In trying to determine truth and knowledge, one faces a very serious and profound problem;

how can one determine anything other than the content of his or her own thoughts? Everything we
observe about anything outside of the mind is ultimately processed and understood by the mind. So
how can we know that there is anything other than the mind? Even the body is in question. Such is the
nature of the Mind-Body Problem. Answers generally fall under either Dualism (mind and body are two
separate and real kinds of entities) and Monism (there is either only mind or only body). Here, I will
defend a kind of Monism known as Physicalism. More specifically, I will defend a theory of mind called
computationalism.
Computationalism rejects dualism and holds that all existence is physical. Furthermore, it
compares the brain to a kind of computer that runs a sort of program that we call the mind. It arises
as a response to the category mistake of both substance dualism and reductive physicalism. Both of
these equate the mind and our conscious experience to a sort of substance. However, computationalism
holds that the mind and conscious experience are not equal to physical processes or a separate
substance from physical substance, but that the mind is the resulting function of physical brain
processes. The mind has a causal relationship with the brain.
Among the most prominent criticisms of computationalism is the Chinese Room thought
experiment. This is described as a man in a room with a large amount of books. He is given papers with
Chinese characters and must look through the books to determine what he will write in response.
Without knowing the tiniest bit of the Chinese language, the man in the room can respond to Chinese
prompts with Chinese answers. This essentially attempts to show that computation alone does not
constitute knowledge and understanding, which is something of which we consider our minds capable.
However, the thought experiment fails to account for everything in the room. The man alone does not
know Chinese, but it is certainly arguable that his knowledge combined with the books constitutes
knowledge of the Chinese language. The man alone is but a part of the ridiculously complex process of
the brains computational ability. Modern computers may be extremely complex and still unable to
learn, but our brains are of a complexity that they themselves are currently incapable of thoroughly
understanding. That our brains are fully functioning computers capable of even learning is fully
defensible.
The final hurdle for computationalism is the problem of other minds. While the theory does not,
in itself, have a direct answer to the problem of other minds, we are capable of using it to solve the
problem. Upon accepting that the brain is comparable to a computer and that certain kinds of brain
activity can constitute mind and conscious experience, we can turn our attention to modern science to
discover that we can actually directly observe other brains and compare them to our own. Upon
reviewing the similarities, computationalism can account for the conscious experience of other brains
and solve the problem of other minds. Armed with this, computationalism can withstand objection.