FROM MOBILIZATION

TO REVOLUTION
Charles Ti l l y
Uni versi ty of Michigan
March 1977
.........................
..
by Charles Ti l l y
CRSO Working Paper 8156 Copies avai l abl e through:
Center f or Research on
Soci al Organization
Uni versi ty of Michigan
330 Packard St reet
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104
,PROMMOBILIZATION TO REVOLUTION
CONTENTS
CENERAI. PLAN OF THE BOOK
Chapt er 1: I nt r oduct i on
Chapt er 2: Theor i es and Des cr i pt i ons of Col l e c t i ve Act i on
Cl ~apt er 3: I n t e r e s t s . Or gani zat i on and Mobi l i zat i on
Chapt er 4: The Oppor t uni t y t o Act Toget her
Chept er 5: Changing Forms of Col l e c t i ve Act i on
Cl ~npt er 6: Col l e c t i ve Vi ol ence
Chapt er 7: Rmrolutlonand Rebel l i on
Chapt er 8: Concl udi vns and llew Begi nni ngs
Appendices
Bibliography
pr ef ace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . gener al pl an of t h e hook i v
t a b l e of c ont e nt s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
l i st of t a b l e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i x
l i s t o f f i g u r e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chapt er 1: I nt r oduct i on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1
The St uf f of Col l e c t i ve Act i on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1
St udyi ng Col l e c t i ve Act i on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7
The Components of Col l e c t i ve Act i on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.10
Groups. Event s and Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.12
What You W i l l Find Here . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.15
Chapt er 2: Theor i es and Des cr i pt i ons of Col l e c t i ve Act i on . . . . . . . 2.1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ma r xon1848 2-1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Durkheim 2-7
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Durkheiminn Tr a di t i on 2.12
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M i l l and t he Ut i l i t a r i a n s 2.19
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Col l e c t i ve Choi ce 2.22
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . St r a t e g i c I nt e r a c t i on 2.29
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M i l l and Pseudo-Mill 2.35
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Weber 2.38
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Soc i a l Movements 2.42
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marxian Anal yses s i n c e Marx 2.48
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Col l e c t i ve Hi s t or y of Col l e c t i ve Act i on 2.53
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Our Task 2.58
. . . . . . . . . . Chapt er 3: I n t e r e s t s . Or gani zat i on and Mobi l i zat i on 3.1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Elementary Models 3-1
iii
A Simple Account of Collective Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 . 6
Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.12
Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.17
Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.26
Measuring Moblization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.41
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . General Conditions for Moblization 3.45
From Moblization to Collective Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.50
The Detection and Measurement of Collective Action . . . . . . . . 3.58
Chapter 4: The Opportunity To Act Together . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 . 1
From Mobilization to Opportunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 . 1
Repression and Facilitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3
Repressive and Tolerant Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.14
Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.27
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Parties 4-29
Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-31
Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.33
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Measurement of Power 4.34
Power and Polity Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.41
Detecting Changes in Polity Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.44
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Opportunity/Threst 4.53
The Interplay of Mobilization and Opportunity . . . . . . . . . . . 4.60
Chapter 5: Changing Forms of Collective Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 . 1
The Forms of Contention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 . 1
Repertoires of Collective Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.14
A Case in Point: The Strike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.25
Elections, Demonstrations and Political Systems . . . . . . . . . . 5.38
Chapter 6: Collective Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1
British Brawls as Collective Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1
iv
Violence: Concept and Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4
Some Lineaments of Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.8
Violence in America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.10
Political Action and Involvement in Violence . . . . . . . . . 6-13
Changing Contexts for Collective Violence . . . . . . . . . . . 6.20
Chapter 7: Revolution and Rebellion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1
Revolutionary Situations and Revolutionary Outcomes . . . . . . 7.1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Revolutionary Situations 7-3
Revolutionary Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7
Situations and Outcomes Combined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9
. . . . . . . . . Proximate Causes of Revolutionary Situations 7-18
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Alternatives to the Existing Polity 7-20
Acceptance of Alternative Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-24
Governmental Inaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.32
Proximate Causes of Revolutionary Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . 7-36
Coalitions between Members and Challengers . . . . . . . . . . 7-38
Control of Substantial Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-41
Revolutionary Sequences and Collective Violence . . . . . . . 7-44
Revolutionary Outcomes and Further Structural Changes . . . . . 7-50
Chapter 8: Conclusions and New Beginnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1
Back to the Eighteenth Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1
Theorizing About Collective Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.8
The Importance of History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-13
The History of Collective Action in Modern France . . . . . . . 8.19
. . . A Last Case in Point: Rural Collective Action in Burgundy 8.25
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendices A.O'
Appendix 1: Procedures for the Studies of Strlkes and Collective
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Violence in France .A. I.
TABLES
Appendix 2: Mnt cr i al s from t h e St udy of Co l l e c t i v e Vi ol ence i n
France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-14
Appendix 3: Pr ocedur es f o r t h e St udy of Cont ent i ous Gat her i ngs
i n Gr eat Br i t a i n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A-36
Appendix 4: Ma t e r i a l s Prom t h e St udy of Cont ent i ous Gat her i ngs
i n Gr eat Br i t a i n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A-55
Bi bl i ogr aphy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a * . . . B-1
Tabl e 3-1: Kerr 6 Si e ge l ' s S m a r y of S t r i k e Pr ope ns i t i e s . . . . . . . .3-22
Tabl e 3-2: French S t r i k e Rat es by I ndus t r y. 1890-1960. . . . . . . . . .3-24
Tabl e 4-1: Groups Fi gur i ng i n 1906-07 Rol l Ca l l s of French Chamber
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . of Deput i es .4-49
Tabl e 6-1: Per cent of Al l P o l i t i c a l Event s Pr ecedi ng t he Cermsn El ect i ol l S
of September 1930 and J u l y 1932 I nvol vi ng Di f f er ent : , Types of
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A c t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16
Tabl e 7-1: D.E.H. Rus s e l l ' s Armed For ce Di s l oya l t y Scal e . . . . . . . .7-43
v i i
Uni t a i n t h e Study of Col l e c t i ve Act i on. . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13
Competi~ig Anal yses of Col l e c t i ve Act i on . . . . . . . . . . . .2-6
Durkheim'a Anal yai a of Col l e c t i ve Act i on. . . . . . . . . . . .2-11
l l unt i ngt on' a Basi c Argument. . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . 2-14
Tr a j e c t or i e s of Slow nnd Rapid Soc i a l Change i n Hunt i ngt on' s
Argument. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2-14
One of Douglas Hibba' Causal Models of P o l i t i c a l Vi ol ence. . . 2-37
Th e p o l i t y Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . .3-2
The Mobi l i zat i on Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-7
Components of Or gani zat i on. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-18
Pour I d e a l Pa t t e r n s of Col l e c t i ve Act i on. . . . . . . . . . . .3-57
Snyder ' s Code f o r Labor Support of Candi dat es. . . . . . . . . 3-61
Repressi on, Tol er at i on, F a c i l i t a t i o n and Coerci on. . . . . . . 4-16
Repressi on i n Ega l i t a r i a n and Ol i 8ar chi c Governments. . . . . .4-17
Tol er ance va. Rebreaai on. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4-19
Repr essi ve Pa t t e r ns i n Di f f e r e nt Typea of Regime. . . . . . . .4-20 ,
Repressi on a s a Funct i on of Scal e and Power. . . . . . . . . . 4-23
l l ypot het i cal d i s t r i b u t i o n of government al r epr es s i on a s a f unct i on
of t he s c a l e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n and t h e power of t he a c t or . .4-24
I n t e r e a t s and Ret urna from Col l e c t i ve Act i on f or an Oppor t uni st
Contender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-35
Hypot het i cal Schedul e of Ret urna from Col l e c t i ve Act i on. . . . 4-37
Gai ni n8 va. Losing Schedul es of Ret ur na. . . . . . . . . . . . 4-38
llow Mobi l i zat i on Li mi t a Col l e c t i ve Act i on. . . . . . . . . . . 4-40
Col l e c t i ve Act i on a s a Funct i on of Thr eat s and Oppor t uni t i es . .4-54
Asymmetrical Ef f ect of Thr eat and Oppor t uni t y on Col l e c t i ve
Act i on. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4-56
v i i i
I deal i zed Sket ch of Condi t i ons f o r Act i on of a run-of-t he-mi l l
Cont ender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4-61
I deal i zed Sket ch of Condi t i ons f o r I na c t i on of a run-of-t he-mi l l
C o n t e n d e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-64
nypot he t i c a l Ef f e c t s of Lowered Coat s of Col l e c t i ve Act i on on
a Z e a l o t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-11
Four Models of Croup Readineaa t o Adopt New Means of Col l e c t i ve
Act i on. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5-18
The Al t e r a t i on of French S t r i k e Shapes, 1890-1954 . . . . . . . .5-32
Combinations of Revol ut i onar y Si t ua t i ona and Revol ut i onar y Out-
comes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7-11.
Syndi c a l i s t . Marxi st and Br i nt oni an Mapa of Revol ~l t i onor y
Re a l i t y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-13
Si t u a t i o n s and Outcomes i n Di f f er ent Typea of Power Tr ans f er s . .7-15
The Timing of Col l e c t i ve Vi ol ence i n Tension-Release and Con-
t e nt i on Models of Revol ut i on. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7-47
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTLON
The St uf f of Col l ect i ve Act i on
1765 was a l i v e l y year i n England. a s i t was i n America. News coming
i n from t he American col oni es des cr i bed t h e us unl c o n f l i c t s : r un- i ns between
smugglers and customs men, s ki r mi s hes of I ndi ans wi t h s e t t l e r s , at t empt s
of f r ont i er smen t o t nke t he law i n t o t h e i r own hands. But t he b i g news
from America was t he r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e Bri t i sh-i mposed Stamp Act. The use
of c o s t l y stamped paper f o r o f f i c i a l t r a ns a c t i ons was supposed t o begi n on
t he f i r s t of November. Long bePor e. t hen, anonymous not i c e s and det ermi ned
crowds t hr eat ened anyone who showed s i g n s of wi l l i ngne s s t o comply wi t h t h e
Stamp Act. I n Roston and el sewhere, ' groups of c i t i z e n s produced c o l o r f u l
s t r e e t t h e a t e r , compl et e wi t h gal l ows, hand- l et t er ed s i gns , and e f f i g i e s
of r oyal o f f i c i a l s . Sometimes t hey sacked t he. houses o r out bui l di ngs of
desi gnat ed stamp agent s and government o f f i c e r s . They succeeded i n bl ocki ng
t h c Act ' s nppl i cat i on i n t he American col oni es . With t h e i r a l l i e s i n Eng-
l nnd, t hey obt ai ned r e pe a l i n March, 1766. That concer t ed r e s i s t a nc e
s t a r t e d t en year s of near l y cont i nuous s t r u g g l e wi t hi n t he American col oni es ,
and ended i n a g r e a t s t r u g g l e between t he c ol oni e s and England. America
was al r eady on its way t o r e vol ut i on.
I n Englnnd, t he r e was some sympat het i c r e a c t i on t o t he American
cause. For exnmple, a t t he begi nni ng of March, 1766, " . . . a body of
upwards of two hundred mcmbers of t he house of Commons c a r r i e d up t he b i l l
t o t h e house of Peer s , f o r r epeal i ng t h e American stamp-duty a c t ; an i n-
s t a nc e of such a number goi ng up wi t h a s i n g l e b i l l , has not been known
i n t he memory of t he o l d e s t man" (Annual Regi s t er 1766: 72). Never t hel ess,
i n 1765 and I766 most of Engl and' s v i s i b l e c o n f l i c t concerned domest i c
i s s ue s . Ta i l o r s went on s t r i k e , weavers marched on Par l i ament t o demand
t he e x c l u ~ i o n of f or ej gn compet i t i on, t he s h e r i f f s of London paraded t o
p e t i t i o n f o r government i nt e r ve nt i on a ga i ns t hi gh food p r i c e s , count ry-
men s ei zed and s ol d food a t t h e i r own pr i c e s , townsmen.attacked t he col -
l e c t o r s appoi nt ed f o r Engl and' s own ver s i on of t he Stamp Act.
That was not a l l . Near l pswi ch, on t he 12t h of August:
Sever al per sons r i ot ous l y assembled t o p u l l down t he house.
of i ndus t r y, l a t e l y er ect ed a t Nncton . . . c a r r i e d t h e i r bol d-
ne s s t o such l engt h t h a t , ne i t he r t he expos t ul at i ons of t h e
magi s t r at e8 a ga i ns t t h e i l l e g n l i t y of t h e i r des i gn, which t hey
openl y avowed, t he consequences of t h e r i o t procl amat i on a c t
bei ng r ead, which were expl ai ned t o them, nor t h e appearance of
a body of r e gul a r hor s e end f o o t , c a l l e d i n a s por t of t h e posse
comi t at us, seemed t o make t he l e a s t i mpressi on on them; nny,
though t he procl amat i on was t hen r ead t o them wi t h an audi bl e
voi c e , and t hey seemed t o hear i t wi t b a t t e n t i o n . not o man s t i r r e d
(Annual Regi s t er 1765: 116-117).
On t he cont r ar y. A s t he t r oops r eadi ed t hemsel ves f o r t he a t t nc k, t he
crowd of a hundred o r s o " f e l l upon bot h hor s es and men wi t h such arms
a s t hey had, peasemakes, hedge-st akes, cudgel s, e t c . , but i n f i v e mi nut es
t he a f f a i r was over. " The s o l d i e r s a r r e s t e d seven men a s examples, and
di s per s ed t he r e s t .
Was t h a t a r i o t ? I n t he t echni cal l e g a l s ens e, i t was: t wel ve o r
more peopl e had, i ndeed, assembled wi t h on appnr ent i n t e n t whtch l o c a l of -
f i c i a l s coul d reasonabl y r egar d a s i l l e g a l ; t hey had not di s per s ed wi t hi n
t h e hour t h e law a l l o t t e d them from t he t i me t h a t t he a u t h o r i t i e s hod
rend t h e r i o t a c t . I n t he l oos er s ens e of f r enzy, conf usi on o r wanton
de s t r uc t i on, however, t h e event does not qua l i f y a s a r i o t . Both s i d e s
appar ent l y knew what t hey were doi ng, and di d i t a s be s t t hey coul d.
That was gener al l y t r u e of t h e many "di sor der s" r epor t ed i n t h e Annual
Regi s t er f or 1765.
I n t he cas e of Nacton, t h e "house of i ndust r y" t he crowd proposed
t o des t r oy was a r ecent l y- bui l t workhouse. Poor Engl i sh v i l l a g e r s had
l ong drawn r e l i e f from t h e i r own par i s hes whi l e l i v i n g a t home. The pay-
ments were mi ser abl e, but t hey as s ur ed s ur vi va l . And t he payments were
a r i g h t . That was "outdoor r e l i e f . " "Indoor r e l i e f " was now t hr eat eni ng
t o di s pl a c e t h e ol de r syst em. From t he 1730s onward, many Engl i sh l o c a l
a u t h o r i t i e s responded t o t h e i nc r e a s i ng numbers of poor wi t h two i mpor t ant
i nnovat i ons: l ocki ng up t he poor t o work under publ i c s uper vi s i on; com-
bi ni ng t he poor-law e f f o r t s of a number of adj acent par i s hes i n t o a
s i n g l e admi ni s t r at i on. Par l i ament ar y l e g i s l a t i o n had l e ga l i z e d bot h e f -
f o r t s . The bui l di ng of workhouses f o r mul t i pl e par i s hes combined t he two
of them. It a l s o per mi t t ed many pa r i s he s t o r educe t h e i r r e l i e f payments
and t o s h i p t h e i r l o c a l paupers el sewhere. The poor f ought i ndoor r e l i e f
i n t he name of e s t a bl i s he d r l g h t s .
I n t he 17508, t he l andl or ds and par sons of t h e par i s hes near l pswi ch,
i n Suf f ol k, caught tlie reform f ever . Admire1 Vernon donat ed a s i t e on
Nacton l l eat h f o r a new workhouse. A bl ue-ri bbon committee super vi sed its
cons t r uct i on. The Nncton House of I ndus t r y, a model of i t s ki nd, s t a r t e d
e nr ol l i ng paupers from a number of adj acent par i s hes i n 1758. The pa r i s h
poor went t o work weaving s acks , making cordage and s pi nni ng wool (Webb 6
Webb 1963: 127) . By 1765. however. t he e l i t e s uper vi s i on had sl ackened.
I t had proved d l f f l c u l t t o f i nd p r o f i t a b l e work f o r t he i ncar cer at ed pau-
per s. The cooper at i ng par i s hes , f ur t her mor e, had dumped i n t o t h e poorhouse
young and ol d, s i c k and we l l , r e ga r dl e s s of t h e i r a b i l i t y t o work. Smal l
wonder t he poor peopl e of Suf f ol k r e s i s t e d t he ext ensi on of t h e sy8tem.
The move a ga i ns t t he Nacton poorhouse was one of many ouch c o n f l i c t s
i n 1765. As The Gentleman' s Magazine r epor t ed f o r t h e week bef or e t l i c
Nacton conf r ont at i on:
Some t housands of r i o t e r s assembled i n t h c neigllborliood oE
Saxmundham i n Suf f ol k, and dest r oyed t he i ndust ry-l i ousc, i n which
t h e poor were employed. Thei r pr et enae was t o r e l e a s e t he poor t o
a s s i s t i n t he h a r v e s t u o r k ; but t he f nc t was t o de f e a t a l a t e a c t of
par l i ament , l a t e l y obt ai ned f o r t he r e l i e f of t h c poor of t h e hun-
dr eds of Wi l f or d, and e, e t c . I n t h i s r i o t . t he mi l i t a r y ware
c a l l e d i n , and s e ve r a l l o s t t h e i r l i v e s bef or e t he r i o t e r s were
di s per s ed (GM 1765: 392).
A t Saxfnundham, not onl y t h e poor, but a l s o many of t h e i r l e s s impoverished
nei ghbor s consi der ed t h e new i n s t i t u t i o n improper and i nt ol e r a bl e .
During t he second week of August, 1765, i n f n c t , much of Suf f ol k was
a l i v e wi t h r e be l l i on. A l a r g e crowd of peopl e f i r s t ant her ed a t Wickham
Market, when t l i e Di r e c t or s of t h e Poor f o r Loes and Wi l ford Hundreds met
t o pl an a new poorhouse; t he crowd f or ced t h e Di r e c t or s t o s i gn a repudi a-
t i o n of t h e i r pl an. For a week. t h e group went from workhouse t o workl ~ouse
t e a r i ng t h e bui l di ngs down and demanding t h a t t he over s eer s commit them-
s e l v e s not t o r ebui l d. They demanded "t hat t he poor shoul d be mai nt ai ned
a s us ual ; t h a t t hey shoul d range a t l i b e r t y and be t h e i r own mnst crs"
(Webb 6 Webb 1963: 141-142). Ri ot s t hes e were. i n t he l e g a l s ens e of tlie
word. They were c l e a r l y much more t han t h a t .
The conf r ont at i ons a t Nacton and Snxmundham act ed out per vas i ve
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of ei ght eent h- cent ur y c o n f l i c t s i n G r ~ a t Br i t a i n a s a whole.
While David Nume and Adam Smith worked out t he r e l e va nt t he or i e s , or di nar y
Br i t ons f ought about who had t h e r i g h t t o di s pos e of l and, l a bor , c a p i t a l
and commodities. At t acks on poorhouses, concer t ed r e s i s t a nc e t o encl os ur es ,
food r i o t s and a number of ot he r common forms of ei ght eent h- cent ur y c o n f l i c t
a l l s t a t e d an i mp l i c i t two-part t heor y: t h a t t he r e s i de nt s of a l o c a l
community had a p r i o r r i g h t t o t he r es our ces produced by o r cont ai ned
wi t hi n t h a t community; t h a t t h e community a s such had a p r i o r obl i ga t i on
t o a i d i t s weak and r es our cel es s members. The r i g h t and t he obl i ga t i on
shoul d t ake p r i o r i t y over t he i n t e r e s t of any p a r t i c u l a r i ndi vi dual and
over any i n t e r e s t out s i de t h e community. It shoul d. even t ake p r i o r i t y
over t he i n t e r e s t of t h e Crown, o r of t he count r y a s a whole. That was,
i n E.P. Thompson's t er ms, t he i l l - a r t i c u l a t e d but powerful t heor y of t he
"moral economy. "
Meanwhile, many merchant s, manuf nct ur er s, l a ndl or ds and l o c a l aut hor -
i t i e s favored anot her , newer, f our - par t t heor y: t h a t a l l goods, i ncl udi ng
l abor power, shoul d be di s pos abl e pr oper t y; t h a t t h e i ndi vi dual pr oper t y
owner had, t he r i g h t , and t o some e xt e nt t he obl i ga t i on, t o use i t t o h i s
own advant age; t h a t t h e c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t , a s s r t i c u l a t e d by t he s t a t e ,
had p r i o r i t y over par ochi al i n t e r e s t s ; t h a t on t h e whole t h e c o l l e c t i v e in.-
t e r e s t wi l l be s t be ser ved by t he r a t i o n a l , unconst r ai ned pur s ui t of i n-
di vi dua l i n t e r e s t s . C.B. Macpherson has c a l l e d i t t h e t heor y of "posses-
s i v e i ndi vi dual i sm. " The f our - par t t heor y i s f a mi l i a r nowadays. It ex-
pr es s es some foundi ng pr i nc i pl e s of our own e r a . But i n t h e ei ght eent h
cent ur y t he t heor y of pos s es s i ve i ndi vi dual i s m was st i l l new and cont es t -
a bl e . To become dominant, i t had t o di s pl a c e t h e r i v a l t heor y of t he
"moral economy." Although t hey di d not dream of sayi ng i t i n t hos e t er ms,
t h e c ont e s t a nt s a t Nacton, Saxmundham and many ot he r pl aces i n ei ght eent h-
cent ur y Br i t a i n were f i g h t i n g t he l os i ng b o t t l e of t he moral economy
a ga i ns t t h e r i s e of pos s es s i ve i ndi vi dual i sm.
Not t h a t t h e f i g h t e r s on e i t h e r s i d e were mere t h e o r i s t s , si mpl e
i deol ogues, hapl es s vi c t i ms of shar ed del us i ons . Real i n t e r e s t s were i n
pl ay. The p a r t i c i p a n t s saw them more o r l e s s c l e a r l y . A t two c e nt ur i e s '
di s t a nc e , we may f i nd some of t h e i r pronouncements quai nt , i ncomprehensi bl e,
o r hopel es s l y romant i c. I n comf or t abl e r e t r os pe c t , we may ques t i on t he
means t hey used t o forward t h e i r i n t e r e s t s : s cof f a t t e a r i ng down poor-
houses, anger a t t h e use of t r oops a ga i ns t unarmed crovds. Yet i n r e t r o-
s pect we a l s o s e e t h a t t h e i r a c t i ons fol l owed a ba s i c , v i s i b l e l ogi c .
The more we l e a r n about ei ght eent h- cent ur y changes i n Gr eat Br i t a i n , t h e
c l e a r e r and more compel l i ng t h a t l o g i c becomes.
The s t r uggl e di d not si mpl y p i t d i f f e r e n t wnys of t i l i nki ng about t he
world a ga i ns t each ot he r . Two modes of s o c i a l or gani zat i on l ocked i n a
b a t t l e t o t h e deat h. The ol d mode ves t ed power i n l and and l o c a l i t y .
The new mode combined t h e expansi on of c a p i t a l i s t pr oper t y r e l a t i o n s
wi t h t h e r i s e of t h e na t i ona l s t a t e . Many ot he r changes flowed from t h a t
f a t e f u l combi nat i on: l a r ge r - s c a l e or gani zat i ons , i ncr eas i ng commercinliza-
t i o n , expanded communications, t h e growth of a p r o l e t s r i a t , a l t e r a t i o n e
of t h e ver y t e x t u r e of d a i l y l i f e . The new mode won. The world of t he
moral economy di s s ol ved. But when or di nar y ei ght eent h- cent ur y Br i mn s
a c t e d c o l l e c t i v e l y a t a l l , us ual l y t hey act ed a ga i ns t one f e a t u r e o r
anot her of t h i s new worl d. On t h e whole, t hey act ed i n def ens e of pa r t i c -
u l a r f e a t ur e s of t h e moral economy.
The e f f o r t t o underst and t h e event s of 1765 t hus t akas us i n s e v e r a l
ver y d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s . It r e qul r e s some knowledge of t h e p a r t i c u l a r
ci r cumst ances i n which t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s found t hemsel ves: t h e problems
1- 7
t hey f aced, t h e enemies be f or e them. t h e means of a c t i o n a t t h e i r di a-
pos al , t h e i r d e f i n i t i o n s of what was happening. I n ei ght eent h- cent ur y
Br i t a i n , t he ma gi s t r a t e s ' e f f o r t s t o cons ol i dat e poor law admi ni s t r at i on.
t h e v u l n e r a b i l i t y of t he l a ndl e s s poor t o swings i n pr i c e s , t he s t r e ngt h
of o t r a d i t i o n i nvol vi ng l o c a l d i r e c t a c t i on a ga i ns t mal ef act or s a r e a l l
c r u c i a l . Underst andi ng 1765 a l s o c a l l s f o r an a n a l y s i s of t he l ar ge-
s c a l e changes behind t he c o n f l l c t s of t h e moment; i n t he ei ght eent h
cent ur y we can s o r t out l i t t l e of t he p a t t e r n of c o n f l i c t u n t i l we d e t e c t
t he conJ oi nt expansi on of c a pi t a l i s m and r i s e of t h e s t a t e . I t t a ke s us ,
f i n n l l y , t o a gener al cons i der at i on of t he ways t h a t peopl e a c t t oget her
i n pur s ui t of shar ed i n t e r e s t s . It t akes us , t h a t i s , i n t o t he s t udy of
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on.
St udyl ng Col l e c t i ve Act i on
The t h i r d I nqui r y -- t h e s t udy of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on -- is t h e chi ef
concern of t h i s book. I wi l l o f t e n i l l u s t r a t e from s p e c i f i c h i s t o r i c a l
ci r cumst ances and w i l l f r equent l y propose explanations i nvol vi ng s t s t e -
making, t he expansi on of c a pi t a l i s m, i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , o r some ot he r bi g
s t r u c t u r n l change. But t h e pages t o f ol l ow wi l l concent r at e on t he gen-
e r a l a n a l y s i s of c o l l e c t i v e oc t i on.
The a na l ys i s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on is a r i s ky advent ur e. For one
t hi ng, t he r e o r e t oo many e xpe r t s around. It is a b i t l i k e food, o r s ex,
o r speech. Almost a l l of us know enough obout food, s ex and speech t o s ur -
vi ve i n our own envi ronment s, and none of us l i k e s t o be t ol d he is i g-
nor ant i n any of t he t hr e e r egar ds. Yet from a s c i e n t i f i c poi nt of view,
we a l l have l o t s t o l e a r n about a l l t hr e e . The same is t r u e of c o l l e c t i v e
oc t i on. Li ke t he ei ght eent h- cent ur y peopl e of Nacton, we a l l draw on a r i ch.
concr et e exper i ence of a c t i n g on shar ed i n t e r e s t s . Among us, f ur t her mor e,
seasoned or gani zer s a r e around t o s ha r e --,and even t o l e c t u r e us on --
1-8
t h e l e s s ons of t h e i r p r a c t i c a l exper i ence. As wi t h t h e s t udent of food,
o r s ex, o r speech, t h e det ermi ned s t udent of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on r uns t he
r i s k e i t h e r of l a be l i ng t h e obvi ous o r of ur gi ng hypot heses which common
s ens e c ont r a di c t s .
It i s more d e l l c a t e t han t h a t . Deep i n ever y di s cus s i on of c ol l e c -
t i v e a c t i on stirs t he l ava of a vol cani c er upt i on: c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on is
obout power and p o l i t i c s : i t i ne vi t a bl y r a i s e s ques t i ons of r i g h t and
wrong, j u s t i c e and i n j u s t i c e , hope and hopel essness; t he ver y s e t t i n g of
t h e problem is l i k e l y t o i ncl ude judgments about who has t h e r i g h t t o a c t .
and what good i t does. Consi der t hes e words from s newspopcr e d i t o r i a l
( Det r oi t Fr ee' Pr eas Oct ober 15, 1975):
Present -day l i b e r a l i s m had i t s r oot s i n t he 19t h cent ur y f a i t h
i n t h e i de a of human pr ogr es s ; t h a t t h e l i v e s of men coul d be made
b e t t e r by c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. I n its ext reme form, It was al ways a
nai ve f a i t h , based on a nai ve view of human nat ur e.
The 20t h cent ur y has been a more t umul t uous time. and i t has
meant cons i der abl e di s i l l us i onment wi t h t he i dea of chong.lng t he
human condi t i on. Consi der i t s mul t i pl e t r agedi es : Two world war s,
t h e Gr eat Depressi on, t he o f t e n bewi l der i ng impact of t echnol ogy on
peopl e, t h e a f t e r e f f e c t s of col oni al i s m and i n a t i t u t i o n o l i z c d r aci sm,
t h e growth i n t h e concent r at i on of weal t h and i nf l uence, t h e 11-bomb,
t he Cold War, t he near-breakdown of mony c i t i e s .
("Heavy s t u f f , t h a t Col l e c t i ve Action!" s a i d t he not e inked on t he e di t or -
i a l when someone t acked i t on our r es ear ch gr oup' s b u l l e t i n board. ) I n
some s e ns e , ' e ve r y pos i t i on one t akes on t he d e s i r a b i l i t y . f e a s i b i l i t y o r
e f f e c t i v e n e s s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on i s a p o l i t i c a l poai t i on. The t one of
l a t e r di s cus s i ons i n t h i s book is gener al l y h o s t i l e t o t h e c o l l e c t i v e ac-
t i on of governments and f avor s bl e t o t h e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on of or di nar y
peopl e; t h a t , t oo, is a p o l i t i c a l s t a nc e .
These r i s k s pr ovi de, a l a s , a s t r ong t empt at i on t o dr e s s up t h e t opi c
i n f ancy, obscur e t ermi nol ogy and fearsome a b s t r a c t models. Yet p l a i n
t a l k a l s o ha s i t s di sadvant ages: peopl e o f t e n respond more t o t he over-
t ones and under t ones t han t o t he s o l i d i nf or mat i on. Without some st andsr d-
i z a t i o n of terms and some e f f o r t a t a b s t r a c t i o n we r un t he f u r t h e r r i s k
of bogging down i n more and more fastidious de s c r i pt i on of tlie d e t a i l s of
p a r t i c u l a r a c t i ons . We must f i nd t h e bal ance poi nt between i mpr eci si on
and obsci ~r ant i am.
Another r j s k r e s u l t s from t he f a c t t h a t c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on s t r a d d l e s
s di vl de which o r d i n a r i l y Repar at es one major ki nd of socLal
a na l ys i s from anot her . That is t h e di vi de between c a us a l and pur posi ve
expl anat i on ( s ee Coleman 1973: 1-5). We may choose t o cons i der t h e a c t i on
of an i ndi vi dua l o r of a group a s t h e r e s u l t a n t of f or ces \ ext er nal t o t he
i ndi vi dual o r group; t hose e xt e r na l f or c e s supposedl y cause t he behavi or .
I n t h i s cas e, we a r e l i k e l y t o t hi nk we have a good expl anat i on when a
c a r e f u l l ook a t t he a c t o r ' s s i t u a t i o n per mi t s us t o deduce more o r l e s s
a c c ur a t e l y how t he a c t o r wi l l behave.
Al t e r na t i ve l y, we may cons i der t h e i ndi vi dua l o r group t o be making
choi ces accor di ng t o some s e t of r u l e s , i mpr i c i t o r e x p l i c i t ; t h a t approach
is pur posi ve. Then we a r e l i k e l y t o t hi nk we have a sound expl anat i on
when we can impute t o t h e a c t o r a r u l e which l e a ds l o g i c a l l y t o most o r
a l l of t he choi ces we obser ve t he a c t o r making. I n t h e real m of col l ec-
t i v e a c t i o n , i t is hard t o bui l d c a us a l models which gi ve s e r i ous a t t e n-
t i o n t o t he i n t e r e s t s , gr i evances and a s p i r a t i o n s of t he a c t or s . It is
a l s o hard t o bui l d pur posi ve models which s pe c i f y t he c ons t r a i nt n l i mi t i n 8
t he pur s ui t of i n t e r e s t s , gr i evances and a s pi r a t i ons .
So why not t r y a s ynt hes i s ? Why not combine cnus al models of con-
s h a i n t s wi t h pur posi ve models of choi ces among a v a i l a b l e cour s es of a c t i on?
The s ynt he s i s i s s ur pr i s i ngl y d i f f i c u l t t o achi eve. Before t h i s book j s
over , we wi l l have s pent a good d e a l of time o s c i l l a t i n g between t he two
a l t e r n a t i v e s , and t r yi ng t o draw them t oget t i er .
The Components of Col l e c t i ve Act i on
The a n a l y s i s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on has f i v e bi g componcnts: i n t e r e s t .
or gani zat i on, mobi l i zat i on, oppor t uni t y and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on i t s e l f . Tl ~e
i n t e r e s t s which concern us most e r e t he ga i ns and l os s e s r e s u l t i n g from a
gr oup' s i n t e r a c t i o n wi t h ot he r groups. Lat er on we wi l l have t o worry
about what c o n s t i t u t e s a r e l e va nt group. and how t o i d e n t i f y o r measure
r e a l , dur abl e i n t e r e s t s .
The or gani zat i on which concer ns us most is t h a t as pect ol: a gr oup' s
s t r u c t u r e which most d i r e c t l y a f f e c t s its capaci t y t o a c t on i t s t n t c r e s t s .
Cl ear l y one of t he problems is t o det er mi ne which fent cl res of or gnni zot i on
do make a di f f e r e nc e . Is i t pos s i bl e , f o r example, t h a t how committed mem-
-
be r s a r e makes l i t t l e di f f e r e nc e t o t l i e form and i n t e n s i t y of t h e i r col -
l e c t i v e a c t i on? Is i t pos s i bl e t h a t t he neat nes s of an or gani zat i on' s
d i v i s i o n of l abor ma t t e r s gr e a t l y?
Hobi . l i zst i on i s t he pr oces s by which a group acqui r es c o l l e c t i v e
c ont r ol over t he r es our ces needed f o r a c t i on. Those r es our ces may be l abor
power, goods, weapons, vot e s and any number of ot he r t hi ngs , j u s t s o l ong
a s t hey a r e us abl e i n a c t i n g on shar ed i n t e r e s t s . Sometimes a group such
,- a s s community has a complex i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e , but few pool.ed r es our ces .
Sometimes i t is r i c h i n r es our ces , but t he r es our ces a r e a l l under i ndi vi d-
ual control. The analysis of mobilization deals witti the ways that groups
acquire resources and make them available for collective action.
Opportunity_ concerns the relationship between a group and the world
around it. Changes in the relationship sometimes threaten the group's in-
terests. They sometimes provide new chances to act on those interests.
The trouble with studying opportunity is that it is hard to reconstruct the
opportunities realistically available to the group at the time. Knowledge
of later outcomes makes it too easy to second-guess a group's action, or
inaction. We con minimize that disadvantage by looking only at contempor-
ary collective action or by concentrating on situations in which the op-
portunities are rigorously defined and strictly lindted. But then we lose
our ability to follow large-scale changes, in their real complexity, over
considerable periods of time.
Collective action consists of people's acting together in pursuit of
common interests. Collective action results from changing combinations of
interests, organization, mobilization and opportunity. The most persistent
problem we will face in analyzing collective action is ita lack of sharp
edges: people v ~ r y continuously from intensive involvement to passive
compliance, interests vary from quite individual to nearly universal. To-
ward the end of this book, we will pursue that complexity into the analysis
of revolutionary processes. Our chief effort, then, will flow along the
lines going from organization to mobilization to collective action to rev-
olution. Especially from mobilization to revolution.
In dealing with each of these problems, the analyses which follow
make serious, debatable choices. With respect to interests, they give
priority to economic and politico1 life. They favor a group's own articu-
lation of its interest over the assumptions of contemporary observers and
over our own retrospective judgment as to what would have been best for
the group. Witti respect to organization, they focus on relntl.vely well-
defined groups. They therefore neglect two fascinating sorta of questions:
how new groups oriented to new world-views come into being, nnd under wl~ot
conditions ill-defined sets of people such as pnnsersby or friendship nct-
works become important collective actors. In regard to mobilization. they
atress the factors of production -- land, labor, capital, technology --
and neglect the possibility that attitudes are more important resources
for collective action than any of these. On the side of opportunity, tlie
analyses in this book atress political opportunity. coalitlon, repression.
relations among governments and well-defined contenders for power over
those governments. When it comes to collective action as such, most of
the concrete discussion deals with contentious gatherings: publicly visible
assemblies in which conflicting interests are cle~rly in play.
Groups, Events and Movements
We find our subject-matter in the overlaps of three intersecting
areas. Sometimes we are interested jn a particulnr population in its own
terms. For example, we want to know what was happenlng to poor people in
eighteenth-century Suffolk. Sometimes we are chiefly concerned with a set
of beliefs. For instance, we wont to follow the r i ~ e and fall of ideas
about the proper treatment of the poor and incompetent. Sometimes certain
kinds of action attract our attention; we might want to understand the con-
ditions in which people take the law into their own hands. The study of
collective action ordinarily requires us to deal with nt least two of these
areas at once. We could dlagram tlie situation like tl~is:
Fi gur e 1-1 Uni t s i n t h e Study of Col l e c t i ve Act i on
1-14
We can t ake groups a s our ba s i c u n i t s f o r t he st udy of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on.
Then we t y p i c a l l y s t a r t wi t h s popul at i on which has some common s t r u c t u r e
and shar ed b e l i e f s . We a r e l i k e l y t o accent t hos e nct i ons whicll we t hl nk
r e s u l t from t h a t combi nat i on of s t r u c t u r e and b e l i e f s . We pay r e l n t l v e l y
l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n t o ot he r ve r s i ons of t he some b e l i e f s o r t o ot he r nc t i ons
of t h e same ki nd. Hi s t o r i e s of t he working c l a s s of t e n t ake t h i s form:
much a t t e n t i o n t o changes i n l i v i n g condi t i ons ; work and i n t e r n a l or gani za-
t i o n ; pl ent y of ma t e r i a l on b e l i e f s and out l ook; a n a l y s i s of t hos e a c t i o n s
which appear t o expr es s t he c ha r a c t e r of t h e worki ng-cl ass popul at i on and
i t s b e l i e f s .
We can a l s o t ake event s a s o u t s t a r t i n g poi nt . We begi n wit11 a
p a r t i c u l a r r evol ut i on, ceremony o r conf r ont at i on. Or we begi n wi t h a c l a s s
of event s: a t t a c k s on poorhouses, demonst r at i ons, revolutions i n gener al .
I n e i t h e r c a s e , we become concerned about popul at i ons and h e l i e f s t o t he
e xt e nt t h a t t hey a r e i nvol ved d i r e c t l y i n t h e event s . Anal yses of "col -
l e c t i v e behavi or" comnonly t ake t h i s t ack. At t h e i r a b s t r a c t extreme.
t hey s t r i v e f o r gener al l aws gover ni ng a l l a c t i o n s of c e r t a i n ki nds of
popul at i ons: l a r g e crowds. f o r example, o r peopl e h i t by d i s a s t e r .
.
The not i on of a "movement" i s more compl i cat ed t han t h e l de a s of
groups and event s . By a s o c i a l movement we o f t e n mean a group of peopl e
i d e n t i f i e d by t h e i r at t achment t o some p a r t i c u l a r s e t of b e l i e f s . In t h a t
c a s e , t h e popul at i on i n ques t i on can change d r a s t i c a l l y , but s o l ong a s
some group of peopl e i s s t i l l working wi t h t he same h e l i e f s , we cons i der
t h e movement t o s ur vi ve. Thus t h e Women's Movement s ur vi ve s major changes
i n composi t i on and i n t e r n a l or gani zat i on. But movement a l s o commonly means
a c t i on. Peopl e wr i t i ng h i s t o r i e s of t he women's movement a r e q u i t e l i k e l y
t o i ncl ude pas t her oi nes who were q u i t e d i f f e r e n t i n b e l i e f s and per s onal
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s from c ur r e nt a c t i v i s t s , j u s t s o l ong a s t h e i r a c t i o n s were
s i mi l a r o r had s i mi l a r e f f e c t s . The f a c t t h a t popul at i on, be l i e f and ac-
t i on do not al ways change t oget her causes s e r i ous problems f o r s t ude nt s of
s o c i a l movements. When t hey di ver ge, shoul d we f ol l ow t he b e l i e f s , what ever
popul at i ons and a c t i o n s t hey become as s oci at ed wi t h? Should we f ol l ow t he
popul at i on. wliotever b e l i e f s and a c t i o n s i t adopt s? Should we f ol l ow t he
a c t i on, r e ga r dl e s s of who does i t and wi t h what i deas ?
What You W i l l Find Here
Thi s book wi l l ge ne r a l l y avoi d t h e a na l ys i s of s o c i a l movements a s
such. Never t hel ess, pl ent y of ma t e r i a l ot he r peopl e have anal yzed under
t h a t headi ng w i l l come i n t o t he di s cus s i on. We wi l l a l t e r n a t e between
groups and event s a s our s t a r t i n g poi nt s f o r t he a n a l y s i s of c o l l e c t i v e ac-
I
t i on. Sometimes we wi l l begi n by as ki ng what peas ant s a r e up t o , and how
t ha t hel p8 us underst and r u r a l c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. Sometimes we wi l l be-
t he c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on of poor peopl e. Sometimes we wi l l t r y t o s t a r t
bot h pl aces a t once, s ear chi ng f o r connect i ons between food r i o t s and pea-
s a n t s o c i a l l i f e , o r between some ot he r c l a s s of event s and some ot he r ki nd
of s o c i a l group.
gi n by as ki ng what food r i o t s a r e about , and how t h a t hel ps us underst and
From Mobi l i zat i on to Revol ut i on o f f e r s bot h a p a r t i a l s ynt he s i s and
-
I
a pr oposal f o r f ur t he r i nqui r y. A s o r e s u l t , i t does not cont ai n a sus-
t ai ned a nol ya i s of a s i n g l e body of evi dence. The i l l u s t r a t i o n s and
f i ndi ngs r un from br awl s t o s t r i k e s t o r evol ut i ons . A t one poi nt o r w-
ot he r t h e di s cus s i on r anges over much of t he world. Most of t he ma t e r i a l .
however, comes from t h e exper i ences of Western Europe end North America
over t he l o s t few c e nt ur i e s . That f ocus gi ve s us much oppor t uni t y t o con-
s i d e r st at emaki ng, t he expansi on of c a pi t a l i s m, i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , urbani -
z a t i on, e l e c t o r a l p o l i t i c s and formal l y-organi zed i n t e r e s t groups.
Al l of
them have f i gur ed i mpor t ant l y i n t h e modern Europenn and American exper i -
ences wi t h c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on.
The f ocus on t he modern West a l s o c oa t s us somet hi ng. It gi ve s us
l i t t l e chance t o t hi nk about c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on i n t he absence of a at r ong
s t a t e , about peopl e whose s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s a r e orgnni zed mai nl y around ki n-
s hi p, about e xot i c movements such a s ~ e l a n e s i a t i car go c u l t s . The concl u-
s i o n s may, a t be s t , appl y onl y t o t he modern ur ban- i ndus t r l al worl d. S t i l l .
making s ens e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on i n t h a t world i s a bi g enough t as k f o r
one book.
The remai ni ng chapt er s f ol l ow a si mpl e pl an. Cllspter 2 c a t a l ogs
competing t he or i e s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i n or der t o l a y out t h e choi ces
bef or e us and t o i d e n t i f y t he major di sagr eement s and unc e r t a i nt i e s .
Chapt er 3 pr e s e nt s and i l l u s t r a t e s a si mpl e s e t of concept s and models f o r
t he a n a l y s i s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on, t hen works out t h e i r implications f o r
t he ways groups a c qui r e t he a b i l i t y t o a c t ; t h a t chapt er dwel l s on l nt e r -
e s t s , or gani zat i on and mobi l i zat i on. Chapt er 4 adds oppor t uni t y t o t he
a na l ys i s ; i t dwel l s on c o n f l i c t , r epr es s i on and s t r uggl e s f o r p we r .
Chapt er 5 c l os e s i n on t he s p e c i f i c forma of c o l l e c t i v e oct i on: how t hey
var y, how t hey r e l a t e t o each ot he r . and h w t hey a l t e r under t he impact
of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , st at emaki ng and ot he r bi g s o c i s l changes. Chnpter
6 c l os e s i n on v i o l e n t c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on whi l e Chapt er 7 a ppl i e s t he gener al
l i n e of r easoni ng t o r e b e l l i o n s and r evol ut i ons . Chapt er 8 t hen sums up
concl usi ons, and i nve nt or i e s new problems encount ered al ong t he way.
CIIAPTER 2: TIIEORIES AND DESCRIPTIONS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
Marx on 1848
Well over a cent ur y ago. Kar l Narx s e t out h i s a na l ys i s of t h e
French Revol ut i on of 1848, and of t h e i n t e r n a l s t r uggl e s which engaged
France f o r t he next f our year s . To Marx, t he r evol ut i on was t h e work
of a temporary c o a l i t i o n among t he Pa r i s i a n p r o l e t a r i a t , t h e p e t t y
bour geoi s i e and an enl i ght ened fragment of t he bour geoi si e. Among
tlie mnny segments of t he popul at i on wi t h i nt e ns e gr i evances a ga i ns t
t he e x i s t i n g s t a t e of a f f a i r s , t he s e were t he ones who combined a
hi gh degr ee of i n t e r n a l communication, a consci ousness of common
i n t e r e s t s , and a c o l l e c t i v e v i s i o n , however f l e e t i n g , of f u t u r e
t r ansf or mut i ons which coul d improve t h e i r l o t .
Altliough each group had i t s own communications s t r u c t u r e , i t s
own i n t e r e s t s and i t s own vi s i on, i n Marx' a n a l y s i s tlie c r i s i s of
1846-47 drove them t oget her and made t h e regime vul ner abl e. Thus
t hey j oi ned i n t oppl i ng t he regi me, a s a mi s er abl e but i ncoher ent
peasant r y s o t by, a s t h e bour geoi s of f i nance and bi g i ndus t r y wrung
t h e i r hands, a s t h e g r e a t l andl or ds l ooked f o r t h e i r own ways t o
p r o f i t by t he de s t r uc t i on of a regime which had shunt ed them a s i de .
The c l a ~ s base of each p a r t i c i p a n t l i mi t e d i t s r evol ut i onar y
vi s i on and checked i t s a c t i v i t y . The c l a s s bas es of t h e r evol ut i onar y
c o a l i t i o n a s a whole, Marx t hought . condemned i t t o de f a ul t on t he
promi ses of s pr i ng 1848. Despi t e t h e ext ensi on of t he r evol ut i onar y
c o a l i t i o n t o pr ol e t a r i a ns and bour geoi s i n a few advanced c e n t e r s
out s i de of Pa r i s , t l i e r evol ut i onar y l eader s hi p compromised. It f a i l e d
t o expand i t s program o r i t s power. The c o a l i t i o n began t o d i s i n t e g r a t e
a s t he workers and t he bour geoi s wi t hi n i t headed s e pa r a t e ways. A
cons er vat i ve c o a l i t i o n of l andl or ds and bour geoi s formed, wit11 pas s i ve
suppor t from t he more comf or t abl e segments of t h e peasant r y. Thus
began t h e pr ocess which l ed t o Loui s Napoleon' s coup d ' 6 t a t and t he
es t abl i s hment of an empi re, an empi re devot ed t o cancel i ng t h e ga i ns
of t h e r e vol ut i on and i ns ur i ng a ga i ns t its r ecur r ence. Morx' accottnt
cont ai ned a good d e a l more -- not l e a s t t he r e l e n t l e s s wi t he t r ai ned
on t he i ndi vi dua l p e r s o n a l i t i e s of ' 48 -- but t he s e a r e t h e main l i n e s
of t h e a n a l y s i s .
Twelve decades of h i s t o r i c a l work have i d e n t i f i e d some gaps and
e r r o r s i n Marx' a na l ys i s . For one example, Marx di d not s e e t h a t many
French workers were al r eady sympat het i c t o Bonaporte i n 1848. For
anot her , he ne i t he r appr eci at ed t h e e xt e nt of t he armed r e s i s t a nc e
t o t he 1851 coup nor recogni zed t h e cons i der abl e involvement oE
l andwni ng peas ant s i n t h a t i ns ur r e c t i on. Yet t he arguments Morx
s t a t e d i n The Ei uht eent h Brumaire of Loui s Bonapart e and The Cl aos
St r uggl es i n France have st ood t h e passage of t i me r a t he r wel l . In
h i s book-length conf r ont at i on of Marx' account wit11 t h e Second Republ i c
s c hol a r s have come t o k n w, Roger Pr i c e o f f e r s many a c a v i l and not a
few nuances, but ends up i n b a s i c agreement . The brood l i n e s of Marx'
*
a n a l y s i s have sur vi ved more t hen a hundred ye a r s of h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m.
*
For a det ermi ned at t empt t o revi ew and r e v i s e Morx' arguments
concerni ng t he dct er ml nont s of worker mi l i t nncy, which concl udes
wi t h a more ext ens i ve r es t at ement t han Pr i c e f i n d s necessar y f o r
1848, s e e J . A. ~ a n k s ' Marxi st Soci ol ogy i n Act i on.
Few i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of h i s t o r i c a l event s l a s t a s l ong a s a
cent ur y. Some endure because s c hol a r s l o s e i n t e r e s t s i n tlie event s.
ot hc r s because t hey f i t pr e va i l i ng pr ej udi ces and doct r i nes . t he
remai ni ng few because t hey expl ai n what happened b e t t e r t han t h e i r
avai . l abl e compet i t or s do. Although t he r i s e of Marxi st doc t r i ne s
and p o l i t i c a l movements has undoubt edl y promoted t h e accept ance of
Morx' h i s t o r i c a l anal ys es a s wel l , i t has a l s o di r e c t e d c r i t i c i s m
and new r es ear ch t o h i s main arguments. That t hey hove sur vi ved
t e s t i f i e s t o t h e i r expl anat or y power.
I f t h a t is s o, we might pay a t t e n t i o n t o Marx' mode of a na l ys i s .
Tmpl l ci t l y. Harx di vi ded t he e n t i r e popul at i on i n t o s o c i a l c l a s s e s
based on t h e l r r e l a t i ons hi ps t o t h e pr e va i l i ng means of pr oduct i on.
Expl i c i t l y, he i d e n t i f i e d t h e major v i s i b l e a c t o r s i n t he p o l i t i c s
of t he t i me wi t h t h e i r c l a s s bas es , o f f e r l n g judgments of t h e i r b a s f c
i n t e r e s t s , consci ous a s p i r a t i o n s , a r t i c u l a t e d gr i evances and c o l l e c t i v e
r cadi nes s f o r a c t i on. Cl as s es a c t , o r f a i l t o a c t . I n gener al ,
i ndi vi dua l s and i n s t i t u t i o n s a c t on behal f of p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l
c l a s s e s . (There is an i mpor t ant except i on: i n anal yzi ng Loui s
Napoleon' s s e i z u r e of power. Marx al l owed t h a t t hos e who run t he
s t a t e may a c t , a t l e a s t f or a whi l e, i n t h e i r own p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t
wi t l ~out r ef er ence t o t h e i r c l a s s bas e. ) I n anal yzi ng r eadi nes s t o
a c t . Uarx at t ached g r e a t i mport ance t o t he e a s e and d u r a b i l i t y of
communications wi t t ~i . n t he c l a s s , t o t he v i s i b l e pr esence of a c l a s s
enemy. When Morx' p o l i t i c a l a c t o r s a c t e d, t hey di d s o out of common
i n t e r e s t s , mut ual awareness and i n t e r n a l or gani zat i on.
A s compared wi t h ot he r a n a l y s t s of t he same event s , Harx at t ached
l i t t l e i mport ance t o gener al i zed t ens i on, momentary i mpul ses o r
per s onal di s or gani zat i on. While he saw t he Lumpenpr ol et ar i at o s
l i a b l e t o cri me and di s or de r , he a l s o sow a world of difference between
, brawl i ng and making r evol ut i ons . I f you want t o anal yze major c o n f l i c t s ,
we hear him t e l l i n g us , i d e n t i f y t h e major c l a s s e s and i n t e r e s t s which
emerge from t h e or gani zat i on of pr oduct l on. Cat al ogue t he r c s u l t l n g
c o n f l i c t s of i n t e r e s t . Examine each c l a s s you have enumerated i n t erms
of i t s pr epar edness t o a c t on i t s i n t e r e s t s . Work out tlie c l a s s bas es
of t h e chi ef i n s t i t u t i o n s and l e a de r s i nvol ved i n t he c o n f l i c t . Wntch
out f o r c r i s e s which make t he dominant cl os s ea vul ner abl e, sod expect
t he or gani zed under cl as s es t o s t r i k e . There is much more t o i t , but
t hos e a r e Marx' e s s e n t i a l i ns t r uc t i ons .
We a r e deal i ng wi t h a t heor y of c o l l e c t i v e act i on: of t he
condi t i ons i n which peopl e a c t t oget her i n pur s ui t of common ends.
Harx' t heor y of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on i s debat abl e. It i s not s e l f -
evi dent t h a t s o c i a l c l a s s e s and t h e i r r e pr e s e nt a t i ve s a r e t h e pr i nc i pa l
a c t o r s i n p o l i t i c s . It i s not ne c e s s a r i l y t r u e t h a t pr i or or gani zat i on
s t r ongl y a f f e c t s a group' a r eadi nes s t o nct . It can e a s i l y be
mai nt ai ned, cont r ar y t o Harx, t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t s i n mass movements
t end t o i gnor e t h e i r own t r u e i n t e r e s t s . The Morxinn t heor y emplinsizes
t he c o l l e c t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y of p o l i t i c a l a c t i on.
Nowadays, ~ a r x ' t heor y sounds f a mi l i a r . I n some wnyu i t seems
obvi ous. Yet i n tlie ni net eent h cent ur y. i t broke de c i s i ve l y wl t h tlie
pr e va i l i ng s ccount s of mass a c t i on. Ot her t he or i e s t r e nt e d "t he
peopl e" a s i ncapabl e of cont i nuous, c a l c ul a t i ng pur s ui t of t h c i r
c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s , a s respondi ng mai nl y t o i mpul ses -- good i mpul ses
o r bffd -- and t o mani pul at i on by e l i t e s . Today t h e Hdrxlon view agai n
has i mpor t ant compet i t or s. The condescendi ng ni net eent h- cent ur y view
of mass action has remained popular with critics of democracy. It
has lingered on in academic analyses of "mass society." And that theory.
too, has rivals.
Among processional students of politics, at least three additional
lines of argument have acquired eloquent advocates. We can identify
the lines loosely with three other nineteenth-century and early
twentieth-century figures: Emile Durkheim. John Stuart Mill and Max
Weber. Figure 2-1 sketches out the general logic of Marxian, Durkheim-
Ian, Millian and Weberisn analyses. The Marxisn analysis, as we have
just seen, generally traces collective action back to solidarity
within groups and conflicts of interest between groups, considers
the solidarity and tlie conflicts of interest to reinforce each other,
and bases both of them on the organization of production. Durkheim
treated collective action as a relatively direct response to processes
of integration and disintegration in whole societies. As the diagram
suggests, his followers have developed rather different explanations
of routine and non-routine collective action. The non-routine forms.
according to Durkheimians, grow from the discontent and pursuit of
individual interests produced by disintegration of the division of
labor; under conditions of routine integration, on tlie other hand,
aolidnrity leads to collective action, which in its turn reinforces
solidarity. Mill rooted collective action in the strictly calculating
pursuit of individual interest. The distinctive approach of Millians,
as the diagram indicates, is the analysis of the various decision
rules which translate individual interests into individual action and
which aggregate individual actions into collective action. Max Weber,
finally, portrayed collective action as the outgrowth of commitment to
Figure 2-1: Competing Analyses
of Collective Action
Marxian
organization - solidarity
of production
collective
conflicting
interests
I I
Durkheimian
NON-ROUTINE ROUTINE 1
I
ec t ion
I I I
J
division of labor
discontent dividual
interest
collective
interest action act ion
solidarity (cl
routine action
Weberian
ON-ROUTINE
interest collective
belief organization
ROUTINE
interest , - collective
belief . - organization
c e r t a i n syst ems of b e l i e f . Weberians, l i k e Durkheimions, t end t o propose
d i f f e r e n t expl anat i ons f o r r out i ne and non-rout i ne c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on:
i n t he non-rout i ne forms t he shar ed b e l i e f s of t he group have a s t r ong,
d i r e c t i mpsct on t h e gr oup' s c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , whi l e a s a c t i on r o u t i n i z e s
two t hi ngs happen: or gani zat i on grows up t o medi at e between t h e b e l i e f s
and t he a c t i on, and group i n t e r e s t s pl ay a l a r ge r and more d i r e c t r o l e
i n c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on.
Marx. Durkheim, M i l l and Neber had d i s t i n c t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t vi ews
of t h e worl d, and bequeathed t o t hei ; h e i r s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t
anal ys es of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. Let us revi ew c h a r a c t e r i s t i c anal ys es
i n t he Durkhcimian, Mi l l i on and Weberian t r a d i t i o n s bef or e r e t ur ni ng t o
t he Mnrxian l i n e of argument.
Durkheim
Durkheim c r y s t a l l i z e d a wi despread ni net eent h- cent ur y view of .
what i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n was doi ng t o t he worl d. He f ashi oned i t i n t o
a s e t of arguments which have remained dominant i n soci ol ogy, e s pe c i a l l y
h e r i c a n , s o c i o l o g y , up t o our own t i me. A s Ta l c ot t Par sons put i t :
. . . i t was t he problem of t he i nt e gr a t i on of t he s o c i a l syst em,
of wliat l ~ o l d s s o c i e t i e s t oget her , which was t he most p e r s i s t e n t
pr eoccupat i on of Durkheim's c a r e e r . I n t he s i t u a t i o n of t h e t i me,
one coul d not have chosen a more s t r a t e g i c f ocus f or c ont r i but i ng
t o s oc i ol ogi c a l t heor y. Moreover, t h e work Durkheim di d i n t h i s
f i e l d can be s a i d t o have been not hi ng s hor t of epoch-making; he
di d not s t and e n t i r e l y al one, but h i s work was f a r more s har pl y
focused and deepl y pe ne t r a t i ng t han t h a t of any ot he r aut hor of
h i s t i mc (Parsons 1960: 118) .
I n The Di vi s i on of Labor i n Soc i e t y and i n Sul ci de, Durkheim l ni d out
a view of something c a l l e d a "soci et y" d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g uns t eadi l y i n
r esponse t o a v a r i e t y of pr es s ur es . Spenking a b s t r a c t l y , Durkheim
summed up t hose pr es s ur es a s a growth i n t he volume and de ns i t y of
s oc i e t y. Speaking c onc r e t e l y, he di s cus s ed occupot i onol changes.
The pr es s ur es emphat i cal l y i ncl uded t he i n t e r n a l l o g i c of Lndus-
t r i a l i z a t i o n . On t he ver y f i r s t page of Di vi si on of Labor, Durkhcim
t e l l s us
We need have no f u r t h e r i l l u s i o n s about t he t endenci es of modern
i ndus t r y: i t advances s t e a d i l y t owards powerful mochines.
t owards g r e a t concent r at i ons of f or c e s and c a p i t o l , and consequent l y
t o t h e ext reme d i v i s i o n of l abor . Occupat i ons a r e i n f i n i t e l y
s epar at ed and s pe c i a l i z e d, not onl y i ns i de t h e f a c t o r i e s , but
each product i s i t s e l f a s p e c i a l t y dependent upon o t h e r s (Durkhelm
1933: 39).
The "s oci et y, " accor di ng t o Durkheim, e x e r t s its c ont r ol over i ndi vi dua l s
v i a t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a shar ed consci ousness. A s Durkheim put s i t ,
"The t o t a l i t y of b e l i e f s and sent i ment s common t o aver age c i t i z c n s of t he
same s oc i e t y forms a det er mi nat e syst em which has i t s own l i f e ; one may
c a l l i t t h e c o l l e c t i v e o r common consci ence" (Durkheim 1933: 79). The
advanci ng d i v i s i o n of l a bor , he s a ys , t hr e a t e ns t he shar ed consci ousness
based on t he e s s e n t i a l s i mi l a r i t y of i ndi vi dua l s , and t her eby t hr e a t e ns
t he primacy of t he needs and demands of t h e s oc i e t y a s a whole over t he
i mpul ses and i n t e r e s t s of t he i ndi vi dua l . A new shar ed consci ousness
based on i nt er dependence and common f a t e is bot h pr obl emat i c and sl ow
t o emerge. I n t o t he gap between t he l e v e l of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and t h e
l e v e l of shar ed consci ousness moves e.
To be precise, anomie is Durkheim's name for that gap between the
degree of differentiation and the extent of regulation of social relations;
from it he derives a set of undesirable results: individual disorienta-
tion, destructive social life, extensive conflict. Uis concrete examples
again come almost entirely from the industrial world. They are the
economic crash, the conflict between management and labor, the separation
of work arid family life, and so on through the standard concerns of
nineteenth-century reformers.
In Suicide. Durklieim sketches the consequences of a rapid growth in
power and wealth:
Time is required for the public conscience to reclassify men and
things. So long as the social forces tlius freed have not regained
equilibrium, their respective values are unknown and so all
regulation is lacking for a time . . . Consequently, there is no
restraint upon aspirations . . . With increased prosperity desires
increase. At the very moment when traditional rules have lost
thcir autl~ority, the richer prize offered these appetites stimulates
them and makes them more exigent and impatient of colitrol. The
state of de-regulation or anomy is thus further heightened by
passions being less dlsclplined, precisely when they need more
disciplining (Durkheim 1951: 253).
We begin to see that Durkheim not only propounded a theory of social
chnnge, but also proposed a theory of collective action.
In fact, he proposed two or three of each. When it comes to the
link between large-scale social change and collective action, we find
Durkheim distinguishing sharply between the orderly pursuit of shared
interests which occurs when the division of labor is not outrunning the
shared consciousness, and the free-for-all which results from anomie.
Later. in The Elementary Forms of the Religious E, we find Durkheim
analyzing the solidarity producing consequences of ritualized, approved
forms of collective action. In an amazingly anthropomorphic passage. IIC
says:
When a society is going through circumstances which sadden, perplex
or irritate it, it exercises a pressure over its members, to make
them bear witness, by significant acts, to their sorrow, perplexity
or anger. It imposes upon them the duty of weeping, groaning or
inflicting wounds upon themselves or others, for these collective
manifestations, and the moral communion which they show and
strengthen, restore to the group the energy which circumntances
threaten to take away from it, and tlius they enable it to hecome
settled (Durkheim 1961: 459).
The basic Durkheimisn idea presents s society strained by a continuous
struggle between forces of disintegration (notably rapid differentiation)
and forces of integration (notably new or renewed commitment to al~sred
beliefs). From the basic notion Durkheim derives models of three
different kinds of collective action: let us call them routine, snomic.
and restorative.
We might sum up Durkheim's snalysin of collective action in a aimplc
diagram:
SIIARED
RELIEF
Fj gur e 2-2: Durklieim's Anal ysi s
of Col l e c t i ve Act i on
DIFFERENTIATION , p p
The shaded a r e a above t h e di agonal is nnf e; t he r e , t he development of
shar ed be l i e f is equal t o or gr e a t e r t han t he s t r e s s imposed by
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and ot he r c a l a mi t i e s . The a r e a below t he di ngonnl is
dangerous: t he r e , d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o u t s t r i p s t h e e xt e nt of shar ed b e l i e f .
Rout i ne c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on goes on i n t he s a f e a r e a , and renews shar ed
be l i e f r out i ne l y. Anomic c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on i nc r e a s e s a s t h e noci et y
s l i d e s down from t l i e di agonal . and per pet uat es i t n e l f by shaki ng slinred
b e l i e f s even more tlian t hey were al r eady shaken. Res t or at i ve col . l ect i ve
a c t i on occur s near t he di agonal , and moves t he s oc i e t y back i n t o t he s a f e
ar ea. Although t he l anguage ts a l i t t l e odd, tlie argument is very f a mi l i a r .
Durkheim'a t heor y, i n c ont r a s t t o Marx'. l e a ds us t o expect anomic
and r e s t o r a t i v e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on t o r i s e a s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n accel er nt en.
It l e a ds us t o a n t i c i p a t e f i ndi ng tlie popul at i ons newly cr eat ed o r d i s -
pl aced by d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n a t t h e c e nt e r of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. It
p r e d i c t s s c l os e a s s oc i a t i on among s ui c i de , cr i me, vi ol ence rind non-
r out i ne c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. I n t he t went i et h cent ur y. most t he or i e s
f o r c o l l e c t i v e behavi or embody some ver s i on of t l i e Durkhejmian argument.
Indeed, t he s t andar d anal ys es of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , ur bs ni ent I on, devi ance.
s o c i a l c ont r ol , s o c i a l d i s o r g a n i z ~ t i o n and c o l l e c t i v e behavi or which
e me r ge di nt he t went i et h cent ur y a l l bbr e t he Durkheimian stomp.
The Durkheimian Tr a di t i on
To s e e t h i s c l e a r l y , we need onl y exnmine an i n f l u e n t i n 1 book from
t he 19608: Samuel Hunt i ngt on' s P o l i t i c a l Order i n Changlng Soc i e t i e s .
Hunt i ngt on ar gues t h a t t h e ext ens i ve domest i c conf l . i ct i n devel opi ng
c ount r i e s a f t e r World War I1 r e s ul t e d from t h e f a c t t h a t p o l i t t c a l
i n s t i t u t i o n s developed onl y sl owl y, whi l e r api d s o c i n l change bot h
pl aced new s t r a i n on e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and promoted tlie
participation of new, demanding groups in political life. Concretely:
Social and economic change -- urbanization, increases in literacy
and education, industrialization, mass media expansion -- extend
political consciousneaa, multiply political demands, broaden political
participation. These changes undermine traditional sources of
political authority and traditional political institutions; they
enormoua1.y complicate the problems o,F cresting new bases of political
association and new political institutions combining legitimacy and
effectiveness. The rates of social mobilization and the expansion
of political participation are high; the rates of political organization
and institutionalization are low. The result is political instability
and disorder (Huntington 1968: 5 ) .
Tlle larger the discrepancy between institutionalization and modernization.
the greater the disorder. At the extreme lies revolution: "The
political essence of revolution is the rapid expansion of political
consciousness and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics
at a speed which makes it impossible for existing political institutions
to assimilate them" (Huntington 1968: 266).
In this formulation, either a speedup of instittltionalization or a
slowdown of modernization will decrease the amount of disorder. But if
political institutions are very rigid, they will inhibit essential social
change. Schematically, Huntington's analysis takes the pattern of Figure
2-3. Furthermore, the argument describes different paths through these
possibilities, depending on the pace of social change:
Figure 2-3: Iluntington's
Basic Argument
A
RIGIDITY , .'
REVOLUTION
>
MODERNIZATION
Figure 2-4: Trajectories of Slow and Rapid Social
Change in Huntington's Argument
I
SLOW SOCIAL CHANGE RAPID SOCIAL CHANCE
I
R
R
Slow social cl~onge, then, is likely to be orderly throughout its course.
Rnpid social change brings a likelihood of disorder, and a possibility
L
of revolution. The similarity to Durkheim is impressive. Institutional-
ization takes the place of Durkheim's shared beliefs, modernization the
place of Durklieim's differentiation. Huntington's model is much more
clearly political than Durkheim's. On the one side of Huntington's ,
argument, the capacity of political institutions (not of society in
general) to handle new demands becomes crucial. On the other, the
political mobilization of new groups and the production of new political
problems are the chicf means by which modernization incites disorder.
Yet Durkheim could not have disagreed very vociferously; at most he
would hove insisted on the importance of non-political restraints,
especially religion, ritual, and occupational organization. The
Durkheimian argument is very much alive. (For an empirical evaluation
of onc part of Huntington's argument -- casting doubt on rapid mobiliza-
tion as a major source of political disorder -- see Przeworski 1975).
Another version from the 1960s appears in Chalmers Johnson's
Revolutionary Change. Johnson identifies three clusters of causes for
revolution:
1. A disequilibrated social system, especially one with power
deflation: "the fact that during a period of change the inte-
gration of a system depends increasingly upon the maintenance and
deployment of force by the occupants of the formal authority
statuses" (Johnson 1966: 90).
2. Inability of authorities to develop policies which mnintaln the
confidence of ordinary people.
3. . Events, often fortuitous, which deprive tlie elite of thetr
means of enforcing conformity, or which lead revolutionary groups
to believe they can deprive the elite of those means.
Johnson then links these very general phenomena to individual behavior
through the sequence:
rapid change
systemic disequilibrium
\
overtaxing of existing means of homeostatic and purposive
response to change
. \
individual disorientation
-panic-anxiety-shame-guilt-depression, ctc.
\ formation of movements of protest
True to his Durkheimian heritage, he proposes the suicide rate as o
prime index of disequilibrium.
The Durkheimian kernel in Johnson's scheme hns around it a husk
of post-Durkheimisn,words and ideas. Johnson's analysis of revolution
differs from Huntington's in several important regards. It is even more
strictly political than Huntington's. The pivotal vnriablc is tlie
authority of the established elite. Yet the central idea treots disorder
as the outcome of a process in which social change weakens the controls
and attachments which under more stable conditions hold people in their
places.
Let us take a third recent example: Ted Gurr's Why Men Rebel.
Gurr seeks to provide a general explanation of "political violence."
Political violence includes all collective attacks on major political
a c t o r s -- e s pe c i a l l y agent s of t he s t a t e -- wi t hi n a p a r t i c u l a r community.
I ns t ead of e l a bor a t i ng a t heor y of how p o l i t i c a l communities oper at e,
however, Gurr concent r at es on exper i ences which happen t o i ndi vi dua l s
nnd t hen cumulaee i n t o mass a c t i on.
Gur r ' s c e n t r a l arguments concern a psychol ogi cal pr ocess. I ndi vi dual s
nnger when t hey s ens e a l a r g e gap between what t hey ge t and what t hey
deser ve. That can happen t hrough a de c l i ne i n what t hey g e t , o r s r i s e
i n what t hey f e e l t hey des er ve. Given t h e chance, angry peopl e r e be l .
Whcn many peopl e go t hrough t h a t same exper i ence of i nc r e a s i ng Rel at i ve
Depr i vat i on pl us wi deni ng oppor t uni t y f o r r e be l l i on a t t he same time.
p o l i t i c a l vi ol ence gener al i zes . Gurr once summarized t he argument i n
t h i s way:
blsgnitude of
poJ . i t i ca1 = RD + (RD x JUST x BALANCE) +
vi ol ence
"wl ~ere RD i s t h e scope nnd i n t e n s i t y of r e l a t i v e depr i vat i on ( di s -
cont ent ) i n a popul s t i on; JUST is t h e scope and i n t e n s i t y of b e l i e f s
i n t h a t popul at i on about t he j u s t i f i a b i l i t y and u t i l i t y of engagi ng
i n ove r t s t r i f c ; BALANCE r e f e r s t o t he bal ance of or gani zat i on and
coer ci ve c a pnc i t i e s between d i s s i d e n t s and regi mes; and is an e r r o r
term" (Curr h Duval 1973: 137). Si mi l ar i deas hove o f t e n emerged i n
t he a na l ys i s of American g l ~ e t t o r e be l l i ons . of Lat i n Anlerican pal ace
coups, and of t h e French Revol ut i on. We saw p a r t of t h e argument
formul at ed i n Durkhelm' s t r eat ment of s ui c i de . Gurr has expl i cat ed t he
l o g i c of t h i s l i n e of nna l ys l s , and devel oped means of measuri ng n
number of t he va r i nbl e s i nvol ved -- al t hough not , na i t happens, t o
measure RD and JUST d i r e c t l y .
Gurr complements h i s argument wi t h an a na l ys i s of 1, 100 " s t r i f e
event s" which occur r ed i n 114 s t a t e s o r col oni es from 1961 through 1965.
I n t h e f i r s t round of a na l ys i s , Gurr t akes t he r e s u l t s a s conf i r mi ng t h e
i nf l ue nc e of some of t he va r i a bl e s which presumably produce RD, some
v a r i a b l e s measuri ng behavi or which presumably r e f l e c t JUST and,
e s p e c i a l l y , a c l u s t e r of va r i a bl e s out s i de t he cor e t heor y: Soc i a l
and St r u c t u r a l Fa c i l i t a t i o n . A l a t e r f or mul at i on c ont a i ns much l e s s
psychology. I n t h e new s e t of models, t h e major pr e di c t or s t o t h e
magnitude of p o l i t i c a l vi ol ence r epr es ent " ' cl eavages' and di s cr i mi nat or y
i n e q u a l i t i e s . . . r e l a t i v e impoverishment and f or ei gn economic expl oi -
t a t i o n . . . shor t - t er m de c l i ne s i n economic condf t i ons . . . rcgimc
i mposi t i on of new p o l i t i c a l s a nc t i ons . . . h i s t o r i c a l pe r s i s t e nc e of
di s s i de nt - i ni t i a t e d c o n f l i c t s . . . l e v e l of economic development . . .
e xt e r na l i nt e r ve nt i on on behal f of di s s i de nt s " (Gurr h Duval 1973:
138-139). These va r i a bl e s do appear t o account J oi r l t l y f o r a good d e a l
of t he i n t e r n a t i o n a l v a r i a t i o n i n major domest i c c o n f l i c t s from 1961
t hrough 1965. I n t h i s r ef or mul at i on, Ilowever, t he Durkl ~el ml sn Li nt has
al most bl eached away. To t h e e xt e nt t h a t t he models embody a c e n t r a l
argument, t he argument accent uat es t h e pr i nc i pa l a c t o r s ' i n t e r c a t s and
capaci t y t o a c t .
The s t andar d Durkheiminn argument s, a s we have s een, s e l e c t heavi l y
from among t h e det er mi nant s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on - or gani zat i on,
mobi l i zat i on, oppor t uni t y and i n t e r e s t s . On t he whole, t hey negl ect
t he a n a l y s i s of or gani zat i on and mobi l i zat i on i n f avor of a vlcw of
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on a s a r e s u l t a n t of i n t e r e s t pl us oppor t uni t y. The
pr eval ent ver s i on of i n t e r e s t , f ur t her mor e, is n t t i t u d i n a l : t he
mot i vat i ons , a n x i e t i e s and needs of i ndi vi dual s . Oppor t unl t y, i n t h e
Durkheimian l i n e , c o n s i s t s mai nl y of t he pr esence o r absence of s o c i a l
c ont r ol s dver t h c expr es s i on' of t hos e mot i vat i ons , a n x i e t i e s and needs.
Tf we t ake Durkheimian argument s s e r i ous l y, we wi l l expect t o f i nd
s har p di s c ont i nui t y between r out i ne and non-rout i ne c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on;
t h e i r caus es , cont ent and consequences wi l l a l l d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y .
We w i l l hypot hesi ze t h a t t he f a s t e r and more ext ens i ve t he s o c i a l change,
t he more wi despread t he onomic and r e s t o r a t i v e forms of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on;
concr et el y, we wi l l expect r api d i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n o r ur bani zat i on t o
produce except i onal l y hi gh l e v e l s of c o n f l i c t and pr ot e s t . We wi l l
srlppose t h a t i ndi vi dual di s or de r and c o l l e c t i v e p r o t e s t a r e c l os e l y
t i e d t o each ot he r , and sometimes i ndi s t i ngui s ha bl e . We wi l l ar gue
t h a t t he more coher ent and compel l i ng a gr oup' s b e l i e f s , t he l e s s l i k e l y
i t is t o engage i n di s or de r l y behavi or . We wi l l imagine t h a t s h i f t s i n
i ndi vi dual d l s s o t i n f a c t i o n s and a n x i e t i e s a r e t he s t r onge s t and most
r c l i a b l e pr e di c t or s of c o l l e c t i v e cont ent i on.
Some ver s i on of t he Durkheimian f or mul at i on hns been t he dominant
expl anat i on of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on -- e s pe c i a l l y cont ent i ous and non-
r out i ne c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on -- f o r c l os e t o a cent ur y. I t st i l l appeal s
t o many peopl e t oday. Never t hel ess, even i n America, Durkheim' s a n a l y s i s
hns never q u i t e squeezed out i t s major r i v a l s : arguments i n t h e t r a di -
t i ons of M i l l . Weber and Marx.
M i l l and t h e Ut i l i t a r i a n s
John St ua r t M i l l r e pr e s e nt s t h e t r eat ment of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on a s
a s t r i c t l y c a l c ~ ~ l a t i n g pur s ui t of i ndi vi dual i n t e r e s t . Among t he Engl i sh
Ut i l i t a r i a n s , we f i nd t h e i ndi vi dua l acqui es ci ng i n a s e t of bi ndi ng
p o l i t i c a l arrangement s (n s t e t e , t he r u l e s of t h e game o r some syst em
of cooper at i on) a t t h e expense of some of h i s shor t - r un i n t e r e s t s . He
does s o i n or de r t o i ns ur e t he pur s ui t of h i s i n t c r e s t s i n t he l ong run.
As Buchanan and Tul l ock say of Mill's most di s t i ngui s hed predccesnor:
Hume r ecogni zed, of cour s e, t h a t were i t poossible, t he i n d i v l d ~l a l ' s
own i n t e r e s t would b e s t be ser ved by t he adher i ng t o t he convcnt i onal
r u l e s of e l l ot her per sons but hi msel f whi l e remai ni ng f r e e t o v i o l a t e
t hes e r ul e s . However, pr e c i s e l y because such r u l e s a r e s o c i a l l y
der i ved, t hey must appl y gener al l y. Ilence each i ndi vi dual must
r ecogni ze t h a t , were he t o be f r e e t o v i o l a t e convent i on, ot hc r s
must be s i mi l a r l y f r e e , and a s compared wi t h t h i s c ha ot i c s t a t e of
a f f a i r s , he wi l l r a t i o n a l l y choose t o accept r e s t r i c t i o n s on h i s
own behavi or (Buchsnan h Tul l ock 1962: 315):
The key a n a l y t i c ques t i ons concern t he det er mi nant s of i ndi vi dual
de c i s i ons , t he c o l l e c t i v e consequences of a l t e r n a t i v e deci s i on r u l e s ,
and t h e i n t e r a c t i o n between t he two.
M i l l and t he Ut i l i t a r i a n s a r e i mper f ect exempl ars of t he r el evant
t went i et h- cent ur y l i n e of argument. Thei r account of collective a c t i on
d e a l t al most excl us i vel y wi t h t he s t a t e . I t gave nl most no a t t e n t i o n
e i t h e r t o t h e s t r i v i n g of groups between t he i ndi vi dual and t hc s t a t e
a s a det er mi nant of p o l i t i c a l de c i s i ons o r t o t he expl anat i on of t h e
behavi or of t h e groups t hemsel ves. "The i ndi vi dual i s m of t he u t i l i t o r i o n s .
t h e i r expl anat i on of s o c i a l phenomena by e humah psychology supposedl y
p r i o r t o s oc i e t y, " colmnents John Plamenatz (1949: 158). "nl so made
them i n d i f f e r e n t t o s o c i a l c l a s s e s . They concei ved of ~ o c i e t y a s
composed of a number of competing i ndi vl dr l nl s and not of r i v a l g r o ~ ~ p s . "
For John St u a r t M i l l , i t would be more a c c ur a t e t o s ay Ile feRred
c l a s s a c t i on t han t o say be i gnored i t . I n a chapt er of h i s 9 r c s e n t a t i v e
Government titled OF THE INFIRMITIES AND DANCERS TO WllICH REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT IS LIABLE, Mill wrote "If we consider as a class, politically
speaking, any number of persons who have the same sinister interest --
that is, whose direct and apparent interest points toward the same
description of bad measures; the desirable object would be that no class,
and no combination of classes likely to combine, should be able to
' exercise a preponderant influence in the government" (Mill 1950: 342).
(The term "sinister interest" comes from Bentham.) At some points in
hia political career. Mi11 feared the class action of landowners: at
others, of landless laborers (Duncan 1973: chapter 6). But at all
points he considered it natural and inevitable that a class given an
opportunity to act on a particular narrow interest would do so. The
task of government -- and of a theory of representative government --
was to forestall that opportunity, to make likely action on the common
interest of the entire population.
tlill's liberal solution and his cautious optimism foreshadowed
those of twentieth-century pluralists:
The reason why, in any tolerably constituted society, justice
and the general interest mostly in the end carry their point,
is that the separate and selfish interests of mankind are almost
always divided: some are interested in what is wrong, but some,
also, have their private interest on the side of what is right;
and those who are governed by higher considerations, though too
few and weak to prevail against the whole of the others, usually
after sufficient discussion and agitation become strong enough
to turn the bnlance in favour of the body of private interests
which is on the some side with them (Mill 1950: 343).
A good constitution and a valid theory of political obligation,
thought Mill, would facilitate that outcome.
By contrast with Mill, twentieth-century theorists of indivldunl
interests show relatively little interest in the general problem of
political obligation. Instead, they show much interest in two other
problems: the consequences of alternative decision rules and tlie
causes and effects of different forms of interest-group politics. Yet
Mill is a useful symbol for a line of argument which leads us to expect
collective action to fluctuate largely as a consequence of changing
decision rules and the changing costs of accomplishing various individ-
ual interests.
Collective Choice
The clearest contemporary expressions of this view appenr in
models of collective choice: the determinants of alternative outcomes '
in situations in which two or more parties make choices affecting the
outcomes. In a sense, all of microeconomics deals with collective
choice. Microeconomic models have been tlie best developed and most
popular in the field. Nonetheless, political scientists, psychologists,
sociologists, logicians, statisticians and mnthemtlcinns have all
accompanied the economists in their search. Come theory, some forms
of voting analysis, some approaches to formal organization, many
treatments of public goods and a few analyses of power illustrate
the relevant work within this tradition (for a careful review, see
Taylor 1975).
James Coleman's general treatise on collective choice offers the
following examples of applications: a simple legislature, realization
of interests as a func'tion of their conceqtrntion, paying the cost of
o publ i c facility, format i on of a c o n s t i t u t i o n , pa t t e r ns of i nf l uence
i n i nf or mal groups, exchange between r e pr e s e nt a t i ve s and c ons t i t ue nt s ,
o por l i amcnt ar y syst em, money a s power i n l e g i s l a t i v e i s s ue s , committee
s t r u c t u r e i n a l e g i s l o t u r e , , ~ si mpl e bur eaucr at i c s t r u c t u r e (Colemon
1973: 96-126). I n a l l t he s e c a s e s , Coleman works wi t h some ver s i on
of a ba s i c equat i on:
i n wb i c h v is t he val ue of a gi ven event wi t hi n an a r r a y of k pos s i bl e
i
event s . j X j i i s t h e sum over j a c t o r s of i ndi vi dua l i n t e r e s t s i n
t h a t event , vk i s t he val ue t o an i ndi vi dua l a c t o r of a p a r t i c u l a r
event , and ckj is t h e c ont r ol a c t o r j has over event k.
I n example 6, t he exchange between a r e pr e s e nt a t i ve and h i s
c ons t i t ue nt s , Coleman assumes o r e pr e s e nt a t i ve who is t o t a l l y i n t e r e s t e d
i n r e e l e c t i on and s i x bl ocs of vot e r s who have no i n t e r e s t i n t he
outcome of t he e l e c t i on o s such but have var yi ng i n t e r e s t s wi t h r e s pe c t
t o a hal f-dozen d i f f e r e n t l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i ons , a s wel l a s var yi ng
degr ees of c ont r ol over t he e l e c t i o n ' s outcome. He i s a b l e t o show
good t h e o r e t i c a l grounds f o r expect i ng t h e l e g i s l a t o r t o f ol l ow t he
cons t i t uency where t he r e is consensus. Less obvi ousl y, he gi ves
grounds f or a t t r i b u t i n g gr e a t e r chances of s ucces s t o t h e a c t o r whose
i n t e r e s t s a r e concent r at ed i n few l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i ons and/ or a l l i e d
wi t h t h e i n t e r e s t s of ot he r oc t or s (Colemon 1973: . 115-117).
Colemon has ext ended t he same s o r t of i nqui r y t o t he s t r u c t u r e
of s oc i e t y a s a whole. Ile put s t oget her two c r u c i a l obs er vat i ons :
f i r s t , i n t h e i r ver y nat ur e cor por at e a c t o r s each a t t e nd t o a narrower
-
range of i n t e r e s t s t han not ur a l persons do; t h a t is t h e i r r a t i o n a l e ,
pa r t of t h e s e c r e t of t h e i r success; second, i n our own age on enor-
mously i ncr eas i ng s ha r e of i mpor t ant r es our ces has been coming under
t he c ont r ol of cor por at e a c t or s . Consequence: " . . . among t he v a r i e t y
of i n t e r e s t s t h a t men have, t hos e i n t e r e s t s t h a t have been s uc c c s s f ul l y
c ol l e c t e d t o c r e a t e cor por at e o c t o r s a r e t he i n t e r e s t s t h a t dominate
t he s oci et y" (Coleman 1974: 49). We a r e no l onger deol i ng wltli t h e
consequences of de c i s i on r u l e s i n any si mpl e s ens e. Yet t h e problem is
ver y s i mi l a r . ~ o l e m n is st i l l anal yzi ng how t h e method of aggr egat i ng
i n t e r e s t s a f f e c t s t he r e a l i z a t i o n of t hos e i n t e r e s t s -- wliotever t hos e
i n t e r e s t s a r e . Under t h e condi t i ons Coleman de s c r i be s , an i ncr cos i ng
s ha r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , and e s pe c i a l l y of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on t l i at
changes t hi ngs , i s c a r r i e d on by, wi t hi n, o r a ga i ns t cor por ot e oc t or s .
Hi l l i a n a n a l y s i s i d e n t i f i e s a s i t u a t i o n which Hi l l would have obhorred.
Al ber t Hirschmon s uppl i e s a complement t o Col emn' s a na l ys i s . I n
t h e ver y t i t l e of Exit, Voice, and Loyol t y, he i d e n t i f i e s t h e t hr e e
main r esponses t h e members o r c l i e n t s of a cor por ot e a c t o r m y gi ve t o
i t s de c l i ni ng performance. The c ons t i t ue nt s of o cor r upt s t o t c my ,
a t a p r i c e , vot e wi t h t h e i r f e e t ; t hey may m. They may t h e t r
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n more o r l e s s aggr es s i vel y; t l i at r esponse, t oo, wi l l hove
i t s pr i c e . Or t hey may wai t out t he bod t i mes i n hopes of b e t t e r -
r e mi n a. Loyol t y, 'too, has o pr i c e : endur i ng t he subst ondord
performance. A l l t hr e e r esponses c os t somet hi ng. The a n a l y t i c problem
is t o s pe c i f y t h e t r s d e o f f s among e x i t , voi ce and l o y a l t y , and t o s e e
how t he t r a de of f s vary.
For t h e a n a l y s i s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , Hi r s c l ~mn ' s f or mul et i on
improves g f e a t l y on a si mpl e anal ogy wi t h a p r i c e syst em. I n a si mpl c
p r i c e syst em, t he i n e f f i c i e n t f i r m f a c e s t h e l o s s of i t s cust omers t o
i t s compet i t or s , but no ot he r s anct i on. The model of a si mpl e p r i c e
syst em of t e n a ppl i e s poor l y t o c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , s i nc e t he c o s t s of
e x i t a r e f r equent l y t oo hi gh. When tlie government i s c or r upt , most
a c t o r s have t o cl ~oos e between s t a t i n g t h e i r oppos i t i on and s uf f e r i ng
i n ~ i l e n c e , between voi ce and l oya l t y. However, tlirschman ar gues ,
voi ce i s a t i t s most e f f e c t i v e when e x i t i s pos s i bl e (and t he r e f or e
a r e a l i s t i c t h r e a t ) but not s o eas y t h a t peopl e r ush away a s soon a s
perrormnnce de c l i ne s . Voice t hen c a r r i e s t he t h r e a t of e x i t . A
modicum of l oya l t y -- of r el uct ance t o l eave -- s t r engt hens t he c or r e c t i ve
e f f e c t of voi ce. Hirschmnn c l a r i Ei e s tlie s t r a t e g i c choice^ f or c o l l e c t i v e
s c t i o n i n a world of gl a nt cor por at e a c t o r s .
Mirschman's a n a l y s i s s t e e r s us i n t o t he world of c o l l e c t i v e goods,
ns we l l a s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. A c o l l e c t i v e good i s " . . . any good
s u c l ~ t h a t , i f any person Xi i n a group X1 . . . Xi . . . X consumes i t ,
i t cannot f e a s i bl y be wi t hhel d from t he ot he r s i n t h a t group" (Olson
1965: 14) . Examples a r e a smog-free environment and mi l i t a r y def ense.
Mancur Olson t r e a t s c o l l e c t l v e a c t i o n , i n es s ence, a s t he e f f o r t t o
produce c o l l e c t i v e goods. That per mi t s him t o appl y tlie economic
t heor y of publ i c goods t o s new domain: t he a c t i ons of l a bor uni ons,
i n t e r e s t groups and s i mi l a r or gani zat i ons . One r e s u l t i s Ol son' s
s e r i ous chal l enge t o s common assumpt i on: t h a t t he e xl s t e nc e and a c t i v i t y
of s o c l ~ or gani zat i ons fl ows na t ur a l l y from t he r a t i onnl pur s ui t of
shar ed i n t e r e s t s .
I n most ci r cumst ances, accor di ng t o Ol son' s a na l ys i s , t h e aver age
group member's est i mat ed a ddi t i ona l r e t ur n from pnr t i c i pa t l on i n t h e
e f f o r t wi l l be l e s s t han t he c o s t of t h e e f f o r t i t s e l f . If c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i on does occur , t hen, i t s expl anat i on must l l e out s i de t he r a t i o n a l
s e l f - i n t e r e s t of t he aver age pa r t i c i pa nt . One l i k e l y candi dat e whl ct ~
Olson i d e n t i f i e s i s t h e pr ovi s i on of s e l e c t i v e i ncent i ves ot he r t han
t he outcome of t he c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on t o particular members of t he group.
Another i s coer ci on, which is t he negat i ve count er par t of s e l e c t i v e
i ncent i ves . It i s a l s o pos s i bl e t h a t peopl e a r e a c t i n g i r r a t i o n a l l y --
but t hen we must expl ai n why.
Many ot he r s t ude nt s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on have t r i e d t o pi ck up
t he problem where Olson l e f t i t . Some c r i t i c i z e Ol son' s a na l ys i s .
Some t r y t o r e f i n e and qua l i f y i t . Some go buck t o t he c l s s s i c p o l i t i c a l
i dea of a government ( or anot her or gani zat i on wi t h powers of compulsion)
which ove r r i de s i ndi vi dual i n t e r e s t s t o s e r ve t he common good; i n t h a t
cas e, i t does not mat t er whet her t h e coer ci ve or gani zat i on came i n t o
bei ng t hrough a d e l i b e r a t e p r i o r agreement , a conquest , a decept i on o r
somet hi ng e l s e .
Ot her peopl e have t r i e d t o i d e n t i f y a s pe c t s of r a t i o n a l i t y which
Olson negl ect ed. One promi si ng s ugges t i on s e pa r a t e s 1) t he aver age
p a r t i c i p a n t ' s r e t ur n from c o l l e c t i v e a c t l on and 2) t he pos s i bl e r e t ur n
t o tlie p o l i t i c a l ent r epr eneur who or gani zes on a c t i on. A s Fr ohl l ch,
Oppenheimer end Young (1971: 6) put i t , c o l l e c t i v e goods "wilJ be
s uppl i ed when someone f i nds i t p r o f i t a b l e t o s e t up an or gani zat i on ( or
make us e of some e x i s t i n g or ga ni z a t i on) , c o l l e c t r es our ces , ond suppl y
t h e goods i n quest i on. " The ent r epr eneur ar r anges f o r t he suppl y of
t he c o l l e c t i v e good i n r e t ur n f or donat i ons , e xt or t i ons , pur chases nnd
t axes . If t h e sum of donat i ons , e xt or t i ons , purchases and t axes 1s
s mal l er t han t he val ue of t h e c o l l e c t i v e good t o n l l r e c i p i e n t s , ye t
l a r g e r t han t he ent r epr eneur ' s c os t i n suppl yi ng i t , t he c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i on s e r ve s t h e i n t e r e s t of t he ent r epr eneur a s wel l ns t h e c o l l e c t i v e
i n t e r e s t .
Fr ohl i ch, Oppenheimer and Young work out t he t h e o r e t i c a l i mpl i cat i ons
oE such an approach i n microeconomic l anguage. The t heor y l e a ds t o
some interesting hypot heses concer ni ng c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. For example:
"The more a p o l i t i c a l l e a de r depends upon donat i ons, t he more
wary he wi l l be of c o l l e c t i v e goods t h a t a r e dur abl e o r have
hi gh i n i t i a l c o s t s of suppl y. "
"A p o l i t i c a l ent r epr eneur wi l l d i v e r s i f y h i s a c t i v i t i e s more and
more I n t o t he pr ovi s i on of p r i v a t e goods a s t h e s i z e of h i s ove r a l l
oper at i on i nc r e a s e s . . . "
"If h i s chances of vi c t or y a r e near zer o, a n oppos i t i on l eader
wi l l d i f f e r e n t i a t e h i s program s har pl y from t h a t of t h e incumbent
l e a de r , and/ or pl an h i s a c t i ons t o maximize t h e s ur pl us he can
obt a i n from remai ni ng i n opposi t i on. "
"Competitors ope r a t i ng under s de c i s i on r u l e wi l l pl ace a hl gher
premium on f i r m commitments on t he p a r t of t h e i r s uppor t er s
t han t hos e who do not ."
"Whenever s compet i t or makes a d e f i n i t e promise t o suppl y a
c o l l e c t i v e good i n exchange f o r c ont r i but i ons from a gi ven
s uppor t er o r group of s uppor t er s , he wi l l t r y t o hi de t h i s
f a c t from a s many peopl e a s pos s i bl e. " ( Fr ohl l ch, Oppenheimer
and Young 1971: 139-141.)
Thus tlie t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l ent r epr eneur s becomes n major
p a r t of t he expl anat i on of t he form and i n t e n s i t y of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on.
A s i n most Mi l l i a n work. t h e i n t e r e s t s i n ques t i on a r e gi ven and f i xed.
Yet t he a n a l y s i s per mi t s bot h uncer t ai nt y and s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n
concer ni ng a l t e r n a t i v e cour s es of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on.
The same emphasis on t he i nc e nt i ve s and t a c t i c a l problems OF
p o l i t i c a l ent r epr eneur s appear s i n t he r ecent work of John UcCarthy
and Mayer Zald. Looki ng' et American s o c i s l movements, ElcCnrthy and Zald
obser ve tlie r i s e of pr of es s i onal l y- s t af f ed movement or gani zat i ons such
a s Common Cause and t he Nat i onal Counci l of Seni or Ci t l z e ns f o r I l cel t h
Care t hrough So c i a l Se c ur i t y. Ref l ect i on on such or gani zat i ons l e a ds
them t o two c r i t i c i s ms of c l a s s i c anal ys es of s o c i a l movements:
1 ) t h e i r s t r ong emphasis on gr i evances and s t a t e s of mind a s opposed
t o or ga ni z a t i ona l end t a c t i c a l problems; 2) t h e i r assumpt i on of an
i d e n t i t y among t he aggr i eved popul at i on, t h e suppor t f o r a movement,
and t h e s our ces of l e a de r s hi p o r act i vi s m. Agai nst t h e " c l a s s i c model"
t hey ar gue t h a t a l l movement or ga ni z a t i ons , what ever t h e gr i evances t o
which t hey respond, f a c e t he common, pr es s i ng problems of acqui r i ng
enough r es our ces t o do t h e i r work. I n a s i mi l a r envi ronment , t h e
common problems t end t o produce common s ol ut i ons , such a s t h e pro-
f e s s i ona l i z a t i on of t h e s t a f f and t h e t ur ni ng t o peopl e out s l de t h e
aggr i eved popul at i on f o r s uppor t . The common s ol ut i ons , i n t ur n,
produce t h e i r own problems - f o r example, r e s l ' c o n f l i c t s among t he
i n t e r e s t s of t he movement or gani zat i on a s such, t he i n t e r e s t s of t h e
out s i de r s who pr ovi de major suppor t f or tlie or gonl zat i on, and t he I nt e r -
e s t s f o r whose b e n e f i t t h e or gani zat i on presumably f i r s t nr os e. I f
we a r e a l ong way from Mill's concern wi t h t he condi t i ons f o r good
government, we a r e a very l ong way from Durkheim's anomic i ndi vi dual s .
The a n a l y s i s is s t i l l e s s e n t i a l l y Mi l l i an; i t t ends t o t ake t he i n t e r e s t s
f or gr ant ed, and t o emphasize t h e causes and e f f e c t s of d i f f e r e n t means
of a c t i on on t hose i n t e r e a t s .
St r a t e g i c I nt e r a c t i on
We have fol l owed t he pat h from John St u a r t M i l l which l e a ds t o
s o c i a l movements v i a c o l l e c t i v e choi ce and c o l l e c t i v e goods. There
a r e o t h e r , l e s s t r odden, pat hs , which coul d t ake us t o t h e same
de s t i na t i on. The most i mpor t ant pas s t hrough t h e s t udy of s t r a t e g i c
i nt e r a c t i on: bar gai ni ng, warmaking, game-playing and t he l i k e . Here
we tend t o t ake bot h t he i n t e r e s t s and t he or gani zat i on of our a c t o r s
a s gi ven, and t o concent r at e on t a c t i c s and s t r a t e g y a s f unct i ons of
var yi ng oppor t uni t i e s and of var yi ng i nf or mat i on about t hos e oppor t uni t i e s .
I mpl i c i t l y, most s t u d i e s of s t r a t e g i c ' i n t e r a c t i o n begi n wi t h some
ver s i on of t he f ol l owi ng scheme:
B GAINS
A LOSES A GAINS
B LOSES
I n t h e si mpl e two-party i n t e r a c t i o n wi t h a s i n g l e outcome, an end poi nt
anywhere i n quadr ant 2 means t h a t A gai ns whi l e B l o s e s , an, end poi nt
B-
i
And we can de s c r i be some ext reme t ypes of i n t e r a c t i o n by p l a c i n ~
boundar i es around a l l pos s i bl e outcomes:
I n t h e pur e- conf l i ct cas e, no pos s i bl e outcome pr ovi des ga i ns f o r
I bot h p a r t i e s . I n t he pure-cooperat i on c a s e , t h e wor st t h a t can
happen is t h a t ne i t he r gai ns. I n t he open cas e, a l l f our quadr ant s
a r e a va i l a bl e .
'The same di agram s e r ve s t o t r a c e t h e patli of a s t r a t e g i c i n t e r -
a c t i on t hrough a s e r i e s of i nt er medi at e outcomes:
i n quadr ant 3 means t h a t bot h l o s e , and s o on. The pos s i bl e outcomes
of a zero-sum i n t e r a c t i o n wi l l f a l l i n t o a s t r a i g h t l i n e :
\\ BOTH
77 DISARMED
I n t h i s i ns t a nc e (adapt ed from Kenneth Boulding ' s Conf l i c t and Defense,
p. 50). t h e s hor t - s i ght ed i n t e r e s t of each par t y i s t o arm a ga i ns t t he
ot he r , and t he s hor t - s i ght ed equi l i br i um has bot h worse o f f because of
arming. The dot t ed l i n e r epr es ent s t he p o s s i b i l i t y of a l onger - si ght ed,
more advant ageous cqul l l br i um through disarmament.
I n its many v a r i a n t s , t h i s approach c l a r i Ei e s t h e a na l ys i s of out -
I
comes and pat hs t o outcomes. ks i n s t u d i e s of c o l l e c t i v e choi ce, t he
a na l ys t t y p i c a l l y mani pul at es t he r el evant i nc e nt i ve s , i nf or mat i on.
de c i s i on r u l e s and a v a i l a b l e s t r a t e g i e s . He does not at t empt t o
expl ai n how and why i nc e nt i ve s , i nf or mat i on, deci s i on r u l e s and avni l -
a b l e s t r a t e g i e s vary. That i s gener al l y t r ue , f o r example. of t h e
t heor y of games. It i s "a gener al framework f o r t he a na l ys i s of i n t e r -
a c t i o n s among s e v e r a l agent s who a r e mut ual l y i nt er dependent . . . and
whose i n t e r e s t s a r e t o some degr ee c onf l i c t i ng" (Kramer and l l er t zber g
1975: 379). Game t h e o r i s t s t ypi c a l l y or gani ze t h e i r anal ys es around
a ' pa yof f ' ma t r i x. I n an el ement ar y ver s i on, we have two shar pshoot i ng
p i r a t e s , Hook and Bl ackbeard, due l l i ng over a t housand- dol l ar c he s t of
gol d. Nei t her one ever mi sses h i s mark, bot h f i r e st once, but t h e i r
o l d p i s t o l s f a i l one t i me out of two. The s ur vi vor , i f any. t akes t he
gol d; i f bot h s ur vi ve, t hey s p l i t t h e t r e a s ur e evenl y. The payoff
mat r i x l ooks l i k e t h i s :
BLACKBEARD
HOOK
FIRES
MISFIRES
FIRES MISFIRES
( I n each cas e, t he payoff t o Hook l i e s above tlie di agonal , t h e payoff
t o Blackbeard below t h e di agonal . ) Lef t i n t h i s form, t h e due l i s not
much of a game. Each p i r a t e has two chances i n f our of dyi ng, one
chance of gai ni ng a thousand d o l l a r s , and one chance of gai ni ng 500.
I f each val ues h i s own l i f e a t a t housand d o l l a r s , i n t h e i n s t a n t bef or e
f i r i n g each p i r a t e aliould e s t i ma t e h i s pr obabl e gairi a s
Not very encouragi ng. Without a chance t o r un away, t o bar gai n o r
t o c he a t , never t hel es s , t he s i z e of t h a t e s t i ma t e wi l l not a f f e c t Hook's
o r Bl ackbeard' s behavi or .
To conver t t h i s conf r ont at i on i n t o an i n t e r e s t i n g game, we muat
gi ve each p i r o t e a choi ce of s t r a t e g i e s , and i nt r oduce some uncer t ai nt y
about which s t r a t e g y each wi l l choose. We can do t h a t by a) gi vi ng
each p i r a t e t h e choi ce between f i r i n g , a s bef or e, o r t r yi ng t o run of f
wl t h t h e cheat wl ~ l l e t he ot he r p i r a t e is l oadi ng h i s gun, b) not i c i ng
t h a t one is a sl ower r unner , t h e ot he r a worse s hot . One pl a us i bl e
mat r i x r e s u l t i n g from t hose changes is:
BLACKBEARD
FTRE CRAB AND RUN
FIRE
G M
AND
RUN
Over al l , grab-and-run is a more f avor abl e a t r a t e gy f o r e i t h e r p l r a t e .
But i f Hook is s u r e t h a t Blackbeard w i l l gr ab and r un, he may be
tempted t o f i r e . I f Blackbeard is s u r e t h a t llook wl l l r un, he wl l l be
i nc l i ne d t o gr ab and r un hi ms el f ; Hook, bei ng f o s t e r , is more l i k e l y
t o escape wi t h t he l o o t , but t he r e i s some chance Blackbenrd w i l l ge t
t he r e f i r s t , a good chance t h a t t hey wi l l s p l i t t he t r e a s ur e , and no
chance t h a t e i t h e r wi l l d i e .
Thi s f a n c i f u l i l l u s t r a t i o n makes t h e e s s e n t i a l poi nt : a game-
t h e o r e t i c a l a na l ys i s por t r ays a s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n a s t h e outcome
of one o r more wel l - def i ned, d e l i b e r a t e deci s i ons on t h e p a r t of each
of t he pa r t i c i pa nt s . The deci ai on is a f unct i on of t h e outcomes each
pa r t i c i pa nt cons i der a l i k e l y t o f ol l ow from t h e var i ous pos s i bl e com-
bi na t i ons of h i s own a c t i o n and t h e a c t i on of t he ot he r par t i ci pot i t e.
So f a r , t h e a ppl i c a t i ons of game t heor y t o t h e a na l ys i s of c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i on have been i n d i r e c t . At its b e a t , game t heor y l i el ps us under-
s t and t h e s t r a t e g i c problems of c o l l e c t i v e a c t o r s , and hel ps us s e e
how t l i e a v a i l a b l e means of i n t e r a c t i o n l i m l t t he p o s s i b i l i t i e s of
r e a l i z i n g t h e beat i n t e r e s t s of any p a r t i c u l a r a c t o r , o r of a l l
a c o t r s t oget her .
Anal yses of bar gai ni ng l i kewi s e concent r at e on outcomes and pat hs
t o outcomes. As henf el t er and Johnson, f o r example, anal yze s t r i k e
a c t i v i t y . They begi n wi t h a t hr ee- par t y bar gai ni ng model which i nvol ves
a f i r m, its workers and t he workers' union l eader s hi p. The s t r i k e ,
i n t h a t model, is a consequence of t he f i r m' s unr eadl nesa t o accede t o
wage demands p r i o r t o open c o n f l i c t , which i n t ur n depends i n p a r t on
t h e di scr epancy between what t h e workers want and what t h e uni on l e a de r s
t hi nk t hey can g e t . The f i r m- l evel model t he r e f or e i ncor por at es a
series of conditions (the size of wage illcrease acceptable to the workers,
the speed at which the workers' expectations decline during a strike,
and so on) which predict to that unreadiness.
For lack of evidence to test their models at the level of the firm,
Ashenfelter and Johnson make some plausible inferences to determinants
of strike activity at s larger scale. At the level of the labor force
,
os a whole, they build models involving unemployment levels, previous
changes in real wages and corporate profits. Estimating their principal
equations on numbers of strikes reported quarterly in the U. S. from
January 1952 through June 1967, they achieve a good fit to the observed
time series. They conclude thst strike activity is, in fact, mainly
a function of the tightness of the labor market and of previous rates
of change in real wages (Ashenfelter and Johnson 1969: 47). (All the
substantial work done so far points to a general tendency for strike
activity in contemporary western countries to rise in good times and
to decline in bod.) In both the emll-scale model they formulate
and the large-scale model they estimate, Ashenfelter and Johnson por-
tray strike activity as one outcome of a coherent bargaining process
I
I
in which all parties watch closely their opportunities to act on their
interests. The Cormul.ation differs from those of game theory, but the
tone of the analysis is still resolutely Millian.
Mill and Pseudo-Mill
At the edge of the Millian tradition stand s number of quantitative
analyses of conflict and collective action. We might better call them
pseudo-Millisn. They resemble the work of collective-choice ond col-
lective-goods theorists in that the models and estimating procedures
typically take on econometric form. They are pseudo-Millian because of
their theoretical content, or lack of it. Some (like Ted Curr's
earlier work) attempt to estimate essentially sttitudinal models in an
econometric style. Some (like Gurr's reformulation of his initial
argument) are eclectic efforts to assemble individually plausible
variables into equations which state their joint effects and inter-
relations. In either case, we find relatively little of the MillCan
concern with the effects of alternative decision rules in the context
of fixed interests and changing opportunities to act on those ioterests.
Douglas Hibbs' cross-national study of "mass political violence"
exemplifies the best in pseudo-Million onolyseo. Hibbs analyzes counts
of riots, armed attacks, political strikes, ossassinstions. deaths
from political violence and antigovernment demonstrations in 108 countries
summed for two adjacent decsdes: 1948-57 and 1958-67. Via factor
analysis, Hibbs combines these diverse events into two dimensions:
Collective Protest and Internal War. Then he combs the existing
literature for proposed predictors of these variables, cautiously
working them into causal models. One of Hibbs' diogroms of the cstimted
causal relationships (expressed here os standardized regression co-
efficients) appears in Figure 2-5. The diagram indicates, among other
things, thst the negative sanctions (censorship, restrictions on political
activity) imposed by the government during tlie second decade predicted
strongly to the country's level of internal war and of collective
protest, while the membership of the nstlonsl Communist Party in 1960
predicted weakly to the level of collective protest during the second
decade.
~ibbs' work is representative in that it formulates and tests
general arguments by means of comparisons of aggregated measures for
Figure 2-5: One of Douglas Hibbs'
Causal Models of Political Violence
Elite Electoral Internal War D2
Product pc 1960 Sanctions D2
Membership 1960
(Abbrcviatlons: In = log-normal transformation; D2 = second decade,
1958-67; pc - per capita)
considerable numbers of whole countries. It does not examine variation
within countries, among groups or from one time period to another; it
does not treat the determinnnts of particulsr events or deal with their
internal development. With the expanded use of computers, multivariate
statistical analysis and international banks in the 19608, a large
number of studies in the same style appeared. tlibb's study summarizes
and improves upon the entire lot.
As compared with Durkheimlan work, Million analyses of collective
action have regularly involved careful. formalization and statistical
estimation of their arguments. Where Durkheimians postulate two or
three rather distinct types of collective action arising out of different
patterns of social change, Millians tend to think of all collective
action as expressing the same fundamental rationality. The price of
these advantages has been some loss of richness, some concentrnti'on on
situations in which the choices and interests are exceptionally clear,
some tendency to emphasize variables which are easy to quantify. So
far we have a good deal of rigor, but no models of revolution so
suggestive as those of Huntington or Johnson. The Millinn emphasis on
the rational pursuit of interests is a welcome antidote to notions of
crowd action as impulsive and irrational. Yet so far the followers of
Mill have'not given us much insight into the way those interests arise
and change. They have not said much about the way people define,
articulate and organize their interests. For further ideas on those
questions, we may turn to the tradition of Max Webcr.
Weber
-
In Max Weber's treatment , groups commit themselves to coll.ective
definitions of the world and of themselves. The definitions incorporate
2-39
goal s , e n t a i l s t andar ds of behavi or , and i ncl ude j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r t h e
power of a u t h o r i t i e s .
Cons t i t ut ed a u t h o r i t i e s a c t on behal f of t he
groups. Sometimes t he a u t h o r i t i e s a c t on t h e b a s i s of t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l
r o l e s , sometimes on t he ba a i s of t h e i r r a t i ona l - l e ga l des i gnat i on a s
agent s f o r t he group, sometimes on t h e b a s i s of t h e i r ext r aor di nar y
per s onal c ha r a c t e r -- t h e i r chari sma.
Which of t heae bases t h e group
adopt s s t r ongl y a f f e c t s i t s or gani zat i on and i t s f a t e .
Whether i n
t r a d i t i o n a l , char i s mat i c o r r a t i ona l - l e ga l form, however, t h e j u a t i f i -
c a t i ons a l l c ons t r a i n t he a u t h o r i t i e s ' a c t i ons . I n Weber's account ,
t he s t r u c t u r e and a c t i on of t h e group a s a whole s pr i ng l a r g e l y from t h e
i n i t i a l commitment t o a p a r t i c u l a r ki nd of b e l i e f syst em.
Be l i e f s
hnve t h e i r own l o g i c and f or ce.
Weber of f e r e d h i s f u l l e s t account of t he o r i g i n s of t h e fundament al
b e l i e f s i n h i s di s cus s i ons of chari sma:
t h e di vi ne g i f t of gr ace and
i t s s e c ul a r equi val ent s . According t o Weber, r e l i g i o u s and i de ol ogi c a l
vi r t uos os or e c ont i nua l l y f or mul at i ng new d e f i n i t i o n s of t h e world and
of t hemsel ves. Only a few, however, a t t r a c t anyone beai des t h e i r
i nvent or s . I n t hose few c a s e s , a group of f ol l ower s commit t hemsel ves
bot h t o t he b e l i e f syst em and t o an acknowledgment of t he chari sma -
t h e except i onal moral q u a l i t i e a -- of t h e l e a de r s , obj e c t s and r i t u e l s
consecr at ed by t hos e b e l i e f s .
Where many more peopl e, f or what ever r eas on, f i nd t h a t t h e new
dof i ni t i ons of t he world pr ovi de more coher ent answers t o t he problem
of meaning t hey f a c e t han do t he ol d d e f i n i t i o n s al r eady a v a i l a b l e t o
them, t hey j o i n and t he group expands.
Then t he group a s a whole
f aces t h e problem of t he "r out i ni zat l . on of charisma".
(Weber's German
f o r r out i ni z a t i on is Ver nl l t i gl i chung -- l i t e r a l l y t h e "everydaying"
of t he chari sma i n ques t i on -- which s t a t e s dr amat i cal l y t h e pr ocess of
t ur ni ng something ext r aor di nar y i n t o somet hi ng or di nar y, i n t o somet hi ng
under st ood and c ont r ol l a bl e . )
The r out i ni z ot i on of chari sma i nvol ves
r e c onc i l i a t i on of t he b e l i e f s wi t h t he exi genci es of or gani zat i on,
development of r e l i a b l e means f o r di s t i ngui s hi ng t r u e and f a l s e ver s i ons
of t h e b e l i e f s , pr ovi s i on f o r s ucces s i on t o t h e l eader ahi p.
Weber s e e s s i x main mechanisms by which char i s mat i c groups s ol ve
t he problem of s ucces s i on (Weber 1972:
143-144):
1. a s ear ch f o r anot her chs r i amat i c l eader of t h e same t ype;
2. r e ve l a t i on t hrough some procedure honored by t he group;
3. t h e ol d l eader ' s per sonal des i gnat i on of a s ucces s or , wi t h
t h e group' a appr oval ;
4. r i t u a l des i gnat i on by t h e body of s ur vi vi ng l ender a;
5 . r e l i a nc e on ki ns hi p, wi t h t he i dea t h a t chari sma i s i nhe r i t a bl e ;
6. t r a n s f e r of chari sma t o t h e or gani zat i on, t he r e f or e t o i t a
o f f i c i a l s and r i t u a l s .
The choi ce among t he s e s t r a t e g i e s t hen l i m i t s what t h e group can do
next . But a l l t he choi ces r e qui r e t he c r e a t i on of a c e r t a i n amount of
or ga ni z a t i ona l s t r u c t u r e , wi t h its own momentum and i t s own exi genci es.
I f t he group s ur vi ves t h a t pr ocesa, we have anot her dur abl e collective
a c t o r oper at i ng under t he d i r e c t i o n of its own constituted a u t h o r i t i e s .
Weber's di s cus s i on of t h e "everydaying" of chari sma f i t s ne a t l y
i n t o h i s gener al t heor y of s o c i a l change.
Weber por t r ays t r a d i t i o n a l
a ut hor i t y a s a s o r t of equi l i br i um i n t o which s o c i a l l i f e t ends t o
f a l l i f no s t r enuous di s r upt i on occur s.
But two opposi ng s our ces of
di s r upt i on a r e al ways pos s i bl e:
t he power of r a t i o n a l i t y and t ho
2-41
power of charism. Each represents the force of a coherent idea, of a
pure principle, when applied to history.
Bureaucratic rationalization, says Weber, "can be a revolutionary
force of tlie first rank against tradition, and often has been. But it
revolutionizes by means of techniques . . . from outside, things and
arrangements first" (Weber 1972: 657). The rational rearrangement of
the environment eventually transforms people and their world-views.
Chnrl.sma, in Weber's analysis, works in exactly the opposite way: first
transforming tlie inner life, then leading people to transform their
worlds. "It is in this purely empirical and value-free sense the
supremely and specifically 'creative' force in history" (Weber 1972:
6 5 8 ) . As Frnncesco Alberoni points out, in Weber's view "Charisma
does not grow from bureaucracy, but counterpoises itself to bureaucracy;
it appears as something gratuitous, miraculous, irrational" (Alberoni
1968: 15).
As Alberoni also points out, Weber's theorizing stops at exactly
that point. Weber gives us a dramatic, compelling sense of social
change as a product of the irruption of charisma into history and of
the diffusion of rationalization through history. Me provides a sense
of tlie historical power of a movement oriented to a coherent idea. Yet
lie offers no theory of the circumstances under which charismatic move-
ments arise. His giant comparison of civilizations gives us a heroic
historical analysis of the way one rationalizing movement -- that of
modern western Europe -- developed, but no manageable general scheme for
the explanation of rationalizing movements. As a result, Weber's followers
have had to complement their Weberian treatments of the life-courses of
movements with non-Weberion explanations of why people formed and joined
the movements in the first place.
Nevertheless, Weber's formulation agrees with Durkheim's in sug-
gesting that rapid social change (hence, presumably greater likelihood
that existing beliefs will become inadequate as guides to routine social
life) will produce widespread non-routine collective action. Then
Weber goes his own way in implying that there are really two main
categories of collective actors. those oriented to deviant beliefs and
those oriented to beliefs which hove won general acceptonce; routinizotion
and diffusion turn one into the other. By extension, the Weberian theory
also suggests that commitment to a group is on incentive, rather than a
barrier, to participation in collective action -- including non-routine
collective action. Today, political analysts commonly invoke essentlnlly
Weberian explanations of tlie collective actions of notional states and
complex organizations. They are less likely to apply Weber to tlie actions
of crowds, political movements or revolutionary groups.
Social Movements
Studies of collective action within the Weberian tradition hove
commonly employed the framework of the social movement. In his brief
conceptual work on the subject. Paul Wilkinson defines a sociol movement
. . . a deliberate collective endeavour to promote change in any
direction and by any means, not excluding violence, illegality,
revolution or withdrawal into 'utopian' community . . . A social
movement must evince a minimal degree of organization, though this
may range from a loose, informal or partial level of organization
to the highly institutionalized and bureaucratized movement and the
cor por at e group . . . A s o c i a l movement's commitment t o change and
t h e r ai s on d ' k t r e of its or gani zat i on a r e founded upon t h e consci ous
v o l i t i o n , normat i ve commitment t o t h e movement's aims o r b e l i e f s ,
and a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n on t h e p a r t o f t h e f ol l ower s o r members
(Wilkinson 1971: 27).
Thi s d e f i n i t i o n , al t hough c l e a r e r t han most of t hos e one encount er s on
e t our through t he l i t e r a t u r e of s o c i a l movements, conveys t he us ual
meaning of tlie term. The under l yi ng concept i on r e f l e c t s t h a t of Weber:
a group of peopl e somchow o r i e n t t hemsel ves t o t he same b e l i e f syst em
and a c t t oget her t o promote change on t l i e b a s i s of t he common or i e nt a t i on.
Thus t he st andar d ques t i ons become: llow do such syst ems of b e l i e f s
a r i s e and a c qui r e f ol l owi ngs7 How do t hey c ons t r a i n t h e i r adher ent s7
How do t hey and t he groups which form around them change, r out i ni z e ,
di sappear 7
We a r e not s ur pr i s e d, t hen, t o f i nd Michael Useem begi nni ng h i s
di acus s i on of t he Resi st ance, t he American movement of t he 1960s a ga i ns t
mi l i t a r y cons cr i pt i on, wi t h t he s e words:
The formati,on of a p r o t e s t movement is gener al l y cont i gent on
t h e pr eexi s t ence of a group of peopl e uni t ed around a s e t of
p o l i t l c a l pr i nc i pl e s deal i ng wi t h a s ol ut i on t o a s o c i a l problem.
Some p r o t e s t s e r upt spont aneousl y and r e f l e c t l i t t l e consci ous
e f f o r t by a p o l i t i c i z e d l eader s hi p. But many movements, t he
Resi st ance i ncl uded, a r e i n s t i t u t e d onl y a f t e r a l engt hy mat ur at i on
pr ocess i n which a s u b s t a n t i a l number of peopl e come t o view a
new p r o t e s t program a s v a l i d and r e a l i s t i c (Useem 1973: 37) .
Given t h a t begi nni ng, Useem's own i nqui r y i n t o American d r a f t r e s i s t a n c e
proceeds l o g i c a l l y : t h e c ha r a c t e r of campus di s c ont e nt , cons cr i pt i on a s
a r e a l i t y and a s an i s s u e , t h e base and pr oces s of r ecr ui t ment t o t h e
movement, or ga ni z a t i ona l problems and t r ansf or mat i ons of t h e movemcnt.
p o l i t i c a l outcomes of movement a c t i ons . For example, Useem pol nt s out
t h e gr e a t i mport ance of t he f r a g i l e s t ude nt d r a f t deferment a s s s t i mul us
t o j oi ni ng t h e movement. For anot her , he anal yzes t h e s. i gnl f l cance of
temporary c o a l i t i o n s between Resi st ance and ot he r p r o t e s t groups seeki ng
s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t goal s ; i n h i s view, t h e decay of c o a l i t i o n s wi t h
such groups a s SDS a c c e l e r a t e d t h e de c l i ne of Resi st ance a s a movement.
Useem's agenda is c l a s s i c . We f i nd i t d i r e c t i n g s t u d i e s of r evol u-
t i ona r y movements, r e l i g i o u s movements, e t h n i c movements. movcmcnta of
reform. Useem hi msel f has appl i ed t hc same scheme t o a wide v a r i e t y of
American p r o t e s t movements. He ends t h a t sur vey wi t h two major compl ai nt s
about e x i s t i n g a n a l y t i c e l schemes: 1) al t hough t l ~ c y pr ovi de a r ensonabl e
g r i p on t h e i n t e r n a l development of a movemcnt once i t has begun, t hey
c ont a i n no s e r i ous expl anat i on of t he genes i s of p r o t e s t movements;
2) t h e i r account s of t he pr ocess by which such movements mobi l i ze f o r
a c t i o n a r e q u i t e uns a t i s f a c t or y. . "At t ent i on must be di r ect ed. " concl udes
.Useem. "at t h e c o n f l i c t s wi t hi n major i n s t i t u t i o n a l syst ems i n America,
bot h a s s our ces of p r o t e s t and a l s o f o r t h e r o l e t hey pl ay i n s l ~a pi ng
t he program, or gani zat i on, and growth of tlie movemcnt. Si nce mnny
t ypes of c o l l e c t i v e behavi or and s o c i a l movements do not s ha r e such r oot s ,
at t empt s t o devel op a s i n g l e t heor y f o r expl ni ni ng a f u l l r ange of
c o l l e c t i v e phenomena a r e bound t o over l ook f a c t o r s t h a t pl ay a r o l e i n
p r o t e s t , but not ot he r t ypes o f , movements" (Useem 1975: 51) .
Anyone who runs through the many writings on American social
movements will notice, in fact, a good deal of agreement about tlie
characteristic life histories of movements and widespread disagreement
about why and how movements arise in the first place. Joseph Gusfield's
Symbolic Crusade, a thoughtful analysis of the American Temperance
movement, distinguishes among three types of movement: class, status
and expressive. The class movement, according to Gusfdeld, organizes
instrumentally around some specific interest of its public. The status
movement orients itself toward the enhancement or maintenance of the
group's prestige. Expressive movements "are marked by goalless behavior
or by pursuit OF goals which are unrelated to the discontents from which
the movement had its source" (Gusfield 1966: 23). In all three cases
the character of tlie public and the character of the goal provide the
major explanations of the movement's content.
Temperance, in Gusfield's view. is largely a status movement; it
arose as a defense of old elites against their declining prestige. In
the twentieth century:
The polarization of the middle classes into abstainers and moderate
drinkers is port of a wider process of cultural change in which
traditional values of the old middle class are under attack by
new components of the middle stratum. In this process of change,
Temperance is coming to take on new symbolic properties as a
xehicle of status protest (Gusfield 1966: 139).
Gusfield sees post-Prohibition Temperance as coalescing with a new
fundamentalism against self-indulgent, morally lax, consumption-
oriented modernism - and thus expressing the status anxieties of the
old middle class in the twentieth century.
Roberta Ash embeds her own brief discussion of Temperance in a
survey of nineteenth-century middle-class movements. They were more
or less interchangeable, she says, but Temperance mingled "a desire to
ameliorate the lot of workers, to destroy a less genteel life style
and perhaps unconsciously express frustration st the loss of political
power . . . " (Ash 1972: 136). The characterization differs somewhat
from Gusfield's, but the basic pro~edure is the same: account Eor the
movement's genesis and content by means of the structural situation in
which the adherents find themselves at the start. In her general
analysis of social movements in America, Ash portrays changes in the
organization of production as producing new structural problems for
different social groups; when ideologically legitimate means for acting
on those problems are not available, the groups tend to create social
movements for the solutions of their problems. She eventually comes to
the' conclusion that the "status politics" which ark so important to
Gusfield's analysis actually turn out to be class politics, misdirected
or in disguise.
The analyses of Gusfield and Ash are only loosely Weberian. They
accept the Weberian idea of a social movement with its own rotionole,
momentum and life history. Yet they do not assign such s compelling
, .
parer to the idea around which the movement organizes in the first
i
place, and they expend much of their effort in tracing the correspondences
I
1
between the social situations of the actors and the contents of the
t movements they form or join. Furthermore, Ash self-consciously adopts
Marxian ideas concerning the origins of structural change. Yet in
identifying the social movement as a coherent object of study and in
treating its formation as a break with legitimate, routine social life,
both Ash and Guafield align themselves with Max Weber.
The Weberian tradition has been rich in inspiration for case studies
and poor in inspiration for further theorizing. In both regards it
differs from the Durkheimian and Millian traditions: both of them have
stimulated reformulation after reformulation, but have proved very hard
to apply to individual, concrete cases. Alberoni and Useem have already
identified the problem for us. Weber left almost untouched the analysis
of the genesis and mobilization of charismatic movements. At the same
timc, he taught that such movements had their own logic, and represented
a sharp break with routine, legitimate social life. The assumptions
of autonomy and separateness make it awkward for the student of a movement
to fill the gap in Weber's analysis by appealing to the everyday interests
of the participants.
Nevertheless, students of social movements who were serious about
origins and mobilizntion have normally gone outside the Weberian frame-
work for their explanations. Ash turns to an unexpected combination:
neo-Marxism and the work of Edward Shils. Useem's proposal to study
"institutional contradictions" is Marxist in inspiration. Anthony
Oberechall's general work on Social Conflict and Social Movements
essentially breaks the subject into three parts: 1) an analysis of social
conflict, which is quite eclectic in its theoretical origins; 2) an
nnalysia of the mobilization of conflict groups, which relies especially
on the Millian framework of Mancur Olson; 3) an analysis of the life
histories of conflict groups, which resembles classic treatments of
social movements. In Oberschsll's analyses, the strong emphasis on
real interests and strategic problems with regard to social conflict
end mobilization wars against the autonomy end separotencss inllcrcnt in
the idea of a "movement." In this case, the interests nnd strategy
win; the notion of a social movement as anything more thnn a set of
mobilized conflict groups collapses.
So why bother with Weber? Because Weber and the Weberians have
pursued several problems in collective action more persistently and
effectively than have the followers of Durkheim and Hill. People
sometimes group around distinctive definitions of thc world and of
themselves: why and how? There something about the growth of
Temperance or Abolitionism that neither an analysis of whole social
classes nor a study of specific associations exhausts: what is It?
A group's conception of its aims and rights does inform its action
and influence its very readiness to act: can't we take that into
account? Weber left us an important agenda.
Marxian Analyses since Morx
The classic Marxist analysis derives shared interests from common
position in the organization of production, changes in interest from
shifts in the organization of production. Any set of people in a
common relationship to the means of production form a class, but
classes very greatly in internal structure and common consciousness.
Shared aims and beliefs emerge from shared interests, as mediated by
a class' internal structure and its relationship to other classes.
Collective action likewise results from shared interests, ss mediated
by internal structure, relationship to other classes end common conscious-
ness. Thus the broad logic runs:
or gani zat i on
pr oduct i on
consci ouaneaa
t o ot he r
Marxian anal ys es s i n c e Marx have var i ed consi der abl y i n t he r e l a t i v e
wei ght and autonomy t hey have assi gned t o t he s e va r i a bl e s . They have
a l s o var i ed i n how much t hey have recogni zed ot he r s i g n i f i c a n t a c t o r s
t han s o c i a l cl as s ea: s t a t e s , e t hni c gr oups, r e l i g i o u s movements, and
s o on. The s t r i c t e r t he Marxism, t h e l e s s s i gni f i c a nc e a t t r i b u t e d t o
t hes e ot he r a c t or a . By a s t r i c t s t andar d, many peopl e i n t he Marxian
t r a d i t i o n do not qua l i f y a s Mar xi s t s a t a l l . Nonet hel ess, t hey s t and
out from t he f ol l ower s of Durkheim, M i l l and Weber by i n s i s t i n g on t he
,.
p r i o r i t y of ma t e r i a l i n t e r e s t s and by f ol l owi ng t h e gener al l o g i c of
Marx' expl anat i on of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. Although t he r e a r e s t r i c t l y
contemporary examples, two of t h e most us e f ul i l l u s t r a t i o n s f o r our
pur pos es ' ar e t he h i s t o r i c a l s ynt hes es of Bar r i ngt on Moore, Jr. and
Er i c Wolf.
The complex web of Moore's Soc i a l Or i gi ns of D i c t a t o r s h i e d
Democracy hangs on two pegs: 1) t he i de a t h a t t he c l a s s c o a l i t i o n s
i nvol ved i n t he g r e a t moderni zi ng r e vol ut i ons -- hence t he c ha r a c t e r
of t hos e r evol ut i ons -- have depended e s pe c i a l l y on t he f a t e s of t h e
a gr a r i a n c l a s s e a i n t he cour s e of t he c o me r c i a l i z a t i o n of a g r i c u l t u r e
and t he growth of t h e a t n t e , wi t h t h e l i qui da t i on of t h e peasant r y and
t he coopt at t on of t he a r i s t oc r a c y and gent r y, f o r example, bei ng c r u c i a l
i n England; 2) t h e f u r t h e r i de a t h a t t he c l a s s c o a l i t i o n mnklng t he
r e vol ut i on has s t r o ~ ~ g l y i nf l uenced t h e subsequent p o l t t i c n l or gani zat i on
of t h a t count r y, wi t h a c o a l i t i o n of bur eaucr at s and l andl or ds , f o r
i ns t ance. t endi ng t o produce f asci sm. Thus par l i ament ar y democracy
becomes t h e h i s t o r i c a l l y - s p e c i f i c consequence of t he e a r l y emergence
of a gr a r i a n c a pi t a l i s m i n c e r t a i n c ount r i e s , a ci r cumst nnce perhops
never t o be r epeat ed agai n. Moore pr ovi des evi dence f o r h i s twtn
t he s e s v i a ext ended compariaona of t h e h i s t o r i e s of England. France.
t h e Uni t ed St a t e s . China. Japan and I ndl a , pl us numerous excur s i ons
t o Germany and Russi a.
Revol ut i on t a ke s on an i n t e r e s t i n g r o l e i n Moore's scheme. The
major r e vol ut i on -- t he Engl i sh Ci v i l War, t h e French Revol ut t on. and
s o on -- a c t s a s a c r u c i a l swi t ch i n t he t r a c k al ong wl ~i ch a p a r t i c u l a r
count r y moves. Yet r e vol ut i on di s s ol ve s a s a phenomenon & gener i s .
f o r i t becomea si mpl y t h e maximum moment of c o n f l i c t s which endure
l ong bef or e and l ong a f t e r t he t r a n s f e r of power; i ndeed, t he cnse of
Germany shows t h a t t h e fundament al t r a n s f e r s of power which occupy
t h e c e nt e r of Moore's a n a l y s i s can occur wi t hout any r e vol ut i on a t
a l l i n t h e convent i onal s ens e of t h e word:
The not i on t h a t a v i o l e n t popul ar r evol ut i on is somehow necessar y
i n or der t o sweep away "feudal " obs t a c l e s t o i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n
i a pur e nonsense, a s t h e cour s e of German and Japanese h i s t o r y
demonst r at es. On t h e ot he r hand, t h e p o l i t i c a l consequences
from di smount i ng t h e ol d or de r from above a r e deci dedl y d i f f e r e n t .
As t hey proceeded wi t h cons er vat i ve moder nl zat i on, t l ~ e s e semi-
par l i ament ar y governments t r i e d t o pr es er ve a s much of t h e o r i g i n a l
social structure as they could, fitting large sections into the
new building wherever possible. The results had some resemblance
to present-day Victorian houses with modern electrical kitchens
but insufficient bathrooms and leaky pipes hidden decorously
behind newly plastered walls. Ultimately the makeshifts collnpsed
(Moore 1966: 4 3 8 ) .
We find ourselves at the opposite pole from Chalmers Johnson's "dis-
equilibration" and "dysfunction." In Moore's analysis, the major
conElicts which occur -- including the revolutions themselves -- are
port of the very logic of the political systems they shake apnrt.
The second case in point is Eric Wolf's Peasant Wars of the Twentieth
Century. Wolf takes on the revolutions of Mexico;Russia, China, Viet
Nam, Algeria nnd Cuba. He extracts from them importnnt lessons about the
response of peasants the world over to being drawn into the capitalist
world economy. Even less concerned to lay out an explicit theoretical
structure thnn Moore, Wolf nevertheless builds a powerful analysis of
the structural foundations of peasant life, the precise ways in which
the expansion of national and internationnl markets shakes those
foundations, the conditions under which peasants resist the threat with
force, and the circumstnnces under which that resistance (however
reactionary its inception) serves revolutionary ends.
The most general argument is simple and telling:
The major aim of the peasant is subsistence and social status gained
within a narrow range of social relationships. Peasants are thus
unlike cultivators, who participate fully in the market and who
commit themselves to a status game set within a wide social network.
To ensure continuity upon the land and suatenance for his household,
the peasant most often keeps the market at arm's length, for unlim-
ited involvement in the market threatens tiis hold on his source of
livelihood. He thus cleaves to traditional arrangements which
guarantee his access to land and to the labor of kin and neigh-
bors . . . Perhaps it is precisely when the peasant con no longer
rely on his accustomed institutional context to reduce his risks,
but when alternative institutions are either too chaotic or too
restrictive to guarantee a viable commitment to new ways, that
the psychological, economic, social and politico1 tensions all
mount toward peasant rebellion and involvement in revoli~tion
(Wolf 1969: xiv-w).
From that springboard. Wolf lesps to a close examination oE the experience
of the peasantry in each of his countries, to scrutiny of the conditions
under which each of the revolutions in question broke out. and to com-
parative analyses of the determinants of the considerably different
forms of involvement of these various peasant populations in their
national movements.
Some common features emerge: the crucial role of the middle
peasants, rather than the rural proletarians or the kulaki; the in-
fluence of alliances with-disaffected intellectusla; the initially
defensive and inward-looking character of all the peasant rebellions;
the frequent occurrence of a deadlock of weak contenders for power,
ultimately favorable to well-organized central groups allied with
military power; the final inability of peasants to accomplish their
political ends, however successful their rebellions in the short run.
in the absence of strong alliances with determined and organized non-
peasants.
Wolf's sense of the variables involved will probably contribute
more to our understanding of political conflict than his enumeration of
the conatants. He shows very effectively (in a line of argument similar
to Moore's) that the coalitions formed by rebellious peasants strongly
affect whether their actions go beyond the immediate redress of grievances.
that where comercialization has proceeded so far as to dissolve the
traditional organization of the peasant community, rebellion does not
occur (contrary to the mass-society notion that atomized and anguished
people make ideal rebels), that a center-outward pattern of rebellion,
as in Russia, China, and Viet llam, favors the expanded power of a single
party, as opposed to on army andlor a national bourgeoisie.
The Collective History of Collective Action
Both Barrington Moore and Eric Wolf are non-historians who turned
to history for evidence concern processes going on in the contemporary
world. They have plenty of companions within the hiatorical profession.
Among recent historians of collective action. Marxian thinking has
prevailed. Georges Lefebvre, the great, long-lived historian of the
French Revolution, provided much of the inspiration, if not much of the
techniques. He forwarded the idea of multiple, semi-autonomous revolutions
. .
converging into a single Revolution. He demonstrated that the semi-
autonomous revolutions -- especially the peasant revolution -- were
accessible to study from the bottom up. But he did not systematize the
study of the populations involved.
Albert Soboul did. Soboul has no doubt been Eefebvre's most
influential heir in both regards. His 1958 thesis. & sans-culottes
pariaiens en l'an 11, shone a torchlight on faces previously deep in
shadow: the faces of the day-to-day activists of the Parisinn sections.
(The "sections" were essentially neighborhood governmenta and political
associations.) It did so mainly through the straightforward but extremely
demanding analysis of the papers of the sections themselves, and the
painstaking reconstitution of their membership.
At about the same time. Richard Cobb was carrying out a close study
of the composition and characteristics of the volunteer Revolutionary
Armies which played such a crucial role in the early yearsof theRevolution.
K8re Tdnnesaon was following the Parisian sans-culottes through the Yenr
111. George Rudd was analyzing the composition of the revolutionary crowds
on the great Journ<es, Adeline Dnumard. Louis Chevalier and Fmnsois
Furet were closely scrutinizing the changing composition and wealth of
the Parisian population from the late eighteenth century to 1848, and
RQmi Gossez was applying many of the same microscopic procedures to the
Revolution of 1848. These historians varied greatly in preconceptions.
techniques and subject matter. What brought them together, with dozens
of their compatriots, as exponents of s new brand of history is the
deliberate accumulation of uniform dossiers on numerous ordinary indivi-
uals in order to produce solid information on collective chsracteristica
not readily visible in the experiences of any one of them. The solid
information was often numerical. although the quantification involved was
ordinarily elementary.
The adoption of this sort of "collective historyv did not guarantee
success. It could have been a terrible waste of time. Indeed, it
have been a waste of time, if old theories about the blind spontaneity
of the masses were correct. As it turned out, however. collecrive history
yielded great returns when applied to French political conflicts. llistorians
nar understand how wide and deep was the political mobilization of ordinary
Frenchmen in 1789 and 1848, how coherent the action of the so-called mob,
how sharp the rifts within the coalition which made the Revolution of 1789
lied become by 1793. The Marxist approach to the study of French political
conflicts gained new strength, both because Marxists were more inclined
than others to take up the close study of the "little people" which this
sort of collective history involved, and because the Marxist tradition
provided more powerful means of analyzing major divisions within the
population than its rivals did.
Outside of France, the greatest impact of collective history on
the study of collective action appeared in England. England has its own
tradition of collective biography, exemplified by the parliamentary
analyses of Lewis Namier. In the field of collective action, however,
the distinctive English contribution did not consist of formal individual-
by-individual analysis of participants. It was the application of the
logic of collective hiogrnphy to events, complemented by the identification
and analysis of evidence concerning the character, outlook and behavior
of ordinary participants in major conflicts and movements. As a prime
example of the first we have Hobsbawm and Rudd's Captain Swinp; the book
reports a thorough systematic study of the many local conflicts comprising
the Swing Rebellion, the great agricultural laborers' revolt of 1830.
As the dominant work of the second type we have E. P. Thompson's The
Making of the English Working Class, a richly-documented portrayal of
workers' struggles from the period of the French Revolution to the
beginning of Chartism.
A recent English example combines the Hobsbawm-Rudd and Thompson
approaches. John Foster's Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution
traces the development of class consciousneaa and working-class collective
action in three industrial tarns -- Oldl~am. Northampton and South
Shields -- during the first half of the nineteenth century. Severs1
features of Foster's study are extraordinary. He is meticulous and self-
conscious in his theorizing; he carefully spells out the empirical
implications of an essentially Leninist argument: a labor aristocrscy
forms, and serves for a time as a vanguard of class-conscious collective
action, but is eventually split, its fragments coopted or isolated in
the capitalist counterattack. Foster is equally meticulous in assembling
and presenting his evidence; it includes close analyses of marriage
patterns, collective biographies of working-class activists and treatments
of changes in the labor force. Finally, Foster devotes great attention
to the opponents and exploiters of the workers: the local bourgeoisie.
Indeed, one of Foster's most illuminating discussions treats the bourgeois
adoption of rigorous religious practice as a means of taming and shaming
the workers.
It is no accident that solid Marxist analyses abound in European
historical work and are rare in studies of contemporary America. There
are two basic reasons. The first is simply thnt Marxism has remained a
lively, evolving body of thought in Europe while sometimes fossilizing
and sometimes having to hide underground in America. The second is that
Marxist ideas are most adequately developed in regard to the experience
Marx himself treated most fully: the conflicts surrounding the growth
of capitalism in Europe. The Marxist scholar's task is to adapt to
other settings a model which is already well fitted to the European
historical experience.
Among the determinants of collective action, Marxists have generally
given grent attention to interests and organization, have sometimes dealt
wi t h mobi l i zat i on, but have gener al l y negl ect ed oppor t uni t y. As compared
wi t h Durkheimian, Mi l l i on and Weberian anal ys es , t he Marxian t r eat ment
of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on s t r e s s e s t he ubi qui t y of c o n f l i c t , t he i mport ance
of i n t e r e a t a r oot ed i n t he or gani zat i on o r pr oduct i on, t h e i nf l uence of
s p e c i f i c forms of or gani zat i on on t h e c ha r a c t e r and i n t e n s i t y of c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i on. Mar xl st a have not pai d a s much a t t e n t i o n a s Weberians have t o
t h e i mpl i cat i ons of pr eval ent b e l i e f ayatems. o r t o , t h e pr oceaaes by
.
which movements r i s e and f a l l . They have not matched t he Mi l l i a ns i n
pr e c i s e modeling of deci si on-maki ng pr ocesses. There i s , however, no
obvi ous a n a l y t i c ground on which t h e Durkheimians have t he advant age
over t h e Marxiana.
That wi l l be t he gener al a t t i t u d e of t he anal ys es t o f ol l ow:
doggedly ant i -Durkhei mi an, r e s ol ut e l y pro-Marxian, but sometimes i ndul gent
t o Webe: and sometimes r e l i a n t on M i l l . Good Durkheimiana wi l l f i nd l i t t l e
comfort i n my arguments o r i n such evi dence a s I pr es ent : no suppor t i n
e i t h e r r egar d f or uproot ed masses a s makers of r e vol ut i ons , r a pi d s o c i a l
cllange a s a gener at or of anomic c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on, and s o on. Orthodox
Mar xi st s wi l l f i nd t hemael ves aomewhat more a t home t han t he Durkheimiana,
but wi l l s t i l l f i nd much t o di s a gr e e wi t h -- not abl y t he cons i der abl e
i mport ance at t ached t o p o l i t i c a l pr oceaaes and t o i n t e r e a t a which a r e
not obvi oual y and d i r e c t l y based on c l a s s c o n f l i c t . Fol l owers of Weber
wi l l de s pa i r a t t he v i r t u a l absence of chari sma snd a t my avoi dance of
t h e a o c i a l movement a s a u n i t of a na l ys i s ; a t l e a s t t hey wi l l gl oa t
over t h e conccaal ons made t o shar ed concept i ons of r i g h t s and obl i ga t i ons
a s bas es of c o l l e c t i v e ~ a c t i o n . Mi l l i ana wi l l r e j e c t much of t he di a-
cuaai on a s i mpr eci se and unparsi moni oua, y e t t hey shoul d f i nd f a mi l i a r
t he e f f o r t s t o anal yze t h e s t r a t e g i c problems of c o l l e c t i v e a c t or s .
Our Task
I f we t r y t o a dj udi c a t e among t he t heor i ea of c o l l c c t i v c a c t i on I
have aomewhat a r b i t r a r i l y i d e n t i f i e d wi t h Marx, Mi l l , nurkheim and Weber,
we f i nd our s el ves i n a f r u s t r a t i n g s i t u a t i o n . The s i t u a t i o n , nl a a , is
common i n t he a o c i a l s ci ences . The t he or i e a a t hand c l e a r l y l ead i n
d i f f e r e n t directions. Yet i n many a r e a s t hey a r e t oo i ncompl et e o r t oo
i mpr eci s el y a pe c i f i e d t o per mi t e i t h e r c l e a r conf r ont at i ons wi t h ot he r
t he or i e s o r de c i s i ve t e s t i n g a ga i ns t t h e f a c t s . Where .they a r e we l l
s pe c i f i e d, f ur t her mor e, i t o f t e n t ur na out t h a t t hey a r e t a l ki ng about
d i f f e r e n t t hi ngs: t he or i e s of c o l l e c t i v e choi ce appl y t o s i t u a t i o n s i n
which t he a l t e r n a t i v e s a r e l i mi t e d and we l l def i ned, t he or i e s of c o l l e c t i v e
behavi or r e f e r t o what happens when t he s t andar d choi ces a r e suspended,
and s o f o r t h .
I n Kenneth Boul di ng' a t er ms, t he or i e s i n t he t r a d i t i o n of M i l l d e a l
mai nl y wi t h exchange ayatems ( t hoae i n which t h e i nc e nt i ve f o r one person
o r group t o a c t i s t he de s i r a bl e r e t ur n someone e l s e wi l l gi ve them i n
r esponse) . Durkheimian t he or i e s d e a l mainly wi t h i nt e gr e t i on syst ems
( t hos e i n which t he i nc e nt i ve is a s ens e of common f a t e o r i d e n t i t y ) .
Weber'a l i n e emphasizes t h r e a t syst ems ( t hoae i n whlch t h e i ncent i ve i s
an undes i r abl e r esponse anot her group wi l l v i s i t on t he a c t o r i f he f a i l s .
t o a c t i n a c e r t a i n way). The Marxian l i n e of t hi nki ng de a l s mainly
wi t h t hr e a t 8 and exchange, al t hough i nt e gr a t i on wi t hi n groups -- e s pe c i a l l y
wi t hi n c l a s s e s -- becomea an i mpor t ant condi t i on f o r e f f e c t i v e a c t i on by
t hoae groups.
We can c r i t i c i z e t he a v a i l a b l e t he or i e s on l o g i c a l grounds, a ppr a i s e
t h e i r f r u i t f u l n e s s i n gener at i ng hypot heses, expl anat i ons and r es ear ch
s t r a t e g i e s , examine how we l l t hey work i n t h e i r ovn f i e l d s of a ppl i c a t i on.
and a s s e s s t he f i d e l i t y o r e f f e c t i ve ne s s wi t h which t h e i r advocat es employ
them. I n t h e i r pr es ent at nge of development, however, we cannot devi s e a
s e t of gener al t e s t s which wi l l convi nci ngl y e s t a b l i s h t h e i r r e l a t i v e
v a l i d i t y .
Never t hel ess, t he accumul at i ng l i t e r a t u r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on
o f f e r s an i n v i t i n g t e r r a i n f o r t h e o r e t i c a l expl or at i on. My pl an her e i s
t o draw on i t i n proposi ng gener al concept s, hypot heses f o r t he s t udy --
contempornry o r h i s t o r i c a l -- of concr et e c a s e s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on.
We r e t ur n t o some of t he problems posed, but not r es ol ved, by Marx'
anal ys es of ni net eent h- cent ur y p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t s : how do bi g s t r u c t u r a l
changes a f f e c t t he pr e va i l i ng pa t t e r ns of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on? Among t he
bi g changes. I want e s pe c i a l l y t o i nqui r e i n t o t h e e f f e c t s of ur bani zat i on.
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , st at e-maki ng and t he expansi on of capi t al i s m. Among
pr e va i l i ng pa t t e r ns of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on, I would p a r t i c u l a r l y l i k e t o
know wl ~at ki nds of groups gai n o r l o s e t he capaci t y t o a c t t oget her
e f f e c t i v e l y , and how t he forms of a c t i o n t hemsel ves change.
I n t h i s nbs t r a c t f or mul at i on, t he problems l ook l i k e a d e s e r t : huge,
dry and f or bi ddi ng. Happi l y, a l l r e n l d e s e r t s cont ai n oas es ; s o does
t h i s one. Some of tlie s p e c i f i c ques t i ons which f ol l ow from t he ~ b s t r n c t
problem a r e engagi ng nnd i mpor t ant . Some a r e even answerabl e: 1s i t
t r u e t ha t tlie p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n of or di nar y peopl e g r e a t l y i nc r e a s e s
wi t h ur bani zat i on, i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and t h e growth of na t i ona l s t a t e s ?
Is i t t r u e t hnt r epr es s i on can onl y work f o r a whi l e, because sooner o r
l a t e r peopl e become s o f r u s t r a t e d t hey s nat ch a t any chance t o r ebel ?
Why has t he a nt i - t a x r e b e l l i o n , once t he most common occasi on f or l ar ge-
s c a l e popul ar vi ol ence i n west er n c ount r i e s , al most di sappear ed? I n our
own t i me, why l ~a ve s t r i k e s and demonst r at i ons become s o f r equent ? Is
t he r e a t endency f o r p o l i t i c h l i f e t o become l e s s and l e s s t ur bul e nt ,
more and more r out i ni z e d, a s a count r y g e t s ol de r and r i c he r ? To what
e xt e nt (and when) a r e s o c i a l c l a s s e s t he chi ef p o l i t i c a l a c t or s ? Our
ques t i ons r un t he whole range of p o l i t i c a l pr ocesnes from t he mobi l i zat i on
of groups f o r a c t i on t o t he working out of r evol ut i on.
The pages t o f ol l ow wi l l not l a y out f i r m answers t o t l ~ c s e q ~ ~ e s t i o n s .
Thei r purpose is more l i mi t ed. They l a y out a s e t of concept s which appl y
a c r os s t h i s wide r ange of problems; t hey t her eby hel p i d e n t i f y t he con-
nect i ons among t he problems. The f ol l owi t ~g chapt er s s t a t c some gencr nl
arguments concerni ng t h e p o l i t i c a l pr oces s es i nvol ved, and i l l u s t r a t e t h e
arguments wi t h a number of d i f f e r e n t concr et e cas es . Now and t hen t l ~ e y
pause t o sum up t he e x i s t i n g evi dence on some mnjor cont r over sy concerni ng
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on.
The i l l u s t r a t i o n s and t he evi dence d e a l mainly wi t h di scont l nuoua.
cont ent i ous c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on: s t r i k e s , demonst rnt i ona and t a x r e be l l i ons
r a t h e r t han workaday ward p o l i t i c s . That i s no acci dent . The Elnrxian
t r a d i t i o n on which I r e l y has d e a l t moat f u l l y and e f f e c t i v e l y wi t h
s i t u a t i o n s of open c o n f l i c t . ).ly own empi r i cal work has c onc e t ~t r a t e d on
c o n f l i c t r a t h e r t han consensus. A t a number of poi nt s l a t e r i n t he book
I ar gue and i l l u s t r a t e t h e g r e a t c ont i nui t y between open c o n f l i c t and
r out i ne cont ent i on f o r power. S t i l l , t he r e l a t i v e weakness of t he
evi dence concerni ng everyday, r out i ni zed, peaceful c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on
wi l l l e a ve open t he possibility t h a t Weber and Durkheim were r i g h t : t hnt
t he r e r e a l l y is a s e pa r a t e real m of cont ent i ous , ext r aor di nar y c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i on which r e qui r e s a s e pa r a t e mode of expl anat i on. I do not t hi nk
so. But t h e s k e p t i c a l r eader may refer t o t r e a t wl ~at f ol l ows a s an
a n a l y s i s of di s cont i nuous , cont ent i ous c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on, and t o r es er ve
judgment about the rest .
The remainder of this book proposes strategies for the study of
mobilization, repression, struggles for power and related processes. It
returns repeatedly to the problems of observing and measuring the political
processes reliably, because those problems of observation and measurement
have been handled thoughtlessly in the past. In passing -- but only in
passing -- the following discussion comments on previous work concerning
collective action, conflict and revolution. Our main concern is with the
work that has yet to be done.
CHAPTER 3: INTERESTS, ORCANIZATLON AND MOBILIZATION
The Elementaty'Mddels
To get anywhere at all, we will l~ove to hew out rough models of inter-
action among groups, and of a single group's collective action. At flrst
chop, the model of interaction is quite static. Let us call it our pollty
model. Its elements are a population, a government, one or more contenders.
a polity and one or more coalitions. We define a population of interest
to us by any means we please. Within that population we search For one or
more of the following:
a government: an organization which controls the prlncipal con-
centrated means of coercion within the population.
a contender: any group which, during some specified period, applies
pooled resources to influence the government. Contenders include
challengers and members of the polity. A =is any contender
which has routine, low-cost access to resources controlled by the
government; a challenger is any other contender.
a polity consisting of the collective action of the members snd the
government.
a coalition: a tendency of a set of contenders andlor governments to
corrdinate their collective action.
Figure 3-1 presents these elements schemntically.
Fi gur e 3-1: The Pol i t y Model
POPULATION
POLITY
/
.
------ c o a l i t i o n
To appl y t h e p o l i t y model t o an a c t u a l popul ot i on, we hove a choi ce
of s t a r t i n g poi nt s . We can i d e n t i f y a government, t hcn i d e n t i f y t he pop-
u l a t i o n over which t h a t government e xe r c i s e s ( or cl ai ms) c ont r ol ; t h e gr e a t
bul k of p o l i t i c a l a na l ys i s s t a r t s t h a t way, and wi t hi n p o l l t i c a l a nnl ys i s
na t i ona l s t a t e s a r e t he most comnon poi nt s of r ef er ence. We can, however,
s t a r t by i de nt i f yi ng a popul at i on, t hen i d e n t l f y a l l governments e xe r c i s i ng
c ont r ol wi t hi n t h a t popul at i on and/ or des i gnat e one such government a s t h e
poi nt of r ef er ence.
I n t he f i r s t approach, we might t ake t h e U.S.S.R. a s our poi nt of
depar t ur e, and t hen i n t e r e s t our s el ves i n a l l popul at i ons over which
t h e U.S.S.R. e xe r c i s e s j u r i s d i c t i o n . The c r i t e r i a we use f o r "government"
and " j ur i s di c t i on" wi l l c l e a r l y det er mi ne how l a r g e a popul ot i on w i l l
f a l l i n t o our a na l ys i s : by a weak c r i t e r i o n much of Asi a and East er n Europe
would qua l i f y; by a s t r ong c r i t e r i o n , gi ven t he f e de r a l s t r u c t u r e of t h e
U.S.S.R., we coul d end up wi t h not hi ng but t h e c e n t ml bur eaucr aci es .
I n t he second approach, we might t ake t he popul at i on r e s i di ng wi t h-
i n t h e mapped boundar i es of a not i ona l s t a t e ; t h a t would produce a r e s u l t
s i mi l a r t o t h e f i r s t approach, wi t h t he main di f f e r e nc e s due t o ml gr ot i on
a c r os s t h e boundary i n bot h di r e c t i ons . However, we might a l s o t ake n l l
na t i ve speaker s of Russi an, a l l e t hni c Kurds, a l l per sons l i v i n g wi t hi n
500 ki l omet er s of t he Black Sea. Those s t a r t i n g poi nt s wi l l produce very
d i f f e r e n t popul at i ons. r~nd very d i f f e r e n t s e t s of r el evant governments. I n
t h i s approach, t he s t i c k i e s t problem i s l i k e l y t o be how dur abl e t h e at t nch-
! ment of i ndi vi dua l s t o t h e popul at i on must be bef or e wc i ncl ude them. Do
. ,
! American t o u r i s t s i n Moscow count ? I f not , what about American di pl omat s
who spend f our o r f i v e year s i n Moscow? Americans whom t he Russi ans put ' i n
j a i l f o r f our o r f i v e year s ? We wi l l s ol ve t he s e problems a r b i t r a r i l y o r --
better -- as a F~rnction of the questions we are asking. The solutions, how-
ever, will affect the answers to our questions.
In the primitive, stntic version of this model, all contenders are
attempting to realize their interests by applying pooled resources to each
other and to the government. They vary in the success with which they get
back resources in return; the biggest division in that regard separates the
high-return members of the polity from the low-return challengers. Among
other things, all contenders (members and challengers alike) are struggling
for power. In the model, an increase in power shows up as an increasing
rate of return on expended resources. All challengers seek, among other
tlllngs, to enter the polity. A11 members seek, among other things, to
remain in the polity. Changes in tlie resources controlled by each contender
nnd by the government, changes in the rates at which the contenders and the
government give and take resources and changes in the coalition structure
add up to produce entries into the polity, and exits from it. The model
conveys a familiar image of interest-group politics.
The second model describes the behavior of a single contender. Let us
call it our mobilization model. Four important, variable characteristics
of contenders are:
interests: the shared advantages or disadvantages likely to accrue to
the population in question as a consequence of various possible inter-
actions with other populations.
orgnnizotion: tlie extent of common identity and unifying structure
among the individuals in the population; as a process, an increase in
common identity and/or unifying structure (we can call a decline in
common identity and/or unifying structure disorganization).
mobilization: the extent of resources under the collective control of
the contender; as a process, an incrense In the reanurces or in tile
degree of collective control (we can call n decline in either one
demobilization).
collective action: the extent of a contender's Joint action in pursuit
of common ends; as a process, the joint action itself.
Interest, organization, mobilization and collective action are four of the
five components we reviewed earlier. The fifth was opportunity.
Opportunity describes the relationship between the populatloli's Ln-
terests and the current state of the world around it. In this First rough
'statement of the model, it has three elements:
power: the extent to which the outcomes of the population's inter-
actions with other populations favor its interests over those of
the others; acquisition of power is an incrense in the fnvorability
of such outcomes, loss of power a decline in their fnvorabillty;
political power refers to the outcomes of internctions with govern-
ments.
repression: the costs of collective action to the contender reaultin~
from interaction with other groups; as a process, any action by a-
nother group which raises the contender's cost of collective action;
an action which lowers the contender's cost is a form of facilitntton;
let us reserve the term politicnl repression and political fncilita-
tion for the relationships between contender(s) and government(s).
opportunitylthreat: the extent to which other groups, including govern-
ments, are either a) vulnernble to new claims which would, if success-
ful, enhance the contender's realization of its interests or b) thrent-
ening to make claims which would, if successfu.l. reduce the contender'e
realization of its interests.
Repression and power refer to closely related transactions. Repression
refers to the volume of collective action as a function of the costs of
producing it, while power refers to the returns from collective action as
o function of its volume. If by some unlikely chance the volume of collec-
tive action were to increase while total costs and total returns remained
constant, by definition both repression and parer would fall. In general,
however, a group which is subject to heavy repression -- that is, pays a
high coat per unit of collective action -- also has little power (that is.
gets R low return per unit of collective action).
Interests and opportunity/threat are also closely connected. Loosely
speaking, interest refers to advantages and disadvantages which would
theoretically result from possible interactions with other groups, oppor-
tunitylthreat to the Jlkelihood that those interactions will really occur.
A Simple Account of Collective Action
Before moving on to the difficulties hidden behind these elementary
concepts, let us consider the simplest version of an argument linking them.
Figure 3-2 presents it in schematic form. The diagram declares that the
mnin determinants of s group's mobilization are its organization, its
interest in possible interactions with other contenders, the current
~~portunitylthreat of those interactions and the group's subjection to
repression. The diagram says that the group's subjection to repression is
mainly a function of the sort of interest it represents. It treats the
extent of a contender's collective action as a resultant of its power,
its mobilization, and the current opportunities and threats confronting its
interests. And so on.
It is easy to add hypothetical connections. For instance, it is
quite possible that the form of s contender's organization, as such, affects
Figure 3-2: The Mobilization Model
REPRESSlONl
FACILITATION
the repression to which other contenders and governments subject it; when
voluntary associations become legal vehicles for one kind of interest,
they tend to become legal for other kinds of interest. My provisional srgu-
ment, however, is that such effects are secondary as compared with the
particular interest embodied in the contender. Repression depends mainly
on that interest, end especially on the degree to which it conflicts with
the interests of the government and members of the polity.
Likewise. a number of these connections are reciprocal over the
longer run. For example, in the longer run a contender's form, pace and
extent of mobilization surely affect the repression which other groups
apply to it. So does power position. A mobilizing group which concentrates
on building sn arsenal is likely to run afoul of the law, although the more
powerful the group is in other respects the more likely it is to get away
with it. Over the longer run a group's form of organization and of mobili-
zation both affect its interest. Roberto Michele made the classic statement
of the dilemma: to act on an interest, a group of people have to organize
and mobilize; but complex and effective forms of organization give their
managers new interests to advance or defend, and the new interests often
conflict with the interests around which the group organized and mobilized
in the first place. This, then, is a short-run model; it deals with the
determinants of collective action at the moment of action.
Although these short-run connections are plausible, they are not self-
evident. Some of them contradict standard arguments concerning political
processes. For instance, many "pluralistic" analyses of politics in
parliamentary democracies make two assumptions which compete with those
of our model: first. that repression is relatively low and spread evenly
across the whole range of contenders and potential contenders; second, that
the costs of organizing and mobilizing are also Eeirly low and equal.
When
he comes to consider the drawbacks of pragmatic two-party politics, Robert
Dahl offers some intriguing reflections:
Consider the lot of the political dissenter . . . If he enters
into a third party, he is condemned to political impotence . . .
It is natural for him to interpret political conflict among
national leaders as sham battles within a unified power elite . . .
For the political dissenter, continued political impotence and
rejection breed frustration. Frustration may produce epothy
and withdrawal from politics, but frustration may also turn to
hostility. resentment, vengefulness, and even hatred for national
leaders in both parties. The political dissenter, then, is
likely to become alienated from the political system -- from
its prevailing practices. its institutions, its personnel, and
their assumptions (Dahl 1966: 65-66).
Dahl does not claim to be building a general account of collective action.
The work just quoted deals with the conditions for different patterns of
political opposition in democracies. Nevertheless it is legitimate and
useful to generalize Dahl's argument, for it contains the main proposals
pluralist theory offers for the analysis of collective action in genernl.
Dahl's reflections place a remarkable emphasis on individual, as
opposed to group, aspirations end grievances. They assume that an indi-
vidual defines his interest. then searches for a way to forward that
interest within the existing poljtical system. They contain an indirect
observation that the costs and returns of collective action differ from
one potential actor to another as a result of the particular lineaments .
of the American political system. Neither repression nor mobilizing costs
seem to play a significant part in Dahl'a explanation of differentials in
political participation.
"Political participation" itself, in this view, consists of voting.
party work, holding office and communicating with legislators: people
whose problems these procedures won't solve tend to withdraw or to act
outside the political system. The extent to which a group's interests
are facing new threats or new opportunities becomes, in Dahl's argument
and the plurallst argument in general, the chief determinant of its
collecti.ve action. Furthermore, the argument draws sharp distinctions
among normal politics, abnormal politics and collective action outside
the realm of politics. In all these regards. our collective-action model
lead^ in other directions: assuming groups as the political participants,
attributing major importance to repression and to mobilizing costs, mini-
mizing the political/nonpolitical distinction and arguing that the main
difference between "normal" and "abnormal" political action is the power
position of the groups involved.
The comparison of our barebones mobilization model with the pluralist
assumptions also helps display some worrisome gaps in the mobilization
argument. For one thing, the model does not directly represent the effects
of beliefs, customs, world views, rights or obligations. Instead, in this
elementary version, it assumes that beliefs, customs, world views, rights
and obligations affect collective action indirectly through their influence
on interest, organization, mobilization and repression. This assumption,
for the ways a contender's collective action affects its opportunities
and its power. The model provides no place for strategic interactions and
no place for the conquest or loss of power. Collective action affects s
group's parer, but that effect takes time. As we move along, we will have
to treat time-sequences more explicitly and carefully.
Finally. the model is essentially quantitative. It concerns the
amount of collective action. the extent of organization, and so on.
Unquestionably, the = of organization, of interest, of mobilization
effects the =of collective action of which a contender is capable: in
many circumatances it affects the quantity of collective nction an well:
In Karl Marx' analysis of 1848, which we looked at in the last chapter,
the social and geographic fragmentation of the peasantry helps explain
their inaction in the face of assaults on their interests. We will have
much to do with these qualitative relationships later on.
If we were to apply the elementary mobilization model to the changing
collective action of different groups of workers in the course of indust-
rialization -- which is one of the purposes for which it is intended --
we would find ourselves pursuing two somewhat separate bunches of questions:
first, how the shared interests, general organization and current mobilization
of a trade affected its members' capacity for acting together; second, how
its current relationship to the government and to powerful contenders
effected the costs and returns of each of the available opportunities to act
and others like it, will need attention later on.
For another thing, the model has no time in it. Collective action
does. The most obvious defect of the model is that it makes no allowance
on common gr i evances and a s pi r a t i ons . Under t h e f i r s t headi ng come. quest i ons
about t he s p a t i a l concent r at i on of t h e i ndus t r y. t he ext ens i venes s of t h e
i n t e r n a l communi cat i o~~s net work, t h e e xi s t e nc e of uni ons, and s o on.
Under t he second a r e ques t i ons concerni ng t he e xi s t e nc e of c o a l i t i o n s wi t h
power-holders, t h e e xt e nt of l e g i s l a t i o n penal i zi ng l abor or gani zat i ons , t he
rewards s v l i l n b l e t o v i c t o r s i n e l e c t i o n s o r i n s t r i k e s , e t c .
Much of t he f ol l owi ng di s cus s i on wi l l propose arguments concerni ng
s u c l ~ s p e c i f i c ques t i ons . It wi l l o f f e r concept s t o c l a r i f y t he arguments
a s wel l a s s t r a t e g i e s of measurement and a na l ys i s . I f , equi pped onl y wi t h
our el ement ary model, we pr essed our i nqui r y i n t o worki ng-cl ass c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i on, we would soon need f c r t h e r assumpt i ons about r i g h t s , b e l i e f s , and
t he r u l e s of t h e p o l i t i c a l game. The l a t e r di s cus s i on wi l l of t e n t a r r y
over such problems.
For t he moment, never t hel es s , we shoul d s t i c k wi t h i n t e r e s t s , or gs ni -
zat i on, mobi l i zat i on, . c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , repression-facilitation, power
and oppor t uni t yl t hr e a t . Let us go around our di agram i n t h a t or de r , r e f i n i n g
a s we go. Then we can r e s t a t e t h e model bef or e appl yi ng i t t o t h e a na l ys i s
of d i f f e r e n t forms of c o n f l i c t . Thi s chapt er wi l l t ake us t hrough i n t e r e s t ,
or gani zat . i on, mobi l i zat i on and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. Chapt er 4 wi l l t hen
add r e pr e s s i on- f a c i l i t a t i on, power and oppor t uni t yl t hr e a t t o t h e a na l ys i s
bef or e r econs i der i ng bot h our models and t h e i r i mpl i cat i ons f o r r e a l - l i f e
c o n f l i c t .
I n t e r e s t s
Elont anal ys es of mobi l i zat i on and' cont ent i on f o r power t ake t he groups
i nvol ved, and t h e i r I n t e r e s t s , f o r gr ant ed. Once we not i c e who i s a c t i ng, i t
r a r e l y seems d i f f i c u l t t o expl ai n why t hey, and not ot he r groups, a r e a c t i ng.
Yet many groups f a i l t o mobi l i ze, some mobi l i zed groups f a l l t o a c t c ol l e c -
t i v e l y , some c o l l e c t i v e a c t o r s f a i l t o cont end f o r power, nnd many a c t o r s
come and go: i ndi gnant women now, angry f ar mer s t hen, temperance ndvocnt es
some ot he r t i me. A v a l i d t heor y of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on must expl ai n t he
comings and goi ngs. I t must a l s o expl ai n why some groups never sl ~ow up a t
.
a l l . Pa r t of t he expl anat i on l i e s i n t he or gani zat i onal problems we wLll
t ake up l a t e r . But p a r t of i t s ur e l y r e s i de s i n t he f a c t t hot groups have
var yi ng i n t e r e s t s i n c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on.
Theor i es i n t he t r a d i t i o n of John St u a r t lI111 gi ve us l i t t l e gui dance
i n t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a gr oup' s i n t e r e s t . Yet t hey suggest t h a t t he
nat ur e of t h e popul at i on' s c e n t r a l deci si on-maki ng s t r u c t u r e s -- its mnrket.
its syst em of vot i ng, o r somet hi ng e l s e of t he s o r t -- s t r ongl y a i f e c t s
which peopl e have an i n t e r e s t i n a c t i n g t oget her , and wi l l t he r e f or e do so.
Durkheimisn t he or i e s t e l l us t o walch t he c r e a t i on and de s t r uc t i on
of groups by t h e changi ng di vi s i on of l a bor . They t e l l us t o expect gr e a t e r
a c t i on ( or a t l e a s t a d i f f e r e n t ki nd of a c t i on) from t h e groups bei ng most
compl et el y and r a pi dl y t ransformed. For Durkheim, i ndi vi dunl and c ol l e c -
t i v e i n t e r e s t s gener al l y c o n f l i c t i n t he s hor t run. I ndi vi dual Jmpulses
and i ndi vi dua l i n t e r e s t s e r e roughl y eqt r i vsl ent ; t he c r u c i a l va r i a t i on from
one group o r s oc i e t y t o anot her is how much t hose i ndJvi dua1 i mpul ses and
i n t e r e s t s a r e under s o c i a l c ont r ol .
Weberian t he or i e s a l s o draw bur a t t e n t i o n t o t h e di vi s i on of l nbor ,
but l ead us t o a n t i c i p a t e gr e a t e r a c t i v i t y from groups wl ~i ch have at t achbd
t hemsel ves t o new syst ems of b e l i e f . Stlared be l i e f i t s e l f l eads t o a de f -
i n i t i o n of i n t e r e s t , and s t i mul a t e s a c t i on or i ent ed t o t h a t d e f i n i t i o n .
The Mnrxian l i n e , f i n a l l y , is we l l known: t he changi ng or gani zat i on
of pr oduct i on c r e a t e s and de s t r oys s o c i a l c l a s s e s which a r e def i ned by d i f -
f e r e n t r e l a t i ons hi ps t o t he ba s i c means of pr oduct i on; out OF t h e or gani -
zat i on of pr oduct i on a r i s e fundament al c l a s s di f f e r e nc e s i n i n t e r e s t .
A c l a s s a c t s t oget her , i n t he Marxian account , t o t h e e xt e nt t h a t i t has
ext ens i ve i n t e r n a l or gani zat i on and t o t h e e xt e nt t h a t i t s i n t e r e s t s a r e
c ur r e nt l y bei ng t hr eat ened.
The Mi l l i on, Durkheimian. Weberian and Marxian vi ews produce
competing s t at ement s about t he r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n t e r e s t and
or gani zat i on. A major p a r t of t he di sagreement concer ns t he pr oper way
t o i d e n t i f y a popul at i on' s i n t e r e s t i n t h e f i r s t pl ace. The ba s i c
choi ces a r e two. We can:
1 ) i n f e r t h e i n t e r e s t from t h e popul at i on' s own ut t e r a nc e s and
a c t i ons ;
2) i n f e r i t from a gener al a n a l y s i s of t he connect i ons between
i n t e r e s t and s o c i a l pos i t i on.
Mi l l i on t h e o r i s t s tend t o do some ver s i on of t he f i r s t ; t hey t r y t o
ground t h e i r anal ys es on u t i l i t i e s o r pr ef er ences r eveal ed d i r e c t l y
o r i n d i r e c t l y by t he a c t or s . El arxi st s of t e n do some ver s i on of t he
second; t hey det er mi ne o gr oup' s i n t e r e s t a p r i o r i from i t s r e l a t i ons hi p
Lo t he means of pr oduct i on. There a r e many e l a bor a t i ons and compromises
between t he two. For example, some a n a l y s t s i n f e r t he i n t e r e s t of
workers a t one poi nt i n t i me r e t r o a c t i v e l y from an i n t e r e s t t hey a r t i c u l a t e
l a t e r . Many t r eat ment s of s o c i a l movements t ake t h a t t ack, l ooki ng back
t o t he e a r l y s t a ge s of t he movement f o r t r a c e s of awareness of goa l s which
would l o t e r become c l e a r and dominant.
The f i r s t choi ce -- i n f e r r i n g t h e i n t e r e s t from t he popul at i on' s
own ut t e r a nc e s and a c t i o n s -- is open t o s e r i ous obj ect i ons . For one
t hi ng. many groups appear t o be unaware of t h e i r own r e a l i n t e r e s t s .
Ei t her t hey have not a r t i c u l a t e d t h e i r shar ed i n t e r e s t s o r t hey have
a r t i c u l a t e d them f a l s e l y . For anot her , t he appr opr i at e evi dence i s very
hard t o i d e n t i f y , assembl e. and s ynt hes i ze: peopl e o f t e n s ay conflicting
t hi ngs , o r not hi ng a t a l l . But t he second choi ce -- i n f e r r i n g i n t e r e s t s
from a gener al a n a l y s i s of t he connect i ons between i n t e r e s t s and s o c i a l
pos i t i on -- a l s o has s e r i ous drawbacks. It t a ke s conf i dence, even
ar r ogance, t o ove r r i de a gr oup' s own vi s i on of i t s i n t e r e s t s i n l i f e .
General i n t e r e s t schemes commonly r e ve a l a c o n f l i c t between shor t - r un
and long-run i n t e r e s t s . (Much i n t e r e s t i n g game t heor y de a l s wi t h
s i t u a t i o n s i n which shor t - r un i n t e r e s t l eads t o s t r a t e g i e s cont r ar y t o
t h e long-run i n t e r e s t of t he p a r t i e s . ) I n t h a t c a s e , whi cl ~ is t h e "r eal "
i n t e r e s t ? Fi na l l y, we a r e t r y i n g t o expl ai n why peopl e behave ns t hey
do; t h e goa l s t hey have f ashi oned f o r t hemsel ves appear t o i nf l ue nc e
t h e i r behavi or even when t hos e goa l s a r e t r i v i a l , vague, cl nr eol i s t i c Or
s el f - def eat i ng. My own r esponse t o t h i s dilemma cont ai ns two r ul e s :
1) t r e a t t he r e l a t i o n s of pr oduct i on a s pr e di c t or s of t he i n t e r e s t s
peopl e wi l l pur sue on t he aver age and i n t he l ong run. but 2) r e l y , a s
much a s pos s i bl e , on peopl e' s own a r t i c u l a t i o n of t h e i r i n t e r e s t s a s nn
expl anat i on of t h e i r behavi or i n t h e s hor t run.
We escape t h a t f er oci ous dilemma, however, onl y t o r ush ont o t h e
hor ns of anot her : i ndi vi dua l i n t e r e s t s vs. group i n t e r e s t s . Even i f
we i d e n t i f y bot h wi t h conf i dence, t hey need not coi nci de, ond m y well.
c o n f l i c t . Much t he or i z i ng i n t h e vei n of John St u a r t M i l l has d e a l t
wi t h pr e c i s e l y t h a t dilemma -- sometimes by s t r i v i n g t o show t h a t
i ndi vi dua l pur s ui t of s e l f - i n t e r e s t wi l l s er ve t h e common good, some-
t i mes by at t empt i ng t o i d e n t i f y and expl ai n t hose s i ~ u a t i o n s i n which
a genui ne c o n f l i c t does emerge. sometimes by l ooki ng f o r deci s i on r u l e s
which wi l l cumul at e i ndi vi dua l i n t e r e s t s t o t he c o l l e c t i v e advnntnge.
I n a famous psaaage of The Wealth of Nat i ons (Chapt er 3. Book 4 ) , Adam
Smith s e t t he t one of t he f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e :
Every i ndi vi dua l is c ont i nua l l y e xe r t i ng hi msel f t o f i nd out t he
most advant ageous employment f o r what ever c a p i t a l he can command.
It is h i s own advant age, i ndeed, and not t h a t of t he s oc i e t y,
which he has i n view. But t h e s t udy of h i s own advant age n a t u r a l l y ,
o r r a t h c r ne c e s s a r i l y, l eads him' t o pr e f e r t h a t employment which
is most advant ageous t o t he s oc i e t y.
On t h e ot he r hand, t he argument by Mancur Olson which we reviewed
e a r l i e r ( de s pi t e i t s debt t o Adam Smith) i ndi c a t e s t h a t i ndi vi dua l
i n t e r e s t and group i n t e r e s t us ua l l y do c o n f l i c t . At l e a s t t hey c o n f l i c t
i n t h i s sense: each i ndi vi dua l a c t o r o r d i n a r i l y has an i nc e nt i ve t o
avoi d c ont r i but i ng h i s s ha r e t o c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s which wi l l be ne f i t
everyone. Adnm Smith r es ol ves t h e dilemma by denyi ng i t ; by i mpl i cat i on,
he deni es t h a t t he r e i s anyt hi ng s p e c i a l about c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on which
t he pr oper st udy of i ndi vi dua l a c t i on wi l l not expl ai n. Mancur Olson.
however, makes t h a t very ' l i n k pr obl emat i c.
We a r e not de f e ns e l e s s s g a i n s t t h e dilemma. We shoul d remain c l e a r
t h a t c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s e x i s t . however l a r g e a p a r t t he pur s ui t of
i ndi vi dua l i n t e r e s t s may pl ay i n t h e accompl i shment of t h o s e c o l l e c t i v e
i n t e r e s t s . We shoul d d e l i b e r a t e l y t r e a t t he degr ee of c o r ~ f l i c t between
i ndi vi dua l end c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s a s a v a r i a b l e a f f e c t i n g t he l i ke -
l i hood and c ha r a c t e r of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. We shoul d t r e a t t h a t degr ee
of c o n f l i c t , more pr e c i s e l y, a s i nc r e a s i ng t he c os t of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on
t o t he i ndi vi dua l s and t o t he group a s a whole. And we 6ho11ld pur sue t he
a n a l y s i s of t h e ways t h a t a l t e r n a t i v e arrangement^ f o r making de c i s i ons
t r a n s l a t e i ndi vi dua l pr ef er ences i n t o c o l l e c t i v e outcomes. I n t h e annl y-
s ea t h a t f ol l ow, I wi l l occas i onal l y wr e s t l e wi t h t he s e t h e o r e t i c a l prob-
lems. Usual l y. however. I wi l l t r e a t them a s pr nc t i c nl mat t er s : how t o de-
t er mi ne, i n p a r t i c u l a r t i mes end pl aces , which i n t e r e s t s a r e l mpprt ant and
how t h e peopl e i nvol ved aggr egat e them.
Or gani zat i on
Har r i son White has made a powerful d i s t i l l a t e of t he most i n s i p i d
wi nes i n t he s oc i ol ogi c a l c e l l a r -- group taxonomies. There we f i nd onl y
two el ement s. There a r e c a t e gor i e s of peopl e who s ha r e some chnr act er i a-
t i c : t hey a r e a l l femal e, a l l Sunni Muslims, a l l r e s i de nt s of Timbuktu, o r
something e l s e . A f ul l - f l edged cat egor y c ont a i ns peopl e a l l of whom recog-
ni z e t h e i r common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , and whom everyone e l s e r ecogni zes a s
havi ng t h a t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . There a r e a l s o net works of peopl e who a r e
l i nked t o each o t h e r , d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y , by a s p e c i f i c ki nd of i n t e r -
per s onal bond: a chai n of peopl e each of whom owes someone e l s e i n t he s e t
at t endance a t h i s o r her wedding, l e t us s ay, o r t he s e t of i ndi vi dua l s de-
f i ne d by s t a r t i n g a r b i t r a r i l y wi t h some person, i de nt i f yi ng everyone t h a t
person t a l k s wi t h st l e a s t once ever y day, t hen i de nt i f yi ng everyone tlley
t a l k wi t h a t l e a s t once ever y day, and s o on u n t i l no new persona j oi n t he
list. I f t h e common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t he i nt e r pe r s ona l bond I s or di nnr y,
t he c a t e gor i e s and net works def i ned by them tend t o be l a r ge . Cl e a r l y we
can s hr i nk t he c a t e gor i e s and networks by i n s i s t i n g on c r i t e r i a ( or combln-
a t i o n s of c r i t e r i a ) which occur r a r e l y: femal e Sunni Muslim r e s i de nt s of
Timbuktu, per haps, o r d a i l y conver s at i on p l u s i n v i t a b i l i t y to n wedd4.ng.
The more i n t e r e s t i n g combi nat i on i s t he one White c n l l n n c a t ne t :
a s e t of i ndi vi dua l s compri si ng bot h a cat egor y and a network. The c a t n e t
cat ches gr a c e f ul l y t he s ens e of "groupness" which more compl i cat ed con-
c e pt s m i s s . For t h a t r eason, I w i l l s u b s t i t u t e t h e word group f o r t h e e xot i c
c nt ne t . A s e t of i ndi vi dua l s is s group t o t he e xt e nt t h a t i t compri ses
bot h s cat egor y and a network.
The i dea of or gani zat i on f ol l ows d i r e c t l y . The more ext ens i ve its
common i d e n t i t y and i n t e r n a l net works, t he more or gani zed t he group.
CATNESS X NETNESS ORGANIZATION. Schemat i cal l y, Fi gur e 3-3 sums up t he
r e l a t i ons hi ps among t h e concept s. "All Br azi l i ans " compri se a s e t of peo-
pl e onl y weakly l i nked by i nt e r pe r s ona l net works, but s t r ongl y i d e n t i f i e d
by t hemsel ves and o t h e r s a s a s e pa r a t e cat egor y of bei ng: low on net nes s ,
hi gh on c a t ne s s . The p r i n t e r s ' uni on l o c a l s por t r ayed i n Li ps e t , Trow
and Coleman's Q Democracy have bot h d i s t i n c t , compel l i ng i d e n t i t i e s
and ext ens i ve, absor bi ng i nt e r pe r s ona l networks: l i i gl ~ on bot h c a t ne s s and
net nes s , t he r e f or e on or gani zat i on.
Fi gur e 3-3: Components of Or gani zat i on
s u a l Crowd Fr i ends hi p Network
,&n
* Low > High
NETNESS
Thi s not i on of or gani zat i on s t r e s s e s t he gr oup' s i ncl us i venes s : llow
c l os e i t comes t o absor bi ng t he members' whole l i v e s . (For "i ncl usi vencsa"
we have our choi ce of t hr e e r e l a t e d s t andar ds : t he nmount of t i me, t he
amount of energy, o r t he pr opor t i on of a l l s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n i n wlilcll t h e
members and ot he r peopl e a r e t aki ng i n t o account t h e f a c t of group mem-
ber shi p. ) Ot her f e a t ur e s of a gr oup' s s t r u c t u r e one might want t o cons i der
i n j udgi ng l~ow "organi zed" i t is a r e i t s e f f i c i e nc y and its e f f c c t i ve ne s s
-- o r t h e s t r u c t u r a l f e a t ur e s presumably e f f e c t i n g e f f i c i e nc y and e f f e c -
t i ve ne s s , such a s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , c e n t r a l i t y and s t r n t l f i c a t i o n . I s t r e s s
i ncl us i venes s on two grounds: 1 ) t h e (unproved) l ~ypot he s l s t l i s t i t i s t he
main a s pe c t of group s t r u c t u r e which a f f e c t s t he a b i l i t y t o mobi l i ze; 2)
t he i n t r i n s i c d i f f i c u l t y of s e pa r a t i ng e f f e c t i ve ne s s and e f f i c i e nc y from
t h e mobi l i zat i on and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on we a r e t r y i n g t o e xpl a i n. By t h e
s t andar d of i ncl us i venes s , an i s o l a t e d community wi l l tend t o be hl ghl y
or gani zed, but s o wi l l some occupat i onal gr oups, some r e l i g i o u s groups
and some p o l i t i c a l groups.
We need t hes e d e f i n i t l o n s i n or de r t o t hi nk about t he groups which coul d,
i n p r i n c i p l e , mobi l i ze. We a l s o need them t o s pe c i f y what i t means t o soy
t h a t or gnni zat i on promotes mobi l i zat i on. The number of p o t e n t i a l mobilizers
is enormous. The t s s k of enumerat i ng a l l of them f or a gi ven popul at i on
would l ook something l i k e t hi s :
1 ) i d e n t i f y ever y s i n g l e s t a t u s d i s t i n c t i o n employed v i t h l n t h e
popul st i on;
2) s e l e c t t hos e d i s t i n c t i o n s which imply some d i f f e r e n c e i n i n t e r e s t
between t hos e i n one cat egor y and t l ~ o s e i n anot her ;
3) produce t he (tremendous) l i s t c ons i s t i ng of a l l combi nnt i ons of
t he s e l e c t e d d i s t i n c t i o n s :
4) e l i mi na t e t hose, wlilch llave no r e a l per sons wi t hi n them (e. g.
Chinese-.lewish-cowboy-grandmother);
5) s e l e c t t hose wi t h some minimum p o s s i b i l i t y of i de nt i f yi ng and
communicnting wi t h each ot he r .
Thi s f a n t a s t i c t a s k is probabl y out of r each f o r l a r ge popul at i ons organ-
i zed i n compl i cat ed ways, al t hough Edmonson (1958) di d anal yze appar ent l y
exhaus t i ve l i s t s of s t a t u s t erms f o r North American I ndi an groups. But
one mi gl ~t be a h l e t o c a r r y out s t e p s 1 and 2 a s sampl i ng ope r a t i ons , i f
t hc r e were an unbi ased s our ce of s t a t u s d i s t i n c t i o n s ; t hen t he l i s t f o r
s t e p 3 coul d be a s s mal l a s one de s i r e d. I f s t e p s 4 and 5 l e f t no c a t e -
gor i e s , one coul d go back t o 1 and 2 over and over .
Gamson's procedure f o r i de nt i f yi ng "chal l engi ng groups" i n American
p o l l t i c s bear s a gener al resembl ance t o t h i s i d e a l pl an, but s t a r t s much
f a r t h e r al ong i n t h e mobi l i zat i on pr ocess. ("Chal l engi ng groups" a r e
t hos e whi cl ~ i n t he per i od from 1800 t o 1945 made a new, cont es t ed bi d t o
cllangc tile or gani zat i on o r behavi or of t he na t i ona l p o l i t i c a l syst em;
t hey a r e a s p e c i a l c a s e of t h e groups whi ch, not c oi nc i de nt a l l y, I e a r l i e r
c a l l e d "chal l enger s". ) Gamson s c a ~ i s numerous h i s t o r i c a l s our ces f or any
mention what soever of a group making new cl ai ms , and pl aces a l l group namea
i n a pool from which he t hen draws groups st random f o r c l os e st udy. Af t e r
somc el i mi nat i ons f o r dupl i c a t i on, l a c k of geogr aphi c scope, e t c . and a f -
t e r a l a r g e scor ch f o r a d d i t i o n a l i nf or mat i on concerni ng t he groups drawn,
Gamson has an unbiased, well-documented sample of a l l chal l engi ng groups
meet i ns h i s c r i t e r i a over t he e n t i r e per i od. Wi t hi n t he sampl e, he can
t hen s t udy changes i n t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of chal l engi ng groups over t i me,
di f f e r e nc e s between s ucces s f ul and unsuccessf ul c ha l l e nge r s , and a number
of ot he r i mpor t ant problems. For our pur poses, t he weakness oE Camson's
pr ocedur e is t h a t a group must have act ed t oget l i er somewhow t o bc mentioned
i n h i s t o r i c a l account s. It i s not , t he r e f or e , a r e l i a b l e way of det ermi ni ng
what c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s s e t o f f t hos e groups which mobi l i ze from a l l t l ~ o s c
o t h e r s which coul d, i n t heor y, have mobi l i zed.
We have an a l t e r n a t i v e . I ns t ead of at t empt i ng t o pr epar e an unbinaed
l i st of a l l p o t e n t i a l mobi l i zer s , we can t nkc one o r two di mensi ons o r
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n which a r e of t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e r e s t , s e n r c l ~ f o r evi dence oC
group f or mat i on, and t hen of mobi l i zat i on, a t d i f f e r e n t l oc a t i ons al ong t h e
di mensi on, l e t t i n g t h e d i f f e r e n t i a l s t e s t more gener nl a s s e r t i o n s con-
cer ni ng t h e det er mi nant s of or gani zat i on and mobi l i zat i on. Vot i ng a n a l y s t s
and s t ude nt s of i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t sometimes do on i mpor t ant pnr t of t h e
necessar y work. I n vot i ng s t u d i e s , i t i s common t o t ake t h e e n t i r e popu-
l a t i o n of p o t e n t i a l vot e r s i n some t e r r i t o r y , di vi de i t up i n t o mnjor demo-
gr aphi c c a t e gor i e s , t hen examine d i f f e r e n t i a l s among t he c a t e gor i e s i n or -
gani zat i on, p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y and vot i ng pr opens i t i es . I n s nnl ys es of
s t r i k e s , i t i s common t o t ake an e n t i r c l abor f or c e , di vi de i t i n t o i ndus-
t r i e s and t ypes of f i r ms , t hen document v a r i a t i o n i n t he or gani zat i on of
work, t ype and i n t e n s i t y of uni oni zat i on and pr opens i t y t o s t r i k e .
Di f f e r e nt ways of di vi di ng up t he e l e c t o r a t e o r t he l a bor f or ce wi l l
produce d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s . But t h a t can be an advant age: i t hel ps us de-
c i d e which d i f f e r e n t i a l s a r e dur abl e and gener al . For example, some year s
ago Cl ar k Kerr and Abraham Si ege1 made a pl a us i bl e and wi del y-accept ed
a n a l y s i s of i n d u s t r i a l s t i k e pr ope ns i t i e s . F i r s t , t hey s u mr i z e d t h e
o v e r a l l p a t t e r n of s t i k e pr ope ns i t i e s i n Aus t r a l i a , Czechosl ovaki a, Germany,
I t a l y . t h e Net her l ands, New Zealand. Norway, Sweden. Swi t zer l and, t h e Uni t ed
Kingdom and t h e Uni t ed St a t e s dur i ng var i ous per i ods from World War I t o
t h e l a t e 19401~. Thei r de s c r i pt i on of t he ~ e n e r a l pa t t e r n appear s 411 Tnbl c
3-1. llaving i d e n t i f i e d t h e d i f f e r e n t i a l s , t hey t r i e d t o expl ai n them.
Tabl e 3-1: Kerr C Si e ge l ' s Summary of St r i k e Pr ope ns i t i e s
Source: Kerr 6 Si e ge l 1.954: 190
PROPENSITY TO STRIKE
lligh
Medium High
Medium
Medium Low
Low
3-23
They s e t t l e d on t h e pr esence of an "i s ol at ed maan" -- a liomogenco~~s
INDUSTRY
mining
mar i t i me and l ongshor e
lumber
t e x t i l e
chemi cal
p r i n t i n g
l e a t h e r
gener al manufact uri ng
cons t r uct i on
food 6 ki ndr ed pr oduct s
c l ot hi ng
gas , wat er , e l e c t r i c i t y
h o t e l s , r e s t a ur a nt s , 6
o t h e r s e r vi c e s
r a i l r oa d
a g r i c u l t u r e
t r a de
wor kf or ce, segr egat ed from o t h e r workers -- a s t h e major condi t i on pro-
duci ng hi gh s t r i k e pr opensi t y. They a l s o suggest ed t h a t ,
I f t he j ob is phys i cal l y d i f f i c u l t and unpl easant , uns ki l l e d o r
s emi s ki l l ed, and cas ual o r s e s s ons l , and f o s t e r s an i ndependent s p i r i t
( a s i n t he l ogger i n t h e woods), i t wi l l draw t ough, i ncons t ant com-
ba t i ve , and v i r i l e workers, and t hey wt l l be i nc l i ne d t o s t r i k e . I f
t he j ob i s phys i cal l y easy and performed i n pl eas ant sur r oundi ngs,
s k i l l e d and r es pons i bl e, s t eady, and s ubj e c t t o s e t r u l c s and c l o s e
s uper vi s i on, i t wi l l a t t r a c t women o r t h e more submi ssi ve t ype of man
who w i l l abhor s t r i k e s (Kerr 6 Si e ge l 1954: 195) .
But t h i s was, f or t una t e l y. a secondary hypot hesi s.
I n e i t h e r ve r s i on, t h e argument has two l e v e l s : 1 ) t he i d e n t i f i c n t i o n
of some s t andar d d i f f e r e n t i a l s among i n d u s t r i e s i n s t r i ke- pr opens i t y; 2)
t he expl anat i on of what ever d i f f e r e n t i a l s a c t u a l l y appear . Both f a c e t s of
t h e Kerr-Siege1 a na l ys i s , e s pe c i a l l y t he second, appear t o be wrong. For
t he cas e of France, Tabl e 3-2 pr es ent s r a t e s of s t r i k e s and man-days i n
s t r i k e s f o r major i n d u s t r i e s from 1890 t o 1960. The dat a stlow no more
t han a moderate s t a b i l i t y i n r e l a t i v e s t r i k e pr ope ns i t i e s from one per i od
t o t l i e next . They show a cons i der abl e di f f e r e nc e i n r c l a t l v e s t r i k e pro-
p e n s i t i e s as measured by frequency of s t r i k e s and hy t o t a l man-days.
Although a g r i c u l t u r e does s t i c k a t t h e bottom of t he l i s t , s o do t r a ns por t
and t e x t i l e s . Food is a l s o c ons i s t e nt l y low, cont r ar y t o t he pr e di c t i on.
There is l e s s cons i s t ency a t t he t op: quar r yi ng t ur ns out t o linve mn y
s t r i k e s , but r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t , a m1 1 ones. Mining t ur ns out t o linve few
s t r i k e s , but bi g, l ong ones. I n any c a s e , t h e ot he r French i n d u s t r i e s
which rank r e l a t i v e l y hi gh i n s t r i k e pr opens i t y -- cheml cal s, c ons t r uc t i on,
bui l di ng ma t e r i a l s and s mel t i ng -- a r e ne i t he r hi gh on a l l i ndi c e s nor ob-
vi ous i l l u s t r a t i o n s of t l i e gr e a t e r s t i ke- pr opens i t y of i s o l a t e d , homogen-
Tabl e 3-2: French S t r i k e Rat es by I ndus t r y, 1890-1960
St r i k e s per 100,000 Man-Days Lost per 100 Mi l l i on
Labor Force Labor Force. .
I ndus t r y 1890-1914 1915-1935 1915-1932 1950-1960
Quarrying* 30 2 2 40 Ill*
Cl ~eml cel s 24 10 54 62
Const r uct i on 24 15 50 31
Uui l di ng Mat er i al s
Ceramics 2 3
Mining . 19 5 151 *
Pr i nt i ng 6 Paper 1.6 11 37 15
Smel t i ng 14 17 220 70
Leot her 6 l l i des 1 3 14 77 1 3
Metalworking 12 10 4 6 88
Tr anspor t I) 8 14 86
Te xt i l e s 8 7 72 2 7
Garments a 2
Wood Industries 8 9 19
Food I ndus t r i e s 5 6 10
Agr i cul t ur e, Fi s h,
For es t 0.4 0. 3 n. a.
Tot a l Non-Agri-
c u l t u r e 7 6 37
*Quarrying and Ni ni ng combined i n 1950-1960.
Source: Shor t er 6 Ti l l y 1974: 201.
eous and/ or "tough" i ndus t r i e s . 3-25
I n or der t o ge t a t t he '!isolated mass" por t i on of t h e argument, Fdward
Shor t er and I regrouped t he French s t r i k e da t e by sm11 d i s t r i c t i n t o
t h r e e t ypes of ar eas : mono-i ndust ri al , pol y- i ndus t r i al , met r opol i t an.
The Kerr-Si ege1 a n a l y s i s pr e di c t s a s t r ong t endency f o r t he mono-industrial
a r e a s t o have hi gher s t r i k e r a t e s , gr e a t e r mi l i t ancy, and s o on. I n f a c t ,
i t is t h e ot he r way round: on t he whole, met r opol i t an d i s t r i c t s outshadow
pol y- i ndus t r i al d i s t r i c t s , and t h e one-i ndust ry d i s t r i c t s come i n l a s t
( Shor t er 6 Ti l l y 1974: 287-295). When Muhammnd Fi az ar r s ycd French i ndus-
t r i e s by t h e i r degr ee of geogr aphi c s egr egat i on over t he count r y os a
whole, he di scover ed no r e l a t i ons hi p between i nol a t i on and s t r i k e proyen-
s i t y ; such f a c t o r s a s uni oni zat i on and pl a nt s i z e , on t h e ot he r hand, s i g-
n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t e d t h e r e l a t i v e pr opens i t y t o s t r i k e ( Fi az 1973). Ltke-
wi se, t h e anal ys es Snyder and Kel l y have done f o r I t a l y , 1878-1903, i n d i c a t e
t h a t once obvi ous or ga ni z a t i ona l f e a t ur e s such a s s i z e and uni oni zot l on
a r e al l owed f o r , i ndus t r y a s such has no s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on t h e broad
q u a n t i t a t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of s t r i k e s (Snyder 6 Kel l y 1976). 111 t hes e '
t r i a l s , a t l e a s t , no ver s i on of t he Kerr-Siege1 argument hol ds up.
These examples o f f e r an i mpor t ant l es s on t o us e r s of a group-compari-
son s t r a t e gy: t he l e s s compel l i ng your a p r i o r i r easons f o r employing a
p a r t i c u l a r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a s a b a s i s f o r t h e st udy of d i f f e r e n t i n l s i n or -
gani zat i on, mobi l i zat i on and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , t h e more i mpor t ant i t is
t o compare t h e e f f e c t s of us i ng d i f f e r e n t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s . Each appl i ce-
t i o n of a new c l a s s i f i c a t i o n t o t he da t a i s , i n its cr ude way, t h e t r i a l
of a new t heory. The c or ol l a r y a ppl i e s more gener al l y: t h e be t t e r - s pe c i f i e d
your t heor y, t he nore l i k e l y you a r e t o f i nd some a c c e s s i bl e cor ner of
r e a l i t y i n which t o t r y i t out . The be t t e r - s pe c i f i e d your t heor y, t he l e s s
you wi l l have t o worry about t he monumental t ns k of enumerat i ng a l l groups
a t r i s k t o or gani zat i on, mobi l i zat i on and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. An obvi ous
sermon,. but one l i t t l e heeded.
u n i t s , t h e s upl a uni t of which t h e u n i t is o member, o r e xt e r nol u n i t s ,
The Kerr-Si cgel a nol ys i s pr ovi des anot her l es s on a s wel l . St r i k e s
or e s form of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. To expl ai n group d i f f e r e n t i a l s i n any ki nd
of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on, i ncl udi ng s t r i k e s , we wi l l have t o t ake i n t o ac-
count a l l our components: i n t e r e s t s , or gani zat i on, mobi l i zat i on and oppor-
t uni t y. Kerr and Si e ge l at t empt t o expl ai n t he d i f f e r e n t i a l s wi t h i n t e r -
e s t s and or gani zat i on al one. The reasoning about i s o l a t e d masses and
t oughness gi ves s p a r t i c u l a r (ond i nadequat e) account of t h e or ga ni z a t i ona l
s t r u c t u r e and i ndi vi dua l workers' i n t e r e s t s c h a r o c t e r i s t i c of d i f f e r e n t
i ndus t r i e s . Rut i t s a ys not hi ng about d i f f e r e n t i a l s i n mobi l i zs t i on o r
oppor t uni t y t o s t r i k e .
To be more e xa c t , Kerr and Si e ge l assume i mpl i c i t l y e i t h e r 1 ) t hot
mobi l l zot i on ond oppor t uni t y a r e rougllly equal a c r os s i n d u s t r i e s o r 2)
t h a t what ever dj f f e r e nc e s i n mobi l i zat i on and oppor t uni t y do e x i s t have
no i ndependent e f f e c t s on s t r i k e pr opens i t y; t hey r e s u l t from t h e d i f f e r -
ences i n i n t c r e s t and or gani zs t i on. Those assumpt i ons, t oo, a r e hypot heses
- dubi ous ones. Before accept i ng i n t e r e s t and or gani zat i on al one a s
f u l l expl anat i ons of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on, we wi l l have t o l ook a t t he evi -
dence concer ni ng mobi l i zs t i on and oppor t uni t y.
Mobi l i zat i on
The word "mobi l i zat i on" conveni ent l y i d e n t i f i e s t h e pr ocess by which
a group goes from bei ng o pas s i ve c o l l e c t i o n of i ndi vi dua l s t o an a c t i v e
p o r t i c i p s n t i n publ i c l i f e . Demobilization is t he r ever s e pr ocess. Ami t ai
Et zi oni (1968: 388-389) put s i t t h i s way:
We r e f e r t o t he pr oces s by which s u n i t gai ns s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n t h e
c o n t r o l of a s s e t s i t pr evi ous l y di d not c ont r ol a s mobi l i zat i on . . .
By d e f i n i t i o n , i t e n t a i l s a de c l i ne i n t he ns a e t s c ont r ol l e d by aub-
unl e s s tlie ns s e t s whose c ont r ol t he u n i t goined a r e newly-produced
ones . . . A mere i nc r e a s e i n t he a s s e t s of members, of sub- uni t s, o r
even of t he u n i t i t s e l f does not mean t h a t mobi l i zat i on llas occur r ed,
though i t i nc r e a s e s t he mobi l i zat i on pot e nt i a l . The change i n t h e cap-
a c i t y t o c ont r ol and t o us e a s s e t s i s what is s i g n t f i c s n t .
Et z i oni o f f e r s a rough c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of a s s e t s , o r r esour ces: coer ci ve
( e. g. weapons, armed f or c e s , ma n i p u l ~t i v e t echnol ogi es ) ; u t i l i t a r i a n (e. g.
goods, i nf or mat i on s e r vi c e s , money); normat i ve (e. 8. l o y n l t i e s , obl i ga t l ons ) .
A group mobi l i zes i f i t gai ns gr e a t e r c o l l e c t i v e c ont r ol over coer ci ve,
u t i l i t a r i a n o r normat i ve r es our ces , demobi l i zes i f i t l os e s t hot s o r t of
c ont r ol .
In pr a c t i c e , Et z i oni ' s c l s s s i f i c s t i o n of r es our ces is d i f f i c u l t t o main-
t a i n . I t r e f e r s t o t h e i r us e r a t h e r t han t h e i r i n t r i n s i c c ha r a c t e r . The
s e r v i c e a r evol ut i onar y c a ba l draws from i t s 272 l o y a l memhers is 1.ikcly
t o be st once coer ci ve and u t i l i t a r i a n . The r es our ce is l obor power of s
c e r t a i n ki nd. Furt hermore, l oya l t y and obl i got i on a r e not s o much r e-
s our ces a s condi t i ons s f f ' ect i ng t he l i ke l i hood t h a t r es our ces wi l l be de-
l i ve r e d when c a l l e d f o r . If. we a r e a c t u a l l y comparing t h e c ur r e nt mobi l i zo-
t i o n l e v e l s of s e ve r a l groups, o r t r y i n g t o gouge o gr oup' s change over
t i me, we wi l l o r d i n a r i l y do b e t t e r t o f a l l back on t h e economi st ' s f oc t or s
of pr oduct i on: l and, l a bor , c a p i t o l , perhaps t e c l ~n i c o l e xpc r t i s c os wel l .
To t he e xt e nt t h a t a l l of t h e r es our ces have wel l - es t abl i s hed market
val ues i n t he popul at i on st l a r g e , r e l i a nc e on pr oduct i on f o c t o r s wi l l he l p
US s e t r a t e s of r e t ur n f o r r es our ces expended i n tlie p o l i t i c a l or esna. We
can t hen r epr es ent l o y a l t i e s , obl i ga t i ons , commitments and s o f or t h a s de-
t er mi nant s of t h e pr oba bi l i t y t h a t eoch r es our ce nominally under group con-
3-28
trol will be available:
mobilization level = sum
I I
production
nominally under
group control
[~~~~!~~j) when called
Political life mokes the probabilities hard to estimate a priori and un-
likely to remnin constant from one possible type of action to another:
the militants who will vote or picket will not always go to the barricades.
This formulation poses the problem explicitly. We can then ask, as a
question for research, whether the use of elections as a reference point
produces the same polnt in time (or for the some group at different points
in time) than does the use of street demonstrations.
We can also close in on the old problem of differences between a dis-
ciplined professional stoff and committed volunteers: it should appear not
I
only as a difference in the morket value of the labor under group control,
but also as a variation in the probability that the available labor will
actually do the different things whicl~ might be demnnded of it: stuff
envelopes, picket, lobby, bribe, kidnap, bomb, write legal briefs.
The formulotion neatly states an old political dilemma: the choice
bctween loyalty and effectiveness. Effective employees or members often
use their effectiveness to serve themselves or to serve others instead of
the orgnnization to which they are attached, while loyal employees or mem-
bers are often ineffective; sometimes the solution of the tax farmer (who
uses his power to enrich himself, but at least has enougli effectiveness to
produce n surplus for his nominal masters) is the best nvailable. Some-
times the disloyalty of the professionals is so great as to make loyal amn-
teurs n more desirable alternative.
Loyalty refers to the breadth of membera' commitments to deliver
resources. It has three dimensions:
-- the amount of resources committed
-- the range of resources involved
-- the range of circumstances in which the resources will be delivered.
A commitment to deliver substantial resources of only one kind in a
narrowly-specified situation bespeaks relatively little loyalty. A commit-
ment to deliver many resources of different kinds regardless of the
situation reveals great loyalty. Real-life organizations lie somewhere
between the two extremes.
Albert Hirschman turns this observation inside out; he considers loyolty
as one of the major alternative modes of demand for on orgnnizntion'e
services. (We looked at Hirschman's analysis briefly while reviewing the
Million approach to collective action.) In the context of response to
decline in the performance of organizations, he distinguished three
possible reactions of consumers, clients or members of a given organizetion:
exit, voice end loyalty. Economics, Hlrschman comments, treats exit -- a
cessation of demand for the commodity or service -- as the normal response
to declining quality. In the case of schools, governments and other orgoni-
zations whose performances fluctuate, he argues, two other responses are
common. The relevant public may voice its dissatisfaction, with implicit
or explicit threats of exit. Or it may tolerate unsatisfactory performance
for a while because the costs of exit or voice are greater than the loss
of quality. That tolerance is a measure of subjective returns from the
organization, hence of loyalty.
The economic problem is to work out the trodeoffs among exit, voice
and loyalty. That specifies the conditions under wl~ich one or anotllcr
occurs. For our purposes. Iiowever, the value of Hirschman's analysis is
to help us calculate the probability that resources ostensibly on call will
actually be delivered. Exit is the analogue of refusal to deliver, while
voice and loyalty are alternative ways of continuing to yield. At least
in the short run, voice raises the cost of group access to the resources.
In general, fl group which puts a large proportion of its membership
into remunerated positions within its own organization (for example, a
bureaucratized priesthood) raises the cost of exit, and thereby makes voice
and loyalty more likely responses to its performance. It does so at the
cost of committing an important share of its mobilized resources to the
maintenance of the organization itself.
The alternative of placing its members elsewhere -- as a victorious
politics1 party often dispofies of government jobs -- reduces the internal
drain on the organization. However, it also lowers the cost of exit, unless
i
members continue to hold their posts at the pleasure of the organization.
I
i
Building an all-embracing moral community also raises tlie relative costs
of exit. Earlier I suggested that tlie most important element of organization.
so far as impact on mobilization was concerned, was the group's inclusiveness
I
of different aspects of social life. The creation of a moral community is
therefore on extreme case of organization-building in general. On the whole,
the higher the level of organization, the greater the likelihood of voice
I
or loyalty. If a group emphasizes coercion, however, it probably shifts the
likelihood away from voice, toward exit or loyalty.
I
The major variables affecting the probability of delivery are therefore
the extent of competing claims on the resources involved, the nature of the
action to which the resources are to be committed, and how organized the I
mobilizing group is. If the resources are free of competing claims, if
I
I
the action clearly defends the interests of every member and if the group
is an all-embracing moral community, the probability of delivery is close
to 100 percent. Loyalty is then at its maximum, the probability of depnr-
ture or contestation -- exit or voice -- is at its minimum.
Indeed, a significant part of the work of mubilizntion goes into
changing these three variables: reducing the competing claims on resources
controlled by members, developing a program which corresponds to the per-
ceived interests of members, building up a group structure which minimizes
exit and voice. In her survey of nineteenth- and twentieth-century
American communes, Rosabeth Moss Kanter identifies a series of "commitment
mechanisms." "For communes ," she tells us :
the problem of commitment is crucial. Since the community
represents an attempt to estahlish an ideal social order within
the larger society, it must vie with the outside for the members'
loyalties. It must ensure high member involvement despite
external competition without sacrificing its distinctiveness or
ideals. It must often contravene the earlier socialization of
its members in securing obedience to new demands. It must calm
internal dissension in order to present a united front to the
world. The problem of securing total and complete commitment
is central (Kanter 1972: 65).
She is describing a mobilization program which concentrates on the lahor-
power and loyalty of the members themselves.
What organizational arrangements promote that sort of mobil.ization?
Ksnter compares nine nineteenth-century comm~~nal movements (including the
Shakers, Harmony, Jerusalem and Oneida) which lasted 33 yeflrs or more with
twenty-one (including Modern Times. Oberlin, Brook Farm and the Iowa
Pioneer Phalanx) which lasted 16 years or less. The commitment mechanisms
wliicli were substantially more common among the long-lived communes included:
eexual and material abstinence
prohibition of nonresident members
signing over property at admission
non-reimbursement of defectors for property and labor
provision of medical services
insulation mechanisms, such as a special term for the Outside,
ignoring of' outside newspapers, speaking a foreign language and/or
a special jargon
rules for interaction with visitors
discouragement of pairing: free love or celibacy required
physical separation of family members
communal ownership of clothing and personal effects
no compensation for labor
no charge for community services
communal work efforts
daily meetings, and most time spent with other group members
mortification procedures such as confession, mutual surveillance
and denunciation, or distinctions among members on moral grounds
institutionalization of awe for the group and its leaders through
the attribution of magical powers, the legitimation of group demands
through appeals to ultimate values, and the use of special forms
of address (Kanter 1972: chapter 4).
Kanter's list begins to give us a feeling for the real-life manifestations
of the process Max Weber called the routinization of charisma. Faith and
magic play a part, to be sure. But so do a concrete set of social arrange-
ments which place the available resources at the disposal of the group, and
make either voice or exit costly ways to respond to unsatisfactory performance.
I
The social arrangements build loyalty. and enliance mobilization.
Most social groups are unlike communes. They differ in the priorl.ties
they assign to exit, voice and loyalty. The professionals Concentrate on
I
I '
accumulating resources free of competing claims, the rat'on~lists on
adapting their program to current group interests, the moralists on building
an inclusive group which commands assent for its own sake. An exploitative
group will concentrate on the first while appearing to concentrate on the
second or the third: actually working to free resources while appearing to
shape a program to the interests of its members or to build a satisfying
group. Religious frauds often take this latter form.
Thus any group's mobilization program breaks down into these components:
1. accumulating resources
2. increasing collective claims on the resources
a. by reducing competing claims
1 b. by altering the program of collective action
c. by changing the satisfaction due to participntion in
the group as such.
A successful mobilization program does all of them at once.
Groups do their mobilizing in a number of different ways. We can
make crude distinctions among defensive, offensive and preparatory mobili-
zation. In defensive mobilization, a threat from outside induces the members
of a group to pool their resources to fight off the enemy. Eric Wolf (1969)
has pointed out how regularly this sort of response to the representatives
I of capitalism and state power has preceded peasant rebellions.
Standard
i
European forms of rural conflict -- food riots, tax rebellions, invasions
of fields, draft resistance and so on -- typically follow the same sort of
defensive mobilization. This large class of actions challenges the common
assumption (made by Etzioni, among others) that mobilization is always a
top-down phenomenon, organized by leaders and agitators.
Offensive mobilization &, however, often top-down. In the offensive
case, a group pools resources in response to opportunities to realize its
interests. A common form of offensive mobilization consists of the diffusion
of a new organizational strategy. In the late 18208, for example, the
success of O'Connell's Catholic Association in forcing the expansion of
the political rights of British and Irish Catholics inspired the creation
of political associations aimed at expanding the franchise and gusranteeing
rights to assemble, organize end act collectively. A coalition of bourgeois
and substsntinl artisans arose from that strategy, and helped produce the
great Reform Rill of 1832. In this instance, the top-down organizational
efforts of such leaders as Francis Place and CJilliam Cobbett were crucial.
Nevertheless, in pariah after parish the local dissidents decided
on their own that it was time to organize their own association, or (more
likely) to convert their existing forms of organization into a political
association.
Preparatory mobilization is no doubt the most top-down of all. In this
variety, the group pools resources in anticipation of future opportunities
and threats. The nineteenth-century trade union is a classic case. The
trade union built up s store of money to cushion hardship -- hardship in the
form of unemployment, the death of a breadwinner or loss of wages during a
strike. It also pooled knowledge and organizational skills. When it
escaped the union-busting of employers and governments, the trade union
greatly increased the capacity of workers to act together: to strike, to
boycott, to make collective demands. This preparatory mobilization often
began defensively, in the course of a losing battle with employers or in
the face of a threat of firings, wage reductions or cutbacks in privileges.
It normally required risky organizing efforts by local leaders who were
willing to get hurt.
The preparatory part of the strategy was always difficult, since it
required the members to forego present satisfactions in favor of uncertain
future benefits. As we move from defensive to offensive to preparatory
mobilization, in fact, we see the increasing force of Hancur Olson's
statement of the free-rider problem: a rational actor will ride for nothing'
if someone else will pay the fuel and let him aboard. But if everyone
tries to ride free the vehicle goes nowhere. Preparatory mobilization,
especially in the face of high risks, requires strong incentives to overcome
the reasonable desire to have someone else absorb the costs.
As we move from defensive to offensive to preparatory mobilization, we
also see that the distinction between offensive and preparatory is less clear
than the distinction between offensive and defensive. Both offensive and
preparatory mobilization require foresight and an active scanning of the
world outside the group. Both are unlikely in any but the smallest groups
without active leadership and deliberate organizational effort. One frequent
pattern is for leaders to employ resources which are already mobilized to
assure the commitment of other resources to collective ends. That happens,
for example. when priests play on their congregations, already obliged to
assemble, for cash contributions. It also happens when landlords send
bailiffs to claim part of the crop. or when word heelers trade jobs for votes.
These are concrete examples of the "selective incentives" for participation
whose importance Mancur Olson has stressed.
Unlike defensive mobilization, neither offensive nor preparatory
mobilization occurs very often as a simple extension of the group's everyday
routines for doing its work: gathering at the market, shaping up for hiring
at the dock, getting together for a little poaching. Offensive and prepara-
tory mobilization resemble each other; the main difference is whether the
opportunities to which the group responds are in the present or the future.
So the basic distinction runs between defensive hnd offensive modes of
mobillzntion.
A population's initinl.wenlth and power significantly affect the proba-
bility that its mobilization will be defensive or offensive. Common sense
says that the rich mobilize conservatively, in defense of their threatened
interests, while the poor mobilize rndically, in search of what they lack.
Common sense is wrong. It is true that the rich never lash out to smash !
the status quo, while the poor sometimes do. But the rich are constantly
!
mobilizing to take sdvant~ge of new opportunities to maximize their interests.
The poor can rarely afford to.
The poor and powerless tend to begin defensively, the rich and powerful
offensively. The group whose members are rich can mobilize a surplus without
threatening a member's othcr amusements end obligations. A group with a
poor constituency has little choice but to compete with daily necessities.
I
The group whose members are powerful can use the other organizations they
control -- including governments -- to do some of their work, whereas the
powerless must do it on their own. The rich and powerful can forestall claims
from othcr groups before they become articul'ated claims, and can sfford to
seize opportunities to make new claims on their own. Tlie poor and the power-
less often find that the rich, the powerful and the government oppose and
punish their efforts at mobilization. (The main exception, an important one,
is the powerless group whlch forms a coalition with a rich, powerful patron;
European Fascists of the 1920s mobilized rapidly in that fashion.) As a
result. any mobilization at all is more costly to the poor and powerless;
only a threat to the little they have is likely to move them to mobilize.
Tlie rich and powerful are well-defended against such threats: they rnrely
have the occasion for defensive mobilization.
If, on the other hand, we hold mobilization constant and consider
collective action itself, common sense is vindicated. Relatively poor and
powerless groups which have already mobilized are more likely to act
collectively by claiming new rights, privileges end advantages. At the
same level of mobilization the rich and powerful are more likely to act
collectively in defense of whet they already have. Thus the well-docu-
mented tendency of strikes to become more frequent and more demnnding in
times of prosperity, when workers have more slnck resources to devote to
acting together, and employers have more to lose from the withholding
of labor.
Mobilization implies demobilization. Any process by wllich s group
loses collective control over resources demobilizes the group. Now could
that happen7 Anything which destroys resources tends to hnve that effect:
war, neglect, potlatch. But the more common source of demobilization is
the transfer of control over certain kinds of resources to another group:
a subunit of the group in question, a large unit of which the group itself
is a part, a group outside. A lost war, for example, frequently produces
all three sorts of demobilization in the losing country. Hen and women
return from military service to the service of their fomilics; the govern-
ment, for a time, gives up some of its control over its own operations to
a concert of nations of which it is a part; other countries seize some of
the loser's territory, population, equipment or wealth. Whether such
processes produce a negative sum, a positive sum or a zero sum depends
entirely on the relative rates at which new resources are being created,
nnd old ones destroyed.
Often two groups, one containing the other, mobilize st approximately
the same time. A confusion between the two levels has regularly dogged
discussions of mobilization, since Karl Deutsch's initial formulation of
the idens (1953). The most notable examples from our own era involve
national states and smaller units within them: parties, unions or even
organized ethnic groups. (Many Africenists, for instance, have noticed
the strengthening of the ostensibly traditional groups which outsiders
call "tribes" with the growth of new states).
Political theorists, both totalitarian and democratic, have often
considered the mobilization at one level end at the other to be comple-
mentary. The party, in such an account, sccumulates loyalties which
transfer to the state. There is actually, however, little guarantee that
this harmony will prevail. In the usual situation, the smaller and larger
units compete for the same resources. They may follow well-defined rules
of combat, and one of them may consistently have the upper hand, but they
compete nonetheless. Likewise, two or more groups mobilizing simultaneously
within some larger group which is also mobilizing commonly struggle over
control of the same resources. The Teamsters and the Transport Workers
fight for jurisdiction over the same drivers. lJhen union members pay more
taxes they l~ave less for union dues. Illen all a person's time goes into
o religious sect, he has none left either for union membership or for
government service. Military conscription withdrew8 a man from his obli-
gations to s circle of friends end relatives.
This lest example underscores the collective character of the process.
We ere not simply dealing with the fact that people in some categories give
up resources as people in other categories ncquire them. \hen conscrip-
tion occurs, a group gives up labor power. In the European feudal period.
the "group" was charscteristically a fief. The vassal's personal obli-
gation to the overlord tied his fief to the overlord's fief, to he sure;
but the fief owed the knight service. As states grew stronger. communities
typically became the units which owed n certain numher of recruttn. The
usual mechanism of the draft consisted of the assignment of s quota to s
commune, with some sort of collective decision (frequently the drawing oE
lots) determining which of the eligible young men would go. The purchase
of substitutes by those who could afford it, as shockin8 as it nppesrs to
egalitarian eyes, expresses precisely this sense of a debt owed by n
comunity, rather than en individual, to the state: Community X owes six
conscripts. Under these circumstances, resistance to the draft united s
community, not just a group of young people, against the ntate. The greot
counter-revolution of the ~endge against the French revolutionsry state,
in 1793, began with solidery resistance of commt~nlties to the demnnd for
conscripts. The cmunity as e whole stood to lose part of its supply
of labor, love, loyalty end procreative power.
The spread of the political theory end practice of "possessive jndi-
vidualism" (as C. 8. Hscpherson calls it) shifted tlie military obll&stion
toward the individual, but only incompletely. Within French villnges, the
classe oE young men coming up for the draft in the same yeor remnins one
of the principal solidar~ groups, one which symbolizes its Jons through
rituals, banquets and ceremonial gifts. In most western countries. religious
groups and some of the professions have, in tlie course of acquiring
distinct political identities. worked out special compacts with the state
exempting some of their members -- nt least their priests -- from service,
and s e t t i n g condi t i ons f o r t h e s e r v i c e of ot her s . I n t he United St a t e s ,
t he American Medi cal Associ at i on has achi eved t h a t s o r t of guar ant ee f o r
i t s members, whi l e t h e American Chi r opr act i c Associ at i on has not . The
Rel i gi ous Soci et y of Fr i ends has , t h e Black Muslims have not . Thi s t yi ng
of r e l i g i o u s exemptions t o s p e c i f i c group memberships caused g r e a t conf usi on
i n t h e 1960s a s young Americans opposed t o t h e Vietnam war begal; appl yi ng
f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n a s cons ci ent i ous obj e c t or s on gener al moral grounds
wi t hout cl ai mi ng a f f i l i a t i o n wi t h one of t he pr i vi l e ge d s e c t s .
I
I n t he America of t h e 1960s. something e l s e was goi ng on a s we l l .
1
In d i f f e r e n t ways, groups of bl acks and groups of young peopl e began t o
cl ai m a c o l l e c t i v e r i g h t t o wi t hhol d t h e i r members from mi l i t a r y s e r vi c e .
I do not mean t hey were wi del y s uc c e s s f ul e i t h e r i n mobi l i zi ng t h e i r own
I
popul at i ons o r i n hol di ng of f t he s t a t e . Both groups cont ai n competing
mobi l i zer s pur sui ng competing ends, and have many members who r e f us e t o
commit t h e i r r es our ces t o any of t he mobi l ' i zer s, even though t hey a r e wi l l i n g
t o yi el d them t o t he s t a t e . Yet t h e cl ai m was t he r e , i n t he form of
or gani zed campaigns t o r e s i s t o r evade t h e d r a f t . The demands f o r t h e
excl us i on of cor por at e and mi l i t a r y r e c r u i t e r s from campuses l i ke wi s e
mnde cl ai ms f o r c o l l e c t i v e c ont r ol of t h e di s pos i t i on of manpower. The
cl ai m was a s i gn t h a t some mobi l i zat i on was occur r i ng; groups, r a t h e r t han
i ndi vi dua l s , were s t r uggl i ng over t he r i g h t t o pr eci ous r esour ces: t h e I
l abor power of young peopl e. With t he end of t h e d r a f t and t he wi t hdrawal
of American t r oops from t h e Vietnam war, t he groups i nvol ved demobi l i zed.
I do not t hi nk t hey, o r t h e i r cl ai ms, have di sappear ed.
Reminder: mobi l i zat i on r e f e r s t o t h e a c qui s i t i on of c o l l e c t i v e
c ont r ol over r esour ces. r a t he r t han t h e si mpl e a c c r e t i on of r es our ces .
A group t h a t grows i n s i z e has more manpower i n i t . That does not mean t he
a bs ol ut e o r pr opor t i onat e monpower committed t o c o l l e c t i v e ends i ncr eas es .
An i nc r e a s e of r es our ces wi t hi n a u n i t normal l y f a c i l i t a t e s i t s mobi l i znt i on,
si mpl y by per mi t t i ng s ubuni t s t o keep r ecei vi ng r es our ces whi l e t he l or ge r
u n i t ga i ns c o n t r o l over more t han i t had bef or e. But i t is t h a t i ncr eas e
i n c o l l e c t i v e c ont r ol i t s e l f which c o n s t i t u t e s mobi l i zat i on. Without some
mobi l i zat i on, a group may pr osper , but i t cannot contend f o r power;
cont endi ng f o r power means employing mobi l i zed r es our cee t o i nf l uence ot he r
groups.
I d e a l l y , t hen, we a r e l ooki ng a t a s e t of groups, and t r y i n g t o
e s t i ma t e f o r each group and f o r each r es our ce under t h e c ont r ol of any
of t h e groups two d i f f e r e n t e n t i t i e s : a ) t he val ue of t h e r es our ce nomi nal l y
under group c ont r ol , and b) t h e pr oba bi l i t y t h a t t h e r es our ce wi l l be
de l i ve r e d when c a l l e d f o r , gi ven some st andar d assumpt i on obout t h e us es
t o which t h e r es our ces wi l l be put . To my knowledge, no one has ever come
c l o s e t o es t i mat i ng t he s e q u a n t i t i e s f o r any s e r of groups. We have onl y
rough approxi mat i ons.
Measurinu Mobi l i zat i on
How t o do i t ? I f t h e mobi l i zat i on of di ve r s e r es our ces f e l l i n t o a
st andar d sequence wi t hi n any p a r t i c u l a r popul ot i on, one coul d produce a
s c a l e of mobi l i zat i on wi t hout havi ng d i r e c t meosures of each of t he component
r esour ces. We might t ake a s a methodolop.ica1 model t h e s c a l e s f o r
" c e nt r a l i t y" of v i l l a g e s which Frank Young has cons t r uct ed ( s ee Young 1966).
Such a s c a l e would resembl e t h e f ol l owi ng s e t :
1 ) No one wi t hi n t h i s cat egor y ever i d e n t i f i e s i t a s a group, s o
f a r a s can be det ermi ned from some s t andar d s e t of s our ces .
2) Members of t h i s cat egor y sometimes i d e n t i f y t hemsel ves a s a group.
3) The group has a standard name known to members and nonmembers
alike.
4) Members of the group sometimes appear in public as a group.
identified by name.
5 ) The group has standard symbols, slogans, songs, styles of dress
and/or other identifying marks.
6) The group contains one or more organizations which some members
of the group recognize as having the authority to speak for the
group as a whole on some matters.
7) The group contains one or more organizations controlling well-
defined buildings and spaces which are at least nominally open to
members of the group as a whole.
8) Thc group has at lenst one common store of major resources --
money, labor, weapons, information or something else -- held in
the name of the group as a whole.
9) At lenst one organization run by group members exercises extensive
control over group members' allocation of time and energy in the
name of the group as a whole.
10) At lenst one organization run by group members exercises
extensive control over the personal relations of members of the group.
The first four items on the list clearly belong under the heading "organi-
zation" rather than "mobilization." The fifth bal.ances uncertainly between
the two. Thus the lower end of the scale rests on the assumption of a
close association between organization and mobilization. Obviously such
a scale could not be used to establish the existence of that relationship.
In my own research group's work on collective action in Europe and
America, we have approached the measurement of mobilization in two
simple ways. They fall short of the comprehensive accounts and internally
consistent scales we would like to have; the real world is hard.
The first and more obvious way is to take one or two widely-available
indicators of mobilization, such as union membership, and prepare comparable
series of those indicators for the set of groups under study. In this case,
we make no a priori effort to combine available indicators. On the contrary,
we hope to learn something about their relationships from the analysis.
In our studies of French strike activity from 1830 to 1968. Edward Shorter
and I recurrently use number of union members andlor years of continuous
existence of a local general labor organization (a bourse de travail) as
indicators of a local labor force's mobilization level (Shorter and Tilly
1974). David Snyder (1974) uses union membership in his time-series analyses
of strikes in Italy, France and the U.S. from various points in the nine-
teenth century to 1970. Joan Lind, studying strikes and labor-related
street demonstrations in Sweden and Great Britain from 1900 to 1950,
measures mobilization via union membership and union income. With interesting
exceptions to be discussed later on, alternative indicators of mobilization
turn out to be strongly correlated with each other, and to have a signi-
ficant positive effect on the level of strike activity.
The second and riskier way we have indexed mobilization is to build
different versions of the sort of ordinal scale I have just sketched from
descriptions -- statistical or otherwise -- of the groups in question.
Ronald Aminzade's study of Marseillaise workers illustrates this tack.
Aminznde was trying to assess the influence of organizational charac-
teristics, prior experience with collective action and mobilization level
on the involvement of different groups of workers in Marseille from 1830
to 1871. Drawing on evidence from French archives and from published
works, he found that he could assemble more or less continuous descriptions
for each of twenty-one occupational categories concerning a) the presence
or absence and b) the general pattern of activity of guilds (more exactly,
compagnonnages), cooperatives, trade unions, mutual benefit societies, and
resistance societies. For 1848, he was also able to ascertain whether the
occupational group had its own representation to the Republican Central
Committee. its own political club, and any collective privileges formally
recognized by government regulations. (Informtion on membership and on
funds controlled was also ovailable, but not regularly enough for the
construction of continuous series.)
Aminzade then combined this information into three indicators:
1) total number of occupational organizations
2) total years of prior existence of different organizational
forms
3) total number of collective actions previously carried out
by these organizations
the third being the most debatable as an index of mobilization. Aminzade
essentially ranked each occupational group as high or low on each of the
three items (2 = high; 1 - low) and summed them into a six-point scale
(6 - three highs; 1 - three lows). Using the scores for the periods just
preceding the events in question, he analyzed occupational differentials in
arrests during Marseille's insurrection of June, 1848 and in the course of
Louis Napoleon's 1851 coup d16tat: for the insurrections of August 1870
and March 1871 in Marseille, he reconstructed a list of 429 portlcipnnts
from police dossiers on persons involved in the revolutionary International,
from conviction records for the 1870 ins~~rrection and Erom arrest records
for the 1871 insurrection. Individual indicators of mobilization correlate
with involvement in one or another of these events from 0 to +.8. The
correlations of participation with the combined mobilization index are:
1848 : +. 333
1851: +.571
1870-71: +.473
There is a substantial relationship between mobilization level -- as
crudely measured by Aminzade -- and involvement in Marseille's major
revolutionary movements from 1848 to 1871.
General Conditions for Mobilization
According to our mobilization model, the broad factors witl~in a popu-
lation affecting its degree of mobilization are the extent of Its shared
interest in interactions with other popu.lntions. and the extent to which
it forms a distinct category and a dense network: its interest end its
organization. Outside the group, its power, Its subjection to repression and
the current constellation of opportunities and threats most strongly affect
its mobilization level. Power, repression and opportunitylthreat will
come in for detailed discussion in the next chapter. Interest and organi-
zation have already hod their share of attention. Yet it would be good to
review their impact on mobilization before rushing on to examine collective
action itself.
Anthony Oberschall has provided a neat synthesis of a good deal of
recent thinking about these relationships. Oberschnll deliberately counters
hrkl~eimlan thinking -- especially its "mass society" variety -- by insisting
on the importance of some forms of prior group coherence to the mobilization
of conflict groups. Among other things, he points out that newly mobilizing
conflict groups usually reduce their organizing costs by building, inten-
tionally or unintentionally, on existing group structure. Instead of
starting from a shared interest but no organization, existing groups coalesce
and reorganize. Thua the conflict group escapes, to some extent, from the
great cost of starting at zero mobilization.
Considering that prior organization, Oberschall cnlls particular
attention to two dimensions: the character of links within the population
(communal orgonizatlon, associational organization, or little organization
of any kind) and to the ties between the population and other groups (inte-
grated with other groups vs. segregated from them). In combination, the two
dimenslons produce a sixfold classification of populations:
internal links
comunal weak associationol
ties to integrated
other
groups segregated
We will use a related classification later on, when we try to distinguish
the major varieties of collective action.
Oberschnll's analysis directly confronts mass-society theory. The
mass-socjety argument says that populations in the central column, especially
those which are segregated from the'rest of society, ore the great breeders
of protest movements. One of the best-known statements of the theory runs:
Groups which are particularly vulnerable to mass movements manifest
mnjor discontinuities in their structure during periods of change.
Thus, comunism and fascism have gained strength in social systems
undergoing sudden and extensive changes in the structure of suthor-
ity and community. Sharp tears in the social fabric caused by
widespread unemployment or by major military defeat are higl~ly
favorable to mass politics. Social classes which provide dispro-
portionate support for mass movements are those that possess the
fewest social ties among their members. This means above all the
lower social classes. However, since there are sections of all
social classes which tend to be sociolly atomized, members of
all social classes are to be found among the participants in mans
politics: unattached (especially free-lance) intellectuals, morginol
(especially small) businessmen and farmers, and isolated workers
have engaged in mass politics in times of crisis (Kornhauser 1959: 229).
We have already encountered the same line of argument in our review of
Durkheimian analyses of collective action.
Oberschall counters with the argument that populations with weak internal
structure rarely act at all. He also argues that each combination of
internal structure and external ties produces a different variety of
mobilization and collective action. In general, he sees ties to other
groups (especially elite groups) as constraints on the formation of conflict
groups; in that one regard, he tends to agree wlth the moss-society theorists.
But in his analysis, segmented populations with either extensive comunnl
or extensive associational structure are especially likely to produce --
,
or become -- conflict groups. To put it in mass-society terms, they are
more, not less, "available" for social movements.
Oberschall then proposes a useful series of hypotheses about the
mobilization of conflict groups:
1. In a segmented context, the greeter the number end variety of
organizations in a collectivity, and the higher the participation of
members in this network, the more rapidly and enduringly does
mobilization into conflict groups occur, and the more likely it is
thst bloc recruitment, rather than individual recruitment, will
take place (Oberschall 1973: 125).
2. The more segmented s collectivity is from the rest of the
society, and the more viable end extensive the communal ties within
it, the more rapid and easier it is to mobilize members of the
collectivity into en opposition movement (p. 129).
3. If a collectivity is disorganized or unorganized along trsdi-
tional comunsl lines and not yet organized along associations1 lines,
collective protest is possible when members share c o m o n sentiments
of opression and targets for hostility. These sentiments are more
likely to develop if the collectivity is segmented rather then
vertically integrated with other collectivities of the society.
Such protest will, however, tend to be more short-lived and more
violent than movements based on comunal or sseociational orgsni-
zstion (p. 133).
4 . Participants in populnr disturbances and activitiat in oppo-
sition organizations will be recruited primarily from previously
active end relatively well-integrated individuals within the
collectivity, whereas socially isolated, atomized, end uprooted
individuals will be underrepresented, at least until the movement
has become substantial (p. 135).
Although the third hypothesis provides en escape clause, the mnin srgumcnt
strongly emphasizes the influence of prior organization. So does the
varied evidence which Oberschall reviews. Perhaps too strongly, or rather
too exclusively: the argument I have been building up here gives greater
weight to interests, mobilization strategy, repression end power position.
Nevertheless, the two lines of argument agree in denying thst unattached
individuals and homogenized masses have any special propensity to form
or join social movements.
Oberschall's hypotheses focus on just that issue: joining or not
joining. For that reason, the comunsl end of his classification remains
more mysterious than the asaociationnl end. It is valuable to point out.
as Oberschall does, thst events such as great peasant revolts do not
ordinarily sweep up society's rootless, disorganized, leftover people, but
draw in coherent but aggrieved eroups of people who remain attached to
each other and to their socisl settings. But to speak of "recruitment"
compromises the insight.
The implicit model has modern contours. It applies easily to such
membership organizations as labor unions, political parties and religiocts
organizations. It does not apply so easily to the eighteenth-century
.
countrymen who tore down poorhouses and then went back to work in their
shops and fields. It distorts the experience of nineteenth-century artisans
who built barricades in the streets near their shops during the revolutions
of 1848. The eighteenth-century people of Nacton and the nineteenth-
century people of Paris mobilized end acted collectively. all right. Btlt
they did not form or join a "socisl movement" or even s "conflict group"
in the sense ,required by Oberschall's model.
To cover the whole range from anti-poorhouse crowds to revolutionary
artisans to political parties to religious cults, we need a very broad
view of mobilization. It must accommodate a great variety of resources.
and not be tied to any particular organizational form or type of interest.
In that spirit, the three major principles we have laid down so far are
brond indeed; schematically:
1. (quantity of resources (probability
x = mobilization
collectively controlled) of delivery)
2. mobilization = f(organization)
3. organization - catness x netness
The first and third are, obviously, definitions. The second is a proposition.
but one which needs a good deal more specification before it has much value.
The specification will drive us back toward the same problems Oberachall
emphasizes: the differences between segmented and integrated populations,
the contrasting mobilization patterns of communal and associational
groups, the conditions for organizational effectiveness. In short, we are
on the right path, but not very far along. Let us try to stride on by
dealing with collective action itself.
From Mobilization to Collective Action
Collective action is joint action in pursuit of common ends. Up to
this point, I have argued that the extent of a group's collective action
is a function of 1) the extent of its shared interests (advantages and
disadvantages likely to result from interactions with other groups).
2) the intensity of its organization (the extent of common identity and
unifying structure among its members) and 3) its mobilization (the amount
of resources under its collective control). Soon I will add repression,
power, and opportunity/threat to those determinants of a group's collective
action. In this general statement, the argument is not very controversial.
It rejects Durkheimian theories which trace routine co11,ective action
back to society's integration and which trace non-routine collective action
back to society's disintegration. Still a grent many Weberian, Marxinn and
Millian analyses will fit, with a bit of shoving, into the boxea defined
by interests, organization and mobilization.
At thia level of argument, the main differences among the Weberian,
Marxian and Millian analyses are in the weighta they assign to the various
determinants of collective action. On the whole, Weberian arguments --
especially as they appear in analyses of social movements and their
routinization -- assign different weighta to interests in routine and
non-routine collective action. In a full-fledged social movement. runs
the argument, interests have a leas immediate effect because the group's
beliefs override or redefine them. The Weberian approach tends to treat
the costs and effects of organization as great, but then to consider the
group's interests and organization a sufficient explanation of ita actions.
Implicitly, that is, it treats the coats of mobilization and collecttve
action as slight.
Marxian analyses likewise give high weights to interests and organi-
zation. low weighta to the costa of mobilization and collective action as
such. The difference from the Weberian line. in thia regard. is in the
strong Marxian emphasis on material interests -- more precisely, on interests
.defined by relationship to the predominant means of production -- and in
the argument that the organization of production underliea and dominates
other forms70r organization.
Milliana are the only one of our four clusters who commonly assign
major importance to the costa of coll,ective action itself. The standard
Millian analysis jumps from defined interests to collective action with
scant attention to organization and mohilization. Starting from the
challenge laid down by Msncur Olson, Millians have sharpened the analysis
/
of collective action by connecting it to the production of collective goods.
The ideal col.lective good is inclusive and indivisible. If any member
of the group receives it, all receive it. There is no way of breaking
it up into shares. The draining of a swamp to prevent malaria is s fairly
pure example. Real goods vary considerably in how much they approximate
that ideal. Police protection, for example, is ideally a pure collective
good; ideally, it is inclusive and indivisible. In practice, some people
get little or no police protection, and others buy up extra shares for
themselves. We therefore have to say that action is collective to the
extent that it produces inclusive, indivisible gooda.
--
The definition I have proposed is more relaxed in some regards and
more restrictive in others. Joint action in pursuit of c m o n ends often
fails to produce any goods at all, but so long as it &?& to produce
collective goods I propose to include it. On the other hand, some collec-
tive gooda (and many collective bads) are produced unintentionally, as
by-products of Individual efforts. I propose to exclude them from the
definition of collective action. That choice has its disadvantages; it
requires us to think about what an unsuccessful action might have produced
and to be sure that people really did act jointly, instead of simply
searching around for the appearance of collective goods. Yet it has
the advantage of focusing the analysis more clearly on the explanation
of the action itself, instead of aiming at its outcomes.
Let us borrow the basic Millian insight: collective actors are
attempting to produce collective goods that have a specific value in
relation to their interests, and are expcnding valuable resources In the
effort. If we can imagine assigning relative values to the collective
goods produced and the resources expended, we can think of a contender
as gaining, losing or breaking even. Diagramatically:
COLLECTIVE
GOODS
OBTAINED
LOSS
L
O RESOURCES EXPENDED
111 t he shaded a r e a above t he dl agonal , t h e val ue of t h e c o l l e c t i v e goods
obt ni ned i s g r e a t e r t han t he val ue of t h e r es our ces expended; t h a t i s
o gai n. Below t he di agonal we have l os s e s , and t he di agonal i t s e l f is a '
brca k-even 1 i ne.
I n any r e a l c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , t h e r e a r e r e a l l i m i t s on how much of
t he space i n t he diagram is a va i l a bl e t o t he a c t o r . We have t al ked about
t h e two main l i m i t s a s mobi l i zat i on and oppor t uni t y. To modify t he di a -
gram:
COLLECTIVE
GOODS
OBTAINEI)
OPPORTUNITY
0 RESOURCES EXPENDED
The group cannot expend more r es our ces t han i t has c ur r e nt l y mobi l i zed;
t hnt s e t s an unbreakabl e l i m i t i n one d i r e c t i o n . The oppor t uni t i e s f o r
ga i n nr e f i n i t e ; t h a t s e t s a l i m i t i n t he ot he r di r e c t i on. Lat er on we
wi l l look c or e f ul l y a t l i mi t s on oppor t uni t y. For t h e moment i t i s enough
t o s e e t h a t bot h mobi l i zat i on and oppor t uni t y l i m i t t he pos s i bl e ga i ns Erom
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. I t f ol l ows, c l e a r l y , t h a t a change i n mobi l i zat i on o r
oppor t uni t y wi l l produce a change i n t he s e t of gai ns and l os s e s a v a i l a b l e
t o a group. Zero mobi l i znt i on - zer o ga i ns o r l os s e s . A group can i ncr eas e
t hc range of gai ns and l o s s e s a va i l a bl e by mobi l i zi ng o r by mani pul at i ng
oppor t uni t i e s -- t h a t is, by i ncr eas i ng i t s power o r r educi ng Lta sl r bj cct i on
t o r epr es s i on.
I f t hi ngs were t h i s si mpl e, we would expect ever y group t o mobl l i ze
t o i t s utmost capaci t y t o mani pul at e oppor t uni t i e s a s much a s pos s i bl c
and t o maneuver i t s e l f i n t o t he hi ghes t a v a i l a b l e pos i t i on above t he dl a-
gonal . To some e xt e nt , t h a t i s a r easonabl e simplification of whnt goes
on i n power s t r uggl e s . But i t i gnor es i mport ant r e a l i t i e s : mobl l l zat i on
i t s e l f is c os t l y. The gr oup' s or gani zat i on i t s e l f s e t s i mpor t ant l i m i t s
on t h e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i ons , mobi l i zat i on s t r a t e g i e s and mani pul at i ons of
oppor t uni t y i t can o r wi l l undert ake. And i t s i n t e r e s t s de f i ne whi cl ~ s o r t s
of ga i ns and l o s s e s a r e accept abl e o r unaccept abl e.
To put i t anot her way, groups d i f f e r consi der abl y i n t he r e l o t l v e
va l ue s t hey a s s i gn t o c o l l e c t i v e goods and t o t he r es our ces which must bc
expended t o a c qui r e them. Many, perhaps most, groups behave l i k e peas ant s
who a r e s e e ki ng. t o draw a t a r g e t income from t h e i r l and; i ns t ead of l o-
c a t i ng t hemsel ves a t t he poi nt of maximum p r o f i t , t hey aim f o r a c e r t a i n
r e t ur n. I f t hey can, t hey expend t he minimum r es our ces r cqui r cd f or t l ~ s t
r eason. Thus a group of workers f i r s t deci de t hey want an el ght -hour day.
t hen c a l c u l a t e what e f h r t t hey w i l l have t o expend i n or der t o win t h a t
p a r t i c u l a r obj e c t i ve .
Some groups val ue a gi ven c o l l e c t i v e good s o hi ghl y t h a t t hey a r e
wi l l i n g t o i ncur what ot he r groups r egar d a s ne t l o s s e s i n or de r t o achi eve
t h e i r cher i s hed obj e c t i ve s . From t he vi ewpoi nt of t he aver age group, t hey
a r e s a t i s f i e d wi t h a pos i t i on below t he break-even l l n e . We can mnke a
d i s t i n c t i o n among f our group s t r a t e g i e s : 1 ) t he z e a l o t s who, compared t o
ot he r groups, s e t an ext r emel y hi gh val ue on some c o l l e c t i v e good i n t erms
of t h e r es our ces r equi r ed t o achi eve t h a t good: wl l l i n g t o expend l i f e and
lLmb, f o r i ns t ance, i n or der t o a c qui r e sel f-government ; 2) t h e mi s er s . who
val ue t he r es our ces t hey a l r e a dy hol d s o hi ghl y t h a t har dl y any a va i l a bl e
c o l l e c t i v e good can draw them i n t o expendi ng t h e i r mobi l i zed r es our ces on
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on; we shoul d expect mi s er s t o a c t t oget her def ens i vel y
when t hey a c t a t a l l ; 3 ) t h e run-of-the-mill cpnt ender s who aim f o r a
l i mi t e d s e t of c o l l e c t i v e goods, making t h e minimum expendi t ur e of r e-
s our ces necessar y f o r t he a c qui s i t i on of t he s e gooda, and remai ni ng i n-
a c t i v e when t he c ur r e nt combi nat i on of mobi l i zat i on and oppor t uni t y makes
a ne t l o s s on t h e exchange l i k e l y ; 4 ) t h e oppor t uni s t s who s t r i v e t o
maximize t h e i r ne t r e t ur n -- t he di f f e r e nc e i n val ue between r es our ces
expended and c o l l e c t i v e gooda obt ai ned -- r e ga r dl e s s of which c o l l e c t i v e
goods t hey acqui r e.
. Fi gur e 3-4 pr es ent s t he t our i d e a l t ypes s chemat i cal l y. I n t h i s
s i mpl i f i e d pi c t ur e . oppor t uni t y and mobi l i zat i on a r e t h e same f o r a l l
t ypes. The di agrams val ue t h e r es our ces expended and t he c o l l e c t i v e
goods acqui r ed st aver ages over a l l groups i ns t e a d of showing t h e r e l a t i v e
val ues us ual l y assi gned t o mobi l i zed r es our ces and c o l l e c t i v e goods by
each t ype of group. According t o t h e di agram, z e a l o t s f i nd accept abl e
onl y a narrow r ange of c o l l e c t i v e goods; t h e goods a r e not ne c e s s a r i l y
t hose t h ~ t ot he r groups val ue most hi ghl y. They a r e wi l l i n g t o spend up
t o t h e l i m i t of t h e i r mobi l i zed r es our ces t o a c qui r e t hos e c o l l e c t i v e
goods, even i f by t he s t andar ds of ot he r cont ender s t hey a r e t aki ng l os s e s .
Mi sers w i l l onl y spend a s ha r e of t h e i r mobi l i zed r es our ces f o r a ver y
val uabl e r e t ur n i n c o l l e c t i v e goods. They wi l l never spend up t o t he
l i m i t s e t by t h e i r mobi l i zat i on. Run-of-the-mill cont ender s resembl e
z e a l ot s . except t h a t t hey a r e wi l l i n g t o s e t t l e f o r a wi der r ange of col -
l e c t i v e goods. and unwi l l i ng t o s e t t l e f or a l os s . Fi na l l y, oppor t uni s t s
wi l l t ake any c o l l e c t i v e goods t hey can ge t . They wi l l . spend up t o t h e i r
l i m i t t o ge t i t , j u s t s o l ong a s t hey make a p r o f i t .
Fi gur e 3-4 Four I de a l Pa t t e r ns of Col l e c t i ve Act i on
ZEALOT MISER
OPPORTUNITY
RESOURCES EXPENDED
RUN-OF-THE-MILL
. , .
ACCEPTABLE
I
The diagram invites further theorizing. For example, it is reasonable
to suppose that zealots tend to maintainhigher levels of mobilization than
i I
other klnds of actors. They therefore have more chances to acquire their I
desired collective goods, but they also run a greater risk of heavy losses.
Opportunists, on the other hand, probably work more effectively at moving
up the opportunity line by aucll tactics as forming coalitions with other
powerful contenders. Some of these strategic questions will become impor-
1 .
tant in our later discussions of power.
Every political system sorts its contenders among zealots, misers, op-
portunists and run-of-the-mill contenders. No doubt every political sys-
tem rewards the opportunists more than the run-of-the-mill, and the run-of-
i
the-mill contenders more than the zealots or the misers. That is even
true. I fear, after zealots seize power. They. too, reward opportunists
and punieh zealots.
Oddly enough, the opportunist is the least likely of the four extremes.
Regardless of group stmtegy, the return the group seeks is rarely or never
i
I
o simple profit on collective action. Groups care about the character of
the collective goods. Labor unions usually don't want papal dispensations.
clans usually don't want recognition as bargaining agents. In fact, both
the supply and the demand are "lumpy", clumped, discontinuous. For that
!
reason, we cannot simply graft the analysis of collective action on the existing
microeconomics of private goods. The existing economics of collective
goods comes closer. But it, too, has yet to solve the problems of interest,
organization and mobilizstion we have encountered.
The Detection and Measurement of Collective Action
When trying to study joint action in pursuit of common ends, we face
the practical problems of detecting the action, and then determining how
joint it is and how common its ends. If we confine our attention to clesr-
cut examples, such as strikes, elections, petitions and attacks on poor-
houses we still face the practical problems of gauging their mngnitudes --
especially if we want to any "how much" collective action one group or
another engaged in over some period of time. As with the meosurcmcnt of
mobilization, we commonly have the choice between a) indicators of collective
action which come to us in a more or lees qunntitatlve form, but are too
narrow or too remote to repreaent adequately the range of action we have
in mind, or b) indicators derived from qualitative descriptions, which
are usually discontinuous, which often vary in coverage from one group or
period to another, and which are always hard to convert reliably into
meaningful numbers.
David Snyder's time-series analyses of Italian. French and American
strikes provide a case in point. Snyder uses number and proportion of
labor union members in the civilian labor force as a mobilization measure.
Data for long periods are difficult to locate and hard to make comparable.
but when they are available at all they are usunlly in quantitative form
from the start. On the side of collective action, Snyder uses two sets of
variables. First come the strike-activity measures: number of strikes.
number of participants in atrikes, mean duration of strikes, days lost.
proportion ending in success or failure, proportion making offensive or de-
fensive demands, and so on. Ultimately, all of these come from official
sources, where they appear as summary statistics or as uniform descriptions
of all the strikes reported for some period, area and definition of the
relevant labor force. As in the case of union membershfp, it tokes some
ingenuity and effort to wrest comparable measures from the sources, but
the quantification itself is not very difficult.
That is certainly not true of Snyder's second set of measures. Tliey
concern other forms of collective action by workers. Snyder's list (from
Snyder 1974: 114) r uns :
Economic and Di r e c t l y Job Rel at ed Act i ons
1) employment i nf or mat i on and placement
2) l o c a l c ont r ol of working condi t i ons , i ncl udi ng gr i evance
procedures. l o c a l adj ust ment s of na t i ona l c o n t r a c t s , e t c .
3) ne got i a t i on of e x t r a l o c a l c ont r a c t s ( us ual l y na t i ona l )
4) di sbursement of s t r i k e funds
Economic, But Not Job Rel at ed Act i ons
1 ) a i d t o members f o r a c c i de nt , s i c kne s s , unemployment, bur i a l
2) pr ovi s i on of social/recreationalleducational f a c i l i t i e s
3) finencjpg cooper at i ve e f f o r t a ( bot h pr oduct i on and consumption)
Pol i t i c a l . Act i ons
1) l obbyi ng a c t i v i t i e s
2) d i s t r i b u t i o n of pr i nt e d ma t e r i a l
3) suppor t of candi dat es f o r e l e c t i o n
4) c o a l i t i o n wi t h p o l i t i c a l par t y
Snyder read t hrough a l a r g e number of economic, l a bor , s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l
h i s t o r i e s f o r each of h i s t hr e e c ount r i e s , a bs t r a c t i ng any mention of any
of t hes e a c t i v i t i e s , r egr oupi ng t h e a b s t r a c t s i n t o or gani zat i on- year sum-
mar i es. t hen codi ng cnch of t h e el even i t ems i n a s t andar d way. For
example, t he code f o r s uppor t of candi dat es appear s i n Fi gur e 3-4. Snyder
summed t he s c or e s f o r each or gani zat i on i n t o f our gener al s c or e s -- one each
f o r h i s Job Rel at ed, Economic-Not-Job-Related and P o l i t i c a l c a t e gor i e s ,
and o summary Col l e c t i ve Act i on s cor e. Fi na l l y, he wei ght ed each or gani za-
t i o n f o r t h e pr opor t i on of t he l abor f or c e i t cont ni ned, and summed each
wei ght ed s c or e over a l l or gani zat i ons f or a count ry-year t o t a l . Snyder ' s
Fi gur e 3-5: Snyder ' s Code f o r
Labor Support of Candi dat es
The coder is e va l ua t i ng a ai ngl e- year sununary of a b s t r a c t s from h i s t o r i c a l
s our ces concer ni ng a p a r t i c u l a r or ga ni z a t i on' s suppor t of candi dat es f o r
e l e c t i v e o f f i c e .
Code
-
0
Eval uat i on
none a t a l l
s mal l amount
moderate
good d e a l
g r e a t de a l
Source: Snyder 1974: 302
Cr i t e r i a
no suppor t of candi dat es
endorsement of candi dnt ee i n
pr i nt e d ma t e r i a l of t h e orgnni -
zat i or !
speechmaking, e t c . . by l abor
leaderslrnembers i n suppor t of
candi dat es and endorsement i n
pr i nt e d ma t e r i a l
a c t i v e compaigning by members
f o r candi dat es ( pnssi ng out l e a f -
l e t s , goi ng door t o door , c t c . )
and i t ems l i s t e d nbove
-
f i n a n c i a l suppor t oE candi dat es
and i t ems l i s t e d above
-
anal ys es of t h e uni oni zat i on c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n and s t r i k e v a r i a b l e s f o r
France and I t a l y i n d i c a t e t h a t t he be s t summary of t h e l r r e l a t i ons hi ps
r uns , s chemat i cal l y:
~dwbr d Shor t er end I had i mp l i c i t l y adopt ed a d i f f e r e n t mbdel:
U N ~ N Z A T ~ ~ f;
THER COLLECTIVE ACTION
Rut we ne i t he r formul at ed t h a t model c l e a r l y nor ( except f o r some a na l ys e s
of t he r e l a t i ons hi ps between s t r i k e a c t i v i t y and c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence)
made much of on e f f o r t t o e s t i ma t e i t . Thus Snyder' s work i n de s c r i pt i on
and measurement l eads us t o r econs i der t h e pr ocesses we a r e anal yzi ng.
Asi de from s t r i k e s , our r es ear ch group' s most ext ens i ve f or ays i n t o
t he meosuremellt of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n have d e a l t wi t h vi ol e nt event s . (For
gener al de s c r i pt i ons end pr el i mi nar y r e s u l t s , s e e Ti l l y , Ti l l y and Ti l l y
1975. ) For r easons which wi l l become c l e a r e r i n t he cour se of my l a t e r
di s cus s i ons of vi ol ence a s such, c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence s e r ve s a s a us e f ul
" t mc e r " of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on i n gener al . Although c o l l e c t i v e a c t i ons
which produce damage t o per sons o r o b j e c t s a r e by no means a random sample
of a l l c o l l e c t i v e a c t i ons , t he pr esence of vi ol ence g r e a t l y i nc r e a s e s t h e
l i ke l i hood ' t ha t t h e event wi l l be not i ced and r ecor ded. With prudent
a na l ys i s , t h e p a t t e r n of c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence w i l l yi e l d val uabl e i nf or ont i on
about t h e p a t t e r n of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n a s a whole. My c ol l obor a t or e and I
hove done d e t a i l e d enumerat i ons and de s c r i pt i ons of c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence
i n I t a l y , Germany, France and England over s u b s t a n t i a l bl ocks of t i me wi t h
e xa c t l y t h a t purpose i n mind.
Let us concent r at e on c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence wi t hi n a popul at i on under t h e
c ont r ol of a s i n g l e government. Let us agr ce t o pay l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n t o
war, t o f ul l - f l edged games, t o i ndi vi dual vi ol ence and t o hi ghl y di s cont i nu-
ous i nt e r a c t i ons . We a r e t hen st i l l f r e e t o exnmine event s i n wl ~i ch t h e
damage was onl y i nc i de nt a l t o t h e aims of most of t hose i nvol ved. I n our
own i nve s t i ga t i ons , my r es ear ch group has di scover ed t h a t w c con, wi t t i out
huge uncer t ai nt y, s i n g l e out event a occur r i ng wi t hi n a p o r t l c u l a r na t i ona l
s t a t e i n which a t l e a s t one group above some minimum s i z e (commonly
twenty o r f i f t y per sons) s e i z e s o r dsmoges someone o r somet hi ng from
anot her group. We us e newspapers, a r c hi va l s our ces and h i s t o r i c n l works
f o r t he purpose. As t h e minimum s i z e goes down, c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence be-
g i n s t o f ade i n t o bandi t r y. br awl i ng, vandal i sm, t e r r or i s m and s wlde
v a r i e t y of t hr eat eni ng nonvi ol ent event s , s o f a r a s our a b i l i t y t o di s -
t i ngui s h them on t h e b a s i s of t he h i s t o r i c a l r ecor d is concerned.
We use t he community-population-day a s an el ement nry uni t . On o
p a r t i c u l a r day, di d t h i s segment of t h e popul at i on of t h i s community
engage i n c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence, a s j u s t def i ned7 Is s o, we hove t he elemen-
t a r y u n i t of a vi ol e nt event . Did an over l appi ng s e t of peopl e c a r r y on t he
a c t i on i n adj acent community? I f s o, bot h communities were i nvol ved jn
t h e same event . Did an over l appi ng s e t of peopl e cont i nue t he a c t i on t h e
f ol l owi ng day? I f s o. t he i nc i de nt l a s t e d a t l e a s t two days. I nt r oduce
a br eak i n time. space o r per sonnel , and we a r e deal i ng wi t h two o r more
distinct events. The result of this modular reasoning is both to greatly
simplify the problem of bounding the "same" incident and to fragment into
many separate incidents series of interactions (such as the Spanish Civil
War as a whole) which many analysts have been willing to treat as s single
unit. More details on definitions and procedures are in the appendix.
For some purposes, like the comparative study of revolutions, a
broader criterion may serve better. Still other investigations will re-
quire more stringent standards: more participants, a certain duration, some-
one killed, a particular minimum of property damage. But the general
reasoning of such choices would be the same: identify the events above
a certain magnitude, or at least a representative sample of them, before
trying to sort them out in terms of legitimacy or in terms of the aims
of the participants.
Let us consider some alternative ways of handling the enumeration
of events. Reacting to what he regards as the weakness of our concentra-
tion on violent events. Heinrich Volkmann has delineated a class of events
called "social protests". In general, he thinks of a social protest as
"any collective disturbance of public order on behalf of common objectives"
(Volkmann 1975: 33). Events qualify when at least twenty persons take
..'
part. Looking at Germany (as defined by the frontiers of 1937) during
the revolutionary years f r y 1830 through 1832, he finds 165 events
. :;..,, - .
meeting the criteria in the of the Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung.
Just as in the case of Prance we use certain key words ("multitude",
"rassemblement", "reunion", "f oule". "attroupement", etc . ) to establish
the presence of at least fifty people when our reports contain no numeri-
cal estimate, Volkmann establishes rough numerical equivalents for certain
terms. He does so by taking the 22 accounts which contain both a numerical
estimate and a verbal description of'magnitude. The claaaificstion runs:
3-65
20-100 persons: eine Anzahl. ein Trupp. Schwsrm. Ilac~femeist mit
spezifizierenden ~ u A t z e n wie "ein Haufe Arbeiter", "ein Haufe Volks".
100-1000 persons: Rotte, Zusamenrottierung, Haufen, grsssere Haufen,
zshlreiche oder gr5ssere Menge, einige Hundert.
1000-2000 pe'rsons: Menge, grosse Menge, grosser Volksaufl.nuf. Hsssen,
unzthlige Menschenmasse (Volkmann 1975: 89).
He 1s thus able to estimate sizes for another 60 events. leaving almost
exactly half without either a numerical statement or a codable verbal
description. Presumably Volkmann judged whether at least 20 persons took
part from the nature of the action itself.
In s study of "mass disturbances" in Japan from 1952 to mid-1960,
I, '
done independently of our research group, Yoshio Sugimoto adopted some of
our definitions and procedures. Ile used a Gmber of Japanese newspapers
to identify all events involving st least fifty people in which the police
intervened and there was some detectable violence. Ile identified 945
such events in his 8.5-year period. Sugimoto's measurement of magnitudes
followed the same pattern: number of events, size, duration. But, follow-
ing Sorokin and Gurr, he added a fourth dimension: intensity. The inten-
sity measurement is unusual.. Instead of simply scoring the injuries,
property damage and arrests that occurred in any particular event, Sugimoto
attempted to estimate their probability as function of the various kinds
of action that made up the event. llaving broken down every event into
phases consisting of only one kind of action. he then sorted all action
phases from all events in his sample by type of action. Items 31 to 40 on
the 70-item list (with numbers of action phases sham in parenthesis)
were, f o r example:
pr ot e c t i on of i ndi vi dua l s from a t t a c k (109)
pi c ke t a ga i ns t c a r s (105)
at t empt t o br eak pi c ke t l i n e (312)
ski r mi sh (1133)
at t empt t o throw someone i n t o t he s ea (3)
f o r c e f u l removal of o b j e c t s (10)
at t empt t o t r ampl e down f i e l d s (1)
at t empt t o d i g a wel l (1)
at t empt t o dam wat er i n a r i v e r (5)
at t empt t o hammer pi kes i n t o ground (1)
For each of t he sevent y t ypes of a c t i on di s t i ngui s he d, he summed i n j u r i e s ,
pr oper t y damnge and a r r e s t s . The "pr obabi l i t y" of i n j u r y assi gned t o each
a c t i on i s t he pr opor t i on of a l l a c t i o n s i n t he c l a s s which produced i n-
j u r i e s . Sugimoto t hen combined t h e t h r e e i ndi vi dua l s c or e s f o r each
act i on-phase by means of t h e wei ght a der i ved from a f a c t o r a n a l y s i s of t he
t hr e e , computed t h e magni t ude of t he act i on- phase by mul t i pl yi ng
i n t e n s i t y x s i z e x dur a t i on
and t hen computed t h e magni t ude of t he event a s a whole by summing t h e
magnitudes of a l l its act i on- phases. The r e s u l t was probabl y t he most
r ef i ned measure of magnitude ever computed f o r a l a r g e sample of v i o l e n t
even t a.
What is more, Sugtmoto made good us e of h i s r ef i ned measures. He
shows t h a t t he magnitude of a gr a r i a n di s t ur bances was g r e a t e r i n r egi ons
where l andhol di ng was r e l a t i v e l y equal bef or e t h e l and r ef or ms, and where
t he pace of t h e reform was more r a pi d, t h a t t he p r o l i f e r a t i o n of l abor
uni ona s t r ongl y promoted di s t ur bances i nvol vi ng wor ker s, and many ot he r
f i ndi ngs of equal i n t e r e s t .
Let us t ake a l a s t example which is e n t i r e l y i ndependent of my gr oup' s
work. Drawing on t he Annual Regi s t er from 1815 t o 1848, Char l es Tayl or
(1966) pr epar ed an i ndex of " p o l i t i c a l a r t i c u l a t i o n " by Engl i sh workingmen.
It s i ngl ed out e f f o r t s t o i nf l uence t he na t i ona l government, i ncl udi ng
"meetings t o demand a reform of t h e f r anchi s e. r i o t s t o p r o t e s t t he i nt r o-
duct i on of new poor law and demonst r at i ons t o suppor t aome p a r t i c u l a r group
cause" (Tayl or 1966: 15) . The cont ext makes i t appear t h a t Tayl or a l s o
scor ed p e t i t i o n s , group vi ol ence, t he f or mat i on of a s s oc i a t i ons and t he
foundi ng of publ i c a t i ons , j u s t s o l ong a s t hey bor e e x p l i c i t l y on t h e
p o l i t i c a l syst em. He weighed each i ns t ance from 1 t o 5 depending on i t s
dur at i on and t he number of p a r t i c i p a n t s . He t hen used t he i ndex t o demon-
s t r a t e s t r ong r e l a t i ons hi ps between a count y' s l e v e l of p o l i t i c a l a r t t c -
u l a t i o n over t he e n t i r e per i od and t h e count y' s urban popul at i on, de ns i t y,
growth r a t e and non- agr i cul t ur al l abor f or ce.
I n my own gr oup' s e f f o r t t o i ndex Rr t t l s l ~ c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on dur i ng
t he same span of t i me, we have avoi ded r e l yi ng on a p o l i t i c a l c r i t e r i o n
a t t he s t a r t , i n hopes of capt ur i ng a wide r ange of a c t i o n ; t hen we have
some chance t o det er mi ne whet her c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on or i ent ed t o na t i ona l
p o l i t i c s and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on i n gener al r i s e and f a l l t oget her . o r
whet her t he r i s e of na t i ona l p o l i t i c s r e pr e s e nt s a net s h i f t wi t hi n t h e
body of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. (For d e t a i l s , s e e t h e Appendjx.) That impor-
t a n t except i on a s i d e , t he two approaches t o t h e measurement of c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i on have much i n common.
I n l i n e wi t h t h e hope of assembl i ng evi dence on t h e pa t t e r n of col -
lective sction as a wliol.e, we have coded many features of the violent
events: chsracteristica of tlie setting, types of participants, forms of
action, outcomes. In thinking of the magnitude of collective action
involved, we hsve followed the model of strike analysis. We have at-
tempted to estimate the total person-days absorbed by the action, and to
disaggreeate that estimate into its components: number of participants,
duration. For the total amount of collective action produced by e given
population in a certain period of time, we then hsve a three-dimensional
figure which can assume quite different proportions:
Croup A produces a few long events of medium size, while Group B produces
many large, short events; the volume of collective action as measured by
person-days, however, is about the-same in the two hypothetical cases.
This simple sort of representation brings out the fact that in France
from the nineteenth to the twentieth century both strikes and collective
violence shifted from a pattern of small size and long duration to large
size and short duration; the number of strikes and the person-days in
strikes expanded greatly, whlle the number of violent events and person-
days in violence did not rise significantly faster than the French popu-
lation.
Some of the reasons for these changes are obvious, and some require
reElection and research. rile twentieth-century rise of the big demun-
strstion and the one-day protest strike as modes of collective action
and as contexts for collective violence played s large part in the net
shift toward large, short, violent events. To ask why they rose, however.
is to ask about the expanding importance of special-purpose nssociotlons,
the changing relations between organized labor and the notional govern-
ment, the movement of protests toward large cities and big plants. In
short, the alterations an the forms of collective sction result from
changes in its determinants.
Interest, organization and mobilization, however. are not tlie only
determinants of the intensity and character of collective actlon. Op-
portunity matters. too. We must look st the three major components of
opportunity -- power, repression/facilitstion and opportunitylthreot --
before we have a rounded picture of collective action.
CHAPTER 4: THE OPPORTUNITY TO ACT TOGETHER
From Mobi l i zat i on t o Oppor t uni t y
We began t he l a s t chapt er wi t h two models. The "mobi l i zat i on model"
de s c r i be s t h e behavi or of a s i n g l e cont ender i n t erms of i n t e r e s t , or gani -
znt i on, power and ot he r va r i a bl e s . That model we have kept much i n view.
We I ~ove, however, looked mai nl y a t one s i d e of it: t he s i d e deal i ng wi t h
t he cont ender ' s i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e . Schemat i cal l y, we have concent r at ed
on t he f ol l owi ng r e l a t i ons hi ps :
By i t s e l f , t h i s por t i on of t he model i s i nadequat e. It de a l s onl y wi t h
t he capaci t y t o a c t , not wi t h t he immediate i nc e nt i ve o r oppor t uni t y t o
a c t . Those i nc e nt i ve s and oppor t uni t i e s f i nd t h e i r pl aces i n t h e ot he r
ha l f of t he mobi l i zat i on model, and i n t h e p o l i t y model.
The " pol i t y model" r e l a t e s cont ender s t o a government and t o ot he r
cont ender s -- bot h chal l enger s and members of t he p o l i t y -- v i a c o a l i t i o n s
and s t r uggl e s f o r par er . So l ong a s we were examining t he i n t e r n a l s t r uc -
t u r e of a cont ender , we coul d t a ke its e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s f o r gr ant ed. As
we move i n t o t he world of oppor t uni t y, we must pay s us t ai ned a t t e n t i o n t o
ot he r a c t or s . Thei r s t r e n g t h s and weaknesses compri se t h e cont ender ' s
oppor t uni t i e s t o a c t on i t s i n t e r e s t s .
I n Durkheimian t hi nki ng, t he main word f o r t h i s s e t of r e l a t i o n s be-
tween t he c o l l e c t i v e a c t o r and i t s environment i s s o c i a l c ont r ol . Soc i a l
c ont r ol c o n s i s t s of t he e f f o r t s of a u t h o r i t i e s , o r of s oc i e t y a s n whole,
t o br i ng devi ant s back i n t o l i n e . Thi a i dea of s o c i a l c ont r ol a s s i gns a
pas s i ve, uncr eat i ve r o l e t o c o l l e c t i v e a c t o r s . It f i t s t he r e a l i t y of
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on t oo poor l y t o hel p us her e.
Real cont ender s a r e more a c t i v e t han Durkheim's p o r t r a i t i mpl i es.
They pur sue t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . They s t r u g g l e f o r par er . On t h e wny, t hey
maneuver, form and br eak c o a l i t i o n s , t r y a l t e r n a t i v e s t r a t e g i e s , win and
l os e . Our pr i mi t i ve models ai mpl i f y a l l t h i s cont ent i on by deacr i hi ng i t
a s a s e r i e s of r esponses t o changi ng e s t i ma t e s of t he c o s t s and h e n e f i t s
l i k e l y t o r e s u l t from var i ous pos s i bl e i n t e r a c t i o n s wi t h governments and
wi t h ot he r cont ender s. The c e n t r a l assumpt i ons run:
1. Col l e c t i ve a c t i o n costs something.
2. Al l cont ender s count c os t s .
3. Col l e c t i ve a c t i o n br i ngs b e n e f i t s , i n t he form of c o l l e c t i v e
goods.
4. Cont enders cont i nuousl y weigh expect ed c oa t s ngnl ns t expect ed
b e n e f i t s .
5. Both c o s t s and b e n e f i t s a r e uncer t ai n because a ) cont ender s have
i mper f ect i nf or mat i on about t h e c ur r e nt s t a t e of t h c p o l i t y ;
b) a l l p a r t i e s engage i n s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n .
We sum up t he r el evant c o s t s and b e n e f i t s under t h e headi ngs r epr eas i on/
f a c i l i t a t i o n , power and oppor t uni t yl t hr e a t . On t he oppor t uni t y s i d e , t he
main r e l a t i ona hi pa i n t he model r un:
COLLECTIVE ACTION
OPPORTUNITY/THREAT
Remember t h a t t he s e r e l a t i ons hi pa r e f e r t o t he moment of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on.
Over t h e l ong r un, t he e xt e nt and form of a cont ender ' s c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on
a f f e c t its power. t he r e pr e s s i on t o which i t i s auhJect ed, and t h e f u r t h e r
oppor t uni t i e s and t h r e a t s i t f a c e s . Thi a ver s i on of t he model i gnor es t i me.
Let us consider each component of the timeless model in turn.
Repression and Facilitation
Contention for power always involves at least two parties. The be-
havior of the second party runs along a range from repression to facili-
tation. Let us recall the definitions: repression is any action by another
group which raises the contender's cost of collective action. An action
which lowers the group's cost of collective action is a form of facilita-
tion. (We cell repression or facilitation political if the other party is
-
s government.) A group bent on repressing or facilitating another group's
action has tlie choice of working on the target group's mobilization or
directly on its collective action. For example, a government can raise a
group's mobilization costs (and thereby raise its costs of collective ac-
tion) by disrupting its organization, by making comunicstions difficult
or inaccessible, by freezing necessary resources such as guns and manpower.
Standard repressive measures such as suspending newspapers, drafting
strikers, forbidding assemblies and arresting leaders illustrate the anti-
mobilization avenue. Or a government can operate directly on the costs of
collective action by raising the penalties, making the targets of the ac-
tion inaccessible or inducing a waste of the mobilized resources; the
egentprovocatex, the barricades around the city hall, the establishment
of military tribunals for insurgents fall familiarly into the strategy of
moving directly against collective action. Facilitation likewise has two
faces, both familiar: pro-mobilization activities such as giving a group
publicity, legalizing membership in it and simply paying it off; activities
directly reducing the group's costs of collective action, such as lending
information or strategic expertise, keeping the group's enemies out of the
action, or simply sending forces to help the action along.
Despite the two faces of repression/facilitation, the elementary mo-
bilization model shows no direct connection between repressionlEacilitation
and collective action. Instead, it portrays repression/facilitstion as
acting on power, which in turn influences collective action. That is be-
cause the elementary model refers to the moment of action alone. At that
moment, the prior effects of repression translate into power: into tlie cx-
tent to which the outcomes of the contender's various possible interactions
with other contenders favor its interests over those of the others.
Governmental repression is the best-known case. For example, the
United States government's outlawing of the Communist Party during the Cold
War essentially guarsnteed that the party would lose lenders to jail when
it acted together in sny visible way. That is a high cost to pay for col-
lective action. The law also raised the party's cost of mobilization by
penalizing individuals who dared to contribute time, money or moral support
to its work. From a government's point of view, raising the costs of mobi-
lization is a more reliable repressive strategy than raising the costs of
collective action alone. The anti-mobilization strategy neutralizes tlie
actor as well as the action, and makes it less likely that the actor will
be able to act rapidly when the government suddenly becomes vulnerable, a
new coalition partner arises, or something else quickly shifts the probable
costs and benefits of collective action. Raising the costs of collective
action alters the pattern of effective demand from mobilized groups, while
raising the costs of mobilization reduces demand across the board.
Governmental repression is uniquely important because governments
specialize in the control of mobilization and collective action: police
for crowd control, troops to back them, spies and informers for infiltra-
tion, licensing to keep potential actors visible and tame. Yet groups
out s i de government a l s o r e pr e s s each o t h e r , i n t he s ens e of mani pul at i ng
each o t h e r ' s c os t of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. That is obvi ous i n t he cas e of
quasi-governments such a s l a r g e f i r ms : si mpl y cons i der how much t he s t r uc -
t ur e and pol i cy of t he f i r m a f f e c t t h e chances f o r uni oni zat i on and t her e-
f o r e f o r s t r i k e a c t i v i t y . It is l e s s obvi ous i n t h e c a s e of r out i ne compe-
t i t i o n among ot he r groups: t he vol unt eer f i r e companies which burned each
o t h e r ' s premi ses and hel d deadl y s hoot out s i n tlie s t r e e t s of ni net eent h-
cent ur y Phi l adel phi a ended up r e s e t t i n g t he r e l a t i v e a b i l i t y of each f i r e
company t o wi el d p o l i t i c a l i nf l ue nc e ( Laur i e 1972). The f i g h t s between
groups of young bl acks nnd I r i s h f o r c ont r ol of l o c a l t u r f s i n Boston s i gni -
f i c a n t l y a f f e c t t h e gr oup' s f u t u r e c o s t s of assembl i ng and a c t i ng t oget her .
I n pr i nc i pl e , t hen, r epr es s i on sums t h e e f f e c t s of t he a c t i ons of a l l ot he r
groups, i ncl udi ng governments, on a p a r t i c u l a r gr oup' s c o s t of c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i on.
If d i f f e r e n t forms of r epr es s i on and f a c i l i t a t i o n sometimes concen-
t r a t e on mobi l i zat i on and sometimes on c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on i t s e l f , t hey a l s o
I
s e l e c t i n two ot he r i mpor t ant r egnr ds : t he t a r g e t groups and t he v a r i e t i e s
of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on encouraged o r de t e r r e d. Se l e c t i v i t y by group is t he
more obvi ous. I n r ecent ye a r s , agenci es of t he U.S. government have
worked t o impede t he c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n of groups a s di ve r s e a s t h e Symbion-
e s e Li ber at i on Army, t he Vietnam Vet er ans Agai nst t he War, and t he Demo-
c r a t i c Par t y. Agencies of t h e government have a l s o worked t o f a c i l i t a t e I
t he c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on of t he Bl ackst one Rangers, tlie American Medi cal Asso-
c i a t i o n and t h e A.P.L.-C.I.O. P o l i t i c s ss us ual i nvol ves a g r e a t d e a l of
conl i t i on-maki ng among and a ga i ns t d i f f e r e n t cont ender s f o r power. Divi-
s i ons of t he government pl ay i mpor t ant p o r t s on bot h s i d e s .
Se l e c t i v i t y by t ype of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on shows up i n t he ver y r u l e s
of t h e game, and i n t h e i r changes; a t a gi ven t i me, i t may be l e g n l t o pet -
i t i o n , a s s oc i a t e , v o t e a s a bl oc, a c qui r e n pat r on i n t h e l e ~ i s l s t i ~ r e and
assembl e a s a f or mal l y- cons t i t ut ed community, but not t o demonst r at e,
s t r i k e , boycot t , form mi l i t a s o r i nvade t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . The r e pr e s s i on
and f a c i l i t a t i o n r e s i d e i n t h e government ' s a c t i on t o a l t e r t he r e l a t i v e
c o s t s of d i f f e r e n t forms of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. Le ga l i t y ma t t e r s because
l aws s t a t e t h e c o s t a and b e n e f i t s which governments a r e prepared ( or a t
l e a s t empowered) t o appl y t o one form of a c t i o n o r anot her .
Impressed by t h a t f a c t . I once t hought we shoul d i ndex f l uc t ua t i ons
i n a government' s r epr es s i venes s by wat chi ng c a r e f u l l y its fl ow of l e g i s -
l a t i o n . A c l o s e r l ook a t t h e way t h e magi s t r at es of ei ght eent h- and nine-
t eent h- cent ur y Br i t a i n di d t h e i r work of r e pr e s s i on and f a c i l i t a t i o n ,
however, di mi ni shedmy conf i dence. Ei ght eent h-cent ury l e g i s l a t i o n mul t i p-
l i e d t h e number of c a p i t o l of f ens es . Pe na l t i e s f or of f e ns e s a g a i n s t
pr oper t y l e d t h e way: pl under i ng shi pwrecks, food r i o t i n g , mn y forms of
f o r c i b l e e n t r y and t h e f t became puni shabl e by hanging. Moreover, t h e b l l l s
which extended t h e deat h pe na l i t y were c h o r o c t e r i s t i c a l l y s pe c i a l - i nt e r e s t
l e g i s l a t i o n ; i n f a c t , t h e c a p i t a l of f e ns e s of t e n appeared a s i nc i de nt a l
f e a t u r e s of complex b l l l s desi gned t o advance t h e c u r r e n t i n t e r e s t s of
shi powners, merchnnt s, l a ndl or ds o r ot he r pr oper t y- hol der s (Hoy 1975).
Thi s much seems q u i t e c ons i s t e nt wi t h t h e ei ght eent h- cent ur y r i s e
of "possessi ve i ndi vi dual i sm. " But one f a c t is i nconveni ent : t h e appl i co-
t i on of t h e deat h penal t y became l e s s f r equent dur i ng t h e ei gl i t eent l i cen-
t ur y ( Be a t t i e 1974). What a r e we t o make of t ha t 7 Perhaps t h e d e t e r r mt
worked s o wel l t h a t fewer c a p i t a l of f e ns e s were committed. Perhaps j u r i e s
tempered t h e law'^ s e v e r i t y by r ef us i ng t o convi ct . Perhaps, a s Douglna
Hay s ugges t s , t h e combi nat i on of wi despread t h r e a t s and de c l i ni ng execu-
t i o n s r e s ul t e d Erom a syst em of ge ne r a l t e r r o r < s e l e c t i v e r e ~ r e s s i o n and
ext ens i ve pat ronage. I n any of t he s e e v e n t u a l i t i e s , t he r eadi ng of r epr es -
s i venes s from l e g i s l a t i o n al one is f a u l t y .
E.P. Thompson's a n a l y s i s of t h e background of t h e Bl ack Act of 1723
is a c a s e i n poi nt . The Bl ack Act s e t t he de a t h penal t y f o r no fewer
t han f i f t y of f e ns e s , e s pe c i a l l y armed and di s gui s ed hunt i ng, poaching,
ri ck-burni ng and ot he r a t t a c k s on r u r a l pr oper t y. Thompson shows t h a t i t
was es s ent i aLl y c l a s s l e g i s l a t i o n ; i t was engi neered by S i r Robert Walpole
and h i s f r i e n d s t o c ons ol i da t e t h e i r excl us i ve enjoyment of t h e i r e s t a t e s
over t h e r e s i s t a n c e of t h e smal l f ar mer s nearby. At a s u p e r f i c i a l r eadi ng.
one might e a s i l y t ake t h e Black Act a s an i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h e manner i n
which l e g i s l a t i o n makes t h e r i s e a n d f a l l of r epr es s i on v i s i b l e . . . and
t hus, perhaps, makes i t qua nt i f i a bl e .
Thompson, however, poi nt s o u t t h e d i f f i c u l t y :
On t h e one hand, i t . i s t r u e t h a t t h e law di d medi at e e x i s t e n t c l a s s
r e l a t i o n s t o t h e advant age of t h e r u l e r s ; not onl y is t h i s so, but
a s t he cent ur y advanced t h e law became a super b i nst r ument by which
t he s e r u l e r s were a b l e t o impose new d e f i n i t i o n s of pr oper t y t o
t h e i r even gr e a t e r advant age, a s i n t h e e xt i nc t i on by l aw of i ndef i n-
i t e a gr a r i a n us e- r i ght s and i n t h e f ur t he r a nc e of encl osur e. On t h e
ot he r hand, t h e l aw mediated t he s e c l a s s r e l a t i o n s t hrough l e g a l
forms, which imposed, agai n and agai n, i n h i b i t i o n s upon t h e a c t i o n s
of t h e r u l e r s (Thompson 1975: 264).
We have t o d e a l wl t h not one el ement -- l e g i s l a t i o n a l one -- but wi t h t hr ee:
t h e l e g i s l a t i o n a s such; t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and a ppl i c a t i on of t h e l e gi s -
l a t i o n ; t h e l i mi t s s e t on t h a t l e g i s l a t i o n ' s e f f k c t by ot he r . e xi s t i ng law.
The f i r s t and t h i r d el ement s a r c bot h ma t t e r s of t h e l aw a s mi t t e n
by j udges, l e g i s l a t o r s and l awyer s. One mi gl ~t hope t o ~ e t a t them by
s t udyi ng c ur r e nt l e g i s l a t i o n and j ur i spr udence. But t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
and a ppl i c a t i on of e x i s t i n g l e g i s l a t i o n a r e s ubt l e , var i ed and s c a t t c r c d.
I n Br i t a i n , t h e J u s t i c e s of t h e Peace had g r e a t d i s c r e t i o n . They used i t .
On t h e one hand, t hey never exer ci s ed t h e i r l e g a l powers t o t l i e f u l l e s t
pos s i bl e ext ent ; t h e r e were groups on which t h e f u l l r i g o r of t l i c l aw di d
not descend, l aws which remained unused, numerous i ns t a nc e s i n whl cl ~ one
person was punished a s an example whi l e t h e ot her of f ender s were l e f t t o
a c qui r e c o n t r i t i o n and f e a r by proxy. I n t h e c a s e o I t h e pr ovi nc i a l hvn-
ger r i o t s of 1766:
. . . t h e ma gi s t r a t e s not onl y r e f r a i ne d from e f f e c t i v e measures t o
cr us h t h e i n t i t i a l di s or de r s , t hey a c t u a l l y a be t t e d ot he r members of
t h e l anded and i n d u s t r i a l i n t e r e s t s i n t h e i r encouragement of t l i c
peopl e t o r e g u l a t e mnrket s and r educe t h e pr i c e s of pr ovi s i ons by
f or ce. . . By t h i s means, t hey di ve r t e d t h e r i o t e r s t owards middle-
men .and l a r g e f ar mer s, and away Erom t h e l anded and i ndus t r i al . i n-
t e r e s t s . Unl i ke ot he r a gr a r i a n d i s o r d e r s of t l i e cent ur y, t he r i o t s
of 1766 di d not i nvol ve d i r e c t a t t a c k s on londowneru o r mnnufact urcrs.
Thus wt i i l e not a c t u a l l y i n c i t i n g t h e r i o t s , t h e a c t i o n s o f t h e magis-
t r a t e s c e r t a i n l y gave them d i r e c t i o n . Only be l a t e dl y, when t h e s c a l e
of di s or de r f r i ght ened them, dLd t h e gent r y- mngi st r at es c l o s e r anks
wi t h t h e a r i s t oc r a c y and ot he r r u r a l l e a d e r s t o c r u s l ~ what t hey had
come t o f e a r was t h e s t a r t of s o c i a l r evol ut i on ( Shel t on 1973: 95-96).
When i t s ul t e d them, on t h e ot he r hand. t h e J u s t i c e s of t h e Pence o f t e n
used portmanteau l aws concer ni ng publ i c or der . They a r r e s t e d peopl e f or
vagrancy, t r es pas s i ng, breach of t h e peace, unl awful assembly o r hi ndr ance
of an o f f i c e r i n t he pur s ui t of h i s dut y. Sometimes t hey r e i nt e r pr e t e d
an e x i s t i n g law, such a s t he law of t r eas on, t o cover t he form of col l ec-
t i v e a c t i on a t hand.
Br i t i s h ma gi s t r a t e s of t he ei ght eent h and ni net eent h c e nt ur i e s pro-
babl y had unusual freedom of a c t i on, a s compared wi t h t h e i r count er par t s
Jn ot her west er n c ount r i e s . Never t hel ess, t h e Pr us s i an Junker who judged
h i s own t e na nt s a s Landrat and t he humbler French not a bl e who hel d c our t
over h l s nei ghhor s a s j uge de pai x a l s o chose t h e i r weapons from a l a r g e
l e g a l a r s e na l .
The e xe r c i s e of d i s c r e t i o n wi t hi n t he syst em does not mean t h a t t he
d i s t i n c t i o n between l e g a l and i l l e g a l means of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on i s i ns i g-
n i f i c a n t . T t means we must de r i ve t h e d i s t i n c t i o n from l e g a l p r a c t i c e i n-
s t e a d of r e l yi ng nai vel y on t he s t a t u t e books. Cr i mi nal s t a t i s t i c s t hus
r ecei ve a new l e a s e on l i f e .
Cri mi nnl s t a t i s t i c s a r e pr oper l y s us pect a s a comprehensive ( or even
r e pr e s e nt a t i ve ) r ecor d of a c t u a l v i o l a t i o n s of t h e law. Yet t hey do un-
ques t i onabl y r e f l e c t t h e a c t i on p f t he j u d i c i a l appar at us. and t he r e f or e
pr ovi de evi dence on changes i n t h a t a c t i on. George Rude not es t h e marked
de c l i ne i n t h e Br i t i s h use of t he deat h penal t y a ga i ns t p r o t e s t a f t e r 1800:
Once ar s on, r i o t and a t t a c k s on pr oper t y had v i r t u a l l y ceased t o
be c a p i t a l of f ences , t h e wor st he would have t o f a c e -- and t h i s
was t e r r i f y i n g enough -- was a term of t r a ns por t a t i on. I t is not
s ur pr i s i ng, t he r e f or e , t h a t t he t y p i c a l cr i mes f o r which pro-
t e s t e r s were t r ans por t ed i n t h e 1840' s -- t h e Ch a r t i s t s and Re-
hecca' s Daught ers, f o r example -- were f or former c a p i t a l o f f e n ~ e s l i k e
demol i shi ng t ur npi kes , pul l i ng down houses. s e d i t i o n , " c ut t i ng and
maiming", "mobbing and r i ot i ng" and "at t empt ed murder". And t he l a s t
bat ch of t r ans por t ed p r o t e s t e r s t o bc s e n t t o Aus t r a l l a from England
were 21 a r s o n i s t s who a r r i ve d t h e r e i n half-a-dozen s h l p s i n 1852.
Af t e r t h i s , t mn s p o r t a t i o n ceased i n Tasmania nu i t had t en year s
e a r l i e r i n Sydney; and when i t r evi ved b r i e f l y i n Western Auet r nl i a
between 1860 and 1868, t h e r e was not a s i n g l e Engl i sl i , Welull o r
Sc o t t i s h pr ot e s t e r among t h e 9, 000 c onvi c t s t h a t went out . Ilcnce-
f or t h, such p r o t e s t e r s a s remained t o be sent enced were conf i ned t o
j a i l s a t home; and, a s we not ed e n r l l c r , i ndi ct ment s f or such of f e ns e s
were, by t h e 1860' s. i n f a i r l y s t eady d e c l i n e (Rudk 1973: 22-23):
A s Rude poi nt s out , t h i s u s e of t h e cr i mi nal r ecor d s h i f t s t h e a n a l y t i c
s l ~ o e t o t h e ot he r f oot . I ns t ead of assuming a cons t ant pa t t e r n of r epr es-
s i on and r eadi ng t h e r epor t ed convi ct i ons a s a h i s t o r y of cr i mi nal n c t i J i t y .
wewant t o "hold const ant " t h e cr i mi nal a c t i v i t y and f or ce t h e r ecor d t o
t e l l u s about r epr es s i on. Not easy, but a t l e a s t we can anal yze t h e punish-
ment meted o u t f or s i mi l a r of f e ns e s i n d i f f e r e n t t l mes and pl aces , watch
t l i e waxing and waning involvement of d i f f e r e n t t ypes of r e pr e s s i ve f or c e s
( f o r example, t h e i ncr ens i ng r o l e of pr of es s i onal pol l c c i n ni net ecnt l i
and t went i et h c e nt ur i e s ) , at udyi ng t h e changi ng l i f e h i s t o r i e s of t ypi c a l
compl ai nt s.
I n l ooki ng a t much t h e same ma t e r i a l a s Rudg, E.P. ll~ompson not e s
t h e f r equent ei ght eent h- cent ur y us e of exemplary punlshment -- e s pe c i a l l y
t h e publ i c hangi ng -- i ns t e a d of wi despread pr osecut i on a s a d e t e r r e n t t o
t h e rambunct i ous ei ght eent h- cent ur y Engl i sh popul ar c l a s s e s , and i t s
l a t e r d e c l i n e i n f avor of a t endency t o pr osecut e a l l ofCenders, t o Jncnr-
c e r a t e them i ns t e a d of s ubj e c t i ng them t o banishment o r b r i e f agony, t o
remove punishment from t h e publ i c view, t o dream of reformi ng t he i ndi vi d-
u a l . Thompson is t he r e f or e pr oper l y s k e p t i c a l t h a t anyone coul d e s t i ma t e
e i t h e r t h e amount of pr ot e s t o r t h e degr ee of r e pr e s s i on by f ol l owi ng such
s t a t i s t i c s a s a r r e s t s , i mpri sonment s and execut i ons. Yet h i s ver y obj e c t i on
hel ps s pe c i f y what has t o be measured. Cl e a r l y we have t o d i s t i n g u i s h
between t h e volume and t ype of r e pr e s s i ve a c t i v i t y , on t h e one hand, and
its symbol i c s i gni f i c a nc e , on t h e ot he r .
Si nce groups var y s o much i n t h e i r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c us e of one s o r t
of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on o r anot her , t h e s e l e c t i v i t y of r epr es s i on and f a c i l i -
t a t i o n wi t h r es pect t o t ypes of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n us ua l l y e n t a i l s a s el ec-
t i on by ki nd of a c t o r a s wel l . No doubt abr i dgi ng t h e r i g h t of assembly
i s l e s s s e l e c t i v e t han out l awi ng t h e Communist Par t y. Even when t h e as-
sembly l aws a r e e qui t a bl y enf or ced, however, t hey f a l l wi t h s p e c i a l f or c e
on t hos e groups which can onl y make c ont a c t by gat her i ng i n publ i c spaces.
I n t he ni net eent h cent ur y. t h e workers who cus t omar i l y got t oget her i n pubs
o r on t h e s t r e e t found t hemsel ves more g r e a t l y hampered by r i o t a c t s t han
di d t h e r i c h . The r i c h coul d escape t o t h e i r s a l ons and p r i v a t e cl ubs .
The ni net eent h cent ur y c a s e i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g because of
t he g r e a t pr of e s s i ona l i z a t i on of pol i c i ng which occur r ed i n most west er n
c ount r i e s a s t h e cent ur y moved on. Some of t h e appar ent l y huge expansi on
of pol i ce f or c e s i n t h e ni net eent h cent ur y r e s ul t e d from t h e bur eaucr at i za-
t i on of vol unt eer and par t - t i me pol i ci ng. I n France, t h e r e gul a r na t i ona l
f or c e s r os e from about 5, 000 policemen and 16, 000 gendarmes ( f o r a combined
r a t e of 57 pol i c e per 100, 000 popul at i on) i n 1848 t o about 16, 000 pol i ce-
men and 21,000 gendarmes ( f o r a combined r a t e of 97 per 100, 000 popul at i on)
I
i n 1897. But a s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t of t h e i nc r e a s e i n policemen cons i s t ed
of t h e i ncor por at i on of i r r e g u l a r l o c a l f or c e s i n t o t h e not i ona l pol i c e
( s e e Ti l l y. Levet t , Lodhi and Munger 1975). i n t h e United St a t e s , no
na t i ona l pol i c e emerged, but p a r a l l e l changes i n pol i c i ng accur r ed. There
we s e e t h e s h i f t from "ent r epr eneur i al " t o "bur eaucr at i c" pol i c e f or c e s
( Levet t 1974). I n t h e e nt r e pr e ne ur i a l s t a ge , t hr e e ki nds of f or c e s shared
t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y : 1 ) c i t i z e n f or ces ; t hey were c a l l e d such t hi ngs a s
posse and de put i e s when t h e government di d not a ut hor i z e them; 2) r egul nr
t r oops ; 3) c ons t a bl e s and s i mi l a r o f f i c e r s , o f t e n shor t - t er m o r par t - t i me,
o f t e n gi ven l i t t l e o r no r egul nr remunerat i on, of t e n drawing most of t h e i r
pol i c e income from f ees : f i ne s , a s ha r e of recovered pr oper t y, rewords
post ed f or t h e appr ehensi on of major cr i mi nal s , and s o on. Thesc f or c e s
had l i t t l e i nc e nt i ve t o c a r r y on comprehensive pa t r ol s , t o de a l wi t h
~ o u t i n e publ i c or der of f ens es , o r t o pr ot e c t t h e poor. The t h i r d group
were "ent r epr eneur i al " i n t h a t t hey made t h e i r l i v i n g s by competing f o r
t h e a v a i l a b l e f e e s . With a growing, i ncr eas i ngl y segr egat ed and i ncr eas -
i ngl y forei gn-born working c l a s s ga t he r i ngi nnl ne t e e nt h- c e nt ur y c i t i e s ,
however, American p o l i t i c a l o f f i c i a l s became i nc r e a s i ngl y i nt e r e s t e d i n
formi ng r egul ar pol i c e f or c e s which would p a t r o l t h e e n t i r e c i t y . d e a l wi t h
vi c t i ml e s s of f e ns e s such a s publ i c drunkenness, and cont oi n rnaJor t h r e a t s
of h o s t i l e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. Thus t hey or gani zed bur eaucr at i zed, s ol a r i e d.
uniformed f ul l - t i me f or ces .
The same gener al change t ook pl ace i n England. Robert St orcl i poi nt s
o u t t h a t a s t h e mi ddl e and working c l a s s e s drew a pa r t , ni net eent h- cent ur y
mi ddl e c l a s s l e a d e r s i nc r e a s i ngl y f e l t t h e need f or a f or c e which would
cont ai n and c i v i l i z e t h e workers:
The d i s i n t e g r a t i o n o f a common s pher e of enjoyment was of cour s e
pa r a l l e l e d by a phys i cal s e pa r a t i on of t h e c l a s s e s -- c l a s s i c a l l y
des cr i bed by Engela -- unprecedent ed i n west er n hi s t or y. The Vi ct or -
i an' bour &oi s i e wliicl~ s e t t h e moral t one of c i t i e s l i k e Manchester
. ,
and Leeds were not l i k e l y t o pa t r oni z e t h e cockpi t a s t he Pr es t on
gent r y of t h e l a t e ei ght eent h cent ur y. had done, nor t o-shower c oi ns
on s Guy Fawkes crowd a s Wakefield To r i e s st i l l f e l t a t l i b e r t y t o
do a t mid-century. Such gentlemen were much more i nc l i ne d t o e i t h e r
mind t h e i r own bus i nes s and bus i nes s es o r e l s e t o pa r t oni z e temperance
o r r a t i o n a l r e c r c a t i on s o c i e t i e s o r mechanics' i n s t i t u t e s . It was
a l s o t hey who suppor t ed t he moral-reform mi ssi on assi gned t o t h e po-
l i c e and added t o i t i n t h e l anguage of numerous l o c a l improvement
a c t s . The ncw demands f o r c i v i l or der i n rdnet eent h-cent ury England
produced a novel t ype of s ur r oga t e t o r e pl a c e o l d e r and perhaps more
per sonal l i n e s of a u t h o r i t y and, def er ence which were now concei ved
t o be moribund. The pol i ce, a "bureaucracy of o f f i c i a l mor al i t y. " were
produced t o tiy t o f i l l t h i s vacuum and t o a c t a s a l e ve r of moral
reform on t h e myst er i ous t e r r a i n of t h e i n d u s t r i a l c i t y ' s i nner c or e
( St or ch 1976: 496) .
What is more, t h e poor of Engl i sh c i t i e s r e s i s t e d t h e growth of r e gul a r
pol i c e f or ces . They sow t h e pol i c e , i u i t e r i g h t l y , a s s p e c i a l i s t s i n i n-
t r udi ng on t h e i r l i f e space, keepi ng them under s ur ve i l l a nc e , i n t e r f e r i n g
i n t h e i r or gani zat i on and ent er t ai nment . They as s aul t ed pol i c e who cl os ed
pubs dur i ng church s e r vi c e s o r t r i e d t o break up crowds of i d l e r s on tlie
s t r e e t . The r e s i s t a n c e was, t o be sur e. s el f - def eat i ng: i t onl y gave t h e
f e a r f u l mi ddl c c l a s s e s s t r onge r i nc e nt i ve s t o expand and r e g u l a r i z e t h e
pol i c e f or ces . Thus an os t e ns i bl y gener al pr ot e c t i ve measure i ncr eased
t h e r epr es s i on di r e c t e d a t urban workers.
Repr essi ve and Tol er ant Governments
Let u s s e t t he s e i de a s down more s ys t emat i cal l y. The r epr cs s i vcnes s
of a government is never a si mpl e mat t er of more o r l e s s . It is aLways
s e l e c t i v e , and al ways c o n s i s t s of some combi nat i on of r epr es s i on, t ol er n-
t i on and f a c i l i t a t i o n . Governments respond s e l e c t i v e l y t o different s o r t s
of groups, and t o d i f f e r e n t s o r t s of a c t i ons . Sometimes t h e discriminations
a r e f i n e i ndeed: t h e same government which s mi l es on c l ~ur c h s e r vi c e s br i ng-
i ng t oget her a thousand peopl e assembled t o pray f o r s a l va t i on s l ~ o o t s
wi t hout h e s i t a t i o n i n t o a crowd of a thousand workers assembled t o pray
f o r j u s t i c e .
Governments which r e pr e s s a l s o f a c i l i t a t e . While r a i s i n g t he c os t a
of some ki nds of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n t o some ki nds of groups. t hey lower
t h e c o s t s of ot he r ki nds of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on t o ot he r ki nds of groups.
They do s o i n two d i f f e r e n t ways: a ) by' si mpl y di mi ni shi ng t h e d i f f i c u l t y
of s p e c i f i c v a r i e t i e s of mobi l i zat i on andl or c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on, and b)
by pr ovi di ng p o s i t i v e i nc e nt i ve s f or s p e c i f i c v a r i e t i e s of mobi l l . zat i on
andl or c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. At t h e ext reme, f a c i l i t a t i o n t he r e f or e t ur ns
i n t o compulnion: puni shi ng non- per f or mnce i ns t e a d of si mpl y rewardi ng
performance. For pr es ent purposes, however. we can t r e o t f a c i l i t a t i o n
and compulsion a s a seaml ess continuum.
Tol er at i on is t h e s pace between r epr es s i on and f a c i l i t a t i o n . For
some combi nat i ons of groups and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i ons , a gi ven government
does not r e a c t a t a l l : t h e r e s i de nt s of an urban neighborhood ge t to-
get her t o wr i t e a l e t t e r t o t h e e d i t o r about l o c a l housl ng f or t h e e l de r l y,
and t h e government ne i t he r impedes them nor hel ps them; s t r i k i n g s t ude nt s
s t a y away from c l a s s e s , and t h e p o l i c e s t udi ous l y i gnor e them.
To t h e e xt e nt t h a t t l i e a c c e p t a b i l l t y of nct i ons and of groups t o a
gi ven government each f a l l i n t o a s i n g l e rank or de r , we have a si mpl e way
of r epr es ent i ng bot h t h e l i mi t s of t o l e r a b l e behavi or and t h e gener al
l e v e l of governmental r epr es s i venes s . Fi gur e 4-1 o f f e r s a si mpl e des cr i p-
t i on of r epr es s i on, t o l e r a t i o n and f a c i l i t a t l o n . I n t h i s i de a l i z e d di a-
gram, any group l e s s accept abl e t hen D g e t s r epr es s ed no mat t er what i t
docs. Any a c t i on l e s s accept abl e t han B g e t s r epr essed no mat t er which
group does it. AC t he r e f or e r e pr e s e nt s t h e amount of r epr es s i on. Any
group more accept abl e t han E and any a c t i on more accept abl e t han F re-
c e i ve governmental suppor t . EG r e pr e s e nt s t h e gener al e xt e nt of govern-
ment al f a c i l i t a t i o n , CG t he gener al e xt e nt of government al t ol er ance.
With t he s e t ool s , we can manufact ure t h e two i d e a l t ypes of regimes
shown i n Fi gur e 4-2: Ega l i t a r i a n and Ol i gar chi c. I n t h e ext reme cas e of
e ga l i t nr i a ni s m, t l i e a c c e p t a b i l i t y of t h e group makes no di f f e r e nc e t o t h e
l i ke l i hood t h a t t l i e government wi l l r e pr e s s o r f a c i l i t a t e a gt ven s o r t of
a c t i on by t h a t group. In t h e ext reme c a s e of ol i gar chy, t h e s o r t of ac-
t i on undert aken makes no di f f e r e nc e t o t h e l i ke l i hood t h a t t h e government
wi l l r e pr e s s t h e a c t i on of a group wi t h a gi ven amount of power.
I n t h a t never-never world where evi dence is f r e e , c l e a r and r e l i a b l e ,
we cs n compare r e a l regi mes i n t he s e r egar ds , and t hus be on our way t o
t e s t i n g argument s concer ni ng such t hi ngs a s t he t emperi ng e f f e c t s of par-
l i ament ar y syst ems on t he r epr es s i on of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. Real evi dence
would a l s o gi ve u s tllemeans of j udgi ng t he u t i l i t y of t h e p o l i t y model
pr esent ed e a r l i e r : t h e c l e a r e r t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between members and chal -
l enger s .
Fi gur e 4-1: Repr essi on, Tol er at i on, Fa c i l i t a t i o n and Cocrcion
Nigh
er ci on
a c i l i t n t i o n
17
.-I U
2
(U
0
X
r(
d . 4
.a
U
8
4
Low
A
Low
Accept abi l i t y of Croup
4-17
Fi gur e 4-2: Repressi on i n Ega l i t a r i a n and Ol i gar chi c Governments
A. EGALITARIAN
Tol er at i on
9
C
0
Low
Fa c i l i t a t i o n
Low Accept abi l i t y of Group Iligh
High
Low
Low High
Accept abi l i t y of Croup
t h e s har per tand more ne a r l y v e r t i c a l shoul d be t h e l i n e between r epr es -
s i on and t o l e r a t i o n . To t h e e xt e nt t h a t governments a r e t r u l y e g a l i t a r i a n
and t h a t t h e t r a n s i t i o n from t o l e r a t i o n t o r epr es s t on is gr adual insLend
of abr upt , t h e d i v i s i o n of cont ender s i n t o manhers and cl ml l cnger a i s m i s -
l eadi ng.
The r e c t i l i n e a r r e pr e s e nt a t i on we have been us i ng s o f a r i s not ver y
r e a l i s t i c . Let us negl ect t h e u n r e a l i t y i nt r oduced by havi ng no gr ay a r e a s ,
no government al waveri ng and no t a c t i c a l maneuvering. Even wi t h gr e a t
certainty a s t o when t h e government wi l l and wi l l not r e pr e s s , t o l e r a t e o r
f a c i l i t a t e , Fi gur e 4-3 is more l i k e everyday r e a l i t y . I n bot h c ns e s shown
i n t h e di agrams, even hi ghl y unaccept abl e groups have a few i nnocuous cour s es
of a c t i o n open t o them. Even hi ghl y accept abl e groups have some a c t i o n s
bar r ed t o them. Rut t h e a c c e p t a b i l i t y of t h e a c t i on va r J e s wi t h t h e accept -
a b i l i t y of t h e group.
I n t h e di agrams, al t hough governments X and Y do about t h e same
amount of f a c i l i t a t i n g of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on, Y i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y more r epr es-
s i v e t han X. Y i s a l s o l e s s t o l e r a n t t han X. We can r epr es ent t l i e di e-
f e r e nc e i n r epr es s i venes s between t h e governments a s AC - A'C'. The same
de vi c e wi l l s e r ve t o por t r ay t h e change i n t h e r epr es s i venes s of a s i n g l e
government over time: t h e ques t i on is how f a r C moves up and down t l i e dJ a -
gonal .
The di agram has an i n t e r e s t i n g by-product: i t hel ps s pe c i f y some s t nn-
dar d i n t u i t i o n s of t h e r e pr e s s i ve pa t t e r ns i n d i f f e r c n t s o r t s of regi mes.
Fi gur e 4-4 l a y s out t h e di f f e r e nc e s among r e pr e s s i ve , t o t a l i t a r i a n . t o l e r -
a n t and weak regi mes. I n t h i s chor nct er i eat i on. a r e pr e s s i ve regime
r e pr e s s e s many groups and a c t i ons , whi l e f a c i l i t a t l n g few of e i t h e r . A
t o t a l i t a r i a n regime may r e pr e s s l e s s , but i t f a c i l i t a t e s a wide r ange of
Figure 4 - 3 : Tolernnce v s . Rcpression
Government X Government Y
A '-
Figure 4- 4: Repressi ve Patterns i n Di f f erent Typcs of Rcgtmc
A. REPRESSIVE
\
C. TOLERANT
8. TOTALITARIAN
a c t i ons , even t o t h e poi nt of making them compulsory. As a consequence,
t h e bnnd of mere1.y t ol e r a t e d a c t i o n s narrows. The t o l e r a n t regi me widens
t h a t mi ddl e bnnd: di agram C sneaks i n t h e s uppos i t i on t h a t t o do s o i t
must bar some a c t i ons t o t h e most powerful groups wi t hi n it. Fi na l l y,
t h e week regime a l s o has a wide band of t ol e r a t e d behavi or , b u t , i t f o c i l i -
I
I
t a t e s l e s s , and t i p s its r e pr e s s i on toward t h e weaker groups whi l e doi ng
!
p r a c t i c a l l y not hi ng about t h e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on of t h e s t r ong.
So f a r we have si mpl y been expl or i ng a two-dimensional d e f i n i t i o n
.
of r epr es s i venes s . We con edge a b i t f a r t h e r i n t o t h e world of t e s t a b l e
pr opos i t i ons by as ki ng what f e a t u r e s of a c t i o n s make them accept abl e,
i
and what f e a t ur e s of groups make them accept abl e. Those a r e empi r i cal
quest i ons. tough ones. Thei r d e t a i l e d answers vary accor di ng t o t h e ki nd
of peopl e and t h e ki nd of government we a r e t a l ki ng about . . Whatever e l s e
a f f e c t s t h e a c c e p t a b i l i t y of an a c t i o n , however, its sheer s c a l e c e r t a i n l y
does. The l a r g e r t h e s c a l e of a c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on, on t h e whole. t h e more
r epr es s i on a government is l i k e l y t o throw a t i t . . By "scal e" we may mean
number of pa r t i c i pa nt s , dur a t i on, geographi c r ange, e i t e n t of or gani zat i on,
I
degr ee of f or c e mobi l i zed, o r some weighted combi nat i on of them.
On t h e s i d e of g r o u p ~o c c e p t a b i l i t y , t h e gr oup' s c ur r e nt .power i s
t h e most promi si ng s i n g l e f a c t or . That . f or two r easons: because might
of t e n makes ri ght , . . and because cur r ent . power sums up many ot he r ki nds of
a c c e pt a bi l i t y. The more powerful t h e group, on t h e average. t h e l e s s r epr es -
s i on i t r ecei ves . Although a t f i r s t hear i ng t h e r e l a t i ons hi p sounds obvi ous,
i t is ne i t he r s el f - evi dent nor t r u e by d e f i n i t i o n . Indeed, a government I I
a t t h e edge oE a revolutionary s i t u a t i o n o f t e n c onc e nt r a t e s what ever r epr es -
I
s i v e s t r e ngt h i t has on i t s most powerful r i v a l s , and l e t s t h e weak r un f r e e .
Never t hel ess, i n gener al an i nve r s e r e l a t i ons hi p between power and r epr es-
s i on probabl y does hol d.
Thi s e f f e c t of power on r epr es s i on and Eoc i l i t ot i on r ever s es ~ l i c main
r e l a t i o n s h i p proposed by our el ement ar y mobi l i zat i on model. 'Illere, t l i e
cont ender ' s c ur r e nt s ubj e c t i on t o r e p r e s s i o n l f a c i l i t o t i o n a f f e c t s its pw-
e r , but not v i c e ver s a. Again t h e di f Fer ence i s due t o a s l ~ i f t i n perspec-
t i ve . The el ement ary model d e a l s wi t h t h e moment of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on,
and ai ms a t t h e a c t i on of t h e cont ender . Thi s supplcmentory model of
repression/facilitation. however, d e a l s wi t h a government' s deci s i on t o
r e pr e s s -- e i t h e r i n r esponse t o some s i n g l e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on, o r a s a
p a t t e r n of r esponses over a l onger per i od.
Our e a r l i e r di agrams now t r a n s l a t e i n t o Fi gur e 4-5. I n t h i s idealized
map, a gr oupweaker t han A wi l l be r epr es s ed no mat t er how smal l t l i e s c a l e
of i t s a c t i on. Even t h e s t r onge s t group wl l l be r epr es s ed i f i t under t okes
an a c t i o n l a r g e r t han E. A group s t r onger t han B wi l l r e c e i ve n c t i v e sup-
por t f o r i t s s mal l er - s cal e a c t i ons . and t h e s t r onge s t groups wi l l r e c e i ve
f a c i l i t a t i o n from t he government f or t h e f u l l r ange of a c t i o n s from C t o
D. The oddi t y of some of t he s e i mpl i cat i ons makes i t c l e a r t h a t o va l i d
map would show more bumps and depr es s i ons . For example. i n any p a r t i c u l a r
p o l i t i c a l system t h e r e i s no doubt a t hr eshol d below which groups a r e t oo
weak t o bot her wi t h; s i n c e t hey pose no t hr e a t , t h e i r smnl l - scal e col l ec-
t i v e a c t i o n s a r e i gnor ed. Making t h e map more r e a l i s t i c i n a s i g n i f i c a n t
t he or e t i da l and empi r i cal problem.
The l a s t f i g u r e i n t h i s s e r i e s , o f f e r s some s pe c ul a t i ons about t h e
st andar d d i s t r i b u t i o n s of r epr es s i on and f a c i l i t a t i o n i n popul at i ons wi t h
r e l a t i v e l y s t r ong governments. I mean them t o appl y t o major west er n
s t a t e s over t h e l a s t two o r t hr e e c e nt ur i e s . The r epr es s i on cur ve now
r e g i s t e r s t h e i dea t h a t groups wi t h a l i t t l e power pose a gr e a t e r t h r e a t
Figure 4 - 5 : Repression a s a Function of Scal e and Power
A B C
Small
1 4 D
V)
Large
E
Weak - + Strong
Power of Croup
Figure 4-6: Hypotheti cal di s t ri but i on of governmental rcpressl on ns o
functi on of t he s c al e of c o l l e c t i v e act i on and t he powcr
of t he act or.
Small
Large
Faci l i t at i on
Repression
Weak +Strong
' Power of Group
t o t h e government and its main s uppor t er s t han do powerl ess groups. Tlie
hypot het i cal government r e pr e s s e s a l l but t h e s ma l l e s t c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s
of s l i g h t l y powerful groups, whi l e al l owi ng more l a t i t u d e t o t h e genui nel y
powerl ess. It a l s o c ont a i ns t h e i dea t h a t a s t h e power of a p a r t i c u l a r
group r i s e s -- a s , f or example, i t a c t u a l l y becomes i d e n t i c a l wi t h t h e
government -- t h e r ange of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s deni ed t o i t event ual l y
dwi ndl es t o not hi ngness. The f a c i l i t a t i o n c ur ve t e l l s us t h a t even r e l a -
t i v e l y ppwerl ess groups r e c e i ve i nc e nt i ve s t o c a r r y o u t c e r t a i n hi ghl y ac-
c e pt a bl e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i ons ; t h e r e s u l t of t h a t ci r cumst ance i s t o squeeze
t he r ange of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n on t h e p a r t of s l i g h t l y powerful groups
which i s si mpl y t ol e r a t e d: e i t h e r t hey c a n ' t do i t o r t hey must do it.
A s s r e s u l t , r e l a t i v e l y powerl ess groups f i nd t h e i r world more t o t a l i t a r i a n
t han do t h e powerful o r t h e compl et el y powerl ess.
At t he ot he r end of t h e power r ange, t h e ext remel y powerful enj oy
governmental suppor t i n al most any c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on t hey c a r r y on.
At t h e ext reme, where t h e government and t h e most powerful group merge
i ndi s s ol ubl y, government s uppor t s ever yt hi ng t he group does. Thi s bas i c
pa t t e r n i s pos s i bl e wi t h a s mal l er o r l a r g e r a r e a of t ol e r a t i on, smal l er
o r l a r g e r zones of r e pr e s s i on and f a c i l i t a t i o n .
I f t h i s argument is c o r r e c t , r epr es s i on and f a c i l i t a t i o n should work.
I t shoul d not be t r ue , f o r example, t h a t a peopl e l ong hel d under a r e
pr e s s i ve regime wi l l gr adual l y bui l d up s o much resent ment t h a t i t b u r s t s
o u t a ga i ns t t he regime. It shoul d be t r ue , on t h e ot he r hand, t h a t v i s i b l e
changes I n a government ' s r e pr e s s i ve pol i cy -- cr acki ng down on v i o l a t o r s
of a c e r t a i n law, o r eas i ng up on them -- wi l l r a pi dl y encourage o r di s -
cour age t l i e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on of mnny groups bes i des t hos e most d i r e c t l y
a f f e c t e d; t he news of t h e change shoul d qui ckl y a f f e c t t h e i r e s t i ma t e s of
t he c o s t s of p a r t i c u l a r ki nds of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on, and perhaps of col l cc-
t i v e a c t i o ~ i , i n gener al . To be more exact , al i l Et s I n t h e pa t t e r n of r epr es-
s i on and f a c i l i t a t i o n shoul d have two r e l a t e d e f f e c t s : depr es s i ng o r
r a i s i n g t h e o v e r a l l l e v e l of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on, a l t e r i n g t h e r e l n t i v e
a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of d i f f e r e n t forms of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on.
The h i s t o r i c a l evi dence f o r t h e impact of r epr es s i on on t h e gener nl
l e v e l of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on is. I t hl nk, q u l t e s t r ong. A t t h e ext reme, t h e
Europe of our own t i me pr ovi des t l i e examples of Spai n under Prifno de Ri vera
and Franco, Por t ugal under Sal azar , Germany under Hi t l e r , and Sovi et Unton
under S t a l i n and h i s s ucces s or s , I t a l y under Mussol i ni . France under
Vichy and t h e Nazi s -- a l l t i mes of enormously reduced c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on
i n t hbs e c ount r i e s , except f o r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on d i r e c t l y i n i t i n t c d by t l i e
s t a t e . I n gener al , when a European s t a t e t empor ar i l y t r ai ned i t s f u l l
r e pr e s s i ve power on its i n t e r n a l enemies ( a s when t he I t a l l n n s t a t c a t -
t acked t h e S i c i l i a n Fas ci of 1893-94), t h e enemies subsi ded.
The a l t e r a t i o n of t h e r e l a t i v e a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of d i f f e r e n t forms of
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on by r epr es s i on end f a c i l i t a t i o n i s easy t o i l l u s t r o t c
and hard t o e s t a b l i s h a s a gener al r u l e . Tl ~e "channeling" of c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i on by governments shows up i n t he ni net eent h- cent ur y pr ef er ence f or
mut ual -ai d s o c i e t i e s over t r a de uni ons. Western governments ge ne r a l l y
di scour aged t he bandi ng t oget het ' of workers who sought t o c ont r ol produc-
t i on. They di ver t ed workers i n t o presumably s a f e r or gani znt i ons or i e nt e d
t o consumption. The t a c t i c worked i n t h e s hor t run; u n t i l t hey bccame
l e g a l , t r a d e uni ons a t t r a c t e d few members. A t l i r s t , Fr i endl y Soc i e t i e s
and s oc i bt 6s de s ecour s mut uel s busi ed t hemsel ves wi t h problcms O F wel f ar e
away from work. I n t h e l onger r un, however, t hey became t h e n u c l e i of ac-
t i on a ga i ns t employers and a ga i ns t t h e s t a t e . Tl ~e lower c o s t a l t e r n a t i v e
e ve nt ua l l y bccame a ver y e f f e c t i v e one. That r epr es s i on makes a d i f f e r e n c e
does not mean t h a t i t sl wnys sccompl.ishes what t he r e pr e s s or s had i n mind.
Power
The pr ovi s i ona l hypot hesi s of t h i s lsst di s c us s i on, t hen, r uns a s
f ol l ows: t he e xt e nt t o which a gi ven c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on by s gi ven group
is s ubj e c t t o r epr es s i on, t o l e r a t i o n o r f a c i l i t a t i o n i s mai nl y a f unct i on
of two f a c t or s : 1 ) t he s c a l e of t h e a c t i o n , 2) t h e power of t h e group.
The l a r g e r t h e s c a l e of t h e a c t i o n , t he more l i k e l y i t s r epr es s i on; t h e
more powerful t he group, t he l e s s l i k e l y i t s r epr es s i on. The l a t e r di a-
grams r e f i ne d t hnt cr ude hypot hes i s by s peci f yi ng i n t e r a c t i o n s between
t he s c a l e of t he a c t i on and t h e power of t he group. But t he cor e of t h e
hypot hesi s remai ns.
Scal e of a c t i on i s s f a i r l y c l e a r i de s . Power i s not . Unfortu-
nnt el y f o r c l a r i t y , t he word has many t ones and over t ones. Enough, I
t hi nk, t o make t he s ear ch f o r one e s s e n t i a l meaning o r one comprehensive
d e f i n i t i o n of power a wi l d goose chase. The meaning I have i n mind he r e
is si mpl e and commonsense. Suppose we have two o r more i n t e r a c t i n g psr -
t i e s . Suppose each pa r t y has an i n t e r e s t i n an outcome of t h e i nt e r a c t i on.
Suppose a t l e a s t one such i n t e r e s t of one pa r t y t o t he i n t e r a c t i o n con-
f l i c t s wi t h t he i n t e r e s t of anot her pa r t y t o t he i n t e r a c t i o n . The power
of t h s t par t y is t h e e xt e nt t o which i t s i n t e r e s t s p r e v a i l over t h e ot he r s
wi t h which i t i s i n c o n f l i c t .
The ot he r a c t o r s may r ange from s s i n g l e person t o t h e sum of a l l
ot he r per sons and groups. The power of a gi ven pa r t y i s t he r e f or e al ways
r e l a t i v e t o a s p e c i f i c 1 ) ot he r pa r t y o r s e t of p a r t i e s ; 2) i n t e r e s t o r s e t
of i n t e r e s t s ; 3) i n t e r a c t i o n o r s e t of i nt e r a c t i ons . A farmer who t r ampl es
t h e i n t e r e s t s of ot he r members of h i s household sometimes makes no headway
i n t h e v i l l a g e counci l ; he has ext enhi ve power a t home. but not abroad.
An i ndus t r y which g e t s ext ens i ve government al pr ot e c t i on from uni oni zat i on
sometimes f a i l s u t t e r l y t o ar r ange pr ot e c t i ve t a r i f f s ; i t s power is hi gh
wi t h r e s pe c t t o l a bor , low wi t h r e s p e c t t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r ade. A group
of r e vol ut i ona r i e s who were i ne f f e c t uol lsst year sometimes r eor gonj ze and
s t a r t making a r evol ut i on t h i s year: i n lsst ye a r ' s i n t e r a c t i o n s t hey
were powerl ess, whi l e i n t h i s ye a r ' s t hey a r e powerful. When we ar gue
about whet her a gi ven group is powerful , we a r e occns i onal l y di s ngr eei ng
about t h e f a c t s . But us ua l l y we a r e cont endi ng over which pnr t i e s . i nt e r -
e s t s and i n t e r a c t i o n s des er ve t o be tnken i n t o cons i der at i on, and how t o
weigh t hen.
Now and t hen someone i nt r oduces p o t e n t i n l power i n t o t he di s cus s i on.
Po t e n t i a l power de s c r i be s t h e e xt e nt . t o which t h e pa r t y' s i n t e r e s t s would
pr e va i l i f i t used a l l t he means a t i t s di s pos al : i f a l l women used a l l
t h e weal t h, t ool s , knowledge, e t c . t hey di s pos e of now t o enf or ce t h e i r
r i g h t s t o employment, f o r example. The t r oubl e wi t h not i ons of pot e nt i ol
powe; is t h a t by d e f i n i t i o n t hey r e f e r t o s i t u a t i o n s we c a n' t obser ve,
t h a t t hey f o r c e u s t o de c i de between assuming t h a t t h e ot he r p a r t i e s t o
t h e i n t e r a c t i o n cont i nue t o behave a s bef or e ( e. g. t h a t men don' t respond
by p i l i n g up a l l t h e weal t h, t ool s , knowledge e t c . thev c ont r ol ) and
t he or i z i ng about t h e whole sequence of i n t e r a c t i o n l i k e l y to' fol l ow: war
games. Yet we c a n' t si mpl y brush a s i d e pot e nt i ol power n s an i nconveni ent
i dea, f o r t h e i mp l i c i t t h r e a t t hnt s par t y w i l l us e t h e means i t hns i n
r e s e r ve o f t e n ( per haps always) mul t i pl i e s t h e e f f e c t of t he means a c t u n l l y
used.
A r e l a t e d d i s t i n c t i o n s e pa r a t e s power-as-effect i veness from powcr-ns-
e f f i c i e nc y. (An e xa c t l y p a r a l l e l d i s t i n c t i o n appear s i n di s c us s i ons of
or ga ni z a t i ona l out put s ; s ee, e.g. Yuchtman and Seashor e 1967.) A group
which accompl i shes what i t s e t s out t o do is e f f e c t i v e , r e ga r dl e s s of t h e
c o s t s i t i ncur s . To t h e e xt e nt t h a t t h e gr oup' s i n t e r e s t s t her eby pre-
v a i l over ot her i n t e r e s t s wi t h which t hey a r e i n c o n f l i c t , t he group i s
e xe r c j s i ng e f f e c t i v e power. On t he ot he r hand, a group which g e t s a l a r g e
r e t ur n r e l a t i v e t o t he means a t i t s di s pos a l i s e f f i c i e n t , r e ga r dl e s s of
t h e s p e c i f i c c ha r a c t e r of t h a t r e t ur n. To t he degr ee t h a t t he r e t ur n f avor s
t he gr oup' s i n t e r e s t s and count er s t h e i n t e r e s t s of ot he r groups, t he
group i a e xe r c i s i ng e f f i c i e n t power.
Both e f f e c t i ve ne s s and e f f i c i e nc y a r e r e l a t i v e t o t he gr oup' s de-
f i ned i n t e r e s t s . But an e f f e c t i v e group may be r a t he r i n e f f i c i e n t ; by
v i r t u e of t h e i r wi l l i ngne s s t o s a c r i f i c e al most s nyt hi ng f o r t h e i r obj ec-
t i v e s , our "zeal ot s " o f t e n f a l l i n t o t h a t cat egor y. Li kewi se, an e f f i -
c i e n t group may be r e l a t i v e l y i n e f f e c t i v e ; our "misers" f r e que nt l y end up
t her e. A ver y i n e f f e c t i v e group t ends t o demobi l i ze t hrough t he pr oces s
t h a t Al ber t Hirschman anal yzes: a s ucces s i on from some combi nat i on of
l o y s l t y + voi ce t o e x i t . A ver y i n e f f i c i e n t group wast es i t s mobi l i zed
r es our ces and t hen t ends e i t h e r a ) t o become i n e f f e c t i v e ss a r e s u l t o r
b) t o l o s e i t s suppor t t o ot he r groups pur sui ng t h e same i n t e r e s t s more
e f f i c i e n t l y . I n or der t o s ur vi ve and pr os per , r e a l groups must mai nt ai n
t hemsel ves above some minimum of power-effi ci ency and some minimum of
par er - ef f ect i venes s . The s n a l y s i s which f ol l ows pr ovi des a means f o r
t l eal l ng wi t h bot h a s pe c t s of power.
Pa r t i e s
Let us go back t o our t hr e e poi nt s of r ef er ence: p a r t i e s , i n-
t e r e s t s and i nt e r a c t i ons . Many s t ude nt s of power l i k e t o di s t i ngui s h be-
tween "governments" o r "aut hor i t i es ", on t h e one hand, and a l l p a r t i e s out -
s i d e t he government, on t he ot he r . Wi l l i am Camson, f o r example, us e s
power t o r e f e r t o t he e f f e c t of a u t h o r i t i e s on ot he r p a r t i e s , and i nf l ue nc e
t o r e f e r t o t he e f f e c t s of ot he r p a r t i e s on a u t h o r i t i e s (Camson 1968). TO
my way of t hi nki ng, t he d i s t i n c t i o n s among par t y. a ut hor i t y and govern-
ment a r e pur el y r e l a t i v e : on a ut hor i t y i s si mpl y a par t y which c o n t r o l s
some concent r at ed means of coer ci on; a government i s si mpl y t h e par t y
which c o n t r o l s t he moat i mpor t ant concent r at ed means of coer ci on wi t hi n
some def i ned popul at i on.
P o l i t i c a l power, t hen, is power over governments. Our e s t i ma t e of a
gr oup' s p o l i t i c a l power wi l l depend on which ot he r p a r t i e s we t ake i n t o
cons i der at i on. At one ext reme, we can l ook a t t he group and t h e govern-
ment al one. Then t h e gr oup' s p o l i t i c a l power is t h e e xt e nt t o wliicl~ f t s
i n t e r e s t s pr e va i l over t hose of t h e government when t h e two s e t s of i nt e r -
e s t s a r e i n c o n f l i c t . That r e s u l t i s vaguel y uns e t t l i ng, pr e c i s e l y because
we us ua l l y have some ot he r cont ender s f or t h e government' s f avor i n mind,
and v i s u a l i z e t h e s i t u a t i o n of a pe r f e c t coi nci dence of i n t e r e s t s between
a gi ven par t y and t h e government: s u r e l y we woul dn' t want t o soy t h a t
such a pa r t y had no p o l i t i c a l power!
An ext reme answer t o t h a t d i f f i c u l t y i s t o i ncl ude a l l ot he r cont ender s.
The answer is ext reme because i t e n t a i l s a) enumernt i ng a l l t hose ot he r
cont ender s, b) pr epar i ng t h e huge bal ance s he e t of t h e i r i n t e r e s t s vs.
t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e group whose power we a r e t r y i n g t o as s ay. The i n-
t er medi at e answer is t o l i m i t t h e s e t of cont ender s t aken i n t o consi der a-
t i on: one compet i t or , a l i mi t e d s e t of powerful compet i t or s , a l l t hos e
which have made t hemsel ves known wltli r e s pe c t t o some p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e
andl or some p a r t i c u l a r phase of governmental a c t i v i t y , and s o on.
The not i on of a "pol i t y" t okes a s t e p i n t h a t direction by s i ngl i ng
o u t a l l cont ender s which have r out i ne acces s t o t h e government. For t h i s
articular n o t i o n o f p o l i t y t o be us e f ul , t he r e must be a br eak I n t h e di s -
t r i b u t i o n of power. The br eak must s e pa r a t e t he r e l a t i v e l y gr e nt power
of a l l cont ender s ("members of t h e pol i t y") who have r o u t i n e acces s t o t h e
government from t h e r e l a t i v e l y s mal l power of a l l ot he r cont ender s
( "chal l enger s") who l ack t h a t r o u t i n e acces s . It a l s o i mpl i es a break i n
t h e l i f e h i s t o r y of a group which moves from chal l enge t o membership o r
membersl~ip t o chal l enge. To t l i e e xt e nt t h a t t he s e pr oces s es a r e cont i nuous
and gr adual , t h e concept of p o l i t y l o s e s i t s val ue.
I n t e r e s t s
We f a c e t h e trilemma which St even Lukes l a y s out . Lukes di s t i ngui s he s
among " pl ur a l i s t , " "r ef or mi st " and "r adi cal " concept i ons of power. The
e s s e n t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n r e s t s on t h e means used t o i d e n t i f y t h e r e l e va nt
i n t e r e s t s of each a c t o r . A " p l u r a l i s t " view, i n Lukes' t ermi nol ogy, onl y
t akes i n t o account t hos e i n t e r e s t s which groups a r t i c u l a t e and pr es s i n t h e
p o l i t i c a l ar ena. A "r ef or mi st " concept i on of power adds ot he r i n t e r e s t s
which a group a r t i c u l a t e s , but , has no oppor t uni t y t o a c t upon. I n a r e-
f or mi s t a na l ys i s , a t r u l y powerful group not onl y s e e s t o i t t h a t its i n-
t e r e s t s pr e va i l i n t h e event of an open c o n f l i c t wi t hi n t h e p o l i t i c a l
ar ena, but a l s o manages t o keep ot he r gr oup' s chal l enges t o i t s i n t e r e s t s
of f t h e publ i c agenda. Both t h e p l u r a l i s t and t h e r e f or mi s t anal ys es
l i m i t t h e l i s t of r e l e va nt i n t e r e s t s t o t hos e which t h e groups t hemsel ves
a r t i c u l a t e .
The "r adi cal " analysis, accor di ng t o Lukes, cons i der s a gr oup' s r e a l
i n t e r e s t s r e ga r dl e s s of whether t he group has a r t i c u l a t e d them. We l ooked
a t t h i s choi ce i n tlie pr evi ous chapt er : 1) i n f e r t h e i n t e r e s t s from t h e
gr oup' s own ut t e r a nc e s and a c t i o n s -- u t t e r s n c e s and a c t i o n s i n t h e publ i c
ar ena f or t h e p l u r a l i s t s , ut t e r a nc e s and a c t i o n s i n any ar ena f or t h e
r ef or mi s t s ; 2) de r i ve t h e i n t e r e s t s from a gener al scheme which r e l a t e s
i n t e r e s t t o s o c i a l pos i t i on. I n t h e Marxi st . t r a d i t i o n , t h e " s oc i a l ps i -
t i on" which count s i s t h e gr oup' s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e means of pr oduct i on.
It is eas y t o accept t h e r ef or mi s t concept i on of power a s a s u b s t i t u t e
f or t he p l u r a l i s t concept i on. The r e f or mi s t appeoach si mpl y adds new i n-
t e r e s t s t o t hose a l r e a dy consi der ed r e l e va nt by t he p l u r n l i s t . The choi ce
between t h e r a d i c a l approach and t h e ot he r two i s more d r a s t i c . I t l c nds
t o t h e concl usi on t h a t some appar ent i n t e r e s t s which groups a r t i c u l a t e and
pur sue a r e not r e a l l y i n t e r e s t s . They a r e chi meras, pr oduct s of f a l s e '
consci ousness, t r i v i a l i t i e s . The r a d i c a l approach a l s o l e a ds t o t h e i den-
t i f i c a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s which t h e a c t o r s t hemsel ves do not -- and, somc-
t i mes, would not -- r ecogni ze a s t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s . I t second-guesses
t h e a c t o r s ' o m per cept i on of t h e worl d.
Subs t i t ut i ng one' s own assessment of t he r e l e va nt i n t e r e s t s f or t h a t
of t h e a c t o r s on t he scene t a ke s conf i dence, sometimes even condescensi on
and ar r ogance. Those i n t e r e s t s which groups a r t i c u l a t e and pursue, whether
an o u t s i d e a na l ys t r a t e s them a s "r eal " o r not.. s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t r e a l
s t r u g g l e s f o r power. I n prudence and humi l i t y, t hen, we shoul d gi ve them
p r i o r i t y . Nothing pr event s us , however, from posi ng t he f ol l owi ng crnpfri-
c a l problem:
IMPUTED INTERESTS - - % ARTICULATED INTERESTS
CONTENTION FOR POWER
We may as k, t h a t is, how a c c ur a t e l y t h e i n t e r e s t s we Impute t o o group on
gener al grounds pr e di c t t o a ) t h e i n t e r e s t s t h e group n r t i c u l a t e o and pur-
s ues , and/ or b) t h e power s t r uggl e s i t 1 which t h e group engages. The
Mar xi st a n a l y s i s s ays t h a t bot h wi l l have pr e dl c t i ve power. Over t l i e l ong
r un, a gr oup' s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e pr e va i l i ng means of product i on det cr -
mlnes t h e i n t e r e s t s which t h e group a r t i c u l a t e s and pursues. The gr oup' s
r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e means of pr oduct i on a l s o nf f ec ts i t s cont ent i on f or
p wc r d l r e c t l y , by det er mi ni ng i t s l i k e l y enemies and a l l i e s , and by
shapi ng i t s i n t e r n a l or gani zat i on. Mar xi st s d i f f e r among t hemsel ves when
i t comes t o deci di ng how much i mport ance t o a t t r i b u t e t o t hes e d i r e c t ef -
f e c t s of c l a s s pos i t i on on cont ent i on f or power, and how much t o i n s i s t
on c l a s s consci ousness a s a p r e r e q u i s i t e f or s us t ai ned o r e f f e c t i v e a c t i on.
TC we can ri nd a r easonabl e way of gaugi ng c l a s s consci ousness, t h i s , t oo,
can become an empi r i cal ques t i on.
I nt e r a c t i ons
Ilaving s e t t l e d on a p a r t i c u l a r s e t of p a r t i e s and a p a r t i c u l a r s e t of
i n t e r e s t s , we s t i l l have t o s e t t l e on a p a r t i c u l a r s e t of i nt e r a c t i ons .
The most obvi ous l i mi t i s time: power t oday, power t h i s year , power over
t h e l a s t decade, power a t some t i me i n t h e Eut ure? Di fEerent s e t s of
i n t e r a c t i o n s a r e r e l e va nt : I f we want t o s i n g l e o u t t h e e f f e c t s of power,
we a r e al most c e r t a i n l y goi ng t o at t empt t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between power
today and power tomorrow, on t h e assumpt i on t h a t t oday' s e xe r c i s e of power
wi l l , d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y , a f f e c t tomorrow' s power d i s t r i b u t i o n . I n
a ddi t i on t o f i xi ng t h e i n t e r a c t i o n s i n t i me, we have t o de c i de whet her t o
cons i der a l l i nt e r a c t i ons , o r onl y some c r u c i a l s ubs et -- ever y comuni ca-
t i on, d i r e c t o r i n d i r e c t , between St andar d Oi l and t he U.S. Government,
o r j u s t formal r e que s t s f or r a t e adj ust ment s?
We sometimes s i d e s t e p t h i s d i f f i c u l t y by l ooki ng si mpl y a t t h e r e t u r n s
a gi ven group g e t s from ot he r p a r t i e s over some per i od of i n t e r a c t i o n ,
wl t hout t r yi ng t o d e t e c t t h e i mpact oE every s i n g l e i nt e r a c t i nn. Logi cal l y
speaking, t h a t is a gr os s s i mpl i f i c a t i on. We a l s o tend t o assume t h a t t h e
power which shows up i n a v l s i b l e s e t of i n t e r a c t i o n s is s t r ongl y cor -
r e l a t e d wi t h t h e power which would show up i n t h e interactions
s hi el ded from our eyes: i f J. P. Morgan coul d do t h a t much i n publ i c, t hen
how much he coul d do i n pr i vat e1 . The c o r r e l a t i o n is never t hel es s a mnt t er
o f f a c t , a s ubj e c t of pos s i bl e di s put e , and an assumpt i on we cannot con-
t i n u e t o make i n d e f i n i t e l y .
The Measurement of Power
Let us suppose, mi r nbi l e d i c t u , t h a t we have s e t t l e d on n s p e c i f i c
s e t o f p a r t i e s , i n t e r e s t s and i nt e r a c t i ons . Wo can now us e t h e s i mpl t f i e d
model of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on a s t h e pur s ui t of c o l l e c t i v e goods t o de s c r i be
a s i n g l e gr oup' s power pos i t i on. Fi gur e 4-7 r e f i n e s t h e e a r l i e r col l ec-
t i v e goods model i n two r egar ds . The r e t u r n s now i ncl ude t h e p o s a i b t l i t y
of c o l l e c t i v e bads: negat i ve r e t u r n s from c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. -1 might
r e pr e s e nt t h e gr oup' s compl et e e xt i nc t i on. The di agram a l s o r e pr e s e nt s
t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e s o r t of cont ender we e a r l i e r c a l l e d an oppor t uni s t :
a group which wi l l accept any s o r t of c o l l e c t i v e goods, s o l ong a s t hey
r e pr e s e nt a s i g n i f i c a n t gai n over t h e r es our ces expended t o ge t them.
With t h e a ddi t i ona l p o s s i b i l i t y of c o l l e c t i v e bnds, t h e diogrnm ni s o
shows t h a t t he cont ender ' s i n t e r e s t ext ends t o def ens e a ga i ns t t he s e nega-
t i v e outcomes. Even I n t h e c a s e of t he omnivorous oppor t uni s t . t h e col -
l e c t i v e goods we now t ake i n t o cons i der at i on a r e t hos e which r e s u l t from
a s pe c i f i e d s e t of i n t e r a c t i o n s wi t h a p a r t i c u l a r s e t of p a r t i e s by r e f e r -
ence t o which we want t o gauge t he cont ender ' s power.
For s i mpl i c i t y' s sake, l e t us narrow our a t t e n t i o n t o t h e i n t e r a c t i o n
of two p a r t i e s . The narrowi ng is not q u i t e s o d r a s t i c a s i t may seem,
s i n c e one of t h e "par t i es " t o t h e i n t e r a c t i o n may be a sum of a l l ot he r
pa r t i e s . We can e a s i l y r e pr e s e nt t h e a c t i o n s of t hi r d p a r t i e s a s i nf l uences
on t h e outcomes i n ques t i on. Then, a s bef or e, t h e di agram r epr esf mt s
Fi gur e 4-7: I n t e r e s t s and Ret ur ns from Col l e c t i ve Act i on f o r an Oppor t uni st
Con t ender
Value of Col-
l e c t i v e Coods
Produced by
l n t e r a c t i d n s
wi t h 0
I - I n t e r e s t --------
-1
' Value of Resources Expended by A Maximum
s e ve r a l c r u c i a l f a c t s : c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on r e qui r e s on expendi t ur e of re-
sour ces; t h e c o l l e c t i v e goods obt ai ned a r e vor t h something; t o t h e ex-
t e n t t h a t t h e r es our ces expended and c o l l e c t i v e goods obt ai ned have com-
par abl e va l ue s t h e i n t e r a c t i o n can r e s u l t i n a gai n, a l o s s o r a st ond-
o f f . Above t he di agonal , Par t y A g e t s back more t han i t expends; i t
t hus gai ns . Below t h e di agonal , Par t y A g e t s back l e s s t han i t expends;
t hus i t l o s e s . The di agonal i s a br eak- wen l i n e .
I n any r e a l i n t e r a c t i o n , a number of t hi ngs c ons t r a i n 0 ' s r esponse
t o A' s a c t i on: t h e r es our ces under 0 ' s c ont r ol , 0 ' s own d e s j r e and cnpa-
c i t y t o r e s i s t o r cooper at e, t he i n t e r e s t of t h i r d p o r t l e s i n t h e r e-
s our ces under B' s c ont r ol , and s o on. For a number of r eas ons i t i s
r eas onabl e t o suppose t h e f ol l owi ng t hi ngs:
1. a cont ender which does not a c t a t a l l w i l l r e c e i ve c o l l e c t i v e
bads;
2. a cont ender which a c t s on a ver y smal l s c a l e v i l l r e c e i ve even
more c o l l e c t i v e bsds, a s t h e ot he r par t y r esponds negat i vel y t o
i t s e f f o r t s ;
3. beyond t h a t poi nt , t h e cont ender wi l l r e c e i ve on i ncr eas i ng re-
t ur n f or i ncr eas i ng out put s of c o l l e c t i v e s c t l o n , but onl y up
t o a l i m i t ;
4. t h e margi nal r a t e of r e t ur n f or c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on event ual l y bc-
comes negat i ve.
The cur ve i n Fi gur e 4-8 de s c r i be s t hos e hypot het i cal e f f e c t s . The r a t e
of r e t ur n e ve nt ua l l y d e c l i n e s because B' s r es our ces a r e not i nexhaus t i bl e.
because B w i l l defend i t s e l f a ga i ns t t h r e a t s t o i t s own s ur vi va l , and be-
cause t h i r d p a r t i e s wi l l i nt e r ve ne when A ' s ga i ns v i s i b l y t hr e a t e n t h e i r
own i n t e r e s t i n t h e r es our ces under B' S c ont r ol . Under t h e c ondi t i ons of
4-37
Fi gure 4-8: t l ypot het i cal Scl l edul e o f Returns from Co l l e c t i v e Act i on
Maximum
X
Col . l cct i ve
Goods
Produced
Fi gure 4-9: Gai ni ng v s . Losi ng Schedul es o f Returns
0 Z Maximum
Resources Expended by A
4-39
Fi gur e 4-8, an unconst r ai ned, c ool l y c a l c ul a t i ng Par t y A -- an oppor t uni s t
-- would mnximlze by expending Z r es our ces , l andi ng a t Y on t h e r e t u r n s
cur ve and g e t t i n g back X i n c o l l e c t i v e goods, f o r a gai n of X-Z. The
1
r e t u r n s cur ve gi ve s a si mpl e des cr ' i pt i on of A ' s power over B.
I
Put t i ng t he di agonal back i n makes i t c l e a r e r t h a t some groups might
I
al ways be i n a l os i ng pos i t i on because t h e i r e n t i r e r e t u r n s cur ve l i e s be-
I
low t he break-even l i n e . Fi gur e 4-9 s t a t e s t h a t p o s s i b i l i t y . There, Par t y
I
A2 has l i t t l e hope; i t s cur ve l i e s t oo low. Par t y A1 i s b e t t e r o f f ; a
!
por t i on of i t s cur ve l i e s above t h e break-even l i n e . With r es pect t o
I
t h i s s e t of p a r t i e s , i n t e r e s t s and i nt e r a c t i ons , Pa r t y A1 has more power
t han Par t y A2 . An oppor t uni s t Par t y A would conf i ne i t s a c t i o n t o t he
1
rnngc produci ng r e t ur ns nbove t h e di agonal : Z t o Z2. An oppor t uni s t
1
Par t y A2 wou1.d a c t onl y enough t o f o r e s t a l l c o l l e c t i v e bods -- and work
t o improve its schedul e of r e t ur ns .
i
i
We have f or got t en, however, t h a t ne i t he r A nor A2 tias unl i mi t ed r e-
1
s our ces t o expend. The amount of r es our ces Pa r t y A c ur r e nt l y has under
I
I
i t s c ont r ol ( t h a t is, mobi l i zed r es our ces ) l i m i t s how Par out on t h e
S-curve of r e t u r n s A can move. Fi gur e 4-10 i d e n t i f i e s t h a t l i m i t . W i t 1 1
i
!
M i n mobi l i zed r es our ces , Par t y A can onl y l os e , d e s p i t e i t s t h e o r e t i c a l l y
1
f avor abl e pos i t i on. I f A can ar r ange t omobi l i zemor e r es our ces , t hen a c t ,
t h a t l ooks l i k e a good s t r a t e gy. With M2, expendi ng al most e ve r yt l ~i ng on
hand wl l l make sense. With M,,, i t would st i l l be smart t o expend some-
t hi ng around M2, and keep t h e r e s t i n r e s e r ve f o r anot her time.
Thi s l a s t di agram per mi t s two r ef i nement s t o t h e a n a l y s i s of power.
F i r s t , t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n of t he S-curve wl t h t h e mobi l i zat i on 1.ine i s a
Fi gur e 4-10: How Mobi l i zat i on Li mi t s Col l e c t i ve Act i on
f a i r l y good approxi mat i on of p o t e n t i a l power. It t e l l s us what e f f e c t
Par t y A coul d have i f i t expended n l l t he r es our ces under its c ont r ol .
(You may pr ef er t o s ear ch f o r t h e hi ghes t poi nt on t l i e S-curve which f a l l s
t o t he l e f t of t he mobi l i zat i on l i n e , and c a l l that A ' s pot e nt i a l power.)
Second, t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between power - ef f ect i veness and power-effi ci ency
nppenrs c l e a r l y . Power - ef f ect i veness r e f e r s t o how f a r up t h e v e r t i c a l
a x i s Par t y A can r each, o r does r each. Power-effi ci ency r e f e r s t o t h e
s l ope of t h e r e t ur n cur ve a t t h e poi nt Par t y A can o r does r each. I n
e i t h e r cas e, tlie di agram t e l l s us t h a t t h e c ur r e nt mobi l i zat i on l e v e l of
Par t y A s e t s a f i r m l i m i t on Par t y A ' s power.
A prudent de s c r i pt i on of A ' s power i n t h e r e a l world di s r e ga r ds
t h e por t i on of t h e S-curve t o t h e r i g h t of t h e mobi l i zat i on b a r r i e r . For
t h i s s t a t e of t h e worl d, t l ~ i s s e t of p a r t i e s , t h i s s e t of i n t e r e s t s and
t h i s s e t of i nt e r a c t i ons , t h e segment of t h e cur ve t o t h e l e f t of t h e mo-
b i l i z a t i o n l i n e de s c r i be s t he power of Par t y A.
Power and Pol i t y Membership
Cont ent i on f or power l i n k s t h e mobi l i zat i on model t o t h e p o l i t y model.
Cont ent i on f or power c o n s i s t s of t h e a ppl i c a t i on of r es our ces t o i nf l uence
ot he r groups, and power i t s e l f c o n s i s t s of a gr oup' s making i t s i n t e r e s t s
pr e va i l over o t h e r s wi t h which t hey a r e i n c o n f l i c t . Cont ent i on f o r politi-
c a l power i nvol ves appl yi ng r es our ces t o a p a r t i c u l a r ki nd of or gani zat i on:
-
a government. A government is si mpl y t h e or gani zat i on, i f any, which con-
t r o l s t h e pr i nc i pa l concent r at ed means of coer ci on wi t hi n some popul at i on.
The cont ender s f or power wi t hi n a gi ven popul at i on i ncl ude a l l groups which
n r e c o l l e c t i v e l y appl yi ng r es our ces t o i nf l uence t he government. In r e a l
l i f e , we us ual l y want t o s e t some t hr es hol d For cont ent i on, i n or der t o elim-
i n a t e t i ny, evanescent , i n t e r mi t t e n t a ppl i c a t i ons of r es our ces t o t h e govern-
ment. I n t heor y, we can gener ousl y i ncl ude a l l of them.
At any poi nt i n t i me, some (and onl y some) of t h e cont ender s hove
achi eved r ecogni t i on of t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e r i g h t s t o wi el d power over t he
government, and have devel oped r o u t i n e ways of e xe r c i s i ng t hos e r i g h t s .
They a r e members of t h e pol i t y. A 1 1 ot he r cont ender s o r e chal l enger s .
They cont end wi t hout r o u t i n e o r r ecogni t i on. Memhership i n t h e p o l i t y
gi ve s i mpor t ant advant ages t o a group. In t he most general senee, i t s
power r i s e s : i n t erms of t he di agrams of t h e pr evi ous s e c t i on, p o l i t y
membership produces a r i s e i n t h e cur ve of r e t u r n s from c o l l e c t i v e a c t l on.
Depar t ur e from t he p o l i t y produces a dr op i n t h e cur ve. Concr et el y, recog-
n i t i o n pays of f i n c o l l e c t i v e acces s t o j obs, exemptions from t axat i on.
0 a v a i l a b i l i t y of pr i vi l eged i nf or mat i on, and s o on.
Every p o l i t y e s t a b l i s h e s t e s t s of membecshlp. A l l p o l i t i e s i ncl ude
among such t e s t s t l i e a b i l i t y t o mobi l i ze o r coer ce s i g n i f i c a n t numbers of
peopl e. Furt hermore, wi t hi n t h e p o l i t y members c ont i nua l l y t e s t one anoth-
e r ; r epr eat ed f a i l u r e s of p a r t i a l t e s t s l ead t o f u l l e r t e s t s . The f u l l e r
t e s t s l end, i n ext r emi s, t o excl usi on from t he p o l i t y . Each new e nt r y o r
e x i t r e de f i ne s t h e c r i t e r i a of membership i n a d i r e c t i o n f avor abl e t o t he
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t he pr es ent s e t of members. I n t h e pr ocess, t he members
tend t o become at t ached t o t hos e c r i t e r i a a s s mat t er o r principle.
I n t heor y, a group can mobi l i ze wi t hout cont endi ng f or power: i L can
appl y i t s c o l l e c t i v e r es our ces e n t i r e l y t o r e c r e a t i on, t h e s ear ch f or
enl i ght enment o r some ot he r non- pol i t i cal end. A commune o r r e l i g i o u s cnm-
muni t y r e t i r i n g from t he world moves i n t h a t di r e c t i on. Wi t hi n t l i e modern
worl d, however, governments a r e s o l i k e l y t o cl ai m tlie r i g h t t o r e gul a t e and
t o e x t r a c t r es our ces from any mobi l i zi ng group t h a t mobi l i zat i on us ual l y
pr opel s a group i n t o cont ent i on f or power over one government o r anot her --
a t l e a s t i n t o an e f f o r t t o s ecur e guar ant ees of i t s bas i c r i g h t s t o e x i s t ,
4-4 3
assembl e, nccumu.Late r es our ces , and c a r r y on i t s val ued a c t i v i t i e s . Er i c
Wol f' s a n a l y s i s of t h e involvement of peasant communities i n r evol ut i ons ,
f or i ns t ance, shows how r e gul a r l y t hey mobi l i ze, and t hen cont end f o r power
not because t hey i n i t i a l l y want a change i n government, but i n sel f - denf ense.
Wol f ' s a n a l y s i s a l s o t e l l s u s how c r u c i a l t o t h e s ucces s of t h a t cont en-
t i on f or power a r e t he c o a l i t i o n s peasant communities make wi t h ot he r groups
out s i de. No c o a l i t i o n = l o s t r evol ut i on. I n a g r e a t many s i t u a t i o n s , a
s i n g l e cont ender does not have enough r es our ces -- enough committed peopl e,
enough guns, enough t r a i ne d l awyers, enough cas h -- t o i nf l uence t he gov-
ernment by i t s e l f . A c o a l i t i o n wi t h anot her cont ender which has over l appi ng
o r complementary des i gns on t h e government wi l l t hen i nc r e a s e t h e j o i n t
power of t he cont ender s t o accompl i sh t hos e des i gns .
Coa l i t i ons most commonly occur between members of t h e p o l i t y o r be-
tween nonmembers of t h e pol i t y. Never t hel ess, c o a l i t i o n s between members
and nonmembers o f t e n occur when t h e members a r e seeki ng ends f o r which t he r e
a r e not enough c o a l i t i o n pa r t ne r s wi t hi n t he pol i t y. and f o r which t h e r e-
s our ces bei ng mobi l i zed by t h e nonmembers would be us ef ul . Thi s happens
when a par t y wins an e l e c t i on by buyi ng of f t h e suppor t of a t r i b e t hrough
promi ses of j obs and i nf l uence. I t a l s o happens when a d i s s i d e n t but
e s t a bl i s he d group of i n t c l l e c t u a l s forms an a l l i a n c e wi t h n new wor ker ' s
movement. These c o a l i t i o n s t ake on s pe c i a l i mport ance because t hey o f t e n
open tlie way t o t he new nc qui s i t i on of membership i n t he pol i t y, o r t h e way
t o a r evol ut i onar y a l l i a n c e .
Member-nonmember c o a l i t i o n s a l s o mat t er because t hey a f f e c t t h e
amount of vi ol ence which grows out of cont ent i on f o r power. Under most
c ondi t i ons a c o a l i t i o n wi t h a member r educes t h e vi ol ence which a t t e n d s a
cl l al l cnger ' s a c qui s i t i on of membership. The c o a l i t i o n s of t h e women's s t ~ f -
f r a g e and temperance movements i n England and t h e Uni t ed St a t e s wi t h
ot he r e s t a bl i s he d segments of t h e mi ddl e c l a s s e s , f o r example, al most
c e r t a i n l y r e s t r a i ne d t h e us e of f or c e a ga i ns t them. Where t he e f f e c t of
c o a l i t i o n i s t o s p l i t t h e p o l i t y i n t o f a c t i ons mk i n g excl us i ve and incom-
p a t i b l e cl ai ms on t he government, Ilowever, a hi gh degr ee of c o l l e c t i v e
vi ol ence is l i k e l y t o f ol l ow. That is, i n f a c t , a r e*ol ut i onar y s i t un-
t i on.
Det ect i ng Changes i nPol i t yMember s hi p
P o l i t i c a l power is a characteristic of t h e i n t e r a c t i o n s between con-
t ender s and governments. I n seeki ng t o d e t e c t major changes i n p o l i t i c a l
power, we have t h e c hoi c e of s t a r t i n g wi t h ' t h e cont ender s o r oE s t a r t i n g
wi t h t h e government. What shoul d we l ook f o r ? A si mpl e, i f s l i g h t l y
r i s ky, approach would be t o t a ke runni ng account s of p o l i t i c a l l i f e a s
t hey appear i n pol i t ' i c a l h i s t o r i e s , yearbooks, memoirs and s o on, t o dc-
t er mi ne whether informed obs er ver s r e p o r t changes i n t he mJ o r a c t o r s on
t he scene. Jean Laponce (1969) has i nvent ed a r e f i ne d ver s i on of t h i s
s t r a t e gy: h e wat ches t h e s t a b i l i z a t i o n of par t y l a b e l s i n Conadion pol i -
t i c s an an i ndi c a t i on of t h e cons ol i dat i on of va r i ous bl oc s of vot er s .
A s ucces s f ul par t y such a s t h e Li be r a l s t ends, a t i t succeeds, t o dr op
t h e q u a l i f i e r s from i t s l a b e l and t o r e t a i n a shor t ened ver s i on of i t s
o r i g i n a l t i t l e . A par t y a t i l l gat her i ng i t s f o r c e s (and perhaps one on
t h e way out , a s wel l ) t ends t o accumul at e changes and q u a l i f i e r s a s i t
makes new, pr ovi s i onal c o a l i t i o n s .
That approach has promise. Another p o s s i b i l i t y is t o examine tlie
expendi t ur e pa t t e r ns of t he government. I f a new budge t ' l i ne r epr es ent i ng
s e r v i c e s t o l i n g u i s t i c mi nor i t i e s appear s, t h a t may be a s i gn t h a t a l l n -
gui s t i cal l y- bas ed chal l enger is br eaki ng i n t o t h e pol i t y. I f an ol d pro-
gram di s appear s ( a s when s p e c i a l b e n e f i t s f o r Spanish-American War ve t e r a ns
mel t i n t o t he gener al ve t e r a ns ' program), t h a t probabl y t e l l s us t h e bl oc
i t s e l f i s di s s ol vi ng. Major changes i n t he amounts s pent on war, edu-
cnt i on o r wel f ar e might poi nt i n t h e same di r e c t i on, al t hough ( a s Fenno
1966 makes c l e a r ) some such changes a r e mys t i f i c a t i ons , and o t h e r s depend
mai nl y on t h e i n t e r n a l dynamics of t h e government i t s e l f .
Perhaps t h e a c t u a l s t r u c t u r e of agenci es -- a Department of l a bor t o
match t h e a r r i v a l of or gani zed l a bor , a Department of Vet er an' s Af f a i r s
t o match t he a r r l v s l of ve t e r a ns -- pr ovi des evi dence of t h e same ki nd.
But i n a par l i ament ar y syst em, t h e behavi or of t h e par l i ament i t s e l f prob-
abl y r e f l e c t s t h e va- et - vi ent of cont ender s more a c c ur a t e l y t han anyt hi ng
e l s e . I)o di s c us s l ons of i s s u e s c l e a r l y l i nked wi t h one cont ender o r anot her
(whether r epr es ent ed i n tlie par l i ament o r not ) wax and wane i n t i me wi t h
t he p o l i t i c a l f or t une s of t hose cont ender s7 Does t h e appear ance of a re-
l i a b l e s p l i t of t he vot e on such i s s u e s s i g n a l t h e a r r i v a l of a member7
Is t he r e a s o r t of s c a l e goi ng:
-- a di s c us s i on of an i s s u e c l e a r l y l i nked wi t h a cont ender (e. g.
put t i ng down unr ul y workers o r r a c i a l mi nor i t i e s )
-- i nt r oduct i on of b i l l s o r r e s ol ut i ons
-- br i ngi ng such b i l l s o r r e s ol ut i ons t o a vot e
-- nppear ances wi t hi n t h e par l i ament of s bl oc, o r s t andar d a l i gn-
ment, wi t h r es pect t o i s s u e s c l e a r l y i i nked wi t h t h e cont ender .
-- appear ance wi t hi n t h e par l i ament of a r e pr e s e nt a t i ve publ i c l y
i d c n t i f i e d wi t h a s p e c i f i c cont ender
-- appear ance wi t hi n t he par l i ament of a pa r t y publ i c l y i d e n t i f i e d
wi t h a s p e c i f i c cont ender 7
With t he i dea t h a t some such pr ocess might be goi ng on. J e f f Pearson
anal yzed r o l l - c a l l vot e s i n t he Ni nt h Le gi s l a t ur e of t h e French Chamber
of Deput i es, which met i n 1906-1907. Those were t ur bul ent year s i n
France. S o c i a l i s t s had withdrawn t h e i r suppor t from t h e government i n t he
f a l l of 1905 over t he i s s u e of s chool t eacher s ' r i g h t t o uni oni ze and t o
s t r i k e . The e l e c t i o n s of Januar y 1906 renewed t he Senat e and br ought
i n a new Pr es i dent , Armand ~ a l l i 2 r e s . A s t r i k e wave concent r at ed i n t h e
mines but i nvol vi ng many workers i n chemi cal s nnd smel t i ng a s wel l began
t o r o l l i n March and reached a c r e s t i n Mny. During t h e l e g i s l a t l v e
e l e c t i o n s of May, t h e P a r t i S o c i s l i s t e ~ n i f i 6 conduct ed a na t i ona l cam-
pai gn f o r t h e f i r s t t i me; quest l cms of na t i ona l i z a t l on of r a i l r o a d l i n e s ,
r et i r ement pl a ns and b e n e f i t s i n gener al f i gur ed wi del y i n t l i e campalgn
debat es . 1907 f e a t ur e d a massi ve p r o t e s t of sout her n winegrowers r es ul -
t i n g from an over pr oduct i on c r i s i s . And t hroughout t he per l od t h e gov-
ernment was implementing t h e di s es t abl i s hment of t h e Cat hol i c Church which
had been deci ded two ye a r s bef or e, and l i q u i d a t i n g t h e Dreyfus Af f a i r
which had hung over France f or a decade. Judgi ng from tlie gener al pol i t -
c a l h i s t o r i e s of t h e t i me, one coul d r easonabl y a s s e r t t h a t two mojor
changes i n p o l i t y membership were occur r i ng: or gani zed l a bor was a c qui r i ng
an e s t a bl i s he d pl a c e i n t h e na t i ona l s t r u c t u r e of power, and t h e Cat hol i c
Church was l os i ng an i mpor t ant s ha r e of power.
Pear s on' s a n a l y s i s j i b e s ni c e l y wi t h t h e p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y of t h e
t i me. He examined 228 of t h e 324 r o l l - c a l l vot e s which occur r ed i n t h e
par l i ament ar y s e s s i on. (The i s s u e s of t he J our nal Of f i c i e l r e por t i ng t h e
ot he r 96 r o l l - c a l l s were unavai l abl e t o Pearson a t t h e time.) They f e l l
i n t o t hr e e c a t e gor i e s : l e g i s l a t i v e r o l l c a l l s deci di ng tlie f a t e of l aws
proposed f o r enact ment ; sanctioning r o l l c a l l s appr ovi ng o r di appr ovi ng
4-47
an a c t i on of t he government; o t h e r s which cover a v a r i e t y of pr ocedur al
mat t er s , r e s ol ut i ons and ot he r a c t i o n s none of which can l ead t o t he
psssnge of a law o r t h e Cal l of a government. Using t he cont ent of t h e de-
ba t e s and suclt secondary s our ces a s Bonnefous' Hi s t o i r e p o l i t i q u e &&
~ r o i s i h n e Rzpubl i qt ~e a s a gui de. Pearson coded ench vot e f o r t he groups
out s i de t he Chnmber, i f any, t o whi cl ~ t he a c t i on was supposed t o appl y.
The r e s u l t s of t he codi ng appear i n Tabl e 4-1.
Pearson was a b l e t o i d e n t i f y about ha l f t he r o l l c a l l s he examined
wi t h some f a i r l y wel l -defi ned group. Some of t h e e n t r i e s r a i s e doubt s:
l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t r i c t s , f or example, o r t h e Army i n gener al ; t hos e doubt s
i nvol ve i mport ant ques t i ons concer ni ng bot h t h e d e f i n i t i o n of cont ender s
f or power i n gener al and t he s t r u c t u r e of cont ent i on wi t hi n t h e French
p o l i t i c a l syst em. Ln gener al , however, t he list cat ches e xa c t l y t he a c t o r s
one would hope f or : winegrowers, pos t a l workers, t he Cat hol i c Church, and s o
on. The i s s ue s i nvol ved i n t he r o l l c a l l s a r e t he i s s ue s which r e n t France
a s a whole i n 1906 and 1907. And t he t a l l y of outcomes i s s ugges t i ve.
"Fcvornble" r o l l c a l l s a r e si mpl y t hose i n which t he pr oposal vot ed on ap-
proves o r promotes t he i n t e r e s t s of t he group i n quest i on. To be t he sub-
j e c t of r o l l c a l l s which a c t u a l l y pass i s evi dence of power, a t l e a s t power
i n t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . Although t h e numbers of r o l l c a l l s a r e t oo s mal l t o i n-
s p i r e confi dence. Pear son' s t a bul a t i on s ugges t s t h a t i n 1906-07 t he power
pos i t i on of mi ners and r a i l r oa d workers was s upe r i or t o t h a t of s c l ~ool t e a -
chcr s and p o s t a l workers. That remai ns t o be v e r i f i e d wi t h ot he r evi dence.
nut t h i s pr el i mi nar y i nve s t i ga t i on mk e s i t seem pos s i bl e t o draw s ys t emat i c
i nf or mat i on about . cont ent i on f or power a t t h e na t i ona l l e v e l from t he ample
pr oceedi ngs of I e gi s l a t ur e s .
The use of r o l l c a l l s and debat es has some obvi ous l i mi t a t i ons . I t is
4-48
be s t s u i t e d t o t he de t e c t i on of groups whose pos i t i on is c l i nn~i ng, r ot l t cr
t han cal ml y enj oyi ng l ong- est abl i shed be ne f i t s . It assumes t hnt a
s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t of publ i c bus i nes s i s a c t u a l l y bei ng done i n t he
l e g i s l a t u r e . I f some cont ender s ( banker s, say. o r t he mi l i t a r y) t y p i c a l l y
do t h e i r work through ot he r branches of government, t h e procedure wi l l
not work s o wel l . One might have t o t ur n t o t he s o r t of a na l ys i s Tudesq
has undert aken f o r gr ands not abl es and f o r c o n a c i l l e r s Rgn&rsux, o r t hnt
many ot he r s have undert aken f o r c a bi ne t members, government o f f l c i n l s
o r l e g i s l a t o r s : person-by-person c o l l e c t i v e bi ography aggr egat ed i n t o
a c ha r a c t e r i z a t i on of t he e n t i r e cat egor y of per sons. At t he edges of
t he government, i t might be p r o f i t a b l e t o s ear ch f or t h e r i s e nnd fn1.l
of pr es s ur e groups, pr of e s s i ona l l obbyi s t s and t he 1.ike. By t h i s poi nt ,
Itowever, we a r e begi nni ng t o edge back i n t o t he s t udy of mobi l i zat i on nnd
of c o l l e c t i v e act i on. away from t h e a c qui s i t i on and l o s s of power a s such.
I n deal i ng wi t h r e l a t i o n s between major i n d u s t r i e s and t he U.S.
government from 1886 t o 1906, William Roy has i nvent ed some pr ocedur es
which ne a t l y l i n k t h e mobi l i zat i on pr ocesses and t he power pr oces s es ,
wi t hout confoundi ng them. Roy's work f ocuses on t he i nf l uence exer t ed
by d i f f e r e n t i n d u s t r i e s over i n t e r a c t i o n s between t he U.S. government
and ot he r count r i es . IIe i ndexes t h a t i nf l uence v i a t he frequency and,
t ypes of e x p l i c i t mention which t he i ndus t r i e s i n ques t i on r ecei ve i n
correspondence between t he S t a t e Department and ombassndori sl of Ci c i nl s
over seas. The i ndex is i mper f ect ; some i mpor t ant ki nds of i nf l uence m y
not appear i n t he correspondence because t hey a r e e i t h e r t oo r i s ky o r
t oo r out i ne t o commit t o p r i n t . Nevert hel . ess, t he ba s i c not i on -- t l l s t
t o hol d power i s t o be t aken account of i n your a r e a s of i n t e r e s t -- is
v a l i d , and t he method of implementing i t i ngeni ous.
Roy at t empt s t o account f o r va r i a t i ons i n power among i n d u s t r i e s
Table 4-1: Groups Figuring i n 1906-07 Rol l Cal l s of French Chamber of Deputies
Group - I ssue
Number of Rol l Cal l s: Percent
Percent Favorable
Legi s l at i ve Sanctioning Other Tot al Favorable and Passed
school t eachers r i ght of s t a t e emplyees t o
s t r i k e f or vages vi t hout 0
government sanct i ons
pos t al workers same 6 0 3 9 89 11
r ai l r oad workers f r e e from compulsory dependence
on employer-run economats
0 0 2 100 50
miners i nt roduce maximum 8-hour day 1 0 0 1 100 100
spi nners emergency funds f or unemployed 0 0 1 1 100 0
winegrowers stemming t he overproduction
c r i s i s of 1907 and safeguards 22
f or f ut ur e
winegrowers punishment f or June 1907
demonstrations i n South 0
wine merchants safeguards and cont r ol s on
and middlemen them t o prevent watering wine
1
Second Amy di s ci pl i ne regiment which re-
fused t o quel l demonstrations
Second Amy provide e a r l i e r r el ease of
dr af t ees t o a i d har vest
3
Amy i n general vi ndi cat e Dreyfus and Pi quar t 4
Amy i n general i ncr ease appropri at i ons 3
Amy i n gener al reduce compulsory s er vi ce 5
by one year
Group
Table 4-1: Groups Figuring i n 1960-07 Rol l Cal l s of French Chamber of Deputies (continued)
I ssue
Number of Rol l Cal l s: Percent
Percent Favorable
Legi s l at i ve Sanct i oni ng Other Tot al Favorable and Passed
smal l grocers impose t ax on, t o r egul at e s a l e
of sugar t o l oc a l wine makers 2
workers i n general cr eat e Nn i s t r y of Labor 1 0 1 2 100 100
workers i n general l egal i ze nat i onal Sunday
hol i day f or 3 0 0 3 67 33
workers i n gener al abol i sh pr i vat e propert y
in behalf of 0 2 0 2 50 0
l ef t - l eani ng l egi s- i n s t i t u t e pr opor t i onal repre-
l a t i v e d i s t r i c t s sent at i on in a l l el ect i ons 0 0 2 2 50 0
lower cl as s es r e l a t i ve t ax burden on 1 4 0 5 20 0
agr i cul t ur e emergency appropri at i ons f or 1 0 0 1 100 100
pr i vat e r ai l r oad s t a t e takeover of
company (Chemin de
Fer de l ' oues t )
Roman Cat hol i c
Church
Tot al c l a s s i f i a bl e
Unclassif i a bl e
r i ght t o r e t a i n tax-free
propert y
Tot al Rol l Cal l s
4-51
and over t i me t l ~r ough Lhree d i f f e r e n t s e t s of i n d u s t r i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s :
1) t he network pos i t i on of f i r ms i n t he i ndus t r y, a s measured e s pe c i a l l y
by i nt e r l oc ki ng d i r e c t o r a t e s and by r e l a t i o n s of i ndus t r y per sonnel t o
government and s oc i a l or gani zat i ons ; 2) "obj ect i ve" c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of
t he i ndus t r y such a s s i z e , number of f i r ms and revenue from f or ei gn
t r nde; 3) mobi l i zat i on and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on wi t hi n t h e i ndus t r y, a s
r epr esent ed by t he i n t e n s i t y of economic cooper at i on and concent r at i on
among f i r ms, tlie c ha r a c t e r of t r a de a s s oc i a t i ons and t r a de publ i c a t i ons ,
t he e xt e nt of l obbyi ng, p o l i t i c a l involvement of execut i ves , and s o on.
Roy's r es ear ch desi gn does not q u i t e br i ng us t o t he poi nt o f
mcnsuring t he r e t ur ns d i f f e r e n t i n d u s t r i e s r ecei ve f o r t he r esour ces
t hey appl y t o t he government; i t t he r e f or e f a l l s s h o r t of t he i d e a l
measure of power proposed e a r l i e r . I t t akes i mpor t ant s t e p s i n t h a t
di r e c t i on. Furt hermore, i t makes pos s i bl e a val uabl e p a r t i a l t e s t of
t he proposed d i s t i n c t i o n between chal l enger s end members of t he pol i t y.
I f a "pol i t y" e x i s t s i n a s t r ong s ens e of t he term, t he r e shoul d be a
d i s t i n c t break i n t he continuum of i nf l uence- wi el di ng; t he br eak shoul d
correspond t o t he t hr eshol d below which an i ndus t r y i s si mpl y not a
p o l i t y member t o be t aken account of .
I f , on t he ot he r hand, tlie continuum runs smoothly from 0 t o i n f i n i t e
power, t he motion of a bounded p o l i t y i s mi sl eadi ng. Li kewi se t he not i on
1
r e qui r e s a br eak i n t he r e l a t i o n s h i e between l e v e l of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on
and amount of i nf l uence. cor r espondi ng t o t he s i g n i f i c a n t l y hi gher r e t ur n
p o l i t y members shoul d r ecei ve f o r t h e i r i nvest ment s. I n any cas e, i f
t he r e is no s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i ons hi p between t he i ndus t r y' s mobi l i zat i on
and i t s p o l i t i c a l i nf l uence, t he model of t he p o l i t y l a i d out he r e wi l l
l o s e p l a u s i b i l i t y .
So f a r , my account makes t he pr ocess of e n t r y and e x i t t oo calm and
4-52
. or der l y: s t o l i d ' ~ r i t o n 8 wai t i ng i n l i n e , r a t l o n books i n hand. t n
r e a l i t y , i t is t he occasi on f o r some of t he g r e a t e s t s t r u g g l e s i n which
peopl e engage. I f ever y p o l i t y has t est ' s of membership. t h a t does not
mean ever y chal l enger has equal chances of meet i ng t hose t e s t s , o r t h a t
t he l e a de r s of ever y cont ender a r e equal l y wi l l i n g t o make t he e f f o r t .
The l i ke l i hood t h a t a new cont ender wi l l accept and employ t he means
of a c qui s i t i on of power t he members of t he p o l i t y pr e s c r i be (e.8. gat her i ng
enough vot e s t o e l e c t a par t y, s a c r i f i c i n g enough peopl e i n war, br i ngi ng
i n enough food from t he hunt , buying enough government o f f i c i a l s ) depends
on t he congruence of t he concept i ons of j u s t i c e which p r e v a i l wi t hi n i t
t o t hos e b u i l t i n t o t he oper at i on of t he pol i t y. Where the'y di ver ge
wi del y, t he chal l enger i s l i k e l y t o employ i r r e g u l a r means -- wl~icli means
appl yi ng r es our ces t o t he government and t o members of t l i e p o l i t y which
a r e r a r e l y used i n t hos e r e l a t i ons hi ps . A concr et e example: Guatemalan
r e vol ut i ona r i e s ki dnap government o f f i c i a l s and American e mi s s a r i e s i n
or de r t o s e c ur e t he r e l e a s e of t h e i r own members from pr i aon. Another
La t i n American case: Per uvi an t r a de uni ons d e l i b e r a t e l y s t a e e vi ol e nt
demonst r at i ons a s a way of pr es s i ng t h e i r demands on' t he c e n t r a l govern-
ment (Payne 1965).
The i de a of a pol i t y, t hen, sums up t he major r e l a t i ons hi ps among
r epr es s i on, power, and c o l l e c t i v e act i on. . Members of tlie pol l . t y have
more power and f ace l e s s r epr es s i on t han chal l enger s do. Chal l enger s
become members through c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on, and members defend t hemsel ves
a ga i ns t l o s s of power t h r o u g h ~c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. Thi s much i s a us e f ul
s i mpl i f i c a t i on. But t he p o l i t y model l a c ks an i mpor t ant el ement : i n t e r e s t s .
It pr ovi des no gui de t o t he oppor t uni t i e s and t h r e a t s a f f e c t i n g nny por-
t i c u l a r gr oup' s i n t e r e s t s . Without some i de a of t he a r t i c u l a t i o n of
i n t e r e s t and power pos i t i on, we can have no c l e a r i de a how t he e xt e nt and
4-53
c ha r a c t e r of chal l enger s ' and members' c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on d i f f e r from
one anot her .
4-54
Fi gur e 4-11. Col l e c t i ve Act i on a s a Funct i on of Thr eat a, ond Oppor t l l ni t i es.
r esponsi veness. Lat er on we wi l l have t o cons i der a cont ender ' s obs er vat i on
~ p ~ o r t u n i t ~ l ~ h r e a t
I
Oppor t uni t y has two s i de s . On t h e oppor t uni t y s i d e , we have t he
!
. i
e xt e nt t o which ot he r groups, i ncl udi ng governments, a r e vul ner abl e t o
of i n t e r a c t i o n s among o t h e r j p a r t i e s -- not i ng, f o r example, t h a t when a
I
new cl ai ms which would, i f s uc c e s s f ul , enhance t h e cont ender ' s r e a l i z a t i o n
of i t s i n t e r e s t s . On t he t h r e a t ai de. we have t he e xt e nt t o which ot he r
groups a r e t hr eat eni ng t o mike cl ai ms which would, i f s uc c e s s f ul , reduce
t he cont ender ' s r e a l i z a t i o n of i t s i n t e r e s t s . The a n a l y s i s of oppor t uni t yl
t h r e a t par a1l el . s t he a na l ys i s of power: i n pr i nc i pl e , i t embraces every-
t hi ng about t he sur r oundi ng world which i s l i k e l y t o a f f e c t t he a c t o r ' s
wel l -bei ng. In pr a c t i c e , we can onl y de a l wi t h i t by r e f e r r i n g t o some
s p e c i f i c s e t of i n t e r e s t s , p a r t i e s and i nt e r a c t i ons .
One i mpor t ant di f f e r e nc e between t h e anal ys es of power and of
oppor t uni t yl t hr e a t concerns per cept i ons and expect at i ons . I n t he a na l ys i s
of power we can choose t o negl ect them: power t hen r e f e r s t o t he
obscr vabl e t r a ns a c t i ons amon8 t h e pa r t i e s . I n t he cas e of oppor t uni t yl
t h r e a t we have no choi ce but t o c ons t r uc t some model of t h e way t h a t
i nf or mat i on about t he environment comes t o t he a c t o r ' s a t t e n t i o n . For
t he moment. l e t us assume t h a t t h e cont ender , who i s engaged i n f r equent
I
I
Maximum
Ext ent
of
Col l e c t i ve
Act i on
i n t e r a c t i o n s wi t h ot he r groups, si mpl y responds t o t he t r end of t hose
I
i nt e r a c t i ons . The cont ender responds i ndi vi dua l l y t o t he t r end of i t s
\
i n t e r a c t i o n s wi t h each s p e c i f i c group, and c o l l e c t i v e l y t o t he t r end i n
i . 0-1 Thr eat
0 Opport uni t y +1
al l . i nt e r a c t i ons . A cont ender which is encount er i ng i ncr eas i ng a t t a c k s
I
Ext ent of Change i n
on i t s i n t c r e s t s a n t i c i p a t e s more a t t a c ks ; a. cont ender which f i nds t he
Realization of I n t e r e s t s
government i ncr eas i ngl y r esponsi ve t o its ove r t ur e s a n t i c i p a t e s f u r t h e r
government shows s i g n s of weakness i n deal i ng wi t h any p a r t i c u l a r con-
t ender most ot he r cont ender s read t l ~o s e s i g n s a s t h r e a t s o r oppor t uni t i e s
wi t h r egar d t o t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s . We wi l l a l s o have t o r ecogni ze t h a t
s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n us ua l l y i nvol ves f e i n t s and mi sunder st andi ngs.
Let us i gnor e t he s e i n t e r e s t i n g compl i cat i ons f o r t he t i me bei ng.
Fi gur e 4-11 br eaks oppor t uni t y/ t hr e a t i n t o two di mensi ons: 1 ) t he
e xt e nt of a nt i c i pa t e d change i n t he cont ender ' s r e a l i z a t i o n of its
i n t e r e s t s ; i t runs from -1. (comp1.ete o b l i t e r a t i o n of i t s i n t e r e s t s ) t o
0 (no change) t o +I. (compl et e r e a l i z a t i o n of its i n t e r e s t s ) ; 2) t he
pr oba bi l i t y t h a t t he change wi l l occur a) i f t he cont ender does not nc t ,
i n t he cas e of t hr e a t s . b) i f t he group a c t s . i n t he cas e of oppor t uni t i e s .
The di agram s ays t h e t t he gr e a t e r t he a bs ol ut e val ue of t he qua nt i t y
( pr obabl y of occur r ence x e xt e nt of change). t he more ext ens i ve t he
cont ender ' s c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. I n t h i s si mpl e ver s i on, t he cont ender ' s
r esponses t o t h r e a t and t o oppor t uni t y a r e e xa c t l y symmet ri cal : t he
more of e i t h e r , t he more c o l l e c t i v e act i on. The two cur ves a r e gent l y
concave t o r epr es ent s mi l d tendency f o r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on t o a c c e l e r a t e
more r api dl y wi t h hi eher l e v e l s of t h r e a t o r oppor t uni t y.
An asymmet r i csl response t o t l ~ r e s t and oppor t uni t y i s more pl a us i bl e
t han a symmet ri cal response. Assuming equal p r o b a b i l i t i e s of occur r ence,
a gi ven amount of t h r e a t t ends t o gener at e more c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on t han
t he "same" amount of oppor t uni t y. On t he whole, r esponse t o oppor t uni t y
i s l i k e l y t o r e qui r e more a l t e r a t i o n of t he group!s or gani zat i on and
mobi l i zat i on pa t t e r n t han i s response t o t h r e a t ; t he group can respond
t o t h r e a t v i a i t s e s t a bl i s he d r out i nes . European peasant communities
r e l i e d on t h e i r l ocal communication net works end shar ed under st andi ngs
i n g e t t i n g t oget her t o chase out t he unwanted t ax c ol l e c t or . They had
much more t r oubl e sendi ng a del egat i on t o t he c a p i t a l t o demand an
Fi gur e 4-12. Asymmetrical Ef f e c t of Thr eat and Oppor t uni t y on
Col l e c t i ve Act i on.
I
Ext ent
of
Col l e c t i ve
Act i on
Ext ent of Ant i ci pat ed Change
i n Real i zat i on of I n t e r e s t s
4-57
a l t e r a t i o n of t he t ax burden. Furt hermore, groups gener al l y i n f l a t e t he
val ue of t hose t hi ngs t hey al r eady possess, when someone e l s e is seeki ng
t o t ake them ahay. For equal p r o b a b i l i t i e s , t h e l o s s of t he e x i s t i n g
v i l l a g e common l and count s more t han t he gai n of t he same amount of
common l and. Fi nal l y, t h r e a t s ge ne r a l i z e more r e a di l y t han oppor t uni t i e s
do. A group is more l i k e l y t o s e e a t h r e a t t o a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t a s
a s i gn of t l ~ r e a t s t o a wide range of i t s i n t e r e s t s t han i t i s t o s e e
an oppor t uni t y f o r enhancement of one of its i n t e r e s t s a s a s i gn of
opport rrni t y f or a wide range of i t s i n t e r e s t s .
These a r e , of cour se. not e s t a bl i s he d v e r i t i e s , but hypot heses.
Fi gur e 4-12 sums them up: t he e xt e nt of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on, i t s ays ,
mounts more r api dl y a s a [unct i on of t h r e a t t han a s a f unct i on of
oppor t uni t y. On t he t h r e a t s i de , i t s ays , c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on r i s e s t o
t he maximum per mi t t ed by t he group' s mobi l i zat i on l e v e l consi der abl y
bef or e t he poi nt a t which t he t h r e a t means a nni hi l a t i on. The l onger t he
t i me l a g consi der ed, t he g r e a t e r tlie asymmetry. Over a l onger per i od
def ens i ve mobi l i zat i on i n r esponse t o t h r e a t t ends t o add i t s e f f e c t
more r a pi dl y t han of f e ns i ve o r pr epar at or y mobi l i zat i on i n response t o
oppor t uni t y.
The asymmetry. T bel i eve, produces a deep conser vat i sm i n ever y
p o l i t y . Members of t he p o l i t y r e s i s t changes which would t hr eat en t h e i r
c ur r e nt r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e i r i n t e r e s t s even more t han t hey s eek changes
which would enhance t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . They f i g h t t e na c i or ~s l y a ga i ns t
l o s s of power, and e s p e c i a l l y a g a i n s t expul si on from t he pol i t y. They
work a ga i ns t admi ssi on t o t he p o l i t y of groups whose i n t e r e s t s c o n f l i c t
s i g n i f i c a n t l y wi t h t h e i r own.
Exi s t i ng members t end t o be more exact i ng i n t h e i r demands of
cont ender s whose very admi ssi on would chal l enge t he syst em i n some
s e r i ous way. Max Hei r i ch poi nt s out t he s t n r k c o n t r a s t i n t he rcsponse
of Uni ver s i t y of Ca l i f or ni a o f f i c i a l s t o two equal l y obscene event s wl ~i ch
occur r ed about t h e same t i me i n 1965: tlie campus Ugly Man c ont e s t (won
by Alpha Epsi l on P i f r a t e r n i t y , whose candi dat e was Miss Pussy Gal or e)
and t he l a t e s t a ge s of t he Fr ee Speech Movement. now redubbed tllc Fi l t hy
Speech Movement. At t h a t poi nt , t he Movement's qui nt es s ence was t he
pos t i ng and par adi ng of s i gns sayi ng, si mpl y. Fuck. He i r i c l ~ r e por t s a
conver sat i on wi t h a f a c ul t y member who a c t i ve l y opposed t he F6M nnd was
i ncensed about a r ecent "obsceni t y r a l l y" a ~ r o u p of f r e e speech advocat es
had or gani zed:
When I asked him why he was angry about t h i s but not about t he
obscene remarks by t he f r a t e r n i t y boys, he r epl i ed: That was
d i f f e r e n t . That was a bunch of f r a t e r n i t y boys blowing of f stenm.
You know t h a t when i t ' s a l l over t hey' r e goi ng t o r e t ur n t o t h e i r
pl ace a s r e s pe c t a bl e members of s oc i e t y. Br ~t t hes e peopl e nr e o u t
t o d e l i b e r a t e l y br eak ever y r u l e t hey can, t o t r y t o t e a r down
s oc i e t y ( Hei r i ch 1971: 363).
Throughout 1964 and 1965 t he var i col or ed Movement was. indeed. r api dl y
mobi l i zi ng and demobi l i zi ng; i t made r ecur r ent , spasmodic bi ds f o r power
wi t hi n t he s t r u c t u r e of t he uni ve r s i t y, o r d i n a r i l y by t e s t i n g Lhe Berkel ey
r u l e s of assembl y, speech, o r advocacy st t l ~ e i r most vul ner abl e l i mi t ,
and t hen cl ai mi ng some a l t e r n a t i v e l egi t i macy f o r i t s a c t i on. The
u n i v e r s i t y ' s r ecogni t i on of t he cl ai med r i ght would tend t o ndmit t he
group making t he cl ai m t o membership i n its p o l i t y . and t her eby t o s h i f t
t he c r i t e r i a of membership i n general.. Something s e r i ous is a t s t a k e
i n ever y such change.
As a consequence, peopl e a r e except i onal l y ready t o f i g h t over
e n t r i e s i n t o a p o l i t y , and e x i t s from i t . A s Ar t hur Stinchcombe (1965)
s ays , l e a de r s of or gani zat i ons a r e e s pe c i a l l y l i k e l y t o employ, a ut hor i z e
o r t o l e r a t e unl i mi t ed means of combat when t hey s ens e a di scr epancy
between what t h e i r or gani zat i on i s g e t t i n g ond what i t i s due. That
enr agi ng di sagreement t ypi c a l l y has t o do, pr e c i s e l y, wi t h what t he
or gani zat i on is due. It i s a mat t er of pr i nc i pl e , of r i g h t s , of j u s t i c e .
Thi s s t a t e of a f f a i r s has s t r ong i mpl i cat i ons f o r t h e l ocus , t i mi ng
and per sonnel of major s t r u g g l e s f o r power.
The r ecent work of Wi l l i am Gamson (1975) de a l s e f f e c t i v e l y wi t h
some a s pe c t s of t he power s t r uggl e . Gamson and h i s a s s oc i a t e s s t udi e d
53 "clial.lenging groups" i n t he U.S. from 1800 t o 1945. (The list makes
nei ghbor s of t he Anarcho-Communists and t he Nat i onal Urban League, of
tlie Uni t ed Sons of Vulcan. t he Tobacco Ni ght Ri der s and t he St e e l Workers'
Or gani zi ng Committee.) The r es ear ch examines two main s o r t s of outcomes
of t he chal l enges:
-- accept ance o r non-acceptance of t he group by a t l e a s t one of
i t s a nt a goni s t s a s a l e gi t i ma t e spokesman f o r t he i n t e r e s t s i t
cl ai ms t o r epr es ent
-- a c qui s i t i on o r non- acqui si t i on of new advant ages f o r i t s members.
The accept ance of t he group, a s def i ned by Gamson, over l aps t o some
e xt e nt wi t h ent r ance i n t o a p o l i t y , a s des cr i bed e a r l i e r . As one might
expect , accept ance and t he a c qui s i t i on of new advant ages a r e connect ed:
80 per cent of t he groups which gai ned some accept ance a l s o acqui r ed new
advant ages, whi l e onl y 21 per cent of t hos e which f a i l e d t o gai n any
accept ance acqui r ed any new advant ages.
-
More i mport ant . t he groups which gai ned accept ance tended t o d i f f e r
i n form and s t r a t e g y from t he ot he r s : on t he whole, t hey were groups
which di d not demand t o di s pl a c e ot he r groups, or gani zed around a s i n g l e
i s s ue , were r e l a t i v e l y l a r ge , provi ded s e l e c t i v e i nc e nt i ve s f o r
p a r t i c i p a t i o n t o t h e i r members i ns t e a d of r e l yi ng on d i f f u s e nppeal s t o
s o l i d a r i t y . and were bur eaucr at i c, Thus f a r , t he r e s u l t s sound l i k e
an argument f o r cool l y- or gani zed pr es s ur e groups. But t he s uc c e s s f ul
chal l enger s were a l s o s i g n i f i c a n t l y more l i k e l y t o ha;e used vi ol ence
and ot he r c ons t r a i nt s i n t h e i r ques t f o r power. The pas s i ve r e c i pi c nt a
of vi ol ence had ver y low r a t e s of success. I f i t i s t r u e t h a t or gani zat i on
pays, i t is not s o t r u e t h a t pat i ence and moderat i on pay. Gomson's r e s u l t s
a r e congruent wi t h tlie ' general aGument . which is unf ol di ng her e.
Gamson's world i s keenl y ant i - ~ur kl i ei mi an: '1t opposes t he Durklteimian
por t r a ya l of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on i n two main ways: 1 ) i t s a c t o r s spproscl i
def i ned obj e c t i ve s wi t h s t r a t e g y and t a c t i c s -- which does not mean t hey
al ways choose t h e b e s t s t r a t e gy o r t h a t t h e i r obj e c t i ve s o r e ol uays
c ons i s t e nt and a t t a i n a b l e ; 2) t h e i r a c t i ons and t he outcomes oE t hose
a c t i o n s cannot be expl ai ned by l ooki ng a t t he chal l engi ng groups al one;
t hey r e s u l t from an i n t e r a c t i o n between chal l enger s and ot he r groups.
I n t he terms we have been us i ng her e, t hey r e s u l t from t he i nt e r pl a y
of i n t e r e s t s , or gani zat i on, and mobi l i zat i on, on t he one s i de . and of
r epr es s i on / f a c i l i t a t i o n , power, and oppor t uni t yl t hr e s t . on t h e ot he r .
The I nt e r pl a y of Mobi l i zat i on and Oppor t uni t y
Let us cont i nue t o concent r at e on t he mobi l i zat i on model. We can
c r y s t a l l i z e t he p r i n c i p a l t eachi ngs of t h e l a s t two chapt er s i n a p a i r
of diagrams. Remember t he e a r l i e r d i s t i n c t i o n s among f our t ypes o f
cont ender s: z e a l ot s , run-of-t he-mi l l cont ender s. mi sers. and oppor t uni s t s .
The run-of-t he-mi l l cont ender s de f i ne t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n terms of a l i mi t e d
range of c o l l e c t i v e goods, and a r e unwi l l i ng t o a c t i f t he a c t i on is
l i k e l y t o br i ng a l os s . I n f i gur e s 4-13 and 4-14 ue s e e an i de a l i z e d
run-of-t he-mi l l cont ender i n two cont r as t i np, s i t u a t i o n s . I n t h e f i r s t ,
t he pr ecedi ng arguments s ay t h a t t he cont ender is l i k e l y t o produce somc
I Fi gur e 4-13: I deal i zed Sket ch of Condi t t ons f o r Act i on of s run-of-the-mill
Cont ender.
Col l e c t i ve
Goods
Returned
Resources Expended
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. In t he second, i f t he arguments a r c c o r r e c t , t he
cont ender shoul d not a c t .
I n Fi gur e 4-13, t he run-of-the-mill cont ender hne s i g n i f i c a n t
c ur r e nt i nc e nt i ve s f o r c o l l e c t i v e act i on. Cur r ent oppor t uni t y i ncl udes
t he gr oup' s narrow a r e a of i n t e r e s t , whi l e c ur r e nt t h r e a t i ncl udes t he
p o s s i b i l i t y of s i g n i f i c a n t l o s s , nl t hough not t h e -1 of t o t a l e xt i nc t i on.
I f t hos e were t he onl y c o n s t r a i n t s i n oper at i on. we would expect t he
cont ender t o a c t bot h t o c a p i t a l i z e on i t s oppor t uni t i e s and t o defend
i t s e l f a ga i ns t t h r e a t s of l os s .
There i s , however, one ot he r c ons t r a i nt : mobi l i zat i on. I n t h i s
s ket ch, t he cont ender ' s mobi l i zat i on l e v e l is hi gh enougl ~ LO per mi t
a c t i on t hroughout t h e range of i t s c ur r e nt i n t e r e s t and oppor t uni t y.
Never t hel ess, t he group' s power pos i t i on would per mi t i t t o a c qui r e
s t i l l more c o l l e c t i v e goods i f i t mobi l i zed f u r t h e r ; t he dot t ed cur ve
t o t he r i g h t of t he mobi l i zat i on l i n e de s c r i be s t hose t he or e t i c nl
p o s s i b i l i t i e s ; i t a l s o shows t he t h e o r e t i c a l de c l i ne i n t he group' n
r e t ur n i f i t pushes c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n t oo f a r . Beyond a c e r t a i n poi nt .
we expect r epr es s i on t o s t a r t di mi ni shi ng t he gr oup' s r e t ur n from
c o l l e c t i v e act i on.
Repressi on does not appear i n t he diagram. but its e f f e c t i s t her e.
Fa i t h f u l t o t he mobi l i zat i on model. we r epr es ent i t a s one of t he f a c t or s
produci ng t he c ur r e nt shape and l oc a t i on of t h e pr obabl e- r et ur n curve.
a s wel l a s t he c ur r e nt l oc a t i on of t h e mobi l i zat i on l i n e . Or gani zat i on
l i ke wi s e remains hi dden from view, a s a vnr i a bl e whi cl ~ works t hrough
i n t e r e s t and mobi l i zat i on. Power is pr es ent , however. The crlrve o f
pr obabl e r e t ur ns gi ves us a s i mpl i f i e d summary of t he cont ender ' s c ur r e nt
power pos i t i on. Indeed. s e ve r a l d i f f e r e n t a s pe c t s of t he cont ender ' s
power a r e t her e: power-effi ci ency i n t he r a t e s of r e t ur n of c o l l e c t i v e
4-63
goods f o r r es our ces expended i n t he two zones of most l i k e l y a c t i on;
power - ef f ect i veness i n tlie por t i on of i t s i n t e r e s t -- i n t h i s case 100
per cent -- t h a t t he cont ender can r e a l i z e ; p o t e n t i a l power i s t he hi gh
poi nt of t he pr obabl e- r et ur n l i n e .
I n our f i r s t dl agram, t hen. t he c ur r e nt combi nat i on of i n t e r e s t ,
mobi l i zat i on, power and oppor t uni t y- t hr eat l e a ds us t o expect t he
cont ender t o engage i n two ki nds and l e v e l s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on: a
low i n t e n s i t y of a c t i on t o count er t h r e a t s of l o s s , a hi gher i n t e n s i t y
of nct i on t o t ake advant age of oppor t uni t i e s f o r gai n i n t he ar ea of t he
gr oup' s i n t e r e s t . Fi gur e 4-14 shows us tlie same s o r t of cont ender i n
a very d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n . The s i t u a t i o n i s a pr e s c r i pt i on f o r i nact i on.
'Eniy? Because a l l f our major vnr i a bl e s a r e now i n d i f f e r e n t pos i t i ons .
Take oppor t uni t y- t hr eat : t he cont ender ' s r ange of des i r ed c o l l e c t i v e
goods l i e s above t he l i mi t s e t by c ur r e nt oppor t uni t i e s , and t he c ur r e nt
t h r e a t of l o s s is ver y s l i g h t . I n ot he r words, no o t h e r cont ender s a r e
c ur r e nt l y vul ner abl e t o cl ai ms which would enhance t h i s run-of-t he-mi l l
cont ender ' s r e a l i z a t i o n of i t s def i ned i n t e r e s t s ; har dl y any ot he r
cont ender is making pl a us i bl e t h r e a t s a ga i ns t i t s c ur r e nt r e a l i z a t i o n
of i t s i n t e r e s t s .
Mobi l i zat i on l l kewi s e i n h i b i t s t h i s run-of-t he-mi l l cont ender ' s
capnci t y f o r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. The c ur r e nt mobi l i zat i on l e v e l r e s t r i c t s
t he cont ender j s pos s i bl e a c t i on t o t he range i n which a n e t l o s s i s
al most c e r t a i n.
The cont ender ' s curve of pr obabl e r et ur t i s from c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on
i s unf avor abl e a s wel l . It bar el y cr os s es t he break-even l i n e -- and
t h a t onl y i n a r egi on which a) i s c ur r e nt l y i na c c e s s i bl e because of t he
mobi l i zat i on c e i l i n g , b) does not q u i t e r each t o t he cont ender ' s a r e a
of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t . Another way of s t a t i n g t hes e r e l a t i ons hi ps is
Fi gur e 4-14: I deal i zed s ket ch of c ondi t i ons t o r i na c t i on of a run-of-t he-mi l l
cont ender .
Col l e c t i ve
Goods
Returned
Resources Expended
t h i s : t he gr oup' s aims nr e "t oo high" f o r its c ur r e nt p o s s i b i l i t i e s of
a c t i on. A change i n any of t he f our va r i a bl e s coul d i ncr eas e t he
l i kl i hood of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. An or gani zer who wanted t o put t h i s
hapl es s run-of-t he-mi l l cont ender i n t o a b e t t e r pos i t i on would at t empt
t o i nc r e a s e i L s mobi l i zat i on and t r y t o augment i t s power by such t a c t i c s
ns forming c oa l i t i ons . IIe might a l s o t r y t o f o s t e r a r e d e f i n i t i o n of
t he cont ender ' s i n t e r e s t s , i n or de r t o br i ng them wi t hi n t he range of
p o s s i b i l i t y . A powerful c o a l i t i o n par t ner might t r y maneuvering t o mnke
ot he r cont ender s o r t he government more vul ner abl e t o t h i s cont ender ' s
cl ai ms -- t o r a j s e t he l i m i t s e t by oppor t uni t y. Any of t hes e e f f o r t s ,
i f s uc c c s s f ul , would i ncr eas e t he l i ke l i hood of t he cont ender ' s c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i on.
Tn t he s l ~ o r t run we have been cons i der i ng, t he e xt e nt of c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i on depends gr e a t l y on t he degr ee t o which t he group i nvol ved has
pr evi ous l y acqui r ed c o l l e c t i v e c ont r ol of r esour ces. Most a l t e r n a t i v e
t he or i e s e i t h e r make mobi l i zat i on such an immediate f unct i on of changi ng
i n t e r e s t s t h a t mobi l i znLi on ceas es t o a c t a s an i ndependent va r i a bl e ,
o r mni nt ai n t h a t under many ci r cumst ances unmohi l i zed groups t end t o
mobi l i ze s o r a pi dl y and e f f e c t i v e l y a s t o wi pe out any gener al r e l a t i ons hi p
between p r i o r mobi l i zat i on and pr es ent c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on.
Simple cl as s - vot i ng schemes f ol l ow t he f i r s t l i n e ; bl oc vot es r i s e
nnd f a l l ns an immediate e f f e c t of changi ng t h r e a t s t o c l a s s i n t e r e s t s .
James Davi es' J-curve expl anat i on of r e be l l i ons f ol l ows t he second l i n e ;
a popul at i on which exper i ences n l ong per i od of r i s i n g s a t f s f a c t i o n of
i t s i n t e r e s t s nnd t hen exper i ences a r a pi d decl i ne i n t h a t s a t i s f a c t i o n ,
Davles ar gues, Lends t o mobi l i ze and t o s t r i k e out a t once. The argument
of r e r e d he r e nnswers t he f i r s t l i n e by sayi ng t hnt t he e f f e c t of changi ng
t h r e a t s e x i s t s , but i s not immediate becnuse t he speed and i n t e n s i t y o f
t he c l a s s ' r esponse depends on i t s p r i o r mobi l i zat i on. The argument
answers t he Davi es l i n e by s ayi ng t hnt t h e qui ck r esponse t o de c l i ne is
onl y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of hi ghl y-mobi l i zed gr oups, and t h a t i n any cas e t h e
groups which r e b e l do not respond t o t he gener al f a c t of dcpr i vnt l on; t hey
respond t o t he s p e c i f i c f a c t of a n o t l ~e r gr oup' s making cl ai ms which would.
i f r e a l i z e d, v i o l a t e t h e i r e s t a bl i s he d r j g h t s and pr i vi l e ge s . The a l t c r -
na t i ve argument s under est i mat e o r e l i mi na t e t he c o s t s of c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i on.
I f t he mobi l i zat i on model is an improvement over pr evi ous anal ys es
of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on, i t st i l l has some s i g n i f i c a n t weaknesses. I t has
no t i me i n i t . Concent r at i ng on t h e immediate s i t u a t i o n of c o l l e c t i v e
a c t o r s g r e a t l y s i mp l i f i e s t he a na l ys i s . But i t a l s o mnkes i t d i f f i c u l t t o
d e a l wi t h r e c i pr oc a l i nf l ue nc e s such a s t hos e which l i n k power nnd col -
l e c t i v e act i on: c ur r e nt power pos i t i on c e r t a i n l y a f f e c t s t he l i kel i hood
of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on, a s t he model s ays ; c ur r e nt c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on a l s o
a f f e c t s f u t u r e power pos i t i on, a s t h e model does not say. The nbsence of
t i me, f ur t her mor e, el i mi nat es t he f e i n t s and h e s i t a t i o n s of s t r a t e g i c i n-
t e r a c t i on. The most t he mode1,can do f o r us i n t hes e r egar ds is t o hel p
us reduce t he bl ur of t he newsreel i n t o many d i s t i n c t s ucces s i ve frames.
each wi t h i t s own l ogi c .
The mobi l i zat i on model is e s s e n t i a l l y qua nt i t a t i ve . I t d e a l s wi t h
amounts of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i ons , r es our ces and c o l l e c t i v e gooda r nt he r t han
wi t h t h e i r q u a l i t i e s . Unl ess we can f i nd some way of e s t e bl i s hi ng t he
q u a n t i t a t i v e equi val ences among d i f f e r e n t s o r t s of c o l l e c t i v e nct i ons .
r es our ces and c o l l e c t i v e goods, f ur t her mor e, t he model wi l l onl y appl y t o
t he s i mpl es t s i t u a t i o n s . With t he di s cus s i on of r epr es s i on and f n c i 1 l . t ~ -
t i on, we wandered i n t o t he comparison of d i f f e r e n t ki nds of cont ender nnd
CHAPTER 5: CHANGING FORMS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
d i f f e r e n t s o r t s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. But by end l a r g e we not i ced qual i -
t a t i v e v a r i a t i o n s wi t hout bui l di ng them i n t o t he mobi l i zat i on model.
We f a c e an i r r por t ant choi ce. 1Je can cont i nue t h e st ep-by-st ep
expl or at i on snd e l a bor a t i on of t he mobi l i zat i on and p o l i t y models. Or
we can jump headlong i n t o t he world of t i me and q u a l i t a t i v e v a r i a t i o n .
I hope many of my r eader s wi l l f ol l ow t he f i r s t cour se: r e vi s i ng t he mo-
b i l i z a t i o n and p o l i t y models t o d e a l e f f e c t i v e l y wi t h t i me, q u a l i t y and
s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n , t hen s c r u t i n i z i n g t h e evi dence t o s e e i f t h e
models work r i g h t . I pl an t o keep st t h a t work mysel f. but el sewher e.
The next t hr e e chapt er s wi l l f ol l ow t h e second cour se. They wi l l make
l oose a ppl i c a t i ons of t he models t o major h i s t o r i c a l problems i n t he
st udy of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. Chapt er f i v e t r e a t s changes i n t he pr eval ent
forms of cont ent i ous c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n which occur r ed i n west er n c ount r i e s
a s l ar ge- s cal e i ndus t r y devel oped, c i t i e s grew, powerful na t i ona l s t a t e s
formed, and c a pi t a l i s m expanded. Chapt er s i x d e a l s wi t h t he r e l a t i o n s h i p
between c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on and c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence. Chapt er seven di s -
cus s es r e be l l i on and r evol ut i on. Then, s t t h e end, we t ake one more l ook
a t t h e ge ne r a l l o g i c of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. .
The Forms of Cont ent i on
Real peopl e do not ge t t oget her and Act Col l ect i vel y. They meet t o
p e t i t i o n Par l i ament , or gani ze t el ephone champaigns, demogst rat e out s i de
of c i t y h a l l , a t t a c k powerlooms, go on s t r i k e . The a b s t r a c t mobilization
model we have been usi ng has many v i r t u e s , but i t t ends t o obscur e two
fundamental f a c t s . F i r s t , c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on gener al l y i nvol ves i nt e r -
a c t i o n wi t h s p e c i f i c ot he r groups, i ncl udi ng governments. Col l e c t i ve
a c t i on r a r e l y c o n s i s t s of s o l i t a r y performances. Peopl e do not o r d i n a r i l y
a c t t o i nf l ue nc e a b s t r a c t s t r u c t u r e s such a s p o l i t i e s and mnrket s; t hey
t r y t o g e t p a r t i c u l a r ot he r pe opl e . t o do p a r t i c u l a r t hi ngs . A s a consc-
quence, expl anat i ons of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on which Concent r at e on t h e cnpn-
c i t i e s and i n c l i n a t i o n s of one p a r t i c i p a n t a t o t i me -- o r t he aver age
c a p a c i t i e s and i n c l i n a t i o n s of a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s wi l l l c s ve us di soppoi nt cd.
Second, c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on us ual l y t akes wel l -defi ned forms el r endy
f a mi l i a r t o t he. par t i ci pant s. i n t he some s ens e t h a t most of an e r a ' s
a r t t akes on of e s mal l number of eat obl i sh$d forms. Because of t h a t ,
ne i t he r t h e s ear ch f o r uni ve r s a l forms (such a s t hos e nometimes proposed
f o r crowds o r r evol ut i ons ) nor t h e assumpt i on of on i n f i n i t y of means t o
group ends wi l l t ake us ver y f a r . Because of t h a t , t he s t udy of t he con-
c r e t e forms of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on immediately draws us i n t o t hi nki ng about
\
t he c u l t u r a l s e t t i n g s i n which more forms appear . Much of t l i e pl eas ur e
and advent ur e i n t he h i s t o r i c a l st udy of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n comes from t he
r i c h compl exi t y of t h e ma t e r i a l : havi ng t o l e a r n how and why t he Pa r i s i a ns
of 1793 paraded sever ed hends on pi kes. how and why t h e young peopl e of
Berkel ey, Ca l i f or ni a occupi ed a makeshi f t par k i n 1.969.
Put t i ng t h e two themes t oget her opens t he way t o a f i r s t rough
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of forms of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s t r e s s e s
t he na t ur e of t he i nt c r oc t i on between ot he r groups and t h e group whose
a c t i on we a r e c l a s s i f yi ng. More pr e c i s e l y, i t depends on t he cl ai ms t he
c o l l e c t i v e a c t or s a r e a s s e r t i n g i n t h e i r act i on: compet i t i ve cl ai ms,
r e a c t i ve cl ai ms o r p r o a c t i v e cl ai ms. The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n l eaves out pur-
--
s u i t of common ends which i nvol ve no cl ai ms on ot he r groups: pur e r ecr ea-
t i on, cont empl at i on, escape. I n f a c t . i t a p p l i e s most e a s i l y where the'
cl ai ms expr ess a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t among t he p a r t i e s . I have worked
out t he c a t e gor i e s i n s t udyi ng t h e evol ut i on of forms of c o n f l i c t i n
west er n Europe, and w i l l i l l u s t r a t e them from European exper i ence.
Compet i t i ve a c t i ons l a y cl ai m t o r es our ces a l s o cl ai med by ot he r
groups which t he a c t o r de f i ne s a s r i v a l s , compet i t or s, o r a t l e a s t a s
pnr t i c i pnnt s i n t he same c ont e s t . Take t h e c h a r i v a r i -- t he American
"shi varee" -- f o r an example. Only r e c e nt l y have European h i s t o r i a n s be-
gun t o uncover t he l a r ge base of compet i t i on and c ont r ol on which t h i s
os t e ns i bl y f r i vol oun custom r e s t e d. John Gi l l i s (1974: 30-31) des cr i bes
one s t andar d ver si on:
I n a t y p i c a l r u r a l c h a r i v a r i , s r e c e nt l y remarri ed widower might
f i nd hi msel f awakened by t he clamor of t he crowd, on e f f i g y of
h i s dead wi f e t h r u s t up t o h i s window and a l i ke ne s s of hi ms el f ,
pl aced backwarddon an a s s , drawn t hrough t he s t r e e t s f or h i s
nei ghbor s t o s ee. Payi ng of a "cont r i but i on" t o t he Lord of Mis-
r u l e might q u i e t h i s yout hf ul t or ment or s, but by t h a t t i me t he
voi ces of v i l l a g e consci ence had made t h e i r poi nt . Second mar r i ages
i nva r i a bl y drew t he g r e a t e s t wrat h and. by c o n t r a s t , endogamous
mar r i ages of young peopl e of roughl y t he same age were t h e occasi on
of t he youth gr oup' s r e j oi c i ng. I n t h a t cas e, t h e [ unct i ons of
c h a r i v a r i were r ever sed and t he coupl e were accompanied by n noi sy
crowd t o t h e i r wedding bed, t h e r i t u a l send-off of its former mem-
ber s by t he peer group. The mar r i age f e a a t . end t he Abbcy's p a r t l c i -
pot i on i n i t , symbol i zed t he c e n t r a l purpose of t he yout l ~ group,
which was t o pr ovi de o prol onged r i t e of passage from r ot ~ghl y t he
ons e t of pubert y t o t he poi nt of mar r i age.
The Engl i sl i o f t e n c a l l e d t h e i r s i mi l a r custom Rough Music. Host of t h e .
t i me, i t was a cont ai ned but raucous a f f a i r , accompanied by t he tllumping
of pans and blowing of horns. The c h a r i v a r i became a "di sor der " t o t he
eyes (and, no doubt , t he e a r s ) of t he a u t h o r i t i e s when i t pe r s i s t e d more
t han a ni ght o r two, o r when dozens of young peopl e j oi ned t he fun.
The p r e c i s e form of t h e c ha r i vnr i di f f e r e d consi der abl y from one
r egi on of Europe t o anot her . Wi t hi n Gr eat Br i t ai n. E.P. Thompson d i s t t n -
gui s hes f our mnin va r i a nt s :
a) c e f f y l pr en (Welsh f o r "wooden horse"). which i s as s oci at ed wi t h
t he Rebecca Ri ot a i n many p a r t s of I,lales;
b) "Ri di ng t he stang". commonly pmc t i c e d i n t he Sc o t t i s h Lowlands
and t he nor t h of England;
C) t h e Skimmington o r Skimmety parade, which st i l l sur vi ved i n t he
ni net eent h cent ur y i n t he West, a s we l l a s i n some r egi ons of t he
Sout h; and f i n a l l y
d) Rough Music i t s e l f , wi t hout a parade, but i n t he cour s e of which
peopl e o f t e n burned e f f i g i e s of t h e vi ct i ms ; a wi despread custom.
but found e s pe c i a l l y i n t he I t i dl ands and t he South (Thompson 1972:
287-288).
I n a ddi t i on t o t he s hl var ce, v a r i a n t s of t hes e ot he r forms of a c t i on r e-
m i n embedded i n American f ol kl or e , even i f t hey have come unst uck from
da i l y pr a c t i c e : r i di ng someone out of town on a r a i l , par adi ng and
burni ng e f f i g i e s , and s o on.
Vi l l a ge sue-groups were t he t y p i c a l i n i t i a t o r s of c ha r i va r i n. The
or gnni zat i on and f unct i ons oE age-groups var i ed consi der abl y from one
p a r t of Europe t o anot her . (For r egi onal p a t t e r n s i n France, e. g. , s e e
Varagnnc 1947). They of t e n had r e s pons i bi l i t y f o r Lent en bonf i r e s and
ot he r c e l e br a t i ons . They sometimes c ont r ol l e d t he pa i r i ng up of young
coupl es f o r bundl i ng and cour t i ng. Vi l l age age-groups a l s o f ought t l i e
youth of nei ghbor i ng v i l l a g e s , sometimes t o tlie deat h. They o f t e n as-
sembled a s a bl oc a t publ i c ceremoni es, sometimes mounting e l e a bor a t e
char ades t o mock and warn t hose who had t r ans gr es s ed t h e i r r ul e s . Al l
t hes e a c t i v i t i e s afct rmed t h e i r p r i o r i t y over t he e l i g i h l e femal es and
over t h e r i t u a l s of cour t s hi p wi t hi n t h e i r own v i l l a g e s . Wi t hi n t h e i r
l i mi t ed s pher e, t he activities were deadl y s e r i ous .
The c h a r i v a r i , t he v i l l a g e f i g h t and t h e youth group' s mocking cer e-
mony had many ki n. There were br awl s between s t ude nt groups, between
d l f f e r e n t det achment s of s o l d i e r s , between s o l d i e r s and c i v i l i a n s , between
e t l ~ n i c and r e l i gi ous groups. There were t h e more hi ghl y r out i ni z e d s t r ug-
g l e s of ~ i v a l groups of a r t i s a n s t o di shonor each o t h e r ' s symbols, impede
each o t h e r ' s ceremoni es and chal l enge each o t h e r ' s p r i o r i t y i n pr oces s i ons
and ot he r publ i c assembl i es. Somehow t he s e forms of a c t i on seem t r i v i a l
and qua i nt t o t went i et h- cent ur y peopl e. Me of t h i s cent ur y have seen
gl a nt wars and mass murder, and have come t o t hi nk of "ser i ous" p o l i t i c s
on havi ng a nadonnl o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l scope. The event s i n ques t i on were.
i ndeed, us ual l y s mal l , sl l or t - l i ved, l oc a l i z e d. They r a r e l y l i nked wi t h
r e vol r ~t i ona r y movements o r gr e a t r e be l l i ons . Yet t hey l e f t t h e i r t o l l
of dead and i nj ur ed. I n t i mes of c r i s i s , t hey bl ended i n t o mnjor c o n f l i c t s .
They were i mpor t ant forms of c o l l e c t i v e act i on.
Some f e a t ur e s of c o l l e c t i v e compet i t i on such a s t he r i t u a l i z e d mockery,
c a r r i e d over i n t o t h e second major cat egor y: r e a c t i ve c o l l e c t i v e act i ons .
(We can a l s o c a l l them c o l l e c t i v e r eact i ons . ) They c ons i s t of group e f f o r t s
t o r e a s s e r t e s t a bl i s he d cl ai ms when someone e l s e chal l enges o r v i o l a t e s
them. Speaki ng of peasant l and i nvas i ons i n contemporary Peru. E.J.
Hobsbawm poi nt s out t h a t t hey t ake t hr e e forms: s qr ~aLt i ng on l and t o
which no one ( or onl y t he go~er nment ) has a c l e a r t i t l e , expr opr i nt i ng l and
t o which t h e i nvader s have n o t pr evi ous l y enj oyed a cl ai m and t o which
someone e l s e has , r epos s es s i ng l and from which t he i nvader s have them-
s e l ve s been expr opr i at ed (Hobsbawm 1974: 120-121).
The t h i r d v a r i a n t i s t he c l e a r r e a c t i ve case: t he di spossessed r e a c t .
Thar s o r t of l and re-occupat i on char act er i zed t he f i r s t s t a ge s of Zopat o' s
r e bc l l i on dur i ng t he Mexican Revol ut i on, r ecur r ed through much of s out her n
I t a l y dur i ng t h e massi ve ni ne t eent h- cent ur y concent r at i on of l and i n bour-
ge oi s and nobl e hands, and marked t he cons ol i dat i on of bour geoi s landowner-
s h i p wherever i t devel oped i n tlie pr esence of s ol i da r y peasant communlLies.
I n a s t andar d Europeanscenari o, a ~ r o u p of v i l l a g e r s who had l ong past ur ed
t h e i r c a t t l e , gat her ed firewood and gl eaned i n common f i e l d s . found a
l andl or d o r a l o c a l o f f i c i a l ( or , more l i k e l y , t he two i n col l abor at i on)
f enci ng t l i e f i e l d s by newly-acquired o r newl y-ssscrt ed r i g h t of pr oper t y.
The v i l l a g e r s commonly warned a ga i ns t tile f enci ng. I f t he warning Went un-
heeded, t hey at t acked t he f ences and t he f encer s. They act ed i n t he name of
r i g h t s t hey s t i l l consi der ed va l i d.
The over l ap wi t h c o l l e c t i v e compet i t i on appeared c l e a r l y when costumed
avenger s t o r e down t h e f ences o r occupi ed t he f i e l d s , a s i n t he Demoiselles
movement of t he 1830' s i n t he Pyrenees ( s e e Merriman 1975). I n ot he r col -
l e c t i v e r e a c t i ons , t he over l ap was a t l e a s t a s not abl e. f o r i n bot h
canes t he a c t o r s commonly assumed. more o r l e s s s el f - cons ci ous l y, t he
r o l e of t he auLhor i t i es who were bei ng d e r e l i c t i n t h e i r dut y, and t he
groups which r eact ed were of t e n t he same l o c a l s o l i d a r i t i e s : t he youth
groups, g i l d s , and s o on.
Tl ~c bns i c o u t l i n e of t he l and occupat i on appl i ed t o t he bul k o f
Eur ~pe a n food r i o t s , machine-breaking, t a x r e be l l i ons and l o c a l a c t i ons
ngni ns t mi l i t a r y cons cr i pt i on: a l l moved d i r e c t l y a ga i ns t someone who
had unj us t l y depr i ved, o r t r i e d t o depr i ve, a l o c a l popul at i on of a pre-
c i ous r esour ce. Yves-Marie 8erc6. expandi ng on h i s comprehensive a na l ys i s
of t he sevent eent h- cent ur y r e be l l i on of t he Croquant s i n sout hwest er n
Frnnce, has proposed t h a t t h e ker nel of European peasant r e be l l i ons bef or e
t he ni net eent h- cent ur y was t he r e s i s t a nc e of cl os ed, s ol i dor y peasant
communities t o out s i de at t empt s t o i n f r i n g e upon t h e i r e s t a bl i s he d r i g h t s
and r out i nes . I n t he cas e of sevent eent h- cent ur y France, he di s t i ngui s hen
f our major occasi ons f o r r e he l l i ons : hi gh food pr i c e s , b i l l e t i n g of
t r oops . t a x c o l l e c t i o n and t he i mposi t i on of e xc i s e t axes by t a x f ar mer s.
Tn a l l t heoe c a s e s , s ays Berc'e, "Revol t is t he s t r a t e g y OF t he l i t t l e
peopl e, a n ext r aor di nar y or gani zat i on f o r def ense a ga i ns t f i s c a l aggr essi on"
(Berci? 1974: 11, 680-681).
A s community s o l i d n r i t y decl i ned, accor di ng t o 8er c6, t he concer t ed
peasant r e be l l i on di snppenred. Only much l a t e r di d f ar mer s and a g r i c u l t u r a l
workers r eappear i n a c t i on; now t hey were or gani zed around forward-l ooki ng
s pe c l a l - i nt e r e s t groups. Al t l ~ough ( a s 8er c6 hi msel f concedes) t he scheme
homogenizes unduly t he p a r t i c i p a n t s and mot i vcs i n t he ol de r forms of con-
f l i c t , it capt ur es an e ns e nt i nl c ont r a s t . It is t he c ont r a s t between re-
a c t i v e and pr oact i ve forma of c o l l e c t i v e act l ons .
Pr oa c t i ve c o l l e c t i v e a c t i ons a s s e r t group cl nt ms which have not
--
pr evi ous l y been exer ci s ed. (We may a l s o c a l l them i ns t a nc e s of c o l l e c t i v e
pr oact i on. ) The s t r i k e f o r hi gher wages o r b e t t e r working condi t i ons pro-
vi des an everyday i l l u s t r a t i o n . Del i bcr at e work st oppaees t o ~ n l n a
poi nt have probabl y e xi s t e d s i n c e peopl e f i r s t worked f or one a not l ~e r .
Na t a l i e Davjs (1975: 1-16) de s c r i be s wel l -organi zed s t r i k e s i n s l x i e e n t t ~
cent ur y Lyons. But t he s t r i k e onl y became a common way of doi ng publ i c
bus i nes s i n t he ni net eent h- cent ur y. A s wage-work i n or ganl zs t t ons
l a r g e r t han househol ds expanded, t he number and s c a l e of s t r i k c s expondcd.
I n most west er n c ount r i e s , f i f t y t o a hundred year s went by i n wl ~i ch
s t r i k e s were i ncr eas i ngl y f r equent but remained i l l e g a l -- sometimes pro-
s ecut ed, sometimes broken up by armed f or ce, sometimes t ol e r a t e d, alwnys
di sapproved. Under pr es s ur e from or gani zed workers and t h e i r par l i nmcnt ar y
a l l i e s . most west er n governments l e ga l i z e d t he s t r i k e between 1860 nnd 1900.
Si nce t hen, s t a t e s t h a t have ~ t e p p e d up r epr es s i on ( s t a t e s o f emergency,
wart i mes governments. Fa s c i s t regimes) have normnlly r esci nded t he r i g h t
t o s t r i k e , and a l l regi mes have negot i at ed c ont i nua l l y wiLh workers nnd
employers over who had t he r i g h t t o s t r i k e . and how. But ill gener al t he
s t r i k e has been wi del y a va i l a bl e a s a means of a c t i on s i n c e t he begi nni ng
of t he t went l et h cent ur y.
Government s anct i on of t he s t r i k e shows up i n s t r i k e s t a t i s t i c s ; they
da t e from t he 18808. or 1890s i n most west ern count r i es . Thei r sppenronce
r e f l e c t s t he working out o f a st andar d publ i c d e f i n i t i o n of t he word
"s t r i ke". and t h e format i on of a bureaucracy t o moni t or nnd r e gul a t e t he
s t r i k e ' s use. I n France, Mi c l ~e l l e Pe r r o t (1974) ar gues t h a t 1l1e s t r i k e
l o s t much of its expr es s i ve f unct i on. its f e s t i v a l a i r , i t s r evol ut i onar y
potential, as the bureaucratization of the 1890s set in. By way of corn
pensation, it became a more widely accessible, less risky way of making
demands.
Several other forms of collective proaction came into their own
during the nineteenth century. The demonstration, the sponsored public
meeting and the petition drive began to thrive with the arrival of mass
electoral politics. The seizure of premises by an insurrectionary comit-
tee also generalized during the nineteenth century, although the ties to
electoral politics are more distant. The military pronunciamento is of
the same vintage. On the other hand, the general strike, the sit-in, and
the farmers' dumping of surplus crops in protest are essentially twentieth-
century creations. Proactive forms of collective action have proliferated
over the last two centtrries.
This labeling of forms has two catches. First, although we are
dealing with situations in which contenders interact. we are not classi-
fying the interactions themselves. On the whole, if one group is engaging
in collective proaction, then at least one of its partners is engaging
in collective reaction: a group of dissident colonels attempts a coup, the
I
junta defends itself against the coup. Landlords band together to raise
rents, peasants band together to resist the raising of rents. Only the
collective competition is usually symmetrical: when one party jockeys for
a visible position in a public ceremony, so does another.
Second catch. Strictly speaking, a public meeting or a general
strike could fit any of the three types: competitive. reactive or pro-
active. Just as the charivari could mock a wrongdoer or celebrate a right-
doer. people can demonstrate for something, against something, or both for
one thing and against another thing at the.same time. The classification
as competitive, reactive or proactive depends on the claims being nsserted.
not on the form of the action. The squatting and expropriating land occu-
pations described by Hobabawm have a far more proactive flavor than the
re-occupations of lost land. Workers have often struck in defense of
threatened job rights. Those strikes were reactive.
Yet the general correletion persists. In general, the demonstro-
tion and the strike have been privileged vehicles for new claims, have
risen in periods and places in which ordinary people were articulating new
demands, and are peculiarly suitable to the effort to m k e gains rother
than to forestall losses. In general, the tax rebellion, tlle food riots
and similar events have cascaded when ordinary people were defending their
righta against attack, and make little sense as means of stating new claims.
On the average, the demonstration and the strike are proactive, the food
riot and tax rebellion reactive.
In Europe of the last few hundred years, tlle three forms of col-
lective action have waxed and waned in sequence. In the fifteenth and six-
teenth centuries, competitive actions seem to have predominated. From the
seventeenth into the nineteenth century, the reactive forms became much
more widespread, while the competitive forms remained steady or perhaps
declined. With the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, collective pro-
action began to predominate, the reactive forms dwindled, while new forms
of competition came into existence. If I read the record nright, seven-
teenth- and eighteenth-century Europeans took collective oction in de-
fense of threatened rights much more than their predecessors had, while
twentieth-century Europeans became exceptionally prone to act in support
of claims they had not previously exercised.
The reasons for the successive changes are, I think. twofold: '
5-10
1) during the period from 1600 to 1850, more so than before and after, the
i
I
Figure 5-1: Hypothetical Effects of Lowered Costs of Collective Action
on a Zealot.
agents of international markets and of national states were pressing their I
new (and proactive) claims on resources which had up to then been under the
control of innumerable households, comunities, brotherhoods and other Mobilization
I
small-scale organizations. The small-scale organizations reacted repeatedly,
fighting against taxation, conscription, the consolidation of landed pro-
perty and numerous other threats to their organizational well-being. Even-
tually the big structures won, the battle died darn, the reactive forms di-
minished. 2) Increasingly, the pools of resources necessary to group sur-
vival came under the control of large organizations, especially governments,
which only redistributed them under the pressure of new claims.
There may be a third factor: 3) a general decline in the costa of
mobilization and co1,lective action during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuriea. Such a decline might have resulted from the massing of popu-
lation in large settlements and big organizations, from the elaboration of
comunicntiona and from the expansion of elections as a way of doing public
business. This is roughly the same set of changes which Karl Deutsch calls
Social Mobilization, end which Amitsi Etzioni regards as making possible
the self-directed Active Society. If the analysis of the previous chapter
is correct, however, we could only expect such changes to elevate the level
of collective action if the relationship between contenders and their in- ,
terests altered. For a fixed set of interests and a given level of oppor-
tunity/threat, a general decline in the costs of mobilization and collective
action could well depress the level of colJ.ective action.
Figure 5-1 shows liar that could happen. (It illustrates the prob-
lem for a zealot -- a contender which aims at a narrow range of collective
Collective
Goods
Produced
Resources Expended
goods and is prepared to take what others would regard as a loss in order
t o achi eve t hos e goods -- but a p p l i e s equal l y t o mi s er s and run-of-the-
m i l l cont ender s. Oppor t uni s t s pr e s e nt , a s we s h a l l s ee, anot her problem.)
Under hi gh c o s t s ( cur ve A f or expect ed r e t u r n s from c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on) .
our cont ender would be unabl e t o a t t a i n i t s i n t e r e s t , r e ga r dl e s s of i t s
m_obi l i zst i on l e v e l o r t h e c ur r e nt c o n s t e l l a t i o n of oppor t uni t i e s ; a l l we
coul d r easonabl y a n t i c i p a t e i n t h a t cas e would be def ens i ve a c t i on t o
f o r e s t a l l t hr e a t s : c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n of amount A on t he resources-expen-
ded a x i s . Under medium c o s t s ( cur ve B), t h e cont ender can achi eve i t s
e n t i r e i n t e r e s t i n new c o l l e c t i v e goods and f o r e s t a l l t h r e a t s a t t he same
t i me by pl aci ng i t s a c t i on i n t he r ange from B1 t o B2. (Being a z e a l ot ,
t he cont ender has no i n t e r e s t i n t h e hi gher r e t u r n s obt ai nabl e by pushi ng
a b i t beyond B2 -- but not t oo f a r -- on t h e resources-expended s c a l e . )
But not e what happens i f c o s t s become ver y low: cur ve C a ppl i e s . I n t h i s
c a s e , t h e pr es ent l e v e l s of oppor t uni t y and mobi l i zat i on per mi t our con-
t ender a ver y hi gh r e t ur n i ndeed. Because t he cont ender ' s def i ned i n t e r e s t
remai ns t he same, however, i t can achi eve t h e name obj e c t i ve s wi t h a
s mal l er amount of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n t han when c o s t s a r e medium. Now t he
i d e a l r ange of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on r uns from C1 t o C2. Lowering c o s t s l owers
t h e expect ed l e v e l of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on.
To be s ur e , t he r e l a t i ons hi p between cont ender s and t h e i r i n t e r e s t s
may a l t e r i n some r e gul a r f as hi on a s c o s t s de c l i ne . Tlie most obvi ous a l -
t e r n a t i v e i s t h e one proposed l ong ago by Robert Mi chel s. "The revol u-
t i onar y p o l i t i c a l par t y, " s a i d Micliels.
i s a s t a t e wi t hi n a s t a t e , pur sui ng t he avowed aim of des t r oyi ng
t he e x i s t i n g s t a t e i n or der t o s u b s t i t u t e f o r i t a s o c i a l or der
of a fundament al l y d i f f e r e n t c ha r a c t e r . To a t t a i n t h i s e s s e n t i a l l y
p o l i t i c a l end, t h e par t y a v a i l s i t s e l f of t he s o c i a l i s t or gani za-
t i on, whose s o l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s found pr e c i s e l y i n i t s pnt i e nt
but s ys t emat i c pr epar at i on f o r t he de s t r uc t i on of t h e orgnni za-
t i o n of t he s t a t e i n i t s e x i s t i n g form. Tlie s ubver s i ve pnr t y or-
gani zes t he framework of t he s o c i a l r evol ut i on. For t h l s r eason
i t c ont i nua l l y endesvor s t o s t r engt hen i t s pos i t i ons , t o ext end
i t s bur eaucr at i c mechanism, t o s t o r e up i t s ener gi es and i t s
f unds (Michels 1949: 384- 385) .
The I r on Law of Ol i gar chy -- t h s t ever y s ucces s f ul s t r u g g l e ends wi t h t he
est abl i shment of a governi ng e l i t e -- t hus a ppl i e s , nccor di ng t o Mi chel a,
t o democr at i c r e vol ut i ona r i e s a s wel l a s t o a l l ot he r s .
Tr ans l at ed i n t o t h e code we have been us i ng, t h e I r on Lnw t a ke s two
forms. F i r s t , t h e pr ocess of mobl l i zs t i on i n i t s e l f t r ansf or ms t h e gr oup' s
def i ned i n t e r e s t s ; t hos e who l ead t h e cont ender ' s mobi l i zat i on a c qui r e t he
d e s i r e and t h e means t o mai nt ai n t he or gani zat i on t hey have b u i l t and t o
i d e n t i f y t h e i r s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s wi t h t hose of t he group a s a whole.
Second, t he l oweri ng of c o s t s i nc r e a s e s t h e gap between t he gr oup' s mo-
b i l i z a t i o n l e v e l and t h e r es our ces i t must expend t o achi eve i t s ends.
That produces a s ur pl us . Tlie a c c r e t i on of a s ur pl ua might l o g i c a l l y lend
t o demobi l i zat i on. But accor di ng t o Ml chel s i t encourages t he ol i gnr cl i s
t o d i v e r t t h e a v a i l a b l e r es our ces t o ends which t hey t hemsel ves de f i ne an
!
de s i r a bl e . I n t he ext reme cas e, t he new i n t e r e s t s which emerge do not
even i ncl ude t h e i n t e r e s t s which o r i g i n a l l y brought t h e cont ender i n t o ex-
i s t e nc e . I n t h e ext reme cas e, a z e a l ot becomes an oppor t uni s t , ready t o
a c t f o r a wide v a r i e t y of c o l l e c t i v e goods, prepared t o s t r i k e f o r t h e
b e s t r e t ur n a va i l a bl e , but unwi l l f ng t o a c t i n t h e f ace of a pr obabl e
l o s s . The " s oc i a l movement or gani zat i ons " i n contemporary America anal yzed
by Zald and ElcCarthy come c l o s e t o t h i s c a r i c a t ur e .
We must a l s o weigh something e l s e a ga i ns t t he presumed cos t - cut t i ng
e f f e c t s of communications improvements, t he i n s t a l l a t i o n of f r e e e l e c t i ons ,
and t he l i ke : t he i ncr eased r e pr e s s i ve a c t i v i t y and r e pr e s s i ve e f f i c i e nc y
of governments and o t l ~ e r l a r g e or gani zat i ons . I n t r i n s i c c o s t s a r e down.
But t he c o s t s imposed by o t h e r s a r e up. I guess t h a t t h e i n t r i n s i c c o s t s
hove decl i ned more t han t h e Imposed c o s t s have r i s e n . I n t h e pr es ent
s t a t e of our knowledge, however, t h a t judgment i s bot h r i s ky and unve r i f i a bl e .
Reper t oi r es of Col l e c t i ve Act i on
At any poi nt i n t i me, t he r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s a v a i l a b l e
t o a popul at i on is s ur pr i s i ngl y l i mi t ed. Sur pr i s i ngl y, gi ven t h e i nnumerabl e
ways i n which peopl e coul d, i n pr i nc i pl e , depl oy t h e i r r es our ces i n pur s ui t
of common ends. Sur pr i s i ngl y, gi ven t h e many ways r e a l groups have pursued
t h e i r own common ends st one t i me o r anot her .
Most t went i et h- cent ur y Americans, f o r example, know how t o demonst rat e.
They know t h a t s group wi t h a cl ai m t o make assembl es i n a publ i c pl ace,
i d e n t i f i e s i t s e l f and i t s demands o r compl ai nt s i n a v i s i b l e way, o r i e n t s
i t s common a c t i o n t o t h e per sons, pr ope r t i e s o r symbols of some ot her group
i t i s seeki ng t o i nf l uence. Wi t hi n t hos e gener al r u l e s , most Americans
know how t o c a r r y on s e ve r a l d i f f e r e n t forms of demonst r st i on: t he massed
mnrch, t h e assembly wi t h speechmaking, t he temporary occupat i on of premi ses.
Moreover, t her e a r e some s p e c i f i a b l e ci r cumst ances i n which most Americans
would a c t u a l l y appl y t h e i r knowledge by j oi ni ng a r e a l demonst r at i on.
Americans who have not l ear ned t h i s compl i cat ed s e t of a c t i o n s t hrough
per s onal p a r t i c i p a t i o n have nonet hel es s wi t nessed demonst r at i ons d i r e c t l y ,
read about them. watched them on t e l e vi s i on. Vari ous forms of demonst r at i on
bel ong t o t l i e r e p e r t o i r e of t went i et h- cent ur y Americans -- not t o mention
t went i et h- cent ur y Canadi ans, Japanese. Greeks. Br a z i l i a ns and many ot he r s . '
The r e p e r t o i r e a l s o i ncl udes s e v e r a l v n r j e t i e s of s t r i k e s , pe t i t i oni ng.
t he or ga ni z a t i on of pr e s s ur e groups, and s few ot he r ways of a r t i c u l a t i n g
gr i evances and demands.
Pew Americans, on t he ot he r hand, know how t o or gani ze t he hi j acki ng
of an a i r pl a ne , d e s p i t e t h e publ i c i t y ht j a c ki ngs have r ecei ved t n r ecent
year s; even fewer would s e r f ous l y cons i der hi j acki ng a s a way of accompl i shi ng
t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e obj e c t i ve s . Hi j acki ng bel ongs t o t he r e p e r t o i r e of onl y
a few groups anywhere. Uachine-breaking, once s f r equent occur r ence, hnn
dropped out of t h e r e pe r t oi r e . So have tlie c l ~ s r i v a r i and t he ser enade. So
has t h e r e gul a r i nt e r - vi l l a ge f i g h t ; onl y f o o t b a l l remai ns t o remind us of
t h a t ol d form of bl oodl e t t i ng.
Almost no one anywhere i s now f a mi l i a r wi t h a Eorm of a c t i o n which
was once canmon i r ? Europe: t he r e be l l i on i n which an e x i s t i n g , f unct i oni ng
group such a s an army o r a conmnrnity assembl es, c a s t s of f its c ons t i t ut e d
a u t h o r i t i e s , commissions t h a t s ucces s or (who knows f u l l we l l t h a t once
t h e a c t i on is completed he is l i k e l y t o be hanged, o r worse, f o r I l l s pai ns )
t o pr es ent a s e t of gr i evances and demands t o s hi gher a u t h o r i t y , r c s j n t s
wi t h det er mi nat i on u n t i l t hos e demands have been met o r u n t i l i t hns been
u t t e r l y des t r oyed, t hen r e t u r n s t o its pr evi ous s t a t e of submi ssi on t o t he
c ons t i t ut e d a u t h o r i t i e s . Remember t he r e c ur r e nt r e v o l t s of t he vi c t or i ous
but unpai d Spani sh ar mi es i n t h e Net her l ands toward t h e end of t he s i xt e e nt h
cent ur y: t hey r e gul a r l y e l e c t e d t h e i r own c h i e f , t he e l e c t o ; t hey decl s r cd
t hey would f ol l ow no one e l s e ' s or de r s u n t i l t h e i r demands f o r hack pay
and ot he r b e n e f i t s were s a t i s f i e d . They sometimes cont i nued t o f i g h t ,
even t o f i g h t he r oi c a l l y. but under t h e i r own di r e c t t on. 'Chey sometimes
pi l l a ge d when i t appeared t h e i r demands would not be met. They al ways
5-16
demanded amnesty f o r a l l a c t i o n s committed dur i ng t he r e b e l l i o n -- and t hey
us ual l y won. Armies mat t er ed t o t h e Spani sh ki ng ( Par ker 1973).
Or r e c a l l t h e Pi l gr i mage of Grace, t h e g r e a t Yor kshi r e r i s i n g of 1536
a ga i ns t Henry V I I I ' s di s pos s es s i on of t h e monast er i es and a g a i n s t ot he r
measures desi gned t o i nc r e a s e t he r o y a l revenues. The "commons" r os e by
t ens of t housands, t ook gentlemen f o r t h e i r c a pt a i ns and London lawyer
Robert Aske ns t h e i r chi ef c a pt a i n. They event ual l y c ont r ol l e d much of
t he North. But t he Duke of Nor f ol k' s vague, l yi ng promi ses t o t ake t h e i r
cas e t o t he King di s per s ed them. By J ul y of 1537 Robert Aske had di ed on
a s c a f f ol d a t t he c a s t l e of York, and two hundred ot he r r e b e l s had per i shed
a t t h e execut i oner ' s hand (Dodds and Dodds 1915). The word "mutiny" st i l l
conveys s s ens e of t h a t ol d form of a c t i on. But now we us e t h e term al most
excl us i vel y i n a mi l i t a r y cont ext . We f a i l t o r ecogni ze t h a t i t was once
an e s t a bl i s he d, i f r i s ky, pat h out of an i n t o l e r a b l e s i t u a t i o n .
Hi j acki ng, mut i ny, machine-breaking, c h a r i v a r i s , v i l l a g e f i g h t s , t ax
r e be l l i ons , food r i o t s , c o l l e c t i v e sel f - i mmol at i on, l ynchi ng, vendet t a
have a l l belonged t o t he s t andar d c ol l e c t i ve - s c t i on r e p e r t o i r e of aome
group a t aome t i me. I n one s e t t i n g o r anot her , peopl e have known r out i ne l y
how t o i n i t i a t e ever y one of them. Peopl e have a t sometime recogni zed
ever y one of them a s a l e gi t i ma t e , f e a s i b l e way of a c t i n g on an uns a t i s f i e d
gr i evance o r a a pi r nt i on. Most of t he s e forms of a c t i o n a r e t e c hni c a l l y
f e a s i b l e i n contemporary America. Yet t hey occur r a r e l y , o r not a t a l l .
More i mpor t ant , no s u b s t a n t i a l American group wi t h a pr es s i ng gr i evance
i
o r a s p i r a t i o n cons i der s any of them t o be a genui ne a l t e r n a t i v e t o
demonst r at i ng, s t r i k i n g , p e t i t i o n i n g o r forming a pr es s ur e group. They
do not bel ong t o t he contemporary American r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on.
To s pe c i f y t he menning of r e p e r t o i r e , i t hel ps t o aak t hi n ques t t on:
t o what degr ee does t h e group p r e f e r t h e means i t has used bef or e over
t hos e which a r e t h e o r e t i c a l l y a v a i l a h l e f o r t h e same purpose? That i s a
d i f f i c u l t ques t i on t o answer i nxt he r e a l worl d. I t is hard t o knov two
t hi ngs : 1 ) what ot he r forms of a c t i o n a r e r e a l l y "aval l abl e" t o a group,
2) t h e r e l a t i v e appr opr i at enes s and e f f i c i e nc y of t he means t h e group
a c t u a l l y us e s and t h e a l t e r n a t i v e meana which a r e t h e o r e t i c a l l y nvai l nhl e.
However, two a o r t a of n a t u r a l exper i ment s occur o f t e n enough t o pr ovi de
i nf or mat i on on t h e s ubj e c t . F i r s t , s i mi l a r groups i n s i mi l a r s e t t i n g s
sometimes us e q u i t e d i f f e r e n t means of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. I n t l i e 1950s.
f o r example, we f i nd Swedish t r a ns por t workers t aki ng t h e i r gr i evances t o
government agenci es whi l e t h e i r Br i t i s h count er par t s go out on s t r i k e .
Second, t h e meana of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n a l t e r and spr ead from one group t o
anot her . For i ns t ance, i n t h e I t a l y of 1919 sit-down s t r i k e s were r a t he r
a novel t y. But by August, 1920 hal f a mi l l i on workers were occupyi ng
t h e i r f a c t o r i e s . Given such event s , we cangauge t h e i mport ance of r eper -
t o i r e s by comparing t he s ucces s i ve choi ces of s i mi l a r groups and by ob-
s e r vi ng i nnovat i on and d i f f u s i o n i n t h e means of a c t i on.
Fi gur e 5-2 pr e s e nt s f our pos s i bl e r e s u l t s of such comparisons. I n
each cas e, we a r e de a l i ng wi t h a group which is pr epar i ng t o a c t col l ec-
t i v e l y i n ci r cumst ances s i mi l a r t o ot he r ci r cumst ances i t has fnced be-
f or e . We i d e n t i f y a l l t h e means which a r e t h e o r e t i c a l l y o r p r a c t i c a l l y
"avai l abl e" t o t h e group, and t hen a r r a y them i n t erms of t h e i r s i mi l a r i t y
t o t he means t h e group has pr evi ous l y employed. I n t h e s heer - ef f i ci ency
model, s i mi l a r i t y t o f a mi l i a r means makes no di f f e r e nc e ; t h e onl y ques t i on
is t h e appr opr i at enes s of t h e means t o t he end. That model is ext reme; i t
may, i n f a c t , be more e f f i c i e n t t o us e f a mi l i a r means because f a mi l i a r i t y
i t s e l f l e a ds t o b e t t e r execut i on. The advant age- of - f ami l i eci t y model
Fi gur e 5-2: Four Models of Group Readi ness t o Adopt New Meana of
Col l e c t i ve Act i on.
Sheer Ef f i ci ency Advantage of Fa mi l i a r i t y
Fl e xi bl e Reper t oi r e Ri gi d Reper t oi r e
100
Pr obabi l i t y
I
of
Adoption
of
Meona
0 ,
t akes t h a t l i ke l i hood i n t o account ; i t pos t ul a t e s a smooth gr adi ent i n t h e
pr oba bi l i t y of adopt i on from moat f a mi l i a r t o l e a s t f a mi l i a r . The model i m-
p l i e s t h a t f a mi l i a r i t y is si mpl y one of s e v e r a l f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g t he
I choi ce of a p a r t i c u l a r means from among a l l t hose which a r e t h e o r e t i c a l l y
a va i l a bl e . The t h i r d model des cr i bea a f l e x i b l e r e p e r t o i r e . Tn t h i s
caae, t h e group has a heavy b i a s toward meana i t has pr evi ounl y used. but
is not compl et el y cl os ed t o i nnovat i on. Fi nol l y, t he r i gi d- r e pe r t oi r e
model des cr i bea a group which chooses f a mi l i a r meana unf a i l i ngl y. To t he
e xt e nt t h a t t h i s model appl i ea. we would expect i nnovat i on t o be r a r e , and
t o occur t hrough br eaks and c r i s e s .
I f t he s heer - ef f i ci ency o r advant age- of - f ami l i ar i t y model a ppl i e a ,
i t i s mi sl eadi ng t o speak of r e p e r t o i r e s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. Only i n
t he t h i r d and f our t h c a s e s is t he word a us e f ul summary of t he r e a l i t y .
Thus we have an empi r i cal t e a t f o r t h e u t i l i t y of t he concept : how c l o s e
t he obser vabl e behavi or of c o l l e c t i v e a c t o r s comes t o one o r anot her of
t he f our modela. My own hypot hes i s is t h a t t he f l e x i b l e r e p e r t o i r e i a
t h e moat gener al caae f o r or gani zed groups. The l e a s or gani zed t h e group.
t h e more l i k e l y t h a t t he advantage-of-familiority model wi l l de s c r i be i t s
behavi or . We might r easonabl y suppose t h a t a cont ender -- e s pe c i a l l y a
member of t h e p o l i t y -- which remai ns i n t he same power pos i t i on f o r n
I
I
I
l ong t i me t ends t o move from a f l e x i b l e t o a r i g i d r e p e r t o i r e . Rout i ni -
zat i on s e t s i n . It is har d, on t h e ot he r hand, t o imagine any cont ender
mai nt ai ni ng t he s heer - ef f i ci ency p a t t e r n f o r a a i gni f i c ont span of time.
A f l e x i b l e r e p e r t o i r e per mi t s cont i nuous. gr adual change i n t he
gr oup' s meana. The change may occur t hrough i mi t a t i on of ot he r groups o r
t hrough i nnovat i on. The i mi t a t i on of ot he r groupa is moat l i k f l y when t he
members of one cont ender obser ve t h a t anot her cont ender i s us i ng a new
--
Low High
Di s s i mi l a r i t y from
Exi s t i ng Meana
means s u c c e s s f t ~l l y , o r new1.y us i ng an ol d means s uc c e s s f ul l y. That i s no
doubt one of t h e main r easons "waves" of s t r i k e s o r demonst r at i ons occur:
t he f a c t t h a t a gi ven s o r t of group g e t s somewhere wi t h t he t a c t i c s pr eads
t h e expect at i on t h a t employers o r governments wi l l be vul ner abl e t o t h e
snme t a c t i c i n t h e hands of ot he r s i mi l a r groups.
I nnovat i on is r a r e r , and har der t o expl ai n. One of t he main pro-
ceas es i s s ur e l y t he s t r e t c h i n g of t h e boundar i es of forms of a c t i o n which
al r eady bel ong t o t he r e p e r t o i r e . I n t he e a r l y ni net eent h cent ur y, f o r
i ns t ance, we begi n t o s e e t h e French c h a r i v a r i i n a new gui s e. It no
l onger aimed e x c l l ~s i v e l y s t cuckol ds. May-September mar r i ages and coupl es
who f a i l e d t o t r e a t t he l o c a l bachel or s t o t he customary n u p t i a l cel e-
br a t i on. Many c h a r i v a r i s began t o dr amat i ze t he oppos i t i on of l o c a l peopl e
t o a p a r t i c u l a r pub1. i ~ o f f i c i a l o r pol . i t i ca1 candi dat e. Likewise. t he
complimentnry ser enade ext ended t o p o l i t i c a l f i g u r e s who had e n t h u s i a s t i c
popul ar s uppor t . I n France, t h e f i r s t hal f of t he ni net eent h cent ur y was
t he heyday of t he p o l l t i c a l c ha r i va r i l s e r e na de . Then t h e i n s t i t u t i o n gave
way t o t he demonst r at i on, t h e r a l l y , t he publ i c banquet and t he f or mal
meet i ng
I n a p a r a l l e l f as hi on, t h e American p a t r i o t s who mobi l i zed from t he
Stamp Act c r i s i s onward adapt ed ol d Engl i sh customs such a s t a r r i n g and
f e a t he r i ng or r i di ng t he s t a ng ( r i di ng a r epr obat e out of t a r n on a r a i l ) .
N a r t hes e shaming a c t i o n s coupl ed wi t h mock publ i c t r i a l s , and appl i ed t o
1, oyal i st s and ot her presumed enemies of t he c ol oni s t s . I n t he French
and American c a s e s , bot h t he form of t he a c t i on and i t s ohj e c t changed.
But i n bot h c a s e s t h e ba s i c a c t i o n was a l r e a dy p a r t of t h e popul ar r eper -
t o i r e .
I\ popul nt l on' s r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on gener al l y i ncl udes
onl y a handf ul of a l t e r n a t i v e s . It gener al l y changes sl owl y. seems obvi ous
and na t ur a l t o t h e peopl e i nvol ved. It resembl es an el ement ary lnngunge:
f a mi l i a r a s t h e day t o i t s us e r s , f or a l l i t s pos s i bl e quai nt nes s o r incom-
p r e h e n s i b i l i t y t o an out s i de r . Ilow. t hen, does such a r e p e r t o i r e come
i n t o bei ng? How does i t change? The answer s u r e l y i ncl udes a t l e a s t
t he s e el ement s:
1. t h e s t andar ds of r i g h t s and j u s t i c e pr e vni l t ng i n t he popul at i on;
2. t h e d a i l y r out i ne s of t he popul at i on:
3. t h e popul at i on' s i n t e r n a l or gani zat i on;
4. i t s accumulated exper i ence wi t h pr i or c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on;
5. t h e p a t t e r n of r e pr e s s i on i n t he world t o which t he popul at i on
bel ongs.
Let u s t hi nk b r i e f l y about each of t hes e el ement s.
The pr e va i l i ng s t andar ds of r i g h t s and j u s t i c e govern t he accep-
t a b i l i t y of t h e components of va r i ous pos s i bl e t ypes of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on.
They do not ne c e s s a r i l y govern t h e p a r t i c u l a r Corm of a c t i on. Por exnmple.
a group which cons i der s t h a t t h e s e t of per sons d i r e c t l y produci ng an ob-
j e c t o r a s e r vi c e has a p r i o r r j g h t t o i t s consumption is l i k e l y t o condone
some ki nds of f o r c i b l e r e s i s t a n c e t o expr opr i at i on of o b j e c t s and s e r vi c e s .
That is t h e i mp l i c i t r a t i o n a l e of t he modern European food r i o t and t a x re-
b e l l i o n . A s i mpor t ant r i g h t s came t o be i nves t ed i n , end sometimes gtlar-
ant eed by, t h e na t i ona l s t a t e , c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i t s e l f nat i onnl i zed.
The popul at i on' s d a i l y r out i ne s mat t er becnuse t hey a f f e c t t h e e a s e
wi t h which one o r anot her of t h e pos s i bl e forms of a c t i on can n c t r ~a l l y
be c a r r i e d on. The s t r i k e becomes f e n s i b l e when cons i der abl e numbers of
peopl e assembl e t o work i n t he same l oc a t i on. The not abl e s h i f t of col -
l e c t i v e a c t i on sway from r out i ne assembl i es such a s market s and f e s t i v n l s
toword de l i be r a t e l y- c a l l e d ga t he r i ngs a s i n demonst r at i ons and s t r i k e s r e-
s ul t e d i n pnr t from t he r e s i d e n t i a l di s pe r s i on of occupat i onal groups nnd
of o t h e r s who shar ed a common i n t e r e s t . They no l onger came t oget her
caaual l y nnd di s cus s ed t h e i r comon gr i evances o r a npi r ot i ons i nc i de nt a l l y.
I n t h a t pr oces s , t he p a r t i c i p a t i o n of European women i n c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n
decl i ned not i ceabl y; t h e segr egat ed wor l ds of p o l i t i c s and l abor orgoni -
zat i on became mole pr es er ves .
I n European and American c i t i e s , t h a t pr oces s of s egr egat i on passed
t l ~r ough t hr e e rough at oges . I n t h e f i r s t , t he r e was l i t t l e d i e t i n c t i o n
between home and work. For example, cr af t smen l i ve d and gat her ed i n t h e i r
shops and i n t11e nearby s t r e e t s . The growth of l a r g e r f i r ms and workpl aces
produced a s e pa r a t i on of home and work. The t y p i c a l arrangement , however,
was f o r workers t o crowd i n t o dwel l i ngs wi t hi n wal ki ng di s t a nc e of t h e i r
ellops, o f f i c e s and h i r i n g s i t e s . Thus d i s t i n c t i v e worki ng-cl ass nei ghbor-
hoods formed. They tended t o be s mal l i n s c a l e and segr egat ed by c r a f t .
Between t he workpl ace and t h e home grew up gat her i ng pl aces f r equent ed by
s i n g l e groups of workers: pubs, cnf es . uni on h e l l s , s o c i a l cl ubs . With
t he f u r t h e r growth i n t h e s i z e and s egr egat i on of workpl aces, j our neys t o
work became l onger and worki ng-cl nsa nei ghborhoods l a r g e r but more het er o-
geneous wi ~ l i r es pect t o c r a f t s . Gat her i ng witli your fel l ow-workers near
t he workplace became i e s s and l e a s f e a s i b l e .
Thew chnnges i n workers' d a i l y r out i ne s ge ne r a l l y r a i s e d t h e mobi l i -
z a t i on c os t a of p a r t i c u l a r t r a de s . They t he r e f or e tended t o r educe t h e
l e v e l of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n by t r ade. A t t he same t i me, t h e changes may
hove lowered t he c o s t s of mobi l i zat i on f o r t h e urban working c l a s s a s a
whole. Thot p o s s i b i l i t y des er ves f u r t h e r i nve s t i ga t i on. For t he pr es ent
di s cus s i on, however, t he i mpor t ant t hi ng t o not i c e i s t h a t t he form of
worki ng-cl ass c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on changed i n conj unct i on witli tlie a l t e r a t i o n
of urban form. To t he f i r s t of our rough s t a g e s ( t he per i od of l i t t l e o r
no home-work s epar at i on) correspond a r e p e r t o i r e of smal l - scal e a c t i ona
which b u i l t d i r e c t l y on t he s t r u c t u r e of t h e t r a de : t he p e t i t i o n from
t h e l e a de r s of t he c r a f t , t h e publ i c pr ocessi on, t he st aged baLt l e he-
tween r i v a l groups of a r t i s a n s , and s o on. I n t he i nt er medi at e s t nge OF
l a r ge r workpl aces and adj acent homogeneous dwel l i ng a r e a s we s e e t he r i s e
of t he s t r i k e , t he b l a c k l i s t of uncooper at i ve employers, t l i e o s t r n c i m o r
punishment of non-conforming workers, and s o f o r t h . At t h e s t a g e of l nr ge
f i r ms and ext ens i ve home-work s e pa r a t i on, t he de l i be r nt e l y- c a l l e d meet i ng.
r a l l y . demonst r at i on and s t r i k e t ook over .
I n t h i s s e t of changes. i t is hard t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e e f f e c t s of
a l t e r a t i o n s i n d a i l y r out i ne s from t h e e f f e c t s of our next f a c t or : changes
i n t h e r e l e va nt gr oups' i n t e r n a l or gnni znt i on. Dai l y r out i ne s ond i n-
t e r n a l or ga ni z a t i on over l ap. The t hr e e s t a g e s correspond approxi mat el y
t o pur e c r a f t or gani zat i on, t h e organization of pr ol e t a r i a ni z l ng t r ade0
and t h e f ul l - f l edged p r o l e t a r i a n s t r u c t u r e . The r e l i g i o u s c onf r a t e r ni t y is
a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c expr es s i on of s o l i d a r i t y a t t he f i r s t s t a ge , t he mutual-
be ne f i t s oc i e t y a t t h e second, t h e bur e a uc r a t i c t r a d e uni on a t t h e t hi r d.
These s h i f t s i n or gani zat i on i n t e r a c t wi t h changi ng d a i l y r out i ne s t o
make d i f f e r e n t forms of c o l l e c t i v e nct i on f e a s i b l e nnd ndvant ap, eo~~a.
Pr i o r exper i ence a l s o count s. The r el evant exper i ence i nc l ude s bot h
t he cont ender ' s own s ucces s es o r f n i l u r e a and t he contender's obs er vnt i ons
of ot her s i mi l a r groups. We nee Lliat bl end of previ oun p r a c t i c e and ob-
s e r va t i on i n t he r i c h s t r e e t t he a t e r which grew up i n t h e American col oni es
from t h e Stamp Act c r i s i s of 1765 Lo t he Revol ut i on. Mock t r i a l s , pn-
r adi ng of e f f i g i e s , r i t u a l i z e d a t t a c k s on t he homes nnd o f f i c e p of r oynl
o f f i c i a l s , t a r r i n g and f e a t he r i ng of Loya l i s t s accompanied p e t i t i o n s , de-
c l a r a t i o n s and solemn assembl i es. Wi t hi n weeks of Bost on' s f i r s t di s pl a y
of a boot cont ai ni ng a d e v i l a s a symbol of Stamp Act promoter Lord Bute.
t he boot and d e v i l had become s t andar d p a r t i c i p a n t s i n urban gat her i ngs t o
oppose t h e Stamp Act up and down t h e American c oa s t . The p a r t i c u l a r form
and cont ent of t hes e ga t he r i ngs were new. But a l l t h e i r pr i nc i pa l el e-
ments were a l r e a dy wel l - es t abl i s hed ways of de a l i ng wi t h decl ar ed enemies
of t h e peopl e. The p r i o r exper i ence of urban s a i l o r s , a r t i s a n s and mer-
chant s shaped t he r evol ut i onar y r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on.
Repressi on l i kewi s e a f f e c t s t he r e p e r t o i r e . Repressi on makes a
l a r g e di f f e r e nc e i n t h e s hor t r un because ot he r powerful groups a f f e c t
t he r e l a t i v e c o s t s and pr obabl e r e t u r n s of d i f f e r e n t forms of a c t i on
t h e o r e t i c a l l y o v s i l ~ b l e t o a p a r t i c u l a r group. It a l s o mat t er s i n t h e
l ong run hecause t h a t s o r t of c os t - s e t t i ng t ends t o e l i mi na t e some forms
I I
of a c t i o n a s i t channel s behavi or i n t o ot he r s . The wi despread l e ga l i z a -
t i o n of t he s t r i k e i n t he 1860s and 1870s s o i ncr eas ed i t s a t t r a c t i v e n e s s
i
r e l a t i v e t o d i r e c t a t t a c k s on empl oyers end on i n d u s t r i a l pr oper t y t h a t
t h e l a t t e r v i r t u a l l y di sappear ed from t he workers' r e pe r t oi r e . Al l t he s e
changes, however, occur wi t h a l a g. The forms of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on which
worked dur i ng t h e l a s t c r i s i s have a s p e c i a l appeal dur i ng t h i s one a s
we l l . Thus t h e s ucces s es and f a i l u r e s of cont ent i on f o r power produce
changes i n t he r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , but onl y wi t hi n t h e l i m i t s
s e t by t he a c t o r s ' own d a i l y r out i nc s and concept i ons of j u s t i c e .
The i dea of a st andar d r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i ons . i f cor -
r e c t , s i mp l i f i e s t he s t udy of v a r i a t i o n s i n c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on from one
pl ace, t i me and popul at i on t o anot her . It s i mp l i f i e s by br eaki ng t he
problem i n t o two pa r t s : how t he popul at i on i n ques t i on came t o have i t s
p a r t i c u l a r r e p e r t o i r e , how t h e popul at i on s e l e c t e d a p a r t i c u l a r form of
a c t i o n ( or no a c t i on a t a l l ) from t h a t r e pe r t oi r e . The a n a l y s i s of inno-
va t i on i n c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n -- f o r example, t he i nvent i on and dl f f us i on
of t h e s i t - i n a s a way of pr es s i ng f o r equal r i g h t s i n publ i c nccomoda-
t i o n s -- br eaks ne a t l y i n t o t h e same two pa r t s .
The i dea of a s t andar d r e p e r t o i r e a l s o pr ovi des i n s i g h t i n t o "con-
t agi on" and "spont anei t y" i n c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. It r a i s e s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y
t h a t when a p a r t i c u l a r form of r i o t o r demonst r at i on s pr eads r a pi dl y, what
d i f f u s e s i s not t h e model of t h e behavi or i t s e l f , but t he i nf or mat i on --
c or r e c t o r not -- t h a t t i e c os t a and b e n e f i t s as s oci at ed wi t h t h e a c t i on
have suddenl y changed. The news t h a t t he a u t h o r i t i e s o r e ( or a r e not )
cr acki ng down on demonst r at or s i n c i t y A f i l t e r s r a pi dl y t o c i t y B. and
i nf l uences t he e s t i ma t e s of p o t e n t i a l demonst r at or s i n c i t y B a s t o t he
pr obabl e consequences of demonst r at i ng. I n t h a t r egar d t he gr ouches
who ar gue t h a t government al "permi si veness" wi l l encourage more a g i t a t i o n
a r e o f t e n r i g h t . It is c l e a r . l i kewi s e, t h a t an a c t i on can be "spon-
t aneous" i n t h e s ens e of not havi ng been pl anned i n advance by any of t he
p a r t i c i p a n t s , and ye t be hi ghl y or gani zed, even r i t u a l i z e d . There t he
grouches a r e us ua l l y wrong; t h e grouchy i n c l i n a t i o n is t o a t t r i b u t e sus-
t a i ne d, concer t ed a c t i on t o some s o r t of conspi r acy.
A Case i n Poi nt : The S t r i k e
Over t h e l a s t cent ur y o r s o, Gie most v i s i b l e a l t e r a t i o n of t he
wor ki ng- cl ass r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on i n ve s t e r n c ount r i e s has
been t h e r i s e of t he s t r i k e . Some form of concer t ed work st oppage goes
f a r back i n t i me. What i s more, t h e i de a muat have been i nvent ed i nde-
pendent l y many t i mes; t he d i s p a r a t e words f o r t he s t r i k e which emerged
i n va r i ous European l anguages suggest mul t i pl e or i gi ns : s ci oper o, t ur nout ,
Streik, grsve, zabastovka, huelga. f evert he less, strikes were rare
events at the beginning of the nineteenth century. By 1900, they were
routine facts of working-class life. They were generally illegal, and
frequently prosecuted, in 1800. . A century later, they were generally
legal, and rarely prosecuted. What is more, in most western countries
the intensity of strike activity continued to rise past the middle of the
twentieth century (see Hibbs 1976). 'In the process, atrikes routinized:
settled down to a few standard formats, acquired their own jurisprudence,
became objects of official statistics. By "routinized," I do not mean
calmed down." Despite the complex, standard rules according to which
they are played, pr of e s s i ~nal hoc ke ~mat c he s are often angry, bone-crun-
ching affairs. The same is true of atrikes.
llow and why did strikes enter the repertoire? In multiple ways,
proletarianization created the strike. By definition, proletarianization
created the worker who exercised little or no discretionnry control over
the means of production and who was dependent for survival on the sale of
his or her labor power. That proletarian and the worker threatened with
becoming that proletarian have long been the chief participants in strikes.
(The word "proletarian" has, alas, recently lost some of the precision
Marx gave it in Dns Kapital. In Marx's analysis the central elements were
sepnration from the means of production + wage-labor. Agricultural workers
were. in fact, the chief historical case Marx discussed. He certainly
did not concentrate on unskilled factory workers.) Of all workers, the
proletarian moat clearly had interests opposing him directly to his em-
ployer. The proletarinn had the moat to gain through the'withh~ldin~
of labor power, and the least to gain by other means.
No w, the pace of proletarianization increased greatly during the
nineteenth century. My own minimum guess is that in Europe as a whole from
1800 to 1900, while the total population rose from about 190 million to 500
million, the proletarian population increased from about 90 million to 300
I
million. If that is true, the very kinds of workers who were the prime
candidates for strike activity were multiplying. Furthermore. many strikes
were about proletarianization. Whether the immediate iasue was wages.
hours or working conditions. the underlying struggle c m o n l y turned about
the employer's effort to exercise greater and greater control over the dia-
position of the means of production, and therefore over the worker's own
use of his labor. .
In his lucid analysis of "remuneration systems," Bernard Mottee dis-
cusses the broad nineteenth-century movement from various forms of task
compensation to various forms of time-effort compensation. A clear exnmple
of task compensation is the set of contracting systems (marchandage) in
which a family or work team undertook to produce a certain number of Fin-
ished objects meeting certain standards at an agreed-upon price. Nuch
mining, woodworking and textile production once took place under contracting
arrangements. Indeed, early quasi-factories often consisted of assemblages
of more or less autonomous artisans who brought their own tools and ma-
terials into a c m o n workplace. (Michael llanagan gives the example of the
artisanal filemakers of nineteenth-century Le Chambon-Feugerolles, near
St. Etienne, who sometimes worked at home and sometimes in omall shops, de-
pending on
inclination and the current level of activity in the
trade. )
Time-effort compensation takes many forms. but the two most obviolle
are the hourly wage and piecework. Piecework differo greatly from taskwork:
the employer characteristically owns the materials, tools and workplace.
and controls the basic location, timing and routines of the work; in ad-
dition, the "piece" in question is not normally a finished product, but one
small portion of it. Most contemporary forms of production incentives fall
into the same category. They assume a proletarian labor force, while task-
work and contracting assume workers who have substantial control over the
means and conditions of production.
As Mottez points out, a nineteenth-century entrepreneur who wanted
to assemble a group of relatively skilled workers into a good-sized pro-
ductive unit had no choice but to adopt some form of task compensation.
But when capital accumulated, when the scale of production rose, and when
innovations in technology and work-discipline made it possible to routinize.
subdivide and demystify the basic productive tasks, employers pushed toward
greater and greater pre-planning and surveillance of the entire process.
That included pushing toward time-effort compensation.
In general, workers resisted the entire process when they could. Not
that they were simple conservatives; although on the average they did prefer
work arran~ements they knew and could somehow manage to those they did not
know, their resistance sometimes took the form of demands for radical reor-
ganization of work and social life: the word "socialism" itself originally
represented the vision of a social order in whicli producers would control
their own fates. The strike grew up as one of the primary means by which
artisans threatened with proletarianization and semi-proletarians threatened
with complete loss of control over the disposition of their labor fought
back.
If my analysis is correct, the strike entered the collective-action
repertoires of European workers as a reactive means, but later became a
primary meana of collective proaction. In the process, the strike routinized.
One sign is its legalization. Moat western countries legalized some form
of strike activity during the latter half of the njneteenth century: Creat
Britain led the way in 1824. Saxony followed in 1861, France in 1864. Bel-
gium in 1866. Prusaia in 1869. Austria in 1870. Another sign js the advent
of regular statistical reporting: there, the 1880s and 1890s saw tlie
launching of annual strike statistics in many western countries. including
the United States. A third sign is the growth of professional bureaucracies
devoted to monitoring, regulating, reporting and, on occasion. settling
strikes. These officials, employers and organized workers hammered out
standard definitions of strikes and lockouts. They worked out rules con-
cerning the proper behavior of the parties to a strike. They developed
meana of registering and publicizing a strike's end and outcome. They, the
courts, police and other public officials were fixing the precise place
of the strike in the day's repertoire of collect~ve action. To he sure.
the rules remained uncertain in important regards, the rules changed na
the balance of power changed, and most of tlie rule-making occurred as a
by-product of bitter struggle. That is the way repertoires of collcctive
action usually change. -
Michelle Perrot's collective biography of the roughly 3,000 strikes
which occurred in France from 1870 to 1890 catches an important period in
the routinization of the strike. The book is a feast: rich with the folk-
lore, rhetoric and tactics of strike activity, jammed with telling obser-
vation on the context of the issues about which workers struck. The
largest theme of the book, however, is that the 18908 tamed and drilled
the strike, which had previously displayed great spontaneity, and had ex-
pressed the immediate concerns of workers quite directly. The growth of
large, centralized labor unions, in Perrot's view, helped smother the strike's
creativity, its spontaneity, perhaps its revolutionary potential. On the
last point some doubt remnins: the 18900 brought a great swelling of strike
activity, an outpouring of revolutionary displays on the occasion of May
Day and the great strlken, and the heyday of anarcho-syndicelism. Further-
more, smaller-scale workers' organizations had been crucial to the develop-
ment of local strike activity before 1890. Nevertheless, the main obser-
vation stands: through an interplny of unions, workers, government and em-
ployers, the strike was indeed standardizing.
In terms of the checklist of factors in the production of collective-
action repertoires which we looked at earlier, the nineteenth century
crystallization of the strike looks something like this: ,
1. prevailing standards of rights and justice: artisanal view that
the contribution of labor gives n right to control the dinposition
of its product and the conditions of.its use. confronting bourgeois
view that the ownership of capital bestows a right to its untrammeled
disposition;
2. daily routines of the population: increasing concentration of
workcra in large shops and the equivalent;
3. population's internal organization: combination of residues of
croft organization, e'mployer pressure toward proletarianization,
increasing residential segregation of workers;
4. accumulated experience with collective action: demonstrated suc-
cess of artisanal strikes, failure of appeals to officials and
patrons;
5. pattern oE repression: increasing readiness of governmentn LO
tolerate limited forms of strike activity.
None of these explains the invention of the strike, which goes bock well be-
fore the nineteenth century. But they are a convenient inventory of the
major factors in the nineteenth-century emergence of the strike as a
standard workers' performance in western countries.
The strike continued to change in the twentieth century. Figure 5-3
shows neveral aspects of that alteration for France From 1890 to 1954.
The three-dimensionnl graphs represent the median duration, the n~~mber of
strikers per strike and the strike rnte in terms of strikes per year per
100.000 workers in the labor force. The volume of the solid gives an ap-
proximation of striker-days per year. The shape of the aolid then sums
up the combination of length, size and frequency of strj.kes. In the 18900,
French strikes were relatively small and infrequent, but they tended to last
a long time. In the,1950s. French strikes averaged large and frequent, but
short. That general change in shape was very common in western countries
(Shorter and Tilly 1974: chapter 12). It reflected. among other things,
the shift from small shops. artisnnsl organization and local unjons toward
large plants, fully proletarian workers and large-scale unione.
While these changes were quite general, nntionsl patterns of strike
activity diverged considerably. The general withering away of the strike
which many theorists expected to come with "mature" industrialization fniled
to materialize; strike frequencies, sizes and volumes genernlly rose after
World War I and remained high or cltmbed even higher after World War 11.
Yet important contrasts upened up.
One of the most dramatic contrasts separated the Scandinavian
countries from the rest of the West. While strike levels were reaching new
5-32
Figure 5-3: The Alteration of French Strike Shapes, 1890-1954.
Median Daya = 6
StrikerslStrike = 250.5
Strikes/100.000 - 2.2
8 Median DayslStrike 0 %a
Median Daya = 7
StrikerslStrike - 477.2
Strikes/100,000 - 4.9
Median Days - 1
StrikeraIStrike = 747.2
Strikea1100.000 = 9.2
heights elsewhere, they were declining in Scandinavia. Joan Lind'a com-
parison of industrial conflict in twentieth-century Britain and Sweden.
brings out an important element of that contrast. At fjrst inspection,
her findings fall into the pattern we have already discussed at length.
Time-series analyses of strike activity in both countries reveal strong re-
lationships between the level of induatrial conflict and the extent of
worker mobilization, as measured either by union membership or by union
income. But the finding is less straightforward than it sounds. In Bri-
tain the relationship is positive: the higher the mobilization level. the
more strikes. In Sweden. it is negative. Swedish strikes declined stea-
dily as union membership mounted.
That is not all. In Britain, a monthly time-series analysis in-
dicates that the repressive measures of World War I had a small dcpres-
sant effect on the overall level of strike activity (allowing for the ef-
fect of such other variables as prices and unemployment) and a larger ten-
dency to promote government-aided voluntary negotiations and binding arbi-
tration as an alternative to strike activity. But a similar analysia of
World War I1 produces no such results. There, strikes rose greatly during
the later months of the war, despite the outlawing of strikes and the es-
tablishment of compulsory arbitration in June, 1940. They roae despite
the rise of prosecutions for strikes and lockouts from fifty in 1941 to
582 in 1942 to 1,279 in 1943 (Lind 1973: 156).
The contradictions are troubling. Some of the things going on are
clear enough. In Britain, organized labor. despite the Labor Party, never
developed the continuous, intimate and reliable tie to the government that
the long incumbency of the Social Democrats nfforded to Swedish labor; in
Sweden, the stronger labor became the easier it was to settle disputes
t hrough ot he r means t han t h e s t r i k e : ne got i a t i on, l e g i s l a t i o n , gov&rnmen-
t a l pr es s ur e on t he employers. As l a bor ent er ed t h e Br i t i s h p o l i t y , mul-
t i p l e t r a de uni ons r e t a i ne d a good d e a l of autonomy; no c e n t r a l l abor or-
gani zat i on acqui r ed t h e power t o ne got i a t e f o r a l l its members o r t o f or c e
t hose members t o abi de by t he t erms of t h e i r c ont r a c t s . I n Sweden, a hi gh-
l y- cent r al i zed f e de r a t i on acqui r ed g r e a t pa r e r bot h a s a ne got i a t or and
a s an enf or cer . Under t he s e ci r cumst ances, p o l i t y membership encouraged
s t r i k e s i n Br i t a i n and made r out i ne p o l i t i c a l pr es s ur e a more a t t r a c t i v e
' a l t e r n a t i v e t o s t r i k e s i n Sweden.
David Snyder' s anal ys es of i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t i n I t a l y , France
and t he United St n t e s l i ke wi s e poi nt t wa r d a more complex model of power-
hol di ng. When Snyder t e s t s s t andar d economic models on annual s t r i k e
s e r i e s r unni ng from t h e l a t e ni net eent h cent ur y t o around 1970, he f i n d s
t hey have uns a t i s f s c t or y ( al t hough not ne gl i gi bl e ) pr e di c t i ve power i n a l l
t hr e e c ount r i e s bef or e World War I1 and i n France and I t a l y s i n c e t hen; f o r
t he Uni t ed St a t e s , t he pr e di c t i ve power of a pur e economic model g r e a t l y
improves a f t e r World War 11. A pur e p o l i t i c a l model ( i n which uni on mem-
ber s hi p, Democrats i n Congress, pa r t y of Pr es i dent and t he pr esence of
na t i ona l e l e c t i o n s f i gur e ) pr ovi des a b e t t e r f i t t o t he obs er vat i ons i n
a l l c a s e s but t he U.S. a f t e r World War 11.
As one might expect . s s ynt he s i s of t h e economic and p o l i t i c a l
models pr ovi des t h e most a c c ur a t e pr e di c t i ons ; even t he r e , t he p o l i t i c a l
v a r i a b l e s c a r r y a major p a r t of t h e expl anat or y wei ght except i n t he r ecent
U.S. exper i ence. Snyder ' s pr opos al i s e s s e n t i a l l y t h a t t he New Deal and
t he accommodations of World War I1 st r engt hened and s t a b i l i z e d t he t i e s of
or gani zed American l abor t o t he government. I t s t a b i l i z e d t hos e t i e s s o
much t h a t pr evi ous e f f o r t s t o i nf l ue nc e t h e government i t s e l f by s t r i k e
a c t i v i t y . o r t o t a ke advar)tage of i t s momentary f avor . subsi ded i n f avor
of a fundament al l y economic c ont e s t between employers and or gani zed
workers. The c ont e s t was f ought o u t wi t hi n l i mi t s s e t and guar ant eed by
t h e government. The r o l e of t h e government remained much more cont i ngent ,
t h e power of or gani zed l abor much weaker and more va r i a bl e , i n I t a l y
I
and France.
Snyder ' s b e s t - f i t t i n g composi t e models resembl e t he ones which
Edward Shor t er end I found t o be most e f f i c i e n t i n account i ng f o r yenr-to-
year f l u c t u a t i o n s i n French s t r i k e a c t i v i t y between 1885 and 1965 ( Shor t er
I
and T i l l y 1974, esp. chapt er 4) . Snyder improves on our foumul at i on by
c l a r i f y i n g t h e e f f e c t of l a bor ' s r e l a t i o n t o aovernment. H i s account of
changes i n t h a t r egar d resembl es Li nd' s comparison of Br i t a i n and Sweden.
Douglas Hibbs has br ought a s i mi l a r per s pect i ve t o bear on twen-
!
t i et h- cent ur y s t r i k e t r e nds i n Belgium. Canada, Denmark. Fi nl and, Prance,
I t a l y . Japan. Net her l ands, Norway. Sweden, Uni t ed Kingdom and Uni t ed
I
St a t e s (Hibbs 1976). Hi s ge ne r a l concl usi ons r un a s f o l l ws :
. . . s t r i k e a c t i v i t y is one mani f es t at i on f~ ongoi n8 s t r u g g l e
f o r power between s o c i a l c l a s s e s over t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of r es our ces ,
-
p r i n c i p a l l y al t hough not excl us i vel y na t i ona l income. The main
t h e s i s of t h e s t udy is t h a t long-run changes i n t he volume of i n-
d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t a r e l a r g e l y expl ai ned by changes i n t h e l oc us of
t he d i s t r i b u t i o n a l s t r uggl e . S t r i k e a c t i v i t y has decl i ned dmma-
-
t i c a l l y i n na t i ons where Soc i a l Democratic o r Labor p a r t i e s assumed
power i n t h e 1930s -- o r j u s t a f t e r t he second World War -- and
cr eat ed t he modern "wel f ar e s t a t e " . I n t he s e c ount r i e s an enor-
mous f r a c t i o n of t h e na t i ona l income n w pas s es t hrough t h e publ i c
s e c t o r and is a l l oc a t e d by t h e p o l i t i c a l pr ocess. P o l i t i c a l con-
f l i c t between l e f t - and ri ght -wi ng p a r t i e s i n t h e e l e c t o r a l
ar ena . . . has r epl aced i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t between l a bor and ca-
p i t o l i n t he p r i v a t e s e c t o r . . . a s t h e ul t i ma t e mechanism f o r t he
d i s t r i b u t i o n of na t i ona l income. By comparison, i n c ount r i e s go-
verned more o r l e s s cont i nuousl y by bour geoi s p a r t i e s of t he c e nt e r
and r i g h t . t he p r i v a t e s e c t o r cont i nues t o domi nat e t he a l l o c a t i o n
a s we l l a s t he pr oduct i on of r es our ces . The economic mar ket pl ace
remains t h e pri mary l ocus of d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t i n t he s e na-
t i ons , and, consequent l y, t h e aver age l e v e l of s t r i k e a c t i v i t y has
been r e l a t i v e l y cons t ant f o r t hr ee- quar t er s of a cent ur y o r more
(Ilibbs 1976: 26-27; i t a l i c s i n o r i g i n a l ) .
Synt hes i zi ng tlce f i ndi ngs of Li nd, Snyder and Hi bbs, we a r r i v e a t a tri-
p a r t i t e di vi s i on: 1 ) c ount r i e s i n which t he market is t h e l ocus of d i s t r i -
but i ona l c o n f l i c t and t he r e l a t i o n s h i p of l abor and management t o govern-
ment r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e ; t he r e , market v a r i a t i o n s s t r ongl y a f f e c t t he l e v e l
of s t r i k e a c t i v i t y ; 2) c ount r i e s i n which a l l o c a t i o n de c i s i ons a r e b a s i c a l l y
under p o l i t i c o 1 c ont r ol ; t he r e , s t r i k e a c t i v i t y is low o r non- exi st ent , and
t he r e a l d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t s occur i n t he cour s e of e l e c t i o n s and
ot her p o l i t i c a l c ont e s t s ; 3) c ount r i e s i n which t he l oc us of a l l o c a t i o n de-
c i s i o n s i s i t s e l f a t i s s ue ; t he r e , shor t - r un p o l i t i c a l f l ~r c t u a t i o n s st r ong-
l y a f f e c t s t r i k e a c t i v i t y . The form of s t r i k e a c t i v i t y -- f o r example,
t h e pr eval ence of t h e one-day p r o t e s t s t r i k e -- undoubt edl y v a r i e s i n a
p a r a l l e l way.
A l l t hes e anal ys es br i ng o u t t h e g r e a t i mport ance of mobi l i zat i on,
a t l e a s t a s r epr es ent ed by uni oni zat i on of t he workforce. A l l of them i n-
d i c a t e t h a t t h e most d i r e c t wny i n which shor t - r un economic f l u c t u a t i o n s
promote s t r i k e o c t i v i t y is not t hrough t h e i mposi t i on of hardslcips but
t hrough t h e pr ovi s i on of oppor t uni t i e s t o a c t on gr i evances o r os pi r a-
t i ons l ong nur t ur ed. As a r e s u l t of t he s e and ot he r r ecent s t u d i e s , tlcere
i s l i t t l e remai ni ng doubt concer ni ng a ge ne r a l tendency of s t r i k e a c t i -
v i t y t o r i s e wi t h economic expansi on and f a l l wi t h cont r act l oci (e.8. Knovlcs
1952. Weintraub 1966. As henf el t er and Johnson 1969. Vonderkamp 1970. Skeel s
1971, Kael bl e and Volkmann 1972). None of t he s e anal ys es at t ncl cen much i m-
por t ance t o i t s complement, f a c i l i t a t i o n , i n t he nense of government ac-
t i o n s l ower i ng t h e c o s t of s t r i k e a c t i v i t y t o workers.
The comparison of d i f f e r e n t na t i ona l p a t t e r n s br i ngs out two i n-
t e r e s t i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s . F i r s t , t h e s t r i k e is onl y one of s e ve r a l means of
a c t i o n open t o workers. At d i f f e r e n t t i mes, p o l i t i c a l pr es s ur e, sabot nge,
demonst r at i ons and occtcpation of t h e workpl ace a l l become n t t r n c t i v e s1-
t e r n a t i v e s t o s t r i k i n g . The workers' r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s nl -
ways i ncl udes more i t ems t han t he s t r i k e . Furt hermore, whet her a pa r t i -
c u l a r s t r u g g l e a c t u a l l y produces a work st oppage depend0 on t he belcavlor
of t he ot he r p a r t i e s : management f i r s t of a l l , uni ons and government i n
many cas es . The l e v e l of s t r i k e a c t i v i t y is t he r e f or e a t bent nn imper-
f e c t i ndi c a t or of worki ng-cl ass c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on a s a whole. A pr oper
expl anat i on of s t r i k e a c t i v i t y must i ncl ude en account hot h of tlce choi ce
among a l t e r n a t i v e forms of c o l l e c t i v e oc t i on and of t h e pr oces s of nego-
t i a t i o n .
The second d i f f i c u l t y is t h a t t h e of t he t i e s between or gani zed
l abor and government a f f e c t s s t r i k e a c t i v i t y q u i t e s t r ongl y. To t he e xt e nt
t h a t l abor or ga ni z a t i ons become powerful wi t hi n t h e government ond a c qui r e
c ont r ol over t he c o l l e c t i v e oc t i on of workers i n gener al , s t r i k i n g becomes
a r e l a t i v e l y expensi ve way of doi ng l a bor ' s busi ness. To t he e xt e nt t h a t
t he t h r e a t o r promi se of government i nt e r ve nt i on i n s t r i k e s de c l i ne s .
-
workers become f r e e t o t une t h e i r s t r i k e a c t i v i t y t o t h e rhythms of t he
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economy. Tlie t h r e a t o r promise of government i nt e r ve nt i on depends on t h e
s t r u c t u r e of power among l a bor , management and t h e government.
El ect i ons , Dcmonst rat i ons and P o l i t i c a l Systems
The l es s on is more gener al . The si mpl e model of t h e p o l i t y l a i d
out e a r l i e r pr ovi des a u s e f u l s t a r t i n g poi nt , but i t mi sses t h e i mport ance
of p o l i t i c a l c o a l i t i o n s and of t h e means of a c t i on b u i l t i n t o t h e e x i s t i n g
p o l i t i c a l or gani zat i on. The us e of e l e c t i o n s t o do publ i c bus i nes s is a
major cas e t n poi nt . P o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s have l ong s i n c e not i ced t h a t
t h e e s t a bl i s l me nt of bi ndi ng na t i ona l e l e c t i o n s promotes t h e growth of po-
l i t i c a l p a r t i e s -- not onl y because governments t end t o l e g a l i z e e l e c t i o n s
and p a r t i e s a t t h e same t i me but because e l e c t o r a l compet i t i on gi ve s such
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a pa t e nt advant age of i n t e r e s t s which a r e or gani zed i n p a r t i e s . I t hi nk
t he e f f e c t of e l e c t o r a l syst ems on t h e p a t t e r n of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on is even
more gener al . A comparison of t l i e h i s t o r i e s of cont ent i ous c o l l e c t i v e ac-
t i o n i n I t a l y , Germany, Fr ance and England ( Ti l l y. T i l l y and T i l l y 1975) sug- .
g e s t s a c l os e connect i on between t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of na t i ona l e l e c t i o n s and
t he us e of f or mal a s s oc i a t i ons of a l l s o r t s a s ve hi c l e s f o r c o l l e c t i v e ac-
t i on. The gr c nt pr ol i f e r a t i on' of cl ubs , c i r c l e s and s o d a l i t i e s i n t h e
French. German and I t a l i a n r e vol ut i ons of 1848 ( i n which expanding t h e el ec-
t o r a t e and i ncr eas i ng t he p o l i t i c a l s i gni f i c a nc e of e l e c t i o n s were s t andar d
p a r t s of t h c r evol ut i onar y program) i l l u s t r a t e s t h e connect i on. The ex-
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per i ence of t hose same c ount r i e s a l s o makes pl a us i bl e t h e hypot hesi s t h a t
t h c growth of e l e c t i o n s promotes t h e c r y s t a l l i z a t i o n and spr ead of t he de-
monst r at i on a s n form of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on.
Why?
Because of an umbrel l a e f f e c t : t h e l e g a l umbrel l a r a i s e d t o
pr ot e c t t he e l e c t o r a l pr oces s , and t o keep i t huddled i n t l i e c e nt e r away
from t he r a i n , has a ragged edge. There i s s h e l t e r f o r o t h e r s a t i t s mar-
gi ns . Tlie gr a nt of l e g a l i t y t o en e l e c t o r a l a s s oc i a t i on o r an e l e c t o r a l
assembly pr ovi des a cl ai m t o l e g a l i t y f o r a s s oc i a t i ons nnd assembl i es which
a r e not q u i t e e l e c t o r a l , not only e l e c t o r a l o r not e l e c t o r s l . The
gr a nt of l e g a l i t y l ower s t h e gr oup' s c o s t s of mobi l i zat i on and c o l l e c t i v c
a c t i on. It a l s o pr ovi des a pr e s t i gi ous , a c c e s s i bl e model f o r a c t i on i n
gener al . I n t h e United St a t e s of t he 1960s we f i nd a grudgt ng gr a nt of
l egi t i macy t o t he Bl ack Pant her Pa r t y, t he Mi s s i s s i ppi Freedom Democratic
Par t y, t h e Peace and Freedom Par t y.
Agents of t he government t r i e d t o har as s a l l t he s e or gani zat i ons out
of e xi s t e nc e a t one t i me o r anot her . But t he r e formed on i mp l i c i t coal i -
t i o n between t h e or ga ni z a t i ons and "whi t e l i b e r a l s " wi t h n s t r ong i n t e r e s t
i n a broad d e f i n i t i o n of accept abl e p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . The c o a l i t f o n
made i t har der f o r t h e government t o wi t hhol d from t he qua s i - pa r t i e s r i g h t s
t o or gani ze, r e c r u i t , assembl e, s o l i c i t , publ i c i z e and demonst r at e which
e s t a bl i s he d p a r t i e s exer ci s ed a s s mat t er of cour se. Yet i t was not a pur e
power pl ay. The f a c t t h a t movements wi t h i mpor t ant a c t i v i t i e s and obj ec-
t i v e s be s i de s winning e l e c t i o n s had chosen t o or gani ze i n t h e gui s e of po-
l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i t s e l f af f or ded them a pr ot e c t i on unavai l abl e t o s i mi l a r
movements which chose t o or gani ze a s autonomous communities, mi l i t a r y
u n i t s o r c o n s p i r a t o r i a l net works. So doi ng, t o be s ur e, t hey r an t h e r i s k
of coopt at i on, i n f i l t r a t i o n and eas y s ur ve i l l a nc e . There l i e s t h e e t e r n a l
dilemma of tlie mi l i t a n t group which f i n d s a pr ot e c t i ve c l e f t i n tlie l e g a l
system: s ol i da r y r e s i s t a n c e witti a chance of de s t r uc t i on, o r a da pt a t i on
wi t h a chance of abs or pt i on o r di s s ol ut i on.
Why shoul d t he demonst r at i on pr osper a s a consequence of t he growth
of e l e c t i o n s ? Because i t s ba s i c form resembl es t h a t of tlie e l e c t o r a l ss-
sembly, and because i t pr ovi des an e f f e c t i v e means of di s pl a yi ng t l i e
s t r e n g t h of a c oot e s t a nt , sometimes of i nf l uenci ng t he outcome of an e l e c t i on.
The demonst r at i on we know ent er ed t he st andar d r e p e r t o i r e of col -
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l e c t i v e a c t i ons i n most west er n c ount r i e s dur i ng t h e ni net eent h cent ur y.
I n England and America, never t hel es s . we can s e e i t s form c r y s t a l l i z i n g be-
f o r e 1800. For s e v e r a l c e n t u r i e s , Englishmen had gat her ed i n l a r g e num-
be r s on c e r t a i n st andar d hol i days , such a s Guy Fawkes' Day. During t he
f e s t i v i t i e s t hey of t e n expr essed t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e opi ni ons of t h e da y' s he-
r oes , v i l l a i n s and f ool s . They paraded e f f i g i e s , f l o a t s , char ades and
pl acar ds . Hangings, f une r a l s , e x i t s from pr i s on, r oyal bi r t hda ys , an-
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nouncements of mi l i t a r y v i c t o r i e s drew crowds end, sometimes, concer t ed
expr es s i ons of demands, sympat hi es o r compl ai nt s. I n a l l t hes e cas es , t h e
a u t h o r i t i e s provi ded t h e occas i on and. t o some degr ee, t he s anct i on f o r t he
assembl i es i n question,. Cont est ed e l e c t i o n s f e l l e a s i l y i n t o t h e same pat -
t e r n , and t he assembl i es of s uppor t er s of d i f f e r e n t candi dat es acqui r ed
a degr ee of pr ot e c t i on.
I n t he f ul l - f l edged demonst r at i on. t h e crowd became more autonomous,
choosi ng its own occasi on and manner of assembl y. Af t e r 1750, t he preaen-
t a t i o n of a p e t i t i o n t o Par l i ament o r t o l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s now and t hen
brought t oget her t housands of peopl e i n suppor t of a common pos i t i on. The
famous Gordon r i o t s of 1778 began wi t h a meet i ng and march or gani zed around
t he pr e s e nt a t i on t o Psr l i ament of t he Pr ot e s t a nt As s oci at i on' s p e t i t i o n .
si gned by some 44,000 peopl e, a ga i ns t t h e Cat hol i c Emancipation Act of t h a t
year . Lord George Gordon l ed f our g r e a t columns of demonst r at or s t o t h e
House of Commons. They were t h e nucl eus of t h e l a r g e crowd t h a t formed
and wai t ed t hrough t h e s e s s i on i n Par l i ament Square. Lat e a t ni ght , "one
s e c t i on of tlie crowd moved of f t owards t h e p r i v a t e chapel of t he Sar-
di ni a n ambassador i n Duke S t r e e t , Li ncol n' s I nn Fi e l ds , anot her t o t h e
chapel at t ached t o t h e Bavari an Embassy i n Warwick St r e e t , St . James' .
The f i r s t , known t o be f r equent ed by Engl i sh Ca t hol i c gent r y, was burned
t o t he ground; bot h were pl undered and ransacked and t h e i r cont ent s burned
i n t h e s t r e e t s " ( ~u d e ' 1971: 221-222).
The e l e c t o r a l assembly came i n t o its own a s t h e s e t t i n g of dcmon-
s t r a t i o n a i n t h e same per i od. At t h e f i n a l e of t h e 1769 e l e c t i o n campaign
of t h e popul ar her o John Wilkes:
Wi l kes' s uppor t er s formed t hemsel ves i n t o va r i ous caval cades t h a t
paraded peacef ul l y t hrough t he s t r e e t s of London bef or e proceedi ng
t o Br ent f or d t o c a s t t h e i r vot e s . One of t hcae s e t out from t l i e
Pr i nce of Orange i n Jermyn St r e e t . bef or e whom were c a r r i e d s i x o r
seven f l a g s ( Bi l l of Ri ght s , Magna Ca r t s , e t c . ) , a l l badges of t he
d i f f e r e n t s o c i e t i e s of which Mr. Wilkes had been made a member
( ~u d ; 1962: 69).
As i t happens. Par l i ament r ef us ed t o s e a t Wilkes a f t e r h i s e l e c t i o n hy a
resoundi ng maj or i t y. That f a c t i n i t i a t e d anot her gr e a t p e t i t i o n d r i v e , .
t h i s one nat i onwi de i n scope; many of t h e p e t i t i o n s a r r i ve d a t Par l i ament
o r t h e Ki ng' s door t o t h e accompaniment of demonst r at i ng crowds. Wilkes'
s uppor t er s i n h i s r epeat ed s t r u g g l e s wi t h t h e government employed t h e
mass p e t i t i o n march wi del y t o e xhi bi t t h e i r growing s t r e ngt h.
That i nnovat i on t ook a l ong s t e p toward t he c r e a t i on of t he demon-
s t r a t i o n a s a d i s t i n c t i v e ' f o n of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. Two more changes
would compl et e t h e t r ansf or mat i on: t h e el i mi nat i on of t h e p e t i t i o n a s a
necessar y pr e t e xt f o r t h e show of s t r e ngt h, and t l i e ge ne r nl i z a t i on of
t he form of a c t i on beyond King and Par l i ament . I n t h e s t r u g g l e s between
London Radi cal s and t he Cr a m which bl azed i n t h e l a s t decades of t he
ei ght eent h cent ur y, t hos e f u r t h e r changes began t o occur .
By t he 1790s. t he Radi cal s o c i e t i e s of London and el sewher e or gani zed
demonst r at i ons, l a r g e ones, wi t h g r e a t frequency. I n She f f i e l d, accor di ng
t o E.P. Thompson:
Demonst rat i ons were hel d a t t he end of November t o c e l e b r a t e t h e
s ucces s of t he French ar mi es a t Valmy, and t hey were r epor t ed i n
t he She f f i e l d Regi s t er . . . , a weekly newspaper which suppor t ed
t he r ef or mer s. A pr ocessi on of f i v e o r s i x thousand drew a quar-
t er ed r oas t ed ox t hrough t h e s t r e e t s amid t h e f i r i n g of cannon.
I n t he pr ocessi on were -- "a c a r i c a t u r e pa i nt i ng r epr es ent i ng
Br i t anni a -- Burke r i di ng on a swi ne -- and a f i gur e , t he upper
pa r t of which wss t he l i ke ne s s of a Scot ch Secr et ar y, and t he lower
p a r t t h a t of an Ass . . . t h e pol e of Li ber t y l yi ng broken on
t he ground, i ns cr i bed ' Tr ut h i a Li bel ' - - - t h e Sun br eaki ng from
behind a Cloud, and t he Angel of Peace, wi t h one hand droppi ng t he
' Ri ght s of Man', and ext endi ng t h e ot he r t o r a i s e up Br i t a nni a
(Thompson 1963: 104).
The symbols a r e e x o t i c , r emi ni scent of William Bl ake. It is easy t o f or -
g e t , however, t h a t t went i et h- cent ur y demonst r at or s o f t e n c a r r y symbol i c
c of f i ns , and dummies, and masks. The ba s i c form of t h a t 1792 demonst r at i on
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I n Shef f i el d i s t h e one we know t oday.
i
During t he s e same ye a r s t h e demonst r at i on was becoming a s t a n-
dard way of doi ng publ i c bus i nes s i n Br i t a i n ' s North American col oni es .
. Li ke t he contemporaneous b a t t l e s over Wilkes i n England, t h e American r e-
s i s t onc e t o t he Stamp Act of 1765 hel ped s e pa r a t e t he demonst r at i on from
t h e sanct i oned ossembly, hel ped e s t a b l i s h i t s i mport ance a s a r out i ne i n-
st rument f o r t he a ppl i c a t i on of p o l i t i c a l pr es s ur e. On t he f our t e e nt h of
s t r e e t i n t o Boston; one r epr es ent ed t h e t a x stsmp d i s t r i h u t o r . Andrew
Ol i ve r , t he ot her . a l a r g e boot cont ai ni ng a d e v i l . Tlle crowd which
gat her ed r ef us ed t o l e t t h e e f f i g i e s be t aken down.
Towards eveni ng some men c u t down t h e e f f i g y of t he stamp-mnster
and pl aced i t on a b i e r , which was c a r r i e d t hrough t h e town ac-
companied by a cheer i ng and lluzzaing mul t i t ude: "Li her t y and proper-
t y f or ever , " "No stamps." "No Placemen." I n t h i s concourse,
"some of t he hi ghe s t Reput ot i on" were wal ki ng "i n t h e g r e a t e s t
or de r , " "and i n solemn manner." At t he head of t he pr ocesni on
"Fort y o r f i f t y t radesmen, decent l y dr es s ed, preceded; and some
t housands of t he mob fol l owed . . . " The concourse, ami dst t h e
accl amat i ons of l a r g e numbers of peopl e l i n i n g t h e s t r e e t , went
down b i n St r e e t . t ur ned i n t o King St r e e t and st opped under t h e
town houi e where Governor and Counci l were assembl ed. The mul t i -
t ude, we l l knowing t h i s , "gave t h r e e huzzas by Way of Defi ance,
and pass' d on" (Hoerder 1971: 153).
The g r e a t elm which hel d t he e f f i g i e s l a t e r became famous a s t he Li ber t y
Tr ee. It was t h e model f o r t housands of l i b e r t y t r e e s consecr at ed. and
s t r uggl ed over , i n America. Lat er t he Li ber t y Tr ee became a pri me symbol
i n Revol ut i onar y France. I n many h i s t o r i e s t he r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e Stamp
Act count s a s t h e begi nni ng of t he American Revol ut i on. The demonntrs-
t i o n t ook an i mpor t ant and dur abl e pl a c e i n t he American r e p e r t o i r e of
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s s a t h a t r evol ut i onar y movement swel l ed.
The c a s e of t he demonst r at i on t eaches a ge ne r a l l es s on. Tlle forms,
f r equenci es and per sonnel of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on depend i nt i ma t e l y on tile
e x i s t i n g s t r u c t u r e of government and p o l i t i c s . When we begi n r e f i n i n g t he
August two e f f i g i e s appeared, suspended from s g r e a t t r e e on a s t r a t e g i c
si mpl e model of government, p o l i t y and cont ender s wi t h which we s t a r t e d ,
we must pay a t t e n t i o n t o t h e s p e c i f i c r u l e s of p o l i t y membership, t he
e x i s t i n g p a t t e r n of r e pr e s s i on and f n c i l i t a t i o n , t he r i g h t s cl ai med by
d i f f e r e n t cont ender s. Our el ement ar y model does l i t t l e more t hen spe-
c i f y i n what connect i ons each of t he s e v a r i a b l e s shoul d be s i g n i f i c a n t .
On t h e ques t i on of p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s , f o r i ns t ance, t he argument
unfol ded s o f a r f a vor s a view of t h e r i g h t t o vot e , t o p e t i t i o n , t o
assembl e, t o publ i s h, and s o on a s a ) c ons i s t i ng not of a ge ne r a l pr i n-
c i p l e , but of a s p e c i f i c cl ai m of a def i ned cont ender on a c e r t a i n gov-
e r me n t , b) coming i n t o bei ng a s t he r e s u l t of s t r uggl e s among mobi l i zed
cont ender s and governments. Thus t h e common i dea of s t andar d s e t of
p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s gr adual l y extended from a s mal l e l i t e t o t he ge ne r a l popu-
l a t i o n is mi sl eadi ng. Not wrong, because on t h e whole t h e s ha r e of t h e
popul at i on havi ng enf or ceabl e cl ai ms on var i ous na t i ona l governments wi t h
r e s pe c t t o vot i ng, p e t i t i o n i n g , assembl i ng, and publ l s hi ng has expanded
enormously over t h e l a s t two c e nt ur i e s , has i ncr eas ed i n d i s t i n c t s t e p s
from e l i t e s t o or di nar y peopl e, has not cont r act ed d r a s t i c a l l y once i t
has g r a m. Never t hel ess mi sl eadi ng, because t h e s i mi l a r cl ai ms or di nar y
peopl e hnve had on ot he r governments ( e s pe c i a l l y l o c a l governments) have
gener al l y dwindled i n t he same pr ocess, and because each s t e p of t he ex-
pansi on hns us ua l l y occur r ed i n r esponse t o t h e demand of some wel l -
def i ned cont ender o r c o n l i t i o n of cont ender s.
The f a c t t h a t t h e r i g h t s c ons i s t of enf or ceabl e cl ai ms on t h e gov-
ernment by p a r t i c u l n r groups makes i t l e s s puzzl i ng t h a t such el ement ary
r i g h t s a s nssembly nnd p e t i t i o n shoul d be s o e a s i l y deni ed t o chal l enger s
whose per s onal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , ohj e c t i ve s o r a c t i v i t i e s a r e unaccept abl e
t o most ot he r groups: p r o s t i t u t e s , mi l l e n n i a l i s t s . Fa s c i s t s , homosexuals.
The d e n i a l of r i g h t s t o a chal l enger onl y t hr e a t e ns t he r i g h t s of e x i s t i n g
members of t he p o l i t y when t h e c ha l l e nge r ' s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , or gani zat i on.
obj e c t i ve s o r a c t i v i t i e s resembl e t hos e of some members, o r when o coal i -
t i o n between chal l enger and member has formed.
Al l our i n q u i r i e s i n t o t he forms and f r equenci es of c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i o n event ual l y l ead us back t o ques t i ons of power. A c l o s e l ook st
compet i t i ve, r e a c t i v e and pr oa c t i ve forms of a c t i on d i s s o l v e s t h e common
d i s t i n c t i o n between "pr e- pol i t i cal ' ' and " pol i t i c a l " p r o t e s t . A c a r e f u l
expl or at i on of t h e cont ext of s t r i k e a c t i v i t y chal l enges t h e s epnr at i on
of "economic" and " pol i t i c a l " c o n f l i c t s from each ot he r . A t hought f ul r e-
f l e c t i o n on t h e demonst r at i on, t he c h a r i v a r i and t h e food r i o t r a i s e s fun-
dament al doubt s about any e f f o r t t o s i n g l e out a c l a s s of spont aneous, ex-
pr e s s i ve , i mpul si ve, evanescent crowd a c t i o n s -- al t hough i t conf i r ms
t h e i mport ance of c r e a t i v i t y , i nnovat i on, dramo and symbolism wi t hi n t he
l i m i t s s e t by t he e x i s t i n g r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on nnd t he e x i s t i n g
s t r u c t u r e of power.
CiIAPTER 6: COLLECTLVE VIOLENCE
Br i t i s h Rrawls a s Col l e c t i ve Vi ol ence
"We n l l know what a nomi nat i on day i s l i k e , " commented The Times
i n June 1868.
The pr es i di ng f unct i onar y bespeaks s f a i r hear i ng f o r bot h s i d e s ,
and i t is we l l i f he g e t s t o t he end of h i s few s ent ences wi t hout
d e r i s i v e cheer s and i r o n i c a l c r i e s e xpl i c a bl e onl y by a l o c a l
hi s t or i a n. Af t er t h a t no one g e t s s hear i ng. Unceasing clamour
pr e va i l s ; pr oposer s, seconder s, and candi dat es speak i n dumb show,
o r conf i dc t h e i r s ent i ment s t o t h e r e por t e r s ; heads a r e broken,
bl ood fl ows from numerous noses, and t he judgment of t h e e l e c t o r s
is gener al l y s ubj ect ed t o a s ever e t r a i n i n g a s a pr el i mi nar y t o
t h e vot i ng of t h e f ol l owi ng day ( Ri cht er 1971: 21).
A s Donald Ri cht er s ays , t h e j e e r s and br awl s which r e gul a r l y accompanied
ni nct eent h- cent ur y e l e c t i o n s b e l i e bot h t h e or de r l y r e put a t i on of Vi ct or i an
Br i t a i n and t h e not i on t h a t e l e c t o r a l reform + r egul ar pol i c i ng c i v i c
calm. Ni net eent h-cent ury Br i t i s h e l e c t i o n s -- and much ot he r publ i c l i f e
i n Br i t a i n a s we l l -- r an vi ol e nt . "Publ i c rowdi ness and r e s i s t a n c e t o
a ut hor i t y, " concl udes Ri cht er , "have been nur t ur ed i n t o t h e Br i t i s h
c ha r a c t e r t hrough c e nt ur i e s of i ndependence and p o l i t i c a l i nt r ans i geance"
( Ri cht er 1971: 28). Ri c ht e r ' s i de a resembl es t he sent i ment of t he
ni net eent h- cent ur y a u t h o r i t i e s : t h a t t hey were deal i ng wi t h n a t u r a l l y
unr ul y peopl e who had t o be checked, t r a i ne d and c i v i l i z e d .
The d i f f i c u l t y wi t h t h i s s o r t of c ha r a c t e r ol ogi c a l expl anat i on of
vi ol ence is t h a t i t e xpl a i ns t oo much, o r not hi ng st a l l . Too much, i n
t h a t t h e r e is no v i o l e n t a c t i on t o which i t coul d not appl y i n pr i nc l pl e ,
and t he r e f or e no way t o prove i t wrong. Nothing st a l l . i n t h a t i t
f i n a l l y r educes t o a de s c r i pt i on of what has t o be expl oi ned. Aval l nbl e
account s of ni net eent h- cent ur y Br i t i s h electoral vi ol ence, however, gi ve
us hope of escapi ng from t aut ol ogy and of de t e c t i ng r egul or r e l a t i o n s h i p s
between t l i e p a t t e r n of c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence and t l i e na t ur e of c ur r e nt
s t r uggl e s over r i g h t s and power.
As i t happens. Ri cht er hi msel f gi ve s u s nome val uabl e i nf or mat i on
on t h e o r i g i n s of Br i t i s h e l e c t o r a l rowdi ness. "It wns not u n c mo n , "
he r e por t s :
f o r agent s of t h e candi dat es , not al ways wi t hout t h e l a t t e r ' s
cogni zance, t o h i r e gangs of r u f f i a n s from nearby collieries t o
i nt i mi da t e and bul l y r i v a l vot e r s . A wi t nes s bef or e t h e Pnrl i nment nry
Committee i nve s t i ga t i ng t h e e l e c t i o n of 1868 t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t
Br i s t o l Li be r a l agent s from London or gani zed end pai d "f l yi ng
columns," bands of from 200 t o 300 men r e c r ui t e d from t he Br i s t ol
suburbs. isp posed i n quas i - mi l i t ar y f or mat i on and armed wi t h
bl udgeons, t hey appeared on e l e c t i o n day a t va r i ous pol l i ng boot hs
and dr ove of f Conser vat i ve vot er s " ( Ri cht er 1965: 180).
More ge ne r a l l y, t l i e s uppor t er s of a gi ven candi dat e -- hf r ed o r not --
o f t e n made a hol i day of t h e e l e c t i o n , s por t i ng t h e i r col or s . dr i nki ng
amply t o t h e he a l t h of t h e i r champion, j e e r i ng h i s r i v a l s , brawl i ng wi t h
t he be a r e r s of ot he r c ol or s . Thi s behavi or may exempl i fy "publ i c rowdincsa
and r e s i s t a n c e t o a ut hor i t y, " but i t n l s o i d e n t i f i e s a c l e n r e r l i n k betwecn
vi ol ence and or gani zed s t r u g g l e s f o r power t han The Times commentntor was
ready t o concede.
Two ye a r s bef or e t h e 1868 e l e c t i o n , t h e Tory government which had
newly come t o power announced, t hrough Di s r a e l i . t h a t i t would not neces-
s a r i l y t ake up par l i ament ar y r ef or m i n t h e next s e s s i on. The Reform
Lesgue c a l l e d f o r a mass meet i ng i n Hyde Park on 23 J ul y 1866. The
meet i ng was t h e occasi on f o r what Fr anci s Sheppard c a l l s t h e "only
s i g n i f i c a n t out br eak' of vi ol ence" i n t he g r e a t campaign l eadi ng up t o
t he Reform Bi l l of 1867:
The l aw o f f i c e r s of t he Crown had deci ded t h a t t he Crown had t h e
r i g h t t o c l o s e t h e g a t e s , and t he llome Secr et ar y. Spencer Walpole,
now deci ded t o e xe r c i s e t h i s r i g h t . On bei ng informed of t h i s t he
l e a de r s of t he League deci ded never t hel es s t o march t o llyde Park,
and i f prevent ed from e nt e r i ng, t o proceed t o Tr a f a l ga r Square.
Pr i nt ed l e a f l e t s t o t h i s e f f e c t were d i s t r i b u t e d i n l a r g e numbers.
When t he l e a de r s of t h e pr oces s i on reached Marble Arch t hey found
t he ga t e s cl os ed and a l a r g e body of pol i c e assembl ed. Af t e r bei ng
r ef used admi ssi on by t h e pol i c e commissioner, S i r Ri chard Mayne.
Beal es and t h e crowd near him l e f t f o r Tr a f a l ga r Square. But ot he r
pr oces s i ons were st i l l s r r i v i n g , c o n t r o l br oke down, and soon a
densely-packed mass of men were pr es s i ng a ga i ns t t h e r a i l i n g s . The
r a i l i n g s and stonework were ol d and week, and breach a f t e r br each
was qui ckl y made al ong Par k Lane and t h e Bayswater Road. The pol i c e
r e s i s t e d t he s e i ncur s i ons , and s c u f f l i n g broke o u t , but many t housands
of peopl e were now i n s i d e t h e par k, and even s company of t he
Gr enadi er Guards, whose a r r i v a l was l oudl y cheer ed, coul d not ous t
t h e i nvader s except by t he us e of f i r ear ms . Af t er an hour o r two
of c he e r f ul s peechi f yi ng dar kness began t o f a l l , and t h e crowd
di s per s ed vol unt a r i l y" (Sheppard 1971: 341).
' Except per haps f o r t h e good cheer , t h e a f f a i r was a t ext book example of
l ar ge- s cal e c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence: one group under t akes a l a r g e a c t i on
which d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y s t a t e s a cl ai m; a second group chal l enges
t h a t cl ai m: t hey s t r uggl e . The group s t a t i n g t h e count er cl ai m is o f t e n
a s pe c i a l i z e d r e pr e s s i ve f or c e -- pol i c e , t r oops , posse, v i g i l a n t e --
a c t i n g on behal f of t he dominant c l a s s e s . No doubt some of t he demonstm-
t o r s i n 1866 were angr y, some were drunk, and some enj oyed t h e rough-and-
tumble. But t h e br eaki ng down of f ences and t h e s c u f f l i n g wi t h pol i c e
was a by-product of t he pl ay of cl ai m and count er cl ai m. That i s t h e
st andar d s t r u c t u r e of c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence.
Vi ol ence: Concept and Re a l i t y
I n or de r t o ge t t h a t poi nt s t r a i g h t , however, we have t o di s poae
of some s e r i o u s concept ual problems. "Violence" o f t e n s e r ve s a s a
c a t c h a l l cont ai ni ng a l l t h e v a r i e t i e s of p r o t e s t , mi l i t a nc y, coer ci on,
de s t r uc t i on o r muscl e- f l exi ng which a gi ven obs er ver happens t o f e a r or
condemn. Vi ol ence, a s Henry Bienen comments, " c a r r i e s over t ones of
' v i o l a t i n g ' , and we o f t e n us e vi ol ence t o r e f e r t o i l l e g i t i ma t e f or ce"
(Bienen 1968: 4) . Grundy and Wei nst ei n (1974: 113) a r r a y competing
d e f i n i t i o n s of vi ol e nc e on a continuum from narrow t o broad:
narrow: t hos e us e s of phys i cal f or c e which a r e pr ohi bi t ed by a
normat i ve or de r presumed t o be l e gi t i ma t e :
i nt er medi at e: any us e of phys i c a l f or ce;
broad: a l l de pr i va t i ons of a s s e r t e d human r i g h t s .
I n ge ne r a l , t hey poi nt o u t , def ender s of c ons t i t ut e d a ut hor i t y pr e f e r
narrow d e f i n i t i o n s . Opponents pr e f e r broad ones. I n betwecn, t h e pl a c e
t he " l i b e r a l democrat s who de f i ne vi ol ence a s any us e of phys i cal f or ce.
because t hey would l i k e t o j u s t i f y r e vol ut i ons a ga i ns t a u t h o r i t a r i a n
regi mes which do not have bui l t - i n mechanisms f o r peacef ul change" (Grundy
and Wei nst ei n 1974: 113).
We have, however, p r a c t i c a l a s we l l a s p o l i t i c a l r eas ons f o r s e l e c t i n g
t he mi ddl e term. The narrow d e f i n i t i o n of vi ol ence a s i l l e g i t i ma t e f or c e
i nt r oduces t h e debat e about t h e pr oper scope of t h e a u t h o r i t i e s i n t o t he
way t o begi n. The broad d e f i n i t i o n of vi ol ence t o i ncl ude a l l v i o l a t i o n s
of human r i g h t s not onl ) r e qui r e s agreement on t he c ha r a c t e r of t hose
r i g h t s , but a l s o expands t h e phenomenon t o such a l a r g e range of s o c i a l
r e l a t i o n s a s t o make s ys t emat i c s t udy of i t al most unt hi nkabl e. I f we
r e s t r i c t our a t t e n t i o n t o human a c t i o n s which damage per sons o r obj e c t s ,
we have a t l e a s t a chance t o s o r t out t h e r e g u l a r i t i e s i n t h e appearance
of t hos e a c t i ons .
Even t h a t r e s t r i c t i o n c a l l a i mmedi at el y f o r f u r t h e r d i s t i n c t i o n s .
Vi ol ence s o def i ned s t i l l i ncl udes :
ver y de l i ne a t i on of t he phenomenon t o be i nve s t i ga t e d -- an unpromising
-- c u t thumbs
-- murders
- hockey games
- r e be l l i ons
-- normal wear of sut omobi l es o r t he r oads t hey t r a v e l
I
-- di s pos a l of noxi ous wast es
- c i g a r e t t e smoking
The obvi ous t empt at i on i s t o add some q u a l i f i c a t i o n s concer ni ng t h e
i n t e n t i o n s of t h e a c t or s : t hey want t o de s t r oy, t hey a r e angr y, t hey
s eek power, o r something e l s e . The t r oubl e wi t h l e t t i n g much depend on
i n t e n t i o n s is t h a t i n t e n t i o n s a r e mixed and har d t o di s c e r n. The judgments
o u t s i d e r s make concer ni ng t h e i n t e n t i o n s of p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o n f l i c t s
us ua l l y i ncl ude i mp l i c i t t h e o r i e s of caus at i on and r e s pons i bi l i t y. Even
wi t h f u l l knowledge, i n t e n t i o n s o f t e n t ur n out t o be mlxed and di ver gent ,
o f t e n change o r mi s f i r e i n t h e cour s e of t he a c t i on. We must nsk
i n t e n t i o n s when.
Vi ol ence, f ur t her mor e, is r a r e l y a s o l o performnnce. It us ual l y
grows out of an i n t e r a c t i o n of opponent s. Whose i n t e n t i o n s sliould count :
t he s mal l group of demonst r at or s who ga t he r on t h e s t e p s of t h e c a p i t a l .
t h e l a r g e r group of s pe c t a t or s who event ual l y g e t drawn i n t o t h e a c t t on.
t h e pol i c e who f i r s t s t and guard and t hen s t r u g g l e t o di s pe r s e t h e crowd?
Both i n t heor y and i n pr a c t i c e . t hen. i n t e n t i o n s pr ovi de sliaky c r i t e r i a
f o r t h e d i s t i n c t i o n of vi ol ence from nonvi ol ence.
I n her b r i l l i a n t es s ay on vi ol ence. Hannah Arendt urged a fundnmental
d i s t i n c t i o n between power and vi ol ence. Power, i n her view, I s "t he
human a b i l i t y not j u s t t o a c t but t o a c t i n concer t . " ' But t he d i f f i c u l t t e s
wi t h which we a r e wr e s t l i ng appear i n one f a c t : Arendt never q u i t e
def i ned vi ol ence. Thi s was t h e c l o s e s t approach:
Vi ol ence i s di s t i ngui s hed by its i ns t r ument al c ha r a c t e r . Phenomeno-
l o g i c a l l y , i t is c l o s e t o s t r e ngt h, s i n c e t h e implements of vi ol ence,
l i k e a l l ot he r t ool s , a r e desi gned and used f o r t h e purpose of
mul t i pl yi ng n a t u r a l s t r e ngt h u n t i l , i n t h e l a s t s t a g e of t h e i r
development. t hey can s u b s t i t u t e f o r i t (Arendt 1970: 46).
As a d i s t i n c t i o n i n p o l i t i c a l phi l osophy -- t h a t is. i n t h e pr i nc i pl e 8
upon which we can r easonabl y found s system of government and by which
we can j u s t i f y o r condemn publ i c a c t i o n s -- Ar endt ' s t r eat ment of power
and violence is illuminating. As a guide to observation of acting people.
however, it has the fatal flaw of resting on exactly the features of col-
lective action which observers and participants dispute most passionately.
That is precisely because they are the features of the action which will
bring on it justification from some and condemnation from others. Justi-
fication end condemnation are important business, but they are not our
business here.
Nor do any easy alternatives lie close at hand. We may try to de-
fine "normal" or "expected" or "legitimate" uses of force in social life.
and define deviations from them as violent. That approach not only re-
quires the (difficult) assessment of the normal, expected state of af-
fairs, but also tends to define away violence exerted by professional
specialists in coercion: police, soldiers, mafiosi, muggers. If, on the
other hand, we turn to the amount of damage sustained by the individuals
or objects involved, we face the difficulty of determining how direct
and material the damage must be: Does a firm's dumping of garbage which
promotes disease count? Does the psychic burden of enslavement count?
I recite these tedious complications in order to emphasize that in
the present state of knowledge 5 definition will be arbitrary in some
regards and debatable in others. People do not agree on whet they will
call violent. What is more, their disagreement springs to an important
extent from differences in political perspective. My own inclination is
towsrd what Terry Nardin cells e "brute harm" conception of violence: any
observable interaction in the course of which persons or objects are
seized or physically damaged in spite of resistance. (Direct or indirect
resistonce, in the form of attacks on persons. erection of barriers,
standing in the way, holding on to the persons or objects at issue, and
so on, enters the definition in order to exclude self-destruction, pot-
latches, ceremonial mutilation, urban renewal and other collective damsge
in which all partiea are more or less agreed to the damage. In short,
to certify the preaence of complicating interests.)
Further distinctions start from there: collective vs. individual,
depending on the number of parties to the interaction; games va. nongnmea,
depending on the extent to which all participants begin with en agreement
to work toward a determinate set of alternative outcomes by fo.llowing
sane standard rules; continuous vs. discontinuous, depending on how great
a time span we observe and how large an interval we permit to elapse be-
fore we call the action at an end; and so forth.
Some Lineaments of Violence
Once collective violence is defined in these terms, interesting con-
clusions begin to emerge from the close examination of the actual record
of violent events. Our study of thousanda of violent incidents occurrii~g
in western Europe since 1800 reveals several strong tendencies which nf-
fect our understanding of the roots of violence.
First, most collective violence -- in the sense of interactions which
produce direct damage to persons and obJects -- grows out of nctions which
ere not intrinsically violent, and which are basically similar to n much
larger number of collective actions occurrilig without violence in the
same periods and s'ettings. The clearest example is the demonstration:
Some group displays its strength and determination in the presence of the
public, of the agents of the state. and perhaps of its enemies as well.
The great majority of demonstrations pass without direct damage to per-
sons or property. But a small proportion do turn to violent encounters
between police and demonstrators, or attacks on property by the demon-
strators. When that happens, we conventionally use a new word for the
event -- "riot" -- and thereby obscure its connection witn nonviolent
events. The demonstration is such a common way of doing political busi-
ness in modern Europe that even the small proportion of violent outcomes
is enough to make the demonstration the most frequent setting for collec-
tive violence. The strike, the parliamentary session, the public meeting.
the fiesta follow something like the same pattern: the great majority of
them going off without violence, the violent ones not differing in any
fundamental way from the rest.
A second important feature of collective violence which stands out
in the modern European record is the heavy involvement of agents of the
state, especially repressive agents like police and soldiers. This is,
unsurprisingly, a matter of scale: the fewer the people involved, the
less likely that repressive agents will be there. Rut it does not mean
simply that the larger the scale of violence the more likely the police
are to step in. For in the niodern European experience repressive forces
are themselves the most consistent initiators end performers of collective
violence.
There is a division of labor: repressive forces do the largest part
of the killing and wounding, while the groups they are seeking to con-
trol do most of the damage to objects. The division of labor follows from
the usual advantage repressive forces have with respect to arms and mili-
tary discipline; from the common tactics of demonstrators, strikers and
other frequent participants in collective violence, which are to violate
symbolically-charged rules and prohibitions whose enforcement is the af-
fair of agents of government; from the typical sequence of events, in
which demonstrators are carrying on an action which is illegal yet non-
violent, and repressive forces receive the order to stop them by what-
ever means are necessary. The means are often violent.
Violence in America
Since no one has done the necessary detailed studies of contemporary
Latin America. North America. Africa or Asia, it is hard to say h w
generally these generalizations apply. The fragments of evidence n w
available indicate that they apply very widely in contemporary countries
with strong governments. Jerome Skolnick (1969: 258) says in aummary of
one part of his analysis of contemporary American protests. "It is mLs-
leading to ignore the part played by social control agencies in aggrn-
vating and sometimes creating a riot. It is not unusuel. a8 the Kerner
Commission observed, for a riot to begin @ end with police violence."
A chronological review of violence in American labor-management dis-
putes makes it clear both that over the long run police, troops and plant
guards have done the bulk of the killing and wounding, and that the typical
starting point has been some sort of illegal but nonviolent collective
action by the workers -- a walkout, a sitdown, a demonstration. picketing.
sending of delegations. In their sketch of the usual circumstances in
which the total of at least 700 persons died in American "labor violence"
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Taft and Ross report:
-
Facing inflexible opposition, union leaders and their members fre-
quently.found that nothing, neither peaceful persuasion nor the heads
of government, could move the employer towards recognition. Frus-
tration and desperation impelled pickets to react to strike-breakers
with anger. Many violent outbreaks followed efforts of strikers to
restrain the entry of strike-breakers and raw materials into the
struck plant. St~ch conduct, obviously illegal, opened the opportunity
for forceful police measures. In the long run, the employer's side
was better equipped for success. The use of force by pickets was
illegal on its face, but the action of the police and company guards
were in vindication of the employer's rights (Taft end Ross 1969:
289-290).
The same general pattern recurs in the bulk of contemporary American col-
lective violence: a group undertakes an illegal andlor politically unac-
ceptable action, forces of order seek to check the group, a violent en-
counter ensues, the "rioters" -- for that is the label the group acquires
at the moment of violent contact with police or troops -- sustain most
of the casualties.
Reflecting on the long succession of violent encounters between
cl~sllengers end power-holders in America. Richard Rubenstein makes an im-
portant observation:
At the outset, one thing seems clear: those groups which achieved
success without participating in sustained rioting, guerrilla terror-
ism or outright insurrection were not necessarily more talented,
hard-working or "American" than those that resorted to higher levels
of violence. The resistance of more powerful groups to change is
one key struggle; another is the match between out-group charac-
teristics and the needs of a changing political-economic system
I
(Rubenstein 1970: 15-16).
Then he goes on to contrast the fluidity of the economic and political
arrangements open to the immigrants of 1880-1920 with the formation, in
the 1930s and 1940s, of a new ruling coalition quite resistant to dis-
myth of peaceful progress and the culpability of the violent -- it is the
existence of this coalition, exercising power through a highly centralized
Federal bureaucracy, which helps keep emerging groups powerless and de-
pendent" (p. 17). The consequence, in Rubenstein's view, is that recent
bids for power have met determined resistance and brought forth the pious
recommendation that the members of the groups involved attempt to enter
the system as individuals, on their own merits. rather than dentroying
the system through collective efforts to wrest benefits from it.
Rubenatein's analysis includes both an idea of how the American eys-
tem usually works and a notion of the changes it has undergone since the
1930s. The general picture corresponds to William Gameon's portrayal of
"stable unrepresentetion" in American politics: " . . . the American po-
litical system normally operates to prevent incipient competitors from
achieving full entry into the political arena" (Gamaon 1968 : 18). That
description applies to all political systems; the real questions are: How
great are the obstacles? How do they vary from system to system and time
to time?
That brings up the second part. Has the American system closed down
since the 1930~7 To try that question out seriously, we shall need much
more precise information than we now have concerning the fates of succes-
sive challengers. Gamson's investigation does not reveal any significantly
increased tendency for the recent challengers in his sample to fail. But
his investigation deals with small numbers, and stops in 1945. It is not
obvious that recent challengers -- antiwar students, organized blacks, goy
activists and aircraft manufacturers are likely candidates for the post-
1940 list -- met more resistance than craft unions, Prohibitionists or
Abolitionists had in the nineteenth century. There is probebly variation
placement: "Ironically, since these are the groups most wedded to the
I
I over t i me, and t he r e may we l l be a long-run t r end. Both a r e s ur e l y t oo
s u b t l e t o show up i n a few offhand comparisons.
P o l i t i c a l Act i on and Involvement i n Vi ol ence
I n t he t erms we were us i ng e a r l i e r , Rubenat ei n is sayi ng t h a t members
of t h e pol i t y, a c t i n g mai nl y t hrough a ge nt s of t h e s t a t e , have banded t o-
get her t o r e s i s t t h e cl ai ms of newly-mobilized c ha l l e nge r s f o r membership.
Hi s moat prominent cas e i s or gani zed bl acks . The a n a l y s i s a ppl i e s more
gener al l y t o t he pant and pr es ent cont ent i on of wheat f ar mer s, women, be-
l i e v e r s i n Temperance, s t ude nt s and or gani zed l abor . I n t he s e c a s e s and
many ot he r s , t he accept ance of t h e gr oup' s c o l l e c t i v e cl ai ms would ai gni -
f i c a n t l y r e a l l o c a t e t he r eaour cea under t he c o n t r o l of t he p o l i t y , rede-
f i n e t he r u l e s of membership f o r f u r t h e r chal l enger s , change t h e l i k e l y
c o a l i t i o n s i ns i de and out s i de t he pol i t y. I n such caaea, t he main l i n e be-
tween vi ol ence and cont ent i on f o r power c o n s i s t s of t he r epeat ed sequence
i n which members of t he chal l engi ng group publ i c l y l a y cl ai m t o some apace,
obj e c t , pr i vi l e ge , pr ot e c t i on o r ot he r r es our ce which t hey cons i der due
them on ge ne r a l grounds, and t h e a ge nt s of t h e government (backed by t h e
members of t he p o l i t y ) f o r c i b l y r e s i s t t h e i r cl ai ms. Col l e c t i ve pr oact i on
on t h e one s i de , c o l l e c t i v e r e a c t i on on t he ot he r .
A compl et e pi c t ur e of t he pr oces s l i nki ng cont ent i on and vi ol ence,
however, r e qui r e s a d i s t i n c t i o n between c ha l l e nge r s and members on t h e i r
way out of t he pol i t y. Members l oai ng t h e i r pos i t i on a r e more l i k e l y t o
f i nd t hemsel ves t r yi ng t o mai nt ai n excl us i ve cl ai ms t o some p a r t i c u l a r
r es our ce -- a school , a d i s t i n c t i v e costume, a s our ce of income, a t a x
exemption -- and unabl e t o e n l i s t t h e suppor t of ot he r members o r of
agent s of t h e government i n mai nt ai ni ng t hos e cl ai ms . Under t hos e c i r -
cumst ances, t hey commonly at t empt t o e x e r t t hos e cl ai ms on t h e i r own, and
t o keep o t h e r s from cl ai mi ng t h e same r esour ces.
Then two d i f f e r e n t sequences a r e l i k e l y t o produce c o l l e c t i v e vi o-
l ence i nvol vi ng de c l i ni ng members of a pol i t y. The f i r s t is l i k e t h e one
i nvol vi ng new cl ai mant s f o r membership i n t h e pol i t y. i n t h a t agent s of
t he government d i r e c t l y r e e f a t t h e cl ai ms of t h e pa r t i ng member t o keep ex-
e r t i n g t h e i r former r i g h t s t o c e r t a i n r eaour ces.
The second p i t a t h e
pa r t i ng member d i r e c t l y a ga i ns t o t h e r s seeki ng t o a c qui r e t h e dj aput ed
r esour ces: v i g i l a n t e movements. p r i v a t e armi es. and gangs of t hugs a r e en-
pe c i a l l y l i k e l y t o e n t e r t he a c t i on a t t h i s poi nt , a s t h e ol d member s eeks
t o s u b s t i t u t e its own f or c e f o r t h a t of t h e now-unrel i abl e government.
The r e gi ona l movement of r e s i s t a n c e a ga i ns t a c e n t r a l i z i n g s t a t e
commonly t akes t h i s form ( s ee Hecht er 1975). So does t h e c l a s s i c European
food r i o t , i n which t h e members of a community c o l l e c t i v e di s put e t h e r i g h t
of anyone t o s t o r e gr a i n i n t i mes of hunger o r s h i p gr a i n out of t h e commu-
n i t y when l o c a l peopl e st i l l need food, and r e i nf or c e t h e i r dl a put e by
a c t i n g i n t he t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e of t he a u t h o r i t i e s : i nvent or yi ng t h e gr oi n
on hand, accumul at i ng i t i n a publ i c pl ace. and s e l l i n g i t of f a t a p r i c e
l o c a l l y det ermi ned t o be j u s t and r easonabl e ( s ee C. Ti l l y 1975. L. T i l l y
1971). So, f i n a l l y , do a v a r i e t y of f a s c i s t movements formed i n oppos i t i on
t o t he t hr eat eni ng cl ai ms of a mobi l i zed working c l a s a .
The sequences i nvol vi ng new cont ender s and de c l i ni ng members mean
t h a t c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence t ends t o c l u s t e r around e n t r i e s i n t o t he p o l i t y
and e x i t s from i t . When membership is s t a b l e , c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence is l e s s . .
pr eval ent . The most i mpor t ant s i n g l e r eason f o r t h a t c l u s t e r i n g is t h e
pr opens i t y of t he government ' s r e pr e s s i ve f or c e s t o a c t a ga i ns t new con-
t ender s and de c l i ni ng members.
Some i ndi c a t i ons of t he l i n k s between c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence and
As Table 6-1 shows, a significant proportion of all the events
included terror or collective violence. More important, the proportions
6-15
struggles nt the edge of the polity appear in Dee Wernette's nnnlysis of
the Germnn elections of September 1930 and July 1932 -- crucial moments
in the ride of the Nnzis and the disappearance of the communists from Ger-
man political life. Among other things. Wernette coded "politicnl events"
reported in the Kiilnische Zeitung during 'the two months preceding ench of
rose as the struggle became more acute: 27 percent of the events involved
collective violence. nine percent terror and eight percent attscks on
property in 1930. while the figures for 1932 were 57 percent, 25 percent
and thirteen percent. (The categories are not. of course, mvtually exclu-
sive.) The leading participants in violent events, by far, ere Nazis,
Cotmnuniats. and police. The chief settings of collective violence were
major areas of Comnunist strength: the regions of Berlin, Cologne, Diissel-
dorf and so on -- the areas in which the Nazis concentrated their campaign
6-16
Table 6-1: Percent of All Political Events Preceding the German Elections
of September 1930 and July 1932 Involvlng Different Types of
Action.
to extirpate the Communists. In fact, the most frequent eventn were Nnzt-
Communist clanhes and attacks of each on the other's property. The col-
the elections. The events he enumernted included 1) non-violent, organized
polltical activities such as electoral rallles; 2) acts of terrorimn such
as bombings and ambushes touching manifestly political targets; 3) Eights
and collective violence involving at'least one group clearly identified by
political affiliation; 4 ) repressive acts by the state, such as police in-
vestigations. arrests and trials.
total number of events
lective violence grew directly from the struggle for places in the
Cerman polity.
I do 'not mean that' the sequences I have described are the only ones
which produce collective violence, just that they are the moat regular and
Type of Action
election-oriented
nonviolent action
other nonviolent action
acts of terror
attacks on property
collective violence
police investigations
arrests
reports of trials
bans on organizations
bans on activities
percent in 1930
33
Percent in 1932
--
15
reliable. Routine testing among established members of a polity pro-
duces a certain amount of violent conflict. but it tends to be limited;
and treated as a regrettable error. Conventional combats among teams.
communitiea. youth groups or schools sometimes fit the pattern of "teeting"
violence. but more often escape it; they. too, operate oa a small scale.
within large restrictions. Drunken brawls, private vengeance. festival
mdness, impcllsive vandalism, all reach a dangerous magnitude now and then.
What is wre. the frequency of conventional combats, brawls, vendettas
and so on undoubtedly varies with the basic conceptions of honor, obli-
gation and solidarity which prevail within a population. Nevertheless. I
would say tlmt in populations under tile control of atates all these forms
account for only a smell proportion of the collective violence which
occurs, and change far too gradually to account for the abrupt surges end
recessions of collective violence which appear in such populations. The
chief source of variation in collective violence is the operation of the
polity.
Nor do I mean that moat collective violence goes on in calculating
calm. Par from it. Both those who are arguing for the acquisition of
rights on the basis of general principles end those who are fighting for
the defense of privilege on the basis of custom and precedent are usually
indignant, and often enraged. Hments of dangerous confrontation (as Louis
Cirard saye of the French Revolutions of 1830 and 1848, and almost every-
one saye of the Prencl~ Events of Hey, 1968) frequently bring an air of
festival, of ext~iliration. of release from ordinary restrictions. Plenty
of individual venting of resentments and settling of old scores takes place
under the cover of collective action in the name of high principle. The
argument up to this point simply denies the common conclusion that the
.
rage. the exhiliration or the resentment cause the collective action.
If these arguments are correct. they produce a paradoxical lesson
for researchers: to understand and explain violent actions, you must under-
stand nonviolent actions. Any study which treats violent events alone
deals with the product of two different sots of determinants: 1) the de-
terminants of collective action in general. whether it produces violence
or not; 2) the determinants of violent outcomes to collective action. We
encountered a similar problem in the explanation of strikes: While in some
sense a group of workers chooses to strike or not to strike. the strike is
simply one of several alternative ways to deal with grievances: slowdowns.
political pressure, sabotage, and individual grumbling are also possible.
That is why we can't simply infer the level of discontent from the fre-
quency of strike attempts. Furthermore, whether a strike actually occurs
is a product of strategic estimates and strategic interaction on the part
of at least two contenders; when either party is much stronger and wilier
than the other, the grievance is likely to be settled. or squashed. short
of a strike.
Snyder and Kelly (1976) find that from 1878 through 1903 ltalian
strikes were more likely to be violent if they were large. long and/or
oriented to wage demands rather than union organization. Contrary to many
arguments which proceed immediately from grievances to strikes. thcy find
no relationship between the frequency of violence in strlkes and the rate
of industrial growth or wage changes. Contrary to the findlnga of Shorter
and Tilly (1971) for Prance, they find thnt on the average violent strikes
were less successful then nonviolent strikes. These are important results.
They emphasize all the more the necessity of separating the determinants
of collective action (in this case, the decision to strike) in general
from t he det er mi nant s of vi ol e nt outcomes t o c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on.
I n our f i r s t cat egor y of det er mi nant s , we f i nd such i t ems a s t h e
frequency of v i o l a t i o n s of e s t a bl i s he d r i g h t s , t he mobi l i zat i on l e v e l s of
d i f f e r e n t cont ender s f o r power, t h e c ur r e nt c oa t s of d i f f e r e n t forms of
a c t i o n which a r e i n t h e a v a i l a b l e r e p e r t o i r e , and s o on. I n t h e second,
we f i nd t h e pr esence o r absence of count er - demonst r at or s, t he t a c t i c s of
r e pr e s s i ve f or ces , t h e l engt h of t i me dur i ng which opposi ng p a r t i e s a r e
i n d i r e c t cont act wi t h each o t h e r , and s o on. Each of t h e two sometimes
changes whi l e t h e ot he r remai ns more o r l e s s t he same: demonst r at i ons be-
come more f r equent , al t hough t he per cent age of demonst r at i ons which pro-
duce s t r e e t - f i ght i ng remai ns t he same; t he a u t h o r i t i e s g e t t ougher wi t h
s t r i k e r s , al t hough s t r i k e pr ope ns i t i e s have not a l t e r e d . Ei t he r one
changes t he frequency of c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence. A pr oper expl anat i on of
vi ol ence l e v e l s must decompose i n t o a t l e a s t t he s e two components.
Out of t he e n t i r e st r eam of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , onl y a s mal l p a r t
produces vi ol ence. The c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on which produces vi ol ence a t t r a c t a
di s pr opor t i ona t e a t t e n t i o n because 1 ) t h e immediate c o s t s t o t h e p a r t i -
c i p a n t s t end t o be g r e a t e r , more v i s i b l e and more dr amat i c t han i n non-
vi ol e nt c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on; 2) t he event s i n ques t i on of t e n i nvol ve t h e
i nt e r ve nt i on of t he a u t h o r i t i e s ; t he s u t h o r i t i e s i nt e r ve ne because t hey
f i nd t h e i r i n t e r e s t s -- o r t hos e of t h e i r a l l i e s -- t hr eat ened by t he
ot he r a c t o r s . Col l e c t i ve vi ol ence is not . by and l a r ge , t he r e s u l t of
a s i n g l e gr oup' s possessi on by an emotion. sent i ment , a t t i t u d e o r i dea.
It grows, f o r t h e moat pa r t , out of s t r a t e g i c =act i on among groups.
I n t he modern west er n exper i ence, t he most f r equent s e t t i n g s f o r
c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence a r e cont ent i ous gat her i ngs : assembl i es of peopl e who
mnke v i s i b l e c o l l e c t i v e cl ai ms which c o n f l i c t wi t h t h e i n t e r e s t s of ot he r
groups. Cont ent i ous ga t he r i ngs s uc h' a s t he demonst r at i on, t he s t r i k e . t he
so- cal l ed food r i o t and t h e t a x p r o t e s t a r e not , on t he whole. i n t r i n s i c a l l y
vi ol e nt . I n f a c t , most of them occur wi t hout vi ol ence.
The v i o l e n t ve r s i ons of t h e demonst r at i on. t h e s t r i k e , t he food
r i o t and t h e t a x p r o t e s t do not form a d i s t i n c t l y s e pa r a t e c l s s s of event s .
They o r d i n a r i l y occur i n t h e mi dst of s t r i n g s of s i mi l a r event s which a r e
I
q u i t e s i mi l a r t o them except f o r t h e f a c t t hnt t hey produce no damage o r
s r j z u r e of per sons o r pr oper t y. They a r e . f o r t he moat p a r t , t h e membcrs
of t he s t r i n g s i n which ot he r p a r t i e s r e a i s t t h e cl ai ms bei ng made. The
ot he r p a r t i e s a r e more l i k e l y t o r e s i s t i f t h e cont ender making t h e cl ai ms
l a c ks a l a r g e advant age i n power o r i f t h e cl ai ms t hr e a t e n t h e i r s ur vi va l .
But v i o l e n t and nonvi ol ent event s of t h e same gener al t ype c l u s t e r to-
get her s u f f i c i e n t l y f o r us t o employ t h e v i s i b l e , v i o l e n t event s a s a
t r a c e r of t he ebb and fl ow of cont ent i ous ga t he r i ngs i n gener al .
Changing Cont ext s f o r Col l e c t i ve Vi ol ence
The competitive/reactive/proactive scheme pr ovi des n conveni ent
means of summing up t h e l a r g e s t t r e nds i n t h e e vol ut i on of t he mnjor con-
t e x t s of c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence i n west er n c ount r i e s over t he l a s t f our o r
f i v e c e nt ur i e s . Two main pr oces s es have dominated a l l t h e r e s t : 1 ) t h e
r i s e of na t i ona l s t a t e s t o preemi nent pos i t i ons i n a wi de v a r i e t y of po-
l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s ; 2) t h e i nc r e a s i ngl y a s s o c i a t i o n a l c ha r a c t e r of t h e
p r i n c i p a l cont ender s f o r power a t t he l o c a l a s we l l a s t h e na t i ona l l e ve l .
I n 1500, no f ul l - f l edged na t i ona l s t a t e wi t h unquest i oned p r i o r i t y over
t h e ot her governments wi t hi n i t s t e r r i t o r y e xi s t e d anywhere i n t h e West.
England was probabl y t h e c l o s e s t approxi mat i on. The England of 1500 was.
however, onl y f i f t e e n ye a r s pa s t t h e s l a yi ng of King Ri chard 111 by Henry
Tudor a t Bosworth Fi el d. It was f r e s h from t he wi del y-support ed r e b e l l i o n s
of Lsmbert Simnel and Perkin Warbeck. It had yet to effect the union with
Scotland. It still harbored a number of great lords who controlled their
own bands of armed retainers. Government itself consisted largely of
shifting, competing coalitions among great magnates and their retinues,
the king being the greatest magnate of the strongest coalition. Become
Henry VII, Henry Tudor began the large work of statemaking which Henry
VIII and Elizabeth so vigorously continued.
A century and a half after 1500, a great civil war reopened the
question of whether the centralized royal apparatus the Tudors, and then
the Stuarts, had begun building would be the dominant politicnl organi-
zation in England. In fact, the state which emerged in 1688 had rather
different contours from the one the Tudors and Stuarts had been building.
The strength and autonomy of Parliament far exceeded anything a cool ob-
server of the England of 1600 or 1620 could reasonably have anticipated.
In 1500 most states faced serious challenges to their hegemony from
both inside and outside the territory. Only a small minority of the hun-
dreds of more or less autonomous governments survived the next two centuries
of statemaking. Moat power was concentrated in politics of smaller than
national scale: communities, city-states, principalities, semi-autonomous
provinces. Most contenders for power in those polities were essentially
communal in structure: craft brotherhoods, families, peasant communities.
The predominnnt forms of collective violence registered those circumstances:
wars between rival governments, brawls between groups of artisans, battles
bong the youth of neighboring communes, attacks by one religious group
on another.
The rise of the state threatened the power (and often the very sur-
vival) of all these small-scale polities. They resisted. The statemakers
only won their struggle for predominance over the furious resistance of
princes, communes, provinces and peasant communities. For several cen-
turies the principal forms of collective violence therefore grew from
reactive movements on the part of different segments of the general popu-
lation: communally-based contenders For power fought againat loss of mem-
bership in polities, indeed against the very destruction of the politiea
in which their power was invested. Collective resistance to conscription.
to taxation, to billeting, to a whole variety of other exactions of the
state exemplify this reactive road to collective violence.
For a century or more in the experience of most West European coun-
tries, however, the most frequent form of violence-producing movement
simed at the krket more directly than at the state. Thot was the food
riot. The name is misleading: most often the struggle turned about raw
grain rather than edibles, and most of the time it did not reach the
point of physical violence. The classic European food riot had three
main variants: the retributive action, in which a crowd attacked the per-
sona, property or premises of someone believed to be hoarding or profi-
teering; the blockage, in which a group of local people prevented the
shipment of food out of their own locality..requiring it to be stored
andlor sold locally; the price riot, in which people seized Atored food
or food displayed for sale, sold it publicly at a price they declared to
be proper, and handed the money over to the owner or merchant.
In the best-documented cases -- England and France of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries -- the blockage occurred more frequently than the
price riot, and much more often than the retributive action. In those
two countries, the food riot practically disappeared some time during the
nineteenth century. Later, questions of food supply motivated dramatic
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i ons now and t hen, but al most al ways i n t h e form of demon-
s t r a t i o n s i n which pr oducer s complained about low p r i c e s o r consumers com-
pl ai ned about hi gh pr i c e s .
The t i mi ng of t h e food r i o t ' s r i s e and f a l l i s r eveal i ng. I n Eng-
l and, France and some ot he r p a r t s of west er n Europe, t he food r i o t di s -
placed t h e t ax r e be l l i on a s t h e most f r equent v i o l e n t form of c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i on toward t he end of t h e s event eent h cent ur y. I t decl i ned pr eci pi -
t ous l y i n England j u s t a f t e r 1820. i n Germany and France j u s t a f t e r 1850.
onl y t o l i n g e r on i n p a r t s of Spai n and I t a l y i n t o t he t went i et h cent ur y.
The cal endar di d not conform t o t h e hi s t or y of hunger; i ndeed t he
gr e a t k i l l i n g fami nes of Medieval and Renai ssance Europe were di s appear i ng
a s t he food r i o t came i n t o i t s own, and per c a p i t a food suppl y was pro-
babl y i ncr eas i ng t hrough much of t he per i od. I ns t ead, t h r e e c onj oi nt
cl ~anges account f o r t h e t i mi ng: 1 ) t he pr ol e t a r i a ni z a t i on of t he popula-
t i o n , which meant a d r a s t i c di mi nut i on i n t h e pr opor t i on of househol ds
which produced enough food f o r t h e s ubs i s t e nc e of t h e i r own members, a
gr e a t expansi on i n t he number dependent on t h e market f o r s ur vi va l ;
2) t he commer ci al i zat i on of food pr oduct i on, which i ncl uded t he bui l a i ng
of na t i ona l mar ket s and t h e promotion of t h e i de a s t h a t t he na t i ona l
market s shoul d have p r i o r i t y over l o c a l needs and t h a t t h e mar ket ' s
ope r a t i on tended t o s e t a j u s t , pr oper and e f f i c i e n t pr i c e ; 3) t h e di s -
mant l i ng of t he ext ens i ve pr evi ous l y- exi s t i ng c o n t r o l s over t h e d i s t r i b u -
t i on of food, which gave t h e l o c a l popul at i on a p r i o r cl ai m over food pro-
duced and s ol d i n s l o c a l i t y , and bound t h e l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s t o pr ovi de
f o r t h e aubs i at ence of t h e l o c a l poor.
E.P. Thompson has c a l l e d t h e e n t i r e pr ocess a de c l i ne i n t h e ol d
Moral Economy, a s h i f t from a bread nexus t o a cash nexus. Peopl e r e s i s t e d
t h e pr oces s s o l ong a s l o c a l s o l i d a r i t y and some c o l l e c t i v e memory of t he
l o c a l i t y ' s p r i o r cl ai ms sur vi ved. To an i mpor t ant degr ee, t he crowd' s
a c t i o n s of bl ocki ng. i nvent or yi ng, s t or i ng, de c l a r i ng o p r i c e and hol di ng
a publ i c s a l e f o r t he b e n e f i t of t h e l o c a l s f u l f i l l e d what had pr evi ous l y
been t h e obl i ga t i ons of t h e l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s i n deal i ng wi t h s hor t ages
and hi gh pr i c e s . Magi s t r at es o r mayors o f t e n acknowledged t h a t f a c t i m-
p l i c i t l y by acqui es ci ng i n t h e r out i ne ; when t hey t ook t h e i n i t i o t i v e
t hemsel ves, t he crowd us ua l l y st opped i t s work.
The immediate o b j e c t s of t h e crowd' s a t t e n t i o n were c m o n l y l o c a l
o f f i c i a l s , baker s , r i c h f ar mer s and, e s pe c i a l l y, g r a i n merchant s. The
s t r u g g l e p i t t e d t h e cl ai ms of t he n a t i o n a l market a g a i n s t t he cl ai ms of t h e
l o c a l popul at i on. For t h a t r eason, t h e geography of t h e f w d r i o t re-
f l e c t e d t h e geography of t he gr a i n market: t endi ng t o form s r i n g around
London, Pa r i s , anot her c a p i t a l o r a major por t , concent r at i ng e s pe c i a l l y
al ong r i v e r s , c a na l s end major r oads. For t he a c ut e Engl i sh c r i s e s of
1795-96 and 1800-01. St evenson remarks: "The map shows t h e ext remel y
c l os e r e l a t i ons hi p of di s t ur bances t o t he communications network i n t h e
pr oduct i on a r e a s around London i n t hege two st l ort ogee. The most s t r i k i n g
p a t t e r n o v e r a l l is t h a t of 1795-96 when a t l e a s t f i f t y food di s t ur bances
t ook pl ace a t comuncat i on c e nt r e s , e i t h e r c o a s t a l p o r t s , c a na l o r r i v e r
por t s , o r towns wi t hi n easy c a r t i n g di s t a nc e of major popul at i on cent r es "
(St evenson 1974: 43). Yet t h e r e f l e c t i o n of t h e market came t hrough a
d i s t o r t i n g mi r r or , f o r t h e most t horoughl y c o me r c i a l i z e d a r e a s , adj acent
t o l a r g e ol d c i t i e s , di d not t ypi c a l l y produce food r i o t s . There, t h e
market had a l r e s dy won out over l o c a l r i g h t s t o t he food suppl y.
Des pi t e t he s a l i e n c e of t he market. t h e food r i o t a l s o r e s ul t e d
i n p a r t from t he r i s e of t h e na t i ona l s t a t e . I n ge ne r a l ( al t hough wi t h
g r e a t h e s i t a t i o n s , v a r i a t i o n s and di f f e r e nc e s i n outcome) European s t a t e -
makers act ed t o promote a l l t hr e e of t he pr ocesses under l yi ng t h e food
r i o t : pr ol e t a r i a ni z a t i on, commer ci al i zat i on, di s mant l i ng of l o c a l con-
t r o l s . A s t h e i r dependent government al s t a f f s , urban popul at i ons and non-
a g r i c u l t u r a f l abor f or c e s swel l ed, t he managers of s t a t e s i nt er vened i n-
cr eas i ngl y t o promote market i ng. (There i s i r ony i n t he f a c t t h a t t hey
act ed t hus i n t h e nome of f r e e i ng t h e mar ket . ) As St evenson s ays of t he
Engl i sh c r i s i s of 1795:
The government, however, was det ermi ned t o keep out of t he i n t e r n a l
cor n t r a de and at t empt ed t o keep up t he normal c i r c u l a t i o n of
gr oi n, s o t h a t t h e l a r g e urban c e nt r e s would be s uppl i ed. On
t he s e grounds t he government r ef us ed t o yi e l d t o t he pl e a s of
l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s and i n t e r f e r e wi t h t h e normal movement of g r a i n
. . . It was r epor t ed t o t he Home Of f i c e t h a t st oppi ng t h e move-
ment of gr a i n had become s o wi despread t h a t count r y mi l l e r s were
s a i d t o be f r i ght ened t o send gr a i n t o t he c a p i t a l except by ni ght .
I n an at t empt t o f r e e t h e c i r c u l a t i o n of gr a i n from t hes e checks
t he government passed an a c t t o pr event t h e s t oppi ng of gr a i n by
making t h e whole hundred l i a b l e t o f i n e and i ndi vi dua l s l i a b l e t o
f i n e and imprisonment (St evenson 1974: 41-42).
I n t h a t c r i s i s , many l oco1 o f f i c i a l s sought t o r e s t r i c t t h e f l ow of gr a i n
away from t h e i r own market s. Wi t hi n t hr e e decades, however, t he market
and t h e nnt i ona l government had won t h e i r b a t t l e ; few mayors and magis-
t r a t e s chose t o count er t h e na t i ona l wi l l , and few hungry crowds harbored
t he hope of making them do so. One of t h e Engl i sh forms. of c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i on had wi t her ed away.
Two t hi ngs event ual l y put an end t o t h e predominance of t h e r e a c t i v e
forms, al t hougl i a t t i mes and tempos which va r i e d markedly from one pa r t of
t he West t o anot her . F i r s t , t he s t a t e won al most everywhere. One may
a s k how compl et e t he v i c t o r y of t he s t a t e was i n t h e remote s e c t i ons
of va s t t e r r i t o r i e s such a s Canada, Aus t r a l i a o r Br nzi l , and s pe c ul a t e
whether r ecent s ur ges of s ect i onal i s m i n Belgium. Gr eat Br i t a i n and even
France pr esage t h e end of s t a t e c ont r ol . Yet on t he whole t he two cen-
t u r i e s a f t e r 1700 produced an enormous concent r at i on of r es our ces and
means of coer ci on under t he c o n t r o l of na t i ona l s t a t e s , t o t h e v t r t u n l
excl us i on of o t h e r l e v e l s of government. Second, a whole s e r i e s of orgnni -
z a t i onnl changes c l os e l y l i nked t o ur bani zat i on. i n d u s t r i a l i z n t i o l ~ and t he
expansi on of c a pi t a l i s m g r e a t l y reduced t h e r o l e of t h e communal group a s
a s e t t i n g f o r mobi l i zat i on and a s a r e pos i t or y f o r power; t h e a s s oc i a t i on
of one ki nd o r anot her came t o be t he c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ve hi c l e f o r c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i on. The r i s e of t he j oi nt - s t ock company, t l i e p o l i t i c a l pnr t y, tlie
l abor uni on, t h e cl ub a l l bel ong t o t h e same gener al t r end.
Working t oget her , t he v i c t o r y of t h e s t a t e and t h e r i s e of t he ss-
s oc i a t i on t ransformed t h e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s which most commonly produced
vi ol ence. I n count r y of t e r count r y, p o l i t i c s nat i onal i zed; tlie p o l i t y
which mat t er ed was t h e one which c ont r ol l e d t h e nnt i ona l s t a t e ; t he cru-
c i a l s t r u g g l e s f o r par er went on a t a nnt i ona l s c a l e . And t l i e p a r t i c i p a n t s
i n t hos e s t r uggl e s were most o f t e n or gani zed a s a s s oc i a t i ons . The s t r i k e .
t he demonst r at i on, t he par t y cons pi r acy, t h e or gani zed march on t he c a p i t a l .
t he par l i ament ar y s e s s i on, t he mass meet i ng become t h e us ual s e t t i n g s f o r
c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence. The s t a t e became an i nt e r e s t e d p a r t i c i p a n t Ln a l l
c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence -- a s policemen, a s pnr t y t o t h e c o n f l i c t , a s t e r t i u s
gaudens.
The di scover y t h a t c o l l e c t i v e ' vi ol ence i s a by-product of t he
same political processes which produce nonviolent collective action does
not mean, then, that it is an uninteresting by-product. The occurrence
of damage to persons or objects gives us some small assurance that at
least one of the parties to the collective action took it seriously.
More important, violence makes collective action visible: authorities,
participants and observers tend to set darn some record of their actions.
reactions and observations. Collective violence therefore serves as s
convenient trscer of major alterations in collective action as a whole.
Like all tracers. we must use it with care.
CIWPTER SEVEN: REVOLUTION AND REBELLION
Revolutionary Situations and Revolutionary Outcomes
We have encountered our share of Big Words on the way from mobili-
zation to revolution. Interest, power and violence have all turned out
to be controversial concepts not only because they refer to complex reali-
ties but also because alternative definitions of each of them tend to im-
ply alternative political programs. That is why Stephen Lukes npesks of
"pluralist ," "reformist" and [truly] "rsdlcsl" definitions of parer. The
same is certainly true of our final Big Word: revolution. Revoli~tionary
reality is complex. And whether it includes coupn, sssossinations, ter-
rorism or slow, massive changes such as induetriolieation is controversial
not only because the world is complex, but also becaune to call something
revolutionary is. within most forms of western political discourse, to
identify it as good or bad.
Nevertheless, most western analysts of revolution restrict their de-
finitions by means of two sorts of requirements: 1) by insisting that the
actors and the action meet some demanding standards -- tl~at they be booed
on an oppressed class, that they have a comprehensive program of social
transformation in view. or some other Cause of seriouness; 2) by dealing
only with cases in which parer actually changes hands. Peter Cnlvert, for
example, builds the following elements into his conception of revolution:
(a) A process in which the political direction of a state hecomes
increasingly discredited in the eyes of either the populntion an a
whole or certain key sections of it . . .
(b) A change of government (transition) at s clearly defined point
in time by the use of armed force, or the credible threat of its
use; namely, an event.
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(c) A more-or-l ess coher ent programme of change i n e i t h e r t h e pol -
i t i c a l o r t h e s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of o s t a t e , o r bot h, induced by
t h e p o l i t i c a l l e a de r s hi p a f t e r a r evol ut i onor y event , t h e t r a n s i -
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t i o n of power, has occur r ed.
( d) A p o l i t i c a l myth t h a t gi ve s t o t h e p o l i t i c a l l e a de r s hi p r e s ul -
t i n g from a r evol ut i onar y t r a n s i t i o n shor t - t er m s t a t u s a s t he l e g i t - 1
i mat e government of t he s t a t e ( Cal ver t 1970:4).
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Thus, he goes on, "i n or der t o i n v e s t i g a t e f u l l y t h e concept of r evol ut i on,
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i t would be necessar y t o st udy i n d e t a i l pr ocess, event , programme, and
myth a s d i s t i n c t phenomena" ( Cal ver t 1970:4). He conf i nes h i s own s t udy
t o r evol ut i onor y event s : changes of government accomplished by f or ce.
That choi ce g r e a t l y i nc r e a s e s t he number of c a s e s he has t o examine, s i n c e
most such event s do not meet h i s c r i t e r i a a , b and c. Yet t h e i n s i s t e n c e
on armed f or c e and on an a c t u a l t r a n s f e r of power el i mi nat es many i ns t a nc e s
i n which competing obs er ver s s e e something r evol ut i onar y: t he I n d u s t r i a l
Revol ut i on, r e vol ut i ons from above, t h e l egendar y General S t r i k e of t h e
s y n d i c a l i s t s , and s o on. On t h e ot he r hand. t h e d e f i n i t i o n has a hard-
nosed q u a l i t y which many advocat es of r evol ut i on w i l l f i nd unaccept abl e; i t
does not i n s i s t t h a t t he par t y which s e i z e s power be di s pos s es s ed, pro-
gr e s s i ve o r even angry.
No concept of r evol ut i on can escape some such d i f f i c u l t i e s , because i
no concept uol i zer con avoi d making some such choi ces. Never t hel ess, we
can c l e a r a good de a l of concept ual ground by means of a si mpl e d i s t i n c t i o n
between r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n s and revol ut i onor)! outcomes. Most s i g n i f i -
c a n t di sagreement about t he proper d e f i n i t i o n of r evol ut i on f a l l s some-
wher e. al ong t he s e two di mensi ons.
Revol ut i onar y Si t u a t i o n s
The di s t i ngui s hi ng c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a r evol ut i onor y s i t u a t i o n , a s
Leon Tr ot sky s a i d l ong ago, is t h e pr esence of more t han one bl oc ef f ec-
t i v e l y e xe r c i s i ng c ont r ol over s s i g n i f i c a n t pa r t of t he s t a t e appar at us :
The h i s t o r i c a l pr epar at i on of a r evol ut i on br i ngs about . i n t h e
pr e- r evol ut i onar y per i od, a s i t u a t i o n i n which t h e c l a s s which is
c a l l e d t o r e a l i z e t h e new s o c i a l system, al t hough not y e t mi s t er
of t h e count r y, has a c t u a l l y concent r at ed i n i t s hands a s i g n i f i -
c s n t s ha r e of t h e s t a t e power, whi l e t he o f f i c i a l appar at us of t he
government i s s t i l l i n t he hands of t h e ol d l o r d s . That is t he i ni -
t i a l dual power i n every r evol ut i oo.
But t h a t i s not its onl y form. I f t he new c l a s s , pLaced i n power
by a r e vol ut i on which i t di d not want, is i n essence an al r eady ol d,
h i s t o r i c a l l y bel at ed, c l a s s ; i f i t was a l r e a dy worn o u t bef or e i t
was o f f i c i a l l y crowned; i f on coming t o power i t encount er s on an-
t a goni s t s u f f i c i e n t l y mat ure and r eachi ng out its hand toward t h c
helm of s t a t e ; t hen i ns t ead of one uns t a bl e two-power cqui l i br i um,
t h e p o l i t i c a l r e vol ut i on produces anot her , s t i l l l e s s s t a b l e . To
overcome t h e "anarchy" of t h i s twofold sover ei gnt y becomes a t cvcr y
new s t e p t h e t a s k of t h e r evol ut i on -- o r t h e count er - r evol ut i on
(Trot sky 1965: 224).
The shadow of Russi a i n 1917 f a l l s dar k a c r o s s t h i s passage. From t h e
p a r t i c u l a r i ns t ance, never t hel es s , comes an i dea of gener al val ue. Tr ot -
s ky' s i dea of dua l sover ei gnt y c l a r i f i e s a number of f e a t u r e s oE r evol u-
t i onar y s i t u a t i o n s . Pet er Amann has gone s o f a r a s t o f as hi on i t i n t o a
s e r vi c e a bl e d e f i n i t i o n of r evol ut i on i t s e l f : f o r him, a r evol ut i on begi ns
when more t han one "power bl oc" regarded a s l e g i t i ma t e and sover ei gn by
some of a count r y' s peopl e emerges, and ends when onl y one power bl oc
remains.
Amann's adapt at i on of Tr ot sky has t h e advant age of ne a t l y i de nt i f yi ng
t he common pr ope r t i e s of coups, c i v i l wars and f ul l - s c a l e r e vol ut i ons
wi t hout r e qui r i ng knowledge of what happened next . It st i l l per mi t s
t h e i r d i s t i n c t i o n i n t erms of t h e i d e n t i t i e s of t h e power bl oc s t hemsel ves.
At t he same t i me i t I d e n t i f i e s a weakness i nTr ot s ky' s f or mul s t i on: t h e
i ns i s t e nc e t h a t a s i n g l e c l a s s makes a r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n . ,Barring-
t on Moore's t r eat ment of t h e g r e a t e s t modern r e vol ut i ons c o r r e c t s t h a t
weakness by t r a c i ng o u t t h e c o a l i t i o n s of c l a s s e s which t o r e down t he o l d
regimes. Thus f or Moore a c o n l l t i o n of workers, bour geoi s and peas ant s
made t he French Revol ut i on, even i f t h e workers and peas ant s l o s t out
f a i r l y soon. What is more, Moore argues t h a t t h e c ha r a c t e r of t he revol u-
t i onar y s l t u a t i o n shaped t h e r evol ut i onar y outcome. The f a c t t h a t i t
was bour geoi s + peasant s + workers r a t he r t han t h e d i f f e r e n t c o a l i t i o n s
which made t he American, Engl i sh o r Russi an r evol ut i ons , i n Moore's view,
pushed France toward t he at t enuat ed par l i ament ar y democracy s he mai nt ai ned
i n t he ni net eent h and t went i et h c e nt ur i e s .
Two of Tr ot s ky' s r e s t r i c t i o n s t he r e f or e seem unnecessary: 1 ) t h a t
each of t h e bl ocs c o n s i s t of a s i n g l e s o c i a l c l a s s ; 2) t h a t t he r e be onl y
two sucli bl ocs a t any poi nt i n t i me. Ei t he r of t he s e r e s t r i c t i o n s would
e l i mi na t e most of t h e st andar d c a s e s of r evol ut i on -- not l e a s t t hos e of
France, China and Mexico.
rots sky's i dea r e t a i n s i t s ona l ys t i c r e s i l i e n c y i f expanded t o i n-
cl ude bl ocs c ons i s t i ng of c o a l i t i o n s of c l a s s e s and/ or ot he r groups and
t o al l ow f o r t he p o s s i b i l i t y of t hr e e o r more si mul t aneous bl ocs.
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s over ei gnt y is t hen t h e i d e n t i f y i n g Eeat ur e of r evol ut i onar y s i t u -
a t i ons . A r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n begi ns when a government pr evi ousl y .
under t h e c ont r ol of a s i n g l e , sover ei gn p o l i t y becomes t h e obj e c t of ef -
f e c t i v e , competing, mut ual l y excl us i ve cl ai ms on t l i e p a r t of two o r more
d i s t i n c t p o l i t i e a . It ends when s s i n g l e sover ei gn pol i t y r e ga i ns con-
t r o l over t he government.
Such a mul t i pl i c a t i on of p o l i t i e s occur s under f our d i f f e r e n t con-
d i t i o n s :
1. The members of one p o l i t y at t empt t o s ubor di nat e anot her pre-
vi ous l y d i s t i n c t pol i t y. Where t h e two p o l i t i e s a r e c l e a r l y sover ei gn
and i ndependent a t t h e o u t s e t we a r e l i k e l y t o cons i der t h i s con-
f l i c t a s p e c i a l v a r i e t y of war. Ci rcumst ances l i k e t he annexat i on
of Texas t o t h e United S t a t e s o r t l i e t r a n s f e r s of power t o var i ous
communist regi mes i n Eas t er n Europe a t t h e end of t h e Second World
War f a l l , i n f a c t , i n t o an uncer t ai n a r e a between war and r evol ut i on.
2. The members of a pr evi ous l y s ubor di nat e pol i t y. such a s t he
group of cont ender s hol di ng power over a r egi onal government, a s s e r t
sover ei gnt y. Here t l i e words "r ebel l i on" and "r evol t " s pr i ng r e a d i l y
t o mind. Yet i n r e c e nt ye a r s i t has become q u i t e usual t o c a l l one
ver s i on of such event s a c ol oni a l o r na t l onol r evol ut i on -- e s pe c i a l l y
i f t h e outcome is independence.
3. Cont enders not hol di ng membership i n t h e e x i s t i n g pol i t y mob1,llze
i n t o a bl oc s uc c e s s f ul l y e xe r t i ng c ont r ol over some por t i on of t h e
governmental appar at us . Despi t e t he o t t r a c t i v e n c s s of t h i s ver s i on
t o l e a d e r s of t h e di s pos s es s ed, i t r a r e l y, i f ever , occur s i n a
pure form.
4. The more usual ci r cumst ance is t he f r agment at i on of an e x i s t i n g
p o l i t y i n t o two o r more bl oc s each e xe r c i s j ng c ont r ol over some p a r t
of t he government. That f r agment at i on f r equent l y i nvol ves t h e emer-
gence of c o a l i t j o n s between es t abl i s hed members of t he p o l i t y and
mobi l i zi ng nonmembers. 1
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How would we r ecogni ze t he ons e t of mul t i pl e s over ei gnt y? The ques t i on
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i s s t i c k i e r t han i t seems a t f i r s t gl ance. Nei t her tlie pr esence nor t h e
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expansi on of a r e ns of autonomy o r of r e s i s t a n c e on t he pa r t of t h e s ubj e c t
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popul nt i on i s a r e l i a b l e s i gn. A 1 1 governments e x c i t e some s o r t s of r e s i s -
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t ance, and a l l governments e xe r t i ncompl et e c ont r ol over t h e i r s ubj e c t s .
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That was t h e poi nt of t he e a r l i e r a n a l y s i s of r epr es s i on, t o l e r a t i o n and
f a c i l i t a t i o n . Most s t a t e s f a c e cont i nui ng margi nal chal l enges t o t h e i r
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sover ei gnt y: from wi t hj n, bandi t s , v i g i l a n t e s , r e l i g i o u s communities, na-
t i o n a l mi nor i t i e s o r uncompromising s e p a r a t i s t s hol d them o f f . From with-
out , powerful s t a t e s i n f i l t r a t e them and encroach on t l i ei r pr er ogat i ves .
A 1 1 of t hes e ci r cumst ances have some d i s t a n t ki ns hi p t o r evol ut i on, but
t hey do not c o n s t i t u t e r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n s . Even r i v a l cl ai ms t o
t hos e of t he e x i s t i n g p o l i t y by t h e s d h e r e n t s o f di spl aced regi mes, mi - I
I
l i t a r y movements o r out s i de s t a t e s a r e q u i t e common. The cl ai ms them-
s e l v e s do not amount t o n r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n .
The ques t i on is whether some s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t of t h e s ubj e c t popu-
l a t i on honors t he cl ai m. The r evol ut i onar y moment a r r i v e s when pr evi ous l y
ocqul escent members of t h a t popul at i on f i nd t hemsel ves conf r ont ed wi t h
s t r i c t l y i ncompat i bl e demands from t h e and f or m an a l t e r n a t i v e
body cl ai mi ng c ont r ol over t h e government, o r cl ai mi ng t o & t he Rovcrn-
ment . . . and t hos e pr evi ous l y acqui es cent peopl e obey t h e a l t e r n a t i v e
body. They pay t axes , pr ovi de men t o its ar mi es, f eed i t s f unc t i ona r i e s ,
honor i t s symbols, gi ve, t i me t o i t s s e r vi c e , o r yi e l d ot he r r es our ces des-
p i t e t h e pr ohi bi t i ons of a s t i l l - e x i s t i n g government t hey Formerly obeyed.
Mul t i pl e s over ei gnt y has begun. When onl y one p o l i t y e xe r t i ng e x c l ~r s l v e
c ont r ol over t l i e government remai ns, and no r i v n l s a r e s uc c e s s f ul l y pr es-
s i n g t h e i r cl ai ms -- however t h a t hsppeiis -- t h e r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n
has ended.*
Revol ut i onar y Outcomes
"A r evol ut i on. " wr i t e s Samuel Hunt i ngt on. "is a r api d. fundnmentnl,
and vi ol e nt ' domest i c change i n t h e dominant va l ue s and myths of a s oc i e t y,
i n i t s p o l i t i c a l i n s i t u t i o n s , s o c i a l s t r uc t ur e . l eader s hi p. and govern-
ment a c t i v i t y and pol i c i e s . Revol ut i ons a r e t hus t o be di s t i ngui s l ~e d
from i ns ur r e c t i ons , r e be l l i ons , r e v o l t s , coups, and wars of independence"
(Hunt i ngt on 1968: 264). Hunt i ngt on' s d e f i n i t i o n s t r e s s e s outcomes, not
t he p o l i t i c a l pr oces s es which l e a d t o t hos e outcomes. Such outcomes a r e
r a r e . Depending on how gener ousl y one i nt e r pr e t e d t he vor ds "rapj d" and
"fundamental", i t would be eas y t o ar gue t h a t no r evol ut i on hns ever
occur r ed, and har d t o ar gue t h a t t h e number of t r u e c a s e s exceeds n hal f -
dozen. Pet er ~ s l v e r t ' s d e f i n i t l o n o f r evol ut i on, which we looked a t
e a r l i e r , is somewhat l e s s demanding t han Hunt i ngt on' s. I t merel y r e-
q u i r e s t h a t a government be di s c r e di t e d, t h a t a new group s e i z e t h e gov-
ernment by f or ce, t h a t t l i e newcomers i nt r oduce a program of change, and
* I r e g r e t t o s s y t h a t i n an e a r l i e r ver s i on of t h i s chapt er ( Ti l l y 1975 ).
I used t he word "r evol ut i on" f o r t h e ci r cumst snces I am he r e c a l l i n g o r evol -
t i ona r y s i t u a t i o n
t l i at a myth l e gi t i ma t i ng t he t r a ns f e r of power come i n t o bei ng. Except f o r
t he discrediting, t hes e condi t i ons , t oo, a r e outcomes; t he r e is no r e l i a -
b l e way t o know whether a r e vol ut i on is occur r i ng u n t i l t h e whole pr ocess
has ended.
For t he moment, I propose an even l e s s demanding s t andar d t han Cal-
v e r t ' s . A r evol ut i onar y outcome i s t h e di spl acement of one s e t of power-
hol der s by anot her . That si mpl e d e f i n i t i o n l e a ve s many r e f e r e nc e poi nt s
ovnt l abl e: power over t l i e means of pr oduct i on, power over symbols, power
over government. Pr ovi s i onal l y, l e t us t a ke power over government a s our
r e f e r e nc e poi nt . A r evol ut i onar y outcome i s t h e di spl acement of one s e t
of members of :he p o l i t y by anot her s e t . Cl ear l y, a r evol ut i onor y s i t u a t i o n
can occur wi t hout n r evol ut i onor y outcome; i n t h e s i mpl es t cas e, t h e
J
e x i s t i n g members of t h e pol i t y beat down t h e i r c ha l l e nge r s a f t e r a per i od
of e f f e c t i v e , competing, mut ual l y e xc l us i ve cl ai ms. It is a t l e a s t l ogi c- I
!
a l l y pos s i bl e f or s r evol ut i onar y outcome t o occur wi t hout a r evol ut i onar y
s i t u a t i o n , through t h e gr adual a ddi t i on and/ or s ubt r a c t i on of members of
1
t h e pol i t y.
I n gener al , how does t h e di spl acement of one s e t of powerholders by
'
anot her happen7 The answer depends i n p a r t on t h e t i me- per spect i ve we
adopt . I n t h e s hor t r un, t h e ques t i on concer ns t a c t i c s and t he bal ance
of f or ces . In Tr ot s ky' s a n a l y s i s of t h e October Revol ut i on, f o r example.
t he t a c t i c a l problems of wi nni ng over t h e Pet rogrod ga r r i s on and t hen of
capt ur i ng t he Winter Pal ace loom ver y l a r g e ; gener al i zed. Tr ot s ky' s con-
c e r ns pl a c e t he c ont r ol o r ne ut r a l i z a t i on of t h e a v a i l a b l e ml l i t a r y f or c e
a t t l i e c e nt e r of t h e shor t - r un c ondi t i ons f or a t r a n s f e r of power.
I n t he medium r un, we a r r i v e a t t h e cons i der at i ons which have domin-
a t e d t h i s book: t he pr esence of mobi l i zed cont ender s i n e f f e c t i v e c oa l i -
t i ons . The medium r un of Tr ot s ky' s a n a l y s i s concer ns Lhe peasant s who
had been mobi l i zed v i a t h e army. t h e or gani zed workers of Pet r oar ad and
Moscow, tlie p a r t i e s and t he pr oces s es by which each of them mobi l i zed
and formed c o a l i t i o n s . I n t h i s medium run, r epr es s i on and f a c i l i t a t i o n
f i g u r e a s wel l -- not abl y i n t he d i s c r e d i t i n g and wenkening of t h e
Ts a r i s t regime by tlie war. It i s I n t h i s medium r un t l i at t h e c r e a t i on o r
emergence of a r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n c ont r i but e s t o -- and m y be es-
s e n t i a l t o -- a r evol ut i onar y outcome. Without t he appear ance of mul-
t i p l e s over ei gnt y a s i g n i f i c a n t t r a n s f e r o f power is e i t h e r i mpossi bl e o r
hi ghl y unl i kel y.
I n t h e l ong r un, i n t e r e s t s and or gani zat i on begi n t o t e l l . I n t h i s
book, we have onl y faced t h e chal l enge of l ong r un a n a l y s i s i nt e r mi t t e nt l y,
t hrough qui ck gl i mpses a t t h e consequences of pr ol e t a r i a ni z nt l on, t he
development of c a pi t a l i s m, s t a t e mk i n g , ur bani zat i on and i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n .
The qui ck gl i mpses have, however, been gr aphi c enough t o conunt~nicate t h e
fundament al i mport ance of t hr eot ened c l a s s i n t e r e s t s . Over t h e l ong run.
t h e r eor gani zat i on of product i on c r e a t e s t he chi ef h f s t o r i c a l a c t or s .
t he major c o n s t e l l a t i o n s of i n t e r e s t s , t he ba s i c t h r e a t s t o t hos e i nt e r -
e s t s , and t he pr i nc i pa l condi t i ons f or t r a n s f e r s of power.
Si t u a t i o n s and Outcomes Combined
Our concept s wi l l do b e t t e r work f or us i f we t ur n them i n t o cont i nuo.
A s i t u a t i o n can be more o r l e s s r evol ut i onar y. The c e n t r a l ques t i on is:
a t t he poi nt i n t i me which we a r e eval uat i ng, how much wu l d i t c o s t t o
e l i mi na t e t h e s p l i t between t h e a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i t i e s 7 How near l y i r r e -
vocabl e i s t he s p l i t 7 We shoul d t r y t o make t h a t jugement from i nt or mot i on
a va i l a bl e a t t he, poi nt i n t i me we a r e j udgi ng, r a t h e r t han from event ual
outcomes. I f we want t o j udge a completed r evol ut i on a s a whole,
we can f i x on t he mean s p l i t between p o l i t i e s , t h e owximum s p l i t , t he i n i -
t i a l s p l i t o r t he t i me-funct i on a s a whole. I n any cas e, one ext reme is
no mul t i pl e s over ei gnt y a t a l l , t h e ot he r an i r r e voc a bl e s p l i t . I nbet ween
a r e di vi s i ons c os t i ng t h e p a r t i e s var yi ng amounts t o el i mi nat e. The
c o s t d e f i n i t e l y i ncl udes t he c o s t of r epr es s i on t o t he r e pr e s s or s and
I I
I
t l i e r epr es s ed. The sum of a l l payof f s and foregone b e n e f i t s shoul d a l s o
e nt e r i n . I f so, t he est i mat ed c o s t wi l l obvi ousl y depend on t he time-
peri od consi der ed -- and wi l l obvi ousl y i ncl ude some t hi nki ng about what
might have happened i f . . .
An outcome can a l s o be more o r l e s s r evol ut i onar y. Now t he c e n t r a l
1
ques t i on is: how c l o s e di d t he e x i s t i n g members of t he p o l i t y come t o
bei ng compLetely di s pl aced? We may s e t t l e f or a si mpl e h a d count . We
may wei ght t he heads by t h e i r power pr i or t o t h e change, but st i l l s e t t l e
f or count i ng how many heads r o l l e d . We may t r y t o es t i mat e t he power of
a l l pr evi ousl y e x i s t i n g members bef or e and a f t e r . I n any cas e, one ext reme
w i l l be t h e mai nt enance o r r e s t or a t i on of t h e s t a t u s quo a nt e , t h e ot he r
extreme tlie compl et e el i mi nat i on of pr evi ous members from t l i e pol i t y. I n
between wi l l be var yi ng degr ees of di spl acement .
i
The deci s i on whether t o c a l l an event a r evol ut i on now l ooks l i k e
Fi gur e 7-1. P o l i t i c s a s usual i nvol ves l i t t l e o r no di spl acement of exi s-
t i n g members of t h e p o l i t y , and no more t han low-cost s p l i t s between a l -
I
t e r n a t i v e p o l i t i e s . Coups i nvol ve hi gher - cost s p l i t s ( al t hough not i r -
r evocabl e ones ) , but r e s u l t i n r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e di spl acement of e x i s t i n g
members. S i l e n t r evol ut i ons , i f t hey occur , produce major di spl acement s
wi t h l i t t l e o r no development of a r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n . Gr eat r evol u- !
t i o n s a r e ext reme i n bot h r egar ds : ext ens i ve s p l i t s between a l t e r n a t i v e
Fi gur e 7-1: Combinations of Revol ut i onar y Si t u a t i o n s and Revol ot i onary
Outcomes
Complete
Displacement
Revol ut i on
S i l e n t
Revol ut i on
P o l i t i c s
a s Usual
NO . . . I r r evocabl e
S p l i t S p l i t
Revol ut i onar y Si t ua t i on
p o l i t i e s , l ar ge- s cal e di spl acement of e x i s t i n g members. I n Fi gur e 7-1,
Li ne A r e pr e s e nt s a gencrous d e f i n i t i o n of r evol ut i on: ever yt hi ng t o t he
r i g h t g e t s count ed. Li ne B s t a t e s a r e s t r i c t i v e d e f i n i t i o n ; onl y g r e a t
r evol ut i ons qua l i f y.
Al t l i ougl ~ t he di agram i s e n t i r e l y concept ual , i t hel ps pi npoi nt some
i mpor t ant t h e o r e t i c a l i s s ue s . St udent s of r evol ut i on di s a gr e e over t h e
combi nat i ons of outcome and r evol ut i onar y s i t t r a t i on which a r e a c t u a l l y
pos s i bl e i n t h i s worl d. To s i mpl i f y a complex s e t of di sagr eement s, l e t
us l ook a t t hr e e i de a l i z e d maps of t h e pos s i bl e and t h e i mpossi bl e:
"Syndi cal i st ", "Marxist" and "Bri nt oni an". They appear i n Fi gur e 7-2.
Thc Syndi c a l i s t argument, i n i t s s i mpl es t form, r uns: t h e more ext ens i ve
t he r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n , t he more sweeping t he r evol ut i onar y outcome.
I t is a c a us a l argument. It s a ys t h e c r e a t i o n of an i r r evocabl e s p l i t be-
tween a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i t i e s wi l l , i n i t s e l f , produce a t o t a l di spl acement
of t h e e x i s t i n g hol der s of power. I t a l s o s ays : t h e l e s s ext ens i ve t h e
r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n , t he l e s s ext ens i ve t h e t r a ns f e r of power.
Tlie Marxl st argumcnt ( e s pe c i a l l y a s a r t i c u l a t e d by such r evol ut i onar y
t h e o r i s t s a s Cramsci and Lenin) di s agr ees . I t ar gues t h a t many a r evol u-
t i onar y s i t u a t i o n f a i l s t o produce a r evol ut i onar y outcome -- f o r l a c k of
a vanguard, f o r l a c k of a di s c i pl i ne d r evol ut i onar y par t y, f or l a c k of
t h e r i g h t c l a s s c o a l i t i o n s , and so on. But i t a gr e e s wit11 t he s yndi c a l i s t
nrgument i n one i mpor t ant r egar d: no r evol ut i onar y t r a n s f e r s of power oc-
cur wi t hout ext ens i ve revolutionary s i t u a t i o n s . Thus a two-part revol u-
t i onar y s t r a t e gy: c r e a t e ( or l ook f o r ) a r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n ; or gani ze
t he p o l i t i c a l means f or a r evol ut i onar y outcome.
Crane Rr i nt on d e l i b e r a t e l y t ook t h e oppos i t e view. He argued import-
a n t i nt er nal . l i m i t s on t h e c r e a t i on of any r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n ; r eac-
t i on was i ne vi t a bl e . He suggest ed, f ur t her mor e, t h a t t he r e l a t i ons hi p
between s i t u a t i o n and outcome was negat i ve: t he more r evol ut i onar y t h e
7-13
Fi gur e 7-2: Syndi c a l i s t , Mar xi st and Br i nt onl nn Maps of Revolutiorlnry
Re a l i t y
SYNDICALIST
I \ / Unreal I
-\/
Difiplacement I
NO I r r evocabl e
' split
MARXIST
Complete 1
No I r r evocabl e
~pl l t ' S p l i t
s i t u a t i o n , t h e l e s s r evol ut i onar y t h e outcome. A peopl e who went t hrough
a maJor r evol ut i on r et ur ned, wi t h r e l i e f , more o r l e s s t o t h e s t a r t i n g
poi nt . But t he more s e ns i bl e gr a dua l i s t s , t hought Br i nt on, produced mn-
j or a l t e r a t t o n s of t h e power s t r uc t ur e . The argument s among Syndi c a l i s t s ,
Mar xi st s and Br i nt oni ans a r e wi t h us today.
Fi gur e 7-3 o f f e r s a r evi s ed c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of t r a n s f e r s of power
i n terms of t h e e xt e nt t o which r evol ut i onar y s i t r ~ n t i o n s and/ or r evol ut i on-
a r y outcomes occur . The diagram t e l l s us t o t ake a k o a d view of revol u-
t i on, r e qui r i ng onl y some minimum combi nat i on of r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n
and r evol ul i onar y outcome t o qua l i f y an event a s a r evol ut i on. It a s s e r t s
t h a t t h e phenomena we c a l l "coups", "i ns ur r ect i ons ", " c i v i l wars" and
" f ul l - s c a l e r evol ut i ons " over l ap, I ~ u t not compl et el y. Each has i t s own
c l i a r nc t c r i s t i c r ange of outcomes and r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n s . But t he
ba s i c di f f e r e nc e s among them r egar d t he i d e n t i t i e s of t h e p a r t i e s t o t he
t r a ns f e r of power: i n t he coup, members of t h e q wl i t y di s pl a c e each ot he r ;
i n a f ul l - s c a l e r evol ut i on much o r a l l of t h e pr evi ous l y dominant c l a s s
l o s e s power. and s o on.
Although t h e diagram does not say s o e x p l i c i t l y , t h e obl ong f or " c i v i l
war" br ushes t he ext reme r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n , i r r evocabl e s p l i t , t o
remlnd u s t h a t one common outcome of c i v i l war i s t h e permanent di vi s i on
of a t e r r i t o r y pr evi ous l y c ont r ol l e d by a s i n g l e government i n t o two o r
more autonomous t e r r i t o r i e s . The diagram i ndi c a t e s t h a t ext ens i ve r evol -
ut i onar y outcomes do not occur wi t hout ext ens i ve r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n s .
Rut i t deni es t he converse: ext remel y r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n s do not
ne c e s s nr i l y produce ext remel y r evol ut i onar y outcomes. The debat e over
dcEi ni t f ons t okes u s i n t o n debat e over t h e s ubs t ance of p o l i t t c a l c o n f l i c t
and t he st rt rcLure of r evol ut i on.
Fi gur e 7-3: Si t u a t i o n s and Outcomes i n Di f f e r e nt Types of Power Tr annf er s
compl et e
Displacement
Displacement
Outcome
No
I 1 Revol ut i on
/'
Rout i ne
1 P o l i t i c s
No
I
+ I r r evocohl e
S p l i t S p l i t
Revol ut i onar y Si t ua t i on
Some of our most val uabl e anal ys es of r evol ut i on and r e be l l i on do
not concern t h e s u f f i c i e n t c ondi t i ons f o r one o r t h e ot he r , but t h e pl ace-
ment of d i f f e r e n t s o r t s of groups wi t hi n some equi vnl ent of t h e diagram.
Some o f t he anal ys es concent r at e on t he mobi l i z a bi l i t y of d i f f e r e n t s o r t s
of groups f o r d i f f e r e n t ki nds of a c t i on: f or r evol ut i onar y act i vi s m, f o r
p o l i t i c s a s us ual , and s o on. Er i c Wolf' s comparison of t went i et h- cent ur y
a gr a r i a n r e b e l l i o n s emphasizes t h e r e l a t i v e mobi l i z a bi l i t y of poor, mid-
d l e and r i c h peasant s, al t hough i t a l s o s a ys i mpor t ant t hi ngs about t he
way expanding c a pi t a l i s m i mpi nges on r u r a l a r e a s and on t h e i n t e r e s t s of
d i f f e r e n t groups of peas ant s wi t hi n them.
Some anal ys es gi ve t h e i r primary a t t e n t i o n t o t he correspondence
between d i f f e r e n t forms of p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n and d i f f e r e n t c onf i gur a t i ons
of i n t e r e s t s , whi l e sayi ng r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e about mobi l i zat i on o r about
t he p o l i t i c a l pr oces s es l eadi ng t o p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n s and outcomes.
They commonly t ake t he form of compari sons f o t he c h a r a c t e r i s t i c forms
of a c t i on of peopl e i n c ont r a s t i ng s t r u c t u r a l s e t t i n g s .
J e f f r e y Pai ge' s
Agr ar i an Revol ut i on i s on out s t andi ng cas e i n poi nt .
Pai ge sums up h i s
gui di ng hypot heses i n t he s e terms:
A. A combi nat i on of bot h nonc ul t i vot or s and c u l t i v a t o r s dependent
on l and a s t h e i r pr i nc i pa l s our ce of income l e a ds t o an a gr a r i a n
r e v o l t . . .
8. A combi nat i on of nonc ul t i va t or s dependent on income from commer-
c i a l c a p i t a l and c u l t i v a t o r s dependent on income from l and l e a ds t o
a reform commodity movement . . .
C. A combinaton of nonc ul t i va t or s dependent on income from c a p i t a l
and c u l t i v a t o r s dependent on income from wagcs t o a reform l abor move-
ment . . .
D, A combi nat i on of nonc ul t i vot or s dependent on income from l end
and c u l t i v a t o r s dependent on income from wnges l e nds t o r evol ut i on
( Pai ge 1975: 70-71).
Pai ge t hen conduct s two s o r t s of a nnl ys i s t o v e r i f y t he s e hypot heses:
a comparison of r u r a l s o c i a l movements i n 135 expor t s e c t o r s of 70 r e l o-
t i v e l y poor c ount r i e s from 1948 t o 1970, and d e t a i l e d c a s e s t u d i e s of
Peru, Angola and Vietnam. The evi dence l ooks good f or h i s argument.
Note how t h e argument works: i t c r os s - t a bul a t e s t h e i n t e r e s t s of
c u l t i v a t o r s and nonc ul t i va t or s , deduces t he c ha r a c t e r and e xt e nt of t he
i n t e r e s t c o n f l i c t r e s u l t i n g from each combi nat i on, and p r e d i c t s from
t h e c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s t o t h e form of t h e c u l t i v a t o r s ' p o l i t i c a l ac-
t i on. The s ubs t ance of hypot hes i s D is t h a t t he combinntion of l and
and wages
i ncl udes some forms of agricultural or gnni zat i on which combine
t h e i n f l e x i b l e behavi or of t h e c u l t i v a t o r s of a l anded e s t a t e wi t h
t h e s t r ong c u l t i v a t o r or ga ni z a t i ons of t he c or por a t e pl a nt a t i on.
When bot h c ondi t i ons e x i s t si mul t aneousl y, t h e r e s u l t is l i k e l y t o
be an a gr a r i a n r evol ut i on i n which a s t r ong peasant-based ~ u e r r i l l o
movement or gani zed by a n a t i o n a l i s t o r Communist par t y at t empt s
t o des t r oy bot h t h e r u r a l upper c l a s s t h e t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of t h e
s t a t e and e s t a b l i s h a new s oc i e t y. ( Pai ge 1975: 358-359).
Pai ge t hen makes f u r t h e r d i s t i n c t i o n s concer ni ng t h e c or r e l nt c u of r evol -
ut i onar y n a t i o n a l i s t movements and r evol ut i onar y s o c i n l i s t movements.
Al -
though i n h i s c a s e s t u d l e s Pai ge is s e n s i t v e nnd i nf or mot i ve about mobil-
i z a t i on, c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on and s t r a t e g i c i nt e r a c t i on, t he ba s i c t heor y
pr e di c t s a c t i on from i n t e r e s t s . Here, i ns t e a d, we a r e assuming i n t e r e s t s
, and deal i ng wi t h t he p o l i t i c a l pr oces s es which l ead from or gani zed and
c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s t o r evol ut i on.
Proxi mat e Causes of Revol ut i onar y Si t u a t i o n s
Let u s l ook more c l o s e l y a t t h e i mpl i cat i ons of t h e d e f i n i t i o n of
a r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n a s mul t i pl e sover ei gnt y. By d e f i n i t i o n , t he r e
a r e t hr e e proxi mat e caus es of mul t i pl e sover ei gnt y:
1. t he appear ance of cont ender s, o r c o a l i t i o n s of cont ender s, ad-
vanci ng excl us i ve a l t e r n a t i v e cl ai ms t o t he c ont r ol over t h e govern-
ment which is c ur r e nt l y exer t ed by t h e members of t h e pol i t y;
2. commitment t o t hos e cl ai ms by a s i g n i f i c a n t segment of t h e sub-
j e c t popul at i on ( e s pe c i a l l y when t hos e commitments a r e not si mpl y
acknowledged i n pr i nc i pl e , but a c t i va t e d i n t h e f a c e of pr ohi bi t i ons
o r cont r ar y directives from t h e government);
3. i ncapaci t y o r unwi l l i ngnes s of t he agent s of t he government t o
s uppr es s t he a l t e r n a t i v e c o a l i t i o n andl or t h e commitment t o i t s
cl ai ms .
Tlie c i r i t i c a l s i gns of a r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n , i n t h i s per s pect i ve,
a r e s i gns of t l i e emergence of an a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i t y . These s i gns may pos-
s i b l y be r e l a t e d t o c' ondi t i ons ot he r anal . yst s have proposed a s p r e c i p i t a n t s
of r evol ut i on: r i s i n g di s cont ent , val ue c o n f l i c t , f r u s t r a t i o n o r r e l a t i v e
depr i vat i on. Tlie r el nt i ons l i i p must, however, be proved and not assumed.
Even ' i f i t is proved t h a t di s cont ent , val ue c o n f l i c t , f r u s t r a t i o n and
r e l a t i v e deprivation do f l u c t u a t e i n c l o s e correspondence t o tlie emergence
7-L9
and di sappear ance of a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i t i e s -- a r e s u l t which wu l d sur -
p r i s e me -- t h e t hi ng t o watch f o r would a t i l l be t l i e commitment of a
s i g n i f i c a n t pa r t of t h e popul at i on, r e ga r dl e s s of t h e i r mot i ves, t o ex-
c l u s i v e a l t e r n a t i v e cl ai ms t o t he c ont r ol over t he government c ur r e nt l y
exer t ed by t h e members of t l i e pol i t y.
So why d i d n ' t t he Uni t ed St a t e s break i n t o r evol ut i on wi t h t h e on-
s e t of t h e Depressi on a f t e r 19301 I cl ai m no s p e c i a l wisdom. Assumlna
t he working c l a s s a s t h e pr i nc i pa l candi dat e f o r counter-mobilization,
however, t h i s l i n e of argument s i n g l e s o u t f a c t o r s such a s t h e fol.lowing:
a low i n i t i a l l e v e l of mobi l i zat i on, l a c k of a l i e na t e d c ool i t l on pa r t ne r s
wi t hi n t h e pol i t y, s h i f t of tlie burden of e xt r a c t i on, a t l e a s t r e l a t i v e l y .
t o unmobilized groups such a s bl acks , t r a di ng of concessi ons which were
r e l a t i v e l y t o t he government (For example, tlie r i g h t of i n d u s t r i a l uni ons
t o or gani ze) f or t h e gr a nt i ng of l oya l t y. . The f a s c i s t s of Germany and
I t a l y went anot her r out e , by d e l i b e r a t e l y demobi l i zi ng t he working c l a s s .
The ot he r na t i ons of t h e world pai d t he c o s t of t h e demobi l i zat i on, i n t he
form of t h e Second World War.
I n an es s ay which Followed h i s l a r g e comparat i ve work. Bat r i ngt on
Moore (1969) proposed f our pr econdi t i ons f or major r evol ut i ons :
1. t he e l i t e ' s l o s s of uni f i e d c ont r ol over army, pol i cy and ot he r
i ns t r ument s of vi ol ence:
2. t h e emergence of a c u t e c o n f l i c t s of i n t e r e s t wi t hi n t he "dominant
cl as s es ";
3. t he development of wi despread chal l enges t o pr e va i l i n8 modes of
t hought and t o t he predominant expi ana t i o n s of justifications of
human s uf f e r i ng;
4 . t h e mobi l i zat i on of a r evol ut i onar y mass, most probabl y through
some sudden di s r upt i on of everyday l i f e coupl ed wi t h i nc r e a s e of
mi sery.
The f i r s t two a r e e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same condi t i on: t h e f r agment at i on of
t he p o l i t y i nt o more t han one c o a l i t i o n , each a pot e nt i a l cl ai mant t o ex-
c l u s i v e c ont r ol of t h e government, and each a p o t e n t i a l c o a l i t i o n par t ner
wi t h c ha l l e nge r s t h a t a r e mobi l i zi ng r a pi dl y. Condi t i on 3) may wel l oc-
c u r r bot h i n s i d e and o u t s i d e t h e p o l i t y , a s t hos e out s i de expr es s t h e i r
out r age a t bei ng excl uded and some of t hos e i n s i d e respond t o t h e i r com-
p l a i n t s wi t h sympathy o r mani pul at i on.
The mobi l i zat i on of a r evol ut i onar y mass de s c r i be s t he r a pi d appear-
ance of a new chal l enger . Not hi ngi nmy a n a l y s i s o r i n my h i s t o r i c a l r e-
f l e c t i o n l e a d s me t o assume t h a t t h e mobi l i zat i on must be sudden o r t h a t
i t must come from i mni s er at i on. But l i ght ni ng mobi l i zat i on, i f i t occur s.
does r educe t h e chances f or t h e i ncr ement al chal l engi ng, t e s t i n g and coal -
i t i on- f or mat i on which bel ong t o t h e r o u t i n e a c qui s i t i on of power, and con-
c e n t r a t e s t h e a t t e nda nt c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence i n a s hor t per i od of t i me.
We have narrowed t h e f ocus of expl anat i on and pr e di c t i on consi der abl y.
It now comes down t o s peci f yi ng and de t e c t i ng t h e ci r cumst ances under
which t hr e e r e l a t e d condi t i ons occur : 1 ) t h e appearance of cont ender s
making excl us i ve a l t e r n a t i v e cl ai ms , 2) s i g n i f i c a n t commitments t o t hose
cl ai ms , 3) r e pr e s s i ve i ncapaci t y of t h e government. The s hor t r un condi -
t i o n s of t he s e outcomes ma y k q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from t he l ong run changes
which make them pos s i bl e. Let us concent r at e f o r t h e moment on t h e s h o r t
r un condi t i ons .
A 1 t e r n a t i v e s t o t he Exi s t i ng Po l i t y
What 1 mean by "excl r ~s i ve a l t e r n a t i v e cl ai ms t o c ont r ol of t he govern-
ment" comes o u t dr amat i cal l y i n an a r t i c l e wr i t t e n ahout a year a f t e r t h e
October Revol ut i on, a s t h e ot he r p a r t i e s which has j oi ned t h e revol n-
t i ona r y c o a l i t i o n were bei ng squeezed out of power:
Now, however. t h e cour s e of world event s and t h e b i t t e r l e s s ons
der i ved from t h e a l l i a n c e of a l l t h e Russian monarchists wi t h
Anglo-French and American i mper i al i sm a r e provi ng in p r a c t i c e
t h a t a democr at i c r e publ i c i s a bourgeoi s-democrnt l c r epubl i c.
which is a l r e a dy out of d a t e from t h e poi nt of view of t h e problems
which i mper i al i sm has pl aced bef or e hi at or y. They show t h a t t he r e
i s no other a l t e r n a t i v e : e i t h e r Sovi et government t ri umphs i n every
advanced count r y i n t h e worl d, 5 t h e most r eact i onar y i mper i al i sm
t ri umphs, t h e most snvage i mper i al i sm, wl ~i ch is t h r o t t l i n g t h e
smal l and weak na t i ons and r e i n s t a t i n g r e a c t i on a l l over t he world
-- Anglo-American i mper i al i sm, which has pe r f e c t l y mast ered t h e
a r t of usi ng t h e form of a democrat i c r epubl i c.
One o r t h e o t h e r .
T h e r e i s no mi ddl e cour se; u n t i l q u i t e r e c e nt l y t h i s vlcw was r e-
garded a s t he bl i nd f anat i ci s m of t h e Bol shevi ks.
But i t t ur ned o u t t o be t r u e (Leni n 19670: 35).
These cl ai ms came from a par t y a l r e a dy i n power. But t hey were addr essed
t o r evol ut i onar y s t r a t e g i s t s i n ot he r c ount r i e s who wished t o cont i nue a
c ol l a bor a t i ve approach wi t hi n Russi a i t s e l f .
When can we expect t he appear ance of cont ender s ( or c o a l i t i o n s of
cont ender s) advanci ng e xc l us i ve a l t e r n a t i v e cl ai ms t o t he cont r ol of t he
government c ur r e nt l y exer t ed by t h e members of t he pol i t y? The ques t i on
is a t r i f l e mi sl eadi ng, f o r such cont ender s a r e al most al ways wi t h us i n
t h e form of mi l l enni a1 c u l t s , r a d i c a l c e l l s o r r e j e c t s from pos i t i ons of
power. The r e a l ques t i on is when such cont ender s p r o l i f e r a t e and/ or mo-
b i l i z e .
Two pat hs l end t o t h a t p r o l i f e r a t i o n and/ or mobi l l zat i on. The f i r s t
i s t he f l our i s hi ng of groups which from t h e i r i ncept i on hol d t o t r s ns -
forming ai ms which a r e i ncompat i bl e wi t h t h e cont i nued power of t h e members
of t he pol i t y. Tr ul y ot her - wor l dl y and r e t r e a t i s t groups seeki ng t o t a l
wi t hdrawal from contemporary l i f e do not f u l l y qua l i f y, s i n c e i n p r i n c i p l e
!
t hey can prosper s o l ong a s t h e r e s t of t h e world l e t s them al one. True
r a d i c a l s , t r u e r e a c t i o n a r i e s , a na r c hi s t s , pr eacher s of t heocr acy, moni st s
of al most every per suasi on come c l o s e r t o t h e mark.
The second pat h is t h e t ur ni ng of cont ender s from obj e c t i ve s which
o r e cumpat i bl e wi t h t h e s ur vl vol of t he p o l i t y t o obj e c t i ve s which s p e l l
i t s doom: a cl ai m t o a l l power, a demand f o r c r i t e r i a of membership
I
,
which would exhaust a l l t h e a v a i l a b l e r esour ces, o r excl ude a l l its pre-
s e nt members.
t
Why and how t he f i r s t s o r t of group -- t h e group committed from t h e
s t a r t t o fundomentnl t r ansf or mat i on of t h e s t r u c t u r e of power -- forms
remai ns one o f t h e my s t e r i e s of our time. Mox Weber t aught t h a t such groups
formed nround charismatic i ndi vi dua l s who of f e r e d a l t e r n a t i v e vi s i ons of
t h e worl d, v l s i o n s t h a t made s ens e of t h e contemporary chaos. Marx sug-
ges t ed t h a t from t i me t o t i me o few i ndi vi dua l s would swing s o f r e e of
t h e i r , assi gned pl aces i n t he e x i s t i n g c l a s s s t r u c t u r e t h a t t hey coul d
view t he s t r u c t u r e a s a whole and t he h i s t o r i c a l pr ocess produci ng i t ;
t hey coul d t hen t each t h e i r view t o o t h e r s who were st i l l caught i n t he
s t r uc t ur e . Si nce Morx and Weber we have had some her oi c concept ual i zi ng
and c a t a l ogi ng of t he v a r i e t i e s of i n t r i n s i c a l l y r evol ut i onar y s r oups
( s e c Smelser 1963, Li ps et and Raab 1970. Gomson 1968) . But t h e r i s e and
f a l l of di ve r s e movements of p r o t e s t s i nc e World War I1 has shown us
t h a t we s t i l l have al most no power t o a n t i c i p a t e where and when such com-
mi t t ed groups wi l l appear .
The t ur ni ng of cont ender s from compat i bl e obj e c t i ve s i s r nt l i er l e n s
of a myst er y, because we can wi t nes s i t s occur r ence a s ol d members l o s e
t h e i r pos i t i on i n t h e p o l i t y and ss chal l enger s a r e r ef used a c c e s s t o
power. The former i s t h e r e c ur r e nt h i s t o r y of r i ght - wi n& act i vi s m. t he
l a t t e r t h e st andar d condi t i on f or l ef t - wi ng act i vi s m. Marx hi msel f gave
/
t he c l a s s i c a n a l y s i s of t h e pr oces s of r a d i c a l i z a t i o n away from some
s o r t of accommodation wi t h t h e e x i s t i n g syst em toward nn e xc l r ~s i ve , r evol -
ut i onar y pos i t i on. l l i s areument was pr e c i s e l y t h a t t hrough r epeat ed
vi c t i mi z a t i on under bour geoi s democracy ( a vi ct i mi zat i on. t o be s ur e.
d i c t a t e d by t he l o g i c of c a pi t a l i s m) workers would gr adual l y t ur n away
from i t s i l l u s i o n s toward cl ass- consci ous mi l i t ancy. That he shoul d
have over est i mat ed t h e pol a r i z i ng e f f e c t s of i t i dus t r i a l capi t nl i s m and
under est i mat ed t h e a bs or pt i ve c a pa c i t y of t he p o l i t i e s i t suppor t ed does
not reduce t h e accur acy of h i s per cept l on of t h e r e l o t i o n s l ~i p s . So f or
a s ns r x was concerned o newly-brmingand growing c l n s s was t he onl y candi -
d a t e f o r such a t r ansf or mat i on. I n f a c t . t h e gener al p r i n c i p l e appear s
t o appl y a s we l l t o na t i ona l mi nor i t i e s , age-sex groups, r egi onal popu-
l a t i o n s o r any ot he r mobi l i zi ng group which makes r epeat ed unsuccessf ul
b i d s f o r power.
The e l a bor a t i on of new i deol ogi es , new cr eeds. new t he or i e s of hw
t he world works, I s p a r t and p a r c e l of bot h pat l i s t o a r evol c~t f onar y posi -
t i on: t h e emergence of brand-new c ha l l e nge r s and t h e t ur ni ng of e xi s i ng
cont ender s. Flost l i k e l y t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n of i deol ogi es which c a pt ur e
and formulate the problems of such oontenders in itself accelerates their
mobilization and change of direction; how great an independent weight
to attribute to ideological innovation is another recurrent puzzle in
th6 analysis of revolution.
The need for elaboration of ideologies is one of the chief reasons
for the exceptional importance of intellectuals in revolutionary movements.
The reflections of s leading French Marxist intellectual on current
political stracegy are revealing:
The revolutionary party's capacity for hegemony is directly linked
to the extend of its influence in the professions and in intellec-
tual circles. It can counter bourgeois ideology to the degree that
its inspires their inquiries and draws their vanguard into reflec- I
tion on an "alternative model," while respecting the independence of
these inquiries. The mediation of the intellectual vanguard is in-
dispensable in combatting and destroying the grip of the dominant
ideology. It is also necessary in order to give the dominated classes
a language end a means of expression which will make them conscious
of the reality of their subordination end exploitation (Gorz 1969:
This is e congenial doctrine for an intellectual to hold. Yet it corres-
ponds to a vigorous reality: as Barrington Moore suggests, an outpouring
of new thought articulating objectives incompatible with the continuation
of the existing polity is probably our single most reliable sign that the
first condition of s revolutionary situation is being fulfilled.
Acceptance of Alternative Clsims
The second condition in commitment to the claims by a nignficant seg-
ment of the subject popu'ation. The first and second conditions overlap.
since the veering of an already-mobilized contender toward exclunive al-
ternative claims to control of the government simultaneously eatnblinhes
the claims and produces commitment to them. Yet expansion of commitment
can occur without the establishment of any new exclus1,ve claims tliro~lgli
a) the further mobilization of the contenders involved, end b) the eccep-
tsnce of those claims by other individunls and groups. It is in accounting
for the expansion and contraction of this sort of commitment that attitud-
inal analyses of the type conducted by Ted Gurr, James Dsvies end Neil
Smelser should have their greatest power.
Two classes of action by governments have s strong tendency to ex-
pand commitment to revolutionary claims. The first is the sudden failure
of the government to meet specific obligations which members of the sub-
ject population regard as well established and crucial to their own
welfare. I have in mind obligations to provide employment, welfare ser-
vices, protection, access to justice, and the other.mjor services of
government.
Italy, for example, experienced a series of crises of thts sort at
'
the end of World War I, despite the fact that she had ended up on the
"winning" side. The demobilization of the army threw over two million
men on a soft labor market, the fluctuation and relaxation of controls
over food supplies and prices aggrieved millions of consumers. and pea-
sants (including demobilized soldiers) began to tnke into their own hands
the redistribution of land they argued the government had promlsed during
the war. The consequent withdrawal.of commitment from the government opened
the way to fascism. Both Right and Left mobilized in response to the
government's inability to deliver on its promises. In the event, the re-
gime chose t o ~ t o l e r a t e o r suppor t t he Fa s c i s t strong-arm s quadr i i n t h e i r
e f f o r t t o de s t r oy t h e most e f f e c t i v e working c l a s s or gani zat i ons . For
t ha t r easons ( r a t he r t han any fundament al s i mi l a r i t y i n t h e i r s o c i n l bas es )
t he i n i t i a l geogr aphi c d i s t r i b u t i o n of I t a l i a n Fascism resembled t he di s -
t r i b u t i o n of s o c i a l i s t s t r e ngt h: t h e Po Val l ey, t he nor t her n i n d u s t r i a l
c i t i e s . and SO f o r t h . The Ri ght : Fur Ri ght c o a l i t i o n worked, more o r
l e s s , i n cr us hi ng t he organi zed segments of t he Le f t . But i t l e f t t he
Fa s c i s t s i n near l y autonomous c o n t r o l of l a r g e p a r t s of I t a l y : mul t i pl e
sover ei gnt y.
The c a s e of postwar I t a l y has a t hr e e f ol d i mport ance, f o r i t i l l u s -
t r n t e s n pr ocess which was wi despread ( al t hough ge ne r a l l y l e s s a c ut e )
el sewher e i n Europe a t t he same t i me. It f a l l s i n t o s ver y gener al pat -
t e r n i n which t he end of war ( vi c t or i ous o r not ) produces a c r i s i s of
government al i ncapaci t y. Fi na l l y, i t demonst r at es tlie way i n which
movements of pr ot e s t t hemsel ves not c l e a r l y "r i ght " o r " l e f t " i n or i e nt a -
t i on sonct i me open t h e way t o s ri ght -wi ng ( or , f o r t h a t mat t er , l e f t -
wing) s e i z u r e of power.
The second c l a s s of government al a c t i o n which commonly expands t h e
commitment of i mpor t ant segments of t h e popul at i on t o r evol ut i onar y cl ai ms
i s s r api d o r unexpected i nc r e a s e i n t he government ' s demand f o r s ur r ender
of r es our ces by i t s s ubj e c t popul at i on. An i nc r e a s e i n t axes is t h e
c l e a r e s t example, but mi l i t a r y c ons c r i pt i on, t he commandeering of l and.
cr ops o r farm ani mal s and t he i mposi t i on of cor vees have a l l pl ayed
an h i s t o r i c a l r o l e i n t h e i nci t ement of oppos i t i on. Gabr i el Ardant
(1965) ar gues , wi t h wi despread evi dence, t h s t i ncr eased t a xa t i on has been
t l i e s i n g l e moat i mpor t ant s t i mul us t o popul ar r e be l l i on t hroughout wes-
t e r n hi s t or y. Furt hermore, he poi nt s out t h a t t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c circum-
s t a nc e s of t a x r e b e l l i o n s i n Europe s i n c e 1500 a r e not what mont historians
have t hought . I ns t ead of bei ng e i t h e r tlie l a s t r e s o r t of t hos e who a r e
i n such mi ser y t h a t any more t a xa t i on wi l l des t r oy t l ~em o r t he f i r s t
r e s o r t of pr i vi l eged p a r t i e s who r e f us e t o l e t anyt hi ng s l l p away from
them, t h e r e be l l i on a ga i ns t new t a xe s most commonly a r i s e s wherc com-
muni t i es f i nd t hemsel ves i ncapabl e of market i ng enough of t h e i r goods
t o a c qui r e t he f unds demanded by t h e government.
Ardsnt cons i der s "i ncapabl e of market i ng" t o mean e i t h e r t h s t t h e
l o c a l economy is i n s u f f i c i e n t l y commercialized o r t h a t t h e market f o r
t he p a r t i c u l a r pr oduct s of t h e community i n ques t i on has cont r act ed.
Er i c I J ol f ' s a n a l y s i s of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between pens s nt s and t he market .
however, s ugges t s t h s t "i ncapabi l i t y" r e f e r s more gener al l y t o any
demands which would make i t i mpossi bl e f o r peopl e t o f u l f i l l t h e ob-
l i g a t i o n s which bi nd them t o t h e l o c a l commun;ty, and whose f ul f i l l me nt
makes them honor abl e men. It f ol l ows d i r e c t l y from Wolf' s orgument
t h a t i ncr eased t a xa t i on i n t h e f a c e of l i t t l e commer ci nl i zat i on o r t h e
c ont r a c t i on of demand f o r t h e pr oduct s al r eady bei ng marketed by a
peasant community t ends t o have de va s t a t i ng e f f e c t s on t h e s t r u c t u r e of
t he community.
Ot her t ypes of communities f a c e d i f f e r e n t ve r s i ons of t he some
problems. The consequence is t h a t r a pi dl y i ncr eased e xt r a c t i on of
r es our ces by t h e government -- which i n west er n c ount r i e s has most
f r equent l y occur r ed i n pr epar at i ons f o r war -- r e gul a r l y per suades some
segment of t he popul at i on t h a t t he government is no l onger l egi t i mnt e.
whi l e t hose who oppose i t a r e .
Such n s h i f t i n pos i t i on sometimes occur s r a pi dl y, wi t h l i t t l e
advance warning.
Thi s appear s t o be e s pe c i a l l y l i k e l y when n cont ender
or set of contenders mobilizes quickly in response to a general threat
to its ponition -- an invasion, an economic crisis, a major attempt by
landlords, the state or someone else to deprive them of crucial resources.
We find the villagers of northern England rising in a Pilgrimage of
Grace to oppose Henry VIII's disposscasion of the monasteries, EIexican
peasnntn banding together to resist the threat of takeover of their
common lands, Jnpanese countrymen recurrently joining bloody uprisings
ngainst the imposition of new taxes.
This defensive mobilization is not simply a cumulation of individual
dlssatisfections with hardship or a mechanical group response to depri-
vntfon. Whether it occurs nt all depends very much, as Eric Wolf and
others have shown, on the pre-existing structure of power end solidarity
within the pop~rlation experiencing the threat. Furthermore, its character
is not intrinsically either "revolutionary" or "counter-revolutionary";
that depends mainly on the coalitions the potential rebels make. This
defensive mobilization is the most volatile feature of n revolutionnry
situation. both because it often occurs fast and because new coalitions
between n rapidly-mobilized group and established contenders for power
can suddenly create s signiticant commitment to en alternative polity.
If thst is thc case, there may be something to the common notion
that revolutions are most likely to occur when a sharp contraction in
well-being follows a long period of improvement. Jsmea Davies has
propounded the idea under the label of "J-curve hypothesis" end Ted
'
Gurr has treated it ss one of the chief variants of his general condition
for rebellion: a widening of the expectation-achievement gap. All the
attempts to test these attitudinal versions of the theory tlnve been
dogged by the difficulty of measuring chnnges in expectations and
achievements for large populations over substantial blocks of time nnd
by the tendency of most analysts to work from the fact of revolution
back to the search for evidence of short-run deprivation and then
further back to the search for evidence of long-run improvement, not
necessarily with respect to the same presumed wonts, needs, or expecta-
tiona. The latter procedure has the advantage of slmost alwnys pro-
ducing s fit between the data and the theory, and the dlsndvantage of
not being a reliable test of the theory. The question remains open.
Assuming that sharp contractions following long exponsions
produce revolutionary situations with exceptionnl frequency, however.
the line of argument pursued here leads to en interesting alternative
explanation of the J-curve phenomenon. It is that during a lonu rut1
of expanding resources, the government tends to take on commitments
to redistribute resources to new contenders and the polity tends to
admit challengers more easily because the relative coat to existing
members is lower when resources are expanding. In the event of quick
contraction. the government has greeter commitments, new mnttera of
,-
right, to members of the polity, and has ncquitted partial cmitmcnts
to new contenders, perhaps not members of the polity, but very likely
forming coalitions with members. The government faces a choice between
1) greatly increasing the coercion applied to the more vulnerable
segments of tlie population in order to bring up the yield of resources
for reallocntion or 2) breaking commitments where thst will incite
the least dangerous opposition. Either step is likely to lend to n
defenaive mobilization, and thence to a threat of revolution. Such a
situation does, to be sure, promote the disappointment of rising
expectations. But the principal link between tlie J-curve end the
revolutionary situation, in this hypothesis, lies in the changing
r e l a t i o n s between cont ender s and government l i k e l y t o occur i n a per i od
of expanding r es our ces .
I n a l onger h i s t o r i c a l view, t he changes which have most of t e n
produced t he r api d s h i f t s i n commitment away from e x i s t i n g governments
and es r abl i s hed p o l i t i e s a r e pr oces s es which d i r e c t l y a f f e c t t h e autonomy
of s mal l er uni t a wi t hi n t h e span of t h e government: t he r i s e and f a l l
of c e nt r nl i z e d s t a t e s , t h e expansi on and c ont r a c t i on of na t i ona l market s,
t he concent r at i on and di s pe r s i on of c o n t r o l over pr oper t y. Pr os pe r i t y
and depr es s i on, ur bani zat i on and r u r a l i z a t i o n , i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and
de i ndus t r i nl i z a t i on, s a n c t i f i c a t i o n and s e c ul a r i z a t i on occur i n a
di s per s ed and i ncr ement al f as hi on.
Although st at emaki ng, t he expansi on and c ont r a c t i on of mar ket s and
pr oper t y s h i f t s a l s o devel op i ncr ement al l y most of t h e t i me, t hey a r e
e s pe c i a l l y s us c e pt i bl e of producinp, dr amat i c conf r ont at i ons of r i ght s .
p r i v i l e g e s and pr i nc i pl e s ; t h i s t a x c o l l e c t o r want s tlie f ami l y cow.
t h i s merchant proposes t o buy t h e v i l l a g e commons, t h i s pr i nce f a i l s t o
pr ot e c t h i s s ubj e c t s from ba ndi t s . S. N. Ei s ens t adt (1963) has brought
out t he ext reme vul ne r a bi l i t y of v a s t bur e a uc r a t i c empi res t o over-
ckpansi on and t o damage a t t h e c e nt e r ; bot h, i n h i s a na l ys i s , tend t o
produce r e b e l l i o n s i n which pe r i phe r a l agent s of t he empi re seek t o
e s t a b l i s h autonomous c ont r ol over t he l ands , men, or gani zat i ons and
weal t h f i r s t mobi l i zed by t he empi re. Fernand Drnuclel (1966) has
s t r e s s e d t he frequency wi t h which bandi t r y and r e l a t e d s t r uggl e s f o r
l o c a l power pr ol i f e r a t e d a s t h e ephemeral s t a t e s of sevent eent h- cent ur y
Europe cont r act ed. I n a l l t he s e cas es , spokesmen f o r l ar ge- s cal e
or gani zat i on and c e n t r i p e t a l pr oces s es f i nd t hemsel ves l ocked i n s t r uggl e
wi t h advocat es of s mal l - s cal e autonomy.
I n or der t o produce mul t i pl e s over ei gnt y, and t hua become revol u-
t i onar y, commitments t o some a l t e r n a t i v e cl ai mant must be a c t i va t e d
i n t he f a c e of pr ohi bi t i ons o r cont r ar y d i r e c t i v e s from t h e government.
The moment a t which some peopl e bel ongi ng t o members of t he a l t e r n a t i v e
c o a l i t i o n s e i z e c ont r ol over some por t i on of t h e government, and ot he r
peopl e not pr evi ous l y at t ached t o t he c o a l i t i o n honor t h e i r d i r e c t i v e s
marks t he begi nni ng of a r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n . That accept ance of
d i r e c t i v e s may, t o be s ur e , occur a s a r e s u l t of dur es s o r decept i on
a s we l l of conver si on t o t h e cause. A mi xt ur e of dur es s , decept i on
and conver si on wi l l o f t e n do t h e j ob.
The pr esence of a coher ent r evol ut i onar y or gani zat i on mnken a
g r e a t di f f e r e nc e a t e xa c t l y t h i s poi nt . An or gani znt l on f a c i l i t a t e s
t h e i n i t i a l s e i z ur e of c ont r ol , s pr eads t he news, a c t i v a t e s t he com-
mi t ment s al r eady made by s p e c i f i c men. I f s o, I.enin pkovi des n more
r e l i a b l e gui de t o r evol ut i onar y s t r a t e g y t han Sor e l ; Lcni n' s cl os el y-
di r e c t e d c o n s p i r a t o r i a l par t y c o n t r a s t s s har pl y wi t h t he spont nneous
and pur i f yi ng r e b e l l i o n i n which Sor e l pl aced h i s hopes. But t h e
e xi s t e nc e of such an or gani zat i on a l s o makes t h e s t a r t of r evol ut i on
more c l os e l y dependent on t he de c i s i ons of a smal l number of men -- and
t hus, par adoxi cal l y, s ubj e c t t o chance end i di os yncr as y.
I n tlie l a s t a na l ys i s , a c t i v a t i o n of r evol ut i onar y commitments
happens t hrough an ext ens i on of t h e same pr ocesses which c r e a t e t h e
c mi t me n t s . Cons pi r a t or i a l or gani zat i on si mpl y linppens t o be t h e one
which maximizes t h e oppor t uni t y of t he committed t o c n l c u l a t e t h e r i g h t
moment t o s t r i k e a ga i ns t t h e government. The government' s sudden
i n a b i l i t y t o meet its own r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ( a s i n t h e German i ns ur -
r e c t i ons dur i ng t he di s i nt e gr a t i on of t he i mper i nl war e f f o r t i n 1918)
or lts violation of the established rights of its subject population (as
in the 1640 rebellions of Portugal and Catslonia against Castile, which
followed Olivsres' attempt to squeeze exceptional resources from those re-
luctant provinces for the conduct of his war with France) can simultaneously
spread and activate the commitment to its revolutionary opposition.
In a case like that of the Tsiping rebellion, the rapid mobilization
of s contender advancing exclusive alternstive claims to control over the
government itself leads quickly and inevitably to s break end to an armed
struggle. The drsmntic weakening of a government's repressive capacity
through war, defection or catastrophe can simultaneously create the possi-
bility of revolution and encourage the revolutionaries to make their bid;
the quick succession of the French revolution of 1870 to the defeat of the
Emperor by Prussis falls into this category.
Governmental Inaction
Condition ehree is the incapacity or unwillingness of the agents of
the government to suppress the alternstive coalition or the commitment to
its claims. Three paths are possible: a) sheer insufficiency of the avail-
able mesns of coercion; b) inefficiency in applying the means; c) inhibi-
tions to their application. The starkest cases of insufficiency occur
when the bslsnce of coercive resources between the government and the sl-
ternstive coalition swings suddenly toward the latter, because the govern-
ment l~ss suffered a sudden depletion of its resources (as in s lost war).
because the alternstive coslition has managed a sudden mobilization of re-
of the alternstive coalition in a rough and unknown terrain and the ndop-
tion of tactics unfamiliar to the professions1 forcen of the government all
raise the cost of suppression as well.
Ted Gurr (1969: 235-2361 develops an interesting argument about
the balance of coercive resources between a government end its opponents.
In his phrasing. "The likelihood of internal war incressen as the ratio
of dissident to regime coercive control approaches equality." (For
"equality," read "one;" Walter Korpi has expanded a similar argument into
a general model of conflict.) Gurr is referring directly to the pro-
bable magnitude of collective violence; where the balance strongly favors
the government, goes the argument, only dispersed acts of rebellion occur;
where the balance strongly favors its opponents, the government tends to
be a pawn in their hands. The analysis applies even more plausibly to
the likelihood of revolution, for an alternative coslition with large
coercive resources is likely to seize control with at most an instant of
multiple sovereignty, while an alternative coslition with small coercive
resources will never get multiple sovereignty started.
I
Inefficiency in applying mesns which are, in principle, sufficient
is harder to pin down and explain; the inefficient almost always plead
insufficient means. William Lnnger (1969 esp. 321-322) 'contends that had
the authorities not bungled their repression of various populnr movements
the European revolutions of 1848 would never hsve occurred. To have con-
fidence in his conclusion we hsve to assess the balsnce of coercive
sources (as in the p ~ ~ i i n g of private arms) or because a new contender
with abundant co,?rcive resources has joined the coslition (as in the de-
fection of troops or foreign intervention). However, the massing of rebels
in locations remote from the centers of coercive strength, the implantation
mesns between popular movements and governments as well as the political
inhibitions to repress'ion. In pre-revol~~tionsry 1848 the governments
clearly had the edge in men, weapons, supplies and coercive technique.
The strong commitment of the new bourgeois who had been acquiring signi-
7-34
ficant roles in European governments to certain kinds of civil liberties
and various working-class movements, however. both stayed 'the government's
hand. Prom a strictly instrumental perspective, all such inhibitions ere
"inefficient." Yet not to distinguish them from tlie apparent incompetence
of the Egyptian reglme toppled in 1952 or the Turkish sultanate displaced
in 1919 blurs the essenti.al explanation of these events.
Inhibitions to the application of available coercive means are
more interesting than shortages or inefficiency, because they are so like-
ly to flow from the political process itself. The great importance of
coalitions between established members of the polity and revolutionary
challengers exemplifies the point very well. The United States of the
1960s witnessed the constant formation and reformation of coalitions be-
tween groups of intellectuals, opposition politicians, Black Liberation
movements, students and peace activists, some within the American polity
and some outside of it. The total effect of these coalitions fell con-
siderahly short of revolution, but while operating they shielded those
whose principles offered the greatest challenge to the existing distri-
bution of power from the treatment they received from police, troops end
other repressors when acting on their own.
Despite the implications of this example, however, the most cru-
cial coalitions over the whole range of revolutions surely link chsllen-
gers directly with military forces. The Egyptian and Turkish revolutions
stand near the extreme at which the chief claims to alternative control
of the government come from within tlie military itself; in both cases
soldiers dominated a coalition linking dissident politicians and local
movements of resistance. In the midst of the range we find events like
the Russian revolution, in which the militory were for from paramount,
but important segments of the military defected, disintegrated or refused
to repress their brethren. The more extensive the pre-revolutionary coo-
litions between challengers end militory units, tlie more likely this is to
happen.
In this respect and others, war bears a crucial relationship to
revolution. Walter Laqueur (1968: 501) puts it this way:
War appears to have been the decisive factor in the emergence of
revolutionary situations in modern times; most modern revolutions,
both successful and abortive, have followed in the wake oE war
(the Paris Commune of 1871, the Russian revolution of 1905. the
various revolutions after the two World Wars, including the Chinene
revolutions). These have occurred not only in the countries that
suffered defeat. The general dislocation caused by war. tlie ma-
terial losses and humn sacrifices, create o climate conducive to
radical change. A large section of the population has been armed;
human life seems considerably less valunble than in peacetime.
In a defeated country authority tenda to disintegrate, and acute
social dissatisfaction receives additional impetus from s sense
of wounded national prestige (the Young Turks in 1908, Naguib and
Nasser in 1952). The old leadership is discredited by defeat, and
the appeal for radical social change ond.nationa1 reossertion
thus falls on fertile ground.
No doubt the statement suffers from a superabundance of explanations. Still
it points out the essential relationship between war and tlie repressive ca-
pacity of the government.
Although war temporarily places large coercive resources under the
c ont r ol of a government, i t does not guar ant ee t h a t t hey wi l l be adequat e
t o tile demnnds pl aced upon them, t h a t t hey wi l l be used e f f i c i e n t l y , o r
t ha t t hey wi l l even remain under t h e government' s f i r m c ont r ol . Defeat
and/ or demobi l i zat i on pr ovi de e s p e c i a l l y f avor abl e ci r cumnt ances f o r revo-
l u t i o n because t hey combine t h e pr esence of s u b s t a n t i a l coer ci ve r es our ces
wi t h uncer t ai n c ont r ol over t h e i r use.
War a l s o ma t t e r s i n q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t way. By and l a r ge , wars have
al ways provi ded t he p r i n c i p a l occasi ons on which s t a t e s have r a pi dl y i n-
cr eased t h e i r l e v i e s of r es our ces from t h e i r s ubj e c t popul at i ons. Conscrip-
t i on is onl y t he s el f - evi dent cas e. Demands f o r t axes , f or ced l oa ns , food,
non- mi l i t ar y l abor , manufact ured goods and raw ma t e r i a l s f ol l ow t h e same
pa t t e r n. The i ncr eased e xa c t i ons al most al ways meet wi despread r e s i s t a nc e .
which t h e agent s of s t a t e s count er wi t h per s uas i on and f or c e .
Despi t e t h e advant age of havi ng ext ens i ve e s t a t e s t o squeeze and a
weal t hy church t o di s pos s es s , t h e Tudors pr essed t h e i r England hard t o
suppor t t h e mi l i t a r y f or c e s t hey committed t o si xt eent h- cent ur y war f ar e.
They faced s e r i ous r e be l l i on i n 1489, 1497, 1536, 1547, 1549, 1553 and 1569.
The l a s t t hr e e -- Ke t t ' s , Wyat t ' s and t he Nort hern Rebel l i on -- cent er ed on
dyna s t i c i s s ue s and cons i s t ed l a r g e l y of r i s i n g s engi neer ed by r e gi ona l
mngnntes. Tlie f i r s t f our , on t h e ot he r hand, were popul ar r e be l l i ons ;
every one' of them began wi t h t h e crown' s sudden l ayi ng hand on r es our ces
pr evi ous l y out ni de i t s c ont r ol . The gener al p a t t e r n i s t he same a s I
have al r eady des cr i bed f o r t a x r e be l l i ons : t h e r api d mobi l i zat i on of an
e n t i r e popul at i on which t hen chal l enges t h e ver y i n j u s t i c e of t he r oya l
demand f o r men, money o r goods.
Proxi mat e Causes of Revol ut i onar y Outcomes
Let us f ocus on t he s hor t and medium r uns , r es er vi ng f o r l a t e r an-
ot he r l ook a t l ongl r un conditions f o r r evol ut i onar y outcomes. Three s e t s
of condi t i ons appear t o be powerful proxi mat e caus es of s i g n i f i c n n t t r ana-
f e r s of power: 1 ) t he pr esence of a r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n : mcl l t t pl e eov-
er ei gnt v: 2) r evol ut i onar y c o a l i t i o n s between chal l enger s and members of
t he p o l i t y ; 3) c_ontrol of s u b s t a n t i a l f or c e by t h e r evol ut i onar y c o a l i t i o n .
To what e xt e nt t he development of a r evol ut i onnr y ni t ua t i on is a
symptom, r a t h e r t han a cause, of a r evol ut i onar y outcome is not cosy t o
r es ol ve. I n a l ong view, whet her a r evol ut i or ~nr y d i v i s i o n of t h e p o l i t y
occur s depends on t h e same condi t i ons wliicli det er mi ne wllether a major
t r a n s f e r of power occur s: t h e f or mat i on of a c o a l i t i o n of mobi l i zed con-
t e nde r s or gani zed around i n t e r e s t s which p i t them and a s ubs t nnt i nl seg-
ment of t he popul at i on a ga i ns t t h e dominant members of t h e p o l i t y . I n
. t h a t l ong view, whet her t h e t r a n s f e r of power occur s t hrough a brenk i n
t he p o l i t y , t he t h r e a t of a break. o r a more gr adual succenui on does not
mat t er much. Nonet hel ess, I would hazard t h i s ge ne r a l i z a t i on: t h e more ex-
t e ns i ve t h e r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n , t h e g r e e t e r t he l i kel l hood of an ex-
t e ns i ve t r a n s f e r of power. That is, i ndeed, one of t he i mpl i c i t messages
of Fi gur e 7-3, t he c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of par er t r nns f e r s .
An ext ens i ve r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n -- a c o s t l y s p l i t hetween t he
e x i s t i n g p o l i t y and an e f f e c t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e c o a l i t i o n -- I ncr eanea t he
l i ke l i hood of an ext ens i ve t r a n s f e r of power i n s e v e r a l ways. The more ex-
t e ns i ve t h e r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n , t h e har der i t i~ f o r any orgnni zed
group o r segment of t he popul at i on t o avoi d committing i t s e l f t o one s i d e
o r t h e ot he r . That commitment makes i t more d i f f i c u l t f o r any cont ender
t o r e c o n s t i t u t e i t s ol d mul t i pl e a l l i a n c e s i n t h e po~t - r e vol ut i onnr y s e t -
t l ement . The more ext ens i ve t he r evol r r t i onar y s i t i ~ a t i o n , t h e morc ex-
per i ence t he r evol ut i onar y c o a l i t i o ~ l w i l l have i n f or gi ng i t s own In-
st r ument s of government i ndependent of t he e xi nt i ng hol der s of power. Tlie
pa r t y, t he nrmy o r t h e i ns ur r e c t i ona r y committee becomes t he s ke l e t on ( or
pertlops t he bl ue pr i nt , o r bot h) of t he new government. The more ext en-
s i v e t h e r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n , t he more oppor t uni t y and j u s t i f i c a t i o n
t h e r evol ut i onar y c o a l i t i o n wi l l have t o a t t a c k t h e per sons and r es our ces
of t h e powerhol ders, and t hus t o bl ock t h e i r chances t o r e ga i n power l a t e r .
These ge ne r a l i z a t i ons a r e not new. They a r e a s t andar d pi ece of
r evol ut i onar y wisdom. Wr i t i ng i n December, 1948, Moo Tse-Tung put i t t hi n
way:
The r agi ng t i d e of Chi na' s r e vol ut i on is f or c i ng a l l s o c i a l s t r a t a
t o deci de t h e i r a t t i t u d e . A new change is t aki ng pl ace i n t h e ba-
l ance of c l a s s f or c e s i n China. Mul t i t udes of peopl e a r e br eaki ng
away from Kumi nt nng i nf l uence and c o n t r o l and coming over t o t h e
r evol ut i onar y cnmp; and t he Chi nese r e a c t i o n a r i e s have f a l l e n i n t o
hopel ess s t r a i t s . i s o l a t e d and abandoned. As t h e Peopl e' s Mar of
Li ber at i on draws c l o s e r and c l o s e r t o f i n a l vi c t or y. a l l t he r evol u-
t i onar y peopl e and a l l f r i e n d s of t he peopl e wi l l u n i t e more s o l i d l y
and, l ed by t h e Communist Par t y of China, r esol . ut el y demand t he com-
p l e t e de s t r uc t i on of t he r e a c t i ona r y f or c e s and t he thoroughgoing
development of t h e r evol ut i onar y f or c e s u n t i l a peopl e' s democr at i c
r epubl i c on n country-wide s c a l e i s founded and a peace based on
uni t y and democracy i s achi eved (Moo 1961: 305).
The exper i ence of China i n t he f ol l owi ng year s conf i r ms t he gener al r e l a -
t i ons hi p between t he ext ens i venes s of t h e r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n and t he
t horoughness of t he t r a n s f e r of power.
Coa l i t i ons between Members and Chal l enger s
The second proxi mat e cause of s i g n i f i c a n t power t r a n s f e r s , however,
works a ga i ns t t he f i r s t t o some e xt e nt . I t is t he f or mat i on of c o a l i t i o n s
between members of t he p o l i t y and t h e cont ender s sdvanci ng excl uni ve nl -
t e r n a t i v e cl ai ms t o c ont r ol over t h e government. The r e l a t i ons hi p is ac-
t u a l l y c ur vi l i ne a r : I f no such c o a l i t i o n e x i s t s . t h a t di mi ni shes t he
chance t h a t t h e r evol ut i onar y c o a l i t i o n wi l l win -- t h a t t he r e wi l l be any
t r a n s f e r of power a t a l l . The e xi s t e nc e of a c o a l i t i o n i ncr eanes t h e
l i ke l i hood of some t r a n s f e r of power. But i f t he c o a l i t i o n s o r e ext en-
s i v e , t he r evol ut i onar y s et t l ement wi l l t end t o r e s t o r e t h e pr evi ous
s t a t u s quo. The wi se r evol ut i onar y who wi s l ~e s t o produce a l a r g e t r ans -
f e r of power forms t h e minimum necessar y c o a l i t i o n wi t h e x i s t i n g members
of t he p o l i t y , and f or c e s h i s c o a l i t i o n pa r t ne r s t o breok i r r evocabl y wi t h
ot he r members of . t he p o l i t y .
The na t ur e of such a c o a l i t i o n is f o r a member of t he p o l i t y t o
t r a de r es our ces wi t h a c ha l l e nge r , f o r example, an exchange of Jobs f o r
e l e c t o r a l suppor t . Such a c o a l i t i o n is al ways r i s k y , s i n c e t h e chal l enger
wi l l al ways be on t he l os i ng end of t h e exchange a s compared wltll t he val ue
of t h e r es our ces when t r aded among members of t he p o l i t y . and t he r e f or e
di sposed t o move i t s ext ens i ve mobi l i zed r enour ces el sewher e. Never t hcl eus
t he chal l enger i s l i k e l y t o accept a c o a l i t i o n where i L o f f e r s a def ense
a ga i ns t r epr es s i on o r deval uat i on of i t s r es our ces and t he member is l i k e l y
t o accept i t when t h e p o l i t y i s c l o s e l y di vi ded, o r when no c o a l i t i o n port -
n e r s a r e a va i l a bl e wi t hi n t h e p o l i t y , o r when i t s own membership is i n
j eopardy f o r want of r es our ces .
A c l n s s i c r evol ut i onar y t a c t i c a l s o f a l l s under t he headi ng of
challenger-member c oa l i t i on: t he penet r at i on of on or gani zat i on whlch nl -
ready has an es t obl i s l i ed pl a c e i n t he s t r u c t u r e of power. A s e nr l y a s 1901.
Lenin was enunci at i ng such an approach t o t r a de uni ons:
Every Soci al -Democrat i c worker shoul d a s f a r a s pos s i bl e a s s i s t and
a c t i v e l y work i n t hes e or gani zat i ons . But, whi l e t h i s i s t r u e , i t
i s c e r t a i n l y not i n our i n t e r e s t t o demand t h a t onl y Social-Demo-
c r o t s shoul d he e l i g i b l e f o r memhersliip i n t he "t r ade" uni ons, s i n c e
t h a t would onl y narrow t h e scope of our i nf l uence upon t h e masses.
Let ever y worker who under st ands t h e need t o u n i t e f o r t he s t r u g g l e
a ga i ns t t he employers and t h e governments j o i n t he t r a de uni ons.
The ver y aim of t h e t r a de uni ons would be i mpossi bl e of schi evement ,
i f t hey di d not u n i t e a l l who have a t t a i ne d a t l e a s t t h i s el ement ar y
degr ee of under st andi ng. i f t hey were not ver y broad or gani zat i ons .
The br oader t hes e or gani zat i ons . t he br oader wi l l be our i nf l uence
over them -- an i nf l uence due, not onl y t o t he "spontaneous" devel -
opment of t he economic s t r uggl e , but t o t h e d i r e c t and consci ous
e f f o r t of t he s o c i a l i s t t r a d e uni on members t o i nf l uence t h e i r c m-
r odes (Lenin 1967b: 191) .
I n t he s e cas es , t h e t r a de uni ons were normol l y e s t a bl i s he d members of t h e i r
r e s pe c t i ve p o l i t i e s , whi l e t h e Soc i a l Democrats i n ques t i on were chal l en-
g e r s s t i l l out s i de t h e p o l i t y . I n t h i s same message, Lenin concl udes by
r ecor nendi ng t h e c ont r ol of t he l a r ge , open, l e g a l uni on by t h e s e c r e t ,
cl osed, di s c i pl i ne d r evol ut i onar y pa r t y.
Sp l i n t e r groups of i n t e l l e c t u a l s appear t o have a s p e c i a l pro-
pens i t y t o form c o a l i t i o n s o u t s i d e t h e p o l i t y . They t r a de of f i de ol ogi c a l
work p u b l i c i t y f o r t h e demands of t he chal l enger , l eader s hi p s k i l l s and
acces s t o per sons i n hi gh pl aces f o r va r i ous forms of suppor t : per sonnel
f o r demonst r at i ons, e l e c t o r a l s t r e ngt h, def ens e a ga i ns t o t h e r t hr eat eni ng
chal l enger s , and s o on. Anal ys t s of r evol ut i on a s di ve r s e a s Crane Br i nt on
and Bar r i ngt on Moore hove consi der ed t h e "des er t i on of t he i n t e l l e c t u a l s "
t o be a c r u c i a l e a r l y omen of a r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n . The "deser t i on"
may, of cour se, c ons i s t of i ndi vi dua l accept ance of e x c l r ~s i v e a l t e r n a t i v e
cl ai ms t o c o n t r o l of t he government. I t may a l s o t oke t he form of r e j e c t -
i ng ell cl ai ms, i n good a na r c hi s t fashi on: But t h e n h i f t s i n commitment
by i n t e l l e c t u a l s which c ont r i but e most t o has t eni ng a r evol ut i onar y s i t un-
t i on, i n my view, c o n s i s t of c o a l i t i o n s between r evol ut i onar y chal l enger n
.
and groups of i n t e l l e c t u a l s havi ng memberallip i n t h c p o l i t y . The pro-
pens i t y of French l ef t - wi ng i n t e l l e c t u a l s t o form such c o a l i t i o n s -- with-
out q u i t e r e l i nqui s hi ng t h e i r own cl ai ms t o power and p r i v i l e g e -- is l egen-
dar y.
Cont r ol of Subs t a nt i a l For ce
Cont r ol over t h e major or gani zed means of coer ci on wi t hi n t h e popu-
l a t i o n i s p i v o t a l t o t he s ucces s o r f a i l u r e of any e f f o r t t o s e i z e power.
Wi t hi n a l l contemporary s t a t e s , t h a t means c ont r ol of t he mi l i t a r y f or c e s .
Although de f e c t i on of t h e mi l i t a r y is by no means a s u f f i c i e n t condi t i on
f o r a t akeover by t h e r e be l s , no t r a n s f e r of power a t a l l is l t k e l y i n a
r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n i f t he government r e t a l n a compl et e c ont r ol of t he
mi l i t a r y pa s t t he openi ng of t h a t s i t u a t i o n (Chorley 1943, Andreski 1968.
Rus s el l 1974).
D.E.H. Rus s el l t ook up t he ques t i on i n t he cas e of f our t een twen-
t i et h- cent ur y mass r e be l l i ons , seven of them succesnf ul . neven of them un-
s ucces s f ul :
aucces s f ul unsuccessf ul
Af ghani st an 1929 Aus t r i a 1934
Al bani a 1924 Burma 1953
Bol i vi a 1952 Colombia 1948
Br a z i l 1930 Cuba 1912
China 1949
Cuba 1959
Mexico 1911
llonduras 1933
I t a l y 1949
Spai n 1934
By "r ebel l i on". Runsel l means "a form of v i o l e n t power s t r u g g l e i n which
t he overt hrow of t he regime i s t hr eat ened by means t h a t i ncl ude vi ol ence"
( Rus s el l 1974: 56). By s uc c e s s f ul r e b e l l i o n , which s he equat es wi t h revo-
l u t i o n , Rus s el l means t hos e i n which t h e r e be l s o r t h e i r chosen r epr esen-
t a t i v e s assume t he pos i t i ons of power. Her d i s t i n c t i o n between r e be l l i on
and r evol ut i on p a r a l l e l s t h e d j s t i n c t i o n between r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n
ond r evol ut i onar y outcome, except t h a t i t excl udes t he p o s s i b i l i t y of revo-
l u t i o n wl t hout r e be l l i on. I n t h e f our t een c a s e s , Rus s el l works out a s c a l e
f o r t he d i s l o y a l t y of t he government al armed f or ces . The s c a l e appear s i n
Tabl e 7. 1. As t he t a b l e shows, t he d i s l o y a l t y s c or e has t hr e e components:
tlie degr ee of d i s l o y n l t y (D), t he t i mi ng of d i s l o y a l t y (T), and t he propor-
t i on of t he armed f or c e s which were d i s l o y a l (P). The ba s i c formul a, wi t h
adj ust ment s f o r t he number of d i f f e r e n t armed f or c e s i nvol ved and t h e d i f -
f e r e n t phases of t h e i r a c t i o n , is t he pr oduct of t he t hr e e components:
D x T x P. Rus s e l l found some over l ap between t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n s of loy-
a l t y s cor ea f o r successful and unsuccessf ul r e be l l i ons . For example, .
tlie Burmese r e be l l i on of 1954 f a i l e d d e s p i t e wide suppor t from t he armed
f or ces . For anot her , t he de f e c t i ons of ~ a t i s t a ' s armed f or c e s t o Cas t r o' a
s uc c e s s f ul Cuban r evol ut i on were few and l a t e . On t he aver age, never t he-
l e s s , t he s uc c e s s f ul r e b e l l i o n s had much hi gher d i s l o y a l t y s cor es . Fur t her -
more, i n no cas e di d s ucces s come wi t hout some armed f or c e d i s l o y a l t y s i g-
n i f i c a n t l y bef or e t h e end of t he r e be l l i on. Thi s l a s t i s ne c e s s a r i l y
Rus s e l l ' s most c ont r ove r s i a l f i ndi ng; one can e a s i l y ar gue t h a t i t merel y
shows t h a t t h e armed f or c e s , t oo, event ual l y s e e which way t he r evol ut i onar y
Tabl e 7.1: D.E.H. Rus s e l l ' s Armed For ce Di s l oyal t y Scal e.
1. Degree of d i s l o y a l t y (D)
0 = wi l l i ng, e n t h u s i a s t i c f i g h t e r s
1 = unwi l l i ng f i g h t e r s , e. g. sur r ender ed r e a di l y
2 = ne ut r a l , e. g. st ood by wi t hout r e s i s t i n g . r an away
3 - a c t i v e l y hel ped r e be l s , e. g. gave arms, informed r e b e l s of
t r oop maneuvers and b a t t l e pl a ns
4 = f ought on t h e s i d e of t he r e b e l s
2. Time a t which d i s l o y a l (T)
0 = never ( i n t he l a s t 5% of tlie dur a t i on)
1 = near t h e end ( i n t h e l a s t 6-252 of t he dur a t i on
2 about hal fway t hrough (from 26-752 of t he dur a t i on)
3 = near t h e begi nni ng ( i n t h e f i r s t 6-25% of t h e dur a t i on)
4- from t h e s t a r t ( i n t h e f i r s t 0-5% of t he dur a t i on)
3. Pr opor t i on of armed f or cea d i s l o y a l a t a p n r t i c u l a r t i me (P)
0 = none (0-1%)
0. 5 - few (2-107.)
1 = some (11-252)
2 - cons i der abl e (26-502)
3 - maj or i t y (51495%)
4 = a l l (96-1OOX)
Source: Rus s el l 1974: 74.
wind is blowing. Si nce Rus s el l e x p l i c i t l y bui l ds i n t he t i mi ng of d i s -
l o y a l t y , however, t he gener al r e s u l t s l ook s o l i d .
I t f ol l ows more o r l e s s d i r e c t l y t h a t t he gr e a t e r t he coer ci ve
r es our ces -- Lncluding pr i va t e ar mi es, weapons and segments of t h e
nnt i onol armed f or c e s -- i n i t i a l l y c ont r ol l e d by t he r evol ut i onar y
c o a l i t i o n , t he more l i k e l y a t r a n s f e r of power. Li kewi se, t he e a r l i e r
movement of coer ci ve r es our ces t o t he a l t e r n a t i v e c o a l i t i o n , t h e more
l i k e l y a t r a n s f e r of power. The mobi l i zat i on of ot he r r es our ces probabl y
a f f e c t s t he chances of acqui r i ng power s i g n i f i c a n t l y a s we l l , but a t a
.
lower r a t e t han t h e mobi l i zat i on of coer ci ve means. It a l s o f ol l ows
t h a t t he pr esence of e x i s t i n g members of t h e p o l i t y i n t he r evol ut i onar y
c o a l i t i o n wi l l i nc r e a s e t he chances f o r some t r a n s f e r of power ( al t hougl ~
i t r educes t he chances f o r a compl et e wr es t i ng of power from members
of t he pol i t y) bot h because of t he a d d i t i o n a l r es our ces i t br i ngs t o
~ l l e c o a l i t i o n and becnuse of t h e g r e a t e r l i kel i hood t h a t t he armed
f or c e s wi l l d e f e c t , waver o r remain n e u t r a l when conf r ont ed wi t h es t ab-
l i s he d members of t he p o l i t y .
Revol ut i onary Sequences and Col l e c t i ve Vi ol ence
We have expl or ed t hr e e proxi mat e causes of r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n s :
1) t he oppenrnnce of cont ender s, o r c o a l i t i o n s of cont ender s, advanci ng
excl us i ve a l t e r n a t i v e cl ai ms t o t he c ont r ol over t he government which
i s c ur r e nt l y exer t ed by t he members of t he p o l i t y ; 2) commitment t o
t he s e cl ai ms by a s i g n i f i c a n t segment of t h e s ubj e c t popul at i on; 3) i n-
c a pa c i t y o r unwi l l i ngmess of t he agent s of t h e government t o s uppr es s
t he n l t e r n a t i v e c o a l i t i o n andl or t h e commitment t o i t s cl al ms. Another
t r i a d summarized proxi mat e caus es of r evol ut i onar y outcomes: a ) t he
pr esence of a r cvol ut i onnt y s i t u a t i o n ; b) revol ut 5onory c o a Ht i o n s between
chal l enger s and members of t h e pol i t y: c ) c o n t r o l of s u b s t a n t i a l f or ce
by t h e r evol ut i onar y c o a l i t i o n . Put t oge t he r , t he i t ems a r e a r e c l pc
f o r r evol ut i on.
To sum up t he i mpl i cat i ons of t he r e c i pe , we might put t o g e t l ~c r an
i de a l i z e d r evol ut i onar y sequenc&
1. gr adual mobi l i zat i on of cont ender s making excl us i ve cl ai ms t o
governmental c ont r ol and/ or unsccept abl e t o t he members of t he p o l i t y ;
2 . r api d i nc r e a s e i n t h e number of peopl e accept i ng t hos e cl ai ms
and/ or r a pi d expansi on of t h e c o a l i t i o n i ncl udi ng t h e unaccept abl e
o r excl us i ve cont ender s;
3. unsuccessf ul e f f o r t s by t h e government ( a t t he behest of members
of t he p o l i t y ) t o s uppr es s t he a l t e r n a t i v e coalition and/ or t he
accept ance of i t s cl ai ms: t h i s may we l l i ncl ude at t empt s a t f or ced
demobi l i zat i on s e i z ur e , deval uat i on o r di s pe r s i on of t he r es our ces
a t t he di s pos a l of cont ender s;
4. es t abl i s hment by t h e a l t e r n a t i v e coal 1 t i on of e f f e c t i v e c ont r ol
over some por t i on of t he government -- a t e r r i t o r i a l br anch, a
f unc t i ona l s ubdi vi s i on, a por t i on of i t s per sonnel ;
5 . s t r uggl e s of t h e a l t e r n a t i v e c o a l i t i o n t o mai nt ai n o r expnnd
t h a t c ont r ol ;
6. r econs t r uct i on of a s i n g l e p o l i t y t hrough t h e vi c t or y of t h e
a l t e r n a t i v e c o a l i t i o n . t hrougb its d e f e a t , o r t hr ougl ~ t he e s t a b-
l i shment of a modus vi vendi between t he a l t e r n a t i v e c o o l i t i o n nnd
some o r a l l of t he ol d members; f r agment at i on of t he r evol ut i onar y
c o a l i t i o n ;
7. r e h . p o s i t i o n of r out i ne government al c ont r ol t hroughout t he
s ubj ect popul at i on.
I l a y out tlie sequence not t o propose a new " na t ur a l hi s t or y" of r e vol ut i on
i n t he a t y l e of Lyford P. Edwards o r Crane Br i nt on, but t o i d e n t i f y t h e
l o g i c of t he pr evi ous di s cus s i on.
That l ogi c d i f f e r s cons i der abl y from t h e common i dea of r evol ut i on
a s a s o r t of t ens i on- r el eas e. I f a t ens i on- r el eas e model of r evol ut i on
were c or r e c t , one might r easonabl y expect t h e l e v e l of c o l l e c t i v e
vi ol ence t o mount uns t eadi l y t o t he cl i max -- t h e r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n
i t s e l f -- and t hen de c l i ne r api dl y. A t t h a t poi nt . presumably, t h e
t ens i on is dissipated. The "cont ent i on" model I have been f ol l owi ng
s ugges t s o d i f f e r e n t sequence. It does not pr e di c t c l e a r l y t o t he
curve of vi ol ence bef or e a r evol ut i on, s i n c e t h a t depends on t h e p a t t e r n
of mobi l i zat i on and cont ent i on l eadi ng t o t he es t abl i s hment of mul t i pl e
s over ei gnt y. Yet i t does deny t h e n e c e s s i t y of a bui l dup of vi ol ence
bef or e a r evol ut i on.
On t he ot he r hand, t he cont ent l on model makes i t appear l i k e l y
t h a t once mul t l pl c s over ei gnt y begi ns , c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence w i l l cont i nue
a t hi gh l e v e l s l ong a f t e r t h e ba s i c i s s u e i s deci ded, and wi l l t aper
of f gr adual l y. Schemat i cal l y, t h e c ont r a s t appear s i n Fi gur e 7-4. There
a r e s e ve r a l r easons f o r t h i s gener al pr e di c t i on. F i r s t , tlie appearance
of mul t i pl e sover ei gnt y put s i n t o ques t i on t he achi eved pos i t i on of
ever y s i n g l e cont ender , whet her a member of t h e p o l i t y o r not . and t her e-
fore t ends t o i n i t i a t e a gener al round of mut ual t e s t i n g among cont ender s.
That t e s t i n g i n i t s e l f produces c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence.
Second, t he s t r uggl e of one p o l i t y a ga i ns t i t s r i v a l amounts t o
war: a b a t t l e fought wi t h unl i mi t ed means. Si nce c ont r ol of t he e n t i r e
Fi gur e 7-4: The Timing of Col l e c t i ve Vi ol ence i n Tensi on-Rel ease and
Cont ent i on Models of Revol ut i on.
1. Tensi on-Rel ease
u
rl
Time
I I
ti
4
4
>
0
3
u 0
rl 4
0 U
w
4
0
I
I
Revol ut i onar y I
Si t u a t i o n
cl
Time
government i s a t s t a ke , hi gh c o s t s and hi gh r i s k s a r e j u s t i f i e d . High
c o s t s and hi gh r i s k s i ncl ude de s t r uc t i on of per sons and pr oper t y.
Thi r d, t he r evol ut i onar y c o a l i t i o n is l i k e l y t o fragment once t h e
i n i t i a l s e i z u r e of c ont r ol over t h e c e n t r a l government al appar at us occur s.
and t h a t f r agment at i on i t s e l f t ends t o produce f u r t h e r s t r u g g l e s i nvol vi ng
vi ol ence. The r evol ut i onar y c o a l i t i o n fragment s f o r s e ve r a l r easons:
i t t a ke s a l a r g e r mobi l i zed mass t o s e i z e power t han t o mai nt ai n i t ; t he
i ne vi t a bl e di ver gence of some major obj e c t i ve s of t he cont ender s wi t hi n
tlie c o a l i t i o n wi l l come t o t h e f o r e once t he common obj e c t i ve of s e i z ur e
of power has been accompl i shed; t hos e cont ender s which have mobi l i zed
r api dl y up t o t he poi nt of r e vol ut i on e r e a l s o l i k e l y t o demobi l i ze
r a pi dl y due t o t h e underdevelopment of t h e i r or gani zat i on f o r t he manage-
ment of t he mobi l i zed r es our ces , and t hus wi l l t end t o l o s e pos i t i on i n
t he next rounds of t e s t i n g .
Four t h, t he vi c t or i ous p o l i t y still f a c e s t h e problem of rei mposi ng
r out i ng government al c ont r ol over t he s ubj e c t popul at i on even a f t e r
mul t i pl e sover ei gnt y has ended. As t h e government r e t u r n s t o i t s work
of e x t r a c t i n g and r e d i s t r i b u t i n g r es our ces , i t f i n d s peopl e r e l u c t a n t t o
pay t axes , gi ve up t h e i r l and, send t h e i r s ons t o war, devot e t h e i r t i me
t o l o c a l admi ni s t r at i on. And s o a new round of v i o l e n t i mposi t i on and
vi ol e nt r e s i s t a n c e begi ns. Where t h e i n i t i a l l ocus of t he r evol ut i on
is c ons t r i c t e d, t h i s is l i k e l y t o show up a s a spr ead of c o l l e c t i v e
vi ol ence t o ot he r p a r t s of t h e popul at i on. I n a c e nt r a l i z e d governmental
syst em, t he most common sequence i s t he r e f or e l i k e l y t o be a l a r g e and
de c i s i ve s t r uggl e s t t he c e nt e r fol l owed by a more wi de ~pr e a d but l e s s
c r i t i c a l s e r i e s of b a t t l e s t hrough t he r e s t of t he t e r r i t or y1.
Wi t hi n t h i s framework, s e v e r a l c ondi t i ons appear l i k e l y t o a f f e c t
t he o v e r a l l l e v e l of vi ol e nc e produced by a r evol ut i on. I n gener al , t h e
l a r g e r t h e number of cont ender s i nvol ved i n t h e a t r uggl e f or par er
( hol di ng cons t ant t h e number of peopl e i nvol ved) , t h e hi gher tlie l e v e l
of vi ol ence, because t he number of mut ual t e s t s of pos i t i on hetween
cont ender s l i k e l y r i s e s exponent i al l y wi t h t he number of cont ender s.
The g r e a t e r t h e f l u c t u a t i o n i n c ont r ol of var i ous segment s of t h e govern-
ment by d i f f e r e n t c o a l i t i o n s of cont ender s, t h e hi gher t h e l e v e l of
vi ol ence, bot h because t h e s e i z u r e of c ont r ol i t s e l f br i ngs vi ol e nt
r e s i s t a n c e and because each change of c o n t r o l s e t s of f f u r t h e r t e s t i n g
of pos i t i on.
Fi na l l y, t h e c ha r a c t e r of t h e r e pr e s s i ve means under government
c o n t r o l s t r ongl y e f f e c t s t he degr ee of vi ol ence. The connect i ons a r e
obvi ous ye t compl i cat ed: t h e us e of l e t h a l weapons f o r c r wd c ont r ol
i nc r e a s e s de a t hs t hrough c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence, t h e d i v i s i o n of l s bor
between s p e c i a l i s t s i n domest i c or der ( pol i ce) and war ( ar mi es) probabl y
decr eas es i t , t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p t o o v e r a l l r e pr e s s i ve capaci t y of t he
government is probabl y c u r v i l i n e a r ( l i t t l e damnge t o per sons o r pr oper t y
where t h e government has g r e a t r e pr e s s i ve c a pa c i t y, l i t t l e damage where
i t s r e pr e s s i ve capaci t y is a l i g h t ) , t he l e v e l of vi ol ence probabl y r i s e s
a s t he armament of t he government and of i t s opponent s spproacl l es
e qua l i t y. Al l of t hes e r el at i ons hi ps , and more, a r e pl a us i bl e , but no
more t han s l i v e r s of s ys t emat i c evi dence f o r t h e i r a c t u a l v a l i d i t y e x i s t .
I f t he s e ge ne r a l i z a t i ons have something t o them, t l i e e xt e nt of
c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence produced by a r evol ut i on shoul d be onl y weakly and
i n d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o t h e e xt e nt t o which t he d i s t r i b u t i o n of par er
changes. A zer o r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of par er (which most of us would c a l l a
f a i l u r e o f t h e r evol ut i on) can occur a s nn outcome of any of t he i d e a l
stages presented before, although it becomes less probable as the stages
proceed.
Revolutionary Outcomes and Further Structural Changes
!
Under what conditions does extensive structural change accompany or
result from a revolution? To the degree that structural change means
transter of power from class to class, party to party, contender to
contender, to be sure, we have already examined the question. But if it
means further redistribution of resources, changes in the quality of
life, urbanization, industrinlizstion, moral'reconstruction, everything
depends on the time scale one adopts.
Relatively few permanent changes of this sort actually occur in the
course of revolutions. Engels. Sore1 and Fanon all held out the hope
of a vast moral regeneration within the act of revolution itself: the
historical experience is sadly lacking in examples thereof. The other
I
structural renrrangements which occur in the course of revolutions are
typically temporary: the mobilization of men, loyalties, organizational
talents and weapons at a national level which recedes as the new structure
of power crystallizes, the disruption of daily routines for festivals,
deliberations, emer~encies, the provisional appearance of commissars,
governing committees, task forces. Michael Walzer has brilliantly
portrayed a revolutionary outlook for seventeenth-century England, Richard
Cobb a revolutionary mentality for eighteenth-century France; nevertheless.
for the outlooks and mentalities of most people, revolutions are but
I
I
passing moments.
A few great revolutions provide exceptions to this absence of short-.
run transformation; that is perhaps what permits us to call them great
revolutions. Although the nobles and the clergy regained some of their
position in France with and after Napoleon, the confiscation and sale of
aristocratic and ecclesiastical property from 1790 to 1793 permnnently
shifted the weight away from those two powerful classes. The soviets
survived the Bolshevik Revolution. The Chinese communists began reor-
ganizing village structure almost as soon as they were on the scene.
Contrary to the world-weary view of Crane Brinton, who argued tliat a
revolution took a country through tremendous turmoil to a posltion
approximately the same as it would have occupied anyway after an
equivalent lapse of time, it may be that the extent of structurnl
alteration occurring while multiple sovereignty persists is our best sign
of the depth of the permanent change to be produced by tlic revolution.
Over the long run, revolutions appear to chan~e the direction of
structural transformation to the extent that they produce a transfer of
power. Where there is s large transfer of power among classes, tllc
particular coalition which gnins profoundly shapes the subsequent
political development of the country. Barrington Moore's comparison of
India, Japan, China, the U.S., France, England, Germany and Russia makes
precisely tliat point. Military coups almost never produce any significant
structural change -- despite the declarations of national renovation
which ritually accompany them these days -- because they involve minor
rearrangements among extremely limited sets of contenders. The apparent
exceptions to this rule, revolutions from above llke those of Japan and
Turkey, ordinarily have a reforming segment of the ruling elite effec-
tively cutting bff their fellows from further access to power. and form-
ing coalitions with classes proviously excludcd from power.
However, the organizational means available to those who emerge from
the revolution with power affect the degree of structural transformation
deliberately promoted by the government in post-revolutionary years. In
a discussion of the effect of the "confining conditions" under which a re-
volutionary coalition seized power on its subsequent capacity to transform
social organization, Otto Kirchheimer comes to the conclusion that the
emergency powers accruing to states during twentieth-century crises like
World War I drastically reduced the confinement of power-holders:
The revolution of the 20th Century obliterates the distinction
between emergency and normalcy. Movement plus state can organize
tlie masses because: (a) the technical and intellectual equipment
is now at hand to direct them toward major societal programs m-
ther than simply liberating their energies from the bonds of tra-
dition; (b) they have the means at hand to control people's live-
lihood by means of job assignments and graduated rewards unavail-
able under the largely agricultural and artisanal structure of
tlie 1790s and still unavailable to the small enterprise and com-
mission-merchant type economy of the 1850s and 1860s; (c) they have
fallen heir to endlessly and technically refined propaganda de-
vices substitut'ing for the uncertain leader-mass relations of the
previous periods; and (d) they face state organizations shaken up
by war dislocation and economic crisis. Under these conditions
Soviet Russia could carry through simultaneously the job of an
economic and a politic~l, a bourgeois and a post-bourgeois revolu-
tion in spite of the exceedingly narrow basis of its political
elite. On the other hand, the premature revolutionary combination
of 1793-94 not only dissolved quickly, but left its most'advanced
sector, the sans-culottes, with only the melsncl~oly choice between
desperate rioting -- Germlnal 1795 -- or falling back into a pre-
organized stage of utter helplessness and agony (Kirchheimer
1965: 973).
This analysis can be generalized. Despite the "confining conditions"
faced by the French revolutionary coalitions of 1789-94. they seized a
state apparatus which was already exceptionally centralized and powerful
by comparison with those whlch had grown up elsewhere in the world. They
were able to use that great parer, in fact. to destroy tlie juridical
structure of feudalism, effect large transfers of wealth, subjugote the
Church, bui1d.a mass army. The nineteenth-century revoli~tionnries who
repeatedly seized control of the Spanish state grabbed an apparatus whose
extractive and repressive capacities were insufficient to any task of na-
tional transformation.
It is true that the mobilization of contenders which occurs before
and during a revolution may itself fncilitote a further nationnl mobili-
zation, putting resources at the disposal of the state which were simply
unavailable before the revolution: property, energy, information, loyal-
ties. That is, indeed, a characteristic strategy of contempornry na-
tional revolutions. The Chinese experience indicates that in the course
of a long mobilizstion revolutionaries sometimes build nlternative innti-
tutions which are potentially stronger than tlie existing state, and serve
as the infrastructure of a strong new state when the revolutionories come
to power. Most revolutionaries, however, seize a state apparatus without
that long preparation of an organizational alternative. In those cases.
the already-accrued power of the state affects the probability that funda-
mental structural change will issue from the revolution much more atrong-
ly than does the extent of mobilization during the revolution.
These facile generalizations, I confess, do not do justice to a
critical question. For on our estimate of the long-run effects of dif-
ferent kinds of revolution must rest our judgment as to whether any par-
t i c u l n r r evol ut i on, o r r evol ut i onar y oppor t uni t y, is wort h its c os t . I
es t i mat e some r e vol ut i ons a s wort h i t . But a t pr es ent no one has enough
s ys t emat i c knowledge about t h e pr obabl e s t r u c t u r a l consequences of one
v a r i e t y of r evol ut i on o r anot her t o make such es t i mat es wi t h conf i dence.
Except. per haps, i n r e t r os pe c t . l l i s t or i a ns cont i nue t o debat e what
t he Engl i sh. French and Russi an r e vol ut i s na c o s t and what t hey accomplished.
I n t hos e canes ( a t l e a s t i n pr i nc i pl e ) t hey a r e de a l i ng wi t h a c t u a l i t i e s
r a t he r t han p r o b a b i l i t i e s . That p o t e n t i a l c e r t a i n t y , however, has a s e l f -
d e s t r u c t i v e s i de ; when i t comes t o an event a s sweeping a s t h e Engl i sh
Revol ut i on, al most ever y pr evi ous event which l e f t some t r a c e i n seven-
t eent h- cent ur y England i s i n some s ens e a "cause", and al most ever y sub-
sequent event i n t h e count r y and i t s ambi t is i n some sense an "ef f ect ".
Making cause- and- ef f ect a n a l y s i s manageable i n t h i s cont ext means r educi ng
t h e r evol ut i on t o c e r t a i n e s s e n t i a l s , i de nt i f yi ng t he s u f f i c i e n t condi-
t i o n s f o r t hos e e s s e n t i a l s , and t hen s peci f yi ng subsequent event s which
would have been unl i ke l y wi t hout t h e r evol ut i onar y e s s e n t i a l s . So i n f a c t
t he c a us a l a na l ye i s of r e a l , h i s t o r i c r e vol ut i ons and of r evol ut i ons i n
gener al converge on s t at ement s of pr oba bi l i t y.
CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS AND NEW BEGINNINGS
Back t o t h e Ei ght eent h Cent ury
We began t h i s i nqui r y t oget her more t han two c e n t u r i e s ago, In
1765. At t h a t poi nt we wandered t hrough England, wat chi ng peopl e a t t a c k
poorhouses. We were t r a v e l e r s i n t i me, si mpl y t r yi ng t o g e t a s ens e of
t h e t e x t u r e and meaning of popul nr c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. We went from t h e r e
t o a r a t h e r t i mel es s worl d, a world cont ai ni ng a b s t r a c t model s' of c ol l c c -
t i v e a c t i on. We climbed up t h e mobi l i zat i on s i d e from i n t e r e s t t o organ-
i z a t i o n t o mobi l i zat i on t o c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. We t hen climbcd down t h e
oppor t uni t y ai de, from r e p r e s s i o n / f a c i l i t n t i o n t o power t o oppor t uni t y/
t hr e nt , onl y t o r e t u r n t o c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. Next we r e- ent er cd t i me,
equipped wi t h our models. We made t hr e e main c i r c u i t s : tlrrouglr major
changes i n r e p e r t o i r e s of cont ent i ous c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , tlrrough va r i ous
forms of c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence, i n t o t he t ur bul ence of: r evol ut i on and r e-
be l l i on. Here we a r e now, back near our s t a r t i n g poi nt : generaL r c f l e c -
t i on on t he t e xt ur e and meaning of popul ar c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on.
Suppose we s p i r i t e d our s e l ve s back t o 1765. Armed wi t h t l t e t eachi ngs
of: t h i s book, what would we do? What we do t h a t we coul dn' t do
when f i r s t we t r od on Nacton Heat h?
One of t h e f i r s t t hi ngs would be t o r e s ol ve t h e gener al "t urbul ence"
of 1765 i n t o s p e c i f i c groups, i n t e r e s t s , a c t i o n s and r e l a t i o n s among
groups. We might. f o r example, s t a r t l ooki ng hard a t such di f f c r e nc e a a s
t hos e between t h e Sussex poorhouse c o n f l i c t s and t h e a c t i on behind t h i s
br i e f not i c e f o r 1 0 Januar y i n t h e Annual Regi s t er :
Some t housands of weavers went Jn a body t o West mi nst er, and prevent ed
p e t i t i o n s t o bot h houses of pnr l i ament , i n behal f of t hemsel ves and
t hei r nmer ous f a mi l i e s , most of them now, a s t hey r epr es ent ed, i n
a s t a r vi ng condi t i on f o r want of work: and begging. a s a r e l i e f
t o t h e i r mi s e r i e s , t h a t t hey would, i n t h e pr es ent s e s s i on of
par l i ament , gr a nt a gener al pr ohi bi t i on of f or ei gn wrought s i l k s .
We would want t o d l f f e r e n t i a t e t h a t from t h e Re gi s t e r ' s r e por t f o r 20 Apr i l :
. . . t en journeymen t a y l o r s were t r i e d , on an i ndi ct ment f o r con-
s pi r i ng t oget her t o r a i s e t he wages, and l e s s e n t h e hour s of work,
s e t t l e d by an or der of s es s i ons , pur suant t o an a c t of par l i ament f o r
t h a t purpose, when ni ne of them, who were t h e pr i nc i pa l and committee-
men of s e ve r a l of t he a s s oc i a t i ons , which r a i s e d a fund t o suppor t
each ot he r i n such unl awful meet i ngs, and who had di s t i ngui s hed
t hemsel ves by t h e name of F l i n t s , were found g u i l t y , and r ecei ved
s ent ence accor di ng t o t h e i r s e ve r a l demer i t s , v i z . two t o be imprisoned
one year i n Newgate, f i v e f o r t h e space of s i x months, and two f o r
t h r e e months; and were, bes i des , f i ned one s h i l l i n g each and or der ed
t o f i nd s e c u r i t y f o r t h e i r behavi our.
A t t h e 30t h of June, we would f i nd a br i e f mention of t h e f a c t t h a t "Nine
whi t e boys were l a t e l y k i l l e d , and twenty made pr i s oner s , i n a ski r mi sh
wi t h a par t y of dragoons, near Dungannon i n I r el and. "
The poor on Nacton Heat h, t h e weavers a t West mi nst er, t he F l i n t s i n
London and t he Whiteboys a t Dungannon were a l l a c t i n g c ol l e c t i ve l y. That
a l e r t s us t o an expl anat or y agenda begi nni ng wi t h t h e s pe c i f i c a t i on of t h e
r el evant popul nt i ons, i n t e r e s t s , or gani zat i on, mobi l i zat i on, r e pr e s s i on/
f a c i l i t a t i o n , power, and oppor t uni t yl t hr e a t , a s wel l a s a c l o s e l ook a t
t he s p e c i f i c forms, i n t e n s i t i e s and outcomes of t h e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on.
It a l s o draws our a t t e n t i o n t o i mpor t ant di f f e r e nc e s among t h e f our
For one t hi ng, t h e poorhouse a t t a c k s have a r a t h e r r e a c t i v e t one: an
at t empt t o defend t h e pa r i s h poor a ga i ns t i nc a r c e r a t i on. The weavers'
p e t i t i o n march and t h e t a i l o r s ' i nc i pi e nt wage demands l e a n i n t h e pro-
a c t i v e di r e c t i on: al t hough bot h groups m y wel l have been respondi ng t o
t h r e a t s t o t h e i r l i ve l i hood, t h e cl ai ms t hey made were f or advnnt ages t hey
d i d not c u r r e n t l y enj oy. The qui ck not e on t h e Whiteboys o f f e r s no i nf or -
mat i on on t h e cl ai ms a t i s s ue. But when we l e a r n t h a t t he Whiteboys oE
I r e l a nd were famous a nt i - Br i t i s h g u e r r i l l a war r i or s , we r e c e i ve an i ndi c-
a t i o n t h a t t h e i r s ki r mi s h f e l l somewhere i n t h e r ange of c o l l e c t i v e
compet i t i on and c o l l e c t i v e r e a c t i on.
For anot her t hi ng, t he c ont r a s t i ng account s g i v e an i nkl i ng of t he
pr e va i l i ng schedul e of r epr es s i on: no v i s i b l e penal t i es f o r t h e p e t i t i o n
march. j a i l s ent ences f o r t h e mobi l i zi ng t a i l o r s , a r r e s t s and shoot i ng
f or a t t a c k e r s of Sussex poorhouses, ni ne dead among t he Whiteboys. The
f our incompletely-documented c a s e s a r e a s l i m b a s i s f or any gener al con-
c l us i ons , y e t t hey i mmedi at el y draw a t t e n t i o n t o t h e v a r i a b i l i t y of r e-
pr es s i on wi t h t h e a c t i o n and group i n ques t i on. They a l s o s t a r t us t hi nk-
i ng about what was changi ng: sendi ng t housands of weavers t o pr es ent n
p e t i t i o n was a s i g n i f i c a n t i nnovat i on, whi l e j a i l i n g peopl e f o r concer t i ng
t h e i r wage demands would p r a c t i c a l l y di s appear over t he next cent ur y.
Fi na l l y, even t he s e Eragmentnry news s t o r i e s g i v e us some r eason t o
be l i e ve t h a t t h e r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on pr e va i l i ng i n t h e
Br i t a i n and I r el and of 1765 d i f f e r e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y from t h e forms nvni l -
a b l e t o or di nar y t went i et h- cent ur y peopl e. Although t h e p e t i t i o n march
would have a s i g n i f i c a n t pl ace i n t h e demonst r at i on' s a nc e s t r y, t h e demon-
s t r a t i o n i t s e l f had not ye t ent er ed t he r e pe r t oi r e . Tlie e t i k e was not t hen
a t ool r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e t o workers -- pa r t l y, a s we have seen, because
groups.
of tlie r epr es s i on v i s i t e d upon any workers who at t empt ed t o concer t t h e i r
wage demands. The r e p e r t o i r e var i ed from one p a r t of Br i t a i n t o anot her ,
from one s o c i a l c l a s s t o anot her . But i t was d i s t i n c t l y an ei ght eent h-
cent ur y r e pe r t oi r e .
I f we t ook a somewhat l onger view, we would f i nd t h e r e p e r t o i r e
chnnging. Indeed, some s i g n i f i c a n t a l t e r a t i o n s i n t h e whole pa t t e r n of
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on were occur r i ng i n t h e Br i t a i n of t h e 1760s and 1770s.
The year 1766, f o r example, br ought one of t h e most widespread s e r i e s of
food r i o t s t o appear i n modern Br i t a i n ; more gener al l y, food r i o t s became
ver y common i n t h e v i l l a g e s and smal l towns of Br i t a i n dur i ng t he mi ddl e
decades of tlte ei ght eent h cent ur y, and onl y began t h e i r d e f i n i t v e de c l i ne
a f t e r 1830. I n London (end, t o some ext ent , i n ot her major c i t i e s ) we
wi t nes s a d i f f e r e n t t r end. There we s e e a Radi cal movement forming on a
mi ddl e- cl ass base wi t h i mpor t ant a l l i a n c e s among s k i l l e d workers; t hey
brought t oget her , among ot he r t hi ngs , t he demand f o r domest i c p o l i t i c a l
reform and t he criticism of t h e crown' s pol i cy i n America. Such s k i l l e d
workers a s t he si l k-weavers who marched on Par l i ament were bui l di ng l ar ge-
s c a l e or gani zat i ons and appl yi ng pr es s ur e i n t he na t i ona l p o l i t i c a l ar ena.
The Radi cal s, t h e s uppor t er s of John Wi l kes, t h e si l k- weaver s and ot her
or gani zed cont ender s f o r power, f ur t her mor e, were shapi ng new means of
exer ci s i ng t h e i r s t r e ngt h. They pr essed t h e r i g h t t o assembl e f o r pe t i -
t i oni ng and f or e l e c t i o n s beyond i t s ol d l i mi t , and began t o c r e a t e a
pr ot ot ype of t h e t went i et h- cent ur y demonst r at i on.
The decnde a f t e r 1765 was l i ke wi s e an i mpor t ant t i me of t r a n s i t i o n
i n America. The American t r a n s i t i o n , t o be s ur e, di f f e r e d g r e a t l y from
t h e Br i t i s h : i t went from t h e g r e a t r e a c t i on a ga i ns t t h e Stamp Act t o t he
openi ng of a t r u l y r evol ut i onar y s i t u a t i o n -- of mul t i pl e s over ei gnt y -- i n
a l l t he col oni es . To r e t u r n t o t he Br i t i s h periodicn.l.s of 1765. The
Gent l eman' s Magazine st epped up its covernge of Americsn news a t t h e
end of t he year . For example:
.. 1 Oct ober: Thi s day is appoi nt ed t o be hel d a t New-York i n
North America, a gener al congr es s of a l l t l i e c ol oni e s , i n or der
--
t o draw up a remonst rance t o be pr esent ed t o h i s maj est y ngai nat
t h e stamp d u t i e s , and ot he r burt l i ens l a i d upon t he col oni ce, by
t he l a t e a c t of t he Br i t i s h par l i ament .
5 Oct ober: . . . t h e s h i p s a r r i ve d a t Phi l adel phi a, wi t h t h e st amps
on board, f o r Maryland, New J er s ey, and Pennsyl vani a, when s e ve r a l
thousand c i t i z e n s assembled i n or der t o cons i der ways and menns f or
pr event i ng t h e stamp a c t t aki ng pl nce i n t h a t provi nce. and a t l e a s t
came t o a r e s ol ut i on t o r eques t t he d i s t r i b u t o r t o r e s f gn h i s o f f i c e ;
which a f t e r some demur he i n p a r t di d, a s s ur i ng h i s countrymen t h a t
no a c t of h i s , o r h i s deput i es , should enf or ce t he execut i on of t h e
stamp-act i n t h e pr ovi nces f or wliicli he was c omi s s i one d, bef or e tlie
same shoul d be ge ne r a l l y put i n f or c e i n t he nei ghbor i ng col oni es .
And a t t h e same t i me t he l awyer s ent er ed i n t o an agreement not t o
pur chase any of t hos e stamps, gi vi ng i t a s t h e i r opl ni on, t h a t i t
was i mpossi bl e t h e dut y imposed by them coul d be pai d f o r i n gol d
and s i l v e r .
4 November [ d a t e l i n e New York] : Some ext r aor di nar y pr epar at i ons i n
For t George, f or t h e s ecur i ng t he stamped paper i n t h a t ga r r l s on,
-
havi ng di s pl eas ed t he i nha bi t a nt s of t h i s c i t y , s v a s t number of
them assembled l a s t Frfday eveni ng, and proceeded t o t l i e f o r t we l l s ,
where t hey br oke open t h e s t a b l e of t h e L- t G- r Cndwallnder
Colden, Esq; t ook o u t 111s coach and a f t e r c a r r yi ng t he same t hr o'
t h e pr i nc i pa l s t r e e t s of t h e c i t y , i n triumph, marched t o t he Com-
mons where a gal l ows was er ect ed; oh one end of which was suspended
t h e e f f i g y of tlie g r e a t man, havi ng i n h i s r i g h t hand s stamped b i l l
of l a di ng, and on h i s b r e a s t a p a p e r wi t h t h e f ol l owi ng inscription:
"The Rebel Drummer i n t he year 1715." A t h i s back was f i xed a drum,
a t t h e ot her end of t h e gal l ows hung t he f i g u r e of t h e de vi l . Af t er
hangi ng a cons i der abl e t i me, t hey c a r r i e d t h e e f f i g i e s , wi t h t he
gal l ows i n t i r e , bei ng preceded by t h e coach, i n grand pr ocessi on, t o
t he ga t e of t he f o r t . from whence i t was removed t o t h e bowling
gr een, under t h e muzzles of t he f o r t guns, where a bonf i r e was i m-
medi at el y made, and t he dummer, d e v i l , coach LC. were consumed
admi st t l i e accl amat i ons oE some thousand s pe c t a t or s . The whole body
next proceeded t o Vsux-hal l , t he house of Major James, who, i t was
r epor t ed, was a f r i end t o t h e Stamp-act, from whence t hey t ook evey
i ndi vi dual a r t i c l e , t o a ver y cons i der abl e amount; and havi ng made
anot her bonf i r e, t h e whole was consumed i n t h e fl ames.
The next ni ght , t he assembled crowd demanded t h a t t he Li eut enant Governor
hand over t l i e stamps. Af t er a whi l e, he decl ar ed under pr es s ur e t h a t he
would not d j s t r i b u t c t he st amps hi ms el f , and f i n a l l y put them i n t o t h e hands
of t h e muni ci pal cor por at i on, i n t h e New York c i t y h a l l . Gentleman' s
Magazine of 1765 pr i nt ed many more r e p o r t s on American Stamp Act r e s i s t a nc e ,
not t o mention mul t i pl e es s ays and commentaries on t he p o l i t i c a l i s s ue s .
We a l r e a dy haveean i de s what happened i n t h e next t en year s. I n t he
t r a di ng c i t i e s of t h e American c oa s t , a nt i - Br i t i s h c o a l i t i o n s Formed,
drawing e s pe c i a l l y on t he merchant s, l awyer s, tradesmen and cr af t smen, but
o f t e n ai ded by such groups a s s a i l o r s and longshoremen. I n a complex i nt e r -
pl ay between Br i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s and American c o l o n i s t s , t l i e Amcricans
moved uns t eadi l y toward a gener al boycot t on p o l i t i c a l and economlc Lrnns-
a c t i o n s wi t h t he Br i t i s h . They moved toward t l i e f as hi oni ng of a s e t of
governmental i n s t i t u t i o n s -- commi t t ees, assembl i es, c o u r t s and associ n-
t i o n s -- p a r a l l e l t o Br i t i s h c ol oni a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , and i ndependent of
them. A s s i g n i f i c a n t numbers of Americans began t o t ake t h e i r d i r e c t i o n s
from t hos e p a r a l l e l i n s t i t u t i o n s and t o r e j e c t t h e or de r s of Li eut enant
Governors and ot he r Bt dt i s h o f f i c i a l s , s r evol ut i onar y s l t u o t i o n was undcr-
way. The outcome, t oo, was a t l e a s t a l i mi t e d r evol ut i on: thousnnds of
prominent s uppor t er s of t he Br i t i s h l e f t t l i e c ol oni e s , t he Americans ac-
qui r ed p o l i t i c a l independence, and t he mi ddl e- cl ass members of t h e r evol -
ut i onar y c o a l i t i o n s wi el ded except i onal power i n t he shapi ng of t he new
pol i t y.
The s t r u g g l e s of t h e 1760s i n Br i t a i n and America c l e a r l y bel ong i n
t h e world we have been expl or i ng i n t h i s book: t h e world of cont ent i ous
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. Ot her peopl e have often por t r ayed t h a t world a s f u l l
of "mobs", "di sor der s" and "mass movements". We have seen many of t h e
event s t hose w r d s r e f e r t o, and i n t h e pr oces s have not i ced r epeat edl y
how mi sl eadi ng t h e words a r e . Mob, di s or der and mass movement a r e top-
down words. They a r e t hewor ds of a u t h o r i t i e s and e l i t e s f o r a c t i o n s of
ot he r peopl e -- and, of t e n, f o r a c t i o n s which t hr eat en t h e i r owl i n t e r e s t s .
The bottom-up approach we have t aken i d e n t i f i e s t h e connect i ons between
t l i e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s OF or di nar y peopl e and t he ways t hey or gnni ze around
t h e i r workaday i n t e r e s t s . That approach a l s o he l ps c l a r i f y how much
of t he vi ol e nc e which e l i t e obs er ver s have been i ncl i ned t o a t t r i b u t e t o
t he di s or ga ni z a t i on, des per at i on o r aggr es s i ve i mpul ses of t he masses is
a c t u a l l y a by-product of i n t e r a c t i o n s between groups which a r e pur sui ng
t h e i r ends i n r e l a t i v e l y r out i ne ways and r i v a l s o r a u t h o r i t i e s who chal -
l enge t h e cl ai ms embodied i n t hos e r e l a t i v e l y r out i ne a c t i ons .
Theor i zi ng About Col l e c t i ve Act i ons
We coul d, i f we wanted, now f or mal i ze t h e a n a l y s i s of t h e S p i t a l f i e l d s
weavers, t he Nacton poorhouse-wreckers, t he Stamp Act crowds i n New York.
The f or mal i zat i on would c o n s i s t of mapping t h e i n t e r e s t s of t he p a r t i c i -
pant s, es t i mat i ng t he c ur r e nt s t a t e of oppor t uni t y and t h r e a t wi t h r e s pe c t
t o t hose i n t e r e s t s , checki ng, t h e i r mobi l i zat i on l e v e l s , gauging t h e i r power
pos i t i ons , t hen s eei ng t o what e xt e nt t he s e v a r i a b l e s account ed f o r t h e
i n t e n s i t y and c ha r a c t e r of t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. One s t e p back from
t h a t f or mal i zat i on we would f i nd our s el ves examining t h e pr e va i l i ng pat -
t e r n of r epr es s i on a nd f a c i l i t a t i o n , t h e impact of t he va r i ous gr oups'
or gani zat i on on t h e i r mobi l i zat i on and on t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , t he e f f e c t of
c o a l i t i o n s wi t h ot he r cont ender s on t h e i r c ur r e nt power pos i t i ons , and s o
on.
Thnt is t he easy pa r t : showing t h a t concept s such a s mobi l i zat i on
and r epr es s i on poi nt t o br oadl y s i mi l a r pr oces s es i n d i f f e r e n t s e t t i n g s ,
and appl y conveni ent l y i n t hos e var i ous s e t t i n g s . We would be s ur pr i s e d
and di sappoi nt ed i f i t came out ot her wi se; a f t e r a l l , t he concept s were
meant t o be q u i t e gener al . Yet t h e easy p a r t has i t s s a t i s f a c t i o n s . I t
hel ps i de nt i f y some unexpected and p o t e n t i a l l y f r u i t f u l comparisons --
between, f o r i ns t ance, t he mobi l i zat i on of Br i t i s h r a d i c a l s i n t he 1760s
and t he mobi l i zat i on of American r a d i c a l s i n t he 1960s. It br i ngs out
t he r i c hne s s nnd r el evance of h i s t o r i c a l ma t e r i a l s f or t he concer ns of
contemporary nnnl ys t s of p o l i t i c a l pr ocesses. Thse two advant ages combjne
t o produce a t h i r d advant age: tlie r ecogni t i on t h a t h i s t o r i c a l exper i ences
n r e an i mport ant and a c c e s s i bl e domain f o r t he t e s t i n g and refi nement of
arguments and expl anat i ons of c o l l e c t i v e act i on.
There we a r r i v e a t t h e har d pa r t . The hard p a r t i s t h e r e s e nr c l ~
agenda: s o r t i n g popul at i ons i n t o members of t h e p o l i t y , c l ~ol l e na e r s and
non-act ors; i de nt i f yi ng t h e i r i n t e r e s t s r e l i a b l y ; measuring t h e e xt e nt
and c ha r a c t e r of r e p r e s s i o n / f a c i l i t a t i o n t o which t hey a r e s ubj e c t ; de-
t er mi ni ng whet her i t is t r ue , a s argued e a r l i e r , t h ~ t r i c h popul at i ons
t end t o mobi l i ze of f e ns i ve l y, poor popul at i ons t o mobi l i ze def ens i vel y;
det er mi ni ng whet her i t is t r u e , ns I have a s s e r t e d r epeat edl y, t l i nt t h e
gener al e f f e c t of s us t ai ned r epr es s i on i s not t o bui l d up t ens i ons t o
t h e poi nt of a g r e a t expl oni o~l , but t o r educe t he o v e r a l l l e v e l of col -
l e c t i v e a c t i on.
Thi s i s t h e har d p a r t . It is not onl y hard because i t i nvol ves many
va r i a bl e s and i n t e r a c t i o n s among t he va r i a bl e s . It is a l s o hnrd because
t he measurement problems a r e s o l ar ge; devi s i ng gener al l y comparable and
meaningful. measures of or gani zat i on, mobi l i zat i on, power, r epr es s i on, and
s o on l i e s beyond t he FreRent s t a t e of t h e a r t . That is why t h i s book has
s o o f t e n t ur ned t o t he problems of measurement. Pl ent y of work t o do
t her e.
The account s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on i n Br i t a i n and America we havc j u s t
reviewed a l s o r e c a l l a major t h e o r e t i c a l problem. I n t he mobi l i zat i on
model which t h i s book has employed, c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s a r e gi ven a p r i o r i .
We impute them from some gener al h i s t o r i c a l a na l ys i s (my pr ef er r ed nnaly-
sis hei ng Marx' r e l a t i o n of d i f f e r e n t segments of t he popul at i on t o t he
pr e va i l i ng means of pr oduct i on) o r we det ermi ne them empi r i cal l y (my pre-
f e r r e d pr ocedur e bei ng t o pay a t t e n t i o n t o what peopl e soy a r e t h e i r gri ev-,
ances, a s p i r a t i o n s and r i g h t s ) . The t h e o r e t i c a l di f Fi cul . t i es mnl t i pl y.
Mobi l i zat i on, c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on nnd a c qui s i t i on o r 1.088 of power f r equent l y
a l t e r a gr oup' s i n t e r e s t s . How shoul d we t ake t h a t a l t e r a t i o n i n t o ac-
count ? The i mput at i on of i n t e r e s t s and t h e empi r i cal de r i va t i on o f t e n
c o n f l i c t wi t h each ot he r ; Leni ni s t 8 speak of " f a l s e c ons c i o~~s ne s s " . Does
t h a t make sense?
Another problem has been wi t h us from t h e s t a r t , and has r ef us ed
t o go away: t he connect i on between c a us a l and pur posi ve expl anat i ons of
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. We have o s c i l l a t e d between t h e two wi t hout i nt e gr a t i ng
them f i r ml y. The mobf l i zat i on model s e r ve s f o r shor t - r un ana1ysb.s.
When we t ake up a s e r i e s of a c t i ons such a s t h e Stamp Act r e s i s t a n c e i n
Phi l . adel phi a and New York we s o r t our o h S e ~ a t i 0 n S i n t o i n t e r e s t s , organ-
i z a t i on, mobilization, r epr es s i on, power, oppor t uni t y and c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i on i t s e l f . But we ul t i mat el y vi s us l i . ze t he var i ous groups i nvol ved
a s under t aki ng t h e i r a c t i o n pur posi vel y: seeki ng t o r e a l i z e t h e i r i n t e r -
e s t s wi t h t h e means a t t h e i r di s pos a l wi t hi n t he l i mi t s s e t by t h e i r re-
l a t i ons hi p t o t he world around them. I have al r eady poi nt ed out t he
l i mi t a t i ons of t he mobi l i zat i on model: t l i e l a c k of al l owance f o r uncer-
t a i n t y nnd f o r s t r a t e g i c i nt e r a c t i on. t h e f ocus on qua nt i t y r a t he r t han .
qt ~nl . i . t y, t he measurement d i f f i c u l t i e s i nher ent i n each of its va r i a bl e s .
Even i f we f i nd ways of overcoming t he s e l i mi t a t i ons , however, we a r e
s t i l l de a l i ng wi t h a pur posi ve model.
I n copi ng wi t h long-rlln changes i n c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on, we have gener-
a l l y t ur ned from pur posi ve t o caus al models. The p o l i t y model has ser ved
us i n t h i s way; f o r example, i t pr ovi des a cr ude expl anat i on of t he
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c di f f e r e nc e s i n c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on among groups which a r e
gai ni ng power, groups which a r e l os i ng power, and groups which a r e main-
t a i ni ng t h e i r power. Chal l enger s gai ni ng p o l i t i c a l power, r uns one p a r t
of t he expl annt i on, t end t o s h i f t toward c o l l e c t i v e pr oact i on, but a t
di mi ni shed l e ve l s ; t h a t i a becsuae t i l e governmental appar at us p r o t e c t s
them from t h r e a t s and because reduced c o s t s of mobi l i zat i on and collective
a c t i on mean t hey can r e a l i z e t h e same i n t e r e s t wi t h l e s s e f f o r t . Thua
t he c r u c i a l changes a f f e c t c ons t r a i nt s , not i . nt ent i ons.
Another ki nd of c a us a l argument has a l s o f i gur ed promi nent l y i n t he
anal ys es of pr evi ous chapt er s . It concerns tlie e f f e c t s of very 1.arge
s o c i a l changes, not abl y st at emaki ng, pr ol e t a r i a ni z a t i on and i ndus t r i a l i z n-
t i on. There 1 have argued r epeat edl y t h a t t he change i n ques t i on si mul t nne-
ous l y a f f e c t e d t he i n t e r e s t s and t h e or gani zat i on of var i ous cont ender s
f o r power, and t her eby a f f e c t e d t hei r mobi l i zat i on and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on.
I n t h e c a s e of peasant r e s i s t a n c e t o t he i ncr eased t a xa t i on accompanying
a t a temaking:
ABSTRACT CONCRETE
DEEWD FOR TAXES
\ 1 \
k L L
THREAT TO SHORT-RUN REINFORCE-
WCAL CON- MENT OF COMMUNLTY
TROI. OF LAND, POLITLCAL INSTITUTIONS
MOBILIZATION CROPS. WF,N,TH, /
SUILDUP OF LOCAL
PARAM!l.LTARY FORCES
J,
TM REBELLIONS
Thi s is not a compl et e account , s i n c e s t a t e mk i n g a l s o a f f e c t s r epr es s i on1
f a c i l i t a t i o n and power. Never t hel ess, t h i s account c l e a r l y d i f f e r s from
t he s t andar d Durkheimian arguments i n which t h e di scr epancy between t he
pace of s t r u c t u r a l change and tlie i n s t i t u t l o ~ l a l i z a t i o n of s o c i a l c ont r ol
det er mi nes t he l i kel i hood of c o n f l i c t and pr ot e s t . Al.though t h e argu-
ment has i mpor t ant i mpl i cat i ons f or changes i n t h e plrrposes of peasant
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on, i t i s e s s e n t i a l l y a c a us a l argument.
I n pr i nc i pl e , i t shoul d not be har d t o i n t e g r a t e t he pur posi ve and
caus al anal ys es . I n pr i nc i pl e , we can i n t e g r a t e them by cont i nui ng t o
t hi nk of group deci s i on r u l e s and t a c t i c a l comput at i ons ( t h e pur posi ve
p a r t ) which oper at e wi t hi n s e ve r e c ons t r a i nt s s e t by t he cont ender ' s
i n t e r n a l or gani zat i on. i t s r e l a t i ons hi p t o ot he r groups, and t he c ur r e nt
s t a t e of oppor t uni t i e s and t h r e a t s i n t he world ( t h e caus al p a r t ) .
I n pr a c t i c e , t h a t i s not s o easy. We might t r y t o do i t by gr adual l y
bt t i l d ltig t i me i n t o t he ba s i c mobil i z a t i o n model: showing, f or i ns t ance.
how a cont ender ' s c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on a t one poi nt i n t i me changes t he con-
d i t i o n s wlticl~ a r e r e l e va nt t o t h e next round of a c t i on. I n t he agenda
s e t by t he model, t h a t means showing how t he form, i n t e n s i t y and outcome
of t h e a c t i on a f f e c t t h e cont ender ' s i n t e r e s t s , or gani zal l on and mobi l i -
zat i on. i t s power pos i t i on, dle new oppor t uni t i e s and t h r e a t s conf r ont i ng
i t , and t h e r e p r e s s i o n / f a c i l i t n t i o n t o which i t is s ubj e c t . I n a very
s hor t r un, we can i gnor e some o f these r e l a t i ons hi ps because t hey wi l l
r enni n e s s e n t i a l l y t h e name. Over a s e r i e s of shor t - r un snapshot s, how-
ever , t h e i r e f f e c t s wi l l hegi n t o accumul at e, and t o a f f e c t
-5, d r i f t of
t he s i t u a t i o n a s a whole.
A s e r i e s of many such shor t - r i m p o r t r a i t s shoul d i n t e g r a t e , l i k e a
many-Cramed movie, i n t o a cont i nuous account of t he pr ocess by which col -
l e c t i v e a c t i on clinnges and fl ows. The d i f f i c u l t y , however, i s obvi ous:
f o r t h e a n a l y s i s of any p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n t we can a f f or d t o t r e a t t he sc-
t i ons of oLhcr groups (and t h e cont ender ' s r e l a t i ons hi p t o ot he r groups)
a s f e a t ur e s o f t he environment. As soon a s t i me e n t e r s , t he a c t i ons and
r e a c t i ons of t h e ot he r s become c r u c i a l . I n t h e s hor t r un, we have s t r a -
t e g i c i nt e r a c t i on. I n t he l onger run, we have changi ng c o a l i t i o n s , cl eavages
and s t r u c t u r e s of power. The p o l i t y model we have used i n t h i s book
s i n g l e s out onl y one a s pe c t -- t h e relationship of cont ender s t o eovern-
ments -- of a complex s e t of changes. I n or der t o i n t e g r a t e t h e c a us a l
and pur posi ve arguments unfol dcd i n t h i s book, we need more. We need o
much f u l l e r a na l ys i s of power s t r ua gl e s . c ool i t t ons . and ot he r forms oE
i n t e r a c t i o n among cont ender s. For s t ude nt s o f c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on, t h a t
i s t he next chal l enge.
The Import ance of Hi s t or y
Hi s t o r i c a l a na l ys i s , t aken s e r i ous l y, wi l l hel p us fasl t i onmorc adc-
qua t e models of power s t r uggl e s . The h i s t o r i c a l r ecor d i s r i c h nnd r el e-
vant . It per mi t s us t o f ol l ow mul t i pl e groups and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s over
s u b s t a n t i a l bl ocks of t i me. Col l e c t i ve a c t i on, cont ent i on and s t r u g g l e s
f o r p o l i t i c a l power a r e e s pe c i a l l y l i k e l y t o l eave t h e i r t r a c e s i n t he
h i s t o r i a n ' s raw mat er i al s .
I t i s t or y i s more t han an abundant sour ce of dat n. I t mat t er s f or
i t s own sake; i t put s our own exper i ence i n t o per s pect i ve and sometimes
hel ps t o expl ai n i t . The h i s t o r y of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on i s a f a s c i na t i ng
i nqui r y which t akes 11s i n t o d i f f e r e n t pat hs from t he hi s t or y of p o l i t i c a l
t hought o r t he h i s t o r y of powerhol ders, al t hough t he t hr e e sor Ls of hi s -
t or y c r os s f r equent l y. The d i f f e r e n t h i s t o r i c n l t r a j e c t o r i e s of t he
demonst r at i on and t he s t r i k e i n west ern c oi t t ~t r i e s . f or example, hel p us
underst and t h e d i f f e r e n t pl aces t hey occupy i n t oday' s p o l i t i c a l r cper -
t o i r e s , he l p us gr as p such pe c ul i a r t hi ngs a s t he r e l a t i v e l y gr e a t e r
frequency wi t h which t he demonst rat i ons of our own t i me produce col l ec-
t i v e vi ol ence; a f t e r a l l , i n most west ern c ount r i e s s t r i k e s were once
ver y common s e t t i n g s f o r shoot i np, , br awl i ng and a t t a c k s on bui l di ngs o r
equipment.
llistorians commonly treat the history of collective action as a sub-
sldsldiary form of political, social or economic history: strikes and
demonstrations serve as the moral equivalent of the statesman's memoirs.
provide evidence of the quality of life among the lower orders, lend
themselves to the measurement of the impact of economic fluctuations.
Those are all legitimate uses of the evidence on strikes and demonstrations.
Taken in its w n terms, however, tl~e history of collective action cuts
across political history, social history, economic history as we usually
imngine them. The categories and periods of collective action's history
do not follw simply from those of political, social or economic history.
Collective nction follows its own course. Our repeated glimpses of his-
torical experience in this book have given us clear indications of the impact
oncollective nction of changes in power structure and in the organization
of production, but they have also shown us how the existing repertoire of
collective action and the previous experience of the collective actors
constrain the way they act together on interests, aspirations and grievances.
Instead of treating it ns a minor elaboration of political or social his-
tory -- for example, as the subject which George Rude labeled The Crowd
in llistory -- we have nome warrant to write the history of collective ac-
-
tion in its own terms.
BeEore we stake out a new liistorical field, however, we should not ask
merely whether it 1s conceivable and interesting. We have to ask whether
it is coherent, worthwile and accessible. In the case of collective
action, the answer to all three seems to be: yes. The subject is coherent
in several fundamental regards: any given population tends to have a
fairly limited and well-established set of means for action on shared In-
terests, and to change tt~ose means little by little; the available means
of action, the results of action, the Intensitities and loci of nctlon
change in an intelligible manner in the course of such large-scale changes
as industrialization and statemaking; we can rensonnbly ask the same
questions about interest, organization, opportunity and action in wide-
ly different settings, and can even expect similar answers to some qucs-
tions to come back from very different times and places.
Worthwhile? In the long run, the reaults of tl~e inquiry will tell
us. In advance, we can see at least that the study of collective action
gets us to the problems that concerned the ordinary actors of history in
a way that almost no other inquiry does. It takes its place with the
historical study of work and the family: it is about the logic, fmme-
work and content of everyday life.
The question of accessibility is harder to settle. Too little of
the work of making the evidence for collective action available and com-
prehensible has been done. Interest, opportunity, organization, action
-- none of them is easy to reconstruct at a distance of o century or two.
The action is less difficult than the rest, because the most precise and
voluminous records come from legal authorities. The nutlloritics tried
to establish what happened in order to punish it this time and prevent it
next time. As for interest, opportunity and orgnnization, we muat either
infer them from the action itself, guess at them on the basis of general
arguments, or piece them together from scattered, brittle materials.
When dealing with the actions of ordinary people, most historians content
themselves wihh the first two choices: describe what the people did, then
deduce what interests they were pursuing, what opporttmities to pursuo
those interests they faced and how they were organized from what they said
and did during the action, as well as from general argumenta concerning the
character of crowds, the nature of pensant life, the mennlng of resistance
to conscription, and similar notions.
In the absence of direct, s'olid evidence concerning interest, op-
portunity and organization, the indirect approach combining general ar-
guments with observations from the action can serve us well. A11 we need
are sound general arguments, well-documented actions, and the wit to cor-
rect the general arguments when the actions prove them wrong. In analy-
zing the actions of the seventeenth-century rural rebels who show up in
history books under such quaint names as Bonnets-Rouges, Camisards and
Croquants, Yves-Mar;e ~brce frames a useful argument. At that time, ac-
cording to Berce, the local community was the main locus of rural solid-
arity and the chief repository of rights in which rural people had a strong
investment. The expansion of the state under Louis XI11 and Louis XIV
threatened both the solidarity and the rights.
To each form of local solidarity. ~ e r c g argues, corresponded a form
of rebellion: revolts of insecurity based on the institutions of common
defense ngalnst 'marauders, food riots based on the communal arrangements
for provisioning in hard times, forceful defense of common agricultural
rights based on the previous exercise and recognition of those rights,
rebellions against direct taxes based on the long participation of the
,
local community in the assessment of those taxes, armed resistance to
indirect taxes based on the prior existence of local cl~annels for the
trading of the items now subject to inspection, taxation and seizure.
Says Berce:
It is roughly from 1660 to 1680 that, irreversibly, communal
powers were dismantled, their military, judiciary and fiscal
prerogatives choked or revoked, their established rights and
privileges crushed. The chronology of great popular rebell-
ions follows the same rhythm. Then these reactions of col-
lective violence died away as the building of the state suc-
ceeded (Berce 1974a: 117).
~erc:'s au-ry underestimates the importance of expanding capitalism.
Yet it pinpoints themes which do recur, time and time again, in seven-
teenth-century revolts: established rights being crushed, long-respect-
ed privileges being swept aside. miat much appears in the action itself,
as when, in 1636, the peasants of Saintonge declared "... that they were
good Frenchmen and would die, rather than live any longer under the ty-
ranny of Parisians who had reduced them to the despair and extreme pov-
erty in which our province now find themaelves because of the great tax
assessments and new burdens that they have imposed upon us and invented
in this reign ..." (Berce 1974b: 736).
The complaint from Saintonge illustrates both the promise and the
penalty of working with observations of collective action olone. The
promise is that people who act together generally have their own idea
of the grievances, hopes and interests which motivate them. and a notion
of their chances of success. If the "tyranny of Parisians" resppears in
complaint after complaint, we have some reason to believe thnt the people
of Saintonge had a genuine grievance ogainst demands from outside. The
penalty, however, is that the rhetoric of rebellion does not reveal the
origin or factual basis of the grievance: how to distinguish, for exam-
ple, betwzen a longstanding condition recently become intolerable be-
cause of changing aspirations or self-definitions, and new privations
which violate longstanding rights7
Part of the remedy consists of paying attention to the whole pat-
tern of actions and complaints: in old-regime France, almost everyone
who made a public lament complalned of "extreme poverty;" if you did
otherwise, there was the chance the tax collector would bite harder the
next time lie passed by. Complaints of "new burdens" and "Parisian ty-
-
ranny." on the other hand. varied from place to place, time to time,
group to group. In that variation over place, time and group we have
a chance to try out our ideas concerning the interests, opportunities
and organization lying behind the collective action.
In the case of
~ercc's argument, we con determine whether there was, indeed, a tendency
for regions just coming under firm royal control to mount major resis-
tance movements, then lapse into docility as the state won out.
(There
wns, although the connections were more complex than ~erci's scheme al-
lows. )
Nevertheless, a broad correlation between the rhythm of statemaking
and the rhythm of rebellion will leave open many alternative interpre-
tations of the interests, opportunities and organization at work.
Event-
ually we will have to try to observe them directly.
Two apparently con-
tradictory strategies apply. The first is the more obvious: dig into
the evidence concerning the settings in which collective action occurs.
I
With enough spadework, it is often possible to discover the interests.
I
I
opportunities and organization in operation outside the great episodes
of action. But eventually we will need comparisons with places, times
and groups in which little or no action occurred: if we find "extreme
poverty" in the setting of every seventeenth-century rebellion, does
that mean the peasants who did not rebel were less poor?
That sort of
question leads us to the second strategy:
broad comparisons of places,
times, and groups which differed in interest, opportunity end organiza-
tion. Did their collective action, or lack of it, vary accordingly?
In writing the history of collective action, we have a choice hc-
tween historical particularism and the attempt to compare and generalize.
In one view, all such comparisons are odious, First because they inevit-
ably warp the interpretation of the past to ftt the preoccupation of
the present, second because they wrench each event from the only con-
text which can give it substance. "The Burgundian of the seventeenth
century," Gastron Roupnel tells us, "did not bear the mark of the modern
age. At the bottom of his soul there wns something so old that it
was as if the Gauls were still around him in their new land where his-
tory had not yet arrived" (Roupnel 1955: xxx). If so, presumnb1.y
neither the Burgundian nor the American of our own time con reconstitute
'
or explain the events of seventeenth-century Rurgundy without projecting
himself across the chasm between the present and on corlier age.
Com-
parisons will only serve to map the depth and contours oE the chasm.
The depth and width of the chasm, however, are questions of fact,
not of fnith. We can, to some degree, determine whether the patterns
and explanations which help us order the collective action of thc
seventeenth century give us any grip o,r~ that of the twentieth -- pro-
vide usable categories for our observations, brin~ out obscure connec-
tions, anticipate features which are not readily visiblc at first sight.
The points at which the seventeenth-century categories nil are clues to
change, signals thot we have something new to explnin. Our attempt to
move across the centuries may lead to the conclusion thot different
centuries require fundamentally different approaches to collective
action. Then that conclusion, and the delineation of the essential
breaks between one mode of action and another, will be accomplLshments
in themselves.
The History of collective Action in Modern France
How, then, might we set concrete historical experience into the
framework this book has built up? The historical work consists of
grouping actions within the historical experience into governments, con-
tenders, polities, coalitions, processes of mobilization, and so on.
Other fundamental phenomena, such as changes in beliefs, demographic
change. or demographic crisis, enter the account only in so far as they
affect the pattern of pursuit of interests and contention for power.
In the case of France since 1500, the largest frame for analysis
shows us the interplay of a gradually urbanizing, industrializing and
proletarianizing population with a national state which was at first
emerging, then establishing priority, then consolid~ting its hold on
the population. The two sets of processes depended on each other to some
degree -- for example, in the way that expanding taxation drove peasants
to market goods they would otherwise have kept at home, on the one hand,
nnd the way thnt the degree of commercialization of land, labor, and
ngricultural production set stringent limits on the return from land
taxes, income taxes, or excise taxes, on the other. Rut their timing
differed. The epic periods of French state-making were the times of
Louis XI11 and Louis XIV. Those periods had their share of economic
turmoil. Furthermore, they saw both a significant increase in the impor-
tnnce of Paris and n few other major cities for the life of France as a
whole and the oprend of trade and small-scale manufacturing through the
towns and villages of the entire country. Yet in terms of productivity.
organization and sheer numbers of persons involved, the urbanization, in-
dustrialization and yroletarianization of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries produced incomparably greater changes. To oversimplify outrage-
ously, the drama consists of two acts: flrst a fast-growing state acting
on a slow-moving population and economy; then a tast-changing population
and economy dealine with a consolidating state.
In analyzing this interplay, we need to ask over and over for dif-
ferent places and points in time wlwt contenders for power (potentinl and
actrtal) the existing social structure made available, and what governments
the existing stage of statemaking left them to contend over. n ~ e most
strenuous current debates over the history bf the turbulent French seven-
teenth century, for example, pivot, first, on the extent to whlch the
national government squeezed out its provincial rivals and acquired firm
control over Frnech social life; second, and even more strenuously. on
the extent to which the operative divisions of the population were social
classes in something like a Marxian sense (soe Mor~snier 1970, Lebrun 1967,
Porchnev 1963. Lublinakaya 1968).
The analytic scheme I have laid out provides no pat answers to those
serious questions; if it did, one would have to suspect that its prin-
cipal assertions were true by definitlon. It does suggest thnt the
tracing of the actual issues, locations and personnel of violent encoun-
ters in seventeenth-century France will provide crucip.1 evidence on the
pace and extent of political centralization, as well as on the nature of
the groups which were then engaged in struggles for power. The basic
research remains to be done. Yet the recurrent importance of new taxn-
tion in seventeenth-century rebellions, the npparent suhsidence of those
rebellions toward the end of the century, and the frequent involvement of
whole peasant communities in resistance to the demands of the crown nll
point toward a decisive seventeenth-century battle among locnl and nntion-
a1 polities.
Not that nll struggle ended then. As Tocqueville declared long ago,
the Revolution of 1789 pitted centralizers agalnst guardians oC provincial
autonomies. The contest betwecn crow and provincinl parlemcnts (which
led quite directly to the calling for the Estates General, which in turn
became the locus of multiple sovereignty in-1789) continued the strug-
gle of the seventeenth century. Throughout the Revolution, in fact,
the issue of predominance of Paris and the national government remained
I
open, with tax rebellions, movements against conscription and resistance
I
I
to the calls of the nation for food recurring when the center weakened
and when its demands increased sharply. Most of the events of the so-
called peasant revolt of 1789 took the form of food riots and other
classic eighteenth-centt~ry local conflicts.
Yet they did not just represent "more of the same," because they
came in extraordinary clusters, because theyoccurred in the presence of
. multiple sovereignty, and because the participants began to form coali- 4
i
ttotis with other contenders for power. Now, the exact contours of the
major contenders and the precise nature of their shifting alliances are
the central issues of the big debates about the history of the Revolution
(see e.g. Cobhan 1964, Hazauric 1970). But it is at least roughly true
to say that a loose coalition among peasants, officials, urban commer-
cial cLasscs and small but crucial grotlps of urban craftsmen and stlop-
keepers carried the revolution through its first few years, but began to
fall apart irrevocably in 1792 and 1793. Looked at from the point of
vlew of coalition-formation and multiple sovereignty, the Revolution
breaks into a whole series of revolutionary situations, from the first
declaration of sovereignty by the Third Estate in 1798 to the final
defeat of Napoleon in 1815.
Agagn, in this perspective we begin to grasp tile significance of
matertally trivial events like the taking of the Bastille. For the at-
tack by Parisjans on the old fortress finally set a crowd unambiguously
against the regime, revealed the uncertain commitment of part of the
armed forces to the government. brought the King to his ffrst accessions
to the popular movement (his trip to tlie Natio~~sl Assembly on thc 15th
of July and his trip to Paris on the 17th) and stimulated a serles of
minor coups in the provinces:
Until. July 14th the handful of revolutlonary instituttons sct
up in the provinces were disparate and isolated. Ilcnccfonsnrd
most of the towns and many of the villagcs of Prance wore to
imitate Paris with extraordinary swiftness. During the uceks
that followed the fall of tlie Bastille there arose evcrywhcre
revolutionary Toron Councils of permanent committees, and citizen
militias which soon assumed the name of national guards (Godechot
1970: 273).
So if we date the start of multiple sovereignty from the Third Estate's
Tennis Court Oath to remain assembled despite the prohibitions of
the King, we still have to treat July 15th and its immediate nftcr-
math as a great expansion of the revolutionary coalition.
Obviously the three proximate conditions for a revolutlonary sltu-
ation enumerated earlier -- coalitions of contenders ndvnncing exclu-
sive alternative claims, commitment to those claims, Failure of the
government to suppress them -- appeared in the France of 1789%'' Whnt
cannot be obvlous from a mere chronicle of the events is how long cach
of the conditions existed. what caused them and whether they were suf-
ficient to cause the collapse of the old re~ime. At least these are
researchable questions, as contrasted with attempts to ask directly
whether the rise of the bonrgeoisie, the increase in relattve deprivn-
tion or the decay of the old elite "caused" the Revolution. What is
more, they call attention to the probable importance of shifting coali-
tions among lawyers, officials, provincial magnates, peasants and wor-
Indeed, these reactive forms of collective action renched their climnx
around the Revolution of 1848, before fading rnpidly to insignificance.
From the mid-century crisjs we can date the date the definitive
reduction of the smaller polities in whtch Frenchmen had once done
most of their political business. the virtual disappearance of communal
contenders for power, the shift of all contenders townrd associntional
kers in the nationwide political maneuvering of 1787 to 1789, as well
as to the effect of "defensive" mobilization of peasants and workers in
response to the multiple pressures impinging on them in 1789.
The Revolution produced a great transfer of power. It stamped out
a new and difinctive political system. Despite the' Restoration of 1815,
the nobility and the clergy never recovered their pre-revolutionary
position, some segments of the bourgeoisie greatly enhanced their power
over the national government. and the priority of that national govern-
ment over ell others increased permanently. In Barrington Moore's analy-
sis, whose main lines appear correct to me, the predominance of the
organization and action at a national level. The massive urbanizntion
and industrialization of France which gained momentum ofter 1830
transformed the available contenders for power, especially by crenting
a large, new urban working class based in factories and other large
1
organizations. From that point on, the demonstration, the meeting. the
strike wer? the usual matrices of collective violence as well as the
settings in which an enormous proportion of all struggles for power
coalition of officials, bourgeois and peasant in the decisive early
phases OF the Revolution promoted the emergence of the attenuated parlia-
mentary democracy which characterizes post-revolutionary France (Moore
1966, ch. IT; for explication and critique see Rokkan 1969, Rothman 1970..
Stone 1967). At thet scale and in the details of public administration,
education, ideology and life style, the Revolution left s durable heri-
tage .
None of the old conflicts, nevertheless, disappeared completely with
the Revolution. The counter-revolutionary vendce, despite having come 1
close to destruction in 1793, again rose in rebellion in 1794, 1795,
1799, 1.815 and 1832. Further revolutions overcame France as a whole in
1830, 1848, and 1870. Host of the characteristic forms of resistance to
demands from the center -- food riots, tax rebellions, movements against
conscri,ption, and so on -- continued well into the nineteenth century.
went on. Collective action evolved with the organization of public
life.
A Last Case'in Point: Rural Collective Action in Burgundy
If this broad sketch of the evolution of collective action holds
for France as a whole, it m y still lose its verisimilitude when compared
to the experience of particular local populations. In Caston Roupnel'a
opinion, which I quoted earlier, the old-regime Burgundian was so dif-
ferent from his modern counterpart that a historian hns to apply differ-
ent explanatory principles to his behavior.
Roupnel!s challenge to us is to discover vhether we can understand
and explain the co1,lective action of old-regime Burgundy in terms which
are relevant to the time and place, yet still hnve meaning in other --
and especially later -- times and placea. I think we can. Old-regime
Burgundians felt the effects of two momentous processes: the expansion
of c a pi t a l i s m and t h e concent r at i on of power i n t h e French na t i ona l
s t a t e . They f e l t t h e expansi on of c a pi t a l i s m concr et el y i n t h e growth
of an a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o l e t a r i a t , t h e s h i f t toward cash-crop pr oduct i on,
t h e de c l i ne of communal pr oper t y r i g h t s i n f avor of i ndi vi dua l owner-
s hi p, and a number of ot her ways. They f e l t t he concent r at i on of s t a t e
power i n tlie r i s i n g i mport ance of r oya l o f f i c i a l s i n t her egi on. t h e
de c l i ni ng autonomy of t h e Parl ement and t h e muni ci pal i t y of Di j on, t he
i ncr eased c ont r ol , t a xa t i on and s a l e of l o c a l o f f i c e s by t h e Crown, and
a number of ot her ways.
The c o n f l i c t s over st at emaki ng a r e most v i s i b l e i n t he sevent eent h
cent ur y, e s pe i c a l l y dur i ng t h e Fronde of t h e 1640s and 16508, when Bur-
gundy wns t he s i t e of major r e be l l i ons a ga i ns t t h e Crown. The c o n f l i c t s
ove r c a pi t a l i s ma r e more v i s i b l e i n t h e ei ght eent h cent ur y, when s t r uggl e s
f o r c ont r ol of l and. l abor and cr ops r ecur r ed t hroughout t he pr ovi nce.
Let us t ake a br i e f l ook a t t h e ei ght eent h- cent ur y s t r uggl e s , t hl nk about
t h e i r r e l a t i ons hi p t o t h e expansi on of c a pi t a l i s m, and t hen compare them
wi t h t h e r u r a l c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on of t he ni net eent h cent ur y.
I n r u r a l Burgundy, ei ght eent h- cent ur y cont ent i on had a s t r ong a nt i -
c a p i t a l i s t f l a vor . It was t h e gol den age of food r i o t s . The c r i s e s of
1709, 1758 and 1775 brought t h e i r c l u s t e r s of c o n f l i c t s , and ot he r s
appeared between t h e g r e a t c r i s e s . That is t he meaning of t he 1770
e d i c t of t he Pa r l e me nt of Burgundy which f or bade, l i k e s o many ot he r e d i c t s
of t h e per i od
t o ga t he r and s t o p wagons l oaded wi t h' whes t o r ot he r gr a i n, on
r oads, i n c i t i e s , towns o r v i l l a g e s , on pai n of s p e c i a l prose-
c ut i on . . . (Archi ves ~6 p a r t e me n t a l e s ~ G t e d' Or [ Di j on] C 81)
That bl ockage of gr a i n expr essed t h e demand of or di nar y peopl e t h a t tlle
needs of t he community have p r i o r i t y over t he r equi r ement s of t he mnr-
ket . The market , and t he r e f or e t he merchant s a s we l l .
The second common form of a n t i c s p i t a l l s t a c t i on was l e s s r out i ne
and more i r oni c . It was l o c s l r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e l a ndl or d' s consol i da-
t i o n of l ends and of r i g h t s i n t h e l and. The i r ony l i e s i n our normnl
r e a di ne s s t o pl a c e t h e l andl or ds t hemsel ves i n t h e a n t i c a p i t a l i s t camp.
A s t h e gr e a t r e gi ona l h i s t o r i a n Pi e r r e de Sai nt -Jacoh showcd, t l i e
Burgundisn l a ndl or ds of t h e per i od -- i ncl udi ng bot h t h e "old" n o b j l t t y
and t h e ennobled o f f i c i a l s and merchant s -- pl ayed t h e c a p i t a l i s t game
by s e i z i n g t h e f o r e s t s , usur pi ng common l ands , encl os i ng f i e l d s and
i n s i s t i n g on c o l l e c t i n g a l l t he us e f e e s t o which t h e i r manors gnve
them
cl ai m. Rur al peopl e f ought back. S u i t s a ga i ns t l andl or ds mul t i pl i e d.
a f a c t which de Sai nt - Jacob i n t e r p r e t s a s evi dence not onl y of s e i g n i o r i s l
aggr es s i on but a l s o of an i nc r e a s i ng l i b e r a t i o n of t he peas ant s from
t r a d i t i o n a l r es pect .
Where t he l aws ui t was i mpossi bl e o r i n e f f e c t i v e , peosant s r e s i s t e d
t he s e i z ur e of connnons by occupyi ng them, r e s i s t e d encl os ur es by brcnki ng
t he hedges o r f ences. A s Pi e r r e de Saj nt -Jacob de s c r i be s it:
The wardens of At hi e were at t acked by tlie peopl e of Vi serny
f o r t r yi ng t o f or bi d e n t r y t o a shepherd. On tlie l ends of
Bernard de Font et t e. Pi e r r e ~ 6 s a r du Cr e s t , t he l or d of Saj nt -
Aubin, or gani zed an unusual. expedi t i on. He went wi t h 17 men
armed wi t h "guns, s t a k e s and s t aves " t o hr eak down t he encl o-
s ur es . They l e d i n 40 c a t t l e under t h e pr ot e c t i on of two guar ds
"with guns and hunt i ng dogs, " and kept t h e t ennnt s of Bernard
de Font e t t e from hr i ngi ng i n t h e i r c a t t l e . I n Charmois, a t t h e
ur gi ng of two women, a band of peas ant s went t o br eak down a f ence
s e t up by t h e over s eer of Grenand who coul d do not hi ng but watch
and r ecei ve t he j e e r s of t he crowd. I n Pant hi er , a merchant wanted
t o erkclose h i s meodow; he got a ut hor i z a t i on from t h e l o c a l c our t .
Peopl e assembled i n t h e s quar e and deci ded t o break t he hedges, which
was done t h a t ni ght . They l e d i n t h e hor ses. The merchant wanted
t o chase them away, but t h e young peopl e who were guar di ng them
st opped him, "sayi ng t h a t t hey were on t h e i r own pr oper t y, i n a
publ i c meodow, t h a t t hey had broken t he encl os ur es and t h a t t hey
would brenk them agai n . . ." (Sai nt -Jacob 1960: 370-371).
A s we can s e e , t he oppos i t i on was n i t di r e c t e d s p e c i f i c a l l y a ga i ns t t h e
l anded n o b i l i t y , but a ga i ns t t h e l andl or ds of any c l a s s who chewed a t
t h e c o l l e c t i v e r i g h t s of t h e r u r a l community. I f i n Longecourt i n 1764
i t wns t h e l or d who demanded h i s own s ha r e of t he commons, i n Dar oi s two
year s l a t e r t h e Chapt er of Sai nt e- Chapel l e, i n Di j on, t r i e d t o t a ke . 0
s har e of t he communal woods, and i n ~ i l l ~ - l e - ~ d l 6 i n 1769 i t was a for-'
mer-notary who encl osed a meadow onl y t o s e e t h e d i t c h e s f i l l e d i n by
t he l o c a l peopl e (A.D. ~ $ t e d' or C 509, C 543, C 1553).
What a c ont r a s t wi t h r u r a l c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on a f t e r t he Revol ut i onl
Food r i o t s di d s ur vi ve u n t i l t he mi ddl e of t h e ni net eent h cent ur y. For
example, i n Apr i l 1829 a crowd i n Chf t i l l on f or ced M. Beaudoin, oper at or
of a f l o u r m i l l . t o s e l l h i s wheat a t 5 f r a nc s and 25 sous per doubl e
bus hel , when he had post ed t he p r i c e a t 5F30 (A.D. ~ & e d' Or M 8 I1 4).
At t h e next market , s e ve r a l br i gades of gendarmes were on hand t o pr event
such "di sor der s" (A.D. C"at ed0r 8 M 27). Although t he food r i o t cont i n-
ued t o f l our i s h. pos t - r evol ut i onar y r u r a l s t r uggl e s hor e har dl y a t r a c e
of t he r e s i s t a n c e agni ns t t h e l andl or ds . I ns t ead t hey concerned t he
p o l i c i e s , and e s pe c i a l l y t h e f i s c a l p o l i c i e s , of t he s t a t e .
The a c t i v e groups of t h e ni net eent h cent ur y came e s pe c i a l l y from
t he s mal l l andhol der s and t he workers of t he commerci al i zed, f u l l y capi t o-
l i st vi neyar ds. Robert Laurent por t r ays t hot s o r t of p r o t e s t a s L t
t ook pl a c e j u s t a f t e r t heRevol ut i on of 1830:
. . . i n September, t h e announcement of t he resllmption of t he
i nvent or y of wine on t he premi ses of winegrower^ s t a r t e d t urbu- .
l e n t demonst r at i ons, ne a r - r i ot s , i n Beatlne. On t he 12t h of Sep-
tember a t t h e t i me of t he Nat i onal Guard revi ew " c r i e s of anger
a ga i ns t t h e Revenue Admi ni st r at i on [ l a ~ e f g i e ~ r os e from I t s very
r anks. " Told t hot t h e r e s i d e n t s of t he subur bs planned t o go
t o t h e t a x o f f i c e s i n or der t o burn t he r e g i s t e r s a s t hey hod i n
1814, t he mayor t hought i t prudent t h a t eveni ng t o c a l l t he a r t i l -
l e r y company t o arms and convoke p a r t of t he Not i onal Guord f o r
5 o' cl ock t h e next morning. On t he 13t h. toward 8A.H., "a huge
crowd of winegrowers and workers, " shout i ng "down wi t h t he wol ves, "
"down wit11 e xc i s e t axes. " occupi ed t h e c i t y h a l l squar e. To calm
t h e demonst r at or s t h e mayor had t o send t h e Not i onal Guard home a t
once. h he crowd t hen di s per s ed gr adual l y" (I.aurent 1957: I . 484-
485).
Des pi t e t h a t peacef ul di s pe r s i on, t h e a u t h o r i t i e s had t o del oy t he inven-
t or y of wine. I n iqeursault i t was l e s s peacef ul : t he winegrowers dr ove
out t h e t a x men.
What is more, t he ant i - t ax movement connect ed d t r e c t l y t o p o l i t i c a l
movements. The winegrowing a r e a st ood out f o r i t s r epubl i coni sm; t h a t
was e s pe i c a l l y t r u e of t h e hi nt e r l a nds of Di j on and Beaune. A 1 1 t hl ngs
consi der ed, we obser ve a s i gnf i c nnt t r ans br mat i on of t h e r e p e r t o i r e of
c o l l e c t i v e s c t i o n i n Burgundy. As compared wi t h t h e means of nct i on
'
pr e va i l i ng hef or e t h e Revol ut i on, t hos e of t he ni net eent h cent ur y were
1.ess t i e d t o s communal hase. more at t ached t o na t i ona l p o l i t i c s . Assoc-
i a t i o n s , c l ubs , s o c i e t i e s pl ayed an i ncr eas i ng p a r t . Yet t he r e were
i mpor t ant c o n t i n i ~i t i e s : t he s ur vi va l of t h e c ha r va r i , t he food r i o t , t h e
c l a s s i c ant i - t nxr ebe1l . i on; t h e p e r s i s t e n t o r i e n t a t i o n t o t he pr ot e c t i on
of l o c a l I n t e r e s t s ngal ns t t l i e cl ai ms of t he s t a t e and t he market r a t h e r
t han t o t he c r e a t i on of a b e t t e r f ut ur e . The ol d regime r e p e r t o i r e
of c o l l e c t i v e nct i on sur vi ved t l i e Revol ut i on. The forms of nc t i on
t hemsel ves a l t e r e d , adapt ed t o new condi t i ons ; among ot he r t hi ngs , we
not i c e a s o r t o f p o l i t i c i z a t i o n of a l l t h e forms. New forms of c ol l e c -
t i v e a c t i on nr os c; t h e demonst r at i on and t h e s t r i k e became st andar d
evcnt s i n Burgundy. That hundred ye a r s spanni ng t he Revol ut i on was a
per i od of t r ansf or mat i on and of growth of tlie means of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on.
\ &at of t he Revol ut i on' s own pl ace i n t h a t t r ans f or mat i on and growth
of tlie means of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on? The Revol ut i on brouglit an ext r a-
or di nar y l e v c l of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , a p o l i t i c i z a e i o n of a l l i n t e r e s t s
and t hus of al most a l l t h e means of act i on. a c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of power
and t hus of al most a l l t h e means of a c t i on, a c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of power
and t hus of s t r i ~ g g l e s f o r power, a f r enzy of a s s oc i a t i on and t hus of ac-
t i on on t he hns i s of a s s oc i a t i onn, a promotion of t h e condi t i ons f o r
t he development of c a pi t a l i s m and hourgeoi n hegemony and t hus of a moun-
t i n g t h r e a t t o non- c a pi t a l i s t , non-bourgeois i n t e r e s t s . I f t h a t sum-
mary is c o r r e c t , t h e Revol ut i on act ed a s a fundament al s t a g e i n t h e cour se
of a t r s ns f or mat i on f a r l onger and l a r g e r t han t he Revol ut i on i t s e l f .
Li ke t he sevent eent h- ccnt uryconsol i dat i onof t h e na t i ona l s t a t e , t h e
changes of t he Revol ut i on l ed t o n s i g n i f i c a n t a l t e r a t i o n of t he pre-
v a i l i n g modes of popul ar c o l l e c t i v e a c l i on.
The evol ut i on of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on had not ended, however. Although
t h e Di j on winegrowers' demonst r at i ons of t h e 1830s c e r t a i n l y di s pl a y
many more f a mi l i a r f e a t u r e s t han t he r e gi ona l t a x r e b e l l i o n s of t h e
1630s. t hey a l s o show t h e i r age. Nowadays, tlie s ucces s or s of t hose wine-
growers t ypi c a l l y assembl e out s i de t he depar t ment al c a p i t a l . grouped
around pl acar ds and banner s i de nt i f yi ng t h e i r or ga ni z a t i ons and s umnr -
i z i n g t h e i r demands. The c l a s s i c c h a r i v a r i and food r i o t have vani shed,
al ong wi t h s number of ot he r forms of s c t i o n which pe r s i s t e d i n t o t h e
ni net eent h cent ur y. ~ o d a y ' s l ar ge- s cal e a c t i o n s a r e even morc heavi l y
concent r at ed i n Di j on, Beaune and ot her c f t i e s t han t hey were i n t h e
1830s. Labor uni ons and p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s o f t e n appear i n t h e a c t i on.
Although p r i c e s and t a xe s cont i nue t o be f r equent causes f o r compl ai nt .
such e xot i c ques t i ons a s American warmaking i n Vietnam and t h e f u t u r e
of s t ude nt s i n s p o r t s and phys i cal educat i on e xe r c i s e many a crowd. A s
t he world has changed, s o has i t s c o l l e c t i v e nct i on.
APPENDICES
1. Procedures f o r t h e St udi es OF St r i k e s and Col l e c t i ve Vi ol ence i n
France
2. Mnt er i al s from t h e Study of Col l e c t i ve Vi ol ence i n France
3. Procedures f or t h e Study of Cont ent i ous Gat her i ngs i n Gr eat Br i t a i n
4. Mat er i al s from t he Study of Cont ent i ous Gat her i ngs i n Grent Br i t a i n
APPENDIX 1. PROCEDURES FOR THE STUDIES OP STRIKES AND COLLECTI.VE VIO-
LENCE I N FRANCE
I n a n u t s h e l l , t h e s t r a t e g y of t h e French s t udy hds been t o pl ace
p a r t i c u l a r event s i n t i me, space and s o c i a l s e t t i n g , not s o much t o ac-
count f o r any s i n g l e event a s t o d e t e c t how l ar ge- s cal e s o c i a l change
and a l t e r a t i o n s of t he s t r u c t u r e of power a f f e c t e d t h e pa t t e r n of col l ec-
t i v e a c t i on. We de a l s e pa r a t e l y wi t h s t r i k e s and wi t h v i o l e n t event s ,
al t hough v i o l e n t s t r i k e s appear i n bot h hal ves of t h e a na l ys i s . St r i k e s
r e pr e s e nt a f r equent , i mpor t ant , well-documented and us ual l y nonvi ol ent
form of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on. Vi ol ent event s tend t o be better-documented
t han t h e i r nonvi ol ent c ount e r pa r t s , and t he r e f or e s e r ve a s a bi ased but
us e f ul t r a c e r of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on i n gener al .
The s t u d i e s ' w i n components a r e :
1. The enumerat i on and de s c r i pt i on of ever y s t r i k e f o r which we
coul d gat her a st andar d body of i n f o r mt i o n from 1830 t o 1968,
f o r a t o t a l of appr oxi mat el y 110, 000 s t r i k e s ; t h e most de t ni l e d
a n a l y s i s concent r at ed on t he 36,000 s t r i k e s r epor t ed i n t he
St a t i a t i q u e de s ~ r h e s from 1890 t hrough 1935.
2. The enumerat i on and de s c r i pt i on of every v i o l e n t event meet i ng
c e r t a i n s t andar ds , t o be di s cus s ed i n a moment, from 1830 through
1960; our anal ys es de a l wi t h roughl y 2, 000 v i o l e n t event s .
3. Indexi ng of change i n s o c i a l or gani zat i on i n France a s a whole
and i n i t s geogr aphi c s ubdi vi s i ons -- communes, ar r ondi ssement s
and. e s pe c i a l l y. t he 85 t o 95 depar t ment s -- over t h e per i od
1830 t o 1960.
4 . Assembling of ( f ur l e s s complete. f a r more t e nt a t i ve ) i n f o r m-
t i on on p o l i t i c a l s t r uc t i l r e and a c t i v i t y f o r Fr ance us a whole
and f o r some t i mes and pl aces wi t hi n i t from 1830 t o 1960.
5. Use of a l l t hr e e t ypes of evi dence i n t he a n a l y s i s of v a r i a t i o n s
i n t he form,' i n t e n s i t y , l ocus , s o c i a l composi t i on and pr eci pi -
' t a t i n g c ondi t i ons of s t r i k e s and v i o l e n t event s ; t h e a n a l y s i s
s t r e s s e s t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of long-run s h i f t s i n t he pa t t e r n
of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i on, and t h e v e r i f i c a t i o n o r f a l s i f i c a t i o n of
a l t e r n a t i v e t he or i e s concer ni ng t h e e f f e c t s of l ar ge- f i cal e soc-
i a l change on collective^ a c t i on.
A compreliensive r e por t of t he s t r i k e s t u d i e s appear s i n St r i k e s i n France,
I
1830-1968. by Edward Shor t er and Char l es Ti l l y . The most gener al sum-
mary of t he s t u d i e s of French c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence i s chapt er two of -
Rebel l i ous Cent ury, by Char l es Ti l l y , Loui se Ti l l y and Ri chard Ti l l y .
I
The Rebel l i ous Century a l s o summarizes our s t u d i e s of I t a l y and Germany.
-
1
For more d e t a i l on t h e French, German and I t a l i a n f i ndi ngs , c ons ul t t he
I
r e p o r t s l i s t e d i n t he bi bl i ogr aphy. Because St r i k e s i n France c ont a i ns
I
an e xt e ns i ve di s cus s i on of s our ces and pro, cedures, whi l e The Rebel l i ous
I
I
I
Cent ur y s u m r i z e s them r a t h e r qui ckl y, t h e f ol l owi ng di s cus s i on wi l l
f ocus on t he a n a l y s i s of c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence r a t he r t han s t r i k e s .
of p o l i t i c a l yearbooks, l i k e t h e & pol i t i que ; d) l ong s e r l c s OF French
newspapers, not abl y t h e Honi t eur uni ver s el . & Co n s t i t ~ ~ t i o n n e l . Lo Gazet t e
de s Tribunaux, t he J our nal des De'bats. Le Temps and Le Monde; e) r e gul a r
--
secondary s our ces , i ncl udi ng r egi onal l ear ned and a nt i qua r i a n j our nnl s .
We work l a r g e l y from mi crofi l med copi es of t he s e s our ces .
Ther e a r e f our over l appi ng samples of event s under cons i der at i on
The f i r s t i ncl udes each s t r i k e r epor t ed i n t he S t a t i s t i q u e des ~ r h v e s ,
t h e S t a t i s t i q u e annuel l e, t h e Revue f r a npa i s e de Tr a va i l , t h e As s ocl ot i ons
pr of e s s i onne l l e s ouvr i a r e s and s e ve r a l ot he r publ i cat i ons t n any year
from 1830 t o 1960. The second c o n s i s t s of a hnphazard c o l l e c t i o n of con-
f l i c t s and s hor t per i ods on which we happen t o have except i onal l y d e t a i l -
ed evi dence, evi dence per mi t t i ng c a r e f u l st udy of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s and
of t he sequence of a c t i on: The June Days of 1848, t h e r c s i s t nnc e t o Loui s
Napoleon' s 1851 coup d ' e t a t . and a number of ot he r s . The t h i r d -- our
"gener al sample" -- c ont a i ns every event meet i ng c e r t a i n minimum c r i t e r i a
( t o be di s cus s ed i n a moment) which t r a i ne d r ender s encount ered i n scan-
ni ng newspapers cont i nuous l y, day by day, over each year from 1830 through
Although i n p r i n c i p l e our work coul d be done i n o t h e r ways, we have
r e l i e d heavi l y on high-speed d i g i t a l computers of t a bul a t i on and quan-
t i t a t i v e a na l ys i s . The codebooks mentioned her e, f o r example, a r e es-
s e n t i a l l y s e t s of i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r t h e pr epar at i on of comparable punched
c s r d s from t h e row de s c r i pt i ons of v i o l e n t event s encount ered
i n a r c hj va l documents, newspapers and p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r i e s .
The bas i c da t a f or t he s t udy, i ndeed, come from a ) documents i n
French ar chi ves , mai nl y r e p o r t s on c o l l e c t i v e c o n f l i c t s and government
r esponses t o them; b) publ i shed s e r i e s of governmental r e p o r t s and s t a -
t i s t i c s concer ni ng t h e admi ni s t r at i on of j u s t i c e , popul at i on censuses,
s t r i k e s , s p e c i a l i n q u i r i e s , l a bor or gs ni z a t i on, and s o on; c) l ong s e r i e s
1860, t hr e e randomly-chosen months per year from 1861 t o 1929, and each
year from 1930 t hrough 1960; t he r e were two d i f f e r e n t newspnpers f or each
day i n most year s, t hr e e newspapers i n a few c a s e s of f a u l t y coverage.
The f our t h -- our "i nt ens i ve sample" -- is composed of ever y event i n
t he gener al sample est i mat ed t o i nvol ve a t l e a s t 1.,000 person-days (1.000
peopl e f or one day. o r 500 f or two days, o r 700 on t he f i r s t pl.us 300
on t h e second. and s o on) , pl us ever y t e nt h event of a l l t h e r e s t . The
gener al sample has about 2.000 i nc i de nt s i n i t , t he i nt e ns i ve sample d-
bout 400.
The a c t ua l de s c r i pt i on of t he i nc i de nt s i n t he two samples comes
not onl y from t he newspaper account s, but a l s o from t he nr cl l i val mt e r i -
a l s , h i s t o r i c a l works and o t h e r s our ces enumerated e a r l i e r . The i nt en-
s i v e sample r e c e i ve s e xt e ns i ve v e r i f i c a t i o n and ver y d e t a i l e d codi ng,
t he gener al sample a l e s s i nt e ns i ve t r eat ment . The s ys t emat i c, and l ar ge-
l y qua nl i t nt i ve , a n a l y s i s of t he s e coded account s de a l wi t h -
1. t h e i n t e n s i t y , form, p a r t i c i p a n t s , and geographi c i nci dence o f
vi ol e nt event s f o r each major per i od under st udy;
2. t he r e l a t i ons hi p between t he s e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of c o l l e c t i v e
vi ol ence and t h e na t ur e of s o c i a l changes occur r i ng i n t h e i r
s e t t i n g s ;
3. covar i ot l on of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of i ndi vi dual event s , i ncl udi ng
t he i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of common pr e c i pi t a nt s , s t andar d sequences
of event s , r e gul a r outcomes;
4 . connect i ons between t h e c ha r a c t e r of i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t and
t h e pa t t e r n of c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence i n an a r e a and/ or per i od;
5. changes of t hes e pa t t e r ns over time.
Obvlouuly, t hes e anal ys es use st andar d i ndexes of var i ous s o c i a l changes
by a r e a and year a s wel l a s t he coded account s of v i o l e n t event s.
SOME MATTERS OF DEFINITION*
The s t udy of France a l s o r e l i c s f or i nt er nal . cons i s t ency on n s e t
of s t andar d d e f i n i t i o n s . The c r u c i a l one i d e n t i f i e s t he "vi ol ent event . "
Without def endi ng i t , I s h a l l have t o pr es ent t h a t d e f i n i t i o n and t h e
r u l e s of thumb we have devel oped f o r its a ppl i c a t i on. Anyone who has
a l r e a dy worked wi t h de s c r i pt i ons oC c o l l e c t i v e c o n f l l c t s wi l l qui ckl y
n o t i c e two t hi ngs about t he s e r u l e s of thumb. F i r s t , t hey form t he b r i d s e
between on a b s t r a c t d e f i n i t i o n and a p a r t i c u l a r per i od and pl ace: o t h e r
per i ods and d i f f e r e n t pl aces would no doubt r e q u l r e somewhat d i f f e r e n t
br i dges . Second, even i n t h e c a s e of France t he r u l e s of thumb Lcave o
good de a l of room f o r judgment and a cons i der abl e number of ambiguous
c a s e s . I onl y cl ai m t h a t t hes e c r i t e r i a i n most c a s e s permi t n f n l r l y
f i n det er mi nat i on of whet her a p a r t i c u l a r s e t o f event s makesup a "vio-
l e n t event " on t he b a s i s of i nf or mat i on one has e a r l y i n t he game.
*I have cr i bbed most o f t h e f ol l owi ng s e c t i on from t he i nt r oduct i on t o
t he i nt e ns i ve sample codebook, which i n t ur n drew hcnvi1.y from s t a f f memo-
randa by Lut z Berkner and Char l es Ti l l y .
Here is t he gener al d e f i n i t i o n :
A "vi ol ent event " i s an i ns t a nc e of mutual and c o l l e c t i v e coer ci on
wi t hi n an aut onomous ' pol i t i cal syst em which s e i z e s o r phys i cal l y damages
per s ons o r obj e c t s .
Col l e c t i ve Coercion
One formnt l on of a t l e a s t 50 per sons must be pr es ent , r epr es ent i ng
e i t h e r t he f or c e s of r e be l l i on o r t h e f or c e s of r epr es s i on. Thi s has
been done mai nl y a s a p r a c t i c a l measure, s i n c e we f e e l t ha t l a r g e r groups
a r c more l i k e l y t o be r epor t ed and r e l e va nt i nf or mat i on is more r e a di l y
a v a i t a b l e on them i n t he s our ces . -
However, f or over hal f of our i nc i de nt s , no exact o r approxi mat e
number of pa r t i c i pnnt s is r epor t ed. We have deci ded t o adopt a List of
words which a r e o f t e n used t o de s c r i be t he i nc i de nt s , and we a r e t ent a-
t l v e l y assc~mi ng t h a t t hey mean t he i nvol vement of a l a r g e group of peo-
pl e , i . e . , over 50.
mr~l.tLtude r i v o l t e
rasscmblemen t r e be l l i on
/
reuni on i ns ur r e c t i on
Eoule L e u t e
nt t roupement 6 c h a u f f o u r ~c
t r oupe bngar r e
t umul t e
t r oubl e
I f an i nci dent meet s t h e c r i t e r i a of damage o r vi ol ence (below)
and no number of p a r t i c i p a n t s is gi ven, we i ncl ude i t i n t he sample i f
i t i s des cr i bed by one of t hes e t erms. Thi s does not mean t h a t t he s e
a r e t he onl y t erms which coul d be used ( e. g. . i nc i de nt , mani f es t at i on,
a g i t a t i o n , s e d i t i o n , r i xe , boul eversement , f &e) , but t h e ones we have
chosen imply t he p a r t i c i p a t i o n of a r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e group of peopl e.
We a r e usi ng t he s e t erms t o det er mi ne t he e xt e nt of vi ol ence, but
onl y a s an i ndi c a t or of pa r t i c i pa t i on.
Adj ect i ves of s i z e used wi t h t he s e words a r e i mpor t ant .
Thus. any
a d j e c t i v e s ugges t i ng a l a r g e s i z e (reassembl emcnt s nombreux, r oul c i m-
mense) means i t i s i ncl uded. Di mi nut i ves ( p e t i t e f oul e , e t c . ) keep t he
i nc i de nt out of t he sample.
Thi s excl udes any i ndependent v i o l e n t a c t i v i t y undert aken by an
i ndi vi dua l o r a s mal l group of i ndi vi dua l s . Thus we do not i ncl nde as s as -
s i n a t i o n s , murders, t h e f t s , o r ot he r cr i mes, c o mj t t e d by l e s s tlinn 50
peopl e ( or a group def i ned by ot he r t han one of our c o l l e c t i v e t er ms) .
However, we i ncl ude vi ol ence by a group on t he per i pher y of a l a r ge r dem-
ons t r a t i on. Thi s a l s o excl udes a c t i on by unknown per sons such ns snbo-
t age, bombs, o r f i r e s . We t ake t he s e i n t o account , but t hey a r e not t o
be i ncl uded i n t he ba s i c sample.
Mutual
Thi s means t hnt t he r e must be a t l e a s t two a nt a goni s t i c f or mat i ons
i nvol ved. However, one m y be jnvolved by t he proxy of i t s pr oper t y o r
symbols. We i ncl ude any oppos i t i on t o t h e symbols o r r e pr e s e nt nt i vc s
of a ut hor i t y o r anot her group. Vi ol ence must be di r e c t e d a t someone e l s e ;
t hus, workers a t t a c ki ng a newspaper o f f i c e a r e i ncl uded, whi l e formers
des t r oyi ng t h e i r own produce i n p r o t e s t t o government farm p o l i c i e s a r e
not .
Sei zur e o r ~ h y s i c i l ~ ~ a m a g e of Persons o r Obj ect s
Any dead o r wounded mnke t he i nc i de nt qual i cy. The major problem
c a s e s i nvol ve r e s i s t a nc e t o pol i c e when i t is not c l e a r whet her anyone
was h u r t , e. g. , s t ones thrown a t t r oops o r mounted gendarmes surrounded
A-8
by a mob. Sei zur e of per sons o r obj e c t s wi t hout phys i cal i nj ur y i s a l s o
a problem. I n gener al , i f per sons o r obj e c t s a r e s ei zed over r e s i s t a nc e ,
t h a t i s enough. I f t he s e i z i n g group f i g h t s of f anot her group o r br eaks
t hrough a phys i cal b a r r i e r of some s o r t , r e s i s t a nc e has occur r ed.
We f ncl ude any damage done by one group t o someone e l s e ' s pr oper t y
by a t t a c ki ng o r s e i z i n g c ont r ol of i t . Besi des s i g n i f i c a n t de s t r uc t i on
t h i a i ncl udes broken windows o r symbol i c minor damage. It does not i n-
cl.ude damage t o one' s own pr oper t y ( f ar mer s des t r oyi ng own cr ops , mer-
chant s burni ng t h e i r own r ecor ds i n p r o t e s t ) and i t must be done by a
group -- which excl udes sabot age, f i r e s , bombings of unknown or i gi ns .
Sei zur e of obj e c t s i ncl udes "t axat i on popul ai r e" -- t h e f o r c i b l e s e i z u r e
of gr a i n o r ot he r f oods t uf f s , Eollowed by t h e i r publ i c s a l e a t a pro-
cl ai med " j us t pr i ce. " It a l s o i ncl udes non- vi ol ent occupat i on of bui l d-
i ngs such a s sit-down s t r i k e s . I n or der t o handl e t he huge number of
si t -downs i n 1936. 1937, and 1938, we have grouped them i n t o departmen-
t a l summaries f o r each month.
These c r i t e r i a c l e a r l y excl ude any l a r g e p o l i t i c a l gat her i ngs t h a t
do not end i n vi ol ence o r crowds which shout t h r e a t s of vi ol ence but
t ake no a c t i on.
Wi t hi n an Autonomous P o l i t i c a l System
Thi s segment of t h e d e f i n i t i o n excl udes war and bor der i nc i de nt s .
It a l s o excl udes any vi ol ence wi t hi n a cl os ed i n s t i t u t i o n out s i de t h e
gener al p o l i t i c a l s pher e such a s pr i s ons , asylums and hos pi t a l s . I f t hey
br eak out of t he s e i n s t i t u t i o n s , however, t hey must be i ncl uded. We i n-
cl ude army mut i ni es s i n c e t h e members of t he armed f or c e s a r e p a r t of
t he p o l i t i c a l community.
Boundari es of Vi ol ent Event s
When one of t he a c t i o n s j u s t di s cus s ed has occur r ed, we must s e t
some l i m i t s i n t i me, space and per sonnel on t h e event s t o be recorded
I
A- 9
i
and anal i zed. When two o r more such a c t i o n s occur , we must a l s o deci de
whet her t hey a r e p a r t s of t h e "same" event , o r r e l a t e d ones. An evcnt bc-
g i n s when a t l e a s t two of t h e f or mat i ons t aki ng p a r t i n t h e vi ol e nt a c t i on
begi n a cont i nuous i n t e r a c t i o n and ends when t h e l a s t two f or mat i ons end
t h e i r cont i nuous i nt e r a c t i on. It occupi es a l l t he space i n which a spec-
t a t o r coul d d i r e c t l y obser ve t h e i n t e r a c t i o n wi t hout be ne f i t of mechani cal
devi ces . The p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e a l l per sons who perform t he c r u c j a l a c t i on( s ) .
a l l per sons who i n t e r a c t wi t h them d i r e c t l y i n t h e cour s e of t hnt a c t i o n ,
pl us a l l per sons a c t i n g c o l l e c t i v e l y wi t h members of e i t h e r of t he F i r s t
two c a t e gor i e s i n t h e st r eam of a c t i v i t y i ncl udi ng t h e c r u c i a l a c t i on( s ) .
Fi na l l y, s e t s of p a r t i c i p a n t s f a l l i n t o s e pa r a t e f or mat i ons t o t he e xt e nt
I
t h a t t hey a c t c o l l e c t i v e l y , communicate i n t e r n a l l y , oppose ot he r sets of
p a r t i c i p a n t s and ar e. gi ven d i s t i n c t i d e n t i t i e s by obser ver s. Where we do
not have enough i nf or mat i on t o appl y t heue def i ni t l . ons wi t h any r i g o r --
which is o f t e n -- we accept t h e convent i onal obs er ver ' s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of
a c t o r s , s t a g e and a c t i on.
When two v i o l e n t a c t i o n s occur on t h e same day o r cons ecut i ve days,
i n t h e same commune o r a dj a c e nt ones ( i n Pa r i s . Lyon o r Mar s ei l l e: t h e
same q u a r t e r or adj acent ones) and t h e r e is a r eas onabl e presumpt i on of an
"
over l ap of per s onnel equal t o t e n per cent o r more of t he p a r t i c i p a n t s i n
t h e s ma l l e r . a c t i on, bot h a c t i ons count a s p a r t of t he same di s t ur bance,
and a l l of t he i nt er veni ng t i me bel ongs t o t he event . Three o r more vi o-
l e n t a c t i o n s wi t h such connect i ons may compound i n t o event s cover i ng
l onger per i ods and l a r g e r t e r r i t o r i e s . Two event s a r e d i s t i n c t hut l i nked
when t hey occur i n t he same o r consecut i ve months, and meet any of t he s e
condi t i ons : a ) concer t ed a c t i o n of a t l e a s t one f or mat i on i n one event
wi t h a t l e a s t one f or mat i on i n t h e ot he r ; b) s t r ong evi dence of over l ap i n
per sonnel ; c ) s t r ong evi dence of t he pr ovi s i on of ma t e r i a l a s s i s t a nc e by
t he p a r t i c i p a n t s i n one event t o t he p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t he ot he r : d) ove r t
i mi t a t i on of t he a c t i on of one event by a format i on i n anot her ; e ) ove r t
r esponse a s i ndi cat ed by demands. s l ogans o r r i t u a l a c t s . Three o r more
event s may be l i nked i n t h i s way.
I n sllmmary, t h e pr ocedur e comes t o t h i s :
1. Scan t h e s our ces f o r v i o l e n t oc t i ons .
2. llaving l ocat ed a vi ol e nt a c t i on, det er mi ne whet her t h e event of
which i t i s a p a r t meet s t h e d e f i n i t i o n of "vi ol ent event . "
3. I f i t does, s e t its boundar i es i n space, t i me and per sonnel .
4. I de nt i f y t he f or mat i ons t aki ng p a r t i n t he event .
5. Determine whet her i t i s l i nked t o any ot he r event .
6. Code.
The di agram a t t he end of t h i s s e c t i on r e pr e s e nt s t h e whole compl i cst -
ed pr ocedur e.
A. VIOLENCE
1. one dead
2. one wounded
3. any damage t o o b j e c t s
4. s e i z u r e of c o n t r o l of o b j e c t s
8. COLLECTIVE
1. st l e a s t 50 per sons i n one format i on ( d i r e c t evi dence t hrough
numbers of p a r t i c i p a n t s wounded o r a r r e s t e d )
2. i n d i r e c t evi dence of a l a r g e group t hrough t h e us e of o c ol l e c -
t i v e t ermi nol ogy:
mul t i t ude r/ evol t e dgsor dr e
rassemblement r e he l l i on t r oubl e
r euni on (meu t e
f oul e kchauff our'ee
at t r oupement bs gs r r e
t r oupe t umul t e
i ns ur r e c t i on
C. MUTUAL
1. two f or mat i ons i n c o n f l i c t
2. a f or mat i on ve r s us an i ndi vi dual
3. a f or mat i on ver s us obj e c t s o r symbols r e pr e s e nt i ng anot her group
D. EXCLUDE:
sabot age, bombings, f i r e s s e t by unknown per sons
a s s a s s i na t i ons , murders, cr i mi nal a c t i v i t i e s by i ndi vi dua l s
l a r g e ga t he r i ngs where no vi ol ence br eaks out even i f t hey t hr e a t e n
vi ol ence
r e be l l i ons wi t hi n cl os ed i n s t i t u t i o n s : pr i s ons , hos pi t a l s , asylums
symbol i c damage t o one' s own pr oper t y
E. BOUNDARIES:
1. Begins wi t h cont i nuous i n t e r a c t i o n of st l e a s t two f or mat i ons.
2. Ends wi t h t er mi nat i on of cont i nuous i n t e r a c t i o n of l e s t two f or -
mat i ons.
3. Occupi es space wi t hi n which s pe c t a t or coul d obser ve i n t e r a c t i o n
d i r e c t l y .
4. Pa r t i c i pa nt s : per f or mer s of v i o l e n t a c t s , ot he r s i n t e r a c t i n g di -
r e c t l y wi t h them, pl us o t h e r s a c t i n g c o l l e c t i v e l y wi t h e i t h e r of
t he f i r s t two groups: t hey a r e di vi ded i n t o f or mat i ons.
F. MULTIPLE VIOLENT ACTIONS FORNING SINGLE EVENT
1. Same day o r consecut i ve days.
2. Same commune o r adj acent communes ( i n Pa r i s , Lyon. Mar s ei l l e,
same qua r t e r or adj acent qua r t e r s ) .
3. Overl ap i n per sonnel of t en per cent o r more of t he p a r t i c i p a n t s
i n t h e s mal l er a c t i on.
G. DISTINCT BUT LINKED EVENTS:
1. Same month o r cons ecut i ve months.
2. Concert ed a c t i on of f or mat i ons.
OR
3. Overl ap i n per sonnel .
OR
4. Pr ovi s i on of ma t e r i a l a s s i s t a nc e .
Thi s whole syst em of d e f i n i t i o n s and pr ocedur es works wel l enough
where t h e r e a r e good (and f a i r l y uniform) account s of many p o l i t i c a l di n-
t ur bancea, and where t h e r e is an i d e n t i f i a b l e "autonomot~s p o l i t i c a l system"
wi t h a s i n g l e c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y t endi ng t o monopolize l e g i t i ma t e c ont r ol
over means of c o l l e c t i v e coer ci on. I n France i t s e l f , i t wenkens dur i ng
l ong i nt er r egna l i k e t h e Occupation and t h e Res i s t ance of World Wnr 11.
I n I t a l y and Germany, t h e per i ods bef or e uni f i c a t i on pr es ent s e r i ous prob-
lems. The whole syst em would probabl y have t o be r e c a s t t o handl e such
c a s e s a s ZaYre ( f or mer l y t h e Bel gi an Congo) a f t e r 1960, t h e United St a t e s
from 1860 t o 1865 o r west er n Europe i t s e l f bef or e t h e 17t h cent ur y. The
scheme a l s o has two q u i t e i n t e n t i o n a l f e a t u r e s which s u i t i t wel l f o r t he
ki nd of a n a l y s i s we have under t aken, but might u n f i t i t f or some ot he r s o r t s
of i nqui r y: 1 ) i t i gnor es t h e p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t s of t h e event , gi vi ng no
s p e c i a l wei ght , f o r example, t o t he r e be l l i on wliicli t oppl es a regime; 2)
al t hough t h e c r i t e r i o n of "vi ol ence" is a f n i r l y generous one, t he scheme
bypasses i ns t a nc e s of nonvi ol ent coer ci on unl es s t hey o r e coupl ed wi t h
vi ol ence. Nei t her a pal ace r evol ut i on nor an u n f u l f i l l e d t h r e a t of m a s
r i o t i n g is l i k e l y t o qunl i f y a s a v i o l e n t event under its restrictions.
These a r e c o s t s we hove accept ed because of t he advant sges of economy and
pr eci s i on t hey br i ng; f or ot he r i nve s t i ga t or s and ot he r purposes, t hey may
be c o s t s t oo g r e a t t o bear .
OR
5. Overt i mi t at i on.
OR
6. Overt r esponse by demands, s l ogans . r i t u a l a c t s .
A-13a
SAMPLE SELECTION PROCEDURE
I
i
DISCARD
War, b o r d e r
AUTONOMOUS f i g h t R e s i s t a n c e
POLITICAL - to o c c u p y i n g -
'
SYSTEM? f o r c e , i n s i d e
t ot a l
i n s t i t u t i o n
COLLECTIVE? (=AT LEAST SO IN ONE
FORMATION, PER ACTUAL NUMBERS
OR WORD LIST)
n o .
- 1% II)NY
no
T
ANY SIGNIFICANT DESTRUCTION
OR SEIZURE OF OBJECTS?
Ye s
I
SUBSAMPLE
IN INTENSIVE
SUBSAMPLE
I-
SEARCH, FOR ADDITIONAL
DATA IN ARCHIVES, PUB-
LISHED SOURCES
APPENDIX 2. MATER1AI.S FROM VIE STUDY OF COI.I.ECT1VE VIO1,ENCE 1.N FRANCE
The ma t e r i a l f ol l ows a s i n g l e r e l a t i v e l y well-documented event from
n a r r a t i v e account t hrough codi ng and t r a n s c r i p t i o n i n mncl ~l ne-readabl e form
t o i t s i nt e gr a t i on i n t o a q u a n t i t a t i v e a na l ys i s . For es t i nvas i ons of t h i s
s o r t ( al t hough not t h i s s c a l e ) were f r equent event s i n t h e Pyrenees from
t h e l a t e 1820' s t hrough t h e Revol ut i on of 1848. The For es t Code enact ed
by t h e French government i n 1828 c u r t a i l e d common r i g h t s t o gl ean, gr a z e
and ga t he r fi rewood, i n f avor of t h e cons ol i dat i on of bour geoi s pr oper t y
i n woodlands. Poor peopl e of t h e mount ai ns. cl ~nl l enged t h e Code Eor twen-
t y- f i ve year s , e s pe c i a l l y a t moments when t h e government weakened, a s i n
t h e r e vol ut i ons of 1830 and 1848. The c o n f l i c t of l a Bsrousse t ook pl ace
j u s t one month a f t e r t h e February Revol ot i on of 1848.
When I devel oped t h e pr ocedur es f or sampl i ng and codi ng v i o l e n t event s
i n t h e mid-19601s, I used t h e word " p o l i t i c a l di s t ur bance" t o de s c r i be t h e
event s under st udy. As I worked wi t h t he ma t e r i a l , I r e a l i z e d t l i e phr ase
cont ai ned an u n j u s t i f i e d presumpt i on and a mi sl eadi ng metaphor. Si nce
we enumerate event s on t he b a s i s of s i z e and t h e pr esence of vi ol ence r e-
ga r dl e s s of p o l i t i c a l cont ext o r cont ent , t h e word " pol i t i c a l " presumes
what is t o be proven: t h a t t h e bul k of c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence does, i ndeed.
grow out of p o l i t i c a l processes. , The word "di st urbance" i mpl i es malfunc-
t i o n , abnor mal i t y, a br eak wi t h ord' i nary l i f e which our anal ys es of t l i e
evi dence ge ne r a l l y c ont r a di c t . I now pr e f e r t h e c o l o r l e s s "vi ol ent event".
"vi ol ent i nci dent " o r even " c ol l e c t i ve a c t i o n produci ng vi ol ence. " Ilowever.
t he ol der vocsbul ar y pervades our mat er i al ; i t would be dl s l ~one s t t o ex-
punge i t .
The v i o l e n t event s s t udi ed i n France i ncl uded ever y one meet i ng our
c r i t e r i a (some damage o r s e i z u r e of per sons o r obj e c t s , a t l e a s t one form-
a t i o n of f i f t y per sons o r more, a t l e a s t one format i on non-mi l i ory) we
encount ered i n r eadi ng two d a i l y na t i ona l newspapers f o r each day from
1830 t hr ougl ~ 1860 and 1930 t hrough 1960, pl us t hr e e randoml y-sel ect ed
months per year from 1861 t hrough 1929. The Gener al Sample i ncl udes a l l
I
t hose event s . The I nt e ns i ve Sample, f o r t he per i ods 1830-60 and 1930-60
I
onl y, i ncl udes a l l event s we es t i mat ed t o i nvol ve a t l e a s t 1, 000 person-
days p111s a s ys t emat i c t en per cent of t he remai ni ng event s . The informa-
,
t i o n coded comes from t h e newspaper account s , from h i s t o r i c a l works, from
p o l i t i c a l yearbooks and from French a r c h i v a l documents.
The i t ems i n t h i s s e t i ncl ude:
1. Excer pt s from r e p o r t s of a c o n f l i c t between t r oops and "i nvader s of
f or e s t s " i n l o Barousse, March 1848.
2. Repor t s on P o l i t i c a l Di st ur bance used f o r a bs t r a c t i ng from newspapers,
a r c hi va l documents and secondary s our ces and a s a cover s he e t f o r photo-
I
copi es of excer pt s from t hose s our ces .
1.
3. Excerpt from t he I nt e ns i ve Sample Codehook used i n codi ng t h e event i n
l a Barousse. !
4. Excer pt s from t he coded ver s i on. of t h e event , i ncl udi ng t he compl et e
s e t of coder ' s comments.
5. Segments of computer pr i nt out i ncl udi ng a p a r t i a l l i s t i n g of t he card-
image ve r s i on of t he I nt e ns i ve Sample codi ng.
6. Segment of computer pr i nt out i ncl udi ng s compl et e 1 i s t i n g . o f t he OSIRIS
ver s i on of t he I nt e ns i ve Sample codi ng.
7. Machine ver s i on of Tabl e 15 from Char l es Ti l l y , "How Pr ot e s t Modernized
i n France" i n 1.lilliom Aydel ot t e, Al l an Bogue and Robert Fogel , e ds . , The
Dimensions f Qua nt i t a t i ve Research i n Hi s t or y ( Pr i ncet on: Pr i ncet on Uni-
v e r s i t y Pr e s s , 1972).
8. Tabl e 6 from Char l es Ti l l y , "The Chaos of t he Li vi ng c i t y " i n Chnr l es
Ti l l y , ed. , An Urban IJorld (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown. 1974).
9. Graph r epr es ent i ng a f i ve- year moving aver age of our e s t i ma t e s of t o t a l
p a r t i c i p a n t s i n French c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence, 1830-1960.
EXCERPTS FROM REPORTS ON EVENT 848 02 29 0 1
" Le t t e r s from Saint-Caudens wr i t t e n t h e 4t h of Marc11 nnnounce t l l s t
or der has been r e s t or e d . . . The band of l o o t e r s cons i s t ed of al most
2,000 peopl e; a t t h e approach of t he l i n e t r oops and t h e Nat i onal Guard
t hey r e t r e a t e d toward t he mountains of l a Barousse; but havi ng a r r i ve d i n
t he d e f i l e s , t hey resumed t h e of f ens i ve. The f r ont r anks, nrmed wi t h
guns, f i r e d ; t h e t r oops r e p l i e d and rushed toward t h e i r enemy wi t h br aver y.
The e vi l doe r s t hen escaped i n ever y d i r e c t i o n ocr os s t h e rough mountain
t e r r a i n , and i t was i mpossi bl e t o f ol l ow them. It appear s t h a t many of
them were s hot a s t hey t r i e d t o e n t e r coves i n t he mount ai nsi des . . . "
(Le ~ i 2 c l e . 11March 1848).
"The t r oubl e s which broke out i n t he vol l e y of In Borousse were
s t a r t e d by i l l e g a l us e r s of t he f o r e s t . A l a r u e number of i nha bi t a nt s of
t h a t va l l e y went t o t h e Cuard Gener al of t h e For e s t s , who was assi gned t o
execut e t he war r ant s i s s ued a ga i ns t them and burned a l l h i s paper s whi l e
he was gone. Thence t hey went t o t he o f f i c e of t h e Col l e c t or s f o r Na-
t i o n a l Lands, where t hey l i kewi s e dest r oyed a l l t he r e g i s t e r s and f or ced
t he o f f i c e r s t o pay a c e r t a i n sum of money a s r e ps r nt j on f o r t he l a t e s t
f i n e s t h e o f f i c e r s had c ol l e c t e d. Fi nnl l y t he same peopl e di d some damage
t o t he chat eau of Lusson, bel ongi ng t o M. Coul nrd, t he ex-deputy of
A-17
~ a ~ n a r e s , who has been di s put i ng t he ownership bf c e r t a i n f o r e s t s wi t h
t he communes i n t he va l l e y. We l e a r n t h a t a Eai r l y l a r g e number of t r ou-
blemakers have been a r r e s t e d and have a r r i ve d a t Bagnbres." (Le Moni t eur,
10 March 1848)
"A band of about 1, 000, most of them armed, or gani zed i n t he Hautes-
~ ~ r e / n i e s , . , During t he ni ght of 2-3 March, t h a t horde invaded t h e can-
t ons oE Sai nt - Ber t r and and s a i n t - ~ b s t i n t h e ar r ondi ssement of Saf nt -
Caudens (Haute-Garonne), pi l l a ge d t he chat eau of M. Coul nrd, t h e former
deput y, a t Lassan, and t h a t of t he Duke of Rovigo a t Barbazon, and f i n a l l y
c ol l e c t e d a ki nd of t r i b u t e from a few wel l -t o-do landowners i n t he same
a r e a . The Nat i onal Cuard of va r i ous communes j oi ned wi t h l i n e t r oops
s e n t from Toul ouse and Tarbes t o r e s t o r e or der . The det achment s s e nt a f -
t e r t l i e mi scr ennt s found them. We o r e t ol d t h a t 25 were t aken pr i s one r ,
3 k i l l e d and 6 o r 7 wounded." (Archi ves Nat i onal es BB 18 1461. r e por t of
pr ocur eur gbn&r nl , cour d' Appel , Toul ouse, 4 March 1848)
"The change of regime occasi oned f a i r l y s e r i ous di s or de r s i n t he
arrondi ssement of Saint-Caudens. A bond of peas ant s from t he mountains
of l a Rarousse (~aut es-I' vr6n6es) spr ead t hrough t he l owl ands i n hopes t h a t
tlie f a l l of t he monarchy might caune an economic over t ur n which coul d
har dl y f a i l t o be p r o f i t a b l e t o them. On t he 2d of March, t h e coach from
~ a ~ n d r e s - d e - ~ u c h o n wos robbed between Ber t r an and Bagi ry, and t he news
soon spr ead t h a t 1, 500 o r 1, 800 peas ant s armed wi t h c l ubs , pi t c hf or ks ,
pi cks and hunt i ng r i f l e s were pi l l a gi ng t l i e houses and c a s t l e s of t he
a r e a , ond hol dj ng t h e i r i nha bi t a nt s f o r ransom . . . " (Antonin cayrG,
"Des j ourn6es de f b v r i e r aux journ' ees du j ui n, " i n J a c q u ~ s Godechot, ed. ,
La ~ Qv o l u t i o n d e 1848 $ Toul ouse e t dons l a Haute-Caronne (Toulouse, 1948).
-
(The f u l l e s t account , however, appear s i n Loui s Cl ar enc, "Les t r oubl e s de
l a Rarousse cn 1848," Annales du Midi 65 (1951), 329-348.)
---
REPORT ON POLITICAL DISTURBANCE (4-65)
1. T i t l e 2. No. 3. Recorder
8. Pr e c i p i t a t i n g Event s
4. Dat e 5. Source .
9. Des cr i pt i on
6. Locat i on
10. Obj ect i veu : D r l o n e ~ b s e r v e r ' s i nf er ence LI, ---. expl i ci t
7. Antecedents/Presumed Or i gi ns
11. Ca s ua l t i e s
12. Pr oper t y Damage 13. Dur at i on
14. Pa r t i c i p a n t s
15. Repr essi ve For ces
16. Linkage wi t h Ot her Di st ur bances 17. Consequences
I
18. Ref er ences
L-=ey Notes on back
/-:-/
Addi t i onal Sheet s Deal i ng wi t h t h i s Di st ur bonce
[ . - --I /
Fur t her I nf or mat i on on Cont i nuat i on Sheet
A-19
Cards 31-39: FORHATION BACKGROUND
A NOTE ON FORHATIONS
Some v i o l e n t a c t i on ( k i l l i n g o r wounding of per sons, damage o r s e i z -
ur e of pr oper t y) brought t h e event s under cons i der at i on i n t o t he sample of
di s t ur bances . The p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e di s t ur bance i ncl ude a l l persons who
performed t he vi ol e nt a c t i o n , a l l per sons who i nt e r a c t e d wi t h them d i r e c t -
l y i n t he cour s e of t h a t a c t i on, and a l l per sons a c t i n g c o l l e c t i v e l y wi t h
members of e i t h e r of t h e f i r s t two c a t e gor i e s i n t h e cont i nuous st r eam of
a c t i v i t y which cont aj ns t he vi ol e nt a c t i on.
We di vi de t he p a r t i c i p a n t s up i n t o f or mat i ons. Se t s of p a r t i c i p a n t s
bel ong t o di a t i r i c t f or mat i ons t o t he e xt e nt t h a t t hey a c t c o l l e c t i v e l y ,
communicate i n t e r n a l l y , oppose ot he r s e t s of p a r t i c i p a n t s and/ or a r e gi ven
s p e c i f i c i d e n t i t i c s meani ngful out s i de t he di s t ur bance i t s e l f ( . e. g. "so-
c i a l i s t e s " , "pnysans", "gendarmes") by t h e obs er ver s . Many f or mat l ons,
however, compound s ever al d i f f e r e n t ki nds of peopl e -- f o r example, mai t r es
and compagnons; we do not a s s i gn them t o s e pa r a t e f or mat i ons unl e s s t hey
a r e r epor t ed t o a c t i ndependent l y o r i n s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t ways.
' . , , Most di s t ur bances i nvol ve two o r t hr e e e a s i l y di s t i nguf s ha bl e forma-
t i ons . I n an ext reme c a s e , R format i on can have onl y one member -- f or ex-
ample, tlie vi c t i m of a l ynchi ng. A t anot her ext reme, a di s t ur bance can i n-
vol ve onl y one format i on -- f o r example, t h e unanimous de s t r oye r s of a cha-
t eau. I n ver y compl i cat ed di s t ur bances , where t he s e p r i n c i p l e s would per-
m i t t he d i s t i n c t i o n of t en o r more d i f f e r e n t f or mat i ons, we combine t he
p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t o ni ne o r fewer f or mat i ons r epr es ent i ng t h e most i mpor t ant
d i v i s i o n s i n c o l l e c t i v e act i on. For example, i f t he b i j o u t i e r s , t he eben-
i s t e s and t l i e o r f 6 v r i e r s each have t h e i r own bar r i cade, t hey would appear
a s s e pa r a t e f or mat i ons i n t he codi ng of a s mal l di s t ur bance, but i n a ver y
l a r g e one coul d be combined i n t o a s i n g l e f or mat i on. I n t h i a cas e, choose
t h e code i n c o l s . 37-38 wi t h g r e a t car e. and COMMENT.
Even i n s mal l di s t ur bances , groups s pe c i a l i z e d i n t l i e maintenonce and
r e s t o r a t i o n of publ i c or de r (which t h i s codebook wi l l c a l l Repr essi ve f o r
s hor t ) can al ways be combined i n t o a s i n g l e Eormation t o t h e e xt e nt t h a t
t h e i r a c t i o n s e r e i ndi s t i ngui s ha bl e . Thus when Nat i onal Guards and t r oops
of t h e l i n e under a s i n g l e command di s pe r s e a group of demot ~s t r nt dr s , t r e a t
them a s a s i n g l e f or mat i on unl e s s t hey begi n t o a c t i n s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t
ways. Be s u r e t o COMHENT i f t h e code l eaves any doubt how and what you
have combined.
I n any cas e, i d e n t i f y t h e f or mat i ons be f or e s t a r t i n g t o code. When a
f or mat i on has a publ i c i d e n t i t y more s p e c i f i c t han words l i k e f oul e , nt t r oupe-
ment, peupl e, and s o on, i ndi c a t e ( f o r exnmple. "Pr ot es t s nt s ", "CRS", " l e s
ha bi t a nt s de " . "Anarchi st es"), s p e l l out t h e i d e n t i t y i n columns 12-36.
cols. 1-2
cols. 3-11
cols. 12-36
cols. 37-38
Cards 31-39: FORMATION BACKGROUND
CARD NUMBER
NUMBER FORMATIONS ARBITRARILY AND NOTE IN FILE
31 Formation 1 to 39 Formation 9
32 Formation 2
IDENTIFYING DATA
DO NOT CODE - WILL BE DUPLICATED AUTOMATICALLY FROM
FIRST CARD
PUBLIC IDENTITY OF FORMATION: ALPHABETIC
If the formation has no definite public identity,
leave blnnk. If it has a name, put it here.
TYPE OF FORMATION
01 Crowd (further identifying information unavailable)
10 Crowd of common ideology
11 Crowd of common political attachment
12 Crowd of common religion
20 Activist group
21 Political cadres, hacks
22 Terrorists
23 Criminal group (brigands)
24 Guerrilla insurgents
25 Private (party) army
26 Secret society
cols. 37-38
(cant's.)
Cards 31-39: FORMATION BACKGROUND
TYPES OF' FORMATION
30 Military or paramilitary group
31 National guard
32 Civil guard
33 Regular nrmy
34 Gnrde mobile
35 Milice bourgeoise
36 Palace guard
37 Bons citoyens (volunteers)
39 Any military group plus public officials:
MANDATORY COMMENT
40 Police
41 Gendarmes
42 CRS
43 Military police
48 Police and militnry group: comment en-
couraged
49 Police plus public officials:
MANDATORY CObfilENT
50 Occupational group
51 Workers of same industry
52 Workers of snme factory
53 Workers of same locality
54 Union
55 Students
c o l s . 37-38
(con' t d; )
A-23 ,'
Cards 31-39: FORMATION BACKGROUND
TYPES OF FORMATION
60 Out s i der s (group r e pr e s e nt i ng a l o c a l i t y )
61 Croup coming d i r e c t l y from a f or e i gn
count r y
62 Croup coming from an out s i de l o c a l i t y
63 Croup of mi gr ant s from out s i de France
64 Croup of mi gr ant s from anot her a r e a of
France
70 Consumer group
71 Users of t h e same market
72 Users of t h e same wat er suppl y
80 Publ i c o f f i c i a l s
90 Combinations: MANDATORY COMMENT
9 1 De l i be r a t e combi nat i on f o r purposes of
br e vi t y i n codi ng: MANDATORY COMMENT
99 Ot her s: MANDATORY COMMENT
A-24
, .
040 02 7 ' C1 LA Bnronsso
::1/1?'12 c ~~~~~r ~ur o: . - ' Tl i ~! hI!rnf- IIO% I i s t c . : r,rr! ~ c r t r ~ n ~ ~ ! - l ) , Trouhnt(1I-F,, md
L
n n ~ l r y :'!I&?). Tho co~xnurlnl i nr or mnt i on ~ G ? I . tliom i t ~ l u saxe e s f o r t hos c col:l:liunc
l i o t o d on t ho cor ds
21 t o ,"/ *7 A - % pol i l : i o~r \ t andoncy o r npnt l w notnd, ; : l nrt wc
t - a t n t o s *\lot t l ~ i a rllstrlrbonco I ~nd not!~irr:: t o ?o wi t h p o l i t i u o a r
d r o i t s l c r i t i mos
! 21 t o 2C!/42 !oson.Lncnt a goi ns t usnr or s : * l - v - r ' Fe-
,- ' &&+
, =/4? Ac+i cns by nnt i ona l c o v l t which del i var od i n t o Iiands of
p r i o t a i r c a Innd ; ~l i i ch rros f e l t t o bo oonnon
71 t o :2!'/48 Nunio~.oun proccs-verbnt x ot c. o::rtinot v i o l a t o r s of Coda ?or r . s t i or
-."A7 ,!!rmt:rous j.ncidan+.z o r bri,:mdnKc oncl dost r uct i o! . occurrod 111 v11rio11s co:::mlmon.
I 11s:-o , ~ou. ond a l l v i c t i n o t~o:c.tkcr. Thoso inclrrdc gr t 5l i c
o r f i c ~ n l s ( o o n d u c t o ~ ~ r d ! ~ Di l i ~e n o o , n a i r a s , I ~cccvour do I' !. ' nro~i ot romant n t o ) pro-
pr!ctr\Li.rcs and wu r a r s .
.53/.77 knrde nation nu^, mi l i t ni r os , ~cndor mos, and soma pr i c a t o
32/43 ~ l d n i n i s t r n t i o n , ~ employor, dr o cont r i but i on, ?r opr ?. ot oi r es e t a .
.73/45 Pol i co, mi l i t n i r c s , nat i onnl gunrd, and pr i os t s .
31/52 !!om of chnnzc i n r os i n? gi vos h r i p md s a p r c t c r t f o r r c v o l t ond an iul-
s e t t . ed s i t u a t i o n t o t nkc odvont o~e of
- 11/56 t o r t h e f i r s t 3 drip, t ho r obc l s rriopondcd t o no vi ol oncc. I b r r , On
!:nrch h, t he y mot t ho r ogr ons i vq Porme.tion i n b n t t l c , bot h s i d e s usin:: f i r oor ms.
I
5 to~:ai!: of ovar 110@0 i nhnbi t nnt s!?t obnl . . Mationel p a r d s l : r c n ~t i l i:..'t.:'rq,;!
frola nnt ur e oE a c t i on and ~ i z o s of tovrns
<l / 55 Fo~i nnt i on ynner nl l y ox:onding. !.iondnys.
42/55 Encli p3r t i c i pont i n t h i s f onnnt i on nnc
?.?/57 Thorc ner o conlo ' o f f b c i n l s r nol t r oi t oo'
.! ./67 Clnrcnc ncnt i ono no rsioundod nnd ct nt cl :
01) but !?O i s of t on rupcnkod, and uncd l?y
,:'lnrenc. 10 .:roro proacocut ed nnd Pour~d rui l t ; .
51-52/13 Tho so?uonco pr c s a nt ol bot:toen t ho two XX codcs i s not n t r u o ncquonco
but a ~ c c r c n t i o n of n t y p i c a l i nci dont . 10-12 i nc i dont s of s i s l i l c r n:.two l:oqnk
pl ncc I?ol-::ccn ?cb. 2Pr&nd l.:nr. 3, ond t hor c i s no r oo n t o coda thom s c u, ~~t i nl l : . .
Af t e r t ho second :C, t ho b a t t l e of !.!arch 3 i s codcd uimxt@~ CI S Vl ( r Q9 . .
51/17 Invozi on of mni r i e, buroou do 1' cnro;:i,, -*rcnunt or bwonu o r bho fornn' .icr.
S t ~ h s c ~ u c n t burnin;: of r ccor ds and nl of ; r a nt l ns ofl ' i ci cl l c.
53/31 A d i r r c r c n t vi ct i m- n chat cnu ovmor
-
51-53/43 Pnrch 8 , noon, n t Antichnn. Roundin6 up of prisono1.s corltir~tr. :: .rn:il
5 : (20 ! > .Tb.
G5/1,! Chnn~c i n roy.in2
-
~.'./,!.1 'l:oromtioll 55 i s In.-! a.nfort.cmont f or cc. IIo~~: ovor, di vi si on botwu,.n 51 md 5:
con~bi t p~r, di r l ' or oncos of ocr up: : t i ot ~ and pr opor t y
GB/T,I- A ~ r m t n~pnhr r nP ~ ~ ~ b l i o r ccor ds h u r n o j i n n h o s t ovor y t c~vn, mos t l y
! or t ni ; t ~i . ~~: ; t o Codv ; ' or os t i cr , l i s t s of or f r ncon, f i non and prococ-vorbnus.
9ccorc!:: ol' dohgs e l s o b: ~r i od. :.:inor pr ope r t y dann::o t o pr:bljc build in:;^. 1'.
hui s oi . or qs hcusc rrns pillny.o:l and l l cr sc s t o l r n i n I.:culoon-Daroosso. E. pi g, 3ona
?ark qnd, somo vrino ~ m s t aken i n Sos t , nrc:s nnd i ns i gno of a dmi ni s t r nt a ur f o r c s t i o r
ot o1. q. : i l l n ~ o i n I &ur cs- ?r r r ouss~~, house i nvndod nnd p i l l n p d i n Ant i chnn,
6, non ~annozncld i n Tr obnt nnd Bor t r on, monny nnd pr ovi oi ono s t o l c n i n Anlo. Pln:;
t o r n : i n :enotwt. I nr gcsl ; dmnaeo n t a p r o p i n t a i r o ' s cl i ot cnu i n L..scan vciloro
t r c c s vrcro cut . rilles broken, door s brokon i n , f u r n i t u r e brokon o r s t o l o n , and
l i m n nnd i:ooka dost r oyod o r t nken.
' .6/55 Th i s ic a lois/ os t i nnt o. 30,000 r r nncs .n~n:o nl onc n t chat oau do Luscnn
~ 6 / 7 3 r!lt11011:h c onpl ot c l y s t i f l o d , t h i s di nt ur bnnco s t i n u l n t c d l n t o r i nci Acnt s ,
notnbl:? n p l o t t o ns oaos i nnt o Rocovour rlc I ' c n ~ c ~ i s t r o mc n t , gho n p r i l 17 d i s -
t w b y ~ o o t S i : ~ n c , and t ' . c i nc i dont ~ t . Ri zc- i i i st os 04; t ! ~ rnd of Apr i l .
73/10 U48-33-lO(501-50.7)
lI34~.~-08-11
ivory m i c * ~ l t t o codc bocntlso of ~ r c n t nt whcr of s xnl l , incidents. Sco t110
modol ooqucncc co*lo devised t o Iiand!o t h i s and not o t h n t t h o r c a r e 12 cor:.l:;w:ns
i nvol vbd.
FORMATION BACKGROUND
,/
Content of Code
Cord Number
Code 31 -39
*IDENTIFICATION
DO NOT CODE
<
,.PUBLIC IDENTITY
ef FORMTI ON
Name ef
Formation
!
\ .
Type of fmrmatlmn
Age-Sex
FORMATION BACKGROUND ( 2)
Contcnl of Code ommcnts
. . I
Birthplace of members
Present residence
Occupotlonol
compositlon
:Politlcol
attochmentr
r
mmediate
background
, Code i n units
' , of 2
Legality of 1st Act
Precipitating
factor
Type of violence
Response t o violence
other forms of
participation
Concerted Action
Mutual Ai d
Overt Imitation
'Objectives
Code I n
units of
L
Explicitness of
objectives
Urtity of objectives
Hom?gcneity of
objectives
Autonomy of objectiv
Fluct,uotion I n focus
.Territory controllcd
Fluctuation i n
territory conholled
...- :.. ..-' i.. .-,: .-' ..... r ' : ' . ,, . . 9 -'.' , . . .... .... ' . . . ." .'
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APPENDIX 3. PROCEDURES FOR THE STUDY OF CONTENTIOUS GATIIERINGS I N
GREAT BRITAIN
Our newest l a r g e e f f o r t is a s t udy of c o n f l i c t s i n Gr eat Br i t oi n
from 1828 t hrough 1833. We have s e ve r a l d i f f e r e n t i nc e nt i ve s f o r trnder-
t aki ng t h e new a na l ys i s . F i r s t , our anal ys es of v i o l e n t event s i n
I t a l y , Germany and France appeared t o confi rm our s uppos i t i on t hot t h e
vi ol ence was on t h e whole t h e by-product of t h e i nt e r ve nt i on of f ur t he r
i nt e r e s t e d p a r t i e s i n a c t i o n s which were not i n t r i n s i c a l l y v i o l e n t and
which occur r ed f r e que nt l y wi t l ~out s i g n i f i c a n t vi ol ence. I n p a r t i c u l a r ,
we were i nt e r e s t e d i n t h e frequency wi t h which t he vi ol e nc e hegsn wi t h
t h e i nt e r ve nt i on of t r oops , pol i c e and ot he r specialized r e pr e s s i ve f or ces .
Si nce t h e onl y nonvi ol ent event s of which we had made l ar ge. s ys t emat i c
enumerat i ons f o r some of t h e same per i ods and pl aces were s t r i k e s . how-
ever , we di d not have t h e evi dence t o l ook c l os e l y a t t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p
between nonvi ol ent and vi ol e nt c o l l e c t i v e a c t i ons .
Second, i t seemed wort h making a Sl ~St oi ned comparison hetwecn pnt-
t e r n s of c o n f l i c t i n ni net eent h- cent ur y Br i t a i n and t hos e we ltod found
on t h e Cont i nent . St udent s of modern Europe of t e n t hi nk of ni net eent h-
cent ur y Br i t a i n ' s exper i ence a s s kind of s ucces s s t o r y -- st l e a s t i n
'Bvoiding" t l i e r e vol ut i ons which occur r ed i n France, Germany. l t o l y ond
el sewher e. A c l o s e s t udy of c o n f l i c t s i n Br i t a i n sliould gi ve us t h e means
t o r e t hi nk t hot ques t i on. Hore i mpor t ant , i t sliould pr ovi de f i r mer
ground f o r choosi ng among obvi ous a l t e r n a t i v e expl anat i ons of t h e d i f f e r -
ences between Br i t a i n and t h e cont i nent : t hot Br i t a i n had fewer of t he
ki nds of peopl e who made ni net eent h- cent ur y r evol ut i ons and r e be l l i ons .
t h a t t h e most l i k e l y r e b e l s had fewer gr i evances, t h ~ t r epr es s i on, was more
e f f e c t i v e i n Br i t a i n, and s o on.
Our or i gi na l hope was t o examine t h e changi ng p a t t e r n s of c o n f l i c t
i n Br i t a i n t hroughout t h e ni net eent h cent ur y. With a wide r ange of non-
v i o l e n t event s t o cons i der , however, bhat would have r equi r ed an enormous
e f f o r t -- many t i mes t he al r eady f or mi dabl e e f f o r t per year i n our s t u d i e s
of France and Germany. Af t er some pr el i mi nar y enumerat i ons i n s c a t t e r e d
year s from t h e end of t h e ei ght eent h cent ur y t o t h e end of t h e ni net eent h.
we narrowed our a t t e n t i o n t o 1828-1833. That per i od recommends i t s e l f
f o r s e ve r a l r easons. F i r s t , i t was a t i me of major movements, c o n f l i c t s
and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i ons : Cat hol i c Emancipation, Reform agi t at i 0. n. i n d u s t r i a l
c o n f l i c t , t h e a t t a c k on s e l e c t v e s t r i e s , and t h e g r e a t a gr a r i a n r e b e l l i o n s
of 1830. Second, t he r e e x i s t e xc e l l e nt h i s t o r i c a l s t u d i e s of some of t h e
per i od' s c o n f l i c t s -- f o r example. Capt ai n Swing, by E. J. Hobsbawn and
George Rud; -- wi t h which we can compare our own r e s u l t s . Thi r d, we have
some r eason t o be l i e ve t h a t t h e per i od a c t e d a s an h i s t o r i c h 1 pi vot i n some-
t hi ng l i k e t h e aame way t h a t t h e r e vol ut i ons of 1848 di d i n France and
Germany: marking, and perhaps produci ng, a s h i f t from r e a c t i v e t o pr oact i ve,
from "backward-looking" t o "forward-looking" c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n on t h e p a r t
of or di nar y peopl e.
I n t h a t per i od, we a r e at t empt i ng t o enumerat e, de s c r i be and anal yze
a l a r g e s hor e of a l l t he"cont ent i ous gat her i ngs" which occurred i n England,
Scot l and, and Wales. Roughly speaki ng, a cont ent i ous gat her i ng is an oc-
cas i on i n which t en o r more per sons out s i de t h e government gat her i n t h e
some pl ace and make a v i s i b l e cl ai m which, i f r e a l i z e d, would a f f e c t t h e
i n t e r e s t s of some s p e c i f i c ~ e r s o n ( s ) o r gr oup( s) out s i de t h e i r own number.
In pr i nc i pl e , t he s e gat her i ngs i ncl ude j u s t about a l l t h e event s covered
i n our e a r l i e r enumerat i ons of s t r i k e s and c o l l e c t i v e vi ol ence. They
a l s o i ncl ude a g r e a t many ot he r ebent s : demonst r at i ons, p e t i t i o n meet i ngs.
del egat i ons , group poaching. and pl ent y of ot he r s . Drawing t he boundari es
bot h gener ousl y and c ons i s t e nt l y is a d e l i c a t e and l a bor i ous t nsk.
We a r e st i l l a dj us t i ng t h e pr ocedur es f o r t h a t t as k. Af t e r doi ng a
t r i a l enumerat i on and s u ms r y codi ng of some event s from 1830, we di d
a pr el i mi nar y scanni ng of t h i r t y randomly s e l e c t e d ten-day bl ocks from
t h e e n t i r e si x- year per i od, t hen proceeded t o enumerate s ys t emnt i cal l y
from t h e begi nni ng of 1828. We have completed t he pr el i mi nar y enumerat i on
of 1828. We f i n d t h e event s v i a a compl et e i ssue-by-i ssue r eadi ng of
t h e Morning Chr oni cl e, The Times. Gentlemen' s Magazine, Hansard' s Pnr l i a-
mentary Debat es, The Mi r r or of Par l i ament end t h e Annual R e ~ i s t e r . Once t he
event s a r e enumerated, we pl an t o l ook f o r more i nf or mat i on nbout them i n
t h e paper s of t h e Home Of f i c e (of which we have al r eady b u i l t up s u b s t a n t i a l
s e l e c t i o n s v i a photocopy and mi cr of i l m) , i n ot he r pe r i odi c a l s , and i n
secondary h i s t o r i c a l works. We a r e st i l l making pl ans f o r codi ng of t h e
i nf or mat i on i n machi ne-readabl e form. The f i l e f o r t h e si x- year per i od
wi l l probabl y de s c r i be on t h e or der of 25.000 event s.
We a r e a l s o sl owl y making pl ans Eor t he c o l l e c t i o n of d a t a on t h e
popul at i ons and a r e a s " a t r i s k" t o cont ent i ous gat her i ngs . The u n i t s of
obs er vat i on wi l l c e r t a i n l y i ncl ude a l l c ount i e s of England. Scot l and and
Wales. They w i l l probabl y i ncl ude compl et e s e t s of hundreds of par i s hes
wi t hi n s e l e c t e d count i es . I f pos s i bl e, t hey wi l l a l s o i ncl ude pnr t i c ul nr
popul at i ons of p o t e n t i a l a c t o r s -- f o r example, t h e handloom weavers of
Lanceshi r e and t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l l a bor e r s of Le i c e s t e r s hi r e . Ul t i mat el y
t h e choi ce of u n i t s and of ki nds of d a t a concerni ng t hos e u n i t s wi l l re-
s u l t from a compromise between t h e arguments we a r e seeki ng t o t e s t and t he
c o s t s of g e t t i n g t h e r e l e va nt evi dence.
Event s t o be Enumerated
The event s a r e "cont ent i ous gat her i ngs " (CGs), O C C ~ ~ ~ O ~ R i n which t en
A-39
o r more per sons out s i de t h e government ga t he r i n t h e same pl ace and make
a v i s i b l e cl ai m which, i f r e a l i z e d, would a f f e c t t h e i n t e r e s t s of some
s p e c i f i c per son( s) o r gr oup( s) out s i de t h e i r own numbers. Most CGs i n
our peri od f a l l i n t o one o r more of t h e f ol l owi ng cat egor i es : 1 ) col l ec-
t i v e vi ol ence, 2) meet i ngs. 3) demonst r at i ons, 4) parades. 5) assembl i es,
6) r a l l i e s , 7) c e l e br a t i ons , 8 ) de l e ga t i ons , 9) s t r i k e s , 10) uni on a c t i v-
i t i e s . More pr e c i s e l y, t h e event s i ncl uded a r e a l l occasi ons:
1. r epor t ed i n t he London Times, Morning Chroni cl e, , Hanssrd' s Par l i a-
mentary Debates. Annual Regi s t er , Gentlemen' s Magazine andl or The
Mi rror of Par l i ament .
--
2. occur r i ng i n England. Scot l and o r Wales,
3. begi nni ng on any d a t e from 1 Januar y 1828 t hrough 31 December 1833,
4. i n which t e n o r more per sons out s i de t h e government:
a. gat her i n t he same pl ace,
b. make a v i s i b l e cl ai m which, i f r e a l i z e d, would a f f e c t t h e i n-
t e r e s t s of some s e p e c i f i c person(8) o r gr oup( s) o u t s i d e t h e i r
own number.
Terms which t he r e f or e r e qui r e working d e f i n i t i o n s :
r epor t ed
occur r i ng
i n England, Scot l and o r Wales
begi nni ng
, persons
out s i de t h e government
gat her
same pl a c e
v i s i b l e cl ai m a f f e c t i n g i n t e r e s t s
s p e c i f i c per son( s) o r gr oup( s)
A-40
DEFINITIONS AND RULES OF TIIWB
r epor t ed. Any mention i n any cont ext . I f , f o r example, on M.P. l oye on
t h e t a b l e a p e t i t i o n "from a numerous meet i ng i n Oldham" which conforms
t o a l l our ot he r c r i t e r i a , t h a t meet i ng e n t e r s t he sampl e. I n par l i ament ar y
debat es , ment i ons of meet i ngs do not need numer i cal i n f o r mt i o n t o be i n-
cl uded. For example, i f Mi r r or of Par l i ament r e p o r t s a meet i ng of pnr i sh-
i one r s a t Pr es t on t o p e t i t i o n Par l i ament , but mokes no mention of how many
peopl e at t ended t h e meet i ng, we wi l l assume pr ovi s i ona l l y t h a t o t l e a s t
10 peopl e t ook p a r t .
occur i ng i n England, Scot l and or' Wnl es. Ten o r more peopl e must have
at her ed wi t hi n t he p o l i t i c a l boundori ea ( i ncl udi ng t e r r i t o r i a l wat er s) of
England, Scot l and o r Wales. I f any p a r t of t he a c t i on occur s wi t hi n t hose
boundar i es, t he e n t i r e event f a l l s i n t o t he sample.
Sometimes i t is d i f f i c u l t t o det er mi ne how mnny peopl e a r e i nvol ved
i n an event o r act i on. I n vague c a s e s t ake t he f ol l owi ng t erms t o mean o t
l e a s t t en peopl e:
AFFRAY DISTURBANCE NUMEROUS
ASSPIBLY GANG RALLY
BRAWL GATHERING RIOT
CONCOURSE GENERAL BODYlBODY RIOTOUS ASSEMBLAGE
CROWD . MOB TllRONC
DEMONSTRATION MULTITUDE TUMULTUOUS ASSEMBLY
begi nni ng on a ny. da t e from 1 Januar y 1828 t hrough 31 December 1833
The event begi ns a t t h e f i r s t poi nt st which a t l e a s t t e n of t he peopl e
who e ve nt ua l l y make t h e v i s i b l e cl ai m a r e gat her ed wi t hout f u r t h e r di s -
p e r s a l bef or e t hey make t h e cl ai m. The day begi ns a t mi dni ght .
persons. Any human being who can reasonably be presumed to Ilave inten-
tlonally participated in the making of the claim.
outside the government. When officers ore acting in the capacity given
them by their offices and no group of ten or more non-officers is acting
wtth cl~em, we exclude the action. If ten or more officers act together
. .
but on their own responsibility, we include their action. Among the sets
of people commonly named in discussions of English governments in the
nineteenth century, we are actually distinguishing three categories,
(6) officers, (b) public committees, and (c) citizenry. As officers.
we are considering:
Aldermen Judges Police Constables
Bailiffs
Beadles
Justices Privy Councilers
Justices of the Peace Schoolboards
Boroughreeves Lord Lieutenants Sherif fs
Burgesses Magistrates Scotch Guards
Churchwardens Mayors Special Constables
Common Councilers Members of Parliament Surveyors
Constables Military (see below*) Town Councilers
Coroners Militia Yeomanry
Directors of the Poor Ministers and others of
Grand Juries Overseers of the Poor essentially
Guardians of the Poor Paymasters similar position.
Horse Guards Police
*(Militnry): Cavalry, Infantry, Dragoons, Hussars, Marines, Blues, Grays
. .
As public committees we are considering Town Meetings, Vestries, Select
Vestries. Liveries, Improvement Commissions, Police Commissions, and es-
sentially shilar organizations.
. . .
Aa segments of the citizenry. we are considering Freeholders. Householders.
Inhabitants, Landowners, Leypnyeri, Occupiers, Parishioners, Ratepayers,
Tithepayers and essentially similar collections of people. One day we m y
well want to analyze the actions of public committees, of segments of the
citizenry, and of other groups (such as members of particular crofts. assoc-
iations, age-sex groups or families) separately. For the present, the
crucial distinction separates officers from all the rest. Officers often
appear as parties in collective actions involving pub1.i~ committees, seg-
ments of the citizenry and/or other groups. But the only circumstances un-
der which their concerted action qualifies by itself is when they take
part in a group of ten or more persons who on their own responsibility ns-
aemble to make a publicly visible claim, demand or complaint.
As citizens we are considering everyone else.
gather'same place Ten or more persons, meeting, assembling or any of
the key words used in Page A-42 to define a get-together. Place is
defined as:
a) specific location, church, inn. field,
b) secondary location. town, parish, city.
C) area location, county, hundred, etc.
or any combination of these.
visible claims affecting interesta of eome specific persons or groups
We are trying to prepare a comprehensive list of occasions where people
outside the government assemble to m k e a publicly visible claim, demand,
or complaint. At one time or another, we use all the following words to
de s c r i be what we' re a f t e r : cl ai ms , demands, compl ai nt s, gr i evances , as-
p i r a t i o n s , i n t e r e s t s . d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n s . Some of t hes e words, such a s
"demands", c l e a r l y have an obj e c t out s i de t h e group. Ot her s, l i k e
"di ssat i sf act i ons", do not ne c e s s a r i l y have out s i de obj e c t s ; one can
e a s i l y be d i s s a t i s f i e d wi t h ones el f . We want t o concent r at e on a c t i ons
which & have a t a r ge t out s i de t he a c t i n g group. Let ' s t a l k about cl ai ms
nnd obj e c t s of cl ai ms. . We a r e t r y i n g t o bui l d a sample of gat her i ngs i n
which -- o r by which -- peopl e a r t i c u l a t e cl ai ms on a c t o r s out s i de t h e i r
own group.
What s o r t s of cl ai ms? Ba s i c a l l y, any expect at i on which would, i f
r e a l i z e d, r equi r e t h e ot he r a c t o r t o expend val ued r es our ces : money, l abor -
power, i nf or mat i on, and s o on. What s o r t s of a c t or s ? Bas l oal l y, any
ot he r s e t of r e a l peopl e. That excl udes a gr oup' s cl ai ms on i t s e l f . It
excl udes a gr oup' s cl ai ms on s upe r na t ur a l o r i magi nary bei ngs. It does
not however, excl ude cl ai ms on an i magi nary "power s t r uc t ur e " , i f t h e
group identifies some r e a l peopl e wi t h t h a t s t r u c t u r e . Nor does i t excl ude
cl ai ms on r e a l peopl e i n t h e i r c a p a c i t i e s a s s el f - decl ar ed agent s of
s uper nnt ur al bei ngs o r i magi nary groups: p r i e s t s , s oot hs ayer s , c ha r l a t a ns ,
members of i nvent ed cons pi r aci es . It does not excl ude cl ai ms on r e a l
peopl e pr es ent a t t he same gat her i ng, j u s t s o l ong a s t he r e i s a wel t hey
s cpar s t i ot i between a c t o r s and o b j e c t s which i s not si mpl y an i n t e r n a l
d i v i s i o n of t he a c t i n g group and which i s more dur abl e t han t h c gat her i ng
i t s e l f . I n f a c t , "any ot he r s e t of r e a l peopl e" does not e ~ c l u d e any i n-
di vi dua l anywhere, j u s t s o l ong a s t hc r e i s a gat her i ng i n which enough
peopl e a r t i c u l a t e cl ai ms on t h a t i ndi vi dual .
When des cr i bi ng t he pos s i bl e cont ent of such cla.tms, we enumerate:
a ) p e t i t i o n i n g o r addr es s i ng o r memori al i zi ng l o c a l o r na t i ona l
government, e i t h e r f o r o r a ga i ns t government;
b) oppos i t i on t o government pol i cy, form of govccnment o r pnr t i c ul nr
agent s of i t ;
C) suppor t f o r government;
d) suppor t f o r an enemy of government;
e ) c ont r ol of l o c a l government o r i n s t i t u t i o n ;
f ) ot he r gr i evances and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n s , i ncl udi ng r e l i g i o u s , s o c i a l
o r economic I s s ue s , di s cus s i on of compl ai nt s about wagca, hour s
o r condi t i ons of work;
Here a r e some r u l e s of thumb f o r t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of qunl i f yi ng
and non- qual i f yi ng cl ai ms:
1. I n t h e absence of c ont r a di c t or y i nf or mat i on, collective vi ol encc
c o n s t i t u t e s pri ma f a c i e evi dence of a cl ai m. I f t e n o r more per sons
a c t t oget her t o a t t a c k , damage o r f or ci bl ys ei ze n person o r object,
t h a t is pr ovi s i ona l evi dence of n cl ai m.
2. Even i f t h e ul t i ma t e aim of t hc a c t i v i t y i s t he making of some
s o r t of cl ai m, pur el y or ga ni z a t i ona l e f f o r t s do not q u a l i f y i n
t hemsel ves. For example, t h e c r e a t i on of a l o c n l Rcform Associ at i on
does not i n i t s e l f c o n s t i t u t e a cl ni m. I f , on t h e ot he r hand, t e n
o r more per sons who a r e or gani zi ng an a s s oc i a t i on s t a t e a qua l i f yi ng
cl ai m a s t hey do s o, t h a t cl ai m count s.
3. Benef i t s upper s , b a l l s , expos i t i ons and t h e l i k e do not qua l i f y
i n t hemsel ves, r e ga r dl e s s of t h e cnuse f o r which t hey n r e conduct ed.
I f , however, we a c qui r e f u r t h e r evl dence of t he making of n cl.nim
(e.g. a claim-making procl amat i on by t h e or gani zer s of t h e b e n e f i t ,
o r a widely-cheered claim-making speech i n t he cour se of t h e e ve nt ) ,
a be nc f i t q u a l i f i e s i n t h e same way any ot he r gat her i ng q u a l i f i e s .
4. A speech by a s i n g l e person which s t a t e s a cl ai m, a r t i c u l a t e s a 1
gr i evance o r makes a demand c o n s t i t u t e s evi dence of a c o l l e c t i v e
i
cl ai m under any of t he s e condi t i ons : a) t h e group f or mal l y adopt s t h e
s peaker ' s views by p e t i t i o n , r e s ol ut i on o r memorial; b) t h e r e por t e r
e x p l i c i t l y i mput es appr oval of t h e cl ai m t o t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e 1
i
gat her i ng; c) t he group ma i ni f e s t l y voi ces an opi ni on by cheer i ng,
J e e r i ng o r ot he r vocnl di s pl ay.
5 . I f a gat her i ng i ncl udes two o r more f a c t i o n s , a t l e a s t one of
which has t en o r more p a r t i c i p a n t s , cl ai ms made by one of t h e f a c t i ons
I
on anot her i f t h e i s s u e s and di vi s i ons i n ques t i on ext end beyond t h e
p a r t i c u l a r gat her i ng and t h e p a r t i c u l a r s e t of pa r t i c i pa nt s . For
i
example. when Henry Hunt and h i s s uppor t er s show up a t a pa r i s h ve s t r y
I
meet i ng and chal l enge t h e powers of t h e l o c a l e l i t e t o c ont r ol t he
I
e l e c t i o n of new ve s t r y o f f i c e r s , t h e d i v i s i o n ext ends beyond t h a t 1
meet i ng and t he cl ai m q u a l i f i e s .
6. Expl i c i t suppor t f o r government, o r d e n i a l of suppor t t o government.
q u a l i f i e s . It can t ake t he form of suppor t f o r i n s t i t u t i o n s ( Par l i o-
ment, t he pr es ent government, t h e c ons t i t ut i on) o r of suppor t f o r s p e c i f i c
o f f i c e r s of government: t he al dermen, b a i l i f f s , beadl es , boroughreeves,
and s o on. l i s t e d e a r l i e r . I t csn t ake t h e form of d e l i b e r a t e d e n i a l
of s uppor t f or t he s e i n s t i t u t i o n s o r o f f i c e r s . The i n s t i t u t i o n s and
o f f i c e r s must b e . c u r r e n t l y i n o f f i c e ; f o r example, a c e l e br a t i ng ban-
quet f o r a member-elect of Par l i ament does not i n i t s e l f qua l i f y.
Evidence of such suppor t o r d e n i a l i ncl udes a ) p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n event s ,
i ncl udi ng c e l e br a t i ons and f e s t i v i t i e s , wl~oae commonly-understood
purpose is t h e di s pl a y of suppor t . e.g. Lord Mayor's Day par ade;
b) t he r e p o r t e r ' s i mput at i on of suppor t o r r e j e c t i on; c) a r t i c u l n t i o n
of a sent i ment through cheer i ng, j eer i ng. and s o on, however, a si mpl e
t o a s t (e.g. "To t h e King") doe8 not qua l i f y i n i t s e l f , even i f par-
t i c i p a n t s cheer .
7. Gat her i ngs e x p l i c i t l y conduct ed t o s uppor t o r condemn an a c t i on
of government s t a t e qua l i f yi ng cl ai ms i f t he p a r t i c i p a n t s t hemsel ves
a r t i c u l a t e s ent i ment s by passi ng r e s ol ut i ons . cheer i ng speeches, and
s o on.
8. Simple expr es s i ons of suppor t o r r e j e c t i o n do not qua l i f y i f t h e
o b j e c t s a r e a) non-governmental i n s t i t u t i o n s o r o f f i c e r s i n Br i t a i n
o r el sewher e, b) governmental i n s t i t u t i o n s o r officer^ out s i de of
Br i t a i n . I f a ga t he r i ng makos f u r t h e r cl ai ms on e i t h e r of t he s e
c a t e gor i e s of obj e c t s , however, t h e cl ai ms qua l i f y. For example, a
banquet i n honor of t h e deposed ki ng of Spai n would not qua l i f y unl es s
t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s d i r e c t l y s t a t e d t he demand t h a t he be r e i ns t a t e d.
BOUNDARIES OF CONTENTIOUS GATHERINGS
Most CGs wi l l occur on one day a t one l oc nt i on; however, many wi l l
l a s t l onger andl or wi l l t ake pl a c e a t s e ve r a l s i t e s . s o we must d e l i n e a t e
boundar i es i n t i me and space. Ac t i v i t i e s wi l l be consi der ed t o be pnr t
of t h e same CG i f :
1. t hey occur on t h e same day. o r on consecut i ve days &
2. t he r e i s s t r ong evi dence of over l appi ng per sonnel wi t hi n t he
c i t i z e n f or mat i on( s ) , such a s cont i nuous i n t e r a c t i o n between
two o r more of t he f or mat i ons i d e n t i f i e d i n t h e i n i t i a l a c t i v i t y
3. the activities involve the same issue, or some directly related
issue (e.g. the escalation of demands).
Activities that meet the above criteria will be defined as one CG even
througl~ they occur in different locations (e.g. different towns).
If on event qualifies on the grounds of,the kind of action and kind
of group involved, but we lack sufficient information to assign it a time
and place in Britain from 1828 through 1833, we exclude the event pending
further information. If only one of these elements -- time or place -- is
uncertain, we'include tlie event pending further information.
GENERAL AGENQA FOR CODING
This is a provisional set of plans for the preparation of a machine-
readable description of each CG. The record for a single event will con-
tain the following sections:
)
. 1. EVENT as a whole, including identification and summary description
of all major features.
2. PLACE: one unit per place in which the event occurred.
3. FORMATION: one unit per formation participating in the event.
4. ACTION-PIIASE: one unit per action by any formation.
5 . SOURCE: one unit per source 'from which information concerning this
event was drawn.
6. COMJIENTS: one unit per comment. All keyed to specific locations
in sections 1-5. .
1. Event Section
identification number: starting date plus sequence number on that date
occuracy of starting date
day of week on which event began
date on which event ended
accuracy of ending date
duration: days
duration: hours
low estimate of total participants
high estimate of total participants
best estimate of total participants
best estimate of person-days +margin of error
best estimate of person-hours + margin of error
best estimate of arrests during even + margin of error
best estimate of arrests after event + margin of error
best estimate of wounded during event + margin of error
best estimate of killed during event + margin of error
number of formations
sunnnary of formation type(s)
summary of participation by authorities
smlacy of repression exercised durina event
summary of repression exercised after evonb
s u m r y of major target(s) of action
broad event type
summary of background
summary of outcome
2. Place Section
one unit per place in which the action occurred. A "place" 1s any named
location, plus any unnamed location in whlcl~ we have strong reason to he-
lieve that some portion o l the action occurred. We produce a i1111t for
"?omeplace" in two circumstnnces: 1) we cannot locate tlie action in at
A-49
l e a s t one s p e c i f i c par i ah; 2) we have st ro, ng r eason t o be l i e ve t h a t some
por t i on of t h e a c t i o n occur r ed out s i de t he pl a c e s f o r which t he account
c ont a i ns s p e c i f i c names. A "name" can be ver y gener al : by t h e r i v e r , on
t he road. a t t h e market , and s o on.
l
a ) f o r i n i t i a l codi na
p r i n c i p a l name of pl ace, al phabet i c. Pa r i s h t akes p r i o r i t y . I f i t is i m-
pos s i bl e, name count y; i f count y is i mpossi bl e, count r y. Pl ace i nf e r r e d
l oc a t i ons i n par ent hes i s . Thus OXFORD means t he account s p e c i f i c a l l y men-
t i o n s Oxford, (OXFORD) t h a t we have i nf e r r e d t he l oc a t i on from t h e account
o r i t s cont ext .
I
de t a i l e d name of pl ace. al phabet i c. Blank i f we have a pa r i s h name and
no ot he r pl a c e i nf or mat i on. SOMEPLACE i f t h e p r i n c i p a l pl a c e is a count y
o r a count r y (England, Scot l and, Wales) and we have no f u r t h e r i nf or mat i on
!
on l oc a t i on wi t hi n t he county o r count r y; a more s p e c i f i c des i gnat i on such
I
a s "near Norwich" ( i n par ent hes i s i f i nf e r r e d) t akes precedence over SOME-
I
PLACE. SOMEPLACE EI.SE f o r a d d i t i o n a l pl a c e s n o t . s p e c i f i c a l l y named.
b) f o r codi ng a f t e r a l pha be t i c s o r t of pl a c e s e c t i ons
sequence number f o r g r i d s quar e l ocat i on: 0 i f some por t i on d e f i n i t e l y
I
t ook pl ace i n t h i s gr i d s quar e l oc a t i on, 1 t o 9 i f one of a c l u s t e r of 1
I
t o 9 pos s i bl e cont i nuous gr i d s quar e l oc a t i ons , used t o de s c r i be i r r e g u l a r
shapes, e. g. a s t r e e t , town, r i ver bank, r oad. Note: t h i s means t h a t a
s i n g l e pl a c e r ecor d may cont ai n 1 t o 9 subr ecor ds f o r gr i d s quar e l oc a t i on.
I
gr i d s quar e l oc a t i on per Gazet t eer : two l e t t e r s pl us f i v e d i g i t s
I
v e r t i c a l l oc a t i on wi t hi n gr i d squar e: 0 i f not k n 6 , 1 t o 9 i f known
I
hor i z ont a l l oc a t i on wi t hi n gr i d squar e: 0 i f not known, 1 t o 9 i f known
A-50
l oc a t i on i n Br i t i s h census of 1831: ni ne d, i gi t a
NOTE on t h e Pl ace Sect i on. Thi s is not t h e onl y i nf or mat i on on pl aces
t h a t we wi l l event ual l y have a v a i l a b l e f o r a na l ys i s . We pl nn t o c ons t r uc t
a s e pa r a t e Pl ace F i l e i ncl udi ng a t l e a a t a l l pa r i s he s i n which event s oc-
cur r ed and a l l count i es , whet her o r not event s occur r ed i n them. The sdd-
i t i o n of f u r t h e r pl a c e s , i f any, wi l l depend on coat . conveni ence end ana-
l y t i c urgency. The l i k e l y i t ems of i nf or mat i on i n such a f i l e a r e :
name of t h e a dmi ni s t r a t i ve u n i t ( pa r i s h, e t c . )
pr oper name of t h e pl a c e
pos i t i on wi t hi n a dmi ni s t r a t i ve hi er ar chy: pa r i s h, hundred, count y. e t c .
g r i d s quar e l oc a t i on per Gazet t eer
l oc a t i on i n 1831 census
popul at i on i n 1831
ot he r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h a t pl ace: pr esence o r absence of market .
e xt e nt of manufact uri ng, e t c .
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of s p e c i f i c l oc a t i on wi t hi n t h a t pl ace: i nn, church.
publ i c aquare; . shop, e t c .
enumerat i on of a l l event s occur r i ng i n t h a t pl a c e
3. Formation Sect i on
One u n i t per f or mat i on knwn t o be pr es ent . Every participant must he ss-
si gned t o a t l e a a t one f or mat i on. So must ever y a c t i on: i f we know some
a c t i o n occur r ed, but c a n' t a s s i gn i t t o a s p e c i f i c f or mat i on, we c r e a t e a
f or mat i on named SOMEONE. There may be more t han one SOMEONE. I n t h a t
c a s e , we name them SOMEONE 1, SOMEONE 2. ....
A f or mat i on i s a s e t of peopl e who a c t t oget her andl or i n t e r a c t wi t h anot -
he r f or mat i on i n t h e cour s e of t h e event . The f i r s t f or mat i on named must
margin of e r r o r ' f o r gr i d s quar e l oc a t i on
A-51
liavc 10+ members. We d i v i d e t he remai nder i n t o a s few f or mat i ons a s pos s i bl e: . '
I
g e n e r a l l y one f or mat i on f o r each s e t of peopl e wlio a c t di s t i ngui s ha bl y i n t he
1
c our s e of t h e event .
f or mat i on numbers: two d i g i t s
ove r l a p wi t h ot he r f or mat i ons : l i s t of ot he r f or mat i on' s numbers
r c l n t i o n of t h i s f or mat i on t o event : p a r t i c p a n t , s p e c t a t o r , e t c .
nnme(s) of f or mat i on: al pl i abet i c, i nc l udi ng SOMEONE ( i n pa r e nt he s i s i f
t h e name i s i n f e r r e d r a t h e r t han gi ven e x p l i c i t l y )
s o c j u l composi t i on of f or mat i on: a l pha be t i c , i nc l udi ng DK ( don' t know)
ot he r words de s c r i bi ng f or mat i on: a l pha be t i c , i nc l udi ng NONE [ i n pa r e nt he s i s
i f i nf e r r e d from account , e. g. (LED BY TAILOR)].
pl a c e of o r i g i n o r normal r es i dence: a l pha be t i c , i ncl udi ng DI;
words used t o de s c r i be maani t ude of f or mat i on: a l pha be t i c , i nc l udi ng NONE
[ i n pa r e nt he s i s i f i n f e r r e d from account , e. g. (GROUP FILLED SQUARE)]
number of p n r l i c i p a n t s : low e s t i ma t e (50+ = a t l e a s t 50. 101+ = more t han
100, e t c . )
number of pa r t i c i pa nt s : hi gh e s t i ma t e
I
number of p a r t i c i p a n t s : b e s t e s t i ma t e
s our ce of be s t e s t i ma t e : code (when t h e a v a i l a b l e account s c ont a i n more
t han one e s t i ma t e , wr i t e COblMENT)
number of person-days: b e s t e s t i ma t e ( 00 - unknown, 01 = p a r t i c i p a t i o n
, l a s t e d l e s s t han one day)
number of person Ilours: b e s t e s t i ma t e . 00 = unknown, 01 = l e s s t han 1 hour .
I'erson-days and person-hours a r e a d d i t i v e . For example. 025, 075 means
25 person-dnys + 75 person-hours, a r eas onabl e e s t i ma t e f o r a f or mat i on
of 25 peopl e i n cont i nuous a c t i o n t o r 1 day pl us t hr e e more hour s.
01,
75 means 0 person-days + 75 person-l i ours. Note a l t e r n a t i v e e s t i ma t e s
a s COMMENTS.
A-52
s our ce of be s t es t i mat e: code
b e s t e s t i ma t e of number a r r e s t e d. Note a l t e r n a t i v e e s t i ma t e s a s COMMENTS.
s our ce of be s t es t i mat e: code
b e s t e s t i ma t e of number wounded. Note a l t e r n a t i v e e s t i ma t e s oe COMMENTS.
s our ce of be e t es t i mat e: code
be s t e s t i ma t e of number k i l l e d . Note a l t e r n a t i v e eet i mat ea a s COHMENTS.
s our ce of be s t es t i mat e: code
NOTE: b e s t es t i mnt es of person-days, person-hours. a r r e s t s , wounded, k i l l -
ed, must each sum t o t o t a l s gi ven i n EVENT SECTION
4. Action-Phase Sect i on
An event begi ns a t t he f i r s t poi nt a t wllich a t l e a s t t en of t he peopl e wlio
event ual l y make a cl ai m which would qua l i f y t h e event f o r i nc l us i on i n our
sample a r e gat her ed wi t hout di s pe r s i ng bef or e t hey make tlie cl ai m. The
event ends when t h e l a s t s e t of peopl e which has made such a cl ai m i n tlie
cour s e of t he event di s pe r s e s . I f new cl ai ms by 1 O t peopl e which would
i ndependent l y qua l i f y t h e event f o r i nc l us i on a r i s e i n t he cour s e of t he
event , t hey keep t h e event goi ng.
A new act i on- phase begi n when f or mat i on begi ns a new a c t i on. A t l e a s t
one phase must de s c r i be a c t i on bef or e t he event s begi ns; when poes i bl e,
t he r e shoul d be one such u n i t f or each format i on pr es ent a t t he begi nnj ng
of t h e event . A t l e a s t one phase must de s c r i be a c t i on a f t e r t h e event
ends; when pos s i bl e , t he r e shoul d be one such u n i t form each f or mat i on
which sur vi ved t o t he end of t h e event .
I f more t han one formnt j on changes a c t i o n a t t he same t i me. we mnke a
phase u n i t f o r each f or mat i on and a s s i gn each u n i t t h e same t i me.
The minimtlm r ecor d c ont a i ns a t l e a s t one phase each:
1 ) be f or e t h e event
b e g i ~ ~ s ; 2) a t t i l e begi nni ng oC t i l e e ve nt ; 3 ) i n t h e cour s e of t he e ve nt ;
4 ) a t t he end of t h e e vc nt ; 5) a f t e r t h e e ve nt .
Every f or mat i on namecl must appear i n a t l e a s t one act i on- phase.
Sequence number: f i r s t new phase a t t h i s t i me. Two d i g i t s ; 00 = sometime
Order number f o r mul t i pl e phases which s t a r t s i mul t aneous l y: one d i g i t
da t e : year , month, day
cl ock t i me: 2400 - mi dni ght ; 0000 = unknown
r e l a t i o n t o cvent : 1 = be f or e event begi ns ; 2 0 a c t i o n i n i t i a t i n g e ve nt ;
3 - i n cour s e of cvent ; 4 = a c t i o n endi ng event : 5 - a f t e r event ends
f o r mt i o n number: 00 - someone ( i f us ed, we must enumerat e a SOMEONE forma-
t i on: 99 - a l l f or mat i ons
a c t i o n : a l p h a b e t i c , i nc l udi ng DK ( d e f i n i t e l y per mi t s phr as es such a s
ATTEMPT TO . . . .; i n pa r e nt he s i s i f our summary o r i n f e r ~? n c e , wi t hout
p n r e n t l ~e s i s i f d i r e c t t r a n s c r i p t i o n of words i n account )
obj e c t of a c t i o n : a l p l ~ a b e t i c , i nc l udi ng DK, NONE, FOREli\TlOPl 23, e t c .
immediate consequences f o r obj e c t : a l p h a b e t i c , i nc l udi ng DK, NONE (conse-
quences oc c ur r i ng dur i ng same act i on- pi l ase onl y; use a f t e r - e ve nt pl ~a s e s f or
l a t e r consequences) .
5. Four cr SccLio:;
-
One u n i t per s our ce. I n p r i n c i p l e , t h e r e shoul d be one s our ce u n i t per
name of s our ce: a l p l ~a b e t i c . St andar d o b b r c v i a t i o ~ ~ s f o r maj or s our ces
l o c a t i o n wi t hi n s our ce: i nf or mat i on wi l l var y wi t h t ype of s our ce. For
newspapers, f o r example, l oc a t i on wi l l t y p i c a l l y be d a t e , page, l o c a t i o n
on page.
f u r t h e r i d e n t i f y i n g i nf or mat i on: i nc l ude s NONE. Hay c i t e he a dl i ne , i n d i c a t e
l o c a t i o n i n f oot not e , and s o on.
comments on s our ce: a l pha be t i c . l nc l ude s NONE. May mention q u a l i t y , con-
t r a d i c t i o n of o t h e r s our ces , use made i n codi ng.
6. Comment Se c t i on
One u n i t per comment. May be keyed t o nny l oc a t i on wi t hi n EVENT, PLACE,
FORMATION, ACTION-PHASE, OR SOURCE s e c t i o n s . I n some c a s e s . t h e codebook
wi l l r e q u i r e t h e coder who us es n c e r t a i n code t o make a CONMENT
J
l oc a t i on i n r e c c r d: numer i cal code
comment: a l pha be t i c
cover s he e t and one cover s he e t pcr s our c e u n i t .
APPENDIX 4. MATERIALS FROM THE STUDY OF CONTENTIOUS GATHERINGS IN GREAT
BRITAIN
The materiala concern February 1828. First comes a provisional list
of all contentious gatherings reported in our six sources (Morning Chronicle,
The Times. Hansard's, The Mirror of Parliament. Gentlemen's and Annual Re-
-- -
gister) for that month. In the list, two events are underlined. The mn-
terials which follow are readers' reports and copies of some of the relevant
articles in the periodicals.
Type of CC Place - -
-
Date Issue
meeting Weymouth 02-02 parliamentary election
meeting London 02-03 protection of victualler trade
meeting Poultry 02-04 test corporation acts
meeting . Edinburgh 02-04 petition king about political favors
gathering Liverpool 02-05 election to parliament
gathering Durham 02-05 local election
gathering Dover 02-06 election to parliament
violence ~ b n d o n 02-06 crowd attacks informer
parade Weymouth 02- 07 election
meeting Sheffield 02-07 vestry, church rates
violence Newbury 02-07 crowd attacks informer
demonstration Weymouth 02-09 election
meeting Windsor 02-10 tax on carts
gathering-crowd Weymouth 02-11 election
gathering-mob on don 02-13 threatens informer
gathering-crowd Durham 02-13 county elections
meeting London 02-15 licensed vs. non-licensed sellers
- -
violence Atherstone 02-16 poaching affray
meeting Leicester 02-18 coin laws
Type of CG
gathering
meeting
violence
meeting
meeting
meeting
meeting
meeting
meeting
Place
Weymouth
Mary-la-bonne
Scarborough
Shef f ield
Islington
London
Honiton
Dorcheater
Manchester
Date
-
02-18
02-20
02-28
February (approx. )
February (approx. )
February (approx. )
February (approx. )
February (approx. )
February (approx.)
Issue
election victory celebration
parish rates
smuggling affray
test and corporation acts
test and corporation acts
test and corporation acts
teat and corporation acts
test and corporation acts
stamp duties
~ - .
Tndav' : d a t r - - 197h
: ) I l ansnr d ( ) IIVP ( ) S c l ~ w e i ~ z e r
, ) L0NlK)W 'PIIIES p;lge col umn
2- ( w o r d ( ) Gues t
2 ( ) E a t o n , ) L e w i s
: 5 MORNING CI!RONI<:l,E d a t e d -//- d- 8/ day + Bot t om ( ) Gr een ( ) Dunkl e
( ) Ander son ( ) Ba r be
F i r s t Lint:- - - &_~; ~Y- . Q&~~/ - C - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
GENERAL DESCRIPTION: CllECK AS MANY AS APPLY(see memo /! 6 )
( 1) VIOLENCE ( )
p r o p e r t y damage ( ), s e i z u r e of p r o p e r t y , s p a c e s o r p e r s o n s ( ).
p e r s o n a l i n j u r y ( ), t h r e a t o f a ny of t h e a bove ( ).
( 2 ) ElEETlNGS ( )
( ) E l e c t i o n
( ) Ve s t r y
f Li ver \ .
( ) s u p p o r t f o r enemy o f gover nment
( ) c o n t r o l o f l o c a l g o v e r n me n t l i n s t i t u t i o n
( ) o t h e r g r i e v a n c e s and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n s
. ,
( ) Di nne r
( ) o p p o s i t i o n t o o t h e r p e o p l e s o r gr oups
( ) P o l i t i c a l c l u b l p a r t y , ( ) o b j e c t i v e s u n c l e a r
( ) wi t h p r t i t i o n , a d d r e s s , e t c . ( ) n o t i c e s , r e q u e s t s ( f o r p a s t o r f u t u r e me e t i n g s )
( ) o p p o s i t i o n t o gover nment ( ) o t h e r ( 1 i s t )
( ) s u p p o r t f o r gover nment
(3-8) GATHERINGS
d e mo n s t r f l i n n s (/I: p a r a d e ( ) , ass-es, cr owds , mobs (4, g a t h e r i n g s ( ) I
r a l l i e s ( ) , s p e c i a l celebrations ( ) .
o t h e r ( )-
( 10) LADllR ACTI\' ITIES ( )
s t r i k e , t u r n o u t ( ). l o c k o u t ( ), c omhi na t i on o r uni on ment i on ( ) ,
t l i r e a t n t o s t o p work ( ) , work s t o p p a g e s ( ). r e t u r n t o work ( ).
dr ! ?i l t at i ons 1 3 f v o r k e r s ( ) .
( 11) I.ECAI. ACTIOI:S ( )
a r r e s t s ( ) . r x a mi n n t l o n s ( ) , r t n o . ( . t r j a l s l c o u r t p r o c e d i n g s (
s e n t e n c e s . e x e c u t i o n s , r t c . ( ) . Re s u r e t o check t h r a p p r o p t n t r a r e a s ahove t h a t
p e r t a i n t o t h e a c t i o n Chat br ought a l >ol ~t t h e a r r e s t o r t r i a l
EXTRA E!:T[1'.
s w e i l r ill,! i n <,I s p e c i a l c u n s t a h l e s ( 5 , o r s u n or s u s p e c t e d a r s o n ( 1.
machi ne b r e a k i n g , d e s ~ r u c t i o n of l ooms o r t h r e s h e r s , c t c . ( ) .
Obj ect . vc. v i a c i i u n > / fi C ~ ( h ' ;
, . p l l t s , rf / &. ~YUC_A~< &wD,~we /;II /%
liunhe r &! &A f7 ~ / , ~ ' ' ~ ~ f l d ~ I. euders &/. . ~ G L ) & x ;
Kc6 7, 7iuwl I ) u r a t i c n ( i f known)
Ye: ; t er d; ~y, I n s t week, a few da ys a go
1 day - o r l e s s , a f r w d a y s , more
I.C,*: -,. i o a l - ;ri+ GAT^ ' . LC)[ [ &~dT/ f ,
s p e c i i p! ace, i n n . f i e l d . e t c . v i l l a y n r t ownl c i t y
p a r i sli
:.,Lsa- :>..-' , "
-
-
I .! ;. C.: C ' i . GI
Tnday's date ,.*'-,.., -- 1976 T~ri;~v'e d;itl , . - : - 1971,
( ) G.M.
- ' C!:!'m' DRlTAllJ STUDY SAMl'LE RECORDING SllEET 3-76 j ( ) A . ~ . C;RI:AT 1)Rll'Alh' STIIDY SMI'1.I: HECORDIF'(: SIII:I:l 3-7h
( ) Hansnrd ( ) 1101' - . I ( ) llansnrd ( ) 1101'
' 8 - ( )Schweltzer page 3 column 3 ( )Scl~wcitzer
( :) LONWN TIMES p o w .I/ column -' T-qp ._. ( )Lord ( )Guest ( L)"LONIJI?: 'I'lFIIS
Top - ( )Lord ( )Guest
w e ' ( aton on ( )Levlo t--!lipdl$ ' ( )Eaton ( )Lewis
( ) MORNING CIIROIIICLE date3-/ 1-1 7~:; day Bottom (dcreen ( )Dunkle ( ) MORNING CllRONICLE dated'//- 42 d day 4' ~ottom ~ ~ r c c n (
I
(1) VlOLENCE ( )
property damage ( ), seizure of property, sp.sces.or persons ( ),
personal injury ( 1, threat of any of the above ( ).
(1) VlOLENCE ( )
property damage ( 1, seizure of property, spaces or persons ( ).
personal injury ( ), threat of any of the above ( ) .
( 2) bEETINGS ( )
( ) Election ( ) support for enemy of government
( ) Vestry ( ) control of local government/institution
( ) Livery ( ) other grievances and dissatisfactions
( ) Dinner ( ) opposition to other peoples or groups
( ) Political club/party ( ) objectives unclear
( ) with petition, address, etc. ( ) notices, requests(for past or future meetings)
( ) opposition to government ( ) other(1ist)
( ) support for.government
(3-8) GATHERINGS /
demonstrations ( 1. parade( ), assemblies, crovds, mobs ( G' , gatherings ( ),
rallies ( ), special celebrations (. ) ,
other ( )
(2) EIEETINCS ( )
( ) Election ( ) support for enemy of government
( ) Vestry ( ) control of local government/institution
( ) Livery .( ) other grievances and dissstisfactions
( ) Ginner ( ) opposition to other peoples or groups
( ) Political clublparty ( ) objectives unclear ,
( j with petition, address, etc. ( ) notices, requests(for past or future meetings)
( ) opposition to government ( ) other(1ist) .
( ) support for government
(3-8) GATHERINGS --'
demonstrations ( ), parade( ) , assemhlies, crowds, mobs (I ), gatl~crings ( ) ,
rallies ( ). special celebrations ( 7 , '
other ( )
( 9 ) DELEGATIONS. DEPUTATIONS ( )
I
(9) DELECATIONS. DEPUTATIONS ( )
(10) LABOR ACTIVITIES ( )
strike, turnout ( ). lockbut ( ) , cdmbination or union mention ( ),
threats to stop work ( 1, work stoppages ( ). return to work ( ),
deputations of workers ( ) . .
(1 I ) LEGAL ACTIOIIS ( 'j
errests ! ), examinattons ( ) , pretrial info. ( ), trials/court procedings ( ) ,
sentences. executions-, etc.'( ) . ' Be sure to check the npproplnte area5 ahove that
ner:ai? to t11c action that brought ahout the arrest or trial.
EX1'1 :
-
sveari.11g in oi special constables ( j , arson or suspected arson ( 1.
s:~chlne breaking, destruction of looms or threshers. etc. ( 1.
(10) LABOR ACTIVITIES ( !
strike, turnout ( ) , 1ock.out ( ), comhination or union mention ( ).
threats to stop work ( ), work stoppages ( ), return to work ( ).
deputations of workers ( ).
(11) LEGAL ACTIONS ( )
arrests ( ) , examinations ( ), prctrinl info. ( ) , trlalslcourt prncedit~gs ( ) .
sentences, cxeclltions, etc. ( ) . Re sure to clicck the apprnpinte areas above that
pertain to the action that brought ahor~r the arrest or trial.
I - -
swearlni: in of special constables ( ) . ar:iurl or susoected nrs1.n ( ) .
I
mnclilne hreakinp. destruction of looms or tlireshers, ctc. ( ) .
0
. ar::ci!.,nts &/Fn3/i of f l . s3 cci.&.f.-
,
flf? Number Leaders
_ , , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ - - - - - - - - -
Objective of action / e';; m7, , * ~7 G',, fi;A0 ,
Pi~rcicipants
. ,
tiurnbrr /Q14 ,C koA7 [ . J, ~ " ' " ,,'> :. .. I.earlers
/,' j -
i - i t ? f d f n /nu 0 - 7~ 1' . ~ / d ) +[l~'~uration(if k n , ) 1 Date Ilurat ion(i f knnwn)
Ycrterdcy, last Meek, s few days ago ' 1 day or less, a few days, more
Ye:-;terd:~y, last week, a few days ago 1 day or less, a few days, more
'. .___Z
-
Lttcati~n-
sl:r!fic place, inn, field, etc. villagebr town/city parish
I.oca t ion - - >
specific place, inn. field, etc. par i sh
'I'<3d:4y1s ,!:,tc -1 - ' .i - l:l7(,
GREAT BRITAIN STIIDY SAMP1.E RECOHDJNE SllEET 3- 76
( ) Hansard ( ) il0P
( ) LONINN TIMES page
column
'
Top ( )Guest
CHiddle ( )Eaton ( )Levlo
MORNING CllRONICLE date d-18- / g28 day ( )~urke ( )Dunklo
( )Burns ( )Driver
/
(1) VIOLENCE ( )
property damage ( ), seizure of property, spaces or persons ( ) ,
personal injury ( ), threat of any of the above ( ).
( 2) MEETINGS (4
( ) Election ( )'support for enemy of government
( ) Vestry ( ) control of local governmentlinstitution
( ) Livery (4 other grievances and dissatisfactions
( ) Dinner (d opposition to other peoples or groups
( ) Political clubfparty ( ) objectives unclear
( ) with petition. address, etc. (9 notices, requests(for&r future mertin(tp)
( ) opposition to government ( ) other(I1st)
( ) support for government -
I
(3-8) GATHERINGS
demonstrations ( ), parade( ), assemblies, crovds, mobs ( ), gatherinms ( ) ,
rallies ( 1, special celebrations ( ),
other ( )
1
( 9 ) DELEGATIONS. DEPUTATIONS ( )
(10) LABOR ACTIVITIES ( )
strike, turnout ( ), lockout ( ), combination or union mention .( ),
threats to stop work ( ). . work stoppages : 1, return to work ( ),
deputations of workers ( ) .
(11) LEGAL ACTIONS ( )
arrests ( ), examinattons ( ), pretrial info. ( ), trialslcourt procedlngs ( ),
sentences, executions> etc. ( ). Be sure to check the appropiate areas nbove thnt
pertain to the action that brought about the arrest or trinl.
EXTRA EXTRA
suearin~ in of speci~l constables ( ), arson or suspected arson ( ) .
machine breaking, destruction of looms or threshers, etc. ( ) .
I - -
/ Objective or action AMI AJ~T /VOAJ- L i ~ e d ~ t d ,se(/en 5 .
/ ~articipants f - ( @. AJ &C~ UI L ~ UI U~ ? RJ
I Number ,VOW ~ R O V J Leaders C R ~ J . / ~ L ~ A D P ~ J
1 Date
iCRi
2.15. /a8 nuration(lf know)
Yesterday, last week, a few days ago 1 day or less, a feu days, more
Location Lof i d~ TAUeU' , ~ d n l d d
specific place, inn, field, etc. village or townlcity parish
county
COMMEhTS ON BACK? ( ) h- 76 6) Bobbi
' l ' a*J: ~y' s d : ~ t r 6 - Z' j - 1976
GREAT BRITAIN STUDY SAW1.E RECORDING SllEET 3-76
( ) Hansard ( ) HOP
(fl LONDON TIMES column 2.
\&%k$izer
page Top, ( )Lord ( )Guest
( aton on ( )Levis
( ) MORNING CllRONICLE date 9 . / 8 - / J Z K day /M Rottom ( )Burke ( )Dunkle
First ~ine:- - -A- - - N ~ M ~ R ~ U J - ~ ~ 7 f d 6 . - . ( )Burns ( )Driver
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
GENERAL DESCRIPTION: CHECK AS MANY-A' %FLY(:~~ memo I1 6)
(1) VIOLENCE ( )
property damage ( ), seizure of property. spaces or persons ( ).
personal injury ( ), threat of any of the above ( ).
(2) MEETINGS (4
( ) Election ( ) support for enemy of government
( ) Vestry ( ) control of local government/institution
( ) Livery (dother grievances atrd dtssstisfactions
( ) Dinner (3/opposition to other peoples or groctps
( ) Political clubfpsrty ( ) objectives unclear
( ) with petition, address, etc. ( ) notices, requests(for past or future meetin~r)
( ) opposition to government ( ) other(1ist)
( ) support for government
(3-8) GATHERINGS
demonstrations ( ), parade( ). sssemblies, crowds, mobs ( ). gatherlngs ( ) .
rallies ( ), special celebrations ( ) ,
other ( )
( 9 ) DELEGATIONS, DEPUTATIONS ( )
(10) LABOR ACTIVITIES ( )
strike, turnout ( ), lockout ( ), combination or union mention ( ),
threats-to stop work ( ), work stoppages : ), return to work ( ),
deputations of workers ( ).
(11) LEGAL ACTIONS ( )
arrests ( ), examinations ( ), pretrial info. ( ), trisls/court procedings (
sentences, executions, etc. ( 0. Be sure to check the appropiate arena nbove thnt
pertain to the action that brought about the arrest or trial.
EXTRA
s w e a r i n g in of special constables ( ), arson or suspected arson ( ) ,
machine breaking, destruction of looms or threshers, etc. ( ).
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Objective of action //v~&?wP I J
Participants L l t e ~ ~ d ~i c 7~&l / e k5
Number /DO& ~ R O ~ J Leaders (h&) B,!e~0erJ
Date 2- / S- / &zr m' I)uration(if knovn)
Yesterday, last week, a few days ego s, a feu days, more
~ocation f O, ?I O~FI ~ A V ~ ~ E J , ~ 3 d J ~ d
specific plac'e, inn, fieid, etc. village or townfcity psri sh
/n ~ D O L J B ~
.- -
coun l y
COHMENTS ON BACK? (4 6-76 ! 6) Bobbi
BW A> mc Cued7
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The bibliography falls into eight sections, corresponding to the book's
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1. Introduction
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B- 2
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I
I
Nor dl i nger , Er i c A.
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