This document presents a model of strategic trade policy involving Airbus and Boeing. It shows different strategy profiles of producing or not producing a new jet for a third market. The payoffs for each company change depending on the strategies and subsidy levels selected by each. The model aims to illustrate how subsidies could help one company capture the market by influencing the Nash equilibrium.
This document presents a model of strategic trade policy involving Airbus and Boeing. It shows different strategy profiles of producing or not producing a new jet for a third market. The payoffs for each company change depending on the strategies and subsidy levels selected by each. The model aims to illustrate how subsidies could help one company capture the market by influencing the Nash equilibrium.
This document presents a model of strategic trade policy involving Airbus and Boeing. It shows different strategy profiles of producing or not producing a new jet for a third market. The payoffs for each company change depending on the strategies and subsidy levels selected by each. The model aims to illustrate how subsidies could help one company capture the market by influencing the Nash equilibrium.
This document presents a model of strategic trade policy involving Airbus and Boeing. It shows different strategy profiles of producing or not producing a new jet for a third market. The payoffs for each company change depending on the strategies and subsidy levels selected by each. The model aims to illustrate how subsidies could help one company capture the market by influencing the Nash equilibrium.
an arrow. Two arrow in a strategy profile indicates a Nash equilibrium Players Strategy profiles Export/production subsidies (change with spinner) Payoffs (profits), change with spinner. Bottom left is Airbus Strategies The Boeing vs Airbus Example of Strategic Trade Policy This sheet sets out the classic strategic trade policy example of Airbus vs Boeing. Any payoff can be altered using the spinners, as can the subsidy levels, and the Nash equilibria will automatically be highlighted with two arrows. -1
-1 -> 100 100 <- -> 0 0 Airbus Subsidy 0 Boeing Subsidy 0 The 'stylized facts' of this story are that Boeing and Airbus are considering production of a new jet that will be sold in a third market. The investment costs are sufficiently high that if both firms enter the market they will not be able to cover their investment and will make a loss. However, the market would be profitable to one firm alone. The question is whether a subsidy to either company could help it capture the market Boeing A i r b u s Produce Don't Produce Produce Don't Produce This sheet sets out the classic strategic trade policy example of Airbus vs Boeing. Any payoff can be altered using the spinners, as can the subsidy levels, and the Nash equilibria will automatically be highlighted with two arrows. 0 <- 0 The 'stylized facts' of this story are that Boeing and Airbus are considering production of a new jet that will be sold in a third market. The investment costs are sufficiently high that if both firms enter the market they will not be able to cover their investment and will make a loss. However, the market would be profitable to one firm alone. The question Boeing Don't Produce