StructuraI FunctionaIism:

Talcott Parsons and

Robert K. Merton
n Chapter 1, we saw that understanding modernity is vital for understanding
contemporary theory and sociology. It's equally important for us to also under stand
a couple of the developments in the mid-twentieth century that formed
contemporary theory, especially in the United States. or our purpose the two most
significant are !alcott "arsons and the ran#furt School. In many ways these two
forces too# the social disciplines in opposite directions$ "arsons saw himself %uild
ing on the ideals of modern #nowledge-the ran#furt School did &ust the oppo
site and argued that rather than leading to social &ustice, social science destroys the
possi%ility of freedom and equality. 'oth were centrally concerned with culture$
"arsons saw culture as the most important factor leading to social cohesion and
harmony-the ran#furt School saw culture, especially popular culture, as produc
ing false consciousness. (nd %oth have influenced contemporary theory %eyond
their specific ideas.
)istorically, the ran#furt School developed first. )owever, I'm going to start
with "arsons %ecause he e*tends and systemati+es the things we learned a%out
modern #nowledge and society in Chapter 1. (dditionally, as you'll see through this
%oo#, "arsons' influence is more central as many contemporary theorists continue
to see themselves arguing for or against his wor#. !here are good reasons for giving
this much influence to "arsons, %ut there's also a sense in which I'm ma#ing him an
ideal type, similar to what I did with modernity. 'oth "arsons and modernity e*ist
and are clearly important, %ut I'm not presenting a well-reasoned and documented
case for either. I'm using them as heuristics for our discussion throughout the
%oo#-they represent ways for us to discover questions, ideas, and theories that
come with each of our theorists. (nd %ecause the influence of the ran#furt School
actually %ecomes increasingly important toward the end of the twentieth century,
199
I
MID-TWENTIETH CENTR! S"CI"#"$IC%# THE"R! 2
rather than mid-century, I'll %e saving our consideration of that perspective for the
last chapter in this section. !he ideas of critical theory set the stage well for
"art III$ Contemporary -ew .isions and Critiques.
In this chapter, I will %e introducing the wor# of two functionalists, !alcott
"arsons and /o%ert K. 0erton. In preparation for reading "arsons, I recommend
that you first review the synopsis for functionalism that you wrote for Chapter 1-
notice how "arsons draws on the functionalism of %oth Spencer and 2ur#heim.
"arsons sets the overall parameters of functionalist thin#ing in the twentieth century
and gives us a very a%stract, analytical model of functionalism. 0erton was a student
of "arsons, yet he also was critical of certain elements of his mentor's approach. (s
we'll see, 0erton wanted to more firmly ground functionalist analysis in the empir
ical world, and he wanted to open the perspective up to alternative possi%ilities.
Analytical Functionalism:
Talcott Parsons (1902-1979)
T&eorist's Di(est
Conce)ts an* T&eor+: Ma,in( t&e Social S+stem
Voluntaristic Action
Constraining and Patterning Social Action
Conce)ts an* T&eor+: S+stem Functions an* Control
System Relations
Cybernetic Hierarchy of Control
Conce)ts an* T&eor+: Social C&an(e
Cultural Strain
Revolution
Summar+
arsons was a man with a grand vision. )e wanted to unite the social and
%ehavioral disciplines into a single social science and to create a single the
oretical perspective. "arsons wor#ed at this not only theoretically %ut also
organi+ationally. In 1341, "arsons %ecame department chair of sociology at
)arvard University. 5ne of the first things he did was to com%ine sociology,
anthropology, and psychology into one department, the 2epartment of Social
/elations. !he reason he did this was to %rea# down the %arriers %etween disci
plines in order to create a general science of human action. )is desire, then, wasn't
simply to understand a portion of human action 6as in sociology7, he wanted,
rather, to comprehend the totality of the human conte*t and to offer a full and
P
complete e*planation of social action. !he department e*isted from 1348 to 1391
and formed the %asis of other interdisciplinary programs across the United States.
(fter 1: years of wor#, "arsons' first %oo# was pu%lished in 13;9$ The Structure
of
Social Action. !his %oo# is characteri+ed %y <ewis Coser 613997 as a =watershed in the
development of (merican sociology in general and sociological theory in particu
lar ... >which? set a new course-the course of functional analysis-that was to dom
inate theoretical developments from the early 134:s until the middle of the 13@:s=
6p. 8@17. 0ore than any other single %oo#, it introduced Auropean thin#ers to
(merican sociologists and gave %irth to structural functionalism. )is other prominent
wor#s include The Social System, Toward a eneral Theory of Action, !conomy and
Society, Structure and Process in "odern Societies, and The American #niversity. or
much of the twentieth century, "arsons was =the ma&or theoretical figure in Anglish
spea#ing sociology, if not in world sociology= 60arshall, 133B, p. 4B:7. !he =question
of what the field of sociology is and how it should %e done ... was more or less settled
in the post-war period %y the dominance of "arsons' functionalism= 6Calhoun,
Certeis, 0oody, )aff, D .ir#, 1::1, pp. 111-1117. (s .ictor <id+ 61:::7 notes, =!alcott
"arsons ... was, and remains, the pre-eminent (merican sociologist= 6p. ;BB7.
!here are at least three ways in which "arsons helped shape the center of sociolog
ical discourse in the twentieth century$ the way he theori+ed, the pro%lem he
addressed, and the theory itself. Ee'll start with his theori+ing. /ecall that science is
%uilt upon positivism and empiricism. (s such, science assumes that the universe is
empirical, it operates according to law-li#e principles, and humans can discover those
laws through rigorous investigation. Science also has very specific goals, as do most
#nowledge systems. !hrough discovery, scientists want to e*plain, predict, and control
phenomena. (dditionally there are two other important issues in positivistic theory,
which we find in the following quotes from prominent contemporary theorists$
!he essence of science is precisely theory ... as a generali$ed and coherent
%ody of ideas, which e*plain the range of variations in the empirical world in
terms of general principles.... >I?t is e*plicitly cumulative and
integrating. 6Collins, 13B@, p. 1;48, emphasis added7
( true science incor%orates the ideas of its early founders in introductory te*ts
and moves on, giving over the analysis of its founders to history and philos
ophy. 6!urner, 133;, p. i*, emphasis added7
!he first thing I want us to glean from the a%ove quotes is that scientific theory is
generali$ed. !o ma#e an idea or concept general means to ma#e it applica%le to an
entire group of similar things. (s you'll see when we consider "arsons' theory, his con
cepts are very general 6and thus fairly dry-%ut, then, all scientific theory is that way7.
Scientific #nowledge also involves %oth theory synthesis and cumulation. Synthesis
involves %ringing together two or more elements in order to form a new whole. or
e*ample, water is the synthesis of hydrogen and o*ygen. Theoretical synthesis, then,
involves %ringing together elements from diverse theorists so as to form a theory that
ro%ustly e*plains a %roader range of phenomena. Cumulation refers to the gradual
%uilding up of something, such as the cumulative effects of drin#ing alcohol. Theory
cumulation specifically involves the %uilding up of e*planations over time. !his incre
mental %uilding is captured %y Isaac -ewton's famous dictum, =If I have seen further
it is %y standing on the shoulders of giants$' Fet, what isn't clear in -ewton's quote is
that the ultimate goal of theory cumulation is to forget its predecessors.
!o ma#e this clear, let's compare the writings of two authors, Adgar (llan "oe
and (l%ert Ainstein. )ere's one of "oe's famous stan+as$
5nce upon a midnight dreary, while I pondered, wea# and weary,
over many a quaint and curious volume of forgotten lore,
Ehile I nodded, nearly napping, suddenly there came a tapping,
(s of someone gently rapping, rapping at my cham%er door.
='!is some visitor,= I muttered, =tapping at my cham%er door,
5nly this, and nothing more$'
)ere's one of Ainstein's famous quotes$
E=me
!here are some o%vious differences %etween these two quotes$ 5ne is poetry and
the other a mathematical equation. 'ut I want you to see a %it more. 2oes it matter
who wrote =5nce upon a midnight dreary=G Fes, it does. ( large part of understand
ing poetry is #nowing who wrote it-who they were, how they lived, what their other
wor#s are li#e, what style they wrote in, and so on. !hese issues are part of what
ma#es reading "oe different from reading Amily 2ic#inson. -ow, does it matter who
wrote
E H me? -ot really. Fou can understand everything you need to #now a%out E H me
simply %y understanding the equation. !he author in this sense is immaterial.
5ne of the a%ove quotes is from Ionathan ). !urner's %oo# Classical Sociological
Theory& A Positivist's Pers%ective. !urner's 6133;7 goal in that %oo# is =to codify the
wisdom of the masters so that we can move on and ma(e boo(s on classical theory
unnecessary'' 6p. i*, emphasis added7. !hat last highlighted section is the heart of
theory cumulation$ Cumulating theory implies that we do away with the individual
authors and historic conte*ts and #eep only the theoretical ideas that e*plain, predict,
and control the social world. In that spirit, here's a theoretical statement from
!urner's 6133;7 %oo#$
!he degree of differentiation among a population of actors is a gradual s-function
of the level of competition among these actors, with the latter varia%le %eing an
additive function of$
(. the si+e of this population of actors,
'. the rate of growth in this population,
C. the e*tent of economical concentration of this population, and
2. the rate of mo%ility of actors in this population. 6p. B:7
Chapter 8 e Structural Functionalism: Parsons an* Merton 5
irst, notice how general the statement is, it can %e applied to any group of
people, living anywhere, at any time. -otice also that there's no mention of from
whom these ideas originally came. -ow, you and I might #now from whom this
proposition comes 62ur#heim7, %ut does it matterG -o. <i#e Ainstein's formula, it's
immaterial. If we are doing social science, what matters is whether or not we can
show this statement to %e false through scientific testing. I- we can't, then we can
have a certain level of confidence that the proposition accurately reflects a general
process in the social world. In science, authorship is superfluous, it's the e)%lanatory
%ower of the theory that matters. !he cumulation of these general statements is one
of the main goals of scientific theory.
5f his ground%rea#ing wor#, "arsons 6 13437 says,=The Structure of Social Action
was intended to %e primarily a contri%ution to systematic social science and not to
history= 6pp. %-./. )is wor# is actually a synthesis of three theorists. "arsons
6 13@17 notes how he used each one$
for the conception of the social system and the %ases of its integration, the
wor# of 2ur#heim, for the comparative analysis of social structure and for
the analysis of the %orderline %etween social systems and culture, that of 0a*
Ee%er, and for the articulation %etween social systems and personality, that
of reud. 6p. ;17
Fet "arsons clearly wants us to forget the historical and personal origins of the
theories-for science, it's the power of the synthesi+ed theory to illuminate and
delineate social factors and processes that matters. !his approach to theory is also
what led to the three sociological perspectives or paradigms you were taught in
your introduction to sociology courses$ structural-functionalism, conflict theory,
and interactionism. !o say that someone is a functionalist, for e*ample, is to pay
more attention to the general features of the theory than what he or she contri%utes
originally.
T!"#$%T&% '$(!%T
)rie* )io+raphy
Talcott Parsons 0as born December 123 14563 in Colora*o S)rin(s3 Colora*o. %s a +oun(
man3 Parsons be(an &is uni7ersit+ stu*ies at %m&erst. He )lanne* on becomin( a )&+sician
but later c&an(e* &is ma8or to economics. Parsons recei7e* &is .% in 1469. .e(innin( in t&at
+ear3 Parsons stu*ie* )olitical econom+ abroa*3 -irst at t&e #on*on Sc&ool o- Economics.
T&ere &e came in contact 0it& t&e ant&ro)olo(ist .ronisla0 Malino0s,i3 0&o 0as teac&in(
a mo*i-ie* S)encerian -unctionalism. Parsons also met &is 0i-e-to-be3 Helen Wal,er3 0&ile in
#on*on. Parsons t&en stu*ie* at t&e ni7ersit+ o- Hei*elber(3 0&ere Ma: Weber &a*
atten*e* an* tau(&t. %t Hei*elber(3 Parsons stu*ie* 0it& Karl ;as)ers3 0&o &a* been a
)ersonal -rien* o- Weber's.
*Continued+,-
<Continue*/
%-ter teac&in( a s&ort 0&ile at %m&erst3 Parsons obtaine* a lecturin( )osition at Har7ar*.
He 0as one o- t&e -irst instructors =alon( 0it& Carle >immerman an* Pitirim Soro,in/ in
Har7ar*'s ne0 sociolo(+ *e)artment in 1421. Parsons became *e)artment c&air in 1496 an*
be(an 0or, on t&e De)artment o- Social Relations--orme* b+ combinin( sociolo(+3
ant&ro)olo(+3 an* )s+c&olo(+. It 0as Parsons' 7ision to create a (eneral science o- &uman
be&a7ior. T&e *e)artment 0as in e:istence -rom 149? to 14@6 an* -orme* t&e basis o- ot&er
inter*isci)linar+ )ro(rams across t&e nite* States.
%-ter 15 +ears o- 0or,3 Parsons' -irst boo, 0as )ublis&e* in 142@: The Structure of Social
Action. More t&an an+ ot&er sin(le boo,3 it intro*uce* Euro)ean t&in,ers to %merican
sociolo(ists an* create* t&e -irst list o- AclassicalA t&eorists. Parsons 0as )articularl+ res)onsible
-or brin(in( Ma: Weber to t&e attention o- .S. sociolo(istsB Parsons translate* se7eral o- Weber's
0or,s3 inclu*in( The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.
Parsons *ie* on Ma+ C3 14@43 0&ile tourin( $erman+ on t&e ?5t& anni7ersar+ o- &is
(ra*uation -rom Hei*elber(.
Central %ociolo+ical ,uestions
Parsons 0as a man 0it& a (ran* 7ision. He 0ante* to unite t&e social an* be&a7ioral
*isci)lines into a sin(le social science an* to create a sin(le t&eoretical )ers)ecti7e. His *esire3
t&en3 0asn't sim)l+ to un*erstan* a )ortion o- &uman be&a7iorB &e 0ante*3 rat&er3 to
com)re&en* t&e totalit+ o- t&e &uman conte:t an* to o--er a -ull an* com)lete e:)lanation o-
social action. His central concern 0as 0it& social or*er: I- &umans are basicall+ sel--moti7ate*3
&o0 is social or*er ac&ie7e*D =Notice t&at Parsons' assum)tion about &uman nature is
basicall+ t&e same as Dur,&eim's3 in C&a)ter ?/.
%imply %tate-
Peo)le are moti7ate* to action because o- biolo(ical an* )ersonal nee*s3 but in ac&ie7in(
t&ose nee*s )eo)le also buil* u) a s+stem t&at is (o7erne* )rimaril+ b+ culture an*
in-ormation. T&e conte:t3 t&en3 o- &uman action is 0&at Parsons calls t&e Aunit actA: a situation
0&ere t&e means an* en*s o- action are outline* b+ cultural norms. T&ese norms are e:)licitl+
-oun* in social institutions t&at mana(e 0&at Parsons calls latent )attern maintenance3
institutions t&at socialiEe us into t&e norms3 7alues3 an* belie-s o- societ+ =li,e -amil+ an*
reli(ion/. Societ+ also &as t&ree ot&er nee*s aroun* 0&ic& institutions are bui.lt: nee*s -or
a*a)tation3 (oal attainment3 an* inte(ration. T&ese -orm t&e lar(er conte:t -or latent )attern
maintenance an* action. Social c&an(e occurs as a result o- cultural strain3 moments 0&ere
cultural e:)ectations *on't meet 0&at t&e ot&er t&ree institutions are able to )ro7i*e.
.ey Concepts
t&e )roblem o- social or*er3 7oluntaristic action3 action t&eor+3 t&e unit act3 mo*es o-
orientation3 a*a)tation3.(oal attainment3 inte(ration3 latent )attern maintenance3 (enera
liEe* me*ia o- e:c&an(e3 7aluesB moti7es3 cultural )atterns3 action t+)es3 institutionaliEation3
%$I#3 socialiEation3 c+bernetic &ierarc&+ o- control3 eFuilibrium3 cultural strain3 alienati7e
moti7ationa I elements
Chapter 8 G Structural Functionalism: Parsons an* Merton 7
Concepts an- Theory: /a0in+ the %ocial %ystem
"arsons saw himself responding to the %roblem of social order posed %y the philoso
pher !homas )o%%es 618BB-1@937. "arsons' understanding of this )o%%esian
pro%lem of social order %egins with the fact that all humans are ruled %y passions.
(nd, all people are motivated to fulfill these passions, and, more importantly, they
have the right to fulfill them %ecause =there is 'no common rule of good and evil to
%e ta#en from the nature of the o%&ects themselves=' 6)o%%es, as quoted in "arsons,
1343, p. B37. In other words, things aren't good or %ad in themselves and people
have different desires for diverse things-thus there is no %asis for rule. In the
a%sence of any rule, people will use the most efficient means possi%le to acquire
their goals. =!hese means are found in the last analysis to %e force and fraud=
6"arsons, 1343, p. 3:7. !hus the most natural state of humanity is war of all against
all. !he question, then, is how is social order achievedG "arsons' %asic response is the
normative order-social order achieved through norms. Ehile some of the lan
guage might %e new to you, most of "arsons' response will pro%a%ly feel familiar.
!he reason that's pro%a%ly the case is that "arsons' answer to the pro%lem of social
order has %ecome for many sociologists the %asic answer given in introduction to
sociology classes. "arsons %egins with what he considers to %e the %asic element of
society$ voluntaristic action.
1oluntaristic Action
"arsons credits 0a* Ee%er with his %eginning point for theory. !his area of the
ori+ing is referred to as action theory. (ction theory references a group of theories
that focus on human action rather than structure. Eithin this group are theories
that center on meaning and interpretation 6li#e 0ead7, and theories that are con
cerned with the nature of human action 6li#e e*change theory, Chapter ll 7. Ee%er
was concerned with %oth, %ut he e*plicitly developed a typology of social action.
(ccording to Ee%er, simple %ehavior is distinguished from social action %y the su%
&ective orientation of the actor. If, in the action, the person ta#es into consideration the
meaning of the act for others, then it is social action. Ee%er argued that there are four
distinct types of social action$ traditional, affective, value-rational, and instrumental
rational. !he focus ofEe%erian action theory is on the latter two types, and it is con
cerned with the degree of rationality in human %ehavior. A*change and rational choice
theories ta#e up these issues in particular, and argue that action is %est understood in
terms of people ma#ing rational choices in which they ma*imi+e their utilities 6hence
the name =utilitarianism=7. In other words, people have dear preferences and try to get
the most out of every encounter with other people %y weighing costs and %enefits. !he
question here %ecomes, how rational can people %e in e*changesG
"arsons specifically names his approach =voluntaristic action theory.= )e isn't so
much concerned a%out how meanings are negotiated in interaction, li#e 0ead, %ut
he wants to understand the conte*t of human action. <i#e rational choice theories,
voluntaristic action draws from utilitarianism in that it sees humans as ma#ing
choices %etween means and ends. 'ut it modifies utilitarianism %y seeing these
choices as circumscri%ed %y the physical and cultural environments.
(n e*ample of voluntaristic action is your %ehavior right now. In order to read
this %oo#, you had to enroll in class, pic# up the sylla%us, %uy the %oo#, schedule
time to read, and actually sit down and read it. (ll of this may %e seen as volun
taristic action$ Fou voluntarily acted, choosing among various ends and means
you could %e drin#ing a %eer and watching !. right now, %ut you selected this
%ehavior. ='ut,= you say, =I didn't volunteer to do this class wor#J= Fes, you did,
no%ody physically forced you. )owever, you volunteered under certain influences
from the environment. !he same with shaving or not shaving this morning, or the
clothes you are wearing right now. !hey are all aspects of voluntaristic action, the
questions have to do with how much freedom you have in ma#ing choices in action,
and what goes into the decisions that you ma#e in order to act.
"arsons' first theoretical wor#, The Structure of Social Action, e*plains this by giv
ing us an analytical model of action. It's a framewor# or scheme through which we
can view and understand human action. "arsons' scheme doesn't predict the #inds
of actions in which people will engage, his thin#ing is more fundamental than that.
)e gives us an analytical model that we can ta#e into any situation and %egin to
understand the myriad elements that go into human action.
The Unit Act
!his analytical model in its completion is termed the unit act. "arsons argues
that every act entails two essential ingredients$ an agent or actor and a set of goals
toward which the action is directed. Ee can see here Ee%er's notion of social
action 6in particular, instrumental rationality7 and its influence on "arsons'
theory. !he initial state within which the actor chooses goals and directs his or her
process of action has two important elements$ the conditions of action and the
means of action. !he actor has little immediate agency or choice over the condi
tions under which action ta#es place. "arsons has in mind such things as the pres
ence of social institutions or organi+ations, as well as elements that might %e
specific to the situation, such as the social influence of particular people or physi
cal constraints of the environment. or e*ample, %eing at a fraternity party 6phys
ical setting7 will influence your action, %ut so will the presence of your parents
6social influence7 at the same party.
Ehen it comes to the means, on the other hand, the actor does potentially have
choice. Some situations allow quite a %it of freedom, %ut others, such as %eing in a
&ail, do not. )owever, notice that even in those situations where there is freedom of
choice a%out the means and goals, the normative orientation of the action limits or
defines the choices made. or "arsons, this is an e*tremely important point. "arsons
says that the concept of human action demands that there %e normative influence.
In other words, "arsons is arguing that human action is distinctly cultural action.
/emem%er that norms are %ehaviors that have sanctions attached to them, %e they
positive or negative. Such %ehaviors necessarily have social meaning attached to
them, have a position on a value hierarchy, and are directly or indirectly related to
some social group. 0ost of the rest of "arsons' wor# may %e seen as an e*plication
of the environment, particularly the cultural one, wherein social action ta#es place.
Constrainin+ an- Patternin+ %ocial Action
)aving understood that human action is circumscri%ed %y various conditions,
"arsons sets out to understand those circumstances. In e*plaining the conditions,
"arsons in the end creates an a%stract theory of the social system. <et's %egin %y
thin#ing a%out the situation. /emem%er, "arsons is thin#ing a%stractly, so we don't
want to %e too specific. So, what do you %ring with you to a social interaction,
whether you are meeting to practice for a play or to study for a testG "arson argues
that you %ring two things$ motivations and values. )e refers to these as modes of
orientation %ecause they orient or position us within the situation, whatever it
might %e. Motives, of course, refer to something within a person 6such as a need,
idea, or emotion7 that stimulates her or him to action. 0otives are the energy for
action$ ( person without motivation is li#e a car without gas-nothing happens.
.alue refers to a thing's worth and it is always a position on a hierarchy-some
things are valued more highly than others. !hus, in every situation we are moti
vated to do something and we have certain ideas a%out what will %e valued in the
encounter with regard to the action.
(ccording to "arsons 6133:7, all social action is understood in terms of some
form of relation %etween means and ends$ =!his appears to %e one of the ultimate
facts of human life we cannot get %ehind or thin# away= 6p. ;1:7. !he relationship
%etween means and ends is formed through shared value systems. In this sense, cul
tural value systems function %asically as a scale of priorities that contains the fun
damental alternatives of selective orientations. !his shared value system prioriti+es
means and ends, and, %ecause it is shared, value hierarchies sta%ili+e interactions
across time and situations. (ction and interaction would %e disorgani+ed without
the presence of a value system that organi+es and prioriti+es goals and means. !he
evaluative aspect of culture is particularly important in this respect %ecause it
defines the patterns of role e*pectations and sanctions, and the standards of cogni
tive as well as appreciative &udgments for any interaction. In other words, the val
ues that we hold tell us the #inds of %ehaviors we can e*pect from others and how
to &udge those %ehaviors and other social o%&ects.
<et me give you an e*ample. I had coffee with a colleague the other day. Ee are
in the planning stages of a %oo# on sociological social psychology. !here are a
num%er of ways to loo# at social psychology from a sociological position, and in my
department there are several people who hold these various views. I am not plan
ning on writing a %oo# with them, nor did I invite them to go to coffee. It's not that
I don't li#e them, I do, %ut I have a particular perspective a%out social psychology
%ased on valuing certain aspects of the literature more than others. 0y colleague
shares those views. 'ecause of that shared value system, we #now what to e*pect
from each other and how to value and appraise what is said and done, %oth intel
lectually and aesthetically.
"arsons sees value systems as having multiple levels that correspond to various
degrees of commitment. (ction may %e sta%ili+ed through a shared system of
meanings and priorities, %ut for a society to %e integrated, people need to %e com
mitted to paying the costs necessary to preserve the system. In any functional
interaction, we can name and prioriti+e the things that are important, %ut this dis
cursive or cognitive accounting isn't enough. Ee must also %e committed to some
things more than others in terms of willingness to sacrifice. "eople are compelled
to sacrifice when the collective means something to them, that is, when they have a
significant level of emotional investment in the group, the more meaningful is
the collective, the more willing people are to ma#e sacrifices. !hus, the value sys
tem of any group varies by degree of commitment, with orientations and prefer
ences at the most %asic level and ultimate meanings and values at the highest level.
<i#e 2ur#heim, "arsons recogni+es the %asic human need for =ultimate= mean
ings, yet his argument concerning the need for ultimate significance is more tied to
group identification and Ee%er's concern with legitimacy. "arsons argues that
interaction requires individual actions to have meanings that are defina%le with ref
erence to a common set of normative conceptions. In other words, our %ehaviors
%ecome meaningful %ecause they are related to a group and its e*pectations.
Croup identity is, of course,KLym%olic. In general, humans are not tied together by
%lood or instinct %ut %y ul&ssu, such as the ideas of freedom and democ
racy in a national identity. By their very nature, sym%ols require legitimacy, grounds
for %elieving in the meanings and system. -o sym%olic or normative systems are ever
self-legitimating, nor are they legitimated by appeal to simple utilitarian issues. or
e*ample, we rarely hear someone &ustify the institution of (merican education %y
saying that it is necessary to the survival of the (merican system 6unless you're in a
sociology class7. <egitimating stories always appeal to a higher source. !hus, "arsons
613@@7 argues that legitimation is always =meaningfully dependent= 6p. ll7 upon
issues of ultimate meaning and therefore is always in some sense religious.
(ccording to "arsons, we hold three general #inds of values$ cognitive, apprecia
tive, and moral. In other words, in any situation, we will place importance on
empirical, factual #nowledge 6cognitive7, standards of %eauty and art 6apprecia
tive7, or ultimate standards of right and wrong 6moral7. !here are also three #inds
of motives$ cognitive, cathectic, and evaluative. Cognitive motivation refers to a need
for information. Fou might %e motivated to meet with your advisor %ecause you
need information a%out which courses to ta#e. Cathectic motivation is the need for
emotional attachment. Fou might feel the need to call home some wee#end in order
to e*perience emotional attachment to your family. Eith evaluative motivation, we
are prompted to act %ecause we feel the need for assessment, such as tal#ing with
your %oss halfway to your year-end evaluation to find out where you stand.
!here are also three types of cultural patterns. Culture acts as a resource for
%oth our motivations and our values in action, so it shouldn't surprise us to find
that "arsons' ty%es of culture correspond to his types of motivations and values.
Culture, then, contains a belief system. Ehile we might thin# of %eliefs in a religious
sense, "arsons has in mind %elief as cognitive significance. It's interesting that he
would phrase cognitions in terms of %elief. )e's ac#nowledging that the ideas we
hold in our head, through which we see and #now the world around us, are in fact
%eliefs a%out the way things are. Culture also contains e)%ressive symbols. !hus, cul
ture not only provides the things we #now, it also patterns the way we feel. !hese
feelings are captured, understood, and e*pressed through sym%ols such as wedding
rings to e*press love, or gang colors to sym%oli+e aggression. Culture also contains
systems of value.orientation standards. It is culture that tells us what to value and
how to value it.
!hese different #inds of motives, values, and cultural patterns com%ine to pro
duce three distinct types of social action. !hese function much li#e Ee%er's ideal
types in that they are ways of understanding action, and none of them usually
appears in its pure form. I've pictured how these ideal types are formed in igure B.1.
Aach type of action-strategic, e*pressive, and moral-is formed %y com%ining a
motivation with a value. Aach of the specific culture systems provides information
and meaning for each of the action types as well as the corresponding needs and
values. (s you can see, the ideal type of instrumental action is composed of the
need for information and evaluation %y o%&ective criteria. A*pressive action is moti
vated %y the need for emotional attachment and the desire to %e evaluated %y artis
tic standards. 0oral action is motivated %y the need for assessment %y ultimate
notions of right and wrong.
In any social encounter, then, we will %e oriented toward it with varying degrees
of motivation and values. !here are three different #inds of motivations and three
types of value systems. !he motivations and values will com%ine to create three dif
ferent types of action. (ny social action will have varying degrees of each type,
depending on the specific com%ination of motives and values, and can %e under
stood in terms of %eing closer to or further from any of the ideal types of action.
)owever, the importance of this scheme of social action is not simply its potential
for measurement. "arsons goes %eyond Ee%er in proposing a typology of social
action, and he uses it to form a %roader theory of institutionali+ation.
Ehat "arsons is doing is %uilding from the ground floor to the top of the sys
tem, from the actor in the unit act to society. )e starts with one small action and
then argues that actors have discerna%le orientations toward their %ehavior. (s a
result, actions tend to fall into specific types. In %rief, we have come this far$ volun
taristic action --@ unit act --@ modes of orientation --@ types of action. rom this
point, "arsons argues that people tend to interact with others who share similar ori
entations and actors. So, if I want to engage in strategic, instrumental action, with
whom will I %e most li#ely to interactG or instance, if I'm interested in %uying a
guitar that has %een advertised in the paper 6strategic7, then I'm not interested in
interacting with someone who wants to tal# a%out the evils of roc# music 6moral7
or the %eauty of a .ivaldi concerto 6e*pressive7.
5%viously, I will see# out others who want the same #ind of thing out of the
interaction. (s we interact over time with people who are li#ewise oriented, we
produce patterns of interaction and a corresponding system of status positions,
roles, and norms. Status %ositions tell us where we fit in the social hierarchy of
esteem or honor, roles are sets of e*pected %ehaviors that generally correspond to a
given status position 6for e*ample, a professor is e*pected to teach7, and norms
are e*pected %ehaviors that have positive andMor negative sanctions attached to
them. !ogether, these form a social system-an organi+ation of interrelated parts
that function together for the good of the whole. Society is composed of various
social systems li#e these.
12
MID-TWENTIETH CENTR! S"CI"#"$IC%# THE"R!
T+)es o- %ction
"rientation To2ar-
%ocial %ituation
M"TIH%TED
BY
3ee-s an- 1alues
Nee* -or
"b8ecti7e
Kno0le*(e
Nee* -or
Emotional
%ttac&ment
Types o*
Culture Pattern
Belief Systems
of Cognitie
Significance
Types o*
Action
Strate(ic
%ction
Nee* -or
E7aluation
Systems of
E!pressie
Symbolism
E:)ressi7e
%ction
"b8ecti7e
Kno0le*(e
P#%CE H%#E
P"N
%est&etic
Feelin(s
E7aluati7e
Stan*ar*s
Systems of "alue#
$rientation
Standards
Moral
%ction
or this, "arsons gives us a theory of institutionali+ation. !he notion of institu
tionalization is very important in sociology. Cenerally spea#ing, institutionali+a
tion is the way through which we create institutions. or functionalists such as
"arsons, institutions are enduring sets of roles, norms, status positions, and value
patterns that are recogni+ed as collectively meeting some societal need. In this con
te*t, then, institutionali$ation refers to the process through which %ehaviors, cogni
tions, and emotions %ecome part of the ta#en-for-granted way of doing things in a
society 6=the way things are=7.
I've diagrammed "arsons' notion of institutionali+ation in igure B.1. -otice
that we move from voluntaristic action within a unit act and modes of orientation
to social systems. In this way, "arsons gives us an aggregation theory of macro-level
social structures. 5ne of the classic pro%lems in sociological theory is the lin#
%etween the micro and macro levels of society. In other words, how are the levels of
face-to-face interaction and large-scale institutions relatedG )ow do we get from
one to the otherG 0ost sociologists simply ignore the question and focus on one
level or another for analysis. )ere "arsons gives us the lin# through the process of
institutionali+ation. <arge-scale institutions are %uilt up over time as individuals
with particular motivations and values interact with li#e-minded people, thus cre
ating patterns of interaction with corresponding roles, norms, and status positions.
!here's a follow-up question to the micro-macro pro%lem$ 5nce created, how
do institutions relate %ac# to the interactionG or 2ur#heim, the collective con
sciousness %ecomes an entity that can act independently upon the individual
and the interaction. It does this through moral force$ "eople feel the presence
and pressure of something greater than themselves and conform. or "arsons,
it's a %it different, even though he does ac#nowledge moral force. (ccording to
T&e Process o- InstitutionaliEation
Holuntaristic
%ction:
T&e nit %ct
Ta,en--or-
Interaction Patterns o-
$rante*
Emer(in( Roles3
T+)es o-
%mon( #i,e-
'....../
Interaction
1--
Norms3 an*
T&e Social
%ction
"riente* %cross Time
Status
S+stem
Mo*es o-
%ctors an* S)ace
"rientation
Positions-
To0ar*
Institutions
%ction
=Halues3
Moti7es3
Cultures/

"arsons, all social arrangements, whether micro or macro, are su%&ect to system
pressures. !hus, institutions influence interactions not so much %ecause of their
independent moral force, %ut rather %ecause interactions function %etter when
they are systematically em%edded in #nown and accepted ways of doing things.
In addition, rather than %eing dependent upon individual people or interac
tions, or having its own whimsical nature as 2ur#heim would have it, society is
su%&ect to self-regulating pressures %ecause it is a system.
Cetting %ac# to the actual process of institutionali+ation, "arsons argues that it
has two levels$ the structuring of patterned %ehaviors over time 6this is the level
we've %een loo#ing at7 and individual internali+ation or sociali+ation. "arsons
understands internali+ation in reudian terms. reud's theory wor#s li#e this$
"eople are motivated %y internal energies surrounding different need dispositions.
(s these different psychic motives encounter the social world, they have to conform
in order to %e satisfied. Conformity may %e successful 6well-ad&usted7 or unsuc
cessful 6repressed7, %ut the point to notice here is that the structure of the individ
ual's personality changes as a result of this encounter %etween psychic energy and
the social world. !he superego is formed through these encounters.
or "arsons, the important point is that cultural traditions %ecome meaningful
to and part of the need disposition of individuals. !he way we sense and fulfill our
needs is structured internally %y culture. or "arsons, then, the motivation to con
form comes principally from within the individual through reudian internali+a
tion patterns of value orientation and meaning. (s the same set of value patterns
and role e*pectations is internali+ed %y others, that cultural standard is said to %e,
from the point of view of the individual, institutionali+ed.
It is worth pointing out that "arsons argues that the content of the institutional
solutions to societal needs doesn't matter. So, for e*ample, it doesn't matter if a col
lective perpetuates itself %iologically through the institution of family 6however it
is defined7 or through an institutionali+ed hatchery such as a chic#en farm. N.hat is
important is that the perceived solutions are a set of highly rituali+ed %ehaviors that
are seen as typical, %elonging to particular settings 6such as church rather than
school7, and are %elieved to solve collective pro%lems.
Concepts an- Theory: %ystem *unctions an- Control
Ee came across the idea of requisite needs in Chapter 1. Fou'll remem%er that
functionalism argues that all societies have certain needs that must %e met in
order to function, &ust li#e the human %ody. Eith 2ur#heim we saw that society
needs a certain level of solidarity, which is provided through the collective con
sciousness. "arsons not only gives us additional needs, he tal#s a%out them more
a%stractly than did 2ur#heim. "arsons argues that society is a system and that it
functions li#e any other system. In other words, he contends that all systems have
the same needs, whether social, %iological, physical, cultural, or any other system.
!here are four such needs$ adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and latent
pattern maintenance.
15 Chapter 8 G Structural Functionalism: Parsons an* Merton
!o get us thin#ing, let me as# you a question$ (re you hungryG 0ay%e you aren't
now, %ut sooner or later you will %e, %ecause every %ody needs food to live. Fet it isn't
really food per se that you need. Fou need the nutrients that are in the food to sur
vive. Ehen you eat something, your %ody has a system that e*tracts the necessary
resources from the food and converts it into usa%le things 6li#e protein7. So, your
%ody doesn't really need a stea#, it needs what is in it. "arsons calls this function
adaptation %ecause it adapts resources and converts them into usa%le elements.
<et's use a larger illustration. Avery organism, society, or system e*ists within and
%ecause of an environment. or e*ample, duc#s are not found at the South "ole %ut
penguins are. Aach of these organic systems has adapted to a given environment
and e*tracts from the surroundings what it needs to e*ist. It is the same with
society. In order to e*ist, each and every society must ada%t to its environment %y
inventing ways of ta#ing what is needed for survival 6such as soil, water, seeds, trees,
animals7 and converting them into usa%le products 6food, shelter, and clothing7.
Society must also move those products around so that they are availa%le to every
mem%er 6or at least most mem%ers7. In society, we call this su%system the economy.
!he economy e*tracts raw resources from the environment, converts them into
usa%le commodities, and moves the commodities from place to place.
'e aware that the economy and adaptation are not the same thing. !he economy
is the subsystem in society that fulfills the ada%tation need. In the %ody, it's the diges
tive su%system. Fet the digestive system and the economy are o%viously not the
same things. !hey fulfill the same function %ut in different systems. !he reason I'm
ta#ing such pains here is that it is important to see that "arsons' scheme is very
a%stract and can %e used to analy+e any system, so I want you to %e clear on how to
apply it. 6In addition, if your professor as#s you to e*plain the adaptation function
and you say that it is the economy, you'll %e wrong.7
Avery system also needs a way of ma#ing certain that every part is energi+ed and
moving in the same direction or toward the same goal. "arsons refers to this su%
system as goal attainment. In the human %ody, the part of us that activates and
guides all the parts toward a specific goal is the mind. !he mind puts %efore us cer
tain goals, things that we need or want to do. Ee feel motivated to action %ecause
our mind invests emotion into these goals.
<et's say that you have the goal of %ecoming the ne*t Iimi )endri*. So you set
a%out listening to all of the legendary roc# guitarist's C2s, you read all the %oo#s
a%out )endri*'s style, and you practice si* hours a day. Fou also wor# a &o% and save
your money in order to %uy the same #ind of guitar and equipment that )endri*
used so you can sound &ust li#e him. Fou are motivated. Four mind has caught the
image of yourself playing guitar and has controlled and coordinated your fingers,
arms, and legs-in short, all your actions-to move you toward that goal. 5n the
other hand, perhaps you aren't as motivated a%out school. (fter all, you're going to
%e a %ig roc# star, so who needs schoolG So the different parts of your %ody are not
energi+ed and coordinated to meet the goal of doing well in school. In the %ody, it's
the mind that coordinates all the different actions and su%systems to achieve a goal.
In the social system, the institution that meets this need for goal attainment is gov
ernment, or polity 6same meaning, different word7.
Systems also need to %e integrated. 'y definition, systems do not contain a sin
gle part, %ut many different parts, and these parts have to %e %rought together to
form a whole. )ave you ever watched a floc# of geese in flightG /ather than flying
singularly in a hapha+ard manner, their actions are coordinated and integrated. !he
dictionary defines =integration= as meaning to form, coordinate, or %lend into a
functioning or unified whole, to unite with something else, and to incorporate into
a larger unit. !he geese are a%le to form into a larger unit mostly %ecause of
instincts. or human %eings, it is a %it more comple*.
)umans generally use norms, fol#ways, and mores to integrate their %ehavior.
-orms can %e informal 6such as the norms surrounding our %ehavior in an eleva
tor7 or they can %e formal and written down. ormal and written norms are called
laws. <aws help to integrate our %ehaviors so that, rather than millions of individ
ual units, we can function as larger units. "arsons refers to this function as integra
tion, and in society that function is performed %y the legal system. !he legal system
lin#s the various components together and unites them as a whole. Ehen, for
e*ample, (pple Computer crosses the %oundaries of I'0, it is the legal system that
ma#es them wor# together, even though they pro%a%ly don't want to.
(s should %e apparent, polity and the legal system are intimately connected,
%ecause these two functions are closely related. In our %odies, for instance, the mind
functions as the goal-attainment system and it uses the central nervous system to
actually move the different parts of the %ody. 'ut the mind and the central nervous
system are two different things. ( person can %e completely paraly+ed and still have
full access to his or her mind, or the %ody can %e in perfect wor#ing order with the
mind completely gone. In the same way, polity and law are related %ut separate.
!he final requisite function that "arsons proposes is latent pattern maintenance.
Avery system requires not only direct management, such as that performed %y a gov
ernment, %ut also indirect management, which "arsons terms latent pattern mainte
nance. -ot everything that goes on in our %ody is directed through cognitive functions.
/ather, some of these functions, li#e %reathing, are managed and maintained through
the autonomic nervous system, a su%system that maintains patterns with little effort.
Society is the same way. It is too costly to ma#e people conform to social e*pectations
through government and law, there has to %e a method of ma#ing them willing to con
form. or this tas#, society uses the processes of sociali$ation 6the internali+ation
of society's norms, values, %eliefs, cognitions, sentiments, etc.7. !he principal sociali+
ing agents in society are the structures that meet the requirement of latent pattern
maintenance-structures such as religion, education, and family. 6'y the way, the word
latent, from which "arsons gets his term, means not visi%le, dormant, or concealed.7
"arsons argues that these four requirements can %e used as a #ind of scheme to
understand any system. Ehen %eginning a study of a system, one of the first things
that must %e done is to identify the various parts and how they function. "arsons'
scheme allows us to categori+e any part of a system in terms of its function for the
whole. In igure B.;, I have diagrammed the way this analytical scheme loo#s. !he
four functions are noted %y the initials (CI<. !he larger %o* represents that system
as a whole, which, of course, needs the four functions. 'ecause they function as sys
tems themselves, each of the four su%systems can %e analy+ed in terms of the same
scheme. I've used adaptation in this case, %ut the same can %e done with each of them.
A-aptation
%$I#-Functional ReFuisites
(oal
Attainment
%
I
C
C
# I
I
# I
#
4
a
$
%ystem #elations
urthe
r, "arsons
gives us a
way of
understan
ding
interinstit
utional
relations.
!his is
important
%ut little
e*plored
ground.
Ehat
usually
passes as
institution
al
analysis is
withi00 an
institution
al sphere
rather
than
%etween.

o
r

e
*
a
m
p
l
e
,

w
e

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g
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t

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t
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a
m
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l
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n

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h
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n
i
t
e
d

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t
a
t
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s

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n
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t
c
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a
n
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e
s

a
r
e

o
c
c
u
r
r
i
n
g
. Some of
these
changes
are
society-
wide
6such as
the
increase
in single-
parent
families7,
some are
the
su%&ect of
much
moral
de%ate
6such as
whether
or not to
define gay
cou ples
as
family7,
and some
are
present
%ut not
part of
the pu%lic
discourse
6li#e an
acquainta
nce of
mine who
introduce
d me to
his wife,
the
mother of
his
children,
and his
girlfriend
-three
different
women-
who were
all four
living
happily
together
in this
arrangeme
n
t
7
.

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e

c
a
n

a
l
s
o

l
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o
#

a
t

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a
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,

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n
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t
h
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p
o
v
!hese
#inds of
research
agendas
can %e
enlighteni
ng, %ut
they are
also quite
lim ited.
Studying
the
phenome
non of
=latch#ey
#ids= is
important
, %ut it
only
e*plains
one small
part of
the
institution
of family
and %y
itself says
nothing
a%out the
instruc
tional
relations
%etween
the
family
and
governme
nt. (s
we've
noted,
each
su%syste
m is part
of a
whole
and, as
such,
each is
related to
the other.
If, for
illustratio
n, I put
dirt
in the fuel system of an automo%ile, it will affect the rest of the car, not &ust the fuel
system itself. !he same is true for society. If there are changes in one su%system, those
changes will ripple their way through all of society.
amily, in our society, is usually thought of as a married couple with 1.8 #ids. Fet
this model, called the nuclear family, has not always %een the norm. In fact, it is a pretty
recent model, historically spea#ing. Up through feudalism, marriage and family were
far more important politically and economically. "eople got married to prevent wars
or to seal economic commitments. (s a result, the #inship structure was considera%ly
more e*tensive and marriages were generally arranged %ecause they were socially
important. 0arriages in the United States are not generally arranged, we conceptual
i+e marriage as e*isting principally for the individual and as %eing motivated %y love.
!hus, when we %emoan the loss of =family values,= it is a historically specific set
of values. !hese values came a%out %ecause of changes in the rest of society. (s
institutions differentiated, the goal-attainment and adaptation functions were no
longer dependent upon or related to family in the same ways. 'ureaucratic nation
states emerged that were a%le to negotiate their interstate relations through treaty
and war 6using a standing army7, the economy shifted to industriali+ed production
and forced families to move from their traditional home to the city where most of
the relationships that people have are not with or associated with family, as they
were in traditional settings. 0any other changes, such as the proliferation of capi
talistic mar#ets and the de-centering of religion, also influenced the definition,
functions, and value of family.
!he point I'm trying to ma#e is that for us to truly understand an institution, we
must see it in its institutional conte*t, in its relationships to other institutions. rom
a systems or functionalist point of view, the environment for any institution is cre
ated %y other institutions 6su%systems7, they mutually affect and sustain one
another. "arsons conceptuali+es su%system relations using his (CI< scheme and the
actual paths of influence as %oundary e*changes. Iust as the digestive su%system in
our %odies provides nutrients for the circulatory su%system, and the circulatory sys
tem in e*change provides %lood to the digestive system, so every social institution
is loc#ed in a mutual e*change. I've listed these %oundary e*changes in !a%le B.1.
Ehat you will see is that each relationship is defined in terms of what one su%sys
tem gives to another. 'oth Spencer and 2ur#heim argued that as institutions dif
ferentiate, they %ecome mutually dependent, %ut neither of them e*plicated the
dependency. )ere "arsons does that for us.
(s you can see, the ta%le outlines what each su%system or institution gives to the
other three. <et's loo# at family as the originating su%system for a moment in the
ta%le. Fou can read the list of its outputs in the center column and the receiving insti
tutions on the right. !he list shows the functions that family provides for the other
su%systems. !hrough proper sociali+ation, family provides political loyalty to the
government, it provides a compliant pool of la%or for the economy, and it influences
the moral content of sociali+ed patterns of norms that %ecome law. I don't want to
ta#e us through each of these relations, you can do that on your own. !he most
important thing to glean is the idea of interinstitutional relations. In addition, while
we may at some point %ecome more sophisticated in our analysis of the associations,
the place to %egin is right where "arsons does$ the functional dependencies.
' . . - O 3 A
217 Chapter 8 G Structural Functionalism: Parsons an* Merton
Ta5le 861
lnterinstitutioriRl
lations
P+66=2O$8.,Il 'N.'' tI %&
N
,
N
.
Q
Cy5ernetic
ierarchy o*
Control
cJG GK
"arsons develops an overall model of
how the systems surrounding human life
integrate. !he model is called the general
system of action or the cybernetic hier
archy of control. Cy%ernetics is the study
of the automatic control system in the
human %ody. !he system is formed %y the
%rain and nervous system and control is
created through mechanical-electrical
communication systems and devices. In
using the term =cy%ernetic,= "arsons tells us
that control and thus integration are
achieved primarily through information.
(lso note that in cy%ernetics, control is
achieved automatically, through what
"arsons calls latent patterned maintenance.
I've outlined the control system in
igure B.4. (s you can see, the cy%ernetic
hierarchy of control is understood through
"arsons' (CI< system. 6In the model,
I have also e*panded the social system to
indicate what we have already seen$ !he
1riginating
Subsystem 1ut%ut
Receiving
Subsystem
Econom+ =%/ Pro*ucti7it+ Polit+ =$/
Ne0 out)ut combinations #a0 =I/
Consumer (oo*s an* ser7ices Famil+ =#/
Polit+ =$/ Im)erati7e coor*ination #a0 =I/
%llocation o- )o0er Famil+ =#/
Ca)ital Econom+ =%/
#a0 =I/ Moti7ation to )attern con-ormit+ Famil+ =#/
"r(aniEation Econom+ =%/
Contin(ent su))ort Polit+ =$/
Famil+ =#/
.:; .
-
\''
N
. I L
#abor Econom+ =%/
Political lo+alt+ Polit+ =$/
Pattern content #a0 =I/
'MN. JA ,+'2&&,,&3
218 MID-TWENTIETH CENTR! S"CI"#"$IC%# THE"R!
social
system is
understood
in terms of
(CI< as
well.7 !here
are thus four
systems that
influence
our lives$
the culture,
social,
personality,
and organic
systems. !he
culture
system is at
the top,
indicating
that control
of human
%ehavior
and life is
achieved
through
cultural
information
. !his
emphasis on
culture
would
o%viously
not %e true
for most
animals.
/egardless
of the recent
news and
de%ates
a%out apes
%eing a%le to
use and
possi%ly
share sign
language,
culture is
not the
primary
information
system for
any animal
other than
humans. or
most animals, infor mation comes
generally through sensory data, instinctual
predispositions, and ha%itual patterns of
action.
C+bernetic Hierarc&+ o- Control
Ultimate 'eality
In-ormation
an* Control
#
Culture
S+stem
Social
S+stem
G
Personalit+
S+stem
A
"r(anic
S+stem
P&+sical En7ironment
# :Reli(ion3 E*ucation3 Famil+
I :#a0
( :Polit+
% :Econom+
Ener(+ -or
%ction
!he position of culture at the top also indicates that it requires the most energy
to sustain. (s information flows from the top down, energy moves from the %ottom
up. Culture has no intrinsic energy. It is ultimately dependent upon the systems that
are lower in the hierarchy for its e*istence. v.ithout such energy, culture will cease
to e*ist. or e*ample, anthropologists and archaeologists #now that a 'a%ylonian
MID-TWENTIETH CENTR! S"CI"#"$IC%# THE"R! 24
culture e*isted at one time. !hat #nowledge of past e*istence is itself part of our
culture, %ut the 'a%ylonian culture has long since died %ecause its support mecha
nisms have passed away.
Culture is most immediately dependent on the social system for its e*istence.
It is also dependent upon the personality system, %ecause it is individual
humans who internali+e and enact culture. Since the personality system is
dependent upon the organic system 6the human mind needs the human %ody7,
culture is indirectly dependent upon it as well. I'd li#e to pause here and men
tion one thing$ /ecent theori+ing argues that culture is also directly reliant on
the organic %ody. "ierre 'ourdieu 61393M13B47, for instance, argues that culture
%ecomes em%odied. !here are not simply cognitive and emotional elements in
culture. Culture also contains practices that form part of the way our %odies
e*ist. !hrough our culture we develop tastes, dispositions, and automatic
%ehaviors. or e*ample, our taste in food is dependent upon our culture.
0oreover, not only is our language cultural, %ut so is the way we spea# it, as in
regional accents.
-otice also that human life is conte*tuali+ed %y conditions of ultimate reality
and the physical environment. "arsons never ma#es any comment a%out what ulti
mate reality is, %ut its understood e*istence is e*tremely important for the culture
system. /emem%er that our most important values are framed in terms of ultimate
truths, and these truths are religious in nature. "arsons, then, sees religion as an
important influence on the culture system in general.
5verall, information moves down and energy moves up. Aach system is
em%edded in and dependent upon the other-systems are reciprocally related to
one another. 5ne of the things that "arsons wants to point out with this #ind of
model is that differentiated, comple* systems are dependent upon generalized
media of exchange for facilitating communication and cooperation among and
%etween the diversified parts. or e*ample, in a comple* society, each of the
ma&or structures has distinct goals, values, norms, and so forth. !he capitalist
economy has the goal of producing profit, while the education system has the
goal of producing critical thin#ing. !hese value-oriented goals may at times
clash, %ut a generali+ed medium of e*change will tend to #eep the system in
equilibrium. "arsons offers language as the prototype of such generali+ed
media of communication and e*plicitly identifies money 6from the adaptive
su%system7, power 6from goal attainment7, and influence 6integration7 as other
such media.
Concepts an- Theory: %ocial Chan+e
5ne of the critiques often leveled against "arsons is that he only sees systems in equi
li%rium and his theori+ing thus maintains the status quo. !he criticism is not entirely
correct. "arsons does assume that systems are in a state of equili%rium, that is, the
forces of integration and disintegration are %alanced. )e feels that any social system
worth studying would have a fair degree of permanence, and thus, =there must %e a
tendency to maintenance of order e*cept under e*ceptional circumstances= 6"arsons
O Shils, 1381, p. 1:97. "arsons 613817 calls this tendency toward equili%rium the
=first law of social process= 6p. 1:87 and the =law of inertia= 6p. 4B17. )owever, it is
not the case that "arsons ignores social change. )e actually has a notion of
revolutionary change in addition to slow evolutionary change.
<i#e 2ur#heim, "arsons argues that the principal dynamic of evolutionary
change is differentiation, and he sees that structural differentiation %rings a%out
pro%lems of integration and coordination. "arsons argues that these pro%lems
would create pressures for the production of an integrative, generali+ed value
culture and a generali+ed medium of e*change. !hus, li#e 2ur#heim, "arsons
argues that culture is the most important facet of a comple* social system. It is
culture that provides the norms, values, and %eliefs that allow us to interact, and
it is culture that provides the general information that the social system needs in
order to operate.
Cultural %train
)owever, the process of culture generali+ation, "arsons 613@@7 notes, may also
%ring a%out severe cultural strain =!o the fundamentalist, the demand for greater
generality in evaluative standards appears to %e a demand to a%andon the 'real'
commitments= 6p. 1;7. or e*ample, in U.S. society, the call to return to =family val
ues= is &ust such an issue. Societies that are a%le to resolve these conflicts move
ahead to new levels of adaptive capacity through innovation. 5thers may =%e so
%eset with internal conflicts or other handicaps that they can %arely maintain them
selves, or will even deteriorate= 6"arsons, 13@@, p. 1;7.
It is at this point that revolutionary change %ecomes more li#ely. Culture gener
ally allows people and other social units 6li#e organi+ations7 to interact. It provides
us with a language and value system. Ehen people or organi+ations %egin to value
different #inds of things or to spea# different languages, the situation is ripe for
conflict. "arsons sees this #ind of pro%lem as a type of strain, strain is defined as a
distur%ance of the cultural e*pectation system. Ehen we have different values, we
do not #now what to e*pect in an encounter. Strain always sets up re-equili%rating
processes, %ut these processes may ta#e a long time to reach %alance and the system
may %e su%stantially different as a result. Change due to revolution occurs in two
phases$ =1/ the ascendancy of the movement, and 617 the adoption of the move
ment as =setting the tone= for the society-the re-equili%rating process 6this latter
is the part that 0ar* and critical theorists leave out of their theories of revolution
ary change7.
#e7olution
our conditions must %e met for a revolutionary movement to %e successful. irst,
the potential for change must e*ist, "arsons refers to this potential as the alienative
motivational elements. "eople %ecome motivated to change the system as the result
of value inconsistencies. !hese inconsistencies are inevita%le and continually present
MID-TWENTIETH CENTR! S"CI"#"$IC%# THE"R! 26
in an empirical system of action, particularly one that has %een generali+ed to incor
porate a num%er of diverse groups, such as in the United States. or e*ample, the term
e4uality has %een stretched to include groups not intended %y the founding docu
ments 6%lac#s weren't originally included in =all men are created equal=7. !he term
has %ecome more general, yet at the same time, the generality of the term sets up con
flicts as more and more groups see themselves as disenfranchised, and others-the
fundamentalists-see the generali+ation as movement away from traditional or
received truth.
Second, dissatisfaction with the system is not enough to %egin a revolutionary
movement, the su%group must also %ecome organi+ed. !he organi+ation of a group
around a su%culture ena%les mem%ers to evade sanctions of the main group, create
solidarity, create an alternative set of normative e*pectations and sanctions, and it
ena%les e*pressive leadership to arise.
!hird, the organi+ed group must develop an ideology that incorporates sym%ols
of wide appeal and can successfully put forward a claim to legitimacy. !he a%ility
to develop an alternative claim to legitimacy is facilitated %y two factors. 5ne is that
the central value system of large societies is often very general and is therefore sus
cepti%le to appropriation %y deviant movements. !he other factor is that serious
strains and inconsistencies in the implementation of societal values create legiti
macy gaps that can %e e*ploited %y the revolutionary group.
!he fourth condition that must %e met is that a revolutionary su%group must
eventually %e connected to the social system. It is this connection that institutional
i+es the movement and %rings %ac# a state of equili%rium. !here are three issues
involved$ 6 17 !he utopian ideology that was necessary to create group solidarity
must %end in order to ma#e concessions to the adaptive structures of society 6e.g.,
#inship, education7-in other words, the revolutionary group must meet the reality
of governing a social system, 617 the unstructured motivational component of the
movement must %e structured toward its central values-the movement must insti
tutionali+e its values %oth in terms of organi+ations and individuals, and 6;7 out
groups must %e disciplined vis-a-vis the revolutionary values that are now the new
values of society.
%ummary
Q "arsons is usually the one credited with having clearly articulated a systems
approach in sociology. !his #ind of theoretical method encourages us to see society
in terms of system pressures and needs. !wo issues in particular are important$ the
%oundary %etween the system and its environment and the internal processes of
integration. "arsons divides each of these into two distinct functions. A*ternal
%oundaries are maintained through adaptation and goal attainment, internal-process
functions are fulfilled %y integration and latent pattern maintenance. Systems theory
also encourages us to pay attention to the %oundaries %etween su%systems, in terms
of their e*changes and communication. 'ecause relatively smart or open systems
have goal states, ta#e in information, and contain control mechanisms, they tend
toward equili%rium. "arsons conceptuali+es society as &ust such a system. In addition,
%ecause "arsons sees everything as operating systemically, his theory is cast at a very
a%stract level and is intended to %e applied to any and all systems.
Q "arsons %uilds his theory of the social system from the ground up. )e %egins
with voluntaristic action occurring within the unit act. )umans e*ercise a great
deal of agency in their decisions, however, their decisions are also circumscri%ed %y
the situation and normative e*pectations. !he normative e*pectations in particular
are where human agency is most e*pressed and where culturally informed motives
and values hold sway. !hese different motives and values orient the actor to the
situation and com%ine to create three general types of action$ strategic, e*pressive,
and moral. "eople tend to interact socially with those who share their general types
of action. (s a result, interactions %ecome patterned in specific ways, which in turn
tends to create sets of status positions, roles, and norms. .ve may say that status
positions, roles, and norms are institutionali+ed to the degree that people pattern
their %ehaviors according to such sets and internali+e the motives, values, and
cultures associated with them.
Q 2ifferent sets of institutionali+ed status pos1t1:ns, roles, and norms are
clustered around different societal needs. 'ecause society functions as a system,
there are four general needs that must %e met$ adaptation, goal attainment,
integration, and latent pattern maintenance. In comple*, differentiated societies,
these functions are met %y separate institutional spheres. !he different
institutions are integrated through the system pressures of mutual dependency
and generali+ed media of e*change. !he social system itself is only one of four
systems that surround human %ehavior. !here are the cultural, social, personality,
and physical systems, each corresponding to (CI< functional requisites. 'ecause
systems are dependent upon information, the culture system is at the top.
Information flows from the top down, and the energy upon which culture is
dependent flows from the %ottom up. "arsons refers to this scheme as the
cy%ernetic hierarchy of control.
Q Systems tend toward equili%rium. !hey can, however, run am1ss if the
su%systems are not properly integrated. In the social system, this happens through
cultural strain. (s societies %ecome more differentiated, the media of e*change
must %ecome more general. In this process, it is possi%le that some groups will see#
to hold onto the dysfunctional culture. !his case sets up a strain within the system,
with some su%systems or groups refusing to change and other su%systems moving
ahead. 0otivation for social revolution is possi%le under these conditions. (fter
people are motivated to change society, they must then create a su%culture that can
function to unite their group and create an alternative set of norms and values. !his
culture must eventually have wide enough appeal to successfully ma#e a claim to
legitimacy. In a revolution, either side could win 6the reformers or the
fundamentalists7, %ut in either case, certain steps are systemically required to
reintegrate the system. (fter the revolution, the su%group must produce a culture
that can unite the system. Institutionali+ation occurs at this point as it does at any
other time$ through %ehaviors patterned and people sociali+ed around a set of
status positions, roles, and norms.
!mpirical Functionalism:
#o5ert .6 /erton (1910-2008)
!heorist's 2igest
Concepts and !heory$ Critiquing "arsons' unctionalism
5unctionalism's Assum%tions
Concepts and !heory$ 2ynamic unctionalism
!mergent Social Change
Summary
s you undou%tedly noticed, "arsons' wor# is very a%stract. )is desire was
to create a scheme that could %e used to analy+e almost any social phe
nomenon in its %roader conte*t. Ee can call this #ind of approach a grand
theory. ( grand theory is one that e*plains all phenomena through a single set of con
cepts. Crand theorists li#e "arsons generally assume that everything in the universe
operates in system-li#e ways, and that all systems are %uilt on the same principles and
are su%&ect to the same dynamics. or e*ample, %iology, psychology, sociology, and
physics are all similar systems and can %e ultimately e*plained using the same theory.
!hin#ing as a grand theorist implies that you tend to see things wor#ing in very
a%stract and mechanistic terms. !he theory has to %e a%stract in order to em%race all
the phenomena in the universe. or instance, in a grand theory you couldn't use simple
psychological terms to e*plain psychology %ecause they wouldn't apply in sociology or
%iology-the terms of a grand theory must %e more a%stract than any one discipline.
T!"#$%T&% '$(!%T
)rie* )io+raphy
/o%ert R. 0erton was %orn on Iuly 4, 131:, in "hiladelphia to Iewish immigrant parents.
0erton's given name was 0eyer /. Sch#olnic#, which he initially changed to %etter suit
his amateur magician show. (s a young man, 0erton spent many hours at the (ndrew
Carnegie <i%rary reading and studying history, science, and %iographies. 0erton studied
6Continued+ -
=Continue*/
an* 0or,e* 0it& Pitirim Soro,in3 Talcott Parsons3 an* Paul #aEars-el*3 all si(ni-icant names
in sociolo(+. He -inis&e* &is P&D -rom Har7ar* in 142P an* soon became a )art o- t&e
-acult+ t&ere. Merton mo7e* to Tulane ni7ersit+ =Ne0 "rleans/ in 14243 an* in 1491 too, a
)osition at Columbia ni7ersit+ in Ne0 !or,3 0&ere &e remaine* -or t&e rest o- &is career.
Merton ser7e* as )resi*ent o- t&e %merican Sociolo(ical %ssociation3 t&e Eastern Sociolo(ical
Societ+3 an* t&e Societ+ -or Social Stu*ies o- Science. His &onors inclu*e more t&an 65 &onorar+
*octoral *e(rees an* members&i) in t&e National %ca*em+ o- Sciences. In 14493 t&e )resi*ent o-
t&e nite* States a0ar*e* Merton t&e National Me*al o- Science. In a**ition3 Robert K. Merton
0as t&e -at&er o- Robert Co: Merton 0&o 0on t&e Nobel PriEe in economics =144@/. Man+ o-
t&e conce)ts t&at Merton coine* &a7e ma*e t&eir 0a+ into )o)ular culture3 suc& as Asel--
-ul-illin( )ro)&ec+3A Arole mo*el3A Amani-est an* latent -unctions3A an* Auninten*e*
conseFuences.A
Merton )asse* a0a+ on Februar+ 623 6552.
!entral "ociological #uestions
%s a stu*ent o- Parsons3' Merton 0as un&a))+ 0it& t&e anal+tical le7el t&at Parsons' t&eor+ is
cast. He ar(ue* t&at sociolo(+ &a*n't *one enou(& em)irical researc& to ma,e t&e ,in*s o-
statements Parsons *i*. Merton's concern3 t&en3 0as to brin( -unctionalism *o0n to t&e
em)irical le7el 0&ere it coul* be teste*.
"imply "tated
In )lace o- Parsons' abstract t&eor+3 Merton (roun*s -unctionalism usin( -unctional
alternati7es3 mani-est an*.latent -unctions3 *+s-unctions3 an* unantici)ate* conseFuences. %ll
-our o- t&ese issues can mo7e a societ+ in a *irection t&at sim)le -unctionalism
0oul*n't-oresee or be able to e:)lain. Merton also ar(ues t&at ot&er -actors can brin( social
c&an(e rat&er t&an eFuilib rium: unantici)ate* conseFuences o- social action3 *e7iance3 an*
sociolo(ical ambi7alence.
$ey !oncepts
mi**le-ran(e t&eor+3 -unctional alternati7es3 mani-est .an* latent -unctions3 *+s-unctions3
unantici)ate* conseFuences3 structuralt&eor+ o- *e7iance3 sociolo(ical ambi7alence
Concepts an- Theory:
Criti9uin+ Parsons& Functionalism
(lthough his focus was ultimately on theory, 0erton wor#ed relentlessly to ground
functionalism in the empirical world first, %efore ma#ing grand, a%stract state
ments. )is alternative approach is to wor# with middle-range theories. 0iddle
range theories =lie %etween the minor %ut necessary wor#ing hypotheses ... and
the all-inclusive systematic efforts to develop a unified theory that will e*plain all
the o%served uniformities of social %ehavior, social organi+ation and social change=
60erton, 13@9, p. ;37. 0erton argues that sociology is too young a discipline to %e
concerned with grand theories, and his intent with the concept is to ground socio
logical theory in =theoretically oriented empirical research= 6p. 8@7.
!here are five attri%utes to middle.range theories& =1/ !hey consist of a limited
set of assumptions that lead to specific hypotheses, which in turn are empirically
confirmed, 617 they are capa%le of %eing %rought together with other middle
range theories to form wider networ#s of theory, 6;7 middle-range theories can
%e generali+ed and applied to different situations 6so the theory is not merely
organi+ed descriptive data7, 6 47 %ecause they don't address the more a%stract
assumptions of grand theory, middle-range theories can fit easily into different
systems of theory, li#e "arsons' social systems or 0ar*'s historical materialism,
and 687 middle-range theories will typically %e in harmony with the method of
classical theorists.
"arsons' and 0erton's approaches represent two methods of theory %uilding$
"arsons privileges reason and argues that theories should %e logically deduced, and
0erton's tactic privileges empirical data and induction. 5f course, middle-range
theories contain a%stractions, =%ut they are close enough to o%served data to %e
incorporated in propositions that permit empirical testing= 60erton, 13@9, p. ;37.
0iddle-range theories usually come in the =theories of= form, such as theories of
gender inequality, role conflict, deviance, and so forth. !hese middle-range theories
don't try to e*plain society at large, rather, they e*plicate some small portion of it
without necessarily connecting it to any other aspect of society. 0erton's idea is
that, as these mid-level theories are proposed and tested, they will %e %rought
together to form a more comprehensive and empirically grounded general theory.
or e*ample, after sufficient empirical testing, we could ta#e <emert's la%eling
theory of deviance and 0erton's structural strain theory and %lend them together
to form a more general theory of deviance, rather than %ringing them together at
the a%stract level as "arsons does.
Functionalism&s Assumptions
0erton also raises questions a%out three of functionalism's ma&or claims. Up
until 0erton, these assumptions seemed to %e the defining features of functional
ism. irst, functionalism posits a functional unity of society. !his postulate states
that the social activities and cultural items that are patterned and standardi+ed
across society are functionally related. In other words, all wor#ing societies have a
functional unity in which all parts of the system wor# together with a fairly high
level of accord and consistency. or e*ample, the functional unity of society princi
ple would assume that the education, government, and religious sectors all wor#
together harmoniously and without fail as parts of the same system. !his assump
tion is what underlies the idea of system equili%rium.
!he second assumption that 0erton questions is the idea of universal function
alism. !his supposition postulates that all social activities or cultural items have
positive sociological functions. In other words, if there is a patterned feature in
society, then it must %e functional %y the very fact that it e*ists. or e*ample, find
ing a society such as the United States where male aggression has high value, the
functionalist assumes that it must have positive %enefits for the whole.
!he last postulate of functionalism that 0erton challenges is that of indis%ens
ability& Avery patterned part of society and culture fulfills a vital function within the
society and is therefore indispensa%le. !his postulate not only assumes there are
certain functions that a society cannot do without, it also assumes that those func
tions must %e fulfilled %y certain cultural or social forms and those forms are there
fore indispensa%le. or e*ample, a functionalist may decide that every society needs
a system of ultimate meanings that gives relevance to all other meanings. !he func
tionalist may then assume that it is only religion that can provide those meanings.
'y such reasoning, religion itself %ecomes necessary for society, when in fact the
function may %e met through other institutions.
0erton sees these assumptions as potentially o%scuring true research. Cenerally
spea#ing, if we assume that something is true, we can usually find evidence for it.
!he first thing 0erton wants to do, then, is change each of these assumptions into
empirical questions. /ather than assuming that government and religion are posi
tively integrated, ma#e it a research question$ In what ways are government and
religion related to one anotherG 5r, might not male aggression have effects that are
other than positiveG (s you can pro%a%ly tell, to as# such questions implies some
ideas that "arsonian functionalism does not contain.
Concepts an- Theory: 'ynamic *unctionalism
In order to help us thin# more clearly a%out functional relations in society, 0erton
gives us several new concepts$ functional alternatives, manifest and latent functions,
dysfunctions, and unanticipated consequences. !he idea of functional alternatives
conceptuali+es the possi%ility that other #inds of structures may meet societal
needs. or e*ample, the function of %iological reproduction doesn't necessarily
have to %e met through family. 5r, for another e*ample, could the meanings that
religion provides %e supplied through other institutions, such as a =civil religion=G
!he concepts of manifest and latent functions specifically refer to the positive con
tri%utions that a social structure has for society, %ut the concepts allow us to see
functions in a more comple* light. 0anifest functions are the #nown contri%utions
and latent functions are the hidden or unac#nowledged contri%utions of social
structures. ( good e*ample is education$ ( manifest function of education is to pass
on the cultural #nowledge of a society, a latent function of education is to provide a
marriage mar#et that pairs people on several important dimensions 6such as class7.
0erton also wants us to %e a%le to see that social structures or institutions may
have negative effects, when seen from a functionalist position. ( dysfunction, then,
is a consequence of a social structure that leads to less adaptation and integration.
!he idea of a dysfunctional family is a micro-level phenomenon that comes from
0erton's concept 6here the dysfunctional consequences come from the perfor
mance of a social role, such as father or mother7. In addition, dysfunctions may %e
manifest or latent.
<atent functions and dysfunctions are concepts that descri%e the outcomes of
social structures. !he idea of unanticipated consequences, on the other hand,
MID-TWENTIETH CENTR! S"CI"#"$IC%# THE"R! %%&
generally refers to the effects of social acts of individuals. Unanticipated conse
quences, then, are those outcomes of social action that are not intended %y the
actor. 0erton 6139@7 gives us several sources of unanticipated consequences.
(mong them are ignorance 6at times, there is such a wide range of possi%le con
sequences that they can't all %e #nown7, chance conse4uences 6=those occasioned
%y the interplay of forces and circumstance that are so numerous and comple*
that prediction of them is quite %eyond our reach= >p. 181?7, error 6the most com
mon source of which is ha%itual action7, im%erious immediacy of interest 6concern
for immediate consequences %loc#s out consideration of long-term effects7, and
basic values 6the actor is concerned with su%&ective rightness rather than o%&ective
consequences$ =)ere is the essential parado* of social action-the 'reali+ation' of
values may lead to their renunciation= >p. 184?7.
!mer+ent %ocial Chan+e
Eith the idea of unanticipated consequences, 0erton is opening up the social
system for unpredicta%le change. unctionalism has usually seen social change in
evolutionary terms-slow change over long periods of time that in the long run
leads to increased comple*ity and thus surviva%ility. (s we've seen, "arsons opens
this idea up a %it %y giving us a functional theory of social revolution. !he reasons
it's a functional theory are that revolutions are only possi%le %ecause of system
strain, such as value inconsistency, and that all revolutions must reintegrate or equi
li%rate the system. 0erton ta#es us a step further.
-ot only are large systems suscepti%le to strain, as "arsons has it, %ut the %ehav
iors of individual actors within the system are also suscepti%le to unanticipated
consequences, %ecause of ignorance, mista#es, values, failure to ta#e the long run
into account, and chance consequences. Unanticipated consequences, then, func
tion as a wild card in the social system. 'oth the idea of dysfunctions and that of
unintended consequences are particularly important for 0erton's 6139@7 theory
%ecause they %oth lead to structural change. Structures change through =cumula
tively patterned choices in %ehavior and the amplification of dysfunctional conse
quences resulting from certain #inds of strains, conflicts, and contradictions in the
differentiated social structure= 6p. 1187, and through =unanticipated consequences
of purposive social action= 6p. 14@7.
!here are two more issues that are important in structural change, according to
0erton$ deviance and am%ivalence. 0erton's structural theory of deviance argues
that society values certain goals and the means to achieve those goals. In the United
States, for e*ample, we value economic success and %elieve that education and hard
wor# are the proper means to achieve that goal. )owever, in any social system there
are disenfranchised people who do not have equal access to the legitimate means to
achieve success, yet are nonetheless sociali+ed to value the same goals as the ma&or
ity. !his structural location puts these people in a position of tension or strain.
Cenerally spea#ing, most people accept the goals and means of society, 0erton
calls this type of response conformity 6acceptance of %oth goals and means7. 'ut for
those in structural strain, there are four other possi%ilities$ innovation 6accept the
goals %ut use innovative means, such as ro%%ery7, ritualism 6a%andon the goals and
perform the means without any hope of success7, retreatism 6deny %oth the goals
and the means and retreat through such things as alcoholism or drug a%use7, or
rebellion 6the individual creates his or her own goals and means7. (s with unin
tended consequences, deviant %ehaviors may accumulate to the point where they
influence the social structure.
Ee can thin# of this idea of accumulation within a system in terms of the heat
thermostat in your home. If it's cold outside and you have your thermostat set at @8
degrees, the internal temperature of your house will trip the thermostat, which will
turn your heat on. If you come into your house while the heat is on, chances are
good that it will stay on-your %ody will have very little influence on the internal
temperature. )owever, if you %ring several of your friends and #eep adding more
people, the total mass of %odies within the house will eventually generate enough
heat to trip the thermostat in the opposite direction and turn the heat off. If you
#eep adding people to your house, you will eventually create enough heat that the
thermostat will pro%a%ly turn the air-conditioner on. It's not a perfect analogy, %ut
you can see where we are heading. /elatively few acts of deviance or unintended
consequences will have little effect, %ut as they accumulate, the social system will
respond and change &ust as your thermostat would.
(m%ivalence generally refers to emotional or psychological attitudes that con
flict with one another. "ociological ambivalence, on the other hand, refers to
7o%%osing normative tendencies in the social definition of a role7 60erton, 139@, p. 11,
emphasis original7. It is important for us to see that the am%ivalence here is struc
tural, not individual-the am%ivalence e*ists within the social structure. or
e*ample, medical doctors e*perience contradictory role e*pectations$ !hey are
e*pected to %e emotionally detached in their professional relations with their
patients, and at the same time they are e*pected to display compassion and concern
for their patients. !here is a way in which sociological am%ivalence is an effect of
modern social change$ (m%ivalence has =evolved to provide the fle*i%ility of nor
matively accepta%le %ehavior required dealing with changing states of a social rela
tion= 60erton, 139@, p. ;17.
!hus, in 0erton's scheme of functionalism, social structures and systems are
ro%ust and comple*. 0erton argues that systems are not simply su%&ect to func
tional consequences, rather, systems regularly e*perience dysfunctions, manifest
and latent functions, and functional alternatives. Eith these ideas, 0erton is
proposing that functional analysis %e open to the possi%ility of multiple conse
quences and focus on the net %alance of outcomes. 0erton also presents us with a
picture of the individual social actor, with culture on one side and social structure
on the other. !hese two structures form the salient environment for the person.
!hat is, individuals set a%out doing their tas#s within this environment that %oth
restrains and ena%les. !he different structural environments that individuals find
themselves within produce differing rates and #inds of deviance and social
am%ivalence. !ogether, am%ivalence, deviance, unanticipated consequences, and
dysfunctions-all of which are intrinsic to social structure-accumulate to create
social change.
MID-TWENTIETH CENTR! S"CI"#"$IC%# THE"R! %'(
%ummary
Q 0erton critiques "arsons' analytical approach to theory, arguing that scientific
theory must accumulate over time and %egin with testa%le middle-range theories.
5nce tested, these mid-range theories, in turn, can %e %rought together to form more
general theories of social structure and action.
Q 0erton also wants to ground functionalism in the empirical world %y getting
rid of some of the more a%stract assumptions underlying functional theori+ing. In
particular, 0erton questions the functional unity of society, universal functionalism,
and indispensa%ility.
Q 0erton further esta%lishes an empirical %ase for functionalism %y arguing that
there may %e alternative outcomes to structural arrangements and individual social
action. 0erton proposes four concepts to help us thin# a%out different outcomes$
functional alternatives, manifest and latent functions, dysfunctions, and unanticipated
consequences.
Q 0erton also sensiti+es us to more su%tle and continuous social change. 0erton
sees quite a %it of social change %uilding up through unanticipated consequences of
social action, deviance, and sociological am%ivalence. "eople rarely have full #nowledge
of the possi%le outcomes of their %ehaviors. If enough of the unanticipated
consequences of %ehavior are similar, they will in the long run accrue enough presence
or force to %ring social change. 2eviance also %uilds up over time, however, deviant
%ehavior is more structurally %ased than unanticipated consequences. "eople have
structured relations with the goals and means of any society. !hese relations result in
four different types of devimRe$ innovation, ritualism, retreatism, and re%ellion. (s
similar forms of deviance accumulate, they too will push for social change. <i#e
deviance, sociological am%ivalence is structured. If the %ehaviors that emerge from
these structured positions %ecome patterned, they will also create pressures within the
social system for change.
4earnin+ /ore-Primary an- %econ-ary %ources
A' Primar+ rea*in(s -or Talcott Parsons:
o Parsons3 T. <142@/. The Structure of Social Action. Ne0 !or,: Mc$ra0-Hill. <Parsons'
ma(num o)us/
o Parsons3 !. =14P9/. Social Structure and Personality Ne0 !or,: Free Press.
o Parsons3 !. =14PP/. Societies. En(le0oo* Cli--s3 N;: Prentice Hall. =Per&a)s t&e most
easil+ un*erstoo* o- Parsons' 0ritin(s/
=Continue*/
G Primar+ rea*in(s -or Robert K. Merton:
o Merton3 R. K. = 1494/. 1n Theoretical Sociology Ne0 !or,: Free Press.
o Merton3 R. K. =14?@/. Social Theory and Social Structure =Re7. e*./. Ne0 !or,: Free Press.
o Merton3 R. K. =14@P/. Sociological Ambivalence and 1ther !ssays. Ne0 !or,: Free Press.
G To rea* more about Parsons3 I 0oul* recommen* t&e -ollo0in(:
o Holton3 R. ;.3 O Turner3 ..S. =14C4/. Talcott Parsons *8ey Sociologists-. C&ic&ester3
K: Ellis Hor0oo*.
o #i*E3 .. =6555/. Talcott Parsons. In $. RitEer =E*./3 The 9lac(well Com%anion to
"a3or Social Theorists. ":-or*3 K: .lac,0ell.
o Robertson3 R.3 O Turner3 ..S. =E*s./. =1441 /. Talcott Parsons& Theorist of "odernity
#on*on: Sa(e.
G For Merton3 rea* t&e -ollo0in(:
o SEtom),a3 ". 614CP/. Robert 8 "erton.: An ;ntellectual Profile. Ne0 !or,: St. Martin's Press.
"eeing the "ocial )orld *+no,ing the theory-
G Write a 6?5-0or* s+no)sis o- Parsons' anal+tical -unctionalism.
G Write a 6?5-0or* s+no)sis o- Merton's em)irical -unctionalism.
G %-ter rea*in( an* un*erstan*in( t&is c&a)ter3 +ou s&oul* be able to *e-ine t&e -ollo0in(
terms t&eoreticall+ an* e:)lain t&eir t&eoretical im)ortance to Parsons' t&eor+ o- social
or*er: the %roblem of social order, voluntaristic action, action theory, the unit act, modes or
orientation, ada%tation, goal attainment, integration, latent %attern maintenance,
generali$ed media of e)change, values, motives, cultural %atterns, action ty%es, insti
tutionali$ation, AC;<, sociali$ation, cybernetic hierarchy of control, e4uilibrium, cultural
strain, alienative motivational elements.
G %-ter rea*in( an* un*erstan*in( t&is c&a)ter3 +ou s&oul* be able to *e-ine t&e -ollo0in(
terms t&eoreticall+ an* e:)lain t&eir t&eoretical im)ortance to Merton's em)irical
-unctionalism: middle.range theory, functional alternatives, manifest and latent functions,
dysfunctions, unantici%ated conse4uences, structural theory of deviance, sociological
ambivalence.
G %-ter rea*in( an* un*erstan*in( t&is c&a)ter3 +ou s&oul* be able to ans0er t&e
-ollo0in( Fuestions =remember to ans0er t&em theoretically-&
o E:)lain &o0 social s+stems are -orme* t&rou(& mo*es o- orientation an* t+)es
action3 an* t&rou(& roles3 norms3 an* status )ositions an* &o0 t&ese
s+stems sol7e t&e )roblem o- social or*er.
o Describe a s+stem's -unctional reFuisites an* interstructural relations
Parsons' %$I# anal+tical sc&eme.
o E:)lain &o0 t&e c+bernetic &ierarc&+ o- control 0or,s an* its im)ortance
un*erstan*in( &o0 societ+ -unctions.
%'% MID-TWENTIETH CENTR! S"CI"#"$IC%# THE"R!
o Discuss t&e )rocess o- social c&an(e -rom t&e be(innin(s o- a social mo7ement to
t&e or*erin( o- t&e ne0 social s+stem =eFuilibrium/.
o E:)lain 0&at mi**le-ran(e t&eories are an* &o0 t&e+ -it into t&e o7erall enter)rise
o- t&eor+ buil*in(.
o Discuss Merton's critiFues o- -unctionalism an* &is )ro)ose* alternati7es.
o se Merton's structural t&eor+ o- *e7iance to *iscuss &o0 *e7iance occurs in a societ+.
!n+a+in+ the %ocial :orl- (usin+ the theory)
G Parsons' )rimar+ )oint o- 7ie0 is t&at &e sees t&in(s as a s+stem. Recall 0&at ma,es a
s+stem a s+stem an* anal+Ee t&is societ+ in terms o- a s+stem. Is t&is societ+ a s+stemD I-
so3 in 0&at 0a+sD I- not3 in 0&at 0a+s *oes it not meet t&e criteriaD #et's ta,e it *o0n a
le7el: %nal+Ee t&e uni7ersit+ +ou atten* in terms o- s+stem Fualities. Is it a s+stemD W&at
about +our classroomD Is it a s+stem in Parsonian termsD Can +ou anal+Ee +our -rien*s&i)
net0or, in terms o- s+stemsD W&at about +ou as a )ersonD Do +ou e:ist as a s+stemD I-
all t&ese are s+stems3 &o0 are t&e+ lin,e* to(et&erD
G Do +ou t&in, t&at 0e can un*erstan* (lobaliEation -rom a s+stems )ers)ecti7eD I- so3
name at least -i7e *i--erent 0a+s t&at Parsons' t&eor+ coul* be use* on a (lobal basis.
G Rememberin( Parsons' i*ea o- cultural strain3 ta,e a loo, at t&e societ+ in 0&ic& +ou li7e.
Is it ri)e -or cultural strainD I- so3 0&+D W&at ,in*s o- cultural strain can +ou
i*enti-+D From a Parsonian a))roac&3 0&at are t&e e--ects 0e mi(&t e:)ectD
G se Parsons' unit act anal+tical sc&eme to e:)lain +our be&a7iors at sc&ool to*a+. Ta,e
t&e sc&eme an* use it in at least -i7e *i--erent settin(s =suc& as sc&ool3 &ome3
s&o))in( mall3 cross0al,3 beac&3 an* so on/. Ho0 *oes &is sc&eme &ol* u)D Were
+ou able to anal+Ee all o- t&e be&a7iors eFuall+ 0ellD
G Recallin( Parsons' i*ea o- (eneraliEe* me*ia o- e:c&an(e3 I'* li,e -or +ou to c&oose t0o
institutions. W&at (eneraliEe* me*ia o- e:c&an(e *o +ou t&in, e:ist bet0een t&ese t0o
institutionsD Ho0 0oul* +ou (o about *eterminin( i- t&e me*ia +ou )ro)ose are
actuall+ at 0or,D
G Pic, t0o *i--erent social institutions3 suc& as reli(ion an* t&e econom+. %nal+Ee eac&
institution usin( Merton's i*eas o- -unctional alternati7es3 mani-est an* latent -unctions3
*+s-unctions3 an* unantici)ate* conseFuences.
G sin( a co)+ o- to*a+'s ne0s)a)er =local or national/3 -in* all t&e articles t&at
co7er some -orm o- *e7iance. se Merton's t&eor+ o- *e7iance to cate(oriEe an*
un*erstan* 0&at is (oin( on.
:ea7in+ the Threa-s (5uil-in+ theory)
G Ho0 *i* Parsons set t&e t&eoretical lan*sca)e -or muc& o- t&e t0entiet& centur+D
G Com)are an* contrast t&e s+no)sis o- -unctionalism +ou 0rote -or S)encer 0it& t&ose o-
Parsons an* Merton. Combine t&ese into a robust *e-inition o- -unctionalism.
(Continued)
=Continue*/
G "ne o- sociolo(+'s abi*in( concerns re7ol7es aroun* t&e issue o- social c&an(e. In t&e
c&a)ter on Dur,&eim3 I as,e* +ou to consi*er S)encer an* Dur,&eim's t&eories o- social
c&an(e an* t&e )roblems o- inte(ration. In t&e c&a)ter on Weber3 I as,e* +ou to com)are
an* contrast Mar: an* Weber on t&e issues o- ineFualit+ an* social c&an(e. Ho0 *oes
Parsons' t&eor+ o- re7olution an* c&an(e inclu*e t&e issues -rom t&e S)encerJDur,&eim
s+nt&esis an* t&e Mar:JWeber s+nt&esisD In ot&er 0or*s3 to 0&at e:tent *oes Parsons'
t&eor+ inclu*e bot& con-lict an* -unctional issues o- social c&an(eD W&at *oes Parsons'
t&eor+ lea7e outD
G S)encer an* Dur,&eim bot& )ro)ose reFuisite -unctions. Com)are an* contrast bot&
S)encer's an* Dur,&eim's lists 0it& Parsons'. W&ere *o S)encer's -unctions -itD W&ere
*oes Dur,&eim's -unction -itD Does Parsons lea7e an+t&in( outD
G Com)are an* contrast Mea*'s t&eor+ o- action 0it& t&at o- Parsons. Do +ou see an+
0a+ t&ese t0o a))arentl+ *iscre)ant t&eories can be brou(&t to(et&er to -orm
-uller un*erstan*in( o- &uman actionD
G %not&er o- sociolo(+'s abi*in( concerns is t&e relations&i) bet0een t&e in*i7i*ual an*
societ+. Sometimes t&is )roblem is )&rase* in terms o- a(enc+ =-ree 0ill/ 7ersus structure
=*etermination/3 an* ot&er times it is tal,e* about as t&e micro-macro lin,. Ho0 are
t&e in*i7i*ual an* societ+ relate*D Ho0 *o t&e actions o- )eo)le in -ace-to--ace
encounters (et translate* to macro-le7el structuresD Ho0 *o structures in-luence
actorsD Parsons *oesn't ans0er all t&ese Fuestions3 but &e (i7es us one o- our -irst
*etaile* t&eoretical e:)lanations o- t&e micro-macro lin,. %ccor*in( to Parsons3 &o0 *o
t&e actions o- )eo)le in -ace-to--ace encounters (et translate* to macro-le7el structuresD
Does &is t&eor+ seem reasonable to +ouD