Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics

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htm
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Αριστοτέλους
Ηθικά Νικοµάχεια
translated by William David Ross
Clarendon Press 1908
Table of Contents [*]
Book I. The Good for Man

[ Book I. ] A. Subject of our inquiry.
1. All human activities aim at some good: some goods subordinate to others.
2. The science of the good for man is politics.
B. Nature of the science.
3. We must not expect more precision than the subject-matter admits. The student
should have reached years of discretion.
C. What is the good for man?

4. It is generally agreed to be happiness, but there are various views as to what
happiness is. What is required at the start is an unreasoned conviction about the facts,
such as is produced by a good upbringing.
5. Discussion of the popular views that the good is pleasure, honour, wealth; a fourth
kind of life, that of contemplation, deferred for future discussion.
6. Discussion of the philosophical view that there is an Idea of good.
7. The good must be something final and self-sufficient. Definition of happiness reached
by considering the characteristic function of man.
8. This definition is confirmed by current beliefs about happiness.
9. Is happiness acquired by learning or habituation, or sent by God or by chance?
10. Should no man be called happy while he lives?
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11. Do the fortunes of the living affect the dead?

12. Virtue is praiseworthy, but happiness is above praise.
D. Kinds of virtue.
13. Division of the faculties, and resultant division of virtue into intellectual and moral.
Books II-V. Moral Virtue
II.1 -- III.5. General Account

[ Book II. ] A. Moral virtue, how produced, in what materials and in what manner
exhibited.
1. It, like the arts, is acquired by repetition of the corresponding acts.
2. These acts cannot be prescribed exactly, but must avoid excess and defect.
3. Pleasure in doing virtuous acts is a sign that the virtuous disposition has been
acquired: a variety of considerations show the essential connexion of moral virtue
with pleasure and pain.
4. The actions that produce moral virtue are not good in the same sense as those that
flow from it: the latter must fulfil certain conditions not necessary in the case of the
arts.
B. Definition of moral virtue.

5. Its genus: it is a state of character, not a passion nor a faculty.
6. Its differentia: it is a disposition to choose the mean.
7. This proposition illustrated by reference to the particular virtues.
C. Characteristics of the extreme and mean states: practical corollaries.

8. The extremes are opposed to each other and the mean.
9. The mean is hard to attain, and is grasped by perception, not by reasoning.
[ Book III. ] D. Inner side of moral virtue: conditions of responsibility for action.
1. Praise and blame attach to voluntary actions, i.e. actions done (1) not under
compulsion, and (2) with knowledge of the circumstances.
2. Moral virtue implies that the action is done (3) by choice; the object of choice is the
result of previous deliberation.
3. The nature of deliberation and its objects: choice is the deliberate desire of things in
our own power.
4. The object of rational wish is the end, i.e. the good or the apparent good.
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5. We are responsible for bad as well as for good actions.
III.6 -- V.2. The Virtues and Vices

A. Courage.
6. Courage concerned with the feelings of fear and confidence -- strictly speaking, with
the fear of death in battle.
7. The motive of courage is the sense of honour: characteristics of the opposite vices,
cowardice and rashness.
8. Five kinds of courage improperly so called.
9. Relation of courage to pain and pleasure.
B. Temperance.
10. Temperance is limited to certain pleasures of touch.
11. Characteristics of temperance and its opposites, self-indulgence and 'insensibility'.
12. Self-indulgence more voluntary than cowardice.
[ Book IV. ] C. Virtues concerned with money.
1. Liberality, prodigality, meanness.

2. Magnificence, vulgarity, niggardliness.
D. Virtues concerned with honour.
3. Pride, vanity, humility.

4. Ambition, unambitiousness, and the mean between them.
E. The virtue concerned with anger.

5. Good temper, irascibility, inirascibility.
F. Virtues of social intercourse.
6. Friendliness, obsequiousness, churlishness.

7. Truthfulness, boastfulness, mock-modesty.
8. Ready wit, buffoonery, boorishness.
G. A quasi-virtue.
9. Shame, bashfulness, shamelessness.
[ Book V. ] H. Justice.
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I. Its sphere and outer nature: in what sense it is a mean.

1. The just as the lawful (universal justice) and the just as the fair and equal
(particular justice): the former considered.
2. The latter considered: divided into distributive and rectificatory justice.
3. Distributive justice, in accordance with geometrical proportion.
4. Rectificatory justice, in accordance with arithmetical progression.
5. Justice in exchange, reciprocity in accordance with proportion.
6. Political justice and analogous kinds of justice.
7. Natural and legal justice.
II. Its inner nature as involving choice.
8. The scale of degrees of wrongdoing.
9. Can a man be voluntarily treated unjustly? Is it the distributor or the recipient
that is guilty of injustice in distribution? Justice not so easy as it might seem,
because it is not a way of acting but an inner disposition.
10. Equity, a corrective of legal justice.
11. Can a man treat himself unjustly?
[ Book VI. ] Book VI. Intellectual Virtue

A. Introduction.
1. Reasons for studying intellectual virtue: intellect divided into the contemplative
and the calculative.
2. The object of the former is truth, that of the latter truth corresponding with right
desire.
B. The chief intellectual virtues.
3. Science -- demonstrative knowledge of the necessary and eternal.

4. Art -- knowledge of how to make things.
5. Practical wisdom -- knowledge of how to secure the ends of human life.
6. Intuitive reason -- knowledge of the principles from which science proceeds.
7. Philosophic wisdom -- the union of intuitive reason and science.
8. Relations between practical wisdom and political science.
C. Minor intellectual virtues concerned with conduct.

9. Goodness in deliberation, how related to practical wisdom.
10. Understanding -- the critical quality answering to the imperative quality practical
wisdom.
11. Judgement -- right discrimination of the equitable: the place of intuition in morals.
D. Relation of philosophic to practical wisdom.
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12. What is the use of philosophic and of practical wisdom? Philosophic wisdom is
the formal cause of happiness; practical wisdom is what ensures the taking of proper
means to the proper ends desired by moral virtue.
13. Relation of practical wisdom to natural virtue, moral virtue, and the right rule.
[ Book VII. ] Book VII. Continence and Incontinence; Pleasure

A. Continence and incontinence.
1. Six varieties of character: method of treatment: current opinions.
2. Contradictions involved in these opinions.
3. Solution of the problem, in what sense the incontinent man acts against knowledge.
4. Solution of the problem, what is the sphere of incontinence: its proper and its
extended sense distinguished.
5. Incontinence in its extended sense includes a brutish and a morbid form.
6. Incontinence in respect of anger less disgraceful than incontinence proper.
7. Softness and endurance: two forms of incontinence -- weakness and impetuosity.
8. Self-indulgence worse than incontinence.
9. Relation of continence to obstinancy, incontinence, 'insensibility', temperence.
10. Practical wisdom is not compatible with incontinence, but cleverness is.
B. Pleasure.
11. Three views hostile to pleasure, and the arguments for them.
12. Discussion of the view that pleasure is not a good.
13. Discussion of the view that pleasure is not the chief good.
14. Discussion of the view that most pleasures are bad, and of the tendency to
identify bodily pleasures with pleasure in general.
Books VIII, IX. Friendship

[ Book VIII. A. Kinds of friendship.
]
1. Friendship both necessary and noble: main questions about it.
2. Three objects of love: implications of friendship.
3. Three corresponding kinds of friendship: superiority of friendship whose motive is
the good.
4. Contrast between the best and the inferior kinds.
5. The state of friendship distinguished from the activity of friendship and from the
feeling of friendliness.
6. Various relations between the three kinds.
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B. Reciprocity of friendship
7. In unequal friendships a proportion must be maintained.
8. Loving is more of the essence of friendship than being loved.
C. Relation of reciprocity in friendship to that involved in other forms of

community.
9. Parallelism of friendship and justice: the state comprehends all lesser communities.
10. Classification of constitutions: analogies with family relations.
11. Corresponding forms of friendship, and of justice.
12. Various forms of friendship between relations.
D. Casuistry of friendship.
13. Principles of interchange of services (a) in friendship between equals.
14. (b) In friendship between unequals.
[ Book IX. ] 1. (c) In friendship in which the motives on the two sides are different.
2. Conflict of obligations.
3. Occasions of breaking off friendship.
E. Internal nature of friendship.

4. Friendship is based on self-love.
5. Relation of friendship to goodwill.
6. Relation of friendship to unanimity.
7. The pleasure of beneficence.
8. The nature of true self-love.
F. The need of friendship.

9. Why does the happy man need friends?
10. The limit to the number of friends.
11. Are friends more needed in good or in bad fortune?
12. The essence of friendship is living together.
Book X. Pleasure; Happiness

[ Book X. ] A. Pleasure.
1. Two opposed views about pleasure.

2. Discussion of the view that pleasure is the good.
3. Discussion of the view that pleasure is wholly bad.
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4. Definition of pleasure.
5. Pleasures differ with the activities which they accompany and complete: criterion
of the value of pleasures.
B. Happiness.
6. Happiness is a good activity, not amusement.

7. Happiness in the highest sense is the contemplative life.
8. Superiority of the contemplative life further considered.
9. Legislation is needed if the end is to be attained: transition to Politics.
[Special thanks to nothingistic.org for providing the Table of Contents]
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ToC Βιβλίον Ι, 8-13 >>
Ἀριστοτέλους
Ἠθικὰ Νικοµάχεια
[ed. J. Bywater, Aristotle's Ethica Nicomachea. Oxford, 1894]

Βιβλίον I, 1-7
Book I. The Good for Man
A. Subject of our inquiry.
1. All human activities aim at

some good: some goods
subordinate to others.
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[1094a] Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα µέθοδος, EVERY art and every inquiry, and
ὁµοίως δὲ πρᾶξίς τε καὶ προαίρεσις, similarly every action and pursuit, is
thought to aim at some good; and for this
ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ· διὸ καλῶς reason the good has rightly been declared to
ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθόν, οὗ πάντ᾽ ἐφίεται. be that at which all things aim.
διαφορὰ δέ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν· τὰ But a certain difference is found among
µὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρ᾽ ends; some are activities, others are
products apart from the activities that
αὐτὰς (5) ἔργα τινά. ὧν δ᾽ εἰσὶ τέλη τινὰ produce them. Where there are ends apart
παρὰ τὰς πράξεις, ἐν τούτοις βελτίω from the actions, it is the nature of the
πέφυκε τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὰ ἔργα. products to be better than the activities.
πολλῶν δὲ πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν Now, as there are many actions, arts, and
καὶ ἐπιστηµῶν πολλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ sciences, their ends also are many; the end
of the medical art is health, that of
τέλη· ἰατρικῆς µὲν γὰρ ὑγίεια, shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy
ναυπηγικῆς δὲ πλοῖον, στρατηγικῆς δὲ victory, that of economics wealth.
νίκη, οἰκονοµικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος.
ὅσαι (10) δ᾽ εἰσὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑπὸ µίαν But where such arts fall under a single
τινὰ δύναµιν, καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἱππικὴν capacity- as bridle-making and the other
arts concerned with the equipment of horses
χαλινοποιικὴ καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τῶν fall under the art of riding, and this and
ἱππικῶν ὀργάνων εἰσίν, αὕτη δὲ καὶ every military action under strategy, in the
πᾶσα πολεµικὴ πρᾶξις ὑπὸ τὴν same way other arts fall under yet others-
in all of these the ends of the master arts
στρατηγικήν, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον
are to be preferred to all the subordinate
ἄλλαι ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρας· ἐν ἁπάσαις δὲ τὰ τῶν ends; for it is for the sake of the former that
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ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάντων (15) ἐστὶν the latter are pursued.

αἱρετώτερα τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτά· τούτων γὰρ
χάριν κἀκεῖνα διώκεται.
διαφέρει δ᾽ οὐδὲν τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς It makes no difference whether the activities
εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἢ παρὰ themselves are the ends of the actions, or
something else apart from the activities, as
ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν in the case of the sciences just mentioned.
λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστηµῶν.
2. The science of the good for

man is politics.
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Εἰ δή τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι᾽ If, then, there is some end of the things
αὑτὸ βουλόµεθα, τἆλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ we do, which we desire for its own sake
(everything else being desired for the sake
µὴ (20) πάντα δι᾽ ἕτερον αἱρούµεθα of this), and if we do not choose everything
(πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ᾽ εἰς ἄπειρον, ὥστ᾽ for the sake of something else (for at that
εἶναι κενὴν καὶ µαταίαν τὴν ὄρεξιν), rate the process would go on to infinity, so
that our desire would be empty and vain),
δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ
clearly this must be the good and the chief
ἄριστον. good.
ἆρ᾽ οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ γνῶσις Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a
αὐτοῦ µεγάλην ἔχει ῥοπήν, καὶ καθάπερ great influence on life? Shall we not, like
archers who have a mark to aim at, be more
τοξόται σκοπὸν ἔχοντες µᾶλλον ἂν likely to hit upon what is right? If so, we
τυγχάνοιµεν τοῦ δέοντος; εἰ δ᾽ (25) οὕτω, must try, in outline at least, to determine
πειρατέον τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ τί what it is, and of which of the sciences or
capacities it is the object.
ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ τίνος τῶν ἐπιστηµῶν ἢ
δυνάµεων.
δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν τῆς κυριωτάτης καὶ µάλιστα It would seem to belong to the most
ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς. τοιαύτη δ᾽ ἡ πολιτικὴ authoritative art and that which is most
truly the master art. And politics appears to
φαίνεται· τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρεὼν τῶν be of this nature; for it is this that ordains
ἐπιστηµῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, [1094β] (1) καὶ which of the sciences should be studied in a
ποίας ἑκάστους µανθάνειν καὶ µέχρι state, and which each class of citizens
τίνος, αὕτη διατάσσει· ὁρῶµεν δὲ καὶ τὰς should learn and up to what point they
should learn them; and we see even the
ἐντιµοτάτας τῶν δυνάµεων ὑπὸ ταύτην most highly esteemed of capacities to fall
οὔσας, οἷον στρατηγικὴν οἰκονοµικὴν under this, e.g. strategy, economics,
ῥητορικήν· χρωµένης δὲ ταύτης ταῖς rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of
the sciences, and since, again, it legislates
λοιπαῖς [πρακτικαῖς] τῶν ἐπιστηµῶν, (5)
as to what we are to do and what we are to
ἔτι δὲ νοµοθετούσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ abstain from, the end of this science must
τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι, τὸ ταύτης τέλος include those of the others, so that this end
περιέχοι ἂν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε τοῦτ᾽ must be the good for man.
ἂν εἴη τἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν.
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εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἑνὶ καὶ πόλει, For even if the end is the same for a single
µεῖζόν γε καὶ τελειότερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως man and for a state, that of the state seems
at all events something greater and more
φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σῴζειν· complete whether to attain or to preserve;
ἀγαπητὸν µὲν γὰρ καὶ ἑνὶ (10) µόνῳ, though it is worth while to attain the end
κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ merely for one man, it is finer and more
godlike to attain it for a nation or for
πόλεσιν.
city-states.
ἡ µὲν οὖν µέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, These, then, are the ends at which our
πολιτική τις οὖσα. inquiry aims, since it is political science, in
one sense of that term.
B. Nature of the science.
3. We must not expect more

precision than the subject-matter
admits. The student should have
reached years of discretion.
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Λέγοιτο δ᾽ ἂν ἱκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν Our discussion will be adequate if it has

ὑποκειµένην ὕλην διασαφηθείη· τὸ γὰρ as much clearness as the subject-matter
admits of, for precision is not to be sought
ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὁµοίως ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς λόγοις for alike in all discussions, any more than in
ἐπιζητητέον, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ ἐν τοῖς all the products of the crafts.
δηµιουργουµένοις.
τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, (15) περὶ ὧν ἡ Now fine and just actions, which political
πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, πολλὴν ἔχει science investigates, admit of much variety
and fluctuation of opinion, so that they may
διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, ὥστε δοκεῖν νόµῳ be thought to exist only by convention, and
µόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ µή. not by nature.
τοιαύτην δέ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ And goods also give rise to a similar
τἀγαθὰ διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συµβαίνειν fluctuation because they bring harm to
many people; for before now men have
βλάβας ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν· ἤδη γάρ τινες been undone by reason of their wealth, and
ἀπώλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δι᾽ others by reason of their courage.
ἀνδρείαν.
ἀγαπητὸν οὖν περὶ τοιούτων (20) καὶ ἐκ We must be content, then, in speaking of
τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς καὶ τύπῳ such subjects and with such premisses to
indicate the truth roughly and in outline,
τἀληθὲς ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς and in speaking about things which are only
ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας for the most part true and with premisses of
τοιαῦτα καὶ συµπεραίνεσθαι. the same kind to reach conclusions that are
no better.
τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδέχεσθαι In the same spirit, therefore, should each
χρεὼν ἕκαστα τῶν λεγοµένων· type of statement be received; for it is the
mark of an educated man to look for
πεπαιδευµένου γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον
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τἀκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον (25) precision in each class of things just so far
γένος, ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγµατος φύσις as the nature of the subject admits; it is
evidently equally foolish to accept probable
ἐπιδέχεται· παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται reasoning from a mathematician and to
µαθηµατικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.
ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις
ἀπαιτεῖν.
Ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἃ γινώσκει, καὶ Now each man judges well the things he
τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής. [1095α] (1) knows, and of these he is a good judge. And
so the man who has been educated in a
καθ᾽ ἕκαστον µὲν ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευµένος, subject is a good judge of that subject, and
ἁπλῶς δ᾽ ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευµένος. διὸ the man who has received an all-round
τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος education is a good judge in general. Hence
a young man is not a proper hearer of
ἀκροατὴς ὁ νέος· ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ
lectures on political science; for he is
τὸν βίον πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι δ᾽ ἐκ τούτων inexperienced in the actions that occur in
καὶ περὶ τούτων· ἔτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν life, but its discussions start from these and
ἀκολουθητικὸς ὢν (5) µαταίως are about these; and, further, since he
tends to follow his passions, his study will be
ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὸ vain and unprofitable, because the end
τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις. aimed at is not knowledge but action.
διαφέρει δ᾽ οὐδὲν νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ And it makes no difference whether he is

ἦθος νεαρός· οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἡ young in years or youthful in character; the
defect does not depend on time, but on his
ἔλλειψις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ζῆν living, and pursuing each successive object,
καὶ διώκειν ἕκαστα. as passion directs.
τοῖς γὰρ τοιούτοις ἀνόνητος ἡ γνῶσις For to such persons, as to the incontinent,
γίνεται, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν· (10) knowledge brings no profit; but to those
who desire and act in accordance with a
τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὀρέξεις rational principle knowledge about such
ποιουµένοις καὶ πράττουσι πολυωφελὲς matters will be of great benefit.
ἂν εἴη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι.
Καὶ περὶ µὲν ἀκροατοῦ, καὶ πῶς These remarks about the student, the
ἀποδεκτέον, καὶ τί προτιθέµεθα, sort of treatment to be expected, and the
purpose of the inquiry, may be taken as our
πεφροιµιάσθω ταῦτα. preface.
C. What is the good for man?
4. It is generally agreed to be
happiness, but there are various
views as to what happiness is.
What is required at the start is an
unreasoned conviction about the
facts, such as is produced by a
good upbringing.
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Λέγωµεν δ᾽ ἀναλαβόντες, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα Let us resume our inquiry and state, in
γνῶσις καὶ προαίρεσις (15) ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς view of the fact that all knowledge and
every pursuit aims at some good, what it is
ὀρέγεται, τί ἐστὶν οὗ λέγοµεν τὴν that we say political science aims at and
πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τί τὸ πάντων what is the highest of all goods achievable
ἀκρότατον τῶν πρακτῶν ἀγαθῶν. by action.
ὀνόµατι µὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν Verbally there is very general agreement;
πλείστων ὁµολογεῖται· τὴν γὰρ for both the general run of men and people
of superior refinement say that it is
εὐδαιµονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ happiness, and identify living well and doing
χαρίεντες λέγουσιν, τὸ δ᾽ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ well with being happy; but with regard to
εὖ πράττειν ταὐτὸν ὑπολαµβάνουσι (20) what happiness is they differ, and the many
do not give the same account as the wise.
τῷ εὐδαιµονεῖν· περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιµονίας,
For the former think it is some plain and
τί ἐστιν, ἀµφισβητοῦσι καὶ οὐχ ὁµοίως οἱ obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or
πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀποδιδόασιν. οἳ µὲν honour; they differ, however, from one
γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον another- and often even the same man
identifies it with different things, with health
ἡδονὴν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιµήν, ἄλλοι δ᾽ when he is ill, with wealth when he is poor;
ἄλλο--πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον· but, conscious of their ignorance, they
νοσήσας µὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν, πενόµενος δὲ admire those who proclaim some great ideal
(25) πλοῦτον· συνειδότες δ᾽ ἑαυτοῖς that is above their comprehension.
ἄγνοιαν τοὺς µέγα τι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς

λέγοντας θαυµάζουσιν.
ἔνιοι δ᾽ ᾤοντο παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα Now some thought that apart from these
ἀγαθὰ ἄλλο τι καθ᾽ αὑτὸ εἶναι, ὃ καὶ many goods there is another which is
self-subsistent and causes the goodness of
τούτοις πᾶσιν αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι all these as well. To examine all the
ἀγαθά. ἁπάσας µὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν τὰς opinions that have been held were perhaps
δόξας µαταιότερον ἴσως ἐστίν, ἱκανὸν δὲ somewhat fruitless; enough to examine
τὰς µάλιστα (30) ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ those that are most prevalent or that seem
to be arguable.
δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον.
Μὴ λανθανέτω δ᾽ ἡµᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν Let us not fail to notice, however, that
οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς there is a difference between arguments
from and those to the first principles. For
ἀρχάς. εὖ γὰρ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἠπόρει Plato, too, was right in raising this question
τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτει, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν and asking, as he used to do, 'are we on the
ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἡ ὁδός, way from or to the first principles?' There is
a difference, as there is in a race-course
[1095β] (1) ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν
between the course from the judges to the
ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἢ ἀνάπαλιν. turning-point and the way back.
ἀρκτέον µὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίµων, For, while we must begin with what is
ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ µὲν γὰρ ἡµῖν τὰ δ᾽ known, things are objects of knowledge in
two senses- some to us, some without
ἁπλῶς. ἴσως οὖν ἡµῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ qualification. Presumably, then, we must
τῶν ἡµῖν γνωρίµων. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν begin with things known to us. Hence any
ἦχθαι καλῶς τὸν (5) περὶ καλῶν καὶ one who is to listen intelligently to lectures
about what is noble and just, and generally,
δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν
about the subjects of political science must
ἀκουσόµενον ἱκανῶς. have been brought up in good habits.
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ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο For the fact is the starting-point, and if this
ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι· is sufficiently plain to him, he will not at the
start need the reason as well; and the man
ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς who has been well brought up has or can
ῥᾳδίως. ᾧ δὲ µηδέτερον ὑπάρχει τούτων, easily get startingpoints. And as for him who
ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου· neither has nor can get them, let him hear
the words of Hesiod:
(10) οὗτος µὲν πανάριστος ὃς Far best is he who knows all

αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ, things himself;
Good, he that hearkens when
ἐσθλὸς δ᾽ αὖ κἀκεῖνος ὃς εὖ men counsel right;
εἰπόντι πίθηται. But he who neither knows, nor
ὃς δέ κε µήτ᾽ αὐτὸς νοέῃ µήτ᾽ lays to heart
Another's wisdom, is a useless
ἄλλου ἀκούων
wight.
ἐν θυµῷ βάλληται, ὃ δ᾽ αὖτ᾽
ἀχρήιος ἀνήρ.
5. Discussion of the popular

views that the good is pleasure,
honour, wealth; a fourth kind of
life, that of contemplation,
deferred for future discussion.
<<< >>>
Ἡµεῖς δὲ λέγωµεν ὅθεν παρεξέβηµεν. Let us, however, resume our discussion
τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν (15) καὶ τὴν εὐδαιµονίαν from the point at which we digressed. To
judge from the lives that men lead, most
οὐκ ἀλόγως ἐοίκασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων men, and men of the most vulgar type,
ὑπολαµβάνειν οἱ µὲν πολλοὶ καὶ seem (not without some ground) to identify
φορτικώτατοι τὴν ἡδονήν· διὸ καὶ τὸν the good, or happiness, with pleasure; which
is the reason why they love the life of
βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν. τρεῖς
enjoyment. For there are, we may say,
γάρ εἰσι µάλιστα οἱ προύχοντες, ὅ τε νῦν three prominent types of life- that just
εἰρηµένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ mentioned, the political, and thirdly the
θεωρητικός. contemplative life.
οἱ µὲν οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς (20) Now the mass of mankind are evidently
ἀνδραποδώδεις φαίνονται βοσκηµάτων quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life
suitable to beasts, but they get some ground
βίον προαιρούµενοι, τυγχάνουσι δὲ for their view from the fact that many of
λόγου διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς those in high places share the tastes of
ἐξουσίαις ὁµοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλλῳ. Sardanapallus. A consideration of the
prominent types of life shows that people of
οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ τιµήν· τοῦ
superior refinement and of active disposition
γὰρ πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος. identify happiness with honour; for this is,
roughly speaking, the end of the political
life.
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φαίνεται δ᾽ ἐπιπολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ But it seems too superficial to be what we

ζητουµένου· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν (25) τοῖς τιµῶσι are looking for, since it is thought to depend
on those who bestow honour rather than on
µᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ τιµωµένῳ, him who receives it, but the good we divine
τἀγαθὸν δὲ οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον to be something proper to a man and not
εἶναι µαντευόµεθα. easily taken from him.
ἔτι δ᾽ ἐοίκασι τὴν τιµὴν διώκειν ἵνα Further, men seem to pursue honour in
πιστεύσωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· order that they may be assured of their
goodness; at least it is by men of practical
ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίµων wisdom that they seek to be honoured, and
τιµᾶσθαι, καὶ παρ᾽ οἷς γινώσκονται, καὶ among those who know them, and on the
ἐπ᾽ ἀρετῇ· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατά γε (30) ground of their virtue; clearly, then,
according to them, at any rate, virtue is
τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων.
better.
τάχα δὲ καὶ µᾶλλον ἄν τις τέλος τοῦ And perhaps one might even suppose this to
πολιτικοῦ βίου ταύτην ὑπολάβοι. be, rather than honour, the end of the
political life. But even this appears
φαίνεται δὲ ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὕτη· δοκεῖ somewhat incomplete; for possession of
γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν ἔχοντα virtue seems actually compatible with being
τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ asleep, or with lifelong inactivity, and,
πρὸς τούτοις κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ further, with the greatest sufferings and
misfortunes; but a man who was living so no
µέγιστα· [1096α] (1) τὸν δ᾽ οὕτω ζῶντα one would call happy, unless he were
οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιµονίσειεν, εἰ µὴ θέσιν maintaining a thesis at all costs.
διαφυλάττων.
καὶ περὶ µὲν τούτων ἅλις· ἱκανῶς γὰρ καὶ But enough of this; for the subject has been
ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν. sufficiently treated even in the current
discussions. Third comes the contemplative
τρίτος δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ θεωρητικός, ὑπὲρ οὗ (5) life, which we shall consider later.
τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἑποµένοις
ποιησόµεθα.
Ὁ δὲ χρηµατιστὴς βίαιός τις ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ The life of money-making is one

πλοῦτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούµενον undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is
evidently not the good we are seeking; for it
ἀγαθόν· χρήσιµον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν. is merely useful and for the sake of
διὸ µᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον λεχθέντα τέλη something else. And so one might rather
τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι· δι᾽ αὑτὰ γὰρ ἀγαπᾶται. take the aforenamed objects to be ends; for
they are loved for themselves. But it is
φαίνεται δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνα· καίτοι πολλοὶ
evident that not even these are ends; yet
λόγοι (10) πρὸς αὐτὰ καταβέβληνται. many arguments have been thrown away in
ταῦτα µὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω. support of them. Let us leave this subject,
then.
6. Discussion of the philosophical

view that there is an Idea of
good.
<<< >>>
7 of 15 23/02/2014 1:24 AM
Τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ἴσως We had perhaps better consider the

ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ διαπορῆσαι πῶς universal good and discuss thoroughly what
is meant by it, although such an inquiry is
λέγεται, καίπερ προσάντους τῆς made an uphill one by the fact that the
τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γινοµένης διὰ τὸ Forms have been introduced by friends of
φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἴδη. our own. Yet it would perhaps be thought to
be better, indeed to be our duty, for the
δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν
sake of maintaining the truth even to
ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς (15) ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ destroy what touches us closely, especially
οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ as we are philosophers or lovers of wisdom;
φιλοσόφους ὄντας· ἀµφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν for, while both are dear, piety requires us to
honour truth above our friends.
φίλοιν ὅσιον προτιµᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.
Οἱ δὴ κοµίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οὐκ The men who introduced this doctrine did
ἐποίουν ἰδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ not posit Ideas of classes within which they
recognized priority and posteriority (which is
ὕστερον ἔλεγον, διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν the reason why they did not maintain the
ἀριθµῶν ἰδέαν κατεσκεύαζον· τὸ δ᾽ existence of an Idea embracing all
ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ ἐν (20) τῷ τί ἐστι καὶ numbers); but the term 'good' is used both
ἐν τῷ ποιῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρός τι, τὸ δὲ καθ᾽ in the category of substance and in that of
quality and in that of relation, and that
αὑτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ which is per se, i.e. substance, is prior in
πρός τι (παραφυάδι γὰρ τοῦτ᾽ ἔοικε καὶ nature to the relative (for the latter is like
συµβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος)· ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἂν εἴη an off shoot and accident of being); so that
there could not be a common Idea set over
κοινή τις ἐπὶ τούτοις ἰδέα.
all these goods.
ἔτι δ᾽ ἐπεὶ τἀγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ Further, since 'good' has as many senses as
ὄντι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί λέγεται, οἷον ὁ 'being' (for it is predicated both in the
category of substance, as of God and of
θεὸς καὶ (25) ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ αἱ reason, and in quality, i.e. of the virtues,
ἀρεταί, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τὸ µέτριον, καὶ and in quantity, i.e. of that which is
ἐν τῷ πρός τι τὸ χρήσιµον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ moderate, and in relation, i.e. of the useful,
and in time, i.e. of the right opportunity,
καιρός, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ δίαιτα καὶ ἕτερα
and in place, i.e. of the right locality and the
τοιαῦτα), δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι like), clearly it cannot be something
καθόλου καὶ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγετ᾽ ἐν universally present in all cases and single;
πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν µιᾷ for then it could not have been predicated in
all the categories but in one only.
µόνῃ.
ἔτι δ᾽ ἐπεὶ τῶν (30) κατὰ µίαν ἰδέαν µία Further, since of the things answering to
καὶ ἐπιστήµη, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων one Idea there is one science, there would
have been one science of all the goods; but
ἦν ἂν µία τις ἐπιστήµη· νῦν δ᾽ εἰσὶ as it is there are many sciences even of the
πολλαὶ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ µίαν κατηγορίαν, things that fall under one category, e.g. of
οἷον καιροῦ, ἐν πολέµῳ µὲν γὰρ opportunity, for opportunity in war is
studied by strategics and in disease by
στρατηγικὴ ἐν νόσῳ δ᾽ ἰατρική, καὶ τοῦ
medicine, and the moderate in food is
µετρίου ἐν τροφῇ µὲν ἰατρικὴ ἐν πόνοις studied by medicine and in exercise by the
δὲ γυµναστική. science of gymnastics.
ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις τί (35) ποτε καὶ And one might ask the question, what in the
βούλονται λέγειν αὐτοέκαστον, εἴπερ ἔν world they mean by 'a thing itself', is (as is
the case) in 'man himself' and in a particular
τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ [1096β] (1) καὶ ἐν man the account of man is one and the
8 of 15 23/02/2014 1:24 AM
ἀνθρώπῳ εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ same. For in so far as they are man, they
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ᾗ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲν will in no respect differ; and if this is so,
neither will 'good itself' and particular
διοίσουσιν· εἰ δ᾽ οὕτως, οὐδ᾽ ᾗ ἀγαθόν. goods, in so far as they are good. But again
ἀλλὰ µὴν οὐδὲ τῷ ἀίδιον εἶναι µᾶλλον it will not be good any the more for being
ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, εἴπερ µηδὲ λευκότερον τὸ eternal, since that which lasts long is no
whiter than that which perishes in a day.
πολυχρόνιον τοῦ (5) ἐφηµέρου.
The Pythagoreans seem to give a more
πιθανώτερον δ᾽ ἐοίκασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι plausible account of the good, when they
λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν place the one in the column of goods; and it
ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἕν· οἷς δὴ καὶ is they that Speusippus seems to have
followed.
Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολουθῆσαι δοκεῖ.
Ἀλλὰ περὶ µὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω But let us discuss these matters
λόγος· τοῖς δὲ λεχθεῖσιν ἀµφισβήτησίς elsewhere; an objection to what we have
said, however, may be discerned in the fact
τις ὑποφαίνεται διὰ τὸ µὴ περὶ παντὸς that the Platonists have not been speaking
ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους (10) εἰρῆσθαι, about all goods, and that the goods that are
λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ᾽ ἓν εἶδος τὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ pursued and loved for themselves are called
διωκόµενα καὶ ἀγαπώµενα, τὰ δὲ good by reference to a single Form, while
those which tend to produce or to preserve
ποιητικὰ τούτων ἢ φυλακτικά πως ἢ τῶν these somehow or to prevent their
ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι contraries are called so by reference to
καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διττῶς these, and in a secondary sense. Clearly,
then, goods must be spoken of in two ways,
λέγοιτ᾽ ἂν τἀγαθά, καὶ τὰ µὲν καθ᾽ αὑτά, and some must be good in themselves, the
θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα. others by reason of these.
χωρίσαντες (15) οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ὠφελίµων Let us separate, then, things good in
τὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ σκεψώµεθα εἰ λέγεται themselves from things useful, and consider
whether the former are called good by
κατὰ µίαν ἰδέαν. reference to a single Idea.
καθ᾽ αὑτὰ δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἄν; ἢ ὅσα καὶ What sort of goods would one call good in
µονούµενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ themselves? Is it those that are pursued
even when isolated from others, such as
ὁρᾶν καὶ ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιµαί; ταῦτα intelligence, sight, and certain pleasures and
γὰρ εἰ καὶ δι᾽ ἄλλο τι διώκοµεν, ὅµως honours? Certainly, if we pursue these also
τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ἀγαθῶν θείη τις ἄν. ἢ for the sake of something else, yet one
would place them among things good in
οὐδ᾽ (20) ἄλλο οὐδὲν πλὴν τῆς ἰδέας;
themselves. Or is nothing other than the
ὥστε µάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος. εἰ δὲ καὶ Idea of good good in itself? In that case the
ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτά, τὸν τἀγαθοῦ Form will be empty. But if the things we
λόγον ἐν ἅπασιν αὐτοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν have named are also things good in
themselves, the account of the good will
ἐµφαίνεσθαι δεήσει, καθάπερ ἐν χιόνι
have to appear as something identical in
καὶ ψιµυθίῳ τὸν τῆς λευκότητος. them all, as that of whiteness is identical in
snow and in white lead.
τιµῆς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς But of honour, wisdom, and pleasure, just in
ἕτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταύτῃ respect of their goodness, the accounts are
distinct and diverse. The good, therefore, is
(25) ᾗ ἀγαθά. οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν not some common element answering to
κοινόν τι κατὰ µίαν ἰδέαν. one Idea.
9 of 15 23/02/2014 1:24 AM
Ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς But what then do we mean by the good?
γε ἀπὸ τύχης ὁµωνύµοις. ἀλλ᾽ ἆρά γε τῷ It is surely not like the things that only
chance to have the same name. Are goods
ἀφ᾽ ἑνὸς εἶναι ἢ πρὸς ἓν ἅπαντα one, then, by being derived from one good
συντελεῖν, ἢ µᾶλλον κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν; ὡς or by all contributing to one good, or are
γὰρ ἐν σώµατι ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ they rather one by analogy? Certainly as
sight is in the body, so is reason in the soul,
ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ. (30) ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ταῦτα
and so on in other cases. But perhaps these
µὲν ἀφετέον τὸ νῦν· ἐξακριβοῦν γὰρ subjects had better be dismissed for the
ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἂν εἴη φιλοσοφίας present; for perfect precision about them
οἰκειότερον. would be more appropriate to another
branch of philosophy.
ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας· εἰ γὰρ καὶ And similarly with regard to the Idea; even
ἔστιν ἕν τι τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούµενον if there is some one good which is
universally predicable of goods or is capable
ἀγαθὸν ἢ χωριστὸν αὐτό τι καθ᾽ αὑτό, of separate and independent existence,
δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρακτὸν οὐδὲ clearly it could not be achieved or attained
κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ· νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι (35) by man; but we are now seeking something
attainable.
ζητεῖται.
τάχα δέ τῳ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι Perhaps, however, some one might think it
γνωρίζειν αὐτὸ [1097α] (1) πρὸς τὰ κτητὰ worth while to recognize this with a view to
the goods that are attainable and
καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οἷον γὰρ achievable; for having this as a sort of
παράδειγµα τοῦτ᾽ ἔχοντες µᾶλλον pattern we shall know better the goods that
εἰσόµεθα καὶ τὰ ἡµῖν ἀγαθά, κἂν are good for us, and if we know them shall
εἰδῶµεν, ἐπιτευξόµεθα αὐτῶν. attain them.
πιθανότητα µὲν οὖν τινα ἔχει ὁ λόγος, This argument has some plausibility, but
ἔοικε δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήµαις διαφωνεῖν· (5) seems to clash with the procedure of the
sciences; for all of these, though they aim at
πᾶσαι γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφιέµεναι καὶ some good and seek to supply the deficiency
τὸ ἐνδεὲς ἐπιζητοῦσαι παραλείπουσι τὴν of it, leave on one side the knowledge of the
γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ. καίτοι βοήθηµα good. Yet that all the exponents of the arts
should be ignorant of, and should not even
τηλικοῦτον τοὺς τεχνίτας ἅπαντας
seek, so great an aid is not probable. It is
ἀγνοεῖν καὶ µηδ᾽ ἐπιζητεῖν οὐκ εὔλογον. hard, too, to see how a weaver or a
ἄπορον δὲ καὶ τί ὠφεληθήσεται ὑφάντης carpenter will be benefited in regard to his
ἢ τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὑτοῦ τέχνην εἰδὼς own craft by knowing this 'good itself', or
how the man who has viewed the Idea itself
τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαθόν, (10) ἢ πῶς
will be a better doctor or general thereby.
ἰατρικώτερος ἢ στρατηγικώτερος ἔσται ὁ For a doctor seems not even to study health
τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν τεθεαµένος. φαίνεται in this way, but the health of man, or
µὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως perhaps rather the health of a particular
man; it is individuals that he is healing. But
ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἰατρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν enough of these topics.
ἀνθρώπου, µᾶλλον δ᾽ ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε·
καθ᾽ ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰατρεύει. καὶ περὶ µὲν
τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.
10 of 15 23/02/2014 1:24 AM
7. The good must be something

final and self-sufficient.
Definition of happiness reached
by considering the characteristic
function of man.
<<< >>>
(15) Πάλιν δ᾽ ἐπανέλθωµεν ἐπὶ τὸ Let us again return to the good we are
ζητούµενον ἀγαθόν, τί ποτ᾽ ἂν εἴη. seeking, and ask what it can be. It seems
different in different actions and arts; it is
φαίνεται µὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει different in medicine, in strategy, and in the
καὶ τέχνῃ· ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ other arts likewise. What then is the good of
στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ὁµοίως. τί each? Surely that for whose sake everything
οὖν ἑκάστης τἀγαθόν; ἢ οὗ χάριν τὰ else is done. In medicine this is health, in
strategy victory, in architecture a house, in
λοιπὰ πράττεται; τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐν ἰατρικῇ µὲν any other sphere something else, and in
ὑγίεια, ἐν στρατηγικῇ (20) δὲ νίκη, ἐν every action and pursuit the end; for it is for
οἰκοδοµικῇ δ᾽ οἰκία, ἐν ἄλλῳ δ᾽ ἄλλο, ἐν the sake of this that all men do whatever
else they do.
ἁπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ
τέλος· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ
πράττουσι πάντες.
ὥστ᾽ εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶ Therefore, if there is an end for all that we
τέλος, τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, do, this will be the good achievable by
action, and if there are more than one,
εἰ δὲ πλείω, ταῦτα. these will be the goods achievable by action.
Μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταὐτὸν So the argument has by a different

ἀφῖκται· τοῦτο (25) δ᾽ ἔτι µᾶλλον course reached the same point; but we must
try to state this even more clearly. Since
διασαφῆσαι πειρατέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω there are evidently more than one end, and
φαίνεται τὰ τέλη, τούτων δ᾽ αἱρούµεθά we choose some of these (e.g. wealth,
τινα δι᾽ ἕτερον, οἷον πλοῦτον αὐλοὺς καὶ flutes, and in general instruments) for the
sake of something else, clearly not all ends
ὅλως τὰ ὄργανα, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι
are final ends; but the chief good is
πάντα τέλεια· τὸ δ᾽ ἄριστον τέλειόν τι evidently something final.
φαίνεται.
ὥστ᾽ εἰ µέν ἐστιν ἕν τι µόνον τέλειον, Therefore, if there is only one final end, this
τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη τὸ ζητούµενον, (30) εἰ δὲ will be what we are seeking, and if there are
more than one, the most final of these will
πλείω, τὸ τελειότατον τούτων. be what we are seeking.
τελειότερον δὲ λέγοµεν τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ Now we call that which is in itself worthy of
διωκτὸν τοῦ δι᾽ ἕτερον καὶ τὸ µηδέποτε pursuit more final than that which is worthy
of pursuit for the sake of something else,
δι᾽ ἄλλο αἱρετὸν τῶν <καὶ> καθ᾽ αὑτὰ καὶ and that which is never desirable for the
δι᾽ αὐτὸ αἱρετῶν, καὶ ἁπλῶς δὴ τέλειον sake of something else more final than the
τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ἀεὶ καὶ µηδέποτε things that are desirable both in themselves
and for the sake of that other thing, and
δι᾽ ἄλλο. τοιοῦτον δ᾽ ἡ εὐδαιµονία
therefore we call final without qualification
µάλιστ᾽ εἶναι δοκεῖ· that which is always desirable in itself and
never for the sake of something else.
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[1097β] (1) Ταύτην γὰρ αἱρούµεθα ἀεὶ δι᾽ Now such a thing happiness, above all
αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε δι᾽ ἄλλο, τιµὴν δὲ else, is held to be; for this we choose always
for self and never for the sake of something
καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν else, but honour, pleasure, reason, and
αἱρούµεθα µὲν καὶ δι᾽ αὐτά (µηθενὸς γὰρ every virtue we choose indeed for
ἀποβαίνοντος ἑλοίµεθ᾽ ἂν ἕκαστον themselves (for if nothing resulted from
them we should still choose each of them),
αὐτῶν), αἱρούµεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς
but we choose them also for the sake of
εὐδαιµονίας χάριν, (5) διὰ τούτων happiness, judging that by means of them
ὑπολαµβάνοντες εὐδαιµονήσειν. τὴν δ᾽ we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other
εὐδαιµονίαν οὐδεὶς αἱρεῖται τούτων hand, no one chooses for the sake of these,
nor, in general, for anything other than
χάριν, οὐδ᾽ ὅλως δι᾽ ἄλλο. itself.
φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ From the point of view of self-sufficiency

αὐτὸ συµβαίνειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν the same result seems to follow; for the
final good is thought to be self-sufficient.
αὔταρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δ᾽ αὔταρκες Now by self-sufficient we do not mean that
λέγοµεν οὐκ αὐτῷ µόνῳ, τῷ ζῶντι βίον which is sufficient for a man by himself, for
µονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι (10) καὶ one who lives a solitary life, but also for
parents, children, wife, and in general for
τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις
his friends and fellow citizens, since man is
καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ born for citizenship.
ἄνθρωπος.
τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις· But some limit must be set to this; for if we
ἐπεκτείνοντι γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ extend our requirement to ancestors and
descendants and friends' friends we are in
τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς for an infinite series.
φίλους εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν.
ἀλλὰ τοῦτο µὲν εἰσαῦθις ἐπισκεπτέον· Let us examine this question, however, on
τὸ δ᾽ αὔταρκες τίθεµεν ὃ µονούµενον another occasion; the self-sufficient we now
define as that which when isolated makes
(15) αἱρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ µηδενὸς life desirable and lacking in nothing; and
ἐνδεᾶ· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιµονίαν such we think happiness to be; and further
οἰόµεθα εἶναι· ἔτι δὲ πάντων we think it most desirable of all things,
without being counted as one good thing
αἱρετωτάτην µὴ συναριθµουµένην--
among others- if it were so counted it would
συναριθµουµένην δὲ δῆλον ὡς clearly be made more desirable by the
αἱρετωτέραν µετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν addition of even the least of goods; for that
ἀγαθῶν· ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ which is added becomes an excess of goods,
and of goods the greater is always more
προστιθέµενον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ µεῖζον
desirable. Happiness, then, is something
αἱρετώτερον ἀεί. (20) τέλειον δή τι final and self-sufficient, and is the end of
φαίνεται καὶ αὔταρκες ἡ εὐδαιµονία, τῶν action.
πρακτῶν οὖσα τέλος.
Ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως τὴν µὲν εὐδαιµονίαν τὸ Presumably, however, to say that

ἄριστον λέγειν ὁµολογούµενόν τι happiness is the chief good seems a
platitude, and a clearer account of what it is
φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δ᾽ ἐναργέστερον τί still desired. This might perhaps be given, if
ἐστιν ἔτι λεχθῆναι. τάχα δὴ γένοιτ᾽ ἂν we could first ascertain the function of man.
τοῦτ᾽, εἰ ληφθείη τὸ ἔργον (25) τοῦ For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or
an artist, and, in general, for all things that
ἀνθρώπου. ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ καὶ
have a function or activity, the good and the
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ἀγαλµατοποιῷ καὶ παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ 'well' is thought to reside in the function, so
ὅλως ὧν ἔστιν ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις, ἐν τῷ would it seem to be for man, if he has a
function.
ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω
δόξειεν ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι
ἔργον αὐτοῦ.
πότερον οὖν τέκτονος µὲν καὶ σκυτέως Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner
ἔστιν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου certain functions or activities, and has man
none? Is he born without a function? Or as
δ᾽ (30) οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀργὸν πέφυκεν; eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the
ἢ καθάπερ ὀφθαλµοῦ καὶ χειρὸς καὶ parts evidently has a function, may one lay
ποδὸς καὶ ὅλως ἑκάστου τῶν µορίων it down that man similarly has a function
apart from all these? What then can this be?
φαίνεταί τι ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου
Life seems to be common even to plants, but
παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα θείη τις ἂν ἔργον τι; we are seeking what is peculiar to man.
τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη ποτέ; τὸ µὲν γὰρ
ζῆν κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς
φυτοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον.
[1098α] (1) ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τήν τε Let us exclude, therefore, the life of
θρεπτικὴν καὶ τὴν αὐξητικὴν ζωήν. nutrition and growth. Next there would be a
life of perception, but it also seems to be
ἑποµένη δὲ αἰσθητική τις ἂν εἴη, common even to the horse, the ox, and
φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ κοινὴ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ every animal. There remains, then, an
βοῒ καὶ παντὶ ζῴῳ. λείπεται δὴ πρακτική active life of the element that has a rational
principle; of this, one part has such a
τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος· τούτου δὲ τὸ µὲν
principle in the sense of being obedient to
ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δ᾽ ὡς (5) ἔχον καὶ one, the other in the sense of possessing
διανοούµενον. διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης one and exercising thought. And, as 'life of
λεγοµένης τὴν κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν θετέον· the rational element' also has two
meanings, we must state that life in the
κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι.
sense of activity is what we mean; for this
seems to be the more proper sense of the
term.
εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς Now if the function of man is an activity of

ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ µὴ ἄνευ λόγου, soul which follows or implies a rational
principle, and if we say 'so-and-so-and 'a
τὸ δ᾽ αὐτό φαµεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει good so-and-so' have a function which is the
τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπουδαίου, ὥσπερ same in kind, e.g. a lyre, and a good
κιθαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου (10) lyre-player, and so without qualification in
κιθαριστοῦ, καὶ ἁπλῶς δὴ τοῦτ᾽ ἐπὶ all cases, eminence in respect of goodness
being idded to the name of the function (for
πάντων, προστιθεµένης τῆς κατὰ τὴν the function of a lyre-player is to play the
ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον· lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do
κιθαριστοῦ µὲν γὰρ κιθαρίζειν, so well): if this is the case, and we state the
function of man to be a certain kind of life,
σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὖ· εἰ δ᾽ οὕτως,
and this to be an activity or actions of the
[ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεµεν ἔργον ζωήν τινα, soul implying a rational principle, and the
ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις function of a good man to be the good and
µετὰ λόγου, σπουδαίου δ᾽ ἀνδρὸς εὖ noble performance of these, and if any
action is well performed when it is
ταῦτα καὶ (15) καλῶς, ἕκαστον δ᾽ εὖ performed in accordance with the
κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται· εἰ appropriate excellence: if this is the case,
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δ᾽ οὕτω,] τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς human good turns out to be activity of soul
ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ᾽ ἀρετήν, εἰ δὲ in accordance with virtue, and if there are
more than one virtue, in accordance with
πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ the best and most complete.
τελειοτάτην.
Ἔτι δ᾽ ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. µία γὰρ χελιδὼν But we must add 'in a complete life.' For
ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ µία ἡµέρα· οὕτω δὲ one swallow does not make a summer, nor
does one day; and so too one day, or a short
οὐδὲ µακάριον καὶ εὐδαίµονα (20) µία time, does not make a man blessed and
ἡµέρα οὐδ᾽ ὀλίγος χρόνος. happy.
Περιγεγράφθω µὲν οὖν τἀγαθὸν ταύτῃ· Let this serve as an outline of the good;
δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον, εἶθ᾽ for we must presumably first sketch it
roughly, and then later fill in the details.
ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι. δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν παντὸς But it would seem that any one is capable of
εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαρθρῶσαι τὰ carrying on and articulating what has once
καλῶς ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ, καὶ ὁ been well outlined, and that time is a good
χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὑρετὴς ἢ discoverer or partner in such a work; to
which facts the advances of the arts are
συνεργὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ τῶν due; for any one can add what is lacking.
τεχνῶν (25) γεγόνασιν αἱ ἐπιδόσεις·
παντὸς γὰρ προσθεῖναι τὸ ἐλλεῖπον.
µεµνῆσθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρηµένων And we must also remember what has been
χρή, καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν µὴ ὁµοίως ἐν said before, and not look for precision in all
things alike, but in each class of things such
ἅπασιν ἐπιζητεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἑκάστοις κατὰ precision as accords with the subject-matter,
τὴν ὑποκειµένην ὕλην καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον and so much as is appropriate to the
ἐφ᾽ ὅσον οἰκεῖον τῇ µεθόδῳ. καὶ γὰρ inquiry. For a carpenter and a geometer
investigate the right angle in different ways;
τέκτων καὶ γεωµέτρης διαφερόντως (30)
the former does so in so far as the right
ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὀρθήν· ὃ µὲν γὰρ ἐφ᾽ angle is useful for his work, while the latter
ὅσον χρησίµη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ὃ δὲ τί inquires what it is or what sort of thing it is;
ἐστιν ἢ ποῖόν τι· θεατὴς γὰρ τἀληθοῦς. for he is a spectator of the truth. We must
act in the same way, then, in all other
τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις
matters as well, that our main task may not
ποιητέον, ὅπως µὴ τὰ πάρεργα τῶν be subordinated to minor questions.
ἔργων πλείω γίνηται.
[1098β] (1) οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δ᾽ οὐδὲ τὴν Nor must we demand the cause in all
αἰτίαν ἐν ἅπασιν ὁµοίως, ἀλλ᾽ ἱκανὸν ἔν matters alike; it is enough in some cases
that the fact be well established, as in the
τισι τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς, οἷον καὶ case of the first principles; the fact is the
περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δ᾽ ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ primary thing or first principle. Now of first
ἀρχή. τῶν ἀρχῶν δ᾽ αἳ µὲν ἐπαγωγῇ principles we see some by induction, some
θεωροῦνται, αἳ δ᾽ αἰσθήσει, αἳ δ᾽ ἐθισµῷ by perception, some by a certain
habituation, and others too in other ways.
τινί, καὶ ἄλλαι δ᾽ ἄλλως. µετιέναι (5) δὲ But each set of principles we must try to
πειρατέον ἑκάστας ᾗ πεφύκασιν, καὶ investigate in the natural way, and we must
σπουδαστέον ὅπως διορισθῶσι καλῶς· take pains to state them definitely, since
they have a great influence on what follows.
µεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὰ
For the beginning is thought to be more
ἑπόµενα. δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ ἥµισυ τοῦ than half of the whole, and many of the
παντὸς εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ questions we ask are cleared up by it.
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ζητουµένων.
Αρχή Σελίδας
ToC Βιβλίον Ι, 8-13 >>
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Βιβλίον I, 8-13
8. This definition is confirmed by

current beliefs about happiness.
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Σκεπτέον δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ µόνον ἐκ τοῦ We must consider it, however, in the light
συµπεράσµατος (10) καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, not only of our conclusion and our
premisses, but also of what is commonly
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγοµένων περὶ αὐτῆς· said about it; for with a true view all the
τῷ µὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνᾴδει τὰ data harmonize, but with a false one the
ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ facts soon clash. Now goods have been
τἀληθές. νενεµηµένων δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν divided into three classes, and some are
described as external, others as relating to
τριχῇ, καὶ τῶν µὲν ἐκτὸς λεγοµένων τῶν soul or to body; we call those that relate to
δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶµα, τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν soul most properly and truly goods, and
κυριώτατα λέγοµεν καὶ (15) µάλιστα psychical actions and activities we class as
relating to soul.
ἀγαθά, τὰς δὲ πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας
τὰς ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχὴν τίθεµεν.
ὥστε καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο κατά γε ταύτην Therefore our account must be sound, at
τὴν δόξαν παλαιὰν οὖσαν καὶ least according to this view, which is an old
one and agreed on by philosophers. It is
ὁµολογουµένην ὑπὸ τῶν correct also in that we identify the end with
φιλοσοφούντων. ὀρθῶς δὲ καὶ ὅτι certain actions and activities; for thus it falls
πράξεις τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ among goods of the soul and not among
τέλος· οὕτω γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν external goods.
(20) γίνεται καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐκτός.
συνᾴδει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ Another belief which harmonizes with our
εὖ πράττειν τὸν εὐδαίµονα· σχεδὸν γὰρ account is that the happy man lives well and
does well; for we have practically defined
εὐζωία τις εἴρηται καὶ εὐπραξία. happiness as a sort of good life and good
φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούµενα τὰ περὶ action. The characteristics that are looked
τὴν εὐδαιµονίαν ἅπανθ᾽ ὑπάρχειν τῷ for in happiness seem also, all of them, to
λεχθέντι. τοῖς µὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῖς δὲ belong to what we have defined happiness
as being. For some identify happiness with
φρόνησις ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι virtue, some with practical wisdom, others
δοκεῖ, (25) τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι µεθ᾽ with a kind of philosophic wisdom, others
ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς· ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ with these, or one of these, accompanied by
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τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν pleasure or not without pleasure; while

συµπαραλαµβάνουσιν. others include also external prosperity.
τούτων δὲ τὰ µὲν πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ Now some of these views have been held by
λέγουσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ἔνδοξοι many men and men of old, others by a few
eminent persons; and it is not probable that
ἄνδρες· οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὔλογον either of these should be entirely mistaken,
διαµαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ᾽ ἕν γέ τι ἢ but rather that they should be right in at
καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατορθοῦν. least some one respect or even in most
respects.
(30) Τοῖς µὲν οὖν λέγουσι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ With those who identify happiness with
ἀρετήν τινα συνῳδός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος· virtue or some one virtue our account is in
harmony; for to virtue belongs virtuous
ταύτης γάρ ἐστιν ἡ κατ᾽ αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια. activity. But it makes, perhaps, no small
διαφέρει δὲ ἴσως οὐ µικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ difference whether we place the chief good
χρήσει τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαµβάνειν, καὶ ἐν in possession or in use, in state of mind or
in activity.
ἕξει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ.
τὴν µὲν γὰρ ἕξιν ἐνδέχεται µηδὲν For the state of mind may exist without
ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσαν, [1099α] producing any good result, as in a man who
is asleep or in some other way quite
(1) οἷον τῷ καθεύδοντι ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως inactive, but the activity cannot; for one
ἐξηργηκότι, τὴν δ᾽ ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἷόν τε· who has the activity will of necessity be
πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὖ πράξει. acting, and acting well. And as in the
Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful
ὥσπερ δ᾽ Ὀλυµπίασιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι
and the strongest that are crowned but
καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται ἀλλ᾽ (5) those who compete (for it is some of these
οἱ ἀγωνιζόµενοι (τούτων γάρ τινες that are victorious), so those who act win,
νικῶσιν), οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν and rightly win, the noble and good things
in life.
κἀγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἐπήβολοι
γίνονται.
Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὸν Their life is also in itself pleasant. For
ἡδύς. τὸ µὲν γὰρ ἥδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν, pleasure is a state of soul, and to each man
that which he is said to be a lover of is
ἑκάστῳ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται pleasant; e.g. not only is a horse pleasant to
φιλοτοιοῦτος, οἷον ἵππος µὲν τῷ the lover of horses, and a spectacle to the
φιλίππῳ, θέαµα (10) δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ· lover of sights, but also in the same way
just acts are pleasant to the lover of justice
τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῷ
and in general virtuous acts to the lover of
φιλοδικαίῳ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν τῷ virtue.
φιλαρέτῳ.
τοῖς µὲν οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἡδέα µάχεται Now for most men their pleasures are in
διὰ τὸ µὴ φύσει τοιαῦτ᾽ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ conflict with one another because these are
not by nature pleasant, but the lovers of
φιλοκάλοις ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα· what is noble find pleasant the things that
τοιαῦται δ᾽ αἱ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν πράξεις, ὥστε are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions
καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν ἡδεῖαι καὶ (15) καθ᾽ are such, so that these are pleasant for such
men as well as in their own nature. Their
αὑτάς. οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ
life, therefore, has no further need of
βίος αὐτῶν ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλ᾽ pleasure as a sort of adventitious charm, but
ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. has its pleasure in itself.
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πρὸς τοῖς εἰρηµένοις γὰρ οὐδ᾽ ἐστὶν For, besides what we have said, the man
ἀγαθὸς ὁ µὴ χαίρων ταῖς καλαῖς who does not rejoice in noble actions is not
even good; since no one would call a man
πράξεσιν· οὔτε γὰρ δίκαιον οὐθεὶς ἂν just who did not enjoy acting justly, nor any
εἴποι τὸν µὴ χαίροντα τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν, man liberal who did not enjoy liberal
οὔτ᾽ ἐλευθέριον τὸν µὴ χαίροντα (20) actions; and similarly in all other cases. If
this is so, virtuous actions must be in
ταῖς ἐλευθερίοις πράξεσιν· ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ
themselves pleasant.
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δ᾽ οὕτω, καθ᾽ αὑτὰς ἂν
εἶεν αἱ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδεῖαι.
ἀλλὰ µὴν καὶ ἀγαθαί γε καὶ καλαί, καὶ But they are also good and noble, and have
µάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον, εἴπερ καλῶς each of these attributes in the highest
degree, since the good man judges well
κρίνει περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· κρίνει δ᾽ about these attributes; his judgement is
ὡς εἴποµεν. such as we have described.
ἄριστον ἄρα καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ἥδιστον ἡ Happiness then is the best, noblest, and
(25) εὐδαιµονία, καὶ οὐ διώρισται ταῦτα most pleasant thing in the world, and these
attributes are not severed as in the
κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραµµα· inscription at Delos-
κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον, Most noble is that which is

λῷστον δ᾽ ὑγιαίνειν· justest, and best is health;
But pleasantest is it to win what
ἥδιστον δὲ πέφυχ᾽ οὗ τις ἐρᾷ we love.
τὸ τυχεῖν.
Ἅπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς For all these properties belong to the best
ἀρίσταις ἐνεργείαις· ταύτας (30) δέ, ἢ activities; and these, or one- the best- of
these, we identify with happiness.
µίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φαµὲν εἶναι
τὴν εὐδαιµονίαν.
Φαίνεται δ᾽ ὅµως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν Yet evidently, as we said, it needs the
προσδεοµένη, καθάπερ εἴποµεν· external goods as well; for it is impossible,
or not easy, to do noble acts without the
ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὰ καλὰ proper equipment.
πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα.
πολλὰ µὲν γὰρ πράττεται, [1099β] (1) In many actions we use friends and riches
καθάπερ δι᾽ ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ and political power as instruments; and
there are some things the lack of which
πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάµεως· ἐνίων takes the lustre from happiness, as good
δὲ τητώµενοι ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ µακάριον, birth, goodly children, beauty; for the man
οἷον εὐγενείας εὐτεκνίας κάλλους· οὐ who is very ugly in appearance or ill-born or
πάνυ γὰρ εὐδαιµονικὸς ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν solitary and childless is not very likely to be
happy, and perhaps a man would be still less
παναίσχης ἢ δυσγενὴς ἢ µονώτης καὶ likely if he had thoroughly bad children or
ἄτεκνος, (5) ἔτι δ᾽ ἴσως ἧττον, εἴ τῳ friends or had lost good children or friends
πάγκακοι παῖδες εἶεν ἢ φίλοι, ἢ ἀγαθοὶ by death.
ὄντες τεθνᾶσιν.
καθάπερ οὖν εἴποµεν, ἔοικε προσδεῖσθαι As we said, then, happiness seems to need
this sort of prosperity in addition; for which
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καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης εὐηµερίας· ὅθεν εἰς reason some identify happiness with good
ταὐτὸ τάττουσιν ἔνιοι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ fortune, though others identify it with
virtue.
εὐδαιµονίᾳ, ἕτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν.
9. Is happiness acquired by
learning or habituation, or sent
by God or by chance?
<<< >>>
Ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερόν ἐστι For this reason also the question is
µαθητὸν ἢ ἐθιστὸν ἢ καὶ (10) ἄλλως πως asked, whether happiness is to be acquired
by learning or by habituation or some other
ἀσκητόν, ἢ κατά τινα θείαν µοῖραν ἢ καὶ sort of training, or comes in virtue of some
διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται. εἰ µὲν οὖν καὶ divine providence or again by chance. Now if
ἄλλο τί ἐστι θεῶν δώρηµα ἀνθρώποις, there is any gift of the gods to men, it is
reasonable that happiness should be
εὔλογον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιµονίαν θεόσδοτον
god-given, and most surely god-given of all
εἶναι, καὶ µάλιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὅσῳ human things inasmuch as it is the best.
βέλτιστον.
ἀλλὰ τοῦτο µὲν ἴσως ἄλλης ἂν εἴη But this question would perhaps be more
σκέψεως οἰκειότερον, φαίνεται δὲ κἂν εἰ appropriate to another inquiry; happiness
seems, however, even if it is not god-sent
(15) µὴ θεόπεµπτός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δι᾽ but comes as a result of virtue and some
ἀρετὴν καί τινα µάθησιν ἢ ἄσκησιν process of learning or training, to be among
παραγίνεται, τῶν θειοτάτων εἶναι· τὸ the most godlike things; for that which is
the prize and end of virtue seems to be the
γὰρ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἆθλον καὶ τέλος ἄριστον
best thing in the world, and something
εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ θεῖόν τι καὶ µακάριον. godlike and blessed.
Εἴη δ᾽ ἂν καὶ πολύκοινον· δυνατὸν γὰρ It will also on this view be very generally
ὑπάρξαι πᾶσι τοῖς µὴ πεπηρωµένοις shared; for all who are not maimed as
regards their potentiality for virtue may win
πρὸς ἀρετὴν διά τινος µαθήσεως (20) καὶ it by a certain kind of study and care.
ἐπιµελείας.
εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν οὕτω βέλτιον ἢ τὸ διὰ τύχην But if it is better to be happy thus than by
εὐδαιµονεῖν, εὔλογον ἔχειν οὕτως, εἴπερ chance, it is reasonable that the facts should
be so, since everything that depends on the
τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οἷόν τε κάλλιστα action of nature is by nature as good as it
ἔχειν, οὕτω πέφυκεν, ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ can be, and similarly everything that
κατὰ τέχνην καὶ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν, καὶ depends on art or any rational cause, and
µάλιστα <τὰ> κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην. especially if it depends on the best of all
causes.
τὸ δὲ µέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον ἐπιτρέψαι To entrust to chance what is greatest and

τύχῃ λίαν πληµµελὲς (25) ἂν εἴη. most noble would be a very defective
arrangement.
Συµφανὲς δ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸ The answer to the question we are asking
ζητούµενον· εἴρηται γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια is plain also from the definition of
happiness; for it has been said to be a
κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ποιά τις. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν
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ἀγαθῶν τὰ µὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ virtuous activity of soul, of a certain kind. Of

δὲ συνεργὰ καὶ χρήσιµα πέφυκεν the remaining goods, some must necessarily
pre-exist as conditions of happiness, and
ὀργανικῶς. others are naturally co-operative and useful
as instruments.
ὁµολογούµενα δὲ ταῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη καὶ τοῖς And this will be found to agree with what we
ἐν ἀρχῇ· τὸ γὰρ τῆς πολιτικῆς (30) τέλος said at the outset; for we stated the end of
political science to be the best end, and
ἄριστον ἐτίθεµεν, αὕτη δὲ πλείστην political science spends most of its pains on
ἐπιµέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιούς τινας καὶ making the citizens to be of a certain
ἀγαθοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποιῆσαι καὶ character, viz. good and capable of noble
acts.
πρακτικοὺς τῶν καλῶν.
Εἰκότως οὖν οὔτε βοῦν οὔτε ἵππον οὔτε It is natural, then, that we call neither ox
ἄλλο τῶν ζῴων οὐδὲν εὔδαιµον λέγοµεν· nor horse nor any other of the animals
happy; for none of them is capable of
[1100α] (1) οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οἷόν τε sharing in such activity.
κοινωνῆσαι τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας.
διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐδὲ παῖς For this reason also a boy is not happy; for
εὐδαίµων ἐστίν· οὔπω γὰρ πρακτικὸς he is not yet capable of such acts, owing to
his age; and boys who are called happy are
τῶν τοιούτων διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν· οἱ δὲ being congratulated by reason of the hopes
λεγόµενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα µακαρίζονται. we have for them. For there is required, as
δεῖ γάρ, ὥσπερ εἴποµεν, καὶ ἀρετῆς we said, not only complete virtue but also a
complete life, since many changes occur in
τελείας (5) καὶ βίου τελείου. πολλαὶ γὰρ
life, and all manner of chances, and the
µεταβολαὶ γίνονται καὶ παντοῖαι τύχαι most prosperous may fall into great
κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν µάλιστ᾽ misfortunes in old age, as is told of Priam in
εὐθηνοῦντα µεγάλαις συµφοραῖς the Trojan Cycle; and one who has
experienced such chances and has ended
περιπεσεῖν ἐπὶ γήρως, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς
wretchedly no one calls happy.
Τρωικοῖς περὶ Πριάµου µυθεύεται· τὸν δὲ
τοιαύταις χρησάµενον τύχαις καὶ
τελευτήσαντα ἀθλίως οὐδεὶς
εὐδαιµονίζει.
10. Should no man be called

happy while he lives?
<<< >>>
(10) Πότερον οὖν οὐδ᾽ ἄλλον οὐδένα Must no one at all, then, be called happy
ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιµονιστέον ἕως ἂν ζῇ, while he lives; must we, as Solon says, see
the end? Even if we are to lay down this
κατὰ Σόλωνα δὲ χρεὼν τέλος ὁρᾶν; εἰ δὲ doctrine, is it also the case that a man is
δὴ καὶ θετέον οὕτως, ἆρά γε καὶ ἔστιν happy when he is dead? Or is not this quite
εὐδαίµων τότε ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ; ἢ absurd, especially for us who say that
happiness is an activity? But if we do not
τοῦτό γε παντελῶς ἄτοπον, ἄλλως τε
call the dead man happy, and if Solon does
καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡµῖν ἐνέργειάν τινα not mean this, but that one can then safely
τὴν εὐδαιµονίαν; εἰ δὲ µὴ λέγοµεν (15) call a man blessed as being at last beyond
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τὸν τεθνεῶτα εὐδαίµονα, µηδὲ Σόλων evils and misfortunes, this also affords
τοῦτο βούλεται, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι τηνικαῦτα ἄν matter for discussion; for both evil and good
are thought to exist for a dead man, as
τις ἀσφαλῶς µακαρίσειεν ἄνθρωπον ὡς much as for one who is alive but not aware
ἐκτὸς ἤδη τῶν κακῶν ὄντα καὶ τῶν of them; e.g. honours and dishonours and
δυστυχηµάτων, ἔχει µὲν καὶ τοῦτ᾽ the good or bad fortunes of children and in
general of descendants.
ἀµφισβήτησίν τινα· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι τῷ
τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ
καὶ τῷ ζῶντι µὴ (20) αἰσθανοµένῳ δέ,
οἷον τιµαὶ καὶ ἀτιµίαι καὶ τέκνων καὶ
ὅλως ἀπογόνων εὐπραξίαι τε καὶ
δυστυχίαι.
ἀπορίαν δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παρέχει· τῷ γὰρ And this also presents a problem; for though
µακαρίως βεβιωκότι µέχρι γήρως καὶ a man has lived happily up to old age and
has had a death worthy of his life, many
τελευτήσαντι κατὰ λόγον ἐνδέχεται reverses may befall his descendants- some
πολλὰς µεταβολὰς συµβαίνειν περὶ τοὺς of them may be good and attain the life they
ἐκγόνους, καὶ τοὺς µὲν αὐτῶν (25) deserve, while with others the opposite may
be the case; and clearly too the degrees of
ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ τυχεῖν βίου τοῦ κατ᾽
relationship between them and their
ἀξίαν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐξ ἐναντίας· δῆλον δ᾽ ὅτι ancestors may vary indefinitely.
καὶ τοῖς ἀποστήµασι πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς
παντοδαπῶς ἔχειν αὐτοὺς ἐνδέχεται.
ἄτοπον δὴ γίνοιτ᾽ ἄν, εἰ συµµεταβάλλοι It would be odd, then, if the dead man were
καὶ ὁ τεθνεὼς καὶ γίνοιτο ὁτὲ µὲν to share in these changes and become at
one time happy, at another wretched; while
εὐδαίµων πάλιν δ᾽ ἄθλιος· ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ it would also be odd if the fortunes of the
τὸ µηδὲν µηδ᾽ ἐπί (30) τινα χρόνον descendants did not for some time have
συνικνεῖσθαι τὰ τῶν ἐκγόνων τοῖς some effect on the happiness of their
γονεῦσιν. ancestors.
Ἀλλ᾽ ἐπανιτέον ἐπὶ τὸ πρότερον But we must return to our first difficulty;
ἀπορηθέν· τάχα γὰρ ἂν θεωρηθείη καὶ τὸ for perhaps by a consideration of it our
present problem might be solved.
νῦν ἐπιζητούµενον ἐξ ἐκείνου.
εἰ δὴ τὸ τέλος ὁρᾶν δεῖ καὶ τότε Now if we must see the end and only then
µακαρίζειν ἕκαστον οὐχ ὡς ὄντα call a man happy, not as being happy but as
having been so before, surely this is a
µακάριον ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι πρότερον ἦν, πῶς οὐκ paradox, that when he is happy the
ἄτοπον, εἰ ὅτ᾽ ἔστιν εὐδαίµων, (35) µὴ attribute that belongs to him is not to be
ἀληθεύσεται κατ᾽ αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον truly predicated of him because we do not
[1100β] (1) διὰ τὸ µὴ βούλεσθαι τοὺς wish to call living men happy, on account of
the changes that may befall them, and
ζῶντας εὐδαιµονίζειν διὰ τὰς because we have assumed happiness to be
µεταβολάς, καὶ διὰ τὸ µόνιµόν τι τὴν something permanent and by no means
εὐδαιµονίαν ὑπειληφέναι καὶ µηδαµῶς easily changed, while a single man may
suffer many turns of fortune's wheel.
εὐµετάβολον, τὰς δὲ τύχας πολλάκις
ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς αὐτούς;
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δῆλον γὰρ ὡς εἰ συνακολουθοίηµεν (5) For clearly if we were to keep pace with his
ταῖς τύχαις, τὸν αὐτὸν εὐδαίµονα καὶ fortunes, we should often call the same man
happy and again wretched, making the
πάλιν ἄθλιον ἐροῦµεν πολλάκις, happy man out to be chameleon and
χαµαιλέοντά τινα τὸν εὐδαίµονα insecurely based.
ἀποφαίνοντες καὶ σαθρῶς ἱδρυµένον.
ἢ τὸ µὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν Or is this keeping pace with his fortunes
οὐδαµῶς ὀρθόν; οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ εὖ quite wrong? Success or failure in life does
not depend on these, but human life, as we
ἢ κακῶς, ἀλλὰ προσδεῖται τούτων ὁ said, needs these as mere additions, while
ἀνθρώπινος βίος, καθάπερ εἴποµεν, virtuous activities or their opposites are
κύριαι (10) δ᾽ εἰσὶν αἱ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν what constitute happiness or the reverse.
ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιµονίας, αἱ δ᾽ ἐναντίαι
τοῦ ἐναντίου.
Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν The question we have now discussed

διαπορηθέν. περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως confirms our definition. For no function of
man has so much permanence as virtuous
ὑπάρχει τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἔργων activities (these are thought to be more
βεβαιότης ὡς περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς durable even than knowledge of the
κατ᾽ ἀρετήν· µονιµώτεραι γὰρ καὶ τῶν sciences), and of these themselves the most
valuable are more durable because those
ἐπιστηµῶν αὗται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· (15)
who are happy spend their life most readily
τούτων δ᾽ αὐτῶν αἱ τιµιώταται and most continuously in these; for this
µονιµώτεραι διὰ τὸ µάλιστα καὶ seems to be the reason why we do not
συνεχέστατα καταζῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοὺς forget them.
µακαρίους· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔοικεν αἰτίῳ τοῦ
µὴ γίνεσθαι περὶ αὐτὰς λήθην.
ὑπάρξει δὴ τὸ ζητούµενον τῷ εὐδαίµονι, The attribute in question, then, will belong

καὶ ἔσται διὰ βίου τοιοῦτος· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἢ to the happy man, and he will be happy
throughout his life; for always, or by
µάλιστα πάντων πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει preference to everything else, he will be
(20) τὰ κατ᾽ ἀρετήν, καὶ τὰς τύχας οἴσει engaged in virtuous action and
κάλλιστα καὶ πάντῃ πάντως ἐµµελῶς ὅ contemplation, and he will bear the chances
of life most nobly and altogether decorously,
γ᾽ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος
if he is 'truly good' and 'foursquare beyond
ἄνευ ψόγου. reproach'.
Πολλῶν δὲ γινοµένων κατὰ τύχην καὶ Now many events happen by chance, and
διαφερόντων µεγέθει καὶ µικρότητι, τὰ events differing in importance; small pieces
of good fortune or of its opposite clearly do
µὲν µικρὰ τῶν εὐτυχηµάτων, ὁµοίως δὲ not weigh down the scales of life one way or
καὶ τῶν ἀντικειµένων, δῆλον ὡς οὐ ποιεῖ the other, but a multitude of great events if
(25) ῥοπὴν τῆς ζωῆς, τὰ δὲ µεγάλα καὶ they turn out well will make life happier (for
πολλὰ γινόµενα µὲν εὖ µακαριώτερον not only are they themselves such as to add
beauty to life, but the way a man deals with
τὸν βίον ποιήσει (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ them may be noble and good), while if they
συνεπικοσµεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ ἡ χρῆσις turn out ill they crush and maim happiness;
αὐτῶν καλὴ καὶ σπουδαία γίνεται), for they both bring pain with them and
hinder many activities.
ἀνάπαλιν δὲ συµβαίνοντα θλίβει καὶ
λυµαίνεται τὸ µακάριον· λύπας τε γὰρ
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ἐπιφέρει καὶ ἐµποδίζει πολλαῖς (30)

ἐνεργείαις.
ὅµως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάµπει τὸ Yet even in these nobility shines through,
καλόν, ἐπειδὰν φέρῃ τις εὐκόλως when a man bears with resignation many
great misfortunes, not through insensibility
πολλὰς καὶ µεγάλας ἀτυχίας, µὴ δι᾽ to pain but through nobility and greatness of
ἀναλγησίαν, ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὢν καὶ soul.
µεγαλόψυχος.
Εἰ δ᾽ εἰσὶν αἱ ἐνέργειαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, If activities are, as we said, what gives
καθάπερ εἴποµεν, οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο τῶν life its character, no happy man can become
miserable; for he will never do the acts that
µακαρίων ἄθλιος· οὐδέποτε (35) γὰρ are hateful and mean.
πράξει τὰ µισητὰ καὶ τὰ φαῦλα.
[1101α] (1) τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸν For the man who is truly good and wise, we
καὶ ἔµφρονα πάσας οἰόµεθα τὰς τύχας think, bears all the chances life becomingly
and always makes the best of
εὐσχηµόνως φέρειν καὶ ἐκ τῶν circumstances, as a good general makes the
ὑπαρχόντων ἀεὶ τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν, best military use of the army at his
καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν τῷ command and a good shoemaker makes the
best shoes out of the hides that are given
παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ χρῆσθαι
him; and so with all other craftsmen.
πολεµικώτατα καὶ σκυτοτόµον ἐκ τῶν
δοθέντων (5) σκυτῶν κάλλιστον
ὑπόδηµα ποιεῖν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ
τοὺς ἄλλους τεχνίτας ἅπαντας.
εἰ δ᾽ οὕτως, ἄθλιος µὲν οὐδέποτε γένοιτ᾽ And if this is the case, the happy man can
ἂν ὁ εὐδαίµων, οὐ µὴν µακάριός γε, ἂν never become miserable; though he will not
reach blessedness, if he meet with fortunes
Πριαµικαῖς τύχαις περιπέσῃ. like those of Priam.
Οὐδὲ δὴ ποικίλος γε καὶ εὐµετάβολος· Nor, again, is he many-coloured and

οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῆς εὐδαιµονίας changeable; for neither will he be moved
from his happy state easily or by any
κινηθήσεται ῥᾳδίως, (10) οὐδ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν ordinary misadventures, but only by many
τυχόντων ἀτυχηµάτων ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ great ones, nor, if he has had many great
µεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, ἔκ τε τῶν misadventures, will he recover his happiness
τοιούτων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο πάλιν εὐδαίµων in a short time, but if at all, only in a long
and complete one in which he has attained
ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, ἐν πολλῷ many splendid successes.
τινὶ καὶ τελείῳ, µεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ἐν
αὐτῷ γενόµενος ἐπήβολος.
Τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίµονα τὸν κατ᾽ When then should we not say that he is
ἀρετὴν τελείαν (15) ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τοῖς happy who is active in accordance with
complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped
ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγηµένον with external goods, not for some chance
µὴ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον ἀλλὰ τέλειον period but throughout a complete life?
βίον;
8 of 15 23/02/2014 1:24 AM
ἢ προσθετέον καὶ βιωσόµενον οὕτω καὶ Or must we add 'and who is destined to live
τελευτήσοντα κατὰ λόγον; ἐπειδὴ τὸ thus and die as befits his life'? Certainly the
future is obscure to us, while happiness, we
µέλλον ἀφανὲς ἡµῖν ἐστίν, τὴν claim, is an end and something in every way
εὐδαιµονίαν δὲ τέλος καὶ τέλειον final.
τίθεµεν πάντῃ πάντως.
εἰ δ᾽ οὕτω, µακαρίους ἐροῦµεν (20) τῶν If so, we shall call happy those among living
ζώντων οἷς ὑπάρχει καὶ ὑπάρξει τὰ men in whom these conditions are, and are
to be, fulfilled- but happy men. So much for
λεχθέντα, µακαρίους δ᾽ ἀνθρώπους. καὶ these questions.
περὶ µὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωρίσθω.
11. Do the fortunes of the living

affect the dead?
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Τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ τῶν That the fortunes of descendants and of
φίλων ἁπάντων τὸ µὲν µηδοτιοῦν all a man's friends should not affect his
happiness at all seems a very unfriendly
συµβάλλεσθαι λίαν ἄφιλον φαίνεται καὶ doctrine, and one opposed to the opinions
ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον· πολλῶν δὲ καὶ men hold; but since the events that happen
παντοίας ἐχόντων διαφορὰς (25) τῶν are numerous and admit of all sorts of
συµβαινόντων, καὶ τῶν µὲν µᾶλλον difference, and some come more near to us
and others less so, it seems a long- nay, an
συνικνουµένων τῶν δ᾽ ἧττον, καθ᾽ infinite- task to discuss each in detail; a
ἕκαστον µὲν διαιρεῖν µακρὸν καὶ general outline will perhaps suffice.
ἀπέραντον φαίνεται, καθόλου δὲ λεχθὲν
καὶ τύπῳ τάχ᾽ ἂν ἱκανῶς ἔχοι.
εἰ δή, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὑτὸν If, then, as some of a man's own
ἀτυχηµάτων τὰ µὲν ἔχει τι βρῖθος καὶ misadventures have a certain weight and
influence on life while others are, as it were,
ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὰ (30) δ᾽ lighter, so too there are differences among
ἐλαφροτέροις ἔοικεν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ the misadventures of our friends taken as a
τοὺς φίλους ὁµοίως ἅπαντας, διαφέρει whole, and it makes a difference whether
δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον περὶ ζῶντας ἢ the various suffering befall the living or the
dead (much more even than whether
τελευτήσαντας συµβαίνειν πολὺ µᾶλλον lawless and terrible deeds are presupposed
ἢ τὰ παράνοµα καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν in a tragedy or done on the stage), this
ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ἢ πράττεσθαι, difference also must be taken into account;
or rather, perhaps, the fact that doubt is felt
συλλογιστέον δὴ καὶ ταύτην τὴν whether the dead share in any good or evil.
διαφοράν, µᾶλλον δ᾽ ἴσως (35) τὸ
διαπορεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς κεκµηκότας εἴ
τινος ἀγαθοῦ κοινωνοῦσιν ἢ τῶν
ἀντικειµένων.
[1101β] (1) ἔοικε γὰρ ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ For it seems, from these considerations, that
διικνεῖται πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁτιοῦν, εἴτ᾽ even if anything whether good or evil
penetrates to them, it must be something
ἀγαθὸν εἴτε τοὐναντίον, ἀφαυρόν τι καὶ weak and negligible, either in itself or for
9 of 15 23/02/2014 1:24 AM
µικρὸν ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις εἶναι, εἰ δὲ µή, them, or if not, at least it must be such in
τοσοῦτόν γε καὶ τοιοῦτον ὥστε µὴ ποιεῖν degree and kind as not to make happy those
who are not happy nor to take away their
εὐδαίµονας τοὺς µὴ ὄντας (5) µηδὲ τοὺς blessedness from those who are.
ὄντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ µακάριον.
συµβάλλεσθαι µὲν οὖν τι φαίνονται τοῖς The good or bad fortunes of friends, then,
κεκµηκόσιν αἱ εὐπραξίαι τῶν φίλων, seem to have some effects on the dead, but
effects of such a kind and degree as neither
ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι, τοιαῦτα δὲ to make the happy unhappy nor to produce
καὶ τηλικαῦτα ὥστε µήτε τοὺς any other change of the kind.
εὐδαίµονας µὴ εὐδαίµονας ποιεῖν µήτ᾽
ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων µηδέν.
12. Virtue is praiseworthy, but

happiness is above praise.
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(10) Διωρισµένων δὲ τούτων These questions having been definitely

ἐπισκεψώµεθα περὶ τῆς εὐδαιµονίας answered, let us consider whether happiness
is among the things that are praised or
πότερα τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ἐστὶν ἢ µᾶλλον rather among the things that are prized; for
τῶν τιµίων· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῶν γε clearly it is not to be placed among
δυνάµεων οὐκ ἔστιν. potentialities.
φαίνεται δὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐπαινετὸν τῷ ποιόν Everything that is praised seems to be

τι εἶναι καὶ πρός τι πῶς ἔχειν praised because it is of a certain kind and is
related somehow to something else; for we
ἐπαινεῖσθαι· τὸν γὰρ δίκαιον καὶ τὸν praise the just or brave man and in general
ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅλως τὸν (15) ἀγαθόν τε καὶ both the good man and virtue itself because
τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπαινοῦµεν διὰ τὰς πράξεις of the actions and functions involved, and
we praise the strong man, the good runner,
καὶ τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν
and so on, because he is of a certain kind
δροµικὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῷ and is related in a certain way to something
ποιόν τινα πεφυκέναι καὶ ἔχειν πως good and important.
πρὸς ἀγαθόν τι καὶ σπουδαῖον.
δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν περὶ τοὺς This is clear also from the praises of the
θεοὺς ἐπαίνων· γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται gods; for it seems absurd that the gods
should be referred to our standard, but this
πρὸς ἡµᾶς ἀναφερόµενοι, (20) τοῦτο δὲ is done because praise involves a reference,
συµβαίνει διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους to something else.
δι᾽ ἀναφορᾶς, ὥσπερ εἴποµεν.
εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ ἔπαινος τῶν τοιούτων, But if if praise is for things such as we have
δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν described, clearly what applies to the best
things is not praise, but something greater
ἔπαινος, ἀλλὰ µεῖζόν τι καὶ βέλτιον, and better, as is indeed obvious; for what
καθάπερ καὶ φαίνεται· τούς τε γὰρ θεοὺς we do to the gods and the most godlike of
µακαρίζοµεν καὶ εὐδαιµονίζοµεν καὶ τῶν men is to call them blessed and happy.
ἀνδρῶν τοὺς θειοτάτους (25)
10 of 15 23/02/2014 1:24 AM
[µακαρίζοµεν].
ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ And so too with good things; no one praises
τὴν εὐδαιµονίαν ἐπαινεῖ καθάπερ τὸ happiness as he does justice, but rather
calls it blessed, as being something more
δίκαιον, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς θειότερόν τι καὶ βέλτιον divine and better.
µακαρίζει.
Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὔδοξος καλῶς Eudoxus also seems to have been right in
συνηγορῆσαι περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων τῇ his method of advocating the supremacy of
pleasure; he thought that the fact that,
ἡδονῇ· τὸ γὰρ µὴ ἐπαινεῖσθαι τῶν though a good, it is not praised indicated it
ἀγαθῶν οὖσαν µηνύειν ᾤετο ὅτι to be better than the things that are
κρεῖττόν ἐστι (30) τῶν ἐπαινετῶν, praised, and that this is what God and the
τοιοῦτον δ᾽ εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ τἀγαθόν· good are; for by reference to these all other
things are judged.
πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τἆλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι.
ὁ µὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος τῆς ἀρετῆς· πρακτικοὶ Praise is appropriate to virtue, for as a
γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης· τὰ δ᾽ result of virtue men tend to do noble deeds,
but encomia are bestowed on acts, whether
ἐγκώµια τῶν ἔργων ὁµοίως καὶ τῶν of the body or of the soul. But perhaps
σωµατικῶν καὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν. ἀλλὰ nicety in these matters is more proper to
ταῦτα µὲν ἴσως οἰκειότερον ἐξακριβοῦν those who have made a study of encomia;
to us it is clear from what has been said that
(35) τοῖς περὶ τὰ ἐγκώµια πεπονηµένοις·
happiness is among the things that are
ἡµῖν δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρηµένων [1102α] prized and perfect.
(1) ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιµονία τῶν τιµίων καὶ
τελείων.
ἔοικε δ᾽ οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι It seems to be so also from the fact that it is
ἀρχή· ταύτης γὰρ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα a first principle; for it is for the sake of this
that we all do all that we do, and the first
πάντες πράττοµεν, τὴν ἀρχὴν δὲ καὶ τὸ principle and cause of goods is, we claim,
αἴτιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τίµιόν τι καὶ θεῖον something prized and divine.
τίθεµεν.
D. Kinds of virtue.
13. Division of the faculties, and

resultant division of virtue into
intellectual and moral.
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(5) Ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιµονία ψυχῆς Since happiness is an activity of soul in

ἐνέργειά τις κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν τελείαν, περὶ accordance with perfect virtue, we must
consider the nature of virtue; for perhaps
ἀρετῆς ἐπισκεπτέον ἂν εἴη· τάχα γὰρ we shall thus see better the nature of
οὕτως ἂν βέλτιον καὶ περὶ τῆς happiness.
εὐδαιµονίας θεωρήσαιµεν.
11 of 15 23/02/2014 1:24 AM
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν πολιτικὸς The true student of politics, too, is thought
περὶ ταύτην µάλιστα πεπονῆσθαι· to have studied virtue above all things; for
he wishes to make his fellow citizens good
βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς and obedient to the laws.
ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν (10) νόµων ὑπηκόους.
παράδειγµα δὲ τούτων ἔχοµεν τοὺς As an example of this we have the lawgivers

Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιµονίων νοµοθέτας, of the Cretans and the Spartans, and any
others of the kind that there may have
καὶ εἴ τινες ἕτεροι τοιοῦτοι γεγένηνται. been.
εἰ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις αὕτη, And if this inquiry belongs to political
δῆλον ὅτι γίνοιτ᾽ ἂν ἡ ζήτησις κατὰ τὴν science, clearly the pursuit of it will be in
accordance with our original plan.
ἐξ ἀρχῆς προαίρεσιν.
περὶ ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρωπίνης But clearly the virtue we must study is
δῆλον ὅτι· καὶ γὰρ τἀγαθὸν (15) human virtue; for the good we were seeking
was human good and the happiness human
ἀνθρώπινον ἐζητοῦµεν καὶ τὴν happiness.
εὐδαιµονίαν ἀνθρωπίνην.
ἀρετὴν δὲ λέγοµεν ἀνθρωπίνην οὐ τὴν By human virtue we mean not that of the
τοῦ σώµατος ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ body but that of the soul; and happiness
also we call an activity of soul.
τὴν εὐδαιµονίαν δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν
λέγοµεν.
εἰ δὲ ταῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ τὸν But if this is so, clearly the student of
πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πως τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς, politics must know somehow the facts about
soul, as the man who is to heal the eyes or
ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν ὀφθαλµοὺς the body as a whole must know about the
θεραπεύσοντα (20) καὶ πᾶν <τὸ> σῶµα, eyes or the body; and all the more since
καὶ µᾶλλον ὅσῳ τιµιωτέρα καὶ βελτίων ἡ politics is more prized and better than
πολιτικὴ τῆς ἰατρικῆς· τῶν δ᾽ ἰατρῶν οἱ medicine; but even among doctors the best
educated spend much labour on acquiring
χαρίεντες πολλὰ πραγµατεύονται περὶ knowledge of the body.
τὴν τοῦ σώµατος γνῶσιν.
θεωρητέον δὴ καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ περὶ The student of politics, then, must study the
ψυχῆς, θεωρητέον δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ soul, and must study it with these objects in
view, and do so just to the extent which is
ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἱκανῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ζητούµενα· sufficient for the questions we are
(25) τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐξακριβοῦν discussing; for further precision is perhaps
ἐργωδέστερον ἴσως ἐστὶ τῶν something more laborious than our purposes
require.
προκειµένων.
Λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς Some things are said about it, adequately
ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἔνια, καὶ enough, even in the discussions outside our
school, and we must use these; e.g. that
χρηστέον αὐτοῖς· οἷον τὸ µὲν ἄλογον one element in the soul is irrational and one
αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον. has a rational principle.
ταῦτα δὲ πότερον διώρισται καθάπερ τὰ Whether these are separated as the parts of
τοῦ σώµατος µόρια καὶ πᾶν τὸ (30) the body or of anything divisible are, or are
distinct by definition but by nature
12 of 15 23/02/2014 1:24 AM
µεριστόν, ἢ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα inseparable, like convex and concave in the
πεφυκότα καθάπερ ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ τὸ circumference of a circle, does not affect the
present question.
κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον, οὐθὲν διαφέρει
πρὸς τὸ παρόν.
Τοῦ ἀλόγου δὲ τὸ µὲν ἔοικε κοινῷ καὶ Of the irrational element one division
φυτικῷ, λέγω δὲ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ τρέφεσθαι seems to be widely distributed, and
vegetative in its nature, I mean that which
καὶ αὔξεσθαι· τὴν τοιαύτην γὰρ δύναµιν causes nutrition and growth; for it is this
τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τρεφοµένοις kind of power of the soul that one must
θείη τις ἂν [1102β] (1) καὶ ἐν τοῖς assign to all nurslings and to embryos, and
ἐµβρύοις, τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην καὶ ἐν this same power to fullgrown creatures; this
is more reasonable than to assign some
τοῖς τελείοις· εὐλογώτερον γὰρ ἢ ἄλλην different power to them.
τινά.
ταύτης µὲν οὖν κοινή τις ἀρετὴ καὶ οὐκ Now the excellence of this seems to be
ἀνθρωπίνη φαίνεται· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς common to all species and not specifically
human; for this part or faculty seems to
ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν µάλιστα τὸ µόριον function most in sleep, while goodness and
τοῦτο καὶ (5) ἡ δύναµις αὕτη, ὁ δ᾽ ἀγαθὸς badness are least manifest in sleep (whence
καὶ κακὸς ἥκιστα διάδηλοι καθ᾽ ὕπνον comes the saying that the happy are not
better off than the wretched for half their
(ὅθεν φασὶν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὸ ἥµισυ
lives; and this happens naturally enough,
τοῦ βίου τοὺς εὐδαίµονας τῶν ἀθλίων· since sleep is an inactivity of the soul in that
συµβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο εἰκότως· ἀργία γάρ respect in which it is called good or bad),
ἐστιν ὁ ὕπνος τῆς ψυχῆς ᾗ λέγεται unless perhaps to a small extent some of
the movements actually penetrate to the
σπουδαία καὶ φαύλη), πλὴν εἰ µὴ κατὰ
soul, and in this respect the dreams of good
µικρὸν καὶ διικνοῦνταί τινες τῶν men are better than those of ordinary
κινήσεων, (10) καὶ ταύτῃ βελτίω γίνεται people.
τὰ φαντάσµατα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἢ τῶν
τυχόντων.
ἀλλὰ περὶ µὲν τούτων ἅλις, καὶ τὸ Enough of this subject, however; let us
θρεπτικὸν ἐατέον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς leave the nutritive faculty alone, since it has
by its nature no share in human excellence.
ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἄµοιρον πέφυκεν.
Ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς There seems to be also another irrational
ἄλογος εἶναι, µετέχουσα µέντοι πῃ element in the soul-one which in a sense,
however, shares in a rational principle. For
λόγου. τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς we praise the rational principle of the
τὸν (15) λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον continent man and of the incontinent, and
ἔχον ἐπαινοῦµεν· ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ the part of their soul that has such a
βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ· φαίνεται δ᾽ ἐν principle, since it urges them aright and
towards the best objects; but there is found
αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον in them also another element naturally
πεφυκός, ὃ µάχεται καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῷ opposed to the rational principle, which
λόγῳ. fights against and resists that principle.
ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ καθάπερ τὰ παραλελυµένα For exactly as paralysed limbs when we

τοῦ σώµατος µόρια εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ intend to move them to the right turn on
the contrary to the left, so is it with the
προαιρουµένων κινῆσαι (20) τοὐναντίον
13 of 15 23/02/2014 1:24 AM
εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παραφέρεται, καὶ ἐπὶ soul; the impulses of incontinent people
τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως· ἐπὶ τἀναντία γὰρ αἱ move in contrary directions. But while in the
body we see that which moves astray, in the
ὁρµαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν. ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τοῖς σώµασι soul we do not.
µὲν ὁρῶµεν τὸ παραφερόµενον, ἐπὶ δὲ
τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὁρῶµεν.
ἴσως δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ No doubt, however, we must none the less
νοµιστέον εἶναί τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, suppose that in the soul too there is
something contrary to the rational principle,
ἐναντιούµενον τούτῳ καὶ ἀντιβαῖνον. resisting and opposing it.
(25) πῶς δ᾽ ἕτερον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει. In what sense it is distinct from the other
λόγου δὲ καὶ τοῦτο φαίνεται µετέχειν, elements does not concern us. Now even
this seems to have a share in a rational
ὥσπερ εἴποµεν· πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν τῷ λόγῳ principle, as we said; at any rate in the
τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς--ἔτι δ᾽ ἴσως continent man it obeys the rational principle
εὐηκοώτερόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ σώφρονος καὶ and presumably in the temperate and brave
man it is still more obedient; for in him it
ἀνδρείου· πάντα γὰρ ὁµοφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ.
speaks, on all matters, with the same voice
as the rational principle.
Φαίνεται δὴ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διττόν. τὸ µὲν Therefore the irrational element also
γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαµῶς κοινωνεῖ (30) appears to be two-fold. For the vegetative
element in no way shares in a rational
λόγου, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπιθυµητικὸν καὶ ὅλως principle, but the appetitive and in general
ὀρεκτικὸν µετέχει πως, ᾗ κατήκοόν ἐστιν the desiring element in a sense shares in it,
αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῦ in so far as it listens to and obeys it; this is
πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων φαµὲν ἔχειν the sense in which we speak of 'taking
account' of one's father or one's friends, not
λόγον, καὶ οὐχὥσπερ τῶν µαθηµατικῶν. that in which we speak of 'accounting for a
mathematical property.
ὅτι δὲ πείθεταί πως ὑπὸ λόγου τὸ That the irrational element is in some sense
ἄλογον, µηνύει καὶ ἡ νουθέτησις καὶ persuaded by a rational principle is indicated
also by the giving of advice and by all
πᾶσα ἐπιτίµησίς τε καὶ παράκλησις. reproof and exhortation.
[1103α] (1) εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο φάναι And if this element also must be said to
λόγον ἔχειν, διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον have a rational principle, that which has a
rational principle (as well as that which has
ἔχον, τὸ µὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ, τὸ δ᾽ not) will be twofold, one subdivision having
ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι. it in the strict sense and in itself, and the
other having a tendency to obey as one
does one's father.
Διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν Virtue too is distinguished into kinds in
διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγοµεν γὰρ αὐτῶν accordance with this difference; for we say
that some of the virtues are intellectual and
τὰς (5) µὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἠθικάς, others moral, philosophic wisdom and
σοφίαν µὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν understanding and practical wisdom being
διανοητικάς, ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ καὶ intellectual, liberality and temperance
σωφροσύνην ἠθικάς. moral.
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λέγοντες γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἤθους οὐ λέγοµεν For in speaking about a man's character we
ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ συνετὸς ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι πρᾶος ἢ do not say that he is wise or has
understanding but that he is good-tempered
σώφρων· ἐπαινοῦµεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν or temperate; yet we praise the wise man
κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν· τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τὰς also with respect to his state of mind; and of
ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς (10) λέγοµεν. states of mind we call those which merit
praise virtues.
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Αριστοτέλους Ηθικά Νικοµάχεια, Βιβλίο ΙΙ, 1-4 http://www.mikrosapoplous.gr/aristotle/nicom2a.htm

Βιβλίον II, 1-4
Books II-V. Moral Virtue
A. Moral virtue, how produced, in

what materials and in what
manner exhibited.
1. It, like the arts, is acquired by

repetition of the corresponding
acts.
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[1103α] (14) Διττῆς δὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὔσης, VIRTUE, then, being of two kinds,
τῆς µὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς (15) δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἡ intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in
the main owes both its birth and its growth
µὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ to teaching (for which reason it requires
διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν experience and time), while moral virtue
αὔξησιν, διόπερ ἐµπειρίας δεῖται καὶ comes about as a result of habit, whence
χρόνου, ἡ δ᾽ ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, also its name (ethike) is one that is formed
by a slight variation from the word ethos
ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνοµα ἔσχηκε µικρὸν (habit).
παρεκκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους.
ἐξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδεµία τῶν ἠθικῶν From this it is also plain that none of the
ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡµῖν ἐγγίνεται· οὐθὲν (20) moral virtues arises in us by nature; for
nothing that exists by nature can form a
γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται, habit contrary to its nature. For instance the
οἷον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόµενος οὐκ stone which by nature moves downwards
ἂν ἐθισθείη ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδ᾽ ἂν cannot be habituated to move upwards, not
even if one tries to train it by throwing it up
µυριάκις αὐτὸν ἐθίζῃ τις ἄνω ῥιπτῶν,
ten thousand times; nor can fire be
οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν habituated to move downwards, nor can
ἄλλως πεφυκότων ἄλλως ἂν ἐθισθείη. anything else that by nature behaves in one
way be trained to behave in another.
οὔτ᾽ ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to
ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ (25) nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we
are adapted by nature to receive them, and
πεφυκόσι µὲν ἡµῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, are made perfect by habit.
1 of 9 23/02/2014 1:25 AM
τελειουµένοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους.
Ἔτι ὅσα µὲν φύσει ἡµῖν παραγίνεται, Again, of all the things that come to us by
τὰς δυνάµεις τούτων πρότερον nature we first acquire the potentiality and
later exhibit the activity (this is plain in the
κοµιζόµεθα, ὕστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας case of the senses; for it was not by often
ἀποδίδοµεν (ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων seeing or often hearing that we got these
δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ senses, but on the contrary we had them
πολλάκις ἀκοῦσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις before we used them, and did not come to
have them by using them); but the virtues
ἐλάβοµεν, (30) ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάπαλιν ἔχοντες we get by first exercising them, as also
ἐχρησάµεθα, οὐ χρησάµενοι ἔσχοµεν)· happens in the case of the arts as well.
τὰς δ᾽ ἀρετὰς λαµβάνοµεν
ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ
τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν·
ἃ γὰρ δεῖ µαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα For the things we have to learn before we
ποιοῦντες µανθάνοµεν, οἷον can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g.
men become builders by building and
οἰκοδοµοῦντες οἰκοδόµοι γίνονται καὶ lyreplayers by playing the lyre; so too we
κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί·[1103b] (1) οὕτω become just by doing just acts, temperate
δὴ καὶ τὰ µὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι by doing temperate acts, brave by doing
brave acts.
γινόµεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονες, τὰ
δ᾽ ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι.
Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ γινόµενον ἐν ταῖς This is confirmed by what happens in

πόλεσιν· οἱ γὰρ νοµοθέται τοὺς πολίτας states; for legislators make the citizens good
by forming habits in them, and this is the
ἐθίζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθούς, καὶ τὸ µὲν wish of every legislator, and those who do
βούληµα παντὸς νοµοθέτου (5) τοῦτ᾽ not effect it miss their mark, and it is in this
ἐστίν, ὅσοι δὲ µὴ εὖ αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν that a good constitution differs from a bad
ἁµαρτάνουσιν, καὶ διαφέρει τούτῳ one.
πολιτεία πολιτείας ἀγαθὴ φαύλης.
Ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ Again, it is from the same causes and by
γίνεται πᾶσα ἀρετὴ καὶ φθείρεται, the same means that every virtue is both
produced and destroyed, and similarly every
ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ τέχνη· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ art; for it is from playing the lyre that both
κιθαρίζειν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ good and bad lyre-players are produced.
γίνονται κιθαρισταί. ἀνάλογον (10) δὲ And the corresponding statement is true of
καὶ οἰκοδόµοι καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες· ἐκ builders and of all the rest; men will be good
or bad builders as a result of building well or
µὲν γὰρ τοῦ εὖ οἰκοδοµεῖν ἀγαθοὶ badly.
οἰκοδόµοι ἔσονται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς
κακοί.
εἰ γὰρ µὴ οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τοῦ For if this were not so, there would have
διδάξοντος, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἂν ἐγίνοντο been no need of a teacher, but all men
would have been born good or bad at their
ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοί. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν craft. This, then, is the case with the virtues
ἀρετῶν ἔχει· πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς also; by doing the acts that we do in our
συναλλάγµασι (15) τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς transactions with other men we become just
or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do
ἀνθρώπους γινόµεθα οἳ µὲν δίκαιοι οἳ δὲ
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ἄδικοι, πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς in the presence of danger, and being

καὶ ἐθιζόµενοι φοβεῖσθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν οἳ habituated to feel fear or confidence, we
become brave or cowardly.
µὲν ἀνδρεῖοι οἳ δὲ δειλοί.
ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυµίας ἔχει The same is true of appetites and feelings of
καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ὀργάς· οἳ µὲν γὰρ anger; some men become temperate and
good-tempered, others self-indulgent and
σώφρονες καὶ πρᾶοι γίνονται, οἳ δ᾽ irascible, by behaving in one way or the
ἀκόλαστοι καὶ ὀργίλοι, (20) οἳ µὲν ἐκ τοῦ other in the appropriate circumstances.
οὑτωσὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι, οἳ δὲ
ἐκ τοῦ οὑτωσί.
καὶ ἑνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁµοίων Thus, in one word, states of character arise
ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται. διὸ δεῖ τὰς out of like activities. This is why the
activities we exhibit must be of a certain
ἐνεργείας ποιὰς ἀποδιδόναι· κατὰ γὰρ kind; it is because the states of character
τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ correspond to the differences between
ἕξεις. οὐ µικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ these. It makes no small difference, then,
whether we form habits of one kind or of
οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, (25)
another from our very youth; it makes a
ἀλλὰ πάµπολυ, µᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν. very great difference, or rather all the
difference.
2. These acts cannot be

prescribed exactly, but must
avoid excess and defect.
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Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ παροῦσα πραγµατεία οὐ Since, then, the present inquiry does not
θεωρίας ἕνεκά ἐστιν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι (οὐ aim at theoretical knowledge like the others
(for we are inquiring not in order to know
γὰρ ἵνα εἰδῶµεν τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ what virtue is, but in order to become good,
σκεπτόµεθα, ἀλλ᾽ ἵν᾽ ἀγαθοὶ γενώµεθα, since otherwise our inquiry would have been
ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ὄφελος αὐτῆς), of no use), we must examine the nature of
actions, namely how we ought to do them;
ἀναγκαῖον ἐπισκέψασθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς
for these determine also the nature of the
(30) πράξεις, πῶς πρακτέον αὐτάς· αὗται states of character that are produced, as we
γάρ εἰσι κύριαι καὶ τοῦ ποιὰς γενέσθαι have said.
τὰς ἕξεις, καθάπερ εἰρήκαµεν.
τὸ µὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον Now, that we must act according to the right
πράττειν κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείσθω-- rule is a common principle and must be
assumed-it will be discussed later, i.e. both
ῥηθήσεται δ᾽ ὕστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τί what the right rule is, and how it is related
ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς to the other virtues. But this must be
τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. [1104a] (1) ἐκεῖνο δὲ agreed upon beforehand, that the whole
account of matters of conduct must be given
προδιοµολογείσθω, ὅτι πᾶς ὁ περὶ τῶν
in outline and not precisely, as we said at
πρακτῶν λόγος τύπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς the very beginning that the accounts we
ὀφείλει λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς demand must be in accordance with the
εἴποµεν ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ὕλην οἱ λόγοι subject-matter; matters concerned with
conduct and questions of what is good for us
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ἀπαιτητέοι· τὰ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰ have no fixity, any more than matters of
συµφέροντα οὐδὲν ἑστηκὸς ἔχει, ὥσπερ health.
(5) οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινά.
τοιούτου δ᾽ ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, ἔτι The general account being of this nature,
µᾶλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα λόγος the account of particular cases is yet more
lacking in exactness; for they do not fall
οὐκ ἔχει τἀκριβές· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τέχνην under any art or precept but the agents
οὔθ᾽ ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεµίαν πίπτει, themselves must in each case consider what
δεῖ δ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ is appropriate to the occasion, as happens
also in the art of medicine or of navigation.
πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ
τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς (10)
κυβερνητικῆς.
ἀλλὰ καίπερ ὄντος τοιούτου τοῦ But though our present account is of this
παρόντος λόγου πειρατέον βοηθεῖν. nature we must give what help we can.
First, then, let us consider this, that it is the
πρῶτον οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι τὰ nature of such things to be destroyed by
τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπ᾽ ἐνδείας καὶ defect and excess, as we see in the case of
ὑπερβολῆς φθείρεσθαι, (δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ strength and of health (for to gain light on
τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς µαρτυρίοις things imperceptible we must use the
evidence of sensible things); both excessive
χρῆσθαι) ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς and defective exercise destroys the
ὑγιείας ὁρῶµεν· (15) τά τε γὰρ strength, and similarly drink or food which is
ὑπερβάλλοντα γυµνάσια καὶ τὰ above or below a certain amount destroys
the health, while that which is proportionate
ἐλλείποντα φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύν, ὁµοίως δὲ both produces and increases and preserves
καὶ τὰ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ σιτία πλείω καὶ it.
ἐλάττω γινόµενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγίειαν, τὰ
δὲ σύµµετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὔξει καὶ
σῴζει.
οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ So too is it, then, in the case of temperance
ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν. and courage and the other virtues. For the
man who flies from and fears everything
(20) ὅ τε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ and does not stand his ground against
φοβούµενος καὶ µηδὲν ὑποµένων δειλὸς anything becomes a coward, and the man
γίνεται, ὅ τε µηδὲν ὅλως φοβούµενος who fears nothing at all but goes to meet
ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα βαδίζων θρασύς· every danger becomes rash; and similarly
the man who indulges in every pleasure and
ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ µὲν πάσης ἡδονῆς abstains from none becomes self-indulgent,
ἀπολαύων καὶ µηδεµιᾶς ἀπεχόµενος while the man who shuns every pleasure, as
ἀκόλαστος, ὁ δὲ πᾶσαν φεύγων, ὥσπερ boors do, becomes in a way insensible;
temperance and courage, then, are
οἱ ἄγροικοι, ἀναίσθητός (25) τις·
destroyed by excess and defect, and
φθείρεται δὴ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία preserved by the mean.
ὑπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως,
ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς µεσότητος σῴζεται.
Ἀλλ᾽ οὐ µόνον αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αὐξήσεις But not only are the sources and causes
καὶ αἱ φθοραὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν of their origination and growth the same as
those of their destruction, but also the
αὐτῶν γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν sphere of their actualization will be the
4 of 9 23/02/2014 1:25 AM
τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν (30) same; for this is also true of the things
ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων οὕτως ἔχει, which are more evident to sense, e.g. of
strength; it is produced by taking much food
οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος· γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ and undergoing much exertion, and it is the
πολλὴν τροφὴν λαµβάνειν καὶ πολλοὺς strong man that will be most able to do
πόνους ὑποµένειν, καὶ µάλιστα ἂν these things.
δύναιτ᾽ αὐτὰ ποιεῖν ὁ ἰσχυρός.
οὕτω δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἔκ τε So too is it with the virtues; by abstaining
γὰρ τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν from pleasures we become temperate, and it
is when we have become so that we are
γινόµεθα σώφρονες, καὶ γενόµενοι (35) most able to abstain from them; and
µάλιστα δυνάµεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν· similarly too in the case of courage; for by
[1104b] (1) ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς being habituated to despise things that are
terrible and to stand our ground against
ἀνδρείας· ἐθιζόµενοι γὰρ καταφρονεῖν
them we become brave, and it is when we
τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ ὑποµένειν αὐτὰ have become so that we shall be most able
γινόµεθα ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ γενόµενοι to stand our ground against them.
µάλιστα δυνησόµεθα ὑποµένειν τὰ
φοβερά.
3. Pleasure in doing virtuous acts

is a sign that the virtuous
disposition has been acquired: a
variety of considerations show
the essential connexion of moral
virtue with pleasure and pain.
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Σηµεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἕξεων τὴν We must take as a sign of states of
ἐπιγινοµένην ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην (5) τοῖς character the pleasure or pain that ensues
on acts; for the man who abstains from
ἔργοις· ὁ µὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόµενος τῶν bodily pleasures and delights in this very
σωµατικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ fact is temperate, while the man who is
χαίρων σώφρων, ὁ δ᾽ ἀχθόµενος annoyed at it is self-indulgent, and he who
stands his ground against things that are
ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ὁ µὲν ὑποµένων τὰ δεινὰ
terrible and delights in this or at least is not
καὶ χαίρων ἢ µὴ λυπούµενός γε pained is brave, while the man who is
ἀνδρεῖος, ὁ δὲ λυπούµενος δειλός. pained is a coward.
περὶ ἡδονὰς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ For moral excellence is concerned with
ἀρετή· διὰ µὲν γὰρ (10) τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ pleasures and pains; it is on account of the
pleasure that we do bad things, and on
φαῦλα πράττοµεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν account of the pain that we abstain from
καλῶν ἀπεχόµεθα. διὸ δεῖ ἦχθαί πως noble ones. Hence we ought to have been
εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν, brought up in a particular way from our very
ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ· ἡ youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in
and to be pained by the things that we
γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν. ought; for this is the right education.
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Ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ αἱ ἀρεταί εἰσι περὶ πράξεις καὶ Again, if the virtues are concerned with
πάθη, παντὶ δὲ πάθει καὶ πάσῃ πράξει actions and passions, and every passion and
every action is accompanied by pleasure and
ἕπεται (15) ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ pain, for this reason also virtue will be
ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας. concerned with pleasures and pains. This is
µηνύουσι δὲ καὶ αἱ κολάσεις γινόµεναι indicated also by the fact that punishment is
inflicted by these means; for it is a kind of
διὰ τούτων· ἰατρεῖαι γάρ τινές εἰσιν, αἱ
cure, and it is the nature of cures to be
δὲ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι effected by contraries.
γίνεσθαι.
Ἔτι, ὡς καὶ πρῴην εἴποµεν, πᾶσα ψυχῆς Again, as we said but lately, every state
ἕξις, ὑφ᾽ οἵων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι (20) of soul has a nature relative to and
concerned with the kind of things by which
χείρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ it tends to be made worse or better; but it is
ταῦτα τὴν φύσιν ἔχει· δι᾽ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ by reason of pleasures and pains that men
λύπας φαῦλοι γίνονται, τῷ διώκειν become bad, by pursuing and avoiding
these- either the pleasures and pains they
ταύτας καὶ φεύγειν, ἢ ἃς µὴ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ
ought not or when they ought not or as they
δεῖ ἢ ὡς οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὁσαχῶς ἄλλως ὑπὸ τοῦ ought not, or by going wrong in one of the
λόγου διορίζεται τὰ τοιαῦτα. other similar ways that may be
distinguished.
διὸ καὶ ὁρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας Hence men even define the virtues as
τινὰς (25) καὶ ἠρεµίας· οὐκ εὖ δέ, ὅτι certain states of impassivity and rest; not
well, however, because they speak
ἁπλῶς λέγουσιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὡς absolutely, and do not say 'as one ought'
οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα and 'as one ought not' and 'when one ought
προστίθεται. ὑπόκειται ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ or ought not', and the other things that may
be added. We assume, then, that this kind
εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας
of excellence tends to do what is best with
τῶν βελτίστων πρακτική, ἡ δὲ κακία regard to pleasures and pains, and vice does
τοὐναντίον. the contrary.
Γένοιτο δ᾽ ἂν ἡµῖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων The following facts also may show us that
φανερὸν ὅτι περὶ τῶν (30) αὐτῶν. τριῶν virtue and vice are concerned with these
same things. There being three objects of
γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ choice and three of avoidance, the noble,
τριῶν τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγάς, καλοῦ the advantageous, the pleasant, and their
συµφέροντος ἡδέος, καὶ [τριῶν] τῶν contraries, the base, the injurious, the
painful, about all of these the good man
ἐναντίων, αἰσχροῦ βλαβεροῦ λυπηροῦ,
tends to go right and the bad man to go
περὶ ταῦτα µὲν πάντα ὁ ἀγαθὸς wrong, and especially about pleasure; for
κατορθωτικός ἐστιν ὁ δὲ κακὸς this is common to the animals, and also it
ἁµαρτητικός, µάλιστα δὲ περὶ τὴν accompanies all objects of choice; for even
the noble and the advantageous appear
ἡδονήν· κοινή τε γὰρ αὕτη (35) τοῖς
pleasant.
ζῴοις, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν
παρακολουθεῖ· [1105a] (1) καὶ γὰρ τὸ
καλὸν καὶ τὸ συµφέρον ἡδὺ φαίνεται.
Ἔτι δ᾽ ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡµῖν Again, it has grown up with us all from
συντέθραπται· διὸ χαλεπὸν our infancy; this is why it is difficult to rub
off this passion, engrained as it is in our life.
ἀποτρίψασθαι τοῦτο τὸ πάθος And we measure even our actions, some of
ἐγκεχρωσµένον τῷ βίῳ. κανονίζοµεν δὲ us more and others less, by the rule of
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καὶ τὰς πράξεις, οἳ µὲν µᾶλλον οἳ δ᾽ pleasure and pain. For this reason, then, our
ἧττον, (5) ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ. διὰ τοῦτ᾽ οὖν whole inquiry must be about these; for to
feel delight and pain rightly or wrongly has
ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πᾶσαν no small effect on our actions.
πραγµατείαν· οὐ γὰρ µικρὸν εἰς τὰς
πράξεις εὖ ἢ κακῶς χαίρειν καὶ
λυπεῖσθαι.
Ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἡδονῇ µάχεσθαι ἢ Again, it is harder to fight with pleasure

θυµῷ, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, περὶ than with anger, to use Heraclitus' phrase',
but both art and virtue are always
δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον ἀεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται concerned with what is harder; for even the
καὶ ἀρετή· (10) καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν good is better when it is harder. Therefore
τούτῳ. ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περὶ ἡδονὰς for this reason also the whole concern both
of virtue and of political science is with
καὶ λύπας πᾶσα ἡ πραγµατεία καὶ τῇ
pleasures and pains; for the man who uses
ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ· ὁ µὲν γὰρ εὖ these well will be good, he who uses them
τούτοις χρώµενος ἀγαθὸς ἔσται, ὁ δὲ badly bad.
κακῶς κακός.
Ὅτι µὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς That virtue, then, is concerned with
καὶ λύπας, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν γίνεται, ὑπὸ pleasures and pains, and that by the acts
from which it arises it is both increased and,
τούτων καὶ αὔξεται (15) καὶ φθείρεται µὴ if they are done differently, destroyed, and
ὡσαύτως γινοµένων, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν that the acts from which it arose are those
ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνεργεῖ, in which it actualizes itself- let this be taken
as said.
εἰρήσθω.
4. The actions that produce moral

virtue are not good in the same
sense as those that flow from it:
the latter must fulfil certain
conditions not necessary in the
case of the arts.
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Ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις πῶς λέγοµεν ὅτι δεῖ The question might be asked,; what we
τὰ µὲν δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους mean by saying that we must become just
by doing just acts, and temperate by doing
γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονας· εἰ temperate acts; for if men do just and
γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα, temperate acts, they are already just and
(20) ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες, temperate, exactly as, if they do what is in
ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραµµατικὰ καὶ τὰ µουσικά, accordance with the laws of grammar and of
music, they are grammarians and musicians.
γραµµατικοὶ καὶ µουσικοί.
ἢ οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; Or is this not true even of the arts? It is
ἐνδέχεται γὰρ γραµµατικόν τι ποιῆσαι possible to do something that is in
accordance with the laws of grammar, either
καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεµένου. by chance or at the suggestion of another. A
τότε οὖν ἔσται γραµµατικός, ἐὰν καὶ man will be a grammarian, then, only when
he has both done something grammatical
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γραµµατικόν τι ποιήσῃ καὶ (25) and done it grammatically; and this means
γραµµατικῶς· τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν doing it in accordance with the grammatical
knowledge in himself.
ἐν αὑτῷ γραµµατικήν.
Ἔτι οὐδ᾽ ὅµοιόν ἐστιν ἐπί τε τῶν τεχνῶν Again, the case of the arts and that of the
καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· τὰ µὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν virtues are not similar; for the products of
the arts have their goodness in themselves,
τεχνῶν γινόµενα τὸ εὖ ἔχει ἐν αὑτοῖς· so that it is enough that they should have a
ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι· certain character, but if the acts that are in
τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόµενα οὐκ ἐὰν accordance with the virtues have
themselves a certain character it does not
αὐτά πως ἔχῃ, δικαίως (30) ἢ σωφρόνως
follow that they are done justly or
πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὁ πράττων πῶς temperately. The agent also must be in a
ἔχων πράττῃ, πρῶτον µὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς, certain condition when he does them; in the
ἔπειτ᾽ ἐὰν προαιρούµενος, καὶ first place he must have knowledge,
secondly he must choose the acts, and
προαιρούµενος δι᾽ αὐτά, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐὰν choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly
καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀµετακινήτως ἔχων his action must proceed from a firm and
πράττῃ. unchangeable character.
[1105b] (1) Ταῦτα δὲ πρὸς µὲν τὸ τὰς These are not reckoned in as conditions of
ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν οὐ συναριθµεῖται, the possession of the arts, except the bare
knowledge; but as a condition of the
πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναι· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς possession of the virtues knowledge has
ἀρετὰς τὸ µὲν εἰδέναι οὐδὲν ἢ µικρὸν little or no weight, while the other
ἰσχύει, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα οὐ µικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ conditions count not for a little but for
everything, i.e. the very conditions which
πᾶν δύναται, ἅπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις
result from often doing just and temperate
πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ (5) σώφρονα acts.
περιγίνεται.
Τὰ µὲν οὖν πράγµατα δίκαια καὶ Actions, then, are called just and
σώφρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ᾖ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἂν temperate when they are such as the just or
the temperate man would do; but it is not
ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σώφρων πράξειεν· δίκαιος the man who does these that is just and
δὲ καὶ σώφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα temperate, but the man who also does them
πράττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ [ὁ] οὕτω πράττων ὡς as just and temperate men do them.
οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες πράττουσιν.
εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια It is well said, then, that it is by doing just
πράττειν (10) ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ acts that the just man is produced, and by
doing temperate acts the temperate man;
τὰ σώφρονα ὁ σώφρων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ µὴ without doing these no one would have even
πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ a prospect of becoming good.
µελλήσειε γίνεσθαι ἀγαθός.
Ἀλλ᾽ οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα µὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, But most people do not do these, but take
ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται refuge in theory and think they are being
philosophers and will become good in this
φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι way, behaving somewhat like patients who
σπουδαῖοι, ὅµοιόν τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς (15) listen attentively to their doctors, but do
κάµνουσιν, οἳ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι µὲν none of the things they are ordered to do.
ἐπιµελῶς, ποιοῦσι δ᾽ οὐδὲν τῶν As the latter will not be made well in body
by such a course of treatment, the former
προσταττοµένων. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ᾽ will not be made well in soul by such a
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ἐκεῖνοι εὖ ἕξουσι τὸ σῶµα οὕτω course of philosophy.

θεραπευόµενοι, οὐδ᾽ οὗτοι τὴν ψυχὴν
οὕτω φιλοσοφοῦντες.
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Αριστοτέλους Ηθικά Νικοµάχεια, Βιβλίο ΙΙ, 5-9 http://www.mikrosapoplous.gr/aristotle/nicom2b.htm
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Βιβλίον II, 5-9
B. Definition of moral virtue.
5. Its genus: it is a state of

character, not a passion nor a
faculty.
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Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ Next we must consider what virtue is.
σκεπτέον. ἐπεὶ οὖν (20) τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ Since things that are found in the soul are
of three kinds- passions, faculties, states of
γινόµενα τρία ἐστί, πάθη δυνάµεις ἕξεις, character, virtue must be one of these. By
τούτων ἄν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετή. λέγω δὲ πάθη passions I mean appetite, anger, fear,
µὲν ἐπιθυµίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling,
hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in
φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν µῖσος πόθον ζῆλον
general the feelings that are accompanied
ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἕπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη· by pleasure or pain; by faculties the things
δυνάµεις δὲ καθ᾽ ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων in virtue of which we are said to be capable
λεγόµεθα, οἷον καθ᾽ ἃς δυνατοὶ (25) of feeling these, e.g. of becoming angry or
being pained or feeling pity; by states of
ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι· ἕξεις
character the things in virtue of which we
δὲ καθ᾽ ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχοµεν εὖ ἢ stand well or badly with reference to the
κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ µὲν passions, e.g. with reference to anger we
σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνειµένως, κακῶς ἔχοµεν, εἰ stand badly if we feel it violently or too
weakly, and well if we feel it moderately;
δὲ µέσως, εὖ· ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τἆλλα. and similarly with reference to the other
passions.
Πάθη µὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰσὶν οὔθ᾽ αἱ ἀρεταὶ Now neither the virtues nor the vices are
οὔθ᾽ αἱ κακίαι, ὅτι οὐ λεγόµεθα (30) κατὰ passions, because we are not called good or
bad on the ground of our passions, but are
τὰ πάθη σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι, κατὰ δὲ so called on the ground of our virtues and
τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας λεγόµεθα, καὶ our vices, and because we are neither
ὅτι κατὰ µὲν τὰ πάθη οὔτ᾽ ἐπαινούµεθα praised nor blamed for our passions (for the
οὔτε ψεγόµεθα (οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ man who feels fear or anger is not praised,
nor is the man who simply feels anger
φοβούµενος οὐδὲ ὁ ὀργιζόµενος, οὐδὲ blamed, but the man who feels it in a
ψέγεται ὁ ἁπλῶς ὀργιζόµενος ἀλλ᾽ ὁ certain way), but for our virtues and our
πῶς), [1106a] (1) κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ vices we are praised or blamed.
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τὰς κακίας ἐπαινούµεθα ἢ ψεγόµεθα.
Ἔτι ὀργιζόµεθα µὲν καὶ φοβούµεθα Again, we feel anger and fear without
ἀπροαιρέτως, αἱ δ᾽ ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις choice, but the virtues are modes of choice
or involve choice. Further, in respect of the
τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως. πρὸς δὲ passions we are said to be moved, but in
τούτοις κατὰ µὲν τὰ πάθη (5) κινεῖσθαι respect of the virtues and the vices we are
λεγόµεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς said not to be moved but to be disposed in a
κακίας οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακεῖσθαί particular way.
πως.
Διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ δυνάµεις εἰσίν· οὔτε For these reasons also they are not
γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ λεγόµεθα τῷ δύνασθαι faculties; for we are neither called good nor
bad, nor praised nor blamed, for the simple
πάσχειν ἁπλῶς οὔτε κακοί, οὔτ᾽ capacity of feeling the passions; again, we
ἐπαινούµεθα οὔτε ψεγόµεθα· ἔτι δυνατοὶ have the faculties by nature, but we are not
µέν ἐσµεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ (10) made good or bad by nature; we have
οὐ γινόµεθα φύσει· εἴποµεν δὲ περὶ spoken of this before. If, then, the virtues
are neither passions nor faculties, all that
τούτου πρότερον. εἰ οὖν µήτε πάθη εἰσὶν remains is that they should be states of
αἱ ἀρεταὶ µήτε δυνάµεις, λείπεται ἕξεις character.
αὐτὰς εἶναι.
Ὅ τι µὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετή, Thus we have stated what virtue is in
εἴρηται. respect of its genus.
6. Its differentia: it is a
disposition to choose the mean.
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Δεῖ δὲ µὴ µόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἕξις, We must, however, not only describe
ἀλλὰ καὶ (15) ποία τις. ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι virtue as a state of character, but also say
what sort of state it is. We may remark,
πᾶσα ἀρετή, οὗ ἂν ᾖ ἀρετή, αὐτό τε εὖ then, that every virtue or excellence both
ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ brings into good condition the thing of which
ἀποδίδωσιν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλµοῦ ἀρετὴ it is the excellence and makes the work of
that thing be done well; e.g. the excellence
τόν τε ὀφθαλµὸν σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ
of the eye makes both the eye and its work
ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλµοῦ good; for it is by the excellence of the eye
ἀρετῇ εὖ ὁρῶµεν. that we see well.
ὁµοίως ἡ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ ἵππον τε (20) Similarly the excellence of the horse makes
σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν δραµεῖν καὶ a horse both good in itself and good at
running and at carrying its rider and at
ἐνεγκεῖν τὸν ἐπιβάτην καὶ µεῖναι τοὺς awaiting the attack of the enemy. Therefore,
πολεµίους. εἰ δὴ τοῦτ᾽ ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως if this is true in every case, the virtue of
ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν ἡ man also will be the state of character which
makes a man good and which makes him do
ἕξις ἀφ᾽ ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται
his own work well.
καὶ ἀφ᾽ ἧς εὖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει.
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Πῶς δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἔσται, ἤδη µὲν εἰρήκαµεν, How this is to happen we have stated
ἔτι (25) δὲ καὶ ὧδ᾽ ἔσται φανερόν, ἐὰν already, but it will be made plain also by the
following consideration of the specific nature
θεωρήσωµεν ποία τίς ἐστιν ἡ φύσις of virtue. In everything that is continuous
αὐτῆς. ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ and divisible it is possible to take more, less,
ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ µὲν πλεῖον τὸ δ᾽ ἔλαττον or an equal amount, and that either in
terms of the thing itself or relatively to us;
τὸ δ᾽ ἴσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ
and the equal is an intermediate between
πρᾶγµα ἢ πρὸς ἡµᾶς· τὸ δ᾽ ἴσον µέσον τι excess and defect.
ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως.
λέγω δὲ τοῦ µὲν πράγµατος (30) µέσον By the intermediate in the object I mean
τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχον ἀφ᾽ ἑκατέρου τῶν that which is equidistant from each of the
extremes, which is one and the same for all
ἄκρων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν, men; by the intermediate relatively to us
πρὸς ἡµᾶς δὲ ὃ µήτε πλεονάζει µήτε that which is neither too much nor too little-
ἐλλείπει· τοῦτο δ᾽ οὐχ ἕν, οὐδὲ ταὐτὸν and this is not one, nor the same for all. For
instance, if ten is many and two is few, six is
πᾶσιν. οἷον εἰ τὰ δέκα πολλὰ τὰ δὲ δύο
the intermediate, taken in terms of the
ὀλίγα, τὰ ἓξ µέσα λαµβάνουσι κατὰ τὸ object; for it exceeds and is exceeded by an
πρᾶγµα· ἴσῳ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ (35) equal amount; this is intermediate according
ὑπερέχεται· τοῦτο δὲ µέσον ἐστὶ κατὰ to arithmetical proportion.
τὴν ἀριθµητικὴν ἀναλογίαν.
τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡµᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον· But the intermediate relatively to us is not
[1106b] (1) οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ δέκα µναῖ φαγεῖν to be taken so; if ten pounds are too much
for a particular person to eat and two too
πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτης ἓξ µνᾶς little, it does not follow that the trainer will
προστάξει· ἔστι γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ order six pounds; for this also is perhaps too
τῷ ληψοµένῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι µὲν γὰρ much for the person who is to take it, or too
little- too little for Milo, too much for the
ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ ἀρχοµένῳ τῶν γυµνασίων
beginner in athletic exercises. The same is
πολύ. ὁµοίως ἐπὶ δρόµου καὶ (5) πάλης. true of running and wrestling. Thus a
οὕτω δὴ πᾶς ἐπιστήµων τὴν ὑπερβολὴν master of any art avoids excess and defect,
µὲν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ µέσον but seeks the intermediate and chooses
this- the intermediate not in the object but
ζητεῖ καὶ τοῦθ᾽ αἱρεῖται, µέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ
relatively to us.
τοῦ πράγµατος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡµᾶς.
Εἰ δὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήµη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ If it is thus, then, that every art does its
ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ µέσον βλέπουσα καὶ work well- by looking to the intermediate
and judgling its works by this standard (so
εἰς τοῦτο ἄγουσα τὰ ἔργα (ὅθεν that we often say of good works of art that it
εἰώθασιν (10) ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν is not possible either to take away or to add
ἔργοις ὅτι οὔτ᾽ ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν οὔτε anything, implying that excess and defect
destroy the goodness of works of art, while
προσθεῖναι, ὡς τῆς µὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ
the mean preserves it; and good artists, as
τῆς ἐλλείψεως φθειρούσης τὸ εὖ, τῆς δὲ we say, look to this in their work), and if,
µεσότητος σῳζούσης, οἱ δ᾽ ἀγαθοὶ further, virtue is more exact and better than
τεχνῖται, ὡς λέγοµεν, πρὸς τοῦτο any art, as nature also is, then virtue must
have the quality of aiming at the
βλέποντες ἐργάζονται)· ἡ δ᾽ ἀρετὴ
intermediate.
πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ (15)
ἀµείνων ἐστὶν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ
µέσου ἂν εἴη στοχαστική.
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λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικήν· αὕτη γάρ ἐστι περὶ I mean moral virtue; for it is this that is
πάθη καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν concerned with passions and actions, and in
these there is excess, defect, and the
ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ µέσον. οἷον intermediate. For instance, both fear and
καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρρῆσαι καὶ confidence and appetite and anger and pity
ἐπιθυµῆσαι καὶ ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεῆσαι and in general pleasure and pain may be felt
both too much and too little, and in both
καὶ ὅλως ἡσθῆναι (20) καὶ λυπηθῆναι
cases not well; but to feel them at the right
ἔστι καὶ µᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, καὶ ἀµφότερα times, with reference to the right objects,
οὐκ εὖ· τὸ δ᾽ ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ᾽ οἷς καὶ πρὸς towards the right people, with the right
οὓς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ, µέσον τε καὶ motive, and in the right way, is what is both
intermediate and best, and this is
ἄριστον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς. characteristic of virtue.
ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἔστιν Similarly with regard to actions also there is
ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ µέσον. ἡ δ᾽ excess, defect, and the intermediate. Now
virtue is concerned with passions and
ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ (25) πράξεις ἐστίν, actions, in which excess is a form of failure,
ἐν οἷς ἡ µὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἁµαρτάνεται καὶ and so is defect, while the intermediate is
ἡ ἔλλειψις [ψέγεται], τὸ δὲ µέσον praised and is a form of success; and being
praised and being successful are both
ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦται· ταῦτα δ᾽
characteristics of virtue. Therefore virtue is
ἄµφω τῆς ἀρετῆς. µεσότης τις ἄρα ἐστὶν a kind of mean, since, as we have seen, it
ἡ ἀρετή, στοχαστική γε οὖσα τοῦ µέσου. aims at what is intermediate.
Ἔτι τὸ µὲν ἁµαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἔστιν Again, it is possible to fail in many ways
(τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ (30) (for evil belongs to the class of the
unlimited, as the Pythagoreans conjectured,
Πυθαγόρειοι εἴκαζον, τὸ δ᾽ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ and good to that of the limited), while to
πεπερασµένου), τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν succeed is possible only in one way (for
µοναχῶς (διὸ καὶ τὸ µὲν ῥᾴδιον τὸ δὲ which reason also one is easy and the other
difficult- to miss the mark easy, to hit it
χαλεπόν, ῥᾴδιον µὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ
difficult); for these reasons also, then,
σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν)· καὶ excess and defect are characteristic of vice,
διὰ ταῦτ᾽ οὖν τῆς µὲν κακίας ἡ ὑπερβολὴ and the mean of virtue;
καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις, τῆς δ᾽ ἀρετῆς ἡ µεσότης·
For men are good in but one way, but
bad in many.
(35) ἐσθλοὶ µὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς,
παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί. [Anon]
ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν Virtue, then, is a state of character

µεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡµᾶς, [1107a] (1) concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e.
the mean relative to us, this being
ὡρισµένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιµος determined by a rational principle, and by
ὁρίσειεν. µεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς µὲν that principle by which the man of practical
καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ᾽ ἔλλειψιν· καὶ wisdom would determine it. Now it is a
ἔτι τῷ τὰς µὲν ἐλλείπειν τὰς δ᾽ mean between two vices, that which
depends on excess and that which depends
ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος ἔν τε τοῖς on defect; and again it is a mean because
πάθεσι καὶ ἐν (5) ταῖς πράξεσι, τὴν δ᾽ the vices respectively fall short of or exceed
ἀρετὴν τὸ µέσον καὶ εὑρίσκειν καὶ what is right in both passions and actions,
while virtue both finds and chooses that
αἱρεῖσθαι.
which is intermediate.
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διὸ κατὰ µὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον Hence in respect of its substance and the
τὸν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα µεσότης ἐστὶν definition which states its essence virtue is a
mean, with regard to what is best and right
ἡ ἀρετή, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ an extreme.
ἀκρότης.
Οὐ πᾶσα δ᾽ ἐπιδέχεται πρᾶξις οὐδὲ πᾶν But not every action nor every passion
πάθος τὴν µεσότητα· ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς admits of a mean; for some have names
that already imply badness, e.g. spite,
ὠνόµασται (10) συνειληµµένα µετὰ τῆς shamelessness, envy, and in the case of
φαυλότητος, οἷον ἐπιχαιρεκακία actions adultery, theft, murder; for all of
ἀναισχυντία φθόνος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν these and suchlike things imply by their
πράξεων µοιχεία κλοπὴ ἀνδροφονία· names that they are themselves bad, and
not the excesses or deficiencies of them.
πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται
τῷ αὐτὰ φαῦλα εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ αἱ
ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν οὐδ᾽ αἱ ἐλλείψεις.
οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν οὐδέποτε περὶ αὐτὰ It is not possible, then, ever to be right with
κατορθοῦν, (15) ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ ἁµαρτάνειν· regard to them; one must always be wrong.
Nor does goodness or badness with regard
οὐδ᾽ ἔστι τὸ εὖ ἢ µὴ εὖ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα to such things depend on committing
ἐν τῷ ἣν δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὡς µοιχεύειν, adultery with the right woman, at the right
ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῶς τὸ ποιεῖν ὁτιοῦν τούτων time, and in the right way, but simply to do
any of them is to go wrong.
ἁµαρτάνειν ἐστίν.
ὅµοιον οὖν τὸ ἀξιοῦν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν It would be equally absurd, then, to expect
καὶ δειλαίνειν καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν εἶναι that in unjust, cowardly, and voluptuous
action there should be a mean, an excess,
µεσότητα καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν· and a deficiency; for at that rate there
(20) ἔσται γὰρ οὕτω γε ὑπερβολῆς καὶ would be a mean of excess and of
ἐλλείψεως µεσότης καὶ ὑπερβολῆς deficiency, an excess of excess, and a
ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἐλλείψεως. deficiency of deficiency.
ὥσπερ δὲ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας οὐκ But as there is no excess and deficiency of
ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις διὰ τὸ τὸ temperance and courage because what is
intermediate is in a sense an extreme, so
µέσον εἶναί πως ἄκρον, οὕτως οὐδ᾽ too of the actions we have mentioned there
ἐκείνων µεσότης οὐδ᾽ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ is no mean nor any excess and deficiency,
ἔλλειψις, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἂν (25) πράττηται but however they are done they are wrong;
for in general there is neither a mean of
ἁµαρτάνεται· ὅλως γὰρ οὔθ᾽ ὑπερβολῆς
excess and deficiency, nor excess and
καὶ ἐλλείψεως µεσότης ἔστιν, οὔτε deficiency of a mean.
µεσότητος ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις.
7. This proposition illustrated by

reference to the particular
virtues.
<<< >>>
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Δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο µὴ µόνον καθόλου We must, however, not only make this
λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς καθ᾽ ἕκαστα general statement, but also apply it to the
individual facts. For among statements
ἐφαρµόττειν. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τὰς (30) about conduct those which are general apply
πράξεις λόγοις οἱ µὲν καθόλου more widely, but those which are particular
κοινότεροί εἰσιν, οἱ δ᾽ ἐπὶ µέρους are more genuine, since conduct has to do
with individual cases, and our statements
ἀληθινώτεροι· περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα
must harmonize with the facts in these
αἱ πράξεις, δέον δ᾽ ἐπὶ τούτων cases. We may take these cases from our
συµφωνεῖν. ληπτέον οὖν ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς table.
διαγραφῆς.
περὶ µὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη ἀνδρεία With regard to feelings of fear and
µεσότης· [1107b] (1) τῶν δ᾽ confidence courage is the mean; of the
people who exceed, he who exceeds in
ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ µὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ fearlessness has no name (many of the
ἀνώνυµος (πολλὰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀνώνυµα), ὁ states have no name), while the man who
δ᾽ ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων θρασύς, ὁ exceeds in confidence is rash, and he who
exceeds in fear and falls short in confidence
δ᾽ ἐν τῷ µὲν φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων τῷ
is a coward.
δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπων δειλός.
περὶ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας--οὐ (5) πάσας, With regard to pleasures and pains- not all
ἧττον δὲ “καὶ” περὶ τὰς λύπας--µεσότης of them, and not so much with regard to the
pains- the mean is temperance, the excess
µὲν σωφροσύνη, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία. self-indulgence. Persons deficient with
ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ regard to the pleasures are not often found;
γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδ᾽ ὀνόµατος hence such persons also have received no
name. But let us call them 'insensible'.
τετυχήκασιν οὐδ᾽ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσαν
δὲ ἀναίσθητοι.
Περὶ δὲ δόσιν χρηµάτων καὶ λῆψιν With regard to giving and taking of
µεσότης µὲν ἐλευθεριότης, ὑπερβολὴ money the mean is liberality, the excess and
the defect prodigality and meanness. In
(10) δὲ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἀσωτία καὶ these actions people exceed and fall short in
ἀνελευθερία. ἐναντίως δ᾽ ἐν αὐταῖς contrary ways; the prodigal exceeds in
ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν· ὁ µὲν spending and falls short in taking, while the
mean man exceeds in taking and falls short
γὰρ ἄσωτος ἐν µὲν προέσει ὑπερβάλλει
in spending. (At present we are giving a
ἐν δὲ λήψει ἐλλείπει, ὁ δ᾽ ἀνελεύθερος mere outline or summary, and are satisfied
ἐν µὲν λήψει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ προέσει with this; later these states will be more
ἐλλείπει. νῦν µὲν οὖν τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ exactly determined.)
κεφαλαίου λέγοµεν, (15) ἀρκούµενοι
αὐτῷ τούτῳ· ὕστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον
περὶ αὐτῶν διορισθήσεται.
περὶ δὲ χρήµατα καὶ ἄλλαι διαθέσεις With regard to money there are also other
εἰσί, µεσότης µὲν µεγαλοπρέπεια (ὁ γὰρ dispositions- a mean, magnificence (for the
magnificent man differs from the liberal
µεγαλοπρεπὴς διαφέρει ἐλευθερίου· ὃ man; the former deals with large sums, the
µὲν γὰρ περὶ µεγάλα, ὃ δὲ περὶ µικρά), latter with small ones), an excess,
ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ βαναυσία, tastelessness and vulgarity, and a
ἔλλειψις (20) δὲ µικροπρέπεια· deficiency, niggardliness; these differ from
the states opposed to liberality, and the
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διαφέρουσι δ᾽ αὗται τῶν περὶ τὴν mode of their difference will be stated later.
ἐλευθεριότητα, πῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν,
ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται.
περὶ δὲ τιµὴν καὶ ἀτιµίαν µεσότης µὲν With regard to honour and dishonour the
µεγαλοψυχία, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ χαυνότης τις mean is proper pride, the excess is known
as a sort of 'empty vanity', and the
λεγοµένη, ἔλλειψις δὲ µικροψυχία· ὡς δ᾽ deficiency is undue humility; and as we said
ἐλέγοµεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν liberality was related to magnificence,
µεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, (25) differing from it by dealing with small sums,
so there is a state similarly related to proper
<τῷ> περὶ µικρὰ διαφέρουσαν, οὕτως
pride, being concerned with small honours
ἔχει τις καὶ πρὸς τὴν µεγαλοψυχίαν, while that is concerned with great. For it is
περὶ τιµὴν οὖσαν µεγάλην, αὐτὴ περὶ possible to desire honour as one ought, and
µικρὰν οὖσα· ἔστι γὰρ ὡς δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι more than one ought, and less, and the man
who exceeds in his desires is called
τιµῆς καὶ µᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον, ambitious, the man who falls short
λέγεται δ᾽ ὁ µὲν ὑπερβάλλων ταῖς unambitious, while the intermediate person
ὀρέξεσι φιλότιµος, ὁ δ᾽ ἐλλείπων has no name.
ἀφιλότιµος, ὁ δὲ (30) µέσος ἀνώνυµος.
ἀνώνυµοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πλὴν ἡ τοῦ The dispositions also are nameless, except
φιλοτίµου φιλοτιµία. ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται that that of the ambitious man is called
ambition. Hence the people who are at the
οἱ ἄκροι τῆς µέσης χώρας· καὶ ἡµεῖς δὲ extremes lay claim to the middle place; and
ἔστι µὲν ὅτε τὸν µέσον φιλότιµον we ourselves sometimes call the
καλοῦµεν ἔστι δ᾽ ὅτε ἀφιλότιµον, [1108a] intermediate person ambitious and
sometimes unambitious, and sometimes
(1) καὶ ἔστι µὲν ὅτε ἐπαινοῦµεν τὸν
praise the ambitious man and sometimes
φιλότιµον ἔστι δ᾽ ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιµον. the unambitious. The reason of our doing
διὰ τίνα δ᾽ αἰτίαν τοῦτο ποιοῦµεν, ἐν τοῖς this will be stated in what follows; but now
ἑξῆς ῥηθήσεται· νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν let us speak of the remaining states
according to the method which has been
λέγωµεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγηµένον τρόπον.
indicated.
Ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ With regard to anger also there is an
ἔλλειψις καὶ (5) µεσότης, σχεδὸν δὲ excess, a deficiency, and a mean. Although
they can scarcely be said to have names,
ἀνωνύµων ὄντων αὐτῶν τὸν µέσον yet since we call the intermediate person
πρᾶον λέγοντες τὴν µεσότητα πραότητα good-tempered let us call the mean good
καλέσωµεν· τῶν δ᾽ ἄκρων ὁ µὲν temper; of the persons at the extremes let
ὑπερβάλλων ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἡ δὲ κακία the one who exceeds be called irascible, and
his vice irascibility, and the man who falls
ὀργιλότης, ὁ δ᾽ ἐλλείπων ἀόργητός τις, ἡ short an inirascible sort of person, and the
δ᾽ ἔλλειψις ἀοργησία. deficiency inirascibility.
Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τρεῖς µεσότητες, There are also three other means, which
ἔχουσαι µέν (10) τινα ὁµοιότητα πρὸς have a certain likeness to one another, but
differ from one another: for they are all
ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσαι δ᾽ ἀλλήλων· concerned with intercourse in words and
πᾶσαι µὲν γάρ εἰσι περὶ λόγων καὶ actions, but differ in that one is concerned
πράξεων κοινωνίαν, διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἣ with truth in this sphere, the other two with
µέν ἐστι περὶ τἀληθὲς τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς, αἳ δὲ pleasantness; and of this one kind is
exhibited in giving amusement, the other in
περὶ τὸ ἡδύ· τούτου δὲ τὸ µὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ all the circumstances of life.
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τὸ δ᾽ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον.
ῥητέον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἵνα (15) We must therefore speak of these too, that
µᾶλλον κατίδωµεν ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ we may the better see that in all things the
mean is praise-worthy, and the extremes
µεσότης ἐπαινετόν, τὰ δ᾽ ἄκρα οὔτ᾽ neither praiseworthy nor right, but worthy
ἐπαινετὰ οὔτ᾽ ὀρθὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. εἰσὶ µὲν of blame. Now most of these states also
οὖν καὶ τούτων τὰ πλείω ἀνώνυµα, have no names, but we must try, as in the
πειρατέον δ᾽, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, other cases, to invent names ourselves so
that we may be clear and easy to follow.
αὐτοὺς ὀνοµατοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἕνεκα
καὶ τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου.
περὶ µὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθὲς (20) ὁ µὲν µέσος With regard to truth, then, the intermediate
ἀληθής τις καὶ ἡ µεσότης ἀλήθεια is a truthful sort of person and the mean
may be called truthfulness, while the
λεγέσθω, ἡ δὲ προσποίησις ἡ µὲν ἐπὶ τὸ pretence which exaggerates is boastfulness
µεῖζον ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν and the person characterized by it a
ἀλαζών, ἡ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ boaster, and that which understates is mock
modesty and the person characterized by it
εἴρων <ὁ ἔχων>.
mock-modest.
περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ µὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ ὁ µὲν With regard to pleasantness in the giving of
µέσος εὐτράπελος καὶ ἡ διάθεσις amusement the intermediate person is
ready-witted and the disposition ready wit,
εὐτραπελία, ἡ δ᾽ ὑπερβολὴ βωµολοχία the excess is buffoonery and the person
(25) καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωµολόχος, ὁ δ᾽ characterized by it a buffoon, while the man
ἐλλείπων ἄγροικός τις καὶ ἡ ἕξις who falls short is a sort of boor and his state
is boorishness. With regard to the remaining
ἀγροικία· περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν τῷ
kind of pleasantness, that which is exhibited
βίῳ ὁ µὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδὺς ὢν φίλος καὶ ἡ in life in general, the man who is pleasant in
µεσότης φιλία, ὁ δ᾽ ὑπερβάλλων, εἰ µὲν the right way is friendly and the mean is
οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα, ἄρεσκος, εἰ δ᾽ ὠφελείας friendliness, while the man who exceeds is
an obsequious person if he has no end in
τῆς αὑτοῦ, κόλαξ, ὁ δ᾽ ἐλλείπων (30) καὶ
view, a flatterer if he is aiming at his own
ἐν πᾶσιν ἀηδὴς δύσερίς τις καὶ advantage, and the man who falls short and
δύσκολος. is unpleasant in all circumstances is a
quarrelsome and surly sort of person.
Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς παθήµασι καὶ περὶ τὰ There are also means in the passions and
πάθη µεσότητες· ἡ γὰρ αἰδὼς ἀρετὴ µὲν concerned with the passions; since shame is
not a virtue, and yet praise is extended to
οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήµων. the modest man. For even in these matters
καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὃ µὲν λέγεται µέσος, one man is said to be intermediate, and
ὃ δ᾽ ὑπερβάλλων, ὡς ὁ καταπλὴξ ὁ another to exceed, as for instance the
bashful man who is ashamed of everything;
πάντα αἰδούµενος· ὁ δ᾽ ἐλλείπων (35) ἢ
while he who falls short or is not ashamed of
µηδὲν ὅλως ἀναίσχυντος, ὁ δὲ µέσος anything at all is shameless, and the
αἰδήµων. intermediate person is modest.
[1108b] (1) νέµεσις δὲ µεσότης φθόνου Righteous indignation is a mean between

καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ λύπην envy and spite, and these states are
concerned with the pain and pleasure that
καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συµβαίνουσι τοῖς are felt at the fortunes of our neighbours;
πέλας γινοµένας· ὁ µὲν γὰρ νεµεσητικὸς the man who is characterized by righteous
λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ indignation is pained at undeserved good
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πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερὸς ὑπερβάλλων fortune, the envious man, going beyond

τοῦτον ἐπὶ (5) πᾶσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δ᾽ him, is pained at all good fortune, and the
spiteful man falls so far short of being
ἐπιχαιρέκακος τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπει τοῦ pained that he even rejoices.
λυπεῖσθαι ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν.
ἀλλὰ περὶ µὲν τούτων καὶ ἄλλοθι καιρὸς But these states there will be an opportunity
ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ of describing elsewhere; with regard to
justice, since it has not one simple meaning,
ἁπλῶς λέγεται, µετὰ ταῦτα διελόµενοι we shall, after describing the other states,
περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐροῦµεν πῶς µεσότητές distinguish its two kinds and say how each
εἰσιν· ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν of them is a mean; and similarly we shall
(10) ἀρετῶν. treat also of the rational virtues.
C. Characteristics of the extreme

and mean states: practical
corollaries.
8. The extremes are opposed to

each other and the mean.
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Τριῶν δὴ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο µὲν There are three kinds of disposition, then,
κακιῶν, τῆς µὲν καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ two of them vices, involving excess and
deficiency respectively, and one a virtue,
κατ᾽ ἔλλειψιν, µιᾶς δ᾽ ἀρετῆς τῆς viz. the mean, and all are in a sense
µεσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαις ἀντίκεινταί opposed to all; for the extreme states are
πως· αἱ µὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ µέσῃ καὶ contrary both to the intermediate state and
ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ (15) µέση to each other, and the intermediate to the
extremes; as the equal is greater relatively
ταῖς ἄκραις· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον πρὸς µὲν to the less, less relatively to the greater, so
τὸ ἔλαττον µεῖζον πρὸς δὲ τὸ µεῖζον the middle states are excessive relatively to
ἔλαττον, οὕτως αἱ µέσαι ἕξεις πρὸς µὲν the deficiencies, deficient relatively to the
excesses, both in passions and in actions.
τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσι πρὸς δὲ τὰς
ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλείπουσιν ἔν τε τοῖς
πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν.
ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς µὲν τὸν δειλὸν For the brave man appears rash relatively to
θρασὺς φαίνεται, (20) πρὸς δὲ τὸν the coward, and cowardly relatively to the
rash man; and similarly the temperate man
θρασὺν δειλός· ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων appears self-indulgent relatively to the
πρὸς µὲν τὸν ἀναίσθητον ἀκόλαστος, insensible man, insensible relatively to the
πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀναίσθητος, ὁ δ᾽ self-indulgent, and the liberal man prodigal
relatively to the mean man, mean relatively
ἐλευθέριος πρὸς µὲν τὸν ἀνελεύθερον
to the prodigal.
ἄσωτος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἄσωτον
ἀνελεύθερος.
διὸ καὶ ἀπωθοῦνται τὸν µέσον οἱ ἄκροι Hence also the people at the extremes push
ἑκάτερος πρὸς ἑκάτερον, καὶ καλοῦσι the intermediate man each over to the
other, and the brave man is called rash by
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(25) τὸν ἀνδρεῖον ὁ µὲν δειλὸς θρασὺν ὁ the coward, cowardly by the rash man, and
δὲ θρασὺς δειλόν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων correspondingly in the other cases.
ἀνάλογον.
Οὕτω δ᾽ ἀντικειµένων ἀλλήλοις τούτων, These states being thus opposed to one
πλείστη ἐναντιότης ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄκροις another, the greatest contrariety is that of
the extremes to each other, rather than to
πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ πρὸς τὸ µέσον· the intermediate; for these are further from
πορρωτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα ἀφέστηκεν each other than from the intermediate, as
ἀλλήλων ἢ τοῦ µέσου, ὥσπερ τὸ µέγα the great is further from the small and the
small from the great than both are from the
τοῦ µικροῦ καὶ τὸ µικρὸν (30) τοῦ
equal.
µεγάλου ἢ ἄµφω τοῦ ἴσου.
ἔτι πρὸς µὲν τὸ µέσον ἐνίοις ἄκροις Again, to the intermediate some extremes
ὁµοιότης τις φαίνεται, ὡς τῇ θρασύτητι show a certain likeness, as that of rashness
to courage and that of prodigality to
πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τῇ ἀσωτίᾳ πρὸς liberality; but the extremes show the
τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα· τοῖς δὲ ἄκροις πρὸς greatest unlikeness to each other; now
ἄλληλα πλείστη ἀνοµοιότης· τὰ δὲ contraries are defined as the things that are
furthest from each other, so that things that
πλεῖστον ἀπέχοντα ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων
are further apart are more contrary.
ἐναντία ὁρίζονται, ὥστε καὶ (35) µᾶλλον
ἐναντία τὰ πλεῖον ἀπέχοντα.
Πρὸς δὲ τὸ µέσον[1109a] (1) ἀντίκειται To the mean in some cases the

µᾶλλον ἐφ᾽ ὧν µὲν ἡ ἔλλειψις ἐφ᾽ ὧν δὲ deficiency, in some the excess is more
opposed; e.g. it is not rashness, which is an
ἡ ὑπερβολή, οἷον ἀνδρείᾳ µὲν οὐχ ἡ excess, but cowardice, which is a deficiency,
θρασύτης ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ δειλία that is more opposed to courage, and not
ἔλλειψις οὖσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ οὐχ ἡ insensibility, which is a deficiency, but
self-indulgence, which is an excess, that is
ἀναισθησία ἔνδεια οὖσα, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ
more opposed to temperance.
ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ (5) οὖσα.
διὰ δύο δ᾽ αἰτίας τοῦτο συµβαίνει, µίαν This happens from two reasons, one being
µὲν τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγµατος· τῷ γὰρ drawn from the thing itself; for because one
extreme is nearer and liker to the
ἐγγύτερον εἶναι καὶ ὁµοιότερον τὸ intermediate, we oppose not this but rather
ἕτερον ἄκρον τῷ µέσῳ, οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ its contrary to the intermediate. E.g. since
τοὐναντίον ἀντιτίθεµεν µᾶλλον· οἷον rashness is thought liker and nearer to
courage, and cowardice more unlike, we
ἐπεὶ ὁµοιότερον εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἡ
oppose rather the latter to courage; for
θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀνοµοιότερον things that are further from the
(10) δ᾽ ἡ δειλία, ταύτην µᾶλλον intermediate are thought more contrary to
ἀντιτίθεµεν· τὰ γὰρ ἀπέχοντα πλεῖον it.
τοῦ µέσου ἐναντιώτερα δοκεῖ εἶναι.
µία µὲν οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ This, then, is one cause, drawn from the
πράγµατος· ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ ἡµῶν αὐτῶν· thing itself; another is drawn from
ourselves; for the things to which we
πρὸς ἃ γὰρ αὐτοὶ µᾶλλον πεφύκαµέν ourselves more naturally tend seem more
πως, ταῦτα µᾶλλον ἐναντία τῷ µέσῳ contrary to the intermediate. For instance,
φαίνεται. οἷον αὐτοὶ µᾶλλον (15) we ourselves tend more naturally to
pleasures, and hence are more easily
πεφύκαµεν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, διὸ
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εὐκαταφορώτεροί ἐσµεν πρὸς carried away towards self-indulgence than

ἀκολασίαν ἢ πρὸς κοσµιότητα. towards propriety.
ταῦτ᾽ οὖν µᾶλλον ἐναντία λέγοµεν, πρὸς We describe as contrary to the mean, then,
ἃ ἡ ἐπίδοσις µᾶλλον γίνεται· καὶ διὰ rather the directions in which we more often
go to great lengths; and therefore
τοῦτο ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα self-indulgence, which is an excess, is the
ἐναντιωτέρα ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ. more contrary to temperance.
9. The mean is hard to attain, and

is grasped by perception, not by
reasoning.
<<< >>>
(20) Ὅτι µὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ That moral virtue is a mean, then, and in
µεσότης, καὶ πῶς, καὶ ὅτι µεσότης δύο what sense it is so, and that it is a mean
between two vices, the one involving
κακιῶν, τῆς µὲν καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ excess, the other deficiency, and that it is
κατ᾽ ἔλλειψιν, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ such because its character is to aim at what
στοχαστικὴ τοῦ µέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τοῖς is intermediate in passions and in actions,
πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν, ἱκανῶς has been sufficiently stated. Hence also it is
no easy task to be good.
εἴρηται. διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον
εἶναι.
ἐν ἑκάστῳ (25) γὰρ τὸ µέσον λαβεῖν For in everything it is no easy task to find
ἔργον, οἷον κύκλου τὸ µέσον οὐ παντὸς the middle, e.g. to find the middle of a circle
is not for every one but for him who knows;
ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰδότος· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ µὲν so, too, any one can get angry- that is easy-
ὀργισθῆναι παντὸς καὶ ῥᾴδιον, καὶ τὸ or give or spend money; but to do this to
δοῦναι ἀργύριον καὶ δαπανῆσαι· τὸ δ᾽ ᾧ the right person, to the right extent, at the
right time, with the right motive, and in the
καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὥς,
right way, that is not for every one, nor is it
οὐκέτι παντὸς οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον· διόπερ τὸ εὖ easy; wherefore goodness is both rare and
καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ (30) laudable and noble.
καλόν.
διὸ δεῖ τὸν στοχαζόµενον τοῦ µέσου Hence he who aims at the intermediate
πρῶτον µὲν ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ µᾶλλον must first depart from what is the more
contrary to it, as Calypso advises-
ἐναντίου, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ
παραινεῖ Hold the ship out beyond that surf and
spray.
τούτου µὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύµατος [Hom. Od. 12.219]
ἐκτὸς ἔεργε
νῆα.
τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων τὸ µέν ἐστιν For of the extremes one is more
ἁµαρτωλότερον τὸ δ᾽ ἧττον· ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ erroneous, one less so; therefore, since to
hit the mean is hard in the extreme, we
µέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρως χαλεπόν, κατὰ τὸν must as a second best, as people say, take
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δεύτερον, (35) φασί, πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα the least of the evils; and this will be done
ληπτέον τῶν κακῶν· τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔσται best in the way we describe.
µάλιστα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν λέγοµεν.
[1109b] (1) σκοπεῖν δὲ δεῖ πρὸς ἃ καὶ But we must consider the things towards
αὐτοὶ εὐκατάφοροί ἐσµεν· ἄλλοι γὰρ which we ourselves also are easily carried
away; for some of us tend to one thing,
πρὸς ἄλλα πεφύκαµεν· τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔσται some to another; and this will be
γνώριµον ἐκ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς λύπης recognizable from the pleasure and the pain
τῆς γινοµένης περὶ ἡµᾶς. εἰς τοὐναντίον we feel. We must drag ourselves away to
the contrary extreme; for we shall get into
(5) δ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν δεῖ· πολὺ γὰρ
the intermediate state by drawing well away
ἀπάγοντες τοῦ ἁµαρτάνειν εἰς τὸ µέσον from error, as people do in straightening
ἥξοµεν, ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διεστραµµένα τῶν sticks that are bent.
ξύλων ὀρθοῦντες ποιοῦσιν.
Ἐν παντὶ δὲ µάλιστα φυλακτέον τὸ ἡδὺ Now in everything the pleasant or

καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ ἀδέκαστοι pleasure is most to be guarded against; for
we do not judge it impartially. We ought,
κρίνοµεν αὐτήν. ὅπερ οὖν οἱ then, to feel towards pleasure as the elders
δηµογέροντες ἔπαθον πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην, of the people felt towards Helen, and in all
(10) τοῦτο δεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἡµᾶς πρὸς τὴν circumstances repeat their saying; for if we
dismiss pleasure thus we are less likely to
ἡδονήν, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τὴν ἐκείνων
go astray. It is by doing this, then, (to sum
ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὴν the matter up) that we shall best be able to
ἀποπεµπόµενοι ἧττον ἁµαρτησόµεθα. hit the mean.
ταῦτ᾽ οὖν ποιοῦντες, ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ
εἰπεῖν, µάλιστα δυνησόµεθα τοῦ µέσου
τυγχάνειν.
Χαλεπὸν δ᾽ ἴσως τοῦτο, καὶ µάλιστ᾽ ἐν But this is no doubt difficult, and
τοῖς καθ᾽ ἕκαστον· οὐ (15) γὰρ ῥᾴδιον especially in individual cases; for or is not
easy to determine both how and with whom
διορίσαι καὶ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις and on what provocation and how long one
καὶ πόσον χρόνον ὀργιστέον· καὶ γὰρ should be angry; for we too sometimes
ἡµεῖς ὁτὲ µὲν τοὺς ἐλλείποντας praise those who fall short and call them
good-tempered, but sometimes we praise
ἐπαινοῦµεν καὶ πράους φαµέν, ὁτὲ δὲ
those who get angry and call them manly.
τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις
ἀποκαλοῦντες.
ἀλλ᾽ ὁ µὲν µικρὸν τοῦ εὖ παρεκβαίνων The man, however, who deviates little from
οὐ ψέγεται, οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ µᾶλλον οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ goodness is not blamed, whether he do so in
the direction of the more or of the less, but
τὸ (20) ἧττον, ὁ δὲ πλέον· οὗτος γὰρ οὐ only the man who deviates more widely; for
λανθάνει. ὁ δὲ µέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον he does not fail to be noticed. But up to
ψεκτὸς οὐ ῥᾴδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀφορίσαι· what point and to what extent a man must
deviate before he becomes blameworthy it is
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν· τὰ
not easy to determine by reasoning, any
δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐν τοῖς καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, καὶ ἐν τῇ more than anything else that is perceived by
αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. the senses; such things depend on particular
facts, and the decision rests with perception.
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τὸ µὲν ἄρα τοσοῦτο δηλοῖ ὅτι ἡ µέση ἕξις So much, then, is plain, that the
ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπαινετή, ἀποκλίνειν δὲ (25) δεῖ intermediate state is in all things to be
praised, but that we must incline sometimes
ὁτὲ µὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν towards the excess, sometimes towards the
ἔλλειψιν· οὕτω γὰρ ῥᾷστα τοῦ µέσου καὶ deficiency; for so shall we most easily hit
τοῦ εὖ τευξόµεθα. the mean and what is right.
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Βιβλίο ΙΙΙ, 1-2

(1109b30-1112a15)
D. Inner side of moral virtue:

conditions of responsibility for
action.
1. Praise and blame attach to

voluntary actions, i.e. actions
done (1) not under compulsion,
and (2) with knowledge of the
circumstances.
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[1109β] (30) τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε SINCE virtue is concerned with passions
καὶ πράξεις οὔσης, καὶ ἐπὶ µὲν τοῖς and actions, and on voluntary passions and
actions praise and blame are bestowed, on
ἑκουσίοις ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων those that are involuntary pardon, and
γινοµένων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις sometimes also pity, to distinguish the
συγγνώµης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου, τὸ voluntary and the involuntary is presumably
necessary for those who are studying the
ἑκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον
nature of virtue, and useful also for
ἴσως διορίσαι τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς legislators with a view to the assigning both
ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιµον δὲ καὶ τοῖς of honours and of punishments.
νοµοθετοῦσι πρός τε τὰς (35) τιµὰς καὶ
τὰς κολάσεις.
δοκεῖ δὴ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βίᾳ ἢ δι᾽ Those things, then, are thought-involuntary,
ἄγνοιαν γινόµενα· [1110a] (1) βίαιον δὲ which take place under compulsion or owing
to ignorance; and that is compulsory of
οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὖσα ἐν ᾗ which the moving principle is outside, being
µηδὲν συµβάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ a principle in which nothing is contributed
πάσχων, οἷον εἰ πνεῦµα κοµίσαι ποι ἢ by the person who is acting or is feeling the
ἄνθρωποι κύριοι ὄντες. passion, e.g. if he were to be carried
somewhere by a wind, or by men who had
him in their power.
ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον µειζόνων κακῶν But with regard to the things that are
πράττεται ἢ διὰ (5) καλόν τι, οἷον εἰ done from fear of greater evils or for some
noble object (e.g. if a tyrant were to order
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τύραννος προστάττοι αἰσχρόν τι πρᾶξαι one to do something base, having one's

κύριος ὢν γονέων καὶ τέκνων, καὶ parents and children in his power, and if one
did the action they were to be saved, but
πράξαντος µὲν σῴζοιντο µὴ πράξαντος otherwise would be put to death), it may be
δ᾽ ἀποθνήσκοιεν, ἀµφισβήτησιν ἔχει debated whether such actions are
πότερον ἀκούσιά ἐστιν ἢ ἑκούσια. involuntary or voluntary.
τοιοῦτον δέ τι συµβαίνει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐν Something of the sort happens also with
τοῖς χειµῶσιν ἐκβολάς· ἁπλῶς µὲν γὰρ regard to the throwing of goods overboard
in a storm; for in the abstract no one throws
οὐδεὶς ἀποβάλλεται (10) ἑκών, ἐπὶ goods away voluntarily, but on condition of
σωτηρίᾳ δ᾽ αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν its securing the safety of himself and his
ἅπαντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες. crew any sensible man does so.
µικταὶ µὲν οὖν εἰσιν αἱ τοιαῦται πράξεις, Such actions, then, are mixed, but are more
ἐοίκασι δὲ µᾶλλον ἑκουσίοις· αἱρεταὶ γάρ like voluntary actions; for they are worthy
of choice at the time when they are done,
εἰσι τότε ὅτε πράττονται, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς and the end of an action is relative to the
πράξεως κατὰ τὸν καιρόν ἐστιν. occasion.
καὶ τὸ ἑκούσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον, ὅτε Both the terms, then, 'voluntary' and
πράττει, (15) λεκτέον. πράττει δὲ ἑκών· 'involuntary', must be used with reference
to the moment of action. Now the man acts
καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κινεῖν τὰ ὀργανικὰ voluntarily; for the principle that moves the
µέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ instrumental parts of the body in such
ἐστίν· ὧν δ᾽ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ actions is in him, and the things of which
the moving principle is in a man himself are
καὶ τὸ πράττειν καὶ µή.
in his power to do or not to do.
ἑκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἁπλῶς δ᾽ ἴσως Such actions, therefore, are voluntary, but
ἀκούσια· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἕλοιτο καθ᾽ αὑτὸ in the abstract perhaps involuntary; for no
one would choose any such act in itself.
τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν.
(20) ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις For such actions men are sometimes even
ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται, ὅταν αἰσχρόν τι praised, when they endure something base
or painful in return for great and noble
ἢ λυπηρὸν ὑποµένωσιν ἀντὶ µεγάλων objects gained; in the opposite case they are
καὶ καλῶν· ἂν δ᾽ ἀνάπαλιν, ψέγονται· τὰ blamed, since to endure the greatest
γὰρ αἴσχισθ᾽ ὑποµεῖναι ἐπὶ µηδενὶ καλῷ indignities for no noble end or for a trifling
end is the mark of an inferior person.
ἢ µετρίῳ φαύλου.
ἐπ᾽ ἐνίοις δ᾽ ἔπαινος µὲν οὐ γίνεται, On some actions praise indeed is not
συγγνώµη δ᾽, ὅταν διὰ τοιαῦτα πράξῃ bestowed, but pardon is, when one does
what he ought not under pressure which
(25) τις ἃ µὴ δεῖ, ἃ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην overstrains human nature and which no one
φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ µηδεὶς ἂν could withstand.
ὑποµείναι.
ἔνια δ᾽ ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι, But some acts, perhaps, we cannot be forced
ἀλλὰ µᾶλλον ἀποθανετέον παθόντι τὰ to do, but ought rather to face death after
the most fearful sufferings; for the things
δεινότατα· καὶ γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδου that 'forced' Euripides Alcmaeon to slay his
Ἀλκµαίωνα γελοῖα φαίνεται τὰ mother seem absurd.
ἀναγκάσαντα µητροκτονῆσαι.
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ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίοτε διακρῖναι (30) It is difficult sometimes to determine what

ποῖον ἀντὶ ποίου αἱρετέον καὶ τί ἀντὶ should be chosen at what cost, and what
should be endured in return for what gain,
τίνος ὑποµενετέον, ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον and yet more difficult to abide by our
ἐµµεῖναι τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ decisions; for as a rule what is expected is
πολύ ἐστι τὰ µὲν προσδοκώµενα painful, and what we are forced to do is
base, whence praise and blame are
λυπηρά, ἃ δ᾽ ἀναγκάζονται αἰσχρά, ὅθεν
bestowed on those who have been
ἔπαινοι καὶ ψόγοι γίνονται περὶ τοὺς compelled or have not.
ἀναγκασθέντας ἢ µή.
[1110b] (1) τὰ δὴ ποῖα φατέον βίαια; ἢ What sort of acts, then, should be called
ἁπλῶς µέν, ὁπότ᾽ ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς compulsory? We answer that without
qualification actions are so when the cause
ἐκτὸς ᾖ καὶ ὁ πράττων µηδὲν is in the external circumstances and the
συµβάλληται; ἃ δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ µὲν agent contributes nothing. But the things
ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε that in themselves are involuntary, but now
and in return for these gains are worthy of
αἱρετά, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, (5)
choice, and whose moving principle is in the
καθ᾽ αὑτὰ µὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ agent, are in themselves involuntary, but
ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἑκούσια. now and in return for these gains voluntary.
µᾶλλον δ᾽ ἔοικεν ἑκουσίοις· αἱ γὰρ They are more like voluntary acts; for
πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, ταῦτα δ᾽ actions are in the class of particulars, and
the particular acts here are voluntary. What
ἑκούσια. ποῖα δ᾽ ἀντὶ ποίων αἱρετέον, οὐ sort of things are to be chosen, and in
ῥᾴδιον ἀποδοῦναι· πολλαὶ γὰρ διαφοραί return for what, it is not easy to state; for
εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς καθ᾽ ἕκαστα. there are many differences in the particular
cases.
εἰ δέ τις τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίη βίαια But if some one were to say that pleasant
(10) εἶναι (ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα), and noble objects have a compelling power,
forcing us from without, all acts would be for
πάντα ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ βίαια· τούτων γὰρ him compulsory; for it is for these objects
χάριν πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν. that all men do everything they do.
καὶ οἱ µὲν βίᾳ καὶ ἄκοντες λυπηρῶς, οἱ And those who act under compulsion and
δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ καλὸν µεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς· unwillingly act with pain, but those who do
acts for their pleasantness and nobility do
γελοῖον δὲ τὸ αἰτιᾶσθαι τὰ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ them with pleasure; it is absurd to make
µὴ αὑτὸν εὐθήρατον ὄντα ὑπὸ τῶν external circumstances responsible, and not
τοιούτων, καὶ τῶν µὲν (15) καλῶν oneself, as being easily caught by such
ἑαυτόν, τῶν δ᾽ αἰσχρῶν τὰ ἡδέα. attractions, and to make oneself responsible
for noble acts but the pleasant objects
responsible for base acts.
ἔοικε δὴ τὸ βίαιον εἶναι οὗ ἔξωθεν ἡ The compulsory, then, seems to be that

ἀρχή, µηδὲν συµβαλλοµένου τοῦ whose moving principle is outside, the
person compelled contributing nothing.
βιασθέντος.
τὸ δὲ δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἑκούσιον µὲν ἅπαν Everything that is done by reason of
ἐστίν, ἀκούσιον δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυπον καὶ ἐν ignorance is not voluntary; it is only what
produces pain and repentance that is
µεταµελείᾳ· ὁ γὰρ δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν (20) involuntary. For the man who has done
πράξας ὁτιοῦν, µηδέν τι δυσχεραίνων something owing to ignorance, and feels not
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ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει, ἑκὼν µὲν οὐ πέπραχεν, ὅ the least vexation at his action, has not
γε µὴ ᾔδει, οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἄκων, µὴ λυπούµενός acted voluntarily, since he did not know
what he was doing, nor yet involuntarily,
γε. since he is not pained.
τοῦ δὴ δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν ὁ µὲν ἐν µεταµελείᾳ Of people, then, who act by reason of
ἄκων δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ µὴ µεταµελόµενος, ἐπεὶ ignorance he who repents is thought an
involuntary agent, and the man who does
ἕτερος, ἔστω οὐχ ἑκών· ἐπεὶ γὰρ not repent may, since he is different, be
διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνοµα ἔχειν ἴδιον. called a not voluntary agent; for, since he
differs from the other, it is better that he
should have a name of his own.
ἕτερον δ᾽ (25) ἔοικε καὶ τὸ δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν Acting by reason of ignorance seems also
πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα· ὁ γὰρ µεθύων ἢ to be different from acting in ignorance; for
the man who is drunk or in a rage is
ὀργιζόµενος οὐ δοκεῖ δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν thought to act as a result not of ignorance
πράττειν ἀλλὰ διά τι τῶν εἰρηµένων, οὐκ but of one of the causes mentioned, yet not
εἰδὼς δὲ ἀλλ᾽ ἀγνοῶν. knowingly but in ignorance.
ἀγνοεῖ µὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁ µοχθηρὸς ἃ δεῖ Now every wicked man is ignorant of
πράττειν καὶ ὧν ἀφεκτέον, καὶ διὰ τὴν what he ought to do and what he ought to
abstain from, and it is by reason of error of
τοιαύτην ἁµαρτίαν ἄδικοι καὶ ὅλως (30) this kind that men become unjust and in
κακοὶ γίνονται· τὸ δ᾽ ἀκούσιον βούλεται general bad; but the term 'involuntary'
λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὰ tends to be used not if a man is ignorant of
what is to his advantage- for it is not
συµφέροντα· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει
mistaken purpose that causes involuntary
ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου ἀλλὰ τῆς action (it leads rather to wickedness), nor
µοχθηρίας, οὐδ᾽ ἡ καθόλου (ψέγονται ignorance of the universal (for that men are
γὰρ διά γε ταύτην) ἀλλ᾽ ἡ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, blamed), but ignorance of particulars, i.e. of
the circumstances of the action and the
ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ ἡ πρᾶξις· [1111a] (1) ἐν
objects with which it is concerned. For it is
τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώµη· ὁ on these that both pity and pardon depend,
γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκουσίως since the person who is ignorant of any of
πράττει. these acts involuntarily.
ἴσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διορίσαι αὐτά, τίνα Perhaps it is just as well, therefore, to
καὶ πόσα ἐστί, τίς τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί determine their nature and number. A man
may be ignorant, then, of who he is, what
ἢ ἐν τίνι πράττει, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ (5) τίνι, he is doing, what or whom he is acting on,
οἷον ὀργάνῳ, καὶ ἕνεκα τίνος, οἷον and sometimes also what (e.g. what
σωτηρίας, καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἠρέµα ἢ instrument) he is doing it with, and to what
end (e.g. he may think his act will conduce
σφόδρα.
to some one's safety), and how he is doing it
(e.g. whether gently or violently).
ἅπαντα µὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν Now of all of these no one could be ignorant
ἀγνοήσειε µὴ µαινόµενος, δῆλον δ᾽ ὡς unless he were mad, and evidently also he
could not be ignorant of the agent; for how
οὐδὲ τὸν πράττοντα· πῶς γὰρ ἑαυτόν γε; could he not know himself?
ὃ δὲ πράττει ἀγνοήσειεν ἄν τις, οἷον But of what he is doing a man might be

“λέγοντές φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν αὐτούς,” ἢ ignorant, as for instance people say 'it
slipped out of their mouths as they were
οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἀπόρρητα (10) ἦν, ὥσπερ speaking', or 'they did not know it was a
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Αἰσχύλος τὰ µυστικά, ἢ δεῖξαι secret', as Aeschylus said of the mysteries,

βουλόµενος ἀφεῖναι, ὡς ὁ τὸν or a man might say he 'let it go off when he
merely wanted to show its working', as the
καταπέλτην. man did with the catapult.
οἰηθείη δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ τὸν υἱὸν πολέµιον Again, one might think one's son was an
εἶναι ὥσπερ ἡ Μερόπη, καὶ ἐσφαιρῶσθαι enemy, as Merope did, or that a pointed
spear had a button on it, or that a stone was
τὸ λελογχωµένον δόρυ, ἢ τὸν λίθον pumicestone; or one might give a man a
κίσηριν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ πίσας draught to save him, and really kill him; or
ἀποκτείναι ἄν· καὶ θῖξαι βουλόµενος, (15) one might want to touch a man, as people
ὥσπερ οἱ ἀκροχειριζόµενοι, πατάξειεν do in sparring, and really wound him.
ἄν.
περὶ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα τῆς ἀγνοίας οὔσης, The ignorance may relate, then, to any of
ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις, ὁ τούτων τι ἀγνοήσας these things, i.e. of the circumstances of the
action, and the man who was ignorant of
ἄκων δοκεῖ πεπραχέναι, καὶ µάλιστα ἐν any of these is thought to have acted
τοῖς κυριωτάτοις· κυριώτατα δ᾽ εἶναι involuntarily, and especially if he was
δοκεῖ ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα. ignorant on the most important points; and
these are thought to be the circumstances of
the action and its end.
τοῦ δὴ κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἄγνοιαν Further, the doing of an act that is called
ἀκουσίου λεγοµένου (20) ἔτι δεῖ τὴν involuntary in virtue of ignorance of this
sort must be painful and involve repentance.
πρᾶξιν λυπηρὰν εἶναι καὶ ἐν µεταµελείᾳ.
ὄντος δ᾽ ἀκουσίου τοῦ βίᾳ καὶ δι᾽ Since that which is done under
ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἑκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὗ compulsion or by reason of ignorance is
involuntary, the voluntary would seem to be
ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότι τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα ἐν that of which the moving principle is in the
οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις. agent himself, he being aware of the
particular circumstances of the action.
ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια (25) Presumably acts done by reason of anger or
εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυµὸν ἢ ἐπιθυµίαν. appetite are not rightly called involuntary.
πρῶτον µὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων For in the first place, on that showing none
ζῴων ἑκουσίως πράξει, οὐδ᾽ οἱ παῖδες· of the other animals will act voluntarily, nor
will children; and secondly, is it meant that
εἶτα πότερον οὐδὲν ἑκουσίως πράττοµεν we do not do voluntarily any of the acts that
τῶν δι᾽ ἐπιθυµίαν καὶ θυµόν, ἢ τὰ καλὰ are due to appetite or anger, or that we do
µὲν ἑκουσίως τὰ δ᾽ αἰσχρὰ ἀκουσίως; ἢ the noble acts voluntarily and the base acts
involuntarily? Is not this absurd, when one
γελοῖον ἑνός γε αἰτίου ὄντος;
and the same thing is the cause?
ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως (30) ἀκούσια φάναι ὧν But it would surely be odd to describe as
δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι· δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐπί involuntary the things one ought to desire;
and we ought both to be angry at certain
τισι καὶ ἐπιθυµεῖν τινῶν, οἷον ὑγιείας καὶ things and to have an appetite for certain
µαθήσεως. things, e.g. for health and for learning.
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ µὲν ἀκούσια λυπηρὰ Also what is involuntary is thought to be

εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κατ᾽ ἐπιθυµίαν ἡδέα. painful, but what is in accordance with
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appetite is thought to be pleasant.
ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρει τῷ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ Again, what is the difference in respect of

κατὰ λογισµὸν ἢ θυµὸν ἁµαρτηθέντα; involuntariness between errors committed
upon calculation and those committed in
φευκτὰ µὲν γὰρ ἄµφω, [1111b] (1) δοκεῖ anger? Both are to be avoided, but the
δὲ οὐχ ἧττον ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα irrational passions are thought not less
πάθη, ὥστε καὶ αἱ πράξεις τοῦ human than reason is, and therefore also
ἀνθρώπου <αἱ> ἀπὸ θυµοῦ καὶ the actions which proceed from anger or
appetite are the man's actions.
ἐπιθυµίας.
ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ τιθέναι ἀκούσια ταῦτα. It would be odd, then, to treat them as

involuntary.
2. Moral virtue implies that the

action is done (3) by choice; the
object of choice is the result of
previous deliberation.
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διωρισµένων δὲ τοῦ τε ἑκουσίου καὶ τοῦ Both the voluntary and the involuntary
ἀκουσίου, (5) περὶ προαιρέσεως ἕπεται having been delimited, we must next discuss
choice; for it is thought to be most closely
διελθεῖν· οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ bound up with virtue and to discriminate
ἀρετῇ καὶ µᾶλλον τὰ ἤθη κρίνειν τῶν characters better than actions do.
πράξεων.
ἡ προαίρεσις δὴ ἑκούσιον µὲν φαίνεται, Choice, then, seems to be voluntary, but

οὐ ταὐτὸν δέ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ not the same thing as the voluntary; the
latter extends more widely. For both
ἑκούσιον· τοῦ µὲν γὰρ ἑκουσίου καὶ children and the lower animals share in
παῖδες καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, voluntary action, but not in choice, and acts
προαιρέσεως δ᾽ οὔ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφνης (10) done on the spur of the moment we describe
ἑκούσια µὲν λέγοµεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν as voluntary, but not as chosen.
δ᾽ οὔ.
οἱ δὲ λέγοντες αὐτὴν ἐπιθυµίαν ἢ θυµὸν Those who say it is appetite or anger or

ἢ βούλησιν ἤ τινα δόξαν οὐκ ἐοίκασιν wish or a kind of opinion do not seem to be
right.
ὀρθῶς λέγειν.
οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν ἡ προαίρεσις καὶ τῶν For choice is not common to irrational
ἀλόγων, ἐπιθυµία δὲ καὶ θυµός. creatures as well, but appetite and anger
are.
καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐπιθυµῶν µὲν πράττει, Again, the incontinent man acts with
προαιρούµενος δ᾽ οὔ· ὁ ἐγκρατὴς δ᾽ appetite, but not with choice; while the
continent man on the contrary acts with
ἀνάπαλιν (15) προαιρούµενος µέν, choice, but not with appetite.
ἐπιθυµῶν δ᾽ οὔ.
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καὶ προαιρέσει µὲν ἐπιθυµία Again, appetite is contrary to choice, but not
ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυµία δ᾽ ἐπιθυµίᾳ οὔ. καὶ appetite to appetite. Again, appetite relates
to the pleasant and the painful, choice
ἡ µὲν ἐπιθυµία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἡ neither to the painful nor to the pleasant.
προαίρεσις δ᾽ οὔτε λυπηροῦ οὔθ᾽ ἡδέος.
θυµὸς δ᾽ ἔτι ἧττον· ἥκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ Still less is it anger; for acts due to anger
θυµὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ. are thought to be less than any others
objects of choice.
ἀλλὰ µὴν οὐδὲ βούλησίς (20) γε, καίπερ But neither is it wish, though it seems
σύνεγγυς φαινόµενον· προαίρεσις µὲν near to it; for choice cannot relate to
impossibles, and if any one said he chose
γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις them he would be thought silly; but there
φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι, δοκοίη ἂν ἠλίθιος may be a wish even for impossibles, e.g. for
εἶναι· βούλησις δ᾽ ἐστὶ <καὶ> τῶν immortality.
ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἀθανασίας.
καὶ ἡ µὲν βούλησίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ τὰ And wish may relate to things that could in
µηδαµῶς δι᾽ αὑτοῦ πραχθέντα ἄν, οἷον no way be brought about by one's own
efforts, e.g. that a particular actor or athlete
ὑποκριτήν τινα νικᾶν ἢ ἀθλητήν· (25) should win in a competition; but no one
προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδείς, ἀλλ᾽ chooses such things, but only the things
ὅσα οἴεται γενέσθαι ἂν δι᾽ αὑτοῦ. that he thinks could be brought about by his
own efforts.
ἔτι δ᾽ ἡ µὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ Again, wish relates rather to the end, choice
µᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ to the means; for instance, we wish to be
healthy, but we choose the acts which will
τέλος, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόµεθα, make us healthy, and we wish to be happy
προαιρούµεθα δὲ δι᾽ ὧν ὑγιανοῦµεν, καὶ and say we do, but we cannot well say we
εὐδαιµονεῖν βουλόµεθα µὲν καὶ φαµέν, choose to be so; for, in general, choice
seems to relate to the things that are in our
προαιρούµεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἁρµόζει·
own power.
ὅλως (30) γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ
τὰ ἐφ᾽ ἡµῖν εἶναι.
οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη· ἡ µὲν γὰρ δόξα For this reason, too, it cannot be opinion;
δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον for opinion is thought to relate to all kinds
of things, no less to eternal things and
περὶ τὰ ἀίδια καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ τὰ ἐφ᾽ impossible things than to things in our own
ἡµῖν· καὶ τῷ ψευδεῖ καὶ ἀληθεῖ διαιρεῖται, power; and it is distinguished by its falsity
οὐ τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ or truth, not by its badness or goodness,
while choice is distinguished rather by
τούτοις µᾶλλον.
these.
[1112a] (1) ὅλως µὲν οὖν δόξῃ ταὐτὸν Now with opinion in general perhaps no
ἴσως οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδείς. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τινί· one even says it is identical. But it is not
identical even with any kind of opinion; for
τῷ γὰρ προαιρεῖσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ κακὰ by choosing what is good or bad we are men
ποιοί τινές ἐσµεν, τῷ δὲ δοξάζειν οὔ. of a certain character, which we are not by
holding certain opinions.
καὶ προαιρούµεθα µὲν λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν And we choose to get or avoid something
[ἤ] τι τῶν τοιούτων, δοξάζοµεν δὲ τί good or bad, but we have opinions about
what a thing is or whom it is good for or
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ἐστιν ἢ τίνι συµφέρει ἢ πῶς· (5) λαβεῖν δ᾽ how it is good for him; we can hardly be
ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πάνυ δοξάζοµεν. said to opine to get or avoid anything.
καὶ ἡ µὲν προαίρεσις ἐπαινεῖται τῷ εἶναι And choice is praised for being related to the
οὗ δεῖ µᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς, ἡ δὲ δόξα τῷ right object rather than for being rightly
related to it, opinion for being truly related
ὡς ἀληθῶς. to its object.
καὶ προαιρούµεθα µὲν ἃ µάλιστα ἴσµεν And we choose what we best know to be
ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, δοξάζοµεν δὲ ἃ οὐ πάνυ good, but we opine what we do not quite
know; and it is not the same people that are
ἴσµεν· δοκοῦσι δὲ οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ thought to make the best choices and to
προαιρεῖσθαί τε ἄριστα καὶ δοξάζειν, have the best opinions, but some are
ἀλλ᾽ (10) ἔνιοι δοξάζειν µὲν ἄµεινον, διὰ thought to have fairly good opinions, but by
reason of vice to choose what they should
κακίαν δ᾽ αἱρεῖσθαι οὐχ ἃ δεῖ.
not.
εἰ δὲ προγίνεται δόξα τῆς προαιρέσεως ἢ If opinion precedes choice or accompanies it,

παρακολουθεῖ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐ τοῦτο that makes no difference; for it is not this
that we are considering, but whether it is
γὰρ σκοποῦµεν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστι δόξῃ identical with some kind of opinion.
τινί.
τί οὖν ἢ ποῖόν τι ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν What, then, or what kind of thing is it,
εἰρηµένων οὐθέν; ἑκούσιον µὲν δὴ since it is none of the things we have
mentioned? It seems to be voluntary, but
φαίνεται, τὸ δ᾽ ἑκούσιον οὐ πᾶν not all that is voluntary to be an object of
προαιρετόν. choice.
(15) ἀλλ᾽ ἆρά γε τὸ προβεβουλευµένον; ἡ Is it, then, what has been decided on by
γὰρ προαίρεσις µετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας. previous deliberation? At any rate choice
involves a rational principle and thought.
ὑποσηµαίνειν δ᾽ ἔοικε καὶ τοὔνοµα ὡς ὂν Even the name seems to suggest that it is
πρὸ ἑτέρων αἱρετόν. what is chosen before other things.
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Βιβλίο III, 3-5

(1112a15-1115a5)
3. The nature of deliberation and

its objects: choice is the
deliberate desire of things in our
own power.
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βουλεύονται δὲ πότερον περὶ πάντων, Do we deliberate about everything, and is

καὶ πᾶν βουλευτόν ἐστιν, ἢ περὶ ἐνίων everything a possible subject of deliberation,
or is deliberation impossible about some
οὐκ ἔστι βουλή; λεκτέον δ᾽ ἴσως things? We ought presumably to call not
βουλευτὸν (20) οὐχ ὑπὲρ οὗ βουλεύσαιτ᾽ what a fool or a madman would deliberate
ἄν τις ἠλίθιος ἢ µαινόµενος, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ about, but what a sensible man would
deliberate about, a subject of deliberation.
ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων.
περὶ δὴ τῶν ἀιδίων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται, Now about eternal things no one
οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσµου ἢ τῆς διαµέτρου deliberates, e.g. about the material universe
or the incommensurability of the diagonal
καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς, ὅτι ἀσύµµετροι. and the side of a square.
ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει, ἀεὶ δὲ But no more do we deliberate about the
κατὰ ταὐτὰ γινοµένων, εἴτ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης things that involve movement but always
happen in the same way, whether of
εἴτε καὶ (25) φύσει ἢ διά τινα αἰτίαν necessity or by nature or from any other
ἄλλην, οἷον τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατολῶν. οὐδὲ cause, e.g. the solstices and the risings of
περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, οἷον αὐχµῶν the stars; nor about things that happen now
καὶ ὄµβρων. οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης, in one way, now in another, e.g. droughts
and rains; nor about chance events, like the
οἷον θησαυροῦ εὑρέσεως. finding of treasure.
ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων But we do not deliberate even about all
ἁπάντων, οἷον πῶς ἂν Σκύθαι ἄριστα human affairs; for instance, no Spartan
deliberates about the best constitution for
πολιτεύοιντο οὐδεὶς Λακεδαιµονίων the Scythians. For none of these things can
βουλεύεται. (30) οὐ γὰρ γένοιτ᾽ ἂν be brought about by our own efforts.
τούτων οὐθὲν δι᾽ ἡµῶν.
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βουλευόµεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡµῖν καὶ We deliberate about things that are in
πρακτῶν· ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἔστι λοιπά. αἰτίαι our power and can be done; and these are
in fact what is left. For nature, necessity,
γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ and chance are thought to be causes, and
τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι᾽ also reason and everything that depends on
ἀνθρώπου. τῶν δ᾽ ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι man. Now every class of men deliberates
about the things that can be done by their
βουλεύονται περὶ τῶν δι᾽ αὑτῶν
own efforts.
πρακτῶν.
[1112b] (1) καὶ περὶ µὲν τὰς ἀκριβεῖς καὶ And in the case of exact and self-contained
αὐτάρκεις τῶν ἐπιστηµῶν οὐκ ἔστι sciences there is no deliberation, e.g. about
the letters of the alphabet (for we have no
βουλή, οἷον περὶ γραµµάτων (οὐ γὰρ doubt how they should be written); but the
διστάζοµεν πῶς γραπτέον)· ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα things that are brought about by our own
γίνεται δι᾽ ἡµῶν, µὴ ὡσαύτως δ᾽ ἀεί, efforts, but not always in the same way, are
περὶ τούτων βουλευόµεθα, οἷον περὶ τῶν the things about which we deliberate, e.g.
questions of medical treatment or of money-
κατ᾽ ἰατρικὴν καὶ χρηµατιστικήν, (5) καὶ making. And we do so more in the case of
περὶ κυβερνητικὴν µᾶλλον ἢ the art of navigation than in that of
γυµναστικήν, ὅσῳ ἧττον διηκρίβωται, gymnastics, inasmuch as it has been less
exactly worked out, and again about other
καὶ ἔτι περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὁµοίως, µᾶλλον things in the same ratio, and more also in
δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήµας· the case of the arts than in that of the
µᾶλλον γὰρ περὶ ταύτας διστάζοµεν. sciences; for we have more doubt about the
former.
τὸ βουλεύεσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ Deliberation is concerned with things that

πολύ, ἀδήλοις δὲ πῶς ἀποβήσεται, καὶ happen in a certain way for the most part,
but in which the event is obscure, and with
ἐν οἷς ἀδιόριστον. things in which it is indeterminate.
(10) συµβούλους δὲ παραλαµβάνοµεν εἰς We call in others to aid us in deliberation on

τὰ µεγάλα, ἀπιστοῦντες ἡµῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς important questions, distrusting ourselves
as not being equal to deciding.
οὐχ ἱκανοῖς διαγνῶναι.
βουλευόµεθα δ᾽ οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ We deliberate not about ends but about
περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς means. For a doctor does not deliberate
whether he shall heal, nor an orator
βουλεύεται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ whether he shall persuade, nor a statesman
πείσει, οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνοµίαν whether he shall produce law and order, nor
ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς (15) does any one else deliberate about his end.
They assume the end and consider how and
περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ἀλλὰ θέµενοι τὸ τέλος
by what means it is to be attained; and if it
τὸ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι· καὶ seems to be produced by several means
διὰ πλειόνων µὲν φαινοµένου γίνεσθαι they consider by which it is most easily and
διὰ τίνος ῥᾷστα καὶ κάλλιστα best produced, while if it is achieved by one
only they consider how it will be achieved by
ἐπισκοποῦσι, δι᾽ ἑνὸς δ᾽ ἐπιτελουµένου
this and by what means this will be
πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται κἀκεῖνο διὰ τίνος, achieved, till they come to the first cause,
ἕως ἂν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ which in the order of discovery is last.
ἐν τῇ εὑρέσει ἔσχατόν (20) ἐστιν.
ὁ γὰρ βουλευόµενος ἔοικε ζητεῖν καὶ For the person who deliberates seems to
ἀναλύειν τὸν εἰρηµένον τρόπον ὥσπερ investigate and analyse in the way described
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διάγραµµα (φαίνεται δ᾽ ἡ µὲν ζήτησις οὐ as though he were analysing a geometrical

πᾶσα εἶναι βούλευσις, οἷον αἱ construction (not all investigation appears to
be deliberation- for instance mathematical
µαθηµατικαί, ἡ δὲ βούλευσις πᾶσα investigations- but all deliberation is
ζήτησις), καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει investigation), and what is last in the order
πρῶτον εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει. of analysis seems to be first in the order of
becoming.
κἂν µὲν ἀδυνάτῳ ἐντύχωσιν, (25) And if we come on an impossibility, we give

ἀφίστανται, οἷον εἰ χρηµάτων δεῖ, ταῦτα up the search, e.g. if we need money and
this cannot be got; but if a thing appears
δὲ µὴ οἷόν τε πορισθῆναι· ἐὰν δὲ δυνατὸν possible we try to do it.
φαίνηται, ἐγχειροῦσι πράττειν.
δυνατὰ δὲ ἃ δι᾽ ἡµῶν γένοιτ᾽ ἄν· τὰ γὰρ By 'possible' things I mean things that might
διὰ τῶν φίλων δι᾽ ἡµῶν πως ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ be brought about by our own efforts; and
these in a sense include things that can be
ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡµῖν. brought about by the efforts of our friends,
since the moving principle is in ourselves.
ζητεῖται δ᾽ ὁτὲ µὲν τὰ ὄργανα ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἡ The subject of investigation is sometimes

χρεία αὐτῶν· (30) ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς the instruments, sometimes the use of
them; and similarly in the other cases-
λοιποῖς ὁτὲ µὲν δι᾽ οὗ ὁτὲ δὲ πῶς ἢ διὰ sometimes the means, sometimes the mode
τίνος. of using it or the means of bringing it about.
ἔοικε δή, καθάπερ εἴρηται, ἄνθρωπος It seems, then, as has been said, that man
εἶναι ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων· ἡ δὲ βουλὴ περὶ is a moving principle of actions; now
deliberation is about the things to be done
τῶν αὑτῷ πρακτῶν, αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων by the agent himself, and actions are for the
ἕνεκα. sake of things other than themselves.
οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη βουλευτὸν τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ For the end cannot be a subject of
τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη· οὐδὲ δὴ τὰ καθ᾽ deliberation, but only the means; nor indeed
can the particular facts be a subject of it, as
ἕκαστα, [1113a] (1) οἷον εἰ ἄρτος τοῦτο ἢ whether this is bread or has been baked as
πέπεπται ὡς δεῖ· αἰσθήσεως γὰρ ταῦτα. it should; for these are matters of
perception.
εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ βουλεύσεται, εἰς ἄπειρον ἥξει. If we are to be always deliberating, we shall

have to go on to infinity.
βουλευτὸν δὲ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτό, The same thing is deliberated upon and is
πλὴν ἀφωρισµένον ἤδη τὸ προαιρετόν· chosen, except that the object of choice is
already determinate, since it is that which
τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς κριθὲν προαιρετόν has been decided upon as a result of
(5) ἐστιν. deliberation that is the object of choice.
παύεται γὰρ ἕκαστος ζητῶν πῶς πράξει, For every one ceases to inquire how he is to
ὅταν εἰς αὑτὸν ἀναγάγῃ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ act when he has brought the moving
principle back to himself and to the ruling
αὑτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούµενον· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ part of himself; for this is what chooses.
προαιρούµενον.
δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων This is plain also from the ancient
πολιτειῶν, ἃς Ὅµηρος ἐµιµεῖτο· οἱ γὰρ constitutions, which Homer represented; for
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βασιλεῖς ἃ προείλοντο ἀνήγγελλον τῷ the kings announced their choices to the

δήµῳ. people.
ὄντος δὲ τοῦ (10) προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ The object of choice being one of the things
ὀρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡµῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις in our own power which is desired after
deliberation, choice will be deliberate desire
ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡµῖν· of things in our own power; for when we
ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι γὰρ κρίναντες have decided as a result of deliberation, we
ὀρεγόµεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν. desire in accordance with our deliberation.
ἡ µὲν οὖν προαίρεσις τύπῳ εἰρήσθω, καὶ We may take it, then, that we have
περὶ ποῖά ἐστι καὶ ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. described choice in outline, and stated the
nature of its objects and the fact that it is
concerned with means.
4. The object of rational wish is

the end, i.e. the good or the
apparent good.
<<< >>>
(15) ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι µὲν τοῦ τέλους That wish is for the end has already been
ἐστὶν εἴρηται, δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς µὲν τἀγαθοῦ stated; some think it is for the good, others
for the apparent good.
εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινοµένου ἀγαθοῦ.
συµβαίνει δὲ τοῖς µὲν [τὸ] βουλητὸν Now those who say that the good is the
τἀγαθὸν λέγουσι µὴ εἶναι βουλητὸν ὃ object of wish must admit in consequence
that that which the man who does not
βούλεται ὁ µὴ ὀρθῶς αἱρούµενος (εἰ γὰρ choose aright wishes for is not an object of
ἔσται βουλητόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν· ἦν δ᾽, εἰ wish (for if it is to be so, it must also be
οὕτως ἔτυχε, κακόν), (20) τοῖς δ᾽ αὖ τὸ good; but it was, if it so happened, bad);
while those who say the apparent good is
φαινόµενον ἀγαθὸν βουλητὸν λέγουσι
the object of wish must admit that there is
µὴ εἶναι φύσει βουλητόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἑκάστῳ no natural object of wish, but only what
τὸ δοκοῦν· ἄλλο δ᾽ ἄλλῳ φαίνεται, καὶ εἰ seems good to each man. Now different
οὕτως ἔτυχε, τἀναντία. things appear good to different people, and,
if it so happens, even contrary things.
εἰ δὲ δὴ ταῦτα µὴ ἀρέσκει, ἆρα φατέον If these consequences are unpleasing, are

ἁπλῶς µὲν καὶ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν βουλητὸν we to say that absolutely and in truth the
good is the object of wish, but for each
εἶναι τἀγαθόν, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ person the apparent good; that that which is
φαινόµενον; (25) τῷ µὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ in truth an object of wish is an object of
τὸ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ τὸ wish to the good man, while any chance
τυχόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωµάτων τοῖς thing may be so the bad man, as in the case
of bodies also the things that are in truth
µὲν εὖ διακειµένοις ὑγιεινά ἐστι τὰ κατ᾽ wholesome are wholesome for bodies which
ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα ὄντα, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐπινόσοις are in good condition, while for those that
ἕτερα, ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ πικρὰ καὶ γλυκέα are diseased other things are wholesome- or
bitter or sweet or hot or heavy, and so on;
καὶ θερµὰ καὶ βαρέα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
since the good man judges each class of
ἕκαστα· ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ (30) ἕκαστα things rightly, and in each the truth appears
to him?
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κρίνει ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τἀληθὲς

αὐτῷ φαίνεται.
καθ᾽ ἑκάστην γὰρ ἕξιν ἴδιά ἐστι καλὰ καὶ For each state of character has its own ideas
ἡδέα, καὶ διαφέρει πλεῖστον ἴσως ὁ of the noble and the pleasant, and perhaps
the good man differs from others most by
σπουδαῖος τῷ τἀληθὲς ἐν ἑκάστοις ὁρᾶν, seeing the truth in each class of things,
ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ µέτρον αὐτῶν ὤν. being as it were the norm and measure of
them.
ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν In most things the error seems to be due to
ἡδονὴν ἔοικε γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οὖσα pleasure; for it appears a good when it is
not. We therefore choose the pleasant as a
ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται. [1113b] (1) αἱροῦνται good, and avoid pain as an evil.
οὖν τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ λύπην ὡς
κακὸν φεύγουσιν.
5. We are responsible for bad as

well as for good actions.
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ὄντος δὴ βουλητοῦ µὲν τοῦ τέλους, The end, then, being what we wish for,
βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς the means what we deliberate about and
choose, actions concerning means must be
τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις (5) κατὰ according to choice and voluntary. Now the
προαίρεσιν ἂν εἶεν καὶ ἑκούσιοι. αἱ δὲ exercise of the virtues is concerned with
τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι περὶ ταῦτα. ἐφ᾽ means. Therefore virtue also is in our own
power, and so too vice.
ἡµῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ
κακία.
ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ἡµῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ For where it is in our power to act it is also
µὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ µή, καὶ τὸ ναί· in our power not to act, and vice versa; so
that, if to act, where this is noble, is in our
ὥστ᾽ εἰ τὸ πράττειν καλὸν ὂν ἐφ᾽ ἡµῖν power, not to act, which will be base, will
ἐστί, καὶ τὸ µὴ πράττειν ἐφ᾽ ἡµῖν (10) also be in our power, and if not to act,
ἔσται αἰσχρὸν ὄν, καὶ εἰ τὸ µὴ πράττειν where this is noble, is in our power, to act,
which will be base, will also be in our power.
καλὸν ὂν ἐφ᾽ ἡµῖν, καὶ τὸ πράττειν
αἰσχρὸν ὂν ἐφ᾽ ἡµῖν.
εἰ δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἡµῖν τὰ καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ Now if it is in our power to do noble or base
αἰσχρά, ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ µὴ πράττειν, acts, and likewise in our power not to do
them, and this was what being good or bad
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι, meant, then it is in our power to be virtuous
ἐφ᾽ ἡµῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοις or vicious.
εἶναι.
τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν (15) πονηρὸς The saying that 'no one is voluntarily
οὐδ᾽ ἄκων µακάριος ἔοικε τὸ µὲν ψευδεῖ wicked nor involuntarily happy' seems to be
partly false and partly true; for no one is
τὸ δ᾽ ἀληθεῖ· µακάριος µὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς involuntarily happy, but wickedness is
ἄκων, ἡ δὲ µοχθηρία ἑκούσιον. voluntary.
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ἢ τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρηµένοις ἀµφισβητητέον, Or else we shall have to dispute what has
καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐ φατέον ἀρχὴν just been said, at any rate, and deny that
man is a moving principle or begetter of his
εἶναι οὐδὲ γεννητὴν τῶν πράξεων actions as of children.
ὥσπερ καὶ τέκνων.
εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ µὴ ἔχοµεν (20) But if these facts are evident and we cannot
εἰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀναγαγεῖν παρὰ τὰς ἐν refer actions to moving principles other than
those in ourselves, the acts whose moving
ἡµῖν, ὧν καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡµῖν, καὶ αὐτὰ principles are in us must themselves also be
ἐφ᾽ ἡµῖν καὶ ἑκούσια. in our power and voluntary.
τούτοις δ᾽ ἔοικε µαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ Witness seems to be borne to this both by
ὑφ᾽ ἑκάστων καὶ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν individuals in their private capacity and by
legislators themselves; for these punish and
νοµοθετῶν· κολάζουσι γὰρ καὶ take vengeance on those who do wicked acts
τιµωροῦνται τοὺς δρῶντας µοχθηρά, (unless they have acted under compulsion
ὅσοι µὴ βίᾳ ἢ δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν ἧς µὴ αὐτοὶ (25) or as a result of ignorance for which they
αἴτιοι, τοὺς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας are not themselves responsible), while they
honour those who do noble acts, as though
τιµῶσιν, ὡς τοὺς µὲν προτρέψοντες τοὺς they meant to encourage the latter and
δὲ κωλύσοντες. deter the former.
καίτοι ὅσα µήτ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἡµῖν ἐστὶ µήθ᾽ But no one is encouraged to do the things
ἑκούσια, οὐδεὶς προτρέπεται πράττειν, that are neither in our power nor voluntary;
it is assumed that there is no gain in being
ὡς οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου ὂν τὸ πεισθῆναι µὴ persuaded not to be hot or in pain or hungry
θερµαίνεσθαι ἢ ἀλγεῖν ἢ πεινῆν ἢ ἄλλ᾽ or the like, since we shall experience these
ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἧττον feelings none the less.
πεισόµεθα (30) αὐτά.
καὶ γὰρ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν Indeed, we punish a man for his very
κολάζουσιν, ἐὰν αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ignorance, if he is thought responsible for
the ignorance, as when penalties are
ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς µεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ doubled in the case of drunkenness; for the
ἐπιτίµια· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ· κύριος γὰρ moving principle is in the man himself, since
τοῦ µὴ µεθυσθῆναι, τοῦτο δ᾽ αἴτιον τῆς he had the power of not getting drunk and
his getting drunk was the cause of his
ἀγνοίας.
ignorance.
καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντάς τι τῶν ἐν τοῖς And we punish those who are ignorant of
νόµοις, ἃ δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ µὴ χαλεπά anything in the laws that they ought to
know and that is not difficult, and so too in
ἐστι, [1114a] (1) κολάζουσιν, ὁµοίως δὲ the case of anything else that they are
καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα δι᾽ ἀµέλειαν thought to be ignorant of through
ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦσιν, ὡς ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς ὂν τὸ µὴ carelessness; we assume that it is in their
power not to be ignorant, since they have
ἀγνοεῖν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιµεληθῆναι κύριοι.
the power of taking care.
ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὥστε µὴ But perhaps a man is the kind of man not
ἐπιµεληθῆναι. ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτους to take care. Still they are themselves by
their slack lives responsible for becoming
γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι (5) ζῶντες men of that kind, and men make themselves
ἀνειµένως, καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκους ἢ responsible for being unjust or
ἀκολάστους εἶναι, οἳ µὲν κακουργοῦντες, self-indulgent, in the one case by cheating
and in the other by spending their time in
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οἳ δὲ ἐν πότοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις drinking bouts and the like; for it is
διάγοντες· αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνέργειαι activities exercised on particular objects that
make the corresponding character.
τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν.
τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν µελετώντων πρὸς This is plain from the case of people training
ἡντινοῦν ἀγωνίαν ἢ πρᾶξιν· διατελοῦσι for any contest or action; they practise the
activity the whole time. Now not to know
γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες. τὸ µὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι that it is from the exercise of activities on
ἐκ τοῦ (10) ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις particular objects that states of character
γίνονται, κοµιδῇ ἀναισθήτου. are produced is the mark of a thoroughly
senseless person.
ἔτι δ᾽ ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα µὴ Again, it is irrational to suppose that a man

βούλεσθαι ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ τὂν who acts unjustly does not wish to be unjust
or a man who acts self-indulgently to be
ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον. εἰ δὲ µὴ self-indulgent. But if without being ignorant
ἀγνοῶν τις πράττει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἄδικος, a man does the things which will make him
ἑκὼν ἄδικος ἂν εἴη, οὐ µὴν ἐάν γε unjust, he will be unjust voluntarily. Yet it
βούληται, ἄδικος ὢν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται does not follow that if he wishes he will
cease to be unjust and will be just.
δίκαιος.
οὐδὲ γὰρ (15) ὁ νοσῶν ὑγιής. καὶ εἰ οὕτως For neither does the man who is ill become
ἔτυχεν, ἑκὼν νοσεῖ, ἀκρατῶς βιοτεύων well on those terms. We may suppose a case
in which he is ill voluntarily, through living
καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς. τότε µὲν οὖν incontinently and disobeying his doctors. In
ἐξῆν αὐτῷ µὴ νοσεῖν, προεµένῳ δ᾽ that case it was then open to him not to be
οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ ἀφέντι λίθον ἔτ᾽ ill, but not now, when he has thrown away
αὐτὸν δυνατὸν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ᾽ ὅµως his chance, just as when you have let a
stone go it is too late to recover it; but yet it
ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ τὸ βαλεῖν [καὶ ῥῖψαι]· ἡ γὰρ was in your power to throw it, since the
ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ. moving principle was in you.
οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ (20) καὶ τῷ So, too, to the unjust and to the
ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς µὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις self-indulgent man it was open at the
beginning not to become men of this kind,
µὴ γενέσθαι, διὸ ἑκόντες εἰσίν· and so they are unjust and selfindulgent
γενοµένοις δ᾽ οὐκέτι ἔστι µὴ εἶναι. voluntarily; but now that they have become
so it is not possible for them not to be so.
οὐ µόνον δ᾽ αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς κακίαι ἑκούσιοί But not only are the vices of the soul
εἰσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐνίοις καὶ αἱ τοῦ σώµατος, οἷς voluntary, but those of the body also for
some men, whom we accordingly blame;
καὶ ἐπιτιµῶµεν· τοῖς µὲν γὰρ διὰ φύσιν while no one blames those who are ugly by
αἰσχροῖς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιµᾷ, τοῖς δὲ δι᾽ nature, we blame those who are so owing to
ἀγυµνασίαν καὶ (25) ἀµέλειαν. want of exercise and care.
ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθένειαν καὶ So it is, too, with respect to weakness and
πήρωσιν· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἂν ὀνειδίσειε infirmity; no one would reproach a man
blind from birth or by disease or from a
τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ πληγῆς, blow, but rather pity him, while every one
ἀλλὰ µᾶλλον ἐλεήσαι· τῷ δ᾽ ἐξ would blame a man who was blind from
οἰνοφλυγίας ἢ ἄλλης ἀκολασίας πᾶς ἂν drunkenness or some other form of
self-indulgence. Of vices of the body, then,
ἐπιτιµήσαι. τῶν δὴ περὶ τὸ σῶµα κακιῶν
those in our own power are blamed, those
αἱ ἐφ᾽ ἡµῖν ἐπιτιµῶνται, αἱ δὲ µὴ ἐφ᾽
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ἡµῖν οὔ. not in our power are not.
εἰ (30) δ᾽ οὕτω, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱ And if this be so, in the other cases also the
ἐπιτιµώµεναι τῶν κακιῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡµῖν ἂν vices that are blamed must be in our own
power.
εἶεν.
εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ Now some one may say that all men
φαινοµένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας desire the apparent good, but have no
control over the appearance, but the end
οὐ κύριοι, [1114b] (1) ἀλλ᾽ ὁποῖός ποθ᾽ appears to each man in a form answering to
ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος his character. We reply that if each man is
φαίνεται αὐτῷ· εἰ µὲν οὖν ἕκαστος somehow responsible for his state of mind,
he will also be himself somehow responsible
ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστί πως αἴτιος, καὶ τῆς
for the appearance; but if not, no one is
φαντασίας ἔσται πως αὐτὸς αἴτιος· εἰ δὲ responsible for his own evildoing, but every
µή, οὐθεὶς αὑτῷ αἴτιος τοῦ κακοποιεῖν, one does evil acts through ignorance of the
ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα (5) end, thinking that by these he will get what
is best, and the aiming at the end is not
πράττει, διὰ τούτων οἰόµενος αὑτῷ τὸ self-chosen but one must be born with an
ἄριστον ἔσεσθαι, ἡ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις eye, as it were, by which to judge rightly
οὐκ αὐθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φῦναι δεῖ ὥσπερ and choose what is truly good, and he is
ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ᾗ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ᾽ well endowed by nature who is well
endowed with this. For it is what is greatest
ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὸν αἱρήσεται, καὶ ἔστιν and most noble, and what we cannot get or
εὐφυὴς ᾧ τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυκεν· τὸ γὰρ learn from another, but must have just such
µέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον, καὶ ὃ παρ᾽ as it was when given us at birth, and to be
well and nobly endowed with this will be
ἑτέρου µὴ οἷόν (10) τε λαβεῖν µηδὲ
perfect and true excellence of natural
µαθεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ οἷον ἔφυ τοιοῦτον ἕξει, καὶ endowment.
τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἡ
τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ ἂν εἴη εὐφυΐα.
εἰ δὴ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, τί µᾶλλον ἡ If this is true, then, how will virtue be more
ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἑκούσιον; voluntary than vice? To both men alike, the
good and the bad, the end appears and is
ἀµφοῖν γὰρ ὁµοίως, τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ fixed by nature or however it may be, and it
κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φύσει ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε is by referring everything else to this that
φαίνεται (15) καὶ κεῖται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ men do whatever they do.
πρὸς τοῦτο ἀναφέροντες πράττουσιν
ὁπωσδήποτε.
εἴτε δὴ τὸ τέλος µὴ φύσει ἑκάστῳ Whether, then, it is not by nature that

φαίνεται οἱονδήποτε, ἀλλά τι καὶ παρ᾽ the end appears to each man such as it does
appear, but something also depends on him,
αὐτόν ἐστιν, εἴτε τὸ µὲν τέλος φυσικόν, or the end is natural but because the good
τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν ἑκουσίως τὸν man adopts the means voluntarily virtue is
σπουδαῖον ἡ ἀρετὴ ἑκούσιόν ἐστιν, voluntary, vice also will be none the less
voluntary; for in the case of the bad man
οὐθὲν ἧττον καὶ ἡ κακία (20) ἑκούσιον ἂν
there is equally present that which depends
εἴη· ὁµοίως γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ on himself in his actions even if not in his
δι᾽ αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ εἰ µὴ ἐν τῷ end.
τέλει.
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εἰ οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἑκούσιοί εἰσιν αἱ If, then, as is asserted, the virtues are
ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἕξεων συναίτιοί πως voluntary (for we are ourselves somehow
partly responsible for our states of
αὐτοί ἐσµεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοί τινες εἶναι τὸ character, and it is by being persons of a
τέλος τοιόνδε τιθέµεθα), καὶ αἱ κακίαι certain kind that we assume the end to be
ἑκούσιοι ἂν εἶεν· (25) ὁµοίως γάρ. so and so), the vices also will be voluntary;
for the same is true of them.
κοινῇ µὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται With regard to the virtues in general we
ἡµῖν τό τε γένος τύπῳ, ὅτι µεσότητές have stated their genus in outline, viz. that
they are means and that they are states of
εἰσιν καὶ ὅτι ἕξεις, ὑφ᾽ ὧν τε γίνονται, character, and that they tend, and by their
ὅτι τούτων πρακτικαὶ <καὶ> καθ᾽ αὑτάς, own nature, to the doing of the acts by
καὶ ὅτι ἐφ᾽ ἡµῖν καὶ ἑκούσιοι, καὶ οὕτως which they are produced, and that they are
in our power and voluntary, and act as the
ὡς ἂν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος (30) προστάξῃ.
right rule prescribes.
οὐχ ὁµοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἑκούσιοί εἰσι But actions and states of character are not
καὶ αἱ ἕξεις· τῶν µὲν γὰρ πράξεων ἀπ᾽ voluntary in the same way; for we are
masters of our actions from the beginning
ἀρχῆς µέχρι τοῦ τέλους κύριοί ἐσµεν, right to the end, if we know the particular
εἰδότες τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, τῶν ἕξεων δὲ facts, but though we control the beginning
τῆς ἀρχῆς, [1115a] (1) καθ᾽ ἕκαστα δὲ ἡ of our states of character the gradual
πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριµος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν progress is not obvious any more than it is
in illnesses; because it was in our power,
ἀρρωστιῶν· ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ἐφ᾽ ἡµῖν ἦν οὕτως ἢ however, to act in this way or not in this
µὴ οὕτω χρήσασθαι, διὰ τοῦτο ἑκούσιοι. way, therefore the states are voluntary.
ἀναλαβόντες δὲ περὶ ἑκάστης εἴπωµεν Let us take up the several virtues,

τίνες εἰσὶ καὶ (5) περὶ ποῖα καὶ πῶς· ἅµα however, and say which they are and what
sort of things they are concerned with and
δ᾽ ἔσται δῆλον καὶ πόσαι εἰσίν. καὶ how they are concerned with them; at the
πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας. same time it will become plain how many
they are. And first let us speak of courage.
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Αριστοτέλους Ηθικά Νικοµάχεια, Βιβλίο III, 6-8 http://www.mikrosapoplous.gr/aristotle/nicom3c.htm


(1115a5-1117a25)
III.6 -- V.2. The Virtues and

Vices
A. Courage.
6. Courage concerned with the
feelings of fear and confidence --
strictly speaking, with the fear of
death in battle.
<<< >>>
ὅτι µὲν οὖν µεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ φόβους That it is a mean with regard to feelings
καὶ θάρρη, ἤδη φανερὸν γεγένηται· of fear and confidence has already been
made evident; and plainly the things we
φοβούµεθα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ φοβερά, fear are terrible things, and these are, to
ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά· διὸ speak without qualification, evils; for which
καὶ τὸν φόβον ὁρίζονται προσδοκίαν reason people even define fear as
expectation of evil.
κακοῦ.
(10) φοβούµεθα µὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά, Now we fear all evils, e.g. disgrace, poverty,
οἷον ἀδοξίαν πενίαν νόσον ἀφιλίαν disease, friendlessness, death, but the brave
man is not thought to be concerned with all;
θάνατον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ for to fear some things is even right and
ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι· ἔνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ noble, and it is base not to fear them- e.g.
φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν, τὸ δὲ µὴ αἰσχρόν, disgrace; he who fears this is good and
οἷον ἀδοξίαν· ὁ µὲν γὰρ φοβούµενος modest, and he who does not is shameless.
ἐπιεικὴς καὶ αἰδήµων, ὁ δὲ µὴ

φοβούµενος ἀναίσχυντος.
λέγεται (15) δ᾽ ὑπό τινων ἀνδρεῖος κατὰ He is, however, by some people called
µεταφοράν· ἔχει γάρ τι ὅµοιον τῷ brave, by a transference of the word to a
new meaning; for he has in him something
ἀνδρείῳ· ἄφοβος γάρ τις καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. which is like the brave man, since the brave
man also is a fearless person.
πενίαν δ᾽ ἴσως οὐ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι οὐδὲ Poverty and disease we perhaps ought not
νόσον, οὐδ᾽ ὅλως ὅσα µὴ ἀπὸ κακίας to fear, nor in general the things that do not
proceed from vice and are not due to a man
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µηδὲ δι᾽ αὑτόν. himself.
ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὁ περὶ ταῦτα ἄφοβος ἀνδρεῖος. But not even the man who is fearless of
λέγοµεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καθ᾽ ὁµοιότητα· these is brave. Yet we apply the word to him
also in virtue of a similarity; for some who
(20) ἔνιοι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεµικοῖς in the dangers of war are cowards are liberal
κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες ἐλευθέριοί εἰσι and are confident in face of the loss of
καὶ πρὸς χρηµάτων ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρσῶς money.
ἔχουσιν.
οὐδὲ δὴ εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ παῖδας καὶ Nor is a man a coward if he fears insult to
γυναῖκα φοβεῖται ἢ φθόνον ἤ τι τῶν his wife and children or envy or anything of
the kind; nor brave if he is confident when
τοιούτων, δειλός ἐστιν· οὐδ᾽ εἰ θαρρεῖ he is about to be flogged.
µέλλων µαστιγοῦσθαι, ἀνδρεῖος.
περὶ ποῖα οὖν τῶν φοβερῶν (25) ὁ With what sort of terrible things, then, is
ἀνδρεῖος; ἢ περὶ τὰ µέγιστα; οὐθεὶς γὰρ the brave man concerned? Surely with the
greatest; for no one is more likely than he
ὑποµενετικώτερος τῶν δεινῶν. to stand his ground against what is
awe-inspiring.
φοβερώτατον δ᾽ ὁ θάνατος· πέρας γάρ, Now death is the most terrible of all things;
καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ οὔτ᾽ for it is the end, and nothing is thought to
be any longer either good or bad for the
ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι. dead.
δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν οὐδὲ περὶ θάνατον τὸν ἐν But the brave man would not seem to be
παντὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι, οἷον ἐν θαλάττῃ concerned even with death in all
circumstances, e.g. at sea or in disease. In
ἢ νόσοις. ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἢ ἐν (30) τοῖς what circumstances, then? Surely in the
καλλίστοις; τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ἐν πολέµῳ· ἐν noblest. Now such deaths are those in
µεγίστῳ γὰρ καὶ καλλίστῳ κινδύνῳ. battle; for these take place in the greatest
and noblest danger.
ὁµόλογοι δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τιµαὶ αἱ And these are correspondingly honoured in
ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς µονάρχοις. city-states and at the courts of monarchs.
Properly, then, he will be called brave who
κυρίως δὴ λέγοιτ᾽ ἂν ἀνδρεῖος ὁ περὶ τὸν is fearless in face of a noble death, and of all
καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεής, καὶ ὅσα θάνατον emergencies that involve death; and the
ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγυια ὄντα· τοιαῦτα δὲ emergencies of war are in the highest
degree of this kind.
µάλιστα (35) τὰ κατὰ πόλεµον.
οὐ µὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ καὶ ἐν Yet at sea also, and in disease, the brave
νόσοις ἀδεὴς ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, [1115b] (1) οὐχ man is fearless, but not in the same way as
the seaman; for he has given up hope of
οὕτω δὲ ὡς οἱ θαλάττιοι· οἳ µὲν γὰρ safety, and is disliking the thought of death
ἀπεγνώκασι τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν in this shape, while they are hopeful
θάνατον τὸν τοιοῦτον δυσχεραίνουσιν, because of their experience.
οἳ δὲ εὐέλπιδές εἰσι παρὰ τὴν ἐµπειρίαν.
ἅµα δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίζονται ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλκὴ At the same time, we show courage in
(5) ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν· ἐν ταῖς situations where there is the opportunity of
showing prowess or where death is noble;
τοιαύταις δὲ φθοραῖς οὐδέτερον but in these forms of death neither of these
2 of 9 23/02/2014 1:27 AM
ὑπάρχει. conditions is fulfilled.
7. The motive of courage is the

sense of honour: characteristics
of the opposite vices, cowardice
and rashness.
<<< >>>
τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν οὐ πᾶσι µὲν τὸ αὐτό, What is terrible is not the same for all
λέγοµεν δέ τι καὶ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον. τοῦτο men; but we say there are things terrible
even beyond human strength. These, then,
µὲν οὖν παντὶ φοβερὸν τῷ γε νοῦν are terrible to every one- at least to every
ἔχοντι· τὰ δὲ κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον διαφέρει sensible man; but the terrible things that
µεγέθει καὶ τῷ (10) µᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον· are not beyond human strength differ in
magnitude and degree, and so too do the
ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα.
things that inspire confidence.
ὁ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς Now the brave man is as dauntless as man

ἄνθρωπος. may be.
φοβήσεται µὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς Therefore, while he will fear even the things
δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑποµενεῖ τοῦ that are not beyond human strength, he will
face them as he ought and as the rule
καλοῦ ἕνεκα· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς directs, for honour's sake; for this is the end
ἀρετῆς. of virtue.
ἔστι δὲ µᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ταῦτα But it is possible to fear these more, or less,
φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔτι τὰ µὴ φοβερὰ ὡς and again to fear things that are not terrible
as if they were. Of the faults that are
τοιαῦτα (15) φοβεῖσθαι. γίνεται δὲ τῶν committed one consists in fearing what one
ἁµαρτιῶν ἣ µὲν ὅτι <ὃ> οὐ δεῖ, ἣ δὲ ὅτι should not, another in fearing as we should
οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἣ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὅτε, ἤ τι τῶν not, another in fearing when we should not,
and so on; and so too with respect to the
τοιούτων· ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ
things that inspire confidence.
θαρραλέα.
ὁ µὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ὑποµένων The man, then, who faces and who fears the
καὶ φοβούµενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, right things and from the right motive, in
the right way and from the right time, and
ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος· κατ᾽ who feels confidence under the
ἀξίαν γάρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, (20) corresponding conditions, is brave; for the
πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. brave man feels and acts according to the
merits of the case and in whatever way the
rule directs.
τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ Now the end of every activity is conformity
τὴν ἕξιν. καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία to the corresponding state of character. This
is true, therefore, of the brave man as well
καλόν. τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος· ὁρίζεται as of others. But courage is noble. Therefore
γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει. the end also is noble; for each thing is
defined by its end.
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καλοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑποµένει καὶ Therefore it is for a noble end that the brave
πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν. man endures and acts as courage directs.
τῶν δ᾽ ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ µὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ Of those who go to excess he who

(25) ἀνώνυµος (εἴρηται δ᾽ ἡµῖν ἐν τοῖς exceeds in fearlessness has no name (we
have said previously that many states of
πρότερον ὅτι πολλά ἐστιν ἀνώνυµα), εἴη character have no names), but he would be
δ᾽ ἄν τις µαινόµενος ἢ ἀνάλγητος, εἰ a sort of madman or insensible person if he
µηδὲν φοβοῖτο, µήτε σεισµὸν µήτε feared nothing, neither earthquakes nor the
waves, as they say the Celts do not; while
κύµατα, καθάπερ φασὶ τοὺς Κελτούς· ὁ
the man who exceeds in confidence about
δὲ τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων περὶ τὰ what really is terrible is rash.
φοβερὰ θρασύς.
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀλαζὼν εἶναι ὁ θρασὺς καὶ The rash man, however, is also thought to
(30) προσποιητικὸς ἀνδρείας· ὡς γοῦν be boastful and only a pretender to courage;
at all events, as the brave man is with
ἐκεῖνος περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ ἔχει, οὗτος regard to what is terrible, so the rash man
βούλεται φαίνεσθαι· ἐν οἷς οὖν δύναται, wishes to appear; and so he imitates him in
µιµεῖται. situations where he can.
διὸ καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν Hence also most of them are a mixture of
θρασύδειλοι· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ rashness and cowardice; for, while in these
situations they display confidence, they do
θρασυνόµενοι τὰ φοβερὰ οὐχ not hold their ground against what is really
ὑποµένουσιν. ὁ δὲ τῷ φοβεῖσθαι terrible. The man who exceeds in fear is a
ὑπερβάλλων δειλός· καὶ γὰρ ἃ µὴ δεῖ (35) coward; for he fears both what he ought not
and as he ought not, and all the similar
καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα
characterizations attach to him.
ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ.
[1116a] (1) ἐλλείπει δὲ καὶ τῷ θαρρεῖν· He is lacking also in confidence; but he is

ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ταῖς λύπαις ὑπερβάλλων more conspicuous for his excess of fear in
painful situations. The coward, then, is a
µᾶλλον καταφανής ἐστιν. δύσελπις δή despairing sort of person; for he fears
τις ὁ δειλός· πάντα γὰρ φοβεῖται. ὁ δ᾽ everything. The brave man, on the other
ἀνδρεῖος ἐναντίως· τὸ γὰρ θαρρεῖν hand, has the opposite disposition; for
confidence is the mark of a hopeful
εὐέλπιδος.
disposition.
περὶ ταὐτὰ µὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὅ τε δειλὸς (5) The coward, the rash man, and the brave
καὶ ὁ θρασὺς καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, διαφόρως δ᾽ man, then, are concerned with the same
objects but are differently disposed towards
ἔχουσι πρὸς αὐτά· οἳ µὲν γὰρ them; for the first two exceed and fall short,
ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν, ὃ δὲ while the third holds the middle, which is
µέσως ἔχει καὶ ὡς δεῖ· καὶ οἱ µὲν θρασεῖς the right, position; and rash men are
προπετεῖς, καὶ βουλόµενοι πρὸ τῶν precipitate, and wish for dangers beforehand
but draw back when they are in them, while
κινδύνων ἐν αὐτοῖς δ᾽ ἀφίστανται, οἱ δ᾽ brave men are keen in the moment of
ἀνδρεῖοι ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ὀξεῖς, πρότερον action, but quiet beforehand.
δ᾽ ἡσύχιοι.
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(10) καθάπερ οὖν εἴρηται, ἡ ἀνδρεία As we have said, then, courage is a mean
µεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ θαρραλέα καὶ φοβερά, with respect to things that inspire
confidence or fear, in the circumstances that
ἐν οἷς εἴρηται, καὶ ὅτι καλὸν αἱρεῖται καὶ have been stated; and it chooses or endures
ὑποµένει, ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ µή. things because it is noble to do so, or
because it is base not to do so.
τὸ δ᾽ ἀποθνήσκειν φεύγοντα πενίαν ἢ But to die to escape from poverty or love or

ἔρωτα ἤ τι λυπηρὸν οὐκ ἀνδρείου, ἀλλὰ anything painful is not the mark of a brave
man, but rather of a coward; for it is
µᾶλλον δειλοῦ· µαλακία γὰρ τὸ φεύγειν softness to fly from what is troublesome,
τὰ ἐπίπονα, καὶ (15) οὐχ ὅτι καλὸν and such a man endures death not because
ὑποµένει, ἀλλὰ φεύγων κακόν. it is noble but to fly from evil.
8. Five kinds of courage

improperly so called.
<<< >>>
ἔστι µὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι, Courage, then, is something of this sort,
λέγονται δὲ καὶ ἕτεραι κατὰ πέντε but the name is also applied to five other
kinds.
τρόπους·
πρῶτον µὲν ἡ πολιτική· µάλιστα γὰρ First comes the courage of the citizen-
ἔοικεν. δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑποµένειν τοὺς soldier; for this is most like true courage.
Citizen-soldiers seem to face dangers
κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν because of the penalties imposed by the
νόµων ἐπιτίµια καὶ τὰ ὀνείδη καὶ διὰ τὰς laws and the reproaches they would
τιµάς· (20) καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνδρειότατοι otherwise incur, and because of the honours
δοκοῦσιν εἶναι παρ᾽ οἷς οἱ δειλοὶ ἄτιµοι they win by such action; and therefore
those peoples seem to be bravest among
καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἔντιµοι. whom cowards are held in dishonour and
brave men in honour.
τοιούτους δὲ καὶ Ὅµηρος ποιεῖ, οἷον τὸν This is the kind of courage that Homer
Διοµήδην καὶ τὸν Ἕκτορα· depicts, e.g. in Diomede and in Hector:
First will Polydamas be to heap

Πουλυδάµας µοι πρῶτος reproach on me then;
ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει· *
and
καὶ [Διοµήδης] (25) For Hector one day 'mid the
Trojans shall utter his vaulting
Ἕκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ harangue:
Τρώεσσ᾽ ἀγορεύων Afraid was Tydeides, and fled
from my face.
Τυδείδης ὑπ᾽ ἐµεῖο. **
ὡµοίωται δ᾽ αὕτη µάλιστα τῇ πρότερον This kind of courage is most like to that
εἰρηµένῃ, ὅτι δι᾽ ἀρετὴν γίνεται· δι᾽ αἰδῶ which we described earlier, because it is due
to virtue; for it is due to shame and to
γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὄρεξιν (τιµῆς γάρ) καὶ desire of a noble object (i.e. honour) and
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φυγὴν ὀνείδους, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος. avoidance of disgrace, which is ignoble.
τάξαι δ᾽ ἄν τις (30) καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν One might rank in the same class even
ἀρχόντων ἀναγκαζοµένους εἰς ταὐτό· those who are compelled by their rulers; but
they are inferior, inasmuch as they do what
χείρους δ᾽, ὅσῳ οὐ δι᾽ αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ διὰ they do not from shame but from fear, and
φόβον αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ φεύγοντες οὐ τὸ to avoid not what is disgraceful but what is
αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηρόν· ἀναγκάζουσι painful; for their masters compel them, as
γὰρ οἱ κύριοι, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἕκτωρ Hector does:
But if I shall spy any dastard

ὃν δέ κ᾽ ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε µάχης that cowers far from the fight,
πτώσσοντα νοήσω, Vainly will such an one hope to
escape from the dogs.
οὔ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν
κύνας. *** And those who give them their posts, and
beat them if they retreat, do the same, and
καὶ οἱ προστάττοντες, κἂν ἀναχωρῶσι so do those who draw them up with trenches
or something of the sort behind them; all of
τύπτοντες, τὸ αὐτὸ δρῶσι, [1116b] (1) καὶ
these apply compulsion. But one ought to be
οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων brave not under compulsion but because it
παρατάττοντες· πάντες γὰρ is noble to be so.
ἀναγκάζουσιν. δεῖ δ᾽ οὐ δι᾽ ἀνάγκην
ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι καλόν.
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐµπειρία ἡ περὶ ἕκαστα Experience with regard to particular facts
ἀνδρεία εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης is also thought to be courage; this is indeed
the reason why Socrates thought courage
ᾠήθη (5) ἐπιστήµην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. was knowledge. Other people exhibit this
τοιοῦτοι δὲ ἄλλοι µὲν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἐν τοῖς quality in other dangers, and professional
πολεµικοῖς δ᾽ οἱ στρατιῶται· δοκεῖ γὰρ soldiers exhibit it in the dangers of war; for
εἶναι πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέµου, ἃ there seem to be many empty alarms in
war, of which these have had the most
µάλιστα συνεωράκασιν οὗτοι· φαίνονται comprehensive experience; therefore they
δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν οἱ ἄλλοι οἷά seem brave, because the others do not know
ἐστιν. the nature of the facts.
εἶτα ποιῆσαι καὶ µὴ παθεῖν µάλιστα Again, their experience makes them most
δύνανται ἐκ τῆς ἐµπειρίας, (10) capable in attack and in defence, since they
can use their arms and have the kind that
δυνάµενοι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ are likely to be best both for attack and for
τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ὁποῖα ἂν εἴη καὶ πρὸς defence; therefore they fight like armed
τὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ µὴ παθεῖν men against unarmed or like trained
athletes against amateurs; for in such
κράτιστα· ὥσπερ οὖν ἀνόπλοις
contests too it is not the bravest men that
ὡπλισµένοι µάχονται καὶ ἀθληταὶ fight best, but those who are strongest and
ἰδιώταις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις have their bodies in the best condition.
ἀγῶσιν οὐχ οἱ ἀνδρειότατοι µαχιµώτατοί
εἰσιν, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ µάλιστα (15) ἰσχύοντες καὶ
τὰ σώµατα ἄριστα ἔχοντες.
οἱ στρατιῶται δὲ δειλοὶ γίνονται, ὅταν Professional soldiers turn cowards, however,

ὑπερτείνῃ ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ λείπωνται τοῖς when the danger puts too great a strain on
them and they are inferior in numbers and
πλήθεσι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς· πρῶτοι equipment; for they are the first to fly,
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γὰρ φεύγουσι, τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ µένοντα while citizen-forces die at their posts, as in

ἀποθνήσκει, ὅπερ κἀπὶ τῷ Ἑρµαίῳ fact happened at the temple of Hermes.
συνέβη.
τοῖς µὲν γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ φεύγειν (20) καὶ For to the latter flight is disgraceful and
ὁ θάνατος τῆς τοιαύτης σωτηρίας death is preferable to safety on those terms;
while the former from the very beginning
αἱρετώτερος· οἳ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς faced the danger on the assumption that
ἐκινδύνευον ὡς κρείττους ὄντες, γνόντες they were stronger, and when they know
δὲ φεύγουσι, τὸν θάνατον µᾶλλον τοῦ the facts they fly, fearing death more than
disgrace; but the brave man is not that sort
αἰσχροῦ φοβούµενοι· ὁ δ᾽ ἀνδρεῖος οὐ
of person.
τοιοῦτος.
καὶ τὸν θυµὸν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν Passion also is sometimes reckoned as
φέρουσιν· ἀνδρεῖοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ courage; those who act from passion, like
wild beasts rushing at those who have
οἱ διὰ θυµὸν (25) ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ wounded them, are thought to be brave,
τοὺς τρώσαντας φερόµενα, ὅτι καὶ οἱ because brave men also are passionate; for
ἀνδρεῖοι θυµοειδεῖς· ἰτητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ passion above all things is eager to rush on
danger, and hence Homer's 'put strength
θυµὸς πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ
into his passion' and 'aroused their spirit
Ὅµηρος “σθένος ἔµβαλε θυµῷ” καὶ and passion and 'hard he breathed panting'
“µένος καὶ θυµὸν ἔγειρε” καὶ “δριµὺ δ᾽ and 'his blood boiled'. For all such
ἀνὰ ῥῖνας µένος” καὶ “ἔζεσεν αἷµα”· expressions seem to indicate the stirring
and onset of passion.
πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔοικε σηµαίνειν
(30) τὴν τοῦ θυµοῦ ἔγερσιν καὶ ὁρµήν.
οἱ µὲν οὖν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὸ καλὸν Now brave men act for honour's sake, but
πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ θυµὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς· passion aids them; while wild beasts act
under the influence of pain; for they attack
τὰ θηρία δὲ διὰ λύπην· διὰ γὰρ τὸ because they have been wounded or
πληγῆναι ἢ διὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἐάν because they are afraid, since if they are in
γε ἐν ὕλῃ [ἢ ἐν ἕλει] ᾖ, οὐ προσέρχονται. a forest they do not come near one.
οὐ δή ἐστιν ἀνδρεῖα διὰ τὸ ὑπ᾽ Thus they are not brave because, driven by
ἀλγηδόνος καὶ θυµοῦ ἐξελαυνόµενα (35) pain and passion, they rush on danger
without foreseeing any of the perils, since at
πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὁρµᾶν, οὐθὲν τῶν that rate even asses would be brave when
δεινῶν προορῶντα, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε κἂν οἱ they are hungry; for blows will not drive
ὄνοι ἀνδρεῖοι εἶεν πεινῶντες· τυπτόµενοι them from their food; and lust also makes
γὰρ οὐκ ἀφίστανται τῆς νοµῆς·[1117a] (1) adulterers do many daring things.
καὶ οἱ µοιχοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυµίαν

τολµηρὰ πολλὰ δρῶσιν.
[οὐ δή ἐστιν ἀνδρεῖα τὰ δι᾽ ἀλγηδόνος ἢ (Those creatures are not brave, then, which
θυµοῦ ἐξελαυνόµενα πρὸς τὸν are driven on to danger by pain or passion.)
κίνδυνον.]
φυσικωτάτη δ᾽ ἔοικεν ἡ διὰ τὸν θυµὸν The 'courage' that is due to passion seems
εἶναι, καὶ προσλαβοῦσα (5) προαίρεσιν to be the most natural, and to be courage if
choice and motive be added.
καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀνδρεία εἶναι.
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καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι δὴ ὀργιζόµενοι µὲν Men, then, as well as beasts, suffer pain
ἀλγοῦσι, τιµωρούµενοι δ᾽ ἥδονται· οἱ δὲ when they are angry, and are pleased when
they exact their revenge; those who fight
διὰ ταῦτα µαχόµενοι µάχιµοι µέν, οὐκ for these reasons, however, are pugnacious
ἀνδρεῖοι δέ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ᾽ ὡς but not brave; for they do not act for
ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος· παραπλήσιον honour's sake nor as the rule directs, but
from strength of feeling; they have,
δ᾽ ἔχουσί τι.
however, something akin to courage.
οὐδὲ δὴ οἱ εὐέλπιδες (10) ὄντες ἀνδρεῖοι· Nor are sanguine people brave; for they
διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλάκις καὶ πολλοὺς are confident in danger only because they
have conquered often and against many
νενικηκέναι θαρροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις· foes. Yet they closely resemble brave men,
παρόµοιοι δέ, ὅτι ἄµφω θαρραλέοι· ἀλλ᾽ because both are confident; but brave men
οἱ µὲν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὰ πρότερον are confident for the reasons stated earlier,
while these are so because they think they
εἰρηµένα θαρραλέοι, οἳ δὲ διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι
are the strongest and can suffer nothing.
κράτιστοι εἶναι καὶ µηθὲν ἂν παθεῖν.
τοιοῦτον δὲ ποιοῦσι καὶ οἱ µεθυσκόµενοι· (Drunken men also behave in this way; they
(15) εὐέλπιδες γὰρ γίνονται. become sanguine).
ὅταν δὲ αὐτοῖς µὴ συµβῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα, When their adventures do not succeed,

φεύγουσιν· ἀνδρείου δ᾽ ἦν τὰ φοβερὰ however, they run away; but it was the
mark of a brave man to face things that are,
ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντα καὶ φαινόµενα and seem, terrible for a man, because it is
ὑποµένειν, ὅτι καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τὸ µή. noble to do so and disgraceful not to do so.
διὸ καὶ ἀνδρειοτέρου δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐν Hence also it is thought the mark of a
τοῖς αἰφνιδίοις φόβοις ἄφοβον καὶ braver man to be fearless and undisturbed
in sudden alarms than to be so in those that
ἀτάραχον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοις· (20) are foreseen; for it must have proceeded
ἀπὸ ἕξεως γὰρ µᾶλλον ἦν, ὅτι ἧττον ἐκ more from a state of character, because less
παρασκευῆς· τὰ προφανῆ µὲν γὰρ κἂν ἐκ from preparation; acts that are foreseen
may be chosen by calculation and rule, but
λογισµοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προέλοιτο, τὰ δ᾽
sudden actions must be in accordance with
ἐξαίφνης κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν. one's state of character.
ἀνδρεῖοι δὲ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες, People who are ignorant of the danger
καὶ εἰσὶν οὐ πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίδων, also appear brave, and they are not far
removed from those of a sanguine temper,
χείρους δ᾽ ὅσῳ ἀξίωµα οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν, but are inferior inasmuch as they have no
ἐκεῖνοι δέ. self-reliance while these have.
διὸ καὶ µένουσί τινα (25) χρόνον· οἱ δ᾽ Hence also the sanguine hold their ground
ἠπατηµένοι, ἐὰν γνῶσιν ὅτι ἕτερον ἢ for a time; but those who have been
deceived about the facts fly if they know or
ὑποπτεύσωσι, φεύγουσιν· ὅπερ οἱ suspect that these are different from what
Ἀργεῖοι ἔπαθον περιπεσόντες τοῖς they supposed, as happened to the Argives
Λάκωσιν ὡς Σικυωνίοις. when they fell in with the Spartans and took
them for Sicyonians.
οἵ τε δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι εἴρηνται ποῖοί τινες, καὶ We have, then, described the character
οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀνδρεῖοι. both of brave men and of those who are
thought to be brave.
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* Ὅµηρος Φ 100
** Ὅµηρος Θ 148
*** Ὅµηρος Β 391
9 of 9 23/02/2014 1:27 AM
Αριστοτέλους Ηθικά Νικοµάχεια, Βιβλίο III, 9-12 http://www.mikrosapoplous.gr/aristotle/nicom3d.htm
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(1117a25-1119b15)
9. Relation of courage to pain and

pleasure.
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περὶ θάρρη δὲ καὶ φόβους ἡ ἀνδρεία Though courage is concerned with

οὖσα οὐχ ὁµοίως (30) περὶ ἄµφω ἐστίν, feelings of confidence and of fear, it is not
concerned with both alike, but more with
ἀλλὰ µᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά· ὁ γὰρ ἐν the things that inspire fear; for he who is
τούτοις ἀτάραχος καὶ περὶ ταῦθ᾽ ὡς δεῖ undisturbed in face of these and bears
ἔχων ἀνδρεῖος µᾶλλον ἢ ὁ περὶ τὰ himself as he should towards these is more
truly brave than the man who does so
θαρραλέα.
towards the things that inspire confidence.
τῷ δὴ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑποµένειν, ὡς εἴρηται, It is for facing what is painful, then, as has

ἀνδρεῖοι λέγονται. διὸ καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἡ been said, that men are called brave. Hence
also courage involves pain, and is justly
ἀνδρεία, καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται· praised; for it is harder to face what is
χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὰ λυπηρὰ (35) painful than to abstain from what is
ὑποµένειν ἢ τῶν ἡδέων ἀπέχεσθαι. pleasant.
[1117b] (1) οὐ µὴν ἀλλὰ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι Yet the end which courage sets before it
τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ, ὑπὸ would seem to be pleasant, but to be
concealed by the attending circumstances,
τῶν κύκλῳ δ᾽ ἀφανίζεσθαι, οἷον κἀν τοῖς as happens also in athletic contests; for the
γυµνικοῖς ἀγῶσι γίνεται· τοῖς γὰρ end at which boxers aim is pleasant- the
πύκταις τὸ µὲν τέλος ἡδύ, οὗ ἕνεκα, ὁ crown and the honours- but the blows they
στέφανος καὶ αἱ τιµαί, τὸ δὲ τύπτεσθαι take are distressing to flesh and blood, and
painful, and so is their whole exertion; and
ἀλγεινόν, εἴπερ (5) σάρκινοι, καὶ because the blows and the exertions are
λυπηρόν, καὶ πᾶς ὁ πόνος· διὰ δὲ τὸ many the end, which is but small, appears
πολλὰ ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι, µικρὸν ὂν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα to have nothing pleasant in it.
οὐδὲν ἡδὺ φαίνεται ἔχειν.
εἰ δὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν And so, if the case of courage is similar,
ἀνδρείαν, ὁ µὲν θάνατος καὶ τὰ death and wounds will be painful to the
brave man and against his will, but he will
τραύµατα λυπηρὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ καὶ ἄκοντι face them because it is noble to do so or
ἔσται, ὑποµενεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ὅτι καλὸν ἢ ὅτι because it is base not to do so.
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αἰσχρὸν τὸ µή.
καὶ (10) ὅσῳ ἂν µᾶλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχῃ And the more he is possessed of virtue in its
πᾶσαν καὶ εὐδαιµονέστερος ᾖ, µᾶλλον entirety and the happier he is, the more he
will be pained at the thought of death; for
ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λυπήσεται· τῷ τοιούτῳ life is best worth living for such a man, and
γὰρ µάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον, καὶ οὗτος he is knowingly losing the greatest goods,
µεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἀποστερεῖται εἰδώς, and this is painful.
λυπηρὸν δὲ τοῦτο.
ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀνδρεῖος, ἴσως δὲ καὶ But he is none the less brave, and perhaps
µᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέµῳ καλὸν ἀντ᾽ all the more so, because he chooses noble
deeds of war at that cost. It is not the case,
(15) ἐκείνων αἱρεῖται. οὐ δὴ ἐν ἁπάσαις then, with all the virtues that the exercise
ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, of them is pleasant, except in so far as it
πλὴν ἐφ᾽ ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται. reaches its end.
στρατιώτας δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει µὴ But it is quite possible that the best soldiers
τοὺς τοιούτους κρατίστους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ may be not men of this sort but those who
are less brave but have no other good; for
τοὺς ἧττον µὲν ἀνδρείους, ἄλλο δ᾽ these are ready to face danger, and they
ἀγαθὸν µηδὲν ἔχοντας· ἕτοιµοι γὰρ sell their life for trifling gains. So much,
οὗτοι πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, καὶ τὸν (20) then, for courage; it is not difficult to grasp
its nature in outline, at any rate, from what
βίον πρὸς µικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται.
has been said.
περὶ µὲν οὖν ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον
εἰρήσθω· τί δ᾽ ἐστίν, οὐ χαλεπὸν τύπῳ γε
περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρηµένων.
B. Temperance.
10. Temperance is limited to
certain pleasures of touch.
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µετὰ δὲ ταύτην περὶ σωφροσύνης After courage let us speak of temperance;

λέγωµεν· δοκοῦσι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων for these seem to be the virtues of the
irrational parts.
µερῶν αὗται εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί.
ὅτι µὲν (25) οὖν µεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ We have said that temperance is a mean
ἡδονὰς ἡ σωφροσύνη, εἴρηται ἡµῖν· with regard to pleasures (for it is less, and
not in the same way, concerned with pains);
ἧττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὁµοίως ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς self-indulgence also is manifested in the
λύπας· ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία same sphere.
φαίνεται.
περὶ ποίας οὖν τῶν ἡδονῶν, νῦν Now, therefore, let us determine with what
ἀφορίσωµεν. διῃρήσθωσαν δὴ αἱ ψυχικαὶ sort of pleasures they are concerned. We
may assume the distinction between bodily
καὶ αἱ σωµατικαί, οἷον φιλοτιµία pleasures and those of the soul, such as love
φιλοµάθεια· ἑκάτερος γὰρ (30) τούτων of honour and love of learning; for the lover
χαίρει, οὗ φιλητικός ἐστιν, οὐδὲν of each of these delights in that of which he
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πάσχοντος τοῦ σώµατος, ἀλλὰ µᾶλλον is a lover, the body being in no way
τῆς διανοίας· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας affected, but rather the mind; but men who
are concerned with such pleasures are called
ἡδονὰς οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι neither temperate nor self-indulgent.
λέγονται.
ὁµοίως δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ οἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὅσαι µὴ Nor, again, are those who are concerned
σωµατικαί εἰσιν· τοὺς γὰρ φιλοµύθους with the other pleasures that are not bodily;
for those who are fond of hearing and telling
καὶ διηγητικοὺς καὶ περὶ τῶν τυχόντων stories and who spend their days on
(35) κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡµέρας anything that turns up are called gossips,
ἀδολέσχας, ἀκολάστους δ᾽ οὐ λέγοµεν, but not self-indulgent, nor are those who
[1118a] (1) οὐδὲ τοὺς λυπουµένους ἐπὶ are pained at the loss of money or of
friends.
χρήµασιν ἢ φίλοις.
περὶ δὲ τὰς σωµατικὰς εἴη ἂν ἡ Temperance must be concerned with

σωφροσύνη, οὐ πάσας δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτας· οἱ bodily pleasures, but not all even of these;
for those who delight in objects of vision,
γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὄψεως, οἷον such as colours and shapes and painting, are
χρώµασι καὶ σχήµασι καὶ γραφῇ, οὔτε called neither temperate nor self-indulgent;
σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι (5) λέγονται· yet it would seem possible to delight even in
καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ὡς δεῖ χαίρειν these either as one should or to excess or to
a deficient degree.
καὶ τούτοις, καὶ καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ
ἔλλειψιν.
ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν· And so too is it with objects of hearing;
τοὺς γὰρ ὑπερβεβληµένως χαίροντας no one calls those who delight extravagantly
in music or acting self-indulgent, nor those
µέλεσιν ἢ ὑποκρίσει οὐθεὶς ἀκολάστους who do so as they ought temperate.
λέγει, οὐδὲ τοὺς ὡς δεῖ σώφρονας.
οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὀσµήν, πλὴν κατὰ Nor do we apply these names to those
(10) συµβεβηκός· τοὺς γὰρ χαίροντας who delight in odour, unless it be
incidentally; we do not call those
µήλων ἢ ῥόδων ἢ θυµιαµάτων ὀσµαῖς οὐ self-indulgent who delight in the odour of
λέγοµεν ἀκολάστους, ἀλλὰ µᾶλλον τοὺς apples or roses or incense, but rather those
µύρων ἢ ὄψων· χαίρουσι γὰρ τούτοις οἱ who delight in the odour of unguents or of
ἀκόλαστοι, ὅτι διὰ τούτων ἀνάµνησις dainty dishes; for self-indulgent people
delight in these because these remind them
γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυµηµάτων. of the objects of their appetite.
ἴδοι δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅταν And one may see even other people, when
πεινῶσι, χαίροντας ταῖς (15) τῶν they are hungry, delighting in the smell of
food; but to delight in this kind of thing is
βρωµάτων ὀσµαῖς· τὸ δὲ τοιούτοις the mark of the self-indulgent man; for
χαίρειν ἀκολάστου· τούτῳ γὰρ these are objects of appetite to him.
ἐπιθυµήµατα ταῦτα.
οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις Nor is there in animals other than man
κατὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδονὴ πλὴν any pleasure connected with these senses,
except incidentally.
κατὰ συµβεβηκός.
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οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῖς ὀσµαῖς τῶν λαγωῶν αἱ For dogs do not delight in the scent of
κύνες χαίρουσιν ἀλλὰ τῇ βρώσει, τὴν δ᾽ hares, but in the eating of them, but the
scent told them the hares were there; nor
αἴσθησιν ἡ ὀσµὴ ἐποίησεν· (20) οὐδ᾽ ὁ does the lion delight in the lowing of the ox,
λέων τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ βοὸς ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐδωδῇ· but in eating it; but he perceived by the
ὅτι δ᾽ ἐγγύς ἐστι, διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ᾔσθετο, lowing that it was near, and therefore
appears to delight in the lowing; and
καὶ χαίρειν δὴ ταύτῃ φαίνεται· ὁµοίως δ᾽
similarly he does not delight because he
οὐδ᾽ ἰδὼν “ἢ [εὑρὼν] ἔλαφον ἢ ἄγριον sees 'a stag or a wild goat', but because he
αἶγα,” ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι βορὰν ἕξει. is going to make a meal of it.
περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δ᾽ ἡδονὰς ἡ Temperance and self-indulgence, however,

σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ are concerned with the kind of pleasures
that the other animals share in, which
τὰ λοιπὰ (25) ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν therefore appear slavish and brutish; these
ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται· are touch and taste.
αὗται δ᾽ εἰσὶν ἁφὴ καὶ γεῦσις.
φαίνονται δὲ καὶ τῇ γεύσει ἐπὶ µικρὸν ἢ But even of taste they appear to make little
οὐθὲν χρῆσθαι· τῆς γὰρ γεύσεώς ἐστιν ἡ or no use; for the business of taste is the
discriminating of flavours, which is done by
κρίσις τῶν χυµῶν, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τοὺς winetasters and people who season dishes;
οἴνους δοκιµάζοντες καὶ τὰ ὄψα but they hardly take pleasure in making
ἀρτύοντες· οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι τούτοις, these discriminations, or at least
self-indulgent people do not, but in the
ἢ οὐχ (30) οἵ γε ἀκόλαστοι, ἀλλὰ τῇ
actual enjoyment, which in all cases comes
ἀπολαύσει, ἣ γίνεται πᾶσα δι᾽ ἁφῆς καὶ through touch, both in the case of food and
ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς in that of drink and in that of sexual
ἀφροδισίοις λεγοµένοις. intercourse.
διὸ καὶ ηὔξατό τις ὀψοφάγος ὢν τὸν This is why a certain gourmand prayed that
φάρυγγα αὑτῷ µακρότερον γεράνου his throat might become longer than a
crane's, implying that it was the contact that
γενέσθαι, ὡς ἡδόµενος τῇ ἁφῇ. he took pleasure in.
[1118b] (1) κοινοτάτη δὴ τῶν αἰσθήσεων Thus the sense with which self-indulgence is
καθ᾽ ἣν ἡ ἀκολασία· καὶ δόξειεν ἂν connected is the most widely shared of the
senses; and self-indulgence would seem to
δικαίως ἐπονείδιστος εἶναι, ὅτι οὐχ ᾗ be justly a matter of reproach, because it
ἄνθρωποί ἐσµεν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ᾽ ᾗ ζῷα. attaches to us not as men but as animals.
τὸ δὴ τοιούτοις χαίρειν καὶ µάλιστα To delight in such things, then, and to love
ἀγαπᾶν θηριῶδες. καὶ γὰρ αἱ them above all others, is brutish. For even
of the pleasures of touch the most liberal
ἐλευθεριώταται (5) τῶν διὰ τῆς ἁφῆς have been eliminated, e.g. those produced
ἡδονῶν ἀφῄρηνται, οἷον αἱ ἐν τοῖς in the gymnasium by rubbing and by the
γυµνασίοις διὰ τρίψεως καὶ τῆς consequent heat; for the contact
θερµασίας γινόµεναι· οὐ γὰρ περὶ πᾶν τὸ characteristic of the self-indulgent man does
not affect the whole body but only certain
σῶµα ἡ τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἁφή, ἀλλὰ περί parts.
τινα µέρη.
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11. Characteristics of temperance

and its opposites, self-indulgence
and 'insensibility'.
<<< >>>
τῶν δ᾽ ἐπιθυµιῶν αἳ µὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦσιν Of the appetites some seem to be

εἶναι, αἳ δ᾽ ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι· οἷον ἡ µὲν common, others to be peculiar to individuals
and acquired; e.g. the appetite for food is
τῆς τροφῆς φυσική· (10) πᾶς γὰρ natural, since every one who is without it
ἐπιθυµεῖ ὁ ἐνδεὴς ξηρᾶς ἢ ὑγρᾶς craves for food or drink, and sometimes for
τροφῆς, ὁτὲ δὲ ἀµφοῖν, καὶ εὐνῆς, φησὶν both, and for love also (as Homer says) if he
is young and lusty; but not every one craves
Ὅµηρος, ὁ νέος καὶ ἀκµάζων· τὸ δὲ
for this or that kind of nourishment or love,
τοιᾶσδε ἢ τοιᾶσδε, οὐκέτι πᾶς, οὐδὲ τῶν nor for the same things.
αὐτῶν.
διὸ φαίνεται ἡµέτερον εἶναι. οὐ µὴν ἀλλ᾽ Hence such craving appears to be our very
ἔχει γέ τι καὶ φυσικόν· ἕτερα γὰρ ἑτέροις own. Yet it has of course something natural
about it; for different things are pleasant to
ἐστὶν ἡδέα, καὶ ἔνια πᾶσιν ἡδίω (15) τῶν different kinds of people, and some things
τυχόντων. are more pleasant to every one than chance
objects.
ἐν µὲν οὖν ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἐπιθυµίαις Now in the natural appetites few go wrong,
ὀλίγοι ἁµαρτάνουσι καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἕν, ἐπὶ τὸ and only in one direction, that of excess; for
to eat or drink whatever offers itself till one
πλεῖον· τὸ γὰρ ἐσθίειν τὰ τυχόντα ἢ is surfeited is to exceed the natural amount,
πίνειν ἕως ἂν ὑπερπλησθῇ, ὑπερβάλλειν since natural appetite is the replenishment
ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ πλήθει· of one's deficiency.
ἀναπλήρωσις γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας ἡ φυσικὴ
ἐπιθυµία.
διὸ λέγονται οὗτοι γαστρίµαργοι, ὡς (20) Hence these people are called belly-gods,
παρὰ τὸ δέον πληροῦντες αὐτήν. this implying that they fill their belly beyond
what is right. It is people of entirely slavish
τοιοῦτοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ λίαν character that become like this.
ἀνδραποδώδεις.
περὶ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας τῶν ἡδονῶν πολλοὶ καὶ But with regard to the pleasures peculiar to
πολλαχῶς ἁµαρτάνουσιν. τῶν γὰρ individuals many people go wrong and in
many ways. For while the people who are
φιλοτοιούτων λεγοµένων ἢ τῷ χαίρειν 'fond of so and so' are so called because
οἷς µὴ δεῖ, ἢ τῷ µᾶλλον ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί, ἢ they delight either in the wrong things, or
µὴ ὡς δεῖ, κατὰ πάντα δ᾽ οἱ ἀκόλαστοι more than most people do, or in the wrong
way, the self-indulgent exceed in all three
ὑπερβάλλουσιν· (25) καὶ γὰρ χαίρουσιν
ways; they both delight in some things that
ἐνίοις οἷς οὐ δεῖ (µισητὰ γάρ), καὶ εἴ τισι they ought not to delight in (since they are
δεῖ χαίρειν τῶν τοιούτων, µᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ hateful), and if one ought to delight in some
καὶ ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν. of the things they delight in, they do so
more than one ought and than most men
do.
ἡ µὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβολὴ ὅτι Plainly, then, excess with regard to
ἀκολασία καὶ ψεκτόν, δῆλον· περὶ δὲ τὰς pleasures is self-indulgence and is culpable;
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λύπας οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας τῷ with regard to pains one is not, as in the
ὑποµένειν λέγεται (30) σώφρων οὐδ᾽ case of courage, called temperate for facing
them or self-indulgent for not doing so, but
ἀκόλαστος τῷ µή, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ µὲν ἀκόλαστος the selfindulgent man is so called because
τῷ λυπεῖσθαι µᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ὅτι τῶν he is pained more than he ought at not
ἡδέων οὐ τυγχάνει (καὶ τὴν λύπην δὲ getting pleasant things (even his pain being
caused by pleasure), and the temperate
ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ ἡδονή), ὁ δὲ σώφρων τῷ µὴ
man is so called because he is not pained at
λυπεῖσθαι τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀπέχεσθαι the absence of what is pleasant and at his
τοῦ ἡδέος. abstinence from it.
[1119a] (1) ὁ µὲν οὖν ἀκόλαστος ἐπιθυµεῖ The self-indulgent man, then, craves for
τῶν ἡδέων πάντων ἢ τῶν µάλιστα, καὶ all pleasant things or those that are most
pleasant, and is led by his appetite to
ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυµίας ὥστε ἀντὶ τῶν choose these at the cost of everything else;
ἄλλων ταῦθ᾽ αἱρεῖσθαι· διὸ καὶ λυπεῖται hence he is pained both when he fails to get
καὶ ἀποτυγχάνων καὶ ἐπιθυµῶν· µετὰ them and when he is merely craving for
them (for appetite involves pain); but it
λύπης γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυµία· ἀτόπῳ (5) δ᾽ ἔοικε
seems absurd to be pained for the sake of
τὸ δι᾽ ἡδονὴν λυπεῖσθαι. pleasure.
ἐλλείποντες δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ People who fall short with regard to
ἧττον ἢ δεῖ χαίροντες οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· pleasures and delight in them less than they
should are hardly found; for such
οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπική ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη insensibility is not human. Even the other
ἀναισθησία· καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα animals distinguish different kinds of food
διακρίνει τὰ βρώµατα, καὶ τοῖς µὲν and enjoy some and not others; and if there
χαίρει τοῖς δ᾽ οὔ· εἰ δέ τῳ µηδέν ἐστιν is any one who finds nothing pleasant and
nothing more attractive than anything else,
ἡδὺ µηδὲ διαφέρει ἕτερον ἑτέρου, πόρρω he must be something quite different from a
(10) ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἄνθρωπος εἶναι· οὐ man; this sort of person has not received a
τέτευχε δ᾽ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὀνόµατος διὰ τὸ µὴ name because he hardly occurs.
πάνυ γίνεσθαι.
ὁ δὲ σώφρων µέσως µὲν περὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἔχει· The temperate man occupies a middle
οὔτε γὰρ ἥδεται οἷς µάλιστα ὁ position with regard to these objects. For he
neither enjoys the things that the
ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ µᾶλλον δυσχεραίνει, self-indulgent man enjoys most-but rather
οὐδ᾽ ὅλως οἷς µὴ δεῖ οὐδὲ σφόδρα dislikes them-nor in general the things that
τοιούτῳ οὐδενί, οὔτ᾽ ἀπόντων λυπεῖται he should not, nor anything of this sort to
οὐδ᾽ ἐπιθυµεῖ, ἢ µετρίως, οὐδὲ (15) excess, nor does he feel pain or craving
when they are absent, or does so only to a
µᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, οὐδ᾽ ὅτε µὴ δεῖ, οὐδ᾽ ὅλως moderate degree, and not more than he
τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν· ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειάν should, nor when he should not, and so on;
ἐστιν ἢ πρὸς εὐεξίαν ἡδέα ὄντα, τούτων but the things that, being pleasant, make
for health or for good condition, he will
ὀρέξεται µετρίως καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ τῶν
desire moderately and as he should, and
ἄλλων ἡδέων µὴ ἐµποδίων τούτοις also other pleasant things if they are not
ὄντων ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν hindrances to these ends, or contrary to
οὐσίαν. what is noble, or beyond his means.
ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων µᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς For he who neglects these conditions loves
τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς (20) ἀξίας· ὁ δὲ such pleasures more than they are worth,
but the temperate man is not that sort of
σώφρων οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς person, but the sort of person that the right
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λόγος. rule prescribes.
12. Self-indulgence more

voluntary than cowardice.
<<< >>>
ἑκουσίῳ δὲ µᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἡ ἀκολασία Self-indulgence is more like a voluntary

τῆς δειλίας. ἣ µὲν γὰρ δι᾽ ἡδονήν, ἣ δὲ state than cowardice. For the former is
actuated by pleasure, the latter by pain, of
διὰ λύπην, ὧν τὸ µὲν αἱρετόν, τὸ δὲ which the one is to be chosen and the other
φευκτόν· καὶ ἡ µὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ to be avoided; and pain upsets and destroys
φθείρει τὴν τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν, ἡ δὲ the nature of the person who feels it, while
ἡδονὴ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτο ποιεῖ. pleasure does nothing of the sort.
µᾶλλον (25) δὴ ἑκούσιον. διὸ καὶ Therefore self-indulgence is more voluntary.

ἐπονειδιστότερον· καὶ γὰρ ἐθισθῆναι Hence also it is more a matter of reproach;
for it is easier to become accustomed to its
ῥᾷον πρὸς αὐτά· πολλὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰ objects, since there are many things of this
τοιαῦτα, καὶ οἱ ἐθισµοὶ ἀκίνδυνοι, ἐπὶ δὲ sort in life, and the process of habituation to
τῶν φοβερῶν ἀνάπαλιν. them is free from danger, while with terrible
objects the reverse is the case.
δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν οὐχ ὁµοίως ἑκούσιον ἡ But cowardice would seem to be voluntary

δειλία εἶναι τοῖς καθ᾽ ἕκαστον· αὐτὴ µὲν in a different degree from its particular
manifestations; for it is itself painless, but in
γὰρ ἄλυπος, ταῦτα δὲ διὰ λύπην these we are upset by pain, so that we even
ἐξίστησιν, ὥστε (30) καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ῥιπτεῖν throw down our arms and disgrace ourselves
καὶ τἆλλα ἀσχηµονεῖν· διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ in other ways; hence our acts are even
βίαια εἶναι. thought to be done under compulsion.
τῷ δ᾽ ἀκολάστῳ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ µὲν καθ᾽ For the self-indulgent man, on the other
ἕκαστα ἑκούσια (ἐπιθυµοῦντι γὰρ καὶ hand, the particular acts are voluntary (for
he does them with craving and desire), but
ὀρεγοµένῳ), τὸ δ᾽ ὅλον ἧττον· οὐθεὶς γὰρ the whole state is less so; for no one craves
ἐπιθυµεῖ ἀκόλαστος εἶναι. to be self-indulgent.
τὸ δ᾽ ὄνοµα τῆς ἀκολασίας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς The name self-indulgence is applied also
παιδικὰς ἁµαρτίας φέροµεν· [1119b] (1) to childish faults; for they bear a certain
resemblance to what we have been
ἔχουσι γάρ τινα ὁµοιότητα. considering.
πότερον δ᾽ ἀπὸ ποτέρου καλεῖται, οὐθὲν Which is called after which, makes no
πρὸς τὰ νῦν διαφέρει, δῆλον δ᾽ ὅτι τὸ difference to our present purpose; plainly,
however, the later is called after the earlier.
ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προτέρου.
οὐ κακῶς δ᾽ ἔοικε µετενηνέχθαι· The transference of the name seems not a

κεκολάσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν bad one; for that which desires what is base
and which develops quickly ought to be kept
ὀρεγόµενον καὶ πολλὴν αὔξησιν ἔχον, in a chastened condition, and these
τοιοῦτον (5) δὲ µάλιστα ἡ ἐπιθυµία καὶ ὁ characteristics belong above all to appetite
παῖς· κατ᾽ ἐπιθυµίαν γὰρ ζῶσι καὶ τὰ and to the child, since children in fact live at
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παιδία, καὶ µάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἡ τοῦ the beck and call of appetite, and it is in
ἡδέος ὄρεξις. them that the desire for what is pleasant is
strongest.
εἰ οὖν µὴ ἔσται εὐπειθὲς καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ If, then, it is not going to be obedient and
ἄρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἥξει· ἄπληστος γὰρ ἡ subject to the ruling principle, it will go to
great lengths; for in an irrational being the
τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις καὶ πανταχόθεν τῷ desire for pleasure is insatiable even if it
ἀνοήτῳ, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυµίας ἐνέργεια tries every source of gratification, and the
αὔξει τὸ συγγενές, (10) κἂν µεγάλαι καὶ exercise of appetite increases its innate
σφοδραὶ ὦσι, καὶ τὸν λογισµὸν force, and if appetites are strong and violent
they even expel the power of calculation.
ἐκκρούουσιν.
διὸ δεῖ µετρίας εἶναι αὐτὰς καὶ ὀλίγας, Hence they should be moderate and few,
καὶ τῷ λόγῳ µηθὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαι--τὸ δὲ and should in no way oppose the rational
principle-and this is what we call an
τοιοῦτον εὐπειθὲς λέγοµεν καὶ obedient and chastened state-and as the
κεκολασµένον--ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν παῖδα δεῖ child should live according to the direction of
κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγµα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ his tutor, so the appetitive element should
live according to rational principle.
ζῆν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυµητικὸν κατὰ τὸν
(15) λόγον.
διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυµητικὸν Hence the appetitive element in a temperate
συµφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ· σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀµφοῖν man should harmonize with the rational
principle; for the noble is the mark at which
τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐπιθυµεῖ ὁ σώφρων ὧν δεῖ both aim, and the temperate man craves for
καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε· οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ the things be ought, as he ought, as when
λόγος. he ought; and when he ought; and this is
what rational principle directs.
ταῦτ᾽ οὖν ἡµῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ Here we conclude our account of

σωφροσύνης. temperance.
<< Βιβλίο IΙΙ, 6-8 ToC Βιβλίο ΙV, 1 >>
8 of 8 23/02/2014 1:27 AM
Αριστοτέλους Ηθικά Νικοµάχεια, IV 1 http://www.mikrosapoplous.gr/aristotle/nicom4a.htm
<< Βιβλίο ΙΙI, 9-12 ToC Βιβλίο ΙV, 2 >>

Βιβλίο IV, 1
(1119b20-1122a15)
C. Virtues concerned with money.

1. Liberality, prodigality,
meanness.
<<< >>>
[1119b] λέγωµεν δ᾽ ἑξῆς περὶ LET us speak next of liberality. It seems

ἐλευθεριότητος. δοκεῖ δὴ εἶναι ἡ περὶ to be the mean with regard to wealth; for
the liberal man is praised not in respect of
χρήµατα µεσότης· ἐπαινεῖται γὰρ ὁ military matters, nor of those in respect of
ἐλευθέριος οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πολεµικοῖς, οὐδ᾽ which the temrate man is praised, nor of
ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων, οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἐν ταῖς judicial decisions, but with regard to the
κρίσεσιν, (25) ἀλλὰ περὶ δόσιν χρηµάτων giving and taking of wealth, and especially
in respect of giving. Now by 'wealth' we
καὶ λῆψιν, µᾶλλον δ᾽ ἐν τῇ δόσει. mean all the things whose value is
χρήµατα δὲ λέγοµεν πάντα ὅσων ἡ ἀξία measured by money.
νοµίσµατι µετρεῖται.
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία Further, prodigality and meanness are
περὶ χρήµατα ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις· excesses and defects with regard to wealth;
and meanness we always impute to those
καὶ τὴν µὲν ἀνελευθερίαν προσάπτοµεν who care more than they ought for wealth,
ἀεὶ τοῖς µᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ περὶ χρήµατα (30) but we sometimes apply the word
σπουδάζουσι, τὴν δ᾽ ἀσωτίαν 'prodigality' in a complex sense; for we call
those men prodigals who are incontinent
ἐπιφέροµεν ἐνίοτε συµπλέκοντες· τοὺς
and spend money on self-indulgence.
γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ εἰς ἀκολασίαν
δαπανηροὺς ἀσώτους καλοῦµεν.
διὸ καὶ φαυλότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· Hence also they are thought the poorest
πολλὰς γὰρ ἅµα κακίας ἔχουσιν. οὐ δὴ characters; for they combine more vices
than one. Therefore the application of the
οἰκείως προσαγορεύονται· βούλεται γὰρ word to them is not its proper use; for a
ἄσωτος εἶναι ὁ ἓν κακὸν ἔχων, [1120a] (1) 'prodigal' means a man who has a single evil
τὸ φθείρειν τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄσωτος γὰρ ὁ δι᾽ quality, that of wasting his substance; since
a prodigal is one who is being ruined by his
αὑτὸν ἀπολλύµενος, δοκεῖ δ᾽ ἀπώλειά
own fault, and the wasting of substance is
τις αὑτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά, thought to be a sort of ruining of oneself,
ὡς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος. life being held to depend on possession of
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substance.
οὕτω δὴ τὴν ἀσωτίαν ἐκδεχόµεθα. ὧν δ᾽ This, then, is the sense in which we take
ἐστὶ χρεία, ἔστι τούτοις χρῆσθαι καὶ εὖ the word 'prodigality'. Now the things that
have a use may be used either well or
καὶ κακῶς· (5) ὁ πλοῦτος δ᾽ ἐστὶ τῶν badly; and riches is a useful thing; and
χρησίµων· ἑκάστῳ δ᾽ ἄριστα χρῆται ὁ everything is used best by the man who has
ἔχων τὴν περὶ τοῦτο ἀρετήν· καὶ πλούτῳ the virtue concerned with it; riches,
δὴ χρήσεται ἄριστα ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τὰ therefore, will be used best by the man who
has the virtue concerned with wealth; and
χρήµατα ἀρετήν· οὗτος δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ this is the liberal man. Now spending and
ἐλευθέριος. χρῆσις δ᾽ εἶναι δοκεῖ giving seem to be the using of wealth;
χρηµάτων δαπάνη καὶ δόσις· ἡ δὲ λῆψις taking and keeping rather the possession of
it. Hence it is more the mark of the liberal
καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ κτῆσις µᾶλλον. διὸ µᾶλλόν
man to give to the right people than to take
(10) ἐστι τοῦ ἐλευθερίου τὸ διδόναι οἷς from the right sources and not to take from
δεῖ ἢ λαµβάνειν ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ µὴ the wrong.
λαµβάνειν ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ.
τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς µᾶλλον τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ For it is more characteristic of virtue to do

εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ πράττειν good than to have good done to one, and
more characteristic to do what is noble than
µᾶλλον ἢ τὰ αἰσχρὰ µὴ πράττειν· οὐκ not to do what is base; and it is not hard to
ἄδηλον δ᾽ ὅτι τῇ µὲν δόσει ἕπεται τὸ εὖ see that giving implies doing good and doing
ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ καλὰ πράττειν, τῇ δὲ λήψει what is noble, and taking implies having
good done to one or not acting basely.
(15) τὸ εὖ πάσχειν ἢ µὴ αἰσχροπραγεῖν.
καὶ ἡ χάρις τῷ διδόντι, οὐ τῷ µὴ And gratitude is felt towards him who gives,
λαµβάνοντι, καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος δὲ µᾶλλον. not towards him who does not take, and
praise also is bestowed more on him. It is
καὶ ῥᾷον δὲ τὸ µὴ λαβεῖν τοῦ δοῦναι· τὸ easier, also, not to take than to give; for
γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἧττον προΐενται µᾶλλον ἢ οὐ men are apter to give away their own too
λαµβάνουσι τὸ ἀλλότριον. little than to take what is another's.
καὶ ἐλευθέριοι δὲ λέγονται οἱ διδόντες· οἱ Givers, too, are called liberal; but those who
δὲ µὴ λαµβάνοντες οὐκ (20) εἰς do not take are not praised for liberality but
rather for justice; while those who take are
ἐλευθεριότητα ἐπαινοῦνται, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ hardly praised at all. And the liberal are
ἧττον εἰς δικαιοσύνην· οἱ δὲ almost the most loved of all virtuous
λαµβάνοντες οὐδ᾽ ἐπαινοῦνται πάνυ. characters, since they are useful; and this
depends on their giving.
φιλοῦνται δὲ σχεδὸν µάλιστα οἱ
ἐλευθέριοι τῶν ἀπ᾽ ἀρετῆς· ὠφέλιµοι
γὰρ, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐν τῇ δόσει.
αἱ δὲ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν πράξεις καλαὶ καὶ τοῦ Now virtuous actions are noble and done
καλοῦ ἕνεκα. καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὖν δώσει for the sake of the noble. Therefore the
liberal man, like other virtuous men, will
τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα (25) καὶ ὀρθῶς· οἷς γὰρ give for the sake of the noble, and rightly;
δεῖ καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅτε, καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα for he will give to the right people, the right
ἕπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει· καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως ἢ amounts, and at the right time, with all the
other qualifications that accompany right
ἀλύπως· τὸ γὰρ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἡδὺ ἢ
giving; and that too with pleasure or
ἄλυπον, ἥκιστα δὲ λυπηρόν. without pain; for that which is virtuous is
pleasant or free from pain-least of all will it
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be painful.
ὁ δὲ διδοὺς οἷς µὴ δεῖ, ἢ µὴ τοῦ καλοῦ But he who gives to the wrong people or not
ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ διά τιν᾽ ἄλλην αἰτίαν, οὐκ for the sake of the noble but for some other
cause, will be called not liberal but by some
ἐλευθέριος ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλος τις ῥηθήσεται. other name. Nor is he liberal who gives with
οὐδ᾽ ὁ λυπηρῶς· (30) µᾶλλον γὰρ ἕλοιτ᾽ pain; for he would prefer the wealth to the
ἂν τὰ χρήµατα τῆς καλῆς πράξεως, noble act, and this is not characteristic of a
τοῦτο δ᾽ οὐκ ἐλευθερίου. liberal man.
οὐδὲ λήψεται δὲ ὅθεν µὴ δεῖ· οὐ γάρ ἐστι But no more will the liberal man take from
τοῦ µὴ τιµῶντος τὰ χρήµατα ἡ τοιαύτη wrong sources; for such taking is not
characteristic of the man who sets no store
λῆψις. οὐκ ἂν εἴη δὲ οὐδ᾽ αἰτητικός· οὐ by wealth. Nor will he be a ready asker; for
γάρ ἐστι τοῦ εὖ ποιοῦντος εὐχερῶς it is not characteristic of a man who confers
εὐεργετεῖσθαι. ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ, λήψεται, benefits to accept them lightly. But he will
take from the right sources, e.g. from his
[1120b] (1) οἷον ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων κτηµάτων,
own possessions, not as something noble
οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, ὅπως but as a necessity, that he may have
ἔχῃ διδόναι. something to give.
οὐδ᾽ ἀµελήσει τῶν ἰδίων, βουλόµενός γε Nor will he neglect his own property, since
διὰ τούτων τισὶν ἐπαρκεῖν. οὐδὲ τοῖς he wishes by means of this to help others.
And he will refrain from giving to anybody
τυχοῦσι δώσει, ἵνα ἔχῃ διδόναι οἷς δεῖ and everybody, that he may have something
καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ καλόν. to give to the right people, at the right time,
and where it is noble to do so.
ἐλευθερίου δ᾽ ἐστὶ (5) σφόδρα καὶ τὸ It is highly characteristic of a liberal man

ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ δόσει, ὥστε also to go to excess in giving, so that he
leaves too little for himself; for it is the
καταλείπειν ἑαυτῷ ἐλάττω· τὸ γὰρ µὴ nature of a liberal man not to look to
βλέπειν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερίου. κατὰ himself. The term 'liberality' is used
τὴν οὐσίαν δ᾽ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης λέγεται· οὐ relatively to a man's substance; for liberality
resides not in the multitude of the gifts but
γὰρ ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν διδοµένων τὸ
in the state of character of the giver, and
ἐλευθέριον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῇ τοῦ διδόντος ἕξει, this is relative to the giver's substance.
αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δίδωσιν.
οὐθὲν δὴ κωλύει (10) ἐλευθεριώτερον There is therefore nothing to prevent the

εἶναι τὸν τὰ ἐλάττω διδόντα, ἐὰν ἀπ᾽ man who gives less from being the more
liberal man, if he has less to give those are
ἐλαττόνων διδῷ. ἐλευθεριώτεροι δὲ εἶναι thought to be more liberal who have not
δοκοῦσιν οἱ µὴ κτησάµενοι ἀλλὰ made their wealth but inherited it; for in the
παραλαβόντες τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄπειροί τε first place they have no experience of want,
γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας, καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσι and secondly all men are fonder of their own
productions, as are parents and poets.
µᾶλλον τὰ αὑτῶν ἔργα, ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς
καὶ οἱ ποιηταί.
πλουτεῖν δ᾽ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὸν (15) It is not easy for the liberal man to be rich,
ἐλευθέριον, µήτε ληπτικὸν ὄντα µήτε since he is not apt either at taking or at
keeping, but at giving away, and does not
φυλακτικόν, προετικὸν δὲ καὶ µὴ value wealth for its own sake but as a
τιµῶντα δι᾽ αὐτὰ τὰ χρήµατα ἀλλ᾽ ἕνεκα means to giving. Hence comes the charge
that is brought against fortune, that those
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τῆς δόσεως. διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται τῇ τύχῃ who deserve riches most get it least.
ὅτι οἱ µάλιστα ἄξιοι ὄντες ἥκιστα
πλουτοῦσιν.
συµβαίνει δ᾽ οὐκ ἀλόγως τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ But it is not unreasonable that it should turn
οἷόν τε χρήµατ᾽ ἔχειν µὴ ἐπιµελόµενον out so; for he cannot have wealth, any more
than anything else, if he does not take pains
ὅπως ἔχῃ, ὥσπερ (20) οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν to have it. Yet he will not give to the wrong
ἄλλων. οὐ µὴν δώσει γε οἷς οὐ δεῖ οὐδ᾽ people nor at the wrong time, and so on; for
ὅτε µὴ δεῖ, οὐδ᾽ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· οὐ he would no longer be acting in accordance
with liberality, and if he spent on these
γὰρ ἂν ἔτι πράττοι κατὰ τὴν
objects he would have nothing to spend on
ἐλευθεριότητα, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα ἀναλώσας the right objects. For, as has been said, he
οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰς ἃ δεῖ ἀναλίσκειν. ὥσπερ is liberal who spends according to his
γὰρ εἴρηται, ἐλευθέριός ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν substance and on the right objects; and he
who exceeds is prodigal.
οὐσίαν δαπανῶν καὶ εἰς ἃ δεῖ· ὁ δ᾽
ὑπερβάλλων (25) ἄσωτος.
διὸ τοὺς τυράννους οὐ λέγοµεν ἀσώτους· Hence we do not call despots prodigal; for it
τὸ γὰρ πλῆθος τῆς κτήσεως οὐ δοκεῖ is thought not easy for them to give and
spend beyond the amount of their
ῥᾴδιον εἶναι ταῖς δόσεσι καὶ ταῖς possessions. Liberality, then, being a mean
δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλειν. τῆς with regard to giving and taking of wealth,
ἐλευθεριότητος δὴ µεσότητος οὔσης the liberal man will both give and spend the
περὶ χρηµάτων δόσιν καὶ λῆψιν, ὁ right amounts and on the right objects, alike
in small things and in great, and that with
ἐλευθέριος καὶ δώσει καὶ δαπανήσει εἰς pleasure; he will also take the right
ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ, ὁµοίως ἐν µικροῖς (30) amounts and from the right sources.
καὶ µεγάλοις, καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως· καὶ
λήψεται δ᾽ ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ.
τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ περὶ ἄµφω οὔσης For, the virtue being a mean with regard to
µεσότητος, ποιήσει ἀµφότερα ὡς δεῖ· both, he will do both as he ought; since this
sort of taking accompanies proper giving,
ἕπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐπιεικεῖ δόσει ἡ τοιαύτη and that which is not of this sort is contrary
λῆψις, ἡ δὲ µὴ τοιαύτη ἐναντία ἐστίν. αἱ to it, and accordingly the giving and taking
µὲν οὖν ἑπόµεναι γίνονται ἅµα ἐν τῷ that accompany each other are present
together in the same man, while the
αὐτῷ, αἱ δ᾽ ἐναντίαι δῆλον ὡς οὔ. [1121a]
contrary kinds evidently are not. But if he
(1) ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ καλῶς happens to spend in a manner contrary to
ἔχον συµβαίνῃ αὐτῷ ἀναλίσκειν, what is right and noble, he will be pained,
λυπήσεται, µετρίως δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· τῆς but moderately and as he ought; for it is the
mark of virtue both to be pleased and to be
ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι
pained at the right objects and in the right
ἐφ᾽ οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. way.
καὶ εὐκοινώνητος δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος Further, the liberal man is easy to deal with
εἰς χρήµατα· (5) δύναται γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι, in money matters; for he can be got the
better of, since he sets no store by money,
µὴ τιµῶν γε τὰ χρήµατα, καὶ µᾶλλον and is more annoyed if he has not spent
ἀχθόµενος εἴ τι δέον µὴ ἀνάλωσεν ἢ something that he ought than pained if he
λυπούµενος εἰ µὴ δέον τι ἀνάλωσεν, καὶ has spent something that he ought not, and
does not agree with the saying of
τῷ Σιµωνίδῃ οὐκ ἀρεσκόµενος.
Simonides.
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ὁ δ᾽ ἄσωτος καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαµαρτάνει· The prodigal errs in these respects also;
οὔτε γὰρ ἥδεται ἐφ᾽ οἷς δεῖ οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ for he is neither pleased nor pained at the
right things or in the right way; this will be
οὔτε λυπεῖται· ἔσται δὲ προϊοῦσι more evident as we go on. We have said
φανερώτερον. (10) εἴρηται δὴ ἡµῖν ὅτι that prodigality and meanness are excesses
ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶν ἡ ἀσωτία and deficiencies, and in two things, in giving
καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία, καὶ ἐν δυσίν, ἐν δόσει and in taking; for we include spending under
giving. Now prodigality exceeds in giving
καὶ λήψει· καὶ τὴν δαπάνην γὰρ εἰς τὴν and not taking, while meanness falls short
δόσιν τίθεµεν. ἡ µὲν οὖν ἀσωτία τῷ in giving, and exceeds in taking, except in
διδόναι καὶ µὴ λαµβάνειν ὑπερβάλλει, small things.
τῷ δὲ λαµβάνειν ἐλλείπει, ἡ δ᾽
ἀνελευθερία τῷ διδόναι µὲν ἐλλείπει,
(15) τῷ λαµβάνειν δ᾽ ὑπερβάλλει, πλὴν
ἐν µικροῖς.
τὰ µὲν οὖν τῆς ἀσωτίας οὐ πάνυ The characteristics of prodigality are not
συνδυάζεται· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον µηδαµόθεν often combined; for it is not easy to give to
all if you take from none; private persons
λαµβάνοντα πᾶσι διδόναι· ταχέως γὰρ soon exhaust their substance with giving,
ἐπιλείπει ἡ οὐσία τοὺς ἰδιώτας διδόντας, and it is to these that the name of prodigals
οἵπερ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἄσωτοι εἶναι· ἐπεὶ ὅ is applied- though a man of this sort would
seem to be in no small degree better than a
γε τοιοῦτος δόξειεν ἂν οὐ µικρῷ βελτίων
mean man.
εἶναι (20) τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου.
εὐίατός τε γάρ ἐστι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας For he is easily cured both by age and by
καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ µέσον poverty, and thus he may move towards the
middle state. For he has the characteristics
δύναται ἐλθεῖν. ἔχει γὰρ τὰ τοῦ of the liberal man, since he both gives and
ἐλευθερίου· καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ οὐ refrains from taking, though he does neither
λαµβάνει, οὐδέτερον δ᾽ ὡς δεῖ οὐδ᾽ εὖ. of these in the right manner or well.
εἰ δὴ τοῦτο ἐθισθείη ἤ πως ἄλλως Therefore if he were brought to do so by

µεταβάλοι, εἴη ἂν ἐλευθέριος· δώσει γὰρ habituation or in some other way, he would
be liberal; for he will then give to the right
οἷς δεῖ, (25) καὶ οὐ λήψεται ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. people, and will not take from the wrong
διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι φαῦλος τὸ ἦθος· sources. This is why he is thought to have
οὐ γὰρ µοχθηροῦ οὐδ᾽ ἀγεννοῦς τὸ not a bad character; it is not the mark of a
wicked or ignoble man to go to excess in
ὑπερβάλλειν διδόντα καὶ µὴ
giving and not taking, but only of a foolish
λαµβάνοντα, ἠλιθίου δέ. one.
ὁ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἄσωτος πολὺ The man who is prodigal in this way is
δοκεῖ βελτίων τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου εἶναι διά thought much better than the mean man
both for the aforesaid reasons and because
τε τὰ εἰρηµένα, καὶ ὅτι ὃ µὲν ὠφελεῖ he benefits many while the other benefits
πολλούς, ὃ δὲ οὐθένα, (30) ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ no one, not even himself.
αὑτόν.
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ἀλλ᾽ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀσώτων, καθάπερ But most prodigal people, as has been
εἴρηται, καὶ λαµβάνουσιν ὅθεν µὴ δεῖ, said, also take from the wrong sources, and
are in this respect mean. They become apt
καὶ εἰσὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀνελεύθεροι. to take because they wish to spend and
ληπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι cannot do this easily; for their possessions
µὲν ἀναλίσκειν, εὐχερῶς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν soon run short. Thus they are forced to
µὴ δύνασθαι· ταχὺ γὰρ ἐπιλείπει αὐτοὺς provide means from some other source.
τὰ ὑπάρχοντα. ἀναγκάζονται οὖν

ἑτέρωθεν πορίζειν.
[1121b] (1) ἅµα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ µηδὲν τοῦ At the same time, because they care
καλοῦ φροντίζειν ὀλιγώρως καὶ nothing for honour, they take recklessly and
from any source; for they have an appetite
πάντοθεν λαµβάνουσιν· διδόναι γὰρ for giving, and they do not mind how or
ἐπιθυµοῦσι, τὸ δὲ πῶς ἢ πόθεν οὐδὲν from what source. Hence also their giving is
αὐτοῖς διαφέρει. διόπερ οὐδ᾽ ἐλευθέριοι not liberal; for it is not noble, nor does it
aim at nobility, nor is it done in the right
αἱ δόσεις αὐτῶν εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ καλαί, οὐδὲ
way; sometimes they make rich those who
τούτου (5) ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ· ἀλλ᾽ ἐνίοτε should be poor, and will give nothing to
οὓς δεῖ πένεσθαι, τούτους πλουσίους people of respectable character, and much
ποιοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς µὲν µετρίοις τὰ ἤθη to flatterers or those who provide them with
some other pleasure.
οὐδὲν ἂν δοῖεν, τοῖς δὲ κόλαξιν ἤ τιν᾽
ἄλλην ἡδονὴν πορίζουσι πολλά.
διὸ καὶ ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· Hence also most of them are self-indulgent;
εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες καὶ εἰς τὰς for they spend lightly and waste money on
their indulgences, and incline towards
ἀκολασίας δαπανηροί εἰσι, καὶ διὰ τὸ µὴ pleasures because they do not live with a
πρὸς (10) τὸ καλὸν ζῆν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς view to what is noble.
ἀποκλίνουσιν.
ὁ µὲν οὖν ἄσωτος ἀπαιδαγώγητος The prodigal man, then, turns into what
γενόµενος εἰς ταῦτα µεταβαίνει, τυχὼν we have described if he is left untutored,
but if he is treated with care he will arrive
δ᾽ ἐπιµελείας εἰς τὸ µέσον καὶ εἰς τὸ at the intermediate and right state. But
δέον ἀφίκοιτ᾽ ἄν. ἡ δ᾽ ἀνελευθερία meanness is both incurable (for old age and
ἀνίατός τ᾽ ἐστίν (δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας καὶ every disability is thought to make men
mean) and more innate in men than
πᾶσα ἀδυναµία ἀνελευθέρους ποιεῖν),
prodigality; for most men are fonder of
καὶ συµφυέστερον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις (15) getting money than of giving. It also
τῆς ἀσωτίας· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ extends widely, and is multiform, since
φιλοχρήµατοι µᾶλλον ἢ δοτικοί. καὶ there seem to be many kinds of meanness.
διατείνει δ᾽ ἐπὶ πολύ, καὶ πολυειδές
ἐστιν· πολλοὶ γὰρ τρόποι δοκοῦσι τῆς
ἀνελευθερίας εἶναι.
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ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ οὖσα, τῇ τ᾽ ἐλλείψει τῆς For it consists in two things, deficiency in
δόσεως καὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς λήψεως, οὐ giving and excess in taking, and is not found
complete in all men but is sometimes
πᾶσιν ὁλόκληρος παραγίνεται, ἀλλ᾽ divided; some men go to excess in taking,
ἐνίοτε χωρίζεται, (20) καὶ οἳ µὲν τῇ λήψει others fall short in giving.
ὑπερβάλλουσιν, οἳ δὲ τῇ δόσει
ἐλλείπουσιν.
οἱ µὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις Those who are called by such names as
προσηγορίαις οἷον φειδωλοὶ γλίσχροι 'miserly', 'close', 'stingy', all fall short in
giving, but do not covet the possessions of
κίµβικες, πάντες τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσι, others nor wish to get them. In some this is
τῶν δ᾽ ἀλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐφίενται οὐδὲ due to a sort of honesty and avoidance of
βούλονται λαµβάνειν, οἳ µὲν διά τινα what is disgraceful (for some seem, or at
least profess, to hoard their money for this
ἐπιείκειαν καὶ εὐλάβειαν τῶν αἰσχρῶν
reason, that they may not some day be
(25) (δοκοῦσι γὰρ ἔνιοι ἢ φασί γε διὰ forced to do something disgraceful; to this
τοῦτο φυλάττειν, ἵνα µή ποτ᾽ class belong the cheeseparer and every one
ἀναγκασθῶσιν αἰσχρόν τι πρᾶξαι· of the sort; he is so called from his excess of
unwillingness to give anything); while
τούτων δὲ καὶ ὁ κυµινοπρίστης καὶ πᾶς ὁ others again keep their hands off the
τοιοῦτος· ὠνόµασται δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς property of others from fear, on the ground
ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ µηδὲν ἂν δοῦναι)· οἳ δ᾽ αὖ that it is not easy, if one takes the property
διὰ φόβον ἀπέχονται τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ὡς of others oneself, to avoid having one's own
taken by them; they are therefore content
οὐ ῥᾴδιον αὐτὸν µὲν τὰ ἑτέρων (30) neither to take nor to give.
λαµβάνειν, τὰ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἑτέρους µή·
ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ µήτε λαµβάνειν
µήτε διδόναι.
οἳ δ᾽ αὖ κατὰ τὴν λῆψιν ὑπερβάλλουσι Others again exceed in respect of taking

τῷ πάντοθεν λαµβάνειν καὶ πᾶν, οἷον οἱ by taking anything and from any source,
e.g. those who ply sordid trades, pimps and
τὰς ἀνελευθέρους ἐργασίας all such people, and those who lend small
ἐργαζόµενοι, πορνοβοσκοὶ καὶ πάντες οἱ sums and at high rates. For all of these take
τοιοῦτοι, καὶ τοκισταὶ κατὰ µικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ more than they ought and from wrong
sources. What is common to them is
πολλῷ. [1122a] (1) πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ὅθεν
evidently sordid love of gain; they all put up
οὐ δεῖ λαµβάνουσι, καὶ ὁπόσον οὐ δεῖ. with a bad name for the sake of gain, and
κοινὸν δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἡ αἰσχροκέρδεια little gain at that.
φαίνεται· πάντες γὰρ ἕνεκα κέρδους, καὶ
τούτου µικροῦ, ὀνείδη ὑποµένουσιν.
τοὺς γὰρ τὰ µεγάλα µὴ ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ For those who make great gains but from
λαµβάνοντας, µηδὲ ἃ δεῖ, οὐ (5) λέγοµεν wrong sources, and not the right gains, e.g.
despots when they sack cities and spoil
ἀνελευθέρους, οἷον τοὺς τυράννους temples, we do not call mean but rather
πόλεις πορθοῦντας καὶ ἱερὰ συλῶντας, wicked, impious, and unjust.
ἀλλὰ πονηροὺς µᾶλλον καὶ ἀσεβεῖς καὶ
ἀδίκους.
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ὁ µέντοι κυβευτὴς καὶ ὁ λωποδύτης καὶ ὁ But the gamester and the footpad (and the
λῃστὴς τῶν ἀνελευθέρων εἰσίν· highwayman) belong to the class of the
mean, since they have a sordid love of gain.
αἰσχροκερδεῖς γάρ. κέρδους γὰρ ἕνεκα For it is for gain that both of them ply their
ἀµφότεροι πραγµατεύονται καὶ ὀνείδη craft and endure the disgrace of it, and the
ὑποµένουσιν, καὶ (10) οἳ µὲν κινδύνους one faces the greatest dangers for the sake
of the booty, while the other makes gain
τοὺς µεγίστους ἕνεκα τοῦ λήµµατος, οἳ
from his friends, to whom he ought to be
δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων κερδαίνουσιν, οἷς δεῖ giving. Both, then, since they are willing to
διδόναι. ἀµφότεροι δὴ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ make gain from wrong sources, are sordid
κερδαίνειν βουλόµενοι αἰσχροκερδεῖς· lovers of gain; therefore all such forms of
taking are mean.
καὶ πᾶσαι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦται λήψεις
ἀνελεύθεροι.
εἰκότως δὲ τῇ ἐλευθεριότητι And it is natural that meanness is

ἀνελευθερία ἐναντίον λέγεται· µεῖζόν τε described as the contrary of liberality; for
not only is it a greater evil than prodigality,
γάρ ἐστι κακὸν τῆς (15) ἀσωτίας, καὶ but men err more often in this direction
µᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην ἁµαρτάνουσιν ἢ than in the way of prodigality as we have
κατὰ τὴν λεχθεῖσαν ἀσωτίαν. described it.
περὶ µὲν οὖν ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ τῶν So much, then, for liberality and the
ἀντικειµένων κακιῶν τοσαῦτ᾽ εἰρήσθω. opposed vices.
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Αριστοτέλους Ηθικά Νικοµάχεια, IV 2 http://www.mikrosapoplous.gr/aristotle/nicom4b.htm
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Βιβλίο IV, 2
(1122a15-1123a30)
2. Magnificence, vulgarity,
niggardliness.
<<< >>>
δόξαι δ᾽ ἂν ἀκόλουθον εἶναι καὶ περὶ It would seem proper to discuss

µεγαλοπρεπείας διελθεῖν. δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ magnificence next. For this also seems to be
a virtue concerned with wealth; but it does
αὐτὴ περὶ χρήµατά τις ἀρετὴ εἶναι· (20) not like liberality extend to all the actions
οὐχ ὥσπερ δ᾽ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης διατείνει that are concerned with wealth, but only to
περὶ πάσας τὰς ἐν χρήµασι πράξεις, those that involve expenditure; and in these
it surpasses liberality in scale.
ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς δαπανηρὰς µόνον· ἐν
τούτοις δ᾽ ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος
µεγέθει.
καθάπερ γὰρ τοὔνοµα αὐτὸ For, as the name itself suggests, it is a

ὑποσηµαίνει, ἐν µεγέθει πρέπουσα fitting expenditure involving largeness of
scale. But the scale is relative; for the
δαπάνη ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ µέγεθος πρός τι· οὐ expense of equipping a trireme is not the
γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δαπάνηµα τριηράρχῳ (25) same as that of heading a sacred embassy.
καὶ ἀρχιθεωρῷ. τὸ πρέπον δὴ πρὸς It is what is fitting, then, in relation to the
agent, and to the circumstances and the
αὐτόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ ὅ. ὁ δ᾽ ἐν µικροῖς
object. The man who in small or middling
ἢ ἐν µετρίοις κατ᾽ ἀξίαν δαπανῶν οὐ things spends according to the merits of the
λέγεται µεγαλοπρεπής, οἷον τὸ case is not called magnificent (e.g. the man
who can say 'many a gift I gave the
πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτῃ, [1] wanderer'), but only the man who does so in
great things.
ἀλλ᾽ ὁ ἐν µεγάλοις οὕτως.
ὁ µὲν γὰρ µεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐλευθέριος, ὁ For the magnificent man is liberal, but the
δ᾽ ἐλευθέριος οὐδὲν µᾶλλον liberal man is not necessarily magnificent.
The deficiency of this state of character is
µεγαλοπρεπής. τῆς (30) τοιαύτης δ᾽ called niggardliness, the excess vulgarity,
ἕξεως ἡ µὲν ἔλλειψις µικροπρέπεια lack of taste, and the like, which do not go
καλεῖται, ἡ δ᾽ ὑπερβολὴ βαναυσία καὶ to excess in the amount spent on right
objects, but by showy expenditure in the
ἀπειροκαλία καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, οὐχ
wrong circumstances and the wrong
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ὑπερβάλλουσαι τῷ µεγέθει περὶ ἃ δεῖ, manner; we shall speak of these vices later.
ἀλλ᾽ ἐν οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ
λαµπρυνόµεναι· ὕστερον δ᾽ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν
ἐροῦµεν.
ὁ δὲ µεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐπιστήµονι ἔοικεν· The magnificent man is like an artist; for

τὸ πρέπον γὰρ (35) δύναται θεωρῆσαι he can see what is fitting and spend large
sums tastefully. For, as we said at the
καὶ δαπανῆσαι µεγάλα ἐµµελῶς. [1122b] begining, a state of character is determined
(1) ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴποµεν, ἡ ἕξις by its activities and by its objects. Now the
ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὁρίζεται, καὶ ὧν ἐστίν. αἱ expenses of the magnificent man are large
δὴ τοῦ µεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι µεγάλαι and fitting. Such, therefore, are also his
results; for thus there will be a great
καὶ πρέπουσαι. τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα· expenditure and one that is fitting to its
οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται µέγα δαπάνηµα καὶ result.
πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ.
ὥστε τὸ µὲν ἔργον τῆς δαπάνης (5) ἄξιον Therefore the result should be worthy of the
δεῖ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἢ expense, and the expense should be worthy
of the result, or should even exceed it. And
καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν. δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ the magnificent man will spend such sums
τοιαῦτα ὁ µεγαλοπρεπὴς τοῦ καλοῦ for honour's sake; for this is common to the
ἕνεκα· κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς. virtues. And further he will do so gladly and
lavishly; for nice calculation is a niggardly
καὶ ἔτι ἡδέως καὶ προετικῶς· ἡ γὰρ
thing. And he will consider how the result
ἀκριβολογία µικροπρεπές. καὶ πῶς can be made most beautiful and most
κάλλιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον, σκέψαιτ᾽ becoming rather than for how much it can
ἂν µᾶλλον ἢ πόσου καὶ (10) πῶς be produced and how it can be produced
most cheaply.
ἐλαχίστου.
ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν It is necessary, then, that the magnificent

µεγαλοπρεπῆ εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ὁ man be also liberal. For the liberal man also
will spend what he ought and as he ought;
ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· and it is in these matters that the greatness
ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ µέγα τοῦ implied in the name of the magnificent
µεγαλοπρεποῦς, οἷον µέγεθος, περὶ man-his bigness, as it were-is manifested,
since liberality is concerned with these
ταῦτα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης, καὶ
matters; and at an equal expense he will
ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει produce a more magnificent work of art.
µεγαλοπρεπέστερον.
οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ (15) ἀρετὴ κτήµατος καὶ For a possession and a work of art have not
ἔργου. κτῆµα µὲν γὰρ τὸ πλείστου ἄξιον the same excellence. The most valuable
possession is that which is worth most, e.g.
τιµιώτατον, οἷον χρυσός, ἔργον δὲ τὸ gold, but the most valuable work of art is
µέγα καὶ καλόν (τοῦ γὰρ τοιούτου ἡ that which is great and beautiful (for the
θεωρία θαυµαστή, τὸ δὲ µεγαλοπρεπὲς contemplation of such a work inspires
admiration, and so does magnificence); and
θαυµαστόν)· καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετή,
a work has an excellence-viz.
µεγαλοπρέπεια, ἐν µεγέθει. magnificence-which involves magnitude.
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ἔστι δὲ τῶν δαπανηµάτων οἷα λέγοµεν Magnificence is an attribute of expenditures

τὰ τίµια, οἷον τὰ (20) περὶ θεούς, of the kind which we call honourable, e.g.
those connected with the gods-votive
ἀναθήµατα καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι, offerings, buildings, and sacrifices-and
ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ πᾶν τὸ δαιµόνιον, καὶ similarly with any form of religious worship,
ὅσα πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτίµητά ἐστιν, and all those that are proper objects of
public-spirited ambition, as when people
οἷον εἴ που χορηγεῖν οἴονται δεῖν
think they ought to equip a chorus or a
λαµπρῶς ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ἑστιᾶν τὴν trireme, or entertain the city, in a brilliant
πόλιν. way.
ἐν ἅπασι δ᾽ ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν But in all cases, as has been said, we have
πράττοντα ἀναφέρεται τὸ τίς (25) ὢν καὶ regard to the agent as well and ask who he
is and what means he has; for the
τίνων ὑπαρχόντων· ἄξια γὰρ δεῖ τούτων expenditure should be worthy of his means,
εἶναι, καὶ µὴ µόνον τῷ ἔργῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ and suit not only the result but also the
ποιοῦντι πρέπειν. διὸ πένης µὲν οὐκ ἂν producer. Hence a poor man cannot be
magnificent, since he has not the means
εἴη µεγαλοπρεπής· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀφ᾽ ὧν
with which to spend large sums fittingly;
πολλὰ δαπανήσει πρεπόντως· ὁ δ᾽ and he who tries is a fool, since he spends
ἐπιχειρῶν ἠλίθιος· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ beyond what can be expected of him and
καὶ τὸ δέον, κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς. what is proper, but it is right expenditure
that is virtuous.
πρέπει (30) δὲ [καὶ] οἷς τοιαῦτα But great expenditure is becoming to those
προϋπάρχει δι᾽ αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν προγόνων ἢ who have suitable means to start with,
acquired by their own efforts or from
ὧν αὐτοῖς µέτεστιν, καὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι ancestors or connexions, and to people of
καὶ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· πάντα high birth or reputation, and so on; for all
γὰρ ταῦτα µέγεθος ἔχει καὶ ἀξίωµα. these things bring with them greatness and
prestige.
µάλιστα µὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος ὁ Primarily, then, the magnificent man is of

µεγαλοπρεπής, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις this sort, and magnificence is shown in
expenditures of this sort, as has been said;
δαπανήµασιν ἡ µεγαλοπρέπεια, ὥσπερ for these are the greatest and most
(35) εἴρηται· µέγιστα γὰρ καὶ ἐντιµότατα· honourable. Of private occasions of
τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσα εἰσάπαξ γίνεται, expenditure the most suitable are those that
[1123a] (1) οἷον γάµος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον, take place once for all, e.g. a wedding or
anything of the kind, or anything that
καὶ εἰ περί τι ἡ πᾶσα πόλις σπουδάζει ἢ interests the whole city or the people of
οἱ ἐν ἀξιώµατι, καὶ περὶ ξένων δὲ position in it, and also the receiving of
ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολάς, καὶ δωρεὰς foreign guests and the sending of them on
their way, and gifts and counter-gifts; for
καὶ ἀντιδωρεάς· οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτὸν
the magnificent man spends not on himself
δαπανηρὸς ὁ µεγαλοπρεπὴς ἀλλ᾽ (5) εἰς but on public objects, and gifts bear some
τὰ κοινά, τὰ δὲ δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθήµασιν resemblance to votive offerings.
ἔχει τι ὅµοιον.
µεγαλοπρεποῦς δὲ καὶ οἶκον A magnificent man will also furnish his

κατασκευάσασθαι πρεπόντως τῷ house suitably to his wealth (for even a
house is a sort of public ornament), and will
πλούτῳ (κόσµος γάρ τις καὶ οὗτος), καὶ spend by preference on those works that are
περὶ ταῦτα µᾶλλον δαπανᾶν ὅσα lasting (for these are the most beautiful),
πολυχρόνια τῶν ἔργων (κάλλιστα γὰρ and on every class of things he will spend
what is becoming; for the same things are
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ταῦτα), καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τὸ πρέπον· οὐ not suitable for gods and for men, nor in a
γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἁρµόζει (10) θεοῖς καὶ temple and in a tomb.
ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ᾽ ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ τάφῳ.
καὶ ἐπεὶ τῶν δαπανηµάτων ἕκαστον And since each expenditure may be great of
µέγα ἐν τῷ γένει, καὶ its kind, and what is most magnificent
absolutely is great expenditure on a great
µεγαλοπρεπέστατον <ἁπλῶς> µὲν τὸ ἐν object, but what is magnificent here is what
µεγάλῳ µέγα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν τούτοις is great in these circumstances, and
µέγα, καὶ διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ µέγα greatness in the work differs from greatness
in the expense (for the most beautiful ball
τοῦ ἐν τῷ δαπανήµατι· σφαῖρα µὲν γὰρ ἡ
or bottle is magnificent as a gift to a child,
καλλίστη ἢ λήκυθος µεγαλοπρέπειαν but the price of it is small and
(15) ἔχει παιδικοῦ δώρου, ἡ δὲ τούτου mean),-therefore it is characteristic of the
τιµὴ µικρὸν καὶ ἀνελεύθερον· διὰ τοῦτό magnificent man, whatever kind of result he
is producing, to produce it magnificently (for
ἐστι τοῦ µεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ such a result is not easily surpassed) and to
γένει, µεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν (τὸ γὰρ make it worthy of the expenditure.
τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐπέρβλητον) καὶ ἔχον κατ᾽
ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήµατος.
τοιοῦτος µὲν οὖν ὁ µεγαλοπρεπής· ὁ δ᾽ Such, then, is the magnificent man; the
ὑπερβάλλων καὶ βάναυσος τῷ (20) παρὰ man who goes to excess and is vulgar
exceeds, as has been said, by spending
τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει, ὥσπερ beyond what is right. For on small objects of
εἴρηται. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς µικροῖς τῶν expenditure he spends much and displays a
δαπανηµάτων πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ tasteless showiness; e.g. he gives a club
dinner on the scale of a wedding banquet,
λαµπρύνεται παρὰ µέλος, οἷον
and when he provides the chorus for a
ἐρανιστὰς γαµικῶς ἑστιῶν, καὶ comedy he brings them on to the stage in
κωµῳδοῖς χορηγῶν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ purple, as they do at Megara.
πορφύραν εἰσφέρων, ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαροῖ.
καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσει οὐ τοῦ (25) And all such things he will do not for
καλοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλοῦτον honour's sake but to show off his wealth,
and because he thinks he is admired for
ἐπιδεικνύµενος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἰόµενος these things, and where he ought to spend
θαυµάζεσθαι, καὶ οὗ µὲν δεῖ πολλὰ much he spends little and where little,
ἀναλῶσαι, ὀλίγα δαπανῶν, οὗ δ᾽ ὀλίγα, much. The niggardly man on the other hand
πολλά. ὁ δὲ µικροπρεπὴς περὶ πάντα will fall short in everything, and after
spending the greatest sums will spoil the
ἐλλείψει, καὶ τὰ µέγιστα ἀναλώσας ἐν beauty of the result for a trifle, and
µικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ, καὶ ὅ τι ἂν ποιῇ whatever he is doing he will hesitate and
µέλλων καὶ (30) σκοπῶν πῶς ἂν consider how he may spend least, and
lament even that, and think he is doing
ἐλάχιστον ἀναλώσαι, καὶ ταῦτ᾽
everything on a bigger scale than he ought.
ὀδυρόµενος, καὶ πάντ᾽ οἰόµενος µείζω
ποιεῖν ἢ δεῖ.
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εἰσὶ µὲν οὖν αἱ ἕξεις αὗται κακίαι, οὐ µὴν These states of character, then, are
ὀνείδη γ᾽ ἐπιφέρουσι διὰ τὸ µήτε vices; yet they do not bring disgrace
because they are neither harmful to one's
βλαβεραὶ τῷ πέλας εἶναι µήτε λίαν neighbour nor very unseemly.
ἀσχήµονες.
[1] Hom. Od. ρ 420
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Βιβλίο IV, 3
(1122b35-1125a35)
D. Virtues concerned with

honour.
3. Pride, vanity, humility.
<<< >>>
ἡ δὲ µεγαλοψυχία περὶ µεγάλα µὲν καὶ Pride seems even from its name to be
ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόµατος (35) ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ concerned with great things; what sort of
great things, is the first question we must
ποῖα δ᾽ ἐστὶ πρῶτον λάβωµεν· [1123b] (1) try to answer. It makes no difference
διαφέρει δ᾽ οὐδὲν τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ whether we consider the state of character
τὴν ἕξιν σκοπεῖν. δοκεῖ δὴ µεγαλόψυχος or the man characterized by it. Now the
εἶναι ὁ µεγάλων αὑτὸν ἀξιῶν ἄξιος ὤν· ὁ man is thought to be proud who thinks
himself worthy of great things, being worthy
γὰρ µὴ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν αὐτὸ ποιῶν ἠλίθιος, of them; for he who does so beyond his
τῶν δὲ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν οὐδεὶς ἠλίθιος οὐδ᾽ deserts is a fool, but no virtuous man is
ἀνόητος. foolish or silly.
µεγαλόψυχος µὲν οὖν ὁ εἰρηµένος. (5) ὁ The proud man, then, is the man we have
γὰρ µικρῶν ἄξιος καὶ τούτων ἀξιῶν described. For he who is worthy of little and
thinks himself worthy of little is temperate,
ἑαυτὸν σώφρων, µεγαλόψυχος δ᾽ οὔ· ἐν but not proud; for pride implies greatness,
µεγέθει γὰρ ἡ µεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ as beauty implies a goodsized body, and
τὸ κάλλος ἐν µεγάλῳ σώµατι, οἱ µικροὶ little people may be neat and
well-proportioned but cannot be beautiful.
δ᾽ ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύµµετροι, καλοὶ δ᾽ οὔ. ὁ
On the other hand, he who thinks himself
δὲ µεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν ἀνάξιος ὢν worthy of great things, being unworthy of
χαῦνος· ὁ δὲ µειζόνων ἢ ἄξιος οὐ πᾶς them, is vain; though not every one who
χαῦνος. ὁ δ᾽ ἐλαττόνων (10) ἢ ἄξιος thinks himself worthy of more than he really
is worthy of in vain. The man who thinks
µικρόψυχος, ἐάν τε µεγάλων ἐάν τε himself worthy of worthy of less than he is
µετρίων, ἐάν τε καὶ µικρῶν ἄξιος ὢν ἔτι really worthy of is unduly humble, whether
ἐλαττόνων αὑτὸν ἀξιοῖ. his deserts be great or moderate, or his
deserts be small but his claims yet smaller.
καὶ µάλιστ᾽ ἂν δόξειεν ὁ µεγάλων ἄξιος· And the man whose deserts are great would
τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ µὴ τοσούτων ἦν seem most unduly humble; for what would
he have done if they had been less? The
ἄξιος; ἔστι δὴ ὁ µεγαλόψυχος τῷ µὲν proud man, then, is an extreme in respect of
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µεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ µέσος· τοῦ the greatness of his claims, but a mean in
γὰρ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν αὑτὸν (15) ἀξιοῖ· οἳ δ᾽ respect of the rightness of them; for he
claims what is accordance with his merits,
ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν. while the others go to excess or fall short.
εἰ δὴ µεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἄξιος ὤν, καὶ If, then, he deserves and claims great
µάλιστα τῶν µεγίστων, περὶ ἓν µάλιστ᾽ things, and above all the great things, he
will be concerned with one thing in
ἂν εἴη. ἡ δ᾽ ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς particular. Desert is relative to external
ἀγαθά· µέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἂν θείηµεν ὃ goods; and the greatest of these, we should
τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέµοµεν, καὶ οὗ µάλιστ᾽ say, is that which we render to the gods,
ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώµατι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς and which people of position most aim at,
and which is the prize appointed for the
καλλίστοις (20) ἆθλον· τοιοῦτον δ᾽ ἡ τιµή· noblest deeds; and this is honour; that is
µέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς surely the greatest of external goods.
ἀγαθῶν· περὶ τιµὰς δὴ καὶ ἀτιµίας ὁ Honours and dishonours, therefore, are the
objects with respect to which the proud man
µεγαλόψυχός ἐστιν ὡς δεῖ. is as he should be.
καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται οἱ And even apart from argument it is with
µεγαλόψυχοι περὶ τιµὴν εἶναι· τιµῆς γὰρ honour that proud men appear to be
concerned; for it is honour that they chiefly
µάλιστα [οἱ µεγάλοι] ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς, claim, but in accordance with their deserts.
κατ᾽ ἀξίαν δέ. ὁ δὲ µικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει The unduly humble man falls short both in
καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν (25) καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ comparison with his own merits and in
comparison with the proud man's claims.
µεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωµα. ὁ δὲ χαῦνος πρὸς
The vain man goes to excess in comparison
ἑαυτὸν µὲν ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ µὴν τόν γε with his own merits, but does not exceed
µεγαλόψυχον. the proud man's claims.
ὁ δὲ µεγαλόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν µεγίστων Now the proud man, since he deserves
ἄξιος, ἄριστος ἂν εἴη· µείζονος γὰρ ἀεὶ ὁ most, must be good in the highest degree;
for the better man always deserves more,
βελτίων ἄξιος, καὶ µεγίστων ὁ ἄριστος. and the best man most. Therefore the truly
τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα µεγαλόψυχον δεῖ proud man must be good. And greatness in
ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. καὶ (30) δόξειεν <ἂν> εἶναι every virtue would seem to be characteristic
of a proud man. And it would be most
µεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῃ ἀρετῇ µέγα.
unbecoming for a proud man to fly from
οὐδαµῶς τ᾽ ἂν ἁρµόζοι µεγαλοψύχῳ danger, swinging his arms by his sides, or to
φεύγειν παρασείσαντι, οὐδ᾽ ἀδικεῖν· wrong another; for to what end should he
τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα πράξει αἰσχρὰ ᾧ γ᾽ do disgraceful acts, he to whom nothing is
great?
οὐδὲν µέγα;
καθ᾽ ἕκαστα δ᾽ ἐπισκοποῦντι πάµπαν If we consider him point by point we shall

γελοῖος φαίνοιτ᾽ ἂν ὁ µεγαλόψυχος µὴ see the utter absurdity of a proud man who
is not good. Nor, again, would he be worthy
ἀγαθὸς ὤν. οὐκ εἴη δ᾽ ἂν οὐδὲ τιµῆς of honour if he were bad; for honour is the
ἄξιος (35) φαῦλος ὤν· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ prize of virtue, and it is to the good that it is
ἆθλον ἡ τιµή, καὶ ἀπονέµεται τοῖς rendered.
ἀγαθοῖς.
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[1124a] (1) ἔοικε µὲν οὖν ἡ µεγαλοψυχία Pride, then, seems to be a sort of crown of
οἷον κόσµος τις εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν· the virtues; for it makes them greater, and
it is not found without them. Therefore it is
µείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνεται hard to be truly proud; for it is impossible
ἄνευ ἐκείνων. διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ without nobility and goodness of character.
ἀληθείᾳ µεγαλόψυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν
τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας.
µάλιστα (5) µὲν οὖν περὶ τιµὰς καὶ It is chiefly with honours and dishonours,
ἀτιµίας ὁ µεγαλόψυχός ἐστι· καὶ ἐπὶ µὲν then, that the proud man is concerned; and
at honours that are great and conferred by
ταῖς µεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων good men he will be moderately Pleased,
µετρίως ἡσθήσεται, ὡς τῶν οἰκείων thinking that he is coming by his own or
τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ ἐλαττόνων· ἀρετῆς γὰρ even less than his own; for there can be no
honour that is worthy of perfect virtue, yet
παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία τιµή, οὐ
he will at any rate accept it since they have
µὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἀποδέξεταί γε τῷ µὴ ἔχειν nothing greater to bestow on him; but
αὐτοὺς µείζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέµειν· (10) τῆς honour from casual people and on trifling
δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ ἐπὶ µικροῖς grounds he will utterly despise, since it is
not this that he deserves, and dishonour
πάµπαν ὀλιγωρήσει· οὐ γὰρ τούτων too, since in his case it cannot be just.
ἄξιος· ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιµίας· οὐ γὰρ
ἔσται δικαίως περὶ αὐτόν.
µάλιστα µὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὁ In the first place, then, as has been said,
µεγαλόψυχος περὶ τιµάς, οὐ µὴν ἀλλὰ the proud man is concerned with honours;
yet he will also bear himself with
καὶ περὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ moderation towards wealth and power and
πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν (15) all good or evil fortune, whatever may befall
µετρίως ἕξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὔτ᾽ him, and will be neither over-joyed by good
fortune nor over-pained by evil.
εὐτυχῶν περιχαρὴς ἔσται οὔτ᾽ ἀτυχῶν
περίλυπος.
οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιµὴν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς For not even towards honour does he bear
µέγιστον ὄν. αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὁ himself as if it were a very great thing.
Power and wealth are desirable for the sake
πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν τιµήν ἐστιν αἱρετά· οἱ of honour (at least those who have them
γοῦν ἔχοντες αὐτὰ τιµᾶσθαι δι᾽ αὐτῶν wish to get honour by means of them); and
βούλονται· ᾧ δὲ καὶ ἡ τιµὴ µικρόν ἐστι, for him to whom even honour is a little
τούτῳ καὶ τἆλλα. (20) διὸ ὑπερόπται thing the others must be so too. Hence
proud men are thought to be disdainful.
δοκοῦσιν εἶναι.
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήµατα The goods of fortune also are thought to

συµβάλλεσθαι πρὸς µεγαλοψυχίαν. οἱ contribute towards pride. For men who are
well-born are thought worthy of honour, and
γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιµῆς καὶ οἱ so are those who enjoy power or wealth; for
δυναστεύοντες ἢ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν they are in a superior position, and
ὑπεροχῇ γάρ, τὸ δ᾽ ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν everything that has a superiority in
something good is held in greater honour.
ἐντιµότερον. διὸ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα
Hence even such things make men prouder;
µεγαλοψυχοτέρους ποιεῖ· τιµῶνται γὰρ for they are honoured by some for having
ὑπὸ τινῶν· (25) κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν δ᾽ ὁ them; but in truth the good man alone is to
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ἀγαθὸς µόνος τιµητός· ᾧ δ᾽ ἄµφω be honoured; he, however, who has both
ὑπάρχει, µᾶλλον ἀξιοῦται τιµῆς. advantages is thought the more worthy of
honour.
οἱ δ᾽ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ But those who without virtue have such
ἔχοντες οὔτε δικαίως ἑαυτοὺς µεγάλων goods are neither justified in making great
claims nor entitled to the name of 'proud';
ἀξιοῦσιν οὔτε ὀρθῶς µεγαλόψυχοι for these things imply perfect virtue.
λέγονται· ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς παντελοῦς Disdainful and insolent, however, even
οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα. ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ those who have such goods become.
ὑβρισταὶ καὶ οἱ (30) τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες
ἀγαθὰ γίνονται.
ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ ῥᾴδιον φέρειν For without virtue it is not easy to bear
ἐµµελῶς τὰ εὐτυχήµατα·[1124b] (1) οὐ gracefully the goods of fortune; and, being
unable to bear them, and thinking
δυνάµενοι δὲφέρειν καὶ οἰόµενοι τῶν themselves superior to others, they despise
ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων µὲν others and themselves do what they please.
καταφρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ᾽ ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι
πράττουσιν.
µιµοῦνται γὰρ τὸν µεγαλόψυχον οὐχ They imitate the proud man without being
ὅµοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν οἷς like him, and this they do where they can;
so they do not act virtuously, but they do
δύνανται· τὰ µὲν οὖν κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν οὐ despise others. For the proud man despises
πράττουσι, καταφρονοῦσι (5) δὲ τῶν justly (since he thinks truly), but the many
ἄλλων. ὁ µὲν γὰρ µεγαλόψυχος δικαίως do so at random.
καταφρονεῖ (δοξάζει γὰρ ἀληθῶς), οἱ δὲ
πολλοὶ τυχόντως.
οὐκ ἔστι δὲ µικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ He does not run into trifling dangers, nor is
φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα τιµᾶν, he fond of danger, because he honours few
things; but he will face great dangers, and
µεγαλοκίνδυνος δέ, καὶ ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ, when he is in danger he is unsparing of his
ἀφειδὴς τοῦ βίου ὡς οὐκ ἄξιον ὂν life, knowing that there are conditions on
πάντως ζῆν. καὶ οἷος εὖ ποιεῖν, which life is not worth having. And he is the
εὐεργετούµενος (10) δ᾽ αἰσχύνεται· τὸ sort of man to confer benefits, but he is
ashamed of receiving them; for the one is
µὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δ᾽ the mark of a superior, the other of an
ὑπερεχοµένου. inferior.
καὶ ἀντευεργετικὸς πλειόνων· οὕτω γάρ And he is apt to confer greater benefits in
οἱ προσοφλήσει ὁ ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὖ return; for thus the original benefactor
besides being paid will incur a debt to him,
πεπονθώς. δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ µνηµονεύειν and will be the gainer by the transaction.
οὗ ἂν ποιήσωσιν εὖ, ὧν δ᾽ ἂν πάθωσιν They seem also to remember any service
οὔ (ἐλάττων γὰρ ὁ παθὼν εὖ τοῦ they have done, but not those they have
ποιήσαντος, βούλεται δ᾽ ὑπερέχειν), καὶ received (for he who receives a service is
inferior to him who has done it, but the
(15) τὰ µὲν ἡδέως ἀκούειν, τὰ δ᾽ ἀηδῶς· proud man wishes to be superior), and to
διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν οὐ λέγειν τὰς hear of the former with pleasure, of the
latter with displeasure; this, it seems, is
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εὐεργεσίας τῷ Διί, οὐδ᾽ οἱ Λάκωνες πρὸς why Thetis did not mention to Zeus the
τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ᾽ ἃ πεπόνθεσαν εὖ. services she had done him, and why the
Spartans did not recount their services to
the Athenians, but those they had received.
µεγαλοψύχου δὲ καὶ τὸ µηδενὸς δεῖσθαι It is a mark of the proud man also to ask for
ἢ µόλις, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ προθύµως, καὶ nothing or scarcely anything, but to give
help readily, and to be dignified towards
πρὸς µὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώµατι καὶ εὐτυχίαις people who enjoy high position and good
µέγαν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ (20) τοὺς µέσους fortune, but unassuming towards those of
µέτριον· τῶν µὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχειν χαλεπὸν the middle class; for it is a difficult and lofty
καὶ σεµνόν, τῶν δὲ ῥᾴδιον, καὶ ἐπ᾽ thing to be superior to the former, but easy
to be so to the latter, and a lofty bearing
ἐκείνοις µὲν σεµνύνεσθαι οὐκ ἀγεννές, over the former is no mark of ill-breeding,
ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορτικόν, ὥσπερ εἰς but among humble people it is as vulgar as
τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι· καὶ εἰς τὰ a display of strength against the weak.
Again, it is characteristic of the proud man
ἔντιµα µὴ ἰέναι, ἢ οὗ πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι· not to aim at the things commonly held in
καὶ ἀργὸν εἶναι καὶ µελλητὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ honour, or the things in which others excel;
ὅπου (25) τιµὴ µεγάλη ἢ ἔργον, καὶ to be sluggish and to hold back except
ὀλίγων µὲν πρακτικόν, µεγάλων δὲ καὶ where great honour or a great work is at
stake, and to be a man of few deeds, but of
ὀνοµαστῶν. great and notable ones.
ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ φανεροµισῆ εἶναι καὶ He must also be open in his hate and in his
φανερόφιλον (τὸ γὰρ λανθάνειν love (for to conceal one's feelings, i.e. to
care less for truth than for what people will
φοβουµένου, καὶ ἀµελεῖν τῆς ἀληθείας think, is a coward's part), and must speak
µᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης), καὶ λέγειν καὶ and act openly; for he is free of speech
πράττειν φανερῶς (παρρησιαστὴς γὰρ because he is contemptuous, and he is given
to telling the truth, except when he speaks
διὰ τὸ καταφρονητικὸς εἶναι, (30) καὶ
in irony to the vulgar. He must be unable to
ἀληθευτικός, πλὴν ὅσα µὴ δι᾽ εἰρωνείαν make his life revolve round another, unless
[εἰρωνεία δὲ] πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς), καὶ it be a friend; for this is slavish, and for this
πρὸς ἄλλον µὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ reason all flatterers are servile and people
lacking in self-respect are flatterers.
φίλον·[1125a] (1) δουλικὸν γάρ· διὸ καὶ
πάντες οἱ κόλακες θητικοὶ καὶ οἱ
ταπεινοὶ κόλακες.
οὐδὲ θαυµαστικός· οὐδὲν γὰρ µέγα αὐτῷ Nor is he given to admiration; for nothing to
ἐστίν. οὐδὲ µνησίκακος· οὐ γὰρ him is great. Nor is he mindful of wrongs;
for it is not the part of a proud man to have
µεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἀποµνηµονεύειν, a long memory, especially for wrongs, but
ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ (5) µᾶλλον rather to overlook them. Nor is he a gossip;
παρορᾶν. οὐδ᾽ ἀνθρωπολόγος· οὔτε γὰρ for he will speak neither about himself nor
about another, since he cares not to be
περὶ αὑτοῦ ἐρεῖ οὔτε περὶ ἑτέρου· οὔτε
praised nor for others to be blamed; nor
γὰρ ἵνα ἐπαινῆται µέλει αὐτῷ οὔθ᾽ ὅπως again is he given to praise; and for the
οἱ ἄλλοι ψέγωνται· οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἐπαινετικός same reason he is not an evil-speaker, even
ἐστιν· διόπερ οὐδὲ κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν about his enemies, except from haughtiness.
ἐχθρῶν, εἰ µὴ δι᾽ ὕβριν.
καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ µικρῶν ἥκιστα With regard to necessary or small matters
ὀλοφυρτικὸς (10) καὶ δεητικός· he is least of all me given to lamentation or
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σπουδάζοντος γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ the asking of favours; for it is the part of
ταῦτα. καὶ οἷος κεκτῆσθαι µᾶλλον τὰ one who takes such matters seriously to
behave so with respect to them. He is one
καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν καρπίµων καὶ who will possess beautiful and profitless
ὠφελίµων· αὐτάρκους γὰρ µᾶλλον. things rather than profitable and useful
ones; for this is more proper to a character
that suffices to itself.
καὶ κίνησις δὲ βραδεῖα τοῦ µεγαλοψύχου Further, a slow step is thought proper to
δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ βαρεῖα, καὶ λέξις the proud man, a deep voice, and a level
utterance; for the man who takes few things
στάσιµος· οὐ γὰρ σπευστικὸς ὁ περὶ seriously is not likely to be hurried, nor the
ὀλίγα (15) σπουδάζων, οὐδὲ σύντονος ὁ man who thinks nothing great to be excited,
µηδὲν µέγα οἰόµενος· ἡ δ᾽ ὀξυφωνία καὶ while a shrill voice and a rapid gait are the
results of hurry and excitement.
ἡ ταχυτὴς διὰ τούτων.
τοιοῦτος µὲν οὖν ὁ µεγαλόψυχος· ὁ δ᾽ Such, then, is the proud man; the man
ἐλλείπων µικρόψυχος, ὁ δ᾽ ὑπερβάλλων who falls short of him is unduly humble, and
the man who goes beyond him is vain. Now
χαῦνος. οὐ κακοὶ µὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι even these are not thought to be bad (for
οὐδ᾽ οὗτοι (οὐ γὰρ κακοποιοί εἰσιν), they are not malicious), but only mistaken.
ἡµαρτηµένοι δέ.
ὁ µὲν γὰρ µικρόψυχος (20) ἄξιος ὢν For the unduly humble man, being worthy of
ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ ὧν ἄξιός good things, robs himself of what he
deserves, and to have something bad about
ἐστι, καὶ ἔοικε κακὸν ἔχειν τι ἐκ τοῦ µὴ him from the fact that he does not think
ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἀγνοεῖν himself worthy of good things, and seems
δ᾽ ἑαυτόν· ὠρέγετο γὰρ ἂν ὧν ἄξιος ἦν, also not to know himself; else he would
ἀγαθῶν γε ὄντων. οὐ µὴν ἠλίθιοί γε οἱ have desired the things he was worthy of,
since these were good. Yet such people are
τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ µᾶλλον not thought to be fools, but rather unduly
ὀκνηροί. retiring.
ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα δοκεῖ καὶ χείρους Such a reputation, however, seems actually
ποιεῖν· (25) ἕκαστοι γὰρ ἐφίενται τῶν to make them worse; for each class of
people aims at what corresponds to its
κατ᾽ ἀξίαν, ἀφίστανται δὲ καὶ τῶν worth, and these people stand back even
πράξεων τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν from noble actions and undertakings,
ἐπιτηδευµάτων ὡς ἀνάξιοι ὄντες, deeming themselves unworthy, and from
ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. external goods no less.
οἱ δὲ χαῦνοι ἠλίθιοι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς Vain people, on the other hand, are fools
ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐπιφανῶς· οὐ γὰρ and ignorant of themselves, and that
manifestly; for, not being worthy of them,
ἄξιοι ὄντες τοῖς ἐντίµοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν, they attempt honourable undertakings, and
εἶτα ἐξελέγχονται· (30) καὶ ἐσθῆτι then are found out; and tetadorn
κοσµοῦνται καὶ σχήµατι καὶ τοῖς themselves with clothing and outward show
and such things, and wish their strokes of
τοιούτοις, καὶ βούλονται τὰ εὐτυχήµατα
good fortune to be made public, and speak
καὶ φανερὰ εἶναι αὑτῶν, καὶ λέγουσι about them as if they would be honoured for
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περὶ αὐτῶν ὡς διὰ τούτων them.

τιµηθησόµενοι.
ἀντιτίθεται δὲ τῇ µεγαλοψυχίᾳ ἡ But undue humility is more opposed to pride

µικροψυχία µᾶλλον τῆς χαυνότητος· καὶ than vanity is; for it is both commoner and
worse.
γὰρ γίνεται µᾶλλον καὶ χεῖρόν ἐστιν.
ἡ µὲν οὖν µεγαλοψυχία (35) περὶ τιµήν Pride, then, is concerned with honour on
ἐστι µεγάλην, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. the grand scale, as has been said.
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Αριστοτέλους Ηθικά Νικοµάχεια, IV 4-6 http://www.mikrosapoplous.gr/aristotle/nicom4d.htm

Βιβλίο IV, 4-6

(1125b-1127a10)
4. Ambition, unambitiousness,
and the mean between them.
<<< >>>
[1125b] (1) ἔοικε δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην εἶναι There seems to be in the sphere of
ἀρετή τις, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις honour also, as was said in our first remarks
on the subject, a virtue which would appear
ἐλέχθη, ἣ δόξειεν ἂν παραπλησίως ἔχειν to be related to pride as liberality is to
πρὸς τὴν µεγαλοψυχίαν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ magnificence. For neither of these has
ἐλευθεριότης πρὸς τὴν µεγαλοπρέπειαν. anything to do with the grand scale, but
both dispose us as is right with regard to
ἄµφω γὰρ αὗται τοῦ µὲν µεγάλου
middling and unimportant objects; as in
ἀφεστᾶσι, (5) περὶ δὲ τὰ µέτρια καὶ getting and giving of wealth there is a mean
µικρὰ διατιθέασιν ἡµᾶς ὡς δεῖ· ὥσπερ δ᾽ and an excess and defect, so too honour
ἐν λήψει καὶ δόσει χρηµάτων µεσότης may be desired more than is right, or less,
or from the right sources and in the right
ἔστι καὶ ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις, οὕτω way.
καὶ ἐν τιµῆς ὀρέξει τὸ µᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ
ἧττον, καὶ τὸ ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ.
τόν τε γὰρ φιλότιµον ψέγοµεν ὡς We blame both the ambitious man as am at

µᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ (10) τῆς honour more than is right and from wrong
sources, and the unambitious man as not
τιµῆς ἐφιέµενον, τόν τε ἀφιλότιµον ὡς willing to be honoured even for noble
οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς προαιρούµενον reasons. But sometimes we praise the
τιµᾶσθαι. ἔστι δ᾽ ὅτε τὸν φιλότιµον ambitious man as being manly and a lover
of what is noble, and the unambitious man
ἐπαινοῦµεν ὡς ἀνδρώδη καὶ φιλόκαλον,
as being moderate and self-controlled, as we
τὸν δ᾽ ἀφιλότιµον ὡς µέτριον καὶ said in our first treatment of the subject.
σώφρονα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις
εἴποµεν.
δῆλον δ᾽ ὅτι πλεοναχῶς τοῦ Evidently, since 'fond of such and such an
φιλοτοιούτου λεγοµένου οὐκ (15) ἐπὶ τὸ object' has more than one meaning, we do
not assign the term 'ambition' or 'love of
αὐτὸ φέροµεν ἀεὶ τὸ φιλότιµον, ἀλλ᾽ honour' always to the same thing, but when
ἐπαινοῦντες µὲν ἐπὶ τὸ µᾶλλον ἢ οἱ we praise the quality we think of the man
πολλοί, ψέγοντες δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ µᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. who loves honour more than most people,
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ἀνωνύµου δ᾽ οὔσης τῆς µεσότητος, ὡς and when we blame it we think of him who
ἐρήµης ἔοικεν ἀµφισβητεῖν τὰ ἄκρα. loves it more than is right. The mean being
without a name, the extremes seem to
dispute for its place as though that were
vacant by default.
ἐν οἷς δ᾽ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, But where there is excess and defect, there
καὶ τὸ µέσον· ὀρέγονται δὲ τῆς τιµῆς καὶ is also an intermediate; now men desire
honour both more than they should and
µᾶλλον ἢ (20) δεῖ καὶ ἧττον· ἔστι δὴ καὶ less; therefore it is possible also to do so as
ὡς δεῖ· ἐπαινεῖται δ᾽ οὖν ἡ ἕξις αὕτη, one should; at all events this is the state of
µεσότης οὖσα περὶ τιµὴν ἀνώνυµος. character that is praised, being an unnamed
mean in respect of honour. Relatively to
φαίνεται δὲ πρὸς µὲν τὴν φιλοτιµίαν
ambition it seems to be unambitiousness,
ἀφιλοτιµία, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀφιλοτιµίαν and relatively to unambitiousness it seems
φιλοτιµία, πρὸς ἀµφότερα δὲ ἀµφότερά to be ambition, while relatively to both
πως. severally it seems in a sense to be both
together.
ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας This appears to be true of the other virtues
ἀρετάς. ἀντικεῖσθαι δ᾽ ἐνταῦθ᾽ (25) οἱ also. But in this case the extremes seem to
be contradictories because the mean has not
ἄκροι φαίνονται διὰ τὸ µὴ ὠνοµάσθαι received a name.
τὸν µέσον.
E. The virtue concerned with

anger.
5. Good temper, irascibility,
inirascibility.
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πραότης δ᾽ ἐστὶ µεσότης περὶ ὀργάς· Good temper is a mean with respect to
ἀνωνύµου δ᾽ ὄντος τοῦ µέσου, σχεδὸν δὲ anger; the middle state being unnamed, and
the extremes almost without a name as
καὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ἐπὶ τὸ µέσον τὴν well, we place good temper in the middle
πραότητα φέροµεν, πρὸς τὴν ἔλλειψιν position, though it inclines towards the
ἀποκλίνουσαν, ἀνώνυµον οὖσαν. ἡ δ᾽ deficiency, which is without a name. The
ὑπερβολὴ ὀργιλότης τις λέγοιτ᾽ ἄν. (30) excess might called a sort of 'irascibility'. For
the passion is anger, while its causes are
τὸ µὲν γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ὀργή, τὰ δ᾽ many and diverse.
ἐµποιοῦντα πολλὰ καὶ διαφέροντα.
ὁ µὲν οὖν ἐφ᾽ οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς δεῖ The man who is angry at the right things
ὀργιζόµενος, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ and with the right people, and, further, as
he ought, when he ought, and as long as he
ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινεῖται· πρᾶος δὴ οὗτος ought, is praised. This will be the
ἂν εἴη, εἴπερ ἡ πραότης ἐπαινεῖται. good-tempered man, then, since good
temper is praised.
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βούλεται γὰρ ὁ πρᾶος ἀτάραχος εἶναι For the good-tempered man tends to be
καὶ µὴ ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, (35) unperturbed and not to be led by passion,
but to be angry in the manner, at the
ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ things, and for the length of time, that the
τούτοις καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον rule dictates; but he is thought to err rather
χαλεπαίνειν· [1126a] (1) ἁµαρτάνειν δὲ in the direction of deficiency; for the
good-tempered man is not revengeful, but
δοκεῖ µᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· οὐ γὰρ
rather tends to make allowances.
τιµωρητικὸς ὁ πρᾶος, ἀλλὰ µᾶλλον
συγγνωµονικός.
ἡ δ᾽ ἔλλειψις, εἴτ᾽ ἀοργησία τίς ἐστιν εἴθ᾽ The deficiency, whether it is a sort of
ὅ τι δή ποτε, ψέγεται. οἱ γὰρ µὴ 'inirascibility' or whatever it is, is blamed.
For those who are not angry at the things
ὀργιζόµενοι ἐφ᾽ οἷς (5) δεῖ ἠλίθιοι they should be angry at are thought to be
δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ οἱ µὴ ὡς δεῖ µηδ᾽ ὅτε fools, and so are those who are not angry in
µηδ᾽ οἷς δεῖ· δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι the right way, at the right time, or with the
right persons; for such a man is thought not
οὐδὲ λυπεῖσθαι, µὴ ὀργιζόµενός τε οὐκ
to feel things nor to be pained by them, and,
εἶναι ἀµυντικός, τὸ δὲ since he does not get angry, he is thought
προπηλακιζόµενον ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς unlikely to defend himself; and to endure
οἰκείους περιορᾶν ἀνδραποδῶδες. being insulted and put up with insult to
one's friends is slavish.
ἡ δ᾽ ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα µὲν γίνεται The excess can be manifested in all the
(καὶ γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ, (10) καὶ ἐφ᾽ οἷς οὐ δεῖ, points that have been named (for one can
be angry with the wrong persons, at the
καὶ µᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ θᾶττον, καὶ πλείω wrong things, more than is right, too
χρόνον), οὐ µὴν ἅπαντά γε τῷ αὐτῷ quickly, or too long); yet all are not found in
ὑπάρχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτ᾽ εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ the same person. Indeed they could not; for
evil destroys even itself, and if it is complete
κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσι, κἂν
becomes unbearable.
ὁλόκληρον ᾖ, ἀφόρητον γίνεται.
οἱ µὲν οὖν ὀργίλοι ταχέως µὲν Now hot-tempered people get angry quickly
ὀργίζονται καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐφ᾽ οἷς οὐ and with the wrong persons and at the
wrong things and more than is right, but
δεῖ καὶ µᾶλλον ἢ (15) δεῖ, παύονται δὲ their anger ceases quickly-which is the best
ταχέως· ὃ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν. point about them. This happens to them
συµβαίνει δ᾽ αὐτοῖς τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ because they do not restrain their anger but
κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀλλ᾽ retaliate openly owing to their quickness of
temper, and then their anger ceases.
ἀνταποδιδόασιν ᾗ φανεροί εἰσι διὰ τὴν
ὀξύτητα, εἶτ᾽ ἀποπαύονται.
ὑπερβολῇ δ᾽ εἰσὶν οἱ ἀκρόχολοι ὀξεῖς καὶ By reason of excess choleric people are
πρὸς πᾶν ὀργίλοι καὶ ἐπὶ παντί· ὅθεν καὶ quick-tempered and ready to be angry with
everything and on every occasion; whence
τοὔνοµα. οἱ δὲ πικροὶ (20) δυσδιάλυτοι, their name. Sulky people are hard to
καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται· κατέχουσι appease, and retain their anger long; for
γὰρ τὸν θυµόν. παῦλα δὲ γίνεται ὅταν they repress their passion. But it ceases
when they retaliate; for revenge relieves
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ἀνταποδιδῷ· ἡ γὰρ τιµωρία παύει τῆς them of their anger, producing in them
ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης pleasure instead of pain.
ἐµποιοῦσα.
τούτου δὲ µὴ γινοµένου τὸ βάρος If this does not happen they retain their
ἔχουσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ µὴ ἐπιφανὲς εἶναι burden; for owing to its not being obvious
no one even reasons with them, and to
οὐδὲ συµπείθει αὐτοὺς οὐδείς, ἐν αὑτῷ digest one's anger in oneself takes time.
δὲ πέψαι (25) τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖ. εἰσὶ Such people are most troublesome to
δ᾽ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς ὀχληρότατοι καὶ themselves and to their dearest friends. We
call had-tempered those who are angry at
τοῖς µάλιστα φίλοις. χαλεποὺς δὲ
the wrong things, more than is right, and
λέγοµεν τοὺς ἐφ᾽ οἷς τε µὴ δεῖ longer, and cannot be appeased until they
χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ µᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ inflict vengeance or punishment.
πλείω χρόνον, καὶ µὴ διαλλαττοµένους
ἄνευ τιµωρίας ἢ κολάσεως.
τῇ πραότητι δὲ µᾶλλον τὴν ὑπερβολὴν To good temper we oppose the excess

ἀντιτίθεµεν· καὶ (30) γὰρ µᾶλλον γίνεται· rather than the defect; for not only is it
commoner since revenge is the more
ἀνθρωπικώτερον γὰρ τὸ τιµωρεῖσθαι· human), but bad-tempered people are worse
καὶ πρὸς τὸ συµβιοῦν οἱ χαλεποὶ χείρους. to live with.
ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται, καὶ ἐκ What we have said in our earlier
τῶν λεγοµένων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον treatment of the subject is plain also from
what we are now saying; viz. that it is not
διορίσαι τὸ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις easy to define how, with whom, at what,
καὶ πόσον χρόνον ὀργιστέον, καὶ τὸ and how long one should be angry, and at
µέχρι τίνος ὀρθῶς ποιεῖ τις ἢ ἁµαρτάνει. what point right action ceases and wrong
begins.
(35) ὁ µὲν γὰρ µικρὸν παρεκβαίνων οὐ For the man who strays a little from the
ψέγεται, οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ µᾶλλον οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ path, either towards the more or towards
the less, is not blamed; since sometimes we
ἧττον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας praise those who exhibit the deficiency, and
ἐπαινοῦµεν καὶ πράους φαµέν, [1126b] call them good-tempered, and sometimes we
(1) καὶ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις call angry people manly, as being capable of
ruling. How far, therefore, and how a man
ὡς δυναµένους ἄρχειν. ὁ δὴ πόσον καὶ
must stray before he becomes blameworthy,
πῶς παρεκβαίνων ψεκτός, οὐ ῥᾴδιον τῷ it is not easy to state in words; for the
λόγῳ ἀποδοῦναι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς καθ᾽ decision depends on the particular facts and
ἕκαστα κἀν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. on perception.
ἀλλὰ τό γε τοσοῦτον (5) δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ µὲν But so much at least is plain, that the
µέση ἕξις ἐπαινετή, καθ᾽ ἣν οἷς δεῖ middle state is praiseworthy- that in virtue
of which we are angry with the right people,
ὀργιζόµεθα καὶ ἐφ᾽ οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ at the right things, in the right way, and so
πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, αἱ δ᾽ ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ on, while the excesses and defects are
ἐλλείψεις ψεκταί, καὶ ἐπὶ µικρὸν µὲν blameworthy- slightly so if they are present
γινόµεναι ἠρέµα, ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ µᾶλλον, in a low degree, more if in a higher degree,
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ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ σφόδρα. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τῆς and very much if in a high degree.
µέσης ἕξεως ἀνθεκτέον. αἱ µὲν οὖν (10) Evidently, then, we must cling to the middle
state.- Enough of the states relative to
περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ἕξεις εἰρήσθωσαν. anger.
F. Virtues of social intercourse.

6. Friendliness, obsequiousness,
churlishness.
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ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁµιλίαις καὶ τῷ συζῆν καὶ In gatherings of men, in social life and
λόγων καὶ πραγµάτων κοινωνεῖν οἳ µὲν the interchange of words and deeds, some
men are thought to be obsequious, viz.
ἄρεσκοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ πάντα πρὸς those who to give pleasure praise
ἡδονὴν ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οὐθὲν everything and never oppose, but think it
ἀντιτείνοντες, ἀλλ᾽ οἰόµενοι δεῖν ἄλυποι their duty 'to give no pain to the people
τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εἶναι· οἱ δ᾽ ἐξ they meet'; while those who, on the
contrary, oppose everything and care not a
ἐναντίας τούτοις (15) πρὸς πάντα whit about giving pain are called churlish
ἀντιτείνοντες καὶ τοῦ λυπεῖν οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν and contentious.
φροντίζοντες δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες
καλοῦνται.
ὅτι µὲν οὖν αἱ εἰρηµέναι ἕξεις ψεκταί That the states we have named are culpable
εἰσιν, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ἡ µέση τούτων is plain enough, and that the middle state is
laudable- that in virtue of which a man will
ἐπαινετή, καθ᾽ ἣν ἀποδέξεται ἃ δεῖ καὶ put up with, and will resent, the right things
ὡς δεῖ, ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ δυσχερανεῖ· ὄνοµα and in the right way; but no name has been
δ᾽ οὐκ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῇ (20) τι, ἔοικε δὲ assigned to it, though it most resembles
friendship. For the man who corresponds to
µάλιστα φιλίᾳ. τοιοῦτος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ
this middle state is very much what, with
κατὰ τὴν µέσην ἕξιν οἷον βουλόµεθα affection added, we call a good friend.
λέγειν τὸν ἐπιεικῆ φίλον, τὸ στέργειν
προσλαβόντα.
διαφέρει δὲ τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι ἄνευ πάθους But the state in question differs from
ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὁµιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ friendship in that it implies no passion or
affection for one's associates; since it is not
τῷ φιλεῖν ἢ ἐχθαίρειν ἀποδέχεται by reason of loving or hating that such a
ἕκαστα ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτος (25) man takes everything in the right way, but
εἶναι. ὁµοίως γὰρ πρὸς ἀγνῶτας καὶ by being a man of a certain kind. For he will
behave so alike towards those he knows and
γνωρίµους καὶ συνήθεις καὶ ἀσυνήθεις
those he does not know, towards intimates
αὐτὸ ποιήσει, πλὴν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις ὡς and those who are not so, except that in
ἁρµόζει· οὐ γὰρ ὁµοίως προσήκει each of these cases he will behave as is
συνήθων καὶ ὀθνείων φροντίζειν, οὐδ᾽ befitting; for it is not proper to have the
same care for intimates and for strangers,
αὖ λυπεῖν.
nor again is it the same conditions that
make it right to give pain to them.
καθόλου µὲν οὖν εἴρηται ὅτι ὡς δεῖ Now we have said generally that he will
ὁµιλήσει, ἀναφέρων δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν associate with people in the right way; but it
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καὶ τὸ συµφέρον στοχάσεται (30) τοῦ µὴ is by reference to what is honourable and

λυπεῖν ἢ συνηδύνειν. ἔοικε µὲν γὰρ περὶ expedient that he will aim at not giving pain
or at contributing pleasure. For he seems to
ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι τὰς ἐν ταῖς be concerned with the pleasures and pains
ὁµιλίαις γινοµένας· τούτων δ᾽ ὅσας µὲν of social life; and wherever it is not
αὐτῷ ἐστὶ µὴ καλὸν ἢ βλαβερὸν honourable, or is harmful, for him to
contribute pleasure, he will refuse, and will
συνηδύνειν, δυσχερανεῖ, καὶ
choose rather to give pain; also if his
προαιρήσεται λυπεῖν· κἂν τῷ ποιοῦντι δ᾽ acquiescence in another's action would bring
ἀσχηµοσύνην φέρῃ, καὶ ταύτην µὴ disgrace, and that in a high degree, or
µικράν, ἢ βλάβην, ἡ δ᾽ ἐναντίωσις (35) injury, on that other, while his opposition
brings a little pain, he will not acquiesce but
µικρὰν λύπην, οὐκ ἀποδέξεται ἀλλὰ will decline.
δυσχερανεῖ.
διαφερόντως δ᾽ ὁµιλήσει τοῖς ἐν He will associate differently with people in

ἀξιώµασι καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσι, [1127a] (1) καὶ high station and with ordinary people, with
closer and more distant acquaintances, and
µᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον γνωρίµοις, ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ so too with regard to all other differences,
κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας διαφοράς, ἑκάστοις rendering to each class what is befitting,
ἀπονέµων τὸ πρέπον, καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ µὲν and while for its own sake he chooses to
contribute pleasure, and avoids the giving of
αἱρούµενος τὸ συνηδύνειν, λυπεῖν δ᾽
pain, he will be guided by the consequences,
εὐλαβούµενος, τοῖς δ᾽ ἀποβαίνουσιν, ἐὰν if these are greater, i.e. honour and
ᾖ µείζω, συνεπόµενος, λέγω δὲ (5) τῷ expediency. For the sake of a great future
καλῷ καὶ τῷ συµφέροντι. καὶ ἡδονῆς δ᾽ pleasure, too, he will inflict small pains.
ἕνεκα τῆς εἰσαῦθις µεγάλης µικρὰ
λυπήσει.
ὁ µὲν οὖν µέσος τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, οὐκ The man who attains the mean, then, is
ὠνόµασται δέ· τοῦ δὲ συνηδύνοντος ὁ such as we have described, but has not
received a name; of those who contribute
µὲν τοῦ ἡδὺς εἶναι στοχαζόµενος µὴ διά pleasure, the man who aims at being
τι ἄλλο ἄρεσκος, ὁ δ᾽ ὅπως ὠφέλειά τις pleasant with no ulterior object is
αὑτῷ γίνηται εἰς χρήµατα καὶ ὅσα διὰ obsequious, but the man who does so in
order that he may get some advantage in
χρηµάτων, (10) κόλαξ· ὁ δὲ πᾶσι
the direction of money or the things that
δυσχεραίνων εἴρηται ὅτι δύσκολος καὶ money buys is a flatterer; while the man
δύσερις. ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ φαίνεται τὰ who quarrels with everything is, as has been
ἄκρα ἑαυτοῖς διὰ τὸ ἀνώνυµον εἶναι τὸ said, churlish and contentious. And the
extremes seem to be contradictory to each
µέσον.
other because the mean is without a name.
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Αριστοτέλους Ηθικά Νικοµάχεια, IV 7-9 http://www.mikrosapoplous.gr/aristotle/nicom4e.htm
<< Βιβλίο ΙV, 4-6 ToC Βιβλίο V >>

Βιβλίο IV, 7-9

(1127a10-1128b35)
7. Truthfulness, boastfulness,
mock-modesty.
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περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ σχεδόν ἐστι καὶ ἡ τῆς The mean opposed to boastfulness is
ἀλαζονείας <καὶ εἰρωνείας> µεσότης· found in almost the same sphere; and this
also is without a name. It will be no bad plan
ἀνώνυµος δὲ καὶ αὐτή. οὐ χεῖρον δὲ καὶ to describe these states as well; for we shall
(15) τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπελθεῖν· µᾶλλόν τε both know the facts about character better if
γὰρ ἂν εἰδείηµεν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦθος, καθ᾽ we go through them in detail, and we shall be
convinced that the virtues are means if we
ἕκαστον διελθόντες, καὶ µεσότητας
see this to be so in all cases.
εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς πιστεύσαιµεν ἄν, ἐπὶ
πάντων οὕτως ἔχον συνιδόντες.
ἐν δὴ τῷ συζῆν οἱ µὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ In the field of social life those who make the
λύπην ὁµιλοῦντες εἴρηνται, περὶ δὲ τῶν giving of pleasure or pain their object in
associating with others have been described;
ἀληθευόντων τε καὶ ψευδοµένων let us now describe those who pursue truth or
εἴπωµεν (20) ὁµοίως ἐν λόγοις καὶ falsehood alike in words and deeds and in the
πράξεσι καὶ τῷ προσποιήµατι. δοκεῖ δὴ claims they put forward. The boastful man,
then, is thought to be apt to claim the things
ὁ µὲν ἀλαζὼν προσποιητικὸς τῶν
that bring glory, when he has not got them,
ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ µὴ ὑπαρχόντων καὶ or to claim more of them than he has, and
µειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δὲ εἴρων the mock-modest man on the other hand to
ἀνάπαλιν ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ disclaim what he has or belittle it, while the
man who observes the mean is one who calls
ἐλάττω ποιεῖν, ὁ δὲ µέσος αὐθέκαστός a thing by its own name, being truthful both
τις ὢν ἀληθευτικὸς καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ in life and in word, owning to what he has,
λόγῳ, τὰ (25) ὑπάρχοντα ὁµολογῶν and neither more nor less.
εἶναι περὶ αὑτόν, καὶ οὔτε µείζω οὔτε
ἐλάττω.
ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἕκαστα καὶ ἕνεκά τινος Now each of these courses may be adopted
ποιεῖν καὶ µηδενός. ἕκαστος δ᾽ οἷός either with or without an object. But each
man speaks and acts and lives in accordance
ἐστι, τοιαῦτα λέγει καὶ πράττει καὶ with his character, if he is not acting for some
οὕτω ζῇ, ἐὰν µή τινος ἕνεκα πράττῃ. ulterior object. And falsehood is in itself mean
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καθ᾽ αὑτὸ δὲ τὸ µὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ and culpable, and truth noble and worthy of
ψεκτόν, τὸ δ᾽ ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ (30) praise. Thus the truthful man is another case
of a man who, being in the mean, is worthy
ἐπαινετόν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὁ µὲν of praise, and both forms of untruthful man
ἀληθευτικὸς µέσος ὢν ἐπαινετός, οἱ δὲ are culpable, and particularly the boastful
ψευδόµενοι ἀµφότεροι µὲν ψεκτοί, man.
µᾶλλον δ᾽ ὁ ἀλαζών.
περὶ ἑκατέρου δ᾽ εἴπωµεν, πρότερον δὲ Let us discuss them both, but first of all
περὶ τοῦ ἀληθευτικοῦ. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ the truthful man. We are not speaking of the
man who keeps faith in his agreements, i.e.
ἐν ταῖς ὁµολογίαις ἀληθεύοντος in the things that pertain to justice or
λέγοµεν, οὐδ᾽ ὅσα εἰς ἀδικίαν ἢ injustice (for this would belong to another
δικαιοσύνην συντείνει[1127b] (1) (ἄλλης virtue), but the man who in the matters in
which nothing of this sort is at stake is true
γὰρ ἂν εἴη ταῦτ᾽ ἀρετῆς), ἀλλ᾽ ἐν οἷς
both in word and in life because his character
µηδενὸς τοιούτου διαφέροντος καὶ ἐν is such. But such a man would seem to be as
λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύει τῷ τὴν ἕξιν a matter of fact equitable.
τοιοῦτος εἶναι. δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος
ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι.
ὁ γὰρ φιλαλήθης, καὶ ἐν οἷς µὴ For the man who loves truth, and is truthful
διαφέρει ἀληθεύων, ἀληθεύσει (5) καὶ where nothing is at stake, will still more be
truthful where something is at stake; he will
ἐν οἷς διαφέρει ἔτι µᾶλλον· ὡς γὰρ avoid falsehood as something base, seeing
αἰσχρὸν τὸ ψεῦδος εὐλαβήσεται, ὅ γε that he avoided it even for its own sake; and
καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ηὐλαβεῖτο· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος such a man is worthy of praise. He inclines
rather to understate the truth; for this seems
ἐπαινετός. ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον δὲ µᾶλλον
in better taste because exaggerations are
τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀποκλίνει· ἐµµελέστερον wearisome.
γὰρ φαίνεται διὰ τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς τὰς
ὑπερβολὰς εἶναι.
ὁ δὲ µείζω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων He who claims more than he has with no

προσποιούµενος (10) µηδενὸς ἕνεκα ulterior object is a contemptible sort of fellow
(otherwise he would not have delighted in
φαύλῳ µὲν ἔοικεν (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔχαιρε τῷ falsehood), but seems futile rather than bad;
ψεύδει), µάταιος δὲ φαίνεται µᾶλλον ἢ but if he does it for an object, he who does it
κακός· εἰ δ᾽ ἕνεκά τινος, ὁ µὲν δόξης ἢ for the sake of reputation or honour is (for a
boaster) not very much to be blamed, but he
τιµῆς οὐ λίαν ψεκτός, “ὡς ὁ ἀλαζών”, ὁ
who does it for money, or the things that lead
δὲ ἀργυρίου, ἢ ὅσα εἰς ἀργύριον, to money, is an uglier character (it is not the
ἀσχηµονέστερος (οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάµει δ᾽ capacity that makes the boaster, but the
ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει· purpose; for it is in virtue of his state of
character and by being a man of a certain
(15) κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν γὰρ καὶ τῷ τοιόσδε
kind that he is boaster); as one man is a liar
εἶναι ἀλαζών ἐστιν)· ὥσπερ καὶ because he enjoys the lie itself, and another
ψεύστης ὃ µὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων, because he desires reputation or gain.
ὃ δὲ δόξης ὀρεγόµενος ἢ κέρδους.
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οἱ µὲν οὖν δόξης χάριν ἀλαζονευόµενοι Now those who boast for the sake of
τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιοῦνται ἐφ᾽ οἷς reputation claim such qualities as will praise
or congratulation, but those whose object is
ἔπαινος ἢ εὐδαιµονισµός, οἱ δὲ gain claim qualities which are of value to
κέρδους, ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσίς ἐστι τοῖς one's neighbours and one's lack of which is
πέλας καὶ διαλαθεῖν (20) ἔστι µὴ ὄντα, not easily detected, e.g. the powers of a seer,
a sage, or a physician. For this reason it is
οἷον µάντιν σοφὸν ἰατρόν. διὰ τοῦτο οἱ
such things as these that most people claim
πλεῖστοι προσποιοῦνται τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ and boast about; for in them the above-
ἀλαζονεύονται· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ mentioned qualities are found.
εἰρηµένα.
οἱ δ᾽ εἴρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον λέγοντες Mock-modest people, who understate

χαριέστεροι µὲν τὰ ἤθη φαίνονται· οὐ things, seem more attractive in character; for
they are thought to speak not for gain but to
γὰρ κέρδους ἕνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, avoid parade; and here too it is qualities
ἀλλὰ φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν· (25) which bring reputation that they disclaim, as
µάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ ἔνδοξα Socrates used to do. Those who disclaim
trifling and obvious qualities are called
ἀπαρνοῦνται, οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης
humbugs and are more contemptible; and
ἐποίει. οἱ δὲ τὰ µικρὰ καὶ φανερὰ sometimes this seems to be boastfulness, like
[προσποιούµενοι] βαυκοπανοῦργοι the Spartan dress; for both excess and great
λέγονται καὶ εὐκαταφρονητότεροί deficiency are boastful.
εἰσιν· καὶ ἐνίοτε ἀλαζονεία φαίνεται,
οἷον ἡ τῶν Λακώνων ἐσθής· καὶ γὰρ ἡ
ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ λίαν ἔλλειψις
ἀλαζονικόν.
οἱ δὲ (30) µετρίως χρώµενοι τῇ εἰρωνείᾳ But those who use understatement with
καὶ περὶ τὰ µὴ λίαν ἐµποδὼν καὶ moderation and understate about matters
that do not very much force themselves on
φανερὰ εἰρωνευόµενοι χαρίεντες our notice seem attractive. And it is the
φαίνονται. ἀντικεῖσθαι δ᾽ ὁ ἀλαζὼν boaster that seems to be opposed to the
φαίνεται τῷ ἀληθευτικῷ· χείρων γάρ. truthful man; for he is the worse character.
8. Ready wit, buffoonery,

boorishness.
<<< >>>
οὔσης δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, Since life includes rest as well as activity,
καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ διαγωγῆς µετὰ παιδιᾶς, and in this is included leisure and
amusement, there seems here also to be a
δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἶναι ὁµιλία τις kind of intercourse which is tasteful; there is
ἐµµελής, [1128a] (1) καὶ οἷα δεῖ λέγειν such a thing as sayingand again listening to-
καὶ ὥς, ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκούειν. διοίσει what one should and as one should. The kind
of people one is speaking or listening to will
δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τοιούτοις λέγειν ἢ
also make a difference. Evidently here also
τοιούτων ἀκούειν. δῆλον δ᾽ ὡς καὶ περὶ there is both an excess and a deficiency as
ταῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις compared with the mean.
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τοῦ µέσου.
οἱ µὲν οὖν τῷ γελοίῳ ὑπερβάλλοντες Those who carry humour to excess are
βωµολόχοι (5) δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ thought to be vulgar buffoons, striving after
humour at all costs, and aiming rather at
φορτικοί, γλιχόµενοι πάντως τοῦ raising a laugh than at saying what is
γελοίου, καὶ µᾶλλον στοχαζόµενοι τοῦ becoming and at avoiding pain to the object
γέλωτα ποιῆσαι ἢ τοῦ λέγειν of their fun; while those who can neither
εὐσχήµονα καὶ µὴ λυπεῖν τὸν make a joke themselves nor put up with
those who do are thought to be boorish and
σκωπτόµενον· οἱ δὲ µήτ᾽ αὐτοὶ ἂν unpolished.
εἰπόντες µηδὲν γελοῖον τοῖς τε λέγουσι
δυσχεραίνοντες ἄγροικοι καὶ σκληροὶ
δοκοῦσιν εἶναι.
οἱ δ᾽ ἐµµελῶς (10) παίζοντες But those who joke in a tasteful way are
εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται, οἷον called ready-witted, which implies a sort of
readiness to turn this way and that; for such
εὔτροποι· τοῦ γὰρ ἤθους αἱ τοιαῦται sallies are thought to be movements of the
δοκοῦσι κινήσεις εἶναι, ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ character, and as bodies are discriminated by
σώµατα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων κρίνεται, their movements, so too are characters. The
οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἤθη. ἐπιπολάζοντος δὲ τοῦ ridiculous side of things is not far to seek,
however, and most people delight more than
γελοίου, καὶ τῶν πλείστων χαιρόντων they should in amusement and in jestinly.
τῇ παιδιᾷ καὶ τῷ σκώπτειν µᾶλλον ἢ and so even buffoons are called ready-witted
δεῖ, καὶ οἱ βωµολόχοι (15) εὐτράπελοι because they are found attractive; but that
they differ from the ready-witted man, and to
προσαγορεύονται ὡς χαρίεντες· ὅτι δὲ
no small extent, is clear from what has been
διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐ µικρόν, ἐκ τῶν said.
εἰρηµένων δῆλον.
τῇ µέσῃ δ᾽ ἕξει οἰκεῖον καὶ ἡ To the middle state belongs also tact; it is
ἐπιδεξιότης ἐστίν· τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιδεξίου ἐστὶ the mark of a tactful man to say and listen to
such things as befit a good and well-bred
τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν οἷα τῷ man; for there are some things that it befits
ἐπιεικεῖ καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ ἁρµόττει· ἔστι such a man to say and to hear by way of jest,
γάρ τινα πρέποντα τῷ τοιούτῳ λέγειν and the well-bred man's jesting differs from
that of a vulgar man, and the joking of an
ἐν (20) παιδιᾶς µέρει καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ ἡ
educated man from that of an uneducated.
τοῦ ἐλευθερίου παιδιὰ διαφέρει τῆς τοῦ One may see this even from the old and the
ἀνδραποδώδους, καὶ πεπαιδευµένου new comedies; to the authors of the former
καὶ ἀπαιδεύτου. ἴδοι δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ indecency of language was amusing, to those
of the latter innuendo is more so; and these
τῶν κωµῳδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν
differ in no small degree in respect of
καινῶν· τοῖς µὲν γὰρ ἦν γελοῖον ἡ propriety.
αἰσχρολογία, τοῖς δὲ µᾶλλον ἡ ὑπόνοια·
διαφέρει δ᾽ οὐ µικρὸν ταῦτα (25) πρὸς
εὐσχηµοσύνην.
πότερον οὖν τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα Now should we define the man who jokes well
ὁριστέον τῷ λέγειν µὴ ἀπρεπῆ by his saying what is not unbecoming to a
well-bred man, or by his not giving pain, or
ἐλευθερίῳ, ἢ τῷ µὴ λυπεῖν τὸν
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ἀκούοντα ἢ καὶ τέρπειν; ἢ καὶ τό γε even giving delight, to the hearer? Or is the
τοιοῦτον ἀόριστον; ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλῳ latter definition, at any rate, itself indefinite,
since different things are hateful or pleasant
µισητόν τε καὶ ἡδύ. τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ to different people? The kind of jokes he will
ἀκούσεται· ἃ γὰρ ὑποµένει ἀκούων, listen to will be the same; for the kind he can
ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν δοκεῖ. put up with are also the kind he seems to
make.
οὐ δὴ πᾶν ποιήσει· (30) τὸ γὰρ σκῶµµα There are, then, jokes he will not make; for
λοιδόρηµά τι ἐστίν, οἱ δὲ νοµοθέται the jest is a sort of abuse, and there are
things that lawgivers forbid us to abuse; and
ἔνια λοιδορεῖν κωλύουσιν· ἔδει δ᾽ ἴσως they should, perhaps, have forbidden us even
καὶ σκώπτειν. ὁ δὴ χαρίεις καὶ to make a jest of such. The refined and
ἐλευθέριος οὕτως ἕξει, οἷον νόµος ὢν well-bred man, therefore, will be as we have
described, being as it were a law to himself.
ἑαυτῷ.
τοιοῦτος µὲν οὖν ὁ µέσος ἐστίν, εἴτ᾽ Such, then, is the man who observes the
ἐπιδέξιος εἴτ᾽ εὐτράπελος λέγεται. ὁ δὲ mean, whether he be called tactful or ready-
witted. The buffoon, on the other hand, is the
βωµολόχος ἥττων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ slave of his sense of humour, and spares
οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε (35) τῶν ἄλλων neither himself nor others if he can raise a
ἀπεχόµενος εἰ γέλωτα ποιήσει, καὶ laugh, and says things none of which a man
τοιαῦτα λέγων[1128b] (1) ὧν οὐδὲν ἂν of refinement would say, and to some of
which he would not even listen. The boor,
εἴποι ὁ χαρίεις, ἔνια δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἀκούσαι. again, is useless for such social intercourse;
ὁ δ᾽ ἄγροικος εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ὁµιλίας for he contributes nothing and finds fault with
ἀχρεῖος· οὐθὲν γὰρ συµβαλλόµενος everything. But relaxation and amusement
are thought to be a necessary element in life.
πᾶσι δυσχεραίνει. δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ
ἀνάπαυσις καὶ ἡ παιδιὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ εἶναι
ἀναγκαῖον.
τρεῖς οὖν αἱ εἰρηµέναι (5) ἐν τῷ βίῳ The means in life that have been
µεσότητες, εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι περὶ λόγων described, then, are three in number, and are
all concerned with an interchange of words
τινῶν καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν. and deeds of some kind. They differ,
διαφέρουσι δ᾽ ὅτι ἣ µὲν περὶ ἀλήθειάν however, in that one is concerned with truth;
ἐστιν, αἳ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν and the other two with pleasantness. Of those
concerned with pleasure, one is displayed in
ἡδονὴν ἣ µὲν ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς, ἣ δ᾽ ἐν
jests, the other in the general social
ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὁµιλίαις. intercourse of life.
9. Shame, bashfulness,
shamelessness.
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(10) περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὥς τινος ἀρετῆς οὐ Shame should not be described as a

προσήκει λέγειν· πάθει γὰρ µᾶλλον virtue; for it is more like a feeling than a
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ἔοικεν ἢ ἕξει. ὁρίζεται γοῦν φόβος τις state of character. It is defined, at any rate,
ἀδοξίας, καὶ ἀποτελεῖται τῷ περὶ τὰ as a kind of fear of dishonour, and produces
an effect similar to that produced by fear of
δεινὰ φόβῳ παραπλήσιον· danger; for people who feel disgraced blush,
ἐρυθραίνονται γὰρ οἱ αἰσχυνόµενοι, οἱ and those who fear death turn pale. Both,
δὲ τὸν θάνατον φοβούµενοι ὠχριῶσιν. therefore, seem to be in a sense bodily
conditions, which is thought to be
σωµατικὰ δὴ φαίνεταί πως εἶναι (15)
characteristic of feeling rather than of a state
ἀµφότερα, ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους µᾶλλον of character.
ἢ ἕξεως εἶναι.
οὐ πάσῃ δ᾽ ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἁρµόζει, The feeling is not becoming to every age,
ἀλλὰ τῇ νέᾳ. οἰόµεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς but only to youth. For we think young people
should be prone to the feeling of shame
τηλικούτους αἰδήµονας εἶναι διὰ τὸ because they live by feeling and therefore
πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἁµαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ commit many errors, but are restrained by
τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύεσθαι· καὶ shame; and we praise young people who are
prone to this feeling, but an older person no
ἐπαινοῦµεν τῶν µὲν νέων τοὺς
one would praise for being prone to the sense
αἰδήµονας, πρεσβύτερον δ᾽ (20) οὐδεὶς of disgrace, since we think he should not do
ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν ὅτι αἰσχυντηλός· οὐδὲν anything that need cause this sense.
γὰρ οἰόµεθα δεῖν αὐτὸν πράττειν ἐφ᾽
οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη.
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχύνη, For the sense of disgrace is not even
εἴπερ γίνεται ἐπὶ τοῖς φαύλοις (οὐ γὰρ characteristic of a good man, since it is
consequent on bad actions (for such actions
πρακτέον τὰ τοιαῦτα· εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ µὲν should not be done; and if some actions are
κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν αἰσχρὰ τὰ δὲ κατὰ disgraceful in very truth and others only
δόξαν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐδέτερα γὰρ according to common opinion, this makes no
πρακτέα, (25) ὥστ᾽ οὐκ αἰσχυντέον)· difference; for neither class of actions should
be done, so that no disgrace should be felt);
φαύλου δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον and it is a mark of a bad man even to be such
πράττειν τι τῶν αἰσχρῶν. as to do any disgraceful action.
τὸ δ᾽ οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστ᾽ εἰ πράξαι τι τῶν To be so constituted as to feel disgraced if

τοιούτων αἰσχύνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ one does such an action, and for this reason
to think oneself good, is absurd; for it is for
οἴεσθαι ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι, ἄτοπον· ἐπὶ τοῖς voluntary actions that shame is felt, and the
ἑκουσίοις γὰρ ἡ αἰδώς, ἑκὼν δ᾽ ὁ good man will never voluntarily do bad
ἐπιεικὴς οὐδέποτε πράξει τὰ φαῦλα. actions. But shame may be said to be
conditionally a good thing; if a good man
εἴη δ᾽ ἂν ἡ αἰδὼς ἐξ (30) ὑποθέσεως
does such actions, he will feel disgraced; but
ἐπιεικές· εἰ γὰρ πράξαι, αἰσχύνοιτ᾽ ἄν· the virtues are not subject to such a
οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. qualification.
εἰ δ᾽ ἡ ἀναισχυντία φαῦλον καὶ τὸ µὴ And if shamelessness -not to be ashamed of

αἰδεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσχρὰ πράττειν, οὐδὲν doing base actions- is bad, that does not
make it good to be ashamed of doing such
µᾶλλον τὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττοντα actions. Continence too is not virtue, but a
αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπιεικές. οὐκ ἔστι δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἡ mixed sort of state; this will be shown later.
ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἀλλά τις µικτή· Now, however, let us discuss justice.
δειχθήσεται δὲ περὶ (35) αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς
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ὕστερον. νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης

εἴπωµεν.
<< Βιβλίο ΙV, 4-6 ToC Βιβλίο V >>
7 of 7 23/02/2014 1:29 AM
Vesica Pisces > Vessel of the Fish > Jesus http://jesus8880.com/chapters/gematria/vesica-pisces.htm
Home > Gematria Topics
The Vesica Pisces Construction

in the raised Jesus (8880)
The Latin term Vesica Pisces, meaning "Vessel of the Fish" is the most basic and important
construction in Sacred Geometry. A Vesica is formed when the circumference of two identical
circles each pass through the center of the other. When a Vesica Piscis is viewed horizontally,
it looks like a vagina or a womb which is why the Christ child was often pictured inside of
one. When the Vesica Pisces is viewed vertically it looks like the shape of a fish. Amazingly,
the above two Vesica Pisces each have a horizontal axis equal in length to the gematria value
of the Greek word for "fishes" (1224) while the top and bottom circles that form the two fish
have a combined circumference equal to the raised Jesus (8880)!
Astrological Symbolism of Jesus and the Fish
The zodiac and astrology were very important to people in antiquity. Early in the first century
AD, the Age of Aries (the Lamb) had just ended which was symbolic of the death of the new
God named Jesus. The Sun now rose in the New Age of the star constellation of Pisces the
Fish at the Spring Equinox (Easter) which was symbolic of the Virgin-birth of the new
1 of 3 20/01/2014 7:35 AM
Christian God named Jesus. Stories of a "Star of Bethlehem" and of "a blood-red Moon" were
even composed to herald his birth and death. The story of his resurrection inspired Christians
to compare Jesus to the Phoenix, a legendary bird that dies in flames each evening and
emerges anew each morning, which was a metaphor for the Sun in both Egyptian and Greek
mythology. The two-fold symbolism of Sacred Geometry and Astrology seems to be the main
reason why the Fish and the Rising Sun became the two most important cosmic signs of Jesus
Christ.
The Fish Anagram
The Greek word Ichthys ( ) is an anagram, containing the initials of the words "Jesus
Christ, Son of God, and Savior."
Jesus
Christ
God's
Son
Savior
Words of the Church Father's
The early Church Fathers saw the Fish as a double symbol of the Savior and of the saved.
Clement of Alexandria, in his hymn, calls Christ the "Fisher of men that are
saved, who with his sweet life catches the pure fish out of the hostile flood in the
sea of iniquity."
Tertullian, in his essay on baptism writes: "We little fishes, as Jesus Christ is our
great Fish, begin our life in the water, and can only be safe by continuing in the
water ... that is if we are faithful to our baptismal covenant, and preserve the
grace there received."
Word's of the Old Testament
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Be on your guard not to corrupt yourselves

by fashioning an idol to represent any figure,
be it in the form of a Man or of a Woman,
or the likeness of any Beast on the Earth,
or of any winged Bird that flies in the air,
or of anything that crawls on the ground,
or of any Fish in the Waters under the Earth.
And when you look up to the Heavens and see the Sun,
the Moon, or any Star among the heavenly hosts,
do not be drawn away into adoring them and serving them.
These things ... the LORD your God has allotted to all other Nations under the Heavens.
Deuteronomy 4:15-19
The Sacred Geometry Mysteries of Jesus Christ
All 8880 diagrams/illustrations, commentary, and Greek to English translations are
Copyright © 1998-2012 Daniel Gleason, all rights reserved
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Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics

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Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics

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Αριστοτέλους Ηθικά Νικοµάχεια - Περιεχόµενα http://www.mikrosapoplous.gr/aristotle/nicom0.

[Αρχαία κείµενα µε µετάφραση] | [Texts with translation]

Table of Contents [*]

Book I. The Good for Man

B. Nature of the science.

C. What is the good for man?

11. Do the fortunes of the living affect the dead?

Books II-V. Moral Virtue

II.1 -- III.5. General Account

B. Definition of moral virtue.

C. Characteristics of the extreme and mean states: practical corollaries.

5. We are responsible for bad as well as for good actions.

III.6 -- V.2. The Virtues and Vices

[ Book IV. ] C. Virtues concerned with money.

1. Liberality, prodigality, meanness.

D. Virtues concerned with honour.

3. Pride, vanity, humility.

E. The virtue concerned with anger.

F. Virtues of social intercourse.

6. Friendliness, obsequiousness, churlishness.

I. Its sphere and outer nature: in what sense it is a mean.

[ Book VI. ] Book VI. Intellectual Virtue

B. The chief intellectual virtues.

3. Science -- demonstrative knowledge of the necessary and eternal.

C. Minor intellectual virtues concerned with conduct.

D. Relation of philosophic to practical wisdom.

[ Book VII. ] Book VII. Continence and Incontinence; Pleasure

Books VIII, IX. Friendship

C. Relation of reciprocity in friendship to that involved in other forms of

E. Internal nature of friendship.

F. The need of friendship.

Book X. Pleasure; Happiness

1. Two opposed views about pleasure.

6. Happiness is a good activity, not amusement.

[Special thanks to nothingistic.org for providing the Table of Contents]

ToC Βιβλίον Ι, 8-13 >>

translated by William David Ross

Book I. The Good for Man

A. Subject of our inquiry.

1. All human activities aim at

ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάντων (15) ἐστὶν the latter are pursued.

2. The science of the good for

ἂν εἴη τἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν.

B. Nature of the science.

3. We must not expect more

Λέγοιτο δ᾽ ἂν ἱκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν Our discussion will be adequate if it has

διαφέρει δ᾽ οὐδὲν νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ And it makes no difference whether he is

C. What is the good for man?

ἄγνοιαν τοὺς µέγα τι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς

(10) οὗτος µὲν πανάριστος ὃς Far best is he who knows all

5. Discussion of the popular

φαίνεται δ᾽ ἐπιπολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ But it seems too superficial to be what we

Ὁ δὲ χρηµατιστὴς βίαιός τις ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ The life of money-making is one

6. Discussion of the philosophical

Τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ἴσως We had perhaps better consider the

7. The good must be something

Μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταὐτὸν So the argument has by a different

φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ From the point of view of self-sufficiency

Ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως τὴν µὲν εὐδαιµονίαν τὸ Presumably, however, to say that

εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς Now if the function of man is an activity of

συµφανῆ γίνεσθαι δι᾽ αὐτῆς τῶν

ToC Βιβλίον Ι, 8-13 >>

<< Βιβλίον Ι, 1-7 ToC Βιβλίον ΙΙ, 1-4 >>

translated by William David Ross