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LAW PREVIEW
2013 BARBRI, INC. | PAGE 1
CASE BRIEF
Piersonv.Post
I. POSSESSION IS NINE-TENTHS OF THE LAW.
A. The Acquisition of Property by Capture, Find, and Adverse Possession.
1. The Rule of Capture.
NAME: Pierson v. Post, Supreme Court of New York (1805).
FACTS:
0 P (Post) was hunting/chasing a fox with his pack of dogs.
0 D (Pierson), knowing that P was hunting/chasing the fox, intercepted it and kept it for himself.
PROCEDURE: P sued D and prevailed. D appealed.
ISSUE: Whether P, merely by the pursuit with his hounds, acquired a right to (or a property interest in) the fox?
HOLDING: No. P, merely by the pursuit with his hounds, did not acquire a right to (or a property interest in) the fox.
REASONING: Rule: Property interests in ferae naturae (wild animals) are acquired by occupancy only.
Rule: Occupancy of a wild animal only occurs when the animal is mortally wounded or greatly maimed by
one not abandoning his pursuit because the pursuer makes clear his intention to keep the animal for his
individual use. Under these circumstances, a wild animal cannot be intercepted by another.
0 D could rightfully intercept the fox, because it was not alleged and proven that P acquired occupancy
of the fox.
0 Although Ds conduct was not admirable or nice, it cannot be redressed by a legal remedy.
DISPOSITION: Decision of the lower trial court reversed in favor of D.
DISSENT: It is unfair to award the fox to a person who did not invest the same time and effort into its capture.
People should be allowed to have a possessory property interest in a wild animal if their pursuit puts
them within reach of their prey, or if their pursuit has a reasonable prospect of taking the wild animal
for their own use.
CLASS NOTES:
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CASE BRIEF
Swartzbaughv.Sampson
III. CONCURRENT OR CO-OWNERSHIP OF LAND.
A. The Joint Tenancy.
NAME: Swartzbaugh v. Sampson, District Court of Appeal, 4th District, California (1936).
FACTS:
0 P (wife) and D (husband) owned 60 acres of land as co-tenants with a right of survivorship.
0 D2 (lessee) began negotiations with P and D to lease a portion of the land and construct a boxing
pavilion.
0 P was against leasing land to D2 and both D and D2 knew her feelings.
0 D entered into three leases with D2 without Ps signature.
PROCEDURE: P sued D and D2 to cancel the leases. The trial court dismissed Ps complaint. P appealed.
ISSUE: Can one joint tenant who has not joined in the leases executed by her cotenant and another maintain an
action to cancel the leases where the lessee is in exclusive possession of the leased property?
HOLDING: No. One joint tenant who has not joined in the leases executed by her cotenant and another cannot
maintain an action to cancel the leases where the lessee is in exclusive possession of the leased property.
REASONING: Rule: In a joint tenancy each tenant owns an interest equal in all of the fee, and each has a right of
possession of the whole.
Rule: One joint tenant cannot oust a cotenant who is in full possession of the property, nor can the joint
tenant charge rent to a cotenant.
Rule: A lease of all the joint property by one joint tenant to a lessee is not a nullity but is a valid and
supportable contract.
The leases between D and D2 are not null and void but are valid contracts giving to D2 the same right to
the possession of the leased property that D had.
DISPOSITION: Judgment of the trial court dismissing Ps claim is affrmed.
CLASS NOTES:
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VI. NUISANCE.
NAME: Arkansas v. Needler, Supreme Court of Arkansas (1982).
FACTS:
0 D ran a halfway house for parolees and convicts in Ps neighborhood.
0 Ds policy was to exclude sex offenders, drug addicts, and alcoholics, but there was evidence that at
least one resident had been convicted of a sex offense and another was removed from the house for
alcohol abuse.
0 Evidence at trial showed that property values in the neighborhood decreased ever since D acquired the
property and used it as a halfway house.
PROCEDURE: Ps commenced an action to enjoin D from using the property as a halfway house, alleging that the
proposed use constituted a nuisance since it diminished the value of the surrounding property and since
the neighbors feared that residents of the halfway house would commit criminal acts. Trial court found
in favor of Ps and granted a permanent injunction. D appealed.
ISSUE: Whether the lower court correctly found by a preponderance of the evidence and upon competent
evidence, that the operation of a halfway house for parolees and released convicts constituted a nuisance
in fact of a private nature?
HOLDING: Yes. The Chancellor properly concluded that Ds halfway house constituted a private nuisance in fact.
REASONING: Rule: A nuisance is an interference with the use and enjoyment of land and includes conduct on property
disturbing the peaceful, quiet and undisturbed use and enjoyment of nearby property.
Unlike the courts decision in Nicholson v. Connecticut Halfway House, here Ps presented evidence
that Ds use of the property constituted a nuisance since (1) its use diminished property values in the
neighborhood and (2) Ps fear for their safety was reasonable especially considering that one resident
was a convicted sex offender and another had to be removed from the house because of alcohol related
incidents.
DISPOSITION: The Chancellors decision and judgment of an injunction was affrmed.
DISSENT: None.
CLASS NOTES:
CASE BRIEF
Arkansasv.Needler
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LAW PREVIEW
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VI. NUISANCE.
NAME: Nicholson v. Connecticut Halfway House, Inc., Supreme Court of Connecticut (1966).
FACTS:
0 D purchased property in Ps neighborhood with the intention of providing a halfway house for selected
parolees from prison.
0 D planned to house 15 men and would exclude sex offenders, drug addicts, and alcoholics.
0 Ds proposed use of the property did not violate any zoning restrictions.
PROCEDURE: Ps commenced an action to enjoin D from creating the half-way house, alleging that the proposed use
constituted a nuisance since it threatened Ps peaceful use and enjoyment of their property since they
feared that residents of the halfway house would commit criminal acts and depreciate the value of their
property. Trial court found in favor of Ps and granted a permanent injunction. D appealed.
ISSUE: Whether Ds proposed use of the property as a halfway house constitutes an equitably abatable nuisance?
HOLDING: No. Absent a suffcient factual showing that D will make an unreasonable use of the property, or that
the prospective residents will engage in unlawful activity in the surrounding neighborhood, there is no
evidence that Ds proposed use of the property would constitute a nuisance.
REASONING: Rule: It is the duty of every person to make a reasonable use of his own property so as to occasion no
unnecessary damage or annoyance to his neighbor.
Rule: The courts power to grant injunctive relief may be exercised only under extreme circumstances
and the unsubstantiated fears and apprehensions of the party applying for an injunction are not grounds
for granting the relief requested.
Ps present fear of what may happen in the future if Ds proposed use is allowed to progress is
speculative in nature and is completely unfounded.
DISPOSITION: The court set aside the permanent injunction and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to
enter a judgment for D.
DISSENT: None.
CLASS NOTES:
CASE BRIEF
Nicholsonv.ConnecticutHalfwayHouse,Inc.