The Solicitor General For Petitioner. Martin B. Laurea For Respondents

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-61647 October 12, 1984
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF LANDS), petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BENJAMIN TANCINCO, AZUCENA TANCINCO
REYES, MARINA TANCINCO IMPERIAL and MARIO C. TANCINCO, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Martin B. Laurea for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court) affirming the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch VIII, which found that Lots 1 and 2 of
Plan Psu-131892 are accretion to the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
89709 and ordered their registration in the names of the private respondents.
Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina (should be "Maria")
Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan,
Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.
On June 24, 1973, the private respondents filed an application for the registration of
three lots adjacent to their fishpond property and particularly described as follows:
Lot 1-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)
A parcel of land (lot 1 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the
Barrio of Ubihan, Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan.
Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by Lot 3 of plan Psu-131892; on the
SE., along lines 2-3-4, by Meycauayan River; on the S.W., along fines 4-5-
6-7-8-9, by Bocaue River; on the NE., along line 9-10, by property of
Joaquina Santiago; on the E., NE., and NW., along lines 10-11-12-1, by
property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 2, Psu-111877). ... containing an area
of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN
(33,937) SQUARE METERS. ...

Lot 2-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)
A parcel of land (Lot 2 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the
Bounded on the E., along line 1-2, by property of Rafael Singson; on the
S., along line 2-3, by Meycauayan River; on the SW., along line 3-4, by
Lot 3 of plan Psu-131892; and on the N., along line 4-1, by property of
Mariano Tancinco (Lot 1, Psu-111877). ... containing an area of FIVE
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY THREE (5,453) SQUARE
METERS. ...
Lot 3-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)
A parcel of land (Lot 3 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the
Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot
1, Psu-111877); and along line 2-3, by Lot 2 of plan Psu-131892; on the
S., along line 3-4, by Meycauayan River, on the SW., along line 4-5, by
Lot 1 of plan Psu-131892; and along line 5-6 by property of Mariano
Tancinco (Lot 2, Psu-111877), and on the NW., along line 6-1, by property
of Joaquina Santiago. ... containing an area of ONE THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE (1,985) SQUARE METERS. ...

On April 5, 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente, in representation of
the Bureau of Lands filed a written opposition to the application for registration.
On March 6, 1975, the private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the application
for registration with respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu-131892 in line with the
recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by the Court.
On March 7, 1975, Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the application and trial
proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892.
On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the application on the
finding that the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents' fishponds
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, it appearing that Lots 1 & 2 of plan Psu-131892 (Exh. H)
are accretions to the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
89709 of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, they belong to the owner of
said property. The Court, therefore, orders the registration of lots 1 & 2
situated in the barrio of Ubihan, municipality of Meycauayan, province of
Bulacan, and more particularly described in plan Psu-131892 (Exh. H) and
their accompanying technical descriptions (Exhs. E, E-1) in favor of
Benjamin Tancinco, married to Alma Fernandez and residing at 3662
Heatherdown, Toledo, Ohio 43614 U.S.A.; Azucena Tancinco Reyes,
married to Alex Reyes, Jr., residing at 4th St., New Manila, Quezon City;
Marina Tancinco Imperial, married to Juan Imperial, residing at Pasay
Road, Dasmarias Village, Makati, Rizal; and Mario C. Tancinco, married
to Leticia Regidor, residing at 1616 Cypress St., Dasmarias Village,
Makati, Rizal, all of legal age, all Filipino citizens.

On July 30, 1976, the petitioner Republic appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals.
On August, 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the
decision of the lower court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na iniakyat ay sinasangayunan at pinagtitibay sa
kanyang kabuuan nang walang bayad.

The rule that the findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding
upon this Court admits of certain exceptions. Thus in Carolina Industries Inc. v. CMS
Stock Brokerage, Inc. (97 SCRA 734) we held that this Court retains the power to
review and rectify the findings of fact of said courts when (1) the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, and impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of
discretion, (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) when
the court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee.
There are facts and circumstances in the record which render untenable the findings of
the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the lands in question are accretions to the
private respondents' fishponds.
The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the
New Civil Code because what actually happened is that the private respondents simply
transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the Meycauayan River, and thus, if
there is any accretion to speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the result of the
gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river.

On the other hand, the private respondents rely on the testimony of Mrs. Virginia Acua
to the effect that:
xxx xxx xxx
... when witness first saw the land, namely, Lots 1 & 2, they were already
dry almost at the level of the Pilapil of the property of Dr. Tancinco, and
that from the boundaries of the lots, for about two (2) arms length the land
was still dry up to the edge of the river; that sometime in 1951, a new
Pilapil was established on the boundaries of Lots 1 & 2 and soil from the
old Pilapil was transferred to the new Pilapil and this was done sometime
in 1951; that the new lots were then converted into fishpond, and water in
this fishpond was two (2) meters deep on the side of the Pilapil facing the
fishpond ... .

The private respondents submit that the foregoing evidence establishes the fact of
accretion without human intervention because the transfer of the dike occurred after the
accretion was complete.

We agree with the petitioner.

Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides:

To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of three requisites before an
accretion covered by this particular provision is said to have taken place. They are (1)
that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of
the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to
the banks of rivers.

The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is
indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by
human intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. In the instant case,
there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said property was
made gradually through the effects of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.
We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that it is preposterous to believe
that almost four (4) hectares of land came into being because of the effects of the
Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The lone witness of the private respondents who
happens to be their overseer and whose husband was first cousin of their father noticed
the four hectare accretion to the twelve hectare fishpond only in 1939. The respondents
claim that at this point in time, accretion had already taken place. If so, their witness
was incompetent to testify to a gradual and imperceptible increase to their land in the
years before 1939. However, the witness testified that in that year, she observed an
increase in the area of the original fishpond which is now the land in question. If she
was telling the truth, the accretion was sudden. However, there is evidence that the
alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of the
current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits came into
being not because of the sole effect of the current of the rivers but as a result of the
transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching upon it. The land sought to be
registered is not even dry land cast imperceptibly and gradually by the river's current on
the fishpond adjoining it. It is under two meters of water. The private respondents' own
evidence shows that the water in the fishpond is two meters deep on the side of the
pilapil facing the fishpond and only one meter deep on the side of the pilapil facing the
river
The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion
deposited by a river is to compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers because
of the location of his land. If estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other
evils produced by the destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of lawful provisions,
said estates are subject to incumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is proper
that the risk or danger which may prejudice the owners thereof should be compensated
by the right of accretion. (Cortes v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Hence, the riparian
owner does not acquire the additions to his land caused by special works expressly
intended or designed to bring about accretion. When the private respondents
transferred their dikes towards the river bed, the dikes were meant for reclamation
purposes and not to protect their property from the destructive force of the waters of the
river.
We agree with the submission of the Solicitor General that the testimony of the private
respondents' lone witness to the effect that as early as 1939 there already existed such
alleged alluvial deposits, deserves no merit. It should be noted that the lots in question
were not included in the survey of their adjacent property conducted on May 10, 1940
and in the Cadastral Survey of the entire Municipality of Meycauayan conducted
between the years 1958 to 1960. The alleged accretion was declared for taxation
purposes only in 1972 or 33 years after it had supposedly permanently formed. The only
valid conclusion therefore is that the said areas could not have been there in 1939.
They existed only after the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the bed
of the Meycauayan river in 1951. What private respondents claim as accretion is really
an encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river by reclamation.
The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the names of the
private respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and
are therefore classified as property of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1
and Article 502, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open to
registration under the Land Registration Act. The adjudication of the lands in question
as private property in the names of the private respondents is null and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respondents are ordered to move back the
dikes of their fishponds to their original location and return the disputed property to the
river to which it belongs.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST
GR L-61647 12 October 1984
Republic v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:

Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Maria Tancinco Imperial and Mario C.
Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land situated at Barrio Ubihan,
Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.
On 24 June 1973, the Tancincos filed an application for the registration of 3 lots
adjacent to their fishpond property (Psu-131892: Lot 1, 33837 sq.m.; Lot 2, 5,453 sq.m.;
Lot 3, 1985 sq.

On 5 April 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente, in representation of the
Bureau of Lands filed a written opposition to the application for registration.

On 6 March 1975, the Tancincos filed a partial withdrawal of the application for
registration with respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu-131892 in line with the recommendation of
the Commissioner appointed by the Court.

On 7 March 1975, Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the application and trial proceeded
only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892.

On 26 June 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the application on the
finding that the lands in question are accretions to the Tancincos' fishponds covered by
TCT 89709.

On 30 July 1976, the Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals.

On 19 August 1982, the appellate court rendered a decision affirming in toto the
decision of the lower cost; without costs.
ISSUE:
Hence, the petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the CA.

RULING:
The Republic claimed that there was no accretion to speak of because what actually
happened was that the Tancincos simply transferred their dikes further down the river
bed of Meycuayan River, and thus, if there was any accretion to speak of, it was man-
made and artificial and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by
the waters of the rivers.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the decision appealed
from, and ordered the private respondents to move back the dikes of their fishponds to
their original location and return the disputed property to the river to which it belongs.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12730 August 22, 1960
C.N. HODGES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
AMADOR D. GARCIA, defendant-appellee.
Gellada, Mirasol and Vallar for appellant.
Roque E. Evidente for appellee.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J .:
This is an action filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the recovery of the
possession of a portion of land designated as Lot No. 908-Q with an area of 5,931
square meters, which is alleged to have been seperated from plaintiff's lands by the
"natural change" in the course of a river. The case having been decided adversely
against the plaintiff, the latter appealed to the Court of Appeals. The court, however,
certified the caseto this Court on the ground that it was decided upon a stipulation of
facts and for that reason questions of fact can no longer be raised on appeal.
It appears that the land in dispute was formerly a part of Lot No. 908 of the Cadastral
Survey of Jaro, Iloilo, which lot was acquired by plaintiff C.N. Hodges from Salustiano
Mirasol in January, 1950, and subsequently registered in his name as evidenced by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2504 issued by the Register of Deeds of Iloilo. This
property was bounded on the north by the Salog River. Adjoining that river on the other
side is Lot No. 2290, which was purchased by defendant Amador D. Garcia from Dr.
Manuel Hechanova on April 15, 1950. On July 12 of that same year, defendant had the
land, which was originally surveyed in 1912 and was then bounded on the SE and SW
by the Salog river, had inreased in area by the river bank, and that the added area,
which bounds the land on the SE and SW, is in turn bounded on the SE and SW by the
Salog river. In due time, defendant applied for the registration of the additional area
under the Land Registration Act, and on March 22, 1952, the cadastral court rendered a
decision holding that the land sought to be registered is an accretion to Lot No. 2290
and decreeing that the land be registered in his name. On June 30, 1952, the
corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. O-229 was issued in favor of the
defendant.
Plaintiff claims in these proceedings that the Salog river changed its course and that the
land in dispute which appears to be a portion of the area added to Lot No. 2290 as
above mentioned was separated from his Lot No. 908 by the current of the river, and
the separation was abrupt, like in avulsion, so that under Art. 374 of the Civil Code (Art.
463 of the new) he retains ownership thereof. No evidence, however, was presented by
plaintiff to show that the change in the course of the river was sudden or that it occurred
through avulsion. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption is that the change
was gradual and caused by accretion and erosion. (Payatas Estate Improvement Co.
vs. Tuason, 53 Phil., 55) In any event, it was agreed upon by the parties in open court
that "from the year 1917 until the construction of the dike (in 1939) along the river . . .,
the course of the Salog river, starting from the edge of lot 2290, gradually ate up the
bank towards the side of the poblacion of Jaro and at the same time gradually deposited
sediments towards the side of Lot No. 2290;" that "when the defendant bought lot No.
2290 from Dr. Manuel Hechanova in 1950, he found out that there was an accretion
along one side of said lot, as now shown on this plan, PSU-12743-A;" that "by virtue of
such accretion towards lot 2290, the defendant applied for its registration under the
Land Registration Act, and decision was on March 22, 1950 by the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo;" that "effectively, original certificate of title No. O-229, dated June 30,
1952, was issued to the defendant;" and that "because of the gradual deposit of
sediments of the Salog River along his land, lot 2290, the defendant has been in
possession of said land since 1950 until now, while the plaintiff and his predecessors in
interest since the gradual loss of lot No 908-Q, covered by water, has never been in
actual possession of the said lot." The foregoing facts have never been denied or
contradicted by plaintiff, and they clearly show that the increase in area of Lot No. 2290
by the river bank was due to alluvion or accretions which it gradually received (from
1917 to 1939, or for a period of 22 years) from the effects of the current of the river.
It should here be stated that in the cadastral proceedings wherein the land object of this
action was sought to be registered by herein defendant Amador D. Garcia, plaintiff C.N.
Hodges did not file any opposition despite due publication of the notice of the
application and hearing. The record also shows that the land now being claimed by
plaintiff had been litigated in three civil cases. (Exhs. "4", "5" and "6".) In those cases,
herein defendant was recognized as the owner of the land and held legally entitled to its
possession. In fact, the land in question had been adjudged to be owned by him as an
accretion to his lot No. 2290. (See exh. "6" decision of the Court of Appeals in
Candelaria Efe, et al. vs. Amador D. Garcia, CA-G.R. No. 9306-R, October 28, 1952,
Reyes, J.B.L., J.,ponente.)
It clearly appearing that the land in question has become part of defendant's estate as a
result of accretion, it follows that said land now belongs to him. The fact that the
accretion to his land used to pertain to plaintiff's estate, which is covered by a Torrens
certificate of title, cannot preclude him (defendant) from being the owner thereof.
Registration does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his
land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which
the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the
property of the owners of the banks. (Art. 366 of the old Civil Code; art. 457 of the new.)
Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and the
provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the Land Registration
Act. (Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason, supra).
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
plaintiff-appellant.
DIGEST

Hodges v. Garcia [G.R. No. L-12730. August 22, 1960.]
En Banc, Gutierrez-David (J): 8 concur
Facts:
A lot formerly a part of Lot 908 of the Cadastral Survey of Jaro, Iloilo was acquired
by C. N.Hodges from Salustiano Mirasol in January 1950, and subsequently registered
in his name as evidenced byTCT T-2504 issued by the Register of Deeds of Iloilo. This
property was bounded on the north by the SalogRiver. Adjoining that river on the other
side is Lot 2290, which was purchased by Amador D. Garcia from Dr.Manuel
Hechanova on 15 April 1950. On 12 July 1950, Garcia had the land he bought
resurveyed. The survey
plan disclosed that the land, which was originally surveyed in 1912 and was then
bounded on the SE and SWby the Salog river, had increased in area by the river bank,
and that the added area, which bounds the land onthe SE and SW, is in turn bounded
on the SE and SW by the Salog river. In due time, Garcia applied for theregistration of
the additional area under the Land Registration Act, and on 22 March 1952, the
cadastral courtrendered a decision holding that the land sought to be registered is an
accretion to Lot 2290 and decreeing thatthe land be registered in his name. On 30 June
1952, the corresponding OCT O-229 was issued in favor ofGarcia.CN Hodges filed an
action with the CFI Iloilo for the possession of a portion of land designated as Lot 908-
Qwith an area of 5,931 sq. m. , which is alleged to have been separated from plaintiffs
land by the naturalchange in the course of a river. The court ruled in favor of Garcia.
Hodges appealed to the Court of Appeals.The appellate court certified the case to the
Supreme Court that it was decided upon a stipulation of facts andfor that reason
questions of fact can no longer be raised on appeal.The Supreme Court affirmed
the decision appealed from, with costs against CN Hodges.
1.Presumption in the absence of evidence that the change in the course of the
river was sudden(avulsion)
In the absence of evidence to show that the change in the course of the river was
sudden or that it occurredthrough avulsion, the presumption is that the change was
gradual and caused by accretion and erosion.
(Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil., 55.)

2.Fact on alluvion or accretion not contradicted
In any event, it was agreed upon by the parties in open court that from the year 1917
until the construction ofthe dike (in 1939) along the river the course of the Salog river,
starting from the edge of lot 2290, graduallyate up the bank towards the side of the
poblacion of Jaro and at the same time gradually deposited sedimentstowards the side
of Lot 2290; that when Garcia bought lot 2290 from Dr. Manuel Hechanova in 1950,
hefound out that there was an accretion along one side of said lot, to which Garcia
applied for its registration, towhich culminated in the issuance of an OCT in his favor;
and that because of the gradual deposit of sedimentsof the Salog River along his land,
lot 2290, Garcia has been in possession of said land since 1950 until now,while Hodges
and his predecessors in interest since the gradual loss of lot 908-Q, covered by water,
has neverbeen in actual possession of the said lot. The foregoing facts have never been
denied or contradicted byplaintiff, and they clearly show that the increase in area of Lot
2290 by the river bank was due to alluvion oraccretions which it gradually received
(from 1917 to 1939, or for a period of 22 years) from the effects of thecurrent of the
river. Neither did Hodges file any opposition despite due publication of the notice of
theapplication and hearing. Further, the land now being claimed by Hodges had been
litigated in three civil cases,while Garcia was recognized as the owner of the land and
held legally entitled to its possession.
3.Registration does not protect the riparian owner against diminution of the area
of his land
The land in question has become part of Garcias estate as a result of accretion, it
follows that said land nowbelongs to him. The fact that the accretion to his land used to
pertain to Hodges estate, which is covered by aTorrens certificate of title, cannot
preclude Garcia from being the owner thereof. Registration does not protectthe riparian
owner against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the
course of theadjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually
receive from the effect of the currentbecome the property of the owners of the banks.
(Art. 366 of the old Civil Code; Art. 457 of the new.)
Suchaccretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and the
provisions of the Civil Code inthat respect are not affected by the Land Registration Act.
(Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason)
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17652 June 30, 1962
IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN
CALALUNG, respondents.
Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.
Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.
BARRERA, J .:
This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia
Grande, from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-R) reversing
that of the Court of First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and dismissing
petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to
and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by the latter without
petitioners' consent.
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a
parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of
Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased
mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in
whose name said land appears registered, as shown by Original Certificate of Title No.
2982, issued on June 9, 1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-
83342. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its
northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in the title).
Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side
took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the
bank thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and
an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been
added to the registered area (Exh. C-1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First
Instance of Isabela against respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square
meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint (docketed as Civil Case No.
1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and
continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered upon
the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to
the value of the fruits of the land as well as attorney's fees and costs. In their answer
(dated February 18, 1958), respondents claim ownership in themselves, asserting that
they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since
prior to the year 1933 to the present.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision
adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering
respondents to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and
to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and costs. Said decision, in part, reads:
It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the
gradual deposit of alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a
navigable river. We are inclined to believe that the accretion was formed on the
northeastern side of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982
after the survey of the registered land in 1931, because the surveyors found out
that the northeastern boundary of the land surveyed by them was the Cagayan
River, and not the land in question. Which is indicative of the fact that the
accretion has not yet started or begun in 1931. And, as declared by Pedro
Laman, defendant witness and the boundary owner on the northwest of the
registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one hectare,
including the stony portion, in 1940 or 1941. Therefore, the declarations of the
defendant Domingo Calalung and his witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the effect
that the land in question was formed by accretion since 1933 do not only
contradict the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but could not
overthrow the incontestable fact that the accretion with an area of 4 hectare more
or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which, it was only declared in that same
year for taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2")
when they entered upon the land. We could not give credence to defendants'
assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") cancelled Tax Dee. No. 28226 (Exh.
"1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax under this declaration begins with the year
1948. But, the fact that defendants declared the land for taxation purposes since
1948, does not mean that they become the owner of the land by mere
occupancy, for it is a new provision of the New Civil Code that ownership of a
piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The
land in question being an accretion to the mother or registered land of the
plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art.
366, Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo, that the accretion has been occupied
by the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no moment, because the law does
not require any act of possession on the part of the owner of the riparian owner,
from the moment the deposit becomes manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408;
Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no act of appropriation on the part
of the reparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial
formation, as the law does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).
This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that
they have been in possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have acquired
the property by prescription. Assuming that they occupied the land in September,
1948, but considering that the action was commenced on January 25, 1958, they
have not been in possession of the land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not
have acquired the land by ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil
Code). Moreover, as the alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the registered
property, the same may be considered as registered property, within the meaning
of Section 46 of Act No. 496: and, therefore, it could not be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession by another person.
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on
September 14, 1960, the decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly
stating:
That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of
alluvium, which started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by
the evidence for both parties. By law, therefore, unless some superior title has
supervened, it should properly belong to the riparian owners, specifically in
accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code
(now Article 457), which provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining the banks
of rivers, belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of
the current of the waters." The defendants, however, contend that they have
acquired ownership through prescription. This contention poses the real issue in
this case. The Courta quo, has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two
grounds: First, since by accession, the land in question pertains to the original
estate, and since in this instance the original estate is registered, the accretion,
consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496, which states
that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall
be acquired by prescription or adverse possession"; and, second, the adverse
possession of the defendant began only in the month of September, 1948, or
less than the 10-year period required for prescription before the present action
was instituted.
As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite
correct. An accretion to registered land, while declared by specific provision of
the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a natural accession thereof,
does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of imprescriptibility
of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection does not extend
beyond the area given and described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would
be productive of confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and the technical
description of the land given therein, of their character of conclusiveness as to
the identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the Supreme Court,
albeit in a negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect the
riparian owner against the erosion of the area of his land through gradual
changes in the course of the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate Development Co.
v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle him to all the rights
conferred by Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is
concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the
provisions of the Civil Code on accession: and these provisions do not preclude
acquisition of the addition area by another person through prescription. This
Court has held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.
We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court,
regarding the length of time that the defendants have been in possession.
Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land in question for the first time
in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs. The area under occupancy
gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he declared the land for
purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1). This tax declaration was superseded in 1948 by
another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the municipality wherein it is located was
changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by
two witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age,
who was Municipal president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in
question adjoins his own on the south, and that since 1940 or 1951, he has
always known it to be in the peaceful possession of the defendants. Vicente C.
Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he said that the defendants'
possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he said, was
then less than one hectare.
We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and
credence than that of the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana
Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants occupied the land in question only
in 1948; that he called the latter's attention to the fact that the land was his, but
the defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the owners, that the plaintiffs did
not file an action until 1958, because it was only then that they were able to
obtain the certificate of title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they
never declared the land in question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes
thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the defendants had the said land surveyed
in April, 1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion
for himself and his co-plaintiffs, but because the survey included a portion of the
property covered by their title. This last fact is conceded by the defendants who,
accordingly, relinquished their possession to the part thus included, containing an
area of some 458 square meters.1wph1.t
The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession
from 1933 to 1958 is not only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover,
supported by the fact that it is they and not the plaintiffs who declared the
disputed property for taxation, and by the additional circumstance that if the
plaintiff had really been in prior possession and were deprived thereof in 1948,
they would have immediately taken steps to recover the same. The excuse they
gave for not doing so, namely, that they did not receive their copy of the
certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the fees of
the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy to merit any serious consideration.
The payment of the surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their right to obtain a
copy of the certificate. Besides, it was not necessary for them to have it in their
hands, in order to file an action to recover the land which was legally theirs by
accession and of which, as they allege, they had been illegally deprived by the
defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence, that the
latter, were really in possession since 1934, immediately after the process of
alluvion started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to their rights only when they
received their copy of the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had
already supervened in favor of the defendants.
It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.
The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the
alluvial property in question through prescription.
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article
366 of the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the
registered owners of the land which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion
becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered
by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible. We agree with the
Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the
registered owner of the adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso
facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under
the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion
received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of
registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land
Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely
confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it
imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must
be placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial
procedures have been provided. The fact remain, however, that petitioners never
sought registration of said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after
petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on
June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the present action in the Court of First
Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered
property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility
enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject
to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive
prescription? This is a question which requires determination of facts: physical
possession and dates or duration of such possession. The Court of Appeals, after
analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in possession of the
alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of
ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the existence of these
facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence presented
by the parties, is conclusive as to them and cannot be reviewed by us.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the
provisions of the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the
pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not in force and before the effectivity of the
new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the
respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance
with law.
The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the petitioners. So ordered.
DIGEST
Grande v. CA [G.R. No. L-17652. June 30, 1962.]
En Banc, Barrera (J): 7 concur, 3 took no part
Facts:
Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande are the owners of a parcel of land, with an
area of 3.5032hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly
Tumauini), province of Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia
Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name
said land appears registered, as shown by OCT 2982, issued on 9 June 1934).
Saidproperty is identified as Lot 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for purposes
of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the
same boundary stated in the title). Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual
accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan
River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about
105meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964
hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered area. On 25 January 1958,
the Grandes instituted an action in the CFI Isabela against Domingo and Esteban
Calalung to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by accretion,
alleging in their complaint(Civil Case 1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest,
were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948,
when the Calalungs entered upon the land under claim of ownership. The Grandes also
asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well as
attorneys fees and costs. In their answer, dated 18 February 1958, the Calalungs claim
ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and
undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present. After
trial, the CFI Isabela, on 4 May 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the ownership of
the portion in question to the Grandes, and ordering the Calalungs to vacate the
premises and deliver possession thereof to the Grandes, and to pay to the latter
P250.00 as damages and costs. Unsatisfied, the Calalungs appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which rendered, on 14 September 1960, a decision (CA-GR 25169-R)
reversing that of the CFI Isabela, and dismissing the Grandes action against the
Calalungs, to quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied
by the latter without the Grandes consent. Thus, the appeal by the Grandes to the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, with
costs against the Grandes.
1.ALLUVIUM BELONGS TO RIPARIAN OWNER
By law, unless some superior title has supervened, alluvium should properly belong to
the riparian owners, specifically in accordance with the rule of natural accession in
Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article457), which provides that to the owner of
lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the water. The area in controversy has been formed
through a gradual process of alluvium, which started in the early thirties, is a fact
conclusively established by the evidence for both parties. There can be no dispute that
both under Article 457 of the new Civil Code and Article 366 of the old, the Grandes are
the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land
to which it adjoins.
2.ACCRETION TO REGISTERED LAND DOES NOT IPSO JURE BECOMES
ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTION OF THE RULE OF IMPRESCRIPTABILITY OF
TITLE UNDER LAND REGISTRATION ACT
An accretion to registered land, while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to
belong to the owner of the land as a natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure
become entitled to the protection of the rule of imprescriptibility of title established by
the Land Registration Act. Such protection does not extend beyond the area given and
described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It
would virtually deprive the title, and the technical description of the land given therein, of
their character of conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the land that is
registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a negative manner, has stated that
registration does not protect the riparian owner against the erosion of the area of his
land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate
Development Co.vs. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55)
, so registration does not entitle him to all the rights conferred by the Land Registration
Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is concerned. What rights he has, are
declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on accession; and
these provisions do not preclude acquisition of the additional area by another person
through prescription.(See Galindez, et al. vs. Baguisa, et al., CA-GR 19249-R, 17 July
1959).
3.OWNERSHIP OF A PIECE OF LAND AND REGISTRATION UNDER TORRENS
SYSTEM ARE DIFFERENT; IMPRESCRIPTIBILITY OF REGISTERED LAND UNDER
LAND REGISTRATION LAW; ACCRETION NOT REGISTERED SUBJECT TO
ACQUISITION THROUGH PRESCRIPTION BY THIRD PERSONS
Accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which
receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property
imprescriptible; just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the
adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of
a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that ownership
is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is
governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the
registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not
vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already
possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to
obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration
laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. The fact remains that the
Grandes never sought registration of said alluvial property (which was formed sometime
after the Grandes property covered by OCT 2982 was registered on 9 June 1934) up to
the time they instituted the action in the CFI Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore,
never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection
of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system.
Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
4.CALALUNGS IN POSSESSION OF LAND SINCE 1934, NOT 1948
Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land in question for the first time in
1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the Grandes. The area under occupancy gradually
increased as the years went by. In 1946, he declared the land for purposes of taxation,
the tax declaration of which was superseded in 1948 by another, after the name of the
municipality wherein it is located was changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalungs
testimony is corroborated by two witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro
Laman, 72 years of age, who was Municipal president of Tumauini for three terms
(recollection of the Calalungs peaceful possession since 1940 or 1941), and Vicente C.
Bacani (Calalungs possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof was
then less than one hectare). The testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much
greater weight and credence than that of Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana
Rodriguez.
5.GRANDES RELINQUISHED POSSESSION OF LOT OCCUPIED BY THE
CALALUNGS
The Grandes did not file an action until 1958, because it was only then that they were
able to obtain the certificate of title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they
never declared the land in question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes thereon. The
excuse they gave for not immediately taken steps to recover possession of the lot was
that they did not receive their copy of the certificate of title to their property until1958 for
lack of funds to pay the fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan. When the Calalungs had
their land surveyed in April 1958, Pedro Grande tried to stop it, not because he claimed
the accretion for himself and for the other Grandes, but because the survey included a
portion of the property covered by their title. Thus, the Grandes relinquished their
possession to the part thus included, containing an area of some 458 sq. ms.
6.FINDING OF COURT OF APPEALS CONCLUSIVE; PRESCRIPTION
SUPERVENED IN FAVOR OF CALALUNGS
The Court of Appeals, upon consideration of the evidence, was convinced that the
Calalungs were really in possession openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim
of ownership since 1933 or 1934, immediately after the process of alluvium started up to
the filing of the action in 1958; and that the Grandes woke up to their rights only when
they received their copy of the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had already
supervened in favor of the Calalungs. This finding of the existence of these facts,
arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence presented by
the parties, is conclusive as to them and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
7.APPLICABLE LAW ON PRESCRIPTION: ACT 190 NOT CIVIL CODE,
SINCE POSSESSION STARTED IN 1933 OR 1934
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the
provisions of the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the
pertinent articles of the Old Civil Code were not in force and before the effectivity of the
New Civil Code in 1950. The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the Calalungs
acquired the alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12958 May 30, 1960
FAUSTINO IGNACIO, applicant-appellant,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and LAUREANO VALERIANO, oppositors-appellees.
Acting Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Crispin V. Bautista
for appellee Director of Lands.
Benjamin H. Aquino for appellee Laureano Veleriano.
MONTEMAYOR, J .:
Faustino Ignacio is appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
dismissing his application for the registration of a parcel of land.
On January 25, 1950, Ignacio filed an application for the registration of a parcel of land
(mangrove), situated in barrio Gasac, Navotas, Rizal, with an area of 37,877 square
meters. Later, he amended his application by alleging among others that he owned the
parcel applied for by right of accretion. To the application, the Director of Lands,
Laureano Valeriano and Domingo Gutierrez filed oppositions. Gutierrez later withdrew
his opposition. The Director of Lands claimed the parcel applied for as a portion of the
public domain, for the reason that neither the applicant nor his predecessor-in-interest
possessed sufficient title thereto, not having acquired it either by composition title from
the Spanish government or by possessory information title under the Royal Decree of
February 13, 1894, and that he had not possessed the same openly, continuously and
adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894. In his turn,
Valeriano alleged he was holding the land by virtue of a permit granted him by the
Bureau of Fisheries, issued on January 13, 1947, and approved by the President.
It is not disputed that the land applied for adjoins a parcel owned by the applicant which
he had acquired from the Government by virtue of a free patent title in 1936. It has also
been established that the parcel in question was formed by accretion and alluvial
deposits caused by the action of the Manila Bay which boarders it on the southwest.
Applicant Ignacio claims that he had occupied the land since 1935, planting it with api-
api trees, and that his possession thereof had been continuous, adverse and public for
a period of twenty years until said possession was distributed by oppositor Valeriano.
On the other hand, the Director of Lands sought to prove that the parcel is foreshore
land, covered by the ebb and flow of the tide and, therefore, formed part of the public
domain.
After hearing, the trial court dismissed the application, holding that the parcel formed
part of the public domain. In his appeal, Ignacio assigns the following errors:
I. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question, altho an accretion to
the land of the applicant-appellant, does not belong to him but forms part of the
public domain.
II. Granting that the land in question forms part of the public domain, the lower
court nevertheless erred in not declaring the same to be the necessary for any
public use or purpose and in not ordering in the present registration proceedings.
III. The lower court erred in not holding that the land in question now belongs to
the applicant-appellant by virtue of acquisitive prescription, the said land having
ceased to be of the public domain and became the private or patrimonial property
of the State.
IV. The lower court erred in not holding that the oppositor Director of Lands is
now in estoppel from claiming the land in question as a land of the public domain.
Appellant contends that the parcel belongs to him by the law of accretion, having been
formed by gradual deposit by action of the Manila Bay, and he cites Article 457 of the
New Civil Code (Article 366, Old Civil Code), which provides that:
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it refers to accretion or deposits on the
banks of rivers, while the accretion in the present case was caused by action of the
Manila Bay.
Appellant next contends that Articles 1, 4 and 5 of the Law of Waters are not applicable
because they refer to accretions formed by the sea, and that Manila Bay cannot be
considered as a sea. We find said contention untenable. A bay is a part of the sea,
being a mere indentation of the same:
Bay. An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides except at
the entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a river, a
bending or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake. 7 C.J. 1013-1014 (Cited in
Francisco, Philippine Law of Waters and Water Rights p. 6)
Moreover, this Tribunal has some cases applied the Law of Waters on Lands bordering
Manila Bay. (See the cases of Ker & Co. vs. Cauden, 6 Phil., 732, involving a parcel of
land bounded on the sides by Manila Bay, where it was held that such land formed by
the action of the sea is property of the State; Francisco vs. Government of the P.I., 28
Phil., 505, involving a land claimed by a private person and subject to the ebb and flow
of the tides of the Manila Bay).
Then the applicant argues that granting that the land in question formed part of the
public domain, having been gained from the sea, the trial court should have declared
the same no longer necessary for any public use or purpose, and therefore, became
disposable and available for private ownership. Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866
reads thus:
ART. 4. Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by
the action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer
washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public
utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coastguard service,
the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the
estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.
Interpreting Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866, in the case of Natividad vs. Director
of Lands, (CA) 37 Off. Gaz., 2905, it was there held that:
Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that when a portion of the shore
is no longer washed by the waters of the sea and is not necessary for purposes
of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for coastguard
service, the government shall declare it to be the property of the owners of the
estates adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof. We believe that only the
executive and possibly the legislative departments have the authority and the
power to make the declaration that any land so gained by the sea, is not
necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special
industries, on for coast-guard service. If no such declaration has been made by
said departments, the lot in question forms part of the public domain.
(Natividad vs. Director of Lands, supra.)
The reason for this pronouncement, according to this Tribunal in the case of Vicente
Joven y Monteverde vs. Director of Lands, 93 Phil., 134, (cited in Velayo's Digest, VI. I,
p. 52).
. . . is undoubtedly that the courts are neither primarily called upon, nor indeed in
a position to determine whether any public land are to be used for the purposes
specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters.
Consequently, until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the
executive department or the Legislature, to the effect that the land in question is no
longer needed for coast guard service, for public use or for special industries, they
continue to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or
ownership.
Appellant next contends that he had acquired the parcel in question through acquisitive
prescription, having possessed the same for over ten years. In answer, suffice it to say
that land of the public domain is not subject to ordinary prescription. In the case
of Insular Government vs. Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil., 505 this Court said:
The occupation or material possession of any land formed upon the shore by
accretion, without previous permission from the proper authorities, although the
occupant may have held the same as owner for seventeen years and
constructed a wharf on the land, is illegal and is a mere detainer, inasmuch as
such land is outside of the sphere of commerce; it pertains to the national
domain; it is intended for public uses and for the benefit of those who live nearby.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised in the appeal.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs.
DIGEST
Ignacio v. Director of Lands [G.R. No. L-12958. May 30, 1960.]
First Division, Montemayor (J): 8 concur
Facts:
Faustino Ignacio, on 25 January 1950, filed an application for the registration of a parcel
of land(mangrove), adjoining a parcel of land that Ignacio has previously acquired from
the Government by virtue of a free patent title in 1936, situated in barrio Gasac,
Navotas, Rizal, with an area of 37,877 sq.m.. Later, he amended his application by
alleging among others that he owned the parcel applied for by right of accretion; the
parcel being formed by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the
Manila Bay which borders it on the south west. He also claims that he had occupied the
land since 1935, planting it with api-api trees, and that his possession has been
continuous, adverse and public for a period of 20 years until said possession was
disturbed by Valeriano. To the application, the Director of Lands, Laureano Valeriano
and Domingo Gutierrez filed oppositions. Gutierrez later withdrew his opposition. The
Director of Lands claimed the parcel applied for as a portion of the public domain, being
a foreshore land covered by the ebb and flow of the tide. In his turn, Valeriano alleged
that he was holding the land by virtue of a permit granted him by the Bureau of
Fisheries, issued on 13 January 1947, and approved by the President. After hearing,
the CFI Rizal dismissed Ignacios application for the registration of the parcel of land,
holding it to form part of the public domain. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed
decision, with costs.
1.Article 457 NCC does not apply as it covers accretion on banks of rivers
Article 457 of the New Civil Code (Article 366, Old Civil Code), which provides that to
the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. This is inapplicable as it
refers to accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers, while the accretion in the present
case was caused by action of the Manila Bay.
2.Article 1, 4 and 5 of the Law of Waters apply (accretion formed by the sea) as
bay is part of the sea
Articles 1, 4 and 5 of the Law of Waters are applicable, referring to accretions formed by
the sea. Manila Bay is a part of the sea, being a mere indentation of the same. As
defined, bay is an opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides except at
the entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a river, a bending or
curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake.
3.Application of Law of Waters on lands bordering Manila Bay; cases
The Supreme Court has in some cases applied the Law of Waters on Lands bordering
Manila Bay; such as the cases of Ker & Co. vs. Cauden, 6 Phil., 732, involving a parcel
of land bounded on the sides by Manila Bay, where it was held that such land formed by
the action of the sea is property of the State; Francisco vs. Government of P.I., 28 Phil.,
505, involving a land claimed by a private person and subject to the ebb and flow of the
tides of the Manila Bay.
4.Interpretation of Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866; Declaration that land is
not necessary for purposes of public utility, etc., lies with the executive and
possibly the legislative departments
Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that when a portion of the shore is no
longer washed by the waters of the sea and is not necessary for purposes of public
utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for coastguard service, the
government shall declare it to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent
thereto and as an increment thereof. We believe that only the executive and possibly
the legislative departments have the authority and the power to make the declaration
that any land so gained by the sea, is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for
the establishment of special industries, or for coast-guard service. If no such declaration
has been made by said departments, the lot in question forms part of the public
domain. (Natividad vs. Director of Lands [CA], 37 OG 2905)
5.Court are not in position to determine if land are used as specified in Article 4 of
the Law of Waters
The courts are neither primarily called upon, nor indeed in a position to determine
whether any public land are to be used for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law
of Waters (Vicente Joven y Monteverde v.Director of Lands (93 Phil. 134).
6.Public domain not subject to ordinary prescription
Land of the public domain is not subject to ordinary prescription. The occupation or
material possession of any land formed upon the shore by accretion, without previous
permission from the proper authorities, although the occupant may have held the same
as owner for seventeen years and constructed a wharf on the land, is illegal and is a
mere detainer, inasmuch as such land is outside of the sphere of commerce; it pertains
to the national domain; it is intended for public uses and for the benefit of those who live
nearby. (InsularGovernment vs. Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil., 505)
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-52518 August 13, 1991
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., respondents-
appellants.
Taada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner-appellee.

DAVIDE, JR., J .:p
From an adverse decision of the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) Laguna dated 3
June 1968 in a special civil action for declaratory relief with injunction, Civil Case No.
SC-650 entitled International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines vs.
University of the Philippines and Jose Campos, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of petitioner
and against the respondents:
(a) Declaring that Rep. Act No. 3990 does not empower the University of
the Philippines, in lieu of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of
Forestry, to scale, measure and seal the timber cut by the petitioner within
the tract of land referred to in said Act, and collect the corresponding
forest charges prescribed by the National Internal Revenue Code therefor;
and
(b) Dismissing the respondents' counterclaim.
respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R.
No. 49409-R.
After the parties filed their respective Briefs in 1971, the Court of Appeals (Sixth
Division) promulgated on 28 December 1979 a resolution elevating the case to this
Court as the "entire case hinges on the interpretation and construction of Republic Act
3990 as it applies to a set of facts which are not disputed by the parties and therefore, is
a legal question.
1

Civil Case No. SC-650 was filed by petitioner Hardwood before the trial court on 28
June 1966.
2
Petitioner seeks therein a declaration that respondent University of the
Philippines (hereafter referred to as UP) does not have the right to supervise and
regulate the cutting and removal of timber and other forest products, to scale, measure
and seal the timber cut and/or to collect forest charges, reforestation fees and royalties
from petitioner and/or impose any other duty or burden upon the latter in that portion of
its concession, covered by License Agreement No. 27-A issued on 1 February 1963,
ceded in full ownership to the UP by Republic Act No. 3990; asks that respondents be
enjoined from committing the acts complained of and prays that respondents be
required to pay petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as damages and costs of the suit.
Its motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue having been unfavorably acted
upon, and pursuant to the order of the trial court of 26 August 1967, respondents filed
their Answer on 13 September 1987,
3
wherein they interpose the affirmative defenses
of, among others, improper venue and that the petition states no cause of action; they
further set up a counterclaim for the payment of it by petitioner of forest charges on the
forest products cut and felled within the area ceded to UP under R.A. No. 3990 from 18
June 1964, with surcharges and interests as provided in the National Internal Revenue
Code.
Petitioner filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim.
4

On 18 October 1967, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Joint
Submission of the Case for Judgment,
5
which reads as follows:
COME NOW the parties in the above entitled case by the undersigned
counsel, and respectfully submit the following JOINT STIPULATION OF
FACTS AND JOINT SUBMISSION OF THE CASE FOR JUDGMENT,
without prejudice to the presentation of evidence by either party:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Plaintiff is, among others, engaged in the manufacture, processing and
exportation of plywood and was, for said purpose, granted by the
Government an exclusive license for a period of 25 years expiring on
February 1, 1985, to cut, collect and remove timber from that portion of
timber land located in the Municipalities of Infanta, Mauban and Sampaloc
Province of Quezon and in the Municipalities of Siniloan, Pangil, Paete,
Cavite and Calauan, Province of Laguna under License Agreement No.
27-A (Amendment) issued and promulgated by the Government through
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on January 11, 1960.
... ;
3. That aforementioned Timber License No. 27-A (Amendment) is a
renewal of the Timber License Agreement No. 27-A previously granted by
the Government to the plaintiff on June 4, 1953 to February 1, 1963. ... ;
4. Plaintiff, since June 4, 1953, continuously up to the present, has been in
peaceful possession of said timber concession and had been felling
cutting and removing timber therefrom pursuant to the aforementioned
Timber License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960;
5. Plaintiff, on the strength of the License Agreement executed by the
Government on June 4,1953 (License Agreement No. 27-A) and of the
License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960, has
constructed roads and other improvements and installations of the
aforementioned area subject to the grant and purchased equipment in
implementation of the conditions contained in the aforementioned License
Agreement and has in connection therewith spent more than
P7,000,000.00 as follows: ... ;
6. Sometime on September 25, 1961, during the effectivity of License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960, the President of
the Philippines issued Executive Proclamation No. 791 which reads as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
RESERVING FOR THE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE,
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS EXPERIMENT
STATION FOR THE PROPOSED DAIRY RESEARCH AND
TRAINING INSTITUTE AND FOR AGRICULTURAL
RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION STUDIES OF THIS
COLLEGE A CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN, SITUATED PARTLY IN THE
MUNICIPALITIES OF PAETE AND PAKIL ,PROVINCE OF
LAGUNA, AND PARTLY IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF
INFANTA, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, Carlos P.
Garcia, President of the Philippines, do hereby withdraw from sale or
settlement and reserve for the College of Agriculture, University of the
Philippines, as experiment station for the proposed Dairy Research and
production studies of this College, a certain parcel of land of the Public
domain situated partly in the municipalities of Paete and Pakil province of
Laguna, and partly in the municipality of Infants, Province of Quezon,
Island of Luzon, subject to private rights, if any there be, and to the
condition that the disposition of timber and other forest products found
therein shall be subject to the forestry laws and regulations, which parcel
of land is more particularly described as follows, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the
seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila this 25th day of September, in the year of Our
Lord, nineteen hundred and sixty-one, and of the Independence of the
Philippines, the sixteenth.
(SGD.) CARLOS P.
GARCIA President
of the Philippines
xxx xxx xxx
7. That on or about June 18, 1964, during the effectivity of the
aforementioned License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of July 11,
1960, Republic Act No. 3990 was enacted by the Congress of the
Philippines and approved by the President of the Philippines, which
Republic Act provides as follows:
AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A CENTRAL EXPERIMENT
STATION FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. There is hereby established a central
experiment station for the use of the University of the
Philippines in connection with its research and extension
functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College
of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences.
SEC. 2. For this purpose, the parcel of the public domain
consisting of three thousand hectares, more or less, located
in the Municipality of Paete, Province of Laguna, the precise
boundaries of which are stated in Executive Proclamation
791, Series of 1961, is hereby ceded and transferred in full
ownership to the University of the Philippines, subject to any
existing concessions, if any.
SEC. 3. All operations and activities carried on in the central
experiment station shall be exempt from taxation, local or
general, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
and any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain
to the general fund of the University of the Philippines.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 18, 1964.
8. That on the strength of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3990, and
prior to the institution of the present suit, defendants have demanded,
verbally as well as in writing to plaintiff-.
(a) That the forest charges due and payable by plaintiff
under the License Agreement 27-A (Amendment) referred to
in paragraph 2 hereof be paid to the University of the
Philippines, instead of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; and
(b) That the selling of any timber felled or cut by plaintiff
within the boundaries of the Central Experiment Station as
defined in Republic Act No. 3990 be performed by personnel
of the University of the Philippines.
9. That the position of the plaintiff oil the demand of the defendants was
fully discussed in the letter dated April 29, 1966 of plaintiffs lawyer
addressed to the President of the University of the Philippines, copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex "A" hereof.
10. That in line with its position as stated in paragraph thereof, plaintiff has
refused to allow entry to personnel of the University of the Philippines to
the Central Experiment Station area assigned thereto for the purpose of
supervising the felling cutting and removal of timber therein and scaling
any such timber cut and felled prior to removal
11. That in view of the stand taken by plaintiff and in Relation to the
implementation of Republic Act No. 3990 the defendant Business
Executive sent the letter quoted below to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue:
xxx xxx xxx
February 8, 1966
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Manila
Re: Forest Charges of U.P. Paete Land Grant
Dear Sir:
Under Republic Act 3990 approved in June, 1964 a parcel of forest land
approximately 3,500 hectares in area was ceded in full ownership by the
government to the University of the Philippines. This area is known as
Paete Land Grant, the title to which is presently issued in the name of the
University of the Philippines. The law transferring the ownership to the
University of the Philippines gives the university full rights of dominion and
ownership, subject to the existing concession of International Hardwood
and Veneer Company of the Philippines. Under the terms of this law all
forest charges due from the concessionaire should now be paid to the
University of the Philippines. The purpose of giving this land grant to the
University is to enable us to generate income out of the land grant and
establish a research and experimental station for the Colleges of
Agriculture, Forestry, Arts and Sciences and Veterinary Medicine.
I would like, therefore, to inform you and to secure your approval of the
following matters:
1. All forest charges paid by Interwood to the District
Forester of Laguna from June, 1964 up to the present should
be remitted in favor of the University of the Philippines pines;
2. All forest charges presently due from Interwood shall
hereafter be paid to the University of the Philippines and
lastly
3. Hereafter the University of the Philippines shall receive all
forest charges and royalties due from any logging
concession at the land grant.
May we request that proper instructions be issued by the district Forester
of Laguna about this matter. Thank you.
Very Truly Yours,
JOSE C. CAMPOS
12. That in reply to the above letter of defendant Business Executive
dated February 8, 1966, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued the
following letter-ruling dated March 11, 1966:
xxx xxx xxx
March 11, 1966
U.P. Paete Land Grant
University of the Philippines
Diliman, Quezon City
Attn: Jose C. Campos, Jr.
Business Executive
Gentlemen:
This has reference to your letter dated February 8, 1966 stating as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
In reply thereto, I have the honor to inform you as follows:
In accordance with Section 266 of the Tax Code as amplified by Section
15(a) of Revenue Regulations No. 85, the Forest Products Regulations,
forest products, cut, gathered and removed from registered private
woodlands are not subject to forest charges, but they must be invoiced
when removed to another municipality or for commercial purposes in the
manner prescribed by the regulations. As the Paete Land Grant was
ceded by law to the U.P. in full private ownership and as the grant is
manifestly to be considered registered, no forest charges are actually due
and payable on the timber cut and removed therefrom. The forest charges
purportedly to be paid by any concessionaire under any licensing
agreement entered or to be entered into by the U.P. are, therefore, to be
considered not as the charges contemplated by the National Internal
Revenue Code but as part of the royalties payable by the concessionaires
for the exploitation of the timber resources of the land grant.
Accordingly, you queries are answered viz:
1. The University may directly collect the supposed forest
charges payable by concessionaires of the land grant.
2. The forest charges paid by International Hardwood and
Veneer Company of the Philippines may be refunded
provided that a formal claim for the refund thereof is made
within two years from the date of payment. The proper
claimant shall be International Hardwood and not the
University.
Very Truly Yours
MISAEL VERA
13. That subsequently, defendant Business Executive sent the letter
quoted below to the District Forester of the province of Laguna una dated
April 18, 1 966:
A
p
r
i
l

1
8
,

1
9
6
6
The District Forester
Bureau of Forestry
Sta. Cruz, Laguna
Dear Sir:
Enclosed is a copy of a letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
concerning the right of the University of the Philippines to collect forest
charges from the existing logging concessionaire at the Laguna Land
Grant (formerly Paete Land Grant). This tract of forest land containing
some 3,500 hectares was ceded to the University of the Philippines in full
ownership by Republic Act No. 3990, approved in June, 1964. In view
thereof, the University of the Philippines requested that its authority over
said land be recognized and that the existing concessionaire, International
Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines, in turn pay its forest
charges directly to the University instead of to the national government.
Please take note of page "2" of the enclosed letter of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue on the official ruling of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to
the following points raised by the University:
1. That the University of the Philippines may now directly
collect forest charges from INTERWOOD, the existing
logging concessionaire.
2. That forest charges paid by INTERWOOD to the Bureau
of Forestry from June, 1964 up to April, 1966 shall be
refunded to the University of the Philippines. In this manner,
INTERWOOD is requested to file a claim for the refund in
the amount heretofore paid by it to be remitted to the
University of the Philippines.
On the basis of this letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, it is
understood that forest charges on timber cut from the Laguna Land Grant
as scaled by scalers of the University of the Philippines shall now be paid
directly to the University of the Philippines. In another ruling by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the University, particularly the Laguna
Land Grant, is exempted from all kinds of Internal Revenue taxes.
Very
truly
yours,
(Sgd.)
Jose
C.
Camp
os, Jr.
Busin
ess
Execu
tive
14. That the above quoted letter of defendant Business Executive dated
April 18, 1966 was duly endorsed by the District Forester of the province
of Laguna to the Director of Forestry.
15. That on or about June 7, 19667 the Assistant Director of Forestry
addressed to plaintiff the letter dated June 7, 1966, which states as
follows:
Sirs:
This is in connection with your request for this Office to
comment on your reply to the letter of Mr. Jose C. Campos,
Jr. of the University of the Philippines.
In your reply to the letter of Mr. Campos, it is stated that the
University of the Philippines is claiming the right:
(a) To scale, measure and seal the timber cut
inside the area covered by the U.P. Land Grant
at Paete, Laguna;
(b) To collect the corresponding forest charges;
(c) To collect royalties aside from the forest
charges; and
(d) To exercise in effect all the authority vested
by law upon the Bureau of Forestry in the
cutting, removal and disposition of the timber
from said area, and the authority of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue respecting the
measurement and scaling of the logs and the
collection of the corresponding forest charges
and other fees in connection therewith.
This office is in full accord with your arguments against the
claim of the University of the Philippines to have acquired
the above rights. We believe that the right vested the
INTERWOOD by virtue of number License Agreement No.
27-A (Amendment) to utilize the timber inside subject area is
still binding and should therefore, be respected. It is on the
basis of this acknowledgment that we sent your client our
letter of November 4,1965 requesting him to comment on the
application of the State University for a Special Timber
License over the said area.
16. That acting on the endorsement referred to in paragraph l4, the
Director of Bureau of Forestry issued the letter ruling quoted below, dated
June 30,1966:
xxx xxx xxx
J
u
n
e

3
0
,

1
9
6
6
District Forester
Sta. Cruz, Laguna
(Thru the Regional Director of Forestry, Manila)
Sir:
This concerns your inquiry contained in the 3rd paragraph of your letter
dated April 26, 1966, designated as above, as to whether or not you shall
turn over the scaling work for logs cut from the area of the International
Hardwood & Veneer Company of the Philippines in the Pacto Land Grant
to Scalers of the University of the Philippines.
In view of the ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the
Paete Land Grant, which embraces the area of the International
Hardwood & Veneer Company of the Philippines, is considered a
registered private woodland of the University of the Philippines and
therefore no forest charges are actually due and payable on the timber cut
and removed therefrom, and in view further of the ruling of said
Commissioner that the forest charges purportedly to be paid by any
concessionaire under any licensing agreement entered or to be entered
into by the U.P. are to be considered not as the charged contemplated by
the National Internal Revenue Code but as part of the royalties payable by
the concessionaires for the exploitation of the timber resources of the land
grant, you may turn over the scaling work therein to the scalers of the U.P.
However, you should guard against the use of such licensing agreements
entered or to be entered into by the U.P. as a means of smuggling forest
products from the neighboring public forests.
Very
truly
yours,
(SGD.
)
ANTO
NIO
A.
QUEJ
ADA
xxx xxx xxx
On the basis of the above JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS, the
pleadings filed in the case, and whatever additional evidence may be
presented by the parties, the parties hereto, through counsel, jointly move
and pray of this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered granting full
and appropriate relief, on the following issues:
1. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed,
should pay forest charges due and payable under its timber
License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) as set forth in
paragraph 2 hereof', to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, or to
the University of the Philippines; and
2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that
said forest charges are to be paid to the University of the
Philippines, whether or not the University of the Philippines
is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel,
the logging, telling and removal of timber within the Central
Experiment Station area as described in Republic Act No.
3990, and to scale the timber thus felled and cut.
Manila for Laguna, September 29,1967.
Upon the foregoing Stipulation of Facts, the trial court rendered its judgment on 3 June
1968 in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which is quoted at the beginning
of this decision. In deciding the case against UP, it held:
... the court finds that the respondents' demand on the petitioner has no
legal basis. In the first place, the cession in full ownership of the tract of
land referred to in the Act was expressly made 'subject to any existing
concessions.' Inasmuch as at the time of the enactment of the Act, the
petitioner's timber concession over the tract of land was existing and
would continue to exist until February 1, 1985, the University of the
Philippines will acquire full ownership' and exclusive jurisdiction to control
and administer the property only after February 1, 1985. The cession of
the property to the University of the Philippines is akin to the donation of a
parcel of land, subject to usufruct. The donee acquires full ownership
thereof only upon the termination of the usufruct. At the time of the
donation, all what the donee acquires is the 'naked' ownership of the
property donated. In the second place, the respondents' demand cannot
be valid unless the provisions of Sees. 262 to 276 of the National Internal
Revenue Code regarding the measuring of timber cut from the forest and
the collection of the prescribed forest charges by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and Bureau of Forestry are first amended. In their arguments,
the respondents tried to stretch the scope of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 3990 in order to include therein such amendment of the provisions of
the National Internal Revenue Code and Revised Administrative Code, but
they failed to convince the Court, not only because of the first reason
above stated, but also because it clearly appears that such amendment is
not intended in Republic Act No. 3990, which does not contain even a
remote allusion thereto in its title or a general amendatory provision at the
end. In the third place, under Republic Act No. 3990, the University of the
Philippines cannot legally use the tract of land ceded to it for purposes
other than those therein expressly provided, namely, 'for the use of the
University of the Philippines in connection with its research and extension
functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary
Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences.' Hence, upon the expiration of
the petitioner's timber concession, the University of the Philippines cannot
even legally renew it or grant timber concession over the whole tract of
land or over portions thereof to other private individuals and exercise the
functions of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry by
scaling and measuring the timber cut within the area and collecting from
them the forest charges prescribed by the National Internal Revenue
Code.
Respondents claim in their Brief that the trial court erred:
I
... WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF WITH INJUNCTION INSPITE OF ITS INHERENT
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS THAT SHOULD WARRANT A DISMISSAL.
II
... WHEN IT DECLARED THAT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3990 DOES NOT
EMPOWER THE RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES,
IN LIEU OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF
FORESTRY, TO SCALE, MEASURE AND SEAL THE TIMBER CUT BY
THE PETITIONER WITHIN THE TRACT OF LAND REFERRED TO IN
SAID ACT, AND COLLECT THE CORRESPONDING FOREST
CHARGES PRESCRIBED BY THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE.
1. The first assigned error is without merit. In the Joint Stipulation of Facts, the parties
jointly move and pray that the trial court render judgment granting full and appropriate
remedy on the following issues:
l. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should pay
forest charges due and payable under its Timber License Agreement No.
27-A (Amendment) as set forth in paragraph 2 hereof, to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, or to the University of the Philippines; and
2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that said forest
charges are to be paid to the University of the Philippines, whether or not
the University of the Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly
appointed personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber within the
Central Experiment Station area as described in Republic Act No. 3990,
and to scale the timber thus felled
These issues bring the matter within the scope of an action for declaratory relief under
Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court and render meaningless the appeal to the rule
laid down in Sarmiento, et al. vs. Caparas, et al.
6
that declaratory relief cannot be joined
by injunction, because herein petitioner, for all legal intents and purposes, abandoned it
by its failure to raise it in the Stipulation of Facts. Thus, what attains is an amendment to
both pleadings (the complaint and the answer), which is authorized by Section 5, Rule
10 of the Rules of Court. Said section pertinently provides:
SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of
evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express
or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respect, as if
they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure to so amend does not affect the result of
the trial by these issues. ...
The stipulation of facts and the agreement as to the issues unquestionably satisfy the
requisites for declaratory relief. (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party
seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue
invoked must be ape for judicial determination.
7

There is a justiciable controversy where there is an actual controversy, or the ripening
seeds of one existsbetween the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court,
and that the declaration sought will help in ending the controversy. A doubt becomes a
justiciable controversy when it is translated into a claim of right which is actually
contested.
8

2. On the second assigned error, respondents assert that: (a) Under R.A. No. 3990, the
Republic of the Philippines may effect collection of forest charges through the University
of the Philippines because the License Agreement does not expressly provide that the
forest charges shall be paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue; in the absence of a
specific contractual provision limiting it to a particular agency in collecting forest charges
owing to it, the Republic may effect such collection through another agency. (b) Having
been vested with administrative jurisdiction over and being the owner of the tract of land
in question, the UP acquired full control and benefit of the timber and other resources
within the area. Timber areas within the ceded property but outside the concession of
petitioner can be fully exploited by UP. However, in respect to timber areas within the
ceded property but covered by the concession of petitioner, only forest charges (or
more appropriately, royalties) may be enjoyed by UP until the expiration of petitioner's
license. To deny it such charges would render its "full ownership" empty and futile. (c)
The UP is clearly entitled to the income derived from the tract of land ceded to it, for
Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 expressly provides:
All operations and activities carried on in the central experiment station
shall be exempt from taxation, local or general, any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, and any incidental receipts or income therefrom
shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the Philippines.
(emphasis supplied for emphasis).
(d) As provided by R.A. No. 3990, the UP is duty bound to operate and maintain a
central experiment station; since this law does not provide for appropriations for such
purpose, it is clearly the legislative intention that the establishment and maintenance
thereof must be financed by the earnings or income from the area, which can only come
from the timber and the royalties or charges payable therefrom. This is in accordance
with the general principle that a grant of authority or jurisdiction extends to all incidents
that may arise in connection with the matter over which jurisdiction is exercised. (e)
Supervision of the License Agreement in favor of petitioner by UP was intended by R.A.
No. 3990. (f) Finally, the two government agencies affected by R.A. No. 3990 have
issued specific rulings recognizing the authority of UP to collect royalties or charges and
to supervise petitioner's logging operations.
Petitioner refutes the foregoing arguments of respondents by asserting that: (a) The UP
has not been granted by R.A. No. 3990 the authority to collect forest charges or the
authority to supervise the operation by the petitioner of the timber concession affected
by said Act.
The rule is well-settled that legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of the
public and most strongly against the grantee, and nothing will be included in the grant
except that which is granted expressly or by clear implication. Under Section 262 of the
Tax Code, as amended, the duties incident to the measuring of forest products and the
collection of the charges thereon shall be discharged by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
under the regulations of the Department of Finance. The reforestation fee shall be
collected by the Bureau of Forestry.
9
The supervision and regulation of the use of forest
products and of the cutting and removal of forest products are vested upon the Bureau
of Forestry.
10
R.A. No. 3990 does not expressly, or even impliedly, grant the UP any
authority to collect from the holders of timber concessions on the area ceded to it forest
charges due and payable to the Government under the Tax Code, or to enforce its
provisions relating to charges on forest products or to supervise the operations of the
concessions by the holders thereof; (b) The cession in full ownership of the land in
question was expressly made "subject to any concession, if any", and that petitioner's
concession would continue until 1 February 1985; the UP then would acquire full
ownership and exclusive jurisdiction to control and administer the property only after 1
February 1985. The position of UP is akin to that of a donee of a parcel of land subject
to usufruct. (c) The rulings of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Acting
Director of the Bureau of Forestry are patently incorrect; moreover, said agencies do not
have the power to interpret the law, which is primarily a function of the judiciary. (d)
Finally, it has acquired a vested right to operate the timber concession under the
supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry.
There is merit in the second assigned error.
Under Proclamation No. 791, dated 25 September 1961, a parcel of land of the public
domain described therein, with an area of 3,500 hectares, which is the very parcel of
land subject of R.A. No. 3990, was withdrawn from sale or settlement and was reserved
for the College of Agriculture of the UP as experiment station for the proposed Dairy
Research and Training Institute and for research and production studies of said college,
subject however to private rights, if any, and to the condition that the disposition of
timber and other forest products found thereon shall be subject to forestry laws and
regulations.
The above reservation is within the area covered by petitioner's timber license.
Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a central experiment station for
the use of the UP in connection with its research and extension functions, particularly by
the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and
Sciences, the above "reserved" area was "ceded and transferred in full ownership to the
University of the Philippines subject to any existing concessions, if any."
When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the Philippines
completely removed it from the public domain and, more specifically, in respect to the
areas covered by the timber license of petitioner, removed and segregated it from a
public forest; it divested itself of its rights and title thereto and relinquished and
conveyed the same to the UP; and made the latter the absolute owner thereof, subject
only to the existing concession. That the law intended a transfer of the absolute
ownership is unequivocally evidenced by its use of the word "full" to describe
it. Full means entire, complete, or possessing all particulars, or not wanting in any
essential quality.
11
The proviso regarding existing concessions refers to the timber
license of petitioner. All that it means, however, is that the right of petitioner as a timber
licensee must not be affected, impaired or diminished; it must be respected. But, insofar
as the Republic of the Philippines is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the license
were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to UP as a consequence of the above
transfer of full ownership. This is further home out by Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 which
provides, inter alia, that "any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the
general fund of the University of the Philippines. Having been effectively segregated
and removed from the public domain or from a public forest and, in effect, converted
into a registered private woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Forestry over it were likewise terminated. This is obvious from the fact that the condition
in Proclamation No. 971 to the effect that the disposition of timber shall be subject to
forestry laws and regulations is not reproduced iii R.A. No. 3990. The latter does not
likewise provide that it is subject to the conditions set forth in the proclamation. An
owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations than those
established by law.
12
The right to enjoy includes the jus utendi or the right to receive
from the thing what it produces, and the jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing
by its use.
13
As provided for in Article 441 of the Civil Code, to the owner belongs the
natural fruits, the industrial fruits and the civil fruits. There are, however, exceptions to
this rules, as where the property is subject to a usufruct, in which case the usufructuary
gets the fruits.
14
In the instant case, that exception is made for the petitioner as
licensee or grantee of the concession, which has been given the license to cut, collect,
and remove timber from the area ceded and transferred to UP until I February 1985.
However, it has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest charges, or
royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at the same rate as provided for in the Agreement.
The charges should not be paid anymore to the Republic of the Philippines through the
Bureau of Internal Revenue because of the very nature of the transfer as aforestated.
Consequently, even the Bureau of Internal Revenue automatically lost its authority and
jurisdiction to measure the timber cut from the subject area and to collect forestry
charges and other fees due thereon.
The foregoing disposes of the contention of petitioner that R.A. No. 3990 does not grant
the UP the authority to collect forest charges and to supervise the operations of its
concession insofar as the property of the UP within it is concerned. Its argument that it
has acquired vested rights to operate its concession under the supervision and control
of the Bureau of Forestry is preposterous. The grantor, Republic of the Philippines, was
by no means bound under the License to perpetuate the Bureau as its agent. Neither is
there force to its contention that legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of
the public and most strongly against the grantee. The grant under R.A. No. 3990 is
transfer of absolute, full and entire ownership which leaves no room for a strict
interpretation against the grantee, the UP. The reservation therein made is in favor of
the private party pursuant to the license, which is nevertheless protected. It is the
concession in favor of the petitioner which should, on the contrary, be bound by the rule.
It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed
personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber within the area covered by R.A. No.
3990.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING
the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. C-650, rendered on 3 June 1968;
DECLARING that forest charges due from and payable by petitioner for timber cut
pursuant to its License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) within the area ceded and
transferred to the University of the Philippine pursuant to R.A. No. 3990 shall be paid to
the University of the Philippines; DECLARING that the University of the Philippines is
entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the logging, felling and
removal of timber within the aforesaid area covered by R.A. No. 3990.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
International Hardwood and Veneer Co. v. University of the Philippines
In International Hardwood and Veneer Co. v. University of the Philippines,41 the
President issued Proclamation No. 791 withdrawing from sale or settlement, and
reserving for the College of Agriculture of the University of the Philippines, a parcel of
land of the public domain for its experiment station. The reservation is within the area
covered by petitioners timber license agreement. Meantime, RA No. 3990 established a
central experiment station for the use of the UP in connection with its research and
extension functions, and the reserved area was ceded and transferred in full
ownership to the University of the Philippines subject to any existing concessions, if
any.
Petitioner thereafter filed suit to declare UP as without right to supervise the cutting and
removal of timber and other forest products in the area covered by its subsisting license
agreement, and to collect the corresponding forest charges. UP, however, alleged that
as grantee, it has acquired full control of the timber and other resources within the area.
In resolving the case, the Supreme Court ruled that when RA No. 3990 ceded and
transferred (the disputed area) in full ownership to the UP, the Republic completely
removed it from the public domain and made UP the absolute owner thereof.
When (RA No. 3990) ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of
the Philippines completely removed it from the public domain and, more
specifically, in respect to the areas covered by the timber license of petitioner,
removed and segregated it from a public forest; it divested itself of its rights and
title thereto and relinquished and conveyed the same to the UP; and made the
latter the absolute owner thereof, subject only to the existing concession. x x x
The proviso regarding existing concessions refers to the timber license of
petitioner. All that it means, however, is that the right of petitioner as a timber
licensee must not be affected, impaired or diminished; it must be respected. But,
insofar as the Republic of the Philippines is concerned, all its rights as grantor of
the license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to UP as a
consequence of the above transfer of full ownership. x x x Having been
effectively segregated and removed from the public domain or from a public
forest and, in effect, converted into a registered private woodland, the authority
and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it were likewise terminated. x x x
However, (petitioner) has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest
charges, or royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at the same rate as provided for
in the Agreement.
The clear implication is that a land grant having been made by a Presidential
proclamation and by legislative act, the grantee may apply for the registration of the
land and bring it under the operation of the Torrens system.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40912 September 30, 1976
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the MINDANAO MEDICAL
CENTER, petioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO Y DE JESUS, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor for petitioner.
Ananias C. Ona for private respondent.

MARTIN, J .:t.hqw
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Apiwals in its CA-G.R.
No. 39577-R, raising the question of whether or not petitioner Mindanao Medical Center
has registerable title over a full 12.8081-hectare land by virtue of an executive
proclamation in 1956 reserving the area for medical center site purposes.
On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus,
applied with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent (Sales Application No. 5436) of a 33-
hectare situated in barrio Libaron, Municipality of Davao (now Davao City).
1
The
property applied for was a portion of what was then known as Lot 522 of the Davao
Cadastre.
On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands, through its Davao District Land Officer,
accepted sealed bids for the purchase of the subject land. One Irineo Jose bidded for
P20.00 per hectare, while a certain Dr. Josc Ebro submitted a bid of P100.50 per
hectare The Director of Lands, however, annulled the auction sale for the reason that
the sales applicant, Eugenio de Jesus, failed to participate in the bidding for non-service
of notice on him of the scheduled bidding.
In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held on October 4, 1934. Sales applicant
Eugenio de Jesus was the lone bidder. He equalled the bid previously submitted by Dr.
Jose Ebro and made a deposit of P221.00 representing 10% of the price of the land at
P100.50 per hectare.
On November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issued to Eugenio de Jesus an Order of
Award, the dispositive portion of which reads:
2
+.wph!1
In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the proceedings had in
connection with the Sales Application No. 5436 were in accordance with
law and existing regulations, the land covered thereby is herebyawarded
to the said applicant, Eugenio de jesus, at P100.50 per hectare or
P2,211.00 for the whole tract.
This application should be entered in the records of this office as Sales
Application No. 3231,covering the tract herein awarded, which is more
particularly described as follows:
Location: Central, Davao,+.wph!1
Davao
Area: 22 hectares
Boundaries:+.wph!1
NMaria Villa Abrille and Arenio Suazo;
SEProvincial Road and Mary Gohn;
SWPublic Land;
WMunicipal Road;
Because the area conveyed had not been actually surveyed at the time Eugenio de
Jesus filed his Sales Application, the Bureau of Lands conducted a survey under Plan
Bsd-1514. On July 29, 1936, the plan was approved and the land awarded to Eugenio
de Jesus was designated as Lot Nos. 1176-A, 1176-B-1-A and 1176-B-1-B with an
aggregate area of 20.6400 hectares, Bsd-10153, City of Davao.
On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales
Application of Eugenio de Jesus stating that "a portion of the land covered by Sales
Application No. 5436 (E-3231) of Eugenio de Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army
for military camp site purposes, the said application is amended so as to exclude
therefrom portion "A" as shown in the sketch on the back thereof, and as thus amended,
it will continue to be given due course." The area excluded was Identified as Lot 1176-
B-2, the very land in question, consisting of 12.8081 hectares.
On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclaimation No. 85
withdrawing Lot No. 1176-B-2 from sale and settlement and reserving the same for
military purposes, under the administration of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army.
On November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.45 covering the 8th and 10th
installment for 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after his Sales Application was
amended. This payment did not include the military camp site (Lot No. 1176-B-2) as the
same had already been excluded from the Sales Application at the time the payment
was made.
3
Thereafter, or on May 15, 1948, then Director of Lands Jose P. Dans
ordered the issuance of patent to Eugenio de Jesus, pursuant to his Sales Application
for "a tract of land having an area of 20.6400 hectares, situated in the barrio of
Poblacion, City of Davao.
4
On the same date, then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources Mariano Garchitorena granted a Sales Patent to Eugenio de Jesus for "a
tract of agricultural public land situated in the City of Davao, Island of Mindanao,
Philippines, containing an area of 20 hectares, 64 ares, and 00 centares.
5

On August 11, 1956, President Ramon Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No. 85 and
declared the disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition under the provisions of the
Public land Act for resettlement of the squatters in the Piapi Beach, Davao City.
6
In the
following October 9, President Magsaysay revoked this Proclamation No. 328 and
reserved the same Lot No. 1176-B-2 for medical center site purposes under the
administration of the Director of Hospital.
7

Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center applied for the
Torrens registration of the 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 with the Court of First Instance
of Davao. The Medical Center claimed "fee simple" title to the land on the strength of
proclamation No. 350 reserving the area for medical center site purposes.
Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and successor-in-interest of sale applicant
Eugenio de Jesus, opposed the registration oil the ground that his father, Eugenio de
Jesus, had aquired a vested right on the subject lot by virtue of the Order of Award
issued to him by the Director of Lands.
A certain Arsenio Suazo likewise filed his opposition to the registration on the claim that
the 2-hectare portion on the northeastern part of Lot 1176-B-2 belongs to him.
After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Davao rendered judgment on
September 2, 1966, directing "the registration of the title to Lot No. 1176-B-2 of
Subdivision Plan Bsd-5134, shown on Plan Ap-6512, situated in the Barrio of Central,
City of Davao, and containing an area of 128,081 square meters in the name of the
Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health.
The two oppositors, Alejandro de Jesus and Arsenio Suazo, excepted from this
judgment of the trial court and appealed the case to the respondent Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1974, the Appellate Court held: +.wph!1
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby modified insofar as it
denies the claim of appellant Arsenio Suazo, the same is hereby affirmed,
in regard the appeal of appellant Alejandro Y. de Jesus, registration Lot
1176-B-2, situated in Barrio Central, Davao City, and containing an area of
12.8081 square meters, is hereby decreed in the name of said appellants,
but said appellant is hereby ordered to relinquish to the appellee that
portion of Lot 1176-B-2 which is occupied by the medical center and
nervous disease pavilion and their reasonable appartenances, no costs.
On July 5, 1974, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center moved for reconsideration,
maintaining ownership over the entire area of 12.8081 hectares, but the Appellate Court
in a Special Division of Five denied the motion on June 17, 1975.
8

Forthwith, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center elevated the matter to Us thru the
present appeal.
We find petitioner's appeal to b meritorious.
1. Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over the whole contested
area of 12.8081 hectares, designated Lot No. 1176-B-2, and not only on a portion
thereof occupied by the Medical Center, its nervous disease pavilion and their
reasonable appurtenances. Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President
Magsaysay legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of
Medical Services, Department of Health, of the whole lot, validity sufficient for initial
registration under the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive of a "fee
simple" tile or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. Thus,
Section 122 of the Act, which governs the registration of grants or patents involving
public lands, provides that "Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to
the Government of the Philippines are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to
public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation
of this Act [Land Registration Act, Act 496] and shall become registered lands."
9
It
would be completely absurd to rule that, on the basis of Proclamation No. 350, the
Medical Center has registerable title on the portion occupied by it, its nervous disease
pavilion and the reasonable appurtenances, and not on the full extent of the reservation,
when the proclamation explicitly reserved the entire Lot 1176-B-2 of 12.8081 hectares
to the Center.
Certainly, proclamation no. 350 is free of any legal infirmity. It proceeds from the
recognized competence of the president to reserve by executive proclamation alienable
lands of the public domain for a specific public use or service.
10
section 64 (e) of the
Revised Administrative Code empowers the president "(t)o reserve from sale oe other
disposition and for specific public uses for service, any land belonging to the private
domain of the Government of the Philippines, the use of which is not otherwise directed
by law. the land reserved "shall be used for the specific purposes directed by such
executive order until otherwise provided by law." Similarly, Section 83 of the Public Land
Act (CA 141) authorizes the President to "designate by proclamation any tract or tracts
of land of the public domain as reservations for the use ofthe commonwealth of the
Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, ... or for quasi-public
uses or purposes when the public interest requires it, including reservations for ... other
improvements for the public benefit.
2. Respondent Appellate Court erroneously ruled that Alejabdro's father, Eugenio de
jesus, had acquired ownership over the whole 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 because
the Sales Award issued to him on November 23, 1934 by then Director of Lands
Simeon Ramos covered the 33 hectares applied for, including the 12.8081 hectares.
We fail to see any reasonable basis on record for the Appellate Court to draw such
conclusion. On the contrary, the very Sales Award describes the tract awarded as
located in Central, Davao, Davao, with an area of22 hectares, and bounded on the
north by Maria Villa Abrille and Arsenio Suazo; on the southeast by a provincial road
and Mary Gohn; on the southwest by a public land; and on the west by a municipal
road.
11
This area of 22 hectares was even reduced to 20.6400 hectares upon actual
survey made by the Bureau of Lands. The same area was reckoned with by then Lands
Director Jose P. Dans when he directed the issuance of a patent to Eugenio de Jesus
on May 15, 1948 for his application filed on January 22, 1921 covering "a tract of
land having an area of 20.6400 hectares, situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of
Davao."
12
In like manner, the Sales Patent issued to Eugenio de Jesus on the same
date, May 15, 1948, by then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Mariano
Garchitorena indicated therein the sale to Eugenio de Jesus of "a tract of agricultural
public land situated in the City of Davao, Island of Mindanao, Philippines,containing an
area of 20 hectares 64, ares 00 centares." Seen in the light of Patent, and Sales Order
for Issuance of Patent, and Sales Patent, invariably bearing the area awarded to sales
applicant Eugenio de Jesusas 20.6400 hectares, it becomes imperative to conclude that
what was really awarded to Eugenio de jesus was only 20.6400 hectares and not 33
hectares as applied for by him.
However, We observe that in the public bidding of october 4, 1934, the succesful bidder,
submitted a bid of 100.50 per hectare and made a cash deposit of only P221.00, which
amount represents 10% of the purchase price of the land.
13
At P100.50 per hectare, the
purchase would be P2,221.00 for 22 hectares, 10% deposit of which amounts to
P221.00. For 33 hectares, the total purchase price would be P3,316.50 at P100.50 per
hectare and the 10% deposit would be P331.65, not P221.00, as what was actually
deposited by sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus. Withal, if Eugenio de Jesus was really
awarded 33 hectares in that public bidding, he should have made the required 10%
deposit of P331.65. That he merely deposited P221.00 strongly suggests that what was
bidden for and awarded to him was only 22 hectares and not 33 hectares as applied for.
As a matter of fact, his last payment of P660.45 on November 29, 1939 for the 8th te
10th installment intended only to cover 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after the
amendment of the Sales Application on August 28, 1936, excluding "the military camp
site [Lot 1176B-2 of 12.8081 hectares] for the reason that the said site, at the time of
last installment was already excluded from Sale Application SA-5436 of Eugenio de
Jesus, as ordered ... by the Director of Lands."
14

But, respondent Appellate Court reasons out that if the area bidden for and awarded in
1934 ws only 22 hectares and since two years thereafter the Director of Lands ordered
an amendment excluding the military camp site of 12.8081 hectares, then only 10
hectares, then would have been left to applicant Eugenio de Jesus and not 20.6400
hectares would have been left in the Sales Patent. The Appellate Court's reasoning is
premised on wrong assumption. What was ordered amended was the Sales Application
for 33 hectares and not the Order of 22 hectares or 20.6400 hectares. The Order states:
"Order: Amendment of Application." Necessarily so, because the amendment was
already reflected in the Order of Award, since only an area of 22 hectares was awarded.
3. The phrase "whole tract" in the Sales Award
15
cannot be licitly seized upon as basis
for the conclusion that the area awarded to applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the applied
area of 33 hectares. Such general description of "whole tract" cannot prevail over the
specific description delineating the area in quantity and in boundaries. Thus, the Sales
Award specifies the area awarded as 22 hectares, located at Central, Davao, Davao,
and bounded on the north by the property of Maria Villa Abrille and Arsenio Suazo; on
the southwest by a provincial road and the property by Mary Gohn on the southwest by
a public land; and on the west by a municipal road.
16
Specific description is ordinarily
preferred to general description, or that which is more certain to what which is less
certain.
17
More so, when it is considered that the series of executive proclamations
(Proclamation Nos. 85, 328, 350) continuously maintained the intent of the Government
to reserve the subject land for a specific purpose or service.
Besides, patents and land grants are construed favorably to the Governement, and
most strongly against the grantee.
18
Any doubt as to the intention or extent of the grant,
or the intention of the Government, is to be resolved in its favor.
19
In general, the
quantity of the land granted must be ascertained from the description in the patent is
exclusive evidence of the land conveyed.
20
And courts do not usually go beyond a
description of a tract in a patent and determine the tract and quantity of land apart from
the patent itself.
21

4. We cannot share the view of respondent Appellate Court that eugenio de jesus's
alleged occupation, cultivation and improvement of the 33-hectare land (including the
12-hectare camp site) since 1916 vested in him a right of preference or pre-empive right
in the acquisition of the land, which right was controverted into "a special propriety right"
when the Sales Award was issued to him in 1934. Not only for the earlier reasons that
the Sales Award was only for 22 hectares (later found to be 20,6400 fectares upon
actual survey) and not for 33 hectares, the privilege of occupying public lands a view to
preemption confers np contractual or vested right in the lands occupied and the
authority of the President to withdraw suchlands for sale or acquisition by the public, or
to reserve them for public use, prior to the divesting by the government of title threof
stands, even though this may defeat the imperfect right of a settler.
22
Lands covered by
reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be
acquired.
23
The claims o0f persons who have settled on occupied, and improved a
parcel of public land which is later included in a reservation are considered worthy of
protection and are usually respected, but where the President, as authorized by law,
issuesa proclamation reserving certain lands and warning all persons to depart
therefrom, this terminates any rights previously avquired in such lands by a person who
was settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of purchase.
24
And patents for
lands which have been previously granted, reserved from sale, or appropriate, are
void.
25

It is true that Proclamation No. 350 states that the same is subject to "privilege rights, if
any there be," but Eugenio de Jesus or his son Alejandro de Jesus failed to prove any
private rights over the property reserved. Wee-settled is the rule that unless the
applicant has shown by clear and convincing evidence that a certain portion of the
public domain was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the
Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any other means for the
acquisition of public lands, such as grants or patents, the property must be held to be
part of the public domain.
26
Nor could respondent Alejandro de Jesus legetimately
claim to have obtained title by prescription over the disputed 12.8081 hectares,
inasmuch as by applying for the sale thereof (assuming hypothetically that the 12.8081-
hectare lot was included in the original sales application for 33 hectares), his father,
Eugenio de Jesus, necessarily admits that the portions applied for are part of the public
domain, against which no acquisitive prescription may lie
27
except as provided in
Section 48(b) of C.A. 141, as amended.
5. Respondent Appellate Court mistakenly sustained Eugenio de Jesus's pretense that
the military "camp site" (Lot 176-B-2) had been donated by him to the Philippine Army,
thru Secretary Serafin Marabut of the Department of National Defense, sometime in
1936 subject to the condition that it would be returned to him when the Philippine Army
would no longer need it. As found by the trial court in 1936, the Department of National
Defense was not yet in existence, so that no Defense Secretary by the name of Serafin
Marabut could have entered into a deed of donation with Eugenio de Jesus over Lot
1176-B-2 consisting of 12.8081 hectares. The Department of National Defense was only
organized in 1939. Nonetheless, respondent Alejandro de Jesus, would prove by
secondary evidence the existence of such donation thru the testimony of persons who
supposedly saw it. In this regard, the Rules provides that before the terms of a
transaction in realty may be established by secondary evidence, it is n that the due
execution and subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing the transaction be
proved. For it is the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss that would
constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence to prove the
contents of such document. And the due of the execution of the document would be
proved through the testimony of (1) the person or persons who executed it; (2) the
person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or (3) any who was present and
saw it executed and delivered, or who, after its execution and delivery, saw it and
recognized the signatures, or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had
previously confessed the execution thereof.
28
None of these modes of proof was ever
followed by respondent Alejandro de Jesus. His predecessor- in-interest, Eugenio de
Jesus, merely made a broad statement that he executed a deed f donation in 1936 with
Defense Secretary Marabut when at hat time the Defense Department was not yet in
existence. The notary public who presumptively acknowledged the donation or the
witnesses to the instrument were never presented. It has been ruled that the failure of
the party to present the notary Public and thore s who must have seen the signing of the
document as witnesses to testify on its execution interdicts the admission of a
secondary evidence of the terms of the deed.
29
This is especially true in realty
donations where Art. 748 of the new Civil Code requires the accomplishment thereof in
a public document in order to be valid. The testimony of Marcelo Belendres that
Sesinando de jesus, brother of Eugenio de Jesus showed him a copy of the "paper"
signed by Secretary Marabut and Eugenio de Jesus; of Jose Tinio, Acting Register of
Deeds of Davao, that in May or June 1937, Col. Simeon de jesus went to his office to
register a document" executed by Eugenio de Jesus and Secretary Marabut; of former
Secretary Brigido Valencia that Col. Simeon de Jesus showed him a deed of donation
signed by Eugenio de Jesus and Serafin Marabut. hardly suffer to satisfy the requisites
of the Rules, as to which very strict compliance is imposed because of the importance
of the document involved.
30
First none of these persons was a witness to the
instrument, nor any of them saw the document after its execution and delivery ind
recognized the signatures of the parties nor to whom the parties to the instrument had
previously confessed the execution; second, the reference to a "paper" or "document"
ambigous as to be synonymous with a "deed of donation;" and third, the persons who
showed the deed, Sesinando de Jesus and Col. Simeon de Jesus were not parties to
the instrument. Respondent Alejandro de Jesus's narration of the existence and loss of
the document equally deserves no credence. As found by the trial court, he testified that
the copy of the deed which his father kept was sent to him in Manila thru his uncle,
Sesinando de Jesus in July 1942, while his father himself, Eugenio de Jesus, declared
that his copy of the deed was burned in Davao during the Japanese occupation. The
replies of the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Acting
Executive Secretary that the property was "still needed for military purposes" and may
not therefore be released from the reservation cannot substitute the proof so required.
These replies are not confirmatory of the existence of such donation much less official
admissions thereof.
Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of the military "camp site" was
executed between Eugenior de jesus and Serafin Marabut, such donation would
anyway be void, because Eugenior de jesus held no dominical rights over the site when
it was allegedly donated by him in 1936. In that year, proclamation No. 85 of President
Quezon already withrew the area from sale or settlement and reserved it for military
purposes. Respondent Appellate Court, however, rationalizes that the subject of the
donation was not the land itself but "the possessory and special proprietary rights" of
Eugenio de jesus over it. We disagree. It is true that the gratiuitous disposal in donation
may consist of a thing or right.
31
But the term "right" must be understood in a "propriety"
sense, over which the processor has the jus disponendi.
32
This is because, in true
donations, there results a consequent impoverishment of the donor or diminution of his
assets.
33
Eugenio de Jesus cannot be said to be possessed of that "proprietary " right
over the whole 33 hectares in 1936 including the disputed 12.8081 hectares for at that
time this 12.8081-hectare lot had already been severed from the mass of disposable
public lands by Proclamation No. 85 and excluded in the Sales Award. Impoverishment
of Eugenio's assets as a consequence of such donation is therefore farfetehed. In fact,
even if We were to assume in gratia argumenti that the 12.8081-hectare lot was
included in the Sales Award, still the same may not be the subject of donation. In Sales
Award, what is conferred on the applicant is merely the right "to take possession of the
land so that he could comply with the requirements prescribed by law."
34
In other
words, the right granted to the sales awardee is only "possessory right" as distinguished
from "proprietary right," for the fundamental reason that prior to the issuance of the
sales patent and registration thereof, title to the land is retained by the
State.
35
Admittedly, the land applied for may be considered "disposed of by the
Government" upon the issuance of the Sales Award, but this has the singular effect of
withdrawing the land from the public domian that is "disposable" by the Director of
Lands under the Public Land Act. Moreover, the dsiposition is merely provisional
because the applicant has still to comply with the requirements of the law before any
patent is issued. It is only after compliance with such requirements to the satisfaction of
the Director of Lands, that the patent is issued and the land applied for considered
"permanently disposed of by the Government." This again is a circumstance that
demeans the irrevocable nature donation, because the mere desistance of the sales
applicant to pursue the requirements called for would cause the virtual revocation of the
donation.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgement of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on July
2, 1974, and its resolution of Jane 17, 1975, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsiderations, are hereby reversed and set aside. The disputed Lot 1176-B-2, Plan
Bsd-1514 of Davao Cadastre and containing an area of 12.8081 hectares, is hereby
adjudicated in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. The urgent motion of the
petitioner for leave to construct essential hospitawl buildings, namely: (a) communicable
and contagious diseas pavilion; (b) hospital motorpool; and (c) physician's quarters, is
hereby granted. With costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST
Republic, rep. by the Mindanao Medical Center v. Court of Appeals
In Republic, rep. by the Mindanao Medical Center v. Court of Appeals,42 the trial court
ordered the registration of Lot No. 1176-B-2 situated in Davao City, which was reserved
by a Presidential proclamation for medical site purposes in 1956, in favor of petitioner
Mindanao Medical Center. Respondent Alejandro de Jesus questioned the registration
on the ground that his father, Eugenio de Jesus, had acquired a vested right over the
subject lot by virtue of a sales award earlier issued to him by the Director of Lands. On
appeal, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioner. It held that Proclamation No. 350
legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center validly sufficient for initial
registration under the Land Registration Act (Property Registration Decree). Such grant
is constitutive of a fee simple title or absolute title in favor of petitioner.

The Solicitor General For Petitioner. Martin B. Laurea For Respondents

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Solicitor General For Petitioner. Martin B. Laurea For Respondents

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Republic of the Philippines

You might also like