Indias Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect

Sumit Ganguly
This paper will provide a survey of Indias foreign policy since 1947 to the present day. It
is divided into three distinct historical sections. The paper will also attempt to eplain the
underlying reasons for these the initial orientation and su!se"uent shifts that occurred
over time. The first section deals with the period from 1947 to 19#$% the second from
19#$ to 1991 and the third from 1991 to the present. The choice of these three segments
is far from ar!itrary. The first period constituted the most idealistic phase of Indias
foreign policy under the tutelage of Indias first prime minister% &awaharlal 'ehru. The
second !egan with Indias disastrous defeat in the 19#$ Sino(Indian !order war. This
period saw a gradual shift away from the early idealism that had characteri)ed the
countrys foreign policy and the adoption of an increasingly *self(help+ approach to
foreign policy while retaining elements of the 'ehruvian rhetoric.
i
The third phase !egan
with the end of the ,old -ar and the adoption of a more pragmatic foreign policy hewing
closely to the principles of .ealism.
ii

The Sources of Indias Foreign Policy
Systemic% national and decision(ma/ing factors helped shape post(independence Indias
foreign policy choices.
iii
0owever% this paper will argue that Indias policyma/ers chose%
"uite deli!erately to ignore systemic constraints and decided to pursue an eplicitly
ideational foreign policy and with mostly disastrous conse"uences.
iv
The pursuit of such
a policy left India utterly unprepared to cope with a serious security threat from the
1eoples .epu!lic of ,hina and culminated in a disastrous !order war in 19#$. 2nly in
the aftermath of the !order war did India em!ar/ on a *self(help+ strategy designed to
guarantee its security.
v
The systemic constraints on Indias foreign policy stemmed from the onset of the ,old
-ar which virtually coincided with Indias independence in 1947. Interestingly enough%
neither the Soviet 3nion nor the 3nited States evinced any great interest in India at the
onset of the ,old -ar. The 3nited States was virtually ignorant a!out India and had few
cultural% strategic or economic lin/s with the nascent nation.
vi
,onse"uently% in the
immediate aftermath of Indias independence it paid scant attention to India.
Simultaneously% the Soviet 3nion did not attach any strategic significance to India.
vii
This
mutual lac/ of interest in India actually wor/ed to Indias advantage as it gave the
country considera!le room for maneuver. 0owever% at a regional level% the distri!ution of
power placed India at a disadvantage. The other ma4or regional state% the 1eoples
.epu!lic of ,hina 51.,6 posed a significant security threat to India one which it chose to
ignore at its own peril.
viii

7t a national level% the memories of colonial rule contri!uted to political culture which
privileged the concept of national autonomy. The desire to maintain the greatest possi!le
independence in the conduct of Indias foreign affairs was a sentiment that pervaded the
1
country. 1u!lic opinion% to the limited etent that it was concerned with foreign affairs%
would find any notion of deference to eternal powers to !e intolera!le.
i
The country had
!een under the yo/e of colonial rule for two hundred years and the weight of this colonial
past was considera!le.
'ot surprisingly% Indias post(independence policyma/ers were acutely sensitive to the
significance of this colonial legacy. 7ccordingly% they eplicitly sought to forge a
pathway that would /eep India outside the am!it of the ,old -ar. Such a strategy was
possi!le !ecause anti(imperialist sentiments were widespread within the Indian polity
across the political spectrum.

This strategy came to !e /nown as non(alignment and

Indian policyma/ers were at pains to distinguish it from *neutralism+.
i
The real architect of this policy was 1rime 8inister 'ehru. 9ven though he was
temperamentally a -estern li!eral% he was deeply s/eptical of the 3nited States.
ii
In part%
his s/epticism was the conse"uence of his highly 7nglici)ed personal and professional
!ac/ground. In effect% he had come to share the :ritish upper class disdain for the 3nited
States. 0is views toward the Soviet 3nion were more am!ivalent. 0e was also cogni)ant
of the horrors of Stalins collectivist enterprise though admiring of the achievements of
the forced(draught industriali)ation program. 0is partiality toward the 3SS. also
stemmed from his own social democratic predilections.
7t least two factors can !e adduced to eplain 'ehrus adoption of non(alignment as the
lodestar of Indias foreign policy. ;irst% he was acutely concerned a!out the opportunity
costs of defense spending. 7ny involvement with the two emerging !locs% he feared%
would draw India into the titanic struggle and divert critical resources from economic
development.
iii
Second% he was intent on maintaining Indias hard(won independence.
8oving into the am!it of either superpower could compromise such freedom of
maneuver.
The Pathway to 1962
;rom the time of independence to the disastrous !order conflict with the 1.,% three /ey
features characteri)ed Indias foreign policy. ;irst% India played a significant role in
multilateral institutions and particularly in 3nited 'ations peace/eeping operations.
Second% it also emerged as a critical proponent of the nonaligned movement. Third% as a
leader of the nonaligned movement it also made a significant contri!ution toward the
process of decoloni)ation.
These three critical commitments% in turn% manifested themselves at glo!al% regional and
national levels. 7t a glo!al level% India attempted to defuse ,old -ar tensions in a
num!er of contets regional and functional. To that end% India had emerged as one of the
early proponents of a nuclear test !an treaty and in 19<$ had introduced a draft resolution
co(sponsored with Ireland to !ring a!out a glo!al !an on nuclear tests. In the event%
than/s to the eigencies of ,old -ar politics% little or nothing came of this effort.
'evertheless% this endeavor was a manifestation of Indias interest in forging a particular
glo!al order% one which would ho!!le the use of force in international affairs. India also
$
sought to play a vital role in 3nited 'ations peace/eeping operations as well as the
peaceful resolution of regional disputes. In pursuit of these ends India !ecame involved in
the International ,ontrol ,ommission in =ietnam along with ,anada and 1oland% it was a
/ey mem!er of the 'eutral 'ations .epatriation ,ommission in >orea and it also made a
significant troop contri!ution the 3nited 'ations 1eace/eeping forces in the :elgian
,ongo.
iv
7lso% India proved to !e a tireless campaigner in the effort to !ring a!out the
end of decoloni)ation. To that end% Indias diplomacy was carefully geared to the
discussion of the issue at various international for and especially in the 'on(7ligned
8ovement 5'786.
In the region% it referred the >ashmir dispute with 1a/istan to the 3nited 'ations for
possi!le resolution. To the dismay of its policyma/ers% the issue !ecame "uic/ly
em!roiled in the politics of the ,old -ar.
v
7s a conse"uence of the largely partisan
discussions at the 3nited 'ations% Indias political leadership !ecame increasingly
disillusioned a!out the resolution of its !ilateral territorial disputes through the
mechanism of the 3nited 'ations. 'ot surprisingly% after etensive diplomatic discussion
with the intransigent Sala)ar regime in 1ortugal produced a deadloc/ and 1rime 8inister
'ehru faced increasing criticism from a group of 7fro(7sian leaders% India chose to use
force to oust the 1ortuguese from their colonial enclave in Goa in 19#?.
vi

;inally% at national level% the countrys commitment to nonalignment led to the adoption
of particular set of significant policy choices. Specifically% one of the /ey elements of the
doctrine of nonalignment was the limitation of high defense ependitures.
vii
To this end
Indian military ependitures were drastically limited even when steady evidence a!out a
possi!le security threat from the 1eoples .epu!lic of ,hina 51.,6 continued to
mount.
viii
Such a policy% unfortunately% proved to !e etremely costly when the !order
negotiations with the 1., ultimately reached a cul(de(sac in 19#?. ;aced with this
situation% India em!ar/ed upon a strategy of compellence designed to restore what it
deemed to !e the territorial status "uo along the disputed 0imalayan !order. This policy%
however% was singularly ill conceived as it involved sending in lightly armed% poorly
e"uipped and ill(prepared troops to high altitudes in *penny pac/ets+. In 2cto!er 19#$%
when the 1eoples @i!eration 7rmy 51@76 attac/ed with considera!le force% the Indian
military was grossly unprepared to face the onslaught. The 1@7 inflicted considera!le
losses on the Indian forces and then withdrew from some of the areas that they had
entered. 0owever% they did not vacate some 14%??? s"uare miles that they had initially
claimed.
i
These territories and other still remain the su!4ect of tortured and glacial
!order negotiations.

*8odified Structuralism+A the post('ehru 9ra
i
The military defeat in 19#$ mar/ed nothing short of a watershed in the structure and
conduct of Indias foreign and security policies. In the immediate aftermath of this
military de!acle 'ehru overcame his staunch o!4ections to defense spending. In his final
days% he oversaw a drastic re(appraisal of Indias security policies and practices. 8ost
importantly% India em!ar/ed on a su!stantial program of military moderni)ation. It
committed itself to the creation of a million man army with ten new mountain divisions
B
e"uipped and trained for high altitude warfare% a 4< s"uadron air force with supersonic
aircraft and a modest program of naval epansion. 0owever% even after 'ehrus demise in
19#4% his successors still could not formally a!andon the stated adherence to a policy of
non(alignment. ,onse"uently% the rhetoric of nonalignment remained a staple of Indian
foreign policy. Indias foreign policy !ehavior% however% increasingly assumed a more
.ealist orientation.
2nce again% glo!al% regional and personal factors contri!uted to the ma4or policy shift.
Cespite a fleeting moment of military cooperation with India in the aftermath of the 19#$
war% the 3nited States disengaged itself from South 7sia after the second Indo(1a/istani
conflict in 19#< as it !ecame increasingly preoccupied with the prosecution of the
=ietnam war.
ii
:arring a !rief and unhappy interlude in 19## when the &ohnson
administration chose to eert considera!le economic pressure on India to temper its
criticism of the =ietnam war% to reform its agricultural policies and to open up its
domestic economy to foreign investment% the 3nited States% for all practical purposes%
lost interest in India.
iii
Sensing an opportunity to epand their influence in the su!continent% the Soviets
!ro/ered a peace agreement !etween India and 1a/istan in the ,entral 7sian city of
Tash/ent in 19##. -ith this 7merican disengagement from the su!continent% 1a/istan
sought to epand the scope of its security cooperation with the 1., to !alance Indian
power contri!uting to a growing security neus !etween Indias two ma4or adversaries.
7t a regional level% Indias misgivings a!out its security increased in the aftermath of the
first ,hinese nuclear test at @op 'or in 19#4.
iv
The political fallout from these tests was
considera!le. Some within Indias parliament called for an a!andonment of nonalignment
and even urged that India ac"uire an independent nuclear weapons option. 7fter
considera!le de!ate% the ruling ,ongress party and the new prime minister% @al :ahadur
Shastri% reaffirmed the countrys pu!lic commitment to nonalignment and eschewed any
immediate plans to ac"uire nuclear weapons.
0owever% in 19##% 1rime 8inister Indira Gandhi. Shastris successor% decided to see/ a
nuclear guarantee from the great powers. This effort% proved to !e "uite fruitless.
v
In the
aftermath of this failure% 1rime 8inister Gandhi authori)ed Indias Su!terranean 'uclear
9plosions 1ro4ect 5S'916 which culminated in Indias first nuclear test of 8ay 1974.
vi

3nder Indira Gandhi% Indias foreign policy sought to sustain two competing visions of
world order. 2n the one hand% India still supported the cause of decoloni)ation and
continued to lead the charge on !ehalf of the wea/er states in the international system.
;or eample% it remained a staunch opponent of the apartheid regime in South 7frica% it
was an unyielding supporter of the 1alestinian cause and it opposed the 1ortuguese
presence in 7ngola and 8o)am!i"ue.
2n the other hand% it also came to accept the importance of defense preparedness and
increasingly overcame its reservations a!out the use of force in international politics. 'ot
surprisingly% when faced with several million refugees from 9ast 1a/istan as a
conse"uence of the out!rea/ of a civil war% the country "uic/ly forged a careful politico(
4
diplomatic strategy to !rea/ up 1a/istan.
vii
1art of this strategy involved the ac"uisition
of a tacit security guarantee from the Soviet 3nion to counter possi!le ,hinese
malfeasance. 7ccordingly% despite Indias professed commitment to nonalignment it
signed a twenty(year pact of *peace% friendship and cooperation+ with the Soviet 3nion
in 7ugust 1971. -ith its northern flan/s there!y protected% India had a free hand to
intervene in 9ast 1a/istan. ;ortunately% 1a/istans attac/ on its northern air !ases in early
Cecem!er gave it the casus !elli to launch an attac/ on the eastern front. -ithin two
wee/s% the Indian army along with an indigenous :engali re!el movement% the *mu/ti
!ahini+ 5literally *li!eration force+6 militarily prevailed against the demorali)ed 1a/istani
forces.
viii
In the aftermath of the 1971 war% the concomitant !rea/(up of 1a/istan and the creation
of :angladesh% Indian emerged as the undisputed dominant power within the
su!continent. Cespite its new(found status% the country was una!le to transcend the
region. Several factors account for this failure to emerge as a power of any conse"uence
in the glo!al order. 8ost importantly% than/s to its pursuit of a du!ious strategy of state(
led industriali)ation Indias economic growth remained anemic.
i
Simultaneously% the
countrys deep(seated eport pessimism led it to shy away from integrating itself into the
glo!al economy. The failure to develop ties with the glo!al economy contri!uted to a
paucity of foreign investment% important technological lags% a lac/ of innovation and the
stifling of entrepreneurship. In turn% these forces contri!uted to what the eminent Indian
economist .a4 >rishna mordantly referred to as the *0indu rate of growth+.

Indias political choices at systemic and national levels also did very little to enhance it
glo!al stature. 7t a glo!al level% in the wa/e of the first oil crisis of 197B% India chose to
spearhead the Group of 77% a set of developing nations see/ing to fundamentally alter the
glo!al economic order. Ironically% while it was a leader of this coalition it !enefited little
from the glo!al spi/e in oil prices and failed to o!tain any meaningful concessions as a
resource(poor developing nation from the 2rgani)ation of 1etroleum 9porting ,ountries
5219,6.
Indeed the countrys economic wea/ness effectively prevented it from carrying through a
via!le nuclear weapons program even after it managed to successfully test a nuclear
weapon in 8ay 1974. ;aced with widespread glo!al diplomatic disappro!ation and
significant economic and technological sanctions% Indias policyma/ers chose not carry
out any further tests.
i
9nter the :ear
Throughout much of the decade of the 197?s than/s to its poor record of economic
growth and its diplomatic limitations India !ecame a marginal player in the glo!al order.
Its influence remained confined to the South 7sian region. Its insignificance was again
underscored when the Soviets invaded 7fghanistan in Cecem!er 1979.
ii
The 3nited
States paid scant attention to Indian sensi!ilities and concerns when it chose to forge a
renewed strategic relationship with 1a/istan almost immediately after the Soviet
invasion. General Dia(ul(0a" even re!uffed Indias efforts at reassuring 1a/istan in the
aftermath of the invasion.
iii

<
In its efforts to oust the Soviets from 7fghanistan the 3nited States came to rely heavily
on 1a/istan. General Dia(ul(0a"% the military dictator% "uite astutely eacted a significant
economic and military price for such cooperation. Curing his watch% the 3nited States
provided two pac/ages of foreign assistance the first for five years of E B.$ !illion and the
second for si years of E4.?$ !illion. 5The second pac/age was not fully delivered
!ecause the Soviets withdrew from 7fghanistan in 199? and the 3nited States also
imposed economic sanctions on 1a/istan for its pursuit of a clandestine nuclear weapons
program6.
iv
In a effort to maintain its military superiority over 1a/istan% India entered
into a tighter military cooperation relationship with the Soviet 3nion. This military
relationship% however% eacted a significant diplomatic cost. India was forced to tacitly
ac"uiesce in the Soviet occupation of 7fghanistan.
v
;or the remainder of the decade%
!arring some limited efforts on the part of the .eagan administration to improve relations
with India as part of a strategy to reduce the countrys dependence on the Soviet 3nion%
India remained of little conse"uence to the great powers.
vi

Re!uie" for #onalign"ent$
;ew events% !arring the shoc/ of the 19#$ Sino(Indian !order war% has had as much of an
impact on Indias foreign and security policies as the collapse of the Soviet 3nion and the
concomitant end of the ,old -ar. The Soviet collapse and the transformation of the
glo!al order forced Indias policyma/ers to ma/e drastic changes in Indias foreign policy
at multiple levels. 7t a glo!al level% nonalignment ceased to have much meaning. 7s a
former Indian foreign and su!se"uently prime minister% Inder >umar Gu4ral% "uite
succinctly stated% *It is a mantra that we have to /eep repeating% !ut who are you going to
!e nonaligned againstF+ -ith the end of nonalignment for all practical purposes% Indias
foreign policy was suddenly !ereft of a grand strategic vision.
7t another level% the country was also confronted with an unprecedented fiscal crisis
partly as a conse"uence of the first Gulf -ar of 1991. Three factors contri!uted to this
crisis. ;irst% anticipating a spi/e in oil prices !ecause of Saddam 0usseins invasion and
occupation of >uwait% India had purchased considera!le amounts of petroleum on the
spot mar/et there!y draining its treasury of much(needed foreign echange. Second% the
government of India was forced to repatriate over a hundred thousand wor/ers from the
1ersian Gulf at short notice. Third% it lost the very su!stantial remittances that the wor/ers
from the Gulf had contri!uted to the Indian eche"uer. The confluence of these three
factors placed the country in dire financial straits.
vii
;aced with his etraordinary crisis
and also confronting the loss of the vast 9ast 9uropean mar/et as a conse"uence of the
Soviet collapse% Indias policyma/ers% most nota!ly the then ;inance 8inister 8anmohan
Singh% chose to dramatically alter Indias domestic and international economic policies.
These involved a!andoning the countrys historic commitment to import(su!stituting
industriali)ation% un!undling% though fitfully at !est% its vast pu!lic sector and
dismantling a la!yrinthine set of regulations% licenses% permits and "uotas which had
largely stifled economic growth.
viii
#
Crastic changes were also underta/en in the political arena. 7s argued earlier% Indias
commitment to nonalignment had already eroded in practice% if not in rhetoric% in the
post('ehru era. 'ow its policyma/ers sought to forge a new vision for the country.
0owever% the country lac/ed a leader of the stature and intellectual proclivities of
&awaharlal 'ehru. Get% the 1rime 8inister% 'arasimha .ao% possessed a sufficient grasp
of international affairs to recogni)e the necessity of charting a new course for the country
in !oth domestic and international arenas.
i
7ccordingly% he sought to chart a new
course for the countrys foreign policy.
This effort to alter the countrys foreign policy orientation toward the emergent% sole
superpower% the 3nited States ran into an important hurdle for three compelling reasons.
;irst% at a glo!al level% the 3nited States had few significant interests in India !arring
nonproliferation. This issue% of course% put the two sides on a collision course as India
was a staunch opponent of the 'uclear 'onproliferation Treaty 5'1T6 and categorically
refused to accede to its epectations. The 3S% especially% under the ,linton
administration% was committed to its indefinite and unconditional etension at the .eview
,onference in 199<. 'ot surprisingly% their fundamental differences put the two countries
ate odds.
Second% at a regional level% even though the 3S Cepartment of ,ommerce under the
stewardship of Secretary of ,ommerce% .on :rown% had anointed India as one of the
worlds *!ig emerging mar/ets+% 7merican investment in and trade with India was so
negligi!le that the nonproliferation issue overshadowed other interests.
Third and finally% at a !ureaucratic level in !oth countries the *shadow of the past+
weighed heavily on all deli!erations. 8ost Indian foreign policy !ureaucrats loo/ed were
du!ious a!out 7merican goals and interests in South 7sia and there was lingering distrust
of India in !oth the State and Cefense departments in the 3nited States. These mutual
misgivings ho!!led the growth of the relationship even though some small progress had
!een made in the last days of Indira Gandhi and her son and successor .a4iv Gandhi. 7s a
conse"uence of these three factors% improvements in relations were% at !est fitful% and
fre"uently hostage to minor% episodic differences. ;or eample% the 7ssistant Secretary of
State .o!in .aphaels careless remar/ a!out >ashmirs accession to India at a press
!riefing in -ashington% C, !ecame a ma4or diplomatic contretemps.
l

0owever% Indian policyma/ers managed to move with somewhat greater deterity on
other fronts. To that end% they ended countrys refleive support for the 7ra! position on
Israel and the 1alestinian "uestion. 0istorically% since the creation of the state of Israel in
194H India had adopted for reasons of !oth domestic politics and national ideology% a
mostly frosty approach toward the &ewish state. 7t home Indian policyma/ers were
attentive to the sentiments of the 8uslim population. 7t an ideological level they had
viewed the creation of Israel as the continuation of a colonial policy.
li
In 199$% in the
wa/e of the 2slo 7ccord !etween Israel and the 1alestinians% India upgraded its
diplomatic relations with Israel to the am!assadorial level.
7
Simultaneously% India also directed its ga)e toward South(9ast 7sia after a long span of
neglect. Curing much of the ,old -ar Indian policyma/ers had shunned the states of
South(9ast 7sia% with the critical eception of =ietnam% viewing them as mostly
7merican puppets. 'ow as part and parcel of the opening of its mar/ets to foreign
investment and see/ing to develop a via!le eport sector% the country em!ar/ed upon a
*@oo/ 9ast policy+.
lii
,loser to home% the 'arasimha .ao regime efforts continued to improve relations with
the 1.,% a process that had !een initiated during the .a4iv Gandhi regime in the late
19H?s. 9ven though the two sides forged two important confidence(!uilding measures
5,:8s6 in 199B and 199# designed to reduce tensions along the @ine of 7ctual ,ontrol%
little or no progress was made in resolving the !order dispute.
liii

;inally% relations with 1a/istan% Indias long(standing adversary remained contentious as
ever. In considera!le part the relationship with 1a/istan deteriorated !ecause of the
out!rea/ of an ethnoreligious insurgency in the dispute state of &ammu and >ashmir in
Cecem!er 19H9. The origins of this insurgency were mostly indigenous could !e traced
to a process of growing political mo!ili)ation against a !ac/drop of steady institutional
decay.
liv
0owever% with the out!rea/ of the insurgency 1a/istans policyma/ers "uic/ly
stepped into the fray and helped transform a largely internal uprising into an ideologically
charged% sanguinary% etortion rac/et.
lv
In an attempt to suppress the insurgency India resorted to a time(honored
counterinsurgency strategy. This involved the su!stantial use of force against the
insurgents !ut with the promise of free and fair elections once they proved willing to
a!andon their secessionist agenda. 7s with other counterinsurgency operations% this
strategy has met with some success. 0owever% while it has reduced the insurgency to
managea!le proportions% it has not !een a!le to eliminate it altogether. ,ontinued
1a/istani logistical support for the insurgents% the provision of sanctuaries in 1a/istan(
controlled >ashmir and a porous !order has prevented India from successfully
suppressing the insurgency.
,rossing the 'uclear .u!icon and :eyond
1a/istans needling of India in >ashmir was and remains suscepti!le to management
through Indias conventional military capa!ilities. 'or does 1a/istans conventional
capa!ilities pose an especially compelling threat to Indias security. The conventional
military capa!ilities% the persistence of the !order dispute and the 1.,s nuclear weapons
posed an altogether different order of threat to Indias security. Indeed it was the long(
term security threats that the 1., posed to India proved to !e the most compelling
underlying factor that drove Indias nuclear weapons program.
lvi
The specific timing of
the program% contrary to much polemical writing had little to do with the ascendance of
the right(of(center :haratiya &anata 1arty 5:&16 to power.
lvii
Instead it was closely tied to
the successful etension of the '1T in 199< and the seeming ineora!le efforts of the
,linton administration to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test !an treaty. ;earful that
H
the test !an treaty was all !ut inevita!le Indian policyma/ers chose to eercise the
nuclear option !efore inelucta!le pressures were !rought to !ear on India to accede to the
regime.
Cespite the initial !urst of hostility from the 3nited States and the other great powers% the
international community has come to grudgingly accept India as a de facto nuclear
weapons state. In large part this came a!out as a conse"uence of etended !ilateral
negotiations !etween the 3.S. Ceputy Secretary of State% Stro!e Tal!ott and &aswant
Singh% the Indian 8inister for 9ternal 7ffairs.
lviii
7lso their alarmist claims and fears
a!out a possi!le nuclear echange !etween India and 1a/istan have not materiali)ed.
1a/istans fec/less attempt to revive the >ashmir issue through its incursion in the >argil
region did contri!ute to a limited war !etween the two states in 1999.
li
0owever% despite
the 1a/istani provocation India eercised remar/a!le restraint and a large(scale war was
effectively avoided. Similarly% in the aftermath of the terrorist attac/ on the Indian
parliament in Cecem!er $??1 India resorted to a strategy of coercive diplomacy al!eit
with mied results.
l
0owever% it is important to note that neither of these two crises
culminated in a full(scale war !etween the two long(standing adversaries.
In the aftermath of the $??1($??$ crisis India and 1a/istan with some 7merican prodding
em!ar/ed upon a peace process. The results from this process have !een limited though it
had resulted in some de(escalation of tensions on the >ashmir front.
li
0owever% in 7ugust
$??H% tensions once again came to the fore with Indian allegations a!out a 1a/istani
violation of the cease(fire agreement. 8atters worsened considera!ly after India 5and the
3nited States6 alleged that 1a/istans Inter(Services Intelligence Cirectorate 5ISI(C6 was
!ehind the attac/ on the Indian 9m!assy in >a!ul in &uly $??H.
lii
-hile relations with 1a/istan remain "uite fraught% Indo(3S relations now seem to !e on
a very secure footing. The :ush administrations willingness to eempt India from the
epectations of the 'uclear 'onproliferation Treaty 5which India had never acceded to in
the first place6 and pursue a civilian nuclear agreement provided a sound foundation for
the relationship.
liii
7fter protracted !ilateral 5and internal6 negotiations the ,ongress(led
regime of 1rime 8inister 8anmohan Singh withstood a parliamentary vote of no(
confidence in &uly $??H.
liv
There is little "uestion that this agreement can ma/e a
meaningful contri!ution toward alleviating Indias energy needs. 0owever% once
consummated% its larger significance will lie in ending Indias thirty(odd years of nuclear
isolation from the glo!al order. Since the 3nited States had !een one of the principal
protagonists in creating and !olstering these glo!al arrangements% the shift in 7merican
policy% which made an eception for India% was nothing short of revolutionary.
,onse"uently% the 7merican concession on this critical issue must !e construed as
recognition of Indias emerging potential as a great power in 7sia and !eyond.
India .esurgentF
-here is Indias foreign policy headed in the post(,old -ar eraF 2!viously the structure
of the international system has changed !eyond recognition since the immediate post(war
era. -ill India !e a!le to sustain the pragmatic approach to the conduct of its foreign
9
policy without completely sacrificing the values that it cherishes and protects at homeF
2r is the new found pragmatism li/ely to manifest itself in a crass pursuit of Indias
parochial interests at the cost of any commitment to the preservation of those valuesF
These "uestions are far from trivial and there are no clear(cut answers that are availa!le.
0owever% given the internal shifts in political power% its raid rate of economic growth and
its emerging position in the glo!al order% it is dou!tful that the country will lapse into its
past posture as a revisionist critic of the glo!al order.
lv
1?
i
9ndnotes
2n the concept of *self(help+ see >enneth -alt)% The Theory of International Politics 5:oston% 87A
8cGraw(0ill% 19796.
ii
;or a statement of the /ey principles of .ealism and its manifold forms see &ohn 8earshiemer% The
Tragedy of %reat Power Politics 5'ew Gor/A 'orton% $??16.
iii
2n the three levels of analysis see >enneth -alt)% &an' State and (ar: Theoretical nalysis 5'ew
Gor/A ,olum!ia 3niversity 1ress% 19#< I19<9J6.
iv
2n the ideational sources of Indias foreign policy see 8ichael :recher% India and (orld Politics:
)rishna &enons *iew of the (orld 5@ondonA 2ford 3niversity 1ress% 19#H6
v
@orne &. >avic% Indias +uest for Security, -efence Policies' 19./01961 5:er/eleyA 3niversity of
,alifornia 1ress% 19#76.
vi
2n this su!4ect see the .o!ert 8c8ahon% The 2old (ar on the Periphery: The 3nited States' India'
and Pa4istan 5'ew Gor/A ,olum!ia 3niversity 1ress% 19946.
vii
.o!ert Conaldson% So5iet Policy Toward India: Ideology and Strategy 5,am!ridge% 87A 0arvard
3niversity 1ress% 19746.
viii
2n the security threat from ,hina that culminated in the Sino(Indian !order war of 19#$ see &ohn
Garver% Protracted 2onflict, Sino0Indian Ri5alry in the Twentieth 2entury 5SeattleA 3niversity of
-ashington 1ress% $??16.
i
;or a discussion of the role of pu!lic opinion on Indian foreign policy see &ayuntanu4a
:andopadhaya% The &a4ing of Indias Foreign Policy: -eter"inants' Institutions' Processes' and
Personalities 5:om!ayA 7llied 1u!lishers% 197?6.

2n this su!4ect see &. 7nn Tic/ner% Self0Reliance 5ersus Power Politics: The "erican and Indian
67perience in 8uilding #ational States 5'ew Gor/A ,olum!ia 3niversity 1ress% 19H#6.
i
See 7.1. .ana% The I"perati5es of #onalign"ent: 2onceptual Study of Indias Foreign Policy
Strategy in the #ehru Period 5CelhiA 8acmillan ,o. of India% 197#6.
ii
See &awaharlal 'ehru% Toward Freedo": The uto9iography of :awaharlal #ehru 5:ostonA :eacon
1ress% 19#B I1941J6.
iii
2n 'ehrus misgivings a!out defense spending see Stephen 1. ,ohen% The Indian r"y: Its
2ontri9ution to the -e5elop"ent of a #ation 5:er/eleyA 3niversity of ,alifornia 1ress% 19716
iv
2n Indias role as a mediator in South(9ast 7sia see C... Sardesai% Indian Foreign Policy in
2a"9odia' ;aos and *ietna" 5:er/eleyA 3niversity of ,alifornia 1ress% 19#H6.
v
The !est discussion of this su!4ect can !e found in ,. Casgupta% (ar and -iplo"acy in )ash"ir'
19./0.< 5'ew CelhiA Sage 1u!lications% $??$6.
vi
The !ac/ground to the Indian use of force in Goa is nicely summari)ed in 7rthur .u!inoff% Indias
3se of Force in %oa 5:om!ayA 1opular 1ra/ashan% 19716.
vii
It also stemmed from two very pragmatic considerations. 'ehru was concerned the opportunity costs
of defense sending and fearful of the dangers of :onapartism. 2n this su!4ect see Sumit Ganguly%
*;rom the Cefense of the 'ation to 7id to the ,ivilA The 7rmy in ,ontemporary India% The :ournal of
sian and frican Studies =olume $#% 'um!er 1($ 519916% pp. 11($#.
viii
,ohen% The Indian r"y.
i
Sumit Ganguly% *Sino(Indian :order Tal/s% 19H1(19H9A 7 =iew ;rom 'ew Celhi%+ sian Sur5ey
=olume $9% 'um!er 1$ 5Cecem!er 19H96% pp. 11$B(11B<.

-aheguru 1al Singh Sidhu and &ing(Cong Guan% *.esolving The Sino(Indian :order CisputeA
:uilding ,onfidence Through ,ooperative 8onitoring%+ sian Sur5ey =olume 41% 'um!er $ 58arch(
7pril $??16% pp. B<1(B7#.
i
The term *modified structuralism+ is derived from >anti :a4pai. See >anti :a4pai% *IndiaA 8odified
Structuralism%+ in 8uthiah 7lagappa ed. sian Security Practice: &aterial and Ideational Influences
5StanfordA Stanford 3niversity 1ress% 199H6.
ii
;or a discussion of the origins of the 19#< war see Sumit Ganguly% *Ceterrence ;ailure .evisitedA
The Indo(1a/istani -ar of 19#<%+ The :ournal of Strategic Studies =olume 1B% 'um!er 4 5Cecem!er
199?6% pp. 77(9B.
iii
Cavid Cenoon% -e5aluation 3nder Pressure: India' Indonesia' and %hana 5,am!ridge% 87A 8IT
1ress% 19H#6.
iv
See G. G. 8irchandani% Indias #uclear -ile""a 5'ew CelhiA 1opular :oo/ Services% 19#H6.
v
2n this su!4ect see 7.G. 'oorani% *Indias Kuest for a 'uclear Guarantee%+ sian Sur5ey =olume 7%
'um!er 7 5&uly 19#76% pp. 49?(<?$.
vi
Sumit Ganguly% *-hy India &oined the 'uclear ,lu!%+ 8ulletin of the to"ic Scientists =olume B9%
'um!er 4 57pril 19HB6% pp. B?(BB.
vii
2n the crisis in 9ast 1a/istan and Indias su!se"uent involvement in the civil war see su!4ect
.ichard Sisson and @eo .ose% (ar and Secession: Pa4istan' India' and the 2reation of 8angladesh
5:er/eleyA 3niversity of ,alifornia 1ress% 199?6.
viii
Indias military strategy in 9ast 1a/istan is discussed in &ohn 8earshiemer% 2on5entional
-eterrence 5IthacaA ,ornell 3niversity 1ress% 19HB6.
i
;or an early and especially thoughtful discussion of the limitations of Indias strategy of import(
su!stituting industriali)ation see &agdish :hagwati and 1adma Cesai% India: Planning for
Industriali=ation' Industriali=ation and Trade Policies since 1911 5@ondonA 2ford 3niversity% 197?6.

;or a useful discussion see% &agdish :hagwati% *-hat -ent -rong F + in .ahul 8u/her4i% ed.
Indias 6cono"ic Transition: The Politics of Refor"s 5'ew CelhiA 2ford 3niversity 1ress% $??76.
i
Ganguly% *-hy India &oined the 'uclear ,lu!.+
ii
2n the motivations and conse"uences of the Soviet invasion of 7fghanistan see 0enry :radsher%
The So5iet In5asion of fghanistan: Study in the 3se of Force in So5iet Foreign Policy 5@eington%
87A @eington :oo/s% 19H#6.
iii
2n Indias efforts see :ha!ani Sen Gupta% The fghan Syndro"e: >ow to ;i5e (ith So5iet Power
5'ew CelhiA =i/as% 19H$6.
iv
The most comprehensive discussion of the clandestine features of the 1a/istani nuclear weapons
program is 7drian @evy and ,atherine Scott(,lar/% -eception: Pa4istan' The 3nited States and the
%lo9al #uclear (eapons 2onspiracy 5'ew CelhiA 1enguin :oo/s% $??76
v
Conaldson% So5iet Policy Toward India: Ideology and Strategy.
vi
The attempts to improve relations with India during the two .eagan administrations see Cennis
>u% India and the 3nited States: 6stranged -e"ocracies' 19.101991 5-ashington% C,A 'C3 1ress%
199B6.
vii
Sumit Ganguly% *:etween Ira" and a 0ard 1lace%A The Ceveloping -orld and the 'ew 2il ,risis+
The International 67ecuti5e% &anuary(;e!ruary 1991.
viii
2n this su!4ect see the succinct discussion in &agdish :hagwati% India in Transition: Freeing the
6cono"y 5'ew Gor/A 2ford 3niveristy 1ress% 199B6.
i
Sumit Ganguly% *South 7sia 7fter the ,old -ar%+ The (ashington +uarterly =olume 1<% 'um!er 4
5199$6% pp. 17B(1H4.
l
See the discussion in Sunanda >. Catta(.ay% (aiting for "erica: India and the 3S in the #ew
&illenniu" 5'ew CelhiA 0arper,ollins India% $??$6.
li
;or a discussion of Indias policies toward Israel see 1... >umaraswamy% in Sumit Ganguly ed. India
as a %reat Power 5@ondonA ;ran/ ,ass% $??B6.
lii
San4aya :aru% *India and 7S97'A The emerging economic relationship towards a :ay of :engal
community%+ in Strategic conse!uences of Indias econo"ic perfor"ance 5'ew CelhiA 7cademic
;oundation% $??#6.
liii
See the discussion in Sumit Ganguly% *:order Issues% Comestic Integration and International
Security%+ in ;rancine ;ran/el and 0arry 0arding% eds. India and 2hina: Ri5alry and 6ngage"ent
5'ew CelhiA 2ford 3niversity 1ress% $??46.
liv
Sumit Ganguly% The 2risis in )ash"ir: Portents of (ar' >opes of Peace 5'ew Gor/A ,am!ridge
3niversity 1ress% 19976.
lv
1raveen Swami% India' Pa4istan and the Secret :ihad: The 2o5ert )ash"ir' 19./02??. 5@ondonA
.outledge% $??76.
lvi
Sumit Ganguly% *Indias 1athway to 1o/hran IIA The Sources and 1rospects of Indias 'uclear
-eapons 1rogram%+ International Security =olume $B% 'um!er 4 519996% pp. 14H(177.
lvii
;or a statement that claims India tested nuclear weapons for reasons of prestige and status see
George 1er/ovich% Indias #uclear 8o"9: The I"pact on %lo9al Proliferation 5:er/eleyA 3niversity of
,alifornia 1ress%19996.
lviii
Stro!e Tal!ott% 6ngaging India: -iplo"acy' -e"ocracy' and the 8o"9 5-ashington C,A
:roo/ings Institution 1ress% $??46.
li
The literature on the >argil conflict% while mostly from Indias perspective% is voluminous. See for
eample 1raveen Swami% The )argil (ar 5'ew CelhiA @eftword :oo/s% 19996L 7marinder Singh%
Ridge Too Far: (ar in the )argil >eights' 1999 51atialaA 8oti!agh 1alace% $??16.
l
Sumit Ganguly and 8ichael >raig% *The @imits of ,oercive Ciplomacy in South 7siaA The Indo(
1a/istani ,risis of $??1($??$%+ Security Studies =olume 14% 'um!er $ 57pril(&une $??<6% pp. $9?(B$4.
li
1... ,hari% 1ervai) I"!al ,heema and Stephen 1. ,ohen% Four 2rises and a Peace Process: "erican
6ngage"ent in South sia 5-ashington% C,A The :roo/ings Institution% $??76.
lii
8ar/ 8a))etti and 9ric Schmitt% *1a/istanis 7ided 7ttac/ in >a!ul%+ 3.S 2fficials Say%+ The #ew
@or4 Ti"es% 7ugust 1% $??H.
liii
;or the pertinent details of the agreement see Sumit Ganguly and Cinshaw 8istry% *The ,ase for the
3S(India 'uclear 7greement%+ (orld Policy :ournal =olume $H% 'um!er $ 5$??#6% pp. 11(19.
liv
.ama @a/shmi and 9mily -a% *;oes fail to oust Indias leaderA Singh survives vote of no
confidence ((( nuclear deal on trac/%+ The (ashington Post% &uly $B% $??H.
lv
7rvind 1anagariya% India: The 6"erging %iant 5'ew Gor/A 2ford 3niversity 1ress% $??H6.