1

NATO is a Bona-FideMilitary Alliance, not a Socio-Political Private Club

By Marcus A. Templar
In my essay Skopje Contributes to its Own Instability
1
I had argued that the problem in the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (the FYROM) is the Slavic majority of the country that
monopolizes the government and all institutions, disregarding its 35% minority of Albanians, let
alone all others. Instead of acting on facts, they have chosen fiction. The latest chosen drama is
FYROMs alleged victimization by Greece according to which Greece invoked its veto power to
preclude Skopje NATO membership.
NATOs principle for enlargement has created misunderstandings and illusions for some
countries that consider NATO the place that either offers security or prestige or even both. It has
created misunderstandings because the FYROM Slavs feel that their membership was guaranteed
as is without changing their modus operandi; it has generated illusions because the FYROM
believes that NATO membership is going to boost their national pride. The statement of the
Greek Prime Minister that all Balkan countries would join the EU in 2014, the so-called
Balkans 2014 project, also created great misunderstandings and illusions. Immediately after the
announcement, the FYROM Prime Minister declared the Project Skopje 2014, assuming that
Skopjes EU membership was also guaranteed.
While the strategic goal of all Balkan countries is NATO membership, it does require a series
of achievements of certain political and military preconditions, as well as military, economic,
and security criteria. On the other hand, one could pose the question, what could FYROM have
to offer to the Alliance, considering their Defense budget is insignificant?
Before any country is considered a NATO member, it has to fulfill certain political criteria
over and above those that NATO requires; the political preparation of the candidate country has
to abide by NATO Enlargement Study and Accession Process, Ch. 5, para. 72, which expects the
prospective members to have met OSCE requirements before NATO even considers
preconditions and criteria for membership.
NATO enlargement Study of 28 September 1995, which is the basis for subsequent
enlargements, can be found in NATO Handbook in the NATO website.
2
Since the enlargement
process is highly regulated one could divide the process into five stages. The first two stages are
only preparatory. Stage 3 is the key to membership. If a country passes stage 3, it means that
the country has met the preconditions, but not necessarily the criteria.
Stage 1 is the expression of desire of a country to cooperate militarily with NATO having as
a goal to eventually join NATO. The expression of a military cooperation is realized by the
1
Marcus A. Templar, Skopje Contributes to its Own Instability, Research Institute for European and American
Studies (RIEAS), http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/greek-studies/678.html (accessed June 22, 2011).
2
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm; http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm#CH3
(accessed June 30, 2011).
2
participation of the applicant to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. The Partnership
for Peace (PfP) is a programme of practical bilateral cooperation between individual Partner
countries and NATO. It allows Partner countries to build up an individual relationship with
NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation.
3
Stage 2 is just one step up the ladder for the country as a preparatory step to membership.
Stage 3 is the hardest step of all. It is the Judgment step and NATOs explicit call. It is a
verdict based on negotiations, deliberations, and consultations in consensual decision. A country
either has what it takes to be member of NATO or it doesnt. The country has to meet the
preconditions for membership. Skopje is in Stage 3 at this point.
Stage 4 is the stage of scrutiny on the criteria listed in NATOs 1995 enlargement study.
Pros and cons of the countrys potential accession are discussed along with shortcomings in
meeting membership pre-conditions.
Stage 5 is the final step starting with consensus of country members that recognizes that the
aspiring country has met NATOs preconditions and is minimally prepared to function within
NATO. This determination is strictly political and depends on the member point of political
view. This is the stage of intra-alliance bargaining regarding the invitation date to join.
4
The Freedom House report of 2010, an independent watchdog organization that supports the
expansion of freedom around the world, considering NATO countries score somewhere between
1 and 1.3 (except Turkey 4.5) for political and civil rights, the FYROM scores Political Rights: 3
and Civil Liberties: 3. Overall the political status of the FYROM is classified
PartlyFree, which means that there is NO democracy in the FYROM.
The FYROM economy is small with GDP in 2010 of US $9,400,000,000.
5
During the same
year it spent US$155,000,000 in military expenditures or 1.65% of its GDP.
6
According
Channel A1 of Skopje, in August 2010, the FYROM budget for the FY 2011 had increased the
Ministry of Internal Affairs one by 11m (US$16 m) at the expense of the military budget
which had decreased by more than 8m (US$11.5m). It means that in FY 2011 the military
budget went down from 107 m (or US$155 m) to 99 m (or US$142 m). The report continues
that the funds for the program of promoting defense and security activities for NATO entry
3
NATO, The Partnership for Peace programme, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm (accessed
June 18, 2011).
4
Thomas S. Szayna, NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and
Shaping. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001). http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1243.
(accessed June 13, 2011).
5
The actual sums given in and FYROM denars.
6
International Institute for Strategic Studies - Military Balance 2011.
3
have been reduced twofold, from 4.2 m (US$6 m) to 2.2 m (US$3.2m). These allocations of
military expenditures bring the military expenses down to 1.4% of the gross national product.
7
Former FYROM Defense Minister Lazar Elenovski stated, "Obviously, by using this
element, the government puts into jeopardy the army's funding by drastically reducing the
defense budget. On the other hand, we know that there have been no effects on the Ministry of
Internal Affairs' budget, but it has instead been increased."
8
The FYROM definitely cannot bear the burden of NATO membership without the financial
support of the United States. So, the question can be raised: Is the U.S. taxpayer asked to pay for
the political megalomania of the FYROM elite when Secretary Robert Gates tells NATO allies
carry your weight or else?
The antiquation of the FYROM for a past that never was aka Project Skopje 2014 costs an
estimate of about US$115 million with the opposition considering the final cost near US$230
million; all this when the country has more than 30% unemployment, and growth is only 1%.
9
But most part of this growth depends of Greek investments. Two hundred eighty Greek-owned
companies are operating in the FYROM, of course not paying a cent to the Greek Revenue
Service, but they do pay taxes to the FYROM. Of the 17 largest foreign investments in Skopje,
the seven are Greek and ten largest Greek companies have invested in the country over 780
million (US$ 1.1 million) for a total of 1 billion (US$1.42). In addition, more than 7 out of 20
largest companies in the FYROM represent Greek interests.
10
Lets however see if the FYROM qualifies to gain NATO membership. According to the
ratings included in NATO Enlargement Study of the Rand Corporation (10 as High and 0 as
Low) the FYROM stands as follows:
On the Assessment of Strategic Attractiveness to NATO, the FYROMs Strategic Position is
medium or 4.2; the FYROMs Armed Forces Readiness has scored Medium 5.0 for an overall
Medium or 4.6.
On the matter of Preparation for and Attractiveness to NATO, the FYROM scored on
Criteria Low (1.7); the Strategic Attractiveness of the FYROM as we saw above is an Average
Medium (4.6). Thus 4.6 plus the 1.7 gives an overall rating ebbing to a Medium-Low (3.2).
7
Irina Gelevska, "Government Deprives Defense Ministry of More Than 8 Million Euros; Interior Ministry Obtains
11 Million Euros More," Channel A1, Skopje, 25 Aug 10.
8
Irina Gelevska, "Government Deprives Defense Ministry of More Than 8 Million Euros; Interior Ministry Obtains
11 Million Euros More," Channel A1, Skopje, 25 Aug 10.
9
Reuters published in Gulf Times, Macedonia erects Alexander statue, infuriating Greece,
22 June, 2011, http://gulf-
times.com/site/topics/printArticle.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=442508&version=1&template_id=39&parent_id=21
(accessed June 22, 2011).
10
, : . 20.000 July 20, 2008
20/07/2008, http://www.makthes.gr/news/politics/21350/ (accessed June 13, 2011).
4
The Political criteria are considered Low (1.5) while the Economic criteria are deemed also
Low (1); the Military criteria are Medium to Low marked as 2.0 for a total assessment of a
Medium, 4.5. The Overall rating for the FYROM meeting NATO criteria was assessed to the
Low 1.7.
Regarding the issue of good neighborly relations, Skopje has not done anything to help itself.
It has infuriated Greece and the EU by erecting the statue of the Equestrian Warrior which just
happens to identically resemble Alexander the Great (under a different name expecting that they
would fool their own people as well) forcing EU Enlargement Commissioner tefan Fle to
state,
Seriously, if you have a neighbour, and I'm not talking about two states now, and there is an
issue between two of you, whatever the nature of that issue is, and you are trying sincerely to
solve it, I guess you would avoid doing anything that your neighbour might call a
provocation. This is simple logic. I would expect the government in Skopje to avoid doing
things which would be called by the other side provocations.
11
..
Am I satisfied with the tempo of reform? Not really. As soon as the government is being
formed, if we see clear steps toward renewing the reform tempo in your country, then I don't
see any reason why we should change our recommendation. If we have a feeling that instead
of progress there is a regress, if we have a feeling that instead of going forward you are
going backwards, we would probably have to reassess that recommendation to start
accession negotiations,
12
Regarding the claim that the FYROM was the only republic that seceded peacefully from
Yugoslavia, it was more of a coincidence than political planning. Trajan Goevski professor of
the Faculty of Philosophy of the University Sts. Cyril and Methodius of Skopje explains,
Unlike Slovenia in 1990, the demilitarization idea was not backed by any critical evaluation
of the deficiencies of the previous military establishment. It was more a product of
Macedonias passivity and self-pity than an expression of a proactive and democratic
attitude towards national security issues. Macedonias peacefulness was more a coincidence
than a result of some political decision. Very soon it was apparent that the state possessed a
deep conflict potential and lacked the democratic culture of conflict resolution. Therefore, it
is incorrect to conclude that demilitarization and making an oasis of peace were the
leading ideas in government policy-making in 199192. Also the idea of a neutral Macedonia
did not create any public attention and was treated only as a nice but unrealistic idea.
13
11
EU shows 'yellow card' to FYROM, ekathimerini,
http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_21/06/2011_395365 (accessed June 22, 2011).
12
EU Scolds Macedonia over 'Alexander the Great' Statue, Slow Reforms, Novinite (Bulgaria), June 20, 2011.
http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=129536 (accessed June 22, 2011).
13
Trajan Goevski, : (Neutral Macedonia: From Vision towards
Reality) (Kumanovo: Makedonska riznica, 1995).
5
In addition, Biljana Vanskova professor of the Faculty of Philosophy of the University Sts.
Cyril and Methodius of Skopje, articulates,
During one decade the Macedonian case attracted the attention of many observers, trying to
discover the peace formula. Macedonias peaceful divorce from Yugoslavia was due to a
set of factors. First of all, it was not a part of the core inter-ethnic and inter-republican
conflicts. Serbian elite did not perceive it as a threat: Macedonia was helpless, and the
Serbian minority hardly numerous, so it seemed that Southern Serbia could be re-instated
at any later point. The second happy circumstance was the tactics of the leadership that had
not pursued any military preparations and favoured the negotiation table. In the worst-case
scenario Gligorov opted for non-violent resistance and appeals to the international
community. Yet military reasons prevailed in the decision to withdraw peacefully. In 1991
92 the focus of the Serbian policy was on the other Yugoslav fronts.
14
In the last a few years the United Macedonian Diaspora (UMD), Skopjes worldwide
mouthpiece and a Skopjan lobby with HQ in Washington, DC has tried to convince politicians
on the Hill that the FYROM meets NATO criteria. They have succeeded convincing some
politicians whose staffers refrain from investigating what UMD is attempting to sell.
Skopjes political elite in order to appease their constituencies have raised the hopes of their
voters by applying for NATO and EU memberships. At the same time, acting under orders from
Skopje, UMD aggressively lobbies the members of the U.S. Congress to form a Macedonian
caucus, while they pressure them to overlook the unqualified status of Skopje and consequently
write letters to the President of the United States asking him in essence to do the same.
As well intended as these members of Congress might be, they must have in mind the above-
mentioned facts before they try their best to please UMD. Above and beyond the fact that the
Greek-American electorate power is far superior to the Skopjan, while satisfying the Skopje
diaspora, U.S. politicians are pushing the United States to accept third rate countries with
priorities other than their own national or regional security as they claim, but in populist
sensationalism. Skopje and UMD expect the United States to be an accomplice to the
destabilization of the Balkans.
As U.S. taxpayers we demand that our tax money goes to the U.S. Treasury instead to
countries where their government spends US$13 million for a statue honoring a hero of a
xenogenic civilization, and US$230 million to antiquization.
15
Skopje attitude is that they want
to pass their domestic problems to NATO and EU upon membership.
14
Biljana Vankovska, "Looking West: Civil-Military Relations in Macedonia" (paper presented at the XVII World
Congress of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) Congress, Seoul, August 17-21, 1997), 12.
15
Reuters published in Gulf Times, Macedonia erects Alexander statue, infuriating Greece,
22 June, 2011, http://gulf-
times.com/site/topics/printArticle.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=442508&version=1&template_id=39&parent_id=21
(accessed June 22, 2011).
6
Whether Skopje meets NATO Preconditions and Criteria is controversial only to the level of
political hypocrisy from both sides of the Atlantic. Although the website of the U.S. State
Department states that Macedonia [sic] had met the criteria in 2008, one and a half years later,
FOCUS News Agency of Sofia, Bulgaria on December 4, 2009 cited the Bulgarian Prime
Minster Boyko Borisov stating that Bulgaria would support the FYROM if they had met the
criteria adding that the only thing his country has seen is, hate speech against Bulgaria and
Bulgarians coming from politicians, state institutions. Prime Minster Borisov wanted the
FYROM to remove hate speech from textbooks and school curriculum and the media; give up
all minority claims towards Bulgaria.
16
The above statement echoes the Greek complaints
officially voiced during the ICJ presentation against the FYROM. Since both countries had the
same problems with the FYROMs behavior, why havent they voiced them in the past?
Defense Secretary Robert Gates recently said that some NATO partners are apparently
willing and eager for American taxpayers to assume the growing security burden left by
reductions in European defense budgets.
17
He further blasted NATO allies for not carrying their
weight in expenditures.
18
The only countries that have exceeded the 2% of their GDP in
allocation for military expenditures are the United States, Great Britain, France, Greece and
Albania.
The FYROM does not meet the fundamental requirements of the OSCE and is not even close
to meeting the pre-conditions. Furthermore, since its military budget of 1.4% from its GDP, it is
far below the 2% that NATO has set and thusly not meeting NATO criteria either.
The FYROM is not near fulfilling its NATO obligations (Pre-Conditions and Criteria) on its
own merit. Without the constant threat of disassociation from the candidate status of the EU and
the continuous monetary assistance from the United States, Skopje cannot fulfill the required
obligations of NATO and therefore, it cannot use NATO potential membership as the catalyst to
domestic political consumption. NATO is a bona-fide military alliance, not a Socio-Political
Private Club.
16
The Center for Southeast European Studies, Bulgaria will support Macedonias[sic] NATO and EU aspirations if
criteria fulfilled, Focus News Agency, December 4, 2009.
http://www.csees.net/?page=news&news_id=73409&country_id=3 (accessed June 24, 2011)
17
Thom Shanker, Defense Secretary Warns NATO of Dim Future, New York Times, June 10, 2011.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/11/world/europe/11gates.html (accessed June 21, 2011).
18
Gates warns NATO: Carry your weight or else, NewsOK, June 16, 2011 http://newsok.com/gates-warns-nato-
carry-your-weight-or-else/article/3577450 (accessed June 22, 2011).