<b>Organization<b>

The organization of feudal armies was kept simple in comparison to the large nat
ional armies of more modern time. There were no permanent regiments, divisions,
or corps until the very end of the age. When a feudal army was summoned, each va
ssal traveled to the meeting point with any knights, archers, and footmen that h
e was required to bring. At the meeting point, the contingents would be reassemb
led by role. The knights and their squires kept and marched together, as did the
archers and footmen.
Special units, such as engineers and the operators of siege artillery, were usua
lly professionals hired for the campaign. Christian mercenaries, for example, op
erated the artillery employed by the Turks against Constantinople.
Being a mercenary soldier was a respected profession in the late Middle Ages. Wa
rrior entrepreneurs formed mercenary companies that allowed a rich lord or city
to hire a ready-made competent fighting force. Mercenary companies existed that
were all of one skill. For example, 2000 Genoese crossbowmen served in the Frenc
h army at the Battle of Crcy in 1346. Other mercenary companies were mixed forces
of all arms. These were often described in terms of the number of lances they c
ontained. Each lance represented a mounted man-at-arms plus additional mounted,
foot, and missile troops. A company of 100 lances represented several hundred fi
ghting men. This system was the origin of the word "freelance."
Command hierarchy within a feudal army was flat. Not much maneuvering was antici
pated so there was little provision of large staffs to support the commander and
pass orders.
In 1439 Charles VII of France raised Royal Ordinance Companies. These companies
were filled with either knights or infantry and were paid from tax revenues. Eac
h company had a fixed complement of men; their armor and weapons were chosen by
the king rather than left to personal choice. This was the beginning of modern s
tanding armies in the West.
<i>Supply<i>
There was little provision for food and medical supplies. Medieval armies lived
off the land, to the detriment of everyone residing in an area they occupied or
passed through. Having a friendly army march through was no better than having t
he enemy pass. Medieval armies did not linger in one area for long because local
supplies of food and forage were quickly exhausted. This was a particular probl
em during sieges. If an army laying siege did not make arrangements to have food
and supplies brought in, it might have to lift its siege to avoid starvation lo
ng before the defenders had to surrender.
Sanitation was also a problem when an army stayed in one place. A medieval army
brought along many animals, in addition to the horses of the knights, and sewage
problems led to dysentery. Feudal armies tended to waste away to disease and de
sertion. During his campaign in France, Henry V of England lost an estimated 15
percent of his army to disease at the siege of Harfleur and more on the march le
ading up to Agincourt. At the battle itself, he lost only 5 percent. Henry V die
d of disease related to poor sanitation at another siege.
<i>Deployment for Battle<i>
Most battles were set-piece affairs where the two sides arranged themselves befo
re the fighting began. Campaigns of maneuver and meeting engagements were rare.
Prior to battle, commanders divided their forces into contingents with specific
tasks in mind for each. The first separation might be into foot soldiers, archer
s, and cavalry. These groups might be divided further into groups to be given in
dividual missions or to be held in reserve. A commander might arrange several "b
attles" or "divisions" of knights, for example. These could be launched individu
ally as desired or held in reserve. Archers might be deployed in front of the ar
my with blocks of infantry in support. Once the army had been arranged, the only
major decisions were when to send in the prearranged pieces. There was little p
rovision for pulling back, reforming, or rearranging once the fighting started.
A force of knights, for example, could rarely be used more than once. After they
had been committed to action, they were usually reinforced or withdrawn. A full
charge by heavy cavalry caused such disruption, lost equipment, and loss of hor
ses that the force was essentially spent. The Norman knights at Hastings were re
formed for further attacks, but they did not launch a full charge because they c
ould not penetrate the Saxon shield-wall.
Superior commanders made use of the terrain to their advantage and conducted rec
onnaissance to evaluate the enemy's strength and weaknesses.
<i>Ransom<i>
The ultimate rewards from successful battle included honors and grants of fiefs.
The proximate rewards included booty from looting bodies, ransacking captured t
owns and castles, selling the armor and weapons of the dead, and ransoming high-
ranking prisoners. Knights were expected to pay ransoms to save their lives. One
of the highest recorded ransoms was more than US $20 million paid to a German p
rince for the release of Richard I of England, captured during his return from t
he Crusades.
At Agincourt the English were holding a large group of French knights at the rea
r for ransom. During the battle, a French contingent raided toward the rear of t
he English and briefly panicked Henry V. He ordered the execution of the held Fr
ench knights to prevent their release, thereby forgoing a fortune in ransoms.
The capture of knights was recorded by heralds who kept a tally of which soldier
s were responsible and thereby due the bulk of the ransom. The heralds then noti
fied the prisoner's family, arranged the ransom payment, and obtained the prison
er's release.
The popularity of ransoms seems remarkably civil but masks a darker story. Low-r
anking prisoners of no value might be killed out-of-hand to eliminate the proble
m of guarding and feeding them.