ELSEVIER Journal of Pragmatics 25 (1996) 455-470

Is there a hi story o f pragmati cs?

Anat Biletzki
Department of Philosophy, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, IL-69978, Israel
Received July 1994; revised version February 1995
Ab s t r a c t
Pragmatics, the last of the three levels (the others being syntactics and semantics) of lin-
guistic analysis to attract widespread interest and systematic research, is still generally per-
ceived as a newly born subject with no history to boast of. My working assumption is that
' new' theories of language may have roots in the past, and, furthermore, that the merit of
these theories can be, in part, checked by such philosophical roots. A methodology for seek-
ing out these roots is suggested, profitably adopting the definition of pragmatics as ' explicit
and essential' mention of the user of a language. Examples of ' case studies' using this
methodology are presented in Various areas of historical language study. The traditional dis-
ciplines of grammar and rhetoric are first candidates for such research, but it is in philosophy
- and specifically, philosophy of language of the past - that true pragmatics is unearthed.
Such ' discoveries' raise the more fundamental question: what are the rationales for looking
for harbingers of pragmatics? A first approximation to an answer is entertained with its pos-
itive, and negative, implications for pragmatics today.
I . I n t r o d u c t i o n
In t hi rt y years pr agmat i cs has advanced f r om the pr over bi al wast ebasket to a full
gr own academi c field, repl et e wi t h its own j ournal , conferences, research grants, and
compr ehens i ve bi bl i ogr aphy. It s mat uri t y is at t est ed to by bot h the number of pr ac-
t i t i oners in the field, and the vari et y of di rect i ons in whi ch its branches gr ow out to
vari ous disciplines. Yet sitting on any of the branches of this pr agmat i c t ree - be
t hey phi l osophi cal , linguistic, psychol ogi cal - one wonder s i f the tree mi ght n' t t op-
pl e over f or l ack of root s. For pr agmat i cs seems to have no formal , i nst i t ut i onal i zed
hi st ory.
Subscri bi ng to the r ecei ved vi ew t hat the t er m ' pr agmat i cs ' was bot h coi ned and
concei ved by Charl es Morri s (1938: 84), the j ournal of the field, the Journal of
Pragmatics, in its sevent een years of publ i cat i on, has pri nt ed onl y t hree articles t hat
have to do wi t h the di sci pl i ne' s bi rt h and past. One goes back a full ten years earl i er
t han Morri s and di scover s not es of speech acts in Kos chmi eder ' s wor k ( Keck and
St ubbs, 1984); anot her turns even furt her back to C. S. Pei rce and, in a mor e fami l -
0378-2166/96/$15.00 1996 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved
SSDI 037 8-2166(95)00019-4
456 A. Biletzki / Journal of Pragmatics 25 (1996) 455~170
i ar vei n, cont r as t s t he ' Ol d ' pr a gma t i c s of t hat ve ne r a bl e phi l os ophe r wi t h t he ' Ne w'
( Fe l dma n, 1986).1 I n f act , onl y i n one ver y r ecent ar t i cl e ( Ne r l i c h and Cl ar ke, 1994)
i s a nyt hi ng l i ke a hi s t or i cal gr a s p of pr a gma t i c s a t t e mpt e d and e nt e r t a i ne d wi t h a
vi e w t o hi s t or i cal r e s e a r c h i n mi nd.
Li ke wi s e , a pr a gma t i c s b i b l i o g r a p h y ( Ver s chuer en, 1978) l i st s no ' hi s t or y of pr a g-
ma t i c s ' i n i t s s ubj ect i ndex. The f our t een ent r i es unde r ' hi s t or i c a l l i ngui s t i c s ' s e e m
t o have be e n i nc l ude d on t he bas i s o f be i ng e xe r c i s e s i n hi s t or i cal l i ngui s t i cs whi c h
t ake pr a gma t i c s i nt o a mo r e or ge ne r a l l y l ess c ons c i ous account . Si mi l a r l y, al l but
one o f t he f i ve ent r i es unde r ' hi s t or y: a uxi l i a r y a nd be ne f i c i a r y di s c i pl i ne s ' ha ve
not hi ng wha t e ve r t o do wi t h p r a g ma t i c s ' past . 2
Fi na l l y, when one t ur ns t o t he mul t i t udi nous v o l u me s on t he hi s t or y of l i ngui s t i cs ,
one ma y e nc ount e r s por a di c me nt i on of wr i t i ngs o f t he pas t as be i ng ' p r a g ma t i c a l ' .
Thi s i s mo r e of t en t han not done i n a pe r f unc t or y ma n n e r - ei t her as l i p s er vi ce t o a
pe r s pe c t i ve whi ch, i t i s a c k n o wl e d g e d , i s ga i ni ng h e a d wa y i n t he l i ngui s t i c mi l i eu,
or, f or wa nt o f a bet t er t er m, as a ge ne r a l he a di ng under- whi c h one can st i l l gr oup
t oge t he r va r i ous as pect s o f l a ngua ge us e whi c h s e e m t o onl y me r i t a wa s t e ba s ke t . 3
Pr a gma t i c s i s o b v i o u s l y pe r c e i ve d, t hen, as a ne wl y bor n s ubj ect wi t h no hi s t or y
t o boa s t of. It i s t her ef or e p r o mi s i n g t o e nc ount e r t he r ecent t r eat ment of pas t pr a g-
ma t i c p h e n o me n a t hat does , c ons c i ous l y, pr e s e nt i t s el f as " a hi s t or y o f pr a gma t i c
i deas i n Eur ope ( and t o a cer t ai n ext ent Ame r i c a ) dur i ng t he 19th c e n t u r y " ( Ne r l i c h
and Cl ar ke, 1994: 441) . Ne r l i c h and Cl a r ke c l a i m t o be t r aci ng " c r o s s - q u o t a t i o n s "
as t hei r me t h o d o f r es ear ch, a dmi t t i ng t he pos s i bi l i t y of t wo ot her me t hods , a s ear ch
f or t he " us e o f var i ous pr a gma t i c ke y t e r ms " , and a mo t e s peci f i c l ook at " t he
t r e a t me nt o f mo o d s f r om Ant i qui t y t o mo d e r n t i me s " t o filad c or r e l a t i ons wi t h t he
" d e s c r i p t i o n o f s peech act s as s uc h" ( i bi d. : 440) . 4 The y poi nt t o va r i ous " p r e l i mi -
Peirce's Pragmatism is, in fact, recognized by many as having direct links to Morris's three-fold
description of pragmatics, syntactics, and semantics, and, indeed, Morris himself says that his program
is "an attempt to carry out resolutely the insight of Charles Peirce" (1946: 27). This self-alleged conti-
nuity is itself questionable and has come under attack. Nowhere does Peirce mention pragmatics (as
opposed to pragmatism) and his division of semiotic is rather into pure grammar, logic proper, and pure
rhetoric. It is not clear whether out of this distinction pragmatics, as Morris perceived it, can be gleaned.
Dewey, for instance, counters that "it is a complete inversion of Peirce to identify an interpretant with
interpreter" and feels that "Morris gives a radically new version of the subject matter, intent, and
method of pragmatic doctrine" ( 1949: 269).
2 Only one article (Schwarz, 1984) is described as an example of 'speech act history'.
3 An exception to this tendency, in its attempt to chart the history of language while taking pragmatics
seriously, is Apel (1963).
4 Were we to limit the history of pragmatics to, for example, a history of speech acts ' as such', we
would, by definition, have embarked on a different, yet relevantly related, enterprise. This project has
been undertaken by Smith (1984, 1988, 1990), who, noticing that most 'anticipations of speech act the-
ory' have consisted in isolated remarks, lists ten conditions which make a theory of the past similar
enough to contemporary speech act theory to be characterized as such. (E.g.: Linguistics must be con-
ceived of as a general universal science, language must be seen as primarily an instrument of communi-
cation, performative utterances must be more than expressions of acts! of will, speech actions must
involve an appeal to the hearer, etc.) I find such demands inappropriate for two reasons. First, even pre-
supposing agreement with Smith on the possibility of specifying such conditions, one may still disagree
with the content of specific conditions. In other words, one has to be fully in agreement with Smith on
A. Biletzki / Journal of Pragmatics 25 (1996) 455-470 457
nar y st udi es" whi ch have pr ovi ded us wi t h dat a concer ni ng pr agmat i c "i deas and
i nsi ght s", thus offeri ng the begi nni ngs of a hi st ory of the field (ibid.). 5 And fi nal l y,
aft er present i ng t hei r per cept i ve, hi st ori cal l y and i nt el l ect ual l y grounded list of prag-
mat i ci st s, t hey poi nt to furt her research agendas whi ch " coul d l ead to a di rect cross-
fert i l i zat i on bet ween the past and the pr esent " (ibid.: 455).
The crux of the present ar t i cl e' s mat t er is pr eci sel y that last st at ement , phrased as
a quest i on. The newness of pr agmat i cs may be quest i oned vi a the t heoret i cal under-
pi nni ng t hat ' n e w' t heori es of l anguage may have phi l osophi cal root s in the past, and
furt hermore, t hat the mer i t of t hese t heori es can be, in part, checked by their phi l o-
sophi cal root s. Locat i ng root s, however , is a euphemi s m for doi ng hi st ory; and such
doi ngs must be advanced and const rai ned by met hodol ogi cal gui del i nes. The prob-
l em of met hodol ogy, mor eover , in the humani t i es, poses pr obl ems of a pr of ound
nature. By sayi ng humani t i es, I am, finally, poi nt i ng to the phi l osophi cal and histor-
ical focus of this article (rat her t han the compet i ng, yet defi ni t el y equal, linguistic
and psychol ogi cal per spect i ves on pr agmat i cs, whi ch will not be deal t wi t h here). So
any at t empt to uneart h root s, and t her eby to wri t e a hi st ory of pr agmat i cs, 6 will have
to answer t wo pr el i mi nar y quest i ons, one met hodol ogi cal l y essential, the ot her phi l o-
sophi cal l y i mport ant : What shoul d we l ook for, and why?
2. Wh a t s h o ul d w e l o o k f o r ?
2.1. Def i ni t i ons o f pragmat i cs
Vari ous defi ni t i ons of pr agmat i cs al ongsi de vari ous pr agmat i cal pr ogr ams cl ai m
the bi rt hri ght bequeat hed by (Pei rce and) Morri s. Del vi ng into this conf usi ng issue
i nvol ves the obl i gat i on to di scuss the al t ernat i ves offered by St al naker, Al l wood,
Kasher, Gazdar , Kamp, Mart i n, Verschueren, Leech and many others. The rel at i vel y
young age of pr agmat i cs has had the furt her ef f ect of a pr eponder ance of at t empt s at
neat l y demar cat i ng pr agmat i cs (as phi l osophi co-l ogi co-l i ngui st i c vs. psychol ogi cal
st udy; or as di fferent i at ed f r om semant i cs; or as compet ence vs. per f or mance; etc.).
Whet her one want s to vi ew pr agmat i cs as the st udy of gr ammat i cal l y encoded
aspect s of cont ext , or as the st udy of const rai nt s on the appr opr i at eness of ut t erances,
the contemporary theory of speech acts (a situation which denies the legitimacy of current debates), in
order to apply his requirements to historical thinkers. Second, between 'isolated remarks' and a rigorous,
up-to-date theory lies the expanse of discussions within which fundamental recognition of speech acts
can be ascertained, and to which it is, therefore, possible and profitable to affix the term 'pragmatics'.
5 Nerlich and Clarke list an astounding array of books and articles which go far in providing evidence
of a history of pragmatics, but these sources are all 'data-oriented' (I owe this insight and terminology
to an anonymous referee for the Journal of Pragmatics). See, for example, Nerlich (1986, 1990) and
Neumann (1987).
6 Nerlich and Clarke emphasize that their exercise is ' a' history, not 'the' history. I similarly desist
from any dogmatism which would commit one to describing her research as 'the' history of pragmatics.
Yet this liberalism should not entice us to ignore a methodological basis which is necessary for ' any'
history.
458 A. Biletzki / Journal of Pragmatics 25 (1996) 455-470
or as def i ned ost ensi vel y as a list of t opi cs (to name j ust a f ew al t ernat i ves) wi l l
make a gr eat di f f er ence, in t he fi nal anal ysi s, t o what one is l ooki ng f or in a hi st or y
of pr agmat i cs.
Def i ni t i ons ( of concept s, domai ns, i nvest i gat i ons, rel at i ons) ma y be i nt ensi onal or
ext ensi onal . One ma y ei t her char act er i ze t he def i ni endum by s ome gener al trait
whi ch purport s, at least t heoret i cal l y, t o l i mi t us t o all and onl y t hose aspect s whi ch
are rel evant , or one ma y gi ve a list whi ch at t empt s t o be excl usi ve of t hose aspect s.
Bot h t ypes o f def i ni t i ons are l egi t i mat e; each i nvol ves di f f er ent ki nds o f i nsi ght i nt o
t he subj ect at hand.
Exampl es o f i nt ensi onal def i ni t i ons o f pr agmat i cs are: " t he st udy of t he rel at i ons
of si gns t o i nt er pr et er s" (Morri s, 1938: 84); " t he st udy o f i ndexi cal rul es f or rel at -
i ng l i ngui st i c f or m t o a gi ven cont ext " (Bat es, 1976: 3); " a t heor y t hat has as its
subj ect mat t er t he r el at i onshi p bet ween a l anguage, its subj ect mat t er, and t he users
o f t he l a ngua ge " (Mart i n, 1971 : 138); " t he t heor y of t he r el at i on bet ween t he l an-
guage users and t he l anguage st r uct ur e" ( Apost el , 1971: 33); " t he sci ence of l an-
guage us e" ( Haber l and and Mey, 1977: 1). Exampl es o f ext ensi onal def i ni t i ons:
" Pr agmat i cs is t he st udy o f dei xi s, i mpl i cat ure, pr esupposi t i on, s peech acts, and
aspect s o f di scour se st r uct ur e" ( Levi nson, 1983: 27) ; " Pr agmat i cs , f or a nat ural l an-
guage, concer ns ' i l l ucut i onar y f or ce' , ' i mpl i cat ur e' , ' pr es uppos i t i on' , and ' cont ext -
dependent a c c e pt a bi l i t y' " ( Gazdar , 1979: 2). 7 Oft en, of cour se, i nt ensi onal defi ni -
t i ons are augment ed by a list, in or der to bet t er illustrate what it is we are deal i ng
wi t h; and conver sel y, ext ensi onal def i ni t i ons are gi ven s ome t ent at i ve over al l f r ame-
wor k f or t hose who do not have the i nsi ght t o f i nd the c o mmo n denomi nat or . 8
A hi st ori cal quest whi ch is l i mi t ed, f or i nst ance, t o t he sear ch f or a " s t udy o f
i ndexi cal rul es f or rel at i ng l i ngui st i c f or m t o a gi ven cont ext " seems a f ool har dy
pr oposi t i on due t o t he nar r ownes s of such a def i ni t i on - it s i mpl y does not c ove r
mos t o f t he phe nome na whi ch are concei ved as pr agmat i c. On t he ot her hand, i f t he
sear ch f or pr agmat i cs be l ed by def i ni t i ons as gener al as " t he st udy of t he rel at i ons
o f si gns to i nt er pr et er s", or as " t he sci ence of l anguage us e " one coul d, al mos t a pri-
7 Recent encyclopedias and dictionaries of linguistics proffer similar definitions, many times quoting
past formulations. Thus, Bright (1992: 260) introduces the entry 'Pragmatics, implicature and presuppo-
sition' while quoting Morris, Carnap, Peirce and Stalnaker. Crystal (1991) begins his entry by describ-
ing pragmatics as "[a] term traditionally used to label one of the three major divisions of Semiotics ....
In modem linguistics it has come to be applied to the study of language from the point of view of the
users.' In like fashion, Malmkjaer (1991: 354) and Fraser (Asher, 1994: 3255) explicitly define prag-
matics (respectively) as "the study of the rules and principles which govern language in use", and as
"the study of the system which underlies the ability of language users to interpret utterances". Notwith-
standing these definitions being oriented to linguistics - as opposed to the philosophical perspective of
this article - they are, nevertheless, in general, a summation of a ' young' tradition. (But see fn. 8 for
Mey on the problem of definition.)
8 Mey (1993, 1994) addresses the problems I have encountered of intensional vs. extensional defini-
tions, as did Levinson (1983). Both supply us with, literally, lists of definitions while analyzing the
advantages and shortcomings of all aspects. While Mey's perspective is scientifically linguistic ("Prag-
matics is the science of language seen in relation to its users" (1993: 5)) it progresses, finally, to a def-
inition which can serve a philosopher as well: "[P]ragmatics is the study of the conditions of human lan-
guage uses as these are determined by the context of society" (ibid.: 42).
A. Biletzki /Journal of Pragmatics 25 (1996) 455-470 459
ori, cl ai m the exi st ence of pragmat i cs in virtually any treatise that ment i ons lan-
guage. 9 So, i f we do need some intensional guideposts in order to l ocal i ze ourselves,
we must find a charact eri zat i on of pragmat i cs whi ch is not t oo sophisticatedly nar-
row as to t hwart any research, and not t oo general l y di ffuse to make that research
tautological.
Kasher (1977: 106) paraphrases, and enlarges on, Mor r i s' s and Car nap' s defini-
tion of pragmat i cs, saying that " an investigation in the fi el d of language study is
assigned to Pragmat i cs i f reference is made in it, expl i ci t l y and essentially, to the
user of a l anguage". The t wo words, explicitly and essentially, are the crucial ele-
ment of the defi ni t i on and that whi ch makes it met hodol ogi cal l y rel evant and of
practical use for historical research. Anal yzi ng historical texts, one may take these
el ement s - explicitness and essentiality - as adequacy criteria for labeling a concept ,
a t heory, an i nvest i gat i on or a phi l osopher pragmatic.
2.2. Criteria of necessity and adequacy
Expl i ci t ness seems to be the easier of the t wo to identify. Its i mport ance lies in its
evidential function. The moder n pragmaticist, honest l y bel i evi ng in the essentiality
of the user of a language, may be prone to i dent i fy such reference to a speaker or
hearer, even when this reference is implicit or simply not there. Yet the facility in
finding expl i ci t ment i on of the speaker, when it is there, must put us on guard
against si mpl y sliding into the pitfall of cl ai mi ng pragmat i cal i t y for t oo many
phi l osophers or practitioners of language. Si nce language is seen by virtually all in
the linguistic-philosophical tradition as bei ng a human artifact, reference to the lan-
guage user may oft en be trivial, but not essential. In ot her words, explicitness is a
necessary, but not sufficient condi t i on for i dent i fyi ng pragmatics.
The ot her side of the coin, essentiality, is far more compl ex and profound.
Whereas expl i ci t ness is a mat t er of readi ng correct l y, essentiality is a mat t er of inter-
preting (where correct ness does not apply). Supposi ng a tract on language has made
expl i ci t ment i on of the speaker (or hearer) - when may we say that this ment i on is
essent i al ? When and how do we deci de that the analysis of language whi ch is bei ng
i nt erpret ed const rues the speaker as fundament al ? Beyond the rare ci rcumst ance in
whi ch the aut hor or phi l osopher mi ght explicitly talk of the essentiality of the
speaker, the answer lies in the cl ai m that the analysis woul d change dramatically i f
ment i on of the speaker were omitted. In ot her words, we must have recourse to fur-
ther, practical guidelines whi ch locate di fferences bet ween analyses, thus establish-
ing essentiality, and accordi ngl y pragmaticality.
These guidelines, in order to pi npoi nt pragmat i cal i t y, must do mor e than indicate
a readi ng of a pragmat i cal ' at mospher e' of texts. A fruitful first step to take is to turn
to the ext ensi onal renderi ngs of pragmatics - as represent i ng the intensional under-
9 For instance, Charles Morris ascribes pragmatics to everyone who has done language philosophy
since pre-history. More recently, philosophers of language as variegated as Davidson and Rorty (in a pri-
vate communication) have attested to the inherent pragmatics involved in any discussion which sincerely
treats of the speaker of a language.
460 A. Biletzki / Journal of Pragmatics 25 (1996) 455~170
st andi ng above - and use t hem in t he i nt erpret at i ve r eadi ng o f hi st ori cal texts.
I nst ead o f si ft i ng t hr ough t he speci f i c def i ni t i ons ment i oned above, we can r at her
t urn t o t he mul t i f acet ed list o f f r equent l y ci t ed concept s in mode r n pr agmat i cs. A
t ent at i ve list woul d l ook l i ke t hi s: cont ext , i ndexi cal s, c ommuni c a t i on, use, i mpl i ca-
ture, pr esupposi t i on, s peech act, convent i on, i nt ent i on (and t hei r affiliates). Thes e
concept s are what pr agmat i ci st s t al k about when t hey do pr agmat i cs ; in this cont ext ,
t oo, t hese concept s are cons i der ed essent i al t o pr agmat i cs. Yet t he list shoul d not be
vi ewed as an i nci dent al gat her i ng o f mode r n cat chwor ds . It s essent i al i t y resi des in
t he cont r i but i on o f its part s t o a t heor y o f l anguage use. l Such a t heor y exhi bi t s
essent i al i t y vi a its anal ysi s, ment i on, or expl i ci t di s cus s i on o f t hese concept s, by
rel at i ng t hem to a s ys t em of uni ver sal rul es o f use.
The wor ki ng hypot hes i s of a hi st or y o f pr agmat i cs shoul d t hen be t hat a phi l o-
sophi cal or l i ngui st i c t reat i se on l anguage whi ch deal s wi t h t hese concept s ( by t hese
or any ot her names ) is essent i al l y pr agmat i cal . And j ust as moder n phi l os opher s do
not subscr i be to a fi xed, exhaust i ve, agr eed upon list, so nei t her do we have to fi nd
all o f t he above in any one t reat i se of any hi st ori cal per i od in quest i on. l l Rat her, t he
list shoul d be concei ved as a cl ust er whi ch poi nt s in t he di r ect i on of pr agmat i cal i t y;
and any phi l os opher who ser i ousl y addr esses a numbe r o f t hese concept s can be seen
as maki ng essent i al r ef er ence t o t he user and hence be accept ed i nt o t he ci rcl e o f
pr agmat i cs. The cr i t er i on o f essent i al i t y, vi a pr agmat i c concept s, is st r ong e nough t o
ove r s ha dow expl i ci t ness, f or wher eas expl i ci t ment i on o f t he user does not ensur e
pr agmat i cal i t y, a convi nci ng essent i al t r eat ment of user ( by anal ysi s o f cont ext ,
i nt ent i on, s peech acts, etc. ) does so by pr es uppos i ng t he user.
It f ol l ows t hat t he sear ch f or pr agmat i cs shoul d be gui ded by an at t empt t o inter-
pret texts o f ot her t i mes in t he l i ght of mode r n pr agmat i c cat chwor ds. Looki ng at
phi l osopher s, gr ammar i ans , rhet ori ci ans, or any t hi nkers deal i ng wi t h l anguage in
ot her cent uri es it is, o f cour se, easy t o get car r i ed a wa y and say t hat t he overal l
at mos pher e of a cer t ai n t ext or treatise is pr agmat i cal , me a ni ng t hat it is si mi l ar in
l0 This remark is fraught with difficulties. Not coincidentally, different definitions of pragmatics turn
to this same list to buttress their respective theories; and, in fact, it is not quite clear that these concepts
are systematically used to illustrate their particular contribution to a particular theory. Thus, for instance,
Kasher and Lappin (1977: 34) define pragmatics as "the theoretical discipline which describes and
explains the systematic connections between sentences, their meaning, and the appropriate circumstances
of their utterance", but then noncommittally (and unsystematically, not to mention not essentially)
explain: "We shall now indicate several central subjects which are treated by pragmatics ..." (ibid.: 37).
Levinson (1983: 32), who emphasizes the problematics in defining pragmatics, caves in to a similar
extensionality. "... if one really wants to know what a particular field is concerned with ... one must sim-
ply observe what practitioners do. The rest of this book will largely be concerned with an overview of
some of the central tasks that pragmaticists wrestle with". The remaining chapters of his book do just
that; they elucidate the contemporary issues of deixis, conversational implicature, presupposition, speech
acts, and conversational structure. It follows that there is an implicit awareness of the essential contribu-
tion of the above list to a theory of pragmatics, but that the systematics of this contribution is hazy. I do
not pursue this point in detail, but note that for methodological (and consensual) reasons such a list is
conducive to the essentiality clause in Kasber's definition.
~ One must, however, be wary of using too few, or too obvious, concepts, on the penalty of finding
talk of communication, for instance, in any philosopher of language, without ensuring pragmaticality.
A. Biletzki / Journal of Pragmatics 25 (1996) 455-470 461
some basic, yet amorphous, way to modem pragmatics. It is here that a ' defi ni t i on'
such as Kasher' s (of explicit and essential reference to user) becomes crucial, and
that its extensional parallels (catchwords) act as constraints. To be pragmatic in a
historical context is, therefore, to explicitly deal with context, or to explicitly analyze
speech as act, or to fundament al l y treat of implicatures or presupposition as inher-
ently important to language study, and so on.
3. S o m e c a s e s t udi e s
The met hodol ogy outlined above instructs us to l ook for explicit and essential
referrals to the language user in the search for roots, precursors, predecessors, and
ancestors of positions which, being labeled ' pragmat i c' , are confi ned to the house of
moderni t y. Such a search is a historical enterprise harboring certain implications
which, in turn, concern its ends (or, alternatively, its futility). A number of (positive
and negative) examples of the ongoing search for roots of pragmatics in earlier cen-
turies will serve, for the moment , to point to insights which will then be instrumen-
tal in answering the ' why' question posed above.
3.1. Earl y grammat i cal cat egori es
Two contextual, i.e. historical, considerations lead specifically to the early gram-
mar textbooks of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as potential candidates for
pragmatic awareness. First, a natural intuition says that the move from classical
Latin grammar to vernacular grammar may contain explicit mention of the vernacu-
lar speaker. Second, because of the confusi on between logic, grammar and rhetoric
characteristic of those times, it behooves us to inspect grammarians vacillating
bet ween logical and rhetorical leanings.
The textbooks of grammar of these centuries display a bewildering array of conti-
nuity and change, unity and diversity - all within a general constructive ambience
conserved since Quintilian. Indeed, the introductory definitions of grammar at first
seem promising, but in the end t hey prove disappointing. Perusing the literal defini-
tions of grammar in the textbooks, and going on to the pedagogical debate on how
to teach grammar, one finds the word ' use' in various, multifarious quarters. An
optimistic researcher may, in taking explicitness to the extreme, pursue such occur-
rences in the hope of finding a theory of use. However, a more realistic interpreta-
tion of numerous, very similar definitions, leads to a dead end, since the use of ' use'
does not point to anyt hi ng resembling a t heory of use. There is neither an intention
of, nor a pretension at positing rules of use. The word ' use' is standardly, commonl y
used with no commi t ment to the modem profundi t y we ascribe to it, but rather as a
synonym for ' exerci se' .
Goi ng beyond the generally uni form definitions, it is rather within the details of
grammar textbooks that one meets real diversity, and with it, some glimmerings of
pragmatics. One outstanding case is that of the relatively original, yet truly prag-
matic treatment of the category of mood encountered in Richard Johnson' s Gram-
462 A. Biletzki / Journal of Pragmatics 25 (1996) 455--470
matical Commentaries of 1706. Johnson supplies a detailed and copious meta-dis-
cussion of all elements grammatical to be found in any contemporaneous grammar-
ian (Biletzki, 1991). He poses the question of formal vs. other criteria of grammati-
cal categories, thereafter dedicating over 80 pages to the analysis of mood. In
attacking the standard Li l yan grammar text, ~2 he presents definitions of mood haunt-
ingly reminiscent of modem speech act theory, with moods being construed as sep-
arate speech acts. Furthermore, and far more importantly, on a high theoretical level
Johnson satisfies the two methodological demands of explicitness and essentiality
posited above, for instance when he says: "I t must therefore be understood at least,
that there is no necessity, that the Mood should be in the Word itself, ... it is not
requi r' d that it should be in the Verb . . . . and so cannot be distinguished by that [ter-
mination] alone, but by the sense of the Sentence, or by the Cont ext " (Johnson,
1706: 254). Nothing could be more explicit, yet to drive the matter of essentiality
home, Johnson adds: " He that understands when they may be used, together with
the use of the other Moods, knows as much as is requisite of this Mat t er" (ibid.:
278). An exceptionally long list of uses follows, as Johnson sets out to define, by
way of these uses, several different moods. This divergence from other grammars
may be viewed, prima facie, as a quantitative difference - but it is indeed the quan-
tity (which was formerl y absent) that leads to better explanations. The list is oriented
to action in speech and is seen to enrich the traditional ' semant i cs' of moods. Instead
of representing ' inclinations of the mi nd' , as the Li l yan moods were explicated in the
standard way, moods stand for ' modes of predication' which are dependent on the
' occasions of manki nd' . The meaning of moods becomes, then, a function of their
use, and their use, in turn, a function of context, circumstance, prior knowl edge,
intention and attendant inference. An early eighteenth-century grammari an does
pragmatics.
3.2. The debate about rhetoric
Movi ng on to rhetoric - textbooks of which were no less bountiful in those eras -
we must tread more warily, for rhetoric involves pragmatics almost by definition, as
it recognizes explicitly and essentially the speaker, the hearer, and the context of
(specific) discourses. Indeed, it becomes mandat ory to ask of the gain obtained by
turning to pragmatic ideas (or terminology, or theory) instead of to (merely) rhetori-
cal ones. My example will be used to present one such profitable endeavor - the turn
to pragmatics as touching of f advances in the t heory of interpretation.
There is, in current literature, a basic dissent among interpreters of the rhetoric of
the English renaissance, representatives of the respective sides of the debate being
Howell (1956, 1971) and Vickers (1970, 1981). The dispute hinges on the relative
importance and significance of the classical parts of rhetoric. While Howel l is intent
on locating a (positive) trend, from the classical, stylistically extravagant rhetorics of
~2 Li l y' s Gr a mma r was act ual l y t he accumul at ed wor k of mor e t han one aut hor - mai nl y Col et and
Lily. Or i gi nal l y publ i s hed in 1510, it under went var i ous changes and edi t i ons. In 1540 it was offi ci al l y
aut hor i zed as t he offi ci al gr a mma r in t he school s by royal i nduct i on.
A. Biletzki / Journal of Pragmatics 25 (1996) 455--470 463
the sixteenth cent ury to the empirical and rationalistic ones of the late seventeenth
century, Vickers insists on the centrality of the t heory of style - elocutio - in all its
subtlety and funct i onal i t y during the same centuries. The question, then, is: was
English renaissance rhetoric a vi ew on ' f or m and cont ent ' born of questions about
language and i nfl uenced by the approach of science and rationalism (as Howel l
would have it), or was it a literary t heory havi ng to do with the intricacies of style as
the be-all and end-all of the effi cacy of language (as Vickers cl ai ms)?
My proposal is to view these two opposing rhetorical strands as participating in a
pragmatic view of language. It then remains to show that English renaissance
rhetoricians were pragmatic in the sense that t hey upheld both these views consis-
tently. Checki ng the issue through pragmatic lenses thus leads to an enlightening
synthesis attested to by the texts on rhetoric themselves: a t heory of rhetoric cog-
nizant of rationality as mot i vat i ng the use of language (~ la Howell) does indeed lie
at the basis of the intricacies of style so prevalent in the texts (as Vickers insists).
Two pragmatic insights stand out in particular: style and specific figures of speech
as a functional, purposive enterprise (as seen in the works of Peacham, 1577;
Hoskins, 1599, and Puttenham, 1589), meshi ng well with the constitutive purpose or
goal afforded to speech acts; and the flexibility of figures of speech as integral to a
view of language which recognizes its inherent context-dependency. Onl y by using
a pragmatic framework can one offer an explication of the seemingly paradoxical
tension bet ween a generalizing, rule-governed basis for rhetoric and a viewpoint
located in the specificities of particular styles, both of which are explicitly present in
the rhetoric texts. But it is, indeed, the forte of pragmatics that it can account for the
vagaries of specific contexts by using rules of rational speech-action. Though usually
not explicitly presented by rhetoricians of the past as a theoretical framework, their
rhetorical ' t heor y' is deserving of the label of pragmatics in no trivial sense. It is in
Thomas Wi l son' s very early Art of Rhet ori que (1553) that we come upon one of the
rare explicit expositions of the essentiality of context: "Not onely it is necessarie to
knowe, what maner of cause wee have taken in hande, when we firste enter upon any
matter, but also it is wise done to consider the t yme, the place, the man for whom we
speake, the man against whome we speake, the matter whereof we speake, and the
j udges before whome we speak, the reasons that best serve to further our cause, and
those reasons also, that mai e seine somewhat to hynder our cause, and in no wise to
use any such at all, or els warel y to mitigate by protestacion, the aiall that is in them,
and alwaies to use what soever can be saied, to wynne the chi ef hearers good willes,
and perswade theim to our purpose" (ibid.: 21). Nowhere has a more pragmatical
introduction been given to rhetoric.
3.3. A pragmat i c phi l osopher of language
Searching t hrough textbooks of grammar and rhetoric is a decodi ng enterprise: we
pretend to discover the gr ammar i an' s or rhet ori ci an' s t hought s on language through
his words on grammar and rhetoric. Phi l osophy is more conducive to our research,
for we may ask the explicit question about a philosopher: What has he to say about
l anguage? A fascinating case is that of Thomas Hobbes, father of political science,
464 A. Biletzki / Journal of Pragmatics 25 (1996) 455--470
and a vi rul ent phi l osopher wi t h posi t i ons of si gni fi cance on several ot her subjects,
and in part i cul ar mar ki ng of f a pi vot al vi ewpoi nt on speech. The secondary, inter-
pret i ve wor k undert aken by academi a on Hobbe s ' s phi l osophy (dare we say t heor y?)
of l anguage is t ant al i zi ng in its ext remes, for it moves f r om t hose who charact eri ze
hi m as provi di ng an original speech t heory to t hose who cl ai m he has no consi st ent
posi t i on regardi ng l anguage. 13 A historical readi ng of Hobbes, f r om the earl y Human
Nat ure, t hrough the Levi at han, and on to the " mos t compl et e and defi ni t i ve state-
ment " (Hungerl and and Vi ck, 1973: 459) of l anguage, found in De Corpore, pre-
sents a phi l osophi cal devel opment of the const ruct s of l anguage and speech. Hi s
wri t i ngs exhi bi t an awareness of the di fference bet ween speech, whi ch is a funct i on
of use, and l anguage, whi ch is a structure consi st i ng of names and proposi t i ons. A
nomi nal semant i cs (t ermed by others ' r ef er ent i al ' and ' i deat i onal ' ) , whi l e exhi bi t i ng
the seeds of a f or mal and ri gorous present at i on, when read in a l arger context, is seen
to be onl y a part of his l anguage theory, whi ch encompasses a far mor e compr ehen-
sive vi ew of l anguage and speech (sharpl y del i neat ed) t han hi t hert o r ecogni zed) 4 It
is the focus on the latter (rarely present in the secondary literature) that uneart hes a
pr agmat i c phi l osophy; one whi ch is not onl y not at odds wi t h his wel l -recogni zed
nomi nal i sm but i ndeed goes wel l beyond it. One must t hen r ef or mul at e Hobbe s ' s
phi l osophy of l anguage in pr agmat i c t erms and, in fact, posi t this ' pr agmat i cs ' as his
defi ni t i ve t heory of l anguage. Al t hough it appear s in his earl y works (esp. chapt er 5
and 13 in Human Nat ure), the syst emat i c present at i on of a vi rt ual ' t heor y of us e' can
pr ovi de an overal l groundi ng for his later, mor e sci ent i fi cal l y oriented, semant i cs.
A di rect consequence of such a novel anal ysi s of Hobbe s ' s intricate di scussi on on
speech and l anguage is the ascri pt i on to Hobbes of a t heory of meani ng whi ch
encompasses the meani ng of mor al and political t e r ms ) 5 The somewhat eni gmat i c
proposal , wel l recogni zed, but rarel y expl i cat ed before the advent of pragmat i cs, that
the soverei gn fi xes the meani ng of words can now be bet t er underst ood by use of the
per f or mat i ve intuition; i.e. that the soverei gn, while legislating, endows t er ms wi t h
meani ng. Thi s el egant anal ysi s now suppl i es a l ever wi t h whi ch to newl y appr oach
Hobbe s ' s mor al and political phi l os ophy) 6 One can, and should, f ur t her mor e deal
mor e di rect l y wi t h the i mpl i cat i ons of pr agmat i cs for his wri t i ngs on rhet ori c; these
arise bot h in his di rect t reat ment of rhet ori c as an i ndependent subject, and in his
st ance t owards, and use of, rhet ori c in his political writings. Rhet ori c is, in fact, one
of the st eppi ng stones whi ch enabl e Hobbes to make the expl i ci t move to politics, as
13 See, e.g., Hungerland and Vick (1973), Hacking (1975).
~4 Analyses of Hobbes's theory of language are rather sparse, but a representative list of the past few
decades would, conceivably, begin with Martin (1953/54) and Krook (1956) and advance up to De
Jong(1990).
J5 This perspective on Hobbesian moral concepts has been with us for several years, see, e.g., Parry
(1967), Weiler (1970), Von Leyden (1973), Bertman (1978).
16 On the direct relationship between Hobbes's theory of language and his politics, see Bertman (1988).
Also of notice, concerning pragmatics in Hobbes's thought on language, is Isermann (1991). Isermann
sees pragmatics as one of the elements of Hobbes's philosophy (along with cognition, semantics, defin-
ition, truth, nominalism, and others), and devotes entire chapters to the practical-political dimension of
language, to language and communication, and to performative language in the state of nature.
A. Biletzki / Journal of Pragmatics 25 (1996) 455--470 465
are his interpretations of religious language and his use of the narrative of the state
of nature. In all these discussions, pragmatics opens up options of a fascinating,
more comprehensive, analysis of Hobbes' s philosophy, far beyond his (supposedly)
delimited phi l osophy of language.
4. Why do a history o f pragmatics?
Why is it at all enlightening or explanatory or important to fi nd pragmatics in
t hought about language in past centuries? I will tackle these three questions - about
enlightenment, explanation and importance - in succession.
4.1. Enl i ght enment (or: understanding the past )
Three points come to mind. First, i f we are bent on convi nci ngl y relating the con-
tent of l anguage study in past centuries - what people had to say about language -
to modem pragmatics, t hen i f these thinkers did say something of a pragmatic
nature, any account which does not report these elements and turns is missing the
point. Notice the terms ' rel at i ng' and ' account ' . I f what is needed is a historical
description of the treatises about language in the past, and i f it is required that this
description be true to the texts, then the lack of recognition of pragmatic details may
simply ' mi si nf or m' the historian. But we are dealing here with the history of ideas -
what is being recount ed is not j ust a historical tale - and a ' rel at i ng' of what was said
about l anguage must be checked under the rubric of understanding. It then becomes
crucial that a real understanding of language study take into consideration, and
report on, pragmatic elements (if these indeed are present). A case in point is that of
Richard Johnson: understanding his ' ani madversi ons' involves, in principle, taking
account of his t heory of moods as a t heory of language use.
Second, and far more importantly, in order to understand historical views on lan-
guage in their times, one may profitably turn to pragmatics. That is, one will be bet-
ter enabled to point to changes in the understanding of language, in the conceptions
of the relations bet ween t hought and language, in the analysis of man, in the status
of language in philosophy, etc. The presence (or absence) of pragmatic awareness, or
the explicit pragmatical renderings of these thoughts, or the weakness or strength of
the pragmatical el ement in such discussions, can all be utilized in the explanation of
historical developments. This point is illustrated convi nci ngl y by the story of
rhetoric in post-renaissance England, whi ch is given a developmental di mensi on (in
the move from classical elocutio to a rationalistic science of speech) through adop-
tion of pragmatical t ermi nol ogy.
The third point which arises is our use of pragmatics to solve our problems of
understanding in dealing with older texts, or problems of understanding which we
think the writers of those texts may have had. These are the question marks, contra-
dictions, and even dead ends whi ch have been numerous in the analyses of past
t hought and older treatises. Such existing question marks and dead ends are arrived
at either because the philosopher in question found hi msel f up against insurmount-
466 A. Biletzki / Journal of Pragmatics 25 (1996) 455-470
abl e phi l osophi cal or linguistic pr obl ems, or because our tools of anal ysi s thus far
have not al l owed us to account for what appear ed to be his sol ut i ons to the pr obl ems.
In ot her words, the dead end may be his as wel l as our own. Bot h situations are
amenabl e to an at t empt at a r enewed deci pheri ng, usi ng pragmat i cs, and the results
may be mani fol d. We may find that f or mer i gnorance of, or i nat t ent i on to, that
wr i t er ' s pr agmat i c emphasi s was the cause of our quest i on mar k; we may di scover
that usi ng pr agmat i c tools, we can bet t er expl ai n the r eason for his quest i on mar k; or
we may hypot hesi ze that, perhaps, t hrough l ack of such t ool s he did i ndeed come to
a dead end. Or again, we may real i ze that full recogni t i on of pr agmat i c el ement s in
t hose wri t i ngs (even i f the ori gi nal wri t er did not recogni ze t hem as such) leads the
way to a different, per chance better, underst andi ng of what he had been saying. (This
is act ual l y a poi nt of conver gence with the first poi nt made above. ) Pragmat i cs, then,
can be per cei ved as a recourse to bet t er underst andi ng and pr obl em sol vi ng with
regard to these texts. Nowher e is such added val ue mor e pr omi nent t han in the case
of Hobbesi an scholarship. The apparent doubl e- edged anal ysi s of his works, movi ng
in the seemi ngl y opposi t e di rect i ons of science and politics, can be synt hesi zed
medi at i ng his vi ews on l anguage. These make sense, concer ni ng bot h Hobbes the
scientist and Hobbes the politician, when seen t hrough pragmat i cal , linguistic
glasses.
4.2. Pragmatic explanation ?
What can the di scover y of pr agmat i cs (or the di scover y of its absence) cont ri but e
to the current debat es surroundi ng pr agmat i c t heori es and const ruct s? 17 When using
pr agmat i cs for the anal ysi s of texts we are act ual l y putting our mo d e m t heori es and
concept s of pr agmat i cs to the test. It is, however , quite difficult, i f not i mpossi bl e, to
det er mi ne the criteria for fai l i ng or passi ng the test. Our t heoret i cal f r amewor k ai ms
at bet t er expl ai ni ng those texts, and it is hard to see at what poi nt we may say that
our expl anat i on is i ndeed better. I f we have used pr agmat i cs to pull us out of a dead
end and have succeeded in our endeavor , then we may surely cl ai m some pract i cal
val ue ( of pr agmat i c t erms) for expl anat or y purposes. But mos t cases are not so cl ear-
cut - a nd so we l and agai n at the quest i on of ' bet t er underst andi ng' . The fruitful
r e- exami nat i on of ol der texts in a new light is of val ue per se, and our ability to make
pr agmat i c t erms rel evant to the st udy of l anguage in ot her t i mes is suffi ci ent j ust i fi -
cat i on and exonerat i on. Ther e is an intrinsic val ue in a fresh anal ysi s of some t ext
(whi ch was hi t hert o unclear, or whose i nt erpret at i on perhaps even seemed mi s-
gui ded), in that such an anal ysi s yi el ds results of a product i ve nat ure when quest i ons
asked in that same t ext are appr ehended as pr agmat i c questions. Qui t e cl earl y, this is
a cont ri but i on to the hi st ory of ideas, or the hi st ory of linguistics or phi l osophy. Our
~7 Again, there is the purely historical interest one may have - especially in something that is currently
popular. Just as books are sprouting up in the history of semiotics, semantics, linguistics - so it is rea-
sonable to expect that, on reaching the heyday of pragmatics, we should be engaged in the history of
pragmatics. The question is one of value rather than of interest - and in that sense it deserves an honest,
deeper - not just an ad hoc - answer.
A. Biletzki / Journal of Pragmatics 25 (1996) 455-470 467
present challenge, however, is directed at the proposal of ' pragmatics as a true the-
ory' and to the claim that delving into texts, using pragmatics, can do somet hi ng for
the present state (rather than status) of the art (of pragmatics). My answer, at this
point, can be no more than an intuitive hint.
Emphases, contexts, and stylistic disciplines are no mean matter. We turn to older
thinkers' weaknesses in order to strengthen our own. But we can t um to their
strengths for the same purpose. In places where their emphases were different from
ours, in disciplines where t hey dwelled while we have dawdled, in contexts which
t hey revered and which we virtually ignore - we can begin the search for new things
to say about pragmatics. Thus, for instance, our theories of persuasion (now
addressed by modern pragmaticists) stand to learn from the full-blown rhetorical the-
ories of other times; our efforts at explaining linguistic categories such as mood
(now i nfl uenced by pragmatic theories) may be enriched by the intricacies of past
grammatical efforts.
Finally, the discovery or interpretation of pragmatic content in past thinkers must
lead to queries concerning the overall status of pragmatics in linguistic and philo-
sophical study. But this becomes the question of importance, actually a meta-ques-
tion, as presented above.
4.3. History as meta-pragmatics
Extreme positions on the issue of language (talking animals and talking machines)
notwithstanding, it is a safe philosophical bet to assume that one essential trait of
man is his possession of language; thus the question of language is lent a legitimate,
perennial nature.
Saying ' t he question of l anguage' amounts, in this context, to more than the lead-
ing question ' What is l anguage?' ; the additions being questions of thought, of mean-
ing, of truth, of language use, of communi cat i on, of mutual human understanding.
Pragmatics claims that sufficient answers, or essential answers, to these questions
cannot be secured unless one takes into account pragmatic factors. So this is really
the meta-theory of pragmatics. It is the same meta-question that any philosopher of
language must answer i f he is to be regarded as addressing a perennial question.
Consequently, he who undertakes to point out pragmatical considerations in texts
of all times - whether such considerations be explicit or implicit, conscious or
unconscious, of a theoretical or practical nature - is rephrasing the perennial ques-
tion in the fol l owi ng way: Is pragmatics necessary for the essential analysis of lan-
guage? Can it provide satisfactory tools for undoing the conundrums and unt yi ng the
puzzles whi ch the philosopher of language faces? Is it explanatory in the sense of
supplying a t heory of language use under which we can subsume phenomena hith-
erto unexpl ai ned? Seen in this light, the search for pragmatics in other times is of
value to the philosopher of language and is justified via the external issue of lan-
guage at large.
A new question now crops up which has been thus far ignored. Do the evidential
results of historical research contribute to this meta-question, or are t hey relevant
onl y on their own research levels? That is, what is the theoretical effect of different
468 A. Biletzki /Journal of Pragmatics 25 (1996) 455-470
r et ur ns t o t he above ques t i ons : di s c ove r y o f obvi ous pr agmat i cal el ement s in s ome
wr i t i ng vs. l ack o f such el ement s, and pr oduct i ve use o f pr agmat i c t ool s f or anal y-
sis vs. t ext s t hat do not l end t hems el ves t o such anal ys i s ? My asser t i on her e is t hat
even t hough, super f i ci al l y speaki ng, t he di f f er ent resul t s wi l l l ead t o vari et i es o f
y e s - n o answer s on t he r esear ch l evel ( ' Ye s - Hobbe s was a pr agmat i ci s t ' , ' No -
t her e is no wa y o f anal yzi ng Ba c on i n a pr agmat i c l i ght ' ) , t hey wi l l af f ect t he met a-
ques t i on of t he st at us o f pr agmat i cs in a f ar mor e compl i cat ed, i nt ri cat e, and i nt er-
est i ng manner .
I f pr agmat i cs can be f ound in f or mer t i mes, and i f t ext s o f ot her cent ur i es are ana-
l yzed pr oduct i vel y wi t h t he ai d o f pr agmat i cs, t hen we ma y t ri vi al l y state t hat pr ag-
mat i cs, at l east t hus far, has been usef ul by pr ovi di ng an i l l ust rat i ve, even essent i al ,
vi ewpoi nt on l anguage. Howe ve r , t he conver s e does not hol d. The fact t hat pr ag-
mat i cs is absent in t ext s o f t he past does not under mi ne its use or its usef ul ness in
l anguage anal ysi s. Rat her, we mus t at this poi nt t ry t o expl ai n this l ack and per haps
even s how t hat t he want o f pr agmat i c t ool s was t he cause of t he l acunae and shor t -
c omi ngs t hat we obs er ved on t he par t of l anguage phi l osopher s o f f or mer cent uri es.
Thi s sort o f cont ent i on is not easi l y uphel d, and its def ense is beset wi t h t heor et i cal
di ffi cul t i es. Never t hel ess, it does pr ovi de a poi nt o f depar t ur e f or di scussi ons on t he
cur r ent st at us o f pr agmat i cs.
It has be c ome obvi ous, in t he cour se o f t he last par agr aph, t hat an ans wer t o t he
met a- ques t i on o f t he i mpor t ance of pr agmat i cs in t he phi l os ophy o f l anguage
depends on t he resul t s o f t he r esear ch on pr agmat i cs i n ot her eras, even t hough it is
not s t r ai ght f or war dl y det er mi ned by t hem. So, in any case, such subst ant i ve r esear ch
s houl d be car r i ed out bef or e we can at t empt t o deal wi t h its pr es umed phi l os ophi cal
r eper cussi ons. And, i f we do meet pr edomi nant l y negat i ve evi dence, we can t hen
pr oceed t o a di fferent , mor e t r oubl esome, ques t i on - wh y is t here no ' r eal ' hi st or y o f
pr agmat i cs ?
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