MODELS, REPRESENTATION, AND MEDIATION

Tarja Knuuttila
University of Helsinki
Representation has been one of the main themes in the recent discussion of models. Several authors have
argued for a pragmatic approach to representation that takes users and their interpretations into account. It
appears to me ho!ever that this emphasis on representation places e"cessive limitations on our vie! of
models and their epistemic value. #odels should rather be thought of as epistemic artifacts through !hich
!e gain kno!ledge in diverse !ays. $pproaching models this !ay stresses their materiality and media%
specificity. &ocusing on models as multi%functional artifacts loosens them from any pre%established and fi"ed
representational relationships and leads me to argue for a t!o%fold approach to representation.
1. Introduction
In vie! of the e"tensive critical discussions of representation in 'ontinental philosophy
pragmatism and the humanities the (uestion of representation has entered philosophy of science
only relatively recently.
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To the philosophy of science representation has found its !ay especially
through the interest in models and modeling. It appears to me that one e"planation for this is the
fact that the things called models in science are truly heterogeneous ensembles. They can be
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This also applies to analytical philosophy in general. Traditionally the problem of *representation* has
featured in the more marginal areas of philosophy proper notably in aesthetics and political philosophy.
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diagrams physical three%dimensional things mathematical e(uations computer programs
organisms and even laboratory populations. The problem becomes then ho! do all these diverse
things add to our kno!ledge+
Interestingly recent !riters on the topic of models and representation have been nearly
unanimous in saying that models have to be representative in order to give us kno!ledge ,-ailer%
.ones ,/0012 da 'osta and &rench ,/0002 &rench and 3adyman ,)4442 &rigg ,/00/2 #orrison 5
#organ ,)4442 Su6re7 ,/00/2 8iere ,/00/2. 9ven so their preferred accounts of representation
differ !idely from each other. This poses several (uestions. 8iven the different analyses of
representation !hy do !e !ant to tie the epistemic value of models to representation even though
!e do not agree on !hat representation involves+ Is the problem that !e lack an ade(uate
conception of !hat scientific representation involves or are !e trying to include too many different
things under the *category: of representation+ ;hat other !ays of approaching the epistemic value
of models are there+
In the follo!ing I argue that the emphasis on representation does not do justice to the various
roles of models in science and that a more material and practical approach to them should be
adopted. I begin by revie!ing some recent analyses of ,scientific2 representation and then discuss
the approaches that shift the traditional focus from representation to those of mediation and
production. I suggest that models could be fruitfully treated as epistemic artifacts that are used to
gain kno!ledge in diverse !ays. &ocusing on models as multi%functional artifacts loosens them
from any pre%established fi"ed and !ell%defined representational relationships and causes us to
rethink the (uestion of representation. 'onse(uently I argue that in tackling the (uestion of
representation !e need an approach that distinguishes bet!een the medium of representation and
the relation of representation. I call this a two-fold approach to representation.
/
2. From dyadic to (at la!t" triadic account! o# r$r!ntation
In the recent discussion on models most !riters have stressed in one !ay or another that
representation is a triadic relation involving either the *users: or *interpretation* ,see ho!ever da
'osta and &rench </000= &rench and 3adyman <)444= for an opposite vie!2. This means a shift
a!ay from the semantic or structuralist conception of models according to !hich representation is
a dyadic relation bet!een t!o things the real system and its abstract and theoretical depiction.
$ccording to the structuralist conception the models are interpreted as structures !hose
relationship !ith their target systems is analy7ed in terms of isomorphism> a given structure
represents its target systems if both are structurally isomorphic to each other. ,-y isomorphism I
refer to a kind of mapping that can be established bet!een the t!o that preserves the relations
among elements2. 'onse(uently the representative po!er of a structure derives from its being
isomorphic !ith respect to some real system or a part of it. ?ne of the advantages of speaking in
terms of isomorphic relationships seems to be that isomorphism can be given a precise formal
formulation !hich cannot be given for instance to similarity !hich is another candidate offered for
the analysis of representative relationships
/
.
The above mentioned theoretical attractiveness of isomorphism vanishes once !e reali7e that
the parts of the real !orld !e aim to represent are not *structures* in any obvious !ay at least not
in the sense re(uired by the structuralist theory. It is perhaps possible to ascribe a structure to some
parts of the real !orld but then they are already modeled ,or represented2 someho!. This has of
course been noticed by the proponents of the semantic theory@ Aatrick Suppes has for instance
invoked *models of data* ,)4B/2. Thus the isomorphism re(uired by the structuralist account
concerns actually the relationship bet!een a theoretical model and an empirical model.
9ven if !e disregard the fact that the !orld does not present itself to us in ready%made
structures isomorphism does not seem to provide any ade(uate account of representation.
/
8iere ,)4CC2 has suggested that representation should be understood in terms of similarity.
1
Isomorphism denotes a symmetric relation !hereas representation does not> !e !ant a model to
represent its target system but not vice versa.
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#oreover the isomorphism account does not accept
false representations as representations. The idea that representation is either an accurate depiction
of its object or then it is not a representation at all does not fit our actual representational practices.
-oth problems appear to be solved once the pragmatic aspects of representation are taken into
account. The usersD intentions create the directionality needed to establish a representative
relationship@ something is being used andEor interpreted as a model of something else !hich makes
the representative relation triadic involving human agency. This also introduces indeterminateness
into the representative relationships> human beings as representers are fallible.
%. Pra&matic a$$roac'! to !cinti#ic r$r!ntation
The critical importance of the use to !hich representations are put has recently been e"pressed in
various !ays by Ronald 8iere ,/00/2 #auricio Su6re7 ,/00/2 and Faniela -ailer%.ones ,/0012. ?f
these pragmatic accounts of scientific representation the one by -ailer%.ones is possibly the most
traditional. She discusses representation in terms of propositions entailed by models. -y entailment
-ailer%.ones does not mean logical entailment for models *use a !hole range of different means of
e"pression such as te"ts diagrams and mathematical e(uations* and thus some of the content of a
model may be e"pressed in non%propositional forms. $s a result the number of the propositions
1
This also applies to the similarity account of representation. &or thorough studies on the formal and other
properties that !e might e"pect an acceptable concept of representation to satisfy see Suare7 ,/00/2 and
&rigg ,/00/2. Insightful though these studies are especially as criticisms of the structuralist account they
appear to put the cart before the horse. It is as if !e already kne! the essentials of the representative relation
and the task remaining !ould be to find ,preferably a formal2 analysis for itGone that satisfies the
conditions laid do!n. The unresolved issues regarding representation suggest the contrary.
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entailed by a model cannot be conclusively determined. #oreover models typically entail
propositions that are kno!n to be false. This leads -ailer%.ones to consider the functions of models
since models containing false propositions can be accepted for some *higher purpose*. -ecause *a
model is intended to meet a certain functionIthe attempt to meet the function overrides the striving
for the modelDs pro"imity to truth* ,/001 J02.
The proposal to speak of representation in terms of propositions entailed by models seems
some!hat parado"ical for as long as philosophy of science operated predominantly on the basis of
propositions ,derived from theories and models2 and their fit !ith the data ,via the procedure of
testing2 the (uestion of representation did not arise. It becomes acute once !e grant that much
scientific reasoning operates on other representative means than ,propositional2 language. -ailer%
.ones admits for instance that large parts of models can be described by means of images.
Kevertheless she tries to justify her propositional account of representation by claiming that there
!ill al!ays be a *commentary* on those images that relates them to the empirical !orld and that
such a commentary !ould be propositional.
Is this so+ It appears to me that this is not the case. The point of using various representative
means arises out of their different affordances in conveying diverse kinds of information much of
!hich cannot be readily if at all propositionally presented. ,Think for e"ample ho! much
information a picture or a diagram can convey us at a glance2. -esides as -ailer%.ones leaves the
notion of *entailing* une"plained one is left !ondering !hy it is that models *entail* some
propositions and not others. This seems to have something to do !ith the representative po!er of
models !hich this account of representation has actually left untouched.
Ronald 8iere ,/00/2 for his part is e"plicit in stating !hat the representative po!er ultimately
hinges on. Though his vie!s on models and representation have changed substantially since the
semantic conception propounded in Explaining Science ,8iere )4CC2 he still claims that
representation is based on a similarity of some kind. 8iere notes that even though no objective
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measure of similarity can be given *it is the e"istence of the specified similarities that makes the
use of the model to represent the real system* ,/00/ B2. Ko general analysis of similarity is needed
,and can be given2 to e"plain scientific representation because of the irreducibly pragmatic nature of
the scientific representation. 'onse(uently instead of concentrating on the t!o%place relation
bet!een representation and its target system 8iere proposes that representation can be thought of
as having at least four places !ith roughly the follo!ing form>
S uses M to represent W for purpose P
In the above form S can be anything from an individual scientist to a scientific community. # is a
model and ; stands for a *piece of the real !orld a ,kind of 2 thing or event:. #ore informally
the message of the form can be e"pressed as> *Scientists use models of a particular type to represent
something in the !orld for a specific purpose* ,/2. Met 8iere is careful to point out that scientists
also use models for other purposes besides representation.
In line !ith 8iere #auricio Su6re7 ,/00/2 critici7es dyadic conceptions of representation
because of their attempt to *reduce the essentially intentional judgments of representation%users to
facts about the source and target objects or systems and their properties* ,12. $s opposed to 8iere
ho!ever Su6re7 does not !ant to *naturali7e representation*. This means that he resists saying
anything substantive about the supposed basis on !hich the representational po!er of representative
vehicles rests i.e. !hether they rest for instance on isomorphism similarity or denotation.
$ccording to Su6re7 such accounts of representation err in trying to *seek for some deeper
constituent relation bet!een the source and the target* !hich could then e"plain as a by%product
!hy firstly the source is capable of leading a competent user to a consideration of a target and
secondly !hy scientific representation is able to sustain *surrogate reasoning*. Instead Su6re7
builds his inferential account of representation directly on these by%products. 'onse(uently Su6re7
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calls his account of representation *deflationary*Gor *minimalist*> no deeper features are sought
instead one settles !ith the surface features.
The formulation Su6re7 gives to the inferential conception of representation is the follo!ing>
A represents B only if (i) the representational force of A points towards B and (ii) A allows
competent and informed agents to draw specific inferences regarding B!
This formulation presupposes the activity of competent and informed agents. The *representational
force: according to Su6re7 is *the capacity of the source to lead a competent and informed user to
a consideration of the target*. This *relational and conte"tual property of the source* is fi"ed and
maintained in part by the intended representational uses of the source by the agents ,/00/ H2. Aart
/ of the formulation contributes to the objectivity that is re(uired of scientific representation. Su6re7
claims that in comparison to Aart ) Aart / depends in no !ay on an agentDs e"istence or activity.
Instead *it re(uires $ to have the internal structure that allo!s informed agents to correctly dra!
inferences about -* ,)12. Thus even though Su6re7 does not !ant to specify !hat kind of a relation
there is bet!een the source and the target it nevertheless has to be grounded on the structure of the
representative vehicle someho!.
These pragmatic attempts to e"plain representation appear promising especially those of 8iere
and Su6re7. Ho!ever if !e adopt a pragmatic approach to models the focus on representation
appears unnecessarily limiting. &rom the scientific practice point of vie! representation is only one
of the uses models are put to.
(. Mdiation
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#orrison and #organDs vie! on models as mediators ,)4442 is an attempt to approach the epistemic
functions of models from other angles besides that of representation. They consider models as
autonomous agents !hich through their construction gain independence ,at least partly2 from
theory and data since besides being comprised of both theory and data models typically involve
also *additional NoutsideD elements* ,)444 ))2. ?nce independent models can mediate in different
!ays. They can function as tools because of their autonomous nature. -ut the models that are used
in science are actually more than just instruments being *investigative instruments*. Thus
#orrison and #organ stress the importance of the !orkability and manipulability of models for the
scientific endeavor.
Ho!ever representation enters the scene !hen #orrison and #organ try to account for ho! !e
can learn from models. They claim that learning from models is dependent on representation> !e
can learn from models because they represent. Thus even on their account the epistemic value of
models becomes once again tied to representation. Met #orrison and #organ point out that they
do not conceive of representation in a traditional !ay as *mirroring* or as a correspondence. &or
them representation is *a kind of rendering O a partial representation that either abstracts from or
translates into another form the real nature of the system or a theory or one that is capable of
embodying only a portion of a system* ,)444 /J2. Fespite their intention to the contrary it seems
to me that their struggle !ith representation only sho!s ho! difficult it is to get rid of the
representational thinking according to !hich kno!ledge consists of representations that depict
,more or less2 accurately the entities and processes of the independently e"isting e"ternal !orld.
$s I see it #orrison and #organDs approach actually has the potential to release the epistemic
value of models from their supposed representative content due to their stress on models as
independent entities. 'oncentrating on models as independent entities is a more radical move than it
might seem at first glance. It has been customary thus far to understand models as abstractions
ideali7ations or theoretical replicas of something e"ternal to themselves. This is built into the
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semantic vie! of models> it is the *underlying: abstract structure that matters. In contrast to this
approach the specific focus on models as independent entities makes us reali7e that scientific
models are typically man%made things that are made !ith a variety of ingredients
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or in the case of
organisms often manipulated according to a certain scheme and utili7ed to gain kno!ledge in
various !ays.
). Modl! a! $i!tmic arti#act!
To call models artifacts might seem an unfortunate choice of !ord to start !ith. In science are !e
not trying to distinguish the artificial phenomena from the real ones+ -ut the problem of the
artifacts arises e"actly because science makes e"tensive use of different kinds of and often very
sophisticated tools and yet philosophy of science has not paid too much attention to their role in the
production of kno!ledge. Ho!ever a gro!ing body of literature in cognitive science suggests that
our kno!ledge is importantly bound to our ability to construct tools and manipulate our e"ternal
material environment ,see e.g. 'lark )44J2. -ased partly on this insight Knuuttila and Poutilainen
,/00/2 discuss models as epistemic artifacts. They argue that models are intentionally constructed
things that are materiali7ed in some medium and used in our epistemic endeavors in a multitude of
!ays. $s parts and products of our scientific ,and other2 activities models are endo!ed !ith
intended uses one of !hich is representation. This is in line !ith the aforementioned pragmatic
approaches to representation. Ho!ever the most interesting properties of models are due to the !ay
in !hich intentionality and materiality intersect in their diverse uses. 9ven though it has become
H
See -oumans ,)4442 for an insightful discussion of ho! many ingredients can go into a model. The
business cycle models #arcel -oumans studied contained analogies metaphors theoretical notions
mathematical concepts mathematical techni(ues styli7ed facts empirical data and finally relevant policy
vie!s.
4
customary to speak of theoretical or formal models as *tools: or *theoretical technologies: much of
that talk is still metaphorical attributing no material dimension to those things ,see Klein /001 )%
H2. Met it is precisely the material dimension of models and representations in general that makes
them collective objects of kno!ledge and enables them to mediate bet!een different people and
various practices. ;ithout materiality mediation is empty.
I !ant to stress that models should not be taken as simply material objects but rather as things
that are variously materiali7ed. There e"ists a strong tendency to distinguish material things from
theoretical abstract or ideal things. Kevertheless as parts of collective human environment
material things are already endo!ed !ith interpretations meanings and kno!ledge concerning
them. This concerns even things that are usually taken as pure tools such as laboratory instruments
and apparatus ,see 8alison )44J2. ?n the other hand theoretical ideas that are presented !ith
diagrams pictures or formal and natural languages are also materiali7ed as various inscriptions on
paper or on a screen. $ll objects of human culture have both ideal ,or virtual if you like2 and
material dimensions%%even totally fictional ones that are nevertheless materiali7ed in te"ts and
pictures concerning them. Thus I do not see ho! it is possible to make any strict demarcation
bet!een !hat is material and !hat is not. Instead one should especially in the conte"t of models
and scientific representations take into account the medium through !hich they are materiali7ed
that is one should be media%specific.
The media%specific approach to models focuses on their constraints and affordances. $s
materiali7ed things models have their o!n construction and thus their o!n !ays of functioning.
They are not open to all possible interpretations and uses !hich simplifies or modifies the cognitive
task scientists face in their !ork. In scientific !ork one typically tries to turn into affordances the
limitations of the models or the constraints built into them@ one devises the model in such a !ay that
one can learn from using or *manipulating: it. 3earning is thus made possible through the material
dimension of models !hich provides scientists a !orking object. The material dimension !hich is
)0
actually re(uired of models if they are to be *independent: in the sense that they can be transferred
to other tasks and conte"ts is also critical for their productivity. #odels often produce something
une"pected and they typically breed in addition to ne! applications ne! problems and lines of
in(uiry. &inally the stress on the artifactuality and materiality of models can accommodate !hat
-aird ,/0012 calls *thing kno!ledge: !hich is often tacit and more bound to local environments
and e"pertise than to e"plicit theoretical kno!ledge.
The artifactual approach to models stresses their multi%functionality in science and suggests that
the links bet!een models and reality are more comple" than appears !hen !e focus only on
representation. This emerges from several recent studies of models. In their study in the field of
language technology Knuuttila and Poutilainen ,/00/2 argue that the epistemic value of a parser is
largely due to its implementation. This runs counter to the tenets of the semantic approach to
models. $ccording to the semantic approach one !ould focus on the linguistic grammar underlying
the parser and the ,epistemic2 (uestion !ould be !hether it correctly represents our linguistic
competence. Met this is something to !hich cannot be ans!ered until one succeeds in making the
parser to !ork. ?nce the parser produces correct output it can be used as a starting point in trying
to ans!er several (uestions concerning language and cognition. Knuuttila ,/00/2 points out
furthermore that as soon as !e start building parsers their fabrication becomes an interesting
epistemic and methodological issue in its o!n right. Thus ne! artefacts create ne! object,s2 of
research producing a host of ne! problems.
It seems therefore that the (uestion of representation in modeling is too often approached from
the point of vie! of the *end%use: of models. It is characteristic of modeling that models are built
by representing and that this task is dependent on !hat data kno!ledge and computational
methods are available. The ready%made models then if they ever become ready are valued often
rather for !hat they produce than for being truthful representations of their ,supposed2 natural target
))
systems%%usually !e do not kno! enough about those systems !hich is e"actly the point of
modeling. Thus in connection !ith models in evolutionary biology $nya Alutynski argues that
*because !e can rarely see evolution in action evolutionary biologists use models as tools for
investigation e"istence proofs and arguments for or against the plausibility of one or another
mechanism at !ork in nature: ,/00) /1H2. $lso Robert Sudgen a theoretical economist himself
finds plausibility ,though he talks about credibility2 important in assessing the relevance of
theoretical models for the real !orld phenomena. $fter studying t!o celebrated and innovative
papers in economics he finds that in neither of them are the results that the authors derive
deductively !ithin their models the ones they !ant us to entertain. -oth !riters try to move from
the particular result in the model to a broader hypothesis that could be true of the !orld too.
'onse(uently Sudgen ,/00/2 proposes that !e are actually inferring inductively on the basis of our
models !hich rather than being any abstractions of reality should be conceived as parallel
realities! #oreover he suggests that to take an e"ample the inferences made from the models of
housing markets to actual housing markets are not very different from those !hich are made
comparing the housing markets of t!o different to!ns. ;hy this is he does not say. I suspect that it
has something to do !ith the circumstance that the models !hether natural or theoretical are
already considered from a certain point of vie! and described accordingly.
*. +onclu!ion, A t-o.#old a$$roac' to r$r!ntation
Seeing models as epistemic artifacts helps us understand that a model can give us kno!ledge in
many other !ays than simply by virtue of some kind of pre%established abstract representative
function. #ost of the information models give us is indirect a result of inferences of various kinds.
The representative links to reality provided by models are less straightfor!ard and more fragile and
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comple"ly mediated than philosophical tradition !ould have us to believe. This should lead us to
take a ne! look at representation by approaching representation provided by models as a two-fold
phenomenon comprised of both a material sign%vehicle and an intentional relation of representation
that connects the sign%vehicle to !hatever it is that is being represented. The sign%vehicle should be
thought of as a materially constructed historical artifact !hich leads us to consider the comple"
culturally constructed artifactual chains through !hich our kno!ledge of the !orld is actually
mediated. The relation part of the representation reminds us that no sign%vehicle is representative in
and of itself but that representation is both a process and a result of diverse intentional human
actions taking place in highly speciali7ed activities.
Representation as a t!o%fold phenomenon is implicit in the pragmatic accounts of representation
of 8iere ,/00/2 and Su6re7 ,/00/2. Su6re7 takes representation to be inferential activity that relates
the source to the target and is also someho! grounded on the structure of the source. 8iere relies on
similarity. Though it is based on the properties of the sign%vehicle similarity is nevertheless
established in the specific uses of the model !hich relate it to *something in the !orld:. The
structural account for its part tries to merge the t!o aspects of representation into one by claiming
that representation is grounded on the structural properties of both the model and its target system
only. It is as if the things taken as representations did their representing job i.e. created the relation
of representation by themselves by virtue of !hat they ,and their target systems2 are. This actually
appears to be often the caseG!hen the application or the interpretation of the model in (uestion has
become routine.
The distinction bet!een the material sign%vehicle and the relation of representation is largely
conceptual@ in practice as parts of intentional human activity models come !ith interpretations and
are thus already embedded in epistemic relations of diverse kinds. Met the sign%vehicle can be
detached from the relations in !hich it is embedded. This is actually a characteristic feature of
modeling@ in modeling sign%vehicles are often transferred to different conte"ts and uses. The
)1
heuristic value of models has been ascribed to this procedure of describing the entities of one
domain !ith the help of already e"isting theoretical tools from another domain ,e.g. -lack )4B/
Hesse )4BB2. In discussing computational models Aaul Humphreys notes the *multiple applicability
of formal descriptions: !hich he calls *computational templates:. These templates are applied
across a number of different disciplines. Kevertheless Humpreys claims that *templates !ith
different interpretations are not reinterpretations of the same model but different models entirely:
,/00/ J2. The same applies to representations more generally@ same sign%vehicles can sustain
different interpretations and are thus different representations.
The t!o%fold account gives !hat must minimally be involved in representation. $lthough it is
not much it is difficult to say anything more substantive about representation. $s I see it the
difficulty !ith representation arises in science as else!here !hen !e reali7e the materiality and
media%specificity of our representations. Thus !e need to e"amine the constraints and affordances
that are specific to diverse ,re2presentative means and the histories and uses of the actual scientific
artifacts. ;hether or not this kind of !ork is bound to lead to ne! analyses of representation or to
ne! conceptuali7ations that ultimately displace much of the discussion on representation remains an
open (uestion.

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