THE POLITICS OF CIVIL WAR WEAPONS PROCUREMENT:

THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT AND TWO OHIO CARBINES

A Thesis

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts

by

James Timothy !?renner, B.A.

The Ohio State University 1977

Approved by

Adviser

Department of History

Chapter One:

Chapter Two:

Chapter Four:

Chapter Five:

Chapter Six:

Chapter Seven:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction to the Ordnance Department

and the Contractors, 1850-1866 1

The Ordnance Department, 1850-1861 6

The Evolution of the Cosmopolitan Carbine ..... 27

The Ordnance Department, 1862-1866 50

The Gwyn and Campbell Carbine, 1862-1865.~ .... 64

The Armstrong-Taylor Carbine, 1862-1866 .•..... 82

The Passing of the Contractors:

Summary and Conclusion 92

Bibliography .............................................•.... 101

ii

chapter I:

Introduction to the Ordnance Department

and the Contractors,

1850-1860

iii

Any study dealing with the subject of technology muSt address itself ~o two fundamental considerations. These considerations are essential in order to understand fully the value and importance of a given technology. These considerations, or questions, are interrelated. The questions are: how did external forces influence or affect the evolution and development of a certain technology and, what was the impact or significance of that technology on the forces that shaped its development? The influence in this study is the Army Ordnance Department. The technological examples are two breechloading carbines designed, developed, and produced in Ohio during the 1850's and 1860's.

In the study of military technology, the same questions must also be addressed. This paper will attempt to illustrate the role of the Ordnance Department in the development of smallarms technology. A corollary will be to indicate

the degree of control that the Department exercised in procurement and contract policies both before and during the Civil War. For the most part, Departmental control of such policies was extremely tight. The Department lost that control only once. In 1861, the urgent need for all types of weapons and the pressure exerted on the Department by various lobbyists temporarily abolished standard contract procedures. The Cosmopolitan carbine is a reflection of that lost control.

In 1862, and in each succeeding year, the Ordnance Department reasserted itself to such an extent that by 1863 neither foreign arms were purchased nor new domestic smallarms contracts let. The Department regained control so completely that by the

1

end of the war and the breechloader trials of 1865 and 1866 it was adhering to its practices of the previous decade.

Beginning in 1862, the subsequent stories of the Cosmopolitan or Gwyn and Campbell carbine and the attempts by John Taylor and James Armstrong to have their breechloader adopted into military service demonstrate the Department's reasserted authority. The fate of these two carbines reflects the position the Department occupied in influencing both the acceptance and evolution of weapons after 1861. Also, the breechloaders themselves indicate the preferences of the Deparment to certain types of arms.

The Ordnance Department fostered developments in smallarms technology, but did so with the intention of producing all the improved, adopted weapons at the national armories. In the mid- 19th century, the Department encouraged private inventors and manufacturers to develop new ideas and incorporate them into breechloading devices. The Department, in effect, used civilian inventions for research and development, but the government owned the facilities for putting the ideas into production. Ordnance boards periodically conducted tests throughout the 1850's and 1860's to keep abreast of the latest improvements in the firearms field.

The device deemed most suited for military service would then be produced not at a private armory, but rather, at the public armories. The Ordnance Department, in other words, recognized the significance of civilian inventors, but preferred not to deal

with them on a permanent contractural basis for production. Notable exceptions did occur (Colt revolvers, for example), but the government realized that it would be less expensive to

2

purchase revolving pistols from private manufacturers than to tool-up Springfield and Harpers Ferry armories for revolver production. The Ordnance Department, for a number of reasons, neither sought nor encouraged a situation similar to doday's military-industrial complex, at least, not for the procurement of shoulder weapons.

In 1849, shortly after the end of the Mexican War, the Ordnance Department continued a plan for the standardization of all weapons then in service. Previously, the Department had standardized musket parts through the system of interchangeable parts .. This plan standardized the ignition systems of the weapons--flintlocks were converted to percussion caps--and smallarms manufacture was done entirely at the national armories. The contract system for musket production was entirely phased out. By 1861, the standardization policy incorporated rifling in all smallarms, a common caliber was established, and cavalry weapons --pistols (not revolvers) and carbines--were manufactured, for the first time, entirely at the public armories.

Closely allied with standardization and in fact dictating the entire policy was the desire for economy and efficiency.

The Ordnance Department had meager appropriations. Contract musa• kets were generally more expensive than government produced arms and, in spite of rigid inspections, the quality of manufacture was inferior. It should be noted that contractors could not afford to retool their works to produce rifled and percussion muskets. This, in part, helps to explain the government decision to manufacture all military arms.

3

The Department's plan called for standardization of model types in which ammunition and parts were both interchangeable.

By producing all arms at the national armories, the unit cost per arm was reduced. And an efficient system of supply, repair and manufacture of arms and ammunition was thereby possible. The policy i~ reflected in the breechloader trials of the 1850's. Ordnance officers and military men in general regarded the muzzle loading rifled musket as the finest smallarm in the world. However, the percussion system it utilized, the rifling it incorporated, and the very ball it shot were not solely the creations of the Ordnance Department. The improvements just mentioned were the results of foreign and domestic arms makers and inventors working in conjunction with the Ordnance Department.

Because of outside developments and because the Department desired to produce the most modern and efficient weapon available, the Department conducted a series of tests through which it encouraged private inventors to develop and submit improved breechloading designs. The mechanism, after a rigorous trial period in which range, accuracy, penetration, workmanship, and durability were examined, if judged superior to all others, would theoretically be purchased by the Ordnance Department and manufactured at Springfield and Harpers Ferry.

The Department, however, never fully approved anyone breechloading system for fear of obsolescence. In 1861, the policy

that precluded acceptance and manufacture of any breechloader, while indicative of Departmental control over procurement matters, ironically resulted in an almost complete loss of

4

Departmental authority in acceptance matters because of the shortage of weapons. The desperate need for all types of arms, and cavalry weapons particularly, allowed civilian and military lobbyists to pressure the Ordnance Department into purchasing weapons normally unsuited for military service. Nevertheless, after the interruption of 1861, the Department gradually reasserted itself and reverted to prewar policies of control over acceptance and efficiency, economy, and standardization.

The tests of the 1850's were primarily for a breechloader for mounted service. The tests of the 1860's were for breechloaders for both cavalry and infantry use. The two series of tests were extremely competitive as the sheer number of designs submitted attest. A careful analysis of the breechloader trials reveals a number of fascinating insights into the role of the Ordnance Department in disseminating smallarms technology to civilian inventors and manufacturers. Also, and just as importantly, the tests are indicative of the position the Department occupied in acceptance and contract procedures. The Cosmopolitan, Gwyn and Campbell, and Armstrong-Taylor carbines are examples of both these points.

5

Chapter II:

The Ordnance Department, 1850-1861

6

From 1850 to 1861 the Ordnance Department occupied a unique

position in both military and civilian affairs.

In military

matters, the Department was aloof and virtually independent of all other bureaus and departments, but dictated to them in all

matters concerning arms and ordnance supplies.

In civilian af-

fairs, the Ordnance Department acted as a medium for the distribution of smallarms technology to inventors and manufacturers aiding in the development of new weapons types. Many of these developments, particularly the concept of breechloading, were later incorporated into military arms.

The Department was dependent upon Congress for appropriations and formulated a policy of standardization, economy, and efficiency based upon the appropriations. TOo, the Department was subject to the orders of the Secre~ary of War, but, for the most part, enjoyed a fair degree of autonomy from close civilian supervision.

In 1861 the demand of the Civil War army for weapons resulted in the loss of Ordnance Department authority in smallarms procurement and acceptance policies. The Department, though, attempted throughout the year to reassert itself and implement its prewar policies of standardization, efficiency, and economy.

The Ordnance Department was organized in 1812 shortly before

the war with Great Britain.

Initially, the duties of the Depart-

ment were to "inspect and prove all pieces of ordnance, ... to direct the construction of all carriages ... the preparing of all kinds of ammunition ... and the [examination] of all ordnance, carriages, and apparatus."l Further provisions provided that

7

"the [chief of Ordnance] shall execute all orders issued by the

Secretary .•. of War." A later act of 1815 added that the senior

ordnance officer should make all estimates and, under the direc-

tion of the Secretary of War, make all contracts and purchases

for procuring the nec~ssary supplies of arms, equipments, ord- 2

nance, and ordnance stores. The act also substituted control of

the national armories from the general authority of the Federal

government to the Ordnance Department.

The organization of the Department remained fairly constant

with only minimal personnel increases. The number of officers increased from 14 in 1832 to 44 in 1861.3 The fairly routine

duties of proving and inspection created a feeling of indepen-

dence for the Department and the men under its control. These

duties, as might be expected, led not only to a sense of auto-

nomy, but also to a sense of conservatism towards new develop-

ments among some of the Department officers.

In wartime, though, the Department chief was subject to the

orders of both the Secretary of War and "the orders of any gen-

eral or field officer commanding any army or garrison, or detach-

ment for the supply of arms ammunition, ordnance, and ordnance stores. ,,4 In theory, the act made the Department subject to the

whims of field commanders, but in actual practice--during the

Mexican War, for example--the armies were small enough to be ad-

equately and well equipped and supplied with necessary ordnance

stores to preclude the necessity of line intervention. The De-

partment retained its autonomy until 1861 due primarily to the

fact that the need for field commanders to dabble in procurement

8

and supply matters never arose. The act is significant, also, in

the respect that it provided precedence for outside interference in Ordnance affairs.

The Department, in addition to its other duties, acted as a clearing house for the dissemination of smallarms technology.

The Department, through its interaction with contractors before 1849 and with inventors in the 1850's, fostered, among other things, improvements in manufacturing techniques. The system of interchangeable parts is just such an example. To facilitate repair of damaged arms, the Department and the contractors de~ vised a sys-tem that ultimately led to the interchangeability of parts. No longer was costly, time consuming handfitting required to repair a broken musket; a sear spring of a contract arm could be replaced by a spring made at Harper's Ferry. The arm could be repaired immediately by an armorer or ordnance employee in the field.5

The Department's interaction with non-military personnel em-

bodied more than just production techniques. New weapons and smallarms designed were oftentimes submitted to the government for trial and possible adoption. The most common type of mechanisms submitted in the period before the Civil War were breech-

loading actions. The Ordnance Department had, at one time, adopted the Hall breechloader and produced it at both Harper's Ferry armory and through private contractors. The weapon was primarily for mounted use, but large numbers were made for infan-

try service. Regular troops, however, were the only units to

receive the Hall.

In 1849, the Hall was replaced by a muzzle-

loading musketoon for cavalry use and smoothbore percussion

9

muskets for foot service.6

The Hall breechloader was dropped from government use pri-

marily because it was neither as reliable nor as effective as a

muzzleloader. The development of breechloaders was to a large ex-

tent dependent upon the development of the metallic cartridge. Early

cartridges were merely soft, powder containers subject to damp

and breakage. Breech loading, about as old in theory as fire-

arms, was impractical until the invention of the metallic cart-

ridge. Before the advent of brass and copper cartridges, breech-

loaders tended to leak gas and flame at the breech and the residue

of combustible cartridge often clogged the mechanism. The cart-

ridges were produced in varying forms and with varying methods of

ignition. All, however, were produced with the objects of safety in handling and rapidity in loading.7

The Ordnance Department was extremely hesitent to adopt a

new breechloader. The reluctance was not solely the fault of

mechanical failings.

In 1852, the report of the Chief of Ord-

nance, Henry Knox Craig, commented on breechloaders, reflecting

military opinion about them:

Many experiments have been made with small arms of novel construction. The general objects of the inventors have been to increase the rapidity of fire [breechloaders] and to obtain greater range and accuracy [rifling and conical bullets]. The first ~s.of dougtful utility, if not of positive l.n) ury ...

Craig, in the same report also stated, however, that Sharps arms

"seem to be the best that have been offered." He added that

some Sharps had been ordered for trial by use in actual service, "the only reliable test.,,9

10

The Department preferred the muzzle loading musketoons for

the cavalry for a variety of reasons.

It was not subject to

leakage of gas at the breech.

It could be made at the national

armories less expensively than an "intricate" breechloader.lO

And, although few Hall's were made by contractors, many regulation muskets were manufactured by private firms and the Department wanted to break with the contract system.

The Department was forced to restructure its smallarms policies because of Congressional involvement. Congress usually separated itself as much as possible from the internal workings

of any bureau. Congressmen and senators would occasionally use their influence to get an inventive constituent an Ordnance

board test. Congress set up a system of arming the militias in 1808, improved the organization and administration of the Department in the 1820's and 1830's, approved meager appropriations, and provided funds for the examination of new arms in the 1850's, but otherwise took little action or interest in the Ordnance

11 Department.

Congress' major concern in the Department was a desire for economy. For the most part, the legislature favored the inexpensive smoothbore musket. The Regular army received rifled

muskets in the mid-1850's, but not the militia units.

State

troops were equipped with smoothbore flintlocks although the Department began gradually to convert many flintlocks to percussion. Congress forced the delegation of smoothbores to the states because a rifled musket at the time cost an expensive

$13.93.

11

Forced by the need for economy, the Ordnance Department in-

stituted a policy of consolidating and standardizing its arms.

Colonel Craig, as early as 1845 stated, "Upon due consideration

of the subject, the Department ... decided that a diversity of arms

was productive of evil [and began] adopting those of ordinary construction which are simpler managed by the ordinary soldier. ,,12

From that time onward, standardization of arms was one of the

major goals of the Secretaries of War and the Chiefs of Ordnance.

All standardization programs were based on simplicity of use,

supply efficiency (interchangeable parts), and economy of manu- 13

facture. The last contract Hall was produced in 1852, but that

contract had been signed in the late 1840's.

By the early 1850's,

the Department abandoned both contract arms and breechloaders.

The Ordnance Department could not disregard breechloaders

entirely. Congressional funds for the breechloader trials forced

Departmental recognition. Also, the legislature increased the

size of the Regular mounted force, and the cavalry weapon

then in use was impractical.

In 1855, the dragoons were gradually

replaced by two regiments of cavalry. The lands gained in the

Mexican War and the constant need for a highly mobile patrol~ing

force resulted in the reorganization and the numerical increase

of the mounted troops. The primary difference between dragoons

and cavalry was that dragoons fought dismounted and the cavalry

fought on horseback. The dragoons were, in effect, mounted in-

fantry. As for the weapon, it was common knowledge that the

musketoon was unsuited for mounted use.

In keeping with its policy of standardization and economy,

12

the Ordnance Department, in 1849, replaced the Hall breechloaders

with musketoons. The musketoon was:

a sort of brevet musket. It was nothing but an old musket sawed off to about 2/3 of its original length and the rammer fastened to the barrel by a swivel to prevent its being lost or dropped when loading on horseback; it used the same cartridge as the musket [.69 caliber roundball], kicked like blazes, and had neither range nor accuracy, and was not near as good as the musket, and was only used because it could be more conveniently carried on horseback. Also the ball would rollout when the wr%pon was slung and the powder would spill.

For all its faults, the musketoon's primary asset was that it

was manufactured solely at the national armories and used the

same type of cartridge as the regular mpsket. The Ordnance

Department did not have to rely on contractors for its manufac-

ture or special ammunition for its use. Both were important

considerations for a Department concerned with standardization

and economy.

The musketoon was ill-suited for mounted use and the creation

of two cavalry regiments demanded that it be replaced. The "sort

of brevet musket" gave way in 1855 to the new U. S. carbine and

U. S. pistol-carbine. The carbine was a modified musketoon and

the pistol-carbine was a single shot muzzleloading pistol with

detachable shoulder stock that could be used as either a hand or

shoulder weapon. Neither type of weapon was practical, but

again, they were manufactured at Springfield and Harper's Ferry

armories and used the regulation cartridge. The Department aug-

mented them with a variety of experimental breechloading carbines.

In 1855, th~ same year as the creation of the cavalry

13

regiments, the Ordnance Department expanded its standardization

policy and extended it to include a common caliber. The Depart-

ment--for Regular army use--replaced the .69 caliber muskets and

.54 caliber rifles with .58 caliber rifled muskets. The .58

caliber U. S. carbine and U. S. pistol-carbine replaced the .69

caliber musketoons. The model 1855 arms incorporated, with the

exception of the carbine, a tape priming device (figure 1). The

mechanism, similar to contemporary roll caps, was the invention

of a civilian dentist, Edward Maynard. The inclusion of his

device encouraged other inventors and in 1855, the Department

was beseiged by erstwhile contractors. The Department did not

take over Colt's pattern for revolvers because it felt that the

design was too intricate and expensive to manufacture at the

. 1 . 15

nat~ona armor~es.

The Ordnance Department, in spite of its exclusion policy,

continued to have interactions with civilian inventors. The

interaction was due partially to the breechloader appropriations,

but also because improvements in smallarms technology were not

necessarily the result of Departmental experimentation. The

1840's and 1850's was a time of far reaching advances in weapons

technology: percussion cap ignition systems, efficient revolv-

ing pistols, elongated expanding rifle bullets, and breechloading

shoulder arms. To the list can be added new manufacturing tech-

niques that allowed inexpensive barrel rifling, tape priming sys-

tems, and metallic cartridges. The Department was well aware of

the developments and the appropriations allowed it to keep abreast

of improvements on the firearms field.

14

Figure 1. The standardization of arms. From top: Ml855 .58 caliber rifled musket with Maynard's tape primer, Ml855 .58 caliber musket. Though not issued, the Department used this arm to compare with breechloaders during the trials. Ml855 .58 caliber pistol-carbine with detachable shoulder stock.

15

In the interests of economy, the Department was hesitant to

engage in contracts for more than a few patent arms. Appropria-

tions for 1854 allowed for the purchase of only 25 of the best 16

type of breechloader. And the Department was reluctant to re-

new dealings with contractors. Contracting out required that

Ordnance personnel inspect all arms manufactured at private

firms. Government arms were also inspected, but the dual system

placed an additional drain on the Department's few personnel.

It was, in short, a nuisance.

In spite of rigid inspections

contract arms were generally poorer in quality and more expen-

. h t 17

Slve t an governmen arms.

Perhaps the most often heard com-

plaint against contractors, though, was their failure to deliver

on time. For these reasons, the Department desired only minimal

associations with contractors and the approval of the Secretary

of War for the purchase of any patent arm was undoubtedly accept-

able to the Department.

At least in the early 1850's, as evidenced by Craig's state-

ment in his annual report, the reaction of the officer corps to

breechloaders was extremely conservative. By the mid-1850's

Craig's opinion was somewhat altered.

In the annual report of

the Chief of Ordnance for 1855, Craig did not denounce breech-

loaders as of "doubtful utility." His statement, while in no

means laudatory, at least indicated that his opinion of breech-

loaders had become more balanced:

To compare this kind of arm with those loading at the muzzle, in respect to their fitness for the use of troops, some of the latter have been made at the national armories and sent out for issue and trial at the same time with patent breechloading arms ... the results of the

16

... test shall determine the question as to the best breechloading arm, and also the 18 advisability and propriety of any purchase.

The conservatism of the Ordnance officers, reluctance to

resume dealings with contractors, the continuation of a policy

for economy and standardization, and a desire for weapons ef-

ficiency left little room for the adoption of a breechloader in

the 1850's. Br~echloaders, before 1858, continued to have im-

perfect gas seals and, although the Department purchased limited

quantities of certain types, it did so in accordance with Con-

gressional and War Department orders to determine the "best breech loading rifle,,19 for possible adoption and production at

the national armories. The Ordnance Department was leery of

purchasing any breechloader; a patent arm averaged $30.00.

On Au~ust 5 of that year, Congress appropriated $90,000 for

the examination and purchase of 25 of the best breech loading

rifles, subject, however, to approval by the Secretary of War.

Part of the $90,000, though, was for the examination of Maynard's tape primer to determine the practicality for cavalry use.20

The Department advertised in ten newspapers throughout the country informing inventors to submit their designs the following month.21

The Department continued the trials until 1857 when a board un-

favorably reported on both breechloaders and the trials. The

Ordnance tests were both extensive and rigid. Each company or

inventor wishing to sell to the government deposited a pattern

arm with the Department. Ordnance boards examined it thoroughly

and fired it as many times as there were cartridges. Accuracy,

penetration, range, workmanship, and durability were prerequisites

17

for further trials.

By the end of the tests, no one arm was

singled out as truly exceptional. The Ordnance Department favored

the Sharps, Burnside, and Smith carbines but did not adopt them.

The tests of the 1850's were extremely competitive and

ushered in new breechloading design improvements.

Effective gas

seals were made possible through improved manufacturing tech-

niques and the introduction of rigid, metallic or rubber cartridges.

Internal ignition and brass casings made repeating breechloaders

a reality by 1857. The Department, because of the trials, was

well aware of these developments, but the sudden changes and

rapid improvements made the standardization of a breechloader un-

desireable for fear of obsolescence.

The breechloader trials in addition to fostering improve-

ments had one additional consequence. Ordnance officers reaffirm-

ed their opposition to breechloaders. The balanced attitude of

Craig in 1855 gave way a year later to remarks about contractors

and inventors:

" ... the tests of breechloading arms ... has made

slow progress ... owing to the failure of the inventors and patenters to deliver the arms ordered for trials ... 22 In 1857, an Ordnance

board commented unfavorably on breechloaders:

In submitting this opinion the board feels

it their duty to state that they have seen nothing in these trials to lead them to

think that a breechloading arm has yet been invented which is suited to replace the muzzleloader for foot troops. On the contrary they have seen much to impress them with an opinion unfavorable to the use of a breech1~ading arm for general military purposes.

Although Craig and the Ordnance boards ruled against

18

breechloaders for both cavalry and infantry use, their opinion

changed within three years. Cavalry breechloaders were accepted,

and infantry breechloaders were looked upon favorably. The rea-

son for the change was the quality performance of the Sharps

carbine on the frontier.

In 1858, the Ordnance Department toyed

with a breechloading conversion for infantry muskets. In

September of that year the Department paid George W. Morse, an

inventive employee at Harper's Ferry Armory, royalties for his

breechloading device. The Morse conversion used a metallic

cartridge.

In 1859, Craig in his annual report displayed a sig-

nificant change.

"True policy," he wrote, "requires that steps

should be taken to introduce [breechloaders] into our service,

and to this end preparation ought to be made for their manufac-

I, ,,,24

ture at the pub ~c armor~es.

The report of the following year

added "as certainly as the percussion cap has superceded the flint

and steel, so surely will the breech-loading gun drive out of use those that load at the muzzle.,,25

The then u. S. Senator Jefferson Davis dealt a severe

blow to breedloaders. Morse conversions had been produced only

in limited quantities when Congress, in an effort to economize,

prohibited the government from producing any more arms for which

l't' must be pa~d.26

roya ~ ~es ...

Sharps carbines had not been pur-

chased in any large quantities and the number of patent breech-

loaders for cavalry use was sufficient to preclude the purchase

of any additional carbines. Breechloaders jn 1860 receded into

the background.

The Department from 1857 to 1860 did not significantly

19

alter its policy. The breechloaders purchased were done so within the confines of the policy. Breechloaders had become waterproof, gas tight, durable, and efficient. But they were

expensive, and complaints about contractors remained.

Ironically,

the policy that precluded the widespread introduction of anyone type of breechloader, while indicative of Departmental control

in procurement matters, nevertheless resulted, in 1861, in a paucity of cavalry arms and resulted in a loss of Departmental authority in procurement affairs.

In April, 1861, the Civil War had begun.

In the following

summer, the bubble that encapsulated and insulated the Ordnance Department from external pressures burst. No longer was the Department able to dictate in matters of acceptance and procure-

ment.

Its jurisdiction was weakened and undermined, and the

result was confusion and inefficiency. Throughout the early mobilizations, however, the Department sought to retain its policy of standardization, economy, and efficiency.

The scarcity of cavalry arms can partially be explained by the failure of the Ordnance Department to introduce a breechloader into the service. But from April until August, the Ordnance Department sought to augment those breechloaders already issued with additional contracts to the same firms. The Department was familiar with Sharps, Burnside, and smith carbines and initially attempted to arm the expanded cavalry units with them. This policy or rather attempt at standardization was perfectly reasonable as the early assumptions were that the army would be 250,000 men.27 In July, 1861, Chief of Ordnance (Brigadier

20

General) James W. Ripley contacted Secretary of War Simon Cameron

and stated the smallarm estimates of June 14 were too low. The

extreme shortages were, he declared, due to losses in the field,

increases in troop strength and types of units, the necessity of

, 1 t 1 't ddt' " 28

armlrtg vo un eer cava ry unl s, an ras lC prlce lncreases.

The War Department, in short, had little cooperation with the

Ordnance Department and the troop increases not only complicated

Ripley's policy, but made it virtually impossible to observe.

The Ordnance Department was forced to look elsewhere for cavalry

arms.

One possible source of additional arms were the legions of

erstwhile contractors beseiging the Department. The Department,

to relieve the arms shortages, resorted to widespread contracting.

Contract money was available from Congress and the War Depart-

ment. But, to complicate the matter, the emergencies of the war

and the need for all arms brought about lobbyists who used poli-

tical pressure to gain acceptance of constituent's inventions.

The Department, unable to continue its policy of acceptance by

examination, attempted to limit the number of designs contracted

for to only the most serviceable. But the Departmetit could not

know which were the most serviceable without examinations.

On September 25, 1861, Ripley complained to Secretary of

State William Seward about the squandering of funds and the num-

ber of different types of arms introduced into the service:

Even the very liberal appropriations for the purpose will not be sufficient to meet the liabilities which may and probably will be likely incurred.29

21

Ripley's complaint was reasonable. The Ordnance Department had

to furnish ammunition and parts to units armed with various

breechloaders. Hastily appointed Ordnance personnel reported,

often incorrectly, on the type of arm, the caliber, and the

nature of the damage. Parts for carbines were interchangeable

within the model, but a Smith mainspring would be worthless in a

Cosmopolitan carbine. Ripley desired to minimize the confusion

in the Ordnance Department.

In December, 1861, Ripley wrote to Secretary of War Cameron

and implied that the Department would attempt to reassert itself

and control the procurement processes .

... the multiplicity and ammunitions of different kinds and patterns and working on different principles is decidedly objectionable and should, in my opinion, be stopped by the refusal to introduce any [additional] unless upon the fu~b and complete evidence of their superiority.

Ripley was, in essence, stating that weapons purchased indiscri-

minately were contrary to the Department's attempted policy of

standardization, efficiency, and economy. More than that, Ripley

was commenting on the inadvisability of continued external inter-

vention in Ordnance matters. Ripley and the Ordnance Department

sought their accustomed autonomy.

In summary, the Ordnance Department from 1850 to 1861 ex-

ercised almost complete jurisdiction over firearm procurement

and acceptance issues. Forced by Congress to economize, the

Department evolved a policy of standardization and efficiency.

The Department abolished, for the most part, the purchase of

contract arms and developed a conservative attitude towards

22

breechloaders. Due, however, to the Congressionally funded breechloader· trials, the Department, by the late 1850's, accepted the idea of breechloaders for military service. In 1861, the Department attempted to meet initial wartime demands through its prewar policy by relying upon known and tested manufacturers. By mid-summer, increased demand for small arms usurped the Department of its role in contract matters, and political intervention introduced into the service sub-quality arms. The Department, by the end of the year, was gradually reasserting itself and began implementing its prewar policy for the procurement of breechloaders.

23

1. L. D. Ingersoll, History of the War Department (Washington, 1879), pp. 300-303.

2. Ibid.

3. Carl L. Davis, Arming the Union: Smallarms in the Civil y,]ar (Port Washington, 1973), pp. 15, 25.

4. Ingersoll, History of the War Department, p. 301.

5. Closely allied with the introduction of interchangeable

parts and, in fact, dependent upon it was accurate precision gauges. These developments led to the formation of a machine tool industry which, in turn, resulted in mass production and the assembly line technique. For a detailed description see: Felicia Dreyup, Arms Making in the Connecticut Valley: a regional study of the economic developments of the smallarms industry (York, 1970).

6. Numerous books are available that describe the model variations of the Hall breechloaders, but perhaps the 'best general work is: R. Gordon Wasson, The Hall Carbine Affair: a study in contemporary folklore (New York, 1948).

7. Claud Fuller, The Breechloader in the Service, 1816-1917 (New Milford, 1965), p. 17.

8. Craig to Conrad, "Annual Report of the Chief of Ordnance, November 2, 1852," House Executive Document Number 1, 32nd Congress, 2nd Session, p. 234.

9. Ibid.

10. A common complaint by ordnance officers against breechloaders was that the mechanism was both too complicated and too fragile for government use.

24

11. Davis, Arming the Union, p. 8.

12. Ibid., p. 9.

13. Ibid.

14. Robert M. Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indians, 1848-1865 (New York, 1967), p. 25.

15. Davis, Arming the Union, p. 10.

16. Davis to Craig, August 5, 1854, Letters Received, Records of the Office of the Chief of Ordnance, United States Army, Old Military Records Division, Record Group 156, National Archives.

17. Dreyup, Arms Making in the Connecticut Valley, p. 118.

18. Craig to Davis, "Annual Report of the Chief of Ordnance, October 25, 1855," House Executive Document- Number 1, 34th Congress, 1st Session, p. 542.

19. Actual wording of Davis' orders to Craig were "for the purchase of the best breechloading rifle." Davis to Craig, August 5, 1854, Miscellaneous Letters Received, Ordnance Office Records.

20. Ibid.

21. The cities in which newspaper notifications were placed were:

Philadelphia, New York, Hartford, Boston, Pittsburgh, Louisville, New Orleans, Washington, Albany, and Troy. Newspaper clippings sent to the Ordnance Department, August to September, 1854, Miscellaneous Letters Received, Ordnance Office Records.

22. Craig to Davis, "Annual Report of the Chief of Ordnance, November 11, 1856," House Executive Document Number 1, 34th Congress, 3rd Session, p. 376.

25

23. Davis, Arming the Union, p. 116

24. Ibid., p. 117.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ripley to Cameron, June 3, 1861, War Department, Official Records of the War of the Rebellion (129 vols., Washington, 1880-1901), Sera Ill, vol. I, p. 245.

28. Ripley to Cameron, July 28, 1861, Official Records, 111, I, p. 26l.

29. Ripley to Seward, September 25, 1861, Official Records, Ill, I, p. 539.

30. Ripley to Cameron, December 9, 1861, Official Records, 111, I, p , 734.

26

Chapter III:

The Evolution of the Cosmopolitan Carbine

27

Because of the Congressionally funded breechloader trials of the 1850's, the Ordnance Department had numerous contacts with inventors. Each of the inventors hoped to win approval and acceptance of his mechanism and thereby receive a lucrative government contract. Oftentimes, inventors annually resubmitted their designs. As an example, Henry Gross, an Ohio inventor, had numerous tests of his breechloader during the 1850's. After

each trial, the Department rejected Gross' design and suggested, through the test reports, changes that would improve the weapon. By 1859, though, Gross was disgusted with both the Ordnance Department and breechloaders and assigned the patent rights to Edward Gwyn and Abner Campbell, two businessmen from Hamilton, Ohio. Gwyn and Campbell began where Gross left off and, in late 1861, they received a government contract for the cosmopolitan carbine.

The contacts that Henry Gross, Edward Gwyn, and Abner Campbell had with the Department do not merely illustrate the interplay between inventors and the Ordnance Department, they LLl.uatrate the role of the Department and civilian manufacturers in the evolution and adoption of a breechloader. The development of the Cosmopolitan carbine is an interesting example of Departmental politics from the 1850's through 1861.

Henry Gross was the second son of Henry Gross, Sr., a gunsmith originally from Union Township, Pennsylvania. The family moved to Tiffin, Ohio, in 1830 and Gross learned the gunsmith's trade at the hands of his father. By 1841, the younger Gross had gained a reputation as a gunsmith. In that year he began a

28

gunsmithing operation that eventually became the Gross Arms

Company. Eight years later his brother Charles joined in the

business, and contemporary gazeteers list them both as gunsmiths

d h' 1

an mec anlCS.

The Gross Arms Company was a modest operation begun in late

1849 or 1850. The initial investment was $2000 and the company

employed three workers at a total of $100 per month. In the year

ending June 30, 1850, the brothers purchased forty-eight gun

banels, seventy-two gunlocks, and numerous other articles amount-

ing to $516. The same year, the company produced fifty rifles

valued at $1,000, ten pistols worth $50, and repaired $1050 worth

f' f' 2

o prlvate lrearms.

In early 1852, probably in an attempt to increase profits,

Henry Gross formed a business to manufacture screw bedsteads.

The venture was ill-fated; neither Gross nor his partner, William

Campbell, were competent businessmen, and a year and a half later the partnership dissolved.3

Gross continued with the arms company, but it seems likely

that based upon the above example it was not his sole concern.

Indeed, it is quite possible that the Gross Arms Company' per-

formed a variety of metal working tasks not necessarily related

to arms making.

In August, 1854, Congress appropriated funds for breech-

loader trials. The following month, Gross wrote to Secretary of

War Jefferson Davis asking for one of the trials. In a short,

optimistic note Henry Gross began the first of a series of letters

that lasted for over a decade.

29

I have invented & [sic] just finishing a Breech Loading Rifle for the Army which I consider (& all who have seen it) the simplest and most practicle rifle ever invented. I have seen Sharps & all others, I beleive & think this far superior to any. I understand you intend to introduce some one in the Army. If so, I wish to have mine tested. I cannot give you a description here of it; the breech revolving to recive the charge & at the same time primes itself. If ¥ou wish I will send you one. Please answer.

Unfortunately no known illustration of the device exists.

The War Department referred the letter to the Ordnance De-

partment, which forwarded to Gross a printed copy of the regulations "as to the examination of all new inventions of firearms."S

On December 15, 1854, the Department chief sent Gross a circular

letter informing him of the start of the trials.

I have to inform you that the Board for the preliminary examination of breechloading rifles is now in session at washington [D.C.] Arsenal. If you desire to be present ... you

have now the opportunity to do so. 6

Henry Knox Craig

Gross replied on December 20:

... 1 have to say that I have so far been unable to complete and send forward my breechloading rifle .•. but I have sent forward [to

a friend] a wooden model for the attention of the committee.7

The printed regulation sent by the Department in September

and the circular letter mailed to Gross in December are possible

indications of the Department's desire to discourage many would-

be contractors. Gross' reply shortly before Christmas no doubt

reenforced Department opinion of the unreliability of civilian

manufacturers.

Henry Gross did not submit a breechloader for examination

30

until the Spring of 1855. In May, Gross had an agent present his

breechloader for ,trial. The arm contained no revolving mecha-

nism. The weapon did, however, retain its automatic popping de-

vice (figure 2). On May 10, the Ordnance Department completed

the test. John C. Symmes, the Ordnance officer in charge, cited

the following faults:

... After casting some balls from a very imperfect spherical mold, a few were fired with great difficulty and inaccuracy. The cap could hardly be exploded by the mainspring and then would not often fire the charge. The lever grew harder to work on each discharge •.. 8

In spite of the defects, Gross apparently felt the design suf-

ficiently unique to warrent a patent. On May 22, he received it.

Throughout the sununer of 1855, Gross modified and improved

his mechanism. He abandoned his capping device and replaced it with a copy of Maynard's tape primer.9 Gross shortened the

length of the arm and moved the loading lever from the side of

the receiver to directly beneath it. In addition, the carbine

fired an elongated bullet. In late August, the Department tested

the weapon. The Ordnance Department considered the weapon "unsuitable"lO for government service. Major Bell, whose signature

appears at the bottom of the test report, cited inaccuracy at 100

yards I extreme fouling after 10 rounds, and a tendency to jam

h ., han i d.i h 11

t e prlmlng meClanlsm upon lSC arge.

Upon receipt of the test results, Gros~ on September 5, felt

obliged to defend his breechloader. He commented at length on

the Department-inspired modifications and promised to improve

them.

31

Figure 2. Henry Gross' patented capping device. ~he top view shows the loading lever and the inside of the cap cylinder. 'Jibe sec-and illustration is a top view of the mechanism, and the third picture portray~ the cap cylinder. Percussion" caps v.e r e placed on each of the nipples in the cylinder and t.he action of th~ loading lever on the side aligned a new cap with a vent iris ide th~ mechanism. 'fhe hanuner was located underneath the arm.

32

This gun is my first upon the plan submitted and I am not at all surprised tho some faults may be found •.. yet there are none which I cannot remedy with little trouble. I am

sure the plan is an excellent one [and] much better than any other in use.12

Less than two weeks later, Gross again wrote the Ordnance Depart-

ment and stated that the priming tape used in the test was of

l n f e r i I' 13

ln erlor qua lty.

The tape priming device, he noted, was

directly copied from Maynard's.

" ••. 1 [consider] this type of

14 primer to be a good oneand used with good tape will perform well."

Gross retained the basic plan of the 1855 patent, but modi-

fied it in subsequent patents. On June la, 1856, he received a

patent for the first of the improvements (figure 3). Essentially,

the breechloader was lever operated by which depressing the lever

raised the front portion of the breech block. The arm could be

charged with either a combustable paper cartridge or with loose

powder and ball. The rifle fired either an undersized minie

(conical) type projectile or a round lead ball.

The Ordnance Department again rejected Gross' breechloader.

The arm performed well throughout; and is on the whole considered an excellent and valuable [weapon]; though perhaps not so well suited for military as civil purposes.lS

The Ordnance officer objected to an imperfect gas seal at the

breech and complained of having to load the gun at a vertical, not

ho r i I " 16

orlzonta posltlon.

In 1857, Gross continued to perfect his mechanism. In July,

the inventor stated his intentions of sUbmitting the breech load-

er for scheduled tests in September. The major modification of

the arm was the insertion of the cartridge directly into the

33

Figurc~ 3. Henry Groso~' 1856 patented breechloader. The breech block 1 if-ted up to receive the cartridge and action of the lever also capped the arm w.i, tll the tape priming device.

34

I 17

chamber instead of the breech. Priming could be done either

with percussion caps or priming tape. While the actual test re-

sults are not known, Gross did, on September 19, 1857, write the

Ordnance Department. He asked that 500 of his breechloaders be purchased for trial in the field.18 He closed the letter by

stating, "MY means are very limited and have to depend chiefly on friends to aid me in perfecting the guns.,,19

Gross, in short, lacked capital with which to develop his

breechloading mechanism. He was then, as later, plagued by an

inadequate business ability. The screw bedstead venture had

failed in 1854 and the Gross Arms Company was probably barely

solvent. The Congressional decision to appropriate money to ex-

amine breechloaders for possible introduction into the service

served not only an incentive to inventors, but to others like

Gross, the decision could ultimately lead to at least solvency

and possibly wealth. The decision also created a sense of com-

petition among inventors and it was not unknown for inventors to

either improve or incorporate another's design in their inven-

tions.

Ho~ever, the military market was not the only place in which

inventors could peddle their wares. Civilians demanded modern

weapons for both personal defense and for sport. No vast differ-

ence existed between military and civilian weapons and almost any

arm could be modified for military use. Each inventor, though,

hoped for military adoption to enhance his profits. Henry Gross

was no exception.

After the 1857 trials, th~ inventor continued working with

35

his brother in the Gross Arms Company. It was about this time

that Henry Gross came into contact with Edward Gwyn. Gwyn was an

English gas engineer who in 1855 had arrived in Hamilton, Ohio,

to supervise the construction of the Hamilton Gas, Light, and 20

Coke Company. While in Hamilton, Gwyn met and probably be-

friended Abner C. Campbell, a member of a prominent local family

and owner of a lumber yard. Gwyn was an entrepeneur who had a

great deal of mechanical expertise, but little financial sub-

stance and virtually no connections of any kind. Campbell pro-

vided both. He was well established and well connected. The

lunilier yard thrived on the building boom then going on in

Hamil ton, and Campbell's brother, Lew i.s D. Campbell, was an out- 21

spoken U. S. senator.

Gwyn was both energetic and opportunistic. As a gas com-

pany engineer, he travelled between Tiffin and Hamilton and

helped form the companies in both communities. By early 1858,

Gwyn and Gross had met and had entered into the firearms field.

Gross, with Gwyn's help, continued to develop and improve the

breechloader, now named the Cosmopolitan, and by the middle of

the following year had it fairly well perfected. On August 30,

1859, the Tiffin inventor received a new patent.

By the mid-suIT@er of 1859, Henry Gross was involved with

both Edward Gwyn and Abner Campbell. Gwyn was the driving force;

the prime mover. Apparently he with Campbell's aid and Gross'

consent formed the Cosmopolitan Arms Company in Hamilton, Ohio.

Gross' connection with the Cosmopolitan Arms Company is not known,

but his name does appear on the lockplate. It appears most

36

likely that Gross developed the mechanisms and Gwyn and Campbell

produced them. In addition, Gwyn received an English patent in

his name for Gross' design on June 21, 1859. The Cosmopolitan

Arms Company produced a variety of firearms based upon the Gross

patent. The weapons were all of rifle length and were produced

in both .40 caliber sporting versions and .52 caliber military

types. The military type rifles came equipped with brass hilted saber bayonets (figure 4}.22

The Cosmopolitan rifles were loaded with paper or linen car-

tridges inserted directly into the breech block. However, the

patent allowed for modification so that the cartridge could be

inserted directly into the breech. It was with this modification that most Cosmopolitans were made (figure 5}.23 The cartridge

was inserted into the breech opening when the lever was dropped

and moved forward. This lever movement pulled the breech plug

to the rear and lowered it by means of an eccentric cam action.

The cartridge could then be inserted into the breech opening,

guided by a groove in the top of the breech mechanism. This

guide groove was part of a separate piece which also served as a

dust cover. A standard musket size percussion cap fired the car-

t . d 24 rl ge.

Perhaps because of Campbell's economic contributions and

business sense, Gwynn's entreprenurial manner I or the

time elapsed since the last Federal test, Gross again attempted

government adoption. In July, 1859, Henry Gross wrote the Ord-

nance Department and asked for a trial. William Maynadier, an

37

Figure 4. The Cosmopolitan military-type rifle. The arm was one of many based upon the 1859 patent design. Although this illustration does not show the bayonet, all of this type came equipped with saber bayonets.

33

Figure 5 mecl1anis~

'rhe 125<) .

and a ,patent ~ . _

t yp i ca l C .. r o _;ch')lock

_ o srnopo Li t '

_ 1 an

carbine.

39

Ordnance officer, replied that the bureau had no appropriations

with which to test new arms and suggested that Gross present his rifle to the Naval Ordnance Bureau.25

Gross decided not to go to the Navy with his breechloader

and allowed Gwyn to submit it to the Naval Ordnance Bureau. He

did so in June, 1860. Lieutenant Lewis examined the two car-

bines Gwyn presented. The Navy, it should be noted, was more l~kely to accept a carbine length weapon than one of rifle length

for shipboard use, no doubt for ease in handling. The first car-

bine jammed on the 34th round, "the apparatus for loading at the breech becoming deranged. 1926 Gwyn asked for a trial of the sec-

ond piece and it was "fired 500 times successfully, and then remained in working order. "27

Lewis cited the following defects:

To load, the hammer must be raised to a full cock, because there is no half cock. In bringing up the working lever to close the breech after loading, it occassionally comes in contact with the trigger and brings down the hammer on the cap, which should be avoided.28

Lewis concluded his remarks by adding that "this piece is very inferior to the systems of Burnsides, Joslyn, Maynard, etc."29

The internal parts of the Cosmopolitan breechloaders were

not totally interchangeable. This was due to a large amount of

hand fitting. Based upon assembly markings the major components,

however, appear to have been machine manufactured and the guns were probably assembled on a production basis.30

Gross, in the meantime, continued operating at his Tiffin

gunshop. He probably was not involved with the actual production

40

of the arms, although he did develop new breech-loading designs.

During the first month of 1861, Gross renewed his relationship

wi th the Ordnance Department and began a series of exchanqe s by

requesting infantry muskets that he could convert to his breechloading principle.3l It is not known definitely that the prin-

ciple was the Cosmopolitan action, but that is most probable.

Gross was no doubt influenced by George W. Morse's breechloading

system that had been purchased by the government for $10,000 in

September, 1858. Again, the Department disappointed Gross. The

Department replied that Federal policy did not allow civilians to

purchase current military arms. The only exceptions were set- 32

tIers bound for California or Oregon. Gross could, however,

purchase condemned weapons at public auction.33

Undeterred, Gross wrote back to Colonel Craig:

Having determined to move to California by the Overland Rout [sic] & as I have to pass through an Indian country, I wish to [purchase an infantry musket] ... one of your late rifled muskets with Maynard's primer attachgd and bayonet.34

The Ordnance Department was not deceived by Gross' request and

restated that he either purchase a musket made of blemished parts or buy a condemned arm at auction.35

On April 13, 1861, Gross requested that an arm made of

blemished parts be forwarded to him.36

The Ordnance Depart-

ment replied on April 24, 1861, that his request could not be

complied with due to the destruction of the Harper's Ferry Arsenal37 and the increased demands of the Springfield Arsenal.

Gross, his interest in breechloaders dispelled, assigned the

rights of his 1856 and 1859 patents to Edward Gwyn on May 16,

41

1861.38 He broke with the Hamilton firm and turned his attention

to the manufacture of a revolver.

By this time the Civil War had started and volunteer units

were clamoring for any type of weapon. Gwyn and Campbell in

Hamilton were manufacturing Cosmopolitans in both rifle and car-

bine length. In April, 1861, the town proposed to raise a local

company of soldiers armed with "Mr. Gwyn's celebrated breechloading rifle.,,39 The unit, if raised, probably went off to war

without Gwyn's "celebrated" weapon. In June, 1861, in an effort

to get the rifle into military service, Gwyn displayed the merits

of the Cosmopolitan in a public demonstration. Gwyn tested the

rifle by firing up the course of a river. The bullet ricocheted

off the superstructure of a bridge and struck a store a block

back and at right angles to the river. The editor of the local

paper congratulated Gwyn for inventing such a remarkable gun that

would actually shoot around corners, thinking it would be most

useful in street fighting. The editor added that the gun might

be impractical due to the lack of cross-eyed soldiers in the country. 40 In September, 1861, Gwyn tested his rifle at Camp

Dennison near Cincinnati shooting a Minie ball 500

41

yards. The

rifle, for all its remarkable features, did not impress the mili-

tary, and the Cosmopolitan rifle passed into oblivion.

The carbine fared much better, and the manner in which it

was accepted is illustrative of the confusion of small arms pro-

curement in the early days of the Civil ~'Jar. Allan Nevins dubbed 42

this period the improvised war and, indeed, the very term ex-

plains the temper of the times. On the one hand, units were

42

clamoring for small arms of all types. Shoulder weapons were at

a premium, but cavalry arms were particularly scarce. The Ord-

nance Department, responsible for supplying both arms and ammuni-

tion, and maintaining the general repair of the weapons attempted

to limit the types of small arms accepted and standardized as much

. 1 h h 1 d . h . 43 h

as posslb e t ose t at were a rea y In t e serVlce. In t e

middle, between the Ordnance Department and the troops, were the

inventors.

During the opening days of the war, the commanders of

volunteer units armed their troops with any weapons a-

vailable. In April, 1861, local Hamilton cavalry regiments ans-

wering Lincoln's call for 75,000 volunteers equipped themselves

with the Cosmopolitan breechloaders (figure 6). These units

eventually became the 6th Regiment, Ohio Volunteer Cavalry. Un for-

tunately, unit histories do not state whether or not the carbines

remained with the regiment. Gwyn and Campbell, however, continued

to manufacture carbines and by December had stockpiled 1,140.

The two men continued to operate under the name of Cosmopol-

itan Arms Company even though Henry Gross was no longer associ-

ated with it. After the failure of the rifles, Gwyn and Campbell

concentrated on attempts to obtain a contract for the carbines.

Gwyn travelled to Washington in the winter of 1861 and tried to

win Ripley's approval. He did not immediately get it.

While Gwyn was lobbying for the Cosmopolitan, James Woodruff

was lobbying for acceptance of his two pounder cavalry cannon.

Woodruff had Illinois Governor William Yates' backing, but only

on the condition that any unit equipped with the cannons must

43

Figure 6. The pre-contract Cosmopolitan carbine. Local Hamilton units armed themselves with this weapon in early l86l~

44

44

also be fully and completely armed. Woodruff, with President

Lincoln's support, managed to have his cannon approved. He had

previously met Edward Gwyn and, after the cannon's acceptance,

suggested Gwyn again visit Ripley. Gwyn returned to the Ordnance

general and on December 23, 1861, the Ordnance Department placed an order for 1,140 Cosmopolitan carbines.45

The entire episode is tantalizing in terms of political pa-

tronage. Governor Yates of Illinois was a Republican and both a

friend and former classmate of U. S. Senator Lewis D. Campbell,

Abner Campbell's brother. Also, during the 1860 Republican con-

venti on William Beckett of Hamilton, a later Gwyn and Campbell

surety, was a delegate for Lincoln.

The contract specifically mentions that the carbines were

intended for Governor Yates. The government agreed to pay $27

for each carbine, but stipulated that the carbines must be made 46

stronger around the lock before payment would be made. Henry

Gross, the original inventor and lobbyist for the carbine, was

not associated with Gwyn and Campbell and was excluded from the

transaction.

The breechloader trials of the 1850's are, in a sense,

ironic. The Department wanted little contact with private manu-

facturers beyond their demonstrations of new inventions. The

Department, by 1855, had adopted a standardized weapon for the

military, but Congress forced the Department to recognize the

existence of and experiment with civilian patent arms.. Yet both

the Ordnance Department and inventors benefitted from the trials.

The Department kept pace with technological developments and the

45

inventors were able to improve their inventions and thereby increase the likelihood for a contract. Henry Gross is also something of an irony. In 1854, Gross began the first of a series of interaction with the Ordnance Department that directly led.to the evolution and eventual acceptance of a Cosmopolitan. But Gross, in 1861, no longer was associated with the carbine, and did not benefit from the contract. The inventor, the manufacturers, the Ordnance Department, and the carbine itself reflect the relationship and outcome of private manufacturers and the Ordnance Department before and during 1861.

46

1. Donald Hutslar, Gunsmiths of Ohio of the 18th and 19th Centuries (York: George Shumway, 1973), pp. 352-353.

2. Ibid.

3.

Dun and Bradstreet Credit Ledger:

"Henry Gross and William

Campbell," Baker Library, Harvard Business School, Boston, Massachusetts.

4. Gross to Davis, September 14, 1854, Miscellaneous Letters Received, Records of the Office of the Chief of Ordnance, united States Army, Old Military Records Division, Record Group 156, National Archives.

5. Craig to Gross, September 20, 1854, Miscellaneous Letters Sent, Ordnance Office Records.

6. Craig to Gross, December 15, 1854, Miscellaneous Letters Sent, Ordnance 'Office Records.

7. Gross to Craig, December 20, 1854, Miscellaneous Letters Received, Ordnance Office Records.

8. Symmes to Craig, May 10, 1855, Miscellaneous Experiments, Ordnance Office Records.

9. Gross to Craig, September 26, 1855, Miscellaneous Letters Received, Ordnance Office Records. The important point here is that Gross was aware of improvements in the firearms

field and freely copied them.

It will be remembered that

Maynard's tape primer was then standard on all 141855 muskets.

10. Bell to Craig, August 27, 1855, Miscellaneous Experiments, Ordnance Office Records.

11. Ibid.

12. Gross to Craig, September 5, 1855, Miscellaneous Letters Received, Ordnance Office Records.

47

13. Gross to Craig, September 26, 1855, Miscellaneous Letters Received, Ordnance Office Records.

14. Ibid.

15. Bell to Craig, May 9, 1856, Miscellaneous Experiments, Ordnance Office Records.

16. Ibid.

17. Gross to Craig, July 15, 1857, Miscellaneous Letters Received, Ordnance Office Records.

18. Gross to Craig, September 19, 1857, Miscellaneous Letters

Received, Ordnance Office Records.

19. Ibid.

20. Hamilton Journal, November 21, 1940.

21. Henry Mallory, Gems of Thought and Character Sketches: a collection of personal reminiscences (Hamilton, 1895),

p , 146.

22. Thomas Rentschler, "The Cosmopolitan Rifle," American

Rifleman, LXII.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Maynadier to Gross, July 18, 1859, Miscellaneous Letters Sent, Ordnance Office Records.

26. Lewis to Dahlgren, June 25, 1860, Miscellaneous Experiments, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Ordnance, Old Navy Records Division, RG. 74, National Archives.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

48

30. Rentschler, "The Cosmopolitan Rifle."

31. Gross to Craig, January 11, 1861, Miscellaneous Letters

Received, Ordnance Office Records.

32. Craig to Gross, January 19, 1861, Miscellaneous Letters

Sent, Ordnance Office Records.

33. Ibid.

34. Gross to Craig, January 29, 1861, Miscellaneous Letters

Received, Ordnance Office Records.

35. Craig to Gross, April 5, 1861, Miscellaneous Letters Sent,

Ordnance Office Records.

,

36. Gross to Craig, April 13, 1861, Miscellaneous Letters

Received, Ordnance Office Records.

37. Craig to Gross, April 24, 1861, Miscellaneous Letters Sent,

Ordnance Office Records.

38. Digest of Assignments, May 16, 1861, Liber (Book) G6, Patent

Office Records, Record Group 26, National Archives, p. 192.

39. Rentschler, "The Cosmopolitan Rifle."

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Allan Nevins, The War for the union, Vol. I (New York, 1959).

Nevins develops this theory in almost all branches of the

Federal government.

43. For a more detailed description, see Davis, Arming the Union.

44. John R. Margreiter, "The Vloodruff Gun," Civil War Times

Illustrated, Vol. XII (May, 1973), pp. 32-33.

45. Ibid.

46. "Contracts made by the Ordnance Department," House Executive

Document No. 99, 40th Congress, 2nd ession, p. 121.

49

Chapter IV:

The Ordnance Department, 1862-1866

50

After the disruption and confusion of the early days of

the war, the Ordnance Department reasserted its authority in smallarms contracts. Carbines like the Cosmopolitan by Gwyn and Campbell and later the Armstrong and Taylor were either controlled or excluded.

By 1862, the Ordnance Department had learned to cope with outside interference. Through a variety of strategems, General Ripley either subverted or drastically altered civilian intervention in sma11arms procurements. In 1862, as in 1861, Ripley attempted to limit both the number of contracts let and the number of carbine types introduced into the service. He was successful primarily because the initial demand for weapons had peaked after the winter months. Following the interruption of 1861, Ripley and subsequent Chiefs of Ordnance sought to resume operations based upon the prewar policy. The Department attempted to standardize cavalry weapons by incorporating those already contracted for into

a rigid system. Given the fact that no less than hineteen different types of carbines were then in service, the attempt appears ludicrous. However, by not permitting additional types to be introduced and issuing those ~ypes either in service or contracted for

on a priority basis, the Department achieved a fairly efficient

and economical system for the repair and supply of ammunition and parts to units armed with different pattern arms.

For the manufacturers who had received contracts regardless of how obtained, the Department exercised a degree of control over production and modification that it had not imposed since before the summer of 1861. Through contract clauses, inspections, and

51

experimentation the Department regained its authority. In another sense though the Department and the contractors exchanged roles. Before the war, inventors did the task of research and development; government armories performed production. By the second year of the war, the reverse was true. The Ordnance Department through experimentation performed research and development and private manufacturers produced the weapons. Ultimately, by 1866, the Ordnance Department performed both functions.

The breechloader trials of the 1860's were somewhat different than the trials of the previous decade. Generally speaking, the trials during the 1850's were for a breechloader for possible cavalry use; in the 1860's conservatism toward breechloaders had vanished and the tests were for a breechloading d~sign for both the cavalry and the infantry. In addition, Ordnance boards attempted to determine both the caliber and cartridge type best suited for military service. The boards also examined repeating magazine patterns, but considered them impractica~ for government use for fear that firepower would replace accuracy.l

Throughout the Civil War, the Department attempted to accomplish a number of objectives. It limited the number and types of contractors, sought to determine a breechloading design that incorporated most of the muzzleloading musket parts, and reasserted itself in procurement and acceptance policies. The goals of the Department were dictated by the guidelines of its policy: efficiency, economy, and standardization.

Outside intervention not only introduced normally unsuitable weapons into the service, but also reaffirmed Departmental

52

objections to civilian manufacturers. The contractual problems

that plagued the Department before the war continued throughout

the conflict, but Congress in early 1862 appointed a commission to

investigate the excessive prices charged by certain contractors.

The Ordnance Commission in its report to Congress echoed Depart-

ment sentiment urging the restriction of the number "of patterns of arms in the service.,,2 The Commission went further and urged

that strict experimentation as a comparative basis be a prerequi-

site for acceptance. Finally, the Commission suggested that arms

already in service be reported on:

... That general orders be given requiring all captains of companies to report quarterly to the Chief of Ordnance the kind of arm in use by his company, his opinion of the suitableness of the arm, the general extent of service, and the number requiring repair since the last report. ,,3

The commission claimed that such reports would "best check the

purchase of unsuitable arms, and soonest show the best and strongest for the service."4

In addition to the Commission's findings, the Department

levelled other complaints against contractors. The nuisance of

inspection remained; the Department's personnel had not been sig-

nificant1y increased. An Ordnance official was stationed at each

manufacturer to inspect and insure the quality of the contracted

item.

In the summer of 1862, the total number of Ordnance offi-

5

cers amounted to forty-four. Often enlisted Ordnance personnel

served as inspectors.

In Ordnance manuals, the Guties of the

inspector required that he inspect, test, and prove each and every item at all stages of production.6 Due, however, to the

53

demand for weapons, it was not uncommon for inspectors to spot check weapons only after final a?sembly. Because of this practice, inferior grade carbines would often be issued to troops in the field. The recommendation of the Ordnance Commission for quarterly reports helped to remove many of the poorer quality carbines and, in 1863, the Ordnance Department required that sample production guns be sent to Washington for extensive inspection and experimentation.

Perhaps the most valid Ordnance Department complaint against contract carbines in the Civil War was the lack of standardization. cartridges for Cosmopolitan carbines would not function in any of the other patent arms. As a result many different types

of cartridges had to be sent to the same regiment. Nor were

parts always interchangeable. On numerous occasions small parts for carbines were hand fitted, precluding the possibility of immediate repair. Also, model changes within carbine types resulted in a lack of interchangeability between variations. Many contractors failed to name all the parts of the carbine. AS an example, in September, 1864, thirty men of the 8th Ohio Cavalry carried Cosmopolitan or Gwyn and Campbell carbines. The remaining men of the unit carried different trpes.

The contract system for nineteen types of breechloaders was inefficient, expensive, and incongruent with standardization; it was contrary to Department policy. The same policy also called for the manufacture of government arms at only national armories. The Department, though, had no other alternative and had to make the most of the contract system. To incorporate the contract

54

system into some kind of manageable, efficient process required a

great deal of skill. By 1863, the Ordnance Department managed to

pare down the excesses of the system by exercising a great deal

of control over the contractors. It eliminated the most unrelia-

ble producers and insured through rigid examination the quality

of contract armsr

The most immediate control the Ordnance Department could ex-

ercise over a manufacturer was through the contract itself.

Strong wording in contract agreements reflects Ripley's attitude.

Failure to deliver, admittance of a third party, transferral of

the contract, and defaulting to deliver of the quality and at the

times provided could result in loss of contract or fine:

... Failure to make deliveries to the extent and within the times specified, then the said parties are to forfeit the right to deliver

whatever number may be deficient for the

month in which the failure occurs if any

such member of Congress, officer of the army or other person is ... admitted to any share

or part of this contract .•. the same may be declared null and void ... at the option of the United States ... if any default ... in delivery ... the articles mentioned ... of the quality and at the time and place .•. provided ... the parties will forfeit and pay to the united 7 States the sum of seven thousand dollars ...

The inspection process at the point of manufacture of assem-

bly was an additional way in which the Ordnance Department could

control the contractor and influence the quality of the manufac-

tured item. Ordnance manuals are quite explicit about the num-

ber and type of tests for smallarms. Barrels were inspected

during all stages of manufacture for impurities, finishing, and

strength. Lock mechanisms were similarly subjected to inspection as were stoc](S, mountings, and appendages.S The Ordnance

55

Inspector examined and approved the contract arms and sent a

certificate of approval to the Chief of Ordnance. As stated

before[ the lack of Ordnance personnel made extremely rigid

inspection virtually impossible. Consequently, the inspections

were often incomplete.

The Ordnance Department accepted the recommendation of the

Ordnance Commission, and beginning in 1862 field commanders sent

quarterly reports to the Department. The reports were unsophis-

ticated and far from complete. Part of the reason is due, again,

to too few qualified personnel. Theoretically, ordnance officers

were attached to each company. During the Civil War such a pol-

icy was impractical and either line commissioned or non-commis-

sioned officers performed ordnance duties.

Such men were seldom

qualified, and until they had gained experience at identifying

carbines by name and caliber, rapid supply and repair was impos-

sible. The reports sent by these officers were likewise unpro-

fessional.

In at least one instance, inexperienced "Ordnance"

personnel confused both the Cosmopolitan and its manufacturer:

The Metropolitan, (or Union) Carbine is made at Dayton, Ohio, by whom I am unable to ascertain. I think the Honorable Senator (Lewis D. Campbell) is one of the firms.

J. H. Semyse 9

Lt. 5th Artillery

Just as routine questions about various carbines bewildered field

commanders, other quarterly reports were likewise uninformative:

The Union Rifle Carbine is liable to get out of repair too easily [sic] for a good arm.

A. H. Seley

Major, Cmdg. Reg't 10

(5th Illinois Cavalry)

On the whole, field reports were often inaccurate and vague. They

56

did, however, at least express the dislikes or preferences of active units to certain types of carbines.

To clarify the ambiguities of the quarterly reports and to determine for itself the quality of smallarms issued, the Ordnance Department conducted a series of thorough examinations. Beginning in 1863 the Department ordered contractors to forward a typical production carbine for inspection at the Washington Arsenal. Ordnance inspectors examined each and every part and commented on the defects. For example, inspectors of the Gwyn and Campbell carefully looked at the quality of rifling, the finish of parts, stocks, locks, and workmanship. Where the field reports were abstract,

the Department inspection was concrete. Where the field reports were inaccurate, the Department inspection was exact. The quarterly reports judged the performance of the carbines on the field; the Arsenal reports judged the quality of the carbine overall.

Perhaps the Department's search for a suitable breechloading mechanism in the mid-1860's best illustrates the implementation

of the prewar policy. And, the trials indicate not only the authority of the Department in contract matters, but also the diminished importance of patronage in contract politics. The tests can be said to have started with the acceptance of the Ordnance Commision recommendation. Both field and arsenal reports indicated the suitability of a patent carbine for general military use. As the war progressed, the Department was able to conduct full experiments with breechloaders that inventors submitted.

By the start of the actual trials in early 1865, the Ordnance Department had three objectives in mind: to find a mechanism

57

suitable for infantry use, to find a design that incorporated many

muzzleloading musket parts, and, ultimately to manufacture that

breechloader at the national armory.

By 1864, Chief of Ordnance Alexander Dyer accepted the prin-

ciple of breechloading small arms for infantry use. General

Ripley, a critic of breechloaders had been replaced, and Dyer enthusiastically supported the concept of infantry breech1oaders.11

In December, Dyer wrote:

The experience of the war has shown that the breechloading arms are greatly superior to muzzleloading for infantry as well as for cavalry and that measures should be immediately taken to substitute a suitable breechloadinr musket in place of the rifled musket. .. 2

The arguments posed by critics to infantry breechloading

weapons had been largely discredited. Opponents had argued that

infantry armed with breechloaders would: 1) rely too much on

firepower and not on accuracy, 2) waste large amounts of ammuni-

tion, 3) breechloading mechanisms were too fragile for active

use, 4) parts were not completely interchangeable,S) breech-

loaders required non-standard ammunition and 6) it would be too

time-consuming for Civil War factories to tool-up for production of both rifles and carbines.13 Each of the criticisms were by

1864 discredited. For the most part, opponents had assumed too

much, particularly that the infantry breechloader would be pri-

vately manufactured. Dyer, in his annual report of 1865, stated:

It is ... intended to ... manufacture [them] at our national armories so soon as the best model for a breechloading arm can be established by full and thorough tests and trials. The alteration of our present model of muzzleloading arm is also a very desireab1e measure,

58

both on account of economy and improvement ~n the characteristic of the arm.14

Dyer called for an Ordnance board to assemble in January,

1865, to test breechloading arms. The 1865 tests were inconclu-

sive, although the Department established that the design should

incorporate as many muzzleloading parts as possible and should

utilize a metallic rimfire cartridge. The Department rejected

magazine and repeating arms as it felt that their manufacture

would be too expensive.

At the end of January, 1866, the War Department ordered a

second test board convened at Washington. special orders stated

the purpose and goals of the trials:

1. What form and caliber should be adopted ... for infantry

(muskets)?

2. What form and caliber should be adopted ... for cavalry

(carbines) ?

3. What form of breechloading arm should be adopted as a model

for changes of muskets already constructed to breechloading muskets?15

The orders also provided that each inventor submitting an arm was

required to state in writing the lowest price at which he would

furnish the breechloader. The orders detailed officers from the

infantry, cavalry, and artillery and the Ordnance Department to constitute the board.16

The board advertised the tests in newspapers throughout the

country and set up a program for examination. To begin the tests,

the inventor dismantled the breechloader, explained its operation

and construction, and stated its merits. After the board

59

examined several different types, the guns were test fired 100

times at the Washington Arsenal. After these preliminary tests

the board selected those weapons it considered most suitable for

military service and subjected them to further trials by sold-

iers in the field. The soldiers fired the arms for range,

accuracy, penetration, rapidity of loading, and for strength and
endurance through use of increased powder loads. 17
The board considered the question of caliber based not only
upon the experiments but also by tests conducted by foreign gov- ernments. Conclusions were verified and/or rejected by addition-

1 . 1 18 a trJ..a s.

The breechloader trials lasted for 55 days. At the end of

the time the board had examined approximately fifty different

types of breechloaders. The board recommended that an inter-

changeable .45 caliber cartridge be adopted for both cavalry and

infantry arms. It recommended five different types of conversion

based upon the design of Berdan, Yates, Remington, Roberts, and

Allin. The board recorrunended further trials of Spencer magazine carbines as it was "the best service gun of this kind.,,19 As the

days had progressed, the tests became increasingly more rigid.

Extreme overloading, interment, and subjection to water had de-

cided the five best patterns. The Departmental trials were pur-

posely severe for the national armory

would produce the adopted

weapon.

By the end of the Civil War, the Ordnance Department had

regained its authoritive position in contractual matters. The

immediate demands for smallarms had been met and, for the most

60

part, political patronage no longer counted in the politics of contract acquisitions. The Department accepted the idea of privately manufactured arms, but conditioned the contractors through implementation of a series of constraints. The arms introduced and the contracts let in late 1861 were incorporated into a system based upon the prewar policy of efficiency, economy, and standardization. The Department excluded additional contracts

to either untested or unreliable manufacturers.

The needs of the Civil War armies in a sense reversed the roles of the Department and the private inventors. In the 1850's the Department produced all military weapons and viewed the

trials as demonstrations of civilian research and development.

In the ea~ly 1860's, private firms manufactured the majority of the smallarms and all the cavalry weapons. Ordnance boards, reports, and experiments performed the research and development through breechloading tests. One of the goals of the 'breechloader trials was for a merger of both production and research at the national level.

The Department throughout the Civil War strived to implement

and adhere to its prewar policy.

In 1861, the plan was abolished

through outside intervention. The remainder of the war witnessed attempts by the Department to reassert itself and its policies. The Department was hampered by too few personnel, but, by the second year of the war the Ordnance Department had begun to reassert itself and by the breechloading trials of the mid-1860's the Ordnance Department was once again in a position of control.

61

1. Davis, Arming the Union, p. 153

2. "Report of the Conunission on Ordnance and Ordnance Stores," Senate Executive Document 72, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 485.

3. Ibid., p. 495.

4. Ibid.

5. Davis, Arming the Union, pp. 15, 26.

6. J. Gorgas, The Ordnance Manual for the Use of the Officers

of the Confederate States Army (Reprint; Morningside Bookshop, 1976), pp. 174-175. Copy of u. S. 1861 Ordnance Manual.

7. Ripley to Gwyn and Campbell, August 4, 1862, "Contracts made by the Ordnance Department," House Executive Document Number ~, 40th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 122.

8. Gorgas, Ordnance Manual, pp. 179-180.

9. Smyser to Ripley, February 2, 1863, Miscellaneous Letters Received, Records of the Office of the Chief of Ordnance,

U. S. Army, Old Military Records Division, Record Group 156, National Archives.

10. Seley to Ripley, December 23, 1863, 1JReport of Arms," Ordnance Office Records.

11. Ripley was replaced in 1863 by George D. Ramsay. Ramsay was in office for only a year when President Lincoln replaced him with Alexander Dyer. Lincoln apparently felt that Ramsay was too old to adequately fill the position.

12. Davis, Arming the Union, p. 42.

13. Ibid., pp. 129-131.

14. Dyer to Stanton, "Annual Report of the Chief of Ordnance,"

62

House Executive Document 83, 38th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 115. 15., Ibid., p. 668.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., 699.

63

Chapter V:

The Gwyn and Campbell Carbines, 1862-1865

64

Beginning in 1862, the Ordnance Department exercised tight control over its contractors. Through inspections, reports, and contracts the Department insured quality and suggested modifications to withstand service use. The history of the Gwyn and Campbell carbine is an example of the Department's control over

contractors.

Edward Gwyn and Abner Campbell in the early days of 1862 worked to fulfill the contract order of December 23, 1861. The

contract had ordered that the arm be strengthened at the box

pivots, sharp corners be rounded, the patch box be made of iron, and the metal around the front lock screw be increased.l The

changes were for the most part impractical as the Department had not seen a Cosmopolitan carbine. The changes ordered cited the

faults of most carbines, not necessarily the Cosmopolitan. Gwyn

and Campbell did, however, modify the arm slightly. The manufac-

tUrers increased the metal around the lock screw.

The Ordnance Commission apparently felt no irregularities accompanied the Cosmopolitan contract, although the order had no specified time for delivery. Gwyn and Campbell delivered 840 of

Governor Yates' carbines on June 18, 1862. Two weeks later, the firm sent the remaining 340.2 The Ordnance Department purchased each carbine for $27. The total amount paid to Gwyn and Campbell

3 was $30,780.

The December contract is unique compared to later Gwyn and Campbell contracts. The Department made no provisions in it for cartridges. The Cosmopolitans were .50 caliber, a size uniform

with the Spencer and Sharps calibers, but the Cosmopolitan

65

cartridges were not interchangeable with any other arms. Shortly

after the contract, the Department ordered 100 cartridges for each

arm. The contract did include a clause that required Gwyn and

Campbell to forward two pattern arms to the Department for exam- 4

ination before payment would be made.

On August 4, 1862, two months after the delivery of Yates'

carbines, the Ordnance Department let a second contract to Gwyn

and Campbell. The contract called for 2,000 Cosmopolitan car-

bines "in all respects identical with a standard pattern carbine 5

to be deposited by [Gwyn and Campbell]." The Department wanted

100 cartridges with each carbine and agreed to a purchase price

of $20 per carbine and $15 per thousand cartridges.

In October, 1862, Gwyn and Campbell patented an improvement

on the Cosmopolitan breech mechanism. The patent, taken out in

their names, simplified the design by reducing the number of in-

ternal parts (figure 7). They also reorganized the business and

changed the company name from the Cosmopolitan Arms Company to

Gwyn and Campbell. The boom of government contracts forced the

company to relocate from a former woolen mill to a site in

Campbell's lumber yard.

Retooling of the company for the new patent carbines delayed

delivery of the breechloaders until the spring of 1863. The

company delivered 1,000 carbines to the Chief Quartermaster at

Cincinnati on April 11, 1863. Two weeks later the company sent the remaining contract carbines.6

Shortly before delivery, Gwyn and Campbell offered to fur-

nish 10,000 carbines at $20 each and cartridges at $18 per

66

Figure 7. Patent type Gwyn and Campbell carbine and breech block improvement.

/

67

thousand. Ripley forwarded the request to Secretary of War

Stanton with the recorrunendation that the delivery date be

November 1, 1863, for as many as possible. Stanton approved Gwyn

and Campbell's offer, but instructed that the delivery date be

December 31, 1863, almost two months after Ripley's suggestion.

Why Ripley wanted the autumn of 1863 instead of mid-winter for

delivery is not known. Stanton probably wanted delivery at ,the

end of the year to bring accounts up to the end of the calendar 7

year.

By the fall of 1863, the Ordnance Department was well on its

way to ascertaining the quality of manufacture and value of its

contractors and contracted items. On September 18, 1863, the

Gwyn and Campbell armory received the following instructions:

Be pleased to furnish at once two samples Cosmopolitan carbines. One of these should be [sent to] Lt. Col. P. V. Hagner, inspector of contract arms, New York, and the other should be sent to this office.8

George D. Ramsey

Col. and Ass't. Chief of Ordnance

The results of the experimentation are unfortunately unknown,

but subsequent model variations are negligible.

The Department continued implementation of its pre-war

policy and in an attempt to expedite field repairs the Department

in January, 1864, ordered Gwyn and Campbell to fill out a data

report. The order was sent to twenty-five firms:

It is highly desireable that this office should have full and correct data as regards the various arms now used in the service. with a view to the attainment of this object, a form has been filled out containing the principle demension, etc. of the arm, a copy of which is enclosed. Please fill up this

68

form as indicated, complete in all respects concerning pattern carbine and forward it to this office at your earliest convenience.9

In the same month the Department negotiated with the Gwyn

and Campbell Armory for cartridges. Ramsay requested the cost of

one million cosmopolitan 'cartridges. Gwyn and Campbell replied:

"we will furnish one million cartridges at eighteen dollars per

thousand; you furnishing caps as usual. Can furnish half million

per month if no interruption in getting a supply of powder and lead. 1,10 The Department ordered 300,000 cartridges for delivery

on February 29, 1864. Before shipment would be made, however,

the armory had to receive percussion caps from the government.

Delivery of the caps was not always prompt and delays often re-

sulted. The Department required that Gwyn and Campbell keep re-

cords of the disposition of caps and cartridges, and periodically

send them to the Department. Such procedure tended to double

check the distribution of ordnance stores.

Gwyn and Campbell received their third government contract

on February 27, 1864. The contract ordered 3,000 carbines. The

carbines were to be identical on all respects with two pattern

carbines. Upon certificate of inspection, the government agreed

to pay $20 for each carbine and $18 per thousand cartridges.

Gwyn and Campbell delivered 2,130 carbines between May and

October, 1864. The scattered delivery was due to a modification 11

of the weapon ordered by the Department.

On March 30, 1864. Gwyn and Campbell had 500 carbines ready

upon inspection for delivery. The armory notified the Ordnance

Department of the completed arms. Ramsay replied:

69

The terms of your contract are that you shall furnish two sample carbines to be approved

by this office ... You will be pleased to deliver to Col. Thornton without delay two carbines to be inspected by him, and sent to this office for final approval, before which no carbine can be accepted.12

Thornton inspected the sample #581 and #608 arms and reported on

them on April 18, 1864. The reports were far from flattering.

In all, Thornton cited numerous defects ranging from poor mater-

ials to poor manufacture:

.•. barrels are torn in rifling, rough in finish, front sight badly brazed and rear sights rough in workmanship ... breech frames are slaggy and rough in finish ... swivel bars and slings of poor material and rough in finish ... lock plates thin at front and flaws in the material. Poor case hardening ... levers sound but rough in finish.13

Thornton finished the report by stating, "#581 stock good but

rough in bedding of the lock. #608 timer soft ... lock poorly bedded. ,,14

George T. Bulch, Thornton's assistant, sent Gwyn and Campbell

a copy of the test report and returned the two carbines to them.

He added:

You will be pleased to send to Col. Thornton ... two other carbines •.. which shall in every particular as regards finish and material meet his approval.lS

The armory complied with Bulch's order and manufactured car-

tridges while the Department again examined the pattern arms. It

should be noted that despite the defects, the Department accepted 16

the carbines already manufactured. Colonel Thornton reported

the results of the second inspection:

These samples .•. should be only used to indicate the patterns of carbines still due under

70

contract, but in accepting them as samples, it should be provided that all unsound materials are defects on workmanship ... and must

be strictly avoided in the future receipts

of Cosmopolitan [Gwyn and Campbell] carbines. And to insure the provision, each component of like arms must be critically inspected.17

Ramsay forwarded Thornton's report to Gwyn and Campbell.

The Ordnance chief stated that neither the workmanship nor the materials were as "high an order as desireable.,,18 The Ordnance

Department ordered Gwyn and Campbell to submit two additional

carbines.

On July 7, 1864, the Ordnance Department sent two dispatches

to the armory at Hamilton. One dispatch contained Thornton's

third test report and the second contained a request for a list

of component parts. The test report concluded with these remarks:

If more care had been given to the workmanship, particularly the barrels I would have no hesitation in recommending the acceptance of the carbines as models, but when I find bad workmanship in sample arms, I cannot but fear the same defects will show themselves on the acceptance of arms produced from such samples.19

The second dispatch requesting "a complete list of the component 20 parts of the Cosmopolitan union carbine as now manufactured"

indicates the Department's efforts to institute an efficient

system for the repair of ordnance stores. Oftentimes, manufac-

turers failed to name the various parts of the breechloaders and

Ordnance officers did not know how to order each part by name.

Through requests of this nature, the Department alleviated such

problems.

In late July, the Departmentagain negotiated with Gwyn and

Campbell. On the 28th, the Department asked the price of one

71

million cartridges. Gwyn and Campbell repled the same day by

telegraph, "[cartridges cost] $25 per thousand; the increase in price [was] due to increased costs of lead, powder, and linen.,,2l

The Department declined the next day "as the price [was] deemed too high.,,22 Dealings of this nature support General Ripley's

claim that contractors could not control market fluctuations.

The three reports of Colonel Thornton echoed those of units

armed with the Cosmopolitan/Gwyn and Campbell. From the end of

1863 throughout 1864, reports were almost consistently derogatory:

December 23, 1863 The Union Rifle Carbine is liable to get out of repair to easily [sic] for a good

arm.

A. H. Sealy 2

Maj. Comdg. 5 Ill. Cav. 3

February 29, 1864

The Union Carbine is light and easy on the men and will do very well for light cavalry, but for hard service it is to [sic] liable to get out of repair.

\'Jm. rrhompson

Act Co dr 8th Ml.'ss. Cav.24

• m .,

January 3, 1864

Many of the Union Carbines are unserviciable; they are not a good arm. I had an inspection of them and they are condemned.

John E. Phelps 25 Col. 2 Ark. Cav.

Even though the Department accepted the carbines, the

Hamilton Armory, because of the inspection reports, requested

extensions of the contract delivery date of August 21. On August

12 and again on August 22, 1864, Gwyn and Campbell asked for ad~

ditional time. Ramsay on August 29 granted them the six weeks

they requested. On September 26, 1864, Gwyn and Campbell asked

for more time:

72

On the 3rd and 4th of September extraordinary falls of rain deluged this part of the country doing extensive damage and, unfortunately for us, bursting the "Hydraulic" Basin and Canal causing an entire suspension of all manufacturi~g operations in the city ... we have just now got to work again ... we ... are forced to

ask an additional extension of one month ... 26

Extensions of delivery dates because of natural and economic

catastrophes reaffirmed the Department's complaint against con-

tractors.

But the Department was even then actively contempla-

ting the end of the war and a return to national manufacture of

all arms.

Gwyn and Campbell were awarded one final contract. Dated

November 19, 1864, the contract ordered 1,000 carbines, subject,

of course, to inspection. The Department probably ordered the

carbines to replace those lost or damaged in the field. The

government agreed to pay $22.50 per carbine and $24 per thousand

cartridges. The carbines were "in all respects identical with 27 carbines purchased under the February 27, 1864, contract."

Gwyn and Campbell responded quickly to the order and delivered

500 carbines to the Ordnance Department on November 30, 1864, and the additional 500 on December 31, 1864.28

Throughout the war the Gwyn and Campbell carbines underwent

slight model variations (figure 3). The changes were minimal.

Si0ht shapes changed as did hammer shapes. The modifications can-

not, unfortunately, be documented to specific inspection reports.

The reports apparently no longer exist. The changes .did occur,

however, only with Departmental approval.

Gwyn and Campbell received no more contracts from the Ord-

nance Department after 1864 perhaps because the government either

no longer needed or

73

Fisurc 8. ~ar time model variations of the Gwyn and Campbell carbines. Changes were, for the most part, minimal. The company probably

at Departmental insistence altered the curvature of the lever and the butt, and the shape of the hammer.

74

no longer wanted the Hamilton breechloaders, Gwyn and Campbell,

however, continued to have dealings with the Department through

the spring of 1865. In late 1864, the Ordnance Department had

announced the commencement of breechloader 'trials for January,

1365. Gwyn and Campbell responded to the announcement by produ-

cing both a single shot carbine and a magazine breechloader

(figure 9). Both weapons were drastic changes from the contract

arms. The single shot carbine fired a metallic, internally

primed cartridge, designed completely different from the old

Cosmopolitan or Gwyn and Campbell. The breechloader appears to

be an almost direct copy of the Spencer carbine. Gwyn and

Campbell did not patent the two mechanisms, but the Spencer type

breechloader reflects the popular preference of repeating breech-

loaders.

The board tested the Gwyn and Campbell carbines on March 21,

1865. In a terse, non-committal evaluation, the board stated:

Gwyn and Campbell submitted a single shooting carbine and a repeater which were examined by the board and afterwards fired. 84 shots

were fired from the two pieces. The single shooter worked with some difficulty. The repeater worked very well. Nine shots were fired from the single shooter in one minute.29

On March 24, 1865, the Ordnance board decided not to consider the repeater further and rejected the single shooter outright.30

By the first week in Hay, Gwyn and Campbell suspected that

their breechloader had not been accepted. Although they did not

receive official notification until later, Gwyn and Campbell ap-

parently decided to abandon the manufacture of breechloaders.

The Hamilton firm made one more attempt to retain government

75

Figure 9. For the 1865 trials, Gwyn and

Campbell submitted the single shot carbine (top) and the repeating magazine breechloader (bottom). Note the similarity between the magazine Gwyn and Campbell and the well known Spencer carbine.

76

employment. On May 8, Gwyn and Campbell wrote

... we presume there will necessarily be a quantity of arms requiring repairing and putting in order ... we ... should be very much gratified if ... we could be kept at work in making the required repairs.31

The Ordnance Department replied four days later that it no longer

needed the services of contractors:

Your proposal has been placed on file and will receive consideration should the Department deem it adviseable to have arms repaired at private e xt.ab Li.s hraerrt.s , 32

The Department not only controlled the manufacture of the

carbines, but also the distribution. The carbine was made in

Ohio and issued only to western units. Gwyn and Campbell deliv-

ered the carbines and armnuni tion to Ordnance depots at Cincinnati,

St. Louis, and Louisville.

The items were then issued to the

following units:

5th Illinois Cavalry, 8th Iowa Cavalry, 8th and

4th Missouri Cavalry, 2nd Arkansas Cavalry, 2nd and 40th Kentucky

Cavalry, 4th and 8th Ohio Cavalry, 7th Tennessee Cavalry, 3rd Wisconsin Cavalry, and the 3rd Regiment, U. S. Colored cavalry.33

Such a practice tended to expedite the issuance of ammunition and

parts.

After the Department's rejection, the company struggled to

survive for tv.yo years manufacturing patent broom heads. Law

suits brought against Campbell and his lumber yard further sapped the firm.34 The company officially ceased when Abner Campbell

died on November 16, 1868.

The carbinei Gwyn and Campbell manufactured were ten years

behind development in smallarms technology. At a time when re-

peating, metallic cartridge breechloaders were being perfected

77

and gaining in popularity, the contract guns of Gwyn and Campbell were single shot breechloaders using an external ignition system and a combustible cartridge.

The carbines, though, are representative pieces in the development of small arms technology. Both the Gwyn and Campbell carbine and the earlier Cosmopolitan are examples of the change from externally ignited muzzle loaders and breechloaders utilizing wholly self-contained metallic cartridges. Also, the Cosmopolitan/Gwyn and Campbell was the only "western" carbine accepted by the Federal government during the Civil War. But, perhaps most important of all, the manner of acceptance at the beginning of the war and its disavowal of standard Ordnance Department procurement procedures is an example of the rampant confusion brought on by the mobilization of the Civil War armies. The evolution of the Cosmopolitan through its later modification as the Gwyn and Campbell reflect the role of the Ordnance Department before, during, and after 1861.

78

1. Ripley to Gwyn and Campbell, December 23, 1861, "Contracts made by the Ordnance Department," House Executive Document Number 99, 40th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 121.

2. Ibid., p. 740.

3. Ibid.

4. Ripley to Gwyn and Campbell, June 3, 1862, Letters Sent, Ordnance Office Records.

5. Ripley to Gwyn and Campbell, December 23, 1861, "Contracts made by the Ordnance Department," House Executive Document Number 99, 40th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 122.

6. Ibid., p. 740.

7. William B. Edwards, Civil War Guns (Stackpole, 1962), p. 112.

8. Ripley to Gwyn and Campbell, December 23, 18S1, "Contracts made by the Ordnance Department," House Executive Document Number 99_, 40th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 123.

9. Ramsay to Gwyn and Campbell, January 21, 1864, Letters Sent, Ordnance Office Records.

10. Gwyn and Campbell to Ramsay, January 22, 1864, Letters Received, Ordnance Office Records.

Ripley to Gwyn and Campbell, December 23, 1861, HContracts

11.

made by the Ordnance Department," House Executive Docement Nu~)er 99, 40th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 124.

12. Ramsay to Gwyn and Campbell, March 30, 1864, Letters Sent, Ordnance Office Records.

13. Thornton to Ramsay, April 18, 1864, Letters Received, Ordnance Office Hecords.

14. Ibid.

79

15. Bulch to Gwyn and Campbell, April 23, 1864, Letters Sent, Ordnance Office Records.

16. Ripley to Gwyn~~and Campbell, December 23, 1861, "Contracts made by the Ordnance Department," House Executive Document Number 99, 40th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 740.

17. Thornton to Ramsay, June 3, 1964, Letters Received, Ordnance Office Records.

18. Ramsay to Gwyn and Campbell, June 7, 1864, Letters Sent, Ordnance Department Records.

19. Thornton to Ramsay, July 7, 1864, Letters Received, Ordnance Office Records.

20. Ramsay to Gwyn and Campbell, July 7, 1864, Letters Sent, Ordnance Office Records.

21. Gwyn and Campbell to Ramsay, July 28, 1864, Letters Received, Ordnance Office Records.

22. Ramsay to Gwyn and Campbell, July 29, 1864, Letters Sent, Ordnance Office Records.

23. Sealy to Ramsay, December 23, 1863, Letters Received,

Ordnance Office Records.

24. Thompson to Ramsay, February 29, 1864, ibid.

25. Phelps to Ramsay, June 3, 1844, ibid.

26. Gwyn and Campbell to Dyer, September 26, 1864, ibid.

27. Eip1ey to Gwyn and Campbell, December 23, 1861, "Contracts made by the Ordnance Department," House Executive Document Nunmer 99, 40th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 126.

28. Ibid., p. 740.

29. Maynadier to Dyer, March 21, 1865, Letters Received, Ordnance

80

Office Records.

30. Maynadier to Dyer, March 25, 1865, ibid.

31. Gwyn and Campbell to Dyer, May 8, 1865, ibid.

32. Dyer to Gwyn and Campbell, May 12, 1865, Letters Sent,

Ordnance Office Records.

33. "Summary Statement of Ordnance and Ordnance Stores on hand

in the Cavalry Regiments in the Service of the united States

.'

during the 3rd Quarter ending September 30, 1864," Ordnance

Office Records.

34. "Dun and Bradstreet Credit Ledger," February 28, 1867,

Baker Library, Harvard Business School, Boston, Massachu-

setts.

81

Chapter VI:

The Armstrong-Taylor Carbine, 1862-1866

82

In 1862, lobbyists for various inventions beseiged the Ordnance Department in search of a lucrative war contract. In

that same year, the Ordnance Department was attempting to reassert its pre-war policies. Although never actually stated, this reform

excluded new contractors.

Inventors, politicians, and mechanics

possibly unaware of the 8epartment's attitude nevertheless attempted to obtain a government contract.

Just as the Department controlled actual contractors, so too did it restrict hopeful contractors. The attempts by James Armstrong and John Taylor to gain an entree into the Department's contract system is an example of that restriction. Armstrong and Taylor tried in 1863 to receive a government contract. They were successful neither time.

The Armstrong-Taylor carbine was first manufactured by Miles Greenwood of Cincinnati, Ohio, sometime during 1862. Greenwood

was an industrialist who had previously been awarded two contracts by the Ordnance Department. The first contract promised to pay Greenwood $1.25 for each European flintlock he rifled and converted to percussion. Greenwood agreed and altered 25,000 muskets.l In late 1861 and throughout 1862 Greenwood manufactured six and twelve pound field pieces for the government. The industrialist manufactured forty-six 6-pound smooth bores, fifty-one 6-pound rifled guns, fifty 12-pound Napoleon cannons, and fourteen l2-pound howitzers complete with cai~sons and forges for each battery.2

Greenwood, in addition to government contracts, also accepted jobs on commission. As an example, Greenwood manufactured six

Gatling guns for Richard Gatling ln 1862. Greenwood and Gatling

83

severed connections In the winter of that year after a fire at

Greenwood's foundry destroyed the rapid fire weapons. For these

reasons, Armstrong and Taylor approached Greenwood'to manufacture

their breechloader not only because Greenwood had government con-

tracts but also because he was experienced in the manufacture of

unique patent arms.

The Armstrong-Taylor carbine operated on a twist action prin-

ciple. The breech mechanism rotated from the receiver opening th~

chamber and extracting the spent casing. The carbine made by

Greenwood had a release button on the tang that unlocked the action.

Armstrong and Taylor claimed the extractor as the particular fea-

ture of their invention (figure 10).

Greenwood both made the weapon and lent his support to the

Kentucky inventors in their attempts to obtain a government con-

tract. On November 20, 1863, Greenwood (at Armstrong and Taylor's

request) wrote to General Ripley.

In the letter, Greenwood asked

the Ordnance chief if it would be worthwhile to bring the carbine

to Washington. The ironmaster stated that the inventors can "show its superiority to any [then] in use.,,3

Ripley replied:

... 1 can hold out no inducements which are not open to everyone. If your friend wishes to submit his arm he must take his chance of success on circumstances to be developed by the trial which would be made of the arm.4

Ripley also declared that a contract would be awarded only upon

the clear evidence that the arm was superior to those already in

the

. 5

serVlce.

Either Armstrong or Taylor went to Washington to display the

84

Figure 10. The ~rmstrong-~aylor breechloader. As the barrel Dovcd to the right, the extractor (middle illustration) withdrew the spent cartridge.

85

gun to Ripley, but apparently the Department did not test the

breechloader. The inventor returned to Cincinnati and probably

had Greenwood alter the gun. The original carbine made by

Greenwood was chambered for a .44 caliber Henry cartridge, a cal-

iber the Department considered almost too light. And the length

of the barrel was 24 inches; most carbine barrels were 20 inches.

The gun Armstrong and Taylor presented to the Department for

trial in April, 1863, was of regular caliber. Greenwood again

endorsed the gun.

In a second letter to Ripley, Greenwood wrote

that his son-in-law, W. K. Nixon, would present the gun. He

further stated that "any arrangements that Mr. Nixon .•. may make I will willingly guarantee •.. ,,6

In 1863, when Nixon presented the Armstrong-Taylor carbine,

the Ordnance Department paid more attention to experimentation

than it had since the beginning of the war. The government tested

the efficiency of several arms, among them the Armstrong-Taylor.

The only specifications required that the arms submitted were to

be .50 caliber with 22-inch barrels maximum and a weight of six 7

to eight pounds.

The Ordnance Department tested the Cincinnati breechloader

at its Washington Arsenal on April 9, 1863. The officer who con-

ducted the trial reported:

The "Arms-trong and Taylor Carbine" presented for trial by Mr. W. K. Nixon has been fired ... ninety-six times ... The specialty of the carbine is [the extractor). This arrangement works perfectly well with great facility. And as far as tried its accuracy ... range and penetration will compare favorably with most of the carbines in service.S

The carbine, in short, was not superior to those already in use

86

and the Department rejected Armstrong and Taylor's bid.

Armstrong and Taylor decided that for all Greenwood's con-

nections and abilities, he was not well-enough known to influence

adoption. From 1863 through 1864, Armstrong and Taylor had their

carbine manufactured first by Eli Remington and Sons of Ilion,

New York, and then by the Norwich Arms Company of Norwich,

Connecticut. Both firms had large government contracts, Remington

for revolvers and muskets and the Connecticut Company for muskets.

It is not known if Armstrong and Taylor resubmitted the carbine

for additional tests during the war years. They did not present

the gun for examination at the 1865 trials.

In October, 1865, Chief of Ordnance Alexander Dyer submitted

his annual report to the Secretary of War. Commenting on the

breechloader trials, Ripley stated:

Extensive [breechloader] experimentation has been made, but as yet, no arm has been presented wh i.ch I am willing to recommend for adoption. 9

Because of the failure to find a suitable breechloading mechan-

ism, the Ordnance Department scheduled additional tests for the

following year. Inventors and mechanics responded enthusiastic-

ally to the announcement. Among them were James Armstrong and

John Taylor.

On March 13, 1866, Armstrong and Taylor submitted their car-

bine for examination. In an accompanying cover letter, the two

inventors not only described the meri·ts of their device, but also

the costs:

... no pretension is made to superiority over the other arms ... but to its simplicity and consequent construction, rapidity of firing,

87

strength, safety, lightness, durability, freedom from noise, general appearance, and its almost entire exemption from the liabilities attending the use of fire arms by the careless and inexperienced. 10

Armstrong and Taylor cited that the estimated cost of construction

in 1863 and 1864 was $8.50, for some reason less than half the

cost of other patent arms. They further proclained that "each and every part can be machined and made interchangeable."ll

On March 19, 1866, the Ordnance Department required the

Kentucky inventors to fill out a form stating the price at which

they would sell the weapon if accepted (figure 11). After the

Department paid $4000,000, manufacturing rights became the sole

property of the government.

The Armstrong-Taylor carbine was tested on Harch 22, 1866.

James Armstrong presented the gun. The test report is short and

uninformative .

... one hundred shots fired without failure. Average firing, fourteen shots per minute.12

The Ordnance board on April 20 officially declared that the car-

bine was not suitable for military use.

Although the test report is sketchy, the Armstrong-Taylor

was probably not rejected because of mechanical difficulty. The extractor mechanism was almost faultless.13 The board's objec-

tion to the Armstrong-Taylor carbine was most likely one of manu-

facture. In 1864, Dyer had stated that the breechloading design

adopted should incorporate as many of the rifled musket parts as

possible. The Armstrong-Taylor could use very few surplus parts.

After the trial, neither Arlnstrong nor Taylor again attempted to

obtain either a contract or a trial.

88

Figure 11. T;pical cost fOrm~~quired of all inventors for the 1866 trials.

/~ vr--~- . / . f iL-

._/}1<-; __ .. ,,_./ ~ of 4~/ ~~ of

b-/~ ~ being the proprietor c of the Patent Right to manufacture

a breech-loading arm, known a, ~ ~ do

hereby bind ~/ L'Heirs, Kxecutors, and AI'~ignt', to grant to the

United States Government, if called Oil within three years from this date to

wake such grant. the right to mauufacture the aforesaid breech-loading arm Oil

the following terms. \17.;-

/ .

For payment to;':;f........ of z., £.V~

dollar s per arm for .yJ)(' / r.::.---

the

privilege -of tnuuufacturiug fifty thousand; of chr......

dollar.s per arm for the privilege of inunufacturiug one hundred thousand; of

dollar J per arm for the privilege of manu-

t:1e1uring two hundred thousand, and of ~ -7~ r /,:_f7/ _/

dollar>

per ann for the privilege of manufacturing any additional number of arms; Provided, That when the Government shall have paid Lthe total amount of .J'L ~ j'~~.£.IR?:" ~llars, counting' each and every payment, then it shall. have the full and entire privilege of manufacturing cl-:-·.:, I;atented arms,

. .

for its own lise, without any further payment to c6 onaccount ot~patent

right.

Each payment. as above specified, to be made for not Jess than 5,000

... ~ ... .Ih..I;!:_.---

Or. by the payment of J~. #- ~ )lollar::;,

arms.

within three years from this date, the privilege of mnuufacturiug as many arms

as may be desired shall he grallted to the United States. ._ /'

._/;.~~a__y~

7")-." / ~,! c<-_~-e I~/"

/ I /.6-~ tI -_ - - .?-.,l-~ 9 / n?

89

/

The attempts by Armstrong and Taylor to obtain a government contract were frustrated both in 1863 and again in 1866. The Armstrong-Taylor design was solid and practical for a civilian weapon, but for military use it could not be accepted. Primarily, the failure of adoption was due to Departmental policy. In 1863, the Department wanted no more contractors, particularly private manufacturers with no prior experience or proven worth. Patronage counted for little. In 1863, the Armstrong-Taylor, even though it utilized common rim fire cartridges, fit neither into the Department's criteria for economy or standardization. The Department did not want twenty types of breechloaders in the service. In 1866, the carbine did not lend itself to the incorporation of standard musket parts; adoption was uneconomical.

For all its drawbacks the significance of the breechloader is not merely a reflection of small arms technology. It is a reflection of both the Ordnance Department's desire for implementation of its pre-1861 policy, and is a reflection of the Department's authority in contract politics after 1861.

90

1. Carl M. Becker, Miles Greenwood" in Kenneth Wheeler's For the Union: Ohio Leaders in the Civil War (Columbus, 1968), p. 284.

2. Ibid., p. 287.

3. Greenwood to Ripley, November 20, 1862, lIIiscellaneous Letters Received, Ordnance Office Records.

4. Ripley to Greenwood, November 24, 1862, Miscellaneous Letters Sent, Ordnance Office Records.

5. Ibid.

6. Greenwood to Ripley, March 10, 1863, Miscellaneous Letters Received, Ordnance Office Records.

7. Dreyup, Arms Making to the Connecticut Valley, p. 186.

8. Nueman to Ripley, April 9, 1863, Miscellaneous Letters Received, Ordnance Office Records.

9. Dyer, "Annual Report of the Chief of Ordnance, 1865," House Executive Document 1, 39th Congress, Session 1, p. 996.

10. Armstrong and Taylor to Hancock, March 13, 1866, Letters Received, Ordnance Office Records.

11. Ibid.

12. Dyer, "Annual Report of the Chief of Ordnance, 1865," House Executive Document 1, 39th Congress, Session 2, p. 671.

13. Although the age of the weapon may be to blame, the Greenwood manufactured carbine on display at the Ohio Historical Society in Columbus has a tendency to jam while opening the breech.

91

Chapter VII:

The Passing of the Contractors:

Summary and Conclusion

92

The end of the Civil War marked more than the end of hosti-

lities. Profitable government contracts were at an end and contractors simply went either out of business or bankrupt. Firearms manufacture virtually ceased except for civilian arms. The Ordnance Department reverted to experimentation and firmly established its independence from all but Congress and the Secretary of War. The Department eventually adopted a breechloading mechanism designed by ~1. S. Allin of the Springfield Armory. The dependence

of the Department on contractors and the dependence of contractors on the Department was over.

After the death of Abner Campbell in November, 1868, Edward

Gwyn remained in Hamilton, Ohio, for one additional year. Gwyn then moved to Springfield, Ohio, and became an independent machine

tool salesman. As a salesman, he travelled extensively worldwide. He died in the ~etherlands on May 25, 1879.1

After Henry Gross assigned the Cosmopolitan patent rights to Edward Gwyn in 1861, -the Tiffin inventor began manufacturing his own patent revolvers. He reorganized the Gross Arms Company and admitted George Seney, the judge of the Seneca County common pleas court, into the business. In February, 1862, Seney sold out to Nimrod Obermiller (or Overmiller), a local physician.2 Gross apparently did not attempt to introduce his pa-tent revolvers into the army and remained aloof from the Cosmopolitan Arms

Company.

In late 1862 or early 1863 Henry Gross decided to again

tinker with breechloading mechanisms. In August, 1863, Gross obtained two patents for improvements on breechloading carbines.

93

Specifically, the improvements were on the Gwyn and Campbell 1862

patent (figure 12). The August 11 patent simplifies the breech

plug and the August 25 patent combined into one piece the lever

and breech mechanism.

As early as February, 1863, Gross had attempted to get one

of the improved carbines into the service even before he received

the patents. He presented a breechloader to both the state

Quartermaster General and the State Congressional Standing Commit-

tee on Military Affairs in Ohio. He apparently felt that poli-

tical patronage would help him to abtain a government contract.

The state officials recommended his carbine to the Secretary of 3

War. The War Department referred the letters to the Ordnance

Department and the Ordnance clerks filed them. Gross did nbt re-

ceive either a response or a contract. In October, 1863, he assigned the patent rights to his partner.4

Even though Henry Gross never again attempted to obtain a

government contract, In May, 1864, the Ohio mechanic patented one

final breechloader device. Although few if any of the guns were

produced, the design is interesting in that it is a radical devia-

tion from the Cosmopolitan/Gwyn and Campbell types. The mechan-

ism utilized a geared action and fired a metallic cartridge

(figure 13). Gross did not submit the gun for trial, but at

least the patent indicated that he was responsive to both improve-

ments in smallarms and the preferences of the Ordnance Department.

In February, 1865, Henry Gross left the firearms business.

The Gross Arms Company folded and the inventor moved to

Cincinnati, For approximately fifteen years, Gross worked for the

94

"

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\ \. ,/...... "

, ".. .... \ ,

'" '" ., " \ \,' ...

------ . :

\ .

... _ ... - -~

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...

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, , '

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Figure 12. Ilenei' Gross' 1003 l,a.tenh,d .i.i.ip.r ove rne n t s . rrhc tOl) .i L'l u s c ra Li.on is t lre _~'\llgust 11, 1;':;63. p a t.e n L and tIle botton illustration is the ~ugust 23, 1863 patent.

Fiqurc 13. Til'; La.vt; b r occh Lo adc r pa t cn t, of Henry Gro[.:;s. IJo t.c t lio qcr)r(~c1 action and t hc method of 0jection.

Hall Lock and Safe Company. He died early in 1880.

If not too much is known about the Armstro~g-Taylor carbine, little more is known about its inventors. Both James Armstrong

and John Taylor were members of prominent Augusta, Kentucky, families. The two men never again patented a firearm or approached the Ordnance Department. Apparently, the returned to private

life in Augusta.

The interrelated effects that contractors had upon the Ordnance Department and the Ordnance Department upon contractors can now be summarized. Before 1861, the Department encouraged new smallarms designs and technologies through the Congressionally-funded breechloader trials. Theoretically, the Department would adopt and manufacture the most practical design. But, because of conservatism among some officers towards breechloaders, a fear of obsolescence, and a reluctance to undermine its policy of efficiency, economy, and (particularly) standardization, the Department never introduced in large numbers any single patent arm. Breechloaders could not be economically manufactured at the national armories. And, the standard musket cartridge could not be used in any breechloader.

The Department throughout the 1850's capitalized on the breechloader trials. The tests provided an inexpensive means through which the Ordnance Department could keep abreast of improvements in smallarms technology. The Department manufactured the military arms; inventors, with Departmental encouragement and advice, performed both hte reseaich and the development of the different mechanisms.

97