DlSASTER, CONFLlCT AND SOClAL

CRlSlS RESEARCH NETWORK

NEWSLETTER
Vol. 14, N. 51, September 2013 December 2013 http://www.dcscrn.org/
COORDINATORS REPORT
Nina Blom Andersen
ninablom@ruc.dk
Dear Members, Colleagues and Followers of the Disas-
ter, Conict and Social Crisis Research Network,
I am glad to be able to present to you this 51
st
DCSCRN
Newsletter.
On behalf of the DCSCRN Coordinating Committee, I
would like to send New Years greetings to all of you.
The beginning of a new year invites most of us to make
wishes for the new year hoping that things that we deal
with will become just slightly better.
This does of course lead me to make the very simple
wish of 2014 with less disasters, social crises, and con-
icts, which I believe that we probably all can agree on.
This is obviously a bit nave since the matter is very
much out of the hands of us both as scholars and as
practitioners. So, a more achievable wish would be to
strengthen the research and documentation on matters
concerning these severe events. Through research we
can contribute just a little bit on making societies bet-
ter suited to handle disaster events both by gathering
knowledge as well as making theoretically informed re-
ections on disaster processes and the like.
In the Coordinating Committee of our research network,
an excellent term has been discussed in the last months,
that of next practices. If we as researchers deal with the
next practices of handling disastrous incidents instead of
trying to strive for the best practices, we acknowledge
the dynamic and evolving character of practices in rela-
tion to crises and conicts. I believe this is necessary
since the character of problems that we are dealing with
is under constant change.
The number of natural disasters has always been an is-
sue, though it is widely recognized that climate change
impacts on the magnitude of natural disasters and will
continue to inuence severe weather phenomenona in
the future. The number of technological disasters can
be seen as a product of the ongoing extension of com-
plex systems and modes of production. Unforeseen so-
cial crises also appear, lately ones related to sudden col-
lapse of nancial stability, with an extensive inuence on
the growing proportion of social despair.
Among the many contributions in this newsletter you can
read about different scholars approaches to some of the
incidents that research must take into account and deal
with. These are gathered in the extended abstracts of
some of the presentations made on our biannual con-
ference in Turin, Italy within the European Sociological
Association (ESA) back in August (p. 3). The presenta-
tions that you can read deal e.g. with the consequences
of the debt crisis in southern Europe, concerning prob-
lems of crime, discrimination, and new kinds of poverty
and exclusion. Further abstracts concern new technolog-
ical systems, crises concerning the decline in natural re-
sources as well as terrorism. New causes of social crises
are described, and well known are scrutinized too, and
novel ways of dealing with these matters are discussed.
Among the presentations you will also nd suggestions
for dealing with technical solutions such as surveillance
and social media.
I wish you a pleasant reading.
Best regards,
Nina Blom Andersen
DCSCRN Coordinator
Contents of this issue
COORDINATORS REPORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
EDITORS NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
DCSCRN WEB MANAGER NOTE . . . . . . . . . 2
FROM DCSCRN MEMBERS . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
RESOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
ANNOUNCEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
THE DCSCRN ELECTRONIC NEWSLETTER . . . 28
1
EDITORS NOTE
Antti Silvast
dscrn.news@gmail.com
Dear Members and Colleagues of the DCSCRN,
Welcome to the December edition of the DCSCRN
Newsletter, which covers the period September 2013
December 2013.
As Nina noted above, the focus of this issue will be with
last autumns 11
th
ESA Conference in Turin, Italy. We
have rst collected all the available extended abstracts of
the papers presented in Turin, starting from p. 3. Then,
from p. 24, you will nd photographs taken during the
conference. We hope this coverage is interesting both
for those attended and those who could not make it this
time. The usual contents such as announcements, paper
calls, and reports about other conference events are also
presented in this issue.
I want to wish you a pleasant reading and Happy New
Year. Yours,
Antti Silvast
DCSCRN WEB MANAGER NOTE
Antti Silvast (dscrn.website@gmail.com)
New members
The DCSCRNreceived no newmembership applications
between September 2013 and December 2013. Anyone
who wants to be kept informed of events and current
issues regarding our themes can register with the net-
work free of charge by following the instructions at http:
//www.dcscrn.org/membership/become-a-member. We
look forward to welcoming new colleagues on board!
The up-to-date list of all 255 members can be viewed at
http://www.dcscrn.org/membership/members.
FROM DCSCRN MEMBERS
In Memoriam: William Anderson
William Anderson one of the prominent and admired US
disaster scholars died suddenly on December 29 when
holidaying in Hawaii.
Bill was one of the early Ph.D.s from Ohio State Uni-
versity when the Disaster Research Center was located
there. His doctoral dissertation was on the 1964 Alaska
earthquake and his later work included a study of oods
in Ohio which led him to identify the concept of a disas-
ter subculture. He was one of the rst to write about the
role of the military in disaster and in 1970 published one
of the rst social science studies of tsunami warnings.
He also co-authored with Russell Dynes a study of
the 30
th
of May movement in Curacao.
After teaching at Kent State and Arizona state where
one of his students was Ron Perry, another distinguished
scholar in our eld, Bill moved to the National Science
Foundation where he was responsible for 26 years of
funding US disaster research.
From June 1999 to June 2001, he served as senior ad-
visor in the Disaster Management Facility in the Infras-
tructure Division at the World Bank while on leave from
the NSF.
In 2010 Bill was awarded the Charles Fritz award by
the International Research Committee on Disasters for
a lifetime contribution to Sociology of Disaster. Bill was
known for the quite supportive way he dealt with schol-
ars at all levels and he was respected, admired and loved
by his colleagues.
A personal note
I rst met Bill when he was a discussant for the rst pa-
per I ever presented in the disaster eld. His criticism
was sensitively thorough and constructive and he made
me feel welcome to what for me then was virgin terri-
tory. I got to know him better when we both attended the
World Congress in Sweden in 1982 and we have been
friends ever since.
Joe Scanlon (jscanlon@connect.carleton.ca)
Disability and Disaster Networking
With some colleagues at University College London, I
am trying to set up an informal network of people based
in EU institutions who are researching this topic. They
could be disaster researchers with an interest in dis-
ability, or disability researchers who are interested in
emergencies and disasters. The idea of networking is,
initially, to share publications and nd out about each
others work and future plans; but in the long term it
could lead to joint research projects and more formal
partnerships. If anyone is interested, please contact me.
John Twigg (j.twigg@ucl.ac.uk)
2
RESOURCES
Books, articles, reports, and recent studies by DCSCRN
members and colleagues. Book prices reect prices at
the time of survey. The DCSCRN cannot guarantee the
prices informed. Prices are as stated in US dollars, Euros
or UK pounds.
Extended Abstracts: European Sociological As-
sociation (ESA), 11
th
Conference, Crisis, Cri-
tique and Change, Turin, Italy, 28-31 August
2013
The DCSCRN is publishing here all the available ex-
tended abstracts from our sessions in the 11
th
ESA con-
ference. The entries were edited by the coordinator and
newsletter editor in correspondence with the authors and
we thank everyone for their efforts. As a result, we
now present you with nine papers about various different
facets of disaster, nancial and social crisis, and conict.
A few further abstracts are in their nal stages of writing
and will be published in due time in the next issue of the
newsletter in April.
For more information about the papers, please corre-
spond directly with the authors. All papers express the
opinions of the authors and not necessarily those of the
coordinators, of the coordinating committee, or of the
newsletter editor of the DCSCRN.
Economic Crises and Crime
By Joanna Tsiganou
1
(jtsiganou@ekke.gr)
Many crime and economy specialists, political analysts
and media commentators have much too often insisted
on the strong relationship between economic crises and
the volume of crime. In the proposed paper I intend to
show that the relationship between economic crises and
levels of criminality needs further empirical verication.
The data available suggest that although the volume of
street crime (that is mainly, thefts, burglaries and rob-
beries) seems to increase in the middle of nancial crises
at an international level, strong empirical evidence to
prove the linear or the causal character of the above men-
tioned relationship is missing. On the contrary the Greek
experience suggests that economic crises alone do not
increase the volume of crime, because criminal behav-
ior has mainly moral that is cultural connotations, as the
value system is considered to be an important determi-
nant of behaviour. Although Greece has been undergo-
ing one of the most severe economic crises of its history
1
Dr., Director of Research, The Greek National Centre for Social
Research EKKE
during the past 3-4 years, criminal activity or law offend-
ing behavior does not unquestionably result from eco-
nomic parameters alone. Neither the increased poverty
has produced more crime, nor does the country live in
a state of violence and anomic chaos.
The issue of crime rates under conditions of economic
crises, poverty, deprivation and austerity is of vast impor-
tance among crime specialists, political analysts and me-
dia commentators. I do not intend to navigate through all
relevant theoretical discussions that attempt to connect
economic crises and crime
2
but only to repeat the com-
mon assumption especially among econometric studies
that adverse economic conditions, from unemployment
and poverty to income inequality and a sense of relative
deprivation, are linked to a growth in crime, especially
in property and violent offences.
3
There exist various explanations as to how economic
factors impact upon levels and patterns of crime. Un-
employment, for example, is thought to strengthen the
temptation to offending, but also to enhance the emer-
gence of other positive correlates of crime such as lack
of education and housing. It might thus be reasonable
to assume that the nancial crisis of the rst decade
of the 21
st
century triggered off reactions in property
and violent crimes in countries hit by the economic tor-
nado. Moreover, within the context of the United Na-
tions Global Pulse initiative on monitoring the impact
of crisis on vulnerable populations and on investigat-
ing the possible effects of economic stress on crime, it
was concluded that whether in times of economic cri-
sis or non crisis, economic factors play an important
role in the evolution of crime trends. Out of a total of
fteen countries examined, statistical modelling identi-
es an economic predictor for at least one crime type
in twelve countries suggesting some overall association
between economic changes and crime. Both visual in-
spection of data series and statistical modeling suggest
that in eight of the eleven crisis countries, changes in
economic factors were associated with changes in crime
leading to identiable crime peaks during the time of
crisis. Violent property crime types such as robbery ap-
peared most affected during times of crisis, with up to
2
See indicatively Quinney R., (1977) : Class State and Crime
On Theory and Practice of Criminal Justice, David McKay, New
York, USA. Also, Cantor D., Land K.C., (1985) : Unemployment
and crime rates in the post - world War II United States : A Theoret-
ical and Empirical Analysis, American Sociological Review,
50, no 3, pp. 317 332. Levitt S.D., (2004) : Understanding why
crime fell in the 1990s: Four factors that explain the decline and six
that do not, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18, no
1, pp. 163-190. Deem M., (2011) : Economic Crisis and Crime,
Emerald Group Publishing, UK.
3
See Xenakis S. & Chelioti L. (2012): The Politics of
Crime and the Financial Crisis in Greece, ESC Newsletter
(http://www.escnewsletter.org), Issue 2 / 2012.
3
two-fold increases in some contexts during a period of
economic stress. In some contexts, increases in homi-
cide and motor vehicle theft were also observed. These
ndings are consistent with criminal motivation theory,
which suggests that economic stress may increase the
incentive for individuals to engage in illicit behaviors.
In no case where it was difcult to discern a peak in
crime was any decrease in crime observed. As such the
available data do not support a criminal opportunity the-
ory that decreased levels of production and consumption
may reduce some crime types such as property crime,
through the generation of fewer potential crime targets.
4
However, such being the case, the relationship between
economic recession, on the one hand, and levels and pat-
terns of crime, on the other, has yet to receive sufcient
attention. Examining the Greek case as an example of
a country in a deep economic crisis, it is revealed that
that the economic recession coupled with severe auster-
ity measures may not be associated with a wide range
of typically acknowledged criminal behaviours. The
Greek case rather exhibits the means and ways politics
have infused perceptions on the connection between cri-
sis and crime the same way it has shaped the nancial
crisis itself. It is true that Greece, even before the cri-
sis suffered from high levels of income inequality and
poverty. With the imposition of austerity, unemployment
rose from about 7% in 2008 to over the 25% in 2012 and
has reached a peak of about 30% in 2013. Living stan-
dards also have dropped sharply particularly from late
2010 onwards. Nevertheless, despite the common ten-
dency of political media to reect on the relationship be-
tween the economic deprivation and a new crime wave
especially in property and violent offences I tend to dis-
agree with such strong relationship suggestion between
nancial crises and crime.
Considering this issue froma broader perspective includ-
ing the historical dimension one has to admit the follow-
ing:
It is true that within the context of the ongoing nan-
cial crisis in Greece, public fears about property and
violent crime appear to have risen often in association
with heightened concerns about illegal immigration into
the country and related offending.
5
It is also true that
these sentiments have been fuelled by public discourse
that refers to police-recorded crime statistics showing a
signicant growth (30-40%) in thefts, burglaries and rob-
beries during the past 2-3 years. Yet, immigrants are of-
4
UNODC (United Nations Ofce on Drugs and Crime): GIVAS
Final Report: Monitoring the Impact of Economic Crisis on Crime,
2011.
5
I agree to this point with Xenakis S. & Chelioti L., in (2012):
The Politics of Crime and the Financial Crisis in Greece, ESC
Newsletter (http://www.escnewsletter.org), Issue 2 / 2012.
ten over-represented in proportion to their share of the
general population, and the fact that immigrant offend-
ers follow the law-offending patterns of the indigenous
population is seldom, if ever, addressed.
6
Thus, senti-
ments of punitiveness are running high, still remaining
incompatible with the actual levels and patterns of crim-
inal victimization. On the other hand volumes have been
devoted to the questioning of the validity of police and
other ofcial crime records and/or statistics. In fact there
are multiple reasons why police-recorded crime statistics
need to be treated with particular caution when used as a
proxy for actual crime rates. These range from attitudes
of reporting, attitudes of recording and the systematic
over-policing of immigrant and other vulnerable social
communities.
At the same time the annual National Survey on Cor-
ruption in Greece provides enough evidence supporting
the arguments that a) the phenomenon has been vastly
present and before the present crisis, b) that the total
levels of corruption have been stabilized in this coun-
try throughout the years of crisis and c) that the total
amounts of money spent for corruption have been de-
creasing from 2010 onwards which of course may be ex-
plicable also in terms of austerity
7
.
As for the connection between economic crisis and the
emergence of anomic phenomena, aspects of disobe-
dience, violence and even organized political violence,
strong empirical evidence to support such a connection is
lacking. On the contrary according to the data provided
by a pilot survey conducted in Athens by the Greek Na-
tional Centre for Social Research in 2012, in the midst
of austerity measures, shows that various forms of dis-
obedience as the refusal to pay taxes considered unfair,
physical attacks against politicians and symbolic acts of
rage are followed and/or approved only by the 9-10% of
the Greek public. It is not valid to assume that the non
payment of the annually imposed income tax by the 30%
of the Greek population is symbolic. It is actually prag-
matic due to income deprivation. Of course the majority
(54%) of Athenian public feel that we live in a society
without rules, 78% think that the Laws are not properly
and justly implemented, 57% believe that the unfair rules
should not be followed, and 86% believe that meritoc-
racy is absent. However, people have become less toler-
ant as 95% believe that the guilty should pay and 83%
feel that injustice is nowadays greater and this is some-
thing they can no longer tolerate. At the same time they
feel insecure and far from certain for their future (79%).
6
Tsiganou J., et al., (2010): Immigration and Criminality: Myths
and Realities, Athens, EKKE.
7
National Survey on Corruption in Greece , 2011. Also, Kourakis
N., Spinelli K., Zagoura P., (eds), 2012 : Transparency and the com-
bating of Corruption, Athens, Sakkoulas.
4
It is to be noted that although the Greek public has be-
come more suspicious and reserved, social solidarity is
still exhibited in various forms. At the same time people
feel (48%) that despite the economic crisis people try to
help each other.
Concluding this brief review it is suggested that the rela-
tionship between crime and the nancial crisis may be
non-linear, irregular and complex, as the Greek expe-
rience bears witness. Also it is important to note that
the process of identication of a period of crisis or of
an impact on crime is highly subjective. In addition,
the suggestion of the existence of a period of economic
downturn and an impact on crime by use of economet-
ric tools alone is unable to identify whether economic
changes are causal of crime changes or to take account
of changes in other factors that may also impact upon
crime levels. Research is still needed in order to validate
such remarks.
The Identity of Excluded in Times of Fiscal Austerity
in Greece: Perceptions and Experiences of Discrimi-
nation in Employment
By Katerina Iliou
1
(kiliou@ekke.gr)
The present economic crisis in Eurozone sets Greece in
the center of international interest as far as economic
breakdown and social unrest is concerned. Trends in un-
employment in South European countries outline a pes-
simist ground for present and future workforce. At time
when the present study was conducted 23.1% of Greek
people were ofcially recorded as unemployed, while in
May 2013 unemployment reached 27.6%. The imple-
mentation of scal austerity policies and the enforce-
ment of overwhelming taxation measures contribute to
a greater risk of poverty for 21.4% of the Greek pop-
ulation. Under these circumstances old and new social
groups have to cope with exaggerated inequalities in em-
ployment.
This paper includes results from a survey conducted by
the National Centre for Social Research in collabora-
tion with the Manpower Employment Organization
2
during 2012. Research was part of PROGRESS (2007-
2013) - The European Union Programme For Employ-
ment and Social Solidarity. Quantitative data were col-
lected with a questionnaire. Sample design focused
on two main groups: a) Members of Vulnerable So-
cial Groups, who were selected proportionally in Local
Employment Promotion Centers of Manpower Employ-
ment Organization throughout Greece (N=1280) and
1
Greek National Centre for Social Research - EKKE
2
The public national institution for: a) promotion of employment,
b) employment insurance and c) vocational education and training.
b) members of the general population as control group
in the prefecture of Attica (applying snowball method)
(N=306).
Vulnerable Social Groups (VSGs) were specied ac-
cording to the Record of Vulnerable Social Groups
held ofcially by the Manpower Employment Organi-
zation. In the sample 16 vulnerable social groups are
represented. However, the majority are Immigrants
(35%), People with disabilities (19%), Long term
unemployed over 45 years old with low qualications
(16%), and Roma/Other special cultural groups (10%).
Regarding the socio-demographic characteristics of the
two groups one major difference between them is that
72.7% of members of Vulnerable Social Groups have
Greek citizenship as opposed to 98.4% of general popu-
lation. VSGs also report lower levels of educational and
professional skills (such as computer efcacy, u-
ency in English, uency in Greek and level of ed-
ucation). Also, members of VSGs are unemployed for
a longer period of time than members of control group.
First we focus on how individuals perceive discrimina-
tion in contemporary Greek labor market. Discrimina-
tion is considered either: a) as social threat or b) as
personal threat of exclusion from employment. Social
threat refers to a general perception of discrimination felt
by members of social groups and it constitutes a rather
abstract threat. In this case we study individuals esti-
mates about the extent of discrimination in general (in
Greek labor market nowadays). Personal threat refers
to a self-directed threat that arises from personal experi-
ence of discrimination and it constitutes a rather realistic
threat. In this case we study individuals estimates of
discrimination based on relevant personal experience in
various conditions of employment.
Analysis shows that social threat is considerably per-
ceived since Means of answers of total sample reveal that
discrimination problems in Greek labor market exist to
a great extent. Discriminations are indicated mostly in
Hiring, Dismissals, and Terms of conditions of em-
ployment, but also in Taking full advantage of staff and
promotions and Wages. What is more, the majority
(55%) have experienced discrimination at least once in
the process of hiring for a vacancy (depicting aspects of
Personal threat). Most persons attribute discrimination
to their age (26%), their gender (14%), their nation-
ality (13%) and their place of origin (12%) (see Fig-
ure 1). As source of discrimination they recognize their
employers (16.8%), their managers (10.5%) and to
a lesser extent their colleagues (8%) (see Figure 2).
The greatest share of respondents (17.2%) did not react
at all to the discrimination. The rest coped with discrim-
ination by verbal reactions (16.9%), while very few
appear to follow ofcial legal processes (such as ling
5
Figure 1: Attributions of discrimination
Figure 2: Source of discrimination
a complaint to the Labor Inspectorate or ling a law-
suit).
Further analysis focuses on the research hypothesis that
membership in a devalued social group may increase
perceptions and experiences of discrimination. In con-
trast to this hypothesis, analysis (running Independent
samples t-tests) shows that non members of VSGs ex-
press higher perception of Social threat compared to
members of VSGs. However, our hypothesis is veried
as far as Personal threat is concerned. Comparison of
answers between members and non members of VSGs
(applying Chi-square statistical criterion) highlight that
members of VSGs report personal experience of dis-
crimination in hiring and previous jobs more than
expected. They also appear to be victims of discrimina-
tory behavior more than expected by their employers and
their colleagues.
In order to nd out which factors contribute to predic-
tion of Social and Personal threat of exclusion from la-
bor market we test four separate Models (running Mul-
tiple Regression Analysis with Stepwise method for
loading of independent variables). In Models 1 and 2
we test which factors (Group membership
3
, Socio-
3
Concerning being vs. not being member of Vulnerable Social
Groups.
economic conditions
4
, Occupation processes
5
) con-
tribute to prediction of Social threat (i.e. perception of
discrimination) in general. In Models 3 and 4 we test
if the same factors contribute to prediction of Personal
threat (i.e. experience of discrimination). In a fewwords,
analyses show that group membership is the main fac-
tor that contributes to prediction of Social and Personal
threat of exclusion from employment. However, vari-
ous Socio-economic conditions and Occupation pro-
cesses also contribute to perception and experience of
discrimination
6
.
Drawing fromabove, we attempt to identify the excluded
from labor market by focusing on perceptions of Social
and Personal threat of exclusion. Two different groups
are tested: Members of Vulnerable Social Groups and
members of general population as control group. In
agreement with our hypothesis, members of VSGs ap-
pear to be in disadvantage, since they report higher lev-
els of Personal threat of employment exclusion (stating
personal experience of discrimination).
Nevertheless, in contrast to our hypothesis, non members
of VSGs tend to express higher levels of Social threat
(reporting high levels of discrimination in general). Such
ndings, highlighting that although members of VSGs
appear to be the victims of discrimination, non members
tend to report discrimination to a higher extent, can be
explained in different ways. First, it may be an outcome
of economic crisis in Greece that inates social dissatis-
faction and emphasizes social inequalities. However, we
should also consider that in times of scal austerity new
social groups are at risk of deterioration of their social
status or even poverty. Second, it could be explained as
an outcome of the meaning of discrimination. In this
case members of general population may view discrimi-
nation in labor market in a more general way (when the
interviewer sets the question) including nepotism, cor-
ruption and in-group favoritism. In this case we should
4
Concerning Age, Marital status, Citizenship, Educa-
tion, Employment, Sector of economy in employment and
Salary.
5
Concerning Change of many employers, Total time of em-
ployment, Job satisfaction and Total time of unemployment.
6
In detail: a) Model 1 shows that non members of VSGs,
Greek citizens, persons with low salary, low job satisfaction
and long-time unemployed tend to express higher levels of dis-
crimination in general in labor market. b) Model 2 shows that non
members of VSGs, Greek citizens, persons with low salary,
low job satisfaction, working in public sector, and long-time
unemployed tend to express higher levels of frequency of discrimi-
nation in general. c) Model 3 shows that members of VSGs, mar-
ried persons, with low salary, low job satisfaction and change
of many employers tend to report higher levels of personal experi-
ence of discrimination in hiring. d) Model 4 shows that members
of VSGs, persons with low job satisfaction, and change of many
employers tend to report higher levels of personal experience of dis-
crimination in previous jobs.
6
consider formulating an open question for the denition
of discrimination in future questionnaires. Third, this
could be an outcome of sample design. Findings may
reect views of VSGs located in public institutions such
as the Manpower Employment Organization that cannot
be generalized. For example, immigrants who represent
35% of present sample, are only such immigrants that
hold ofcial papers of stay. At the same time, social sci-
entists often face up problems of access to populations
such as paperless immigrants. However, specic pub-
lic institutions should be used with caution and proper
methodological questioning.
Last, but not least, the present paper highlights that group
membership is not a sufcient factor for predicting So-
cial and/or Personal threat of exclusion from labor mar-
ket. Perception of discrimination in general as well as
personal experience of discrimination are multi-factorial
phenomena involving not only afliations with groups,
but also socio-economical conditions and processes.
The Institutional Framework on Combating Discrim-
ination in the Greek Labour Market under the Im-
pact of the Economic Crisis
By Nikos Sarris
1
(nsarris@ath.forthnet.gr)
This article examines the implementation of the anti-
discrimination legislative framework in Greece, partic-
ularly after the incorporation of Directives 2000/43/EC
and 2000/78/EC
2
through Law 3304/2005
3
. It fur-
ther aims to document the efcacy of implementing the
legislative provisions concerning discrimination both in
general and especially on the labour market, particularly
within a period of economic crisis. This short analysis
is based on data from Greek Ombudsmans (GO) annual
reports, Eurobarometer surveys and the 5
th
Round of the
European Social Survey. The GOs data present citizen
complaints, in other words reported experience of dis-
1
Researcher, Greek National Centre for Social Research - EKKE
2
The Directives on racial and ethnic equality (2000/43/EC) and
employment equality (2000/78/EC) serve a dual purpose: a) the for-
mation of a framework for combating discrimination on the grounds
of racial and ethnic origin, disability, religion or belief, age or sexual
orientation in the EU member-states and b) the establishment of bod-
ies and mechanisms in the EU states in order to monitor the imple-
mentation of the legislation discussed and to promote and encourage
equal treatment.
3
Law 3304/2005 incorporates Directives 2000/43/EC and
2000/78/EC and provides for the protection against discriminatory
treatment due to racial or ethnic origin (employment and training,
education, social protection, including social security and healthcare
social benets, membership and participation in employees and em-
ployers organizations, access to goods and services, including hous-
ing), religious or other convictions, disability, age and sexual orienta-
tion (for the sectors of employment and training). The aim is to form
a general framework for combating discrimination.
COMPLAINTS FOR
DISCRIMINATION
(by discrimination
ground)
2009 2010 2011 2012
Ethnic origin 3.7% 3.8% 3.5% 4.5%
Racial origin 53.7% 67.9% 47.3% 58%
Disability-reasonable
adjustments
25.9% 26.4% 24.5% 17%
Age 13% 1.9% 22.8% 15.2%
Sexual orientation 3.7% - 1.8 % 3.5%
Religious beliefs - - - -
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Table 1: Citizens Complaints for Discriminations cov-
ered by Law 3304/2005 (2009-2012). Source: Greek
Ombudsmans Annual Reports 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012
crimination while the other surveys stamp the population
perception of discrimination.
Following Law 3304/2005, the Greek Ombudsman is the
specialized body, to which citizens may appeal in cases
of experiencing discriminatory treatment on the grounds
of racial or ethnic origin, religious or other beliefs, dis-
ability, age or sexual orientation. Drawing from the
GOs annual reports, it is observed that during the last
four years there is a steady number of complaints led
by citizens who have experienced discriminations and
ask the GO to intervene and apply the principle of equal
treatment. More specically, 54 cases were examined by
the GO in 2009, 53 in 2010, 57 in 2011, and 112 in 2012.
In Table 1 the respective percentages concerning all dis-
crimination grounds covered by Law 3304/2005 are pre-
sented. The main reason citizens appeal to the GO over
time is discriminations on the grounds of ethnic or racial
origin at a rate steadily over 47%.
The Greek Ombudsmans interventions regarding gen-
der discrimination is of equal importance, particularly
after the passing of Law 3896/2010, which widens GOs
competencies on gender discrimination in the workplace
in both public and private sectors. With Law 3896/2010
the legislature institutionally enhanced the role of GO
as a body for monitoring and promoting the principle of
equal treatment between men and women in employment
and extended the Authoritys duties regarding equal op-
portunities for men and women. Table 2 presents cases
by form of unequal treatment on the grounds of gender
or marital status for years 2009-2012.
4
The majority of
complaints related to terms and conditions of employ-
ment, which rose to 72.89% in 2010, while during last
4
The numbers in the table are referred as such in each one of the
annual reports of the Greek Ombudsman and are obviously based
on citizen cases that were examined in each specic year. The total
number of each year is 250-300 cases. See http://www.synigoros.gr/
7
Distribution of cases 2009 2010 2011 2012
Employment terms and
conditions
39.13% 72.89% 47.83% 40.81%
Access to employment 20.29% 18.64% 4.35% 0.82%
Termination of
employment
relationship
23.19% 5.08% 41.74% 30.20%
Wages 11.59% 3.39% 0.87% 4.08%
Professional/Staff
development
4.35% - 3.48% 2.04%
Professional/Vocational
training
1.45% - 1.74% 0.41%
Table 2: Cases of unequal treatment on the ground of
gender for 2009-2012. Source: Greek Ombudsmans
Annual Reports 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012
two years there was a rapid increase of complaints re-
garding terminations of employment relationships. This
could be mainly due to the increase of exible forms of
employment and the change of scenery within the labour
market, brought about by a series of legislative interven-
tions imposed by the memoranda
5
and applicable laws.
According to the Eurobarometer survey, in 2012 citizens
in Greece believed that most forms of discrimination
they were asked about are (very and fairly) widespread
in their country. Findings are presented in Figure 1. The
most commonly reported form of discrimination is eth-
nic origin by 70%, followed by sexual orientation (being
bisexual, gay or lesbian) by 65%, gender identity (being
transgender or transsexual) by 64%, disability by 53%,
age (being over 55 years old) by 43%, religion or beliefs
by 37%, gender by 23% and age (being under 30 years
old) by 15%.
Comparing discrimination rates in Greece with the EU-
27 mean (Figure 2), it is noticed that rates are higher
in Greece on the grounds of ethnic origin (70% versus
56% in EU-27), disability (53% versus 46% in EU-27),
sexual orientation (65% versus 46% in EU-27), and gen-
der identity (64% versus 45% in EU-27). On the other
hand, lower rates of discrimination are observed on the
grounds of gender (23% versus 31% in EU-27), whereas
they are more or less equally high when it comes to dis-
crimination on the grounds of age (for both persons over
5
Since May 2010, the euro area Member States and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) have been providing nancial support
to Greece through an Economic Adjustment Programme in the con-
text of a sharp deterioration in its nancing conditions. The aim is
to support the Greek governments efforts to restore scal sustain-
ability and to implement structural reforms in order to improve the
competitiveness of the economy, thereby laying the foundations for
sustainable economic growth. Memoranda are the international con-
ventions between the Greek government and the board of creditors.
Figure 1: Very and fairly widespread types of discrimi-
nation in Greece. Source: Eurobarometer 77.4. Discrim-
ination in the EU in 2012 Results for Greece
Figure 2: Types of discrimination in Greece and the EU.
Source: Eurobarometer 77.4 Discrimination in the EU in
2012
55 years old and persons under 30 years old) and religion
or beliefs.
On the other hand, by collating Eurobarometer 2012
ndings for Greece with the ndings of 2009, as they are
presented in Figure 3, it is observed that citizens per-
ceptions about discrimination on the grounds of ethnic
origin (71% in 2009 and 70% in 2012) and sexual ori-
entation (64% in 2009 and 65% in 2012) remain steady.
However, there is a decrease in other types of discrimina-
tion, rather impressive especially when it comes to gen-
der discrimination (from 49% in 2009 to 23% in 2012).
Figure 3: Comparative longitudinal data of discrimina-
tion in Greece. Source: Eurobarometer 2012 and 2009,
Discrimination in the EU
8
Figure 4: Factors that are perceived to put job applicants
at a disadvantage in Greece and the EU. Source: Euro-
barometer 77.4, Discrimination in the EU in 2012
Discrimination however is also prominent in workplaces.
Job candidates certain characteristics may in most cases
act as determinants for their selection or not by prospec-
tive employers. Asked when a company wants to hire
someone and has the choice between two candidates
with equal skills and qualications, which of the fol-
lowing criteria may, in your opinion, put one candidate
at a disadvantage, respondents in Greece consider the
candidates age, specically being over 55 years old, as
the primary criterion of discrimination in the labour mar-
ket (54%). This is followed by disability (48%) and the
candidates look (manner of dress or presentation, 47%).
The candidates skin colour or ethnic origin (43%) and
his/her psychical appearance (size, weight, face, etc,
42%) are also believed to be signicant grounds of dis-
crimination. Age over 55 years old is at the top (54%)
when EU-27 is concerned, followed by the candidates
look (45%) and disability (40%). Figure 4 presents in
detail the criteria which could put a candidate at a dis-
advantage in the labour market, as well as response rates
for Greece and the EU.
According to the European Social Surveys (ESS) 2011
data, the proportion of respondents who identify them-
selves as members of groups that are subject to discrim-
ination amounts to 7.5% in Greece, whereas the respec-
tive average across the 27 participating countries is 6.5%.
The most commonly reported grounds of discrimination
in Greece are nationality by 35.5%, colour or race by
29.1% and age by 11.3%. On the other end we nd dis-
crimination due to sexual orientation and disability, both
amounting to 2.5% (see gure 4). These data are in ac-
cordance with the outcomes of the Eurobarometers sur-
vey, as well as data from the Greek Ombudsman based
on citizens complaints led with the Authority.
Regarding Greece despite any gaps of Law 3304/2005,
there is today a comprehensive anti-discrimination leg-
islative framework, which has been recently enhanced
Figure 5: Grounds of discrimination in Greece.
Source: ESS Data, Results of 5
th
Round,
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/
with Laws 4074/2012 and 4097/2012; these laws incor-
porate into the Greek legislation directives and interna-
tional conventions, thus increasing the level of protec-
tion. Looking closely into the application of legislation,
it could be argued that complaints regarding discrimina-
tions on the grounds of religion or beliefs and sexual ori-
entation are still quite limited. A greater effort needs to
be made in this area by the state, in order to raise public
awareness and in order for citizens to learn their rights.
According to the Eurobarometer survey, in Greece there
is a relatively stable view regarding discriminations due
to ethnic origin and sexual orientation, whereas a de-
crease is documented on other grounds, especially re-
garding gender discrimination. Discrimination on the
ground of nationality remains the basic ground of dis-
crimination in Greece, as the ESS ndings also suggest.
Out of the ten proposed grounds of discrimination, there
is a decrease in six, nationality rates remain stable, and
rates are higher for the remainder three.
Discriminations seemto be more intensied in the labour
market, where all rates are higher. Age discrimination
(being over 55 years old) appears as the most promi-
nent ground of unequal treatment. Discrimination out-
side working life is seen as occurring less often. The
economic crisis has also increased discriminations, par-
ticularly in the labour market and mainly due to exible
forms of employment and the change of scenery, brought
about by a series of legislative interventions.
The primary duty of the Greek state is to raise cit-
izens awareness and to disseminate information re-
garding anti-discrimination legislation. Raising public
awareness on discrimination issues is an important tool,
which will ultimately be used to combat them. Develop-
ing social dialogue among government, the civil society
and social partners could constitute a signicant step of
progress.
9
The Demographics of Poverty in Selected Mediter-
ranean Countries
By Dionyssis Balourdos
1
(dbalourdos@ekke.gr)
Aim
The use of demographic variables is an essential part
of any analysis of poverty. However, we cannot yet be
fully satised with the analysis and understandings of the
role of demographic factors that inuence poverty. This
paper focuses on three factors related to demography,
which have been shown to have an impact on poverty:
fertility, age and household size and composition.
Theoretical considerations
In social science literatures there are partial theoretical
pieces, each one contributing to the understanding of the
poverty and demography connection. I shortly consider
three suitable perspectives.
The individualization perspective: Ulrich Beck
2
assumes
that poverty is not a xed condition, a personal or group
feature, but rather it is an experience or a stage in the life-
course. It is not necessarily associated with a marginal
position in society, but reaches well into the middle class
(erosion of middle class).
The family stress perspective was developed with the aim
to verify the effect of nancial loss during the Great
Depression.
3
The perspective assumes that poor fami-
lies face signicant economic pressure as they struggle
to pay bills and are forced to cut back on the costs of
daily living. This economic pressure, coupled with other
stressful life events, creates stress which is manifested in
depression and hostility in poor parents. These behav-
iors are reective on marital and parenting relationships
which may be detrimental to their children and other
household dependents.
The Second Demographic Transition perspective refers
to changes in family structure, delayed marriage, post-
poned and more rare childbearing, cohabitation, higher
rates of abortion and divorce, lower fertility-below re-
placement and more non-marital childbearing. Overall,
the recent recession is likely to have some depressing ef-
fects on childbearing and push period fertility rates that
are often considered too low, to a slightly lower level in
many countries.
1
Research Director, Greek National Centre for Social Research -
EKKE
2
Beck, U. (1992). Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Lon-
don: Sage (German original 1986).
3
Elder, G. H., Jr. (1974). Children of the Great Depression: So-
cial change in life experience. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.


2

from 19.6% to 21.8%. In Malta and Cyprus the risk of poverty rate is lower than the
European mean.
2


Figure 1. At risk of poverty rate, selected countries 2005-2011


Figure 2 shows that by 2011, some of the biggest declines in TFR occurred in the
countries hardest hit by the euro crisis. Spain's fertility rate fell from 1.46 in 2008 to
around 1.36 in 2011. Greece`s Iell Irom 1.51 to below 1.42. It seems that a ten-year
fertility rise stopped around 2008 as the economic crisis hit, and started to slide in
2011. In Cyprus and Portugal in 2011, the TFR was 1.5, just above 1.3, considered by
some scholars as marking a level oI lowest-low` Iertility. To see such a change in
trend so soon after the start of recession is remarkable. It seems that, changes in
fertility partially follow changes in the economy, with an average lag of less than two
years.

Figure 2. Economic recession and fertility: Mediter ranean countries 2002-2011



"
All data is derived Irom Eurostat`s online database.
16.4
16.5 16.5
16.4
16.3 16.3
16.9
19.6
20.5
20.3
20.1
19.7
20.1
21.4
19.7
19.9
19.7
19.6
19.5
20.7
21.8
18.9
19.6
19.8
18.7
18.4 18.2
19.6
16.1
15.6
15.5
15.9
15.8
15.1
14.5
13.9 14.0
14.8
15.0
15.3
15.0
15.4
19.4
18.5
18.1
18.5
17.9
17.9
18.0
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
At risk of poverty rate
Year
1.26
1.31
1.32
1.34
1.37
1.39
1.39 1.38
1.36
1.28
1.30
1.33
1.40 1.41
1.51
1.52
1.51
1.42
1.27
1.29
1.33
1.32
1.35
1.37
1.42
1.41
1.41
1.40
1.47
1.44
1.40 1.40
1.36
1.33
1.37
1.32
1.36
1.46
1.47
1.50
1.51
1.54
1.56
1.60
1.59
1.60
1.57
1.45
1.48
1.38
1.39
1.44
1.43
1.49 1.49
1.50
1.49
1.42
1.45
1.46
1.51
1.44
1.35
1.24
1.29
1.34
1.39
1.44
1.49
1.54
1.59
1.64
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
EU 27
Spain
Series brake
Malta
Italy
Portugal
Total fertility rate
Year
Figure 1: At risk of poverty rate, selected countries
2005-2011. Source: Eurostat
Selected empirical ndings
Macro level studies generally conclude that increase in
relative poverty is due to higher levels of fertility. Mi-
cro level studies nd that poor households tend to have
larger families and that their children are raised in lower
quality.
4
As Figure 1 shows, strict income policy seems to have
had a strong impact on relative poverty in Greece, Spain
and Portugal. For example, in Greece relative poverty
increased from 20.1% in 2008 to 21.4% in 2011 while in
Spain during the same period it increased from 19.6% to
21.8%. In Malta and Cyprus the risk of poverty rate is
lower than the European mean.
Figure 2 shows that by 2011, some of the biggest de-
clines in total fertility rate (TFR)
5
occurred in the coun-
tries hardest hit by the euro crisis. Spains fertility rate
fell from 1.46 in 2008 to around 1.36 in 2011. Greeces
fell from 1.51 to below 1.42. It seems that a ten-year
fertility rise stopped around 2008 as the economic crisis
hit, and started to slide in 2011. In Cyprus and Portugal
in 2011, the TFR was 1.5, just above 1.3, considered by
some scholars as marking a level of lowest-low fertil-
ity. To see such a change in trend so soon after the start
of recession is remarkable. It seems that changes in fer-
tility partially follow changes in the economy, with an
average lag of less than two years.
Concerning the relationship between poverty and fer-
tility we nd that low fertility is associated with high
poverty rates and this is actually the trend in all Mediter-
ranean countries except Malta and Cyprus which have
4
The cost for raising children includes the direct nancial costs
e.g. housing, health care, education, child care, but also the indirect
or opportunity cost, of the mothers time spent in child care (often
measured using estimates of the womans earning power, or potential
wage rate, in the labor market).
5
The term Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is used to describe the total
number of children the average women in a population is likely to
have, based on current birth rates throughout her life. The TFR re-
quired for replacement is currently considered to be around 2.1 chil-
dren per woman.
10


2

from 19.6% to 21.8%. In Malta and Cyprus the risk of poverty rate is lower than the
European mean.
2


Figure 1. At risk of poverty rate, selected countries 2005-2011


Figure 2 shows that by 2011, some of the biggest declines in TFR occurred in the
countries hardest hit by the euro crisis. Spain's fertility rate fell from 1.46 in 2008 to
around 1.36 in 2011. Greece`s Iell Irom 1.51 to below 1.42. It seems that a ten-year
fertility rise stopped around 2008 as the economic crisis hit, and started to slide in
2011. In Cyprus and Portugal in 2011, the TFR was 1.5, just above 1.3, considered by
some scholars as marking a level oI lowest-low` Iertility. To see such a change in
trend so soon after the start of recession is remarkable. It seems that, changes in
fertility partially follow changes in the economy, with an average lag of less than two
years.

Figure 2. Economic recession and fertility: Mediter ranean countries 2002-2011



"
All data is derived Irom Eurostat`s online database.
16.4
16.5 16.5
16.4
16.3 16.3
16.9
19.6
20.5
20.3
20.1
19.7
20.1
21.4
19.7
19.9
19.7
19.6
19.5
20.7
21.8
18.9
19.6
19.8
18.7
18.4 18.2
19.6
16.1
15.6
15.5
15.9
15.8
15.1
14.5
13.9 14.0
14.8
15.0
15.3
15.0
15.4
19.4
18.5
18.1
18.5
17.9
17.9
18.0
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
At risk of poverty rate
Year
1.26
1.31
1.32
1.34
1.37
1.39
1.39 1.38
1.36
1.28
1.30
1.33
1.40 1.41
1.51
1.52
1.51
1.42
1.27
1.29
1.33
1.32
1.35
1.37
1.42
1.41
1.41
1.40
1.47
1.44
1.40 1.40
1.36
1.33
1.37
1.32
1.36
1.46
1.47
1.50
1.51
1.54
1.56
1.60
1.59
1.60
1.57
1.45
1.48
1.38
1.39
1.44
1.43
1.49 1.49
1.50
1.49
1.42
1.45
1.46
1.51
1.44
1.35
1.24
1.29
1.34
1.39
1.44
1.49
1.54
1.59
1.64
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
EU 27
Spain
Series brake
Malta
Italy
Portugal
Total fertility rate
Year
Figure 2: Economic recession and fertility: Mediter-
ranean countries 2002-2011. Source: Eurostat


3


Concerning the relationship between poverty and fertility we find that low fertility is
associated with high poverty rates and this is actually the trend in all Mediterranean
countries except Malta and Cyprus which have low fertility rates and poverty levels
below the EU mean (Figure 3).

We also find that the differences in poverty between the two sexes are not so high. In
general females show higher rates than men. Concerning the risk of poverty with
respect to age we observe that in Spain, Italy, Portugal and Malta the child risk of
poverty rate is significantly higher than the risk of poverty rate of the aged, while in
Cyprus the opposite is observed. Generally, the elderly and children feature among
the core groups with a higher than average poverty risk, compared to people of
working age or to total population.
3


Figure 3. At risk of poverty rate and fertility in EU countries, 2011


Household structure and size
We assume that better educated women are motivated to increase their labor market
attachment and postpone childbearing due to fear of putting their career progress at
risk. According to mainstream theory they face higher opportunity costs than those
with low income potential. In contrast, among the women with lower education,
childbearing could become a strategy` iI there is enough Iinancial support Irom the
welfare system. However, during the recession, as the welfare systems` generosity has
been exhausted and the unemployment rates are high, the possible loss oI a man`s
income is a central Iactor in couples` childbearing decision. It is the tempo eIIect`
that matters and the average age of first births is expected to increase further.

As data extracted from Eurostat show, in 2011 two types of households face higher
risks of poverty:

3
Ibid.

Bulgaria
Romania
Spain
Greece
Lithuania Italy
Latvia
Portugal
Poland
Estonia
EU 27
United Kingdom
Germany
Malta Belgium
Ireland
Cyprus
France Sweden
Hungary
Finland
Luxembourg
Slovenia
Denmark
Slovakia Austria
Netherlands
Czech Republic
y = 8.3651x
2
- 31.77x + 44.84
R 0.1128
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
1.20 1.30 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.80 1.90 2.00 2.10
At risk of poverty rate
Total fertility rate
Figure 3: At risk of poverty rate and fertility in EU coun-
tries, 2011. Source: Eurostat
low fertility rates and poverty levels below the EU mean
(Figure 3).
We also nd that the differences in poverty between the
two sexes are not so high. In general females show
higher poverty rates than men. Concerning the risk of
poverty with respect to age we observe that in Spain,
Italy, Portugal and Malta childrens risk of poverty rate
is signicantly higher than the risk of poverty rate of the
elderly, while in Cyprus the opposite is observed. Gen-
erally, the elderly and children feature among the core
groups with a higher than average poverty risk, com-
pared to people of working age or to total population.
Household structure and size
My paper assumes that better educated women are mo-
tivated to increase their labor market attachment and
postpone childbearing due to fear of putting their career
progress at risk. According to mainstream thinking, they
face higher opportunity costs than those with lowincome
potential. In contrast, among the women with lower edu-
cation, childbearing could become a strategy if there is
enough nancial support from the welfare system. How-
ever, during the recession, as the welfare systems gen-
erosity has been exhausted and the unemployment rates
are high, the possible loss of a mans income is a central
factor in couples childbearing decision. It is the tempo
effect that matters and the average age of rst births is
expected to increase further.
As data extracted from Eurostat show, in 2011 two types
of households face higher risks of poverty:
Single-adult households (that is, single parents with
dependent children, or without children); and
Households with a greater number of children.
Poverty among single-person households can be higher
than in two-adult households, where income pooling can
facilitate responses to income shocks if they affect one
of the two individuals.
Also, single-adult households are often composed of
young, unemployed persons or elderly pensioners, both
of who face higher risks of poverty. Women are espe-
cially at risk since they are over-represented both among
single-parent households (in several European states,
more than 80 percent of all single-parent households are
headed by women) and among single-adult households,
since elderly female pensioners are more likely to live
alone than elderly men.
Risk of poverty among lone parents is lower in Cyprus
(12.3%) and is over 30 percent in Portugal, Italy, Greece
and Malta. Child poverty has been associated with lone
parent households, which are often headed by women,
and therefore already at a disadvantage in terms of earn-
ings, partly since the income available to support the
child is limited. We also nd that poverty risks for
single-adult households are signicantly higher across
the selected countries and the EU average, whether the
household includes children or not, compared to two-
adult households with or without children. This cannot
be attributed to a decrease in family size, as all the ex-
amined countries have a high average family size. On
the contrary, it may be stated that as the share of people
living in single households has grown in these countries,
growing poverty risks for larger parts of the population
is observed.
Besides, according to recent statistical data, the risk of
poverty is high for immigrants from a non EU country
(Third Country Nationals): the risk of poverty follows
an increasing trend during the period 2008-2011, in all
countries and the EU average. In 2011, the rate is higher
in Greece (46.3%), Spain (43.2%), Cyprus (36.3%) and
Portugal (35.3%).
Material deprivation rate provides an estimate of the pro-
portion of people whose living conditions are severely
affected by a lack of resources and varies signicantly
among Member States. In Greece, Italy and Cyprus the
indicator of severe material deprivation rate is high, es-
pecially for women. Besides, in 2011, the share of per-
sons declaring that they were having great difculty in
making ends meet, is higher in Greece (25.6%), Cyprus
11
(25.1%), and Portugal (19.2%). It seems that for Spain
and Malta monetary poverty is the dominant indicator
while in Greece, Italy, Cyprus and Portugal the non mon-
etary aspects of poverty
6
are of great signicance.
Conclusions
Population trends are more sensitive to the eco-
nomic cycle than might be expected, although
showing some time lag.
People are postponing starting families (tempo ef-
fect), as the average age of rst births rises and rst
births are decreasing more than later births in some
countries, suggesting also that people are postpon-
ing starting families.
The central point for the countries hit hardest by the
recession is the sustainability of male income and
the uncertainty of this factor postpones the child-
bearing decision.
Lowfertility is a feature for countries with lowGDP
and high poverty rates.
Gender has a limited effect on poverty while age
has an enlarged effect.
The household types most at risk of poverty were
single parents with dependent children, single el-
derly people and single females, while children are
among the new risk groups.
The examined Mediterranean countries are neither
equally affected by the crisis nor do they face sim-
ilar population characteristics and household struc-
ture. The situation is dramatic for those who
are monetary poor, feel poor and are materially
deprived (basically Greece and Portugal but also
Spain and Italy).
The following gure is very important, showing that not
only the composition but also the population size mat-
ters.
6
Non-monetary poverty can be described by a host of indicators,
related to the enforced lack of a combination of items that depict
material living conditions: durable goods, housing facilities and de-
terioration etc.


5

-Sex has a limited effect on poverty while age has an enlarged effect
-The household types most at risk of poverty were single parents with dependent
children, single elderly people and single females, while children are among the new
risk groups.
-The examined Mediterranean countries are neither equally affected by the crisis nor
do they face similar population characteristics and household structure. The situation
is dramatic for those who are monetary poor, feel poor and are materially deprived
(basically Greece and Portugal but also Spain and Italy).

The following figure is very important, showing that not only the composition but
also the population size matters.
Figure 4. The size of the poor population and the poverty rate across
European countries, 2011*

Malta
Luxembourg
Cyprus
Estonia
Slovenia
Latvia
Lithuania
Croatia
I reland
Finland
Slovakia
Denmark
Bulgaria
Austria
Sweden
Hungary
Czech Republic
Portugal
Belgium
Greece
Netherlands
Romania
Poland
Spain
Italy
U. K.
F rance
Germany
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
At risk of poverty rate
* Bubbles showing the size of the poor population


Figure 4: The size of the poor population and the poverty
rate across European countries, 2011. Source: Eurostat
The Social Acceptability of Surveillance Technologies
in Pre-emptive Security: Towards a Democratization
of Risk Management Strategies
By Elvira Santiago
1
(elvira.santiago@cchs.csic.es),
Sara Degli Esposti
2
(sara.degliesposti@open.ac.uk) &
Vincenzo Pavone
3
(vincenzo.pavone@csic.es)
Over the past ten years, in the face of global terrorism,
nuclear proliferation, and transnational organized crime,
new approaches to safeguard national and personal secu-
rity have emerged. As a result of the spatial and temporal
unpredictability of criminal actions and of their global
repercussions, a safer society is often pursued through
the implementation of security policies that increasingly
rely on the deployment of surveillance-oriented security
technologies (SOSTs). A surveillance-oriented security
technology is a technology which collects information
about the general population to monitor their activities
in order to tackle a security problem. These technolo-
gies rely on ubiquitous surveillance and interconnected
data exchange systems to identify malicious behaviours
and stop - or even prevent criminal activity from oc-
curring. However, while any real improvement of public
security has to be demonstrated on a case by case basis,
SOST systems are based on a mass blanket surveillance
approach. The high level of monitoring and control to
which ordinary citizens are subject, as a result of the im-
plementation of SOST systems, is interpreted by some
sociology scholars as evidence of the transformation of
our Western societies into surveillance societies (Lyon
1994; SSN 2006; Lyon 2007).
Although the role played by the shifting nature of secu-
rity risks and the national reactions to security threats
have been studied (Kroener and Neyland 2012), little
1
IPP-CSIC, Spain
2
The Open University, UK
3
IPP-CSIC, Spain
12
work has been done on how the public perceive the mas-
sive and often indiscriminate development and deploy-
ment of SOSTs (Pavone and Degli Esposti 2010). The
specic characteristics of these new technologies and the
controversy around their acceptability increase the de-
bate about the validity of the distinction between subjec-
tive and objective risks and highlight the need for new
risk management frameworks and theories.
To tackle security problems surveillance measures are
often implemented throughout Europe without acknowl-
edging cultural and social differences. Diverging na-
tional understandings, political traditions and institu-
tional settings may affect the way these technologies are
perceived, implemented and managed. So far decisions
on matters concerning security and privacy have left es-
sential questions regarding public opinion unanswered:
What are acceptable security technologies in Europe,
what are not and why? How do citizens interpret the
relationship between privacy and security? How do Eu-
ropeans diverge in their privacy and security perceptions
and why?
Where security measures and technologies involve the
collection of information about citizens, questions arise
about whether and to what extent their privacy has been
infringed. This infringement of individual privacy is
sometimes seen as an acceptable cost of enhanced se-
curity. Similarly, it is assumed that citizens are will-
ing to trade off their privacy for enhanced personal se-
curity in different settings. This common understanding
of the security-privacy relationship, both at state and cit-
izen level, has informed policymakers, legislative devel-
opments and best practice guidelines concerning security
developments across the EU.
The security-liberty trade-off is problematic for at least
three reasons. First, liberty and security are presented
as abstract categories, instead of enacted social practices
emerging from the interaction between people and their
social and institutional context. Second, the debate on
security and liberty is framed as a zero-sum game, in
which the trade-off acts as a rhetorical device to reduce
public opposition to a mere problem of making the nec-
essary sacrice for the sake of national security. Third,
studies adopting the trade-off approach are empirically
narrow, because they require citizens to assess the intro-
duction of new security technologies using a predeter-
mined conceptual approach, which frames security and
privacy as interchangeable goods right from the start.
However, an emergent body of work questions the valid-
ity of the security-privacy trade-off (Pavone and Degli
Esposti 2010). This work suggests that the trade-off
model over-simplies the reactions of citizens to secu-
rity measures, especially when they embed surveillance
functionalities. The reliance on the trade-off model may
make invisible to those who design, produce and manage
the technology more complex issues underlying privacy
concerns and public scepticism towards the adoption of
new security measures.
In response to these developments, the SurPRISE
Project, funded under the EU 7
th
Framework Pro-
gramme, organises large scale participatory events,
called citizen summits, with the aim of re-examining the
relationship between security, privacy and surveillance
from a lay publics perspective. SurPrise, which is an
acronym, stands for Surveillance, Privacy and Secu-
rity: A large-scale participatory assessment of criteria
and factors determining acceptability and acceptance of
security technologies in Europe. One of the aims of the
project is to identify factors affecting SOSTs acceptabil-
ity and investigate if citizens see a trade-off between se-
curity and privacy and how this affects their acceptability
perceptions. By acceptability we mean that a technol-
ogy is capable of being endured, because it is tolerable,
adequate and conforms to approved standards from pub-
lics point of view, nor necessarily from a technical or
legal perspective.
In order to study SOSTs acceptability and identify its
antecedents we relied on three types of academic litera-
tures: science and technology studies (STS), risk analy-
sis studies, and privacy and security studies. The follow-
ing list presents the factors selected as considered most
likely to inuence SOSTs acceptability:
1. Familiarity with SOSTs (Slovic et al. 1986) and
General attitude towards SOSTs: Technology De-
tractors vs. Supporters, (Gaskel et al. 2005) com-
ing from STS literature;
2. Perceived Intrusiveness and Perceived Effective-
ness, (Sanquist et al. 2008); Temporal, Spatial and
Social Proximity (Bickerstaff et al 2006; Irwin et al
1999; Moffat et al 2004); Perceived Level of Secu-
rity Threat (Johnson and Tversky, 1983; Huddy et
al. 2002), and the variable Trade-off Model (San-
quist, 2008), from Risk studies;
3. Institutional Trustworthiness (Tensey and
ORiordan, 1999; Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2000),
from both STS contextual approach and the
socio-cultural perspective in Risk studies;
4. Substantive Privacy Concerns (Clarke, 1997;
Pavone, Degli Esposti and Santiago 2013) inferred
from privacy studies.
This theoretical framework represents the base for the
development of the survey design and of the correspond-
ing questionnaire that will be used during the citizen
13
summits to collect peoples responses. Questions will be
displayed on a large screen and people will be able to an-
swer by means of clickers. Before the event, summit par-
ticipants will receive a booklet containing information
about three specic SOSTs: Smart Closed-Circuit Tele-
vision (CCTV); Cyber surveillance using Deep Packet
Inspection (DPI); and Smartphone Location Tracking.
During the event citizens will also watch short docu-
mentaries lms presenting these same technologies and
will have the chance of discussing with fellow partici-
pants. Citizen summits with about 200 participants will
be held in Italy, Spain, Norway, Germany, United King-
dom, Switzerland, Austria, and Denmark between Jan-
uary and March 2014.
References
Bickerstaff, K.; Simmons, P. Pidgeon, N. (2006). Public
perceptions of risk, science and governance: main nd-
ings of a qualitative study of six risk cases. Understand-
ing risk working paper.
Clarke, R. (1997). Introduction to Dataveillance and In-
formation Privacy, and Denitions of Terms, last version
7th August 2006. URL: http://www.rogerclarke.com/
DV/Intro.html
Gasckell, G.; Eyck, T. et al. (2005). Imagining nan-
otechnology: cultural support for technological innova-
tion in Europe and the United States. Public Understand-
ing of Science, vol. 14: 81-90.
Huddy, L.; Feldman, S.; Capelos, T. and Provost, C.
(2002). The consequences of Terrorism: Disentangling
the effects of personal and national threat. Political Psy-
chology, vol. 23(3):485-509.
Irwin, A.; Simmons, P. and Walker, G. (1999). Faulty en-
vironments and risk reasoning: the local understanding
of industrial hazards. Environment and Planning, vol.
31:1311-1326.
Johnson, E. J.; and Tversky, A. (1983). Affect, general-
ization and the perception of risk. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, vol. 45:2031.
Kroener, I. and D. Neyland (2012). New technolo-
gies, security and surveillance. Routledge Handbook of
Surveillance Studies. K. Ball, K. Haggerty and D. Lyon.
London, Routledge International Handbooks.
Lyon, D. (1994). The electronic eye: The rise of surveil-
lance society. Minneapolis, University Of Minnesota
Press.
Lyon, D. (2007). Surveillance, Security and Social Sort-
ing. International Criminal Justice Review, 17(3): 161.
Moffatt, S.; Boeldke, B.; and Pless-Mulloli, T. (2004).
Local environmental concerns among communities in
North-East England and South Hessen Germany: the in-
uence of proximity to industry. Journal of Risk Re-
search, vol. 6:125-144
Pavone, V. and S. Degli Esposti (2010). Public as-
sessment of new surveillance-oriented security tech-
nologies: beyond the trade-off between privacy and
security. Public Understanding of Science, DOI:
10.1177/0963662510376886.
Pavone, V., Degli Esposti, S. and Santiago, E.
(2013). Deliverable 2.2: Draft Report on Key Factors,
28/02/2013. URL: http://surprise-project.eu/
Sanquist, T. F., Mahy, H. et al. (2008). An Exploratory
Risk Perception Study of Attitudes Toward Homeland
Security Systems. Risk Analysis: An International Jour-
nal, vol. 28(4): 1125-1133.
Siegrist, M and Cvetkovich, G. (2000) Perception of
Hazards: The Role of Social Trust and Knowledge. Risk
Analysis, 20: 713-720.
Slovic, P.; Fischhoff, B.; and Liechtenstein, S. (1986).
The psychometric study of risk perceptions. Risk Eval-
uation and Management. New York, London, Plenum
Press, pp. 3-24.
SSN (2006). A Report on the Surveillance Society. A re-
port for the Information Commissioners Ofce. London
UK, Surveillance Studies Network.
Tansey, J. and ORiordan, T. (1999). Cultural theory and
risk: a review. Health, Risk and Society 1(1): 71-90.
Negotiating the Future of International Peace (or
War) Under Conditions of Natural Resource Scarcity
and Global Climate Change
By Tracey Skillington
1
(t.skillington@ucc.ie)
The following presents a brief assessment of a number of
recent policy statements on the security implications of
climate change before offering a critical appraisal of how
inclinations towards democratic peace might be main-
tained in the face of intensifying competition between
states for diminishing stocks of natural resources. From
a Rawlsian perspective, the motives necessary to recog-
nize and act upon obligations of justice are becoming in-
creasingly strained by the depletion of global reserves of
resources like gas, oil, sh, water and minerals.
2
Princi-
1
Dr., University College Cork, Ireland
2
For John Rawls (1971:11), justice as fairness is best under-
stood as the product of a hypothetical agreement among the free
members of a self-guiding society of peoples like a nation state
whose future ourishing depends upon the continued availability of
sufcient supplies of essential natural resources, amongst other ele-
ments.
14
ples of justice are widely assumed to operate more effec-
tively within bounded political communities (e.g., nation
states) where interpersonal ties and historically grounded
models of justice and solidarity predominate. What is
taken for granted in this instance is the notion that issues
of justice can continue in some way to be contained
within the borders of distinct sovereign political com-
munities and extended only minimally to include certain
duties of assistance to the peoples of other states.
What require greater sociological investigation are those
mechanisms that currently restrict prospects for a greater
resource sharing and simultaneously encourage anti-
cosmopolitan tendencies towards inter-state rivalry and
occasionally, conict over diminishing stocks of re-
sources worldwide. Arguably, the core element miss-
ing is a more practically oriented principle of co-
responsibility (Apel 1993: 9) for the deepening hu-
manitarian effects of global climate change crop fail-
ure, drought, ooding, leading to a greater incidence
of disease, hunger, and mass displacement. Notions
of our common future (e.g., Bruntland Report 1987)
have circulated in international political debate on cli-
mate change for more than three decades. Yet until re-
cently, this discourse has not provoked any serious effort
to cosmopolitanize the law of peoples or extend spheres
of resource justice across sovereign borders in a manner
that maximizes opportunities to secure a minimum of re-
sources for all the peoples of this world. If anything, we
have seen an intensication of state communitarian rea-
soning. With the long-term resource supplies of bounded
political communities seen as under increasing threat, a
military defense of diminishing reserves is presented by
many of the larger political powers as a legitimate cli-
mate change security measure.
In a Report to the European Council on Climate Change
and International Security (March 2008), the European
Commission urges the Council to establish a preventa-
tive security policy capable of responding effectively to
the threats greater natural resource conict will pose to
the EU in the future. Entire regions, it argues, may be
destabilized by a politics of resentment between those
most responsible for climate change and those most af-
fected by it. Threats to international security are most
likely to emerge where governance capacity at the state
level is overstretched and unable to manage the physical
impacts of climate change. Where this occurs, civil un-
rest, inter-communal violence, mass migration, and po-
litical instability become increasingly probable. In its
2010 Climate Change Adaptation Report, the US De-
partment of Homeland Security echoes many of the con-
cerns of the European Commission when it explains how
as a threat multiplier, climate change may trigger or-
ganized insurrections due to increased resource scarcity,
weakening states, and widening economic inequalities
conditions that in severe cases are likely to breed ex-
tremism and terrorism (p.3).
International Alert has identied forty-six states with a
combined population of 2.7 billion people, where cli-
mate change and water-related crises produce a high
risk of violent conict. In a further fty-six states, 1.2
billion people, they estimate, are likely to experience
various forms of climate-induced political instability in
the decades ahead. The United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) (2012) notes how at least eighteen
of the most violent conicts in the last two decades
have been fuelled by natural resource distribution, not
only those centred on high value resources like dia-
monds, gold, or oil but also more regular and increas-
ingly scarce resources like fresh water. Figures pro-
duced by The Robert S. Strauss Center (Social Conict
in Africa Database 2011) support the concerns of the UN
and point to a sharp rise in the incidence of hostilities
in areas vulnerable to climate-related hazards, includ-
ing Chad, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique where
a high prevalence of drought and over-intensive resource
exploitation all contribute to social unrest in regions pre-
dicted to lose upwards of 75% of their arable lands in the
decades ahead. Implicit in this policy discourse on the
security implications of climate change is the notion that
war, in certain circumstances, is a legitimate response
to perceived threats to a communitys resource reserves
and given the inevitability of shortages amongst many
climate vulnerable states in the future, highly likely.
An uncomfortable paradox (Beck 2008:131) emerges
alongside the institutionalization of a liberal democratic
regime that in principle supports global peace and soli-
darity under conditions of resource scarcity and growing
climate adversity but in practice, also offers legitimation
occasionally to its opposite war - as a just response
to acts of resource aggression.
3
It is crucial that current models of democratic peace be-
gin to take on board the reasonableness of the larger po-
litical powers justicatory claims for war in a resource
challenged world. In particular, strategic denials of the
fact that states are interdependent in their reliance upon
certain resources subject to redistribution (e.g., a sh-
ing commons or more fundamentally, the earths atmo-
3
Ulrich Beck (2003:454) explains how the institutionalization of
an actually existing cosmopolitanism must maintain a critical pur-
pose particularly in relation to current expressions of a burgeoning
war mentality on issues like the future resource security of the com-
munities of this world. The ambivalent transitional co-existence of
a lingering national gaze on climate adversities, for instance, with
more cosmopolitan visions of our common future is more the prod-
uct of a persisting lack of reexivity in the self-understandings of the
national perspective of states, the latter of which gives rise to bla-
tant moral asymmetries and radical inequalities of opportunity in the
context of globally sustained climate risks.
15
sphere, see Vanderheiden (2008) and perhaps in time,
water). The relevant community to deliberate on such is-
sues is international, not national or regional in isolation,
especially when we take into consideration the various
spillover effects of the escalating race for resources.
As communitarians have argued (e.g., Walzer 1994),
norms that grant persons control over matters of common
concern should coincide with the communities of which
they are a part. Applying this reasoning to the issue of
resource scarcity, the latter is a matter of common con-
cern, one that is international in scope and, therefore,
transcends the exclusive jurisdiction of individual nation
states. If basic resources are to be preserved both now
and into the future, then all within this globally extended
community must abide by the principles of a peace-
ful and cooperative cosmopolitan scheme of distribu-
tive justice to ensure humanitys common survival (see
UNGeneral Assembly Resolution 65/159, December 20,
2010 Protection of a Global Climate for Present and
Future Generations of Humankind). As Vanderheiden
(2008) warns, a self-interested race to the bottom in cli-
mate policy, even by one nation, can undermine overall
commitments to an inter-generational justice. The ques-
tion then is how can we improve prospects for a prin-
cipled cooperation on resource distribution amongst the
global commons?
According to Delanty (2013), what are required are sub-
stantial socio-cognitive shifts in self-understanding and
ways of thinking about our common membership of
world risk society (Beck & Levy, 2013). It is about
activating cosmopolitan learning potentials in the search
for solutions to problems that eventually will threaten
all of humanity. The sheer scale and speed of resource
depletions today require the full range of our principle-
reexive capacities to adjust to new global realities and
open up the space of the political to new possibilities
for global peace under changing ecological conditions.
Arguably, the best way to ensure perpetual peace is to
trans-nationalize procedures for peace building (Bohman
2012). The latter may take the form of multiple deliber-
ative procedures (legal, political and public procedures
coordinated by one, globally elected steering commit-
tee) that debate the conduct of resource wars from multi-
ple angles and perspectives and establish, on the basis of
ongoing discussion, a new set of requirements for a just
global peace and ongoing democratic compromise.
References
Apel, K. O. 1993. How to Ground Universalistic Ethics
of Co-Responsibility For the Effects of Collective Ac-
tions and Activities?, Philosophica. 52 (2): 9-29.
Beck, U., 2003. Toward a New Critical Theory With a
Cosmopolitan Intent. Constellations. 10, 4. 453-468.
Beck U., 2008: Cosmopolitan Vision. Cambridge:
Polity.
Bohman J., 2012. Jus Post Bellum as a Deliberative
Process: Transnationalizing Peacebuilding. Irish Jour-
nal of Sociology, 20, 1, 10-27.
Delanty, G., 2013. The Prospects of Cosmopolitanism
and the Possibility of Global Justice, Journal of Soci-
ology, Special Issue on Globalization and Cosmopoli-
tanism (forthcoming) 49, 4.
European Commission, 2008. Climate Change and
International Security. See: http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/
99387.pdf
European Commission, 2012. Developing a European
Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: progress since
2008 and next steps, http://eeas.europa.eu/arctic_region/
docs/join_2012_19.pdf
Rawls, J., 1971. A Theory of Justice. Harvard: Harvard
University Press.
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2009:
From Conict to Peace-building: The role of natural re-
sources and the environment. http://postconict.unep.
ch/publications/pcdmb_policy_01.pdf
UNGeneral Assembly Resolution 65/159, December 20,
2010 Protection of a Global Climate for Present and Fu-
ture Generations of Humankind
UN Report of the World Commission on Environment
and Development. Our Common Future (Bruntland Re-
port), 1987. See: http://conspect.nl/pdf/Our_Common_
Future-Brundtland_Report_1987.pdf
Vanderheiden, S. 2008. Atmospheric Justice: A Political
Theory of Climate Justice. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Walzer M., 1977. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Ar-
gument with Historical Illustrations. New York: Basic
Books.
White House, 2009: US National Security. Arctic Pol-
icy Report (National Security Presidential Directive-66
(NSPD). https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.
htm
16
Social Attractors: A Tool for Reading Shifts in
Gender Relations in Disaster Contexts
By Christopher Lyon
1
(c.lyon@dundee.ac.uk)
Socially marginalised groups may suffer undue harmdue
their exclusion in society, suggesting that at least part
of the solution rests in nding ways of recognising their
voices. Drawing on recent work in social-ecological sys-
tems resilience by the late Ken Hatt on concept of social
attractors, this extended abstract shows how the attractor
concept may also be used to make visible marginalised
groups in disaster scenarios. Following an explanation
of the concept, two examples from gender and disaster
literature are used to illustrate how this might work. Ed-
ward Saids contrapuntal approach to unequal relation-
ships provides an additional conceptual anchor.
Theory of resilience and social attractors
Ken Hatts 2012 paper
2
describes a useful way of doing
this. Hatt integrates insights from the study of ecolog-
ical systems to provide a better understanding of social
systems dynamics in social-ecological systems (SES) re-
silience. SES resilience thinking sees the natural and
human worlds as dynamic systems where human and
non-human elements interact in complex processes of
growth, change, and renewal at different scales of time
and space. Social attractors are the things around which
peoples perspectives (discourses) and actions (social
practices) are formed. Peoples discourses and related
social practices enable or constrain certain types of ac-
tion around a given issue, to positive or negative feed-
back into the social system (society). Formulating a so-
ciety as a system of discourses and practices creates a
dynamic map of the groups, key issues, and viewpoints
that drive peoples actions. Importantly, it helps to show
how different social practices interact with others in a
system of feedbacks that act to maintain or transform the
society.
To illustrate the social attractor approach, Hatt describes
the scenario of development around an austere lake-
side cottage community in rural Qubec, Canada. Here,
the system of ecological attractor of the lake and so-
cial attractors (nature, conservation, property) dene cer-
tain discourses around social practices (boating, sep-
tic/toilets, farming, electricity). Through a simple equa-
tion, he shows how the interaction between groups, dis-
courses, and practices results in positive or negative
1
School of the Environment, University of Dundee, Dundee,
Scotland
2
Hatt, Ken. 2012. Social Attractors: AProposal to Enhance Re-
silience Thinking About the Social. Society & Natural Resources
26(1):3043.
feedbacks. For example, he explains, as the commit-
ment to nature increases, the use of and support for
power boats decreases. . . [and] conservation increases.
Recognising the discourses and practices of
marginalised groups as activities that feedback into
the larger social system makes these groups visible as
actors in the analysis of disaster. The links between
discourses around the attractor and the consequent social
practices are important. These connections reveal the
feedback effects of the practices into the particularities
of the functioning of a given social (-ecological) system
and show how the actions of each group inuence the
whole. Considered with Edward Saids contrapuntal
approach to postcolonial relationships, such an approach
helps us understand the role of marginalised groups in
disaster settings.
Link to contrapuntal approach
Edward Said
3
borrowed the contrapuntal concept from
music theory to describe a way of reconceptualising the
relationship between colonised and coloniser society as
one of hybridisation and relationship, like the way a mu-
sic is made of the sounds of different instruments. Said
writes,
No one today is purely one thing. Labels like
Indian, or woman, or Muslim, or American
are not more than starting points, which if fol-
lowed into actual experience for only a mo-
ment are quickly left behind. . . survival in fact
is about the connections between things.
Applying Saids approach to disaster accounts for the
role of marginalised groups as part of the system of
disaster that also includes privileged groups. In turn,
this allows disaster to be understood holistically and
beyond the valuable but narrow focus on the most
marginalised. Just as people are more than just vulner-
able, the discourses around which people mobilise are
also not singular. Therefore, whichever group is consid-
ered marginalised or vulnerable in a scenario may mo-
bilise around similar or unrelated attractors to those con-
sidered to have privilege and in addition to those cen-
tred on notions of difference or contestation. It is not
enough to say that this group or that is vulnerable or priv-
ileged without also looking for the places where they are
more equitable. By reading disaster contrapuntally and
seeking out the social attractors, the complex ways in
which marginalised people are both impacted by and also
contribute to shaping the outcomes for their communities
may be revealed.
3
Said, Edward. 1994. Culture and Imperialism. 1st Vintage
Books ed. New York: Vintage Books.
17
Figure 1: Hurricane Katrina (drawing on Luft 2008)
Reading social attractors in gender and disaster
Rachel Luft
4
examines the intersections of class, race,
and gender in her account of a series sexual assaults
within a large relief organisation operating in the Hur-
ricane Katrina impacted New Orleans area. The organi-
sation, Common Ground (CG), although emerging from
a call from local members, drew on mostly white and
sometimes middle-class volunteers who travelled from
locations throughout the United States. A popular draw
was an initiative that positioned volunteering as an alter-
native spring break for university students. During the
course of relief efforts a number of mostly white men
assaulted a number of white women within CG.
However, the gendered and racialised discourse that sub-
sequently emerged within the organisation around the
sexual assault attractor saw it both advise against the
practice venturing alone into the nearby mostly Black
neighbourhood and fail to mention the internal rapes to
newly arrived volunteers. Figure 1 shows how a negative
feedback was created that ultimately served to reinforce
the intersectional racialised, sexualised, and colonial so-
cial relations extant in the American South as they were
reected in the relationship between largely white relief
volunteers and local recipients of relief and rebuilding
efforts. However, despite these problems, the organisa-
tion did much productive work and the women and men
within the organisation still worked together. Recognis-
ing but moving beyond intersectionality in accounting
for the experience of the marginalised is therefore neces-
sary, especially if the goal of progressive social transfor-
mation is to be achieved.
In contrast, an example of a positive disaster feedback
resulting in social transformation is provided by Lynn
Hortons
5
study of Haitian women and womens or-
4
Luft, Rachel E. 2008. Looking for Common Ground: Relief
Work in Post-Katrina New Orleans as an American Parable of Race
and Gender Violence. NWSA Journal 20(3):5.
5
Horton, Lynn. 2012. After the Earthquake: Gender Inequality
and Transformation in Post-disaster Haiti. Gender & Development
20(2):295308.
Figure 2: Haiti Earthquake (drawing on Horton 2012)
ganisations after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The
Haitian social context and recent history has resulted in
the marginalisation and poor treatment of women on a
number of levels, including state sanctioned rape used
to threaten women activists and leaders, and the exclu-
sion of women from male dominated roles in civil so-
ciety as well as the foreign-dominated the aid and de-
velopment sectors. Here, womens discourse in the im-
mediate aftermath of the earthquake centred on survival
and basic needs and, positioning themselves as moth-
ers and caretakers around the social attractor of chil-
dren and other women. Children may have lost par-
ents, and women tended to be worse off and prostitu-
tion or violence were risks. Haitian women formed a
committee to ensure dangers such as the bodies of vic-
tims were removed from the area so it could be made
safe for children. In the longer-term, these womens or-
ganisations shifted their focus to more strategic issues of
education, police, and justice reform aimed addressing
womens structural inequalities in Haitian society and
politics. Thus, as Figure 2 shows, the social attractors
of women and children led to a positive feedback where
local women collectively acted to provide aid after the
earthquake and empowered local women as a force for
change within the legal, political, and social attractors in
Haiti.
These accounts each reveal examples of how social at-
tractors contribute to negative and positive feedbacks
into the overall system of a community facing disaster.
Hortons example in particular shows how marginalised
groups, in her case women, might contribute positively
not only in helping with disaster recovery, but in moving
toward progressive social change. However, these kinds
of account are incomplete if they are understood with-
out reference to the other groups in relationship to them
including those understood to have a normative privi-
lege, as a contrapuntal approach would have. Relational,
or contrapuntal, analysis of the experiences of non-
marginalised and marginalised is inclusive, and when
combined with a social attractor approach, presents a
18
more nuanced systemic picture of the social aspects of
disaster than approaches that focus on single issues.
Conclusion
The social attractor concept as a systems-based approach
for understanding the contribution of marginalised com-
munities toward disaster recovery shows the relationship
between the discourses around which groups coalesce,
and how these translate into social practices that feed-
back into the overall social system. In Lufts study, the
gendered feedbacks from the discursive practice of sex-
ual assault were racialised and had negative consquences
for both CGs members and its relationship with the sur-
rounding community, yet did not ultimately negate the
benets CG brought the locality. Used here, the social
attractor approach reveals the complex and sometimes
ambiguous nature of intersectional disaster settings. In
Hortons study, a positive shift in gendered relation-
ships occurred as the hurricane instigated collective ac-
tion among women that was at rst focussed on protect-
ing women and children, which sustained and developed
into political change. More broadly, demonstrating the
value of marginalised groups as capable actors in disaster
recovery and how disaster can be mobilised to promote
longer-term social progress, the social attractor approach
may help reduce marginalisation.
Models of Governmental Crisis Communications and
Information Management
By Elena Gryzunova
1
(mail2.elena@mail.ru)
The term crisis designates an unexpected perceived dis-
ruption of a social unit which threatens its basic struc-
tures, integrity, reputation or survival, shatters the life-
worlds of people by challenging the public sense of
safety, legitimacy or fundamental values and norms, and
requires critical decisions under time pressure, uncer-
tainty, complexity and increased attention.
The aim of this study is to analyze the role of informa-
tion and communications in governmental crisis man-
agement, and to explore major factors that make cri-
sis communications and information management func-
tional or dysfunctional. The research presents new per-
spectives on the status of citizens as productive actors of
crisis management.
Governmental crisis communications and information
management can be represented for clarity as a system
which consists of two subsystems. Here, the subsystem
1
PhD in sociology, MGIMO-University, Moscow, Russia
F igure 1: Model of information blockage
1.1. I nformation
processing: lack of
reliable external
resources, slow flow
of internal
information,
groupthink

1.2. Coordination:
hierarchy,
command and
control, top level
overload

2.2. Citizen
involvement:
formal control of
participation, civil
self-organization
is suppressed
1. I nternal decision-making
subsystem: slow decision-
making, approval of operative
decisions on top level
2.1. I nformation
dissemination:
denial, lack of
risk
communication,
information
vacuum
2. External crisis
communication subsystem:
dysfunctional strategy of
information blockage
Figure 1: Model of information blockage
of internal decision-making applies mechanisms of in-
formation processing and coordination between differ-
ent units of a crisis management team. The subsystem
of external crisis communications includes not only ex-
change of information but also crowdsourcing and cit-
izen involvement in crisis management. By models I
understand different functioning procedures of the gov-
ernmental crisis communications and information man-
agement system which depend on three major factors: 1)
goal setting, 2) crisis type, and 3) level of citizen involve-
ment.
Goal setting
The government often chooses misguided crisis commu-
nications strategies and tactics not by ignorance but in
order to reach divergent goals, not (only) crisis manage-
ment. Conicting goals can damage the whole system,
not only crisis communications but decision-making as
well. The hypothesis is proved by developing models of
information blockage and information manipulation that
can be easily illustrated by real-life cases.
The information blockage strategy is aimed not only
at crisis management but also at hiding evidence and
avoiding open discussion which leads to misuse of
the systems mechanisms (Figure 1). The classical
example of this model is Chernobyl disaster (USSR,
1986) crisis management. In 1990 the Soviet govern-
ment admitted that mistakes in information manage-
ment had destructive social and political effects which
threatened legitimacy of local and central government
(Postanovleniye. . . , 1990). We may even suppose that
the Chernobyl crisis was among the many factors that
contributed to the Soviet Union breakdown.
The information manipulation strategy (Figure 2) is cho-
sen to gain political advantage or make a prot out of a
crisis which leads to opportunistic decision-making and
crisis-escalating victimization (Altheide, 2009, p. 45-
46) tactics. For example, to draw on critical scholarship,
the US discourse of the war on terror after 9/11 could of-
19
1.1. I nformation
processing:
preconceived
analysis, ignoring
some risks & crisis
factors,
exaggerating others

F igure 2: Model of information manipulation
2.1. I nformation
dissemination:
victimization,
discourse of fear,
new propaganda
1. I nternal decision-making
subsystem: opportunistic
decisions
1.2. Coordination:
lack of
coordination
between agencies,
latent rivalry, post-
crisis
hierarchization
2.2. Citizen
involvement:
symbolic
supportive
activity, 'block
watch", some
forms are
suppressed
2. External crisis
communication subsystem:
dysfunctional (crisis-
escalating) strategy of fear
management
Figure 2: Model of information manipulation
fer one case study. Sociologist D. Altheide (2011), who
applies symbolic interactionism to consider how the ter-
rorist threat was presented in the mass media, argues that
the terrorist attacks on the United States on September
11, 2001 were strategically used by ofcials to justify
various domestic and international actions (p. 270).
Crisis type and the level of citizen involvement
The second hypothesis of my study was as follows:
employment of crowdsourcing and citizen participation
makes the crisis communications and information man-
agement system more effective because the crisis is suc-
cessfully managed by using more resources with less in-
put. However, at the same time, this statement is only
partly accurate. Citizen participation can be dysfunc-
tional as well, and the possibility to crowdsource de-
pends on a social response to crisis.
In the basic classication of a crisis by the disaster soci-
ologist E. Quarantelli (1993) there are two crisis types.
Conict crises (confrontation and malevolent acts) di-
vide the society because there is a group which tries
to aggravate the crisis situation. Consensus crises like
natural, biological and technological disasters, on the
contrary, unite the society in the attempt to overcome
the crisis situation. However, not all crisis types t this
classication. We can also add polemic crises (Freund,
1976) which provoke discussion and correspond to com-
plex structural crises in systems (political, social, cul-
tural, economic, and ecological) and institutions. Dif-
ferent crisis types require specic communication and
information management strategies.
During conict crises use of crowdsourcing can lead to
crisis escalation in forms of aggression or psychological
trauma. There is also a problem of using crowdsourced
information because social media contain rumors and
malevolent propaganda. Traditional mass media may op-
pose the government and take the other side of the con-
ict as well. The prescriptive model of conventional in-
F igure 3: Model of conventional information
management for conflict crises
!
2.1. I nformation
dissemination:
risk & threat
communications,
quick response,
winning media
loyalty, newsfield
domination,
opposing
manipulation
2.2. Citizen
involvement:
public dialogue on
issues (not on
acute stage)
1.1. I nformation
processing:
issues evaluation,
conflict analysis,
monitoring of
psychological
threats, info-
superiority
assessment,
sense-making
1. I nternal decision-making
subsystem: strategic
decisions centralized,
operative ones made on lower
levels
1.2.
Coordination:
combination of
network and
hierarchy,
situational
hierarchical
structure
2. External crisis
communication subsystem:
speaking with one voice,
getting feedback
Figure 3: Model of conventional information manage-
ment for conict crises

F igure 4: Model of integrated crowdsourced and
conventional information management for consensus
crises
"
1.1. I nformation
processing:
integration of
traditional &
crowdsourced
information, crisis
mapping, citizen
science &
community-based
risk assessment
1. I nternal decision-making
subsystem: crowdsourced
information & citizen
knowledge enhance decision-
making
1.2. Coordination:
situational flexible
coordination with
other organizations
& volunteers; web-
resources for
crowdsourcing &
network-building

2. External crisis
communication subsystem:
openness, voice of citizens
as both transmitters &
receivers
2.1. I nformation
dissemination: not
only officials but
also citizens as
communicators
(community
leaders, bloggers);
discourse of
consolidation
2.2. Citizen
involvement:
creating attractors
(culture, web-
resources, open
scientific projects)
for constructive
self-organization
& participation of
citizens
Figure 4: Model of integrated crowdsourced and conven-
tional information management for consensus crises
formation management which suits this crisis type is rep-
resented in Figure 3. The case study of Russian informa-
tion policy in 2000-2004 during terrorist threat crisis and
military campaign in the North Caucasus shows that the
tactics applied by the government consisted of: framing
the counterterrorist operation and distinguishing it from
war; soft power media relations to win media loyalty;
monitoring of psychological threats, opposing disinfor-
mation, manipulation and trauma; and a discourse of re-
newal (Gryzunova, 2012).
For consensus crises, on the contrary, consolidation and
constructive self-organization are natural. In this case
citizen participation and crowdsourcing are not only
cost-effective practices to overcome a crisis, but they can
also increase solidarity and represent new chance for de-
velopment. Integrated crowdsourced and conventional
information management model (Figure 4) means that
citizens participate in crisis management as equal actors.
They are involved in the information processing in forms
of crisis mapping and citizen science (McCormick,
2012). Technological and legal tools are required to in-
tegrate ofcial and crowdsourced information. Disaster
site volunteering demands citizen-institutional coordina-
tion of activities including special web-resources and
20
mobile applications. Citizens also participate in exter-
nal communication not only as receivers of information
but also as crisis communicators themselves (community
leaders or socially responsible online bloggers called cit-
izen journalists). In this model the government supports
citizen participation by creating attractors for construc-
tive self-organization.
We can look at Hurricane Sandy disaster management
as an example close to the model. Before the crisis
there was the call of President Barack Obama to promote
volunteering culture and self-organization practices, fol-
lowed by creation of University for volunteers (Hand-
sOn University) and of governmental Corporation for
National and Community Service (CNCS) in 2009. At
the acute crisis stage the authorities showed good co-
ordination (regardless of political parties during Pres-
idential race), cooperated with volunteer organizations
and networks through CNCS and ad hoc, used geospa-
tial platforms, including FEMA GeoPlatform, online re-
source for informing, network-building and crowdsourc-
ing which was launched in August, 2012. At the post-
crisis stage FEMA used crowdsourcing for creating a
map of fuel scarcity (together with a mobile application
called "Waze") and damage assessment. The authorities
also cooperated with volunteers in relief operations.
In polemic crises there are different opinions how to
solve a crisis based on specic knowledge and differ-
ent interests. All of them should be represented and in-
tegrated in participative decisions. The model of pub-
lic dialogue facilitation and knowledge management is
proposed to solve this kind of crises. A new commu-
nication culture of open public dialogue should be cre-
ated. Thus decision-making becomes the result of ne-
gotiations (Van Santen, Jonker, Wijngaards, 2009) and
knowledge sharing. First of all, the government should
detect social problems and corresponding opinion or in-
terest groups. As long as crisis communications resem-
ble negotiations between them, there should be a struc-
ture within the government that is responsible for their
facilitation and mediation. Coordination of crisis man-
agement activities can be done through public dialogue
where all opinions are represented or through partici-
patory crowdsourced problem-solving. If the dialogue
is facilitated, networks of interests are transformed into
networks of knowledge sharing(see Figure 5).
The model can be illustrated by nuclear policy dialogue
and crowdsourcing in Russia (1999-2006). Nuclear in-
dustry provokes issues and crises which are transsys-
tem by consequences (affecting ecological, economical,
political, health systems, etc.) and polemic by the so-
cial response. The society-government nuclear policy
dialogue included: meetings between Russian ecologi-
cal network, experts, governmental and municipal struc-
F igure 5: Model of public dialogue facilitation and
knowledge management for polemic crises
1. I nternal decision-making
subsystem: decisions through
'communicative action,
negotiations, balance of
interests & citizen knowledge
networks
1.2.
Coordination:
through public
dialogue
(discussion,
negotiations,
citizen jury or
council) &
participatory
problem-solving
2. External crisis
communication subsystem:
based on new communication
culture of open public dialogue
space
2.1. I nformation
dissemination:
negotiations
between groups &
networks; supra-
communicative
practices of
facilitation &
mediation
2.2. Citizen
involvement:
development of
participatory
democracy & civil
society institutions
that further
constructive self-
organization
1.1. I nformation
processing:
detection of
problems &
opinion (interest)
groups; creation of
multiple think
tanks; knowledge
management;
sense-making
Figure 5: Model of public dialogue facilitation and
knowledge management for polemic crises
tures, participatory decision-making, and creation of Mi-
natoms (now Rosatoms) citizen council. The initia-
tive of the dialogue was actually put forward by Rus-
sian ecological activists (Mironova, 2003). However,
the governmental agencies and enterprises used the di-
alogue and crowdsourcing space to manage a crisis in
nuclear industry when CEO of a governmental nuclear
plant Mayak was accused for severe ecological dam-
age to Techa River and contiguous area during the years
2001-2004 (the prosecution was stopped in May 2006
due to the amnesty granted by the Parliament on its
100-year anniversary). Knowledge management eco-
logical program Techa-2006 (formally connected to
Kyshtym disaster of 1957) nanced by Rosatom and
Mayak was aimed at crowdsourcing of citizen project
ideas for ecological, social and information policy in the
region. From the crisis management perspective it not
only helped to collect and realize useful ideas but also
switched the attention of ecological and civil rights or-
ganizations to cooperative project management instead
of protest activity.
References
Altheide, D. (2011). Creating fear: transforming terror-
ist attacks into control and consumption. In: K. Doveling
(Ed.). The Routledge Handbook of Emotions and Mass
Media (pp. 259-272). New York: Routledge.
Altheide, D. (2009). Terror Post 9/11 and the Media.
New York: Peter Lang Publishing.
Freund, J. (1976). Observations sur deux catgories de
la dynamique polmogne; de la crise au conit (Obser-
vations of two categories of polemic dynamics: from a
crisis to a conict). Communications, No. 25.
Gryzunova, E. (2012). Crisis communication under ter-
rorist threat: a case study of Counterterrorist operation
21
in Chechnya. Proceedings of the ECREA 2012 Confer-
ence. Istanbul.
McCormick, S. (2012). After the cap: risk assessment,
citizen science and disaster recovery. Ecology and soci-
ety, Vol. 17 (4).
Mironova, N. (2003). Obshestvo-Pravitelstvo: strategiya
peregovorov (Society-Government: strategy of negotia-
tions). In: Ekologiya i prava cheloveka (Ecology and
human rights). Chelyabinsk: ChelGU-CEPR (pp. 160-
176).
Postanovleniye Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR ot 25 aprelya
1990 g. [Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
of 25 April, 1990] (1990). Moscow.
Quarantelli, E. L. (1993). Community crises: an ex-
ploratory comparison of the characteristics and conse-
quences of disasters and riots. Journal of Contingencies
and Crisis Management, Vol. 1 (2).
Van Santen W., Jonker C., Wijngaards N. (2009). Cri-
sis decision making through a negotiation mental model.
Proceedings of the 6th International ISCRAM Confer-
ence. Gothenburg.
The Dark Side of Interaction in Socio-technical Sys-
tems
1
By Chiara Bassetti
2
(chiara.bassetti@loa.istc.
cnr.it), Emanuele Bottazzi
3
(emanuele.bottazzi
@loa.istc.cnr.it) & Roberta Ferrario
4
(roberta.
ferrario@loa.istc.cnr.it)
Interaction seems to be responsible in manifold ways
for accidents and disasters (e.g., Perrow 2008; Vaughan
1999; Mattewman 2012). Interpersonal interaction may
help in mitigating crises, but it can also pave the way
to catastrophes. We delineate some peculiar ways in
which this can be true and propose that interaction is a
fatal attraction. That is to say, people prefer to maintain
and sustain interpersonal interaction, and are attracted to
it, as an end per se. This is crucial in socio-technical
systems, intended as complex and technologically dense
environments, whose functioning is strongly dependent
1
A previous version of the paper, Fatal attraction. Interaction
and crisis management in socio-technical systems, has been pre-
sented at the 29
th
EGOS Colloquium, July 4-6, 2013, Montreal,
Canada.
2
Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Consiglio
Nazionale delle Ricerche, Trento & Department of Sociology, Uni-
versity of Trento
3
Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Consiglio
Nazionale delle Ricerche, Trento
4
Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Consiglio
Nazionale delle Ricerche, Trento
upon the exchange of information, and where both ar-
ticial and human agents, and their relations and inter-
actions, play a central role (cf. e.g. Suchman, 2002).
In such systems, the fact that interaction calls for fur-
ther interaction could have fatal consequences. This is
because, besides the interacting subjects, other relevant
elements, such as specic inter- and infra-organizational
ends and goals, are in place. The present contribution
result of an interdisciplinary effort (sociology, philos-
ophy, AI) is mainly theoretical, yet some empirical
cases, stemming both from eldwork and documentary
analysis, are taken into consideration. They mainly serve
as examples of application of our approach. The paper
reects on interpersonal interaction and its force of at-
traction, introduces the notion of Recognized Epistemic
Field (REF), and considers the role they all play in socio-
technical systems crisis management.
Interpersonal interaction is a process involving subjects.
Conceiving subjects entails, for us, considering them as
having an Epistemic Field (EF), i.e., an ensemble of at-
titudes: intending to go to the movies, believing that it is
raining, etc. When subjects are interacting, they regard
the other participants (as well as themselves) as having
an EF too. This is what, in a sense, allows interaction it-
self: on such a basis, in fact, participants are oriented to-
wards the construction and mutual recognition of a com-
mon ground of/for the interaction, i.e., an epistemic eld
which is recognized as shared. What we call Recognized
Epistemic Field is, simultaneously, a by-product and a
requirement of interpersonal interaction. In our account,
situated and co-constructed sense making, has, among its
basic elements, reference points (RP). Dans putting an
item on the counter and Alex picking it up and scanning
creates an RP in their interaction. With this RP in force,
it would be awkward, for instance, if Alex, right after,
ran away instead of doing the checking out. When peo-
ple create an RP by mutually recognizing it through in-
teractional moves and reply moves, they mark that point
in the REF. That is, they have reached an interperson-
ally valid denition of the situation (Garnkel 2008).
By an ongoing conrmation through recognition, REF
emerges as an interactional co-construction and achieve-
ment. A REF, basically, is a regarded-as-shared map of
the ongoing interaction that allows coordination (objec-
tivity is more a requirement than a feature of interaction).
The REF as an ongoing interactional accomplishment
situated in a local environment is fundamental for co-
ordination and triangulation
5
, that are in turn crucial
in complex socio-technical contexts. REFs boundaries
5
The notion of triangulation is partially inspired by Davidson
(2001). Here is to be intended as taking place between two (or more)
interactants and the environment (with its artefacts, tools, etc.). In
other terms, intersubjective coordination is achieved leveraging on
the features of the surrounding environment and at the same time
22
are the boundaries of coordinated action-in-interaction.
What is not marked in the REF does not exist, so to
speak, with respect to the positive and negative ends
of the socio-technical system: what has not been agreed
upon and marked in the REF is not available as a
means for reaching such ends through situated interac-
tion, and this may led to catastrophe. Furthermore, in
socio-technical systems, coordination has to be main-
tained also with the relevant elements of the environ-
ment; the systems ends go beyond the per se end of
interacting, and the latter can therefore cause problems.
Some examples in this sense are given by the detailed
analysis of two empirical cases: the crash of an Air-
France Airbus in 2009 (Table 1), and the incursion that
occurred in 2001 on Milan Linate Airports runaways.
On such a basis, nally, we propose some indications for
improving crisis management in socio-technical system.
Such guidelines refer both to human agents possible ed-
ucation, and to articial agents design. On the one hand,
we single out which extra-ordinary modality, or style,
of action-in-interaction is more suited for dealing with
critical situations in complex organizational contexts.
First, even if at the detriment of interpersonal interaction
per se, though not to the point of misring interaction,
REF needs to be periodically doublechecked by partici-
pants, like in the sequence of the Air France case that had
lead indeed to a temporary realignment of the copilots
REF (Table 1, Excerpt #1). Participants should thus re-
sist the attraction of interaction, increase dis-preferred
moves and, in some sense, search for impasses that is,
they should neither take agreement for granted, nor get
caught too deeply in the entrainment that characterizes
most of interpersonal interaction. Monitoring the REF is
crucial, at least with respect to those aspects that are most
relevant both in systemic terms, such as organizational
(positive) goals and (negative) ends, and at the situated
level of the material environment and its artefacts. Such
an extra-ordinary control over reciprocal perspectives re-
quires an equally extra-ordinary interaction: more frail
than the ordinary one; less oriented towards agreement,
as well as interactional continuity and stability; prone to
dis-preferred moves and local impasses for the sake of
the goals of the socio-technical system.
Secondarily, not only mutual coordination, but also the
triangulation with the environmental elements that are
relevant to the socio-technical systems ends is funda-
mental. To illustrate this we introduce the Linate Airport
case: on 8 October 2001, a Cessna collided with a Scan-
dinavian Airlines Flight, which was preparing to take off.
the relevant (for the purpose at hand) features are singled out and rec-
ognized by means of interaction itself (cf. also Liberman 2013: ch.
1).
Excerpt #1
02:08:03 R: You can possibly pull it a little to the left.
02:08:05 B: Sorry, what?
02:08:07 R: You can possibly pull it a little to the left.
Were agreed that were in manual, yeah?
02:08:19 B: What I call in manual er, no were in
computed.
Excerpt #2
02:10:10 The stall warning sounds.
02:10:11 R: Whats this?
Excerpt #3
02:10:51 The stall alarm begins to sound: Stall,
stall + cricket continuously.
02:10:55 R: Damn it!
02:10:56 B: TOGA.
02:11:00 R: Above all try to touch the lateral controls as
little as possible eh.
02:11:03 B: Im in TOGA, eh?
02:11:06 R: (3.00) Damn it, is he coming or not?
02:11:07 Plane reaches maximum altitude. With
engines at full power, the nose pitched
upward,it moves horizontally for an instant
and then begins to sink back toward the
ocean.
Table 1: Air France Airbus Crash. Elaborated from
Otelli (2011) and BEA (2012).
The Cessna was instructed to taxi along taxiway R5, and
then to the main taxiway; instead, the pilot taxied along
taxiway R6, crossing the main runway where the Scandi-
navian airbus was passing. This error was primarily due
to the bad communication by the air trafc controller on
the ground, and to the copresence of an old and a new
signalling systems. On the one hand, the controller was
not aware of the permanence of old signs, while, on the
other hand, the pilot did not know about their dismissal
and used them as a reference. When communicating
his position after taxing, the pilot made reference to S4
(old sign), but the controller did not take into account
this mismatch, assuming the pilot was where instructed
(R5). In the accident, 118 people were killed. Even in
this case, both pilot and controller behaved as more con-
cerned with the interaction per se rather than on the con-
tent of such interaction. Furthermore, the ambiguity due
to the double signalling system undermined the triangu-
lation with the environment, and thus prevented the con-
struction of a mutually recognized, valid denition of
the situation.
Sometimes, and we reach the third and last issue, con-
sidering artefacts as subjects, thus capable to contribute
to the REF, may be helpful. It is not by chance that,
in the Air France case, the interactional sequence of re-
23
triangulation and realignment which got closest to solve
the crisis and prevent the tragedy contained the follow-
ing turn: It says were going up, so descend. Unfortu-
nately, however, it seems that a cultural tendency towards
technology and technological artefacts is emerging that
goes in the opposite direction: indifference and/or over-
ruling. This, moreover, appears to pertain not only to
common sense culture, but also professional, expert and
organizational ones, as the empirical cases show.
On the other hand, we should also acknowledge that hu-
mans interact in technologically dense environments, in
which articial devices surely play a role in interaction,
but are not regarded as genuinely active participants.
Take for instance the case of the Air France ight: Why
did the co-pilots ignore the warning that was being pro-
posed again and again? Because, whereas the onboard
computer was signalling the stall, they could not recog-
nize the situation they were in as a stall and, not being
able to really interact with the computer (asking expla-
nations or conrmations, providing the reasons of their
sayings or doings), they just ignored it. They had un-
derstood that the computer was giving a warning alarm,
they had understood that the computer was warning them
because it believed they were in stall, but they could
not understand why the computer believed it, and the
computer could not explain why, nor acknowledge the
problem.
Therefore, it is necessary to develop articial agents able
to play an active role in interaction, that is, able to repre-
sent, reason and communicate about: the socio-technical
system as a whole and in its components, the environ-
ment in which the system is immersed, and most of all
and this is the point we would like to make here the
interaction itself. The latter includes many aspects, such
as the rules of the particular kind of interaction, the roles
that various agents play in the interaction, the dynamics
of the interaction, the attitudes of the interactants (as they
can be inferred by their ongoing sequential conduct), and
the REF that is reached at various stages of the interac-
tion. To capture these aspects is for sure not an easy
task, but a last claim we would like to make is that ap-
plied ontology (cf. Guarino 2009), intended as a tech-
nique in Knowledge Representation in AI, could have
a key role. The ontological approach is grounded on a
foundational analysis of the context at hand, aimed at
making explicit the meaning of the terms used to express
the concepts. The result of the analytical work is the
construction of axiomatic models, expressed in a formal
language, which are implementable in articial agents.
The conceptual primitives of such models are anchored
in common sense and therefore understandable by hu-
man agents. The copresence of these two elements may
foster the achievement of a system-level communication.
Keywords: Interaction, Socio-technical systems, Rec-
ognized Epistemic Field, Crisis
Acknowledgements
C. Bassetti and R. Ferrario are supported by the VisCoSo
project grant, nanced by the Autonomous Province of
Trento through the Team 2011 funding programme.
Emanuele Bottazzi is supported by the STACCO project
grant, nanced by the Autonomous Province of Trento
through the Post-doc 2011 funding programme.
References
BEA (2012). Final report: On the accident on 1
st
June
2009.
Davidson, D. (2001) Subjective, Intersubjective, Objec-
tive. OUP.
Durkheim (1912/1995). Les formes lmentaires de la
vie religieuse. (1912). The Elementary Forms of the
Religious Life. Translated by Karen Fields. Free Press
(1995).
Liberman (2013). More Studies in Ethnomethodology.
SUNY Press.
Garnkel, H. (2008). Toward a sociological theory of
information. Paradigm.
Guarino, N., Oberle, D., Staab, S. (2009). What is an
ontology? In Staab, S., Studer, R. (eds.), Handbook on
Ontologies, Second Edition:117. Springer Verlag.
Matthewman, S. (2012). Accidentology. Interna-
tional and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences,
1(2):193215.
Otelli, J. (2011). Erreurs de pilotage: Tome 5. Alti-
presse.
Perrow, C. (2008). Normal Accidents. PUP.
Suchman, L. (2002). Practice-based design of informa-
tion systems: Notes fromthe hyperdeveloped world. The
Information Society, 8(2), 139144.
Vaughan, D. (1999). The dark side of organizations. An-
nual Review of Sociology, 25:271305.
ESA13 Photographs
On the following pages, you will nd photographs taken
at the DCSCRN sessions in ESA13 at the University of
Turin, Italy. All together, we have received more than 50
pictures from our friends and colleagues and we thank
everyone very much for their efforts and help. This
24
newsletter can of course only present a small selection of
the pictures. The photos here were taken by Dr. Nicholas
Petropoulos (except for Figure 1, which was taken by
Antti Silvast). Please follow our web site dcscrn.org for
more publications of the photographs in the future.
New publications
Jelle Groenendaal who is a doctoral student in Nijmegen
in the Netherlands and Joe Scanlon have published two
more articles about the role of ordinary people in emer-
gencies. They teamed up when Joe was invited to lec-
ture on that subject by the Amsterdam-Amstelland re
department which has been studying ways to integrate
the real rst responders (ordinary people) into the subse-
quent response by personnel from emergency agencies.
Scanlon, Joseph and Jelle Groenendaal (2013)
PHASE ONE: BYSTANDERS. Focusing on ordi-
nary people the rst rst responders Natural
Hazards Observer, November pp: 9-11
Scanlon, Joseph and Jelle Groenendaal (2013)
WHEN DISASTER STRIKES, ORDINARY CITI-
ZENS RESPOND: ITS TIME TO MAKE THEM
PART OF THE PLAN Royal Canadian Mounted Po-
lice Gazette, Vol. 75 No. 1 pp: 30-31
Joe also has a chapter in a book on medical ethics which
is now in press and is scheduled to come out early next
year. The chapter ows from an invited lecture he gave
at a conference on medical ethics in Geneva two years
ago.
Scanlon, Joseph (2014) Ethical Issues in Health
Communications: Strategies for the (Inevitable)
Next Pandemic in Dnal P. OMathna, Bert
Gordijn and Mike Clark, Eds. Disaster Bioethics:
Normative Issues When Nothing is Normal. Public
Health Ethics Analysis, Vol. 2 pp: 77-93
The thrust of Joes article (which wont surprise anyone
in the disaster eld) is that transparency is the best pol-
icy but there are ethical questions including questions
about privacy and the behaviour of medical profession-
als. He has noted that in 1918 during the second and
deadly wave of pandemic inuenza there was a contin-
ual attempt to downplay the extent of the threat. This
was sometimes almost amusing as the same issue of a
newspaper stating the u was not serious would carry
ve to seven obituaries of persons who died from the
u. For example an article in the Kingston Daily Stan-
dard on November 7, 1918 was headlined "INFLUENZA
IS NOT ALARMING while assuring readers there was no
Figure 1: From left to right: Nikos Petropoulos, Mu-
rat Balamir, Nina Blom Andersen, Barbara Lucini, and
Elena Gryzunova.
Figure 2: Erna Danielsson and Jrgen Sparf
Figure 3: Ivano Scotti
25
Figure 4: Karin Erdberg
Figure 5: Vincent Ialenti
Figure 6: Elvira Santiago
Figure 7: Arho Toikka
Figure 8: Christopher Lyon
Figure 9: Audience in the sessions
26
cause for alarm but went on to mention there were sev-
eral hundred cases in the city and that the hospitals were
beginning to experience a strain.
Joe Scanlon (jscanlon@connect.carleton.ca)
Conference report: Transformation in a Chang-
ing Climate, University of Oslo, Norway, June
2013
The highly unique and excellent Transformation in a
Changing Climate conference, held at the University
of Olso in June was organised by Professor Karen
OBrien and Linda Sygna, and aimed at understanding
and enabling social transformation in the face of climate
change. As such, it would be of great interest to those
persons and organisations engaged with social change
and disaster. Unlike a standard academic conference,
this one used an open space facilitation format and
included both academics and practitioners from various
circles. This meant for example, that paper sessions were
organised around speed talks of not more than ve min-
utes, after which the audience and speakers could con-
gregate around each other freely to engage in deeper dis-
cussion. People were also free to leave sessions and con-
versations to join others. Participants were thus able to
engage with topics much more deeply that would be pos-
sible in a standard question and answer format. In turn,
this helped to build new networks and insights, making
the conference itself a transformative experience, point-
ing toward an active means of mobilising science and
practice for climate adaptation. The next conferences in
this series are scheduled for the Stockholm Resilience
Centre in Sweden in 2015, and the University of Dundee,
Scotland in 2017.
More information may be found at the following URLs:
http://www.sv.uio.no/iss/english/research/news-
and-events/events/conferences-and-
seminars/transformations/about/index.html
http://www.stockholmresilience.org/21/research/res
earch-news/6-27-2013-transformation-in-a-
changing- climate.html
Christopher Lyon (c.lyon@dundee.ac.uk)
ANNOUNCEMENTS
Call for Papers: International Journal of Mass
Emergencies and Disasters Special Issue on
Nordic Research on Disasters, Crises and other
Related Topics
Guest editors
David M. Neal, Oklahoma State University
Erna Danielsson, Mid Sweden University
Roine Johansson, Mid Sweden University
Brief background
The International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Dis-
asters is the longest publishing journal related to topics
related to disasters. Henry Quarantelli established the
journal and became its rst editor. The rst issue, pub-
lished in March 1983, was based upon a 1980 conference
on Family and Disaster held at Rosersberg Slott, Swe-
den. Jan Trost and rjan Hultker of Uppsala Univer-
sity served as guest editors. Since that time, IJMED has
published a number of papers related to Nordic disaster
issues by Nordic researchers.
This special issue provides an opportunity to put current
Nordic themes, perspectives and ideas into one volume.
Manuscript parameters
We are soliciting manuscripts related to Nordic Research
with a focus on disasters, crises and other related topics.
About 7,000 words.
Research carried out by Nordic researchers with a
priority on crises within the Nordic countries.
Empirical papers preferred but theoretical
manuscripts considered.
Empirical papers can be qualitative, quantitative, or
mixed method.
Manuscripts should have a social science focus.
May be interdisciplinary among social sciences.
May be interdisciplinary using social and natural
sciences.
Manuscripts must be submitted by May 1, 2014,
and written in English.
27
Initial reviews should be completed by October 1,
2014. Final revisions will be completed by Decem-
ber 31, 2014.
Publication is scheduled for the March 2015 Issue
(Volume 33, #1)
Submit manuscripts to this address:
ijmed.editors@gmail.com.
Please attach only one copy of the manuscript.
Please identify that this submission is for the Nordic
Research issue.
All manuscripts will use the double blind review
process.
Please follow formatting and citation requirements
found at this web address: http://www.ijmed.org/
article-submission/.
If you have any questions, please contact Dave Neal
at dave.neal@okstate.edu.
Roine Johansson (roine.johansson@miun.se)
THE DCSCRN ELECTRONIC NEWSLETTER
This is the periodic electronic newsletter of the Disas-
ter, Conict and Social Crisis Research Network (DC-
SCRN). The purpose of the DCSCRN is to promote the
study, research and analysis of natural, technologi-
cal and social disasters with a view to contributing
to the development of disaster resilient European com-
munities, and preventing or mitigating the human, eco-
nomic, social, cultural and psychological effects of crises
and disasters.
The DCSCRN Electronic Newsletter is published three
times a year (April, August, December). The previously
published newsletters are downloadable at the networks
webpage: http://www.dcscrn.org.
Announcements of conferences, book, lm, and CD-
ROM reviews, reportage on conferences, disaster di-
aries, brief articles on best or worst practices in disas-
ter prevention and recovery, commentaries on disasters
and crises, human interest stories relevant to disasters,
etc. should be sent electronically to the editor, Antti Sil-
vast (dscrn.news@gmail.com) no later than the rst of
the month of publication. Contributions to the newslet-
ter should preferably be written in a concise format (-1
page long maximum) in order to make reading compre-
hensive albeit focused. Ideas should be referenced (Au-
thor, year), but there is no need for a complete reference
list.
Relevant contributions from the eld of disaster, conict
and crisis research, as well as from applied disaster, con-
ict and crisis management practice, are most welcome!
All signed texts express the opinions of the authors and
not necessarily those of the coordinators, the editor or of
the DCSCRN.
Nina Blom Andersen, DCSCRN Coordinator
Antti Silvast, DCSCRN Vice Coordinator and E-
Newsletter Editor
28