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Occult philosophy and politics: Why John Dee wrote his Compendious rehearsal

in November 1592
Glyn Parry
History Department, Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Available online 23 December 2011
Keywords:
John Dee
Occult philosophy
Elizabethan politics
a b s t r a c t
John Dees autobiographical Compendious rehearsal, written in November 1592, not only reveals the close
connection between occult philosophy and high Elizabethan politics through its contents, but also
through the circumstances that brought it into existence. Dees Court career shows a clear pattern, in
which events sometimes aligned to make his occult philosophy useful to senior politicians, boosting
his status at Court. One such series of events occurred in 15912, when Lord Burghley used Dees predic-
tion of a Spanish conquest of England in 1592 to panic Queen Elizabeth into permitting a large scale, orga-
nized persecution of Catholic recusants, based on a Proclamation against Jesuits and missionary priests.
This enabled Burghley to deect Archbishop Whitgifts campaign against the Presbyterians and re-estab-
lish his own inuence over religious policy. However, the eventual failure of Dees prediction enabled
Burghley to abandon Dee to Whitgifts revenge, part of Whitgifts cultural counter-revolution against
all forms of occult philosophy, which be believed inspired political subversion. With the fall of Sir Walter
Raleigh in the summer of 1592 it also left Dee vulnerable to criticism from Catholic exiles, and enables us
to denitely identify Dee as the conjuror associated with the ctional, atheistical School of Night asso-
ciated with Raleigh.
2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
This essay discusses the previously unknown events in John
Dees later life that forced him to spend several days in November
1592 writing his Compendious rehearsal. That long, carefully
selective text detailed his education, his scholarship, his writings
both published and unpublished, and particularly his services as
an intellectual consultant to the Queen and her Court on questions
including imperial rights, navigation and discovery, calendar re-
form, alchemy, astrology, and policy formation in general.
1
The Re-
hearsal was a desperate appeal for Elizabeths patronage at a
moment when Dees Court career had ignominiously collapsed. Par-
adoxically, what had brought him to that predicament was his ser-
vice for Lord Burghley, Elizabeths chief minister, in helping to
persuade the Queen to pursue a more aggressively anti-catholic
policy.
However, the evidence analyzed here does not just add to Dees
biography. It raises wider issues, particularly the cultural war over
magic in Renaissance England, which in turn has implications for
the broader question of the decline of magical beliefs. The publica-
tion of Keith Thomas seminal Religion and the decline of magic
(1971) stimulated a still unresolved debate over the reasons for
the profound change in western thought from a broadly magical
to an ostensibly scientic understanding of the world. I will not re-
view that debate here, but I do want to suggest that in England,
from where Thomas drew most of his evidence, one promising
way to understand this change is to bring together two elds of
historical study that post-Enlightenment historians have tradition-
ally seen as unrelatedthe practice of occult philosophy and Eliz-
abethan high politics. Dee is a particularly useful bridge between
these two historical worlds. Apart from the intrinsic interest of
his occult philosophy, throughout his life, in propitious circum-
stances, leading Elizabethan politicians used his occult learning
to persuade the Queen to follow the policies they favoured. The
evidence discussed here also questions the conventional historio-
graphical distinction between elite, philosophical magic, and the
0039-3681/$ - see front matter 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.12.006
E-mail address: Glyn.Parry@vuw.ac.nz
1
Dee, Compendious rehearsal (hereafter CR), Appendix in Hearne (1726).
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43 (2012) 480488
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
j our nal homepage: www. el sevi er. com/ l ocat e/ shpsa
mercenary magic of ordinary cunning folk and wizards, a distinc-
tion that has encouraged the separation of elite political history
from occult philosophy.
This new interpretation of Dees biography in 15912 begins
with my identication of the English traitor whose accusation,
that Dee had been conjuror to the Elizabethan Privy Council,
Dee denied in a printed petition to James I in 1604. The traitor
was Cardinal William Allen. This fact also helps to resolve a long-
standing literary puzzle, by proving that Dee was the conjuror al-
leged by Catholic exiles in 1592 to have taught the so called School
of Night, a group of allegedly atheistic intellectuals indelibly asso-
ciated by his enemies with Sir Walter Raleigh.
The following discussion therefore uses abundant political evi-
dence to reconnect Dees occult philosophy with the exigencies
of Elizabethan politics. Circumstances made Dees occult learning
useful to inuential politicians on many occasions (Parry, 2011).
His experiences in 15912 also show that in the right political cir-
cumstances the practical political application of his occult philoso-
phy led to many of his fellow Englishmen being arrested, some
being interrogated, and several being executed. In thus serving
the Tudor state Dee sought to advance his own career, at least until
the powerful William Cecil, Lord Burghley, ceased to need his
services.
By the late spring of 1591, almost forty years after his complex
relationship with Dee began, Burghley faced a three-pronged crisis
for what he considered the Protestant Cause. He needed to defend
the Presbyterians currently being persecuted in the Star Chamber
by John Whitgift, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and by Elizabeths
inuential favourite and Councillor, Sir Christopher Hatton. He also
needed to prepare against anticipated Spanish invasion, and scotch
Whitgift and Hattons attempt to neutralise the English Catholic
exiles by offering some form of de facto toleration for English
Catholics.
Burghleys response to this latest crisis, like his perception of
the crisis itself, followed a well established ideological pattern. Be-
cause in high Elizabethan politics the line of ideological cleavage
over policy formation ran not between Privy Councillors, who lar-
gely shared Protestant beliefs, but between them and an instinc-
tively far more conservative Queen. Patrick Collinson has
identied Elizabeth as a humanist evangelical, not a Protestant in
the sense Burghley recognised (Collinson, 2007). From the 1560s
onwards her Protestant Councillors battled to overcome her refusal
to make the liturgy established by the Church settlement of 1559
more Protestant, or to act as the Deborah protecting the interna-
tional Protestant cause, by rigorously suppressing Catholicism. In
these battles Councillors knew that their most potent weapon
was anti-catholicism. Indeed, when generalising about Elizabethan
Catholicism we use concepts that Burghley and other Councillors
deployed in ideologically loaded ways. They frequently threw to-
gether discrete events and actions and spun them like modern
politicians, constructing an ideological worldview in which they
used slanders about Catholics to justify particular actions (Lake,
2008, pp. 146147).
From the beginning of Elizabeths reign ideological Protestants
like Cecil, later joined by the Earl of Leicester and Francis Walsing-
ham, had joined the dots between events for Elizabeth in such a
way as to convince her that she faced a determined international
Catholic conspiracy, against which only thoroughly Protestant ref-
ormation could prevail. At crucial moments this plot took a stan-
dard form: domestic subversion by disaffected Catholics, inviting
in armed Catholic invasion. However many of these plots actually
existed, and however many Burghley and other Councillors se-
cretly nurtured, they regularly worked to alarm Elizabeth into
abandoning her conservative instincts and reluctance to persecute
Catholics, to pursue more radical policies.
Burghleys political needs explain the abrupt reversal in Dees
fortunes during 1591. Dee returned to the Elizabethan Court in
December 1589 after six years at the Imperial Court in Prague
and the Polish capital of Cracow. He had been persuaded to leave
England by his scryer or seer, Edward Kelley, whom he believed
received angelic revelations. At Prague, Kelley eventually aban-
doned both Dee and the angels for a more lucrative career as an
alchemist, enjoying the patronage of the Emperor Rudolf II and a
European reputation for transmuting base metal into gold. Since
Dees return his occult philosophy had come under sustained at-
tack from the conservative Whitgift and Hatton. They objected
not just to Kelley and Dees rumoured angel magic, but their prac-
tice of alchemy, believing that such spiritual enthusiasm stimu-
lated radical political subversion. Until 1591 Dees Court
reputation therefore rose and fell in harmony with Elizabeth and
Burghleys hopes of enticing Kelley back from Prague to transmute
gold for them. They repeatedly sent Edward Dyer to persuade Kel-
ley to return. Thus, when the Emperor Rudolf II arrested Kelley in
early May 1591, the news prompted Dee on 27 May to abandon
the Court. He accepted Sir Thomas Jones offer of a rent-free castle
at Newcastle Emlyn in remote Cardiganshire, and money to sup-
port alchemical work.
2
However, Dee remained at Mortlake and around the Court until
1596, when he left for the more prestigious position of Warden of
Manchester Collegiate Church. To explain his improved fortunes
from June 1591 we must jump forward to 5 June 1604, when he
petitioned James I. Panicked by the draconian Bill Against Conjura-
tion, Witchcraft, and dealing with evil and wicked spirits passing
through Parliament that week, Dee wearily denied slanders that
he was a Conjuror, . . . or Invocator of Devils. The Act ordained
death for conjuring any evil spirit (I James I, c. xii.).
Dees petition criticized an unnamed English traitor, a Catholic
exile who in Print (Anno 1592, 7 January) described Dee as the
Conjuror belonging to Elizabeths Privy Council (Dee, 1604). Iden-
tifying this slanderer explains why Dees Court career rose in 1591
and early 1592, when his occult philosophy proved useful in Eliz-
abethan high politics. It all began when Burghleys need to divert
Whitgift and Hattons drive against the Presbyterians in 1591
met Dees need to resurrect his Court career. The January 1592
accusation that Dee conjured for Elizabeths Privy Council reects
Burghleys remarkable turnaround in church politics during the
previous six months. He used Dees occult abilities to force this
sea change, which led to the imprisonment, torture and execution
of Catholic priests and laymen, justifying the Catholic exiles bitter
accusation.
When Dee prepared to abandon the Court for Cardiganshire in
May 1591, Whitgifts and Hattons vendetta had brought the Pres-
byterians to a Star Chamber trial for seditious conspiracy. Burghley
tried indirectly to slow the process. In mid-May Elizabeth visited
his country house, Theobalds. Burghley, still ignorant of Kelleys ar-
rest, wrote to Dyer at Prague for some of Kelleys philosophers
stone to defray his expenses. Burghley used pageants to draw Eliz-
abeths attention to his indispensability, suggesting he retire from
the crippling burdens of administration (Sutton, 2004, Ch. 3). This
indirectly signalled his displeasure at the persecution of the
Presbyterians.
Burghley next repeated a familiar tactic by emphasising the
threat from English Catholics supporting Spain. He possibly saw
how to use Dees occult learning for this campaign, because four
days after Dee accepted Jones offer, Bartholomew Hickman arrived
to scry at Mortlake. We know this from Dees so called Diary,
2
Parry (2011), pp. 205216; Ch. 18; Bodleian Library Oxford (BLO) MS Ashmole 487, 25, 27 May 1591.
G. Parry / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43 (2012) 480488 481
actually cryptic marginalia in an ephemerides, which unfortu-
nately, while mentioning various occult philosophical activities
during these two years, do not describe them in detail. However,
on 19 June 1591 Dee noted an interview with Elizabeth. Consider-
ing how Burghley would later use Dees abilities, Dee may have
predicted Spanish plans.
In contrast to the last eighteen months, when occasional news
that Kelley would not return to England had lowered Dees Court
status, his stock now rose appreciably, despite the fact that Eliza-
beth already knew that Rudolf II had arrested Kelley and placed
Dyer under house arrest. About 22 July, the Countess of Warwick,
last of Dees Dudley patrons in Elizabeths Privy Chamber, secured
Elizabeths promise of the Mastership of St Cross Hospital outside
Winchester if it were a living t for me. This offered greater in-
come than Dees lost rectories of Upton-upon-Severn and Long
Leadenham, and could easily house his library and alchemical lab-
oratories. When a chastened Dyer returned from Prague in early
July, he acknowledged Dees improving Court status by sending
money. They solemnly reconciled on 28 July. That day Hickman re-
turned to scry for several sessions, and on 2 August Dee noted Mr
William Digges his philosophical courtesy: all day, though we can-
not be certain whether this referred to alchemy, or possibly setting
questionary horoscopes about Spanish intentions.
3
In July 1590 Whitgift had assured Dee that Kelley faked alchem-
ical transmutation, and he and Hatton had inspired a whispering
campaign against Kelley in early 1591. When Dyer now described
Kelleys transmutation at Whitgifts table, he received a frosty
reception. Dyer had seen Kelley put base metal in a crucible, heat
it and put in a very small quantity of the medicine to make per-
fect gold. Whitgifts response connected Dyers gullibility with
indelity. He warned him to take heed what you say (Spedding,
187076, vii, p. 162).
Even worse for Burghley and Dee, Whitgifts drive against the
Presbyterians provoked extremists in the religious underworld.
On 19 July 1591, in Cheapside, London, Edmund Coppinger and
Henry Arthington, both fervent believers in Presbyterianism, pro-
claimed William Hacket, an illiterate maltmaker from Northampt-
onshire, Gods Prophet of Judgement and King of Europe, red with
an Angelical spirit to remove Whitgift and Hatton, overthrow the
established order, release the imprisoned Presbyterians, and usher
in the millennium. Unless the Discipline of the Lord was installed,
they predicted, England would that year suffer grievous famine,
pestilence and warre. Hackets connections with many leading
Presbyterians left a paper trail vulnerable to sinister interpretation
(Camden, 1635, pp. 401404).
Whitgifts propagandists exploited the connections between
Hacket and the Presbyterians. They denounced Hackets claims to
commandbothblackandwhitemagical powers. Theycomparedthis
imposture withPresbyterianclaims to aninspiredecclesiastical pol-
ity. Hacket, executed on the day Dee and Dyer reconciled, claimed to
converse directly with God, to summon angels into a crystal ball and
to exorcise demons through prayer (Walsham, 1998, pp. 2766.).
The scandal gave Whitgifts cultural counter-revolution against
spiritual fanatics fresh impetus, by exposing the political threats
in magic closely resembling Dees angelic practices.
That counter-revolutionhad begun evenbefore September 1583,
when Whitgift was installed as Archbishop of Canterbury. Bishop of
Worcester since 1577 through Hattons patronage, Whitgift had
made his political reputation by attacking the Presbyterians, partly
for their reliance on spiritual inspiration resembling Dees belief in
angelic revelations. CriticizingthePresbyterianleader, Thomas Cart-
wright, in the early 1570s, Whitgift stressed human training against
gifts and graces miraculously poured into the Elect. Learning and
wisdom did not come by inspiration only (Ayre, 185153, iii, p.
274). Whitgift suspectedthat claims tocharismatic authoritymerely
cloaked a desire for popularity with the foolish multitude.
Whitgifts inuence as Archbishop enabled other writers, espe-
cially Reginald Scot, to condemn radical Protestants claims to spiri-
tual illumination. Spiritual hysteria about further Church reform
threatened social conict. Within months of Whitgift becoming
Archbishop, Scot publishedhis Discoveryof Witchcraft [and] the knav-
ery of conjurors (1584). Like other conformists, Scot wanted to mar-
ginalize Presbyterianism from political society, by connecting
Presbyterianclaims to spiritual illuminationwithpolitically suspect
forms of magic. Drawing heavily onthe sceptical Netherlands doctor
Johann Weyer, Scot politicized Weyers criticisms of magical beliefs,
arguing that God revealed the future to the wise, the rich, the
learned, not the poor (Scot, 1584, sigs. A2v, B5r). He attacked radical
reformers seekinga newChurchtoadvancetheir magical words and
curious directions (ibid., sig. B1r). His rational attack on magical be-
liefs drew in Dees occult philosophy. Miracles and prophecies had
ceased with the apostles, all angelic revelations since Christ were
impostures. The allegorical games of the kabbalah allowed athe-
ists (anyone Scot despised) to claim power over angels and devils.
Reports of seeing angels in crystals were counterfeit, and popish.
4
Scot dismissed invocations to angels like Dees, especially that they
may give me a true answer of all my demands. By publishingthe seals
to trap angelic spirits in crystals, Scot hoped to debunk magics mys-
tique. Healsoequatedconjurors withwitches. Scots concludingswipe
at Leicester for protecting another deceitful conjuror in 1582 touched
on Dees notoriety as a conjuror.
5
Many contemporaries disagreed with Scots sweeping scepti-
cism, but he exercised disproportionate inuence over the con-
formist clergy grouped around Whitgift.
6
Amongst them, Bishop
John Aylmer of London tried to prosecute Dee for conjuring with
the Devil in September 1584. Leicesters death in 1588 freed Whit-
gifts protgs Richard Bancroft, Richard Cosin and Samuel Harsnett
to criticize the Presbyterians for their magical claims from then on.
They frequently cited Scot.
In September 1591, for example, Whitgifts protg Richard Co-
sin explained how Anabaptistical wizards and fanatical sectaries
like Hacket did Satans work, leading enthusiasts to the overthrow
of states (Cosin, 1592, sigs. b2rv, C2v). According to Cosin, Hacket
declared himself a Prophet of Gods vengeance, though Hackets
landlord simply thought him a conjurer. A mere yeoman, Hacket
might be dismissed, but Coppinger was a gentleman, and shared
Dees notions, despite the distinctions drawn by later historians
between elite and popular magic. Coppingers belief that he had
been very strangely and extraordinarily moved by God to go to
her Majesty, and tell her the Lords pleasure that she reform
her self, her family, the Common-wealth, and the Church recalls
an interviewDee sought with Rudolf II in September 1584 at angel-
ic command. Coppinger and Dee both believed a secret mystery
would transform the world.
7
Fortunately for Dee, he avoided Coppingers threats against the
establishment. Cousin alleged that the Cheapside prophets planned
to depose Elizabeth, purge Whitgift and Hatton from the Council,
then establish Presbyterianism under Hacket as Emperor.
8
Only
3
BLO MS Ashmole 487, 31 July, 3 Aug.; BLO, MS Ashmole 488, 31 July, 2 August 1591.
4
Ibid., pp. 156160, 500501, 177,183, 199, 261, 422, 290.
5
Ibid., pp. 394430 (esp. p. 395), 467469.
6
E.g. British Library (BL) MS Harley 2302, fols. 57r105v.
7
Ibid., sigs. C2v, C3v, E2v. See below.
8
Cosin (1592), sigs. F3v, F4r, E2vE3v.
482 G. Parry / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43 (2012) 480488
Dees reverent presentation of angelic revelations distinguished him
from men depicted as subversive terrorists. Other similarities could
be unsettling.
Hacket and Coppinger warned a Privy Councillor of a plot
against Elizabeth revealed by occult means, just like Dee.
9
Hacket
foretold the future by conjuring, including identifying foreign
threats to England. Like Dee, Hacket believed that guardian angels
watched over him. His revelations required diligent preparation,
including the prayer and fasting Dee used before angelic actions
(Cosin, 1592, sigs. G4vH1r). Like Dee, he prophesied an imminent
new world, which required the casting out of devils (ibid., sigs.
H4rv, K3r).
These comparisons matter because Cosin emphasized that self-
proclaimed prophets, with their extraordinary callings, ravishings
in spirit, carryings into Heaven, inevitably threatened the natural
political order. Just at the edge of Cosins eld of vision stood the
nervous gure of John Dee, no doubt relieved that whereas Hacket
had practised sympathetic magic against Elizabeth by stabbing her
portrait through the heart, Dee had defended her against impaled
wax images in 1578.
10
Nevertheless, Whitgifts campaign expanded the denition of
the lunatic fringe almost to include Dee. In response Dee laid
low. From 3 August to 3 December 1591, his Diary records little
beyond a few weather notes. Then suddenly, at 10 am on 14
December, we nd him at Whitehall, hearing a very gentle answer
from Burghley to his latest patronage request. Six days later came
another gentle answer, that the Queen would have me have
something at this promotion of bishops at hand, meaning the Mas-
tership of St Cross. What had suddenly enabled Dee to overcome
Whitgifts obdurate resistance to his promotion?
Put simply, Dee solved the problems facing Burghley in late
1591. Burghley was not an innovative thinker. He relied on familiar
solutions for political difculties. In 1591 he needed to prepare
against anticipated Spanish invasion, defend the Presbyterians
against Whitgift and Hatton, and scotch their attempt at de facto
toleration for English Catholics. He addressed all three problems
with a proclamation against Catholic seminary priests and Jesuits,
who seduced English subjects from their obedience. He drafted it
in mid-October, but only published it in late November.
11
That de-
lay had signicant implications for Dee.
The proclamation created a far more rigorous system than the
existing county recusant commissions. From late November
1591, the usually haphazard Tudor government machinery min-
utely enforced the proclamation, under constant badgering from
Burghley. Over the next few years the imprisonment, torture, and
execution of Catholic priests and lay recusants reached unprece-
dented intensity. The proclamation justied this persecution be-
cause Catholic missionaries supported Philip IIs ambition to
dominate Christendom, partly by an Armada against England,
greater for this year to come than ever (ibid., p. 87). These fugi-
tives, rebels and traitors were recruiting a Fifth Column to support
the Spanish invasion. Traitorous exiles like Cardinal William Allen
and the Jesuit Robert Parsons had organised foreign seminaries,
and cited English Catholic support to encourage Philip IIs invasion
(ibid., pp. 889). Burghley responded with familiar solutions:
diligent preaching of the gospel to instil obedience, the strengthen-
ing of the navy, and the mustering of land forces.
The proclamation included one relatively new remedy for the
secret infection of treasons. It ordered commissions in every
shire, city, and port to detect disguised priests or their supporters.
Every head of household must register the origins, occupation and
church attendance of residents. Suspects must be brought before
local commissioners, those of high rank before the Privy Council.
Anyone encountering missionary priests must inform the commis-
sions, on pain of abetting treason. No exceptions were permitted
for any respect of any persons, qualities or degrees (ibid., pp.
912). Abundant evidence from many counties conrms that par-
ishes appointed teams of searchers. They interrogated their neigh-
bours and reported recusants to city or county commissions that
sent quarterly reports and prisoners to the Privy Council.
Burghley created a Tudor police state. He added bureaucratic
instructions for effective questioning, targeting not just male but,
for the rst time, female recusants. Catholic lifestyle became an of-
fence. County commissions should arrest not just those who re-
fused to attend church, but anyone that probably by their
behaviour and manner of life or otherwise may be suspected to
be Seminaries, Priests, Jesuits or Fugitives. Commissioners had
to use set questions, previously designed to entrap hardline trai-
tors and missionaries, against all suspects. Recusants suspected
of supporting the Spanish must answer under oath a question care-
fully drafted to discover their seducers. Then followed the so called
bloody questions designed to unmask disguised seminary priests
and Jesuits.
12
Burghleys motives for writing this proclamation have been
controversial since it appeared. Catholics denounced his allega-
tions of invasion plots as threadbare justications for perpetuating
his power beyond Elizabeths reign. Therefore, the Catholics al-
leged, the Privy Council licensed Richard Topcliffe and Richard
Young to use torture to conrm the plots.
13
They certainly tortured
some of the three priests and four Catholic laymen executed in early
December.
14
Catholic propagandists condemned the new Cecilian Inquisi-
tion, as the parochial teams searched house-to-house throughout
the summer of 1592, particularly in London.
15
Topcliffe and Young
relentlessly hunted down priests and laymen (ibid., pp. 5258), and
commissioners observed the proclamations refusal to exempt Cath-
olic noblemen. In late January 1592, the Catholic magnate in strate-
gically vital Sussex, Viscount Montague, had to swear his loyalty
before the Sussex recusancy commission, if the Pope or the King
of Spain offered to invade this realm, for any cause.
16
Burghley had always been paranoid about an international
Catholic conspiracy against Elizabeth. The 1591 proclamation re-
peated arguments he had made in mid-1559, long before the rst
English overseas seminary, a generation before the rst English Je-
suit mission in 1580. He tted events into a providential pattern
that would produce the same response to all later crises. By 1591
the pattern had become reality.
17
Publicly, Roberts Parsons dismissed Burghleys proclamation as
a panicky response to Parsons successful Valladolid seminary,
founded in 1589. He scorned Burghleys hysteria about a Spanish
9
Ibid., sigs. E4vF1r and CR, pp. 521522.
10
Ibid., sigs. M4v, O1r, M4v, O3v, N3rv, K4v; CR, pp. 521522.
11
Burghley (1591), reprinted in Hughes & Larkin (196469), iii, pp. 8695.
12
Ibid., pp. 9295, no. 739; Calthrop (1916), p. xx.
13
Robert Southwell (?) to Richard Verstegan, London (?), early December, 1591, in Petti (1959), pp. 15, 89, 39.
14
Acts of the Privy Council (APC), (18901964) xxii, 15912, pp. 15, 3942, 92; cf. Richard Verstegan to Robert Parsons from Antwerp, 5 March 1592, in Petti (1959), pp. 3940;
The National Archives (TNA), SP 12/240/109; Geninges (1614).
15
Richard Verstegan to Robert Parsons from Antwerp, 5 March 1592, in Petti (1959), pp. 3940; Richard Verstegan to Roger Baynes, Antwerp, 27 June 1592, in ibid., p. 50.
16
Woking, Surrey History Centre, Loseley MS 1856, p. 3, quoted in Questier (2004), p. 252.
17
TNA, SP 12/4, fol. 135r; Alford (1998), pp. 5455. TNA, SP 70/39, fol. 106v, cited in Alford (1998), pp. 9495.
G. Parry / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43 (2012) 480488 483
invasion, invented to manipulate Elizabeths fears for his advan-
tage.
18
Privately William Allen conceded to Parsons that the procla-
mation had been inspired by Spanish invasion plans, revealed by
their secret messengers, recently captured, who have confessed
the same (Hughes & Larkin, 196469, iii, p. 89).
Allen especially blamed two captured English Valladolid semi-
narists examined by Burghley: John Cecil, alias Snowden, and John
Fisher or Fixer, who have discovered all they knew, and perhaps
added somewhat of their own more than they knew. In early Jan-
uary 1592, Allen conrmed to Parsons that they have betrayed all
indeed. Their information enabled Burghleys proclamation to
blame the predicted Spanish invasion on Allen and Parsons traitor-
ous subversion (Parsons, 1601, sig. F3v). In fact, Snowden and Fixer
played down Spains ability to invade.
19
Fixer claimed that Philip
presided over a ruined economy and demoralised society,
20
and
Snowden assured Burghley that the Kings forces are not to be feared
for many years.
21
Because they failed to conrm Burghleys obses-
sion with Catholic conspiracy, he dismissed their vulgar and trivial
intelligences . . . to no great purpose.
22
His conviction that the mis-
sionaries presaged an imminent Spanish invasion came from
elsewhere.
Everyone knew Philip IIs determination to revenge 1588. Yet
effective defence required precise information about where and
when the Armada would strike. Like modern intelligence systems,
the Council faced the challenge of distinguishing the signal from
the noise of conicting information. In August 1590, the Council
expected an invasion of England or Ireland in spring or summer
1591. However, without precise information, they could do little.
23
Burghley omitted Spanish invasion threats from a September
proclamation prohibiting English merchants from trading to
Spain.
24
Why then did his proclamation against Jesuits and seminar-
ies emphasise the invasion? In part, this was because Renaissance
governments used peace negotiations strategically, to weaken ene-
mies while enhancing their own strength (Allen, 2000, pp. viiiix.).
For several years Elizabeths regime had been secretly negotiating
with Philips viceroy in the Netherlands, the Duke of Parma, through
English Catholic exiles around Parmas Court at Brussels. Elizabeth
offered to marry Parmas son to Arabella Stuart, her plausible succes-
sor, as well as de facto toleration for English Catholics.
If Parma took the bait, he might fail to support Philips invasion.
Offered hope of a Catholic succession, English Catholics and the
Papacy had less reason to support Philip. If Parma baulked, leaks
about the negotiations would undermine Philips condence in
him (Renold, 1967, pp. 209216). This would also further divide
the English Catholics in the Netherlands, who still dreamed of rec-
onciliation with Elizabeths regime, from hardliners who dismissed
empty promises of toleration.
By October 1591, promising discussions persuaded the Privy
Council to offer the exile Charles Paget safe conduct to negotiate
with Hatton and Whitgift about religious liberty for English Cath-
olics. As Allen informed Parsons, Paget naively believed that Hatton
and Whitgift would become Catholics, by which you may see what
kind of practises these goodfellows . . . have in hand, and with
whom they deal.
25
Radical Protestants considered Hatton a crypto-Catholic.
Whitgifts suppression of Protestant dissent never undermined
his Calvinist suspicion of Romes profound errors. Hatton and
Burghley only differed over domestic religious policy (Hammer,
1999, pp. 100105). Given his ingrained suspicions about an inter-
national Catholic conspiracy, Burghley feared that the negotiations
would surrender fundamental Protestant positions.
Burghleys proclamation scuttled the peace negotiations. By
hounding even politically quiescent recusants for their lifestyle, it
squashed all prospect of tolerance. The proclamations curious
publication chronology supports this motivation. Drafted in mid-
October and printed by the 18th, it remained unpublished.
26
This
delay suggests arguments within Council over whether to counter
Philip by deceptive negotiations or by Burghleys thorough-going
Reformation. Hattons death on 20 November meant Burghley won
by default. Catholic informants in England certainly attributed the
delay to Hattons opposition, and claimed that the proclamation ap-
peared the day after his death. This also explains why the Councils
hurried letters setting up the commissions on 23 November had to
be rewritten and reissued a week later.
27
Forcing the proclamation through also enabled Burghley to de-
fend the Presbyterians by diverting Whitgifts energies. By focusing
the Queens attention on the inherent political threat of Catholic
recusancy because it supported Spanish invasion, Burghley took
the wind out of Whitgifts sails. Despite Whitgifts intransigent
opposition, the Presbyterians were gradually freed out of prison by
the summer of 1592. By then Burghley had busied the Ecclesiastical
HighCommissionwiththe persecutionof Catholic recusants, further
diverting Whitgifts aggressive energies from zealous Protestants
(Collinson, 1967, pp. 428431). But Burghley needed compelling
reasons for Elizabeth to publish his proclamation, thus abandoning
her political prejudices and Whitgifts policy. Burghley had previ-
ously used an imminent Spanish invasion to shift Elizabeths policy.
However, ananticipatedinvasionin1591hadnot forcedElizabethto
alter course. How did Burghley sway the Queen away from the
peace policy in late November? What was different now?
To nd the answer we must properly locate Dees occult philos-
ophy in the political landscape of these years. In his 1604 petition
to James, Dee defended himself against the English traitor who on
7 January 1592 slandered him as the Privy Councils conjuror. This
previously elusive publication was not a book, but William Allens
letter to Robert Parsons dated 7 January 1592, printed in Parsons
Apology in defence of ecclesiastical subordination in England (1601).
Allens letter included a further, sensational claim that Dee con-
cealed from James in 1604. Allen alleged that Burghleys proclama-
tion owed much to,
Doctor Dee their conjurer or Astrologer [who] is said to have put
them in more doubt, for that he hath told the Counsel by his cal-
culation, that the Realm indeed shall be conquered this Sum-
mer, believe him who will. (Parsons, 1601, sig. F3rv)
This was not invented propaganda. Allen had reliable infor-
mants at Elizabeths Court, and this private letter rst appeared
in print seven years after his death. His claim did not appear in
published attacks on the proclamation. Parsons received excellent
intelligence from England, so by printing Allens letter he could use
Dees deteriorating reputation in 1601 to smear the surviving
Councillors from 1592.
18
Verstegan (1592), sigs. A5v, C 1rv, D8r; Parsons (1601), sigs. 3vD6r, F3v; Parsons (1592), sigs. A3v, A6r, B5r.
19
TNA, SP 12/238/160, 21 May 1591; SP 12/238/179.
20
TNA, SP 12/238/162, 163; Parsons (1601), sigs. A5rC8r.
21
TNA, SP 12/238/178, 179, 25 May 1591, and 180, 26 May 1591.
22
TNA, SP 12/238/165, 166, 167, 168; SP 12/239/46; SP 12/238/180; SP 12/239/2; SP 12/239/26; SP 12/240/86.
23
BL MS Harley 703, fol. 61v, Privy Council to Lords Lieutenant of Sussex, 31 August 1590.
24
APC, xxii, pp. 611; Hughes & Larkin (196469) iii, pp. 8386, 16 September 1591.
25
Allen to Parsons, 26 October 1591, quoted in Parsons (1601) sigs. F2vF3v, and see Renold (1967), p. 211; Parsons (1601), sigs. A5rB6v.
26
Hughes & Larkin (196469), iii, p. 86; S.T.C. 8207, 8208; TNA, SP 12/240/53, 31 October 1591.
27
Green (1872), pp. 1367; Verstegan (1592), sigs. A7v, D6v; Parsons (1592), p. 20; Renold (1967), p. 230, citing TNA, SP 85/1/ fo. 132.
484 G. Parry / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43 (2012) 480488
Moreover, Burghley knew Elizabeths deep belief in Dees phi-
losophy and alchemy and in his astrological predictions, for Burgh-
ley shared those beliefs. Dee used magic to support Elizabeth in
1555, and she had defended his alchemical Monas hieroglyphica
in 1564 (CR, pp. 507, 519). Dee advocated a British Empire that de-
pended partly on alchemical research producing the philosophers
stone (ibid., p. 520). He had explained to Elizabeth the imperial sig-
nicance of the comet of November 1577. In return, she promised
her protection for his occult philosophy, reiterated in December
1590, when she engaged in alchemy with Dee (ibid., p. 521).
Burghley accepted Dees timetable for the new calendar in 1583
for the secret reason of the imminent apocalypse (BL MS Lans-
downe 39, fol. 28r). Therefore Burghley could reasonably expect
that Dees prediction would alarm Elizabeth into reversing course
and publishing the proclamation.
Returning to the political narrative to plot Dees rising Court
career alongside the graph of Catholic persecution also conrms
Allens accusations. The two lines run parallel, except where
Whitgift could intervene against Dee. In mid-December 1591,
as the Council began cranking up the persecution, Burghley gave
Dee gentle answers about receiving the Mastership of St Cross,
once Robert Bennett had been promoted from St Cross to a bish-
opric. Bennett seemed certain to be promoted. Whitgift had
introduced him to Burghley, who appointed him his chaplain be-
fore presenting him to St Cross in 1583.
28
A learned, staunch
anti-Romanist, soon after appointment he began bombarding
Burghley with letters begging for further promotion.
29
However,
he mysteriously failed to become a bishop in December 1591.
Politically naive, in November 1592 Dee remained mystied as
to why Bennett, very worthy and sufcient to be a Bishop, had
not been promoted to relieve Dees incredible distress. Bennett
missed out in another round of episcopal promotions in mid-
1594.
30
That November, Bennett complained bitterly to Burghley
about his own students being promoted over his head (BL MS
Lansdowne 77, fol. 138r).
Whitgift kept Bennett at St Cross to deny the appointment to
Dee. This became particularly necessary after May 1594, when
the bishopric of Winchester fell vacant. Elizabeth could now grant
Lord Cobham, longstanding patron of Dees mothers family, the
Wildes of Gravesend, the right to appoint Dee to St Cross as soon
as Bennett resigned (TNA SP 12/248, fols. 256r257r). Signicantly,
once Dee had been sidelined as Warden of Manchester Collegiate
Church, Bennett prospered. In 1596 he added the Deanery of Wind-
sor, and nally resigned St Cross on becoming Bishop of Hereford
in 1603 (TNA SP 12/256/109).
Dees next patronage promise in early 1592 coincided with ris-
ing anxiety about a Spanish invasion. After spies reported Spanish
plans to seize an English port, the Council began fortifying Plym-
outh.
31
In early February London parishes prepared street barricades
and troops against the coming in of the Spaniards (Fresheld, 1890,
pp. 25, 29). In March, clearer information about threats to ports
prompted Burghley to plan for imprisoning principal recusants.
32
Meanwhile, the recusancy commissions kept up their local searches
(Drew, 194050, ii, p. 182). In April another Catholic pamphlet
attacking the proclamation urged a Spanish conquest, followed by
Richard Verstegans attack on the Cecilian Inquisition (Exemplar,
1592; Verstegan, 1592).
By then Dees credit was drying up. His work for Burghley re-
mained secret, so he needed some public sign of Elizabeths gra-
cious favour towards me to restore his credit with all men
generally. In March, Elizabeth therefore granted Dees cousin Wil-
liam Aubrey the rights of presentation to ve sinecure rectories in
the diocese of St Davids. Ofcially they were together worth 75,
although their real income was probably double that. Elizabeth
had a free hand in St Davids because the phenomenally corrupt
bishop had been suspended. Aubrey exercised authority as Chan-
cellor and Vicar-general to Archbishop Whitgift.
33
As so often for Dee, things went awry. How much did Whitgift
know about these rectories? Two turned out to be already occu-
pied. Three other men claimed to be Rector of the third. Richard
Meredith, Bishop of the impoverished Irish see of Leighlin, held
the rectory of Angle in south Pembrokeshire. Imprisoned for run-
ning foul of Burghley, Meredith cut a deal with Dee for Angle.
Sometime in 1592 he assigned his house in St Brides, London, to
Dee (BL MS Cotton Cleopatra B.II, fol. 216v). However, their deal
went sour, and on 31 December 1592 Meredith started proceed-
ings against Dee. The following February they quarrelled furiously
in the Tower over which of them was in fact Rector of Angle. Mer-
edith sneeringly called Dee conjuror. However, when Whitgift de-
prived Meredith in 1594 he appointed another Rector and
subsequently resisted all Dees claims.
34
Dee only secured the fth
rectory, Tenby, worth 50 a year, in March 1601.
35
Although Elizabeths patronage temporarily bolstered Dees
public credit, he could not keep his creditors at bay for long. In
1592 he therefore hired out his occult learning. Despite the 1563
Witchcraft Act, he performed tasks usually associated with low-
er-order cunning folk: casting horoscopes to identify robbery sus-
pects, nding buried treasure, and exorcising the possessed.
Nevertheless, he had to borrow money, rent out rooms and take
in pupils in order to continue his philosophy.
36
In July 1592 he
turned sixty-ve, claiming incredible want of due maintenance,
though with hopes that the Countess of Warwick would inuence
the Queen to obtain St Cross for him (CR, p. 515).
The regimes rising anxiety over the prophesied Spanish Arma-
da also helped. In late May, Elizabeth worried about foreign threats
and domestic tensions. Serious Jesuit plots to assassinate her began
that month.
37
By June, Catholic prisoners in London buzzed with ru-
mours of an imminent Spanish eet. The Council, worried about
invasion through Milford Haven, extended the recusancy commis-
sions into Wales, where seminaries fostered disloyalty.
38
In mid-June, overwhelmed by the county commissioners suc-
cess in arresting recusants, the Council delegated their incarcera-
tion to Whitgifts High Commission, whose experience with
Protestant dissent increased the persecution (Petti, 1979, pp. 54
55). In late July the Council began disarming all Catholics, since
the exiles were bragging about the assistance of those that are
backward in religion.
39
Whispers that predominantly Catholic
28
BL MS Lansdowne 36, fol. 66r; HMC Salisbury (18831976), xiv, pp. 878; Great Britain, Public Record Ofce (1986), p. 170.
29
BL MSS Lansdowne 39, fol. 183rv; Lansdowne 40, fol. 53rv; Lansdowne 54, fol. 72r.
30
CR, p. 516; HMC Salisbury (18831976), iv, p. 529.
31
See for instance TNA, SP 12/241/78.
32
Wernham (19642000), iii, p. 407, no. 723 (SP 84/44, fol. 128); TNA, SP 12/241/100, 15 March 1592.
33
BLO MS Ashmole 487, 6, 9, 10, 16 March 1592; CR, pp. 513514; Thomas (1971), pp. 250256.
34
Thomas (1971), pp. 252254; BLO MS Ashmole 487, 31 December 1592, 22 February 1593; Walshe (2004).
35
Thomas (1971), pp. 255256; TNA E 331/St Davids/8.
36
BLO, MS Ashmole 487, 5 April 1592; 14 April, 16 April, 15 May.
37
TNA, SP 12/242/25, Robert Cecil to Heneage, 25 May 1592; see TNA, SP 12/247/78, 79, 91.
38
TNA, SP 12/243/24, 30 Sept. 92; APC, xxii, pp. 5434; TNA, SP 12/240/97, SP 12/242/26.
39
APC, xxiii, pp. 402, 21 July 1592, and cp. BL MS Harley 703, fol. 67v.
G. Parry / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43 (2012) 480488 485
Lancashire might be the bridgehead for the invasion raised suspi-
cions about the local magnate, the Earl of Derby.
40
The crisis peaked in August, the Armada season. So did Dees
patronage hopes. On 6 August, Dee went to Nonsuch to the Court,
alerted by the Countess of Warwick about Elizabeths gracious
speeches for St Cross. He should certainly have it, if it were t
for him. Whitgift sniffed the wind, repeated Elizabeths words to
Dee, and unblinkingly conrmed that the Mastership is a living
most t for me. Three days later Burghley invited Dee to a family
dinner, repeated on the 10th. There Lord Cobham asked Burghley
to help me to St Crosses, which he promised to do his best in.
Ten days later, Dee spent two days with Cobham in London, press-
ing home his advantage.
41
With such support, what could prevent
Dee obtaining the place?
Everyone seemed convinced by Dees prediction about the inva-
sion. Burghley discounted his own agents intelligence denying
that Philip could send an Armada that summer.
42
On 7 August,
the Council ordered all leading recusants imprisoned.
43
Six days later
they arrested lesser gures.
44
They then imprisoned every promi-
nent Catholic lawyer in London, where virulent plague exacerbated
the crisis atmosphere (Birch, 1754, i, p. 79).
Elizabeth departed on Progress towards Oxford, her itinerary
avoiding coastal areas vulnerable to sudden Spanish landings. As
the plague increased so did Armada sightings. Near midnight on
29 August, Lord Admiral Howard ordered the Lord Lieutenant of
Sussex to ready the militia, reporting a great eet of tall Shippes
discovered at Sea being Spaniards heading for the Sussex Coast
(BL MS Harley 703, fol. 68v). Within days, still trying to penetrate
the fog of war to identify the real Spanish landing, the Council ob-
sessed over a complicated Lancashire invasion plot. This preoccu-
pied them through mid-September, when they again harried the
county commissions to arrest recusants.
45
Burghleys anxious
memos in mid-October about preventing the general revolt of the
Recusants of the realm, and particularly in Lancashire, increased
the tension. Days later the Council nally gave Burghley what he
had sought since 1558they purged suspected Catholics from the
county commissions of the peace.
46
This completed Burghleys tri-
umph over Whitgift, marked by the release of the Presbyterian lead-
ers and even of Henry Arthington, Hackets disciple, in early August.
Dees role in all this remained secret. Until he obtained public
reward, his cash crisis would persist. After three years at Mortlake,
by autumn 1592 he owed 500 to friends, who had also provided
food and clothing. He had pawned all his plate and his wife Janes
jewellery. He had borrowed upon bonds with promises to repay.
All told he owed 833, many times the annual income he sought.
Worse still, in July his household suppliers cut off credit and began
shaming Dee in public, demanding money (CR, pp. 538541). Why
had Dees public reputation, as opposed to his secret status at
Court, plummeted in July?
The answer resolves a longstanding controversy. At the end of
May, Sir Walter Raleigh fell spectacularly from Elizabeths favour,
when enemies revealed his secret marriage to her pregnant maid
of honour, Elizabeth Throckmorton. Raleighs complete lack of re-
morse infuriated the Queen. Throughout June and July she kept
him under house arrest, and on 7 August, the day after Dee went
to Nonsuch in hope of promotion, she sent the offenders to the
Tower. Since his spectacular rise to Elizabeths favour in 1583, Ra-
leigh had patronised Dee, who collaborated with Raleighs half-
brothers, Humphrey and Adrian Gilbert.
47
Contemporary opinion
evidently connected the notorious pair more than Dees Diary sug-
gests, so that Raleighs fall dragged down Dees political and public
credit in July.
Now Raleigh could defend neither himself nor his clients. His
many enemies included Richard Verstegan and Robert Parsons,
Catholics who furiously attacked Burghleys proclamation. In Au-
gust 1592, Verstegan published an English summary or Advertise-
ment for Parsons forthcoming full-blooded Latin Response to
Burghleys proclamation. The Advertisement included perhaps the
best known libel in Elizabethan history,
Of Sir Walter Raleighs school of Atheism . . . , and of the Con-
jurer that is Master thereof, and of the diligence used to get
young gentlemen to this school, where in both Moses, and our
Savior; the old, and newTestaments are jested at, and the schol-
ars taught among other things, to spell God backward. (Verste-
gan, 1592, sig. B1v)
This so called School of Night was polemical slander against a lead-
ing anti-Spanish courtier, not historical fact. Yet we can now rmly
identify the Conjurer and trace the creation of this ction (Brad-
brook, 1936).
Catholic polemics routinely branded all leading Protestant pol-
iticians as atheists, particularly Burghley. Verstegan played upon
this commonplace in a March letter to Parsons, criticising Burgh-
leys rumoured plan to marry his eldest grandson to Arabella Stu-
art, for,
The young youth is as prettily instructed in atheism as the Lady
Arbella is in puresy [Puritanism], for he will not stick openly to
scoff at the Bible, and will folks to spell the name of God
backward.
48
Before Verstegan completed his Advertisement in August, Ra-
leighs fall enabled him to similarly vilify the fallen favourite, and
thus the general mores of Elizabeths Court. In the light of Allens
letter of 7 February 1592 that described Dees conjuring for the Pri-
vy Council, it is now clear that amongst Catholic exiles, including
Verstegan, only one man qualied as the Conjurer at that
CourtJohn Dee.
49
Circumstances left Dee vulnerable to such assaults by the time
Parsons published his Response in October, for the Armada panic
had subsided abruptly. The arrival of the autumnal Atlantic gales
enabled the Council to stand down the beacon watch on 23 Octo-
ber, later than normal.
50
An experienced observer noted three
weeks later that in Court and Council now, there is no stirring at
all. Burghley left on Elizabeths Accession Day, 17 November, when
the same observer counted the Council attendance the smallest I
have seen on that day.
51
The reduced Spanish threat persuaded
many recusancy commissions to slacken their efforts (APC, xxiii, p.
289).
40
BL MS Royal 18.D.III, fols. 82v83r; TNA, SP 12/242/116, 121, and APC, xxiii, pp. 1634.
41
BLO MS Ashmole 487, 6, 9, 10, 22 August; CR, p. 515.
42
Wernham (19642000), iii, pp. 400401; Birch (1754), i, pp. 66, 76, 6970, 80.
43
APC, xxiii, pp. 106108, 110113.
44
BL MS Harley 703, fol. 68r, Council to Sussex, and TNA, SP 12/242/105, to Lord President of the North, SP 12/243/76; TNA, SP 12/242/112.
45
APC, xxiii, pp. 163164, 188189, 192193, 202203, 227; Birch (1754), i, p. 87; TNA, SP 12/243/51.
46
TNA, SP 12/243/37, dated 14 October 1592, and APC, xxiii, pp. 253258, 20 October 1592; BL MS Harley 703, fol. 69rv.
47
BLO MS Ashmole 487, 18 April 1583, scrying 4, 31 July 1583, 31 July, 9 October 1595.
48
Verstegan to Parsons, Antwerp, 5 March 1592, in Petti (1959), p. 40.
49
Strathmann (1947), pp. 365372, could not prove the connection.
50
BL MS Harley 703, fol. 69v, Council to the Lords Lieutenant of Sussex, and cf. fols. 62r and 63r for the earlier 1591 dismissal.
51
Birch (1754), i, p. 92, Nicholas Faunt to Anthony Bacon, London, 22 November 1592.
486 G. Parry / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43 (2012) 480488
By early October, the failure of Dees invasion prediction had de-
stroyed his political inuence, enabling the atheism accusations
to gain traction amongst Raleighs many Court enemies. Attacks
on Dee also hindered Raleighs rehabilitation. We can date this
development precisely, and identify that segment of Court opinion
where the accusations impacted most, through the interview that
Dee sought with Whitgift on 13 October. Dee tried to demonstrate
his orthodoxy by showing Whitgift two books of blasphemy
against Christ and the Holy Ghost . . . desiring him to cause them
to be confuted.
52
He forgot to mention that he had owned them
for years, and that in 1587 one blasphemous author, Christian Franc-
ken, assured Dee that he had recanted his errors (BLO, MS Ashmole
488, 9 July 1587).
When Parsons Response appeared shortly afterwards it further
blackened Dees reputation. Parsons promised that if Raleigh be-
came a Councillor, his education in the necromancers school of
atheism would produce a proclamation from that Magician, pub-
lished in Elizabeths name, abolishing divinity and the souls
immortality, denouncing as traitors any objectors to the sweet rea-
sonableness of libertinism (Parsons, 1592, p. 36, sect. 43).
Allens letter informing Parsons about Dees conjuring for
Burghley means we can identify Dee as Parsons necromancer. Fur-
thermore, Parsons condant in Spain, Sir Francis Engleeld (once
considered the author of the Advertisement) had previously inves-
tigated Dee for his magic against Mary in 1555, revealed by Engle-
elds servant Prideaux, who died in exile at Madrid in 1591.
53
By early November 1592, Dees political and nancial credit
seemed destroyed, shattering his hopes of advancement. Burghley
had effectively used Dee against Whitgift. Having rescued the Pres-
byterians, derailed the negotiations with Parma, harried the recu-
sants, and purged Catholics from the commissions of the peace,
he now ruthlessly took his revenge. For he had known since
1585 that Dee had slandered him throughout the European courts,
blaming the Lord Treasurers niggardly patronage for his departure
from England in September 1583 (BLO MS Tanner 78, fol. 99r).
In Burghleys chamber at Hampton Court on 6 November, Dee
reminded him of Elizabeths promises about St Cross. Burghley re-
sponded with words and gestures that Dee meticulously recorded,
because he knew they meant the death of his hopes. Burghley,
with his hand very earnestly smitten on his breast, told Dee, By
my faith, if her Majesty be moved in it by any other for you, I will
do what I can with her Majesty to pleasure you therein. Dee rea-
lised that if Burghley declined to take the initiative, no courtier
would dare challenge the triumphant Lord Treasurer, especially
on behalf of the disgraced Raleighs client, whose public reputation
had been so savagely attacked. Dee rode home disconsolately,
wryly concluding in his Compendious rehearsal, And so I thanked
his Honour humbly (CR, pp. 525526).
These events explain for the rst time why Dee had to write his
remarkable Compendious rehearsal. The sudden catastrophe
brought about by Burghleys use of Dees occult philosophy com-
pelled Dee to appeal directly to Elizabeth over Burghleys head.
Even the timing of his appeal was dictated by Burghleys absence
from Court (Parry, 2011, pp. 233, 236). It is widely known that
Dees appeal failed to resurrect his career until his appointment
to Manchester in early 1595. It is less widely appreciated that
Dee failed to prosper partly through Burghleys continuing indiffer-
encehe never mentioned the Lord Treasurer again. Yet Dee
mostly suffered through Whitgifts continuing obdurate opposition
to his promotion, because he associated him with politically sus-
pect conjuring and magic. However, the details of that story belong
elsewhere (ibid., pp. 241245).
What is most important here is to realise that in late Elizabe-
than England conservative intellectual and social forces were
increasingly focused on the subversive political threat they de-
tected in occult philosophy. Whitgift, his clients and supporters
established a critical, even sceptical attitude towards such philos-
ophy within inuential segments of English society. Richard Ban-
croft, rst Whitgifts chaplain, then Bishop of London and nally
Archbishop of Canterbury, condemned magical beliefs in a series
of books excoriating the Presbyterians, and exerted all his inuence
to debunk belief in demonic possession, attacking charismatic
Presbyterian preachers who cultivated popularity by frauduently
expelling demons (MacDonald, 1991). Samuel Harsnett became
Archbishop of York partly in reward for developing similar attacks,
which helped to establish a longstanding cultural tradition. We are
still living with the consequences of that conservative cultural tri-
umph, and not just in the biography of John Dee.
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