FRANK W. DALY & ASSOCIATES, INC.

BY: Frank W. Daly, Esquire

Attorney I.D. #19485
110 West Front Street
P. O. Box 199
Media, PA 19063
(610) 565-7520
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DELAWARE COUNTY
CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY
CEDAR GROVE ASSOCIATES LIMITED :
PARTNERSHIP
t/a MEDIA SHOPPING CENTER :
519 East Baltimore Pike :
Media, PA 19063 :
Plaintiff :
:
v. : No. 13-________
:
PATRICIA SONS BINSWANGER, ESQUIRE :
71 Parkridge Drive :
Bryn Mawr, PA 19010 :
:
and :
JOHN AND JANE DOES 1 THROUGH 20, and :
DOE ENTITIES 1 and 2, :
all whose true names are unknown, :
:
Defendants :
PLAINTIFFS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiff, Cedar Grove Associates Limited Partnership ("Cedar Grove") hereby submits
the following brief in support of its petition for a preliminary injunction.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, Cedar Grove Associates Limited Partnership is a Pennsylvania Limited
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Partnership. It does business at 519 East Baltimore Pike, Media, Pennsylvania 19063 under the
name of the Media Shopping Center.
Defendants are a group of adult individuals who organize together under the name
Boycott We Love Pets - Stop Animal Cruelty for the purposes of boycotting and demonstrating
against a local business called We Love Pets. Defendants are activists who oppose the retail sale
of puppies, among other things. The group is organized by defendant Patricia Sons Binswanger
and uses what is known as a group tool on www.facebook.com to coordinate demonstrations
which have taken place on the Plaintiffs property on an almost weekly basis since October of
2011.
John and Jane Does 1 through 20 are listed as defendants because they are individuals
whose names and addresses of residences are unknown. Upon information and belief, some of
the persons who coordinate and participate in the demonstrations use aliases on the internet and
at the demonstrations in order to avoid identification.
Doe Entities 1 and 2 are listed defendants because the Plaintiff has reason to believe that
there may be some legally constituted organizations that have participated in the protests at the
shopping center, but their names are unknown.
Plaintiff is the owner of the strip shopping center located at the intersection of Providence
Road (SR 252) and East Baltimore Pike in Media Borough and also partially in Nether
Providence Township along East Baltimore Pike and Beatty Road,(The Property). The eastern
portion of the property is in Nether Providence Township and the western portion in Media
Borough.
The Plaintiff has a strict policy that states Solicitation, Distribution of Printed Materials,
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and Protesting is Strictly Prohibited. The policy is posted at the entrances to the Property and in
the windows of the stores in the shopping center. The Plaintiff also has a strict policy for parking.
The policy provides that the lot is for private parking for shopping center patrons only.
Parking is permitted only while actively shopping. The policy warns that Unauthorized vehicles
will be towed at owner's expense. The policies are posted at the entrances to the Property and at
various areas in the Plaintiffs parking lot.
We Love Pets, Inc is a retail store and is one of Plaintiffs tenants at the Media Shopping
Center. It is a pet store that sells, among other things, puppies. Defendants have organized
protests on Plaintiffs property against the We Love Pets store on numerous weekends since
October 2011.
Plaintiff does not seek to prevent Defendants from expressing their opinion. However,
Plaintiff seeks this Courts assistance in limiting the time, place and manner of those
demonstrations in order to protect Plaintiffs property rights from interference and damage. The
Defendants actions have harmed the Plaintiff in the following ways, among others:
1. On prior occasions, at the We love Pets Store location and directly in front of it, upon
information from the store owner, the defendants:
(a) Verbally harassed their customers as they come in to shop and leave, have
sometimes spit on customers and have harassed store employees.
(b) Have disrupted business and have blocked entrance to the store.
(c) Distributed flyers in and outside the store and in the parking lot.
(d) Place signs on (there own) cars in the parking lot.
(e) Have made threatening phone calls to the store.
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(f) Some have tried to break into the store.
(g) Some have gone through his trash at the store.
(h) On at least one occasion, a protestor gained access to the rear portion of the
store, which is clearly marked not open to the public and attempted to video the area.
2. In the parking area of the shopping center, and as well as on a portion of the sidewalk
along Providence Road, Media, PA that is privately owned by the Plaintiff (and not part
of the public ROW) and a sidewalk area that is part of the public ROW:
A. Defendants park on Plaintiffs property even though they are not actively
shopping, in violation of Plaintiffs posted policy.
B. Defendants obstruct the private sidewalk as well as the public right of way in
violation of Media Code 311-90 (B) (1) (No sign other than exempt signs shall be
erected within or over a public right-of-way or shall be of such character, form or
shape as to confuse or dangerously distract the attention of the operator of a motor
vehicle on a public street.) and Nether Providence Code 300-116.2 F (F. No signs
or billboards, except those specifically permitted by PennDOT or other
governmental body, including traffic signs and similar regulatory notices, shall be
allowed in the street rights-of-way).
C. Defendants weekly post more than 50 signs in the lawn on Plaintiffs property in
violation of Media Code 311-90 (A)(5) (Prohibits signs placed on property
without the permission of the owner or his agent. ) and common law trespass.
D. Defendants trample planting areas and place props and stick more than 50 signs in
the planting beds and blocking the sidewalk. Though in the public ROW these
areas are maintained by the Plaintiffs.
E. Defendants sometimes appear with more than 20 demonstrators, overwhelming
and blocking the narrow public right-of-way at a dangerous intersection.
F. Defendants have trespassed onto and erected signs on the parking lot in violation
of Media Code 311-90 (A) (15). (Prohibits signs placed on vehicles or trailers
which are parked or located for the primary purpose of displaying the signs.) and
Nether Providence Code 300-116.2 G ( Any vehicle to which a sign is affixed in a
conspicuous manner that the carrying of such sign or signs no longer is incidental
to the vehicles primary purpose in itself, shall be considered a sign and as such be
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subject to the provisions regarding signs in the district in which such vehicle is
located).
G. Defendants have trespassed onto the parking lot to distribute flyers.
H. At times, the Defendants have erected a 15' canopy tent on the Plaintiffs property,
placing folding chairs and tables on their property.
I. Defendants have placed a sign that is approximately 4' by 8' and blocks view of
cars in violation of Media Code 311-90 (A)(13). (Signs or mobile stands which
can be moved from place to place and thereby not permanently affixed to the
ground.) and Nether Providence Township Code 300-116.2 P (No sign shall be
permitted that is deemed to constitute a hazzard of any kind, or that obscures light
or air from any building, prevents ingress or egress from any window or exit or
interferes or obstructs the view of motorists or pedestrians).

J. Defendants have entered out into the busy intersection of Baltimore Pike and
Providence Road (SR 252) and distributed flyers to motorists stopped at the red
lights. This is dangerous for all involved.
K. Defendants have defaced trees and utility poles in the area with signs in violation
of Media Code 311-90 (A)(7) (Prohibits signs painted on buildings, or painted on
or attached to trees, utility poles, fences, outdoor benches or similar natural or
man-made features.) and Nether Providence Township Code 300-116.2 Q (Signs
may not be attached to utility poles or trees).
L. On information and belief, Defendants have instructed Demonstrators to give
false names to the police.
Accordingly, in order to protect Plaintiffs property rights, the Plaintiff is requesting that
the Court enter an Order setting for reasonable, content neutral time, place and manner
restrictions on the protesting activities by Defendants while on the Plaintiffs property.
There are two distinct issues which need to be addressed, first, trespassing on the
shopping center and, second, the manner and method of protests in the public right of way which
surrounds the shopping center.
First, Plaintiffs seek to prohibit the Defendants and other protestors from trespassing on
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the Plaintiffs property. This means that the Defendants should be prohibited from entering upon
Plaintiffs property other than as immediate customers of the stores located in the Media
Shopping Center. While in the Media Shopping Center as customers of stores located therein,
they must comply in all manners with the Plaintiffs no solicitation policy. This prohibition
should include, but not be limited to prohibiting all of the following:
(1) Defendants may not distribute leaflets or any literature of any nature
anywhere and to anyone on the shopping center premises, other than in the public
right of way.
(2) Defendants may not carry any signs or any other method of
communicating protest against any store located in the shopping center, other than
in the public right of way..
(3) Defendants may not attempt to harass or intimidate or disrupt any
employees of any of the stores or any of the customers of the shopping center.
(4) Defendants may not attempt to block the entrance to any of the stores
located in the shopping center.
(5) Defendants will not place threatening phone calls to the store.
(6) Defendants will not attempt to break into the store, nor go through the
trash of the store.
(7) Defendants may not park their vehicles in the shopping center parking
lot when not an active customer of the shopping center.
(8) Defendants may not place any protest or other sign on their vehicles
while shopping at the shopping center.
(9) Defendants may not place or erect any sign on any trees, lighting
fixtures, utility poles or any other fixed object located anywhere in the shopping
center or in the public right of way.
With regard to the public Right of Way adjacent and surrounding the Plaintiffs property,
Defendants and other protesters activities should be limited by reasonable time, place an manner
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restrictions. As previously stated, there are numerous issues whereby the demonstrations in the
right of way are impinging on the rights of Plaintiff and the public. The demonstrators are
damaging the Plaintiffs property and dangerously interfering with the free flow of pedestrian and
vehicular traffic. While the Plaintiff is not seeking to prevent Defendants from demonstrating,
Plaintiff is requesting that the Court impose reasonable, content neutral restrictions including, but
not be limited to the following:
(1) No more than 4 individuals may be present to protest at any given time.
(2) The protestors are only permitted to carry signs that do not obstruct the
view of any motorist nor cause any other safety issue or problem.
(3) No protestor may enter into any public highway to distribute literature
to any motorists.
(4) No protestor may park his or her vehicle in the Media Shopping Center
while engaged in protests.
(5) No signs may be affixed to any tree, utility or lighting fixture located in
the public Right of Way. Nor may they lean signs or props on trees or fixtures.
(6) No free standing signs may be driven into the ground in the public
Right of Way. The demonstrators must comply with all of the provisions of the
sign ordinances of the Borough of Media, when in Media and the Nether
Providence Township sign ordinance, when in Nether Providence.
(7) No tents, chairs or other such structures or devices, no matter how
temporary, may be placed or erected in the public Right of Way.

(8) The protesters may not block the sidewalk and must keep it open and
free and clear to pedestrian traffic.
It is requested that both the Media Borough and Nether Providence Township Police
Departments be instructed and empowered to enforce such restrictions in their respective
municipalities including the immediate removal and confiscation of any impermissible signs
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and/or abatement of any proscribed activities. The Plaintiff understands that a balancing must be
made to both protect Plaintiffs property rights and to allow free discussion of ideas.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff is suggesting these reasonable and content neutral restrictions to
balance the interests of all parties.
STANDARD OF DECISION
The law regarding injunctions is well established. In ruling on a preliminary injunction
request, a trial court there are six "essential prerequisites" that must be satisfied. See County of
Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 518 Pa. 556, 544 A.2d 1305, 1307 (Pa. 1988). First, a party
seeking a preliminary injunction must show that an injunction is necessary to prevent immediate
and irreparable harm that cannot be adequately compensated by damages. Singzon v. Dep't of
Pub. Welfare, 496 Pa. 8, 436 A.2d 125, 127-28 (Pa. 1981); John G. Bryant Co. v. Sling Testing
& Repair, Inc., 471 Pa. 1, 369 A.2d 1164, 1167-68 (Pa. 1977). Second, the party must show that
greater injury would result from refusing an injunction than from granting it, and, concomitantly,
that issuance of an injunction will not substantially harm other interested parties in the
proceedings. Valley Forge Historical Soc'y v. Washington Mem'l Chapel, 493 Pa. 491, 426 A.2d
1123, 1128-29 (Pa. 1981). Third, the party must show that a preliminary injunction will properly
restore the parties to their status as it existed immediately prior to the alleged wrongful conduct.
Valley Forge Historical Soc'y, 426 A.2d at 1128-29. Fourth, the party seeking an injunction must
show that the activity it seeks to restrain is actionable, that its right to relief is clear, and that the
wrong is manifest, or, in other words, must show that it is likely to prevail on the merits.
Anglo-Am. Ins. Co. v. Molin, 547 Pa. 504, 691 A.2d 929, 933-34 (Pa. 1997); Shenango Valley
Osteopathic Hosp. v. Dep't of Health, 499 Pa. 39, 451 A.2d 434, 440 (Pa. 1982). Fifth, the party
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must show that the injunction it seeks is reasonably suited to abate the offending activity. Albee
Homes, Inc. v. Caddie Homes, Inc., 417 Pa. 177, 207 A.2d 768, 771- 73 (Pa. 1965). Sixth and
finally, the party seeking an injunction must show that a preliminary injunction will not adversely
affect the public interest. Philadelphia v. District Council 33, AFSCME, 528 Pa. 355, 598 A.2d
256, 260-61 (Pa. 1991).
ARGUMENT
The above facts, when proved at the evidentiary hearing, clearly entitle Plaintiff to a
preliminary injunction against all defendants to prevent defendant demonstrators from further
trespassing on the plaintiffs property and violating numerous laws of the Commonwealth of PA
and the Codes and Ordinances of the Borough of Media and the Township of Nether Providence
as described previously.
Individuals do not have the general right to enter upon the private property of another.
Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co.,
512 Pa. 23, 32 (Pa. 1986) citing Kopka v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pa., 371 Pa. 444, 91 A.2d 232
(1952); Hobbs v. Geiss, 13 S & R 417 (1826). The Supreme Court in Western Pa Socialist
Workers specifically held that, even if invited for one purpose, the invitee has no recognized
right to engage in another activity against the landowner's wishes. Id. Citing Commonwealth v.
Johnston, 438 Pa. 485, 263 A.2d 376 (1970).
Western Pa Socialist Workers is on point because there, as here the public at large . . .
were invited to [the shopping center] for commercial purposes: shopping, dining and
entertainment. But, the Supreme Court held that, because political solicitation was uniformly
forbidden, the shopping center had a right to exclude the activists therein from the shopping
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center. Accordingly, it held that a shopping center has a right to enforce a total ban on political
solicitation and demonstration on its property.
Likewise, in Zartman v. Pennsylvania Animal Rights Coalition, 1983 Pa. Dist. & Cnty.
Dec. LEXIS 223 (Pa. C.P. 1983), the Court issued a permanent injunction which prohibited
animal rights activists from protesting and leafleting inside a farmers market. The Defendants
sought to protest a live animal auction at the market. It held that the protesters were prohibited
from entering the property. But, it allowed demonstrations limited to the area along the road
outside the auction on the sidewalk. Plaintiff herein seeks similar relief.
COUNT I - INJUNCTION AGAINST TRESPASS
The law is very well established that one who intentionally enters land in the possession
of another without a privilege to do so is liable to the possessor of the land as a trespasser.
Section 329 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a "trespasser" as "a person who enters
or remains upon land in the possession of another without a privilege to do so created by the
possessor's consent or otherwise." Restatement (Second) of Torts 329. Article I Section 1 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution guarantees as inherent and indefeasible the right of acquiring,
possessing, and protecting private property. Pa. Const. Art. I, 1.
It is a fundamental maxim of law which states that an owner of realty has a cause of
action in trespass against any person who has committed a trespass upon his lands, and it is not
necessary for the landowner to allege any actual injury or damage as an element of the cause of
action. 37 P.L.E., Trespass 6 (and collected cases). There is no need to allege harm in an
action for trespass, because the harm is not to the physical well being of the land, but to the
landowner's right to peaceably enjoy full, exclusive use of his property. See, Houston v. Texaco,
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Inc., 371 Pa.Super. 399, 538 A.2d 502 (1988), alloc. den. 520 Pa. 575, 549 A.2d 136 (1988).
The Superior Court, in Jones v. Wagner, 425 Pa. Super. 102, 109 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993),
applied Prosser on Torts which states:

Any physical entry upon the surface of the land is a trespass, whether it be by
walking upon it, flooding it with water, casting objects upon it, or otherwise. One
may commit a trespass upon the vertical surface of another's premises, as well as
the horizontal -- as where he piles dirt or attaches wires against a boundary wall.
But the interest in exclusive possession is not limited to the surfaces; it extends
above and below. There is a property right in the air space above the land, which
may be invaded by overhanging structures, or telephone wires, by thrusting an arm
above the boundary line, or by shooting across the land, even though the bullets
do not fall upon it. Prosser, Torts (5th ed., 1984); See also Restatement (Second)
of Torts, 159 (trespass may be committed above the surface of the earth).
Defendants actions irreparably harm Plaintiffs right to exclusive use of its land.
Plaintiff has a clear policy forbidding the use of its property for any kind of protest. Additionally,
the policy is clear that the parking lot may only be used by customers while actively shopping.
Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law to redress the impending harm from Defendants'
proposed conduct. The right of the Plaintiff to be free from trespass on its land and free from
violation of Borough Ordinances on its land and the protection of the public health, safety and
welfare cannot be compensated.
Greater injury would result by refusing the requested relief than by granting it. The
proposed restrictions allow the Defendants to protest. They merely require the protests to be
confined to the public right of way and implement reasonable restrictions to protect Plaintiffs
property rights.
The activity sought to be restrained is actionable and the requested relief is reasonably
suited to abate such activity. Each restriction is specifically targeted to ensure that any protesting
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activities do not occur outside the right of way, does not obstruct the right of way and does not
damage Plaintiffs property. The requested relief will abate the danger to public health, safety
and welfare posed by violation of the municipal ordinances, obstruction of the right of way and
interference with the flow of vehicular traffic.
The Plaintiff's right is clear and the wrong to be remedied is manifest. The Plaintiffs have
a clear right to exclude non-shoppers from their private shopping center. This injunction places
the parties in the position that they enjoy when Defendants are not protesting, namely that only
shoppers are permitted to park in Plaintiffs lot, no signs are displayed by Defendants on
Plaintiffs property and the Defendants are only permitted on the Plaintiffs property if actively
shopping.
The issuance of the injunction will not be contrary to the public interest, and indeed is
wholly designed to protect and preserve the public interest. The proposed restrictions protect the
public interest in protesting, while imposing narrow restrictions which are content neutral and
targeted at protecting Plaintiffs property rights.
Even in the public right of way, injunctions which effect the time, place and manner of
expression are proper if they are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. Perry
Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 955, 74
L.Ed.2d 794 (1983); Klebanoff v. McMonagle, 380 Pa. Super. 545, 548-549 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988).
Here, Plaintiff is not asking to prohibit speech, but merely to ensure that Defendants
conform to reasonable and content neutral rules which protect the Plaintiffs Property from
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damage and the free use of the right of way.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of its claim and the Court
issue an injunction preliminarily and permanently after final hearing, enjoining Defendants from
trespassing on the Plaintiffs Property, setting forth reasonable, content neutral limits on
Defendants protests which are confined to the public right of way, and awarding such other
relief as the Court deems just and proper.
COUNT II - INJUNCTION AGAINST VIOLATION OF
THE MEDIA BOROUGH and NETHER PROVIDENCE TOWNSHIP SIGN
ORDINANCES
Chapter 311 of the Codified Ordinances of the Borough of Media (the "Sign Ordinance")
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
311-90 (A) Prohibited signs. It is unlawful to erect or maintain the following signs:

(5) Signs placed on property without the permission of the owner or his agent.
(6) Signs with obscene or prurient words, scenes or graphics.
(7) Signs painted on buildings, or painted on or attached to trees, utility poles, fences,
outdoor benches or similar natural or man-made features.
(13) Signs or mobile stands which can be moved from place to place and thereby not
permanently affixed to the ground.
(15) Signs placed on vehicles or trailers which are parked or located for the primary
purpose of displaying the signs. This does not apply to lettering on buses, taxis or
vehicles operating in the normal course of business.
Likewise, Chapter 300-116 of the Codified Ordinances of Nether Providence Township
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
300-116.2. General sign and billboard regulations.
F. No signs or billboards, except those specifically permitted by PennDOT (Pennsylvania
Department of Transportation) or other governmental body, including traffic signs and
similar regulatory notices, shall be allowed within street rights-of-way.
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G. Any vehicle to which a sign is affixed in such a conspicuous manner that the carrying
of such sign or signs no longer is incidental to the vehicle's primary purpose, but becomes
a primary purpose in itself, shall be considered a sign and as such be subject to the
provisions regarding signs in the district in which such vehicle is located.
O. In the event that the location of a sign creates sight-view problems, then there must be
a minimum of seven feet of clearance between the ground and lowest portion of the face
of any sign except those permitted in any residential district.
P. No sign shall be permitted that is deemed to constitute a hazard of any kind, or that
obscures light or air from a building, prevents ingress or egress from any window or exit
or interferes or obstructs the view of motorists or pedestrians.
Q. Signs may not be attached to utility poles or trees.
Defendants have no right which is implicated herein. All that is requested is that the
Court compel them to follow the law. The Ordinances prohibit Signs placed on property
without the permission of the owner or his agent. Plaintiff has never granted any permission to
Defendants to place signs on its property. Yet, during the almost weekly demonstrations, signs
are placed upon and/or mounted to Plaintiffs property by Defendants.
The Borough and the Township Ordinances prohibit Defendants from erecting signs
attached to trees, utility poles, fences, outdoor benches or similar natural or man-made
features. However, Defendants often attach signs to the trees, telephone poles and other
structures on Plaintiffs property.
The Ordinance prohibits Signs or mobile stands which can be moved from place to place
and thereby not permanently affixed to the ground. Likewise, every weekend signs are placed
on the ground and in the right of way.
The Borough and Township Ordinances also prohibit the placement of signs on vehicles
or trailers which are parked or located for the primary purpose of displaying the signs. Yet,
Defendants have repeatedly mounted signs to their vehicles and parked them on the Plaintiffs
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property for the primary purpose of displaying their signs.
In addition to violating the law of trespass, Defendants actions in erecting signs on
Plaintiffs property are clearly in violation of the Borough and the Township Sign Ordinances.
There is no remedy at law which can adequately compensate Plaintiff for the damages imposed
by Defendants actions. An injunction is the only remedy which will prevent immediate and
irreparable harm. Since the Defendants have no right to erect signs on the Plaintiffs property,
greater injury would result from refusing an injunction than from granting it. It merely enforces
the status quo, i.e. that the Plaintiffs has the exclusive right to erect signs on its property.
Because these actions are in direct violation of the Borough Sign Ordinance, Plaintiff is
likely to prevail on the merits. The proposed injunction is narrowly drawn to specifically abate
the offending activity. There is no public interest in violating the Borough Ordinances.
Accordingly, a preliminary injunction will not adversely affect the public interest.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the Plaintiff requests that the Court enter an injunction
prohibiting further trespass by Defendants and establishing reasonable time, place and manner
restrictions on the demonstrations which are held along the right of way on Plaintiffs property as
set forth in the proposed Order.
Respectfully Submitted,
______________________________
Frank W. Daly, Esquire

January 22, 2013
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