STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINES

Construction, defned
Caltex v. Paloar
Construction is the art or process of discovering and
expounding the meaning and the intention of the authors
of the law with respect to its application to a given case,
where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others,
by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly
provided for in the law.
!e"islative Intent#Ratio !e"is $ Dura !ex Sed !ex $ %&en
t&e la% is clear and una'i"uous, t&ere is no roo (or
inter)retation#Plain *eanin" Rule#S)irit and Pur)ose o(
!a%
RC+C v. IAC
When the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation. Only when the law is ambiguous or of
doubtful meaning may the court interpret or construe its
true intent. A statute is ambiguous if it is admissible of
two or more possible meanings, in which case, the Court
is called upon to exercise one of its judicial functions,
which is to interpret the law according to its true intent.
Re"alado v. Yulo
The intent of the egislature is to be ascertained and
enforced is the intent expressed in the words of the
statute. The courts cannot assume some purpose in no
way expressed and then construe the statute to
accomplish this supposed intention.
*ata'uena v. Cervantes
The principle of statutory construction that what is within
the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is
written! whatever omission may be apparent in an
interpretation purely literal of the language used must be
remedial by an adherence to its avowed objective.
Del *ar v. Pa"cor
"n the interpretation of statutes, it is not proper or
permissible to in#uire into the motives which in$uenced
the legislative body, except insofar as such motives are
disclosed by the statute itself.
Cecilleville Realt, and Service Cor). v. Court o( A))eals
Where the law is unambiguous and clear, it must be
applied according to its plain and obvious meaning,
according to its express terms.
Ursua v. Court o( A))eals
There exists a valid presumption that undesirable
conse#uences were never intended by a legislative
measure and that a construction of which the statute is
fairly susceptible is favored which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil
and injurious conse#uences.
-arcia v. Social Securit, Coission !e"al and Collection
The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines
construction of a provision of law % it is a cardinal rule in
statutory construction that in interpreting the meaning
and scope of a term used in the law, a careful review of
the whole law involved, as well as the intendment of the
law, must be made.
.rancisco, /r. v. Na"aalasa0it na "a *ananan""ol n"
"a *an""a"a%an" Pili)ino, Inc.
"f the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear,
resort to other aids is available. The proper interpretation
of a constitutional provision depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than the framers&
understanding thereof.
Ut res a"is valeat 1ua )ereat
/** Prootions and *ana"eent Inc., v. N!RC
"n interpreting a statute, care should be ta'en that every
part be given e(ect. Construction that would render a
provision inoperative should be avoided and inconsistent
provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as
parts of the harmonious whole.
2isdo#Practicalit, o( !a%
RC+C v. IAC
The holding that suspension of actions for claims against a
corporation under rehabilitation ta'es e(ect as soon as
the application or a petition for rehabilitation is )led with
the *+C % may, to some, be more logical and wise but
unfortunately, such is incongruent with the clear language
of the law. To insist on such ruling, no matter how practical
and noble, would be to encroach upon legislative
prerogative to de)ne the wisdom of the law % plainly
judicial legislation.
!acson v. Ro1ue, et al.
,ere silence of the statute with respect to notice and
hearing will not justify the removal of such an o-cer
without 'nowledge of the charges and an opportunity to
be heard.
3uintos v. !acson, et al.
As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision,
it is the duty of the courts to interpret and apply them
regardless of whether or not they are wise and salutary. "f
the law is deemed unwise and detrimental to the
discipline and e-ciency of public o-cers, proper
representations and re#uests may be made to the
egislature.
Executive#Adinistrative Inter)retation
UP v. Court o( A))eals
The previous uncontested acts of the Civil *ervice
authorities in endorsing to the .niversity for action the
administrative cases of /ospital employees 0ernande1 and
2orospe, and declaring that 3the 4ureau had no
disciplinary jurisdiction over said employees in view of the
provisions of the .niversity charter,5 constitutes
contemporary interpretation of highly persuasive
character.
Enri1ue v. Court o( A))eals
2reat weight accorded to interpretation or construction of
a statute by the government agency called upon to
implement the same.
!iteral Inter)retation
+ello v. CA
This Court has cautioned against narrowly interpreting a
statute as to defeat the purpose of the legislator and
stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty to
construe statutes so as to avoid such deplorable result 6of
injustice or absurdity7 and that therefore a literal
interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead
to absurd results. "n the construction of its own 8ules of
Court, this Court is all the more so bound to liberally
construe them to avoid injustice, discrimination and
unfairness and to supply the void % that is certainly within
the spirit and purpose of the 8ule to eliminate repugnancy
and inconsistency.
Salaria v. +uenvia4e
Construction by +xecutive 4ranch of government of a
particular law although not binding upon courts must be
given weight as the construction comes from that branch
of government called upon to implement the law.
5alid in )art, void in )art
+arraeda v. *oir
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as
repugnant to the Organic aw, while another part is valid,
the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand
and be enforced.
Tatad v. Secretar, o( t&e De)artent o( Ener",
A separability clause states that if for any reason, any
section or provision of the statute is held to be
unconstitutional or 6invalid7, the other section6s7 or
provision6s7 of the law shall not be a(ected thereby. "t is a
legislative expression of intent that the nullity of one
provision shall not invalidate the other provisions of the
act. *uch a clause is not, however, controlling and the
courts may, in spite of it, invalidate the whole statute
where what is left, after the void part, is complete and
wor'able.
A'i"uit,, construed a"ainst )art, %&o caused it
Re,es v. dela Cru6
"f there is any ambiguity or obscurity in the interpretation
and meaning of a contract, the same shall not favour the
party who cause such ambiguity or obscurity.
Ilde(onso v. Si'al
Agreements must be construed according to the intention
of the parties.
3ua C&ee -an v. !a% Union and Roc0 Insurance Co)an,
!td.
The contract of insurance is one of perfect good faith not
for the insured alone, but e#ually so for the insurer! in
fact, it is more so for the latter, since its dominant
bargaining position carries with it stricter responsibility, 4y
reason of the exclusive control of the insurance company
over the terms and phraseology of the insurance contract,
the ambiguity must be strictly interpreted against the
insurer and liberally in favour of the injured, especially to
avoid a forfeiture.
+a,lon v. Court o( A))eals
"f the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as
to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal
meaning of its stipulation shall control.
!a% does not distin"uis&, Courts s&ould not distin"uis&
Col"ate Palolive P&il., Inc. v. -iene6
2eneral terms may be restricted by speci)c words, with
the result that the general language will be limited by
speci)c language which indicates the statute&s object and
purpose. The rule is applicable only to cases where,
except for one general term, all the items in an
enumeration belong to or fall under one speci)c class.
2&ere t&e la% does not distin"uis&, %e s&ould not
distin"uis&.
The rule of construction, that general and unlimited terms
are restrained and limited by particular recitals, when
used in connection with them, does not re#uire the
rejection of the general term entirely. "t is intended merely
as an aid in ascertaining the legislative intent and is to be
considered in connection with other rules of construction.
P&il. +ritis& Assurance Co. v. IAC
There should be no distinction in the application of a
statute where none is indicated. 0or courts are not
authori1ed to distinguish where the law ma'es no
distinction. They should instead administer the law not as
they thin' it ought to be but as they )nd it and without
regard to conse#uences.
A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law
does not ma'e any exception, courts may not except
something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason
apparent in the law to justify it.
*andator, and Director,
Pientel, /r. v. A"uirre
The provision in the ocal 2overnment Code providing for
such release uses the word 3shall5 and as a rule, the term
3shall5 is a word of command that must be given
compulsory meaning.
*arcelino v. Cru6
Constitutional provisions are directory, and not
mandatory, where they refer to matters merely
procedural.
+re& v. Re)u'lic
,andatory provisions prevail over directory ones.
Ex)ressio unius est exclusion alterius
Cit, -overnent o( San Pa'lo, !a"una v. Re,es
"t is a basic precept in statutory construction that the
express mention of one person, thing, act, or conse#uence
excludes all others.
Peo)le v. *oro *acarandan"
39eace o-cers5 are exempted from the re#uirements
relating to the issuance of license to possess )rearms.
Peo)e v. *a)a
The fact that a person, found in possession of an
unlicensed )rearm, is a secret agent of a provincial
governor does not exempt him from criminal liability. The
law does not contain any exception for a secret agent.
Peo)le v. Santa,aa
At the accused&s apprehension, the doctrine then
prevailing is enunciated in the case of People v.
Macarandang, holding that the appointment of a civilian
as 3secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace
and order campaigns and detection of crimes su-ciently
puts him within the category of a :peace o-cer&
e#uivalent even to a member of the municipal police
expressly covered by *ection ;<=.5 The case of People v.
Mapa revo'ed the doctrine in Macarandang case only on
August >?, @=A<. .nder the Macarandang rule therefore
obtaining at the time of the accused&s appointment as
secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for
possession of the pistol.
E4usde -eneris
Roan Cat&olic Arc&'is&o) o( *anila v. SSS
The rule of ejusdem generis applies only when there is
uncertainty. "t is not controlling where the plain purpose
and intent of the lawma'ing body would thereby hindered
and defeated.
*utuc v. CO*E!EC
.nder the wellB'nown principle of ejusdem generis, the
general words following any enumeration being applicable
only to things of the same 'ind or class as those
speci)cially referred to.
Stateent o( Individual !e"islator
Casco P&il. C&eical Co. v. -iene6
"ndividual statements made by *enators on the $oor of
the *enate do not necessarily re$ect the view of the
*enate. ,uch less do they indicate the intent of the /ouse
of 8epresentatives.
*anila /oc0e, Clu' Inc. v. -aes and Auseent +oard
"n the interpretation of a legal document, especially a
statute, unli'e in the interpretation of an ordinary written
document, it is not enough to obtain information as to the
intention or meaning of the author or authors, but also to
see whether the intention or meaning has been expressed
in such a way as to give it legal e(ect and validity. The
legal act, so to spea', is made up of two elements % an
internal and an external one! it originates in intention and
is perfected by expression. 0ailure of the latter may defeat
the former.
Noscitur a sociis
Na"ta4as v. Pr,ce Pro)erties Cor)., Inc.
.nder the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or pharse
should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same
meaning of, words with which it is associated, and, since
the word 3gambling5 is associated with 3and other
prohibited games of chance,5 under *ec. CD; of the ocal
2overnment Code, the word should be read as referring
only to illegal gambling.
AND#OR
Roulo, *a'anta v. 7oe Develo)ent and *utual .und
The term :andEor& means that the e(ect shall be given to
both the conjunctive 3and5 and the disjunctive 3or!5 or
that one word or the other may be ta'en accordingly as
one or the other will best e(ectuate the purpose intended
by the legislature as gathered from the whole statute. The
term is used to avoid a construction which by the use of
the disjunctive 3or5 alone will exclude the combination of
several of the alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive
3and5 will exclude the e-cacy of any one of the
alternatives standing alone.5 "t is accordingly ordinarily
held that the intention of the legislature in using the term
3andEor5 is that the word 3and5 and the word 3or5 are to
be used interchangeably.
Retroactivit,
Es)iritu v. Ci)riano
*tatutes are not to be construed as intended to have a
retroactive e(ect so as to a(ect pending proceedings
unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and
necessarily implied from the language of enactment.
Casus oissus )ro oisso &a'endus est
Peo)le v. *anantan
The rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est can
operate and apply only if and when the omission has been
clearly established.
Co)utation o( Tie
5ira, v. CA
The rule that excludes the last day of a period, should the
same be a holiday, refers to the performance of the act
prescribed or re#uired. 4ut it does not apply where at the
end of the period no such act is to be done.
!i'eral or strict construction
B statement of a rule when there is ambiguity
B if proceduralF liberal
7olo"ra)&ic %ills8 A4ero v. CA
0ailure to strictly observe other formalities will not result
in the disallowance of a holographic will that is
un#uestionably handwritten by the testator.
Naturali6ation !a%s8 On" C&ia v. Re)u'lic
"t is settled that naturali1ation laws should be rigidly
enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government
and against the applicant.
!a'or Statutes8 A.!. Aen v. +or4a
aborF liberal construction in favour of labor statutes.
Tax Exe)tions8 Esso Standard v. Actin" Coissioner o(
Custos
+xemption from taxation is not favored. +xemptions in tax
statutes are never presumed. +xceptions from taxation
are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and
liberally in favour of the taxing authority.
Taxation8 *anila Railroad v. Collector o( Custos
"t is the general rule in the interpretation of statutes
levying taxes or duties not to extend their provisions
beyond the clear import of the language used. "n every
case of doubt, such statutes are construed most strongly
against the 2overnment and in favour of the citi1en,
because burdens are not to be imposed, nor presumed to
be imposed, beyond what the statutes expressly and
clearly import.
Pleadin"s and Rules8 Del Rosario v. 7ao,
8ules of Court mandates a liberal construction in favour of
the rules and pleadings to e(ect substantial justice.
Doalanta v. CA
On certain occasions, this Court has allowed liberality in
the construction of the rules. The present case, however,
does not warrant such liberality because the decision of
respondent CA is satisfactorily supported by the records.
3ui'u,en v. CA
9leadings, as well as remedial laws, should be construed
liberally, in order that the litigants may have ample
opportunity to prove their respective claims, and that a
possible denial of substantial justice, due to legal
techincalities, may be avoided.
Contracts o( Insurance8 NPC v. CA
Contracts of insurance construed liberally in favor of the
insured and strictly against the insurer. Thus ambiguity in
the words of an insurance contract should be interpreted
in favour of its bene)ciary.
Cor)oration !a%8 7oe Insurance Co. v. Eastern S&i))in"
!ines, Inc.
The objective of the law was to subject the foreign
corporation to the jurisdiction of our courts. The
Corporation aw must be given a reasonable, not an
unduly harsh, interpretation which does not hamper the
development of trade relations and which fosters friendly
commercial intercourse among countries.
Pro'ation8 Pa'lo v. Castillo
9robation law is not a penal statute and therefore, the
principle of liberal interpretation is inapplicable. The Court
has pronounced that the policy of liberality of probation
statutes cannot prevail against the categorical provisions
of the law.
Retireent !a%s8 Re1uest o( Cler0 o( Court Tessie !.
-ataitan
8etirement laws are liberally interpreted in favour of the
retiree.
Inter)retation o( la%s8 +uenaseda v. .lavier
9enal statutes are strictly construed while procedural
statutes are liberally construed.
A statute granting powers to an agency created by the
Constitution should be liberally construed for the
advancement of the purposes and objectives which it was
created.
Inter)retation o( Peanl Statutes $ Retroactivit,
U.S. v. Cuna
9enal laws are to be given retroactive e(ect only in so far
as they favour the defendant charged with a crime or a
misdemeanour, and that, when a penal law is enacted
repealing a prior law, such repeal does not have the e(ect
of relieving the o(ender in whole or in part of penalties
already incurred under the old law, unless the new law
favors the defendant by diminishing the penalty or doing
away with it altogether, and then only to the extent to
which the new law is favourable to the o(ender.
Peo)le v. Taa,o
The doctrine was clearly established that in the
9hilippines, repeal of a criminal act by its reBenactment,
even without a saving clause, would not destroy criminal
liability.
U.S. v. -o C&ico
"t is clear from the authorities cited in the Act under
consideration that the legislature did not intend that a
criminal intent should be a necessary element of the
crime. The statutory de)nition of the o(ense embraces no
word implying that the prohibited act shall be done
'nowingly. The Act means what it says. Gothing is left to
interpretation.
U.S. v. Esta)ia
All the words of a statute should, when possible, be given
some meaning, and when the legislator ma'es use of
words of limitation, he must be presumed to have
intended to limit and restrict, in some way, the word or
idea with reference to which such words of limitation are
applied.
State Prosecutors v. *uro
Hudicial notice cannot be ta'en of a statute before it
becomes e(ective. A law which is not yet in force and
hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common 'nowledge
capable of ready and un#uestionable demonstration.
E9ects o( Re)eals and Aendents $ -eneral and S)ecial
!a%s $ I)lied Re)eal
*anila Railroad Co. v. Ra9ert,
*pecial laws or charters may not be amended, altered, or
repealed by a general law, by mere implication.
8epeal of laws by implication is not favored. The mere
repugnancy between two statutes should be very clear in
order to warrant the court in holding that the later in time
repeals the former, when it does not in terms purport to
do so.
"t is well settled that a special and local statute is not
repealed by a subse#uent statute unless the intent to
repeal or alter it is manifest, although the terms of the
general act are broad enough to include the cases in the
special law.
Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the
later general % the terms of the general broad enough to
include the matter provided for in the special % the fact
that one is special and the other general creates a
presumption that the special is to be considered as
remaining an exception to the general % one as a general
law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case.
Iloilo Pala, and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. .eliciano
A repealing clause in an Act which provides that 3all laws
or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed or modi)ed accordingly5 is certainly
not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify
or designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be
repealed. 8ather, it is a clause which predicates the
intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial
con$ict must be found in existing and prior Acts. *uch
being the case, the presumption against implied repeals
and the rule against strict construction regarding implied
repeals apply ex proprio vigore.
Aleda v. .lorentino
8epeals by implication are not favored, unless it is
manifest that the legislature so intended and courts are
duty bound to adopt a construction that will give e(ect to
every part of a statute, if at all possible.
Sanc&e6 v. Ri"os
"n construing di(erent provisions of one and the same law
or code, such interpretation should be favored as will
reconcile or harmoni1e said provisions and avoid a con$ict
between the same.
+xceptions are not favored, unless the intention to the
contrary is clear.
*ecano v. Coission on Audit
The failure to add a speci)c repealing clause indicates
that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless
an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in
the terms of the new and old laws.
There are two categories of repeal by implication. The )rst
is where provisions in the two acts on the same subject
matter are in an irreconcilable con$ict, the later act to the
extent of the con$ict constitutes an implied repeal of the
earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the whole
subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a
substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law. "mplied
repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency ta'es place when
the two statutes cover the same subject matter! and both
cannot be given e(ect, that is, that one law cannot be
enforced without nullifying the other.
astly, it is a wellBsettled rule in statutory construction
that repeals by statute by implication are not favored. The
presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for
the legislature is presumed to 'now the existing laws on
the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or
con$icting statutes.
Cit, o( +asilan v. 7ec&anova
Whenever there is a con$ict of an ordinance with a
statute, the former must give way.
Arenas v. Cit, o( San Carlos
The primary purpose of a proviso is to limit the general
language of a statute. When there is irreconcilable
repugnancy between the proviso and the body of the
statute, the former is given precedence over the latter on
the ground that it is the latest expression of the intent of
the legislature.