Modelling tThe Moral Dimension oOf Decisions

Katie Steele, University of Queensland

In this paper we explore the connections between ethics and decision theory. In
particular, we consider the question of whether decision theory carries with it a
bias towards consequentialist ethical theories. We argue that although there is
a sense in which other ethical theories can be accommodated by standard
decision theory, these ethical theories are not naturally suited to the project of
maximising expected utility. In particular, we argue that the motivation for the
other ethical theories and the psychological processes of the agents who
subscribe to those ethical theories are lost or poorly represented in the
resulting models.
1. INTRODUCTION
Decision theory has two components: probabilities and utilities. From the formal point
of view, these two components play symmetrical roles in decision theory. For each
actstate pair or outcome! we assi"n a probability and a utility, then we multiply
these to"ether and sum the products across each act. #he resultin" sum we call the
expected utility. Standard decision theory then tells us to choose the act with the
"reatest e$pected utility if there is such an act!. #his is all very familiar. %hat we
draw attention to is that, in terms of the formal decision calculus, probabilities and
utilities are treated similarly&they are 'ust two real numbers to be multiplied and then
added.

#he similarities between probabilities and utilities run even deeper. (oth are
constrained by a$iomatic theories: probabilities by the Kolmo"orov )*+,! a$ioms
and utilities by von -eumann./or"enstern )*00! utility theory. #hese a$iomatic
theories place minimal structural constraints on probabilities and utilities.
i
1ther
representation theorems, such as Sava"e2s )*+0! e$pected utility theory, e$plicitly
bind to"ether belief and preference, and thus the resultin" probability and utility
functions.! %hichever way we 'ustify their connection to belief or preference, t#he
a$ioms ensure that there are no violations of consistency. For e$ample, the
Kolmo"orov a$ioms rule out probabilities that don2t sum to ), so if an a"ent assi"ns
probability p to some proposition Q, then the a"ent must assi"n )p to 3Q. 4nd the
von -eumann./or"enstern a$ioms insist, for instance, on transitivity of preferences:
if an a"ent prefers A to and to !, then the a"ent ou"ht to prefer A to !. 5all an
a"ent whose probability assi"nments conform to the Kolmo"orov a$ioms a
"olmogorov#consistent agent, and call an a"ent whose utility assi"nments conform to
the von -eumann./or"enstern utility theory a von#$eumann#%orgenstern#consistent
agent. 6t is clear that mere Kolmo"orov.consistency and von.-eumann./or"enstern.
consistency are, in "eneral, not enou"h to ensure that an a"ent is beyond reproach.
5ompliance with these conditions does not imply responsible decision.ma7in".

#a7e probabilities first. 5onsider an a"ent who assi"ns probability ) to the flat earth
theory and probability 8 to every other theory about the shape of the earth. Such an
a"ent is "olmogorov#consistent, but she is a poor or irresponsible epistemic agent, for
she assi"ns 9ero probability to a theory for which there is a "reat deal of evidence the
rou"hly.spherical earth theory!. /oreover, because she assi"ns probability ) to the
flat earth theory, no amount of evidence will chan"e this assi"nment, since updatin"
on new evidence via (ayes2s theorem will never lower the probability of ma$imal.
probability propositions. %hat are the e$tra constraints we need to ensure that merely
Kolmo"orov.consistent a"ents are responsible epistemic a"ents: %ell, this is "oin" to
be a complicated epistemolo"ical story, and the details will depend on the particular
epistemolo"y to which you subscribe.

-ow to utilities. 5onsider an a"ent who prefers "enocide to murder and prefers
murder to a wal7 in the hills. So lon" as this a"ent satisfies transitivity i.e., prefers
"enocide to a wal7 in the hills! and other such structural constraints, the a"ent is a
von.-eumann./or"enstern.consistent a"ent. (ut clearly such an a"ent is a poor
moral agent. %hat are the e$tra constraints we need to ensure that merely von.
-eumann./or"enstern.consistent a"ents are responsible moral a"ents: #his is "oin"
to be a complicated story about ethics, and presumably the details will depend on the
particular ethical theory to which you subscribe.

So while decision theory is able to "loss over the details of how probabilities and
utilities are assi"ned and hence "loss over the thorny issues in epistemolo"y and
ethics!, a full account of decisions re;uires both an epistemolo"ical and an ethical
theory. /oreover, we need the epistemolo"ical and ethical theories to be spelled out
in ways which that enable them to be accommodated in the standard decision.theory
framewor7. 1f course a "reat deal has been written on the epistemic side of this story.
6n particular, there is a lar"e literature on the ;uestion of whether decision theory
re;uires (ayesianism or whether other interpretations of the probabilities are
possible.
ii
(ut, "iven the symmetry between the probability side of thin"s and the
utility side, it is somewhat surprisin" that very little has been written about the ethical
side of decision theory. #his, then, brin"s us to the central ;uestion we will address in
this paper: how much freedom do we have in choosin" an ethical theory to
accompany standard decision theory:

1ne way of loo7in" at this ;uestion is as a search for a philosophical interpretation of
utilities. <ust as (ayesianism is the obvious candidate for the philosophical
interpretation of the probabilities that arise in decision theory if not all probabilities!,
conse;uentialism presents itself as the obvious candidate for the philosophical
interpretation of the utilities employed by decision theory. (ut is conse;uentialism the
only "ame in town, where decision theory is concerned: %e investi"ate whether
alternative ethical theories can be at least accommodated in the decision.theory
framewor7. 6n other words, is the utility function capable of representin" the
preferences of a"ents who subscribe to ethical theories other than conse;uentialism:
(efore we move on we should say a little about the si"nificance of what we are tryin"
to do and why we approach it the way we do. 1f course, conse;uentialism presents
itself as the obvious candidate insofar as we want an ethical theory that sits well with
decision theory. 6n relation to the si"nificance of our pro'ect,=ven so, i it mi"ht be
thou"ht that it is trivial or at least well 7nown that the various ethical theories can all
be modelled in the decision theory framewor7.
iii
=ven if this is ri"ht, it is still
interestin" to see at least some of the details, rather than rest content with the simple
7nowled"e that it can be done. /oreover, in providin" the details, we shed some li"ht
on the ethical theories, the decision theory framewor7, and the relationship between
the two. #he ;uestion arises as to whether it is appropriate or useful to merely
accommodate other ethical theories within decision theory or do we do too much
violence to the said theories in tryin" to submit them to this framewor7: %e will
return to these issues in the final section.

#o introduce ethics to decision theory, we place constraints on the real.valued utility
function rather than on underlyin" preferences between acts. #here are a couple of
reasons for this. Firstly, it shouldn2t really matter where the constraints "o, because
accordin" to the representation theorems an a"ent2s preference orderin" and the
correspondin" utility function should be in a sense interchan"eable. %e refer to the
utility function because decision theory is ar"uably most instructive at the level of
probability.utility computations. 6f the framewor7 is "oin" to be of some use to
ethical thin7in", rather than merely consistent with ethical thin7in", then it is natural
to frame our constraints in terms of calculatin" e$pected utilities. #his also allows us
to be a bit more specific about how some features li7e the effect of virtuous
motivation on action! could be modelled. %e lose "enerality, but we "ain more
tan"ible models.! 6n addition, e$tra constraints on belief, such as conformity to
>ewis2s ?rincipal ?rinciple, are introduced at the level of probability functions. 6f
there is an analo"y to be drawn between ethical constraints on preference and such
constraints on belief, it su""ests introducin" ethics at the level of the utility function.
@avin" said all this, we note that one could alternatively introduce ethical constraints
at the level of ordinal preference ran7in"s, and it would moreover be interestin" to
compare the two approaches. %e save this for future wor7.

-ote also that w%e set ourselves the tas7 of tryin" to accommodate the ethical
theories in ;uestion into standard decision theory. 4nother option mi"ht be to play
around with the decision theory model to introduce, say, two.dimensional utility
functions e.". @A'e7 B88C!. %hile there are no doubt some interestin" avenues to be
e$plored here, we restrict ourselves to standard decision theory. #here are several
reasons for this but the most si"nificant is simply that this framewor7 is widely used
and we would hope that all ethical theories mi"ht be able to use it. #o develop
different decision theories for different ethical theories tends to mar"inalise ethics.
Finally, we note that we will occasionally run with specific and occasionally very
simple versions of the ethical theories in ;uestion. For instance, we use utilitarianism
as our model conse;uentialist theory. For the most part we do this because @avin" a
particular version of an ethical theory in mind facilitates the formulation of constraints
on the utility function. %we want our account to be as "eneral as possible, however,
so. %e do not want we try not to ta7eto ta7e too many stands on substantial issues
althou"h occasionally this will be unavoidable!. So in a nutshell, we want to show
the details of how to accommodate fairly "eneric versions of the ma'or ethical
theories into standard decision theory.
2. THREE ETHICA THEORIE!
%e e$amine three of the most important types of theory in contemporary
philosophical ethics: conse;uentialism and in particular, utilitarianism!, deontolo"y
and virtue theory. =thical theories are primarily theories of ri"ht action. 4lthou"h
virtue ethics is often ta7en to be an e$ception, we treat it here as furnishin" a theory of
ri"ht action. 1ur challen"e is to translate theories of ri"ht action into a decision.
theoretic framewor7 by representin" them as offerin" diverse accounts of utility. First,
however, we outline our "eneral approach to the theories and what we re"ard as
distinctive of each of them.
Utilitarianism provides us with the most natural method of "eneratin" utility
assi"nments because it e$pressly incorporates a theory of utility, one that identifies
utility with welfare. %elfare is conceptuali9ed by utilitarians in mar7edly different
ways. For e$ample, classical utilitarianism&the theory associated with <eremy
(entham and <ohn Stuart /ill&identifies welfare with happiness, where the latter is
interpreted as a preponderance of pleasure over pain. ?reference.satisfaction
utilitarianism, by contrast, identifies welfare with the satisfaction of self.re"ardin"
preferences i.e., with a person2s preferences about how their life is to "o!.
iv
/ore
ob'ective conceptuali9ations of welfare have also been proposed in which a mi$ed
bas7et of ob'ective life conditions are said to contribute in some reasonably well.
defined way to a person2s overall welfare. #he important point for our purposes is that
every utilitarian theory proposes an account of utility as welfare and introduces a
cardinal measure of total utility in a situation. -ow utility assi"nments of this 7ind are
widely dismissed as too controversial and probably undiscoverable, and for these
reasons do not fi"ure much in economic theory and public policy. @owever, for
philosophical purposes, one mi"ht nonetheless insist that the notion of a cardinal
measure of welfare is coherent and plays a role in determinin" ri"ht action, even
thou"h we are usually in a position only to appro$imately and fallibly identify levels
of welfare.
4n important feature of utilitarianism is the interpretation of the nature of
value it presupposes. For utilitarians, values are attributed to possible states of affairs
and furnish reasons to brin" them about. Utility is the sole measure of morally
relevant value for utilitarians and they are naturally led towards a ma$imi9in"
principle with respect to it. #o act in a way that promotes an outcome other than
ma$imum utility would be to value somethin" other than utility more than one values
utility. (ut since utilitarians reco"ni9e no morally relevant value other than utility
they "enerally re"ard it as a moral error to pursue less than the ma$imum available
utility.
v
Deontolo"ists differ from utilitarians in that they do not offer a theory of
utility at all. Dather, deontolo"y introduces a set of moral constraints upon decision.
ma7in". #hese include prohibitions and obli"ations that often have the effect of
undercuttin" welfare ma$imi9ation.
vi
For e$ample, observin" a prohibition a"ainst
tar"etin" civilians in war may prolon" a bloody conflict so that, on any reasonable
assessment of welfare, "eneral welfare is "reatly diminished as a result.
?rohibitions and obli"ations need not be absoluteE they may be conditional.
For e$ample, a deontolo"ist may allow lyin" under some circumstances&say when a
person is ne"otiatin" with you in bad faith&and not others. 4 deontolo"ist mi"ht also
ta7e the application of duties to be conte$t.sensitive: the duties relevant in one
situation may not be relevant in another. For e$ample, a parent may have duties to
their child that a stran"er does not have. 6t is also possible for a deontolo"ist to hold
certain duties to be defeasible. #his is, prohibitions and obli"ations may be defeated
by the threat of certain levels of disutility. For e$ample, a deontolo"ist mi"ht thin7 it
permissible to lie or steal when the threat to "eneral well.bein", or even to their own
survival, is sufficiently hi"h and no better alternatives are available. ?rohibitions and
obli"ations may also be ran7ed, so that, for e$ample, prohibitions a"ainst 7illin"
outran7 prohibitions a"ainst stealin", both of which outran7 obli"ations to come to the
aid of nei"hbours in distress.
Deontolo"ists are motivated by a conception of the moral relevance of value
that is very different from that of the utilitarian.
vii
%here the utilitarian conceives of
'ud"ments of value as supplyin" reasons to promote particular states of affairs, the
deontolo"ist is li7ely to thin7 of morally si"nificant value 'ud"ments as directed
towards persons, morally re;uirin" that persons be respected. For deontolo"ists,
morally valuin" someone entails respectin" them, not see7in" to promote their
welfare. #o respect a person is not to wish to see more of a certain valuable state of
affairs, but, at least in part, to accept that we are le"itimately restricted in what we
may do to or for the person. Deontolo"ists characteristically direct respect towards
persons, but other sub'ects of respect are also possible in deontolo"y. For e$ample,
deontolo"ical environmental ethicists may value all livin" thin"s.
viii
#he third ethical theory under view&virtue ethics&neither offers a theory of
utility nor a set of e$plicit moral constraints upon action. Firtue ethics is first and
foremost a re.focusin" of moral theory away from the concern to provide an account
of correct moral decision.ma7in". #he central ;uestion for the virtue ethicist is not
Gwhat should 6 do:2 but Gwhat 7ind of person should 6 be:2 and this latter ;uestion is
not sufficiently well answered by observin" that 6 should be the 7ind of person who
acts ri"htly. -onetheless, a number of contemporary virtue ethicists attempt to show
how virtue.theoretic considerations contribute directly to the tas7 of moral decision.
ma7in". Firtue.theoretic accounts of ri"ht action derive an account of ri"ht action in
one way or another from an independent account of virtue. #he idea is to first
determine which character traits or motivations are morally admirable either
intrinsically or because they are essential features of a flourishin" life or of a morally
"ood life! and use this account to describe how a morally "ood person would act in
various challen"in" situations. 1n one natural development of this idea, ri"ht action is
identified with virtuous a"ency.
i$
For such virtue ethicists, to act ri"htly is to act
virtuously and to act virtuously is to manifest a comple$ inner state: a state involvin"
at least! morally admirable motivations. 4n alternative virtue.theoretic approach to
ri"ht action identifies ri"ht action with actions that would, characteristically, be
performed by a virtuous a"ent.
$
Such an indirect, or hypothetical, virtue.theoretic
account of ri"ht action has the advanta"e of preservin" intuitions about the distinction
between doin" the ri"ht thin" actin" ri"htly! and doin" the ri"ht thin" for the ri"ht
reason and with the ri"ht motivation actin" virtuously!. (y contrast, direct virtue.
theoretic accounts&those identifyin" ri"ht action with virtuous action&en'oin moral
a"ents to pursue virtuous action rather than merely conform to the standards of
virtuous action.
Firtues interact with each other in comple$ ways. 6t is unli7ely that any simple
ran7in" of virtues will capture the variable si"nificance of virtues as they apply in
complicated and varied circumstances. %hen does benevolence&a virtue directed at
the well.bein" of stran"ers&ta7e precedence over the virtue of carin" for loved ones:
%hen is the virtue of inte"rity outran7ed by the virtues of practicality and willin"ness
to compromise: 6n answerin" ;uestions li7e these, the virtue ethicist may appeal to
their version of what it is for the moral a"ent concerned to live a "ood life and the role
virtues play in this life or they may appeal directly to intuitions about the comparative
si"nificance of virtues. #here is very little precise wor7 on the problem and this
reflects real imprecision in our picture of a "ood life and uncertainty about 7ey moral
intuitions. #he important point for our purposes is that we ta7e the virtue ethicist to
propose some account&albeit a "appy and imprecise account&of how virtues
interact which furnishes them with an account of what it is for an action to be the
most virtuous possible action in a situation. For e$ample, on a particular occasion a
person mi"ht face the choice of actin" with "eneral benevolence or actin" with a
special concern for loved ones and the virtue ethicists owes us a way of ran7in" the
virtues in this situation even if they ran7 the options e;ually!.
6n tyin" ri"ht action to virtuous action, either directly or indirectly, the virtue
ethicist identifies valued states of affairs that are to be promoted. For the direct virtue
ethicist, an a"ent2s own virtuous a"ency is to be promotedE for the indirect virtue
ethicist, an a"ent2s conformin" to virtuous action is to be promoted. #hus virtue ethics
identifies states of affairs to be promoted, but unli7e utilitarian promotion of welfare,
virtue.theoretic values are a"ent.relative i.e. inde$ed to a"ents! and time.relative i.e.
inde$ed to the immediate choice situation of the a"ent!. Firtue ethicists do not
typically hold a moral a"ent responsible for the impartial promotion of virtuous
actionE they have it that individual a"ents have a special responsibility for their own
character and they act ri"htly only when they act virtuously or act as the virtuous
would act!.
#he three theories outlined here represent fundamentally different approaches
to ri"ht action. Utilitarians define ri"ht action as the achievement of a "oal&
ma$imi9ed utility. Firtue ethicists also see ri"ht action in terms of the achievement of
a "oal, this time an immediate and self.oriented "oal. 6n every choice situation, the
virtue ethicist2s "oal is either to manifest virtue in the situation in direct versions of
virtue ethics! or to outwardly conform to virtuous behaviour in the situation in
indirect versions of the theory!. Deontolo"ists, by contrast, see ri"ht action as a matter
of complyin" with rules of conductE not promotin" the compliance of rules, but
actually complyin" with rules in every choice situation.
". INTRODUCIN# ETHIC! TO DECI!ION THEOR$
-ow we turn to the tas7 of tryin" to incorporate these three ethical theories into the
standard decision theory framewor7. 1ur hands are tied somewhat here, because,
as4s we2ve already pointed out, what we see7 are there is really only one place in
decision theory where ethics can enter the picture, and that is as additional constraints
on admissible utility functions. @ 4nd here it mi"ht seem that there is only one way to
proceed, for the dec7 seems to be stac7ed in favour of utilitarianism. 6ndeed, even the
lan"ua"e Hutility functionsI and He$pected utilityI! su""ests that utilitarian ethics is
the only real contender here. 4ccommodatin" the other two ethical theories is by no
means strai"htforward, but deontolo"y and virtue ethics should not be dismissed
simply because decision theory employs a mathematical function called Ga utility
function2, and this is su""estive of utilitarianism. 4s we hope to show, we can indeed
"ive the other two a fair run in the framewor7 of decision theory, at least in terms of
"ettin" the Hri"htI answers to decision problems. 6n an important sense we will be
tryin" to model the ethical theories in ;uestion, rather than "ive formal presentations
of the theories themselves. #his distinction will become important in the final section.
First we turn to the tas7 of determinin", for each of the three ethical theories, what
type of constraints should be placed on the utility function, so that decision
calculations yield morally correct actions.
>et2s start with utilitarianism. 4s we2ve already mentioned, representin"
utilitarianism in the decision theory framewor7 is fairly strai"htforward. Decision
theory already considers the value of each act.state pair, and this value is measured on
an interval as opposed to a merely ordinal! scale.
$i
#he best act is that which has
maximum e$pected value or utility. 4ll this sits very well with utilitarianism, but we
shouldn2t be fooled into thin7in" that decision theory2s utility functions 'ust are the
utilitarian2s value functions. For a start, nothin" in the von -eumann /or"enstern
utility theory rules out a utility function that assi"ns "reatest value to the act.state
pairs that are associated with the "reatest harm. (efore decision theory2s utility
functions can be considered utilitarian, we must add somethin" li7e the followin"
constraints. 4n outcome, &
ij
, is the result of our havin" performed action a
i
while the
world is in state s
j
. %e will use this notation for acts, states, and outcomes throu"hout
the rest of the paper.! #here will, in "eneral, be a ran"e of possible outcomes of
performin" a
i
. #wo constraints on a utilitarian utility function are:
U)! 6f &
ij
involves "reater total welfare than &
'l
, then any admissible
utility function u must be such that u&
ij
! J u&
'l
!.
UB! 6f &
ij
involves the same total welfare as &
'l
, then any admissible
utility function u must be such that u&
ij
! K u&
'l
!.
#hese constraints are enou"h to prevent perverse anti.utilitarian functions that assi"n
"reater value to the "reatest harm to the "reatest number. 6n other words it is sufficient
for rulin" out perverse unethical functions that value "enocide over a wal7 in the hills.
#here are still substantial details that need to be dealt with, most of which involve the
details of the version of utilitarianism to be represented, and in particular the account
of welfare that is in play. %e set these aside, thou"h, for there does not seem to be any
serious impediment to this 7ind of approach to the incorporation of utilitarianism into
decision theory. 6ndeed, addin" the above constraints U) and UB! is very natural, and
somethin" li7e this is li7ely to have been in the bac7 of the minds of many decision
theorists.
#he above constraints ar"uably do not yield a uni;ue utility function and can
thus lead to a number of different ran7in"s of the acts in ;uestion! because they
represent ordinal rather than cardinal relations between outcomes. #his is certainly the
case if the constraints are applied only to a local decision problem ta7en in isolation.
=ven here the constraints at least identify the 7ind of utility functions that deserve to
be called utilitarian. #he more varied outcomes that are ta7en into account, the more
the utility function is narrowed down to a uni;ue utilitarian function. 4dmittedly, this
last comment is hed"in" towards constraints bein" on an infinitely rich set of
preferences.!
-e$t consider deontolo"y, and how it mi"ht be incorporated into decision
theory. #he first point to observe is that whereas utilitarians evaluate outcomes wholly
in terms of their preferred characterisation of welfare represented by an outcome, a
deontolo"ist evaluates morally salient outcomes in terms of the actions that produced
them. %e can say that in both cases, the sub'ect of evaluation is an outcome of an
action, but insist that for the utilitarian welfare determines utility assi"nment and for
the deontolo"ist, in certain morally salient situations, the nature of the action
determines utility. %e will assume that in all other cases actions are evaluated
accordin" to utilitarian constraints.! 4lso, in a sense we will ma7e clear shortly, we
need to assume that deontolo"ical constraints arey is a"ent and time relative.
@ere is a preliminary attempt to describe the additional constraints
prohibitions and obli"ations ma7e on utility functions, specified in terms of types of
acts yieldin" an outcome:
D)L! 6f &
ij
is the result of an absolutely! prohibited act, then any
admissible utility function u must be such that u&
ij
! K .
DBL! 6f &
ij
is the result of an absolutely! obli"atory act, then any
admissible utility function u must be such that u&
ij
! K M.
(y ma7in" the utility of outcomes depend upon the action that produces them at least
for certain types of acts!, utility functions are made relative to choice situations: utility
becomes a product of the options available to an a"ent in a choice situation. #his
ma7es sense of the deontolo"ist2s attitude to prohibitions and obli"ations.
Deontolo"ical a"ents do not see7 to promote ma$imal compliance with rules of
conduct and they are not prepared to violate rules in order to promote such
compliance. #ypically, a deontolo"ist would not be prepared to 7ill 'ust in order to
prevent future 7illin"s by themselves or by others!. ?rohibitions and obli"ations
apply to deontolo"ical moral a"ents in their immediate choice situation i.e. they are
a"ent and time relative!, and this aspect of deontolo"y is captured nicely by ma7in"
utility functions a product of the options available to a"ents.
4s mentioned in our characterisation of deontolo"y above, a deontolo"ist may
thin7 of obli"ations and prohibitions as conditional upon types of situation
encountered. For e$ample, a deontolo"ist mi"ht consider lyin" prohibited, e$cept for
cases when they thin7 another person is ne"otiatin" with them in bad faith. #he
clearest way to introduce this type of conditionality into our model is at the level of
act description. 4 deontolo"ist may say either that lyin" is prohibited e$cept in cases
of bad faith ne"otiations or they may refine their description of the relevant act. Under
such a description, instead of lyin" per se bein" prohibited conditionally, lyin" of a
certain 7ind is prohibited unconditionally. 6f we allow this way of refinin" act
descriptions, we have no need of modifyin" our constraints on a deontolo"ist2s utility
function in order to accommodate duties that are conditional upon situations.
$ii
6n addition to problems associated with infinite utilities which we discuss
presently! a4 more si"nificant problem with our way of modellin" deontolo"y so far
is that all prohibited or obli"atory! acts are on a par. /urder, if it is prohibited, is no
better or worse than "enocide, if this too is prohibited. 6n effect, we have only
modelled absolutely bindin" prohibitions and obli"ations and we have not introduced
means of comparin" the claims of one duty a"ainst another. 1ne way of respondin" to
this problem is to assi"n very lar"e utilities and disutilities in place of infinite utilities.
#he important thin" about obli"ations, from a deontolo"ist2s point of view, is that one
is rationally bound to them over and above other possibilities of action. 4n alternative
set of deontolo"ical constraints, therefore, would be:
D)! 6f &
ij
is the result of a prohibited act, then any admissible utility
function u must be such that u&
ij
! has a disutility "reater than any
assi"ned to the outcome of a permitted act.
DB! 6f &
ij
is the result of an obli"atory act, then any admissible utility
function u must be such that u&
ij
! has a utility "reater than any assi"ned
to the outcome of any non.obli"atory act.
#his allows us to introduce a ran7in" amon" obli"ations and prohibitions. Say there is
a ran7in" of prohibitions (
)
, (
*
, N (
n
, such that (
'
outran7s (
'M)
and a ran7in" of
obli"ations, or positive duties, +
)
, +
*
, N +
m
, such that +
l
outran7s +
lM)
, then:
DC! 6f &
ij
is result of a prohibited act of type (
r
and &
'l
is the result of a
prohibited act of type (
s
, such that (
r
outran7s (
s
, then any admissible
utility function u must be such that u&
ij
! O u&
'l
!.
D0! 6f &
ij
is the result of an obli"atory act of type +
r
and &
'l
is the result
of an obli"atory act of type +
s
, such that +
r
outran7s +
s
, then any
admissible utility function u must be such that u&
ij
! J u&
'l
!.
1ne well.7nown problem with allowin" infinite utilities is that they can swamp the
probabilities, so that decision theory is rendered useless. For instance, if 7illin" is
assi"ned infinite utility, then any of my actions that mi"ht lead to me 7illin" no
matter how unli7ely! mi"ht seem to be impermissible. #his would clearly be
unsatisfactory. Further, it is a violation of one of the von -eumann./or"enstern
a$ioms: the continuity or 4rchimedes condition.
$iii
#he move to usin" lar"e finite
utilities for obli"ations and small finite utilities for prohibitions mi"ht seem to address
this problem, but an analo"ue of it remains. 4fter all, if the utilities are small enou"h
for prohibitions then these utilities will still swamp most probabilities. For e$ample, if
we attach a very small utility to 7illin", then any action of mine e.". drivin" to wor7!
that has some probability of leadin" to me 7illin" in the future will be thus selected
a"ainst. 6n effect, we run the ris7 of endin" up with a decision theory that is crippled
by swampin" effects of the lar"e and small utilities we introduce to capture the
deontolo"ist2s attitude towards duties and prohibitions.
Decall, however, our claim that prohibitions and duties only apply to a"ents in
their immediate choice situation. %e claim that a typical! deontolo"ist is not duty.
bound to prevent, for e$ample, future 7illin"s by themselves or by others. #he
swampin" problem associated with infinite or very lar"e! utilities hi"hli"hts the
importance of this condition that duties be a"ent and time relative, if deontolo"y is to
be accommodated in the decision theory framewor7. %e are assumin" here that a
deontolo"ist would re"ard an a"ent2s own future actions as probabilistic, rather than
7nown with certainty, because in the latter case swampin" would not be an issue even
if duties were only a"ent relative and not time relative.! 6mposin" strict time relativity
on the operation of duties mi"ht seem intuitively ;uestionable, but this is simply the
result of a deontolo"ical insistence that duties&moral rules&are to be complied with.
For the deontolo"ist, compliance with duty is not a valuable outcome to be
ma$imised. -ote also that deontolo"ists can capture many intuitions about our
responsibility for our future actions by introducin" future.oriented duties, such as the
duty not to place ourselves oneself in moral dan"er or a prohibition a"ainst rec7less
behaviour.
$iv

%e have not yet, however, provided the means to represent all the demands of
deontolo"y. 4 difficult issue yet unaccounted for is that we want to allow
deontolo"ists to recommend defeasible obli"ations and prohibitions, that is,
obli"ations and prohibitions that may be overturned by conse;uentialist in our case
utilitarian! considerations when the sta7es are sufficiently hi"h. #his is not a simple
matter of addin" to"ether different types of utility to "et the total utility for each act
outcome. 6n fact, so far we have been able to i"nore the nature of an
obli"atoryPprohibited act2s outcomes by constrainin" utility assi"nments in terms of
the moral ;uality of acts alone. @ow then are we "oin" to ma7e obli"ations and
prohibitions sensitive to the utilitarian conse;uences of complyin" with them:
#o model defeasibility we need to add some e$tra constraints that do not
directly apply to the utility function but rather to the way a decision problem is
framed. #his is not a radical departure from standard decision theory. 6t rather fills in
"aps that are not addressed by the theory. Decision theory says nothin" about what
acts should be assessed in any "iven situation. #his is a nonetheless an important
component of practical rationality, and it is even more critical when we are tryin" to
act ethically. 4 utilitarian is not supposed to leave out of their decision problem an act
that would otherwise ma$imise welfareQ 6n the same way, a deontolo"ist must
incorporate all relevant duties in any decision framewor7, and must balance out
prohibitions with morally permissible acts. %hen we introduce defeasibility, framin"
the decision becomes a little more complicated.
(efore "oin" on to e$plore defeasibility, we 'ust want to point out that addin"
obvious constraints about how a decision problem should be framed also helps to
nullify some unanticipated and undesirable aspects of the deontolo"ist2s utility
function. 6f our deontolo"ical theory is "oin" to be consistent with von -eumann and
/or"enstern2s a$ioms, then we have to say somethin" about the 7ind of mi$ed acts
that mi"ht arise. 6n fact, when we introduce obli"ations and prohibitions, some very
bi9arre mi$ed acts arise. For instance, accordin" to the 7ind of deontolo"ical utility
theory we are describin", a +8P+8 mi$ed act that will result in either an obli"ation or
else a prohibition will have a resultin" utility that lies somewhere ri"ht in the middleE
it could well be e;uivalent to a wal7 in the hills. 4 deontolo"ist will li7ely not want to
buy into such a utility functionQ %e can allay their fears however, by pointin" out that
such an act will never be chosen in a decision problem. #his can be assured by simply
stipulatin" that any time a mi$ed act involvin" an obli"ation or a prohibition features
in a decision problem, the pure acts involved in the mi$ed act should also be part of
the act space. 6n such case, an obli"ation will always be chosen over a mi$ed act that
incorporates the obli"ation, and a non.prohibited act will always be chosen over a
mi$ed act that incorporates the non.prohibited act in addition to a prohibited act. For
defeasible obli"ations and prohibitions, however, we need to 'u""le both
conse;uentialist and deontolo"ical utility considerations. 6t is a matter of appraisin"
individual act outcomes from a conse;uentialist perspective, and usin" this
information to determine the act2s obli"ationPprohibition status.
-ow bac7 to the tric7y issue of defeasibility. #he defeasibility condition ma7es use of
actual utility values, so it needs to be a final consideration that is decided upon by the
deontolo"ist after an appropriate utility function is already in place. %e re;uire a bit
of e$tra apparatus&every instance of an obli"ation or prohibition must be associated
with a Hshadow actI that is essentially the same act e$cept without the moral duty
status, as well as a utility value that acts as a defeasibility limit and is dependent on
the type of prohibitionPobli"ation at hand. 6t seems most plausible to say that moral
duties are variably defeasible. #he circumstances in which a deontolo"ist mi"ht be
prepared to license the tellin" of a lie are more widespread than the circumstances in
which they would licence the torture of innocents, for e$ample.!
%hat we have then for every duty! are the followin" triples:
Op
i
, s
i
, u
pi
,
Oo
i
, h
i
, u
oi
,
where p
i
is a prohibition, o
i
an obli"ation, and s
i
and h
i
the respective correspondin"
Hshadow actsI. #he defeasibility utility values are u
pi
and u
oi.
(asically the defeasibility condition wor7s as follows: whenever a duty or
prohibition is relevant to a decision problem, we loo7 at the appropriate triple to see
what acts! should be included in the act space for the problem. For a prohibition p
i
, if
the e$pected utility of its shadow act s
i
e$ceeds the e$pected utility of the otherwise.
best.act in the act space by an amount at least as lar"e as the defeasibility utility u
pi
,
then the shadow act s
i
should be included in the set of acts. 1therwise only the
prohibition is included or 'ust left out alto"ether!. For an obli"ation o
i
, if its shadow
act h
i
has e$pected utility that is at least u
oi
less than the e$pected utility of the
otherwise.best.act in the act space, then only the shadow act h
i
should be included in
the act space. 1therwise obli"ation o
i
should be part of the act space.6t seems most
plausible to say that moral duties are variably defeasible. #he circumstances in which
a deontolo"ist mi"ht be prepared to license the tellin" of a lie are more widespread
than the circumstances in which they would licence the torture of innocents, for
e$ample. %e can model this by nominatin" levels of utilityPdisutility appropriate to
the e$ercise of every obli"ation and prohibition&limits beyond which the
deontolo"ist is prepared to "ive up the claim of that duty. 4ssume a defeasibility
function f from prohibitions and obli"ations to defeasibility limits. #his is a function
from act.types to levels of utility hi"h positive utility in the case of prohibitions and
hi"h disutility in the case of obli"ations!. #he idea is that an obli"ation or prohibition
wor7s as specified until it encounters an action whose outcomes breach the
defeasibility limit specific to that duty. 1ne su""estion here would be to hold that the
outcomes of an obli"ation or prohibition simultaneously have two different utility
values&one conse;uentialist and the other deontolo"ical. #his would be problematic
or at least very cumbersome. (ut we can avoid this appeal to dual utility measures by
assessin" the defeasibility conditions of an action throu"h comparison with a
hypothetical permitted action yieldin" the same probabilistic outcomes as the action
in ;uestion. #he permitted action is merely hypothetical because in many cases there
will not be an actual permitted action that yields the same probabilistic outcomes as
the duty.! 6n this way, we refer to the hypothetical permitted action to determine
whether the appropriate defeasibility limits are breached, and then use this
information in assi"nin" utilities to the outcomes of the defeasible duty.
So what is it e$actly for a duty to breach its defeasibility limit: #he most plausible
model of this ma7es defeasibility dependent on the nature of the alternative
permissible acts. 6n this way, defeasibility is not about breachin" some absolute utility
value, but rather is an issue of the harm done or the "oods foresworn by actin" in the
ordinarily obli"atory manner. 6n certain situations, for e$ample, lyin" may be
permissible, not because the conse;uences of lyin" e$ceed some absolute e$pectation,
but because all other options are 'ust so much worse, from a conse;uentialist point of
view, than lyin". 6n formalisin" the defeasibility condition for both obli"ations and
prohibitions we thus ma7e reference to the alternative permissible act with the
"reatest e$pected utility because this would be the act that would otherwise be
chosen in the "iven decision scenario!:

>et act a
p
be a defeasible prohibition and act a
h
a hypothetical permitted act with
identical probabilistic outcomes to a
p
. >et act a
m
be the alternative permissible act in
the option set with ma$imal e$pected utility and f our defeasibility function.
D+! 6f =Ua
h
! R =Ua
m
! M fa
p
!
#hen for each outcome &
pj
of act a
p
, u&
pj
! K u&
hj
!
>et act a
r
be a defeasible obli"ation and act a
'
a hypothetical permitted act with
identical probabilistic outcomes to a
r
. >et act a
n
be the alternative permissible act in
the option set with ma$imal e$pected utility and f a"ain be our defeasibility function.
D,! 6f =Ua
'
! S =Ua
n
! fa
r
!
#hen for each outcome &
rj
of act r, &
rj
K &
'j
1f course, there is scope for disa"reement amon"st deontolo"ists as to how the
defeasibility condition actually wor7s, but we have "iven here a plausible model that
may be ad'usted in some obvious ways. %hat we have shown with the si$ utility
function constraints is that deontolo"ical thin7in" can be modelled within a decision.
theoretic framewor7, provided we are prepared to assi"n utilities to act.state pairs and
have an independent characteri9ation of how acts constrain admissible utility
functions. %e must also help ourselves to a sufficiently precise characteri9ation of
acts in terms of the duties&prohibitions and obli"ations&relevant to these acts, a
ran7in" of prohibitions and obli"ations and defeasibility limits, if any, on the e$ercise
of them.
-e$t we turn to virtue ethics. #his is tric7ier stillmi"ht seem tric7ier still since,
as we pointed out in section B, virtue ethics is concerned as much with the motivations
of the a"ents as with their actions or with the outcomes of those actions. (ut we can
ma7e some headway here. 4 concrete e$ample mi"ht be helpful at this sta"e.
5onsider the choice of whether to donate to charity or not. 4 conse;uentialist is only
interested in the outcomes of the acts in ;uestion&it doesn2t matter whether a
donation is motivated by "enerosity, by the desire to be seen to be "enerous, or by
"uilt. 4ll that matters, from the perspective of the conse;uentialist, are the
conse;uences of the act in ;uestion.
$v
(ut the motivations ma7e all the difference in
the world for the virtue ethicist. ?resumably, the act of charity stemmin" from
"enerosity is what a virtuous person would aim at doin" at least for direct virtue
theorists, who identify ri"ht action with virtuous action!. #his, then, su""ests a way of
incorporatin" virtue ethics into decision theory: we discriminate actions a little more
finely than normally so that we distin"uish actions with different motivations, and
assi"n different utilities accordin" to the virtuousness of the act2s motive. 6f an act has
a virtuous motivation, we say that it e$presses the virtue in ;uestion. #hus, a "enerous
act of charity e$presses the virtue of benevolence. 4 cynical act of charity does not.
4 satisfactorily complete virtue theory should provide us with the means of
discriminatin" actions in terms of their e$pression of virtue. 6ndirect virtue theories,
i.e. those that characteri9e ri"ht action in terms of actions that a hypothetical virtuous
a"ent would underta7e, will describe the hypothetical e$pression of virtue. 4ctions
would then be ran7ed in terms of the e$tent of their match to the motivations of ideal
virtuous a"ents. @ere we consider only direct versions of virtue theory. #hou"h more
comple$, indirect virtue theories can be accommodated within the "eneral framewor7
we describe. 6n any situation s, an a"ent will confront a finite number of available
actions, a
)
, a
*,
- a
i
, - a
n
. %e use our virtue theory to ran7 these actions in terms of
their e$pression of virtue. /inimal constraints that virtue theories impose upon the
relevant utilities are:
F)! 6f a
i
is more virtuous than a
h
and &
ij
&
h'
, then u&
ij
! J u&
h'
!.
FB! 6f a
i
and a
h
are e;ually virtuous and &
ij
&
h'
, then u&
ij
! K u&
h'
!.
where G&
ij
&
h'
2 is read as outcomes &
ij
and &
h'
are e;uivalent, in the sense that they
are indistin"uishable outcomes in all but their virtue.theoretic motivations!. Such
virtue.theoretic constraints on the utility function come down to this. #he utility of the
outcome of a virtuously motivated act will always e$ceed the utility of that very
outcome produced by less virtuous means. 4 charitable "ift may be a valuable
outcome on this way of viewin" thin"s, but well.motivated charitable "ift."ivin"
invariably possesses hi"her utility. =;uivalent outcomes of e;ually virtuous actions
have identical utility. Say that fairness and "enerosity are e;ually virtuous
motivations. #he outcome of a charitable donation "iven out of a sense of fairness
would then attract the same utility as an identical outcome motivated by "enerosity. 6t
is more li7ely, however, that virtues are not all e;ual li7e this. See below.!
F
)
represents a minimal virtue.theoretic constraint. #he resultin" utility
function will not reflect an intuitively compellin" virtue perspective until the level of
difference that virtuous motivation brin"s to assi"nments of utility becomes very
mar7ed. -ot all virtues are e;ually si"nificant and so it is plausible to say that every
virtue will ma7e a distinctive contribution to the utility of the outcomes of actions that
e$press it.
$vi
/oreover, it is hi"hly plausible to say that 'ud"ements of virtuous action
combine a concern for virtuous motivation with a concern for "ood outcomes. 6n all
plausible versions of virtue theory, a virtuous action is also a wise or prudent one, one
that accommodates thin7in" about the probabilistic outcomes of actions. 1f course, it
is the primary business of decision theory to model this 7ind of rationality and our
model of virtue.theoretic decision ma7in" ou"ht to ma7e use of this resource. 6n view
of this, we mi"ht try to model virtue theory in terms of a virtue.specific multiplicative
factor that modifies a prior set of utilities. #hus we introduce a function, ., from
motivations to multiplicative factors. 5onsider a virtuous or vicious! action a
i
,
e$pressin" a particular motivation m
i
. 4nd consider virtue.neutral action, a
h
,
e$pressin" motivation m
h
. %e may then specify the followin" virtue.theoretic
constraint on an a"ent2s utility function.
$vii

FC! 6f .m
i
! K T, .m
h
! K ) and &
ij
&
h'
, then u&
ij
! K Tu&
h'
!.
4ccordin" to this constraint, the utility of an outcome of a virtuous vicious! action is
the utility of that outcome produced by virtue.neutral means i.e. where .m! K )!
multiplied by some factor specific to the virtue or vice! e$pressed by the action. For
vicious actions, 8 O .m! O )E for virtuous action, .m! J ).! %here the values of .
are sufficiently lar"e or small!, we will have modelled the decision.ma7in" of a
moral a"ent payin" si"nificant heed to the motivational character of each of the
options they confront. 4d'ustin" the values of . is a matter of determinin" 'ust how
much wei"ht motivational considerations ou"ht to have in determinin" virtuous
action. (y modellin" virtue2s contribution to utility throu"h multiplicative factors
rather than, say, throu"h additive ones, we accommodate the intuition that the
contribution virtuous or vicious motivation ma7es to decision ma7in" should be
proportional to the sta7es involved. =$pression of malice throu"h some relatively
trivial act, say spittin" in a person2s soup, should attract proportionally less disutility
than hi"hly si"nificant e$pression of malice, say falsely informin" on a successful
rival. 6t is not only the conse;uences of acts which should be assi"ned variable utility,
the malice itself appears more or less si"nificant in proportion to the sta7es.
.
)
to .
/
modify prior utility functions, but not all prior utility functions are
e;ually compatible with virtuous a"ency. 6t is possible for an a"ent to brin" to the
table such perverse prior utilities that otherwise plausible versions of .
/
"enerate
intuitively vicious decisions. For e$ample, a fanatical -a9i mi"ht re"ret the coldness
and harshness re;uired to pursue the destruction of =uropean <ewry, and yet hold this
"oal to be sufficiently important that his stron" motivational scruples are
overwhelmed. %e therefore need to introduce further constraints on the utility
functions of virtuous a"ents. 4 complete and ade;uate virtue theory will probably
furnish these constraints in terms of the le"itimate ends of virtuous a"ency. #his mi"ht
be characterised in terms of the pursuit of a"ent.neutral "oods, or in neo.4ristotelian
versions, as a nested series of a"ent.specific ends leadin" to the condition of
eudaimonia, or the leadin" of a "ood and fulfilled life. >et us describe the former
case. 1ne e$ample of this is a version of morality as universal benevolence.
$viii
#he
primary virtuous motivations here are benevolence and "enerosity and motivation.
independent prior utilities are the familiar utilitarian ones. %e introduce two
additional constraints on the utility function to model these prior utilities. @ere acts a
i
and a
'
are both virtue.neutral, such that they each e$press motivation m,

where .m! K
). #he e$tra constraints are as follows:
F0! 6f &
ij
involves "reater total welfare than &
'l
, then any admissible
utility function u must be such that u&
ij
! J u&
'l
!.
F+! 6f &
ij
involves the same total welfare as &
'l
, then any admissible
utility function u must be such that u&
ij
! K u&
'l
!.
#here are still substantial issues of what the various virtues are and how to resolve
different virtues into motivational wei"htin"s and prior.utility settin"s. %e set such
complications aside for now. #he details of these interactions is the business of virtue
ethics, and it is simply not our tas7 to pre'udice the ;uestion of how to resolve open or
difficult ;uestions within the ethical theories. 1ur tas7 is merely to show how each
theory, once suitably spelled out by the advocates of the ethical theory in question,
mi"ht be modelled in an appropriate fashion in the decision theory framewor7. So
bearin" this in mind, we ta7e it that the above a$ioms constitute a plausible start to the
problem at hand.
%. ADE&UAC$ O' THE MODE!
6t is common to distin"uish two ;uite different 7inds of model: descriptive models
and e$planatory models. 4 descriptive model is a model that2s empirically ade;uate in
the sense that it "ets the data ri"ht or nearly ri"ht!. 4n e$planatory model needs to
shed li"ht on the underlyin" reasons for the way the system in ;uestion behaves as it
does.
$i$
%e don2t propose that the distinction between these two types of models is
sharp&it certainly is not&but it does provide a useful way to thin7 about the purpose
and role of theoretical models.
$$
%ith this distinction in mind, let2s turn to the
ade;uacy of the three models of ethical decision ma7in" we2ve presented in this
paper.
#he formal constraints on the utility function that we2ve proposed above, we
ta7e it, amount to reasonable ways of representin" the three ethical theories in
;uestion. 4t least the formal constraints are a credible first shot at representin" the
theories in ;uestion. (ut it is important to note that all we have done is provide a
framewor7 that is able to model the preferences of the utilitarian, deontolo"ist, and
virtue theorist, as well as the outcomes of their decision ma7in" processesE we have
not even attempted to model their underlyin" thou"ht processes and motivations. -or
have we modelled the 'ustifications moral theories furnish a"ents. /oral theories not
only aim at specifyin" moral behaviour, they aim to supply 'ustifications for moral
behaviour. 1nly our model of utilitarianism furnishes the means of morally 'ustifyin"
actions. 4ccordin" to utilitarianism, a moral a"ent is always 'ustified in optimally
promotin" "eneral welfare, which is trac7ed by e$pected utility calculations
employin" an ade;uate utilitarian utility function. 4 utilitarian can thus use the fact
that the e$pected utility of a particular action is "reatest of all current options to
'ustify their performin" it.
For deontolo"ists, however, appeal to the effect of the enormous disutility of
prohibited options, which are "iven an arbitrary precision by nominatin" a specific
disutility, has no 'ustificatory power. #hese precise measures of disutility do not
reflect deontolo"ical proposals about the precise relative disvalue of a prohibited act,
for e$ample. 6n our model, the disutility of a prohibited act applies only to an a"ent2s
current options. (ut if a person disvalued a prohibited 7ind of act in "eneral, say
lyin", and used this valuation as a basis of moral decision.ma7in", the disutility of
lyin" should affect the utility of all outcomes involvin" lyin", not 'ust those involvin"
the a"ent lyin" now. 4lthou"h deontolo"ical determinations of ri"ht action can be
modelled in terms of the pursuit of optimal e$pected utility, it does not follow that
deontolo"ists are motivated to optimise e$pected utility. -or are they inclined, or
e;uipped, to 'ustify actions by appealin" to the optimisation of e$pected utility.
Deontolo"ists, typically, thin7 of morality as providin" a series of constraints on
behaviour based on their interpretation of what it is to respect another person, or on
intuitions of ri"htness that are independent of their conception of the "ood.
Unli7e deontolo"ists, virtue theorists share an overall teleolo"ical approach
with utilitarians. #hus, where deontolo"ical interventions on a utility function, in
effect, replace normal utility assi"nments with assi"nments whose purpose is to
ensure compliance or non.compliance with a rule, virtue.theoretic interventions
modify the utility function by enhancin" the value of virtuously derived outcomes and
diminishin" the value of viciously derived outcomes. @owever, a virtue.theorist is ill
e;uipped to 'ustify their decisions in terms of the utilities thus specified. #his is
because, as with deontolo"y, virtue.theoretic modifications of utility functions apply
only to the options currently faced by a decision.ma7er. #hey do not describe the 7ind
of a"ent.neutral value assessments e.". malicious actions ma7e the world poorer! that
ma7e for plausible 'ustifications of value promotion. #he virtue.theorist may be
optimisin" e$pected utility under an appropriate description of this utility, but they are
not e;uipped to 'ustify their actions in terms of the promotion of "eneral values
e$pressed by these utilities. Firtue.theoretic 'ustification of action must ta7e a
different form: appealin" to the importance of self.respect, or the special
responsibility each person has for their own character and its e$pression in action.
1n the one hand, the fact that our models are only descriptive should not count
a"ainst them. 6t is non.trivial and an interestin" fact that we can provide a descriptive
model of decision ma7in" by virtue theorists and deontolo"ists, in particular. (ut we
need to be careful not to over.interpret the models and thus overstate their
si"nificance. For instance, in all three models we2ve represented the decision.ma7in"
process in terms of the ma$imisation of e$pected utility with ethical constraints on
the utility function!. First, we should not read too much into the name Gutility
function2 or Ge$pected utility2. #hese are both 'ust formal features of the model and
may have nothin" to do with utility in the usual sense. 6ndeed, this is so even for
standard decision theory without ethical constraints!. #he utility function is best
thou"ht of as an uninterpreted mathematical function constrained by the von
-eumann./or"enstern a$ioms. #ypically the utility function is interpreted in the
obvious way, as a measure of a"ent.neutral and time.insensitive values, but this is a
further move&ar"uably a move away from a descriptive to an e$planatory model&
and this move can be resisted.
Second, and more importantly, we should not conclude from the fact that all
three ethical theories are represented as ma$imisin" some ;uantity, that they are all
conse;uentialism in dis"uise.
$$i
Firtue theory and deontolo"y, in particular had to be
shoehorned into the conse;uentialist framewor7 of decision theory. 4s we2ve ar"ued,
we have not attempted to provide e$planatory models, and the e$planations of the
behaviour of the deontolo"ical and virtue a"ents, and of the 'ustifications available to
them, drawn from our models are either misrepresented or opa;ue. 6t would thus be a
mista7e to press further claims about deontolo"y and virtue theory that depend on our
havin" captured the motivations for the theories in ;uestion.
$$ii
4s with all models, it
is important to remember that these are 'ust models and that there is dan"er in readin"
off too much from the model.
$$iii
@avin" said this, however, there is still a si"nificant
issue of how e$planatory the models we2ve presented are. %e leave this issue for
another occasion.
6n this paper we have shown that, despite initial appearances, deontolo"y and
virtue theory can be accommodated in the standard decision.theory framewor7, and
thus decision theory need not be thou"ht of as a tool available only to the
conse;uentialist. 4s it stands, decision theory is silent on ethical matters, but with a
little wor7 it can be made to accommodate each of the ma'or ethical theories. %hile
the "enerality of decision theory is well 7nown, if what we2ve been ar"uin" for in this
paper is correct, there is another way in which decision theory e$hibits "enerality. 6t is
able to accommodate ethical theories without pre'udicin" the ;uestion of which
ethical theory ou"ht to be preferred and without pre'udicin" the ;uestion of how the
details of these ethical theories ou"ht be spelled out. Decision theory, it would seem,
is "enuinely neutral with respect to ethical considerations. 4nd this is "ood news for
everyone.
$$iv
i
Notes
1ne mi"ht ar"ue about whether the respective a$ioms are in fact minimal constraints. %e won2t pursue such issues
here. 1ur interest lies in what other constraints we need in addition to the a$ioms.
ii
See, for e$ample, Uillies B888! and @A'e7 B88Ca! on the interpretation issue and <effrey )*VC! and Kaplan
)**,! for the details of decision theory and its role in philosophy respectively!.
iii
6ndeed, there are some interestin" results alon" these lines. See 1ddie and /ilne )**)!.
iv
?reference utilitarianism introduces a cardinal measure of social utility because it involves at least! comparin"
total numbers of satisfied preferences.
v
For this discussion, we set aside consideration of satisficin" versions of conse;uentialism, i.e. versions in which
moral a"ents aim for sufficiently "ood rather than ma$imally "ood levels of utility.
vi
4lon"side obli"ations and prohibitions, deontolo"ists sometimes also posit permissions or prero"atives. %e set
aside these aspects of deontolo"y here.
vii
#he followin" characteri9ation is a simplification. Some deontolo"ical approaches rest on direct intuitions about
duties and about the priority of the ri"ht over the "ood rather than on accounts of respect. See Doss )*,W!.
viii
See, for e$ample, ?aul #aylor )*V,!.
i$
Slote B88)! develops virtue ethics alon" these lines.
$
Dosilind @ursthouse )**) and )***! develops such a view.
$i
#hat is, the utility functions employed in decision theory respect distance between the various values.
$ii
5onditionality is a special case of conte$t.sensitivity. Duties may not only be conditional upon the satisfaction of
bac7"round conditions, they may vary in numerous ways from one conte$t to another. For e$ample, ran7in"s of duties
may vary from one conte$t to another. %e i"nore this complication in our model.
$iii
Desni7 )*V,! outlines the Hcontinuity conditionI as follows:
For any lotteries x, y, and 0, if x(y and y(0, then there is some real number a such that 8SaS) and y I 12a, x, 03.
%here I is the indifference relation, and 12a, x, 03 represents a lottery that offers pri9e x with probability a and
pri9e 0 with probability ).a!.!
#he continuity condition rules out infinite utilities because when such pri9es are involved in any lottery, the lottery also
has infinite value. @ence we say that infinite utilities HswampI all other considerations.
$iv
6t may also be the case that certain actions may be ruled a"ainst on conse;uentualist "rounds. For e$ample, my
buyin" a "un mi"ht not be prohibited because it raises the chance of my future self en"a"in" in the prohibited act of
7illin". Dather, my buyin" a "un mi"ht simply be ruled a"ainst because it raises the probability of low utility outcomes
such as deaths by shootin".
$v
#his is a little simplistic. 5harity motivated by "uilt mi"ht have different conse;uences from charity motivated by
"enerosity, but let2s set such possible complications aside for now.
$vi
4s in the case of deontolo"ical theories we discuss above, we i"nore the complication of conte$t.sensitivity here.
6t seems plausible to say that virtues are not ran7ed absolutely, but are variably appropriate to distinct situations. 6n one
situation, a sense of fairness mi"ht be the most appropriate&and thus virtuous&motivation to act uponE in another, a
sense of "enerosity may be of "reater moral si"nificance. 4 fully developed virtue theory should be able to specify what
it is that tri""ers this variability.
$vii
#o facilitate our presentation of this model, we assi"n disutilities over the open interval 8OuO).
$viii
/ichael Slote B88)! attributes such a theory to <ames /artineau.
$i$
4 couple of e$amples mi"ht help. 4 purely mathematical description of the "rowth of a population, in terms of,
say, the lo"istic e;uation, may be empirically ade;uate in that such a model ma7es correct predictions about the
abundance of the population in ;uestion. (ut without a story about why the population abundance can be described by
the lo"istic e;uation, the model fails to be e$planatory. 1n the other hand, an e$planatory model mi"ht lay bare the
underlyin" biolo"y and thus be e$planatory a story about carryin" capacity, birth and death rates and so on!, but may
fail to deliver the predictive success of the lo"istic model.
$$
%e put aside the issue of the place of normative models. 4ll the models under discussion in this paper are
normative since they involve both ethics and rational decision ma7in"!, but the descriptivee$planatory distinction is
supposed to cut across the normativedescriptive distinction. 6t is unfortunate that the word Gdescriptive2 is used in both
these conte$ts&to contrast with both Gnormative2 and Ge$planatory2.!
$$i
1ddie and /ilne )**)! and >ouise B880! draw such conclusions from the representability of ethical theories in
a conse;uentialist framewor7.
$$ii
Such as that the theories are really 'ust conse;uentialism after all, that they are lac7in" motivation, or that they
have implausible motivations.
$$iii
%e do not, for e$ample, conclude that fluids are incompressible because our model of fluid flow assumes this, or
that (risbane has no hills because our street directory of (risbane has no hills.
$$iv
%e2d li7e to than7 N
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