the settling tank. Treated water to be used (not potable water due to the risk of reverse flow and hence contamination) PA Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.52 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12 SYSTEM: High Capacity Settling Tank LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883-301 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 172. Plant Items Delete the second isolation valve on discharge side of the coagulant dosing pump as it is only isolating a reducer and double isolation is not required. Apply this action to all chemical dosing systems PA 173. Instruments Provide a diaphragm connection to all instruments on sludge lines in the plant to prevent blocking of the impulse lines from the solids PA
Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.53
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12 SYSTEM: Feed Tank System including the Untreated Water Basin LEADER: Dean Shewring
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 174. High Flow / High Level Rain and the water treatment plant not available Overfilling the untreated water basin Procedural control monitoring water levels Install a flashing light (to be visible from the DTDU) and/or use a SMS text warning service to alert the operators of any unacceptable process conditions when the plant is unattended PA 175. High Flow / High Level Draining of both sedimentation tanks to the feed tank, e.g. manual valves passing or left open Potential to initially overflow the feed tank and then overflow the pump well bund Operator to check level in the feed tank prior to discharge from the sedimentation tank.
High level alarms and trip 2.1 to stop some feed pumps into the feed tank Review the need to overflow the pump well bund to the adjacent bunded area given the current containment areas capacities LK 176. Zero Flow / Empty Operator does not perform recycle from the break tank to the feed tank during start up Higher than normal solids through to the zeolite filters resulting in plant recovery impacts due to the need to backwash the filters SOPs and training Review the need for automating the break tank recycle valves to lower the risk of this occurring, e.g. two actuated valves for flow path determination after the transfer pump PA Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.54 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12 SYSTEM: Feed Tank System including the Untreated Water Basin LEADER: Dean Shewring
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 177. Impurities Foreign objects entering the un- treated water basin Blockage and/or damage to the raw water feed pump Install a screen on the inlet to the raw water feed pump. Apply this action to all sump pumps in the plant PA 178. Instruments Plant inlet water flowrate monitoring for mass balances and performance checks Provide means to monitor the water flow into the mixing tank, e.g. replace the flow switch with flow meter and a low flow trip PA Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.55
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12 SYSTEM: Flocculation Tank and Chemical Dosing Systems (HAZOPed by Difference) LEADER: Dean Shewring
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 179. General Discussion Review the possibility of overflowing from the flocculation tank chamber 1 to chamber 2 to minimise risk of short circuiting in the first chamber and hence inadequate mixing (i.e. use a higher elevation overflow line) PA 180. General Discussion Markup the P& ID to show the drain valves on the flocculation tank chambers PA 181. General Discussion Show both isolation valves on the outlet of flocculation chamber 2 from the flocculation tank PA 182. High Flow / High Level Caustic line breakage through high pressure / damage Potential to splash a person and cause a corrosive burn System to be leak checked prior to use, high pressure tubing to be used Add a flow switch alarm to the water supply to the proposed safety shower in case a lone worker requires assistance when using the safety shower PA 183. High Flow / High Level Loss of containment of flocculant Slip hazard Utility station to be added to allow wash down of any spills of flocculant PA Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.56 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12 SYSTEM: Flocculation Tank and Chemical Dosing Systems (HAZOPed by Difference) LEADER: Dean Shewring
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 184. Reverse Flow Failure of the flocculant discharge non-return valve and the pump suction and discharge (check) valves Drain the entire flocculation tank, including both chambers, to the flocculant IBC Maintenance on the piping system and check valves As above, preference is to overflow from the mixing tank (chamber 1) at a high point which would be ideal for the flocculant addition point to reduce the chance of this reverse flow scenario. Further review required PA 185. High Temperature Water supply line to the safety shower / eyewash heated by the sun Hot water from the safety shower eyewash with the potential to render the unit inoperable Ensure the potable water to safety shower eyewash is protected from reaching high temperature due to heating by the sun LK 186. Low Temperature Cold winter night Potential to freeze caustic (46 to 50%), in particular, in small bore lines that have intermittent flows Review means to ensure the caustic does not freeze in the dosing lines SA Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.57 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12 SYSTEM: Flocculation Tank and Chemical Dosing Systems (HAZOPed by Difference) LEADER: Dean Shewring
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 187. Plant Items Personnel or wildlife contact with caustic when splash filling into the mixing tank Corrosive burn injuries Caustic not dosed during maintenance (the system is shut down).
Plant will be shutdown during maintenance of the pH probe Perform a risk assessment on the caustic dosing point for this scenario to check if additional safety controls are required, e.g. cowling around the caustic dosing point SA
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.58
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12 SYSTEM: Lamella Settlers LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 303 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 188. General Discussion Apply the common actions from the settling tank sludge pump as appropriate, i.e. actions 7, 8 and 10.
No further significant issues identified PA
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.59
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12 SYSTEM: Break Tank / Zeolite Feed Tank (HAZOPed by Difference) and the Filter Pumping System, i.e. Filters on-line LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 303 Rev A, SAS10883 304 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 189. General Discussion Review the need for having two tanks in series, i.e. the break tank and the zeolite feed tank. Can the plant be operated adequately with only one tank (e.g. consider sludge fouling the filters at a higher frequency if only one tank was used). Delete one tank from the scope if two are not required PA 190. General Discussion Operator leaves one or more filter manual valves in the incorrect position during or after a backwash operation Unwanted misdirected flows, e.g. backwash water to the GAC feed tank SOPs and training acceptable given the consequential impacts No further action required - - 191. High Pressure Zeolite filters outlet valves shut Potential to exceed the design pressure of the filters from the filter feed pumps PSH on filter feed pumps discharge, however, its set point is unknown Confirm that there are adequate safeguards to protect against over- pressure of the filters as they are designed for maximum pressure of 250 kPag PA Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.60 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12 SYSTEM: Break Tank / Zeolite Feed Tank (HAZOPed by Difference) and the Filter Pumping System, i.e. Filters on-line LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 303 Rev A, SAS10883 304 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 192. Testing Install an analysis point on the common line to the GAC feed tank to allow the operators to test the performance of the zeolite filters PA
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.61
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12 SYSTEM: Zeolite Filters Backwashing LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 304 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 193. General Discussion Install an additional valve downstream of zeolite filters to isolate the filter system from the GAC feed tank for backwashing of the zeolite filters PA 194. Low Flow / Low Level All three filters become blinded Inability to backwash Provide means to backwash all three filters when blinded, e.g. install an additional hose connection on common backwash inlet to all three filters for connecting a hose (must consider the maximum water supply pressure to ensure this does not exceed the filter maximum pressure) or install a filter bypass line to allow backwash with non- filtered water from the zeolite filter feed pump PA 195. Instruments Review the need for the flow switch after the zeolite feed pumps as the PSH can be used for filter blockage and deadhead protection. Delete if not required PA
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.62
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12 SYSTEM: GAC Feed Tank System (HAZOPed by Difference) and GAC Filters LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 305 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 196. General Discussion Update the P&ID to show the tank liquid outlet nozzle isolation valve PA 197. General Discussion Operator leaves one or more GAC manual valves in the incorrect position Unwanted misdirected flows, e.g. non-treated water to the treated water basins, or deadhead of the GAC feed pump SOPs and training acceptable given the consequential impacts No further action required - - 198. High Flow / High Level Two pumps in operation Potential to carry over activated carbon to the downstream treated water tank and beyond The stand-by pump is to be removed from the field and used as a hot spare (i.e. two pump operation not possible). Also, include in SOPs the need to only run one pump at a time in the future to avoid fluidisation of the GAC if a second stand-by pump is installed PA 199. High Flow / High Level Incorrect valve alignment Potential contaminants going into the treated water feed tank and/or dead head the GAC feed pump Testing of the treated water prior to discharge to the sewer and the ability to rerun off-spec water through the plant Include in the SOPs the need for supervisory checking of valve positions after a GAC unit valve change / change over LK Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.63 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12 SYSTEM: GAC Feed Tank System (HAZOPed by Difference) and GAC Filters LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 305 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 200. High Flow / High Level GAC purifier feed pump is larger in size than the current pump Increase pumping rate has potential to fluidise the carbon bed and hence the increase risk of carry-over of GAC Confirm the new pump will not result in fluidisation of the GEC purifiers SA 201. Zero Flow / Empty GAC feed pump stops Water in the GAC purifiers will drain down to the treated water tank and form a vacuum in the upper sections of the GAC Purifiers. Also, if the pump check valve fails, the pressure in the GACs will be close to a full vacuum when draining back to the GAC feed tank Confirm that the GAC vessels are adequately rated for the maximum vacuum that can be generated PA Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.64 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12 SYSTEM: GAC Feed Tank System (HAZOPed by Difference) and GAC Filters LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 305 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 202. High Pressure New pump feeding the GACs Potential to exceed the maximum design pressure for the GAC vessels as this is a larger duty pump Confirm that the maximum design pressure of the GAC vessels exceeds the maximum supply pressure from the new pump. If not, review the need to replace the existing PRVs with larger valves LK 203. Impurities Extended shutdown (i.e. 4-5 weeks or more) Potential for biological growth on the GAC and hence deactivation Install a recirculation line from the outlet of the GACs to the GAC feed tank to allow GAC recirculation during downtime PA 204. Impurities Fines from the initial flushing of the zeolite filters Blinding of the activated carbon and hence deactivation (as above) Include in the SOPs the need to rinse the zeolite filters to the sedimentation tank via the rinse valves PA 205. Testing Determine availability of methods to get quick turnaround on GAC bed analyses, or indicator tests while awaiting lab results PA Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.65 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12 SYSTEM: GAC Feed Tank System (HAZOPed by Difference) and GAC Filters LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 305 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 206. Plant Items Confirm the mechanical integrity of the equipment available in the existing parts of the WTP including the structures (e.g. stairs and platforms) and the vessels (e.g. routine pressure vessel inspection and testing required?) LK
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.66
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 30/11/12 SYSTEM: Treated Water Basin System LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 306 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 207. General Discussion As the treated water tank and pump are not required to recover off-spec material etc then these can be removed from the design. To prevent draining and hence forming a vacuum in the GACs when the GAC feed pump stops install a motorised solenoid valve on the common outlet line (close to the GACs) which is to close the when the GAC feed pump stops.
Also, include position switches on this motorised valve to allow interlocking to pump operation, i.e. prevent pump operation if the motorised valve is stuck closed and raise an alarm if this valve is open when it should be closed. The valve should fail to the last position PA 208. General Discussion Retain means to recirculate the basins, e.g. for pH correction. Note: sampling can be achieved by manually dipping the basin PA Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.67 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 30/11/12 SYSTEM: Treated Water Basin System LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 306 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 209. High Flow / High Level Passing butterfly valve Relatively small amount of off-spec material could flow to sewer but probably still on spec in relation to trade waste consent Change the destination selection valves in pipes from the basin to ball valves. Establish a protocol in which Orica and EPS agree on discharge to the sewer to minimise the risk of off-spec discharge, e.g. supervisory checks that the valves are in the correct position prior to discharging to the sewer PA 210. High Flow / High Level Off-spec treated water running to two basins, e.g. basin inlet valve passing or inadvertently left open Putting an on-spec basin off-spec and hence having to rerun a basin back through the plant prior to discharge Visible inlets to basins to make sure the operator can check visually during inspections Change the three basins inlet butterfly valves to ball valves for improved reliability of shut-off. These are to be lockable ball valves to allow full isolation of basins PA 211. Low Pressure Motorised valve to treated water basins closes quickly Potential to form a vacuum downstream of the motorised valve and suck in the poly pipe Provide means to mitigate the vacuum that could be formed, e.g. install a vent (vent could have a non-return valve to prevent water discharge but allow air in) or a vacuum breaker SA
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.68
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 30/11/12 SYSTEM: Sedimentation Tanks LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 307 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 212. General Discussion Review the option of using bulkabags under the sedimentation tank drains instead of the drying beds to improve ease of handling of sludge LK 213. General Discussion Mark up the P & ID to show the bund under the sedimentation tanks PA Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.69 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 30/11/12 SYSTEM: Sedimentation Tanks LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 307 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 214. Zero Flow / Empty Sludge caking within the sludge outlet line Inability to drain the sedimentation tank Lines can be rodded. Sedimentation tank to be isolated by the first outlet valve and the second outlet valve is to remain open (to prevent sludge blockages between these two valves). For improved operation, the preference is to keep one tank offline and hence have the option to use this standby tank should the first tank/lines become blocked As an option in the SOPs put the sludge line from the high capacity settler to only one of the sedimentation tanks, i.e. minimise the risk of blocking both tanks with the higher sludge containing stream PA 215. Zero Flow / Empty Fouling of the sand dryer bed with the sludge Inability to drain through the beds Operation to be reviewed during commissioning and bulkabags considered as alternative option to beds if the beds are blocked too often LK Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.70 PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 30/11/12 SYSTEM: Sedimentation Tanks LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 307 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 216. Plant Items Personnel exposed to DDT etc contained within the sludge Health impacts on personnel SWMS/JSA to be performed on sludge handling, e.g. disposal via the DTDU No further action required - - 217. Instruments Position the level switch in each sedimentation tank for ease of maintenance access and away from the sludge inlet to avoid any materials potentially seizing up the instrument PA
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.71
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 30/11/12 SYSTEM: Overview LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: All WTP P&IDs MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE 218. Commissioning Contamination of the pressure test / wash water with existing contaminants in the plant Problems in disposing of the wash-water Include in the commissioning plan the ability to store water used to rinse and test the plant and equipment for processing through the plant at a later date.
Also, avoid using detergents / dispersants when cleaning. These can cause future issues with the settling processes LK 219. Materials of Construction Review the existing and proposed materials of construction to ensure that potential contaminants do not react / interfere with plant components. Analysis is also required for the potential for construction materials being impregnated by contaminants and therefore being unsuitable for reuse on future projects or difficult to dispose of PA