RA 9262 (Violence against Women and Children)

Sec. 3 (a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate,
within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes,
but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making
demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing
her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts
and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the
same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of
the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the
physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to
custody and/or visitation of common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes,
but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and
moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the
conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.
(b) "Battery" refers to an act of inflicting physical harm upon the woman or her child resulting to the
physical and psychological or emotional distress.
(c) "Battered Woman Syndrome" refers to a scientifically defined pattern of psychological and behavioral
symptoms found in women living in battering relationships as a result of cumulative abuse.
(d) "Stalking" refers to an intentional act committed by a person who, knowingly and without lawful
justification follows the woman or her child or places the woman or her child under surveillance directly
or indirectly or a combination thereof.
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of
the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or
social context is not a dating relationship.
(f) "Sexual relations" refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common
child.
(g) "Safe place or shelter" refers to any home or institution maintained or managed by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) or by any other agency or voluntary organization accredited by
the DSWD for the purposes of this Act or any other suitable place the resident of which is willing
temporarily to receive the victim.
(h) "Children" refers to those below eighteen (18) years of age or older but are incapable of taking care of
themselves as defined under Republic Act No. 7610. As used in this Act, it includes the biological children
of the victim and other children under her care.
RA 9710 MAGNA CARTA FOR WOMEN
Section 4. Definitions. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(b) "Discrimination Against Women" refers to any gender-based distinction, exclusion, or restriction which has the
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise by women, irrespective of their
marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
political, economic, social, cultural, civil, or any other field.
It includes any act or omission, including by law; policy, administrative measure, or practice, that directly or
indirectly excludes or restricts women in the recognition and promotion of their rights and their access to and
enjoyment of opportunities, benefits, or privileges.
A measure or practice of general application is discrimination against women if it fails to provide for mechanisms
to offset or address sex or gender-based disadvantages or limitations of women, as a result of which women are
denied or restricted in the recognition and protection of their rights and in their access to and enjoyment of
opportunities, benefits, or privileges; or women, more than men, are shown to have suffered the greater adverse
effects of those measures or practices.
Provided, finally, That discrimination compounded by or intersecting with other grounds, status, or condition, such
as ethnicity, age, poverty, or religion shall be considered discrimination against women under this Act.

Section 12. Equal Treatment Before the Law. - The State shall take steps to review and, when necessary, amend
and/or repeal existing laws that are discriminatory to women within three (3) years from the effectivity of this Act.
Section 13. Equal Access and Elimination of Discrimination in Education, Scholarships, and Training. - (a) The
State shall ensure that gender stereotypes and images in educational materials and curricula are adequately and
appropriately revised. Gender-sensitive language shall be used at all times. Capacity-building on gender and
development (GAD), peace and human rights, education for teachers, and all those involved in the education
sector shall be pursued toward this end. Partnerships between and among players of the education sector,
including the private sector, churches, and faith groups shall be encouraged.
(b) Enrollment of women in nontraditional skills training in vocational and tertiary levels shall be encouraged.
(c) Expulsion and non-readmission of women faculty due to pregnant;- outside of marriage shall be outlawed. No
school shall turn out or refuse admission to a female student solely on the account of her having contracted
pregnancy outside of marriage during her term in school.
Section 18. Special Leave Benefits for Women. - A woman employee having rendered continuous aggregate
employment service of at least six (6) months for the last twelve (12) months shall be entitled to a special leave
benefit of two (2) months with full pay based on her gross monthly compensation following surgery caused by
gynecological disorders.
RA 7877 Anti Sexual Harrasment Act
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. Work, education or training-related
sexual harassment is committed by an employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor,
professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another
in a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from
the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of
said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or
continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions,
promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the
employee which in a way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect said employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employees rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.
(b) In an education or training environment, sexual harassment is committed:
(1) Against one who is under the care, custody or supervision of the offender;
(2) Against one whose education, training, apprenticeship or tutorship is entrusted to the offender;
(3) When the sexual favor is made a condition to the giving of a passing grade, or the granting of honors
and scholarships, or the payment of a stipend, allowance or other benefits, privileges, or considerations; or
(4) When the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the student,
trainee or apprentice.
Any person who directs or induces another to commit any act of sexual harassment as herein defined,
or who cooperates in the commission thereof by another without which it would not have been committed, shall
also be held liable under this Act.
Sec.4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related, Education or Training Environment. It shall be
the duty of the employer or the head of the work-related, educational or training environment or institution, to
prevent or deter the commission of acts of sexual harassment and to provide the procedures for the resolution,
settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment. Towards this end, the employer or head of office shall:
(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in consultation with the jointly approved by the
employees or students or trainees, through their duly designated representatives, prescribing the procedure for
the investigation or sexual harassment cases and the administrative sanctions therefor.
Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in the proper courts for unlawful acts of sexual
harassment.
The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to this section (a) shall include, among others, guidelines on
proper decorum in the workplace and educational or training institutions.
(c) Create a committee on decorum and investigation of cases on sexual harassment. The committee shall
conduct meetings, as the case may be, with other officers and employees, teachers, instructors, professors,
coaches, trainors and students or trainees to increase understanding and prevent incidents of sexual harassment.
It shall also conduct the investigation of the alleged cases constituting sexual harassment.
In the case of a work-related environment, the committee shall be composed of at least one (1) representative
each from the management, the union, if any, the employees from the supervisory rank, and from the rank and file
employees.
In the case of the educational or training institution, the committee shall be composed of at least one (1)
representative from the administration, the trainors, teachers, instructors, professors or coaches and students or
trainees, as the case maybe.
"The employer or head of office, educational or training institution shall disseminate or post a copy of this Act
for the information of all concerned.
Sec. 5. Liability of the Employer, Head of Office, Educational or Training Institution. The employer or head
of office, educational training institution shall be solidarily liable for damage arising from the acts of sexual
harassment committed in the employment, education or training environment if the employer or head of office,
educational or training institution is informed of such acts by the offended party and no immediate action is taken
thereon.
Sec. 6. Independent Action for Damages. Nothing in this Act shall preclude the victim of work, education or
training-related sexual harassment from instituting a separate and independent action for damages and other
affirmative relief.





TRADERS ROYAL BANK, petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION & TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION, respondents.
FACTS
On November 18, 1986, the Union, through its president, filed a letter-complaint aga...inst TRB with the
Conciliation Division of the Bureau of Labor Relations and on March 24, 1987, the Secretary of Labor certified the
complaint to the NLRC for resolution of the following issues raised by the complainants:
l) The Management of TRB per memo dated October 10, 1986 paid the employees their holiday pay but has
withheld from the union the basis of their computation.
2) The computation in question has allegedly decreased the daily salary rate of the employees. This diminution of
existing benefits has decreased our overtime rate and has affected the employees' take home pay.
3) The diminution of benefits being enjoyed by the employees since the (sic) immemorial, e.g. mid-year bonus,
from two (2) months gross pay to two (2) months basic and year-end bonus from three (3) months gross to only
two (2) months.
4) The refusal by management to recall active union members from the branches which were being transferred
without prior notice, solely at the instance of the branch, manager.
On September 2, 1988, the NLRC rendered a decision in favor of the employees, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
1. Holiday differential for the period covering l983-1986 as embodied in Resolution No. 4984-1986 of respondent's
Board of Directors but to start from November 11, 1983 and using the Divisor 251 days in determining the daily
rate of the employees;
2. Mid-year bonus differential representing the difference between two (2) months gross pay and two (2) months
basic pay and end-year bonus differential of one (1) month gross pay for 1986.
The claim for holiday differential for the period earlier than November 11, 1983 is hereby dismissed, the same
having prescribed.
Likewise, the charge of unfair labor practice against the respondent company is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the bonus is demandable?
DECISION:
No. From 1979-1985, the bonuses were less because the income of the Bank had decreased. In 1986, the income
of the Bank was only 20.2 million pesos, but the Bank still gave out the usual two (2) months basic mid-year and
two months gross year-end bonuses. The petitioner pointed out, however, that the Bank weakened considerably
after 1986 on account of political developments in the country. Suspected to be a Marcos-owned or controlled
bank, it was placed under sequestration by the present administration and is now managed by the PCGG.
In the light of these submissions of the petitioner, the contention of the Union that the granting of bonuses to the
employees had ripened into a company practice that may not be adjusted to the prevailing financial condition of
the Bank has no legal and moral bases. Its fiscal condition having declined, the Bank may not be forced to
distribute bonuses which it can no longer afford to pay and, in effect, be penalized for its past generosity to its
employees.
Private respondent's contention, that the decrease in the midyear and year-end bonuses constituted a diminution
of the employees' salaries, is not correct, for bonuses are not part of labor standards in the same class as salaries,
cost of living allowances, holiday pay, and leave benefits, which are provided by the Labor Code.
NLRC reve4rsed.





NASIPIT INTEGRATED ARRASTRE AND STEVEDORING SERVICES, INC. (NIASSI), represented by RAMON M. CALO,
petitioner,
vs.
NASIPIT EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION (NELU)-ALU-TUCP, represented by DONELL P. DAGANI, respo...ndent.

FACTS
NIASSI is a domestic corporation with office at Talisay, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. Respondent Nasipit Employees
Labor Union (Union) wasand may still bethe collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of
NIASSI and is a local chapter of the Associated Labor Union.
The dispute started when, in October 1999, the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board (Wage Board) of
Caraga Region in Northeastern Mindanao issued Wage Order No. (WO) RXIII-02 which granted an additional PhP
12 per day cost of living allowance to the minimum wage earners in that region. Owing allegedly to NIASSIs failure
to implement the wage order, the Union filed a complaint before the DOLE Caraga Regional Office for the
inspection of NIASSIs records and the enforcement of WO RXIII-02. A DOLE inspection team was accordingly
dispatched and reported that WO RXIII-02 was not applicable to NIASSIs employees since they were already
receiving a wage rate higher than the prescribed minimum wage.
Upon motion by the Union, the DOLE Regional Director indorsed the case to the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch
for further hearing, which in turn referred the case to the NCMB for voluntary arbitration.
On February 22, 2002, Voluntary Arbitrator Jesus G. Chavez rendered a decision granting the Unions prayer for the
implementation of WO RXIII-02 on the rationale that WO RXIII-02 did not specifically prohibit the grant of wage
increase to employees earning above the minimum wage. On the contrary, Chavez said, the wage order specifically
enumerated those who are outside its coverage, but did not include in the enumeration those earning above the
minimum wage. He also held that the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between NIASSI and the Union
provides that wage increases granted by the company within one year from CBA signing shall not be creditable to
future legally mandated wage increases. Following the denial of its motion for reconsideration, NIASSI filed with
the CA a petition for review, which affirmed the decision of the voluntary arbitrator.
ISSUE
WON the wage order may be made to apply and cover Nasipits employees who, at the time of the issuance and
effectivity of the wage order, were already receiving a wage rate higher than the prevailing minimum wage.
DECISION
No. It is abundantly clear from the above quoted provisions of WO RXIII-02 and its IRR that only minimum wage
earners are entitled to the prescribed wage increase. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.6 The express mention of
one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. The beneficent, operative provision of WO RXIII-02 is
specific enough to cover only minimum wage earners. Necessarily excluded are those receiving rates above the
prescribed minimum wage. The only situation when employees receiving a wage rate higher than that prescribed
by the WO RXIII-02 may still benefit from the order is, as indicated in Sec. 1 (c) of the IRRs, through the correction
of wage distortions.
Clearly then, only employees receiving salaries below the prescribed minimum wage are entitled to the wage
increase set forth under WO RXIII-02, without prejudice, of course, to the grant of increase to correct wage
distortions consequent to the implementation of such wage order. Considering that NIASSIs employees are
undisputedly already receiving a wage rate higher than that prescribed by the wage order, NIASSI is not legally
obliged to grant them wage increase.
CA reversed.





P.I. Manufacturing v. P.I. Manufacturing Supervisors and Foremen Association
Facts:
RA 6640 was signed into law on 10 December 1987, providing, among others, an increase in the statutory
minimum wage and salary rates of employees and workers in the private sector. It provides that the minimum
wage of workers and employees in the private sector shall be increased by P10, except those outside Manila who
shall receive an increase of P11, provided those that are already receiving above the minimum wage shall receive
an increase of P10. PI Manufacturing Supervisors and Foremen Association (PIMASUFA) entered into a new CBA
whereby the supervisors were granted an increase of P625 per month and the foremen, P475 per month. The
increases were made to retroact to 12 May 1987, or prior to the passage of RA 6640. The application of said CBA
resulted in a wage distortion, which prompted the PIMASUFA together with the National Labor Union to file a case
against PIMA for violation of RA 6640. PIMA asseverates that the The Company and Supervisors and Foremen
Contract absolves, quitclaims, and releases the company for any monetary claim that the supervisors and the
foremen may have previous to the signing of the agreement on 17 December 1987
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of PIMASUFA and ordered PIMA to give the PIMASUFA members wage increases
equivalent to 13.5% of their basic pay. The CA affirmed, but raised the wage increase to 18.5%.
Issues:
1 W/N the PIMASUFA, by signing The Company and Supervisors and Foremen Contract, has waived any benefit it
may have under RA 6640.

2 W/N the 13.5% increase in the supervisors and foremens basic salary should be increased to 18.5% to correct
the wage distortion brought about by the implementation of RA 6640.
Ruling:
1 NO. The increase resulting from any wage distortion brought about by the implementation of the new minimum
wage law is not waivable.

2 NO. Although there was a wage distortion, the same was cured or remedied when PIMASUFA entered into the
1987 CBA with PIMA after the effectivity of RA 6640. The 1987 CBA increased the monthly salaries of the
supervisors by P626 and P475, which re-establishes the gap not only between supervisors and foremen but also
between them and the rank-and-file employees. Such gap as re-established by virtue of the CBA is more than a
substantial compliance with RA 6640. Moreover, requiring PIMA to pay 18.5%, over and above the negotiated
wage increases provided under the 1987 CBA, is highly unfair and oppressive to the former.

A CBA constitutes the law between the parties when freely and voluntarily entered into. It was not shown that
PIMASUFA was coerced or forced by PIMA to sign the 1987 CBA. All of its 13 officers signed the CBA with the
assistance of NLU. They signed it fully aware of the passage of RA 6640. The duty to bargain requires that the
parties deal with each other with open and fair minds. PIMASUFA cannot invoke the beneficial provisions of the
1987 CBA but disregard the concessions it voluntarily extends to PIMA.
Doctrine:
Quitclaims by laborers are generally frowned upon as contrary to public policy and are held to be ineffective to bar
recovery for the full measure of the workers rights. The reason for the rule is that the employer and the employee
do not stand on the same footing.

Article 1149 of the Civil Code states that: When the law sets, or authorizes the setting of a minimum wage for
laborers, and a contract is agreed upon by which a laborer accepts a lower wage, he shall be entitled to recover the
deficiency.

According to RA 6727, wage distortion is a situation where an increase in prescribed wage results in the
elimination or severe contraction of intentional quantitative differences in wage or salary rates between and
among employee groups in an establishment as to effectively obliterate the distinctions embodied in such wage
structure based on skills, length of service, or other logical bases of differentiation. Otherwise stated, wage
distortion means the disappearance or virtual disappearance of pay differentials between lower and higher
positions in an enterprise because of compliance with a wage order.

The goal of collective bargaining is the making of agreements that will stabilize business conditions and fix fair
standards of working conditions.
























Bay Haven v. Abuan
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari on the decision of the CA, who denied their petition to annul the resolution of the
DOLE .
Upon complaint of Florentino Abuan, one of herein respondents, the DOLE, in the exercise of its visitorial,
inspection and enforcement powers, through its Regional Director for the National Capital Region (NCR), issued an
Order commanding petitioners to pay respondents a total of P638,187.15 corresponding to the latter's claims for
underpayment as petitioners' workers. The Regional Director based his Order on the results of the inspection
conducted on April 23, 1997 by one of its inspectors who found that petitioner New Bay Haven Restaurant,
committed the following violations under the labor standards law which are Underpayment of minimum wage,
Underpayment of thirteenth month pay, Underpayment of regular holiday pay, Underpayment of special holiday
pay, Non-payment of night shift differential pay and Non-registration of the firm under Rule of Occupational Safety
and Health Standards. The petitioners filed with the DOLE-NCR Regional Office a Motion for Reconsideration,
alleging that the office had no jurisdiction over the case and that the order was issued in denial of petitioners' right
to due process, and the jurisdiction rest on the NLRC. they added that their right to due process was also denied
because the order was issued without them being furnished copies of the complaint and the inspection report and
without being notified of the hearings held in the case. The DOLE-NCR Assistant Regional Director, acting for the
Regional Director, issued an Order granting petitioners' motion for reconsideration as he found merit in
petitioners' allegation of absence of due process in the issuance of the first order. The order, however, stated that
the DOLE had jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to the Labor Code. The next hearing was set wherein the
petitioners showed payroll sheets and waivers of quitclaims which were signed by the respondents. However, the
latter denied of the amount stated in the payroll as they contend they receive lesser that what is stated there and
also they were forced to sign the quitclaims. The DOLE issues an order holding the petitioners liable to the
respondents. The case was elevated to the CA. The CA ruled in dismissing the petition, ruling that the DOLE had
jurisdiction over the labor standards case and that petitioners did not present enough evidence to refute the
claims made by respondents.
Issues:
1) whether the DOLE Secretary and her authorized representatives have jurisdiction to impose the monetary
liability against petitioners; and
2) whether the DOLE-NCR, as upheld by the DOLE Secretary and the CA committed an error in awarding the claims
of respondents.
Ruling:
1. The DOLE Secretary and her authorized representatives such as the DOLE-NCR Regional Director, have
jurisdiction to enforce compliance with labor standards laws under the broad visitorial and enforcement
powers. The Court has held that the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary, exercised
through his representatives, encompass compliance with all labor standards laws and other labor
legislation, regardless of the amount of the claims filed by workers.
2. The mere disagreement by the employer with the findings of the labor officer, or the simple act of
presenting controverting evidence, does not automatically divest the DOLE Secretary or any of his
authorized representatives such as the regional directors, of jurisdiction to exercise their visitorial and
enforcement powers under the Labor Code. Thus, the key requirement for the Regional Director and the
DOLE Secretary to be divested of jurisdiction is that the evidentiary matters are not verifiable in the
course of inspection. Where the evidence presented was verifiable in the normal course of inspection,
even if presented belatedly by the employer, the Regional Director, and later the DOLE Secretary, may still
examine them; and these officers are not divested of jurisdiction to decide the case.

In the present case, petitioners' pieces of evidence of the alleged contract of lease, payroll sheets, and
quitclaims were all verifiable in the normal course of inspection and, granting that they were not
examined by the labor inspector, they have nevertheless been thoroughly examined by the Regional
Director and the DOLE Secretary. For these reasons, the exclusion clause of Art. 128(b) does not apply.


























BARCENAS V NLRC (REV SIM DEE)
FACTS
- In 1978, Chua Se Su (Su, for short) in his capacity as the Head Monk of the Buddhist Temple of Manila and Baguio
City and as President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Poh Toh Buddhist Association of the Phils. Inc.
hired the petitioner, Filomena Barcenas, who speaks the Chinese language as secretary and interpreter.
- Her position required her to receive and assist Chinese visitors to the temple, act as tourist guide for foreign
Chinese visitors, attend to the callers of the Head Monk as well as to the food for the temple visitors, run errands
for the Head Monk such as paying the Meralco, PLDT, MWSS bills and act as liaison in some government offices.
Aside from her pay and allowances under the law, she received an amount of P500 per month plus free board and
lodging in the temple.
- In December, 1979, Su assumed the responsibility of paying for the education of Barcenas nephew. In 1981, Su
and Barcenas had amorous relations. In May, 1982, or five months before giving birth to the alleged son of Su on
October 12, 1982, she was sent home to Bicol. Upon the death of Su in July, 1983, she remained and continued in
her job.
- . In 1985, Manuel Chua (Chua, for short) was elected President and Chairman of the Board of the Poh Toh
Buddhist Association of the Philippines, Inc. and Rev. Sim Dee (Dee, for short) was elected Head Buddhist Priest.
Thereafter, Chua and Dee discontinued payment of her monthly allowance and the additional P500 effective 1983.
In addition, Barcenas and her son were evicted forcibly from their quarters in the temple by six police officers. She
was brought first to the Police precinct in Tondo and then brought to Aloha Hotel where she was compelled to sign
a written undertaking not to return to the Buddhist temple in consideration of the sum of P10,000. She refused
and Chua shouted threats against her and her son. Her personal belongings including assorted jewelries were
never returned.
- The Labor Arbiter ruled for Barcenas but the NLRC reversed.
ISSUES
1. WON Barcenas was a regular employee of the Manila Buddhist Temple
2. WON Barcenas was illegally dismissed
HELD
1. YES
Reasoning
- We agree with the petitioner's claim that she was a regular employee of the Manila Buddhist Temple as secretary
and interpreter of its Head Monk, Su. As Head Monk, President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Poh
Toh Buddhist Association of the Philippines, Su was empowered to hire the petitioner under Article V of the By-
laws of the Association which states:
"The President or in his absence, the Vice President shall represent the Association in all its dealings with the
public, subject to the Board, shall have the power to enter into any contract or agreement in the name of the
Association, shall manage the active business operation of the Association, shall deal with the bank or banks."
- Chua and Dee, on the other hand, claimed that Barcenas was never an employee of the Poh Toh Temple but a
servant who confined herself to the temple and to the personal needs of the late Chua Se Su and thus, her position
is co-terminus with that of her master. However, the work that she performed in the temple could not be
categorized as mere domestic work. Barcenas, being proficient in the Chinese language, attended to the visitors,
mostly Chinese, who came to pray or seek advice before Buddha for personal or business problems; arranged
meetings between these visitors and Su and supervised the preparation of the food for the temple visitors; acted
as tourist guide of foreign visitors; acted as liaison with some government offices; and made the payment for the
temple, Meralco, MWSS and PLDT bills. Indeed, these tasks may not be deemed activities of a household helper.
They were essential and important to the operation and religious functions of the temple.
2. NO
Reasoning
- Her status as a regular employee ended upon her return to Bicol in May, 1982 to await the birth of her lovechild
allegedly by Su. The records do not show that she filed any leave from work or that a leave was granted her.
Neither did she return to work after the birth of her child on October 12,1982, whom she named Robert Chua alias
Chua Sim Tiong [Whoa, wait a minute! If youre alert youll realize that Sim is the NEW Head Monks name!
Hmmm dont you think something elses going on here? ]. The NLRC found that it was only in July, 1983 after
Su died that she went back to the Manila Buddhist Temple.
- She herself supplied the reason for her return. She stated:
"It was the death-bed instruction to her by Chua Se So to stay at the temple and to take care of the two boys and
to see to it that they finish their studies to become monks and when they are monks to eventually take over the
two temples as their inheritance from their father."
- Thus, her return to the temple was no longer as an employee but rather as Su's mistress who is bent on
protecting the proprietary and hereditary rights of her son and nephew. In her pleadings, the petitioner claims that
they were forcefully evicted from the temple, harassed and threatened by respondents and that the Poh Toh
Buddhist Association is a trustee corporation with the children as cestui que trust. These claims are not proper in
this labor case. They should be appropriately threshed out in the complaints already filed by the petitioner before
the civil courts. Due to these claims, we view the respondents' offer of P10,000 as indicative more of their desire to
evict the petitioner and her son from the temple rather than an admission of an employer-employee relation.
- The petitioner's claim for unpaid wages since May, 1982 which she filed only in 1986, has already prescribed.
Under Article 292 of the Labor Code, all money claims arising from employer-employee relations must be filed
within three years from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall forever be barred.
- Finally, while petitioner contends that she continued to work in the temple after Su died, there is, however, no
proof that she was re-hired by the new Head Monk. In fact, she herself manifested that respondents made it clear
to her in no uncertain terms that her services as well as her presence and that of her son were no longer needed.
However, she persisted and continued to work in the temple without receiving her salary because she expected
Chua and Dee to relent and permit the studies of the two boys. Consequently, under these circumstances, no
employer-employee relationship could have arisen.
Disposition Decision of the NLRC is AFFIRMED.







APEX MINING CO V NLRC
196 SCRA 251
GANCAYCO; April 22, 1991

NATURE
Special civil action for certiorari to annul NLRC decision
FACTS
- Sinclita Candida was employed by Apex Mining Company, Inc. to perform laundry services at its staff house. At
first, she was paid on a piece rate basis. Later, she was paid on a monthly basis.
- While she was hanging her laundry, she accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. She reported the
accident to her immediate supervisor and to the personnel officer. As a result of the accident she was not able to
continue with her work.
- She was permitted to go on leave for medication and was offered P2k which was eventually increased to P5k to
persuade her to quit her job, but she refused the offer and preferred to return to work. Petitioner did not allow
her to return to work and dismissed her.
- Labor arbiter ordered Apex Mining Company to pay the complainant Salary Differential, Emergency Living
Allowance, 13th Month Pay Differential and separation pay of one month for every year of service NLRC affirmed.
ISSUE
WON the househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company is a domestic helper
HELD
NO
- Petitioner is a regular employee
- Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code:
The term "househelper" as used herein is synonymous to the term "domestic servant" and shall refer to any
person, whether male or female, who renders services in and about the employer's home and which services are
usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the
personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's family.


- The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant who is employed in the
employer's home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's family. The
definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp or laundrywomen working in staffhouses of a company
- The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said employer.
- While it may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home
or in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference in their circumstances is that in the former
instance they are actually serving the family while in the latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single
proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered
in the staffhouses or within the premises of the business of the employer. In such instance, they are employees of
the company or employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.
Disposition Petition dismissed




Bacsin vs. Wahiman


FACTS
-Bacsin, a public elementary school teacher, was charged with Misconduct for fondling the breast of his
student, as was witnessed by another student. In his defense, Bacsin claimed that the touching
happened by accident.
*CSC: GUILTY of Grave Misconduct (Acts of Sexual Harassment), DISMISSED. Act contained in the Anti-
Sexual Harassment Act of 1995. MR Denied. Appealed to CA
*CA: Affirm. Even if Bacsin was formally charged with disgraceful and immoral conduct and
misconduct, CSC found that the allegations and evidence sufficiently proved petitioners guilt of grave
misconduct, which is punishable by dismissal from service.

ISSUE: WON MISCONDUCT (which was the charge against him) includes Grave Misconduct, thus, he can
be convicted of such even if that was not charged

HELD: YES
*Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission: The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need
not be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is
apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what is controlling is the allegation of the acts
complained of, not the designation of the offense.
>>>It is clear that petitioner was sufficiently informed of the basis of the charge against him, which was
his act of improperly touching one of his students. Thus informed, he defended himself from such
charge. The failure to designate the offense specifically and with precision is of no moment in this
administrative case.
>>>Charges against him imputes acts covered and penalized under Anti-sexual harassment act of 1995
*Domingo v. Rayala: it is not necessary that the demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor be
articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the
acts of the offender.
>>>act of mashing the breast, in an education environment, upon a student, who felt fear at the time
Bacsin touched her, are sufficient grounds for grave misconduct
*there is grave misconduct! The act of petitioner of fondling one of his students is against a law, RA
7877, and is doubtless inexcusable. The particular act of petitioner cannot in any way be construed as a
case of simple misconduct. Sexually molesting a child is, by any norm, a revolting act that it cannot but
be categorized as a grave offense. Parents entrust the care and molding of their children to teachers,
and expect them to be their guardians while in school. Petitioner has violated that trust. The charge of
grave misconduct proven against petitioner demonstrates his unfitness to remain as a teacher and
continue to discharge the functions of his office.
*no denial of due process: The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek for
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. These elements are present in this case, where
petitioner was properly informed of the charge and had a chance to refute it, but failed.
A teacher who perverts his position by sexually harassing a student should not be allowed, under any
circumstance, to practice this noble profession. So it must be here.

Disposition: DISMISS Petition
PT&T v NLRC
FACTS:

This is a case for illegal dismissal filed by Grace de Guzman against PT&T.

Grace de Guzman is a probationary employee of PT&T. In her job application, she represented that she was single
although she was married. When management found out, she was made to explain. However, her explanation was
found unsatisfactory so she was subsequently dismissed from work.

Grace thus filed a case for illegal dismissal against PT&T with RAB. According to the Labor Arbiter, Grace, who had
already gained the status of regular employee, was illegally dismissed by PT&T. Moreover, he ruled that Grace was
apparently discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company rules.

On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was upheld. The Motion for Reconsideration was likewise
rebuffed, hence, this special civil action.

Petitioner argued that the dismissal was not because Grace was married but because of her concealment of the
fact that she was married. Such concealment amounted to dishonesty, which was why she was dismissed from
work.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the company policy of not accepting married women for employment was discriminatory
Whether or not Graces act of concealment amounted to dishonesty, leading to loss of confidence
Whether or not Grace was illegally dismissed

HELD:

There was discrimination

Article 136 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female
employee.

Petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts
marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor
laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioners assertion that it dismissed private respondent
from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were
dissolved principally because of the companys policy that married women are not qualified for employment in
PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

Concealment did not amount to willful dishonesty

Verily, private respondents act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly
characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to
retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal
company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of
confidence is a just cause for termination of employment, it should not be simulated. It must rest on an actual
breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the employers caprices. Furthermore, it should never be
used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified.

However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace did commit an act of dishonesty, which should be sanctioned and
therefore agreed with the NLRCs decision that the dishonesty warranted temporary suspension of Grace from
work.

Grace attained regular status as an employee

Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her dismissal. When she was
served her walking papers on Jan. 29, 1992, she was about to complete the probationary period of 150 days as she
was contracted as a probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected just when
her probationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was done in order to
prevent her from earning security of tenure.

There was illegal dismissal

As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed without just cause, she is
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of
allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent.

On Stipulation against Marriage

In the final reckoning, the danger of PT&Ts policy against marriage is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and
purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation.

Petition dismissed.
















Sonza vs. ABS-CBN broadcasting Corporation
FACTS:
ABS-CBN and MJMDC entered into a contract on may 1994. ABS-CBN was represented by its officers while MJMDC
was represented by sonza, as president and general manager and mel tiangco, as EVP and treasurer referred to in
the agreement as agent, MJDC agreed to provide sonzas services exclusively ABS-CBN as talent for radio and
television. The agreement listed the services sonza would plender.
On april 1996, sonza wrote a letter to ABS-CBNs president in regard to his resignationin view of the events
concerning his programs and career.
April 30,1996, sonza filed a complaint against the ABS-CBN before the DOLE. Sonza complained that the ABS-CBN
did not pay his salaries, separation pay, service incentive, leave pay, signing bonus, travel allowances and amounts
due under the employee stock option plan (ESOP).
On july 10 1996, ABS-CBN filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there is no employer-employee
relationship. Sonza filed an opposition to the motion on July 19, 1996.
Meanwhile, ABS-CBN opened a account to continually remit sonza fees under the agreement.
Labor arbiter denied the motion to dismiss, however in his decision labor arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction and that there is not employer-employee relationship.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter. The same was also denied upon the motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE
I. Whether or not sonza is an employee or independent contractor
- the existence of an employer-employee relationship is a question of fact. Appellate courts accord the
factual findings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC not only respect but also finality when supported by substantial
evidence. Court does not substitute its own judgment for that of tha tribunal in determining where the weight of
evidence lies or what evidence is credible.
II. Essential elements of employer-employee relationship
A. Selection and engagement of employer. the specific selection and hiring of sonza, because of
his unique skills, talent and celebrity status not possessed by ordinary employees. Is a
circumstance indicative but not conclusive of independent contractual relationship.
B, Payment of wages whatever benefits sonza enjoyed arose from contract and not because of an
employer-employee relationship. The power to bargain the talent fees way above the salary
scales of ordinary employees is a circumstance indicative, but not conclusive of independent
contractual relationship.
C. Power of dismissal. Sonza failed to show that ABS-CBN could terminate his service on grounds
other than breach of contract, such as retrenchment to prevent losses as provided under labor laws.
D. power of control applying the control test the court held that sonza is not an employee but an
independent contractor. The control test being the most important test our courts apply in distinguishing
an employee from an independent contactor.
ABS-CBN did not exercise control over the means and methods of performance of sonzas work.
Moreover a radio broadcast specialist who works under minimal supervision is an independent contractor
lastly, in broadcast industry exclusively is not necessarily the same as control.
I. nature of sonzas claim
- sonzas claims are all based on the may agreement and stock option plan and not in the 1994 labor
code. Clearly the present case does not call for an application of the labor code. In effect sonzas
cause of action is for breach of contract which is intrinsically a civil dispute cognizable by the court.

DISPOSITION Petition denied .Assailed decision is affirmed























Tan vs. Lagrama
FACTS:
Petitioner Rolando tan is the president of supreme theater corporation and the general manager of crown and
empire theater in butuan city. Private respondent leovildo lagrama is a painter, making ad billboards and murals
for the motion pictures shown at the empress, supreme and crown theaters for more than 10 years from
September 1, 1988 to October 17 1998.
On October 17, 1998 lagrama was summoned and was scolded for urinating on his work area and was
asked not to draw anymore.
Lagrama denied the charged against him. He claimed that he was not the only one who entered the drawing are
and that even if the charge was true, it was a minor infraction to warrant his dismissal. However everytime he
spoke. Tan showed at him to get out, leaving him no choice but to leave the premises.
Lagrama filed a complaint with the sub-regional arbitration branch no. x of the NLRC in butuan city. He
alleged that he had been illegally dismissed and sought reinvestigation and payment of 13th month pay, service
incentive leave pay, salary differential, and damages.
Tan denied that lagrama was his employee. He asserted that lagrama was an independent contractor.
On june 1999, labor arbiter found tan guilty of illegal dismissal and grand petition.
Upon appeal to the NLRC fifth division, cagayan de oro city which rendered a decision finding lagrama to b an
independent contractor,and for this reason reversing the decision of the labor arbiter. NLRC denied motion for
reconsideration
A. petition for certiorari was filed before the court of appeals which found that tan exercises control over
lagramasit is a method of computing compensation, not a basis for determining the existence or absence of
employer-employee relationship. In the case at bar petitioner did not present the payroll to support his claim that
lagrama was not his employee
B. the primary standard for determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular
activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. In this case there is
such a connection between the job of lagrama painting billboards and murals and the business of the petitioned.
C. the fact the lagrama was not reported as an employee to the SSS is not conclusive on the question of whether
he was an employee of petitioner. Otherwise an employer would be rewarded for his failure or even neglect to
perform his obligation.
D. neither does the fact that lagrama painted for other persons affect or alter his employment. Relationship with
petitioner.That he did 50 only during weekends has not been denied by petitioner.
E. lagrama had been employed by petitioner since 1988.under the law, therefore, he is deemed a regular
employee and is thus entitled to security of tenure, as provided in art. 279 of labor code.
This court has held that if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if he not
continuously but intermittently, the repeated and continuing need for its performance is sufficient evidence of the
necessity, if not indispensability, of that activity to the business of his employermence the employment is also
considered regular although with respect only to such activity and while such activity exists.
F. whether or not lagrama abandoned his work. There is no evidence to show this abandonment. Requires two
elements: 1. the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason and 2. a clear intention to
server the employer-employee relationship , with the second element as the more determinative factor and being
manifested by some overacts. Mere absence is not sufficient, and the burden is on the part of the employer to
show a deliberate and unjustified refusal on the part of the employee to resume his employment without any
intention of returning the court affirmed the court of appeals ruling that, private respondent (herein petitioner )
has not established clear proof of the intention of the petitioner to abandon his job or to sever the employment
relationship between him and the private respondent. On the contrary, it was the private respondent who told
that he did not want the latter to draw for him and thereafter refused to give him work to do or any mural or
billboard to paint or drawn on.
II. whether or not private respondent lagrama was illegally dismissed. to begin, the employer has the burden of
proving the lawfulness of his employees dismissal. Labor code provides that no worker shall be dismissed except
for a just or authorized cause provided by law and after due process.
In this case, by his refusal to give lagrama work to do and ordering lagrama to get out of his sight as the
latter tried to explain his side, petitioner made it plain that lagrama was dismissed. Urinating in a work place other
than the one designated for the purpose constitutes valid g___ for dismissal. However, there is no evidence that
lagrama did urinate in a place other than the rest room in the premises of his work.
III. the grant of separation pay in LIEU of reinstatement is appropriate because the relationship between the
employer and employee has been so strained that reinstatement would no longer serve any purpose.
IV. the bureau of working conditions classifies workers paid by results into two groups, namely 1. those whose
time and performance is supervised by the employer and 2. those whose time or performance is unsupervised by
the employer. The first involves an element of control and supervision over the manner the work is to be
performed, while the second does not. If a piece worker is supervised, there is an employer-employee relationship.
As in this case. However such an employee is not entitled to service incentive leave pay since he is paid a fixed
amount for work done. Regardless of the time he spent in accomplishing such work.
DISPO:
Petition is denied. Decision of labor arbiter is affirmed with modification that the back wages and other benefits
awarded to private respondent should be computed from the time of his dismissal up to the time of the finality of
this decision, without any deduction and qualification. However, the service incentive leave pay awarded to him is
deleted.