Report of Luzon Campaign - 6th US ARMY

SIXTH
UNITED STATES
ARMY
R E P O R T
O F T H E
LUZON
CAMPAIGN
9 JANUARY 1945 3O JUNE1945
I N F O U R V O L U M E S - V O L U M E
JAN 1 A 1982
Table of Contents
VOLUMEI
I-PLANNING
A. PreliminaryPlanning
B. EvolutionoftheSixthArmyPlan
C. ModificationofthePlan
D. CoordinationofAirand.NavalSupport
withPlansoftheGroundForce
II-AMPHIBIOUSPHASE
III-OPERATIONS
A. 9January19^5-2SJanuary19^5
B. 29January19^5- 5FebruaryI9I+5
C. 6February19^5- kMarch19^5
D. 5MarchI9I+5-30JuneI9U5
IV-AIHSUPPOHT
GEHERALHSADQUARTERS,SOUTHWESTPACIFICASSA,
DIEECTIVES
SIXTHABMYDIEECTIVES
ROSTEROFOFFICERS,HEADQUARTERSSIXTHARMY
VOLUMEII
DIAGRAMS
(Fordetailedcontents,seeVolumeII)
VOLUMEIII
REPORTSOFGENERAL USDSPECIALSTAFFSECTIONS
(Fordetailedcontents,seeVolumeIII)
VOLUMEIV
REPORTOFTHEENGINEER
(Fordetailedcontents,seeVolumeIV)
PAGE
1
5
5
6
9
10
13
17
17
29
37
59
99
109
117
176
Introduction
TheLuzonCampaign,followingimmediatelyupontheheelsoftheLeyteandAiindoro
Opsrations,wasthethirdandmostimportantstepintheoverallplanfortheliberation
ofthefhilippineIslands. GeneralMacArthur,Commander-in-Chief,SouthwestRicific
Area,entrustedthisoperationtotheveteranSixthArmyunderthecommandofGeneral
(thenLieutenantGeneral)WalterKrueger. ForcesassignedtoSixthArmyforthisopera-
tionwerewidelyscattered,beingstagedinNewGuinea,inWesternNewBritain,inthe
Solomons,inNewCaledonia,andinthereconqueredislandsofthe.Philippines,thereby
presentingatremendousprobleminoperationalplanningandlogistics.
Brieflystated,SixthArmy'smissionswere: (l)tolandintheLingayen-Damortis-
SanFernando(laUnion)areasofLvzon;(2)toestablishabaseofoperations,including
facilitiesforuninterruptednavalandairoperations;(3)toadvancesouthwardandseize
theCentralPlain-Manilaarea;and(4)bysubsequentoperations,asdirectedbyGeneral
Headquarters,SouthwestPacificArea,toestablishcontrolovertheremainderofLuzon.
Inviewofthevaguenessoftheenemysituationintheobjectivearea,theinitial
objectivesassignedtothetwocorpsofSixthArmywerelimited;thefieldorderdirect-
ingtheamphibiousmovementandlandingmerelyorderedthe IandXIVCorpseachtoseize
aspecifiedbeachhead,andthentobepreparedtoadvancesouthward,whenordered,~and
securecrossingsovertheAgnoRiver,withaviewtofacilitatinganaggressiveoffen-
siveattheearliestpracticabledate.
SixthArmybegantheLuzonCampaignon 9January1945withamphibiousassaultland-
ingsonbeachesintheLingayenGulfareaofcentralLuzonwiththeXIVandICorps
abreast,theXIVCorpsontheright. Contrastedwiththelackoforganizedresistance
onthefrontoftheXIVCorps,bitteroppositionwasmetbythe ICorpsonitsleft
front. VeryearlyintheoperationitbecameevidentthatGeneralYamashita,theJapa-
nesecommanderonLuzon,didnotintendtogivebattleintheCentralPlainarea,elec-
tinginsteadtodefendstronglywhatamountedtoflankpositionsinmountainareas.He
apparentlyhopedtherebytocauseustofritterawayourforces,buthisflankpositions
werenotaseffectiveasheprobablyanticipated,sincetheydidnotpreventSixthArmy
fromcarryingoutitsmissionsandcontinuingitsadvanceasplanned. Amereglanceat
thesituationmapwhichportrayedthedispositionsoffriendlyandenemyforcesatthe
timeclearlypresentstheproblemwhichthenconfrontedtheSixthArmy. Oppositeits
left,thestrongenemyforcesinthemountainareatothenortheastandeastconstituted
aseriousthreattoitsbaseofsupply,whichhadtobesafeguardedwhiledrivingtothe
southtosecuretheCentralPlain-Manilaarea. Nootherbasewouldbecomeavailable*-
untilManila,120milestothesouthward,couldbere-establishedas aport,anditwas
imperativethatthisbeaccomplishedpriortotheadventoftherainyseason. Moreover,
ofthefivedivisionsandoneregimentalcombatteaminitiallyavailabletotheArmy
Commander,the6thand43dDivisionsandthe158thRegimentalCombatTeam,allofthe
ICorps,werefromthestartheavilyengagedontheleft.
WhileICorpscontinuedrelentlesspressureagainsttheenemy'sdefensesinfront
oftheArmy'sleft,theXIVCorpswaspushedsouthwardanditsecuredcrossingsoverthe
AgnoRiverandcapturedTarlac. Thearrivalofthe32dDivision,1stCavalryDivision,,
andthe112thCavalryRegimentalCombatTeamonS/18thenprovidedsufficientforcesto
permitemploymentoftheXIVCorpsinanalloutdrivetowardsManilawhileICorpswas
ableatthesametimetoprotectthebaseonLingayenGulfandcontinuetheattacks
againsttheenemyforcesinthenortheast. Inrapidsuccession,theXIVCorpscaptured
theClarkFieldarea,drovetheopposingenemyforcesbackintotheZambalesMountains
westofFortStotsenburgandsecuredcrossingsoverthePampangaRiveratCalumpit.The
1stCavalryDivision,whichhadlandedonLingayenbeaches27Januaryandhadbeenas-
signedtotheXIVCorps,crossedthePampangaRiveratCabanatuanon1February,advanced
rapidlysouthward,andonthenightof3February1945droveintotheGraceBarkareaof
ManilaandliberatedhundredsofAlliedinterneeswhowerebeingheldbytheJapanesein
SantoTomasUniversity. Afeanwhile,the37thDivisionhadcrossedthePampeogaRiverat
CalumpitandwasdrivingrapidlyonManilaalongHighway 3. In adesperatelyfoughtand
month-longbattle,theXIVCorps,spearheadedbythesetwodivisions,destroyedapproxi-
mately17,000ofManila's20,000defendersandsucceededincompletelysecuringthatcity
on4March1945,whileits40thDivisioncontinuedthebitterstruggleagainstheavy
JapaneseoppositioninthemountainswestofFortStotsenburg.
Meanwhile,twoadditionalamphibiousassaultlandingshadbeenmadeonLuzonby
forcesinitiallyunderEighthArmycontrolo Thefirst,intheSanAntonio-SanNarcisco
areaofZambalesProvince,wasmadebyXICorps(38thDivisionand34thRegimentalCombat
Teamreinforcedbythe11thFieldArtilleryBattalionofthe24thDivision)on29January
1945. n30January1945XICorpspassedtocontroloftheCommandingGeneral,Sixth*rmy,
andafteropeningSubicBayfordevelopmentasanavalbase,droveeastonHighway7to
isolate3ataanPeninsulaandpreventanenemywithdrawalthereto. Thesecondlandingat
MasugbuinBatangasProvince,wasmadebythe11thAirborneDivision,reinforcedbyele-
mentsofthe24thDivision,on31January1945. DrivingnorthwardonHighways1?and1,
thisforceapproachedManilafromthesouth,passingtocontroloftheCoinoiandingGeneral,
SixthArmy,onthesouthernoutskirtsofthecityon10February1945
WhiletheBattleofManilaragedatitsheight,SixthArmyinitiatedoperationsto
openManilaBaytoAlliedshipping. Inacombinedoverlandandamphibiousassaulton
15February1945,itestablishedcontroloverthesouthernportionofBataaniêninsula,
wittla
followingthisupon16February1945 combinedairborneandamphibiousassault
ontheislandfortressofCorregidorwhichguardedthenorthchannelintoManilaBay.
Corregidorwassecuredinaferocious12-daybattle,therebypermittingminesweepingby
theNavyinManilaBayandopeningoftheBaytoAlliedshipping. Followingthecapture
ofCorregidor,theremainingislandsinManilaBaywerecapturedbytheXICorpsina
seriesofshore-to-shoreoperations,whichculminatedwiththecaptureofGarabaoIsland
on16April1945,
Consistentwithhispolicyofdefendingmountainousareas.GeneralYamashitahad
organizedaseriesofstrongpositionseastofManilaextendingnorthwardfromLaguna
deBaytoincludetheIpoDamarea. Hisforwardpositionsweresolocatedthathecould
bringlong-rangeartilleryfiretobearagainstthecityofManila. Followingthecap-
tureofManila,SixthArmycommencedaseriesofoperationsagainstthisfortifiedarea,
unhingeditssouthernanchor,droveawedgebetweenenemyforcesinsouthernLuzonand
thosenortheastofManila;andfinallybrokethelastremainingorganizedenemyresis-
tanceon21May1945* Meanwhile,otherSixthArmyforcesdrovesouthandsoutheastof
ifanilatoopenBalayanandBatangasBaysandtoclearenemyforcesfromtheareasouth
ofLagunadeBay.
SimultaneouslywiththeseoperationsinsouthcentralandsouthernLuzon,theI
Corps,reinforcedon10February1945bythe33dDivisioncontinueditsrelentless
attacksagainsttheenemy'smountainstrongholds,drovetheenemybackallalongits
front,capturedBaguio,advancedalongtheVillaVerdeTrail(32dDivision)andHigh-
way5(25thDivision),andafterlonganddesperatefightingtotallydefeatedtheenemy
andsecuredtheImugan-SantaFe-BaletePassareaon2?May1945andtherewithgained
anaccessroutetotheupperCagayanValley.
TheCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy,wasdeterminedtoretaintheinitiative,but,
forcedtooperatewithtwodivisionslessthanoriginallysetupfortheLuzonCampaign,
hewasobligedtodispensewithareserveandsolvehisproblembyrapidlyshiftingfor-
cesfromplacetoplacewhenevernecessarytogainsuperiorityofnumbersandfire
powerwheremostneeded.
Inthemeantime,otherelementsofSixthArmy(158thRegimentalCombatTeam),fol-
lowinganamphibiousassaultlandingatLegaspiintheAlbayGulfareaofthesoutheast-
ernBicolPeninsula,on1April1945*securedthenorthernexitstoSanBernardino
Straitand,turningnorthwestward,droveuptheBicolPeninsula,clearedtheBiccl
ProvincesofenemyforcesandmadecontactwithunitsoftheXIVCorps(1stCavalry
Division)drivingsoutheastward. Thejunctionoftheseforcesmarkedtheendofall
organizedenemyresistanceinsoutheasternLuzon,
WiththebreakthroughintheIrnugan-SantaFe-BaletePassareaandthesubsequent
debouchmentofSixthArmyforcesintotheupperCagayanValley,theLuzonCampaigndrew
toarapidclose. Whilethej?thDivisionoftheICorpswasdispatchednorthwardinto
anddowntheCagayanValley,airborneforceswerelandedintheenemy'srearnear
Aparritoassistreinforcedguerrillaunitsinblockingallpossibilityofescapetothe
north. WhencontactwasestablishedbetweenthesetwoforcesonLLJune1945,theLuzon
CampaigncametoaclosewithSixthArmyincompletecontrolofLuzon. Theonlyremaining
enemyforceofanystrengthonLuzonhadbênaplitintotwopocketsmoreorlessequal
insize;oneintheSierraMadreMountainseastoftheCagayanValley;theotherinthe
Kiangan-BontocareawheretheJapanesehadelectedtomakeafinalsuicidaldefensive
stand. Theultimateliquidationofthesetwopocketswasmerelyamatteroftime. On
1July1945,bydirectionoftheCommander-in-Chief,SouthwestPacificArea,reponsibility
fortheconductofremainingoperationsonLuzonpassedfromtheCommandingGeneral,Sixth
Army,totheCommandingGeneral,EighthArmy.
TheLuzonCampaignprovidesafertilefieldinwhichtostudytheproblemsofcommand
asappliedtoalmosteverytypeofwarfare: anamphibiousassaultonahostileshore;
open,mobilewarfareinflatterrainadaptedtotheemploymentofarmoredequipment;
mountainwarfare,junglewarfare;combinedoverlandandamphibiousassaults;acombined
airborneandamphibiousassaultonasmall,fortifiedisland;fightinginalargecity;
aclassicairborneoperationtodisruptenemylinesofcommunicationandcutoffretreat;
largescaleguerrillawarfare;theuseofrangersandscoutsbehindenemylines;and
largescalemoppingupopen*ions.
ThisreportpresentstheoperationsoftheSixthArmyintheLuzonCampaign. It
includesthedecisionsmadebytheArmyCommander,theconsiderationswhichledtothose
decisionsandthewayinv/hichtheywerecarriedout. Pertinentprovisionsofdirectives,
GeneralHeadquarters,SouthwestPacificArea,andHeadquarters,SixthArmy,areincluded
throughout*-':*cmainbodyofthereport,thecompletedirectivesfollowingthemainbody
ofthereport. Adiscussionoftheamphibiousphaseofthecampaignisincorporatedas
aseparatesectionofthereport;andinthecaseofairsupportthedameplanisfol-
lowed. Reportsofthegeneralandspecialstaffsections,HeadquartersSixthArmy,
incorporatingtheactivitiesofthesesectionsduringtheLuzonCampaignandthelessens
learnedbythemduringthatcampaign,arealsoincluded. Instudyingthereport,itis
suggestedthatfrequentreferencebemadetothepertinentdiagramswhichareboundin
aseparatevolume.
PLANNING
IPlanning
A. PRELIMINARYPLANNING
InJune1944,whentheSixthArmywasuponthethresholdofgainingcompletetactical
andstrategiccontrolofthenortherncoastofNewGuinea,GeneralHeadquarters,Southwest
PacificArea,announcedabroadgeneralplandesignedtoaccomplishtheliberationofthe
Philippines. Thevariousprojectedoperationsinthisplanformedapatternthatbeganon
MorotaiIslandandsweptonnorthwardacrossthePhilippines,appropriatelyculminatingin
alandingonLuzon,thelargestandnorthernmostofthePhilippineIslands.
Inastrategicsense,reconquestofthePhilippineswouldprovideair,naval,and
logisticalbasesfromwhichtomountfutureoperationsagainstthehomeislandsofJapan
andthecoastofChina. Furthermore,AlliedoccupationofthePhilippineswouldposea
seriousthreattotheBnpire'soverwatersupplyroutestothesouth. ShouldJapanlose
thePhilippines,allofherconquestsintheSouthwestPacific,theNetherlandsEast
Indies,Singapore,andBurmawouldbejeopardized,andthehomeislandsthemselveswould
beuncoveredtoanAlliedoffensive.
By15September19441thedatewhenelementsoftheSixthArmylandedonMorotai,car-
rieraircraftoftheThirdUnitedStatesFleethadsucceededinreducingJapaneseaerial
strengthinthePhilippinestoaconsiderabledegree,aswellasindestroyingmuchenemy
shippinginPhilippinewaters* Thisdeteriorationofhostilestrengthledtoanaccele-
ratedscheduleforthebasicandcontingentoperationsinthePhilippines,thefirst
landingofwhichwastotakeplaceonLeyteon20October1944 twomonthsinadvance
ofthetargetdateoriginallyplannedforthatlanding.
On30September1944HeadquartersSixthArmyreceivedfromGHQ,SWPA,thestaffstudy
outliningtheplanfortheLuzonCampaign. On12October1944GHQissuedOperationsIn-
structionsNumber731whichHeadquartersSixthArmyreceivedinthemidstofitsprepara-
tionsformovementtoLeyte. ThisdirectivedesignatedtheSixthArmy*General(then
LieutenantGeneral)WalterErueger,commanding,astheforcethatwouldmaketheinitial
AlliedingressintoLuzonandfurtherdesignatedthe33dandthe41stInfantryDivisions
astheGHQReserve.
SixthArmy,supportedbytheAlliedAirandAlliedNavalForces,wasdirectedto
seizebyoverwateroperationsandtooccupybeachheadsintheLingayen-Damortis-San
Fernando(laUnion)areasofLuzonaswouldberequiredtoinitiateandinsureuninter-
ruptednavalandairoperationsinsupportofthecontinuedoffensivetoseizethe
CentralPlain-Manilaarea. Uponthecompletionofthisphase.SixthArmy,byoverland
operationstothesouthward,wastoseizetheCentralPlain-Manilaareaand,thereafter,
tobepreparedtoconductsuchoperationsasmightlaterbedirectedbyGHQ,SWPA,to
completethedestructionofhostileforcesandtheoccupationofLuzon.
Thetargetdatefortheamphibiousassaultlanding,referredtohereafterasS-Day,
wassetas20December1944*
TheSixthArmywasdirectedtoestablish,attheearliestpracticabledate,facili-
tiesforminornavaloperationsintheLingayenarea,asarrangedwiththeCommander,
AlliedNavalForces;inaddition,theSixthArmywastobepreparedtoinitiatethees-
tablishmentofnaval,airandlogisticbases,asrequired,tosupportsubsequentopera-
tionstocompletethedestructionofJapaneseforcesinthePhilippines,andtosupport
futureoperationstothenorthandwestofthePhilippineArchipelago.
TheCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy,wasdesignated: (a)tocoordinateplanningof
theground,air,andnavalforces;(b)toassumecontrolofanddirecttheoperationsof
FilipinoguerrillaforcesonLuzon.
ForcescoveringandsupportingtheoperationsonLuzonconsistedoftheThirdFleet
undertheconmandofAdmiralWilliamF.Halsey.USN,theAlliedNavalForces,comanded
SyViceAdmiralThomasC.Hnkaid.USN;the20thand14thAirForces;andtheAlliedAir
Forces,underthecommandofLieutenantGeneralGeorgeC.Kenney,U.S.A. Thedetailed
missionsassignedtheseforcesappearinGHQOperationsInstructionsNumber73-
ThemajorcombatunitsassignedtotheSixthArmyfortheLuzonCampaignwere:
HeadquartersICorps,MajorGeneralInnisP.Swift,U.S.A.,commanding*
HeadquartersXIVCorps,MajorGeneralOscarW.Griswold,U.S.A.,commanding.
6thInfantryDivision,MajorGeneralEdwinD.Batrick,U.S.A.,commanding*
25thInfantryDivision,MajorGeneralCharlesMillins,Jr.,U.S.A.,commanding.
37thInfantryDivision,MajorGeneralRobertS.Beightler,U.S.A.,commanding.
40thInfantryDivision,MajorGeneralRappBrush,U
8
S.A.,commanding.
43dInfantryDivision,MajorGeneralLeonardF.Wing,U.S.A.,commanding.
l-lth_AirborneDivision,MajorGeneralJosephM.Swing,U.S.A.,commanding.*
158thInfantryRCT,BrigadierGeneralHanfordHfecNider,U.S.A.
f
commanding.
13thArmoredGroup,ColonelMarcusE.Jones,commanding.
Oftheseunitsthe6thand43dInfantryDivisionswereassignedtoICorpsjthe37thand
40thInfantryDivisionstoXIVCorps;theremainderbeingdirectlyunderArmycommand.
B. EVOLUTIONOFTHESIXTHARMYFLAN
SummaryofPlanningActivities
AtthetimeofreceiptofGHQ,OperationsInstructionsNumber73HeadquartersSixth
ArmywaslocatedatHollekang(nearHollandia,DutchNwGuinea). Shortlythereafterthe
CommandingGeneral,SixthArmy,accompaniedbykeymembersofhisstaff,embarkedforthe
LeyteOperation, Priortothisdeparture,thebasictacticalandoveralllogisticalplans
fortheLuzonCampaignwerecompletedbythestaffandapprovedbytheArmyCommander. A
considerableamountofdetailedlogisticalplanningstillremainedtobeaccomplished,
however. ThemovingforwardofthetargetdatefortheLeyteCampaignbytwomonths,made
itimperativethatthisplanningbecompletedintheshortestpossibletime. Inorder
thatamaximumeffortmightbeconcentratedonthecompletionofthelogisticalplan,a
specialplanninggroup,composedofrepresentativesofthevariousstaffsections,was
designatedtoremainatHollekangwhereitcouldworkuninterruptedbytheexigenciesof
whatevertacticalsituationmightdeveloponLeyte. Furthermore,GHQ*SWPA,AlliedNaval
ForcesandAlliedAirForceseachhadheadquartersintheHollandiaarea. Thelocation
oftheSixthArmyplanninggroupatHollekangfacilitatedfrequentconferenceswithrep-
resentativesoftheseheadquarters.
ConcurrentlywiththeplanningbeingconductedbytheSixthArmyRearEchelonat
Hollekang,othermembersofHeadquartersSixthArmycarriedonplanningactivitiesatthe
CommandPostonLeyte,whileactuallyengagedintheLeyteOperation. Closeliaisonwas
maintainedbetweentheArmycommandpostanditsrearechelonuntilthelatterclosedon
11November1944
EarlyinNovembertheSixthArmyplanfortheLuzonCampaignwassubmittedtothe
Commander-in-Chief,SouthwestPacificArea,whoapprovedit. Ameetingofcommandersand
staffsofthemajorunitsdesignatedtoparticipateinthecampaignwasthenheldatthe
SixthArmyCommandPostatTanauan,Leyte,on15November1944* Atthisconferencethe
chiefsofthevariousstaffsectionsofHeadquartersSixthArmypresentedtheSixthArmy
plan. Commandersofsubordinateandsupportingunitsinturnpresentedtheirpreliminary
plansandreceivedinstructionstosubmittheirfinalplansby25November1944. These
plansweretoincludetheassignmentofshippingandtheloadingandlandingplansofall
units,eitherattachedorassigned. Sinceplanningbysubordinatecommandersandtheir
staffshadproceededconcurrentlywithSixthArmyplanning,allsubordinatecommanders
wereabletosubmittheirplansbythespecifieddate.
SixthArmvPlan(SeeDiagrams1.2.and3)
ThesalientfeaturesoftheSixthArmyplan,assubsequentlyincorporatedinField
Order34tHeadquartersSixthArmy,arediscussedbrieflyinthesucceedingparagraphs.
Theinitialoperationsweretobedividedintothreephases: PhaseI-anamphibious
assaulttoseizeandconsolidatebeachheadsintheLingayen-DaraortisareaofLingayen
Gulf,andtoinitiatetheestablishmentofairandbasefacilitiestherein?PhaseII-
anattacktodestroyallhostileforcesnorthoftheAgnoRiverandtoseizeandsecure
crossingsoftheAgnoRiver;PhaseIII-thedestructionofhostileforcesintheCentral
PlainareaandthecontinuationoftheattacktocaptureManila.
Thisdivisionsubsequentlywasdeletedfromthetrooplist.
ThetargetdateforS-Daywastobe20December1944.
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tnez-othand37thDivisionsabreast;toattackaggressivelytoseizeandsecurethe
ArmyBeachheadwithinthecorpszoneofaction;toprotecttherightflankofSixthArmy;
toestablishandmaintaincontactwithICorps;andtobepreparedtoseizeandsecure
crossingsoftheAgnoRiverwithinthecorpszoneofaction.
The25thDivision,reinforced,wastobeinSixthArmyReserve. Initiallyafloat,
thisdivisionwastobepreparedtoreinforceeitherICorpsorXIVCorpswithoneRCT
onS/2andwiththeremainderofthedivisionbyS/4;ortoreinforcethe158thRCTin
itsinitialobjectiveareawithoneRCT. Intheeventitwasnotcommittedpriorto
S/2, thedivisionwastobepreparedtolandintheDagupan- Mabilaoarea,commencing
onthatdateandmovetoanassemblyareainthegeneralBinalonanarea.
The11thAirborneDivision,reinforced,wastobepreparedonorafter1January1945
toseizeoneofseveralobjectivesdesignatedbySixthArmybyanairborneoperationor
tomovebyairorwatertransportationtotheLingayenGulfarea.
The158thRCT,reinforced,wastolandnorthofMabilaoonS/2withinthezoneof
actionofICorpsand,passingthroughthenorthflankoftheICorpsbeachhead,attack
northandcaptureRabon. MaintainingcontactthereafterwithICorps,the158thRCTwas
toblocktheadvanceofhostileforcesfromthedirectionofSanFernando(LaUnion).
The13thArmoredGroupwastolandintheDagupan- MabilaoareacommencingonS/2,
movingthereaftertoanassemblyareainthegeneralBozorrubioarea,preparedtolaunch
anarmoredattackinthezoneofactionofeithercorps.
OnS/lthe6thRangerInfantryBattalionwastolandintheDagupanareaandassemble
inthatareainSixthArmyReserve.
TheSixthArmyServiceCommand(ASCGM)wastoestablishairandtemporaryportand
basefacilitiesasdirected. Thisagency,whendirected,wastoassumeresponsibility
fortheunloadingofallunits,supplies,andmaterialsarrivingintheobjectivearea;
forthedispersal,storage,andissuanceofsuppliestogroundandairunits;and,in
coordinationwiththevariousRiilippineCivilAffairsUnits(PCAU's).fortherecruit-
ment,allocation,supervision,andadministrationofcivilianlabor. ASCOMwastoini-
tiatetheestablishmentofairandlogisticfacilities,asdirected,forthesupportof
subsequentoperations.
TheCommandingGeneral,68thAAABrigade,wastobeprepared,whendirected,to
assumecommandofantiaircraftartilleryretainedunderthedirectcontrolofSixthArmy.
FactorsAffectingthePlan
BeforearrivingatafinaldecisionastothelocationoflandingareasinLingayen
Gulf,theadvantagesanddisadvantagesofallpossiblelandingsitesinthisareawere
carefullyconsidered. AlthoughtheDamortis- SanFernando(LaUnion)areapresentedthe
bestlandingbeachesinLingayenGulf,intelligencereportsindicatedstrongenemybeach
defensesinthisarea,aswellashighlyorganizeddefensivepositionsonthehighridges
immediatelyinlandfromthebeaches. Ontheotherhand,slightenemyactivityandvery
fewfixeddefenseswerereportedintheDagupan- MebilaoareaandnoneintheLingayen
area whichincommonhadlong,widebeachesofferingaccesstoexcellentroadnets. The
proximitytotheLingayenareaofPortSual,withitsfairharborfacilities,andLingayen
airstrip whichlaynearthelandingbeaches,weredefiniteandimportantconsiderations.
Balances'againstthelackofenemydefensiveactivityintheLingayenandDagupan-
Mabilaoareas,wasthealmostcompleteabsenceofbeachesshelteredfromthehighwinds
whichoftenlashLingayenGulfintoawhitecappedfuryandthepresenceimmediately
inlandfromtheLingayenareaofnumerousswampsandfishpondsintertwinedbymany
streamsandseveralWsized rivers,whichcouldonlybetraversedoveraseriesof
easilydefendedcausewaysandbridges.
Aftercareful3tudy,itwasdecidedthatassaultlandingscouldbestbemadeinthe
LingayenandDagupan-Mabilaoareas. TheDaaiortis-SanFernando(LaUnion)lending
areawasdiscardedbecauseofthestrengthoftheenemydefenses,thelackofmaneuver
spaceresultingfromthenarrowcoastalcorridor,andtheprobabilitythat,inviewof
thedifficultterrainintheLingayenareaasdiscussedabove,theenemywouldnotdefend
thatfrontstronglyandalandingtherewouldgainmaximumsurprise.
ThenecessityforearlyuseofLingayenairstrip,theimportanceofearlyseizure
ofthegoodlateralroadnet,andtheproximityofPortSualtoLingayenfurtherinflu-
encedthisdecision.
ThegreatwidthoftheSixthArmyfront,extendingasitdidfromPortSualtoDaxcr-
tis,dictatedaformationofcorpsabreastwithtwodivisionsabreastineachcorps.
(SeeDiagram3). Anotherfactor,thesuspectedlocationofenemystrength,hadsome
effectuponthechoiceoftheassaultformationsandthenumberoftroopslandedon
S-Day. Intelligencesourcesindicatedthestrongprobabilitythatthreeinfantrydivi-
sions,anarmoreddivision,andoneindependentmixedbrigadewereintheCentralPlain
area,withtwooftheinfantry,divisionsandtheindependentmixedbrigadeintheinimedi-
atevicinityoftheproposedbeachheadarea. Inaddition,thereportedconcentrationof
anentireenemyinfantrydivisionintheSanFernando(LaUnion)areaandthesuspected
concentrationofahostilearmoredregimentintheBinalonanareagreatlyincreasedthe
enemycapabilityofcounterattackingtheleftoftheSixthArmyBeachhead. Lastly,
sufficientforcewasnecessarytoinsuretheearlyseizureofvitalrivercrossings,
particularlythoseinthezoneoftheXIVCorps. Itwas,accordingly,expedienttoput
ashoreonS-Daythemaximumforceconsistentwiththecapacityofthebeaches.
IncooperationwithrepresentativesoftheAlliedNavalForces,theSixthArmyplan-
ninggroupatHollekangallottedshippingtoeachofthemajorsubordinatecommandsof
SixthArmyanddevelopedashippingschedulethatwouldbestconformtothetacticaland
logisticalrequirementsofthecampaign. Baseduponthecapacityofthelandingbeaches
andtheavailabilityofamphibiousshipping,theplanninggroupassignedsufficientlift
tothetwocorpstopermiteachtolandonS-Daytheequivalentoftworeinforceddivi-
sions,witheachdivisionlessoneofitsregimentalcombatteams. Theschedulefurther
providedforthelandingonS/lofelementsoftheremainingRCT.ofeachassaultdivi-
sionalongwithadditionaldivisionandcorpssupportingunits. Furthermore,inorderto
obtainanevenflowoftroops,supplies,andequipmentoverthebeaches,theSixthArmy
planninggroupdesiredinclusionofanS/lechelonintheshippingschedule. 1'heNavy
advisedthatinsufficientescortcraftprecludedaseparateconvoyonS/l. Conferences
betweenrepresentativesofSixthArmyandtheAlliedNavalForcesresultedinacompro-
mise: theS/lechelonwasactuallytoaccompanytheS-Dayconvoytotheobjectivearea,
butwasnottounloaduntilS/l.
ThelocationoftheArmyBeachheadlinewasdeterminedonlyaftercarefulthought
hadbeengiventoseveralpertinentfactors. Sufficientdepthwasessentialtosecure
thelandingbeachesagainstfirefromhostilelongrangeartillery. Inadditiontopro-
vidingsufficientspaceforinitialairinstallations,dispersionofsupplydumps,and
deploj'mentoflargeforces,itwa3highlydesirablethattheArmyBeachheadincludethe
mainaccessroadsleadingtothesouthacrosstheAgnoRiveraswellasanadequate
lateralroadnettofacilitatereadyshiftingofforceswhenthetimecametobreak
outofthebeachhead. Itwasimportantthatthisareaal3Oincludetheroadnetema-
natingfromPbzorrubioandBinalonantopermittheconcentrationofourownarmorin
thatarea,whileatthesametimedenyingtheareatotheenemy. Asthefinalconsidera-
tion,theSixthArmyflanksmustbeanchoredonthehighgroundalongthecoastaldefiles
atPortSualandintheRosario-Damortisarea.
Itwasdecidedtolandthe158thRCTnorthofMabilaoonS/2becausetheleftwing
oftheArmywasrelativelymorevulnerableandmuchmoreopentoseriousattackthanthe
rightwing. TheenemyreportedlyhadmorethantwodivisionsinthegeneralSanFernan-
do(LaUnion)-Baguio-Damortisareaandcouldbringuptroopsfromthesouthto
reinforcethosedivisionssolongashecontrolledthehighwaysrunningfromsouthto
norththroughtheCentralPlains. Besides,heoccupiedaverystrongposition--really
aflankpositionoppositeourleftwingfromwhichhecouldlaunchastrongcounter-
offensivewithoutcrossingdifficultobstacles. Onourrightwingontheotherhand,
theenemywouldhavebeenobligedtolaunchacounter-offensiveacrosstheAgno,a
difficultobstacleatbest,andonewhich,oncewegainedit,coveredourfront.
8
.Moreover,asidefromthenecessityofprotectingourbasebystrikingnortheasttodrive
theenemydeeperintothemountains,andcuttingthehighwaysleadingnorthtopreventthe
onemyfrombringinguptroopsandsuppliesfromthesouth,theterrainoppositeourleft
W1
?f?
fe
^
edU S g O O d
PP
rtuni
ti6sforanenvelopingoffensiveincasetheenemychoseto
noldthelineoftheAgno. S/2wasselectedasthelandingdateforthe158thRCTtopre-
ventunduecongestionontheICorpslandingbeaches.
TheemploymentoftheArmyReserve(the25thDivision)waslimitedbybeachcondi-
tions,insufficientdispersalareas,andunloadingconditionsthatwouldnotpermitthe
commitmentoftheArmyReserveoritselementspriortoS/2. Toenablethereserveto
gointeractionwiththeleastpossibledelay,alternateplansforitscommitmentwere
prepared. Intheeventthatthetacticalsituationdidnotrequiretheimmediateemploy-
mentoftheArmyReserve,itwastolandinthezoneoftheICorps,becausethiscorps
hadbetterbeachesandabetterroadnetthanhadtheXIVCorps;andalsoforthereasons
givenaboveinconnectionwiththe156thRCT. ByconcentratinginthevicinityofBina-
lonan,the25thDivisionwouldbeinanexcellentpositiontocounteranyenemythreat
fromthenorthflankortoexploitabreakthroughafteracrossingoftheAgnoRiverhad
beenforced.
Inconsideringtheplanfortheemploymentofarmor,itwasdeemedadvisabletohold
the13thArmoredGroupdirectlyunderArmycontrolbuttoallotarmorinsufficientquan-
titytoeachcorpstopermitit: toexploitearlygains;tosupporttheseizureand
establishmentofbridgeheadsacrosstheAgnoRiver;andtosecuretheinitialbeachhead
againstcounterattackbyenemyarmorshouldtheJapanesedecideuponapiecemealcommit-
mentoftheirarmornorthoftheAgnoRiver. Inaddition,initialassaultelements
mightpossiblyrequirearmortoreduceanyexistingbeachfortifications.
The13thArmoredGroupwasdirectedtolandintheDagupan-irtabilaoareabecause
thatareaprovidedmoredispersalspacefortroopconcentrations,alessernumberof
bridges,andbetteraccessroadsthantheLingayenareaafforded. Asinthecaseof
theSixthArmyReserve,the13thArmoredGroupcouldnotlandearlierthanS^2because
ofthebeachcongestionandunloadingconditions;however,anearlierneedforthegroup
wasnotanticipated 1sincearmoredattachmentshadbeenmadetoeachcorps* Byconcen-
tratinginthegeneralBozorrubioarea,the13thArmoredGroupwouldbeinanexcellent
positiontoopposeanycounterattackbyenemyarmororgroundtroopsagainstthevulnera-
bleleftflankoftheSixthArmy. TheroadnetemanatingfromFozorrubiowouldpermit
earlycommitmentofthegroupinthezoneofactionofeithercorpstoexploitenemy
weaknessesortocounterattackenemyarmor.
Itwasfullyappreciatedthatthesuccessfulaccomplishmentofmissionsassignedthe
11thAirborneDivisionwascontingentuponearlyassistancefromgroundtroopsoperating
inconjunctionwiththisdivision. Thismeantthatadecisiontocommitthedivisionto
anyofitsproposedmissionsmustnecessarilyawaitdevelopmentsinthegroundsituation;
itwasanticipatedthatneedforthedivisionwouldnotarisepriortoS/10. Moreover,
itcouldbeforeseenthatthecommitmentofthedivisiontoanyofitscontingentmissions
byairborneoperationsfromLeytemightproveneitherfeasiblenordesirable;orthat
weatherconditionsbetweenLuzonandLeytemightseriouslydelayitsmovement,whenand
ifdesired. Consequently,theprovisionwasmadeformovingthedivisiontotheLingayen
area,eitherbyairorbywatertransportation,whereitwouldbeinafavorableposition
forsubsequentemploymentingroundorairborneoperations.
C. MODIFICATIONOFTHEPLAN
AstheLeyteOperationprogressed,evidencedailygrewstrongerthatthetargetdate
fortheLuzonCampaignwouldhavetobereconsideredinthelightoftheslowprogressof
airfieldconstructiononLeyte. TheAlliedAirForcesfinallyrecommendedthatthetar-
getdateforS-DaybepostponedasthelimitedairfacilitiesonLeytewouldnotpermit
theAirForcestocompleteandmaintainneutralizationofenemyairbasesinthe
Philippines,especiallyLuzon,bytheoriginaltargetdate. Thispostponementhadalso
beenstronglyrecommendedbytheAlliedNavalForcesforthesamereason.
ThepostponementofthetargetdatefortheMindoroOperationexercisedadirect
influenceuponthetargetdatefortheLuzonCampaign. AirfieldsonMindoro.fromwhich
AlliedAirForcesinitiallyweretoprovidedirectsupportfortheLuzonCampaignandto
assistintheneutralizationofenemyairpowerintheLuzonarea,couldnotbecompleted
bytheoriginaltargetdatesinviewofthepostponementoftheMindorolandingfrom
5December1944to15December1944. Furthermore,unlesstheLuzontargetdatewere
postponed,theamountofamphibiousshippingavailablefortheLuzonCampaignwouldbe
seriouslyreducedsincemuchofthisshippingwasscheduledtobeusedbothintheMin-
doroandLuzonOperations.
Becauseoftheaboveconsiderations,GRQ*SWPA,inradioinstructionsdated30Novem-
ber1944,postponedthetargetdateforS-DayfortheLuzonCampaignfrom20December1944
u
P
n
to9January1945. receiptofthischange.AmendmentNumber1toFieldOrder34,
HeadquartersSixthArmy,wasissuedannouncingtherevisedtargetdate.
GHQ,OperationsInstructions73/12,dated1December1944.eliminatedthe11thAirborne
DivisionfromtheSixthArmyTroopList. TheAlliedAirForcesbadneithersufficient
airfieldsonLeytenortransportationtoenablethemtomovethisdivisiontotheobjec-
tivearea. Accordingly,AmendmentNumber1toFieldOrder34HeadquartersSixthArmy,
providedfordroppingthe11thAirborneDivisionfromtheSixthArmyTroopListand
rescindingallordersforitsemployment.
AsthetargetdateforS-DayfortheLuzonCampaignapproached,intelligencesources
indicatedthatduringtheseveralprecedingmonthstheenemyhadbuiltuphisstrength
onLuzonfromtheoriginalestimateof150,000to235,000troops. Consequently,the
Commander-in-Chief,SouthwestPacificArea,issuedOperationsInstructions84,dated19
December1944,whichprovidedfourdivisionsandaseparateRCTasreinforcementsfor
SixthArmyfortheLuzonCampaign. Theseunitsandtheirscheduleddatesofarrivalin
theLingayenGulfarea,Luzon,wereasfollows:
1stCavalryDivisionand112thCavalryRCT -3/18
32dDivision,reinforced -S/18
33dDivision,reinforced* -3/3
41stDivision,reinforced* -S/32
Withtheadditionofthesereinforcementsandthedeletionofthe11thAirborne
Divisionfromthetrooplist,themajorcombatunitsavailabletotheCommandingGeneral,
SixthArmy,fortheLuzonCampaignconsistedof9divisions,twoseparateRCT'sandone
armoredgroup.
D. COORDINATIONOFAIRANDNAVALSUPPORTWITHPLANSOFTHEGROUNDFORCE
Asinpastoperations,GHQ,SWPA,chargedtheCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy,with
theresponsibilityofcoordinatingtheplansoftheair,navalandgroundforcesforthe
LuzonCampaign.
CoordinationofNavalSupport
FunctioningunderthedirectionoftheAssistantChiefofStaff,G-2,andinconjunc-
tionwiththeAssistantChiefofStaff,G-3,atargetsectionofHeadquartersSixthArmy
providedtheNavywithallavailableintelligencedataonenemytroopconcentrations,
beachdefenses,andcoastdefenseguns. Basedonthisandondataobtainedthroughits
ownintelligencesources,theNavydevelopeditsplanofpre-S-Dayandpre-H-Hourbom-
bardment.
ProvidedwithintelligencedatasimilartothatfurnishedtheNavy,thecorpscom-
manders,asdirectedbytheCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy,workedinclosecooperation
withthenavalcommandersoftheirrespectiveattackforcestocoordinatethepreparatory
navalairandsurfacebombardmentanddirectnavalairandgunfiresupport.
CoordinationofAirSupport
RepresentativesofHeadquartersSixthArmyparticipatedinaseriesofconferences
withrepresentativesofAlliedAirForcestocoordinatetheplanoftheAlliedAirForces
withthegroundforceplan. Whencoordinationoftheplansoftheair,naval,andground
ThisrepresentedashiftingoftheseunitsfromGHQ,Reservetoreinforcingdivisions.
10
forceswasnecessary,representativesoftheAlliedNavalForcesalsoattendedthecon-
ferences. Amon^;theproblemsdiscussedintheseconferenceswerethecoordinationof
pre-S-DayairstrikesagainsttargetsintheCentralLuzonPlainarea;provisionforthe
reliefofnavalaircraftbyarmyaircraftoftheresponsibilityfordirectairsupportin
theLingayenGulfarea;andthestructureofair-groundliaisonfortheLuzonCampaign
andprovisionforsupportairpartiesforeachcorps,division,andseparateRCT.
Oneofthebestexamplesofthecoordinationbetweentheairforcesandtheground
forceswastheblockingofthedefilesleadingintothenaturalterraincompartmentof
theCentralPlain- Manilaarea,whichissubdividedintotheCentralPlainareanorth
ofthePampangaRiverandtheManilaarealyingsouththereof. Themaindefileconnec-
tingthesetwoareasisknownasthePlaridel- Calumpitdefile,whichconsistsofa
seriesofbridgesandcausewaysacrossthePampangaandtheAngatRiversandthesouth-
ernendoftheCandabaSwamp. Intelligenceestimatesindicatedthat,oftheestimated
235,000enemytroopsonLuzon,76,000wereconcentratedintheCentralPlain- Manila
areaand,further,thatintheCentralPlainareaalonewasatotalofapproximately
50,000troops. Thus,ifthedefileleadingintotheCentralPlainfromtheManilaarea
couldbeblocked,theforcesimmediatelyavailabletotheenemyforthedefenseofthe
CentralPlainareawouldapproximate50troops.
InordertoaccomplishtheisolationoftheenemyintheCentralPlain- Manilaarea,
aplanwasdevelopedthroughconferencesattendedbyrepresentativesofGHQ,,SWPA,Head-
quartersSixthArmy,andAlliedAirForces. PriortoS-3,theAlliedAirForceswereto
destroyHighway3attheClaveria,Sani-steban,andTaguidindefiles;whileduringthe
period5-5throughS-2,theyweretocuttherailandhighwaysystemrunningsouthfrom
ManilaalongLagunadeBay. DuringtheperiodS-5throughS-l,AlliedAirForceswereto
block3aletePassandtodestroytherailroadbridgeeastofCalauag;andinaddition,
weretobepreparedtocuttherailandhighwaysystemsrunningthroughthePlaridel-
CalumpitdefileonlaterinstructionsofGHQ,oronrequestoftheCommandingGeneral,
SixthArmy. SubsequenttoS-Day,theAlliedAirForcesweretomaintaintheblockadeof
defilesasrequiredtodenytheirusetohostileforces. GuerrillaforcesonLuzonwere
toassistindestroyinghostilelinesofcommunicationbyconductingdemolitionandsabo-
tageoperations.
II
AMPHIBIOUS
PHASE
IIAmphibious Phase
Introduction
TheUnitedStatesSeventhFleet,Admiral(thenViceAdmiral)ThomasC.Kinkaid
commanding,waschargedbyOperationsInstructions73,GeneralHeadquarters,Southwest
PacificArea,dated12October1944.withprovidingdirectnavalairandsurfacesupport
toSixthArmyfortheLuzonCampaign. TheprimarymissionassignedtotheAlliedNaval
Forcesbytheseoperationsinstructionswasto: transport,protect,landandsupport
SixthArmyinanamphibiousoperationtoseize,occupyanddeveloptheLingayenGulf
areaofCentralLuzon. Thefollowingdiscussionconcernsitselfwiththeactivitiesof
theUnitedStatesSeventhFleetinsupportofSixthArmy'samphibiousoperationsinthe
LingayenGulfareaofCentralLuzonduringtheperiod6January1945through2?January
1945.
OrganizationandCompositionofSupportingNavalForces
TheNavalforcewhichsupportedSixthArmy'samphibiousoperationsintheLingayen
GulfareawasknownastheLuzonAttackForceundercommandofAdmiral(thenVice
Admiral)Kinkaid,Comnander,SeventhFleet. Theprincipalnavaltaskgroupscomposing
thisattackforcewereasshownbelow:
77.1FlagGroup
FleetFlagshipUnit Capt.Granum
1AGC,2DD
CruiserUnit Capt.Downes
1CL,2DD
CommanderSupportAircraft Capt.Taylor
(InFleetFlagship)
77.2BombardmentandFireSupportGroup ViceAdmiralOldendorf
6OBB,5CA,1CL,19DD,10APD,
1AVP,11LCI(G),6UDT.
77.3CloseCoveringGroup RearAdmiralBerkey
3CL,6DD.
77.4EscortCarrierGroup RearAdmiralDurgin
17CVE,16DD,6DE.
77.5Hunter-KillerGroup Capt,Cronin
1CVE,5DE.
77.6MinesweepingandHydrographicGroup CommanderLoud
2DM,1CM,10DMS,10AM,
43YMS,2PF,1APD.
77.7ScreeningGroup Capt
5DD.
77.8SalvageandRescueGroup CommanderHuie
6ATF,3ARS,8LCI(L),
2ARL,2ATO.
77*9ReenforcementGroup HearAdmiralConolly
1AGC,8DD,6DE,16APA,
3AP,5AKA,11APD,50LST.
77.10ServiceGroup RearAdmiralGlover
Forcesassignedplus6DE,
2LST(ammunition)
78SanFabianAttackForce ViceAdmiralBarbey
22DD,13DE,1AGC,2RACC,16APA,6AP,
1APH,3AKA,4AK,5LSD,1USV,82L2T
t
20LSM,6PC,8SC,26XAK,1A0,1ATF,1ARL,
Miscellaneoussmallcraft.
79LingayenAttackForce ViceAdmiralWilkinson
19DD,6DE,3AGC,18APA,3AP,
1Affl,3LSI,6AKA,4LSD,2LSV,
38LST,31LSM,Miscellaneoussmallcraft.
ThebombardmentandFireSupportGroupandtheEscortCarrierGroupwereassigned
themissionofpreliminarynavalsurfaceandairbombardmentofenemydefensesinthe
LingayenGulfareabeginningonS-3andcontinuingthroughS-l;andrenderingdirect
navalairandsurfacesupportforthelandingoperationsofSixthArmyonS-Day(9Janu-
ary1945)andsubsequently. TheSanFabianAttackForcewaschargedwithresponsibility
fortransportingICorpstotheobjectivearea,landingitonbeachesintheDagupan-
MabilaoareaofLingayenGulfandprovidingdirectnavalgunfiresupporttherefor. The
LingayenAttackForcewasassignedsimilarmissionsinsupportofXIVCorps. Therein-
forcementgroupwaschargedwithtransportingthe25thDivision(SixthAriiy,Reserve)and
the158thRCTtotheobjectiveareaandlandingthemonbeachesintheDagupan-ifiabilao
areaofLingayenGulfinaccordancewiththescheduleestablishedbytheCommanding
General,SixthArmy.
MovementtotheObjectiveArea
ThevarioustaskgroupscomposingtheinvasionarmadarendezvousedinLeyteGulf,
havingeffectedconcentrationenroutethereto. FromLeyteGulftheroutepassedthrough
SurigaoStrait,theMindanaoSea,theSuluSea,MindoroStraitandthencenorthwardoff
thewestcoastofLuzontoLingayenGulf.
Themovementtotheobjectiveareawasmadeinfourseparategroups: TheMinesweeping
andHydrographicGroupandtheBombardmentand.FireSupportGroupdepartedLeyteGulfon
2January1945a
nd
3January1945respectivelyandrendezvousedofftheobjectiveareaon
themorningof6January1945 TheCloseCoveringGroup(theCommander-in-Chief,South-
westPacificArea,embarkedintheBoise(CA)withthisgroup),theSanFabianAttack
Forceandmiscellaneouselements,departedLingayenGulfon4January1945,arrivingin
theobjectiveareaonthemorningof9January1945.
T n e
LingayenAttackForceandthe
FleetFlagship,USSWasatch,withtheCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy,andtheCommander,
LuzonAttackForceaboard,leftLeyteGulfon6January1945#arrivingintheobjective
areaonthemorningof9January.
AccompanyingtheCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy,ontheUSSWasatch,werehisChief
ofStaff,theAssistantChiefsofStaff,G-2andG-3,andotherkeymembersofthegeneral
andspecialstaffsectionsofHeadquartersSixthArmy. Duringtheapproachtotheobjec-
tivearea,duringthelandingoperationsanduntil13January1945whentheCommanding
General,SixthArmy,departedtheFleetFlagshipandassumedcommandofhisforcesashore,
14
GuardedDyapowerfulnavy,theLuzonconvoymovednorththroughMindoroStrait,
arrivedinLingayenG-ulfwhereheavynaval"bombardmentpreceededtheinitiallandings,andwhere
shortlythereafter,landingcraftmovedtowardthe"beachesasallconcernedremainedalert.
t;esestaffrepresentativesfunctionedasaskeletonoperationalstaff. Thisstaff
snared t.,ejointoperationsroomoftheUSSWasatcnwiththeController,SupportAir-
crait.andhisstaff. Inadditiontothenavalship-to-shipcommunicationfacilities.
t//wothermeanscfcommunicationwereavailable: thenavalsupportaircraftradionet
wiacnprovidedcommunicationwiththesupportaircraftparties,witheachmajorcommand
headquarters,andwithsubordinateheadquartersdowntoandincludingtheairliaison
partieswitheachfrontlineinfantrybattalion;andthearmyradiocoiamunicationnet
established bytheSignalOfficer,SixthArm:/,whichprovidedcommunicationwitheach
majorsubordinateheadquartersasitbecameestablishedashore. Throughtheutilization
J
t h e s e
v a r
i
u
3 communicationnetstheSixthArmystaffwasenabledtoobtainup-to-the-
minute informationontheprogressofoperationsashore. Threeidenticalsituationmaps
erekept;oneinthejointoperationsroo:.;oneintheofficeoftheCommandingGeneral,
Sixthi-.rmy;andoneontheFlagBridge.
TheAssistant ChiefsofStaff,G-2andG-3,workedinclosecooperationwiththe
NavalSupportAircraftController,furnishinghimwithinformationonthetacticalsitu-
ationasreceivedoverthearmycommunicationnetandestablishingpriorities,when
necessary,forstrikesbynavalaircraft. InthisconnectiontheAssistantChiefof
Staff,G-2,incooperationwiththeAssistant ChiefofStaff,G-3,furnishedtheNaval
SupportAircraft Controllerwithallavailabletarget information.
Although itwasbelievedprobable,inthelightcfpreviousexperienceatLeyte,
tnutthe Japanesemightriskapartoftheirfleetinhitandrunattacksbyfastsur-
faceforcesonourtransportgroups,nosuchjjaj^rattacksdevelopedduringthemovement
tcLin&ayenGulf. Therewerecnl}-threecontactswithenemysurfaceforces. Thefirst'
occurredon5 January1945whentwoenemydestroyersweresightedwestof-Manila. They
wereattackedbyonecfourdestroyersandretiredeastwardathighspeed. Aircraft
fron.curCVL'sattackedthesetwoenemydestroyerswithtorpedoesandrockets,heavily
damagingboth. AnothercontactwasmadewiththeenemysouthofApoIslandonthesame
date,whenaJapanesesubmarinefiredtwotorpedoesatthecruiserBoise, Thesubmarine
wasoa:riaêdbyaplaneoftheanti-submarinepatrol,thenrammed,depthchargedand
probably sunkbyoneofourdestroyers. Thethirdcontactwasmadewithanenemydes-
troyeroffWanila Bayjustatdarkon7January1945* fourdestroyerswhichhadbeen
concentrated entheeastflankofourconvoy inexpectationofjustsuchasituation
wenttotheattack,sinkingtheenemywarshipafterabriefengagementinwhichour
forcessufferednodamage.
Theconstant pressureexertedbyourlandandcarrierbasedaircraftbeginningwith
thestrikespriortotheLeyteOperation,hadcausedsubstantialdamagetoJapaneseair
facilitiesandaircraft inthePhilippineIslands. Despitethisfacttheenemywasstill
capable ofastrongairreactionagainstourforcesenroutetoLingayenGulf. Therewere
stillover70operationalairfieldsintheHiilippinesfromwhichmilitaryaircraftcould
operate. Inaddition,enemyaircraft couldbestagedthroughfieldsonFormosa,Hainan,
ChinaandtheNetherlandsEastIndies. DespitetheaircoverfurnishedbothbyAllied
AirForcesandNavalcarrierbasedaircraft,theconvoysweresubjectedtonumerousand
seriousenemyairattacksenroutetoandafterarrivalintheobjectivearea. From3
January1945through8January1945threeofourshipsweresunk,13sustainedmajor
damageand 14sustainedminordamagethroughenemyairaction. Enemysuicideplanes
accounted for27ofthese.
PreliminaryOperationsattheObiective
Having rendezvousedwith theBombardmentandFireSupportGroupofftheentranceto
Lingf.yenGulfintheearlymorningof6January1945theMinesweepingandHjdrographic
Grcupcommenced sweepingLingayenGulfat07001onthatdate. Nominesweresweptbut
severalfloaterswerefoundandsunkbygunfire. Inadditiontocoveringtheminesweep-
ingoperations,theBombardmentandFireSupportGroupbombardedtargetsintheSan
Fernando (LaUnion),PoroPointandSantiagoIslandareason6January1945*
On7January1945theunderwaterdemolitionteamsreconnoitered thelandingbeaches
underheavycoveringfirefromtheBombardment andFireSupportGroup. Theyfoundno
beachdefensesnorunderwaterobstructions. Meanwhile,theBombardmentandFireSupport
Groupfired ontargetsintheSanFabianbeachareaandtheLingayenbeacharea. Few
remunerativetargetswerefoundintheSanFabianbeachareabuttheareawasthoroughly
covered LingayenTownandairfieldwereheavilybombarded. Numerousbuildingssuita-
blea-defensivepositionsweredestroyed. Someenemyshorebatteriesattemptedto
interfere'wUh thebombardmentbutweresilencedbeforetheycouldinflictdamageon
ourships. Cn8January1945
t n e
BombardmentandFireSupportGroupagainbombarded
15
targetsintheSanFernandoarea.
TheEscortCarrierGroupfurnishedcombatairpatrolsandanti-submarinepatrolsto
covertheshipsinthegulfandtheapproachingattackforceconvoys. Inadditionto
this,navalaircraftbombed,strafedandattackedwithrockets,targetsonandbehindall
landingbeaches. Duringtheperiod6January1945through8January1945tinclusive,
navalcarrieraircraftoftheLuzonAttackForceflewatotalof788sortiesoverthe
targetareadespitethelossofoneescortcarrierandtheseriouscripplingofanother.
TheairattacksonourshipsenroutetoandinLingayenGulfpriortoS-Daywere
extremelyserious* Ashasbeenstatedpreviously,almost30shipsweresunkordamaged
bytheseenemyairattacks. ItbecameapparentthatenemyairpoweronLuzonhadnot
beenneutralized. Navallosseswereassumingsuchproportions,that,shouldtheycon-
tinue,areconsiderationofplansmightberequired. Consequently,the.Commander,
SeventhFleet,requestedthattheCommander,ThirdFleet,conductathoroughairsweep
ofLuzonon7January1945givingparticularattentiontoallairfieldsintheLingayen
Gulfarea. TheCommander,ThirdFleet,cancelledascheduledstrikeonFormosaandmade
repeatedsweepsofairfieldsinnorthernLuzonandtheLingayenGulfarea. Fewairborne
enemyplanesweredestroyedinthesestrikesbut75weredestroyedorbadlydamagedon
thegroundandanumberofairfieldswererenderedinoperational. Thereaftertheinten-
sityofenemyairreactionwasmateriallyreduced.
pirectSupportofAmphibiousOperationsofSixthArmy
At07001,S-Day(9January1945)
tn
eBombardmentandFireSupportGroupbeganits
bombardmentofthelandingbeaches. Therateoffirewasgraduallyincreaseduntiljust
priortoH-Hour,O93OI,whenthebombardmentliftedtotargetsinlandfrom,andtothe
flanksof,thebeaches. Astheassaultwavesapproachedtheshorethebeacheswere
bombardedbyLCIs(rocket)followedimmediatelybystrafingbylowflyingnavyfighter
planes. ThefirstassaultwavelandedatO93OI* ^nenavalsurfacebombardmentoftar-
getsinlandfrom,andtotheflanksof,thebeachescontinuedfortenminutesfollowing
thearrivalofthefirstassaultwavesatthebeaches. Bombardmentthenceased.
Followingtheinitialbombardment,navalsurfacefiresandstrikesbynavalsupport
aircraftwerefurnishedoncall. NooppositiondevelopedonthefrontofXIVCorpsor
onthefrontoftherightflankelementsofICorps. ResistanceontheICorpsleft
flankdevelopedrapidlybeginningon9January1945* Consequently,themajorpartof
thenavalsurfaceandairsupportwasconcentratedontargetsinthisarea. Rosario
wasmercilesslypoundedbyourownbignavalgunsandsupportaircraft;severalenemy
artillerypieceswhichfiredonlandingcraftintheSanFabianareaweresilenced.
FollowingS-Daynavalsurfaceunitsandnavalaircraftcontinuedtofurnishsupportto
groundforcesoncall. AtI83OI,17January1945t*neCommandingGeneral,AlliedAir
Forces,relievedtheCommander,AlliedNavalForces,ofresponsibilityfordirectair
supportofgroundforcesandforairprotectionoftheLingayenNavalForces. Shortly
thereafter,thebulkoftheCVE'sdepartedLingayenGulf, TheBombardmentandFire
SupportGroupremainedintheLingayenGulfareatosupporttheSixthArmyuntil22
January1945whenthebulkofitdepartedtoreturntothePacificFleet. Fourbattle-
shipsremainedinLingayenGulfuntil10February1945whentheytooreturnedtothe
PacificFleet.
On27January1945theCommander,LuzonAttackForce,departedLin&ayenGulffor
Mindoro.
16
Oppositionwasnegligibleasoursmalllandingcraftlandedwaveafter
waveoftroopson"beachesatseveralpointsintheLingayenGulfarea.
OPERATIONS
Operations
A. 9January-28January1%5'- Theassaultlanding;seizureofArmyBeachhead;com-
mitmentoffloatingreserve(25thDivision);passageoftheAgnoRiverand
advancetothesouthwiththerightwingwhilecontinuingattacks
withtheleftwingoftheArmy;seizureofClarkAirCen-
ter;arrivalof1stCavalryDivision,32dDivision,
and112thCavalryRegimentalCombatTeam.
1. S-Day(9January1945).
a. OperationsofICorps:
ICorpscommencedlandingoperationsatH-Hour,O93OI,on9January1945*
n
theMangaldan-SanFabian-MabilaoareaofLingayenGulf,Luzon,followinganaval
bombardmentpreviouslyunequalledinsouthwestPacificwarfare. The6thDivisionon
therightlandedonbeachesintheMangaldanarea. The43dDivisionontheleftlanded
onbeachesintheSanFabian-Mabilaoarea. Therewasnoenemyoppositiononthe
beaches. Theforceofnavalairandgunfirepreparationshadapparentlycausedany
enemyforcesoccupyingbeachdefensesintheareatowithdraw.
The6thDivisionlandedwithtwoRCT'sabreast,the20thInfantryRCTonthe
right,the1stInfantryRCTontheleft. Advancingrapidlyinlandwithoutmeetingenemy
opposition,thedivisionseizedandsecuredtheDagupan.RivercrossingatDagupanand
occupiedDagupanandMangaldan. Byduskon9January1945,thedivisionhadsecureda
beachheadapproximately6000yardsindepthand8000yardsinwidthextendinggenerally
inanarcfromDagupantoMangaldan, Advancereconnaissenceelementshadreached
CalasiaoandBuenlag,eachapproximately9000yardsinland,withoutenemycontact. (For
dispositionsofthe6thDivisionat24001,S-Day,9January1945,seeDiagram4). Major
GeneralEdwinD.Patrick,CommandingGeneral,6thDivision,assumedcommandofhisforces
ashoreat153*
o n
9January1945*
The43dDivisionlandedwithtwoRCT'sabreast,the103dInfantryRCTon
theright,the172dInfantryRCTontheleft. Therewasnoenemyoppositiontothe
initiallanding, iiarlyintheafternoon,enemyartilleryfirerangingincalibrefrom
J^vam.to30cm,whichbeganfallingonthelandingbeaches,hamperedunloadingandnec-
essitatedtheretractionofsomelandingcraft. Thedivisionencounterednoopposition
toitsimmediatefrontandadvancedinlandrapidly. The172dInfantry,onthedivision
leftflank,sentonebattalionnorthalongthecoastalhighwaytowardRabon. Theonly
enemyresistanceencounteredduringthedaywasinthesectorofthisbattalionwhich
washeldupbyheavyenemyfireatapointonthecoastapproximately1500yardsnorth
northeastofMabilao. Bythecloseofthedaythedivisionhadoccupiedabeachhead
8000yardsindepthand8000yardsinwidthextendinginanarcfromMangaldan,where
ithadcontactwithelementsofthe6thDivisiononitsright,throughSanJacintcand
Bindaytoapointonthecoastapproximately1500yardsnorthnortheastofMabilao.
(Fordispositionsofthe43dDivisionat24OOI,S-Day,9January1945.seeDiagram3).
MajorGeneralLeonardF.Wing,CommandingGeneral,43dDivision,assumedcommandofhis
forcesashoreat14301on9January1945
b. OperationsofXIVCorps:
Followingapreparatorynavalairandsurfacebombardmentequalinintensity
tothatdeliveredinsupportofICorps,XIVCorpslandedatH-Hour,O93OI,on9January
1945,onbeachesintheLingayen-Binmaleyarea,LingayenGulf,Luzon,withtwodivi-
sionsabreast,the40thDivisionontherightlandingonbeachesintheLingayenarea,
the37thDivisionontheleftlandingonbeachesintheBinmaleyarea. Therewasno
enemyoppositiononthebeaches. Pre-S-Dayestimatesthattherewerenoenemydefen-
sivepositionsinthisareawereconfirmed. Theforceofthenavalairandgunfire
bombardmentapparentlycausedanyJapswhomighthavebeeninthisareatowithdraw.
The40thDivisionlandedatO93OI,9January1945.withtwoRCT'sabreast,
the185thInfantryRCTontheright,thel6othInfantryHCTontheleft. Thedivision
^
e e tlon
6t advancedinlandunopposed,seizedLingayenAirfield(foundtobeover5
0 0 0
^
n
excellentcondition,thoughrequiringfillingofafewshellholestomakeitservicea-
ble), seizedandsecuredLingayenTownandcrossedtheB
a
sinaRiverjustsouthofLin-
gayen. ElementsadvancingwestalongthecoastreachedSamatwhileotherelements
reachedapoint5000yardswestofEstanza,sendingreconnaissanceelementsacrossthe
AgnoRiveratapointapproximately3000yardssouthofEstanza, Bytheendoftheday,
thedivisionhadsecuredabeachhead6000yardsdeepandapproximately9000yardswide.
(Fordispositionsofthe40thDivisionat24OOI,S-Day,9January1945.seeDiagram4).
MajorGeneralRappBrush,CommandingGeneral,40thDivision,assumedcontrolofhis
forcesashoreatI615I,9January1945*
The37thDivisionlandedwithtwoRCT'sabreast,the145thInfantryRCT
ontheright,the129thInfantryRCTontheleft. Therewasnoenemyoppositionas
thedivisionpushedinlandandsecuredBinmaley. Thedivisionsecuredacrossingof
theCalmayRiveratapointapproximately2500yardssoutheastofBinmaleyandacross-
ingovertheDagupanRiveratGayaman. Bythecloseoftheday,thedivisionhad
establishedabeachhead6000yardsdeepand5000yardswide. (Fordispositionsofthe
37thDivisionat24001,S-Day,9January1945,
s e e
Diagram4). MajorGeneralRobertS.
Beightler,CommondingGeneral,37thDivision,assumedcommandofhisforcesashoreat
1445L9January1945-
c. General:
Bytheendoftheday,9January1945.SixthArmyhadaccomplishedinitial
lodgmentintheLingayenGulfareaofCentralLuzonwithnegligiblecasualties. Although
RadioTokyohadpromisedtheinvadingtroopsthe"hottestreceptioninthehistoryof
warfare",thereceptionhadfailedtomaterialize. Sporadicartilleryfiredeliveredon
thebeachesofthe43dDivisioncombinedwithresistancetotheadvanceoftheleftflank
elementsofthe43<*DivisiontothenorthupthecoasttowardRabonweretheextentof
enemyreactionon9January1945* AdvancereconnaissanceelementsofHeadquartersSixth
Armyaccompaniedtheassaultelementsashoretoreconnoiterconcentrationareasforthe
25thDivisionandthe13thArmoredGroupandalocationfortheArmyCommandft>st.
2. S/l,10January1945.throughS/7,16January1945*
After9January1945*Corpspushedrapidlyinlandencounteringonlylight
sporadicresistancefromsmallscatteredenemygroupsonitsrightwhileonthecorps
left,enemyresistancebecameincreasinglystrongerasthe43dDivisionadvancedinland
towardtheBinalonan-J-bzorrubioarea,northeasttowardRosario,andnorthalongthe
coasttowardRabon* MajorGeneralInnisP.Swift,CommandingGeneral,ICorps,assumed
commandofhisforcesashoreat12301,11January1945*
Althoughitencounterednoorganizedenemyresistance,thesouthwardadvance
ofthe6thDivisionwasslowedinitiallybydifficultunloadingconditionsonthebeach,
broughtaboutbyhighsurfandshallowwaterwhichcausedLST'stobeachasmuchas100
yardsfromshore. UnloadingofvitalBaileyBridgingmaterialwastherebyimpeded..
Moreover,theenemyhaddestroyedmostofthebridgesacrossthemainstreamsinthe
divisionsector,butfoottroopscrossedthesestreamssuccessfullyonfootbridgesor
byfording. Heavyequipment,however,suchasarmorandartillery,hadtoawaitcon-
structionofbridgescapableofbearingitsweight. On10January1945thedivision
establishedcontactwiththe37thDivision(XIVCorps)atCalasiao,maintainingthis
contactasitadvancedsouth. By16January1945the6thDivisionhadoccupiedtheline
Malasiqui-Catablan-Parian. (Fordispositionsofthe6thDivisiononS/7,16January
1945. s
e
Diagram5)
After9January1945the43<iDivisiondroveinlandtowardtheBinalonan-
Pozorrubiocommunicationcenter,northeasttowardRosarioandnorthalongthecoast
towardRabon. On16January1945elementsofthedivisionsecured^danetaandreached
thewesternoutskirtsofBinalonanandthesouthwesternoutskirtsoffozorrubio,en-
counteringresistanceonlyfromsmallenemydelayingforcesduringtheadvance. Mean-
while,otherelementsofthedivisionwerebeginningtodevelopwhatultimatelyproved
tobethesouthflankofthemainenemybattlepositionontheICorpsnorthflank. As
18
Smalllendingcraft,loadedwithmen
supplies,carriedtheinitial
assaultwavestofourmain"beachesand,
astheoperationprogressed,larger
landingcraftwerea"bletoland,heavier
equipmentwa?"broughtashore,and
suppliesweredispersedanddugin
toprotectthemfromenemyfire
Groundtroopsmakingearlyadvancesinland,
securedaformerJapaneselandingstripwhichwasquicklyreconditionedbyourengineers
andmadeoperationalforourairforceunitssupportinginitialgroundoperations,
thedivisionadvanced,enemyforceswithdrewtofortifiedcavepositionsonthehigh
groundextendingnorthwestfromthehillmassdominatedbyMtAlava,tothehighground
inthevicinityofRabon. OnMtAlavaanenemyforceofapproximatelybattalion
strength,occupyinganetworkofcavepositions,resistedalleffortstodislodgeit.
rheenemyshowedlittleoffensivetendencybutresistedfiercely,supportedbyartillery
lirefrompositionsinthehillseastofthePozorrubio-RosarioRoadandnorthofthe
D a m o r t i s R o a d
*
The
?Ao!^T" divisionby-passedMtAlavaleavingabattalionofthe
lb^thInfantrytoreducetheenemypositionsinthatarea. By16January1945the169th
InfantryhadcutthePozorrubio-RosarioRoadatapointdueeastofMtAlava. The
172dInfantry,havingby-passedMtAlavaonthewest,advancednortheastupthevalley
oftheBuedRiver,cuttheRosario-DamortisRoadand,advancingeast,reachedtheout-
skirtsofRosariowhereitencounteredstrongenemyresistancesupportedbyartillery
firefromthehillssurroundingRosario. The63dInfantry(6thDivision),initiallyin
corpsreserve,wascommittedonthewestflankofthe172dInfantryandattachedtothe
43dDivision, Advancingnorthwestthroughhillyterrain,egainstheavyenemyresistance,
itcuttheRosario-DamortisRoadatapoint3500yardswestofRosarioby16January
1945* (Fordispositionsofthe43dDivisiononS/7,16January1945,seeDiagram5).
Elementsofthel?2dInfantry(43dDivision),whichhadoriginallydriven
northupthecoasttowardRabonwererelievedon11January1945atapoint1500yards
southofRabonbythe158thRCTwhichlandedonthatdateintheMabilaoareaofLin-
gayenGulf. BrigadierGeneralHanfordMacNider,CommandingGeneral,158thRCT,assumed
commandofhisforcesashoreat11001,11January1945. Operatingundercontrolofthe
CommandingGeneral,SixthArmy,theRCTadvancednorthandon12January1945,after
securingRabcnagainstlightenemyresistance,occupiedDamortiswithoutopposition.
On13January1945theRCTpassedtocontroloftheCommandingGeneral,ICorps. On
thatdatetheRCTturnedeastandadvancedtowardRosarioontheRosario-Daioortis
Road. EnemyforceswhichhadwithdrawnfromtheDamortisarea,putupstubbornresis-
tanceonthehighgroundjusteastofAmlang. The158thInfantryreachedthishigh
groundon14January1945.buttheenemy,supportedbyconcentratedartilleryfire,
counterattackedandforcedawithdrawal. On16January1945the158thRCTwasattached
tothe43dDivision..TheRCTattackedtotheeastonthissamedateandsecuredthe
highgroundeastofAmlangdespiteheavyenemymortarandartilleryfirefromthehills
tothenorthandnortheast. (Fordispositionsofthe158thRCTonS/7,16January1945
seeDiagram5)
OperationsofICorpsfromS-Daythrough16January1945werecharacterized
by: therapidsouthwardadvanceofthe6thDivisionagainstonlyscattereddisorganized
resistance;thelackofstrongenemyresistancetotheadvanceofthe43dDivisionto-
wardtheBinalonan-Pozorrubiocommunicationcenter;thepenetrationbythe43dDivision
oftheenemy'sMtAlava-Amlangdefensivepositiondespitefanaticalenemyresistance;
thecuttingofthePozorrubio-RosarioRoadeastofMtAlavaandtheisolationofMt
Alava;thecuttingoftheRosario-DamortisRoadandtheadvanceofthe172dInfantry
(43dDivision)totheoutskirtsofRosario.
Alloftheabovewasaccomplishedinthefaceofseriouslogisticdiffi-
cultiesbroughtaboutbypoorbeachconditions,whichforcedashiftingofallunloading
tobeachesatSanFabianandMabilaowheremoreshelteredconditionsandlowersurf
permittedlighteragetooperateunimpeded. Thisshiftingofbeachesplacedaheavy
strainonunloadingdetailsandofnecessityslowedtheflowofsuppliesinlandfrom
thebeaches. ThiswasparticularlyevidentinthecaseofthevitalBaileyBridging
material.
After9January1945%& CorpsdroverapidlyinlandtowardtheAgnoRiver
andnorthwestalongthecoasttowardPortSual. Duringthisdrivenoorganizedenemy
resistancewasencounteredalthoughscatteredgroupsofenemystragglerswerecontacted
fromtimetotime. Thesegroupsshowednoaggressivetendencies,however,andhabitu-
allywithdrewafterashortfirefight.
UnloadingofvitalsuppliesincludingcriticalBaileyBridgingequipment
wasalsoseriouslyimpededbybeachconditionsintheLingayen-Binmaleyarea. Begin-
ningon10January1945
t h e
heightandforceofthesurfincreasedtoapointwhere
unloadingofLST'sorsmallercraftbecameimpossible. CausewaysconstructedfromLST's
tothebeachesweretornlooseandsomeLST'sbroached. Theseconditionsforced
19
abandonmentofbeachesintheLingayen-BinmaleyareaandthetransferofXIVCorps
unloadingoperationstobeachesatD&gupaninsidethemouthoftheDagupanRiverandto
ICorpsbeachesintheSenFabian-Mabilaoarea. BeachesatDagupanhadlimitedfacili-
ties. XIVCorpssuppliesflowingoverICorpsbeachesplacedafurtherheavystrainon
alreadyovertaxedunloadingfacilitiesandontheroadnetleadingfromthebeaches.
LateraltrafficacrosstheICorpsfronttotheXIVCorpszoneofactioncauseddifficult
trafficcontrolproblemsandslowedtheflowofsuppliesandequipmenttobothcorps.
Despitetheabovementionedlogisticaldifficulties,furtheraggravatedby
themanydemolishedbridgesalongthemainroutesthroughthefish-pondandswampareas
immediatelyinlandfromLingayenandBinmaley,elementsofboththe40thand37thDivi-
sionsreachedtheArmyBeachheadLineatseveralpointson11January1945* &ajor
GeneralOscarW.Griswold,CommandingGeneral,XIVCorps,assumedcommandofhisforces
ashoreat14301,11January1945.
B y
16January1945
b o t n
divisionshadconsolidated
alongtheArmyBeachheadLine.
HavingsecuredPortSualon13January1945,elementsofthe40thDivision
pushednorthandon14January1945occupiedNanatianonCabalitianBaywithoutenemy
contact. The40thDivisionReconnaissanceTroopreachedAlaminos,westofCabalitian
Bayonthissamedatewithoutenemycontact. By16January1945patrolsoperatingwest
andnorthwestfromAlaminoshadfailedtomakeenemycontact. 'I'hedivisionsentare-
connaissanceinforce,consistingofonebattalion,southalongtheAguilar-Mangatarem-
Camilingroad. Thisforcemadecontactwithabattalionfromthe3?thDivisionat
Camilingon16January1945*
Afterestablishingcontactwithelementsofthe6thDivision(ICorps)at
Calasiaoon10January19451the37thDivisionpushedsouth. Despitedifficulties
encounteredinunloadingandbringingforwardBaileyBridgingmaterial,withtheconse-
quentdelaysiniuovementofheavyequipmenttothesouth,the37thDivisionhadcom-
pletedconsolidationoftheArmyBeachheadLineinitszoneofactionby16January
1945
an(
i
na<
*reconnoiteredcrossingsoftheAgnoRiver,atseveralpoints. Aone-
battalionreconnaissanceinforce,movingsouthfromAfelasiqui,establishedcontact
withabattalionfromthe4thDivisionatCamiling,
By16January1945tXIVCorps,despitedifficultlogisticalproblems,had
advancedinlandadistanceofapproximately28miles,crossingafish-pondandswamp
areawhich,inviewofthelackofBaileyBridgingequipment,requiredahighstandard
ofengineeringperformanceandcoordinationtotraverse. Inthisrespect,themovement
ofthecorpswasmateriallyexpeditedbythesuperiorperformancecfapproximately45
amphibioustractorsattachedtothecorpsfortheoperation. Afterapreliminaryrecon-
naissanceforabridgesite,engineertroopshadinitiatedconstructionofabridge
acrosstheAgnoRiveratBayambang. By16January1945thisbridge,capableofsupport-
ing8tons,wasreadytotaketraffic. Thereconnaissanceinforcebybothdivisions,
resultedintheirjunctioninthevicinityofCamilingwithoutencounteringanyorganized
enemyresistance,andsetthestageforacrossingoftheAgnoRiverinforce. (ForXIV
CorpsdispositionsonS/7,16January1945tseeDiagram5)*
c. SixthArmyReserve:
The25thDivision,SixthArmyFloatingReserve,landedintheItfabilsoarea
on11January1945
an
^by13January1945^
a d
completedconcentrationinthevicinity
ofManaoag. The13thArmoredGrouplandedonbeachesintheMabilaoareaon11January
1945
an(
*concentratedinitiallyjustinlandfromthebeaches. Movementtothe&rcup
concentrationareainthevicinityofSanJacintowasdelayeduntilbridgescapableof
supportingitsheavyequipmentcouldbeconstructedacrosstheBuedRiverandits
tributaries. On13January1945thebulkofthegroupcompletedconcentrationinthe
SanJacintoarea.
d. Commitmentofthe25thDivision(less35thInfantry):
Theheavyresistancebeingencounteredbythe43dDivision(withthe158th
RCTattached)onthenorthflankoftheArmyBeachheadmadeitevidentthattheentire
strengthofthedivisionwouldhavetobeconcentratedontnatflankinordertocapture
thehighgroundeastoftheFozorrubio-RosarioRoadandnorthoftneHosario-Damor-
tisReadtosecuretheArmyBeachheadagainstanypossiblelargescaleenemycounter-
attackfromthisdirection. InorderthatICorpsmighthavesufficientforcesto
accomplishtheaboveandstillhaveadequatestrengthtcdrivesoutheastfromtheArmy
20
TroopsmovinginlandtosecuretheABHLencountervarioustypesofterrain:
MountainousintheRosario-DamortisArea;
CoconutPalmGrovesintheCentralPlainArea
StreamsandswampsnearSanFabian;
Beachhead,seizecrossingsoftheAgnoRiverandcontinuetheadvancedowntheCentral
Plain,FieldOrder42,issuedon16January1945,releasedthe25thDivision(less35th
Infantry)toICorps,anddirectedthecorpstoseizeandsecurethelineUrdaneta-
Binalonan,employingforthispurposethe25thDivision. Thisfieldorderfurther
directedIandXIVCorpstosecureneededcrossingsoftheAgnoRiverwithintheir
respectivezonesofactionandtoreconnoitertoincludethegenerallineCamiling-
Paniqui-Cuyapo-SanLeon-SanQuintin-SanNicolas.
e. General:
By16January1945SixthArmy*hadseizedabeachheadalmost30milesdeep
atitsdeepestpointandapproximately30mileswide. TheArmyfrontoffourdivisions
plusaseparateRCTextendedinanarcofover60miles. Theselectionoflending
beachesinthatareaofLingayenGulfwhichextendedfromLingayentoMabilachadappar-
entlytakentheenemycompletelybysurprise. Thepoorbeaches,highsurf,andthe
swampsandfish-pondsimmediatelyinlandfromthebeacheshadledhimtodiscountthe
possibilityofalandinginthisarea. Therapidandunopposedadvancetothesouthby
theXIVCorps,theuncontestedseizureofPortSualandCabalitianBayandthefailure
onthepartofpatrolstoestablishcontactwithanyorganizedenemydefensivepositions
ontheArmyrightflankortothefrontoftheXIVCorps,corroboratedthepre-S-Day
estimatethattheenemyhadlefthimself"wideopen"inthisarea. Thelackofopposi-
tiontotheadvanceofthe6thDivisionhadnotbeenanticipatedbutwascapitalizedon
immediately,inaccordancewiththepre-S-DayinstructionsoftheArmyCommander,direc-
tingallunitstopushtotheArmyBeachheadLineasfastastheproblemsoflogistical
supportwouldpermit. Onlyinthezonesofactionofthe43dDivisionandthe158th
RCThadtheexpectedheavyenemyresistancebeenencountered. HeretheJapfought
fanaticallytoholdthesouthflankofhisDamortis-SanFernando(LaUnion)position
andpreventtheadvanceofourforcestoRosariowhichherightlyestimatedwouldseal
offhisforcesinthemountainstctheeast,reducehiscapabilityofcounterattacking
theSixthArmybeachesatSanFabianandMabilao,andfurther,wouldsecurethese
beachesagainsthislongrangeartilleryfire. Thenatureandbitternessoftheenemy
resistancetotheadvanceofthe43dDivisionand158thRCTfurtherconfirmedtheesti-
matethattheenemyhadorganizedhisdefensesagainstalandingintheDaoiortis-San
Fernandoarea,totheexclusionoftheLingayen-Dagupanarea. (Fordispositionsof
SixthArmyat24001,S/7,16January1945seeDiagram5).
3. S/8,17January1945-S/9,18January1945*
Duringtheperiod17January1945-18January1945**Corpsconcentrated
itseffortsontheseizureoftheUrdaneta-Binalonan-Pozorrubioroadnetandonthe
seizureofthehighgroundeastofthePozorrubio-RosarioRoadandnorthofthe
Rosario-DamortisRoad.
On17January1945"the6thDivisionsecuredUrdanetawithoutoppositionand
on18January1945reconnoiteredtotheUrdaneta-VillasisRoadtoapoint51yards
southofUrdanetawithoutenemycontact. Meanwhile,otherelementsofthedivisionse-
curedCabaruanTownanddispatchedpatrolstoreconnoitertheCabaruanHills*
The25thDivision(less35thInfantry),havingpassedtocontrolofICorps,
advancedeastandon18January1945securedBinalonan,sendingabattalionnorththere-
fromtowardPozorrubiotccontactthe43dDivision. The27thInfantry(25thDivision)
relievedthe20thInfantry(6thDivision)inUrdanetaon18January1945*
3y18January1945
t n e
43
d
DivisionhadsecuredPozorrubio,thehighground
2,000yardsnorthofPozorrubioand,advancingnorthward,hadoccupiedthetownofSison
onthePozorrubio-RosarioRoadagainstonlyscatteredenemyresistance. The172d
Infantry,meanwhile,wasmakingslowprogressinitsattacktosecurethehighground
northandnorthwestofRosariowhichdominatedtheexitintotheCentralPlain,viathe
KennonRoad,atHoaario. Enemyforcesresistedsuicidallyfromdug-incavepositions,
supportedbyheavycalibreartilleryfiringfrompositionsinthehillsnorthandeast
TheCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy,assumedcommandofhisforcesashoreat14301,
1?January1945.
T h e
^^ CommandPostwasestablishedjustinlandfromthebeachat
BonuanBoquig.
21
ofRosario. Resistanceofthistyperequiredcarefullyplannedmethodsofreduction.
Artilleryandmortarfire,whileeffectiveinforcingtheenemytoremaininhiscave
positions,couldnot,inthefinalanalysis,reducethesepositions. Infantryflame-
throwerdemolitionteams,supportedand.coveredbysmallarmsfireandautomaticweapons,
wererequiredtodothejob. Thismethodwasslowandsomewhatcostlybutprovedtobe
theonlyeffectivewaytotaketheground,which,inmostcases,couldnotbebypassed.
The158thInfantryandthe63dInfantry(43dDivision),meanwhile,hadmadecontact
alongtheDamortis-RosarioRoadatapointapproximatelymidwaybetweenRosarioand
Damortis. Batrolsfromthe158thInfantryhadreconnoiterednorthalongtheDamortis-
SanFernando(LaUnion)RoadasfarnorthasSanJulian(10,000yardsnorthnorthwest
ofDamortis)withoutenemycontact. Abattalionofthe169thInfantrycontinuedthe
reductionofbypassedenemypositionsonMtAlava,
By18January1945*CorpswasfirmlyestablishedalongtheArmyBeachhead
Lineinthatpartofitszoneofactionassignedtothe6thand25thDivisionsandhad
controlofthevitalUrdaneta-Binalonan-Bozorrubioroadnet. Thecorpswasnowin
apositionforfurtheradvancestotheeastandsoutheast. Alongtheleftwingofthe
corps,heavyfightingwasstillinprogressforthekeyterrainnorthofFozorrubioand
inthevicinityofRosario. TheArmyBeachheadcouldnotbeconsideredsecureuntil
thisterrainwastakenandtheenemyforcedtowithdrawintothemountains.
Duringtheperiod17January1945- l&January1945#XIVCorpsmadeunop-
posedcrossingsovertheAgnoRiveratWawaandBayambang,andpatrolledsouthtothe
b o t n t n e
lineCamiling-Raniquiwithoutenemycontact. On18January1945 4thand
37thDivisionsinitiatedmovementinforcetothesouth,intheirrespectivezonesof
action,tothelineCamiling--Raniqui,
c. General:
On18January1945SixthArmyoccupiedabeachheadextendingalongthe
coastofLingayenGulffromCabalitianBaytoDamortis,adistanceofapproximately40
milesandextendinginlandfor30milesatitsdeepestpoint. CrossingsoftheAgno
RiverintheXIVCorpszoneofactionhadbeenseizedandsecuredwithoutenemyopposi-
tion. ThekeyroadnetintheUrdaneta-Binalonan-Jbzorrubioareawasunderour
control. OntheICorpsnorthflankthe43dDivisionand158thRCTweregraduallyfor-
cingtheenemybackintothemountains. TheArmyBeachheadwasnotyetsecure,however,
astheenemystillhadthecapabilityoflaunchingastrongcounterattackagainstthe
ArmynorthflankfromthedirectionofSanFernando(LaUnion)orfromtheRosarioarea.
TheArmyfrontconsistedoffivedivisionsplusanRCTdistributedinanarcofapproxi-
mately75miles. Thecapabilityofcounterattackbyenemyarmorfromthedirectionof
SanManuelagainsttheleftflankoftheICorpscouldnotbediscountedasintelligence
reportsindicatedaconcentrationofenemyarmorinthetriangleformedbySanManuel-
Tayug-SanNicolas. (FordispositionsofSixthArmyonS/9,18January1945*see
Diagram6).
On17JanuarytheCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy,receivedaradiomessage
fromtheCommander-in-Chief,SWPA,emphasizingthenecessityforanearlyseizureof
theClarkAirCenter. SixthArmydidnothavesufficientforcesavailabletolaunch
ageneraloffensivetothesouthandsoutheastwithbothcorpswithoutseriously
jeopardizingitsoneandonlybaseofsupply;andtheLingayenGulfbasehadtobe
protectedatallcostuntilManilacouldbesecuredandreopenedasaport. Inviewof
thedangerousthreatpoisedatthisbasebythepresenceoftwoenemydivisionsandone
independentbrigadeonthenorthandnortheastflank,themaineffortofICorpswas
concentratedonthesecurityofthisflank. AdvancingICorpstothesoutheastin
strengthwoulddetractfromitsmaineffortandmateriallyincreasetheenemythreatto
ourbase;and,byover-extendingitslines,wouldmakethecorpsextremelyvulnerable
tocounterattackagainstitseastflankbyenemyforcesconcentratedintheSanItenuel-
Tayug-SanNicolastriangleorintheSanJose(Nuevacija)area. Anenemybreak-
throughineitheroftheseareaswouldbeextremelydangerous,especiallyinviewof
themeagerreserveavailable. Intelligencesourcesindicatedthepresenceofaconcen-
trationofenemyarmorintheSanManuel-Tayug-SanNicolastriangle,probably
elementsoftheJapanese2dArmoredDivision,andthepresenceofthebalanceofthe
2dArmoredDivisionandthebulkoftheJapanese10thInfantryDivisionintheSanJose
(NuevaEcija)area. Thuslocated,theseenemyforceswereaseriousmenacetotheArmy
leftflank,particularlysoshouldICorpsbecomeover-extended.
22
nfiaain
f
n) H a s
incitet h e l i ^ vf
f
' - *<**"*>Felipe,pushingreconnaissanceto
LL Netopia (exclusive)
)
- Guimba.
ba.
Thi
Thi
s
s
orde
orde
r
r
woul
woul
d
d
hav
hav
e
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th
th
e
e
effec
effec
t
t
o
o
f
f
t0th
*
S0Uthwhile
anTtheî^ 5 l r** ^ ^ chelcmingtheleftofXIVCorps
b t h 3 O u t h ofthe
?rom & nj!f rS ^ ! '
T
*5*>Mfep,tomeetanyenemyattackcoming
fromSan JoseorCabanatuan. r
hiswa3adecisionthatinvolved consid
^;
bie riskf
especiallysmce reinforcementsconsistingofthe 32dDivision,1stCavalryDivisionand
112thCavalryRCT couldnot beexpectedtoarriveuntil27January1945. However,as
latereventsproved,the decisionwas bothsoundand justifiable.
k. S/10,19January1945 -
s
/12,21January1945.
On19January1945ICorps,whilecontinuingreductionofenemypositionson
theArmyleftflank,initiatedadvancestothesoutheastand easttosecurethe objec-
tivessetforthinSixthArmyFieldOrder43. By21January1945,the6thand 25th
Divisionshadreachedthecorpsobjectivelineestablishedbythisfieldorder. Neither
divisionencounteredotherthanscatteredenemyresistanceinsecuringthisline.
The6th Divisiondevelopedapocketofenemyresistanceofapproximately
battalionstrengthintheCabaruanHillsand detailedabattalionfromthe 20thInfantry
toreduceit. Thisactionwasstillinprogresson21January1945* Divisionrecon-
naissancetothelineVictoria- Guimba,the MtBalungaoareaand toSan Leonresulted
inonlyminorcontacts.
The25thDivision,havingencounterednoenemyresistancetoits advanceto
thecorpsobjectivelineinitszoneofaction,had,by20January19451occupied
Asinganinforce. PatrolstoSantaMaria(eastoftheAgnoRiver)foundthe town
desertedandby21January1945
n
&dreconnoiteredtothe ArboredoRiverwithonlyminor
enemycontacts.
Meanwhile,the 43dDivisionwas makingslowprogressinits offensiveto
securethe highgroundeastoftheBozorrubio- RosarioRoadandnorthofthe Rosario-
DamortisRoad. The divisionbloodilyrepulsedseveralstrongenemycounterattacks
againstitslinesinthe vicinityofSison. Theseattackswereheavilysupportedby
artilleryfireandbyenemytankswhichhadapparentlybeentrappednorthofFozorrubio
bytheseizureofthe town. Throughoutthisperiod,thedivisionredisposedmen,sup-
pliesandequipmentinpreparationfor acoordinatedassaultto breakenemyresistance
initszoneofactionandseizethe dominatingterrain. Artillery,navalgunsand air-
craftkeptupacontinuouspoundingofenemypositions. By21January1945
Mt
Alava
hadbeensecuredandenemyforcesinthatareabrokenupintosmallisolatedpockets
whichcouldbemoppedupatleisure, (For dispositionsofICorpsonS/12,21January.
1945,seeDiagram 7 ) .
b. OperationsofXIV Corps:
HavingsecuredthelineCamiling- -Eaniquiwithoutoppositionon19January
1945
tlie
4
0 t nanci
37
t h
DivisionscontinuedsouthtowardthelineTarlac- Victoria.
Enemyforcesencounteredconsistedofisolatedgroupsofstragglerswho weremorebent
onwithdrawingtothesouththanonfightinganykindofadelayingaction.
Movingrapidlysouthward,the40thDivisionsecuredTarlacon21January
1945andbytheendofthatday,divisionreconnaissancepatrols,movingsouthfrom
TarlaconHighway3,reachedSan Miguel(7000yardssouthofTarlac). Duringthis ad-
vancetothesouth,the40thDivisionsecuredthe XIVCorpsrightflankwithscreening
patrolsoperatinginthefoothillsoftheZambalesMountainsfromAlaminostoTarlec.
Enemycontactswerescattered. Allindicationswerethatthe eneinyhadevacuatedthis
area.
23
By21January1945,the37thDivisionhadsecuredthelineTarlac(exclu-
sive)-Victoriainitszoneofaction,withoutenemyopposition,andhadsentpatrols
asfarsouthasLaPazonthecorpsboundarywithoutenemycontact. Theadvanceofthe
37thDivisiontothelineTarlac(exclusive)-Victoriahadtheeffectofpivotingthe
37thDivisiontotheeastwithadeepechelonmentofitsunitsontheXIVCorps'left
flank. (FordispositionsofXIVCorpsonS/12,21January1945.seeDiagram7).
c. General:
Thestagewasnowsetforarapidadvancetothesouthtoseizeandsecure
theClarkAirCenter. Accordingly,on21January1945.FieldOrder44wasissued. Phis
fieldorderdirectedXIVCorpstocontinuetheoffensivetocaptureClarkAirCenterand
directedICorps,whilecontinuingassignedmissions,tobeprepared,whenordered,to
advanceandseizethelineVictoria(exclusive)-Guimba. Itwasfeltthatageneral
advancetothesouthandsoutheastbyICorpscouldnottakeplaceuntilthearrivalof
thetworeinforcingdivisions,the1stCavalryDivisionandthe32dDivision,on27Janu-
ary1945,withoutseriouslyexposingtheArmyleftflanktoenemycounter-offensiveopertj
tionsfromtheSanJose(NuevaEcija)area. HencetheprovisionintheArmyfieldorder
thatICorpswastoadvancetothelineVictoria(exclusive)GuimbaonlyonArmyorder.
5. S/13,22January1945-S/17,26January1545.
a. OperationsofXIVCorps:
IncompliancewiththeprovisionsofSixthArmyFieldOrder44.XIVCorps
completedpreparationson22January1945f
ra n
advancetothesouthtoseizeandsecure
theClarkAirCenter. 40thDivisionpatrolstopoints10to12milessouthcfTarlac
failedtomakeenemycontact. Patrolsfromthe37thDivisionreachedConcepcion(10
milessoutheastofTarlac)andZaragozaU3mileseastsoutheastofTarlac)without
enemycontact.
Owingtothevulnerabilityofitsleftflank,XIVCorpsdeterminedto
advanceaggressivelyonClarkAirCenterwithitsrightdivision,the4th,while
echeloningthe37thDivisiontotheleftrearwithareconnaissancescreenoperatingin
thedirectionofZaragozaandCabanatuan, ArrangementsweremadewithICorpsforlong
rangepatrolsfromthe37thDivisiontooperateasfareastasCabanatuanandsouthof
thelineVictoria-GuimbaintheICorpszoneofaction.
On23January1945the4thDivisionmovedsouthfromTarlacastrideHighway
3withtworegimentsabreast,thel6othInfantryontheright,the108thInfantryonthe
left. Noenemyresistancedevelopeduntilthel60thInfantryreachedBamban.. Onthe
northernoutskirtsofthistown,theregimentcameunderthefireofenemyartilleryand
begantoencounterresistancefromenemyforcesindug-inpositionswithinthetown. By
theendoftheday,23January1945.thel6othInfantrywasengagedinaheavyfire
fightforcontrolofBamban. Meanwhile,theDivisionReconnaissanceTroophadcrossed
theBambanRiverandhadreachedMabalacatAirfieldNo.2,themostnortheasterlyofthe
stripscomprisingtheClarkAirCenter. Astheenemy'sdispositionsweredeveloped,it
becameevidentthathehadorganizedthehighground,foothillsoftheZambalesi/buntains,
tothewestandsouthwestofBamban,inanapparentefforttodenyourforcestheuseof
Highway3anîmpedeouradvanceontheClarkAirCenter, AftersecuringBambanon25
January1945the4thDivisionturnedwestandsouthwestandlaunchedanattackagainst
theenemypositionsonthehighground,tothewestofHighway3,whichdominatesthe
highwaybridgeacrosstheBambanRiver. Enemyresistancewasfanaticalandsuicidal.
Cavepositionswereheldtothelastman,whichnecessitatedtheusualmethodicalreduc-
tion. Theenemyhademplacedantiaircraftguns,apparentlydisplacedfromtheClarkAir
Center,inthesehillpositions. Whilenothinglikemassedfireswereemployed,this
groundfirebyantiaircraftgunsmadethetakingofthesehillpositionsmorecostly.
Captureddocumentsandprisonerofwarreportslaterconfirmedearlierindicationsthat
theenemyforcesdefendingthisareaconsistedofservice,basedefense,andantiaircraft
unitswhichhadbeenstationedattheClarkAirCenter. By26January1945,the40th
Divisionhadsecuredthehighgroundrunningfromapoint4000yardsnorthwestofBamban
toapoint5000yardssouthwestofBamban,thusclearingHighway3fortrafficsouthof'
theBambanRiver. Divisionpatrolsoperatingonthecorpsrightflankhadreconnoitered
southfromAlaminostoDasolBay,onthewestcoastofZambalesProvince,withoutenemy
contact.
24
DrivingsviftlydownthecentralLuzonplain,the40thDivisionencountered
itsfirstmajorresistanceintheroughterrainsouthwestofBam'ba.nandhad
torelyheavilyonartilleryto"blasttheenemyoutofhisfortifiedpositions
ffleantin
lineSanRaflel
f
.\
n
.
h
*dconsolidatedpositionsalongthe
^
P a t r
l sSCreenedtheXIVCoT
^
leftf l a
<*^ aTineVictoria" i S a 'S of
^
P Q t r
l s
Lbanituan Z ?h" f \,^ "
re
^nnoiteredallroutesleadingoutof
r t h w e s t
activities!LinV t f
and n
fore a
^y detectionofenemycounterOffensive
flSnk Th6SePatrolsmade onl
* llcts Bv1)Tll \t^\l
eft
- scatteredenemycon-
%5 t h e rd i v i s i o n
River*int h f ^ T * P
at
lstadreconnoiteredsouthtothVBamban
n a n d n 25 J a n U a r y 1 9
^ northbankoft L L\
ZOn
f,.
Of a C U
thedivisionadvancedtothe
1 V e r W i t h
U t
lvI ^ H ^ K fn!ur^*
ban eneffly
opposition. On26January1945.concurrent-
lywiththe40thDivision'sattackagainstenemypositionsonthehighgroundwestand
southwestofBamban,the37thDivisioncrossedtheBambanRiverinforceandadvanced
southtowardAngelesandtheeasternsectionoftheClarkAirCenter,encounteringonly
scatteredenemyresistance. Bythecloseoftheday,thisdivision,withtworegiments
abreast,the145thInfantryontherightandthe148thInfantryontheleft,hadoccu-
piedalineCulayo-SanJose-point,2,000yardssouthofMagalang. Areinforced
battalion,dispatchedtoseizeandsecureAngeles,hadreachedMabiga(6,500yards
northofAngeles)withoutopposition.
AnearlycapturebyXIVCorpsoftheClarkAirCenterwasnowimminent.
Thelackofenemyoppositiontotheadvanceofelementsofthe37thDivisionsouthto-
wardAngelesgaveindicationofanenemyweaknessinthisareawhichmightbeexploited
inarapiddashtothePaaipangaRiver,thestrongestnaturaldefensivebarrierremain-
ingnorthofManila.
b. OperationsofICorps:
Duringtheperiod22January1945through26January1945,ICorpscontinued
toscreenthelineVictoria-Guimba,initiatedoffensiveoperationstodestroyhostile
forcesinSanManuel,preparatorytocrossingtheAgnoRivertotheeast,andcontinued
offensiveoperationstosecuretheleftflankoftheArmyBeachheadinthevicinityof
Ro3srio.
WhilescreeningthelineVictoria-GuimbaandreconnoiteringtheMtBalun-
gaoarea,the6thDivisionconductedoperationstoreduceenemyresistanceinthe
CabaruanHills. Anenemyforceofestimatedbattalionstrengthhadbeenisolatedin
thisareabytherapidsouthwardadvanceofourforces. By26January1945
a
bat-
talionfromthe1stInfantry(6thDivision)hadcorneredtheremainingenemyforcesin
thehillswestofCabaruanTown. Anadditionalbattalionfromthe1stInfantrywas
movedupasreinforcementandplanswerecompletedforacoordinatedattackagainst
theseenemypositionson27January1945
ThoroughreconnaissanceoftheSanifenuelareaby25thDivisionpatrolson
22January1945and23January1945revealedthatanenemyforceofconsiderablestrength
hadorganizedthetownfordefense. On24January1945thedivisionlaunchedanattack
onSanifenuelemployingthel6lstInfantrysupportedbyheavyartilleryfireandair
bombardment. Here,aselsewhere,theenemyresistedfanaticallyfrompillboxesanddug-
inpositionsunderbuildings,supportedbyfirefromtankshulleddownaspillboxesand
anti-tankgunsplacedatstrategicstreetintersectionsthroughoutthetown. On24Janu-
ary1945
a n d 2
5January1945ourforcesenteredthetownseveraltimes,buteachtime
wereforcedtowithdrawinthefaceofintenseenemyfire. Theenemyhavingresisted
allitsattemptstotakethetownbyfrontalassault,the25thDivisionmadeplansto
outflankthetownbyseizingthehighgrounddominatingitonthenorth. Accordingly,
on26January1945,
o n e
battalionmovednorthandseizedthishighground,annihilating
anenemycompanyattemptingtodefendit. Meanwhile,divisionreconnaissanceelements
operatingfromthelineBactad-Asinganhadpatrolledtotheeastandsoutheast,reach-
ingapoint2500yardssoutheastofSanQuintinon25January1945withoutenemycontact.
Indicationswerethattheenemyhadcommittedatankregimentofthe2dArmoredDivision
toanisolated,suicidaldefenseofSanManuel. The25thDivisioncontinuedwithplans
forafinalassaultonthistown.
Inthemeantime,theenemycontinuedtoresistallattemptsbythe43dDivi-
sion,reinforcedbythe158thRCTandthe63dRCT(6thDivision),tosecurethehigh
groundeastoftheftozorrubio-RosarioRoadandnorthoftheRosario-DamortisRoad.
By24January1945,thedivisionhadsecuredportionsofthecommandingterrain7000
yardsnorthofitozorrubioandthehighgroundjustnorthwestofRosario. On25January
1945afterapreliminaryairbombardmentandartillerypreparation,thedivisionlaunched
acoordinatedattackallalongitsfronttocapturethehighgroundextendingfroma
25
point7,500yardsnorthofPozorrubiotoapoint2,000yardsnortheastofRosario. The
powerandweightofourartilleryandairbombardmentcombinedwiththepressureexerted
byfiveregimentsofinfantrycompletelysmothertheenemydefensesand,bytheevening
of26January1945,thedivisionhadsecuredallitsobjectiveswiththeexceptionofthe
highground4,000yardssoutheastofRosariowhichdominatedthepointwheretheKennon
(Rosario-Baguio)Roadenteredthemountains. The63dInfantry(6thDivision),attached
tothe43dDivision,hadreachedthewestslopesofthishillanditscapturewasimmi-
nent. (ForICorpsdispositionsonS/17,26January1945*
s e e
Diagram8).
c. General*
By26January1945*it
w
aspossibletoforeseetheimminentseizurebyXIV
CorpsoftheClarkAirCenterandthecapturebyICorpsofthecommandingterrainin
theRosarioareawhichwouldcompletethesecuringoftheArmyBeachheadandassurethe
safetyoftheArmy'sBase. Inviewofthis,andinanticipationofthearrivalinthe
LingayenGulfareaon27January1945
o f
thefirsttworeinforcingdivisions,the32d
Divisionandthe1stCavalryDivision,reinforcedbythe112thCavalryRegimentalCombat
Team;andinfurtheranticipationofthescheduledassaultlandingbyXICorps(opera-
tingundercontrolofEighthArmy)intheSanAntonioarea,justnorthofSubic*&y
o n
29January1945,HeadquartersSixthArmyissuedFieldOrder45. Thisfieldorderdirec-
tedXIVCorpstoadvancesouthwardandsecurethecrossingscfthePampangaRiverat
CalumpitandICorps,whilecontinuingassignedmissions,toadvancevigorouslytothe
southeastandsecurethelineLicab-Talavera-Munoz-Lupao. iliisorderfurther
directedthe1stCavalryDivision,reinforcedbythe112thRCT,tolandonbeachesin
theMabilaoareaofLingayenGulfandassembleinSixthArmyReserve,initiallyinthe
Urdanetaarea,preparedforimmediatemovementtoGuimba,andthe32dDivision,rein-
forced,tolandonbeachesintheMabilaoareaofLingayenGulfandassembleinthe
Manaoag-SanVicente-Mapandanareawherethedivision(lessoneinfantryregiment,
inSixthArmyReserve)wastopasstocontroloftheCommandingGeneral,ICorps. The
35thInfantry(25thDivision)wasreleasedfromSixthArmyReservetocontrolofI
Corps. The13thArmoredGroupwasdirectedtoassemblethe44thTankBattalion(less
CompanyC,alreadyattachedtothe6thDivision)intheGuimbaarea.
ItwasanticipatedthattheimminentseizureoftheClarkAirCenterwould
makeitpossibleforXIVCorpstoreleasethebulkofoneofitsdivisionsforanadvance
southwardonHighway3towardthePampangaRiverandAflanila. Theattachmentofthe32d
DivisiontoICorpswouldenableittomakeageneraladvancetothesoutheastinthe
CentralPlainwhilestillcontinuingtoattackwithitsleftwing. Theconcentrationof
the1stCavalryDivision,reinforcedbythe112thRCT,intheGuimbaarea,togetherwith
the44thTankBattalion(lessonemediumtankcompany),wouldplaceastrongmobilestrik-
ingforceinpositionforadriveonManila. (FordispositionsofSixthArmyonS/17,
26January1945seeDiagram8.)
6. S/18,27January1945-S/19,28January1945:
On27January1945and28January1945the40thDivisioncarriedoutoffen-
siveoperationstoreduceenemypositionsonthehighgroundwestandsouthwestofBamban.
Bythecloseoftheday,28January1945thedivisionhadreachedpositionsshownin
Diagram9
Meanwhile,the37thDivision,havingsecuredAngeles,turnedwestandadvanced
towardFortStotsenburgagainstheavyfirefromenemyantiaircraftartillery. Although
slowedbythenecessityforclearinglargeminefieldscoveringthearea,thedivision
occupiedtheClarkAirCenteron28January1945andbythecloseofthedayhadadvanced
westtothebarracksareaofFortStotsenburg, Otherelementsofthedivisionadvanced
southfromAngelesonHighway3toSanFernando(Pampanga),seizingthebridgeacrossthe
SanFernandoRiverintactanddispatchingpatrolstothesoutheasttowardCalumpit.
EnemyresistancetoouradvancesouthfromAngeleswasscatteredandsporadic. (For
dispositionsofXIVCorpsonS/19,28January1945,seeDiagram9.)
At12001,on23January1945theSixthArmyCommandPostclosedatBonuanBoquig
andopenedatCalasiao.
26
Usingthecombinedforcesofair,artilleryandsmallarmsfire,the
37thDivisiontooklittletimeinseizingtheClarkAirCenterand
drivingtheremainingJapanesewestintothehills,
Advanceelementsofthe129thInf
approachClarkField.
Newsphotographers moveforwardtoget
close-upshotsoftheartillerypreparation
onenemy heldFortStotsenburg.
Themuch-dreadedartilleryobserverflies
overhead tomorepreciselyadjusthisfire
poweronenemypositionsnearFort Stotsenburg,
IncompliancewiththeprovisionsofSixthArmyFieldOrderAS 1Cores
**T**
t0thaS
U t h
nne^ T ^ v e r ^ *^ e a ^ ' t oselzfandsT/urethe
L U P 8
ManuelandI n t h l Z l% " '
3iraulta
ôuslypressingoperationsagainstSan
n theC
r p SnOrthflank On28J
**y \ T ^ ^ 1945the6th
mov.dInffh +*?organizedenemyresistanceintheCabaruanHillson2?January
.movedsoutheasttoseizethelineLicab-Talavera-Munoz. Bytheendofthe
n i e d
f n d h ^ n ^ h ^ ~
th
*lineV
ict
oria(exclusive)-Guimbawithoutopposition
andhadpushedreconnaissancepatrolstoLicabwithoutenemycontact.
D i v i s i o n
T ,nr ^ meanwhile,presseditsattackagainstSanManuelon
January1945andcompletedpreparationsforanattacktothesoutheasttoseizethe
lineUinoz(exclusive)-Lupao. On28January1945afterapulverizingairandartil-
lerybombardment,thel6lstInfantrylaunchedafinalassaultonSanManuelandsecured
thetownbytheendoftheday. DuringthecourseofthisbattleforSanManuelthe
enemyhadsacrificedthegreaterpartofonetankregimentinavainattempttodeny
ustheuseoftheroadnetemanatingtherefrom. Histotaltanklossesinthisaction
were41mediumandfourlighttanks. ThebattleofSanManuelsetthepatternforthe
repeatedpiecemealcommitmentofenemyarmorthroughouttheLuzonCampaign,ultimately
resultinginthecompletedestructionoftheJapanese2dArmoredDivisionasafighting
force. SimultaneouslywiththefinalassaultonSanManuel,the27thInfantry(25th
Division)advancedtothesoutheasttowardthelineMunoz-Lupao. Bythecloseofthe
day,28January1945.thisregimenthadsecuredthelineSanLeon-San<&intinwithout
enemyopposition.
Meanwhile,by28January19a5the43dDivisionhadcompletedtheseizure
andconsolidationofthehighgroundeastofthePozorrubio-RosarioRoadandnorthof
theRosario-DamortisRoad. TheArmyBeachheadwasnowsecure. (Fordispositionsof
ICorpsenS/19,28January19451seeDiagram9.)
c. Reinforcingdivisions:
On27January1945the1stCavalryDivision,reinforcedbythe112thRCT,
andthe32dDivisioncommencedlandingonbeachesintheMabilaoareaofLingayenGulf.
The1stCavalryDivision,reinforced,concentratedinitiallyintheUrdanetaarea. On
28January1945thedivisioninitiatedmovementtoGuimbainaccordancewithSixthArmy
FieldOrder45 Meanwhile,the32dDivisionconcentratedintheManaoag-SanVicente-
Mapandanareawherethedivision(lessoneinfantryregiment,inSixthArmyReserve)
passedtocontrolofICorps.
Inaperiodof19days.SixthArmy,effectivelysupportedbyAlliedNaval
andAirForces,hadmadeasuccessfulmajorassaultlandingontheshoresofLingayen
Gulf,Luzon,hadthenseizedandsecuredabeachheadandestablishedanArmyBase,
crossedtheAgnoRiverand,inarapidadvancetothesouth,hadgainedpossessionof
theClarkAirCenter,oneofthestrategicobjectivesoftheLuzonCampaign. The
enemy'sresistancetotheadvancedowntheCentralPlainhadbeennegligible. The
landingintheLingayen-SanFabianareaofLingayenGulfhadoutflankedmanystrong
enemydefensivepositions. OnlyontheArmyleftflank,inthezoneofactionofthe
43dDivision,hadtheenemymadeacoordinateddefense. Hisresistancetotheadvance
ofthe25thDivisionintheSanManuelarea, whilefanaticalandsuicidal,had,inthe
finalanalysis,onlyamountedtoapiecemealcommitmentofaportionofhis2dArmored
Divisiontothehopelessdefenseofanisolatedarea.
Althoughtheenemyhadlaunchedseveralpiecemealcounterattacksemploying
smallunitssupportedbytanks,thesizeoftheseforceshadneverexceededacompanyof
infantrysupportedbyatankplatoon. Atnotimehadtheenemylaunchedageneralcoun-
terattackalonghisentirefront. Theseizurebythe43dDivisionofthehighground
eastofthePozorrubio-RosarioRoadandnorthoftheRosario-DamortisRoad,sealed
uptheenemy's19thand23dDivisionsand58th1MBinthemountainsandsecuredtheArmy
BeachheadandBaseagainstthethreatoflargescalecounterattackfromthenorth.
Duringthefirst19dayaoftheLuzonCampaigntheenemylost10,014counted
deadand126captured. Itisbelievedthatmanyotherswerekilledandwoundedbylong
rangeartilleryfireandairbombardment. SixthArmypersonnellossesforthissame
27
periodwere1,017killed,3,040woundedand197missing. Ofthese,ICorpslost 827
killed,2,675woundedand91missing*whileXIVCorpslost102killed,299woundedand
55missing. ThebalancewereArmyTroops.
Withthearrivalofthe1stCavalryand32dDivisionsand the112th Cavalry
RCT,andthesecuringoftheArmyBeachheadandClarkAirCenter,SixthArmy couldcon-
centrateitsmaximumeffort onthenextphaseofthecampaign,thecaptureofManila.
28
RuggedhillcountryintheDamortis-Rosarioareahampered,operationandsincethe
heldmostofthecommandingridges,ourtroopswereoftenexposedtoharrassingartilleryfire
enemy
ilawhileattackingenemyforcesinthemountainswestofClarkAirCen
terandcontinuingthedrivetosealoffenemyforcesinthemountains
northandnortheastoftheCentralLuzonPlain;assaultlanding
byXICorps(underEighthArmycontrol)atSanAntonio
(ZambalesProvince)preparatorytopassingto
SixthArmycontrol;assaultlandingby
11thAirborneDivision(under
EighthArmycontrol)at
Nasugbu(Batangas
Province),
1. S/20,29JanuaryI945-S/21,30January1945.
Duringtheperiod29-30January1945,XIVCorpscontinuedoperationsto
reduceenemyresistancewestandsouthwestofBambanandtosecureFortStotsenburg,
whilecompletingpreparationsforthecomingdriveonManila. The40thDivisionmade
slowprogressinitsattacktccleartheenemyfromthehighgroundwestandsouthwest
ofBamban. Resistanceonthepartofenemysuicidedetachmentswasstubbornandbitter.
Asartillerycouldnotdislodgetheenemyfromhiscavepositions,demolitionsquads,
coveredandsupportedbysmallarmsandmachinegunfire,hadtocleanoutorseal
eachcaveindividually,employingflamethrowers,whitephosphoroussmokegrenades,
thermitegrenadesanddemolitioncharges.
InitsattacktosecureFortStotsenburg,the37thDivisionfoundland
minesandartilleryfirethemainobstacletoitsadvance. On29January1945thedivi-
sioncleared200landminesfromtheFortStotsenburgarea. Enemyartillery(largely
AA)firedbetween600and1000roundsondivisionpositionsonthisday. By24001,
30January1945however,thedivisionhadsecuredmostofFortStotsenburg. Enemy
forceswithdrewtothewestendofthefortareaandtoTopoftheWorldHill,just
westofSapangbato. Meanwhile,divisionpatrolscrossedtheSanFernandoRiveratSan
Fernando(Fampanga)andreconnoiteredsouthtothePampangaRiverbridgesiteatCalum-
pit,developingnoorganizedenemydefensesnormajortroopconcentrations. Boththe
highwaybridgeandtherailwaybridgeatCalumpithadbeenpreviouslydestroyedbyour
airforceaspartofthepre-S-Dayplantointerruptenemytroopmovementsanddisrupt
communications. (ForXIVCorpsdispositionsonS/21,30January1945tseeDiagram10.)
On29-30January1945*Corps,whilecontinuingtomopupintheRoaario
areawithitsleft,advanceditsrightrapidlytowardthecorpsobjectiveline,Licab -
Talavera-Munoz-Lupao. At24001,30January1945,the6thDivisionreachedTalavera
andadvancedtoapoint1000yardssouthwestofMunozagainstscatteredenemyresistance.
PatrolsweredispatchedtoreconnoiterMunoz. TheDivisionReconnaissanceTroopoccupied
Licabwithoutopposition.
Meanwhile,advancingeastandsoutheasttowardthelineMunoz(exclusive)-
Lupao,the25thDivisionencounteredenemyoppositionsouthwestofUningan. By24001,
30January1945,thedivisionhadadvancedtoalineextendingfromapoint3500yards
southsouthwestofUmingantoapoint2500yardswestofUminganagainstincreasingenemy
resistance.
The32dDivision(less12othInfantry,inSixthArmyReserve)passedto
controlofICorpson30January1945andwascommittedontheleftflankofthe2|th
Division. By24001,onthatdate,thedivisionhadrelievedthe161stInfantry(25th
Division)inSanManuel. DivisionpatrolsenteredTayug.findingthetowndesertedwith
manyunoccupieddefensiveinstallationsinandaroundit.
The43dDivisionconductedmopping-upoperationstoelfcninateenemyremnants
iS-si-XT #2J7^&
Diagram10.)
29
c. OperationsofXICorps:
On29January1945XICorps,underEighthArmycontrol,madeanassault
landingonbeachesintheSanAntonio-SanNarciscoareaofZambalesProvinceonthe
westcoastofLuzon. Thecorpsconsistedofthe38thInfantryDivision,the34thInfan-
tryRCT(24thDivision)andothercombatandserviceelements. Themissionsofthecorps
weretoland,seizeandsecureSanMarcelinoairstripandsuchareasaswouldpermitthe
constructionofairfacilitiesforsupportofoperations;toopenSubicBaytoAllied
shipping;toestablishportfacilitiesatOlongapo;andtobepreparedtoadvance,when
directed,eastonHighway7toDinalupihantoblockthewithdrawalofenemyforcesinto
Bataan. ThecorpswastopasstoSixthArmycontrolassoonaspracticableafterland-
ing.
On30January1945controlofXICorpspassedfromEighthArraytoSixthArray.
Onthatday,the38thDivision,reinforced,securedtheSanMarcelinoairdromearea
againstonlylightoppositionand,turningsouth,capturedSubicTownandOlongapo. One
battalionfromthe151stInfantrylandedonGrandeIslandin-ûbicBay,findingitunoc-
cupied. (FordispositionsofXICorpsonS/21,30January,19451seeDiagram10.)
d. 1stCavalryDivision;
By24001,30January1945,
tn
majorportionofthe1stCavalryDivisionhad
completedconcentrationatGuimba*
n
preparationfortheadvancetoManila. (SeeDiagram
10).
e. Rescuebythe6thRangers(Seediagram11).
On27January1945HeadquartersSixthArmyreceivedareportfromFilipino
guerrillasthatbetween300and50AmericanprisonersofwarwerebeingheldinaJapa-
nesestockadeatPangatian,justeastofCabanatuan. Whilethisprisoncampwaslocated
approximately25milesinsideenemylines(themostadvancedelementsofthe6thDivision
hadreachedGuimba),theguerrillareportindicatedthattheprisonersofwarwereguard-
edbyonlyasmallenemygarrison.
Accordingly,theArmyCommanderdeterminedtotakeimmediateactiontorescue
theseprisonersofwar. Intelligencereportsindicatedthatlargeenemyforceswere
evacuatingtothenorthalongHighway5throughCabanatuanandBaloctoSanJose(Nueva
Ecija)andalongtheroadrunningeastfromCabanatuanthroughCabutoRizal. Any
rescueattemptmust,ofnecessity,beprecededbyadetailedgroundreconnaissance.
Assignedthismissionofgroundreconnaissance,anAlamoScoutgroupofthreeofficers
and10mendepartedfromGuimbaontheeveningof2?January1945*
LieutenantColonelHenryA.Mucci,theCommandingOfficer,6thRanger
InfantryBattalion,wasdirectedtofurnishonecompany,reinforcedtoperformtheres-
cuemission. At14001,28January1945*CompanyC,6thRangerInfantryBattalion(with
2dPlatoon,CompanyF,attached)*aforceoffiveofficersand115men,movedsouthfrom
GuimbaunderthepersonalcommandofLieutenantColonelMucci,
Travellingacrosscountry,theRangersreachedarendezvousareaatBalin-
carinat04001,29January1945*
H
retheforcemettheAlamoScoutpartywhichhadnot
yetbeenabletoobtaincompleteinformationonenemydispositionsandstrengthinthe
stockadearea. Inviewofthisandinconsiderationofaguerrillareportthatalarge
numberofJapanesetransientswasspendingthenightinthevicinityoff&ngatian,the
Rangersdecidedtopostponetherescueattemptfromthenightof29January1945tothe
nightof30January1945.
Onthemorningof30JanuaryI945oneofficerandoneenlistedmanfromthe
AlamoScoutparty,guidedbyguerrillas,madeafinalreconnaissanceofthestockade
area. ThisreconnaissancerevealedthattheJapanesegarrisonofthecampconsistedof
73officersandmen. Inadditiontothese,150enemytransienttroopshadmovedinto
thestockadetorestfortheday. Aconcentrationofapproximately800Japanesewith
tanksandtruckswasatCabu,twomilesnortheastoftheprisoncamp. TheAlamoScout
teamalsoreturnedwithcompletedetailedinformationastothelocationoftheAmerican
andAlliedprisonersofwarwithinthestockade,thesizeofthestockade,thelocation
ofallsentryposts,thetimesofreliefofsentriesandthelocationandnatureofthe
enemydefenses.
30
Executingacarefullydevelopedplan,aforce,
composedofmembersofthe6thHangerInfantryBattalion
assistedbytheAlamoScoutsandFilipinoGuerrillas,
madeadaring25mileinfiltrationofenemylinestoliberate512allied
prisonersofwarfromtheJapaneseprisoncampnearCabanatuan.
surprisemu.tM'St^rS*
1 1
**^5***
f
r
*"*
mi3si0Dt0be 3u
"
S
ful.complete
of!h i? planaswellasonhisownindividualtask. The
ofabsolutesurprisewasstressed.
?
u e r r i l l a s
< *n reportedaconcentrationofapproximately7.000Japanesetran-
sientsatCabanatuan. SincetheJapanesenormallymovedatnighttoavoiddetectionby
Alliedaircraft,itwasanticipatedthatthisenemyforcewouldundoubtedlycommence
movementtotheeastundercoverofdarknessthatnight. Thecommandingofficerofthe
Rangersdecidedtomaketheattackonthestockadeearlyintheeveningof30January
1945toavoidinterferencebytheseenemytroopsproceedingfromCabanatuan. Atthe
requestoftheRangercommander.ArmyHeadquartersmadearrangementsforanightrecon-
naissanceplanetocovertherouteofwithdrawalwiththemissionofattackingtrucks
andtanksonly. This,itwashoped,wouldretardanarmoredormotorizedpursuitof
theRangerforceasitwithdrew. Toprotecttheflanksofthewithdrawal,twoforcesof
80guerrillaseach,reinforcedbybazookateamsprovidedbytheRangers,weretoestab-
lishroadblocksonthehighwaytotheeastandwestrespectivelyoftheprisoncampto
preventinterferencebyenemytroopsorarmorfromthedirectionofCabanatuanorCabu.
Duringtheday,therescueforcemovedtoPlateros(twomilesnorthof
Bangatian). At17001,30January1945,theforceleftPlaterosproceedingtoafinal
asseoiblyarea700yardsnorthofthestockade. ByI925I,allunitswereintheiras-
signedpositions,readyfortheassault. At19451,the2dPlatoon,CompanyF,opened
fireandtheattackbegan. By20151.theentireenemygarrison,includingthe150
transients,hadbeenannihilatedandtheprisonersofwarhadbeenreleased. Withthe
guerrillascoveringtheirflanksandrear,theRangersimmediatelybegantowithdraw
towardPlateros.
AsthetailofthecolumnclearedthePampangaRiver,anestimated800Japa-
nesesoldiers,apparentlyalertedbythefiringatPangatian,approachedtheguerrilla
roadblockatthebridgewhichthewithdrawingcolumnhadjustcrossed. Theguerrillas
guardingthebridgeallowedtheleadingJapanesetroopstocomewithin15yardsandthen
openedupwithBAR's,submachinegunsandrifles,killingorwoundinganestimated3
Japanese. Theremainderwerethrownintoutterdisorder. Japanesetanksthathadfol-
lowedthecolumnapproachedthebridgeandopenedfire,butdidnotcross. Anhour
latertheguerrillasbrokecontact,withdrawingundercoverofdarkness. Inthisaction
theguerrillacasualtieswereninewounded.
Meanwhile,theRangercolumn,with100litterpatients(transportedin
carabaocarts)and412liberatedmenabletowalk,continuedtowithdrawtothenorth.
At08001,31January1945,thecolumnreachedSibulwhereitwasmetbyambulancesand
truckswhichevacuatedthe512liberatedmentoGuimba,wherehospitalfacilitieshad
beenestablishedtocareforthemen.
WiththearrivaloftherescuedprisonersofwaratGuimba,theoperation
wascomplete. Bytheexerciseofextremedaring,carefulpriorreconnaissanceandde-
tailedplanning,coupledwithamaximumofsurprise,theRangershadaccomplishedtheir
missionwithalossoftwokilledandonewounded. TheJapanesecasualtiesintheprison
campalone(notincludingthoseinflictedonthembytheguerrillasintheactionatthe
bridge)wereover200.
f. General:
By30January1945theconcentrationofthe1stCavalryDivisionatGuimba
wasnearlycompletedandthe32dDivisionwasintheprocessofbeingcommittedinthe
zoneofactionofICorps. Inviewofthisandinanticipationofthereductionofenemy
resistanceintheFortStotsenburgareatoadegreewhichwouldpermittheearlyrelease
ofonedivisionfromthatareatoformtherightprongofatwo-prongedadvanceon
Manila,SixthArmyFieldOrder4^wasissuedon30January1945.Thisfieldorder
directedXICorpstoadvancevigorouslyeastwardandestablishandmaintaincontactwith
XIVCorpsalongthelineHermosa-Dinalupihan;XIVCorps,nowreinforcedbythe1st
CavalryDivision,withthe44thTankBattalion(lessCompanyC)attached,wasdirected
tocontinue,toadvanceaggressivelysouthward,movingwithitslefton1February1945.
securecrossingsoftheFampangaRiverwithinthecorpszoneofaction,securetheline
Malolos-SibulSprings-Cabanatuan,andbepreparedtocontinuetheadvancetocapture
31
Manila. ThisfieldorderfurtherdirectedICorpstcattackvigorouslytothesoutheast
on1February1945,captureSanJose,and,continuingtheadvance,securethelineCabana-
tuan-Bongabon-Rizal(MuevaEcija).
TheadvanceofXICorpstothelineDinalupihan-Herirosawouldisolate
Bataanandpreventanylargescaleenemywithdrawalthereto. Theanticipatedearlycol-
lapseofenemyresistancewithinFortStotsenburgproperwouldpermitXIVCorpstoshift
onedivisionfromthatareaforthedriveonManilawhileemployingonedivisiontopro-
tectthecorpsrightflankandcontinuetcattackenemyforcesinthehillswestand
northwestofFortStotsenburg. The1stCavalryDivisionwastobeorganizedintoa
flyingcolumntomakethemaineffortontheXIVCorpsleft. Thisfast,motorizedstrik-
ingforcewastobereinforcedbyatankbattalionlessonemediumtankcompany. P-40's
weretobeonairalertoneachflankofthecolumntoforestallanyenemyattemptto
strikethecolumnfromtheflank. NineSBD'sweretobeoncontinuousairalertduring
daylighthoursforclosesupportmissions,whileasquadronofA-20'swastobeheldon
continuousgroundalert. Throughemploymentofthismobilestrikingforceitwashoped
tocatchtheenemyoffbalanceandseizeManilaintactwithaminimumofdamagetothe
city.
TheseizureofSanJosebyICorpswoulddenyenemyforcesinnorthernLuzon
accesstotheCentralPlainandwouldremovethelastremainingthreatoflargescale
enemycounterattackagainsttheArmyleftflank.
XIVCorpswasnotgivenacompletelyfreehandforanuncheckedadvanceon
Manila. IndicationswerethattheenemyhadalargeconcentrationoftroopsintheIpo-
MontalbanareaeastofManila. Toorapidanadvancetothesouthmightseriouslyover-
extendthiscorps,makingitvulnerabletoacounterattackfromthisdirection. Bythe
sametoken,thesecurityoftheXIVCorpsleftflankfromcounterattackbystrongele-
mentsoftheJapanese10thInfantryDivisionand2dArmoredDivision,thoughttobe
concentratedintheSanJose(NuevaEcija)area,requiredthatICorpsbeinaposition
tocountersuchanenemythrustbeforeXIVCorpscouldadvancetoManilaunchecked.
s
2. S/22,31January1945- /
2
4.2February1945*
a. OperationsofXIVCorps:.
On31January1945XIVCorpscompletedpreparationstocarryoutthemissions
assignedbySixthArmyFieldOrder4&. The37thDivisionsecuredFortStotsenburgon
thatday,havingdrivenenemyforceswestfromtheforttopositionsrunningnorthfrom
TopoftheWorldHill. Thisactionpermittedthecorpscoifjmandertodisengageallbut
oneRCTofthe37thDivisionandregroupthedivisionforanadvanceinforcetothesouth,
alongtheaxisofHighway3toseizecrossingsofthePampangaandAngatRiversatCalum-
pitandPlaridel.respectively,andtoseizeandsecureMalolos. The40thDivision,rein-
forcedbyoneRCTfromthe37thDivision,relievedthe37thDivisionofresponsibility
foroperationsintheFortStotsenburgarea. Meanwhile,the1stCavalryDivision,rein-
forcedbythe44thTankBattalion(lessCompany C),on31January1945completedconcen-
trationatGuimbainpreparationforanadvancetothesouthalongHighway5. The112th
CavalryRCTassembledatGuimbainSixthArmyReserve. Thecommitmentofthe1stCavalry
DivisionwouldleavethisRCTasthesoleArmyReserve,anundesirablebutunavoidable
situationduetothefactthatadditionaluncommittedcombattroopswerenotavailable
totheArmyCommander. LocatedatGuimba,the112thCavalryRCTwouldbeinpositionto
reinforcethe1stCavalryDivisionimmediatelyshouldanythreattoitslineofcommuni-
cationdevelopasthedivisionadvancedsouth;ortocounteranyenemythrustagainstthe
SixthArmy'sleftflankfromthedirectionofSanJose. TheseizureofthelineMalolos-
SibulSprings-CabanatuanwouldhavetheeffectofplacingtheXIVCorpsinpositionto
counteranyenemyattackagainstitsleftflankfromtheeast. Bythecloseoftheday,
31January1945*onereinforcedcompanyofthe37thDivisionhadseizedandsecuredthe
siteofthedestroyedBampangaRiverbridgeatCalumpitwithoutmeetingenemyopposition.
On1February1945thedriveonManilabeganinfullforce. The37thDivi-
sioncrossedtheBampangaRiverunopposedatCalumpitandadvancedsoutheasttoward
Malolos. ThedivisionalsosentaforceeasttoseizeandsecurePlaridel. Although
enemyresistancewasencounteredinPlaridel,itwassomewhatdisorganizedandquickly
overcomeafterasharpencounter,andthetownandtheAngatRiverbridgesiteatthe
pointwerethensecured. By24001,2February1945,onemotorizedcolumnofthe37th
DivisionhadseizedandsecuredMalolosonHighway3andhadadvancedadistanceof
10,000yardssoutheastofthetown,whileanothermotorizedcolumn,advancingsoutheast
32
1
^
l d e 1 h a d r e a c h e d a o n t h e
r S ! ^ TK
K
' P
i n t
Highway10,000yardssoutheast
v.1âridel. Thenegligibleenemyo
Pi
x>sitiontotheadvanceofthesetwocolumns
existed largelyofcontactswit
i
h
h
smal
smal
l
l
isolate
isolate
d
d
groups
groups.
. Divisio
Divisio
n
n
patrols
patrols
,
,
aispatche
aispatche
d
d x
e r n a n d 0
n l f n T f ^ ^ / (^mpanga)towardDinalupihantomakecontactwith
eleraents o f X I
contact Corps,hadby24001,2February1945,reachedGuaguawithout
i Meanwhile,the1stCavalryDivision,beginningitsadvancesouthfromGuimba
on.February1945,crossedtheBampangaRiveratCabanatuan,butencounterednoorganized
enemyresistance. By24OOI,2February1945.thedivisionhadestablishedcontactwith
elementsofthe37thDivisionatPlarideland.continuingsoutheast,hadsecuredSanta
Maria(1^,000yardssouthsoutheastofPlaridel). (FordispositionsofAIVCorpsonS/24,
t.February1945.seeDiagram12.)
"b. OperationsofICorps:
Cn31JanuaryI945ICorpscompletedpreparationsforthedrivetosecure
SanJose(Nueve&cija)andthelineCabanatuan- Bongabon- Rizal(NuevaEcija). The
seizureoftheseobjectiveswouldcutthelastroad.Highway5,leadingfromsouthern
LuzonendtheCentralPlainintotheCaraballoMountainsandthencetotheCagayan
ValleyandplaceICorpsinpositionforfurtheroffensiveoperationstothenorthward.
On1February1945ICorps,makingitsmaineffortwithitsright,beganthe
drivetosecuretheobjectiveslistedabove. The6thDivision,onthecorpsrightflank,
launchedanattacktowardthelineRizal- SanJose. Preliminaryreconnaissancedis-
closedthattheenemyhadheavilyfortifiedthetownofMunozinanapparentattemptto
protectthesouthernapproachestoSanJoseandLupao. Advancingnortheastalongthe
Guimba- SanJoseRoad,the20thInfantry(6thDivision)droveagainstthemainenemy
defensesinthesouthernportionofMunoz,destroyingfiveenemytanksduringthefirst
dayoffighting. &nemyresistance,asat3anânuel,wasfanatical. Captureddocuments
andprisonerofwarreportslaterindicatedthattheenemyhadcommittedonereinforced
tankcompany(2dArmoredDivision),oneinfantrycompanyandoneartillerybatteryto
defendMunoztothedeath. ThedefensiveorganizationofMunozwassimilartothatof
SanManuel. Anintegratedfireplan,withmediumtanksdug-inaspillboxesandcovered
andsupportedbyinfantrysmallarms,machineguns,andlightartillerypiecesemploying
directfire,madethepositionadifficultonetoassault. By24001,2February1945
the20thInfantryhadfailedtogainafootholdinthetownalthough,inheavyfighting
ontheoutskirtsofthetownonthatday,theregimentdestroyedanadditionalnine
enemytanks. Meanwhile,the1stInfantry,havingby-passedMunozonthesouth,advanced
northeasttocuttheRizal- 3anJoseRoadatTumana. Otherelementsofthisregiment
reachedepointapproximately90yardssouthwestofRizal. Enemyresistancetothe
advanceofthisregimentwasnegligible. The63dInfantry(releasedfromICorps
Reserve)passedtocontrolofthe6thDivisionatGuimbaon2February1945.
an
d,ad-
vancingnortheast,by-passedMunoztoreachapoint1,200yardsnortheastofthetown
bythecloseoftheday. HereagainatMunozthepiecemealnatureoftheenemy'sdefense
waswellillustrated. Areinforcedtankcompany,supportedbyinfantryandartillery,
hadbeencommittedtodieinapointlessdefenseofanisolatedstrongpointwhichcould
easilybecontainedandby-passed,tobereducedatleisure.
Meanwhile,the25thDivisionhadcapturedUninganafterasharpfirefight,
andturningsoutheast,hadadvancedtowardLupao. This25thDivisioncolumnrepresen-
tedthenorthernarmofatwo-prongeddriveonenemydefensesintheSanJosearea,the
southernarmbeingthe6thDivision. By24OOI,2February1945telementsofthe25th
DivisionhadreachedthenorthwesternoutskirtsofLupao,wheretheycameunderheavy
enemyfire.
The32dDivision,inthemeantime,hadcrossedtheAgnoRiver,hadoccupied
Tayugwithoutopposition,hadsecuredSanMcolas,alsowithoutenemyopposition,andby
24001,2February1945,hadclearedtheenemyfromthetriangleNatividad- SanNicolas-
Tayug,andhadseizedSantaMaria. Lnemyarmorpreviouslyreportedinthistrianglewas
foundeithertohavebeendestroyedbyAlliedairbombardmentortohavebeenwithdrawn.
Severalabandonedtanksingoodoperatingconditionbutwithoutfuel,andwiththeir
machinegunsand47ramgunsremoved,werefoundinthevicinityofSantaMaria.
Meanwhile,the43dDivisionconsolidateditspositionsontheA
rmy
north
flankandsentpatrolstotheeast,northeastandnorthtodevelopenemydefensesin
thisarea. Thesepatrolsmadecontactswithnumeroussmallenemypatrols,butnomajor
actionstookplace. (ForICorpsdispositionsonS/24,2February1945.seeDiagram12.)
33
c. OperationsofXICorps:
AfterpassingtothecontrolofSixth-Armyon30January1945*XICorpshad
completedtheopeningofSubicBay,aspreviouslydescribed,bysecuringSubicTown,
OlongapoandGrandeIsland. InaccordancewiththeprovisionsofSixthArmyFieldOrder
46,thecorpsincreasedthetempoofitsdrivetotheeastalongtheaxisofHighway7
towardînalupihan,withtheprimaryobjectiveofisolatingBataanPeninsula. By24001,
2February1945,the38thDivision,reinforced,wasengagedinamajorbattleforZig-Zag
Pass,onHighway7,approximately7,000yardseastnortheastofOlongapo.
(ForXICorpsdispositionsonS/24,2February1945tseeDiagram12.)~
d. General:
TheadvancesmadebyICorpshadbynowmadeitimpossiblefortheenemyto
launchalargescalecounterattackagainsttheleftflankofXIVCorpsfromthedirection
ofSanJose(NuevaEcija). Bythepiecemealcommitmentofhis2dArmoredDivisionand
hisapparentfailuretoappreciatetheimportanceofmaintainingintactastrongmobile
strikingforce,theenemyhadsacrificedhiscapability,ofemployingthecombinedpower
ofthe2dArmoredDivisionandthe10thInfantryDivisioninadecisiveblowagainstthe
ArmyleftflankintheCentralPlainarea. Theadvancescfthe37thDivisionand1st
CavalryDivision,moreover,placedXIVCorpsinapositiontostrikeforiWanilawithout
seriousdangertoitsleftflankfromanycounter-offensivetheenemymightlaunchfrom
theMontalban-Ipoarea.
Inthelightoftheaboveconsiderations.SixthArmyFieldOrder47was
issuedon2February1945. **directedXIVCorps,whilecontinuingcurrentmissions,
tocontinuetheaggressiveadvancesouthward,capture.ManilaandsecurethelineCavite-
Tagig-Taytay-Antipole-Montalban. IandXICorpsweredirectedtocontinuecurrent
missions.
TheseizurebyXIVCorpsofthelineCavite-Tagig-Taytay-Antipolo-
MontalbanwasintendedtosecureManilaagainstanyenemythreatfromthedirectionof
BatangasandCaviteProvincesorfromtheareaeastofManila,securetheimportant
CaviteNavalBase(amajorstrategicobjective),andsealoffenemyforcesinthemoun-
tainseastofManila.
3. S/25,3February1945.throughS/27,5February1945.
a. XIVCorps:
On3February1945i
n
accordancewiththeprovisionsofSixthArmyField
Order47.XIVCorpsstruckfcrManila. The1stCavalryDivision,inanenvelopingmove,
drovethroughSantaMaria,theNovalicheswatershedarea,NovalichesTown,and,scat-
teringallenemyresistancebeforeit,reachedGraceJRarkinthenortheasternsectionof
ManilaatI835I,3February1945. Thusbetween1February1945and3February1945,
the1stCavalryDivisionhadadvancedsouthfromGuimba,hadcrossedthefampangaRiver
andhadcontinuedontoManila,traversingadistanceofapproximately100milesinless
thanthreedays. By5February19451thedivisionhadcapturedSantoTomasUniversity,
liberating3521Alliedinternees,andhaddriventothefasigRiveragainstincreasiiigly
bitterenemyresistance. Onthemorningof5February1945
t n e
divisionlaunchedan
attacktoseizeandsecurethesiteoftheQuezonBridge,whichhadbeendestroyedby
enemydemolitions. Afterafuriousall-daybattle,thedivisionwasforcedtohalt
theattackbecauseofinsufficienttroops. Elementsofthedivisionwerestrungout
protectingthelineofcommunicationwhichextendedfromCabanatuanthroughPlaridel,
SantaMariaandNovalichestoManila. Thesinglesquadronwhichthedivisionwasable
tobringtobearagainsttheQuezonBridgesitewasnotadequatetoreducethenetwork
ofenemystrongpointswhichguardedit.
The37thDivision,therightprongofthetwo-prongedattack,encountered
strongenemydelayingforcesinitsadvanceonManila. Theenemyhaddemolishedall
bridgesontheMalolos-ManilaRoad. Thisslowedtheadvancesothatitwas4Febru-
ary1945beforethe37thDivisionreachedJlfenila. By24001,5February1945,thedivi-
sionhadcapturedBilibidPrison,hadliberated1024Alliedinternees,andhadreached
thePasigRiverinforce. Theenemyhaddeliberatelysetfiretothebusinessdistrict
ofIfenilawhichwasburningfuriously,andhissniperswereactiveallalongthedivision
lineofcommunicationthroughthecity.
r^rr^r:^f,
3 7 t h
-.. !f
t h
***
Di
vi3ionand1stCavalryDivisiondrawnupalongthenorth
*
theBatUe f
rManilawasjoinedin
"***** I n tS
8
Althoughenemy
resistancetotheoccupationofthatpartofthecitylyingnorthofthePasigRiveT
wascharacterizedbynumeroussharpandsometimeshandtohandencounters,theresis-
tancewasnotonamajorscale. Ratheritappearedtobeanattemptonthepartofsmall
enemydelayingforces,neverlargerthanacompany,toimpedeandslowouradvanceto
ihePasigRiver. Tothisresistancewasaddedthesmokeandflamesfromburningbuild-
ingsinthebusinessdistrictonthenorthbankofthePasigRiver.
(ForXIVCorpsdispositionsonS/27,5February1945,seeDiagrams13and14.)
b. OperationsofICorps;
Duringtheperiod3February1945through5February1945,ICorpsincreased
thetempoofitsoperationstocleartheenemyfromtheCentralPlainareawithinits
zoneofaction. By24001,5February1945,the6thDivision,therightarmofthe
pincerattackonSanJose,hadsecuredSanJose,andhadsentreconnaissanceeastto
thehighgroundnorthandnorthwestofRizalwithoutmakingenemycontact. Theenemy
strongpointatMunozcontinuedtoholdoutinspiteofaceaselesshammeringbyboth
artilleryandair. On5February1945elementsofthe6thDivisionhadforcedan
entranceintothenorthwestcornerofthetown,buthadmadeonlysmallgainsbecause
offanaticaldefensefromnumeroushostilestrongpoints. Theenemylaunchedrepeated
counterattackswhichcausedhimheavylosses,butwhichforcedustopayahighprice
foreveryfootofgroundgained.
Meanwhile,the25thDivision,astheleftarmofthepincermovementon
SanJose,havingsecuredUmingan,advancedsoutheastontheUrningan-SanJoseRoad
towardSanJose. TheenemyelectedtomakeadeterminedstandatLupaoandSanIsi-
dro(NuevaEcija). EncounteringenemyresistanceonthenorthwestoutskirtsofLupao,
thedivisionlaunchedanattackagainstthetown,simultaneouslyby-passingitwith
otherelements. Theseby-passingelementsranupagainstanotherstrongpointatSan
Isidro. ThebattlesofLupaoandSanIsidro(NuevaEcija)followedmuchthesame
patternasthoseforSanManuelandMunozwiththeenemyusinghulleddowntanksand
artilleryprotectedbyentrenchedinfantryforclose-indefense. Hereagaintheenemy
hadcommittedelementsofhis2dArmoredDivisiontoanapparentlyhopelessdefenseof
twoisolatedareas. TherewasnomutualsupportbetweentheenemyforcedefendingSan
IsidroandthatdefendingLupao. Apparentlynonehadbeenplanned. By24001,5Febru-
ary1945,
t n e
divisionhadgainedfootholdsineachofthetowns,andtheusualtech-
niqueofincessantpoundingbyairandartilleryhadbeguntoshowresultsinavery
evidentlesseningoftheenemy'spowerofresistance.
BysecuringSantaMariaatthesouthernendoftheVillaVerdeTrail,the
32dDivisioneffectivelydeniedtheenemyexitfromtheCaraballoMountainsintothe
CentralPlainnorthwestofSanJose. Drivingnorthalongthetrailthroughthemost
ruggedterrainyetencounteredintheLuzonCampaign,thedivisionhad,by5February
1945, reachedpositionsastridetheTrail,1,000yardsnortheastofSantaMaria,against
increasinglyheavyenemyresistance. Theterrain,ideallysuitedfordefense,consisted
ofaseriesofknifeedgeridges,almostperpendicularslopes. Theenemyhadcleverly
organizedthisterrainfordefensewiththeusualnetworkofcavesandreverseslope
positions. Excellentobservationenabledhimtomakemaximumuseofartillery,with
whichhewaswellsupplied. Itsoonbecameapparentthatdrivingintheenemydefenses
alongtheVillaYerdeTrailwouldbeacostlyandprolongedprocess.
OntheICorpsnorthflank,the43dDivision,meanwhile,conductedmopping-
upoperationsandprobedenemypositionstotheeast,northeastandnorthwithlong
rangepatrols.
AfterwehadsecuredSanJose,theenemy'slastmajorpointofexitfrom
theCaraballoMountainswassealed. Henceforth,hiscapabilityforoffensiveactionin
thZCentralPlainwithintheICorpszoneofactionwasgone. Ihoseelementsofthe
2dAr^redDivisionand10thDivisionwhichhadbeencommittedtotheisolateddefense
35
ofHinoz,LupaoandSanIsidroweretrapped* Withallmainescaperoutestothemountains
out,theyweredoomedtoultimateannihilationorapiecemealwithdrawalthroughareasin
whichtheywouldbesubjectedtoconstantharassmentbyourforces*
(ForICorpsdispositionson3/27,5February1945*
flee
Diagram13*)
c* OperationsofXICorpsa
Duringtheperiod3February1945through5 February1945 **>Corpscontinued
tohammeratenemypositionsintheZig-ZagBasswhiledispatchingthe149thInfantry
Regiment inanenvelopingmovementaroundthenorthflankoftheenemydefensesastride
Highway7. TheobjectiveofthismovementwastomakecontactwithXIVCorpsatDina-
lupihanand,afterturningwestalongHighway7ttotaketheenemydefensesfromthe
rear* By24001,5February1945
tbe
iabodyofthe149thInfantryhadreacheda
point6,000yardsnorthwestofDinalupihan. Onthatday,apatrolfromthisregiment
enteredDinalupihanandcontactedapatrolfromthe40thDivision(XIVCorps)* Enemy
resistancetotheadvanceofthe149thInfantryhadbeennegligible. Dinalupihanwaa
foundtohavebeenevacuatedbytheenemy*
Meanwhile,themainbodyorthe38thDivisionattackingenemypositionsin
Zig-ZagBasshadbeenheldtosmallgainsinthefaceoftheusualsuicidalenemyresis-
tancefromanetworkofmutuallysupportingcavesandpillboxes. By24001,5February
19451stillengagedinafuriousbattle,thedivisionhadadvancedtoapoint11,000
yardswestofDinalupihan*
(FordispositionsofXICorpsonS/27,5February1945**** Diagram13*)
d. Generals
On5February1945
the
***&CommanderdirectedXIVCorp*toseize,inaccor-
dancewithagivenpriority,theprincipalfeaturesoftheManilaWaterSupplySystemin
thewatershedareaeastofthecity,makingthemaximumeffortconsistentwiththede-
mandsofthetacticalsituation. Intelligencereportsindicatedthattheenemyintended
todestroyorpossiblypollutethesourceofwaterfortheManilaarea. Earlyseizure
ofthesesourcesofwatersupplywasthereforevitaltothehealthandeventoexistence
ofthecity'spopulation.
4. SummaryofSixthirmyOperations,S-Day,9January1945~3*27#5February1945*
Duringthefirst27daysoftheLuzonCampaign,SixthArmy*advancedsouthward
throughtheCentralPlainofLuzonfrombeachesonLingayenGulftotheCityofManila,a
roaddistanceofapproximately120miles. SixthIrmyforcesoverranalmostallofthe
CentralPlainarea,securedtheClarkAirCenter,oneofthemajorstrategicobjectives
ofthecampaign,andbottledupthemajorportionoftheremainingenemyforcesinthe
CagayanValleyandthemountainsofnorthernLuzon. OurseizureofthelineRizal-San
Jose-SantaMaria-Rosario-Damortisnullifiedanycapabilitywhichtheenemymight
havehadforlaunchingalargecounter-offensiveagainstSixthArmy*snorthandnortheast
flank* EnemypocketsstillholdingoutwestofFortStotsenburg,atMunoz.SanIsidro,
andLupaofacedcertainannihilation. TheadvanceofXICorpstowardDinalupihanthreat-
enedsoontocuttheenemy'slastescaperoutefromtheCentralPlainintoBataan*
Inthefirst27daysoftheLuzonCampaign,theenemylost17,724killedand
179captured. SixthArmycasualtiesforthesameperiodwere1,465killed,4,717
woundedand184missing.
IndicationsearlyinthecampaignthattheenemymightnotdefendManilahad
provenfalse* The37thDivisionand1stCavalryDivision,drawnupalongthenorthbank
oftheBasigRiverintheheartofManila,facedaclever,ingeniousanddeterminedfoe
who,accordingtolaterintelligenceinformationtogetherwithfiguresoncountedenemy
dead,hadcommittedatleast20,000army,naval,basedefenseandservicetroopstoan
alloutdefenseofthecity. ThestagewasnowsetfortheBattleoflfenila,abattle
distinguishedforferocityanddestruction.
(FordispositionsofSixthArmyon*27,5February1945,Diagrams13and14.)
TheCommandPost,HeadquartersSixthArmy,openedatGeronaat16001,3February1945*
ARearEchelonremainedatCalasiao*
Inordertopenetrateanddestroythenumerous,
emplacedgunpositionswhich confrontedthe
32dDivisionontheVillaVerdeTrail,
fightingnecessitatedthecompletecoordinationofair,artillery,andgroundforces.
C. 6February-4March1945* BattleofIfenila;initiationofoperationstodestroy
enemyforcesinthemountainseastofJtfanila;clearingofBataanfteninsulaand
beginningofoperationstoopenManilaBay;11thA/BDivisionpassesto
controlofCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy;commencementofoperations
southofLagunadeBay;continuationofoperationstodestroy
enemyforcesinthemountainswestofClarkAirCenter;,
CentralPlainareacompletelysecured;arrivalof
33dDivision;initiationofoperationsto
shortenlinesinSixthArmyleftwing
anddestroyenemyforcesinnorth-
ernLuzon.
1. OperationsofXIVCorps:
BattleofIfanila
AsthebattleforManiladeveloped,itbecameapparentthattheenemyhaddone
everythingpossibletostrengthenthedefensesofifenilabetween9January1945and3
February19451whenadvanceelementsofthe1stCavalryDivisionreachedGracePark.
HismainpositipnwasorganizedinthatpartofManilalyingsouthoftheJtesigRiver.
ThefinalcitadelwasIntramuros,theancientwalledcitylyingjustsouthofthemouth
oftheB&sigRiver. TheenemyhadblownallbridgesacrosstheBasigbythetimeadvance
elementsofthe37thDivisionand1stCavalryDivisionreacheditsnorthbanks. Theap-
proachestothebridgesiteswereminedandbarredby.obstaclesdefendedbyautomatic
weapons. Althoughtheenemy'sresistancenorthoftheBasigRiverwasinthenatureof
adelayingaction,hehadconvertedthemainbusinessdistrictsouthofthePasigRiver
intoaveritablefortress. Everybuildingandeverywallbecameastrongpoint. The
streetswereminedandbarricadedwithobstacles. Theseinturnwerecoveredbyfire
fromantitankgunsandautomaticweaponslocatedinbuildingsandpillboxesatkeystreet
intersections. Artillerywasemplacedintheupperstoriesofbuildingswhereitcould
deliverfireagainstourforcesadvancingdownthemainthoroughfares.
TheoriginalXIVCorpsplanfortheassaultonManilaincludedallofthecity,
exceptforaportionofGraceBark,inthezoneofactionofthe37thDivision. Thezone
ofactionassignedtothe1stCavalryDivisionwouldhavehadtheeffectofcompelling
thatdivisiontoturnintothemountainsnortheastofManila. Therapidadvanceofthe
1stCavalryDivisiontoGraceBarkandtheincreasingevidencethattheenemyintendedto
makeanalloutdefenseofthecity,ledthecorpscommandertochangehisplansothat
the37thDivisionwoulddriveduesouththroughthecitywhilethe1stCavalryDivision
madeanenvelopmentfromtheeast.
On6February1945the37thDivisioncompletedthereductionoforganizedenemy
resistanceinthatpartofManilanorthoftheBasigRiverlyingwithinitszoneofaction.
Thisresistancewascharacterizedbysmallsuicidedetachmentsmanningmachinegunposi-
tionsatstreetintersections,inpillboxes,andinhouses;riflemenonhousetopsandin
otherconcealedpositions;anddemolitionteamswhichattemptedtoharassourforcesfrom
therear. FiresalongthefbsigRiver,somesetbyenemydemolitions,othersbyartillery
impededoperationsinthatarea. Onthissamedaythe1stCavalryDivisionsecuredthe
SanFrancisco-DelMonteBridgeacrosstheSanJuanRiver. Aspecialforcefromthe7th
CavalryRegimentcapturedNovalichesDam,oneofthemainfeaturesoftheManilawater,
system. Theenemyhadplaceddemolitionchargesatkeypointsonthedambuttherapidity
ofitsseizurebyourforcespreventedhisblowingthestructure. On7February1945the
divisionseizedtheBalaraFiltersintact.
On7February1945the37thDivisionmadeanassaultcrossingoftheItesigRiver
inthevicinityofthePresidentialBalaceatMalacanan. Theforceofthepreliminary
artillerybombardmentreducedenemyresistancetosporadicsmallarmsfire. Afoot
bridgewasrapidlyconstructedandthiswassoonreplacedbyapontonbridgecapableof
bearingthedivision'sheavyequipment. By24001,8February1945.the37thDivision
hadenlargeditsbridgeheadtoadepthof1500yardsandawidthof2000yards. The
divisionthenoccupiedtheentirenorthbankoftheBasigfromitsmouthtothePresi-
dentialffelace. Southoftheriver,meanwhile,thedivisionturnedwestanddrovetoward
theIntramurosDistrict. By24001,9February1945.thedivision,advancingagainst
bitterenemyresistance,reachedpositionsshowninDiagram15.
Meanwhile the1stCavalryDivisionhadreducedallorganizedresistancenorth
oftheFaîgiiverinIfenilawithinitszoneofaction. By2*001.9February1945.the
37
divisionwasdisposedalongthenorthbankoftheBasigRiverasshowninDiagram15.
Onthatdate,elementsofthe7thCavalryRegimentcapturedSanJuanReservoir,thus
securingthreeofthefourmainfeaturesoftheManilaWaterSystem,IpoDambeingthe
onlyonenotyetsecured.
The1stCavalryDivisionwasnowreadytocrossthePasigRiver, Inplanning
theschemeofmaneuvertobeemployed,theCommandingGeneral,XIVCorps,wasfacedwith
thedifficultproblemofcoordinatingtheeffortsofthe1stCavalryDivisionwiththose
ofthe11thAirborneDivisionadvancingnorthtowardManilaundercontroloftheEighth
Army. By7February1945,the11thAirborneDivision,havingpushednorthfromNasugbu
toParanaque,waspreparedtolaunchanattacktoseizeandsecureNicholsAirfieldon
thesouthernoutskirtsofManila. CoordinationbetweentheoperationsofXIVCorps
withinManilaandthe11thAirborneDivisionapproachingfromthesouthbecaioeanacute
problem,especiallyinviewoftheabsenceofaboundarybetweenthetwoforces. Par-
ticularconsiderationhadtobegiventotheproblemofartillerytargetsintheinter-
veninggap. Asolution,agreeabletobothArmies,wasarrivedatthroughmutual
arrangementbetweentheXIVCorpscommanderandthe11thAirborneDivisioncoumander
whichresultedintheestablishmentofanartillery"nofireline"beyondwhichneither
forcewouldfirewithoutaspecificclearancefromtheother. On8February1945this
linewasestablishedandwaslocatedasshowninDiagram15. Further,thelight75
m m
packhowitzersofthe11thAirborneDivisionhadprovenlargelyineffectiveagainstthe
concretepillboxesguardingthesouthernapproachestoManila. Asaresultofthis,
XIVCorpsarrangedtofurnishartillerysupportforthe11thAirborneDivision. To
insurecarefulcoordinationofthesefires,thecontinuanceofdirectliaisonbetween
thetwoforceswasauthorized*
Thenon-existenceofaboundarybetweenSixthandEighthArmiescausedfurther
complications. SixthArmyFieldOrder47directedXIVCorpstoseizeCavite. Theun-
certaintyastowhenthe11thAirborneDivisionwouldpasstocontrolofSixthArmy,
coupledwiththeaforementionedabsenceofaboundary,addedtotheproblemsconfront-
ingXIVCorpsindevelopingaplanofmaneuverandsettingobjectivesforthe1stCaval-
ryDivision. Furthermore,theonlyoperationalreportcoveringthedispositionsofthe
11thAirborneDivisionwasthedailyEighthArmyoperationsreport,whichwasquite
generalinnature. Asaresult,neitherforce,asitadvanced,wassureoftheintents
orcurrentdispositionsoftheother.
On10February1945undercoverofaheavyartillerypreparation,the1st
CavalryDivisioncrossedthePasigRiverattwopoints,oneinthevicinityofthe
PhilippineRacingClubandtheotheratMakati. Theenemydidnotopposethesecros-
sings.
On10February1945bydirectionoftheCommander-in-Chief,SouthwestPacific
Area,the11thAirborneDivision,asreinforced,passedtocontrolofSixthArmy. Sixth
ArmyFieldOrder5tissuedon11February,attachedthe11thAirborneDivision,rein-
forced,toXIVCorps. The1stCavalryDivision,meanwhile,havingadvancedrapidlyto
thesoutheastfromitsbridgeheadacrossthePasigîver,reachedifanilaBayinthe
vicinityoftheitaloClubonthesouthedgeofManilaon11February1945,andmade
patrolcontactwiththe11thAirborneDivisionatthatpoint. Contactinforcebetween
thetwodivisionswasestablishedon12February1945.
ThebattleforManilanowbegantodevelopintoadrivewhichgraduallycompressed
theremainingJapdefendersofthecityintotheWallaceField-Intramuros-Portarea
justsouthofthePasigRiver. Aftermakingcontactwiththe11thAirborneDivision,the
1stCavalryDivisionturnednorthandattackedtowardthePortAreaandIntramuros. The
37thDivisionatthesametimecontinueditsdrivetothewestwhilesimultaneously
therewithadvancingitsleftinanenvelopingmaneuvertogainthesouthernapproaches
toIntramuros.
On16February1945the37thDivisionreachedtheeasternedgeofIntramuros.
ItslefthaddriventoManilaBayjustsouthofIntraraurosandturningnorthhadadvanced
toTennesseeAvenue,approximately1800yardssouthofthesouthernwallofIntramuros.
The1stCavalryDivision,meanwhile,havingclearedtheenemyfromthecoastalareabe-
tweenthePoloClubandHarrisonPkrk,hadsecuredHarrisonParkandwasdrivingnorth,
againstincreasinglybitterenemyresistance,towardajunctionwithelementsofthe
37thDivisionalongtheshoreofManilaBay.
38
Byfiercetuilding-to-"buildingfighting,theletCavalryDivisionincheditswaynorthward,
tookHizalStadium,Pier7,andfinallyclearedtheportareauptothePasigRiver
37thDivisiontroopsadvancingintotheheartofManilaencounteredstubborn
resistancefromwell-emplacedenemypositionsinthestreetsand"buildings.
Heavydamagecaused"byenemydemolitionandfriendly
infantryassaulttroops
artilleryfirepavedthe
fM a n i l a h a d n o w
44 ^ t reachedastagewhereshiftingthe1stCavalry
DivisionfromManilatooperationseastofManilainthedirectionofthelineTaytay-
Antipolo-Montalbancouldbeforeseen. Intelligencereportsindicatedthepresencein
tneAntipolo-Montalban-Ipoareaofanenemyforceofapproximately20,000troops.
Inyiewofthisstrengthandthewidthofthefronttobecovered,itbecameapparent
a <
?
1
:u
0
?
alf o r c e 3m u s t b e
c o concentratedeastofAfenila. Accordingly,on15February
1945.SixthArmyFieldOrder51wasissued. Theprovisionsofthisfieldorderwhich
appliedtoXIVCorpstransferredcontrolofthe6thDivision(less1stRCT),whichhad
completedoperationsintheSanJose(NuevaEcija)area,fromICorpstoXIVCorps,
effective08001,17February1945. (OperationsofthisdivisionintheCentralPlain
from6FebruaryI945through16February1945,andwhichoccurredpriortoitsaaaign-
menttoXIVCorps,willbetreatedlaterinthetextofthissectionunderthediscus-
sionofoperationsofICorps.) SixthArmyFieldOrder51furtherdirectedXIVCorpsto
makeadeterminedefforttosecureobjectivespreviouslyprescribedinSixthArmyField
Order47.
InaccordancewiththeprovisionsofFieldOrder51,XIVCorpsatoncebegan
preparationsforthefinalassaultonIntramurosandthePortAreainManila,whilemov-
ingmen,suppliesandequipmentintopositionforthedrivetosecurethelineTaytay-
Antipolo-Montalban. Thecorpsbroughtforwardheavyartilleryfordirectfireagainst
thewallsofIntramurosinanattempttobreachthewallsinpreparationforthefinal
assault. On16February1945the1stCavalryBrigade(less2dSquadron,12thCavalry),
whichwasadvancingnorthalongDeweyBoulevardontheshoreofManilaBaytoforma
junctionwiththe37thDivision,passedtocontroloftheCommandingGeneral,37thDivi-
sion. The1stCavalryDivision(less1stCavalryBrigade,less2dSquadron,12thCavalry)
meanwhilepreparedforoffensiveoperationstotheeastofManilatoseizetheline
Taytay-Antipolo. The6thDivision(less1stRCT),whichpassedtocontrolofXIVCorps
on17February1945atthesametimebegantomovetopositionsintheNovalichesWater-
shedareainpreparationforanassaultonMontalban.
Inthemeantimethe11thAirborneDivision,havingsecuredthePoloClubarea,
hadcapturedCaviteNavalBaseandNicholsFieldon12February1945and,advancing
east,had,by17February1945*securedFortNbKinleyAnnexonthesoutheasternedgeof
ManilaandthelineTagig-HagonoyonthenorthwesternshoreofLagunadeBay.
(FordispositionsofXIVCorpsonS/39,17February1945seeDiagrams16and
17.)
AletterfromtheCommander-in-Chief,SouthwestPacificArea,totheCommanding
General,SixthArmy,dated5February1945
n
adstressedthestrategicimportanceofthe
earlycaptureofManilaandtheopeningofManilaandBatangasBaystoAlliedshipping.
InordertospeedtheaccomplishmentoftheseobjectivesandtoallowXIVCorpstocon-
centrateallitseffortsonoperationsintheManilaareaandsouththereof,theArmy
Commander,inFieldOrder33,issuedon19February1945tdirectedthecorps,while
continuingcurrentmissions,tocaptureTernate,securetheapproachestothesouth
channelofAfanilaBayandtobepreparedtocontinuetheaggressiveadvancesouthward
ofManilawiththeobjectiveofopeningBatangasBay. Further,thisfieldorderre-
lievedXIVCorpsoftheresponsibilityforoperationsinthatpartofitszoneofaction
lyingwestandnorthofthePampangaRiver,andtransferredcontrolofthelÔthDivision
intheFortStotsenburgareatoXICorps,effective08001,21February1945- Inaddi-
tion,itdirectedXICorpstoconcentratethe1stRCT(6thDivision)intheSanVicente
(Bulacan)areaby18001,23February1945.whereitwastopasstocontrolofXIVCorps.
FinalAssaultonIntrTmiro
flff
nriCaptureofManila
Duringtheperiod18February1945through22February1945the37thDivision,
reinforcedbythe1stCavalryBrigade(less2dSq
t
12thCavalry),continuedtoclosein
onenemyforcesholedupforalaststandinIntramurosandthePortArea. The12th
Cavalry(less2dSq),drivingnorthalongtheshoreofManilaBaytowardthePortArea,
securedtheHighCommissioner'sresidence,theElksClubandtheArmy-NavyClubon
20February1945andby22February1945wasengagedinabitterbattlefortheManila
Hotel. ThestrugglefortheAfenilaHotelexemplifiedthefuryandbitternessofthe
enemy'ssuicidalresistancethroughoutthefightinginManila. At10151on21February
1945,elementsofthe12thCavalryenteredthelobbyoftheManilaHotelwherethey
immediatelycameunderfirefromenemysmallarmsandautomaticweaponslocatedonthe
secondfloor. Thebattleragedwithinthebuildingforalmostthreedaysduringwhich
39
timetheenemymadenumeroussuicidalattacksfromonefloortothenext. Atrapped
enemypocketheldoutonthemezzaninefloorofthehotelforalmost24hours. Finally
on23February1945*aehotelwastaken.
On22February1945the37thDivisioncompletedallpreparationsforthefinal
assaultonIntramurosandtheIbrtArea. Thedivisioncommanderplannedtolaunchthe
finalassaultonIntramurosintheearlymorningof23February1945followingaone-
halfhourartilleryandmortarpreparation. Heavyartillery,employingdirectfire
methods,hadbreachedthewallsofIntramurosattwoplacesduringthedayspreceding
thefinalassault. Onebreachwaslocatedinthenorthwallofthecity,theother
atthenortheastcornerofthecityoppositetheJonesBridge. Althoughthebreaching
ofthewallsbytheheavyartillerycausedrubbletoslideintothebreachesandblock
themformovementofvehicles,itwasexpectedthat,withclosecoordinationbetween
thepreliminaryartilleryandmortarbombardmentandtheinfantryassault,theinfantry
wouldbeabletonegotiatetherubbleblockingthebreachesandenterthecitywitha
minimumofcasualties. The129thInfantry(lessonebattalion)wastomakeanassault
crossingofthefasigRiveroppooitethenorthernbreachinthewallofIntramuroswhile
the145thInfantry,attackingfromtheeast,wastoentertheWalledCitythroughthe
breachatthenortheastcorner. (ForfriendlyandenemydispositionsinJVianilaat
3
e
24001,S/44,22February1945, Diagram18. Fortheplanofmaneuverforthefinal
assaultonIntramuros,seeDiagram19)
n t n e
ThefinalassaultonIntramurosbeganatO73OI,23February1945
w i t
open-
ingofthepreparatoryartilleryandmortarbombardmentofselectedtargetsinthe
WalledCity,sectionsoftheeastandnorthwallsandapproachesthereto.. Duringthis
preparation,fourbattalionsof1051001howitzers,threebattalionsof155
mm
howitzers,
onebatteryof8*howitzers,onebatteryof240mmhowitzers,onebattalion(lessone
lightcompany)oftanksandelementsofonebattalionoftankdestro;.ersfired7i69&
rounds,(I85tons)ofHE,APC,HCandWPshells. Inaddition,4*2"mortarsfiredup-
wardsof1900roundsofHEandHPsmokeonspeciallyselectedtargets.
AtO83OI,theartilleryfireliftedandthe129thand145thInfantryRegiments
begantheirsimultaneousassaultsonIntramurosfromthenorthandeastrespectively,
whilethe12thCavalry(attachedto37
tn
Division)attackednorthalongtheshoreof
ManilaBayfromthevicinityoftheManilaHoteltowardthePortArea. The129th
Infantry,incolumnofbattalions,madetheinitialcrossingofthePasigRiverin
assaultboatswithoutasinglecasualtyandassaultedthenorthwallofIntramuros
atthebreachinthevicinityoftheMint. Enemyresistancewasdisorganizedandwas
primarilyconfinedtoFortSantiagointhenortheastcornerofthecityandtothearea
betweenAduanaandPastigoStreets. By24.OOI,23February1945,the129thInfantryhad
reachedpositionsshowninDiagram20. The145thInfantryenteredtheWalledCity
throughthebreachinthenortheastcornerandadvancingwestandsouthwestagainst
lightscatteredresistancehad,bythecloseoftheday,23February1945,reached
CabildoStreetwhereitcameundersmallarmsandmortarfirefromthesouthwestcor-
nerofIntramuros. (Fordispositionsofthe145thInfantrywithinIntramurosat24001,
S/45,23February1945.seeDiagram20.)
On24February1945
tfa
e37thDivisioncompletedthedestructionofenemyforces
inIntramurosexceptforasmallpocketinthebasementofFortSantiago. The12th
Cavalry(attachedto37thDivision)securedtheFortDistrictonthatday. By24OOI,
25February1945organizedresistanceintheCityofManilawasbrokenexceptforenemy
strongpointswhichcontinuedtoholdoutinthe.Hgricultural,FinanceandLegislative
Buildings(seeDiagram20). Theenemyhadconvertedthesebuildingsintolaststand
fortresses,havingbarricadedallentrancesandhavingconstructedconcretepillboxes
inthehalls. Togainentrancetothesebuildings,the37thDivisionhadtoemploydi-
rectfirefromartillery,tanksandtankdestroyerstobreachthewalls. Finallyon
4iioarch19451eightdaysafterthefallofIntramuros,thelastenemystrongpointin
I*ianila,theFinanceBuilding,wasreducedandtheCityofMianilawascompletelyinour
hands.
ThusendedtheBattleofManila. Theenemy'ssuicidaldefenseofthecityhad
costhim16,665incounteddead. ThenumberofdeadJapanesesoldiersdisposedofbythe
enemyorburiedintheruinsofdestroyedbuildingsandinundergroundtunnelscouldnot
bedetermined. DuringthebattleofManila,hardlyabuildingindowntowniuanilaescaped
heavydamageordestruction. Intramuroswasamassofrub.le. Pier7inthePort
Districtwastemporarilyunusable,althoughsoonputbackintooperatingcondition.
40
The37thDivision,aftertakingthenorthernsectorofManila,crossedthePasigRiver
andenteredIntramurosthroughgapingholesinthehugewallsofthisoldsectionofthecity,
_QperationaEastof
f Uu
*
1
*
W a a at i t 3hel
h
!, t, Corpscompletedpreparations
t o t h e o a s t o f
Itot^b-^ I* V
1
**
0
^ i l a tosecurethelineTaytay-Antipolo-
D
*
fo
*
a
^ i '
6t 0 th
*southtoaeizeTernateandsecurethesouthernapproaches
& o p e r a t i o n s w e r e
w V?n ,\ . ^ accordancewiththeprovisionsofSixthArmy
FieldOrders47,52and53,previouslymentioned.
The1stCavalryDivisionsecuredFortBfcKinleyon19February1945and,driving
eastagainstalightenemydelayingaction,crossedthelferikinaRiverandsecuredTaytay
by22February1945
#
Meanwhile,the6thDivisioncompleteditsmovementintoposition
ontheXIVCorpsnorthflank. Bythecloseoftheday,22February1945,the1stCavalry
Divisionandthe6thDivisionwerepreparedforacoordinatedattackonthemorningof
23February1945toseizethelineAntipolo-Montalban. (Fordispositionsofthe1st
CavalryDivisionandthe6thDivisiononS/44,22February1945,seeDiagram21.)
Onthemorningof23February1945.simultaneouslywiththe37thDivision's
assaultonIntramuros,followingapreparatoryairandartillerybombardment,the1st
CavalryDivision(less1stRCT,lessonesquadron)andthe6thDivisionattackedeast.
Bythecloseoftheday,the1stCavalryDivisionhadreachedpositionsastridethe
Taytay-AntipoloRoadapproximately3000yardswestofAntipoloagainststiffening
enemyresistance. The6thDivisioncrossedtheMarikinaValleyandtheJferikinaRiver
inthevicinityofSanMateowithoutenemyoppositionand,turningnorth,hadreached
theoutskirtsofMontalbanbythecloseofthedaywhereitcameunderheavyfirefrom
enemypositionsonthehillmassessurroundingthetown. The1stRCT(6thDivision),
whichhadbeenoperatingontheBataanPeninsulaundercontrolofXICorps,havingcon-
centratedintheSanVicente(Bulacan)areaby18001,23February1945,passedtocontrol
ofXIVCorps,andinturntocontrolofthe6thDivision,
On24February1945the6thDivisionenteredMontalbanwithoutopposition.
Attempts,however,totakethehighgroundsurroundingthetownmetwithdetermined
enemyresistance. Tothesouth,the1stCavalryDivisionwasalsoencounteringstrong
oppositionwestofAntipolo. On4March1945thesetwodivisionsreachedpositionsas
showninDiagram22. ffetrolsfromthe1stCavalryDivisionreconnoiteredsoutheastof
TaytayalongHighway21borderingLagunadeBay,throughAngonoandBinangonan(Rizal)
toMaybancal,andencounteredenemypatrolsbutnofixeddefenses. Thiswasstrong
evidencethat,forsomeinexplicablereason,theenemyhadneglectedtofortifyhis
leftflank,whichapparentlywascompletelyexposedtoanencirclingmovementfromthe
south. Meanwhile,6thDivisionpatrolsdevelopedenemypositionsonthehillsover-
lookingMontalbaninpreparationforanattacktosecurethisdominatingterrain.
ConmencementofOperationsSouthofLagunadeBay
Whilethe1stCavalryand6thDivisionsweredrivingeastfromManilaintothe
mountains,the11thAirborneDivisionengagedinoperationssouthofManilatosecure
TernateandthesouthernapproachestoManilaBay,andmadepreparationstoadvancesouth
andsoutheasttoopenupBatangasBay. By22February1945*the11thAirborneDivision
hadreachedpositionsalongthewestshoreofLagunadeBayextendingfromMuntinlupanorth
toTagig. Onthissamedate, thedivisioncompletedpreparationsforacombinedoverland,
shore-to-shoreandairborneassaultagainsttheJapaneseinternmentcampatLosBanos
(LagunaProvince)onthesouthernshoreofLagunadeBay. Intelligencereportsindicated
thatapproximately2000AmericanandAlliedcivilianswereinternedatthecamp. Although
anoperationtoliberatetheseinterneeswouldinvolvea24-mileinfiltrationofenemy
lineswithitsinherentdifficultiesandrisksitwasdeterminedtoattempttherescue.
Intelligencereportsindicatedthattheconditionoftheinterneesatthecampwasdes-
perateand,owingtolackoffoodandmedicine,themortalityratewasexceedinglyhigh
andwasincreasingdaily. Accordingly,XIVCorpswasdirectedtomakeeveryeffortto
liberatetheseinterneesattheearliestpossibledate.
Onthemorningof23February1945aspecialtaskforcecomprisingthe1st
Battalion,188thParachuteGliderInfantry,elementsofthe511thParachuteInfantry,
supportingartillery,tankdestroyersandamphibioustractorsassaultedLosBanosfrom
thewestbyland,fromthenorthbyalandingwithamphibioustractorsonthebeaches
inthevicinityofthecampandbyairwithparachutists. Theentireenemygarrisonof
243Japanesesoldierswasannihilated. Twenty-onehundredandforty-seveninterneeswere
liberatedandreturnedsafelytoAmericanlines. Thetaskforcecasualtiesinthisopera-
tionweretwokilledandthreewounded. Threecivilianinterneeswereslightlywounded.
41
FollowingtherescueatLosBanos,thetaskforcewithdrewtoCalamba.
Meanwhile,the1stBattalion,188thParachuteGliderInfantry,waswithdrawn
fromtheCalambasector,reinforcedwithCompanyA,44thTankBattalion,anddirected
toseizeTernate,whichhadbeenbypassedbythe11thAirborneDivisioninitsadvance
upHighway17fromNasugbutoManila. Thisbattalion,asreinforced,movedtothe
vicinityofIferagondon,justsouthofTernate,withoutenemyoppositionandon2March
1945attackedandsecuredTernateagainstdisorganizedenemyresistance. Enemyforces
drivenoutofthetownwithdrewtothemountainousterrainsouthwestofTernate. (On
4March1945,thedayonwhichManilawascompletelysecured,the11thAirborneDivision
wasdisposedasshowninDiagram22.)
OperationsWestofClarkAirCenter
Whilethe37thDivisionand1stCavalryDivisionbattledforManila,the40th
Division,operatingintheFortStotsenburgarea,droveslowlywestwardagainstdis-
organizedenemydefensesintheruggedmountainousterrainwestandnorthwestofClark
AirCenter. Althoughlimitedinhisabilitytocounterattackonalargescalebecause
oftheruggednessoftheterrain,lackofartillerysupportandtheheterogeneouscom-
positionofhisforces,theenemycleverlyorganizedtheterraintotakeadvantageof
everynaturaldefensivefeature. Hehadconstructedanetworkofcavepositionsinthe
sheercliffswhichdominatedtheapproachestohismaindefensiveposition. Mutually
supportingfireplansfurthercomplicatedthereductionofthesepositions. Theneces-
sityforemployingdemolitionandflamethrowerteamstocleanoutcavepositionsin
close-incombatmeantthattheprogressoftheadvancewasmethodicalandslow. Plans
werecompletedon20February1945forafinalassaulton23February1945tobreak
organizedenemyresistanceinthearea. At08001,21February1945^
n
accordancewith
theprovisionsofSixthArmyFieldOrder531controlofthe40thDivisionandresponsi-
bilityfortheconductofoperationsintheFortStotsenburgareapassedfromXIVCorps
toXICorpsinordertofreeXIVCorpsfromresponsibilityinthatarea.
General
On25February1945SixthArmyFieldOrder54
w a s
issued. Amongotherthings,
theprovisionsofthisfieldorderdirectedXIVCorps,whilecontinuingcurrentmissions,
toreduceexpeditiouslyallobstaclestotheimmediaterestorationofportandbase
facilitiesintheManilaarea. Inaccordancewiththisdirective,XIVCorpsconcentrated
thebulkoftheeffortoftheengineerswiththecorpsontherepairoffacilitiesinthe
PortAreaofManila,ontheclearingofdebrisandrubblefromthestreetsandonthe
creationofstorageapacedispersalareasforsupplies. EvenbeforeManilawasoffici-
allydeclaredsecureon4March1945engineershadmadeconsiderableprogresstowardthe
accomplishmentoftheseobjectives. Pier7thelargestinthePortArea,wasgiventop
priority. Enemydemolitionshadseriouslydamagedit. Inadditiontothis,theenemy
hadsunkanumberoffreightersandtransportsalongsidethepiertodenyittoour
shipping. Workingdayandnight,theengineersconcentratedeveryeffortonreturning
Pier7toanoperationalstatus. By4March19451rapidstridesinthisdirectionhad
beenmade.
On15February1945GHQ,SWPA,directedtheCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy,to
relievethoseelementsofthe24thDivisionwhichhadbeenattachedtoXIVCorpsand
mounttheminshippingformovementtoMindoro, Accordingly,SixthArmyFieldOrder54
furtherdirectedXIVCorps a torelieveelementsofthe24thDivision;toconcentrate
promptlythe3dBattalion,19thInfantry124thDivision)atNasugbu(BatangasProvince)
andon1March1945tomountthisbattalioninassaultshippingtobefurnishedas
arrangedbyHeadquartersSixthArmy;toconcentratethe2dBattalion,19thInfantry,
andtheCannonCompany,21stInfantry(both24thDivision)atNasugbu(BatangasProv-
ince)by7March19451and,onthatdate,tomounttheseunitsinamphibiousshipping
asarrangedbyHeadquartersSixthArmy, Thereliefoftheseunits,whichhadbeen
securingthe11thAirborneDivision'slineofcommunication,wasaccomplishedexpedi-
tiously, 3y 3March1945*allunitsofthe24thDivisionwhichhadbeenoperatingunder
controlofXIVCorpshadbeenmountedinassaultandamphibiousshippingatNasugbuand
wereenroutetorejointheremainderofthedivisionatMindoro. Uponarrivalthere
theypassedtocontrolofEighthArmy.
42
Theenemy's"beingstronglyentrenched
infortifiedcaves,
necessitated systematicreductionbyinfantrytroops
employingflamethrowersand othersmallarmsfire.
Filipinoscontributedgreatlytothe
maintainanceofoursupplyroutesinthe
ruggedmountainterrain eastofManila.
6
/ the
e n P n
^ I ^ M
e b r u a r
y^45through4March1945. Corpshaddestroyed
n i l a S n d l i b e r a t e d
tntv rt V ^ thecity;hadlaunchedoffensiveoperations
totheeastofManilatowardthelineAntipole-Montalbantodestroyenemyforcesinthe
mountainsinthatarea;had3eizedandsecuredTernate,thekeytocontrolofthesouth-
e m approachestoManilaBay;andhadadvancedsoutheastalongthewestershoreof
LagunadeBaytothelineMtSungay-Calamba,fromwhichitwaspreparedtolaunchan
offensivetothesouthandsoutheasttoopenBetangasBay. Duringthissameperiod,
the40th^visionhadsteadilydrivenenemyforcesintheClarkAirCenterareaback
intothemountainswestofFortStotsenburg. Aspreviouslystated,.theApthDivision
hadpassedtocontrolofXICorpson21February1945.
InanticipationofthecollapseofenemyresistanceinManila*SixthirmyField
Order55wasissuedon28February1945. Theprovisionsofthisfieldorder,insofar
asitappliedtoXIVCorps,changedthecorpsboundaryeffective00011,5.March1945,to
excludethegreaterHfenilaareafromthecorpszoneofactionandpassedcontrolofthe
37thDivisioninManilafromXIVCorpstotheSixthArmy,thistobecoincidentwith
thechangeinboundary. TheorderalsodirectedXIVCorps,whilecontinuingcurrent
missions,vigorouslytopressoperationseastandnortheastofAfenilatodestroyhostile
forcesintheAntipolo-Montalban-Ipoareaandeastandsoutheastthereofjtoadvance
aggressivelysouthward,destroyinghostileforcesencountered;securethelineLlijan-
Batangos-Lipa-Tanauan-Linga;openBalayanandBatangasBaya;andbepreparedto
advancetothelineLucena-Tayabas-Lucban-Cavinti-Bagsanjan. Inordertopro-
videadditionalforcestoXIVCorpsforitsoperationssouthofManila,andinviewof
thecontemplateduseofthe158thRCTinanamphibiousoperationintheBicolProvinces,
thisRCTwasdirected,inFieldOrder35*toconcentrateinthegeneralParanaquearea
whereitwastopasstocontrolofXIVCorpson5March1945. FieldOrderS5further
directedXIVCorpstobeprepared,afteropeningBatangasBay,toconcentratethe158th
RCTintheBauanareaforshore-to-shoreoperationstosecurethenortherneaitstoSan
BernardinoStrait. WiththecollapseofthelastvestigeofenemyresistanceinManila
on4March19451XIVCorpswasfreetoconcentratealleffortsontheaccomplishmentof
themissionssetforthinFieldOrder33* (FordispositionsofXIVCorpsonS/54.4
March1945,s
ee
Diagram22.)
2. OperationsofICorpst
WhileXIVCorpswasheavilyengagedwestofFortStotsenburgandinassaulting
Manila,ICorpscontinueditsoperationstocompletethedestructionofenemyforcesin
theeasternpartoftheCentralPlainandinitiatedoperationstodestroyenemyforces
inthemountainsofnorthLuzonandtoforceanentranceintotheCagayanValley. The
followingdiscussionincludestheoperationsofthe6thDivisionundercontrolofI
Corpsuntilthedivision(less1stRCT)passedtocontrolofXIVCorpson17February
1945foroperationseastandnortheastofManila. The1stRCTwastransferredtothe
BataanIteninsulawhereitpassedtothecontrolofXICorpson14February1945- Thi
RCTrejoinedthedivisioneastofManilaon23February1945
SecuringtheEastCentralLuzon
TheisolatedenemystrongpointsofSanIsidro,Munoz,andLupaowerecaptured
inturnandtheremnantsofthe2dArmoredDivisiondefendingthemwr@destroyed. The
3dBattalion,l6lstInfantry,securedSanIsidroon6February1945completingthe
annihilationoftheenemygarrisonandthedestructionoffivelightend27mediumtanks
oftheJapanese2dArmoredDivision. Munozfelltothe20thInfantryofthe6thDivision
onthemorningof7February1945afteranassaultprecededbyacombinedairandartU
lerybombardmentoftwohoursduration. Onthenightof6-7February1945 etherem-
nantsoftheenemyforcedefendingMunozattemptedtowithdrawfromthetowntothe
northtowardSanJose,apparentlyunawarethatSanJosehadalreadyfallentoAmariceJi
forceswhichhadby-passedMunoz. Theseretreatingforcesheadednorthfromi&iuozmCAni
noattempttoconcealtheirmovementsandwithheadlightsbiasingontrucksandtank/,
Theywerecaughtontheroadbythe63dInfantryanditssupportlugartillerywhich.ViM
advancedsouthwestfromSanJose. Theentireenemyforcewas-annihilatedanditsve-
hiclesandtanksdestroyed. Duringtheseven-daydefenseof?<sinoztheenemy.lost&n
entirecompanyofinfantry,abatteryoffieldartillery,fou-;ligntaari48u^diumtanks
capturedordestroyed. OnthesamedaythatMunozfellotheraleu^ntsat,he6thDivi-
sion,havingsecuredthehighgroundsurroundingRizalon5February1545,aspreviously
reported,occupiedthetowninforcewithoutenemyoppositionand,sapiaciagaoattallon
43
of105mmhowitzersinthetown,shelledenemypositionsonthehighgroundtotheeast
ofthePampangaRiver.
Meanwhile,the35thInfantryofthe25thDivisionhadbeenengagedsince2Febru-
ary1945inabitterbattleforthetownofLupao. Elementsofonetankcompanyofthe
Japanese2dArmoredDivision,supportedbyinfantryandartillery,defendedthetownto
thelast. Finally,on8February1945.the35thInfantry(25thDivision)succeededin
takingthetown. At10001,on8February1945theremnantsoftheLupaogarrison,in-
cluding15tanks,madeadashforthefoothillstotheeast. Sixtanksweredestroyed
butnineescaped,latertobefoundabandonedbytheircrews. Intheseven-daybattle
forLupao,theenemylostonelighttankand36mediumtankscapturedordestroyed. On
8February1945,thesamedayasthecaptureofLupao,elementsofthe6thDivisionoccu-
piedBongabonwithoutenemyopposition.
Whilethe6thand25thDivisionswereengagedineliminatingthelastofthe
enemyresistanceinthesoutheasternportionoftheCentralPlainlyin&withintheI
Corpszoneofaction,the32dDivisiondroveuptheVillaVerdeTrailthroughincreas-
inglyruggedterrainandagainststiffeningenemyresistancetoreachpositions&500
yardsnortheastofSanNicolasby24001,8February1945- -*ddedtothedifficulties
encounteredwasthefactthatthetrailcouldsupport'vehiclesnolargerthan1/4-ton
trucks. Thisnecessitatedbuildingaroadbehindthetroopsastheyadvancedinorder
thatadequatesuppliesmightbebroughtforwardbyheaviervehicles. Troopsoperating
awayfromthetrailhadtobesuppliedandevacuatedbynativecarrier,aprocesswhich
wasslowandoftenuncertainowingtothetendencyofthecarrierstodesertunderenemy
fire. Allofthesefactorscombinedwithfanaticalenemyresistancetomaketheadvance
slowandcostly.
The43dDivision,meanwhile,hadconsolidateditspositionsonthehighground
eastofthePozorrubio-RosarioRoadandnorthoftheRosario-DamortisRoad,had
launchedlocalat.tackstoimproveitspositions,andhadpatrolledextensivelytodeter-
minethestrengthanddispositionofenemydefensesopposingit. Inordertodisrupt
anyenemyattempttolaunchacounterattackagainstthenorthflankofthedivision,
whichwouldhaveposedaseriousthreattotheArmybeachheadsincealargeproportion
ofthesuppliesforlogisticalsupportoftheoperationwerebeingunloadedatRabon,
onlyfourmilessouthofDamortis,arrangementsvreremadewithFifthAirForcefora
seriesofdailysaturationbombingraidsonenemypositionsnorthoftheRosario-
DamortisRoad. Theeffectivenessoftheseraidsmaybejudgedbythefactthatatno
timedidtheenemycounterattackinthisareawithaforcelargerthanacompanyin
strength. Theselocalcounterattackswereinvariablyrepulsedwithheavylosoesto
theenemy.
7i/iththefallofLupaoandtheoccupationofRizalandBongabon,thatpartof
theCentralLuzonPlainlyingwithinthezoneofactionofICorpsbecamesecure. The
Japanese2dArmoredDivisionhadbeenliquidatedinaperiodofthreeweeksfollowing
firstcontact. Thisdivisionnevermountedanattackwithmorethan16tanksatone
timeandlost214ofthetankswithwhichitwasequipped. Itneveremployedtheprin-
cipleofmass;andrarelymadeuseofthemobilityofitstanks,choosinginsteadto
utilizethemhulleddowninfixeddefensiveemplacements. ThustheJapanesetank
commanderssacrificedtheironlyarmoreddivisioninpiecemealcounterattacksandin
immobiledefenses. Anexplanationforthisisdifficulttofind. Perhapstheuiost
reasonableonecamefromanofficerofthe2darmoredDivisioncapturedlaterinthe
fightingintheBaletePassarea. HestatedthattheCommandingGeneral,2darmored
Division,hadwantedtoconcentratethedivisionintheSanJosearea,employingitin
amasscounterattackagainsttheSixth*rmyleftflankwhenourlinesshouldbecome
wellextendedintotheCentralPlain. However,GeneralYamashitahadinsistedonthe
piecemealcommitmentofthedivision. HadGeneralYamashitapermittedtheCommanding
General,2dArmoredDivision,to-ûployhisdivisionashedesired,itcouldhavebeen
heldinreserveatSanJosetostrikeattheSixthArrayflank,thatiswhenXIVCorps
wasextendedallthewayfromfbrtSualtotheClarkAirCenterandthe32dDivision
and1stCavalryDivisionhadnotyetarrivedonLuzon. But,eveninsuchanevent,
ouroverwhelmingairsuperioritycombinedwiththetacticaldispositionsofICorps
wouldhaveenabledustodestroytheJapanese2dArmoredDivisionultimately. However,
byamassarmoredattackagainsttheSixthArmyleftflankattheopportunetimeand
place,theJapaneseCommander,whilesacrificinghisdivision,mightwellhaveseriously
slowedtheadvancedowntheCentralPlainandinflictedmuci*greaterdestructionand
highercasualtiesonourforcesthanhedidbythepiecemealcommitmentofhistjnksto
thedefenseofisolatedstrongpoints. (FordispositionscfICorpsat24001,3/30,
8February1945t
s e e
Diagram23.)
44
FightingwasseriouslyhamperedbypoorsupplyroutesintheVillaVerdeTrailareauntil
theengineersblastedoutroadswhichhelpedimmeasurably
inclearingouttheremainingpocketsofenemyresistance
f
i n 8d i v i s i o n t h e
OilIfontF K 1 ^ 33d,wasscheduledtoarriveia..ngayen
uulfon10February1945. Anticipatingthearrivalofthisdivision,plansweremadeto
employitinthezoneofactionofICorpswhereageneralredispositionofforceswas
indicated. The43dDivisionandthe158thRCThadengagedinover30daysofcontinuous
violentcombat,andthehighattritionsufferedbybothunitsmadeitadvisabletore-
lievethem. Despitetheanticipatedarrivalofthe33dDivisionintheLingayenGulf
area,thereliefoftheseunitspresentedaseriousproblemsincetnenumberofdivisions
availabletoo
ix
th^rmyforthex-uzonCampaignhadbeenreducedfromeleventonine,
xhe41stDivisionhadbeenceletedfromtnelistofreinforcingdivisionsanddiverted
fromLuzontooperationsinthesouthernPhilippines. Inaddition,GHQ,SWrA,haddir-
ectedthataSixth^rmydivisionbenamedforwithdrawalfromLuzonforoperationsin
theVisayasjandtne40thDivisionwasselectedforthispurpose. Consequently,only
ninedivisionsremainedforthebalanceoftheLuzonCampaign,therebyforcingSixth
Armytocontinueoperationswithverylimitedreservesandwithoutmeanstoeffectthe
reliefoftireddivisions. However,inviewofthefactthatthedominatingterrainin
thePozorrubio-Rosario-Damortisareawasnowinourhands,andsinceenemyactivity
inthatareahadsharplydecreased,itwasfeltthatthisproblemcouldbesolved
temporarilybyrelievingthe43dDivisionandthe158thRCTwithonedivision,the33d.
Theincreasinglyheavyresistancetotheadvancesofthe32dDivisionontheVillaVerde
Trailindicatedthedesirabilityofreleasingthe126thInfantry(32dDivision)from
SixthArmyReservetocontrolofICorpsforemploymentinthatarea. Theneedfora
mobilereserveintheSanJose(Nueva&cija)area,whereitwouldbeavailabletorein-
forceeitherthe25thDivisioninaariveupHighway5towardBaletePassorthe j2d
DivisionontheVillaVerdeTrail,alsobecameapparent.
Inlightoftheaboveconsiderations,SixthArmyFieldCrder49,9February
1945,directedt:ie33dDivision,afterlandingintheSanFabianareacfLingayenGulf,
toconcentrateinthei*-enaoeg-SanJacinto-SanFabianareawhereitwastopassto
controlofICorpsat08001,12February1945,?OTthepurposeofrelievingthe43d
Divisionand15SthRCTinthePozorrubio-.Rosario-Damortisarea. Otherprovisions
ofthisfieldorder,applicabletoICorps,releasedthe126thInfantry(32dDivision)
fromSixthArmyReservetocontrolofICorps,effective08001,15February1945,and
directedICorps,whilecontinuingcurrentmissions,toeffectthereliefofthe158th
RCTend43dDivisionwiththe33dDivisionby08001,14February1545and03001,16
February19orespectively. ICorpswasfurtherdirectedbythisfieldordertocon-
centratethe158thRCTintheTarlacareaandthe43^DivisionintheUrdaneta-ivâpandan
3nta3arbaraareawherebothunitsweretopasstoSixthArmyReserveeffective08001,
15February1545anduSOOI,1?February1945*respectively;andtoconcentrateone
infantryregiment(lessonebattalion)inthegeneralSanJose(NuevaEcija)areaby
08001,10February1945.
Redisrx>3itlonofForces
OperationsinthezoneofactionofICorpsduringtheperiod10February1945
through21February1945
w e r e
characterizedmainlybyredispositionofforcesinaccord-
ancewiththeprovisionsofSixth*rmyFieldOrder49- Theyinvolvedreconnaissancein
forcebythe6thDivisiontoDingalanandBalerBaysontheeastcoastofLuzonjlocal
advancestoimprovepositionsintheCaraballoiviountains;extensivepatrollingtodeter-
mineenemystrengthanddispositionsinpreparationforoffensiveoperationstoshorten
lines;destructionofenemyforcesintheCaraballoi*iountains;andpreparationsfora
concentricadvanceagainstthestronglyheldUmingan-BaletePass-SantaFetriangle.
On10February1945,
t n e
33&divisionlandedintheSanFabianareaofLing&yen
Gulfandimmediatelyconcentratedinthe"tenaoag-SanJacinto-SanFabianareawhere
<tpassedtocontrolofICorpsat08001,12February1945.andon13February1945
corrrasneedreliefofthe43dDivisionandthel;8thRCTontheccrpsnorthflank,ivfcan-
while*areinforcedcompanyofthe6thDivisionreconnoiteredtheroadfromBongabon
toDiiralanBay,reachingDingalanBayon11February1945andfindingitevacuatedby
theenemy SixthArmyFieldCrder50,issuedonthissamedate,directedICorpsto
concentratethe1stRegimentalCombatTeam(6thDivision)intheDinalupihanareaby
l
c
Vl IkFebruary1945,atwhichtimeitwouldpasstocontrolofXICorps. Theccn-
sicer'ItiersâuingtotheattachmentcfthisHCTtoXICorpswillbediscussedlater
inthisre,or";unJeroperationscfthatcorps. Cn12February1945onereinforced
com-^nycf*the6thDivisionreachedBalerBay.havingtraversedtheroadfromBongabon
withoutene:^contact. *,wastnecaseatDingalcnBay.BalerBaywasfoundtohavebeen
evacuatedbytheene^. At18001.1*February1945,the1stRegimentalCombatTeam
45
(6thDivision),havingcompletedconcentrationatDinalupihen,passedtocontrolof
XICorpsinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofSixthArrayFieldOrder5-
AnamendmenttoSixthArmyFieldOrder49,issuedon11February1945changed
theconcentrationareaofthe43dDivision(lessoneRCT)totheUrdaneta-L&pandan-
SantaBarbaraareawhereitwouldpasstoSixthArmyReserveat08001,17February1945*
anddirectedICorpstoconcentratetheexceptedregimentalcombatteamintheGuimba
areawhereitwouldpasstoSixthArmyReserveat08001,1?February1945*
On13February1945the33dDivisioncompletedreliefofthe158thRCTinthe
Rosario-Damortisarea. TheRCTmovedtoaconcentrationareainthevicinityofTar-
lacwhere,at08001,15February1945,itpassedtoSixthArmyReserve. Onthissame
date,the33dDivisioncompletedreliefofthe43dDivisiononthecorpsnorthflank.
The126thInfantrypassedfromSixthArmyReservetocontrolofICorpsandrevertedto
controlofthe32dDivisionat08001,15February1945, On16February1945the43d
Division(less103dRCT)completedconcentrationintheUrdaneta-Mapandan-Santa
Barbaraarea,whilethe103dRCTcompletedconcentrationatQuimba. iteanwhile,the
CommandingGeneral,ICorps,havingreceivedoralwarninginstructionsthatthe6th
Division(less1stRCT)wouldshortlypassfromhiscontroltothatofXIVCorpsfor
operationssouthoftheJfempangaRiver,relievedthe6thDivisionwiththe25thDivi-
sionandcompletedconcentrationofthe6thDivisioninthegeneralPinagpanaan-
Bongabonareaby24001,14February1945preparedformovementsouthofthePampanga
River.
On15February1945*SixthArmyFieldOrder51*asissued. Undertheprovisions
ofthisfieldorderICorpswasdirectedtoassumeoperationalcontrolcfandre~psonsi-
bilityformissionsinthatpartoftheXIVCorpszoneofactionlyinggenerallynorth
ofaneast-westlinethroughTarlac. ThefieldorderfurtherprovidedthatICorps
retaincontrolofoneinfantryregimentofthe43<iDivisionwhentheremainderofthe
divisionshouldpasstoSixthArmyReserveat08001,17February1945
T n e
infantry
regiment(lessonebattalion)ofICorps,heldinArmyReserveintheSanJose(Nueva
Eicja)area,wasreleasedtoICorps,effectiveatonce. Inaccordancewithprevious
oralwarninginstructions,ICorpswasdirectedtoconcentratethe6thDivision(less
1stRCT,attachedtoXICorps)andCompanyC,44thTankBattalion,intheCabanatuan
area,southofthePampangaRiverwhereitwastopasstocontrolofXIVCorpsat08001,
17February1945.
At08001,17February1945,the43dDivision(less169thInfantryRegiment)
passedtoSixthArmyReserve,whilethe6thDivision(less1stRCT)passedtocontrol
ofXIVCorpsinCabanatuan. On18February1945the169thInfantry(43dDivision)re-
lievedelementsofthe185thInfantry(40thDivision)inthenorthwesternportionof
therevisedICorpszoneofaction.
The33&Divisionlaunchedanattackon18February1945toseizeakeyhill
approximately3700yardseastofCauringanandeffectlocalimprovementinitspositions
inthatarea. DivisionpatrolsoperatingfromthevicinityofAgoo,justsouthofSan
Fernando(LaUnion),madescatteredcontactswithsmallenemypatrols.-By21February
1945the33dDivisionhadcaptureditsobjectivehill37OOyardseastofCauringan..
Meanwhile,the25thDivision,operatingalongHighway5andthe32dDivision,engaged
ontheVillaVerdeTrail,confinedtheiractivitieslargelytoextensivelongrange
patrolstodeterminethestrengthanddispositionsoftheenemyforcesopposingthem.
By21February1945bothdivisionshadcompletedpreparationsforfurtheradvances:
the25thDivisiontoattacknorthtowardPuncanfrompositionsapproximately3000yards
southofthattown;the32dDivisiontolaunchanattacktothenorthtodestroyan
enemydefensiveposition9000yardsnortheastofSanNicolas,whichpositionwasblock-
ingitsadvancealongtheVillaVerdeTrail.
(ForICorpsdispositionsat24001,S/43,21February1945,eeDiagram24.)
InitiationofOperationstoDestroyEnemyForcesinNorthernLuzon
Duringtheperiod22February1945through4ifcrcfc1945,ICorpsbeganamethodi-
cal,relentlessadvancetodriveinthedefensesblockingtheapproachestotheenemy's
mountainstrongholdinnorthernLuzonandtheCagayanValley. The25thDivisionadvanced
intwocolumnstowardDeletePass. Therightcolumn,consistingofthe35thInfantry,
reinforced,advancednorthalongthetrailrunningfromRizal(NuevaLcija)toward
46
eutt^f? h / S V ?
J
5
c t l v eof
outflankingtheenemydefensesastrideHighway5and
cuttingthehighwayatDigdigwherethetrailfromCarranglanmeets . s
ranglanmeets
Highway^
Highway^.
Thi
This
e n C n C
U n t U n t e
ll^Z ll^Z
c
r r
e d e d
.
n l n lyy3Cattere 3Catteredd
resistanc resistanceefro frommenem enemyyscreenin screeninggforcf forcfssi innii
88
advan advance
towardCarranglanbutwasslowedbythedifficultterrain. Theleftcolumnofthe25th
Division,spearheadedbythel6lstInfantry,advancednorthonHighway5,butencountered
strongenemydefensesastridethehighwayjustsouthofPuncan.
3 2 d D i v i s i o n
o JZ*
f
ormedtheleftarmofthepincermovementclosingatBalete
5
t h G th D i v i s i o n w a s o n
!* V H I S therightarm. Asitadvancednorthandnortheast
ontheVillaVerdeTrail,the32dDivisionencounteredincreasingdifficultyinreducing
enemydefensescleverlyorganizedtogainmaximumadvantagefromtheruggedterrain. The
necessityforconvertingthetrailintoaroadcapableofbearingheavyvehiclesfor
logisticsupportoftheoperation,coupledwiththecomplicatedproblemofoverlandsupply
bynativecarrier,whereveranattemptwasmadetoinjecttheelementofmaneuverintothe
operationbyenvelopingmovementsawayfromthetrail,slowedtheattacktoamethodical
hillbyhilladvance.
The33dDivision,meanwhile,conductedoperationstoimproveitspositionseast
ofthePdzorrubio- RosarioRoadandnorthoftheRosario- DamortisRoad,andbeganto
driveinenemydefensesastridetheKennonRoadonthesouthernapproachestoBaguio.
AsoperationsalongHighway5,theVillaVerdeTrail,theKennonRoadandHighway
3alongLingayenGulfdeveloped,itbecameincreasinglyapparentthatthekeytothe
enemy'sentiredefensesystemguardingtheapproachestotheCagayanValleyandthemoun-
tainstrongholdformedbythetriangleBaguio- Kiangan- BontocwascontroloftheBalete
Ifess- SantaFeareaonHighway5 Theseizureofthisareawouldplaceourforcesonthe
immediateapproachestothesouthernCagayanValley. Intelligencesourcesindicatedthat
tothedefenseoftheapproachestotheCagayanValleyalongHighway5andtheVillaVerde
TrailtheenemyhadcommittedthebulkoftheJapanese10thInfantryDivision,whichwas
stillintact,reinforcedbyremnantsofthe2dArmoredDivisionfightingasinfantry,
severalindependentinfantryregiments,andalargenumberofprovisionaldefenseunits
organizedfromairforceandservicepersonnel. Bycommittinghisforcestoastatic
defenseindepthandmaintainingthebulkofhisreservesintheBaletePass- SantaFe-
Imuganarea,theenemycouldfeedreinforcementstohispositionsastridetheVillaVerde
TrailandHighway5fromacentralpoint. NoadditionalAmericandivisions,otherwise
employedonLuzon,couldbedisengagedforoperationsinnorthernLuzon. Furthermore,
the33dDivisioncouldnotbeusedtoreinforcetherightwingofICorpsasitwasthen
fullycommittedinoperationsagainstenemydefensesontheapproachestoBaguio. Opposing
the33dDivisionweretheremnantsoftheJapanese^QthIndependentMixedBrigadeandthe
23dDivision,reinforcedbyotherremnantsofseveralindependentinfantryregiments. Con-
centratedintheBaguioareawastheJapanese19thInfantryDivisionwhichhadbeenonly
partiallycommittedtoactionandwhichcouldbecalleduponforreinforcementsifneeded.
Inviewoftheaboveconsiderations,SixthArmyFieldOrder54issuedon25Febru-
ary1945,'directedICorps,whilecontinuingcurrentmissions,topressvigorouslycurrent
aggressiveactionwiththecorpsrightwinginordertoshortenlinessoastoeconomize
troopsandmakethemavailableforfurtheroperations. SinceSixthArmyplanscalledfor
thereliefofthe4uthDivisionbythe43dDivisionintheFortStotserburgarea,this
fieldorderfurtherdirectedICorpstorelievethe169thInfantry(43dDivision)onthe
corpsnorthwestflankandconcentratethatregimentintheCamilingareaby18001,26
February1945,whereitwastoreturntocontrolofthe43dDivision. Inordertocom-
pensateICorpsforthelossofthe169thInfantry,whichhadbeencommittedtoscreening
thecorpswestflankandprovidingsecurityforsupplyandbaseinstallationsinthe
westernportionoftheCentralPlainlyingwithinthezoneofactionofICorps,Field
Order54furtherdirectedthatthe632dTankDestroyerBattalionpasstocontrolofI
Corpsat08001,25February1945*
Beginningon25February1945,
i n
accordancewiththeprovisionsofSixthArmy
FieldOrder54,ICorpsintensifieditsoffensiveoperationswithitsrightwingwhile
maintainingcontinuouspressureonenemydefensesinthezoneofactionofthe33dDivi-
sion. The35thInfantry(25thDivision)drivingnorthfromRizal(NuevaEcija)toward
CarranglanontheRizal- Carranglan- DigdigTrail,securedCarranglanon26February
1945againstlightscatteredresistanceand,turningwest,drovetowardDigdigonHighway
5. Meanwhile,thel6lstInfantry,theleftcolumnofthedivision,continueditsdrive
northtowardPuncanonHighway5-
T
*e32dDivision,drivingnortheastontheVillaVerde
Trail,smashedenemydefenses9000yardsnortheastofSanNicolason27February1%D and,
turningeast,continueditsdrivetowardSantaFe. The2dBattalion,126thInfantry(32d
Division),withthemissionofprotectingthedivisionleftflank,droveuptheAmbayabang
47
RiverValleytoward-Uiwican,encounteringstrongenemycavepositionsapproximately2000
yardsnorthofSapinit.
Meanwhile,the33dDivision,advancingnortheastontheKennon(Rcsario-Baguio)
Road,securedDongonon25February1945andcontinueditsattacktothenortheastto
securethehighgrounddominatingtheKennonRoad,1000yardsnorthofHotSprings. On
itsleftflank,thedivisionlaunchedlocalattackstoimprovepositionsandsecuredthe
dominatingterrain7000yardseastofAgooon26February1945.encounteringonlyminor
enemyresistance.
By4%rch1945,the25thDivisionhadsecuredîgdigandPuncan,hadopened
Highway5totrafficasfarnorthasDigdig,andwasregroupingtoresumetheadvance
tothenorthastridehighway5towardBaletePass. The32dDivision,meanwhile,driving
eastontheVillaVerdeTrailhadreachedpositionsapproximately7000yardswestofImu-
ganwhereithadencounteredwhatshortlydevelopedtobethemainenemydefensiveposi-
tionsguardingtheapproachestoSantaFealongtheVillaVerdeTrail. Theterrainhere
wasthemostruggedandbestsuitedfordefenseofanyyetencounteredalongthetrail.
Aroundaclusterofalmostperpendicularhillsasacore,theenemyhadorganizedhis
defensivesystemofmutuallysupportingcavepositions, layingastridethetrailasthey
did,anddominatingthevalleytothenorthofthetrail,reductionofthesepositions
wasessentialtofurtherprogresstotheeast. Furtherinore,theenemyhadorganized
defensivepositionsandartilleryobservationpostsalongtheforwardslopesofiitImugan,
lyingapproximately1500to2000yardsnorthofandparalleltotheVillaVerdeTrailat
thispoint. FromhispositionsonMtImugan,theenemycouldharassal+OOQ-yardstretch
oftheVillaVerdeTrail;and,havingpracticallyunlimitedobservationofourmovements
onthetrail,whichfollowedthecrestsofrazorbackedridges,wasabletoadjustartil-
leryfireontroopsandvehiclestraversingthisoneandonlyroute. Furthermore,his
positionsonMtImuganplacedtheenemyinpositiontocounteranythrustwhichthe32d
DivisionmightattempttomakedownthevalleylyingbetweentheVillaVerdeTrailand
Mt.Imugan,andposedacontinuousthreattoitslineofcommunicationalong.ti.etrail.
Thus,withtheenemycontrollingMt.Imugan,the3
2
cLDivisionwaslargelyrestrictedto
anattempttosmashthroughtheenemydefensesonthedominatingterrain7000yardswest
ofIraugan,by-passingthembeingoutofthequestion. Theopei-ationresolveditselfinto
asluggingmatchwithsecurityforcesspreadoutalongtheVillaVerdeTrailfromSan
Nicolastothefrontlines,thuscorrespondinglyreducingthepowerwhichthedivision
wasabletoconcentrateoncrackingtheenemydefensesopposingit.
3y4March1945the33&DivisionhadreachedpositionsastridetheKennonRoad
approximately7000yardsnortheastofRosurioandwasconductingintensivereconnaissance
inpreparationforfurtheradvancestothenortheastalongthisroadtoseizethehi^jh
groundinthevicinityofâmp1-1/2. Thedivisionwasalsopushingintensiverecon-
naissancenorthalongthecoastofLingayenGulftowardSanFernando(LaUnion). Ciuer-
rillaforcesoperatingintheSanFernando(LaUnion)areawerealreadyforcingtheenemy
towithdrawfromthecoastalareabetweenDamortisandSanFernandotowardBaguio,leav-
ingonlyalightcoveringforcetosecurehisrear.
(FordispositionsofICorpsat24001,4March1945*seeDiagram2^,)
3. OperationsofXICorps:
OperationsofXICorpsduringtheperiod6February1945through4March1945
werehighlightedbythecompletionofoperationstoisolateBataanPeninsula,these-
curingofthesoutherntipofBataanandthebattleforCorregidorwhichopenedupthe
northchannelintoManilaBay;theterminationoforganizedenemyresistancewestof
FortStotsenburg,whichresultedinsecuringthatportionoftheCentralPlainlying
withinthezoneofactionofXICorps.
IsolationofBataanPeninsula
Aspreviouslydiscussed,thebulkofthe38thDivision,advancingeastastride
Highway7towardDinalupihanwiththeobjectofisolatingBataanPeninsulaandpreventing
anenemywithdrawalthereto,had,by24001,5February1945,reachedpositionsapproxi-
mately11,000yardswestofDinalupihanwhereitwasheavilyengagedwithanenemyforce
occupyingahighlyorganizeddefensivepositionastridethehighway. Onthissamedate,
patrolsofthe149thInfantrywhichhadmadeanenvelopmentoftheenemy'srightflank
northofHighway7.contactedpatrolsofthe185thInfantry(40thDivision)inDinalupi-
han. On7February1945.
t n e
149thInfantrymadecontactinforcewithelementsofthe
48
Directfire"byM-18tankdestroyersflayedanimportantrole
intakingduginenemyartillerypositionsinthePuneanaxea,
Subsequenttothearduoustaskof"buildingasupplyroadtoourfrontline
infantrymeninthePuncanarea,aprogressiveadvance"byourtroopswasmade
possibleinclearingoutofallenemyresistanceinthisarea.
IntheroughmountainousterraininthePuncanarea,
Filipinoscarryammunitionandsuppliesvitalto
battle-wearytroopswhowereforcingtheJapaneseoutoffortifiedcavepositions
Infantry (40thDivision)inDinalupihan,and,doublingback,attackedwestastride
highway7withthepurposeofeffectingajunctionwiththel$2aInfantryandbreaking
enemyresistancealongthehighway. Cn13February 1545.Patrolsofthe149thand15^d
iniantryRegimentsmadecontactonthehi^hgroundsouthofHighway7approximately
10,000yardswestofDinalupihan. Onthefollowingday.thetworegimentslauncheda
coordinatedattacktodestroythelastremaininghostilepocketonadominatingridge
onthenorthsideofthehighwayatthispoint. Bytheendoftheday,14February1545.
organized enemyresistanceonHighway7hadbeenovercomeandthehighwaywasopenedfor
traffic. Bataanhadbeenisolated,thusblockingtheenemy'soverlandrouteofwithdrawal
intothepeninsulaaswellasescaperoutesfromthepeninsulaintotheZambalesftbuntains
tothenorth.
PlanningforOperationstoCuenManilaBay
Whilethe38thDivisionengaged infinaloperationstoisolateBataanPeninsula,
plansnearedcompletionfortherolewhichXICorpswouldplayinaccomplishing theover-
allSixthArmymissionofopeningManila Bay. On3February1545theCommandingGeneral,
SixthArmy,hadreceived fromtheCommander-in-Chief,SouthwestPacificArea,aradio
message outliningthegeneralplanfortheclearanceofManilaBay. Thisplan,asorigi-
nallyconceived,envisagedtheearliest possibleseizureofSataantoincludeMariveles,
thesecuringofCorregidorandthesouth coastofivianilaBayinthegeneralareaof
Ternate. ThecaptureofCorregidorwastobeeffectedbyshore-to-shoreassaultorby
parachute drop,orboth,asindicatedbythetacticalsituationaftereffectiveair
neutralization.
Inaccordancewiththeabovedirective,theArmyCommander submittedtothe
Commander-in-Chief,SouthwestPacific^vrea,hisplanforopeningtheentrancetoManila
Bay. ThisconsistedofasouthwarddrivedowntheeastcoastofBataanwithoneregi-
mentalcombat team,reinforced,inconjunctionwithashore-to-shoreassault,mounted
fromSubicBay,employingoneregimentalcombatteam,reinforcedbyoneinfantrybat-
talion,tcseizepositionsonthesouthcoastofBataanintheJwarivelesBayarea. On
D/l,acombined shore-to-shoreandairborneassaultwastobemadeonCorregidoremploy-
ingoneinfantrybattalion,reinforcea,fortheshore-to-shoreoperationfromItfariveles
Bayandthe5Q3&ParachuteInfantry,mountedbytheMghth ArrayfromMindoro,tobe
droppedonthefortressisland. PlansfortheseizureofTernateandthemethodoftheir
executionwerediscussedunaeroperationsofXIVCorps.
On5February 1545,
the
CommandingGeneral,SixthArmy,receivedaradiomessage
fromtheCommander-in-Chief,SouthwestPacificArea,approvinghisplanfortheopening
ofManilaBayanddesignating12_February 1545asD-Dayforplanningpurposes. This
radiomessagefurtherdirectedAlliedNavalForcestosupporttheoperationbytrans-
portingandescortingamphibiousassaultforcesandbyconductingpreliminarybombard-
mentsoff&rivelesBayandCorregidor,aspracticable,priortooperationsandbyfire
supportduringthelandingoperation. AlliedAirForcesweredirectedtoinstituteat
once,heavypreliminaryneutralizationofthedefensesofthesoutherncoastofBataan
PeninsulaandCorregidorandtomakeplanstodroponCorregidor,onD/l,suchelements
ofthe503dParachuteInfantryastheCommandingGeneral,SixthArray,mightdesignate.
ThedetailedplanoftheArmyComnanderwasembodiedinSixthArmyFieldOrder48
issuedon7February1545.
The
salientprovisionsofthatfieldorderwereasfollows:
a. SixthArmy,supportedbyAlliedNavalandAirForces,wastocontinuethe
offensivebyseizingtheimarivelesBayareaandCorregidorbyshore-to-shore
andairborneoperationstoassistinopeningtheentrancetoManilaBayand
securingBataanPeninsula.
b. D-Daywasannouncedas12February 1545* H-Hourwastobeannouncedlater.
c. XICorps:
(1) OnD-Day,atH-Iicur,employingnottoexceedonereinforcedregimental
coiiibatteam,wastolandintheAlarivelesBayareaofsouthernBataan,
seizeandsecureabeachheadandestablishcontroloverthesouthern
tipofBataan.
(2) Inconjunctionwiththeamphibiousassault intheMarivelesBayarea,
wastolaunchavigorousattacktothesouthwardalongtheeastcoast
ofBataananddestroyhostileforcesencountered.
49
(3) OnD-Day,wastomoveonereinforcedinfantrybattaliontotheMariveles
Bayarea,preparedforashore-to-shoreoperationagainstCorregidoron
D/linconjunctionwiththeattackofthe503dParachute InfantryRegi-
ment*
(4) OnD/l,employingthe503dParachuteInfantryRegimentinairborne
operationsasarrangedwiththeEighthArmy,andby shore-to-shore
operationsfromtheLferivelesBayarea,wastocaptureCorregidor.
d. Troopstobeemployed intheoperation,exclusiveofthe503d Barachute
InfantryRegiment,weretobedesignatedbytheCommanding General,XICorps,
fromtroopsthenunderhiscommand,
e. TheCommandingGeneral,XICorps,wasdirectedtosubmitabriefofhisplan
fortheoperation,toincludeplansofclosesupportingnavalanaairforces,
totheCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy,onorbefore10February1945
f. Controlofthe503dParachute InfantryRegimentwastopasstoXICorpsupon
completionofthedroponCorregidor.
TheRCTemployedtodrivedowntheeastcoastofBataanwasexpectedtogain
earlycontroloftheeastcoastofBataan,preventinganenemywithdrawalfromMariveles
totheinterior,andtoblockanyfurtherenemyattemptstoevacuatebywaterfromLtonila
toBataan. Intelligencesourceshadindicatedthatsuchamovementwasinprogress.
Further,shouldtheamphibiousassaultforcesencounterwellorganizeddefensesinthe
Marivelesarea,arapiddrivedowntheeastcoastofthepeninsulawouldtakethese
enemydefensesinflankandrearandwouldspeedthevitallyimportantseizureofthe
southerntipofBataan.
TacticalplanningfortheassaultonCorregidorinvolvedthehighestdegreeof
coordinationofoperationsofground,seaandairforces. Japaneseexperience in1942
haddemonstratedthatanamphibiousassaultonthisislandcouldbeextremelycostly.
Themeanstoavoidacostlyamphibiousassaultwereavailable. The53<iParachute
Infantry,which,ifitweredroppedonCorregidoronpointsofourownchoosing,would
beablebysurprisetoseizethekeyterrainfeaturesoftheislandbeforetheenemy
couldreacttothwartouraction.
Thesuccessofsuchanairborneoperationwas,ofcourse,dependentupona
numberoffactors. Butonereallysuitabledropsitewasavailable:namely,Kindley
Field. Ifthetroopsweredroppedthere,however,theywouldbeexposedtohostilefire
directedatthemfromhigherground,i.e.,MalintaHilland"Topside*,andwouldbe
forcedtoattackagainsttheheavilydefendedhighground. Theonlywaytoobviatethis
wastodropon"Topside",amaneuverthattheJapanesewereveryunlikelytosuspect.
Thedisadvantageousdroppinggroundon"Topside"simplyhadtobeaccepted.
Assumingthataparachuteassaultwastobemadeon"Topside",the "Rock"{Cor-
regidor)mustbesubjectedtosuchintensenavalandairbombardmentforseveraldays
priortothedayoftheassault,andonthedayoftheassault,immediatelypriorto
H-Hour,thatenemystrengthmaintainedon"Topside"duringdaylighthourswouldbe
reducedtoaminimum, ^nemystrengthonCorregidorwasestimatedbyG-2asamaximum
of850firstlinetroopspossiblyreinforcedbyevacueesfromAfenila. Thatthisbom-
bardmentachieveditspurposebecameapparentlaterfromthecompletesuccessattained
bytheairborneassault.
Carefulplanningwasessential. Thisincludedadetailedreconnaissance for
jumpareasandledtoajumpplandesignedtoputthemaximumnumberoftroopsonthe
groundintheshortestpossibletimewithminimumcasualties.
Anumberofimportant considerationsledtotheinclusionintheplanofan
amphibiousassaultinconjunctionwiththeairborneassault. Amphibiousassault forces
couldseizeabeachhead,establishabaseofsupply,and,bygainingcontactwiththe
airborneforces,openupanoverwaterrouteofsupplyandevacuationtotheairborne
forces. Thisamphibiousassaultwasconsideredfeasible,astheamphibiousassailtunits
couldlandundercoveroftheairborneforcewhich,havinglandedfirst,wouldhavegained
controlof"Topside"whichdominatestheentireisland. TheearlyseizureoflyfelintaHill
wasconsideredessential. Itwasessentialthatthishill,whilenotaslargeas"Top-
side",beincontrolofourforcesbeforeanassaultwaslaunchedtoseizethe "Tail*
50
(easternportion)oftheisland. IfMalintaHillwasnotseizedattheoutsetofthe
operation,whentheenemywasconfusedanddisorganizedbythepowerofournavaland
airbombardmentandthesurpriseattendantontheairborneassault,itwasfeltthata
lateramphibiousassaultoragroundassaultbythe503dParachuteRegimenttotakethe
hillwouldbeextremelycostly.
AsplanningfortheAferiveles-CorregidorOperationprogressed,itbecame
apparentthatthe38thDivisionwassoheavilyinvolvedonHighway7thattheCommanding
General,XICorps,wouldnotbeabletodisengagesufficientforcesintimetomeetthe
targetdateof12FebruaryI945. furthermore,allhecouldpossiblymakeavailable,
evenifthethetargetdatewerepostponedseveraldays,wouldbeoneHCT,reinforced
byoneinfantrybattalion,plussupportingcombatandserviceelements. Basedonthe
aboveconsiderations,theCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy,recommendedtotheCommander-
in-Chief,SouthwestPacificArea,thatthetargetdateforD-Daybechangedfrom12
February1945to15February1945. Thisrecommendationwasimmediatelyapprovedand
thetargetdatechangedaccordingly. InordertoinsurethattheCommandingGeneral,
XICorps,wouldhavesufficientforcesavailableforthedrivedowntheeastcoastof
Bataanwithoutnecessitatingafurtherpostponementofthetargetdate,SixthArmyField
Order50,issuedon11February1945.directedICorpstoconcentratethe1stHeginiental
CombatTeam(6thDivision)intheDinalupihanareaby18001,14February1945,atwhich
timeitwastopasstocontrolofXICorps,forthepurposeofadvancingalongtheeast
coastofBataan,sinceitwasrealizedthatanflCT,38thDivision,wouldprobablynotbe
availableintimetherefor. CnthissamedateAmendmentNo.2toFieldOrder48was
issued. Thisamendment,whichhadtheconcurrenceoftheCoinmander-in-Chief,Southwest
BacificArea,changedtheforcefortheairborneassaultonCorregidorfromthe503d
ParachuteRegimenttothe503dParachuteRegimentalCombatTeam,thusaddingthefire
powerofthe462dParachuteFieldArtilleryBattalion(75amHowitzer)andthel6lst
ParachuteEngineerCompany.
Tosummarize,thefinalizedplanfortheMariveles-CorregidorOperationcalled
foradrivedowntheeastcoastofBataanbythe1stRegimentalCombatTeam,reinforced;
anamphibiousassaultlandinginMarivelesBayon15February1945bythe151stRCT,
reinforcedbythe3&Battalion,34thInfantry,plussupportingcombatandserviceele-
ments,followedbytheestablishmentofcontroloverthesoutherntipofBataan;an
airborneassaulton"Topside",Corregidor,bythe503&ParachuteRCTbeginningat08301,
16February1945,tobefollowedbyanamphibiousassaultat10301,bythe3dBattalion,
34thInfantry,reinforced,onSanJosebeachonthesouthcoastofthe"Iteck"ofthe
islandatthefootofMalintaHill. The3dBattalion,34thInfantry,reinforced,wasto
bemountedforitsshore-to-shoreoperationfromJVferivelesBay. Thetotalstrengthof
theforcedestinedtoassaultCorregidoronD/lamountedto2,916men. (SeeDiagram26
forthePlanofAttack:.Mariveles-CorregidorOperation^
SecuringofSouthernBataan
Cn12February1945the
lst
Battalion,1stInfantry(6thDivision),movedto
Dinalupihanbymotorandon13February1945beganitssouthwardadvancedowntheeast
coastofBataan,tobefollowedbytheremainderoftheregimentincolumn,supportedby
thelstFieldArtilleryBattalion(6thDivision). Bytheendcftheday,14February
1945,thelstRCThadseizedandsecuredthetownofPilar,whichishalfwaydownthe
eastcoastofBataan,andtheeasternterminusoftheBagac-PilarRoad,whichroad
dividesthePeninsulaapproximatelyinhalf. Therewasnoorganizedenemyresistance
tothisadvance,contactsbeinglimitedtoafewenemystragglers,mostofwhomwere
evacueesfromManila. Onthissamedate,asmentionedpreviously,the38thDivision
crushedthelastorganizedenemyresistanceonHighway7- (
F
rdispositionsofXICorps
onS/36,14February1945.seeDiagram27.)
Forseveraldayspriorto15February1945.theJ^rivelesareaofsouthern
BataanhadbeensubjectedtointensebombardmentbytheAlliedNavalandAirlorces.
Onthemorningof15February1945.navalminesweepersopenedachannelintoMariveles
Bayand,followingheavypre-H-Hourairandnavalbombardment,the151stRCT,rein-
forced,beganlandingat10001. Theassaultforces,encounteringonlylightenemyop-
position,cuicklysecuredMarivelesTownandAirfieldandbytheendofthedayhad
establishedabeachheadapproximately1500yardsdeepby1700yardswide. Planswere
compleedforadrivetotheeastbythel
5
l.tRCTonthefollowingdayforthepurpose
ofeffectingajunctionwiththelstfiCTwhich,inthemeantiu.haadriventowithin
sevenmile,ofCabcabenonthesoutheasttipofBataan. Whilethegroundforceswere
51
establishingthemselvesashore,Americanwarshipskeptupacontinuousneutralizing
fireonenemycoastalgunpositionsinthecliffsofCorregidor. Despitethepre-D-Day
airandnavalbombardmentandthenavalgunfireconcentratedontheislandonD-Day,
enemygunnerssucceededindamagingseveralescortvessels. Inadditiontothis,de-
spiteallprecautionstoclearachannelthroughMarivelesBaytothebeach,oneLSM,
transportingthe24thDivisionReconnaissanceTroop,struckamineonbeachingandblew
up,causingseverecasualtiesandalmosttotallossoftheequipmentofthereconnaissance
troop.
AssaultonCorregidor
Onthemorningof16February1945,whilethe151stRCTwasexpandingits
beachheadatMarivelesandinitiatinganadvancetotheeasttocontactthe1stRCT
drivingdowntheeastcoastofBataan,the503dParachuteRCT,launchedtheairborne
assaultonCorregidor. Thisassaulthadbeenprecededbythoroughaerialreconnais-
sanceforapproachesandjumpareasandbydetailedplanning. Thisplanningcovered
airandnavalbombardmentdesignedtodestroyorneutralizeasmanyenemydefensive
installationsaspossiblepriortoD-Dayandtokeeptoaminimumtheenemyforceon
"Topside"duringtheapproachofthetroopcarryingplanesandduringthejump. It
alsocoveredthemainfeature,thatis,provisionsfordroppingthemaximumnumberof
troopsintheshortestpossibletimewithminimumcasualties.
Carefulaerialreconnaissanceandstudyofphotographshadrevealedthatthere
wereonlytwopossibledropzoneson"Topside*. Thesewererespectively"A",theParade
Ground,and"B",theGolfCourse. Theusableareaofdropzone"A"wasapproximately
150by250yards,whilethatofdropzone"B"wasapproximatelythesameinwidthbut
75yardslonger. Thetwocombinedprovidedthesmallestareaintowhichanairdropof
combattroopsinanynumberhadyetbeenmadeinthistheaterofoperations. Evenex-
cludingtheirlimitedsizeasafactor,thesefieldswerefarfromidealdrop-zones.
Theyweresurroundedbysplinteredtrees,tangledundergrowthandwreckedbuildings;
pockmarkedwithbombcratersandlitteredwithclods,rocks,bombfragments,tinroof-
ingandotherdebris. Further,thefieldsslopedsharplyattheirertremetiestodrop
offinsheercliffs. Theseweretheonlyfieldsavailable,however,soapproachand
jumpplanshadtobedesignedtofitthem. Itwasestimatedthatjumpcasualtiesmight
runashighas20percent.
Basedondropconditionsanticipated,aflightpatternoftwocolumnsof
singleplanesintrail,onecolumnovereachfield,wasadopted. Eachplanewasto
makeaminimumoftwoorthreepassesasnecessary,droppingastickofsixtoeight
menineachpass. Intheactualexecutionoftheplantheinitialsticksweredropped
fromanaltitudeofabout650feet. Thiswassoonreducedto500feetorlessto
minimizedrift. LiftsweretobemadefromSanJose,Mindoroasfollows;
a. Firstlift,31C47's,tobeovertheobjectiveareaatO83OI,16February
1945:
3dBattalion,503dParachuteInfantry
Detachment,Headquarters,53&ParachuteInfantry
l6lstEngineerCompany
Detachment,HeadquartersBattery,4&2dFieldArtilleryBattalion
BatteryA,462dFieldArtilleryBattalion(75mmHow)
.50CalMGPlatoon,BatteryD,462dFieldArtilleryBattalion
b. Secondlift,51C47's,tobeovertheobjectiveareaat12151,16February
1945:
Detachment,Headquarters,503dItarachuteInfantry
2dBattalion,503dParachuteInfantry
ServiceCompany,5Q3&ParachuteInfantry
BatteryB,462dFieldArtilleryBattalion(75mmHow)
c. Thirdlift,43C47's,tobeovertheobjectiveareaat08301,17February
1945:
Balance,Headquarters,503&ParachuteInfantry
1stBattalion,53&ParachuteInfantry
52
BatteryC,46^dFieldArtilleryBattalion(75xnmHow)
d. 12C47'swereallocatedfordailyresupplyuntilreplacedbyamphibious
resupplyassoonasasupplyroadfromSanJosebeachto"Topside-should
beopened.
b a
f
i S ft h i s f l i g h t plan a n
airborneforceof2022wastobedropped
F hru&
reinfnJ A \l t y
x
?45. This,combinedwiththe
3
dBattalion,34thInfantry,
off00?VT T l I?')
U 6FebpUary
^
k5)t0talOf2
'?
1 6
'buildinguptoatotal
of4,002bytheendof1^2(1?February1945). Basedontheestimatethatenemystrength
onCorregidorapproached850plus,thisforcewasdeemedmorethanadequate.
Toaccomplishtheobjectiveofdestroyingorneutralizingasmanyenemydefenses
aspossiblepriortoD/landtoforcetheenemytostayawayfrom"Topside"duringday-
lighthours,Corregidorwassubjectedtotheheaviestandmostintensiveaerialpounding
towhichanyareaofcomparablesize(lessthanonesquaremile)hadbeensubjected
duringtheentirewarintheSouthwestPacificArea. Beginningon23January1945,and
continuingthrough15February1945.theFifthBomberCommanddropped3,128tonsof
bombsontheisland. Mostofthistonnagewasdroppedonenemydefensiveinstallations
on"Topside".
On16February1945.inadditiontothenavalgunfirepreparationbycruisers
anddestroyers,aheavyairbombardmentprecededandcoveredtheparachutedropscheduled
forO83OI. From07451to08001,onegroupofheavybombersdroppedapproximately125
tonsofdemolitionbombsonthe"Rock",mostofthemon"Topside". Thiswasimmediately
followedbyonegroupofA-20'swhichstrafedandbombedbothCorregidorandCaballo
Islandswith250poundpara-demobombs. FollowingH-HourduringtheperiodO83OIto
09301,twogroupsofA-20'scoveredtheareasoutsidethejumpzones. Bythistimethe
firstliftofparatrooperswasonthegroundandairsupportwasthenlimitedtothree
squadronsofA-20'sonairalert: onepreparedtoflysmokemissionsoncall;theother
twotosupportthesecondairdropoftroopsscheduledfor12301. Thetotalweightof
bombsdroppedindirectsupportofthecombinedairborneandamphibiousassaulton16
February1945wasI85tons.
ThedropofthefirstliftofparatroopersbeganpromptlyatO83OIon16February
1945* Thedropproceededaccordingtoschedule. Whiletherewassporadicanti-aircraft
fireduringthedrop,holingsomeplanesandinjuringsomepersonnel,theclosesupport
ofstrafingA-20*sontheflankssilencesmostofthefireandnotrooperswereprevented
fromjumpingnorwereanyplaneslost. Theheavynavalandairbombardmenthadforced
theenemytoabandonmostof"Topside"andtakecoverinthenumerouscaves,tunnelsand
heavilyfortifiedgunpositionswithwhichthe"Rock"washoney-combed. Thedegreeof
surpriseattainedwasattestedtobythespeedwithwhichtheparatrooperswereableto
organizeandseizetheirinitialobjective. Enemyresistancewaslimitedtosmallgroups
oftwoorthreemenfiringmachinegunsandrifles. AtIO3OI,the3dBattalion,34th
Infantry,reinforced,landedonSanJosebeachfollowingapreparatorynavalbombardment
whicheffectivelyneutralizedenemygunpositionscoveringtheapproachestothebeach.
Landminesencounteredonthebeach,however,causedheavycasualtiesanddamageto
equipment. TheamphibiousforcequicklysecuredthetopofMalintaHill. Thesecond
liftofparatroopscommenceddroppingat"12501,16February1945-
T h i s
ôpwasalso
completedsuccessfullydespitecontinuousbutinaccurateenemyantiaircraftfire,which,
becauseofthecloseproximityofourtroopsonthegroundtothejumpareacouldnotbe
silencedbystrafingA-20's.
Bytheendoftheday,16February1945.theparachuteforcewasfirmlyestab-
lishedon"Topside",whiletheamphibiousforce,byseizingMalintaHill,controlled
thedominatingterraininthebeachheadarea. Theenemy'scommunicationshadbeendis-
rupted,hisforcescutintwo. Thedominatingterrainontheislandwasours. The
assaultphaseoftheoperationwascomplete,butthetaskofroutingtheenemyfroma
myriadofstrongpointsincavesandtunnelsallovertheislandwastodevelopinto
someofthebloodiestfightingoftheLuzonCampaign.
WiththecompletionoftheassaultphaseoftheCorregidorOperation,arecapitu-
lationofjumpcasualties,inthelightofsubsequentinformationobtainedonenemy
strengthandplanofdefense,isinorder. Dropcasualties,whichithadbeenestimated
previouslymightrunashighas20percent,actuallyapproximatedslightlyover11per
cent,asfollows;
53
Totalnumberofmendropped2,022
Killed 12
Woundedandinjured 267
TotalCasualties 279
Ofthe12deathsinthejump,onewasduetoamalfunctionofchute;the
otherswereduetoenemyactionortostrikingbuildingsorotherobstacles.
Thefollowingfactorscombinedtomaketheassaultphaseoftheoperationsuc-
cessfulandtokeepthejumpcasualtiesdowntoapproximatelyhalfthepre-operation
estimate: first,thecarefulreconnaissancefordropzoneswhichprecededtheoperation,
andthedetailedplanningwhichresultedinawellcoordinatedapproachbythetroop
carriersandaflightpatternandjumpplanwhichbestsuitedtheanticipatedconditions,
butwhichwassufficientlyflexibletopermitittobequicklymodifiedtofitanysitua-
tionencountered;second,theclosetimingandcoordinationoftheactionsoftheland,
seaandaircomponentsparticipatingintheoperation. Anexampleofthiswasthesuccess
attainedbytheAlliedAirandNavalforcesinpreventingtheJapanesefromoccupying
defensivepositionsonTopside"fromwhichtorepulsetheairborneassault. Thistim-
ingandcoordinationrequiredahighstandardofstaffplanningandcooperationbetween
thevariousheadquartersconcerned;third,thecompletesurpriseattained. Information
laterobtainedfrominterrogationofprisoners-of-warandexaminationofcaptureddocu-
mentsshowedthattheenemystrengthonCorregidorapproached6000, TheJapanesehad
3000troopsdisposedonthedefense,perimeterofthe"Rock",inpreparedpositionsto
opposeanamphibiousassault. Thesepositions,locatedintheravinesleadingfromthe
shoreto"Topside",providedmutuallysupportingbandsoffireandmadelateralmovement
alongthebeachorovertheinterveningridgesextremelydifficult. However,theylacked
anylateralwirecommunication. Suchwirecommunicationasdidexistwasfromthevarious
strongpointstoacentral,locatedon"Topside",whichwascapturedatanearlymoment
anddestroyedbytheparachutists. Thebalanceoftheenemy'sstrengthonCorregidor,
approximately3000men,wasconcentratedintheMalintaHillandTunnelarea. Fromthe
above,itisapparentthattheenemyplannedtopreventamphibiouslandingsonthe
beachesimmediatelybelow"Topside";topreventamphibiouslandingsatornearSanJose;
andtoprovideareservetocounterattackanddestroyanyamphibiousforcewhichmight
succeedingettingashore.
Indevelopinghisplanofdefense,theJapanesecommanderonCorregidorcom-
pletelyruledoutthepossibilityofanairborneassault. Higherheadquartershadwarned
himtobepreparedforanairborneassault. But,inspiteofthat,afterexamingall
possibleareasinwhichparatroopersmightconceivablybedropped,hehadapparently
concludedthatsuchanoperationwouldbecompletelyiiLpracticableandconsequentlyhad
takennoprecautionsagainstit.
Becauseoftheinitialsuccessesattainedonthedayoftheassaultandinorder
toavoidanyfurtherjumpcasualties,theCommandingOfficer,53&ParachuteRCT,request-
edthatthethirdliftscheduledtodropthe1stBattalion,53&ParachuteInfantry,
reinforced,onCorregidorbeginningatO83OI,17February1945*&
e
directedtodroponly
itssuppliesandequipment,thepersonneltolandatSanMarcelinoairstripnearSubic
Bayandmakeashore-to-shoremovementtothe"Rock". Thisrequestwasapprovedandthe
appropriateordersissued. Thesuppliesweredroppedasscheduledandtheremainderof
theRCTlandedonSanJosebeachontheafternoonof17February1945 Asthelanding
craftapproachedtheshore,theycameunderheavyenemyautomaticweaponsfirewhich
forcedthemtowithdrawuntildestroyershadmovedincloseandsilencedthefire.
From17February1945through23February1945,the503dParachuteRCT,rein-
forced,engagedinamethodicalreductionofenemydefensivepositionson"Topside",
inthecliffssurroundingit,andintheMalintaHillarea. Thesame"gopherlike"Japan-
eseresistanceencounteredelsewhereonLuzonandinotherSouthwestPacificoperations
wherevertheenemywascornered,characterizedtheenemy'slaststandonCorregidor,
Hehadtobesealedinhiscavesortunnelsbydemolitionsordugoutbygrenadesand
flamethrowers. Inseveralinstancestheenemyresortedtomassselfdestruction. He
blewupaportionoftheMalintaTunnelonthenightof21-22February1945causingan
untoldnumberofcasualtiestohisownforcesandinflictingheavycasualtiesonthe
3dBattalion,34
t n
Infantry. Againon26February1945
n e
blewupanammunitiondump
inthevicinityofMonkeyPoint. ThiswastheheaviestexplosiononCorregidorand
causedover100casualtiesinthe1stBattalion,53dParachuteInfantry.
54
datethe2dBattalion,151stInfantry,relievedthe3dBattalion,34thInfantry,on
Corregidor. The
3
dBattalion,
3
4thInfantry,movedfromCorregidortoSub!cB ^ on2
5
reDruary1945,toprepareforfurtheroverwatermovementtoMindoroon10March1945,
inaccordancewithinstructionscontainedinSixthArmyFieldOrder54,issuedon25
February1945- By2?February1945,enemyremnantshadbeencorneredontheextreme
easterntipoftheisland. Onthisdate,the503dParachuteRCTlaunchedafinal
assaultonthisenemypocketandbytheendofthedayallorganizedresistanceon
Corregidorwascrushed;nothingbutmoppingupofsmall,isolatedenemystrongpoints
incavesandtunnelsremained.
DuringtheactiononCorregidoruptoandincluding2?February1945,the503d
ParachuteRCT,reinforced,hadkilled4,497Japaneseandcaptured19. Thecasualties
sustainedbythe503dParachuteRCT,reinforced,duringthesameperiodwere209killed,
725woundedand19missing. Thesefiguresincludethe279jumpcasualties. (Fordis-
positionsonCorregidoronS/49,27February1945,seeDiagram28.)
CollapseofOrganizedEnemvResistanceonBataan
Whilethe503&ParachuteRCT,reinforced,wasdrivingtheenemyfromhiscaves
andtunnelsonCorregidor,the151stRCT,reinforced{38thDivision),andthe1stRCT,
reinforced(6thDivision),hadadvancedtoeffectajunctionontheeastcoastofBataan.
Neitherforcehadencounteredstrongenemyresistance. By17February1945,the151st
RCT,reinforced,hadsecuredthesoutherntipofBataantoincludeCabcabenandon18
February1945madecontactwiththe1stRCT,reinforced,justnorthofCabcaben. Simul-
taneouslywithitsadvancedowntheeastcoastofBataan,the1stRCT,reinforced,had
sentonebattalionwesttowardBagaconthePilar-BagacRoad* On18February1945
the149thInfantry(38thDivision)beganacrosscountryadvancewestfromPilaronthe
northsideofthePilar-BagacRoad. Theonlyorganizedenemyresistanceencountered
wasontheapproachestoBagacandthiswassoonbroken. On20February1945the1st
Battalion,1stInfantry,reachedBagac,thuscuttingBataaninhalf. Ithadencountered
nofixeddefensivepositionsexceptafewwhichweredesignedtodefendagainstanattack
fromthewest. Theseweredeserted. By20February1945,elementsofthe149thInfantry,
advancingoverland,hadreachedpositionshalfwayacrossBataanPeninsula,whileother
elementsoftheregimentinitiatedreliefofthe1stBattalion,1stInfantry,inthe
Bagacarea. Theonlyoppositionencounteredbythisforcewasthehalf-heartedenemy
defenseofafortifiedpositionapproximatelyfourmileswestofPilar, Theenemyforce
evacuatedthispositionundercoverofdarkness,however,andwhenourforcesoccupied
ittheyfoundithadbeenconstructed.todefendagainstanattackfromthewest. With
theseizureofBagac,anyvestigeofwhatmighthavebeentermedorganizedresistance
onBataanwasatanend. (FordispositionsofXICorpsonS/42,20February1945,see
Diagram29.)
CollapseofOrganizedEnemvResistanceWestofFt.Stotsenburg
On19February1945SixthArmyFieldOrder53wasissued. Theprovisionsof
thisfieldorderapplyingtoXICorpsdirectedthat,effective08001,21February1945*
thecorpsassumecontrol"ofthe40thDivisionintheFortStotsenburgareaandresponsi-
bilityforoperationsinthatportionoftheXIVCorpszoneofactionlyingwestofthe
PampangaRiver. ThisfieldorderfurtherdirectedXICorpstorelievethe1stRCT(6th
Division)onBataanandconcentrateitintheSanVicenteareaofBulacanProvinceby
e
18001,23February1945.
T h
RCTcompletedthismovementby18001,23February1945,
andthereuponpassedtocontroloftheCommandingGeneral,XIVCorps.
InaccordancewiththeprovisionsofSixthArmyFieldOrder53
%
the40thDivision
andresponsibilityforoperationsintheFortStotsenburgareapassedtoXICorpsat
e
4
0 t h
08001,21February1945.
T h
Divisionmadepreparationsforanattackon23Febru-
ary1945tocrushremainingenemyresistancewestofFortStotsenburg. Meanwhile,the
38thDivisionhadinitiatedintensivepatrollingofthewestcoastandtheinteriorof
BataanPeninsula. WiththeoccupationofBagacon20February1945.thepeninsulacould
betermedcompletelyinourhands. Itwasexpected.However,thatisolatedenemy
possiblyofapproximatelycompanysize,mightbefoundintheinterior.
55
Onthemorningof23February1945*the4thDivision,withtworegiments
abreast,launchedanattacktothewesttobreakorganizedenemyresistanceintheSnake
HillareawestofFortStotsenburg. Fortwodayspriortothisattackapproximately125
B-24'sadayhadpoundedtheenemypositionswithdemolitionandfragmentationbombs.
Manyoftheseenemypositionsconsistedoftheusualcavesduginthefacesofalmost
perpendicularcliffsandsoarrangedastodelivermutuallysupportingfires. Fromthese
cavepositions,theenemyhadbeenabletoslowouradvancetoasnail'space. Inaddi-
tiontotheB-24strikesontheseenemypositions,fighterbomberssaturatedtheposi-
tionswithnapalmon21February1945122February1945*
n
&Justpriortotheattackon
23February1945* Enemyoppositiontothegroundoffensivewaslightanddisorganized.
B|ytheendoftheday,thedivisionhadmadeadvancesrangingfrom2000to400yards
throughthemostruggedterrain. By2400I,25February1945,the40thDivisionhad
effectivelybrokenorganizedenemyresistancewestofFortStotsenburg,. Severallarge
pocketsofenemyresistanceremainedtobedestroyedbuttheenemy'scapabilityofa
coordinateddefenseinthisareawasgone, (Fordispositionsofthe4thDivisionon
S/47,25February1945,seeDiagram30.)
RedispositionofForces
InaccordancewithinstructionsreceivedfromtheCommander-in-Chief,Southwest
PacificArea,whichcalledforthedisengagementfromcombatofonedivisionforopera-
tionsintheWesternVisayasundercontrolofEighthArmy,SixthArmyFieldOrder54
issuedon25February1945,directedXICorpstorelievethe40thDivisionfromcombat
andconcentrateitintheSanJacinto(Fangasinan)areaby18001,4March19451
a t
whichtimeandplaceitwastopasstodirectcontroloftheSixthArmy. Thefieldorder
furtherdirectedXICorps,whilecontinuingcurrentmissions: topressoperationson
Corregidor,infiataanandintheBamban-FortStotsenburgareainordertodestroyhos-
tileforcesthereatanearlydate;torelieveelementsofthe24thDivisionthenunder
XICorpscontrolwithothertroops;toconcentratethe24thDivisionReconnaissance
Troop,34thRCT(less3dBattalion)and11thFieldArtilleryBattalionatSubicby
28February1945*
a n d
tomounttheseunitsinamphibiousshippingasarrangedbyHead-
quartersSixthArmy;toconcentratethe3dBattalion,34thInfantry,atSubicBayby
10March1945
an
^tomountitinamphibiousshippingasarrangedbyHeadquartersSixth
Army;andtorelievethe53dParachuteRCTandtoconcentrateitatCorregidorby10
March1945^
or
mountinginamphibiousshippingasarrangedbyHeadquartersSixthArmy.
Thefieldorderalsodirectedthe43^Division,whichhadbeenrelievedforrest
on13February1945fromtheRosarioarea,topasstocontrolofXICorps,asfollows:
172dRCTintheBambanarea,effective24001,26February1945J169thInfantryinthe
Camilingarea,effective24001,28February1945?andbalanceofthedivisioninthe
generalSanFabianarea,effective24001,28February1945
InaccordancewiththeprovisionsofSixthArmyFieldOrder541the43dDivision
completedreliefofthe40thDivisionintheFortStotsenburgareaon2March1945*
O n
3March1945the24thDivisionelementsundercontrolofXICorpscompletedembarkation
forMindoro,andpassedtocontroloftheEighthArmy. On4March1945the4thDivi-
sionpassedtodirectcontroloftheSixthArmy,inthegeneralSanFabianarea. On
thissamedate,the43dDivisionlaunchedageneralattacktocompletethedestruction
ofenemyforcesinthehillswestandnorthwestofFortStotsenburg.
General
Duringtheperiod6February1945througn4March1945,XICorpshadcleared
BataanBeninaulaoforganizedenemyresistanceandhadtakenCorregidor. Thisdidnot
securetheentrancetoManilaBay,asseveralsmallerislands,Caballo,ElFraile,and
Carabao,controllingthesouthernchannelintoManilaBay,stillremainedtobecaptured;
butitdidmakeitpossiblefortheNavytobeginminesweepingoperationsinthenorth
channelandManilaBaytopermitshippingtoentertheharbor. TakingoverfromXIV
CorpsintheFortStotsenburgarea,theXICorpshaddirectedthe40thDivisioninthe
offensivewhichbrokethebackboneoforganizedenemyresistanceinthatarea. Orga-
nizedenemyresistanceinthezoneoftheXICorpshadbeenlargelyeliminated. (For
dispositionsofXICorpsonS/54,4March1945,seeDiagram31.)
56
4 Summary:
daySt6F e b r u a r
+<*J"?
V
y
1
945- 4March1945.representedthemostactiveperiod
ois>ixt&Army*operationsonLuzon. Duringthisperiod,theCityofManilahadbeencap-
tured;theentireCentralLuzonPlainhadbeenclearedoforganizedenemyresistance;;the
southerntipofBataan,Corregidor,TernateandCavitehadbeensecured,thusopening
ManilaBaytoshipping;thousandsofAlliedprisonersofwarandcivilianinterneeshad
beenliberated;thebackboneoforganizedenemyresistancewestofFortStotsenburghad
beenbroken;andoperationshadbeeninitiatedtocompletethedestructionofenemyforces
westofFortStotsenburg,eastofManilaandinthemountainsofnorthernLuzon. Sixth
ArmyforceswereinpositiontoseizetheremainingislandsattheentrancetoManilaBay
andtodrivesoutheasttoclearBatangasProvinceandopenBatangasandBalayanBaysto
Alliedshipping,fy4March1945,mostoftheprincipalstrategicobjectivesoftheLuzon
Campaignhadbeenattained. Tworemainedtobeaccomplishedhowever;theseizureofthe
northernexitstoSanBernardinoStraitandthecompletedestructionoftheremaining
enemyforcesonluzon. Duringthefirst54daysoftheLuzonCampaigntheenemyhad
lostheavilyinmenandwarmateriel. His2dArmoredDivisionhadbeendestroyedasa
majorcombatunit. Hehadlostacountedtotalof65,204menkilledand641captured,
plusanestimatedadditional24,000killedbyartilleryandair,sealedincavesor
deadfromstarvationanddisease. SixthArmylosseswere3,480killed,13,164wounded
and211missinginaction.
Thismeantthatofanestimated260,000JapanesesoldiersoriginallyonLuzon,
approximately172,000werestilltobeaccountedfor. Themajorconcentrationsofthese
wereestimatedtobedistributedasfollows:
Bataan-1000
West of Fort Stotsenburg and in Zambales Province - 15,000
Antipolo-Montalban-Ipoarea-20,000:
Aforceconsistingofelementsofthe8thand105thDivisionswhichhad
movednorthfromBatangasandtheBicol,reinforcedbyseveralprovisional
combatunits,elementsoftheJapanese26thIndependentMixedBrigadeand
miscellaneousbasedefenseandserviceunitswhichhadevacuated-Manila.
Batangas-Bicolarea-l6,000z
Aforceconsistingofelementsofthe8thand105thDivisions,whichhad
beenpreventedfromevacuatingthisareabyourseizureofManila,rein-
forcedbyanumberofGyoroBattalionsandmiscellaneousbasedefenseand
serviceunits.
NorthLuzon-upwardof110,000:
BaletePass-SantaFearea: the10thInfantryDivision,practically
intact,remnantsofthe2dArmoredDivision,whichhadbeendestroyed
almostcompletelyintheCentralPlainandafewelementsofthe105th
Division,whichhadsucceededinevacuatingBatangasandtheBicol,
Rosario-Baguio-SanFernandoTriangle: remnantsofthe58thIndependent
MixedBrigadeand23dDivisionwhichhadsufferedheavylossesinthe
fightinginthePozorrubio-Rosario-Damortisarea,reinforcedbymis-
cellaneousbasedefenseandserviceunits.
NorthwestofBaguio: the19thInfantryDivisioninreserveand,asyet,
practicallyuncommitted.
CagayanValley: the103dDivision,reinforcedbybasedefenseand
serviceelements.
(FordispositionsofSixthArmyonS/54.4March1945.seeDiagram32.)
TheCommandPost,HeadquartersSixthArmy,closedatGeronaandopenedatSanFernando
(fampanga)at08001,12February1945- TheRearEchelon,HeadquartersSixthArmy,re-
mainedatCalasiaountil5March1945.whenitjoinedthebalanceoftheheadquarters
atSanFernando.
57
the H M I ?
5
- ,^
a
ns^ openBatangasandBalayanBaysandtoclear
theenemyfromCavite.Batangas,LagunaandTayabasProvinces;operations
toseizeandsecurethenorthernexitstoSanBernardinoStraitand
toclearenemyforcesfromsoutheasternLuzon;destructionof
hostileforceseastandnortheastofManila;annihilation
ofremainingenemyforceswestofFortStotsenburg;
operationstosecuretheremainingislandsat
theentrancetoManilaBay;operations
againstenemyforcesinthemoun-
tainsofNorthLuzonandin
theCagayanValley.
1. General:
By5March1945,theseizureoftheCentralLuzonPlain-Manilaareahadeffec-
tivelydividedtheenemy'sforcesintothreemajorgroups: namely,thatinsouthern
LuzoninclusiveofthemountainseastandnortheastcfManila;thatinwesternLuzon;
andthatinnorthernLuzon. Eachofthesegroupswasisolatedforallpracticalpur-
poses. SomecommunicationbetweennorthernandsouthernLuzonbycircuitousjungle
trailsthroughtheSierraMadreMountainswasstillpossible,butthemovementofheavy
equipmentorlargebodiesoftroopsoverthesetrailswasnotpracticable. Thestrength
anddispositionsofeachofthesemajorgroupswerediscussedatthecloseofthepre-
cedingsection.
OperationsofXIVCorpshadfurthercutofftheenemyforcesinthemountains
eastofManilafromthosesouthofLagunadeBay. Theenemydid,indeed,stillhavean
extremelytenuouslineofcommunicationaroundtheeastendofLacunadeBay,butthis
wassoontobecut. OperationsofXICorpshadalsosplittheenemyforcesinwestern
Luzon,bycuttingoffenemyremnantsonBataanfromthosewestofFortStotsenburgand
intheZambalesMountains. InnorthernLuzon,however,theenemyhadbeenabletoretain
asemblanceofcentralizedcontrol,sincetherehehadtheadvantageofinteriorlines
andcouldconductameasureofcoordinateddefense. Forexample,hecouldfeedrein-
forcementsfromhisreserveintheCagayanValleytotheBaletePass-SantaFe-Imugan
areadownHighway5
an
& totheBontocareaalongHighway4* Similarly,hecouldmove
reinforcementsfromtheBontocareatotheBaguio-SanFernandoareaovertheHighway11
Highway4-Highway3roadnet. Butthisroadnetwaspoor,wassubjecttocontinual
harassmentbyourairforceandbyFilipinoguerrillaforcesand,aswillbeseenlater,
v/aseffectivelyblockedatseveralpointsbythoseguerrillas. Atanyrate,itwas
extremelydifficultfcrhimtoshifttroopsbetweentheBaletePass-SantaFe-Imugan-
CagayanValleyareaandtheBaguio-SanFernando-Bontocarea.
Thusitcanbeseenthatthethreeisolatedmajorenemygroups: namely,thatin
southernLuzon,thatinwesternLuzon,andthatinnorthernLuzonwereincapableofren-
deringeachothermutualsupport, ivioreover,twoofthesegroupshadbeenstillfurther
splitup. Thedivisionofenemyforcesintothreemainisolatedgroupsprofoundlyaf-
fectedSixthArmyoperationsduringtheperiodfollowingtheoccupationoftheCentral
Plain-Manilaarea. ItenabledSixthArmysimultaneouslytoconductthreeseparate
corpsoperationswithalltheadvantagesofinteriorlinesandagoodroadnet,which
permittedtroopstobeshiftedreadilyfromonecorpstoanotherasoccasionrequired;
whereastheenemy,dividedashisforceswere,wasdefinitelyplacedatadisadvantage
andreducedtothepuredefensive.
Intheensuingdiscussion,theoperationscfeachcorpsduringtheperiod5March
through30June1945
a r e
dealtwithseparately. InthecaseofXIVCorps,thediscussion
ofoperationsiscarriedinitiallythrough31March1945.thedayprecedingthatonwhich
the158thHCT,reinforced,landedatLegaspi(BicolPeninsula),underdirectcontrolof
SixthArmy,withthemissionofsecuringthenorthernexitstoSanBernardinoStraitthen
drivingnorthwestuptheBicclPeninsulatomakecontactwithXIVCorps. Atthispoint,
thenarrativeshiftstothe158thRCT,reinforced,describingitsoperationsfrom1April
1945through22April1945,thedateonwhichtheRCTpassedtocontrolofXIVCorps.
Followingthis,thediscussionofXIVCorpsoperationsisbroughtuptodateandcarried
throughthecloseofthecampaign.
59
2. OperationsoftheXIVCorps: Sft5,5torch1945-
s
/
31
31March1945*
a. InitialoperationssouthofLagunadeBeyandeastandnortheastofManila,
S/55,5Lferch1945-3^4.14March1945.
On5March1945the158thRCTandthe11thAirborneDivisionweremoving
intopositionssouthofLagunadeBayfromwhichtolaunchanattacktothesoutheast
andsouthtoopenBalayanandBatangasBays. The1stCavalryDivisionandthe6thDivi-
sioneastofManilawereatthesametimepoisedforanassaultagainstenemyhillde-
fensesalongthelineAntipolo- Montalban. The112thROT,attachedtothe6thDivision,
wasscreeningtheXIVCorpsnorthflankfromtheMovalichesWatershednorthtoCabanatuan.
SixthArmyFieldOrder5$,whichwentintoeffectat00011,5March1945changedexist-
ingboundaries,transferredthe37thDivision(less145thRCT)fromXIVCorpstodirect
SixthArmycontrolandassigneditasthegarrisonofManila,andreleasedthe158thRCT
fromSixthArmyReservetothecontrolofXIVCorpsintheParanaque(Rizaljarea. The
145thRCThadpassedtothecontroloftheProvostMarshalGeneral,USAFFE,inManilaen
2March1945.
OperationsSouthofLacunadeBay
On6March1945theH
t n
AirborneDivision,towhichXIVCorpshadattached
the158thRCT,attackedsoutheastwiththeobjectofopeningBalayanandBatangasBays.
Initialenemyresistancewaslight,contactsbeinglimitedtosmallenemydelayingde-
tachments. Inanticipationthatanadditionaldivisionwouldbeneededinthedriveto
openBalayanandBatangasBaysandtocleartheenemyfromCavite,Laguna,Batangas,
andTayabasProvincesandthat,bythemiddleofMarch,operationsinBataanandwestern
Zarabaleswouldhavereachedastagewherethe38thDivisionwouldbeabletorelievethe
bulkofthe43dDivisionwestofFortStotsenburg,SixthArmyFieldOrder56wasissued
s
on6March1945. Effectiveat00011,15March1945
t n i
fieldorderdesignatednew
corpsboundaries,relievedXIVCorpsofresponsibilityforoperationseastandnortheast
ofManila,andpassedthatresponsibilitytoXICorps. ItfurtherdirectedXIVCorps,
whilecontinuingcurrentmissions: topressvigorouslytheattackagainstenemyposi-
tionsintheAntipolo-Montalbanarea,untilrelievedofthatdutyinthisareabyXI
Corps;andtorelievethe1stCavalryDivisioninitszoneofactioneastofManilawith
the43dDivision(lessoneRCT)and,by00011,15March1945tocompletetheconcentra-
tionofthe1stCavalryDivisionintheAlabangarea(LagunaProvince). XICorpswas
directedinthisfieldordertoconcentratethe43dDivision(lessoneRCT)intheTaytay
area(eastofManila)inaccordancewiththefollowingschedule; oneRCTby08001,8
March1945;andthebalanceofthedivision(lessoneROT)by24001,12IVlarch1945. The
43dDivision(lessoneRCT)wastopasstocontrolofXIVCorps,effectiveuponarrival
intheTaytayarea,andreverttocontrolofXICorpsat00011,15March1945,atwhich
timethenewboundariesbetweencorpsweretobecomeeffective. Atthesamedateand
hourthe6thDivision,with112thRCTattached,wastopassfromcontrolofXIVCorpsto
controlofXICorps.
Theconcentrationofthe1stCavalryDivisionforoperationssouthofLaguna
deBaywouldpermitthe158thRCTtobewithdrawnfromcombatatanearlydateandstaged
foroperationsintheLegaspiareaoftheBicolPeninsula.
DrivingeastandsoutheasttoopenBalayanandBatangasBays,the11thAir-
borneDivision,reinforcedbythe158thRCT,advancedintwocolumns. Therightcolumn,
consistingofthe158thRCT,droveeastthroughtheneckoflandbetweenBatangasBay
andLakeTaal;theleftcolumn,composedofthe511th"ParachuteInfantryandtheI8?th
Parachute-GliderInfantry,advancedsoutheastthroughtheneckoflandbetweenLakeTaal
andLagunadeBay. The188thParachute-GliderInfantrysecuredthedivisionlinesofcom-
municationandconductedoperationstodestroyenemyremnantswhichhadwithdrawnfrom
Ternatetothehillssouthwestthereof.
Enemyresistancetotheadvanceofthe158thRCTwaslightanddisorganized.
TheRCTadvancedrapidly,seizedBauanonthenorthshoreofBatangasBay,sentaforce
downColumpanPeninsulatowardMabiniand,on12March1945,seizedandsecuredBatangas
Townagainstlightopposition,thereaftersendingpatrolstothesouthandnortheast
towardTabangaoandSanJoserespectively, (Fordispositionsofthe158thRCTonS/62,
12March1945,seeDiagram33.) On14March1945elementsoftheRCTinashore-to-shore
operationlandedatDagatanonCalumpanPeninsulaand,encounteringnoenemyopposition,
advancedsoutheasttowithin1200yardsofMabini. AdetachmentoftheRCT,advancing
southdowntheCalumpanPeninsula,encounteredanorganizedenemydefensivepositionon
60
Infantrymenofthe158thRegimentalCombat
Teammetlittleresistance andlevelterrain
intheirpushsouthtowardBatangasBay.
Thepointofthe1stCavalryDivision'sadvance
onAlaminosmovescautiously throughasmall
villageontheoutskirtsoftheobjective.
NearSantoTomas,Batangas,men
ofthe1stCavalryDivisiononaflankguard
pusliintothewoodsinsearchofenemysnipers
orapossibleJapambush
cat**rTr f P^ntmtubig,whichdominatestheapproachestoMabinialongthe
coastofCalumpanPeninsula. ThisdetachmentlaunchedanattackonMountMuntin-
tubi,.
:
on14March1945,makingslowprogressagainsttheusualfanaticalresistance.
t
. ,.
q
^ , the511thParachuteInfantry,advancingsoutheastandeasttoward
thelineSantoTomas(Batangas)-LosBanos(Laguna),encounteredonlylightenemyresis-
tanceuntilitreachedthevicinityofMountBijiang,justnorthofSantoTomas,andthe
higngroundjustnorthwestofSantoTomas. Hereastrongenemydelayingpositionwas
encountered On13March1945the511thParachuteInfantrylaunchedanattacktoseize
thelineoantoTomas-MountBijiang. Bynightfallof14March1945,elementsofthe
regimenthadreachedthenorthwestoutskirtsofSantoTomasagainstheavymachinegun
andmortarfire. OtherelementsattackingwountBijiangwereheldtosmallgainsby
heavysmallarmsandmortarfirefromcavepositionsonthehill. Concurrently,the
107thParachuteGlioerInfantryseizedandsecuredTalisayonthenorthshoreofLake
Taalwithoutenemyoppositionandbydark,14March1945,itspatrolsmovingcross-
countryhadreachedtheoutskirtsofTanauanwithoutenemycontact.
OperationsEastandNortheastofManila
Whilethe11thAirborneDivision,reinforcedbythe156thRCT,drovesouth-
easttcopenBalayanandBatangasB
a
ys,the1stCavalryDivisionandthe6thInfantry
DivisioneastandnortheastofManila,completedpreparationsforanassaultonthe
enemy'sAntipolo-Ivlontalbanline. Inthisarea,theenemyhadorganizedadefense
builtaroundtheusualnetworkofmutuallysupportingcavepositions. Insupportof
thesedefenses,theenemyhademplacedallthefieldartilleryandantiaircraftartillery
thathehadbeenabletowithdrawbeforetherapidadvanceofourforces. Thisartillery
rangedincaliberfromtheveryeffective47mm,hignvelocityantitankgun,to15Qmm
pieces. Toreinforcethisartillerytheenemyemployedspinstabilizedrocketsranging
insizeupto447
Indevelopingaplanfortheassaultontheenemypositionseastandnorth-
eastofManila,acarefulstudywasmadeofenemydispositionsandtheterrainasre-
vealedbygroundreconnaissance,studyofaerialphotographsandinformationobtained
fromprisonerofwarinterrogationsandcaptureddocuments. Asthisstudyprogressed,
itbecameincreasinglyevidentthattheenemydefenseseastofManilawerenotonecon-
tinuouspositionbutrathertwoseparateorganizedareaswhichwerenotmutuallysup-
porting. Tothedefenseofthesouthernposition,centeredaroundthetriangleAnti-
polo-Wawa-Montalban,theenemyhadcommitted12,000-13,000troops. Tothedefense
ofthenorthernposition,centeredonIpo,theenemyhadcommitted6,000-7,000troops.
Owingtotheroughterrainandinadequateroadnet,itwasevidenttheenemycouldnot
readilyshiftreservesfromthenorthernpositiontothesouthernposition,orviceversa.
Therewerenolateralroads,andthejungletrailswhichdidexisttraversedruggedmoun-
tainousterrainthroughwhichheavyequipmentorlargeorganizedforcescouldnotmove.
Itfurtherbecameapparentthat,evenshouldhehavesufficientforcestodoso,the
enemycouldnot,fortheabovereasons,keepacentrallylocatedreservefromwhichto
feedreinforcementstoeitherorbothofthesouthernandthenorthernpositions. He
wasforcedtcconductaseparateandlargelyindependentdefenseineacharea. Bydriv-
inginthesouthernwingofthisposition,wecouldeffectivelyblockenemymovement
fromsouthtonorthacrossLagunadeBay,furthermore,ourforceswouldbeinposition
foralateradvancetothesoutheasttocutthenorth-southroadalongtheeasternshore
ofLagunadeBay,whileascreeningforce(the112thCavalryRCT),operatingontheXIV
Corpsnorthflank,containedanddevelopedthenorthernpositionintheIpoarea.
Duringtheperiod5 - 7 March1945.B-24'sandfighterbombersstruckheavily
attheenemy'sAntipolo-Montalbanpositionswithdemolitionbombsandnapalm,with
particularattentiontotheAntipoloarea. Apre-H-Hourairstrikeon8March1945was
deliveredbySBD'sonpin-pointedtargetsinconjunctionwitha30-minuteartillery
preparation,followingwhichthe1stCavalryDivisionand6thDivisionlaunchedageneral
attackagainsttheAntipolo-Montalbanline. (Fordispositionsofthe1stCavalryand
6thDivisionsjustpriortothisattack,seeDiagram22.)
Inthefaceofbitterenemyresistancefromamyriadofcavepositions,which
includedheavymortar,artilleryandrocketfire,anddespitehighcombatlosseswhich
hadreduceditseffectivecombatstrength,the1stCavalryDivisiondrovesteadilyeast-
ward,makingitsmaineffortwithitsrightastridetheTaytay-AntipoloRoad. On11
March1945thedivisionsecuredthehighgroundnorthandsouthofAntipolo. On12
61
March1945the103dRCT(43dDivision)completedreliefofthe2dCavalryBrigade(1st
CavalryDivision)ontheoutskirtsofAntipoloand,operatingundercontrolofthe1st
CavalryDivision,securedthetownwithoutenemyopposition. (Fordispositionsofthe
1stCavalryDivisiononS/62,12March1945.seeDiagram33.) On13March1945the43d
Divisioncompletedreliefofthe1stCavalryDivision,andbynightfall,li^March1945.
hadadvancedeastandsoutheastagainstlightenemyresistancetoreachpositions3,000
yardseastofAntipoloandtosecurethehighgroundoverlookingTeresafromtheeast.
Onthissamedate,the1stCavalryDivisioncompleteditsconcentrationintheAlabang
area,onthewestshoreofLagunadeBay,inaccordancewiththeprovisionsofSixth
ArmyFieldOrder56.
Meanwhile,the6thDivision,attackingeasttowardthelineHill33$-Yfewa,
encounteredheavyenemyopposition,particularlyfromtheMountMataba-MountPacawagan-
MountOrohillmassdominatingtheMarikinaRiverValleyjusteastofViontalban. The
enemyhadsucceededinmovingapproximately2,000troopsfromtheIpoarea,bycross-
countrymarchthroughthemountainstoreinforcehisdefensivepositionseastofMon-
talban. While,asaresultofthis,the6thDivisionleftwingwasheldtorelatively
minorgains,thedivisionrightwing,afterheavyfighting,brokethroughtheenemy
defensestoseizetheridgerunningnorthandsouththroughHill335on12March1945*
(SeeDiagram33.) Throughoutthisperiod,the112thCavalryRCTscreenedtheXIVCorps
leftflankandconductedlongrangepatrollingtodevelopenemydefensivepositionsin
theIpoarea,
b. OperationsinsouthernLuzon,S/65,15March1945-
s
/
81
3
1
March1945:
InitsoperationseastofManila,theXIVCorpshaddriveninthesouthern
flankoftheenemy'sAntipolo-Wawa-Montalbanposition. ThisenabledtheXICorps,
onceithadtakenover,todrivetotheeasttomakecontactwithourforcesoperating
southofLagunadeBay,andtodrivetothenorthtocompletethedestructionofenemy
forcesintheAntipolo-Wawa-Montalbantriangle. Throughitsoperationssouthof
LagunadeBay,andwithreinforcementsintheformofthe1stCavalryDivision,XIVCorps
wasnowinapositiontointensifythedrivetocompletetheopeningofBalayanand
BatangasBaysandtodestroytheremainingenemyforcesinCavite,Batangas,Laguna,and
TayabasProvinces.
At00011,15March1945,controlofthe43dDivision(less169thRCT)and
the6thDivision(with112thRCTattached)andresponsibilityforoperationseastand
northeastofManilapassedtoXICorps. XIVCorpscouldnewconcentrateallitsefforts
onopeningBalayanandBatangasBaysandondestroyingenemyforcessouthofLagunade
Bay.
Intelligencesourcesindicatedthat,atthistime,slightlyover10,000
enemytroopsremainedinsouthLuzon,exclusiveoftheBicolPeninsula. Thesetroops
wereinscatteredconcentrationsthroughouttheareaimmediatelysouthofLagunadeBay,
themajorconcentrationareabeingtherectangleBatangasTown-Lucena-Lucban-Tanauan.
TheseenemyforcesconsistedofelementsoftheJapanese8thand105thDivisions,rein-
forcedbyseveralmiscellaneouscombatunitsandbasedefenseandservicepersonnelorga-
nizedintoprovisionalcombatunits. Theprogressalreadymadebythe158thRCTsouth
ofLakeTaalandthe11thAirborneDivisionnorthofLakeTaalgaveearlyindicationof
thedegreeoftheenemy'sdisorganization. Atthesetwobottlenecksarelativelysmall
force,occupyingwellorganizeddefensivepositionsinthehillsdominatingtheexitsto
thetwodefiles,couldhaveputupastrongdefenseagainstamuchlargerattackingforce,
and,maintainingacentrallylocatedreserveinthevicinityofLipa,couldhavefed
reinforcementstothemostthreatenedposition. Thistheenemyfailedtodo. Asopera-
tionsprogressed,itbecameapparentthattheenemyplannedtodefendaseriesofiso-
latedstrongpointsinthehillmassessouthofLagunadeBayandeastofLakeTaal. -^ch
ofthesestrongpointswasorganizedindepthwithmutuallysupportingandinterconnecting
cavepositions. Butthevariousstrongpointswere,inonlyafewcases,inter-dependent
ormutuallysupporting,anddidnotundulyslowouradvance,althoughtheirreduction
involvedseverefightingandoftenconsumedconsiderabletime. However,asmentioned
inthediscussionatthebeginningofthissection,theenemy'slinesofcommunication
betweenhisforceseastofManilaandthosesouthofLagunadeBayhadbeensevered,
exceptforHighway21andafewsecondaryroadsaroundtheeastendofLagunadeBay.
Theseweresoontobecutbythe1stCavalryDivision,operatingsouthofLagunadeBay,
andbythe43dDivision,operatingtothenorthofit. Whenthathadbeendone,the
enemyforcessouthofLagunadeBayweretrapped.
62
TheterrainintheAntipolo-Theresaareawasnoteworthyforitslarge
cavepositionswhichhousedbothlargeandsmallcaliberartilleryweapons,
Thesepositionsnecessitatedmethodicalreductionbydemolition,flamethrower,andbazookateams,
M-4ShermanTanksspearheadedtheattack,as
Infantrytroopsofthe1stCavalryDivisioncloselyfollow
totakethedevastatedcityofAntipolo
J R C T d r o v e e a s t a n
A4-v, n*u^-
dnort
heastonthesouthsideofLakeTaal
IT TVP
A
irborneDivisiondroveeastandsoutheastonthenorthsideofLakeTaal,
theAIVCorpsplanofmaneuverdevelopedintoapincermovementonLipa,justeastof
'
aKe aal
* .^
f o r c e
A
encounteredincreasinglynumerousenemystrongpointsasitad-
vanced, xheljdthRCTlaunchedanattackon21March1945toseizethelineCuenca-
%>untMacolod. TheACTcapturedCuencaonthatdateand,pushingon,encountereda
strongenemypositionintheSanJoseHill-MountMacolodhillmass. Elementsofthe
11thAirborneDivisionadvancingeasttowardLosBanoswereheldupforseveraldays
byanorganizedenemypositiononMountBijiang,buton20March1945succeededincap-
turingthismountain.
S i x t h
^W FieldOrder57,asamended,issuedon11March1945,haddirected
XIVCorpstoconcentratethe158thRCTinthegeneralLemeryarea{BatangasProvince)by
1B00I,24March1945,
an
atomountitforshore-to-shoreoperationstosecurethenorthern
exitstoSanBernardinoStrait. Thedetailedprovisionsofthisfieldorderwillbe
takenupunderthediscussion oftheLegaspiOperation. Pursuanttothisdirective,
XIVCorpsplannedtohavethe1stCavalryDivisionrelievethe11thAirborneDivision
andtohavethe11thAirborneDivisionsidesliptotheareasouthofLakeTaaltore-
lievethe158thRCT. On23March1945the1stCavalryDivisioncompletedreliefofthe
11thAirborneDivisionandthe11thAirborneDivisioncompletedreliefofthe158thRCT.
TheRCTthenconcentratedinthevicinityofLemerywhere,at18001,24March1945,it
passedtothedirectcontroloftheSixthArmy.
On25iferch1945whenthedisorganizedstateofenemyforcessouthofLaguna
deBaybecameapparent.SixthArmyFieldOrder58wasissuedinordertospeedtheopen-
ingofBatangasBay. ThisorderdirectedXIVCorps: tosecurepromptlythelineLlijan-
Batangas-Lipa-Tanauan-Linga,andtoopenBatangasBayforearlydevelopmentasa
portandsupplybase;toadvanceaggressivelyeastward,destroyenemyforcessouthof
LagunadeBay;tosecurethelineLucena-Tayabas-Lucban-Cavinti-Pagsanjan;and
toestablishcontactwithXICorpseastofLagunadeBay.
Intelligencesourcesreportedamovementofsomeenemyforcestothenorth
aroundtheeastshoreofLagunadeBay. ContactbetweenXICorpsandXIVCorpseastof
LagunadeBaywouldeffectivelycutthislineofcommunication. However,beforethis
contactwasestablishedandthisrouteblocked,theenemysucceededinmovingapproxi-
mately2,000troopsfromthesouthtoreinforcehisforceseastofênila.
Thepincermovementofthe11thAirborneDivisionandthe1stCavalryDivision
convergedonLipa. The11thAirborneDivisionby-passedMountMacolodand,leavingone
battaliontoreduceit,pushedeasttoIbaanagainstlightenemyopposition,thenturned
northandon27March1945seizedLipaHill(justsouthofLipa)withoutopposition.
Meanwhile,the1stCavalryDivision,afterbreakingenemyresistanceinSantoTomas,
pushedsouthand,seizingTanauanon26March1945*continuedtheadvancetoseizeLipa
on29March1945againstdisorganizedenemyopposition. Onthissamedate,otherele-
mentsofthe1stCavalryDivision,advancingeastalongthesouthshoreofLagunadeBay
after pushingthroughL03ânos,seizedBaywithoutenemyoppositionandsentpatrols
east,southeast,andsouththerefrom. On30March1945*
hel l t h
AirborneDivisionand
the1stCavalryDivisionmadecontactjustsouthofLipa. Onthissamedatethellth
AirborneDivisionalsosecuredthelineRosario-OldRosario(5milessoutheastofLipa)
withoutencounteringenemyresistance.
Bynightfall,31March1945,
X I V c
orpshadsecuredthelineLlijan-Rosario-
MapaetHill(justsouthofAlaminos)-Tanauan-Calauan-Bay. The32dReconnaissance
Troop(1stCavalryDivision)hadadvancedeasttoPilaonthesouthshoreofLagunade
Baywithoutmeeting-nemyopposition. Meanwhile,elementsofthellthAirborneDivision
hadsecuredMabinionCalumpanPeninsulaandhadcompletedclearingtheenemyfromthat
peninsula. BalayanandBatangasBayswerenowopenandsecure. (ForXIVCorpsdisposi-
tionsonS/81,31March1945.seeDiagram34.)
ThenarrativeofXIVCorpsoperationssouthofLagunadeBayishereinter-
ruptedtodiscussoperationsofthe153thRCTintheLegaspiareafrom1April1945
untilitrevertedtocontrolofXIVCorpson22April1945.
3. LegaspiOperations,3/82,1April1945-S/103,22April1945-
63
Planning
On5February1945theCommander-in-Chief,SouthwestPacificArea,ina
letterdirectedtotheCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy,theCommandingGeneral,Eighth
Army,theCommander,AlliedNavalForces,andtheCommander,AlliedAirForces,out-
linedthegeneralstrategyfortheLuzonCampaignfollowingthecaptureofIwanila.
Amongthestrategicobjectivestobeaccomplishedbyit,assetforthinthisletter,
SixthArmywastosecurethenorthernexitstoSanBernardinoStrait,inconjunction
withoperationsbyEighthArmytosecurethesouthernexit'stcthestrait. Theobject
oftheseoperationswastoopenupashortrouteofsupplyforshippingtoLuzonand
theVisayas. Onthebasisofthisletter,SixthArmyimmediatelybegantodeveloptenta-
tiveplansfortheoperation. Theabovementionedletterfromthe Commander-in-Chief,
SouthwestBacificArea,hadfurtherdirectedthatoperationsbeconductedtoclearthe
enemyfromtheBicolPeninsual. Aplantoaccomplishthiswasincludedintheoverall
planofoperationstosecurethenorthernexitstoSanBernardinoStrait, Aradiomes-
sagereceivedfromtheCommander-in-Chief,SouthwestPacificArea,on11February 1945
hadelaboratedsomewhatontheinstructionscontainedintheletterdiscussedaboveand
haddirectedthatSixthArmy,attheearliestpracticabledatefollowingthecaptureof
Aflanila,conductoverlandandshore-to-shoreoperationstoachievetheobjectivesset
forthintheletter. ThisradiomessagehadfurtherdirectedtheAlliedNavalandAir
ForcestosupportSixthArmyinaccomplishingtheassignedmissionsandestablished the
linethroughtheVerdePassageandSanBernardinoStraitastheboundarybetweenSixth
andEighthArmies.
TheSixthArmyplantocarryouttheaboveGHQDirectiveswasembodied in
FieldOrder57,issuedon11March1945* Itssalientprovisionsfollow:
a. SixthArmy,supportedbyAlliedNavalandAirForcestoseizetheLegaspi
area,AlbayProvince,byshore-to-shoreoperationsandsecurethenorthernexitstoSan
BernardinoStrait,the158thRCT,reinforced (strength5583) beingdesignatedasthe
TaskForce.
b. ThetargetdateforD-Daywasannouncedas2jMarch1945 iH-Hourtobe
determinedlater.
c. The5Hth ParachuteInfantryRegiment (lessonebattalion),ofthe11th
AirborneDivision,wasdesignatedasSixthArmyReserve.
d. TheTaskForcewasdirected: tolandonD-DayatH-Hour intheLegaspi
area,toseizeabeachheadandtocaptureLegaspi;tosecurepromptlythenorthernexits
toSanBernardinoStraitandtoclearSorsogonProvinceofallenemyforces;andtobe
preparedforfurtheroffensive.operations tothenorthwestofLegaspi,whendirected.
e. Inadditiontostagingandmountingthe158thRCTfromBatangasBayas
previouslydiscussed,XIVCorpswasdirectedtobepreparedtoconcentrate the5Hth
ParachuteInfantry(lessonebattalion),onorafterD-Day,atNicholsFielden24hours'
notice;tomountthe5Hth ParachuteInfantry (lessonebattalion)fromNicholsFieldfor
airbornemovementtoreinforcethe158thRCTinitsobjectivearea:
(1) Withoneparachuteinfantrybattalionwithin48hours.
(2) Withthe5Hth ParachuteInfantry (lessonebattalion)within60
hours.
f. TheTaskForcewasfurtherdirected: toarrangealldetailsofloaaing,
landingandnavalsupportdirectwiththeAlliedNavalForcesandalldetailsofdirect
airsupportwiththeFifthAirForce;andtosubmititsplan,toincludeplansofsup-
portingnavalandairforces,toHeadquartersSixthArmyby17March1945.
g. XIVCorpswasfurtherdirected: toarrangealldetailsforair-lifting
the5 H t h irarachuteInfantry (lessonebattalion)directwiththeFifthAirForce;and
tosubmititsplanformountingtheSixthArmyReservetoHeadquarters SixthArmyby
22JVferch1945.
TheletterreceivedfromtheCommander-in-Chief,SouthwestPacificArea,
earlyinFebruary,outliningthestrategicobjectivesoftheLuzonCampaignfollowing
64
by31March1945- WhentheoverallSixthArmyplanfortheclearingofthe
a W
?
3 be
i
n
f
f o r m u i a t e d
R?TW - " wasexpectedthatbythetimetheTaskForce
7 V o
re
^forcedhadsecuredthenorthernexitstoSanBernardinoStrait,had
clearedSorsogonProvinceandwasreadytoadvancenorthwestuptheBicolPeninsula,
XI/CorpswouldhavecompletedthemajortaskofclearingCavite,LagunaandBatangas
Provinces. Further,thatXIVCorpswouldthenbeabletoleavethe11thAirborneDivi-
siontomopupsouthofI*gunadeBay.whilepushingthe1stCavalryDivision,ora
portionthereof,southeastthroughsouthernTayabasProvincetowardtheBicolstoform
ajunctionwiththetaskforceadvancingnorthwest.
Legaspiwasthelogicalplaceforthelanding. Itofferedthebestbeaches
inthesoutheastBiccl,infactthebesteverencounteredinanySixthArmyoperation;
itaffordedshelteredanchorageslargeenoughtoaccommodatesufficientsupplyshipsto
supporttheoperation;anditsportfacilitieswerethebestinsoutheastLuzon. Besides,
alandingintheLegaspiareacutofftheenemyforcesinAlbayProvincefromthosein
SorsogonProvince.
However,landinginthisareainvolvedcertaindisadvantages: therouteof
approachtothelandingareapassedthroughSanBernardinoStraitwhichwasknowntobe
mined;whileEighthArmyhadsecuredthesouthernexitstothestrait,movementthrough
thestraitwasopentoharassmentbysuchcoastaldefensesastheenemyhadonthe
southerntipoftheBicolPeninsula. Further,intelligencesourceshadindicatedthe
existenceofahighlyorganizedbeachdefensesystematLegaspi,reinforcedbyartil-
leryrangingfrom105mmto6-inch. Itwasestimatedthatanenemyforceofbetween
1500and2000menwaslocatedintheorganizeddefensiveareaLegaspi-Camalig-Mount
Bariwy,andwascapableofcounterattackingthebeachheadwithinashorttimeafter
landingoperationsbegan.
Toovercomethesedisadvantages,SixthArmy,workingincooperationwith
representativesofAlliedNavalForces,developedplanstosweeptheminesfromSanBer-
nardinoStraitinadvanceofthetargetdateandtosaturatetheobjectiveareawith
aerialbombspriortoD-Day,concentratingonknownenemydefensiveinstallationsand
troopconcentrationareas. Itwasdecidedtoriskthepossibilityofenemycoastalde-
fensegunsbeingonthesoutherntipoftheBicolPeninsula,sinceneitherpreliminary
reconnaissancenorstudiesofaerialphotographsrevealedtheirexistence. Inanyevent,
itwasfeltthat,ifsuchgunsdidexist,theycouldbeneutralizedeffectivelybyair
andnavalbombardment.
ThenecessityforsweepingSanBernardinoStreitofminesandthenavy'sin-
sistenceonaprotractedaerialbombardmentoftheLegaspicoastaldefensescausedthe
postponementofD-Dayto1April1945.
In
addition,sincetheSixthArmyReserve(511th
ParachuteInfantry)wasalreadyintheBatangasarea,theplanwasfurthermodifiedto
provideforstagingitatBatangasAirfield,whichhadmeanwhilebecomeoperational,in-
steadofatNicholsAirfield,asoriginallyplanned.
Beginningon23March1945,theFifthAirForcebeganascheduleofdaily
bombardmentoftheLegaspiareabytwogroupsofheavybombers,atleasttwogroupsof
fightersandonegroupofattackbombers. Badflyingweatherrequiredcancellationof
thestrikesonabout25percentofthedays,butthebombardmentontheotherdayswas
veryeffective,destroyingLegaspiPortalmostcompletelyanddamagingenemycoastal
defensesseverely. CarewastakentosparethedockfacilitiesandLegaspiairstrip
which,althoughpockmarkedwithcratersfrompreviousbombingsandcoveredwithwrecked
enemyplanes,wasexpectedtobeusableforC-47'swithinafewdaysfollowingtheland-
ing. (ForthePlanofAssaultandEnemyStrengthandDispositions,Legaspi,seeDiagram
35.)
Operations
Thel58thRCT,reinforced,madetheoverwatermovementfromBatangasBay
throughtheVerdeIslandPassageandSanBernardinoStraittoAlbayGulfwithoutunto-
65
LegaspiPort. Theonlyenemyresistanceencounteredconsistedof3to4roundsof
artilleryfiredirectedatamphibiouscraftjustpriortothelanding. Thiswasquickly
silencedbynavalgunfire. Theterrificpre-D-Dayaerialpoundingandpre-H-Hourair
andnavalpreparationhadcausedtheenemytoabandonhisbeachandcoastaldefenses.
Theassaultforces,fanningoutquickly,seizedLegaspiibrtandTown,LegaspiAirfield
andMtLinguionwithoutmeetingresistance. Bytheendoftheday,1April1945the158th
RCThadestablishedandsecuredabeachheadanddispatchedreconnaissancepatrolsnorth-
westandsouth. TheCommandingGeneral,158thRCT,assumedcommandofhisforcesashore
at10301,1April1945. (Fordispositionsofthe158thRCTat24001,S/82,1April1945,
seeDiagram3&)
FollowingD-Day,the158thRCTpushedrapidlyinlandwhilesendingpatrols
tothenorthandsouthtodetermineenemydispositions,ifany,onitsflanks. TheRCT
encounteredonlylightenemydelayingforcesuntilitreachedDaraga. Here,aftera
sharpfirefightwithanestimatedenemycompany,theRCTcapturedthetownon3April
1945a
n
dpushedonwesttowardCarnalig. On6April1945
t n eR C T
overcamelightenemy
resistanceinseizingthehillmassjustwestofDaragawhichdominatestheentireYawa
RiverValley. ItthencontinuedontowardCaraaligencounteringonlylightenemyresis-
tancetoitsfront,butstrongresistanceonitssouthwestflank. Onthissamedate,
theregimentalATCompany,reinforced,inashore-to-shoremovementfromLegaspi,landed
atBacononthewestshoreofSugotBay,advancedsouthwest,andreachedSorsogonon7
April1945withnoenemyoppositionencounteredduringtheentiremovement. Fromhere,
theATCompanyinitiatedreconnaissanceofSorsogonPeninsula. PatrolssentfromSorsogon
westtoCastilla,easttoSugodandPrietoDiaz,andsouthtoGubat,Juban,Bulanand
Matnogfailedtodevelopanyenemycontacts,indicatingthatnolargeenemyforcewascon-
centratedinSorscgonProvince.
On11April1945the158thRCT,advancingwest,capturedCamaligagainst
onlyminorenemyopposition. Meanwhile,reconnaissancepatrolsoperatingonthesouth
flankoftheRCTlocatedwhatsoonprovedtobethemainenemydefensivepositioninthe
Bicol,inahillmasscenteredonMtCituinan,approximately2000-300yardssoutheast
ofCamalig. HereenemyremnantsfromSorsogonandAlbayProvinces,reinforcedbyevacuees
fromSamar,aforcecomposedlargelyofbasedefenseandservicetroopsandaportionof
aGyoroBattalion(SpecialPenetration-SuicideUnit),hadholedupintheusualcave
defenses. Whilethe2dBattalion,158thRCT,by-passedthisorganizedareatoadvance
southdownHighway1towardPutiaowithultimatedestinationtheBulanarea(westcoast
ofSorsogonPeninsula),the1stand3^Battalionsattackedtheenemypositionfromthe
eastandnortheast,encounteringbitterresistanceandartilleryfirerangingupfrom
155
mn
i(U.S.) Inthemeantime,theRegimentalIandRPlatoon,reinforced,madelandings
onRapurapuIsland,annihilatingthesmallenemygarrison,andonCagrarayIsland,find-
ingitunoccupiedbytheenemy.
SinceitwasanticipatedthatthetaskofdestroyingenemyremnantsinSorso-
gonProvinceandofsecuringthenorthernexitstoSanBernardinoStrait,wouldbeaccom-
plishedinthenearfuture. SixthArmyFieldOrder60,issuedon12April1945directed
the158thRCT,reinforced: toadvancepromptlyandvigorouslynorthwestwardandtoclear
theenemyfromAlbayProvince;toreconnoiteraggressivelytoincludethelineSabang-
Anayan-Cotmo;tocompletethedestructionofenemyforcesinSorsogonProvince;and
confirmingpreviousradioinstructions,todestroyenemyradarinstallationsonCatan-
duanesIsland,employingguerrillaforcestothemaximum.
Thisfieldorderfurtherconfirmedradioinstructionsreleasingthe5
ParachuteInfantry(lessonebattalion)toXIVCorps,effective00011,12April1945-
InaccordancewiththeapplicableprovisionsofFieldOrder60,the158th
RCTintensifieditseffortstodestroytheenemyforceintheonlyareainwhichorga-
nizedresistanceremainedjustsoutheastofCamaligandatthesametimedispatched
patrolsnorthwesttowardthelineSabang-Anayan-Cotmo. Patrolsoperatingsouthtc
Jovellar(14,000yardssouthwestofCamalig),andnorthwesttoNabua(4milesnorthof
LakeBato)failedtomakeenemycontact. Cn14April1945combatpatrols,conducting
shore-to-shoreoperationstocleartheenemyfromtheislandsinAlbayGulf,reported
Rapurapu,CagrarayandSanMiguelIslandsclearofJapanese. ApatrolfromtheRegimental
IandRPlatoonreachedMayong(6milesnorthwestofTiwiPoint)on15April1945without
enemycontact.
Meanwhile,the2dBattalion,158thInfantry,advancedsouthonHighway1and
securedBulanonthewestcoastofSorscgonPeninsulawithoutmeetingenemyopposition.
66
FollowingapreparatorynavalbombardmentonthePortofLegaspi,
menof the158thRegimentalCombatTeamhitthebeach.
158thRegimentalCombatTeamtroopsmoveintothetownofPortofLegaspi
andwitnessatfirsthandthetotalwreckagecausedbythepreparatory navalbombardment
h 8 d b 6 e n
^
er at i n i n
' this area, reported having driven approxi-
T* T*
%OW %OW
** ^ ^
tt ee
**
l i o l i o nn
g
ou outt
pp
Tl T
t
00
0
**'
t h t h
the
b a t t b a t t
batt
*
lion
^
out
reconnaissa reconnaiss pat roLwhi cht or tor: : r : Tl' T l ^ -**' -**' ^^ reconnaissance
patrols which located this td J f
locatedthisJapaneseforceindug-inpositionsin thehillssurrounding
n
r t h fBulan ( S o r s o
g
n
1 5 T
f
^ êvince). The battalionattackedthis
enemyforceon14 April1945,decisivelydefeatedit on1? April1945andcapturedor
destroyedlargequantitiesofsuppliesandequipment. Withthedestructionof enemy
forcesinthe San Franciscoarea,allorganizedenemyresistancein SorsogonProvince
ceasedandthe northernexitstoSanBernardinoStrait,the primarystrategicobjective
ofthe operation,weresecured. Thenceforth,themoppingup of enemystragglersinthe
U b ea c c o m
P
l i s h e db
?'Ii
2X
?
e C
yFilipinoguerrillas. On18 April1945,the2d Battalion,
ljBthInfantry,was thendispatchedin anoverwatermovementto Legaspiand thenceover-
landtotheCamaligareatoreinforcethe remainderofthe 158thRCTwhichwasmaking
slowprogressinits effortstobreakorganizedenemyresistanceinthehillssoutheast
ofCamalig. Meanwhile,one companyof the 3dBattalion,158thInfantry,had beendis-
patchednorthwesttoIriga(5-1/2milesnortheastofLakeBato),whichitoccupiedon\5
April1945withoutmeetingenemyopposition. (Fordispositionsofthe158thRCTon ^99,
18April1945tsee Diagram37.)
Thefactthatour occupationofIrigahad beenunopposed,thatpatrolssent
outtowardthe lineSabang- Anayan- Cotmohadmetnoopposition,and thattheadvance
ofthe1stCavalryDivisionoftheXIV Corpshad reachedCalauag(northeastTayabas
Province)by18April1945,indicatedanearlyjunctionbetweentheXIV Corpsandthe
158thRCT. In viewofthis,SixthArmyFieldOrder6l,issuedon18April1945,directed
thatthe158thRCT,reinforced,passto controlof XIV Corpsat00011,22 April1945.
Otherprovisionsofthisfieldorder,applicableto XIV Corps,willbediscussedunder
operationsofthatcorps.
Asthebulkofthe 158thRCTclosedin on enemydefensessoutheastof Camalig,
againststiffeningresistance,CompanyI,ofthatregimentpatrolleda10,000- 18,000
yardarc aroundIriga,but encounterednoenemytroopconcentrationsnor organized and
occupieddefensivepositions. Cn 20 April1945apatrolfromtheRegimentalAnti-Tank
CompanyoccupiedNagawithoutopposition,and thenwithdrewtoIriga. On thissamedate,
inaccordancewiththe provisionofSixthArmyFieldOrder60 directingthedestruction
ofenemyradarfacilitiesonCatanduanesIsland,acombatpatrolfromthe158thInfantry
landedontheisland,contactedthe localguerrillasand,organizingthemintoasmall
taskforce,locatedand destroyedthe enemyradarstationanditsdefendersonthe
southeasterntip of theisland. Meanwhile,themainbodyof the 158thRCT,whichwas
attackingthe enemycenterofresistancesoutheastofCamalig,surroundedtheposition
andconvergedonthe lastenemystrongpointon ahill2500yardssoutheastof Camalig.
At00011,22 April1945,
tn
e158thRCT,reinforced,thenpassedtocontrol
ofXIVCorps. (Fordispositionsofthe 158thRCTat24001,S/103,22 April1945.see
Diagram39.)
4. Operationsof XIVCorps,southofLagunade Bay andin thenorthwestBicol
Peninsula,S/82,1April1945- 3/103.22 April1$45-
Whilethe 158thRCT was functioningunderdirectoperationalcontroloftheSixth
ArmytoclearSorsogonandAlbayProvincesand to securethe northernexitsto SanBernar-
dinoStrait,the XIV Corpsintensifiedoperationstocleartheenemyfromtheareasouth
ofLagunadeBay. The 11thAirborneDivisionand 1st CavalryDivisiondroveeasttoward
thelineLucena- Tayabas- Lucban- Cavinti- Bagsanjan,the 1st CavalryDivisioninten-
sifyingits effortsto establishcontactwithelementsof XICorpseastof LagunadeBay.
Asalreadymentioned,the enemyforcessouthof Lagunade Bay occupiedanumberofiso-
latedstrongpointsthatwereasarulelocatedindominatinghillpositions. The enemy
madenoattempttoshifttroopunitsof any sizefromone strongpointto another,although
enemyremnantsfromastrongpointthathad beenoverrunoftensoughtrefugein aneigh-
boringone. Nothinglikeacoordinateddefenseexisted,andthe enemylaunchedno large
scalecounterattacks. Nowheredid heattemptaprotracteddefenseofanimportantcom-
municationcenterorroadjunction. All indicationswerethatthe enemyhadalready
acceptedthelossofsouthernLuzonasaforegoneconclusion,asindeeditwas,and, as
washishabit,had holedupinwellorganizedcavepositionsinisolatedhillmassesto
carryonthefighttothe death. Althoughthe enemyresistedbitterlywherevercontacted.
?hesecontactswereextremelylimited,and did not slowtheadvanceappreciably.. Each
divisionadvancedwithits primaryreconnaissancewellin advanceofthemainbody,while
lonTraLe patrolscombedthe areason bothflanksto developany enemycentersofresis-
tanceani to maintaincontactbetweendivisions. Otispracticeacceleratedtheadvance,
67
since,wheneverkeypoints,suchasroadcenterswerefoundunoccupiedQr
:
very,.lightly
held,thedivisions,bymotorizingacompanyorabattalion,wereabletoseze;such
pointsbeforetheenemy,withhisextremelylimitedmeans,.couldshifttroopstothe
threatenedarea. Likewise,whenpatrolscombingtheflankslocated
f
anenemy...Qenterof
resistance,aforcewasdetachedfromthemainbodytotake-itout.
Pacedbyarmorandmotorizedinfantry,theXIVCorps.advance-movedforwardina
rapidsweepthrougheasternBatangas,easternLagunaandwesternJEayabas.Prpyinces.Âd-
vancingeastonHighway1,the11thAirborneDivisiondrovethroughIban^tiaong,and
CandeleriatoSariaya,andsplittingintotwocolumnsatthelatterpoint,continuedon.
ThesoutherncolumncapturedLucenawithoutmeetingoppositionon hApril,.1945and,seized
Pagbilao,againwithoutencounteringopposition,onthefollowingday. The?northern:
columnadvancednortheastfromSariayaandseizedTayabasandLuc.btnon,7April1945>
At
variousintervalsalongtherouteofadvancetotheline.Pagbilao^.Lucena..~-
f
Xayabaa-,-
Lucban,the11thAirborneDivisiondroppedoffdetachments10,3ecure
t
jjnôrtant
A
townsand
roadcentersortotakeoutenemystrongpointsdevelopedby.patrols.,,.In^thismanner^
Dolores,TaysanandSanJuanwere'secured. Aforcewasalsosênttcthenorthtoinvesti-
gatereportsofenemydefensivepositionsintheMtMalepunyohillmass.
Msanwhile,ontheXIVCorpsnorthflank,the1stCavalryDivisionadvancecLêast
intwoparallelcolumns. Thesouthcolumndroveeast,throughAlaminbsagainstonly^.,
lightresistance,andcontinuedonthroughSanPabloto"secure,theroa<^junctionJust
southofLuisianaon7April1945
b u tm e
*no"enemy.resistance.- Adetachedforce,.dis-
patchedtothesouthatSanPablobythe'column,reachedthe"northern,slopeso^+JvitMale-
punyoon8April1945*havingmetresistancefromsmallenemy,decayingforces.only,.,The
northerncolumnofthedivisionfollowedHighway21"alongthe,southshoreofLagunade
BayanddrovethroughBayandSantaQruz. ItcapturedPagsanjanwithoutoppositionon
6April1945*
a n d
CavintiandLuisiana,alsowithoutopposition,on7April1945* ^con-
naissanceelementssentforwardtothenortheastonHighway?1,madecontactwit^.troops
ofthe43^Division(XICorps)atLumban(eastshoreofLagu'n|'deBay),
HavingsecuredthelinePagbilao-Lucena-Tayabas-Lucban-"Cavinti
r
-
i
Pagsanjan,
theXIVCorpswasdirectedbySixthArmyFieldOrder49,7'April/I945,to.se^zethe.line
Atimonan-Maubanandtobepreparedforafurtheradvanceto"thesoutheastînt.othe.
BicolPeninsula. 0n_9April1945patrolsofthe,11thAirborneDivisionreconnoitered
eastonHighway1toCalauagontheBicolPfeninsula,butcontactedscattered,enemy.strag-
glersonly..Meanwhile,elementsofthedivisionweredevelopingenemypositionônthe
southernslopesofMtWfelepunyo,whilethe2dCavalryBrigade(1stCavalryDiyisio^)
c
feltoutenemypositionsohitsnorthernslopes.
Advancereconnaissanceelementsofthe1stCavalryDivision.pavingenteredMauban
withoutoppositionon10April1945*thedivisionoccupiedthetown"inforcethe.follow-
ingday,sendingfjatrolssoutheastalongtheshoreofLamohBay^wKerethey.made"contract
withpatrolsfromthe11thAirborneDivision. ThelineAtimonan-Maubanhadthus"been
secured. (FordispositionsofXIVCorpsonS/92,11April194.$,seeDiagram-38.)
On12April1945SixthArmyissuedFieldOrder60whichdirectedXEV'Corpsto
captureCalauag,toseizethelineVinesRiver-CuyaoPointand-tobe.preparedfora
furtheradvancetothesoutheastdowntheBicolPeninsula. Aspreviouslystatedit_
alsoreleasedthe511thParachuteInfantry(lessonebattalion),(11th'Airbornedivision)
fromSixthA
rm
yReservefortheLegaspioperationtoXIV.Corpsand"therewithto""the.-
rn
controlofthe11thAirborneDivision.
UponreceiptofFieldOrder60,XIVCorpsredispqsedthe1stCavalrytDivisioi}for
adrivedowntheBicolPeninsula,anddirectedthe.11th"Air.borneDivision7to.mopup,i-n
thegeneralarea: Lucena-Pagbilao-Atiraonan-Tayabas,>hileintensifyingitsefforts,
assistedbythe2dCavalryBrigade(1stCavalryDivision)attackingfromthenorth,io
destroyorganizedenemyresistanceintheMt,Malepunyo'hillmass.
ThelineAtimonan-Maubanhavingbeensecure.4.an^contact;Between^'XlVa^4
r
-^J
CorpseastofLagunadeBayhavingbeenestablished,"tkeonlymajorpocketqforganized
enemyresistanceremainingintheareasouthofLagunadeBaywasintheMtmiepnnyq
hillmass,thoughsmallgroupsofenemystragglerswere^stillscatteredthroughout.the
area. Elementsofboththe11thAirborneDivisionandthe'1stCavalryDiyi
3
ionwere
closinginfromallsidestodestroytheenemyinthispocket.'Fromnowon,"theefforts
ofthe11thAirborneDivisionandoftheelementsofthe1st"'CavalryDiyisionsqutiiof
LagunadeBayweretobeconfinedtomoppingup. Foralf'pr.acticalpurposes,the'
68
st rat egi c obj e c t i ve ^ cleaMag the:*nemy from Cavi*e,
;
,Batangas and Laguna Provinces
and from the western portion.'of.Tayabas Province-had been accomplished.
^ Ap r i l 1945 the 11th Airborne Division completed rel i ef of elements of the
D
i
v i s i G I
*
i n
Tofrr *! ? ^ e area, lvar-Tanauan-Santo ôiDas-Calamba, and on 15 April
1945 the 1st Cavalry Division complyVM rel i ef of elementa of the 11th Airborne' Division
m-t he vicinity of Atimonsri-and in the Lucetia- Tiaong area. Ont hi s same date, bne
reinforced troop, 5th Cavalry (1st Cavalry D
iv
ision)-adVahced
:
downhighway 1 and seized
Calauag without meeMng enemy opposition. Patrols sent south from Gumacaron HighwayN
to Pitogo (Tayabes-Bay) failed to mafce enel# contact. Cn 17 April 1%5 the 2d Squadron,
5th Gavalry, joined the reinforced troop at Calauag, and i t s patrols reached"Santo
Domingo (northea-st of Caluag> without -contact.
Since âdvance elements of the XIV Corps arid elements' of the 158th'fief, rein-
forced, were^new within supporting distance cf each other, Sixth Army Field Order 61,
, y d
18 April 19/6i therefore, effective at 00011, 22 April 1945, attached the 158thROT
!
to-'the- XIV Corps'
v
arid directed that 'corps*' to assume responsibility for operations in
the Bi
C
ol Peninsula; by overland and
1
shore-to-shore operations to destroy enfemy remnants
in the Sicol PeninsulW; and to relieve *he
;
XI Corps garrison 6n Carabao Island with
:
guerri l l as under XIV Corps control. There wa^ evidence at- tiiis time that
1
some enemy
remnants had esc!aped
J
overland or by small boat from
r
the^northeastern Bicol and the area
soiitii of I^^na' de BaKto-'thfr Infanta area (Poli'llo St r ai t ) , from-which they were moving
-west^t o reîhf6rce
:
enemy forces oppd'sing- the XI Corps east of Manila. Sin<;e i t was'An-
t i ci pat ed that the i l Corp^would require al l i t s strength to vanquish"the' enemyfor'ces
east ' of Manila, Field ^rder ^1^further directed the XIVCorps, effective at 0001I,
p
22
April I-945
:
to reiiev the^XI'Corps of responsibility lôr-opera-ti^ns in -the Infanta -
Santa Marifi - Famy - Sinilokn area.
Pursuant t o the foregoing field
r
order, the XIVCorps increased the tempo of i t s
drive down
;
the Bicol ^Penlnsulaj initiated relief- of elements of XI Corps' inthe-Siniloan -
Faiqv area (northeast shbre of'Lagulia de Bay);and-on Carabao Island, and continued i t s
ef^forts-ttr'destr by the' enemy''pocket
1
'in the':Mt Marlepunyo hi l l ma^s.
;
By21 Aprii
:
1945* the
2d Squadron', 5tif CaYalry, reinforced, (1st Cavalry Division) had advanced northeast and
ea.st on Highway 1 from Calauag to*positioris^five miles east of the mouth of the'Bulala
River (vicinity of Flat Top Mountain). During this entire advance, it had encountered
no-organized enemy resistance', contacts being limited to small-groups of stragglers,
poorly armed and
J
In bad physical condition. Advance reconhais3ariee patrols reached '
Culiag (on Highwa^
1
!^ 16 miles eist of Santbl
1
Bay)'with only mirier contacts. The 302d
Reeonnaissarice Troop (1st Cavalry Division) reconnoitered fromPitoftO southeast on-
:
Highway N
J
to Gatanfiiuan {Tayabas Bay) without encountering an enemy.
Meanwhile, the 2d Cavalry -Brigade'(Ie3s< one squadron-) had closed in
;
on enemy
positions on Mt Ivlalepunyo from the north, while elements of the-11th Airborne Division
closed in from the south. Thi
3
pocket had been completely surrounded by 21 April 1945*
but the enemy s t i l l resisted fanatically. Ont hi s same date, elements of the 7th Caval-
ry had relieved elements of XI Corps in the Siniloan - Famy area, had secured Highway 21
from Lumban to Siniloan and.had, advanced to positions 5000 yards northeast of Famy on
the Famy - Infanta road;without enemy
7
contact-.
At 00011, 22 April
i
1945i' the 158th-HCT
t
reinforced, passed to control of XIV
Corps, which, at that same time, assumed responsibility for operations in the Bicol
Peninsula.
r
During tfie 22 days from 1 April 1945 through 22 April 1945. the XIV Corps
had cleared enemy forces fronTthe 'area soutfi of Laguna de Bay and had advanced east from
the' eastern end of Lake TaalW the Flat Top'-Mountain area (Basiad Ba^, Bicbl fteninsula),
a r6addistance of apprdXimately 135 miles. ' (For dispositions of XIV Corps onS/ i e ^
22 April' 1451'se Diagram'39)
5
, Operations of the:XIV Co r ^ VlOk. 2
3
April 1945-
;
S/172, 3P
of the XlV Corpsduring;:the:period 23 April 1945 through 30 June 1945
enemy-force's'in the Infanta area
of
69
OperationstoCompletetheDestructionofEnemy
ForcesintheBjcol-Peninsula
On29April1945the158thRCTbrokeallorganizedenenyresistanceinthe
CituinanHillarea,2500yardssoutheastofCamalig. Theregiment,lessthe3dBat-
talion,whichwasmoppingupsouthandsoutheastofCamalig.thenadvancednortheast
toBaao,encounteringonlyenemystragglersduringtheadvance. Withthereductionof
theenemyhillpositionssouthandsoutheastofCamalig,organizedenemyresistancein
thesoutheastBicolwasatanend. Thenceforth,the158thRCTconductedmoppingup
operationsbylongrangepatrolactionsandshore-to-shoreoperationsalongthecoast
oftheBicolPeninsulaandtheislandslyingoffshore. Contactswiththeenemyforces
werelimitedtoenemygroupsofnevermorethancompanysize. Mostofthecontactswere
intheMtIsarogarea(CamarijiesSur). TheRCTkilledapproximately800Japanesein
J u n e m o s t o f
thisareabetween23April1945and30 1945# thempoorlyarmedandinbad
physicalconditionfromlackoffoodandthedepredationsofdisease.
Meanwhile,elementsofthe1stCavalryDivision,drivingdownHighway1through
Labo,hadoccupiedDaetandhadreachedCabusao(atthemouthoftheBicolRiver)on
28April1945withoutmeetingenemyopposition, Patr61soperatingontheflanksand
fromshore-to-shorealongthecoastmadecontactswithsmall,poorlyarmedgroupsof
enemystragglerswhichtheyeasilyannihilated. By28April1945#theentire1stCaval-
ryBrigadewasconcentratedineasternTayabasandtheBicolPeninsula,the5thCavalry
spearheadingtheadvance,whilethe12thCavalrysecuredthelineofcommunicationsand
moppedupinrearareas. Onetroopofthe5thCavalryhadseizedBasacao(12milessouth-
eastofNaga)inashore-to-shoreoperationon27April1945andhadoccupiedNagawith-
outmeetingenemyoppositionon28April1945. n
2
9April1945thistroopwasreinforced
bytheremainderofthe1stSquadron,5thCavalry. The5thCavalrythenpushedontothe
southeastandreachedPili(7milessoutheastofNaga)on1May1945.
Th
e158thRCT,ad-
vancingnorthwestfromBaao,meanwhilecontactedanenemyforceestimatedatacompany,
reinforced,atthePawiliRiverbridgeonHighway1,forcedacrossingoftheriver,and
on1May1945occupiedAnayan(1mile southeastofPili),whereonthesamedayitmade
contactwiththe5thCavalry. On2Ikey1945.bydirectionofXIVCorps,the5
t n
Cavalry
thenpassedtocontrolofthe158thRCT. (Fordispositionsofthe1stCavalryDivision
and158thRCT,reinforced,intheBicolPeninsulaat24001,S/113,2May1945,
s e e
dia-
gram40*) XIVCorpsfurtherdirectedthe158thRCTtoassumeresponsibilityforthe
finalmoppingupoftheBicolProvinces. On16May1945theCommandingGeneral,158th
RCT,reportedtheBicolProvincessecurelyinourhands. \?hilemoppingupoperations
intheBicolPeninsulacontinuedthrough30June19451contactswerelimitedtoenemy
stragglersandsmallgroupsforagingforfood. The5thCavalryrevertedtocontrolof
the1stCavalryDivisionon6June1945andevacuatedtheBicclPeninsulatorejoinits
division. On15June1945,inaccordancewithSixthArmyFieldOrder68,the158thRCT,
reinforced,passedfromcontrolofXIVCorpstocontrolofXICorps,underwhosedirection
itoperatedthrough30June1945.
OperationstoBreakOrganizedResistancein
theMtMalepunyoAreaandMop-Upthe
AreaSouthofLa&unadeBay
On23April1945XIVCorpsplacedthe8thCavalry(1stCavalryDivision)under
controlofthe11thAirborneDivisioninordertoprovideaunifiedcommandintheopera-
tiontoexpeditethedestructionofenemyforcesintheMtMalepunyohillmass. The2d
Squadron,7thCavalry,whichhadbeenassistingthe8thCavalryinthereductionoffor-
tifiedpositionsonthenorthslopesofMtIvklepunyo,wasrelievedinthatareaby
elementsofthe11thAirborneDivisiononthissamedateandrejoineditsregimentinthe
Siniloanarea.
Thebulkofthe11thAirborneDivision,reinforcedbythe8thCavalry,converged
fromalldirectionsonenemypositionsintheMtMalepunyohillmass. Etaemycaveand
pillboxdefenseswerecleverlylocatedtocoveralllogicalapproachestothemaindefen-
sivepositionwithinterlockingbandsoffire. Theenemy'ssuicidaldefenseofthese
positions,combinedwiththeirinaccessability,requiredthesamemethodicalmethodsof
reductionbyspecialdemolitionteamsashadbeenemployedelsewhere. Muchclosefight-
ingtookplaceandprogresswasmeasuredinyards. Despitealloftheabovedifficulties,
however,the11thAirborneDivision,assistedbythe8thCavalry,brokeorganizedenemy
70
resistanceintheMtItfalepunyohillmasson1May1945. (FordispositionsofXIVCorps,
exclusiveoftheBicolPeninsula,at24001,S/112,1May1945,seeDiagram41.) While
the11thAirborneDivisionwasconcentratingthemajorportionofitsstrikingpower
againsttheenemydefensesintheMtMalepunyoarea,combatrjatrolsfromthedivision
combedtheentireareasouthofLagunadeBayandconductedshore-to-shoreoperations
alongtheshoresofBalayanandBatangasBaysandalongthesoutherncoastsofCavite,
BatangasandLagunaProvincessearchingoutsmallgroupsofJapanesestragglerswhich
hadtakenrefugeinvariousisolatedareas. Follov/ingthecollapseoforganizedresis-
tanceintheMtMalepunyoarea,divisionoperationsconsistedentirelyofthistypeof
combatpatrolling. On15June1945the11thAirborneDivisionpassedtocontrolofXI
CorpsunderwhosedirectionitcontinuedmoppingupoperationssouthofLagunadeBay
through30June1945.
OperationsAgainstknemyForcesintheInfantaAreaNorth-
eastofLagunadeBay
AsalreadymentionedindiscussingtheoperationsoftheXIVCorpsduringthe
tn
7
t h
period1April1945through22April1945, Cavalry,afterrelievingelementsof
XICorpsintheSiniloan-Famy-SantaMariaarea,advancedtowardInfantaontheFamy
InfantaRoad. AfterovercomingstrongenemyresistanceinthevicinityofKapatalan
Sawmill,theregimentpushedontothenortheastandagainencounteredstrongresistance
inthevicinityofPagus(11,000yardsnorthofSiniloan). Hereitwashalteduntilre-
inforcedbythe8thCavalry,whichhadbeenreleasedbythe11thAirborneDivisionon
O n t n e 2 d
3May1945. 7^ y !945 CavalryBrigade(less1stSquadron,8thCavalry)
launchedanattacktodestroyenemyforcesintheInfantaareaandtoseizeInfanta,
whilethe1stSquadron,8thCavalry,moppedupintheSantaMariaRiverValley,annihi-
latingnumeroussmallgroupsofenemystragglersencountered.
FightingitswayupthecoastofLamonBay,the2dCavalryBrigade(less1st
Squadron,6thCavalry)crushedorganizedresistanceintheInfantaareaandseized
Infantaon24May1945-
(FordispositionsofXIVCorps,exclusiveoftheBicolPeninsula,at24001,
S/I35,
2
4^ y
1
945.seeDiagram42.)
FollowingtheseizureofInfanta,the1stCavalryDivisionconductedmoppingup
operationsintheInfantaarea. Oneofthe.provisionsofSixthArmyFieldOrder64,
issuedon2June1945,directedthatthe2dCavalryBrigade(1stCavalryDivision)pass
tocontroloftheXICorps,effectiveat00011,5June1945- ông theconsiderations
governingthistransferwere: thenecessityofcoordinatingtheactivitiesoftheele-
mentsofXICorps,whichweremoppingupinthemountainseastofManila,withthose
unitsofthe2dCavalryBrigade,whichwereoperatingintheInfanta-SantaMariaValley
area-andtheanticipatedtransferofresponsibilityforalloperationsinsouthernLuzon
fromtheXIVCorpstotheXICorps,inaccordancewiththeprovisionsofSixthArmyField
Order68.
PlansforthetransferofresponsibilityfortheconductofoperationsonLuzon
fromtheSixthArmytotheEighthArmyat00011,1July1945.calledforXIVCorpsto
taêoverdirecHacticalcontrolofalloperationsonLuzononthatdate. Toaccomplish
tMs SixthSmyFieldOrder68,issuedon12June1945,relievedthem r Corpsofre-
s^nsibilityfZ allmissionsthencurrentlyassignedtoit,effective00011.1
5
June
S S anddirectedthatcorpsheadquartersandcorpstroopsremainingundercorpscontrol
ni'ltnthe vicinityofSanJose(Nueva.Ecija). ItfurtherdirectedXIVCorps,effec-
tive24001 foJune1945.toassumecontrolofallunitsonLuzonthatweretobeassigned
!rattachedtoEighthArmyandtobepreparedtocarryoutsuchmissionsonLuzonas
mightbeassignedtoitbytheEighthArmy.
Inaccordancewiththeprovisions.ofthisfieldorder,XIVCorpsaccordingly
71
1
SummaryofXIVCorpsOperationsonLuzon
FollowingitslandingintheLingayen-BinmaleyareaofLingayenGulfon9
January1945,%$1CorpshadadvancedrapidlysouthwarddowntheCentralLuzonPlain,
hadseizedthestrategicallyimportantClarkAirCenterand,continuingtheadvanceto
thesoutheast,hadreachedManilaon3February1945* Thecorpshadtraversedaroad
distanceofapproximatelyI30milesin26days. Ina29-daybattlecharacterizedby
itsdestructivenessandthefanaticalresistanceoftheenemy,thecorpshadcrushedall
oppositioninManilaandhadcompleteditsoccupationon4March1945* Duringthis
periodXIVCorpshadkilledover16,000oftheestimated20,000Japanesedefendersof
iv&nila,buthadcapturedamerehandful. FollowingthefalloftheCityofManila,XIV
Corpshadinitiatedoperationstodestroyenemyforcesinthemountainseastofivianila,
whilecontinuingtocrushorganizedenemyresistanceinthehillswestofFortStotsen-
burg. AftertheXICorpshadrelievediteastofManilaXIVCorpshadconcentratedall
ofitseffortsonopeningBalayanandBatangasBaystoshipping,hadsecuredthesouthern
entrancestoManilaBay,andhaddestroyedenemyforcesintheareasouthofLagunade
Bay,theInfantaareaandtheBicolPeninsula. At00011,1.5June1945whenitsopera-
tionsinsouthernLuzonended,theXIVCorps,in157daysofcontinuouscombat,had
killed4117Japaneseandhadcaptured681. Moreover,ithadreducedenemyremnants
insouthernLuzontoanestimated5
0 0
-600disorganizedandstarvingtroops,mostof
whomwereunarmedandinterestedprimarilyinonething: food. (Fordispositionsof
XIVCorpsat24001,^156,14June1945,seeDiagram43.)
5. OperationsofXICorps: S/55,5March1945*S/172.30June1945.
OperationsAgainstEnemyForcesintheMountains
totheLastandNortheastofivianila
TheCommandingGeneral,XICorps,assumedcontrolofoperationseastandnorth-
eastofIv&nilaat00011,15March1945*inaccordancewiththeprovisionsofSixthArmy
FieldOrder56,andthecorpsatonceintensifiedoperationstodestroyenemyforcesin
theAntipolo-Wawa-iViontalbanposition,thesouthernflankcfwhichhadalreadybeen
partiallyturnedbytheXIVCorps. TheXICorpsplannedtomakeaconcerteddrivewith
the43dDivision(less169thRCT)torollupthissouthernflank,andsimultaneously
therewith,tohavethe6thDivisionattackeastwithitsrighttodriveintheenemy's
centerwhileholdingwithitsleftintheMontalbanarea. The112thRCT(attachedto
the6thDivision)wastoscreenthecorpsnorthflankfromjustnorthofivlontalbanto
CabanatuanandtodetermineenemystrengthanddispositionsintheIpoarea. Aspre-
viouslypointedout,theenemy'sAntipolo-Wawa-Montalbanpositionwasentirely
separateanddistinctfromhisIpoposition. Thetwopositionswerenotlinkedtogether
byanydefensivesystem,norweretheforcesinthetwoareasmutuallysupporting,but
theenemydidmoveapproximately2000troopssouthfromhisIpopositiontoreinforce
hisAntipolo-Wawa-LfontalbanpositionduringtheearlyoperationseastofManila.
However,asthe112thRCT,whichwaslaterreinforcedbythe169thRCT,increasedits
pressureagainsttheIpoposition,theenemy,facinganacuteshortageofmanpowerin
theIpoareaandhavingnoreserve,madenofurtherattemptstoshifttroopstothe
south.
The43dDivision(less169thRCT)advancedintwocolumns,onecolumndriving
southeastonHighway21alongthenorthshoreofLagunadeBaywhilethenortherncolumn
droveupthe^crongRiverValleytowardthelineuQuitago- nutTanauan-&tYabang.
The6thDivisionadvancedea3twithitsrighttowardthelineWXBaytangan-MtPurro-
MtLamita. Itslefthaltedinfrontofthestrongenemy&titetaba- IvitPacawagan(Kill
390)- MtOrohillpositionsjusteastofJrfontalban,whichdominatedthelvârikinaRiver
Valley. The112thRCTmeantimepatrolledvigorouslyintheIpoareaandbegantodevelop
strongenemydefensesastridetheitetropolitanRoadapproximately8000yardswestofIpo.
Thesouthcolumnofthe43dDivision(less169thRCT)advancedsoutheastfrom
AntipoloonHighway21butencounteredlightenemyresistanceonlyandreachedPililla
on22./arch1945- Inthemeantime,themainbodycfthedivision(less169thRCT),
whichattackednortheastuptheMorongRiverValley,andtl.e6thDivision,whichwas
makingafrontalassaultontheenemy'spositionsdefendingtheapproachestotheline
MtBaytangan-MtPurro- hitLamita,wereencounteringheavyenemyresistance. Theentire
Antipolo-Wawa-ivontolbanpositionconsistedofanetworkofcavedefenses. Almost
everyhillwasasmallfortressinitself. Althoughtheenemyconductedaworeorless
staticdefense,thisonlycomplicatedoperations,foritwasnecessarytoreduceeach
72
*
3 t r o n
^
o i n t
forcehidtobedetacher ' ^ / ^ <">uldnotbereducedimmediately,a
U andthiSinturnreducedthe
attackingfor, p t f t^^ strengthofthemain
attackingforce. By22,*rch1945.however,the43dDivisionhadsecuredMtQnitagoand
tZl 7'
8 S
f
f a n a t
^ a l enemyresistance,whilethe6thDivisionhadreachedthe
northwesternslopesofMtYabang,whereitwasengagedinaheavyfirefight.
SixthArmyFieldOrder5&,23March1945,directedtheXICorpstopressopera-
tionstodestroyenemyforcesintheAntipolo-Montalban-Ipoarea;tocaotureCaballo,
*lm*ile anaOurabaoIslandstocompletetheopeningofManilaBay;andtoestablish
contact withAXVCoreseastofLagunadeBay.
Onthesameday,the43dDivision (less169thRCT), havingsecuredMtQuitago
and MtTanauan,thoughmoppingupoperationsinbothareaswerestillinprogress,en-
ccuntered heavyresistanceasitadvancedeasttowardEosoboso. Otherelementsofthe
divisionreachedthesouthernslopesofMtYabang. At24001,23March1945,the169th
RCT(43dDivision)completedconcentrationinthevicinityofRirang(jOOOyardssouth-
eastofSantaUdaria,BulacanProvince)andpassedfromcontrolofthe38thDivisionto
controlofthe43dDivision. The43dDivisionattackedMtYabangon24March1945after
heavy airandartillerybombardment,captureditthenextdayandsecuredBosobosoon
26Iv^rch1945- The6thDivisioncapturedMtBaytanganthesameday.
WiththecaptureofthelineMt Quitago-MtTanauan-MtYabangbythe43d
DivisionandthecaptureofMtBaytanganbythe6thDivision,XICorpshadcrushed
organizedenemyresistanceinthemountainsdueeastofManila. Buttheoperations
whichfollowed involvedmuchbitterfighting. Moreover,MtMataba,MtPacawagan,Mt
Oro, -'.tPurroandIv.tLamita,veritablefortresses,stillremainedtobereducedand
theirdefendersdestroyed. WiththeseizureofthehighgroundoverlookingBosoboso
andofXYetownitself,theenemy'sabilitytoshiftreservestothreatenedpoints
withinhisAntipolo -Wawa-Montalbanbattlepositionceased. Priortothistime,
theenerayhadbeenabletofeedreinforcementsoverthemountainous jungletrailsfrom
3osobc3c tohisiiiontalban,totQiitago,MtTanauan,MtYabangandl&tBaytanganpositions.
However,sincethe43dDivisionhadalmostcompletelyoverruntheenemy'smainbattle
position,whichwasapproximately8000-9000yardslong,eastandwest,theenemy's
capabilityforanythingbutaverylimitedcounter-offensive intheAntipolo-Wawa-
Montalbanitreahadbeencompletely eliminated.
e
followingitscaptureofMtBaytanganon26March1945
t h
6thDivisionhad
shifteditsstrengthtoit3northflanktoattackMtWatabafromthewestandsouthwest
on29i.iarch1945. Elementsofthedivisionattackingthisobjectiveencounteredstrong
resistance. Theterraindifficultieswereaugmentedbyheavyenemymortars,ranging
inthecaliberupto150mm,whichweresitedtocoverallapproachestotheposition.
Meanwhilethe43dDivisionhadadvanced itsrightsoutheastalongHighway21toposi-
tionsoverlookingtheSantaJ.IariaRiverValleyon1April1945*
Inordertostrengthentheforcesonitsnorthflank,whichwasthenverylightly
screened bypatrolscfthe112thRCT,andtoprovidesufficienttroopstoconducta
reconnaissance inforcetowardIpo,theXICorpsdetachedthe169thRCTfromcontrolof
the43dDivision,andplaceditundercontrolofthe112thRCT,designatingthetask
forcethuscreatedastheBaldyforce. TheTaskForceCommanderpreparedtomakeare-
connaissance inforcetoward Ipo;/ithonebattalionofthe169thInfantryattacking
northwest,todeterminetnestrengthoftheenemy'ssouthflankpositions,andwithone
squadron,112thCavalry,attackingdueeasttotesttheenemydefensesastridetheitetro-
politanRoadonthewesternapproachestoIpo. Inthemeantime,the43dDivision(less
169thRCT),whileadvancingwith itsrighttowardtheeastendofLagunadeBay,had
sentabattalionnorthuptheSantaMariaRiverValleytowardthetownofSantaMaria.
OtherelementscfthedivisionatthesametimeadvancedeastandnortheastfromBoso-
bosotodestroyisolatedenemystrongpointsinthemountainsinthatarea. Elementsof
the6thDivision,v/liici.hadcontinueditsattacktocaptureMtMataba,hadmetheavy
enemyresistanceandhadmadesmallgainsonly. Otherelementsoftheaivisionâttacked
northfrompositionsinthevicinityofMtBaytangantowardMtPurroanaMtLamita.
Element-- oxtie43dDivision (less169thRCT)advancedsoutheastonHighway21,
a*air.c
t
scatteredenemyresistance,toseizeSiniloanon4April1945. Onthissame
dfte elementso?the10
3
d infantry,advancingnorthuptheSantaMariaRiverValley
of
contactwiththe1stCavalryDivisioninthe
73
TheXIandXIVCorpshavingjoinedhandseastofLagunadeBayandthe43dDivi-
sion(less169thRCT)havingsecuredthelineLumban-Siniloan-Famy-SantaMaria,
1
allenemymovementfromsouthernLuzontotheInfantaarea(LaraonBay)andfromtheIn-
fantaareawesttoreinforceenemypositionseastofManilahadbeeneffectivelyblocked.
ThestagewasnowsetforagradualconcentrationofthestrengthofXICorpsonthe
approachestoIpo. Asalreadymentioned,operationsintheAntipolo-Wawa-Montalban
areawerenowintheirfinalstages;butbitterfightingtoreduceisolatedstrongpoints
wasstillinprogress. OrganizedresistancedueeastofJManila,however,wasdefinitely
atanend. Itwasnownecessarytoconcentratethemajoreffortagainsttheenemyforces
intheIpoareatoeffecttheearlyseizureofIpoDam,animportantsourceofManila
watersupply. (FordispositionsofXICorpseastandnortheastofIvlanilaonS/87,6
April1945s
ee
Diagram45)
On7April1945theBaldyForce(112thCavalryRCTand169thRCT)launchedits
reconnaissanceinforcetowardIpo. Inthis,the^dBattalion,169thInfantry,metonly
scattereddefensivepositionsandlightresistanceinitsadvancenortheasttodevelop
theenemy'ssouthflankandreachedpositionsapproximately8000yardssouthwestofIpo
on10April1945. The1stSquadron,112thCavalry,ontheotherhand,encounteredin-
creasinglyheavyresistancefromwellfortifiedpositionsinitsadvanceeasttodevelop
enemydefensesastridetheMetropolitanRoadontheapproachestoIpo,andon10April
1945itsadvancewasstoppedabout7000yardswestofIpobytheintensemortarand
artilleryfireoftheenemywhocounterattackedalmostcontinuouslyfor24hours. Since
theobjectofthereconnaissanceinforcehadnowbeenaccomplished,thereconnaissance
forcewasorderedtowithdrawon11April1945topreviouslyheldpositions. Ithad
definitelyestablishedthatallapproachestoIpofromthewestwereheavilyfortified,
andthatthesouthernandsouthwesternapproachestoIpowerebutlightlydefended.
ThisinformationhadadetermininginfluenceupontheXICorpsplanofmaneuverforthe
finalassaultonIpo,whichwaslaunchedaboutamonthlater.
Duringtheperiod7-10 April1945,the6thand43dDivisions(less169thRCT)
intensifiedmoppingupoperationsinthegeneralareaMtBalidbiran-MtMapatad-Mt
Pacawagan(Hill390)-MtMataba. The43<iDivisionadvancednorthandnortheastfrom
Bosobosoagainststrongenemypositionsonthesouthernapproachestoivltivlapatad. Mean-
while,inthefaceofbitterenemyresistance,the6thDivisionreachedthesummitof
MtMatabaon10April1945*
an
^securediton16April1945* Thisplacedthedivision
inapositiontoattackenemypositionsonMtPacawagan(Hill390)fromthesouthas
wellasfromthewest.
On19April1945*
a s
directedinSixthArmyFieldOrder6l,issuedon18April
1945*the20thRCT(6thDivision)passedtocontroloftheProvostMarshalGeneral,
USAFFE,andassumedthemissionofgarrisoningManila,relievingthe145thRCT(37th
Division),whichpassedtothecontrolofXICorpsandwasthenattachedtothe6th
Division. On21April1945the1stCavalryDivisionrelievedelementsofthe43<*Divi-
sion'intheLumban-Siniloan-Famy-SantaMariaarea;andon22April1945i
n
accor-
dancewithSixthArmyFieldOrder6l,theboundarybetweenXICorpsandXIVCorpswas
changedtogiveXIVCorpsresponsibilityforoperationsintheLumban-Siniloan-Famy-
Infanta-SantaiY&riaarea. Thetacticalconsiderationsleadingtothischangearedis-
cussedunderoperationsofXIVCorps.
On21April1945followingseveraldaysofairandartillerybombardmentto
softenupenemypositions,the6thDivision(less20thRCT,with145thRCTattached)
launchedanattackfromthesouthandwesttoreducethefortifiedenemypositionon
MtPacawagan(Hill390). Hereagainthenowhighlydevelopedtechniqueofcavereduc-
tionbyspecialdemolition-flamethrowerteams,coveredandsupportedbyartilleryand
assistedbydirectfirefromtanksandtankdestroyers,cameintoplay. On28April
1945thedivisionsecuredMtPacawagan.
Meanwhile,on19April1945*
a
radiomessagefromtheCoramander-in-Chief,South-
westPacificArea,hadindicatedacriticalwatershortageinManilaandtheconsequent
dangerofpestilence,andhadurgedthateveryeffortbemadetosecureadditionalsources
ofwatertheninenemyhands. XICorpswasaccordinglydirectedtopressvigorously
operationstoseizeIpoDam. Thedateforlaunchingtheoffensivetodestroyenemyfor-
cesintheIpoareaandtocaptureIpoDamwassetas7May1945,thisbeingtheearliest
datethattheoperationcouldbeundertaken.
XICorpsimmediatelybegantoregroupitsforcesinpreparationfortheattackon
Ipo,inaccordancewithpreviouslypreparedplans. The38thDivisioninitiatedreliefof
the6thDivision(less20thRCT)intheMontalbanarea,completingthereliefon30April
74
^ May1945the38thDivision(with145thRCTattached)beganreliefofthe
43dDivision(less169thRCT), whilethe43dDivisioninitiatedmovementtothenorthto
v? ?
l d y F
r C e T
it}l
e
lt
(ll2thRCTwith l 6
?
t hRCT
attached)intheIpoarea. On3May
1V43theXICorpsdissolvedtheBaldyForceandmovedthe112thRCTsouthtoscreenthe
extremesouthflankofthecorpsalongthenorthshoreofLagunadeBay. The169thRCT
revertedtocontrolofthe43dDivisionatthesametime.
Asalreadystatedelsewhere,intensivereconnaissancehaddisclosedhighly
organizedenemydefensivepositionsastridetheMstropoiitanRoadonthewesternap-
roachestoIpo. Hisleftwasrelativelyweak,however,inthatithadfeworganized
defensivepositionsandthesewerebutverylightlyheld,theenemyapparentlyrelying
onthedifficultmountainousjungleterraintopreventanylargescaleattackagainst
hisleft. TheXICorpstookfulladvantageofthisweakness,andmadethe43dDivision
andMarking'sGuerrillasavailablefortheattack. The43dDivisionwastoattack
generallynortheast,makingthemaineffortwithitsrightandthesecondaryattackwith
itsleft,whichwastoexertsufficientpressureontheenemyforcesdefendingthewest-
ernapproachestoIpotoholdtheminplace. Whenthemainefforthadprogressedsuf-
ficientlytopermitittostrikeattheenemypositionsastridetheMetropolitanRoad
fromthesouthandsoutheast,the43dDivisionleftwastoattackeastalongtheMetro-
politanRoadtowardIpo. TheplanfurthercalledforMarking'sGuerrillaForce,a
regimentapproximately3000strong,toturnthenorthflankoftheIpoposition. This
guerrillaforcewasactuallydividedintotwoforcesequalinstrength: aNorthForce
andaSouthForce. FrompositionsinthevicinityofNorzagaray,northwestofIpo,the
SouthForcewastoattacksoutheast,inacloseenvelopmentdownthevalleyoftheAngat
River,whiletheNorthForcemadeawideenvelopmenttothenorthandeastand,turning,
attackedduesouthtowardIpo. TheestimateofenemystrengthintheIpoareapriorto
thelaunchingoftheoffensivewasapproximately5000taforcemadeupofmiscellaneous
andprovisionalcombatunitscomposedlargelyofbasedefenseandservicetroops. This
estimateofenemystrengthlaterprovedtobesubstantiallycorrect.
Thetroopswereinpositionandhadcompletedallpreparationsfortheattackby
6May1945 ^
n
ordertogainmaximumsurpriseforhismaineffort,thedivisioncommander
decidedtomakeanightattack. Thisdecisionwasmadeinviewoftheweaknessofthe
enemy'sleftandwasfurtherinfluencedbythesuccessofpreviousnightattacksmadeby
ourtroopsagainstenemypositionsintheAntipolo-ilontalbanarea. H-Hourwassetfor
(
fcr
220016May1945. dispositionsofXICorpseastandnortheastofManilaat12001,
S/117,6May1945,
s e e
Diagram46.)
Forthreedaysprecedingtheattack,heavyandfighterbomberscarriedout
saturationraidsemployingnapalm,demolitionandfragmentationbombsonenemypositions
intheIpoarea. Theareahadbeendividedintcfivemainsub-divisionsandthesewere
thoroughlypatternbombedwithnapalmfollowedupbyfragmentationbombingtodestroy
enemypersonnelforcedfromtheirholesbythenapalm,anddemolitionbombingtodestroy
pinpointedtargets. Duringthesethreedaysofbombing,250,000gallonsofnapalm,the
largestquantityeveremployedagainstoneareainanysouthwestPacificoperationupto
thattime,weredroppedonenemypositionsdefendingtheapproachestoIpo. Inoneday,
atotaloffivegroupsoffightersmadenapalmstrikesinthearea. Groundforceslater
attributedapproximately2000enemykilledtotheairbombardmentandreportedthata
strongpsychologicaleffectwasproducedontheenemybythenapalmstrikes.
At22001on6May1945,the43dDivisionexceptforthe169thInfantry--but
withiviarking'sGuerrillasattached,begananightattackwithregimentsabreast. The
103dInfantryontherightattackedeastandnortheasttoenveloptheenemyleft,its
objectivesbeingIpoandIpoDam;the172dInfantryinthecenterattackednortheastto
enveloptheenemyforcesonOsboyRidge,itsobjectivebeingthatridge;andMarking's
GuerrillasadvancedagainsttherightwingcftheIpoposition. The169thInfantryat-
tackedeastatdaybreakon7May1945.tocontainenemyforcesdefendingthewestern
approachestoIpoastridetheMetropolitanRoad. Theonlyartilleryfireprecedingtne
attackwastheregularlyschedulednightharassingfire.
Theenemywascaughttotallyunpreparedonhisleft. The103dInfantryadvanced
\
Tall
^^f 10,000yardstothenortheastoverextremelyroughterrainand" ff*^
1
^
weredifficulttcfollowinthedark,andreachedpositionsabout4000yardssouthof
75
Ipobeforedaybreak. The172dInfantrywhichalsoattackednortheast,madeslowprogress
becausetheguideslosttheirway,withtheresultthattheregimenttraversedthemost
difficultterraininthearea. TheNorthForceofMarking
f
sGuerrillas,whichinitially
advancedeast,reachedBayabas(8000yardsnortheastofAngat)withoutmeetingenemy
opposition. By12May1945,the43dDivisionhadreachedpositionsextendinginanarc
fromapproximately1000yardssouthofIpoto5000yardssouthwestofIpo. Enemyresis-
tance,includingartilleryfire,increasedinintensityasthedivisionclosedinonIpo
andOsboyRidge. Inthemeantime,theNorthForceofMarking'sGuerrillas,advancing
southeasttowardIpofromBayabas,encounteredonlyscatteredenemyresistanceandmade
rapidprogressuntilitarrivedwithinabout3500yardsnorthofIpowhereitencountered
stronglydefendedenemypositions. Afteraheavyairandartillerybombardmentthis
forcecrushedenemyresistanceonitsfrontandadvancedtowithinabout3000yardsnorth
ofIpoby12May1945. 0
n
thissamedate,the169thInfantryattackedtotheeasttoward
OsboyRidgebutmadeveryslowprogressbecauseofheavyenemyfirefrompillboxandcave
positions. On16May1945the103dInfantryhadreachedpositionswithin300to5
0 0
yardsofIpoDam,itsfrontextendinginanarcfromnortheasttosouthwestaroundthe
dam;Marking'sGuerrillashadsecuredthehighground5
0 0
yardsnorthofIpoDam;and
the172dInfantryhadadvancedagainstOsboyRidgefromthesouthwhilethe169thInfan-
tryhadattackeditfromthewest.
On17May1945the43dDivision,withMarking'sGuerrillasattached,launched
thefinalassaultwhichwasprecededbya45"
m
i
nu
teairstrikeduringwhich228fighter-
bombersdropped7t56ogallonsofnapalmonenemypositionsdefendingthedam. The103d
Infantry,thenattackedfromtheeastandsouthandMarking'sGuerrillasfromthenorth;
theycapturedIpoDamintactafterovercomingnegligibleenemyresistance. (Fordisposi-
tionsofXICorpsintheIpoareaat24OOI,S/128,17May1945,seeDiagram47.)
FollowingthecaptureofIpoDam,the43dDivision,withMarking'sGuerrillas
attached,concentrateditseffortsonbreakingdownorganizedresistanceonOsboyRidge
andinthebendoftheAngatRiver. On19May1945the172dand169thInfantryRegiments,
attackingfromtheeast,southandwest,capturedOsboyRidgeandopenedtheMetropolitan
RoadfortrafficfromNovalichestoIpo;andon21May1945thedivisioncrushedthe
snemyresistanceinthebendoftheAngatRiver,northwestofIpo. Organizedresistance
intheIpoareawasatanend. Enemyremnants,unabletoevacuatetheareabecauseof
theblockingofallescaperoutes,weresystematicallyhunteddownandannihilatedduring
theremaining4daysofthecampaign. VeryfewstragglersescapedintotheSierraMadre
Mountainstothenorth,andthesefacedalmostcertaindeathfromstarvationanddisease.
WiththecaptureofIpoDamandthedestructionofenemyforcesinthebendof
theAngatRiver,SixthArmyhadpracticallycompletedthemajorpartofitsmissionto
destroyenemyforceseastandnortheastofManila. Thissuccesswasaugmentedwhenthe
38thDivisioncapturedMtPurroandoccupiedMtLamitaon5June1945i
Q
thefaceof
lightopposition. Inaddition,the2dBattalion,169thInfantry(43dDivision),having
movedsouthfromtheIpoarea,capturedMtOroon8June1945afteraheavyairand
artillerybombardment. Moreover,MtMapatadfellintoourhandson11June1945* Fol-
lowingthereductionofMtPurro,MtLamita,MtMapatadandMtOro,the38thand43d
Divisionsconductedlargescalepatrollingoperationstccompletethemoppingupand
finaldestructionofallenemyremnantseastandnortheastofIvlanila.
Meanwhile,the2dCavalryBCT,togetherwithresponsibilityforoperationsin
theSiniloan-Infanta-SantaMariaarea,passedtocontrolofXICorpson5June1945
inaccordancewithSixthArmyFieldOrder64,issuedon2June1945* '^
ne
%1Corpsthen
reconstitutedtheBaldyForcetoconsistofthe2dCavalryBCT(1stCavalryDivision)and
the112thRCT,undercommandoftheCommandingGeneral,112thRCT. ThisI'orcecombed
thetriangleInfanta-SantaInes-SantaMaria,butmadefewcontacts,andseizedSanta
Ineson10June1945withoutmeetingenemyopposition.
At00011,15June1945*theboundarybetweenXIandXIVCorpswaseliminatedas
directedinSixthArmyFieldOrder68. TheXICorpsrelievedtheXIVCcrpsofresponsi-
bilityfortheconductofoperationsinsouthernLuzonsothatXIVCorpsmightmoveits
headquarterstoSanJose(NuevaEcija)inpreparationfortakingoverallmissionsin
northLuzonaspreviouslydirected. Similarly,the11thAirborneDivision,thatportion
ofthe1stCavalryDivisionnotalreadyundercontrolofXICorps,andthe158thKCT,
reinforced,passedfromcontrolofXIVCorpstocontrolofXICorps.
76
Thisaerialphotographshowstheterrain
encountered"bythe169thInfantryRegimentin
itszoneofactionintheassaultonIpoDam.
Engineersfollowedclosely"behindfrontlineunits
toopenthesupplyroadsblockedwithdebrisresulting
fromheavyairstrikesintheIpo7)?j>narea
IntheassaultonWawe
infantrymenofthe149thInfantryRegiment
cautiouslyadvanceonduginenemypositions
OperationstoCompletetheDestructionofEnemyForces
intheMountainsWestofFortStotsenburg.onBQ-
taanPeninsulaandintheZambalesMountains
On5March1945the43dDivisionwasstillengagedinoperationsagainstthe
remainingenemypocketsinthehillstothewestandnorthwestofFortStotsenburg.
The4"thDivisionhadbrokenthebackboneoforganizedenemyresistanceinthisarea
priortoitsreliefbythe43dDivision,butmanylarge,wellorganizedenemystrong-
pointsadequatelystockedwithammunition,rationsandothersupplies,andlocatedin
inaccessibleterrainstillremainedtobereduced. Intelligenceestimatesplacedenemy
strengthinthisareaatapproximately8000-10,000. Whiletheseenemyforceswere
incapableofmakingacoordinatedcounterattack,theycouldanddidconductadefensein
depthfromtheabovementionedstrongpoints. Eachofthesewasself-contained,hadits
ownsupplydumpslocatedinwellconcealedcaves,wasorganizedforall-arounddefense,
andoftenconsistedofasmanyas50-&0mutuallysupportingcavepositions. Theenemy
fullyrealizedthat,ifhewasonceforcedbackintothemountains,thedifficultterrain
andourairpowerandartillerywoulddrasticallyreducehisabilitytomaintainhiscom-
municationsandtoshifthisreserves. Heaccordinglyplannedtocarryoutastatic
defenseindepthfromtacticallyandlogisticallyindependentpositions,andexecuted
thisplantotheletteruntilhispositionshadbeencompletelyoverrun. Theenemyforce
defendingeachpositionfoughttothebitterend,therebymakingthetaskofreducingit
doublydifficultandforcingustomaintainthebetterpartofadivisionintheFort
Stotsenburgareaforapproximatelytwomonthsafterthebackboneoforganizedresistance
hadbeenbroken.
On11March1945elementsofthe38thDivision,whichhadbeenmoppingupon
BataanPeninsulaandintheZambalesMountains,completedreliefofthe43dDivision
(less169thRCT)intheareawestandnorthwestofFortStotsenburgandtheCommanding
General,38thDivision,assumedcontrolofoperationsinthatarea. The43dDivision
(less169thRCT)hadmeanwhilecompleteditsconcentrationeastofManilaandhadpassed
tocontrolofXIVCorpsinaccordancewithSixthArmyFieldOrder56issuedon6March
1945 The169thRCTremainedwiththe38thDivisionintheFortStotsenburgareaand
the2dBattalion,151stInfantry,remainedonCorregidortocompletethemoppingup
there. Meanwhile,the503dParachuteRCTdepartedfromCorregidorforMindoroandpassed
tocontroloftheEighthArmyon9March1945*
FollowinghisassumptionofoperationalcontrolintheFortStotsenburgarea,
theCommandingGeneral.38thDivision,launchedvigorousattackstocompletethedestruc-
tionoHnem/forcesthere. Elementsofthedivisionpushedsteadilywestandnorthwest,
reducedstrongpointsastheyadvanced,andthendoubledtackandcombedallareasagain
S certainthatnohostilepartieshadbeenoverlooked Almostevery^ f f**
haditsclusterofcavesorpillboxes. Theseourtroopssealed
h
0 r
+
"
d
^
h
^
O
^ ^ ^
y
andthencontinuedthehunt. By31March1945,thedateonwhichthe169thRCTpassed
fromcontrolofthe
3
8thDivisiontocontrolofthe43dDivisionintheifcrangarea
(BuWanProvince),the38thDivisionhadthoroughlycombedtheareabetweenFortStot-
senburgaS* Dorst.andwasbeginningtoencounterresistance ^
t
^ Z t Z Zill
thenorthernslopesofMtDorstandthenorthwesternapproachestoMtPinatubo. Indica-
tionswerethatenemyremnantswhichhadbeenabletowithdrawfromtheareaseastof
i
smallscatteredhostilegroups.
DivisionclosedinonMtPinatubo.whereanestimatedenemyforceof
CentralLuzonPlain. Mostofthesetroopsw
emaoiat
edandpoorlyarmedasthey
fewgroupsdidmanagetoreachthej
r
*'
and
^ ^ poiicepatrols.By
3
0
were,theyfellaneasyprey* " ' ^ ^ completedreliefofthe
3
BthDivision
April1945.thedateonwhichthe* *
1 0
M
^ ^ e s Mountainsandontheislands
fendersintheMtPinatuboarea.
77
TheonlyotherenemypocketofanysizewhichdevelopedintheBataan-Zambales
areawasonMtNatib,northoftheBagac-PilarRoadonBataanPeninsula. Hereapproxi-
mately800-1000poorlyarmedandstarvingenemyremnantsfromtheBataangarrison,
plusseveralhundredevacueesfromManila,hadtakenrefuge. By30April1945the38th
Divisionhadalsoliquidatedthiseneiaypocket. (FordispositionsofXICorpswestof
FortStotsenburg,ontheislandsinManilaBayandinBataanandZombalesProvinceson
S/lll,30April1945,seeDiagram48.)
Operationsofthe6thDivisionintheBataan-Zambalesareafrom30April1945
through10June1945consistedofextensivepatrollingwithnomajorencounters. On
11June1945the6thDivision(less1stInfantry)passedtothecontrolofICorpsin
theDigdig(NuevaEcija)areainaccordancewithSixthArmyFieldOrder63,issuedon
8May1945
Tn
considerationsleadingtotheshiftingofthisdivisiontotheDigdig
areawillbecoveredinthediscussionofoperationsofICorpsintheCagayanValley.
From11June1945until25June1945,whenitwasrelievedbyelementsofthe38thDivi-
sion,the1stInfantrypatrolledthroughoutBataanandZambalesProvinces. Itthen
n
movedtotheDigdigarea(NuevaEcija),whereon29June1945*
i
accordancewithSixth
ArmyFieldOrder70,issuedon25June1945,itpassedtothecontrolofICorpsand
rejoineditsdivision.
OperationstoCaptureCaballo.ElFraileandCarabaoIslands
andSecuretheSouthernEntrancestoManilaBay
FollowingthereductionofCorregidorandthedepartureofthe5
Q
3&Parachute
RCTforMindoroon9March1945,the2dBattalion,151stInfantry(38thDivision),re-
mainedtogarrisonandcompletemoppinguponCorregidor. Aspreviouslymentioned,Sixth
ArmyFieldOrder58.issuedon23March1945directedXICorpstoseizeCaballo,El
FraileandCarabaoIslandsaspartoftheplanforsecuringthesouthernentrancesto
ManilaBay. XICorpsimmediatelybeganplanningforoperationstoreducetheseislands.
Preliminarysofteningupbyairandnavalbombardmentwasemployedtoneutralize
enemycoastdefensegunsandotherdefensiveinstallationsontheislands. Aerialbom-
bardmentofCaballoIslandimmediatelyprecededtheamphibiousassaulton27March1945
whennineB-25sandthirty-fourP-51sdropped15tonsofdemolitionbombsandthreetons
ofnapalmontheisland. Priortothistime,someaerialbombardmentoftheislandhad
beencarriedoutbyafewplanessimultaneouslywithstrikesonCorregidor. -further,
B-24shadusedtheislandasapracticebombingtarget. Theheaviestairstrikeswere
directedagainstCarabaoIsland. Between4April1945
an
<*16April1945.thedateon
whichourforceslandedonthatisland,theFifthAirForcedropped184tonsofdemoli-
tionbombsandthreetonsofnapalmonit. Inadditiontothispoundingfromtheair,
navalshellingsystematicallyknockedoutallcoastdefensegunsontheislandsduring
thedaysprecedingtheamphibiouslandings. Whenourforcesdidland,notasingle
enemycoastdefensegunfiredonthem.
PreliminaryreconnaissanceofCaballoIslandbyacombatpatrolfromCorregidor
revealedthatthebestbeachesontheisland wereontheeastside. Accordingly,at
09001,27March1945.followingapreliminaryairbombardmentandapreparationfiredby
artilleryemplacedonCorregidor,the2dBattalion,151stInfantry,lessCompanyF,(38th
Division)inashore-to-shoreoperationfromCorregidor,landedonbeachesontheeast
coastofCaballoIsland. Enemyresistancewaslimitedtoheavymachinegunfireand
riflefire. By30March1945the2dBattalion,151stInfantry(lessCoF)hadsur-
roundedtheenemydefendersintwoconcretepillboxesonthehillinthecenterofthe
island. Heretheenemyheldouttothebitterend. On7April1945
o u r
troopspumped
fueloilfromabargeintobothofthesepillboxes,thenevacuatedtheislandandset
firetothefueloil. Theresultingfirecausedaseriesoftremendousunderground
explosions. On8April1945alone,32separateexplosionswerecounted. Ourtroops
thenreoccupiedtheislandandby13AprilI945hadreducedallenemyresistance. The
islandwassecurelyinourhands.
On13April1945the2dBattalion,151stInfantry(38thDivision)landeden
ElFraile,precededbyaheavyairandnavalbombardment. Followingthelanding,our
forcespumpedFortDrumfulloffueloil,setitafireandevacuatedtheisland. A
seriesoflargeexplosionsfollowedandfiresragedontheislandforthebetterpart
ofaweek. Whenourtroopsreoccupiedtheislandtheyfound60Japanesedead. Many
uncountedbodieswereconsumedbytheflameswhichhadenvelopedtheisland.
78
ElPraile,islandfortressinManilaBay,wasreducedbypumping3200gallonsofamixture
ofgasandoilintothefortanddetonatingthis mixturewitha600lbcharge.
AspeciallydevisedrampfromthetowerofanLCIenabled
troopstoenter thefortressandreportthetotaldestruction
causedbytheexplosionof thegasandoilmixture.
DemolitionchargesweresetoffbypatrolstorouteanyJaps
cachedin nichesonthesteepslopesofCaballoIslandshoreline
Apipelinefromthebeachsuppliedthefueloil Infantrymenscalethesteepslopestoplace
neededtoburnouttheJapstrappedinlargecaves demolitionchargesinenemycavepositions.
onCaballoIsland.
InfantrymenofCompanyB,151stInfantry,observetheshelling
ofCara"baoIslandbeachespriortotheirlanding.
Smokefromwhitephosphorusgrenadesscreeninfantrytroopsas
theycrossa ravinenearthenorthwestpartofCarabaoIsland.
'
f o l l o w i n
8
a
1stBattalion
3
i^ttS^V
9 4 5
, Preliminaryairandnavalbombardment,the
1stBattalaon,151stInfantry,landedonCarabaoIsland,butfounditevacuated.
from^77,27March1945.throughS/97,16April,seeDiagram49.)
SummaryofXICorpsOperationsonLuzon
FollowingitsamphibiousassaultlandingintheSanAntonioareaofZambales
ProvinceonthewestcoastofLuzonon29January1945.XICorpsseizedandsecuredSan
ivJarcelmoairstripandadvancedsoutheasttoseizePortOlongapoandopenSubicBay.
ihecorpsthenpushedeastonHighway7toDinalupihantoisolateBataanPeninsula,thus
preventinganenemywithdrawalinforcethereto. Combiningadrivedowntheeastcoast
ofBataanwithanamphibiousassaultinMarivelesBay,thecorpssecuredthesouthern
tipofBataanPeninsulaand,inacombinedairborneandamphibiousassault,reducedthe
fortressofCorregidorinrecordtimeof12days. Followingthisupwithaseriesof
shore-to-shoreamphibiousassaultsontheremainingenemyheldislandsinManilaBay.
XICorpscompletedtheopeningofthebayby16April1945. Asmentionedpreviously,
Manila3ayhadactuallybeenmodeaccessiblenearlytwomonthspriortothiswiththe
openingcfthenorthchannelasaresultofthecapturecfMarivelesandCorregidor.
AfterrelievingXIVCorpseastandnortheastofASanilaandwestandnorthwestofFort
Stotsenburg,XICorpssucceededinbreakingtheremainingorganizedenemyresistanceand
incompletingdestructionofenemyforceseastandnortheastofnfianila,capturedIpoand
WawaDams(theformeramajorsourceofwatersupplyforManila),andaLnostcompletely
annihilatedenemyforceswestandnorthwestofFortStotsenburgandintheZambalesMoun-
tains. -During153daysofcontinuouscombatonLuzon,XICorpskilled40,399Japanese
andcaptured1,404. (FordispositionsofXICorpsat23001,3^172,30June1945,see
Diagram5)
6. OperationsofICorpsinNorthLuzon.
Duringtheperiod5March1945through3June1945.ICorpsconcentratedall
itseffortsonthedestructionofenemyforcesinthemountainsofnorthLuzonandin
theCagayanValley. Asindicatedatthecloseoftheprecedingsectionofthisreport,
whenManilafelltheenemyhadaforceofabout110,000troopsinnorthLuzon,their
generaldispositionsbeingasshowninthatsection.
Generalenemycapabilitiesfortheconductofacoordinateddefenseinnorth
Luzonv/eredescribedintheopeningparagraphsofthissection. By5March1945tthe
enemyplanofdefenseinnorthLuzonhadassumedadefinitepattern. Thispatternhad
beguntodeveloppriorto9January1945withthelargescalewithdrawalofenemyforces
fromtheCentralLuzonPlainintothemountainstothenorthandnortheast. Documents
capturedsoonaftertheinitiallandingsofSixthArmyforcesintheLingayenGulfarea
revealedtheessentialpointsoftheplancfGeneralYamashita,thecommandercfthe
JapaneseforcesonLuzonwastowithdrawtothemountainsofnorthLuzonandinto,the
CagayanValleyandtobedisposedasfollows: the58thIndependentMixedBrigaaeand
the23dDivisionintheHosario-Damortis-SanFernando(LaUnion)area;the19th
DivisionintheBaguio-Bontocarea;the10thDivision(lessoneregiment)atI'ayug,
aboutfivebattalionsofthe105thDivision,andartilleryandcombatandservicetroops,
v/hichhadbeeninsouthernLuzon,intheSanJose(Nuevakcija)area;the103dDivision
(lessthe79thBrigade)inthenorthernapproachestotheCagayanValley. Otherenemy
forcesonLuzonweretoconcentratefortriedefenseofimportantstrategicinstallations
suchasManilaanditsportfacilitiesandtheClarkAirCenterwitaitsvaluableair
facilities. TheJapanesecommanderexpectedthathisforcesdefendingtheimportant
stratsgicareasonLuzonwouldmakeU.S.troopspayaveryhighpriceforeveryaavance
andintendedtolaunchtrieforceshehadassembledonthenorthernedgeoftheCentral
Plainatthepropertimeinacoordinatedcounter-offensiveagainsttheSixthArmy'sleft
Theenemy'splanfailedcompletely. Firstofall,theoperationsofAlliedAir
ForcesseriouslyimpededhisevacuationtothenorththroughtheCentralPlain,and
finallyforcedhimtcrestrictallmovementtothehourscfdarkness. Moreover,the
bul
1
-cfthe105thDivision,whichhadbeenscheduledtoconcentrateintteS
a
nJose
(NueVaEcija)area,nevergotfarthernorththantheAntipolo-Montalbanarea tnough
afewmiscellaneouspartsofthedivisiondidultimatelyreachântaFe,aftera
79
protractedoverlandmovementwhichgreatlyreducedtheircombatefficiency. Further-
more,the10thDivision(lessoneregiment),whichmovedsouthonHighway5
an
<i
WQ
s
destinedforTayug,neverreachedthatarea..
AlloftheabovefactorscombinedwiththerapidsouthwardadvanceofSixthArmy
intheCentralPlainforcedtheenemytomodifyhisplan. Insteadofbeingconcentrated
intheTarlacarea,the2dArmoredDivisionhadtobethrownintotheSanl*5anuel-Tayug-
Lupao-Umingansectortocoverthewithdrawalofotherforcesevacuatingtothenorth
onHighway5# Thefatesufferedbythisdivisionasaresultofitspiecemealcommit-
menthasalreadybeendescribed. Thefailureofthefivebattalionsofthe105thDivision
toreachtheSanJoseareaplacedtheentireburdenofdefendingtheapproachesto
BaletePassontheshouldersofthe10thDivision,reinforcedbyprovisionalcombatunits
composedofairforcepersonnelandmiscellaneouscombatandservicedetachments.
Themuchheraldedcounter-offensiveagainsttheleftoftheSixthArmynever
materialized. Theseizurebythe43dDivision,reinforcedbythe158thand63dRCT's,
ofthehighgroundextendingfromPozorrubiotoRosarioandDamortisresultedinthe
destructionofalargeportionofthe58thIndependentMixedBrigadeandthe23dDivi-
sionandeffectivelysealeduptheremnantsofbothunitsinthemountainsinthatarea.
Thefailureoftheenemytoemploythe2dArmoredDivisionand10thInfantryDivision
inalargescalecounter-thrustagainstSixthArmy'slefthasalreadybeendiscussed.
By5March1945,ICorpshadeffectivelysealedallexitsleadingfromthemountainsof
northLuzondownintotheCentralPlain.
TheJapanesecommanderwasnowfacedwithachoicebetweentwoalternatives:
spreadoutashisforceswerealongthelineSanFernando(LaUnion)-Rosorio-SanJose
(NuevaEcija)-DingalanBay,hecouldconductaseriesofharassingattacksagainstthe
Sixth^rmy'sleft,byemployingsmallforces;orhecouldconcentratehisforcesfor
defenseoftheapproachestohismountainstrongholdandtheCagayanValley.
Asoperationsdeveloped,itbecameevidentthattheenemyhadchosenthesecond
alternative. Bymakinguscomeintothemountainsafterhim,hehopedtomeetuson
groundofhischoosing,inflictmaximumcasualties,andcompelustomaintainalarge
forceinnorthernLuzonforalongtimetocome,thuscorrespondinglyreducingthefor-
ceswhichwewouldhaveavailableforoperationselsewhere. (Forenemydispositionsin
northLuzononS/54i4March1945*
3 e e
Diagrams25and32.)
ThisthenwastheproblemwhichfacedtheSixthArmyinformulatingplansfor
thereductionoftheenemy'smountainpositionsandthedestructionofhisforcesin
northLuzon.. Acarefulstudyoftheterrainandtheroadandtrailnetofnorthern
Luzonindicatedthattherewereseveralkeypoints,controlofwhichwouldgiveus
accesstotheenemy'smountainstrongholdsandtheCagayanValley. Themostimportant
ofthesewasBaletePass. Withitinourhands,theenemywouldbedeprivedofhis
principaldefensivepositionguardingaccesstotheCagayanValleyandtheKiangan-
Bontocarea,andwewouldbeable,byadvancingtoBagabag,tocuthiscommunications
betweenthetwo. However,inordertotakeBaletePass,itwasessentialthatthe
entireVillaVerdeTrail,which,thoughextremelypoor,connectedtheCentralValley
ofLuzonatSanNicolaswithHighway5atSantaFe,justnorthofBaletePass,bein
ourhands.
AnotherkeypointwastheBaguioarea. FromtheBaguio-Trinidad-Bokodroad-
net,theJapanesehadconstructedanewroad,whichranviaKayapaandPingkianto
BambangonHighway5andgaveaccesstotheackdooroftheenemy'sBaletePassposi-
tion. Inaddition,Highway11,commonlyknownastheMountainTrail,whichconnects
BaguiowithBontoc,providedanapproachtotheenemy'sBontocmountainstronghold.
Athirdgatewaytotheenemy'snorthLuzondefensivepositionwasBontoc. Its
possessionwouldplacetheSixthArmyinpositionforadrivetothenortheastalong
Highway11towardtheCagayanValley,tothesoutheastonHighway4towardBagabagand
thesouthernentrancetotheCagayanValley,andsouthwestonHighway11towardBaguio.
Thefourthandlastimportantapproachtotheenemy'snorthLuzonpositionwas
Aparri,situatedatthemouthoftheCagayanRiverandthenorthernentrancetothe
CagayanValley. Thiswasvulnerabletoanamphibiousattackfromtheseaoranover-
landattackbymovementupthewestcoastofLuzontheneastalongthenorthcoast.
80
ImmediatelyavailabletoSixthArmyforoperationsinnorthLuzonwastheI
Corpswiththe25thand32dDivisionscommittedontheapproachestoBaleteftissalong
V l
^
V e r d o
f r o n ' t ^ ^ n n I * " " . respectively,andwiththe
3
3dDivisionontheleft
fromtheAgnoRiverValleytothewe.tcoastinthevicinityofIgoo (seeDiagram25.)
SoonafterthefallofManila,SixthArmyrequested GHQtoreleasSthe
37
thDivisionfrom
garrisondutyinthecityatanearlydate,inorderthatthebulkofthedivisioncould
beemployed innorthernLuzon,thoughitwasrealizedthatdivisionwouldprobablynot
beavailableuntillateinMarchorearlyinApril.
Thedeletionofthe2*lstDivisionfromthelistofreinforcingdivisions,the
transferofthe40thDivisiontothecontrolofEighthArmyandassignment ofthe37th
DivisionasgarrisonofManila,precludedamajorsimultaneouseffortbySixthArmy
againstallfourkeyapproachestotheenemy'smountainstrongholdandtheCagayan
Valley. With fourdivisionscommittedinthesouth,onegarrisoningManilaandone
committed tomoppingupinwesternLuzonandtheBataanPeninsula,onlythreedivisions
wereavailable inthenorth;and,ifthe37thwerereleased,four.
Carefulanalysisofthestrategicimportanceofeachofthesekeypointsin
thelightofterrain,roadnetandenemystrengthanddispositionsindicatedclearly
thatthekeytotheenemy'sentiredefensesysteminnorthLuzonwasthe3aletePass-
SantaFe -Imuganarea. Itslosswouldopenthebackdoortohismountainstronghold
intheKianân-Bontocareaandtohis "granary",theCagayonValley. Lossofthe
CagayanValleyinturnwoulddestroyhisabilitytoconductacoordinateddefensein
northLuzonandwouldmakethefinalliquidationofhisforcescertain. Conversely,
thelongerheheldtheBaleteâss-Santa.Fe-Imuganarea,thelongerhecouldtie
uplargeAmericanforcesinnorthLuzonandthemoretimehewouldhavetoaccumulate
astockpileoffoodfromtheCagayanValleyinhismountainstronghold. Apparently
realizing this,theenemy,asalreadystatedelsewhere,committedthebulkofhis10th
Division,lessoneregiment,whichwasbeingannihilated onBataanandintheZambales
Mountains,tothedefenseoftheSantaFe-Balete.Bass-Imuganarea,reinforcingit
withremnantsoftheJapanese2dArmoredDivision,thosefewelementsofthe105th
DivisionwhichhadbeenabletoevacuatesouthernLuzon,andlargenumbersofairforce
andservicepersonnelorganizedintoprovisionalcombatunits. Asoperationsprogressed,
itbecamemoreandmoreclearthattheenemyintendedtoholdBaletePass-SantaFe-
Imuganatallcosts.
TheSixthArmyplanfortheBaletePassoperationprovidedforaconverging
attacknorthalongHighway5
and
- eastcmtheVilla
v
erdeTrail. Itincludedmaintenance
ofrigorouspressureagainsttheBaguiofrontfromthesouth,southwestandwest,and
againsttheC
ervan
tes-Bcntocfrontfromthewestandnorthwest. TheICorpswasen-
trustedwithcarryingouttheoperation. Ithadavailableforitstaskthe25thDivision
onHighway5,the32dDivisionontheVillaVerdeTrail,.the33dDivision (lateraug-
mentedbySixthArmywiththe37thDivision,lessoneRCT)onthegeneralBaguiofront,
andPhilippine GuerrillaForces,NorthLuzon,undercommandofColonelVolckmann,onthe
Cervantes-Bontocfront. Itshouldbenotedthattheseguerrillaforceshadbeenmaking
harassingraidsagainstenemytroopsandlinesofcommunicationinthemountainsofnor-
thernLuzonsincepriortoS-Day.
ColonelRussellVolckmannwasanAmericanofficerwhohadrefusedtosurrender
whenBataanfellearlyin192*2and,who,withtheaidoffriendlyFilipinos,hadmade
hiswayacrosstheCentralLuzon-PlaintothemountainsofnorthLuzon. Herehemade
contactwithotherAmericanofficerswhohadsimilarlyrefusedtosurrenderandorganized
thePhilippineGuerrillaForces,WorthLuzon. ThisforcewascomposednotonlyofFili-
pinocivilianswhodesiredtojointheresistancemovementbutincludedmanyformermem-
bersoftheUnitedStatesArmyForcesinthePhilippineswhohadescapedtheJapanese.
Priorto9January1945,thisforceharassedenemylinesofcommunicationthrough-
out themountainsofnorthLuzon,furnishedintelligenceinformationandcarriedout
specialdemolitionmissions,asdirectedbytheCommander-in-Chief,SouthwestPacific
Area tointerferewiththemovementofenemyforcesalongHighway5andtheMountain
Trail (Highway11). ByS-Day,theforcesunderVolckmann'scommandtotalledapproximately
8,000menofwhom2,000werearmed. WhentheCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy assumed
commandofhisforcesashoreon13January1945.healsoassumedcontrolofallFilipino
forcesonLuzon,includingthoseunderColonelVolckmann.
StepswereimmediatelytakenbySixthArmytoarmtheFilipinoguerrillaforces
onLuzonandtoimprovetheirsupply. VolunteersflockedtojoinVolckmannandhis
81
forcequicklyincreasedtoabout18,000men,organizedintofiveinfantryregiments,
the11th,14th,15th,66thand121st,plussupportingtroops. SixthArmywasableto
toarmandpartiallyequipVolckmann'sforce. Thisincludedsupportinginfantryweapons
aswellasindividualamis,aconsiderablepartofwhichconsistedofcapturedJapanese
arms. Unfortunately,thenon-availabilityofAmericanfieldartillerymaterieland
ammunition,combinedwithascarcityoftrainedguerrillapersonneltooperateit,pre-
ventedtheimmediateequippingofVolckmann'sforcewithsupportingartillery. Soon,
however,capturedJapanesefieldartillerypiecesandammunitionwereturnedoverto
ColonelVolckmannand,inacomparativelyshorttime,hewasabletoorganizeandtrain
abattalionoffieldartillery. Bythetimeth#LuzonCampaignwasdrawingtoaclose,
hehadorganizedandcompletedthetrainingofasecondfieldartillerybattalion.
Asearlyas2February1945aletterofinstructionswasissuedhySixthArmy
tothecommandersofrecognizedFilipinoguerrillaforcesonLuzon. Fiveoutofsix
ofthesewereAmericans. Thisletterofinstructionsdirectedtheguerrillaforces
undercontrolofthesecommanderstocontinueoffensiveoperationsagainsttheenemyin
presentareas: byambushinggroundforcesandpatrols;byseizingammunitionandsupply
dumpsfortheircwnuseordestroyingdumpsincaseitwasimpracticabletocapturethem;
bydisruptinglinesofcormTtgnl"Cactions;andbyblockingroutesofadvanceorwithdrawal.
Thisletterfurtherdirected-these-guerrillaforcestocontinuetofurnishSixthJ&my
withpertinentandtimelyinformationoftheenemy,suchashisstrength,dispositions,
composition,armament,directionofmovementandhisintentions.
PhilippineGuerrillaForces,NorthLuzon,carriedoutthesemissionssosuccess-
fullythatby5March1945,theycontrolledallofthenorthcoastofLuzonwestofthe
mouthoftheCagayanRiver,andthewestcoastofLuzon(withtheexceptionofVigan)
southtopositionsjustnorthof3anFernando(LaUnion). Theiroperationsinthe
westernportionoftheCagayanValleyhadforcedtheenemytorestricthisactivitiesin
thatareatopurelypunitiveexpeditionswhichaccomplishedpracticallynothing. The
operationsoftheseguerrillasnorthofSanFernando(LaUnion;,togetherwiththepres-
sureexertedbythe33&Divisionfromthesouthandwestagsin3thisover-extendedfront
forcedtheenemytoinitiatealargescalewithdrawaltotheeasttowardhismountain
strongholdinordertoshortenlines(seeDiagram32.)
CarefulconsiderationswasgivenbyHeadquartersSixthArmytoanamphibious
operationagainstAparri,tobelaunchedwhenoperationselsewhereonLuzonshouldhave
reachedsuchastagethatadivision,reinforced,couldbemadeavailabletherefor. But
theideahadtobedropped,sincethenecessaryshippingcouldnetbemadeavailableto
SixthArmy,becauseofamphibiousoperationsthenbeingplannedfororcurrentlybeing
carriedoninthesouthernPhilippinesandtheNetherlandsEastIndies. Besides,itwas
realizedthatthemerethreatofanassaultlandingbySixthArmyforcesintheAparri
areawouldprobablyforcetheenemytodisposethe103dDivisionfordefensecfthe
northernCagayanValley,therebyimmobilizingthatdivision. Thatthisestimateproved
tobecorrectwillbecomeevidentasthediscussionofoperationsinnorthLuzonproceeds.
ThisthenwasthesituationinnorthLuzonwhen,on6March1945SixthArmyField
Order56wasissued. ThisdirectedICorpstocontinuecurrentmissionsandtofflakea
determinedefforttosecurethevitalBaletePass-SantaFe-Imuganareaatanearly
dateandtopres3theenemyallalongtheline. Inaccordancewiththisdirective,I
CorpspushedforwardaggressivelytowardBaletePassitselfwithtne25thDivisionen
Highway5*andtowardImugan-SantaFewitnthe32dDivisionontheVillaVerdeTrail,
exertedpowerfulpressurewithits33dDivisionagainstenemypositionsastridetheKen-
nonRoadontheapproachestoBaguio,andsecuredthecorpsleftflankwiththatdivision.
The25thDivision,havingcapturedDigdig,advancednorthastrideHighway5towardBalete
Pass,whilethe3^dDivisionpushedeastontheVillaVerdeTrailtowardImugan-Santa
Feintherearoftheenemy'sBaletePassposition. Bothdivisionsmadeslowprogress
throughexceedinglydifficultterrainandagainstsuicidalenemyresistance. Asthe
linesoftheenemybecameprogressivelyshorterduetotheconvergingadvanceofthese
twodivisions,itbecameeasierforhixtoshirtreservesassembledintheSantaFearea
tothreatenedpartsofhisfrontinthisregion. The25thDi
v
i
3
i
onw a s
fortunatein
havinga^codsupplyroad,Highway5,anadvantagewhicnthe32dDivisiondidnotpos-
sess. Butthe25thDivisionwasforcedtooperatealmostcontinuallyalongtheseries
ofridgesoneithersideofHighway5,inordertopermituninterrupteduseofthatroad.
Theoperationsofthisdivisionaccordinglydevelopedintoaseriesofpincermovements
whichculminatedinawidedoubleenvelopmentofBaletePassfromtheeastandwest.
Thenecessityforcarryingoutoperationsinthemountainousjungleterrainon
bothsidescfHighway5presented serioussupplyproblems. Supplyandevacuationroads
82
hadtooeconstructed. Thedensejungleandsteepslopescombinedwiththeeverpresent
tnreatcienemyinfiltrationattacksmadethisconstructionworkdoublydifficult. The
rateofadvancewasdeterminedlargelybytheprogressmadeinconstructingsupplyroads
andmuchofthesupplyhadtobeeffectedbynativecarriers.
Acriticalshortageofartilleryammunitionfurthercomplicatedoperations,not
onlyinthisareabutelsewhereonLuzon. 'Thisshortagewasbroughtaboutbydifficulties
encounteredinunloadingandthefailureofcertainammunitionshipstoarriveonsched-
ule. Thisdifficultywasaccentuatedbytheaterammunitionshortageswhichmadeit
necessaryforSixthA
rmy
tosupplycertaindivisionalunitsofEighthArmywithinitial
ammunitionallotmentsforoperationsinthesouthernPhilippines.
The32dDivision,whichoperatedalongtheVillaVerdeTrail,wasfacedwith
difficultiessimilartothoseencounteredbythe25thDivision. AlthoughtheVilla
VerceTrailgenerallyfollowedhighground,thussomewhatreducingthenecessityfor
lateraloperationsoffthetrailwiththeirattendantsupplyproblems,thisadvan;age
wasmorethanoffsetbytheextremelydifficulttaskofconvertingthetrailintoa
roadcapableofsupportingheavyequipmentandsupplies.
Theoperationsofbothdivisionswereincreasinglyhamperedbyheavyrains,
whichmadesupplyroadsandtrailsimpassableandgreatlyincreasedthedemandfor
nativecarriers. Thesewereoftenhardtoobtainandfrequentlyunaependable. Enemy
fireusuallyimmobilizedthem,eventhoughtherewasnoimmediatedanger,andcaused
themtodesertinlargenumbers.
Inspiteofseeminglyinsurmountabledifficultiesofterrainandsupplythetwo
divisionsdrovesteadilyahead,systematicallyreducinggroupsofcavepositions. Where
apositioncouldnotbereadilyreduced,itwascontainedandby-passedtobethoroughly
poundedbyair,artilleryanddirectfireweaponsandthencleanedout. By23March
1945the25thDivisionhadopenedHighway5northtoapointabout1500yardssouthof
Kapintalanandwasdevelopingstrongenemydefenseswhichextendedinarougharcof
1000-yardradiussouthandsouthwestofKapintalan. The35thInfantry(25thDivision),
inawideturningmovementeastofHighway5tadvancednorthalongtheCidSpanishirail
runningfromCarranglantoDupaxandreachedpositionssome6,500yardsnortheastof
Kapintalanby23March1945*withoutencounteringanythingbutlightresistance,though
itsprogresswasretardedbydifficultiesofterrainandsupply. Initssubsequent
advancenortheastofKapintalan,however,theregimentencounteredheavyresistancefrcm
strongenemydefensivepositions. Theenemyhadapparentlyrecognizedthattheadvance
ofthe3jthInfantrythreatenednisflankandhadbroughtupreinforcementstomeetit.
Meanwhile,the32dDivisionhadencounteredincreasinglyheavyenemyresistance
asitadvancedeastalongtheVillaVerdeTrîl. By23March1945*thedivisionwas
engagedinanalloutbattleforpossessionofthehighestterrainontheVillaVerde
Trail5000yardswestofImugan. Itwasdestinedtobehelddowntolimitedgains
hereforslightlymorethanamonth. Butbytheendofthattimethedoggedfighting
ofitsinfantry,thesuperiorfirepowerofitsartillery,theenemy'scriticalsupply
situation,hisheavylossesinmenandmaterials,andtheserioussituationofhisfor-
cesontheBaletePassfront,enabledthedivisiontopushontoimugan. Cnebattalion
ofthe127thInfantryhadbeendispatchedtothesouthoftheVillaVerdeTrailtotake
Imuganfromtheflankandrearanddrivewesttomakecontactwiththebalanceofthe
divisionadvancingeastastridetheVillaêrdeTrail. On17March1945
t h i a
battalion
hadreachedpositionsabout700yardssouthwestofImugan,whereitranagainststrong
enemydefensesandwassubjectedfortendaystoheavyenemyartilleryfireandcontinu-
ouscounterattacks. Whenitbecameevidentthatthemaneuverhadlosttheelementof
surpriseandlogisticalsupportofthebattalionbecamenexttoimpossible,itwas
withdrawn.
Whilethe25thand32dDivisionswereconvergingontheBaletePass-SantaFe
Imuganarea,the33dDivisionhadmadelimitedgainsagainststrongenemyresistancein
itsadvancetowardBaguioalongtheKennonRoad. Reconnaissancepatrolsofthedivision
-vereoperatingallalongthefronttodevelopenemydefensesontheapproachestoBaguic.
Reportsfror/itnosewestoftheKennonRoadindicatedageneralnortheastanaeastward
withdrawalofenemyforcesdefendingtheapproachestoBaguio. The1stBattalion,130th
Infantry whichadvancednorthonHighway3seizedBauangandthehighwayandrailroad
bridgesacrosstheBauangRiverintacton19March1945- Continuingtheadvancenorth
againstscatteredresistancefromsmallenemydelayinggroups,thisbattalionreached
83
thesouthernoutskirts ofSanFernando (LaUnion)on20March 1945.wiiereitcontacted
PhilippineGuerrillaForces,WorthLuzon,whichhadalready captured theportandtown
priortothisdate. On22torch1945.elementsofthebattalionreached theâguilian
airstrip,wheretheyencountered lightopposition. Meanwhile,otherelementsofthe
33dDivision,whichhadadvancednortheastastridetheKennonRoaa,hadsecured theline
Alibang-Buebue-TwinPeaks-Pugoby23March1945-
(FordispositionsofICorpsat24001,S/73.23March1945.seeDiagram51.)
Inviewoftherapidadvanceofthe33dDivisionontheleft oftheICorpsand
thesuccessfuloperationsofPhilippineGuerrillaForces,ftcrthLuzon,inthe3
a n
Fer-
Th
is nando (LaUnion)area,FieldCrder56wasissuedbySixth*rmyon23March1945-
orderestablishedaboundarybetweenICorpsandPhilippine GuerrillaForces, North
Luzon,whichrangenerallywestfromAritao,onHighway5.*Bokoa,thence northwest
toBacnotanonthewestcoastofLuzon,allinclusiveofICorps,anddirected ICorps:
toadvancevigorouslywithitslefttosecuretheSanFernando (LaUnion)areaforearly
developmentasaportandsupplybase;topushstrongreconnaissance inthedirectionof
Baguio,preparedtoattackandcaptureitwhendirected;tocontinuedetermined efforts
tosecurethevitalBaletetass-SantaFe-Ixuuganareaatanearlydate,inorderto
shortenlinesandgainaccesstotheCagayanValley;todestroyhostileforcesremaining
inPangasinanandNuevaEcijaProvincesandinthosepartsofZambalesandTarlacProv-
inceswithinthecorpszonecfaction;andtoestablish andmaintaincontactwith
PhilippineGuerrilLaForces,NorthLuzon.
FieldOrder58alsodirectedthe37thDivisiontoconcentratethe12'9thRCTand
the136thFieldArtilleryBattalioninthegeneralBauang (LaUnion)--reaby24OOI,2/
March1945;andPhilippineGuerrillaForces,WorthLuzon (Volckmann)tocontinuethe
missionsassignedtheminSixthArmyLetterofInstructionsof2February 1945.byan
aggressiveoffensivetoseizeCervantesandestablishcontrolofHighway4east thereof
toincludeBontocandtoestablishandmaintaincontactwithICorps.
SincethefacilitiesatPortSualandintheSanFabian-Damortisareawerenot
adequatetomaintaintheflowofsuppliesrequired,thesecurepossessionoftheport
facilitiesofSanFernando (LaUnion)wasvitallyimportantforthelogistical support
ofoperationsinnorthwesternLuzon.
TheconcentrationintheBauangareaofoneRCT,reinforced,fromthe37thDivi-
sionwasdesignedtoplaceitinpositiontosecuretheportofSanFernando;fora
driveonBaguioviaHighway9andthentoshortenthelinesofthe33dDivisionand
permit ittoconcentrateallitsstrengthagainstthewesternandsouthwesternapproaches
toBaguio. Itwasplannedtoconcentratethebalanceofthe37thDivision,lessoneRCT,
onthenorthwesternapproachestoBaguioassoonasitcouldbereleasedfromManila.
InaccordancewithSixthiiruvFiedCrder58,the129thRCT (37thDivision)con-
C n 2
7 centratedintheBauangareaandpassedtocontrolofICorpson26March1945.
March1945the3dBattalion,129thInfantry,occupiedSanFernandotosecuretheport
facilities,whilethebalanceoftheROTconcentrated intheNaguilianareaonHighway
9 inpreparationforareconnaissance inforceinthedirectionofBurgos. On28March
1945the129thInfantry (less2dBattalion)advancedtothesoutheasttowardBurgos.
Encounteringresistancefromsmallenemydelayinggroupsonly,theregimentreachedthe
outskirtsofBurgogt>
y
thecloseoftheday. Itoccupiedthetownonthefollowingday,
continuedtheadvance,and,afterbrushingasidetheveryslight enemyresistance,seized
thehighground3,500yardssoutheastofB
u r
g
O S o n
30March1945. Onthissamedate,the
2dBattalion,129thInfantry,advancedeastfromSanFernando (LaUnion)andoccupied
Santiago (1500yardseastcfSanFernando)withoutmeetingenemyresistance.
Whilepatrolsofthe129thInfantry (less2dBattalion)reconnoiteredeastand
southeastofBu
r
g
O Sw
ithonlyminorenemycontacts,elementsofthe33dDivision continued
todrivethebitterlyresistingenemyfromhispositionsastridetheKennonRoad. Other
elements ofthedivisionadvancedeastfromPugowhileonecolumn,advancingupthevalley
oftheGalianoRiver,seizedGalianowithoutmeetingoppositionon30March1945.
B v
6April1945.thedivisionhadsecuredCamp3ontheKennonRoadand itsleftflankele-
mentsadvancingeastfromPugoandGaliano,hadreachedthewesternandsouthernapproach-
estoMtCalugong. Longrangeartillerywasalreadypoundingenemypositions inBaguio.
PhilippineGuerrilla Forces,NorthLuzon,advancingeastalongHighway4towardCervantes,
haduncovered theenemy'sright (north)flank. Itwasb-ecomingmoreandmoreevident
84
Thisaerialviewlookingsouthwestofaportion
oftheVillaVerdeTraili
s
typicaloftheterrain
moststronglydefended"bytheenemyonLuzon.
*H
Engineerunitsworkedlonghoursto"buildandmaintainthe
vitalsupply roadtoourtroopsontheVillaVerdeTrail
Troopsofthe32dDivisiondiginandrest
aftertaicir.ôneofthemanyobjectivesin
itsfighttoseizetheVillaVerdeTrail.
B g 6 n e r a l w i t h d r a w a l to t h e
i t r n n ^ L w ^ + v ^3tandnortheastbuthadleft
strongdelayingforcesbehindtoccvertheretirementofhismainbodyfromBaguio.
Nowwasthetimeforthe33dDivisionand129thRCTtostrikedirectlyatBaguio.
Meanwhile,the25thand32dDivisionscontinuedtobatterenemydefensesonthe
southernandwesternapproachestoBaletePass. The25thDivision,advancingnorth
astrideHighway^,encountereddeterminedenemyresistanceonthesouthernapproachesto
Kapmtalan. Althoughitadvancedtowithin1,000yardssouthofKapintalan,itsrepeated
attemptstopenetratetheenemypositionsfromthisdirectionfailed. Accordingly,on
1April1945thedivisionby-pasjedKapintalanontheeastandwest. Thismovedeveloped
intoawidecoordinateddoubleenvelopmentofBaletePass,the27thInfantrywiththe
35thInfantryonitsleftadvancingacrosstheridgeseastofHighway5andthel6lst
Infantryalongthoseparalleltoandwestofthehighway. By6April1945,the35thand
27thInfantryRegimentshadreachedalinethatextendedinanarcfromapointonHigh-
way5some1000yardssouthofPiapintalanviathehighgroundabout1900yardseast
northeastofthatplacetotheridgeline3500yardseastnortheastofKapintalanwhile
thel6lstInfantryonthelefthadgainedaridgeroughly1500yardswestofKapintalan.
ItwasapparentthattheenemydefensescenteredonEapintalanwerethemainenemyposi-
tionsdefendingBaletePassonthesouth. Theenemydisplayedhisusualinabilityto
shiftandmassartilleryfiresrapidly,buthisfirewasintenseandaccurate,andhe
prearrangedfirestogoodadvantageonafinaldefenseline. Healsomanagedtolocate
someofourbatteries,commandposts,andsupplyinstallationsandbombardedthemaccu-
ratelyfromtimetotime. Theperformanceofthe90mmanti-aircraftartillerywhich
supportedthe25thDivisionwasoutstanding. Theabsenceofenemyairactivitypermitted
theemploymentofanti-aircraftartilleryinsupportofgroundtroopsratherthanin
positionstoprotectbasesandethermilitaryinstallations. Inconsequenceoursupply
cf90mmammunitionwasplentiful,afactorthatservedmateriallytoalleviateourshort-
agesoffieldartilleryammunition.
The3^^divisiondrivingeastontheVillaVerdeTrailmadeveryslowprogress,
becauseofstrongenemycavedefenseslocatedondominatingterrain,butelementsofthe
divisionreachedalineabout4000yardswestofImuganon6April1945* Theenemyar-
tillery,whichrangedincaliberupto150mm,apparentlyhadanampleammunitionsupply
anditsfirewasaccurateandintense. Thedivisionattemptedtooutflanktheenemy
defensesastridethetrailbysendingoneregimenteastdownthevalleybetweenivitImugan
andtheVillaVerdeTrail. Thisregimenthadtobesuppliedentirelybynativecarriers
operatingfromadvancetruckheadsalongthetrail. Moreover,enemyartilleryobservers
onMtImugancouldobserveitsmovementsinthevalleytothesouth;consequentlyitwas
continuallysubjectedtoaccuratedefensivebarragesandharassingfires. Theeffective-
nessofcounterbatteryfiredeliveredagainstsuchenemyartilleryascouldbelocated
wasconsiderablyreducedbytheprecipitousnatureoftheterrain,whichprovidedexcel-
lentdefiladeforenemyartilleryposiitons,andbythewellconstructedcavepositions
inwhichtheenemyeraplacedhisartillery.
(FordispositionsofICorpsonS/87,6April1945.seeDiagram52.)
Whiletheadvancemadebythe25thDivisionenabledittooutflanktheenemy
defensesonthesouthernapproachestoBaletePassthefailureoftheenemytooffer
determinedresistancetotheadvanceofthe33dDivisiontowardBaguio,togetherwith
thefactthatheofferednooppositionatalltotheadvanceofthe129thInfantryon
Highway9towardBaguiowassuchadefiniteindicationofhisweaknessoppositethe
SixthArmy'sleft,astoinviteexploitation.
Inviewoftheforegoing,SixthArmyissuedHeldOrder59.on7April1945.
whichdirectedICorps,whilecontinuingcurrentmissions,toattackvigorouslyall
alongtheline,makingitsmaineffortontherighttoseizetheBaletePass-SantaFe
areaatanearlydate,andtocaptureBaguio. Thisplanwasdesignedtoexertpressure
allalongtheenemy'sseriouslyover-extendedlines,thusplacingSixthArmyforcesin
apositiontoexploitanylocalweaknesswhichmightdevelop. Sincethebalanceofthe
37thDivision(less145thRCT)hadnowbeenreleasedfromgarrisondutyinManila,the
aboveorderdirectedittoconcentrateintheNaguilian(La?
nion
^ " /
h e
" "
c
^
y
t 0
o w i n
f
e R
passtothecontrolofICorpsinaccordancewiththe
f o
H
h
s c
^ ^ -
C T
O
^
d t
C
^
18001 10April1945;andtheremainderofthedivision(lessthe145thRCTandthose
elementsalreadyapartofICorps)by18001,11April1945-
Pursuanttotheabovementionedorder,theICorpsincreasedthetempoofits
85
offensiveallalongitsfrontsfromHighway5
o n
theapproachestoBaletePass,to.
Highway4ontheapproachestoCervantes. Thebalanceofthe37thDivision(less145th
RCT)concentratedintheKaguilian(LaUnion)areaandpassedtocontroloftheCommanding
General,ICorps,asdirected. The129thRCT,136thFieldArtilleryBattalionand66th
PhilippineInfantry,less2dBattalion(PhilippineGuerrillaForces,WorthLuzon)passed
tccontroloftheCommandingGeneral,37thDivision,at18001,10April1945*
Cn8April1945,the33dDivisionlaunchedageneraloffensivetowardBaguio,
makingitsmaineffortwithitsleft,inordertoexploittheapparentenemyweakness
inthatarea. On12April1945itcapturedAsinandMtCalugongagainstonlylight
enemyopposition. Onthissaraedate,the37thDivisionadvancedalongHighway9toward
BaguioandreachedSablan,afterovercominglightresistanceofferedbyenemydelaying
forces.
TheenemydidnotconductacoordinateddefenseontheapproachestoBaguio.
Inthezoneofactionofthe33dDivision,hehad,indeed,organizedaseriesofmore
orlessindependentstrongpointseachmannedbyaboutacompany,asforexample,on
BilbilMountain,MtLomboy,Hill1518andMtSantoTomas. Inthezoneofactionof
the37thDivision,hehadsimilarlydevelopeddefensesonthehighgroundatkeypoints
alongHighway9 Allthesepositionswereorganizedindepthandtheforcesmanning
themfoughttothedeath.
Asthe33d
an
d37thDivisionsconvergedonBaguio,enemyresistanceincreasedin
intensity. On17April1945.the33dDivisiondevelopedstrongeneiuypositionsalong
thelineMtSantaTomas-Hill1518-MtLomboy-BilbilMountain. Cnthissameday,
the37thDivisionencounteredheavyresistance,thefirstintheadvance,asitapproached
IrisenonHighway9 On19"pril1945itcrushedenemyresistanceinthisareaandad-
vancedsoutheastandeasttowithinabout1500yardsofBaguio,whereitagainmetheavy
opposition. On24April1945*followinganintenseair,artillery,tankandtankdestroyer
bombardment,thedivisionwipedouteneaiyresistanceinthisareaalso,andby26April
1945
na
dreachedalineoverlookingBaguiofromthewest. Onthissameday,othereleîents
ofthedivision,advancingnortheasttowardTrinidad,capturedihilippineafterovercoming
lightenemyresistance. Meanwhile,the33dDivision,havingcontainedandbypassedthe
enemystrcngpointsonMtSantoTomas,MtLomboyandMtBilbil,hadadvancedeastonthe
rightofthe37thDivisiontcalineoverlookingBaguic.
On27April1945*followinganairstrikeinwhich60tonsofdemolitionand
fragmentationbombsweredroppedontheremainingenemystrongpointblockingtheroad
intoBaguio,the37thDivisionsecuredthecityandCampJohnHaytotheeastthereof
withoutmeetingenemyresistanceandpatrolssenttowardTrinidadfailedtoregaineon-
tactwiththeenemy. Baguicwasdesertedexceptforapproximately5^0civilianswho
hadtakenrefugeinandaroundthecathedral. Alliedbombingandartilleryfirehad
almostlevelledthebusinessdistrictofthecity,butthecathedralhadescapedadirect
bombhit.
On2b
1
April1945the33dDivisionrelievedthe37thDivisionintheBaguio-
CampJohnHayarea. The37thDivisionthenadvancednorthandnortheasttowardtheline
Sablan-Takian-Amsalsal(north),whilethe33dDivisionpushedeastandnortheast
towardthelineItogon-Hill1561,atthesametimesendingaforcesouthwestfrom
BaguioalongtheKennon-Ftoadtomakecontactwiththeelementsofthedivisionthatwere
movingnortheastonthatroad. On29April1945the37thDivisioncapturedTrinidad
withoutmeetingopposition. Lne;nyremnantsthatwerefleeingfromthisareaonthepre-
cedingdayhadbeenthoroughlybombedandstrafedwithresultingheavylossesinper-
sonnelandequipment. On1May1945thedivisionsecuredthelineSablan-Takian-
Amsalsal(north)andsentpatrolsnortheastonHighway11toward^cop'sPlacewithout
regainingcontactwiththeenemy. On3May1945itoccupiedAcop'sPlacewithoutmeet-
ingresistance.
Meanwhile,the33dDivision,advancingeastandnortheasttowardthelineItcgon-
Hill1561hadcapturedTopsideon29April1945withoutmeetingopposition,hadreduced
thelastpocketsofenemyresistanceonMtSantoTomas,MtLomboyandBilbilMountainon
30April1945,andhadsecuredItogonandHill1561on3May1945. Cn5May1^45the
divisionrelievedthe37thDivisionofmissionsintheBaguicareaforemploymentinthe
operationsoftherightwingofICorps.
Afterrelievingthe37thDivision,the33ddivisioncovered.itsleftwitha
86
The33dand37thDivisionsencounteredandconqueredthproblems
ofpoor roads,stronglydefendedenemycavepositions,
bridge"buildingandmaintenance, andthefatigueofconstantvigiltoconsummatein
theirjointassaultor Baguiowithaminimumofcasualtiesandaminimumoftime.
P a
^
1 S f
*
hiie
nit8ri
^
htiliaUGched
towardTebbo o ? *two-prongeddrive
^
S0Uth f r
r L It0gOn andtheother
^ t h *^ theIn 1 r if ^ T valleyof
theAfenohiver. O n 10May1945thesecolumnswipedouttheenemypocketofresistance
encounteredJ>y theminthisarea,formedajunctioninthevicinityofTebboandseized
tnetown, urcm11ifey1945through23Way1945,thedivisionmoppedupintheT
e
bbo-
ltoôn-Lamp4areaanaconauctedlongrangepatrollingtotheeast,northeastandnorth
fromthelineTebbo-Itogon-Acop'sPlace-Amsalsal (north),butmadelightscattered
enemycontactsonly.
Whilethe33dand37thDivisionswerewipingouttheenemydefensesonthe
approachestoBaguio,PhilippineGuerrillaForces,NorthLuzon,htdadvancedeaston
Highway4toward Cervantes,hadconductedoperationsbehindenemylinesintheBontoc-
Sianganarea,andhadharassedenemylinesofcommunicationandsupplyintheCaâyan
Valley. Moreover,the15thPhilippineInfantryhadoperatedeastofVigantocomplete
thedestructionofremnantsoftheJapanese79thBrigade (103dDivision),whichhadbeen
trappedinthebendoftheAbraRiver.
TheterrainalongHighway4westofCervanteswasevenmoreruggedthanthat
traversedbytheVillaVerdeTrail. Moreover,insteadoffollowinghighground,asdid
theVillaVerdeTrail,Highway4followedtheValleyofthe C
Q
icoRiver,andthis
materially,increasedthedifficultyoftheoperations. Itrequiredanunusualamount
cfcross countrymovement,awayfromtheroad,inordertogaincontrolofhighground.
Forexample,the121stPhilippine Infantry,whichwasadvancingeastonHighway4toward
Cervantes,hadtofacemuchthesameproblemthatthe32dDivisionhadencounteredonthe
VillaVerdeTrail,buttheseproblemswerefurtheraggravatedbythemoreruggedterrain,
thenecessityfor agreatdealofcrosscountrymovement,andbyashortageofengineer
equipmentandsupplyvehicles. Inspiteofthesedifficulties,however,the121stPhilip-
pineInfantry,by23May1945hadreachedthewesternapproachestoBessangPass(1,100
yardswestsouthwestofCervantes),whereitsadvancewasbroughttoahaltinfrontof
abeltoforganizedenemycavepositions. Fortunately,elementsofthe11thPhilippine
Infantry,whichwereoperatingnortheastofBontoconHighway11,hadsucceededinef-
fectivelyblockingthatavenuetoallenemymovement,therebypreventingtheenemyfrom
bringingtroopsoutoftheCagayanValleytoreinforcetheCervantesarea,hadhede-
siredtodoso.
SimultaneouslywithitsdrivetocaptureBaguio,ICorpsintensifieditseffort
alongHighway5
a n
dtheVillaVerdeTrailtccapturetheBaletePass-SantaFe-Imugan
area. Asalready pointedoutelsewhere,the25thDivisionhad,by7April1945 developed
wellorganizedenemydefensive positionsastride'Highway5onthesouthernapproachesto
Xapintalan. Thesewerethemainenemydefensesguardingthesouthernapproachesto
BaletePass. By7April1945operationswerealreadyunderwaytooutflanktheseenemy
positionsbyav/ideturningmovementtotheeast,coupledwithanorthwarddriveanden-
velopmentalongtheparallelridgesonthewestsideofHighway5
T n e
32dDivision,
meanwhile,washeavilyengagedinanalloutbattleforSalacsacPass,tnekeyterrain
ontheVillaVerdeTrail,4000yardswestofImugan.
PivotingonHighway5justsouthofKapintalan,the25thDivisiondrovesteadily
aheadeastofthehighwaywithitsright. Filipinoguerrillassecuredtherightflank
ofthedivisionandblockedtheOldSpanishTrail,repulsingnumerousenemyattemptsto
launchsmallscalecounterattacksfromthedirectionofDupax. By21April1945.the
27thInfantry,whichwasattackingnorthfrompositions35
00
yardsnortheastofKapin-
talanhad'capturedtheridêlineabout37OOyardssoutheastofBaletePass,whilethe
Klst Infantry,whichwasadvancingnorthonthewestsideofHighway5,hadreacheda
line500y^rdswestofKapintalan. Indicationswerethatenemyresistanceonthewest
sideofHighway5wasbeginningtocrack. On27April1945the27thInfantryhad
o^trated strongenemydefensesabout1100yardssoutheastofBaletePassandhad
ma'desnail"ains. Onthesameday,thel6lstInfantry,inanenvelopingmovementfrom
thewest,hadcutHighway5atapoint1400yardsnorthofKapintalsn. On28April
191^ enemydefensesonthesouthernapproachestoKapintalancollapsedandthe3jth
Infantry,wipingoutenemypocketsby-passedbytheothertworegimentsofthedivision,
captured'the'tovmandopenedHighway5tothatpoint.
Definitesigns indicatingthatenemyresistancewestofHighway5wasweakening,
nowappeared. Thel6lstInfantry,inposition2100yardssouthwestofsaletePass,
^ *%tVl ^ o u s ' r Sa n c e ^ u t astneadvanceproceed totnenorth
87
andnortheastalongtheridgesparallelingHighway5
n
thewest,thedefensecollapsed;
and,on5May1945,theregimentcapturedthehighground300yardswestofandover-
lookingBaletePass. Onthesameday,elementsofthe27thInfantry,inawideenvelop-
mentfromtheeast,reachedpositions1000yardseastofBaletePassanddrovewestto
formajunctionwiththel6lstInfantry.
The25thDivisionnowbeganpreparationsforthefinalassaulttoseizethe
BaletePass-SantaFearea. On30April1945the148thInfantry(lessCannonCompany)
hadpassedfromcontrolofthe37thDivisiontocontrolofthe25thDivision,andhad
concentratedintheSanJose(Nuevacija)area. Thisregimentimmediatelyinitiated
reliefofrightflankelementsofthe25thDivision,therebyenablingthedivisionto
concentrateitsforcesforthefinaldriveonBaletePass. By8Iviay1945the27th
Infantry,drivingwestagainststubbornenemyresistance,hadreachedpositions5
0 0
yards
eastofBaletePass. Cnthesameday,thel6lstInfantrydrovenorththroughcollapsing
enemydefensesandsecuredthehighground600yardssouthcftheVillaVerdeTrailand
1800yardssouthwestofSantaFe.
Whilethe25thDivisionclosedinonBaletePass,the32dDivisioncontinuedto
hammertheenemypositionsastridetheVillaVerdeTraill00QyardswestofImugan. This
areawaspockmarkedwithamultitudeofcavepositionssoconstructedascompletelyto
dominatethetrailandthevalleytothenorth. Thefactthatthecrestofahillhud
beensecuredwasnoindicationwhateverthatthehillitselfwasinourhands,forit
wasstillnecessarytoundertaketediousmoppingupoperationstocleanoutorsealthe
numerouscavepositionswhichcoveredtheslopesofthehill. Jworeover,outflankingan
enemydefensivepositiondidnotmeanthatitwouldthencollapse,fortheenemyfought
oninhiscavesandtunnelsuntiltheywereblownuporsealedortheiroccupantskilled.
Hefedreinforcementsintoeachpositionaslongastherewasanywaytoreachit,no
matterhowuntenableitmighthavebecomeinthemeantime. ^Vhenthepositionbecame
isolated,theJapanesedefendersfoughtuntilovercomeandkilled.
Theoperationsofthe32dDivisionalongtheVillaVerdeTrailwerefurther
complicatedbyacriticalshortageofreplacements. Allregimentswereunderstrength
agreatpartofthetime,the128thInfantrybeingforawhiledowntolessthan1500
effectives,officersandmen. Thisshortageofreplacementsseriouslyhandicapped
operationsandmeantthatwhenaregimentwasrelievedfromtheline,aninordinate
amountoftimewasrequiredtorehabilitateit.
Theprogressoftheadvanceofthe3
2
dDivisionwasmeasuredinhundredsof
yards,buton16April1945itcompletelysecuredSalacsacPass,thedominatingterrain
4000yardswestofImugan. Controlofthispassenabledthedivisiontopenetrate600
yardsthroughstrongenemydefensestoa line34-^0yardswestofImuganby20April
1945- Duringthisadvance,itwassubjectedtoheavyenemyartilleryfire,rangingin
caliberupto150mm,andfirefromenemy81mmandJOmnmortars. Thisfirewasdirected
fromobservationpostsonMtImuganfromwhichtheenemyhadexcellentobservationover
ourmovementsinthisarea. By3*&y1945advanceelementsofthedivisionhadreached
positionsapproximately2500yardswestofImugan.
Asthe25thDivisiondroveclosertotheBaletePass-SantaFearea,theenemy
begantowithdrawtroopsfromhisdefensivepositionsopposingthe32dDivisiononthe
VillaVerdeTrail,toreinforcehispositionsontheapproachestoBaletePassalong
Highway$. Inordertoexploitthissituation,the32dDivision,whilecontainingenemy
forcesastridetheVillaVerdeTrailonthewesternapproachestoImugan,by-passed
thesedefensesonthenorthand,advancingcrosscountry,againstincreasinglyheavy
enemyresistance,reachedpositionsapproximately7800yardswestofSantaFeonc**ay
1945.
ThestagewasnowsetforthefinalassaultontheBaletePass-SantaFe-
Imugandefensivesystem. Indicationsofacollapseofenemydefensesinthisareahad
becomeverystrong. Therapid,andalmostunopposedadvanceofthel6lstInfantryon
thewestsideofHighway5topositionsoverlookingBaletePassandtowithin600yards
oftheVillaVerdeTrail,reinforcedthisestimate. Theoutflankingmaneuverofthe
27thInfantryontheeastofHighway5haduncoveredtheenemy'sleftflankandhad
isolatedhisdefensivepositionssouthofBaletePass.
The25thDivisionbeganregroupingitsforcesinpreparationforthefinal
attackontheBaletePass-SantaFeposition,andby12May1945*
n
^dcompletedprepa-
rationsfortheassault. Itwaswithin500yardsofthepassontheeast,within1000
88
Asthisviewlookingsouthwardfromthe
BaletePassshows,ourforceswereinitially
agreatdisadvantageasregardsobservation;
andlater,astheterrain"becamemoreruggedand
enemypositionsmoresuitedfordefense,
ourinfantrymenwereagainforcedtomethodically
andpainstakinglyreduceeachstrongpoint"by
useof"bazookas,demolitions,andflamethowere.
S
nthe WeSt
ITetlnTsITtlTltisfTJ* l
yyr
"
and Within60
y^
onthe
northwest,
M g h
^
U n d yards30uthoftheVillaV
linterdictedth!t t f^ "*
6

?i
3
i!^L
1 9 A 5 f f
^
w i n
S
ah e
borriba
a n
^yairbombardmentwithnapalmanddemolition
bombsandanintensiveartillerypreparation,the25thDivisionattackedandcaptured
BaletePass,openingHighway5tothatpoint,andcontinueditsoffensivenorthtoward
bantaFe. Enemyresistancerapidlydisintegratedbeforethecombinedblowsofourair
andgroundforces. By23May1945.thedivisionhadadvancedtowithin500yardsof
SantaFeonthesouth,within1100yardsonthesoutheast,andwithin1700yardsonthe
southwest. DivisionpatrolsoperatingtothenorthontheeastsideofHighway5atthe
sametimereachedaline1500yardseastofSantaFewithoutencounteringorganizedde-
fensesoranylargeenemyforces.
Meanwhile,the32dDivisiondroveeastfromitspositionsapproximately78OO
yardswestofSantaFe. Despitethefactthattheenemywasseriouslymenacedbythe
advanceofthe25thDivisiontowardSantaFe,hedidnotattempttoevacuateanymore
troopsfromhisdefensesopposingthe32dDivisionontheVillaVerdeTrail, histroops
foughttenaciously,contestingeveryfoot-ofground. Captureddocumentsrevealeda
fastapproachingammunitionshortagebutstillhefoughton. y23iway1945,the32d
divisionhadfoughtitswayeastwardtopositionsapproximately6500yardswestofS
a
nta
*e. Cnthisdaythe126thInfantry(32dDivision)wasconcentratedintheDigdigarea
onHighway5andpassedtothecontrolofthe25thDivision. Thisregimentwastobe
employedinanattackagainsttherearoftheenemypositionsconfrontingthe32dDivi-
siononthewesternapproachestoSantaFe.
Thedesirabilityofhavingarelativelyfreshdivisionexploitthebreakthrough
intheBaletePass-SantaFe-Irnuganareawasobvious. Hence,itwasdecidedtocon-
centratethe37thDivision(less145thRCT)inthegeneralSanJose(NuevaEcija)area,
giveitashortrestandprepareitforearlycommitmenttoexploitthebreakthrough.
Asalreadymentioned,the146thInfantryhadrelievedrightflankelementsofthe25th
DivisionontheapproachestoBaletePasson30April1945
an
^theremainderofthe
division(less145thRCT)completedconcentrationinthevicinityofLupaoon8May1945*
(FordispositionsofICorpsat24001,S/I34,23u&y1945.
s e e
Diagram53.)
Inviewoftheforegoing,SixthArmyFieldOrder62,issuedon24May1945.
directedICorpstocontinuecurrentmissionsandtocaptureSantaFe-Imuganatan
earlydate;andthen: torelievethe25thDivisioninitspresentzoneofactionwith
the37thDivisionandtoconcentratethe25thDivisionintheDigdig-SanJose(Nueva
Ecija)area;toadvanceaggressivelynorthwardwiththerightofthecorps,destroy
hostileforcesintheântaF
e
-Aritaoarea,andcaptureAritao;assurethesecurity
ofSanFernando(LaUnion)-Baguioareasandblocktheentrancesfromthenorthand
northeastintotheCentralValleyofLuzon;withdrawthe32dDivisionfromtheVilla
VerdeTrail,whenthetacticalsituationshouldpermit,orterrainandweatherconditions
shouldrequire,relievingthe33dDivisioninitspresentzoneofactionwiththe32d
Division,andconcentratingthe33dDivisionintheAringay-Bauang(LaUnion)area;
andtobepreparedtoconcentratethe25thDivisionintheTorlac-Bambanareawhenthe
6thDivision(lessonefiCT),shouldbemadeavailabletoICorpsintheDigdig(Nueva^
Ecija)area. ThisfieldorderalsodirectedtheXICorpstoconcentratethe145thRCT
(37thDivision),thenattachedtothe38thDivisionforoperationseastofManila,in
thegeneralSanJose(Nueva^cija)areaby00011,2June1945*whereitwastopassto
thecontrolofICorps.
Theprimaryintentofthisfieldorderwastomakeafresh,fairlyresteddivi-
sionavailablepromptlytocapitalizeabreakthroughintheSantaFearea. Aftera
detailedanalysisoftheenemysituationinnorthLuzon,itwasconcludedthatthe
enemyhadcommittedthebulkofhisbeatcombattroopstothealloutdefenseofthe
BaletePass-Santabe-Imuganareaand,further,thatwiththebulkoftheJapanese
103dDivisionimmobilizedinthenorthernCagayanValleytoopposethepossiblethreat
ofanAlliedamphibiousassaultagainstAparri,abreakthroughatSantaFe.ifaggres-
sivelyandpromptlyexploited,wouldcausethecompletecollapseoforganizedresistance
innorthLuzon. Meanwhile,theadventoftherainyseasonhadseriouslyimpeaedthe
operationsofthe
3
2dDivisionalongtheVillaVerdeTrail. Washoutsandlandslides
a fvariouspointsonthetrail,interruptedtheflowofsuppliesandequipmenttothe
front heavyrainsandfogslowedtacticaloperations;andheavyequipmentboggeddown;
89
hencetheprovisioninthefieldorderforthedisengagementandwithdrawalfroiuaction
ofthe32dDivision. Besides,theseizureoftheSantaFeareawould cuttheenemy's
mainsupplylinetohisVillaVerdeTrailpositions. Moreover,with theadventofthe
rainyseason,histroopsinthosepositionswouldbeunabletooperateeffectively and,
isolatedastheywere,wouldfacedeathfromstarvationanddisease. Thus,the tactical
necessityforoperationsontheVillaVerdeTrailwouldsoonbeatanend. The provision
forultimatereliefofthe25thand33dDivisionswasinanticipationoftheir engagement
inaprotractedprogramoftrainingandrehabilitationtopreparethemforotheropera-
tionsupontheconclusionoftheLuzonCampaign.
InaccordancewithSixthArmyFieldOrder62,ICorpsconcentrated itsmaximum
effortsonthecaptureoftheSantaFe-Imuganareaandthedestructionoftheenemy
remnantsinthatarea. By26May1945,
t h e 2
5thDivisionhadcompletedpreparationsfor
thefinalassaultonSantaFe. On27May1945,followinganairstrikebyfighterbom-
bersemployingnapalmanddemolitionbombs,andanintensiveartillery andmortarprepa-
ration,thedivisionattacked,securedSantaFeagainstunexpectedly lightenemyresis-
tance,anditsadvanceelements,brushingasidemineroppositionreachedaline7<->0yards
northofSantaFe,onHighway5. Onthefollowingday,aftorover]00daysoffighting
ontheVillaVerdeTrail,the32&Division,advancingeastonthattrail,finally cap-
turedthelongcontestedobjectiveofIniugan. Onthesameday,thedivisionmade contact
withits126thInfantry,whichhadbeentemporarilyoperatingundercontrolofthe25th
Divisionandwhichhadadvanced westfromtheBaletePa3sareatotheeasternedgeof
Imugan. Althoughmuchmoppingupstillremained,theVillaVerdeTrailwasclearedof
theenemyfromSantaMariatoSantaFe. Curforceswerenowpoisedforapowerfulthrust
towardstheupperCagayanValley. (FordispositionscfICorpsat24001,S/I36,27May
1945i seeDiagram54)
On28r/iay1945SixthArmyFieldOrder63directed ICorps,whilecontinuingcur-
rentmissions,topushforwardwiththeutmostdeterminationandspeedtocaptureAritao
andtobepreparedtoadvancethereafter,whendirected,tocaptureBayombong. Theorder
placedthePhilippineGuerrillaForces,NorthLuzon (Volckmann),underthecontrolofI
Corps,effectiveat00011,1June1945*
a n
d directed ICorpstoassistthisforce,as
necessary: tocaptureCervantesatanearlydate;toexertmaximumpressureagainst"
enemyforcesintheCagayanValley;andtodenytheusecfAparritoenemyforces. The
orderalsodirectedtheXICorpstcconcentratethe6thDivision (lessoneRCT)inthe
Digidgareainaccordancewiththefollowingschedule: oneRCTby00011,5 June1945>
thebalanceofthedivision (lessoneRCT)by00011,15June 1945 Uponarrivalinthe
Digdigarea,thedivision(lessoneRCT)wastopasstothecontrolofICorps.Butan
amendmenttoFieldOrder63,issuedon31May1945*directed thatthe6thDivision (less
oneinfantryregiment)bemadeavailabletotheICorps.
Thisfieldorderplacedemphasisonexploitationandpursuit. Theseizureof
theEaleteJFass-SantaFe-ImuganareagaveSixthArmy controlofthekeyapproachto
theenemy'snorthLuzondefensiveposition. Asalreadymentioned,inanalyzingtne
enemy'sorganizationforthedefenseofnorthernLuzon,ithadbeenconcluded thatthe
keytotheenemy'sentiredefensivesystemwastheBaletePass-SantaFe-Imug&narea.
Subsequenteventscorroborated thisestimate: thefuryandbitternessoftheenemy's
alloutdefenseofthearea;andthepersistenceofintelligencereportsobtainedfrom
captureddocumentsandprisonersofwarthattheJapanesehadbasedtheirwholeplanon
theassumptionthattheycouldholdtheBaletePass-SantaFe-Imuganareauntilthe
endofJune,bywhichtimetheywouldhavecompletedconstructionoftwoadditionalde-
fensivepositionsastrideHighway5 oneatAritao,theotheratSanFelipe (justsouth
ofBayombong),wheretheSantaCruzRiverprovidesanaturaldefensivebarrier across
Highway5 ^ becameincreasinglyapparent thattheenemyhadmadehisplayandlost;
thathehadexpendedthebulkofhisreservesintheall-outdefenseoftheBaletePass-
SantaFe-ImuganareaandhadtherebylaidhimselfwideopentoanadvanceviaHighway5.
Suchanadvancewouldhaveseriousconsequencesfortheenemy,sinceitwoulddeprivehim
ofBagabagandtherebycutofftheCagayanValleyfromhisBontec-Kianganmountain
stronghold. Thiswouldpreventhimfromshiftingtroopsfromoneoftheseareastothe
other,wouldmakeitimpossibleforhimtcmeetuswithhisforcesunitedandwouldexpose
themtothedangerofbeingdefeatedindetail. Itwouldalsopreventhimsuccessfully of
opposingourentranceintoandoccupationofhis"granary
11
,theCagayanValley,would
exposehisforcesintheKianganareatoattackfromthesoutheastviaHighway4,and
wouldlayopentheBambang-Pingkian-Kayapa-BokodRoadtoanattackfromtheeast.
Moreover,thedifficultiesofhissituationwouldbeincreasedif,coincidentwithcur
drive-3.fromthesoutheastandeastagainsthismountainstronghold,Philippine Guerilla
Forces,NorthLuzon,(Volckmann),weretobringmaximumpressuretobearagainstthe
enemysBontocposition,whilethe33dDivisiondroveeastandsoutheastfromBokodon
theBokod-Kayapa-Pingkian-BambangRoad.
FieldOrder63implementedthedecisiontoexploitthebreakthroughatBalete
Bass-SantoFe,whileincreasingthepressureagainsttheothermajorapproachestothe
mountainstrongholds.fliilippineGuerrillaForces,NorthLuzon,wereplacedunderthe
controlofICorpsinordertoinsurecompletecoordinationofthefinaldecisiveblows
againsttheenemyinnorthLuzon. Thekeynoteofalloperationswastobe: attackthe
enemyallalongtheline,disrupthislinesofcommunication,demolishhissupplies,dis-
organizehistroops,givethemnorestanddestroythem. Itwasanticipatedthatan
additionaldivisionwouldberequiredforoperationstothenorthwestalongHighway4and
tothewestontheBambang-PingkianRoadwhenthe37thDivisionadvancedintothe
CagayanValley;hencetheprovisionforthetransferofthe6thDivision(lessonein-
fantryregiment)tothecontrolofICorps. Asinthecaseofshiftingthe37thDivision
fromtheBaguioareatoBaletePass,thistransferofthe6thDivisiontotheDigdig
areawasaccuratelytimedtoenablethedivisiontocompleteitsmissionsinthearea
itwasvacatingsothatasmallerforcemightrelieveit.
ImmediatelyfollowingthecaptureofSantaFeandImugan,andinpreparation
forcarryingoutthemissionsassignedbySixthArmyFieldOrder63,ICorpsredeployed
itsforcesandconductedmoppingupoperationsintheBaletePass-SantaFe-Imugan
area. On30May1945the37thDivision(less145thand148thROT's)completedconcen-
trationintheSantaFearea. Onthefollowingday,itpassedthroughthe25thDivision
andattackednorthastrideHighway5towardAritao. Bytheendoftheday,thedivision
hadreachedpositions53
QQ
yardsnorthofSantaFe. Theenemyfoughtadisorganized
delayingactionashewithdrewbeforethisadvance. On1June1945*
h
e145thRCT(37th
Division)passed,fromthecontrolofXICorpstothecontrolofICorpsintheSanJose
(NuevaEcija)areaandthentocontrolofthe37thDivision. On2June1945*Corps
transferredcontrolofthe148thRCT(37thDivision)fromthe25thDivisiontothe37th
Division. Beingnowinpossessionofitsfullstrength,the37thDivisionsweptnorth
againstcollapsingenemyresistancetosecureAritaoon5June1945*
Meanwhile,the33&Divisionincreaseditspressureontheenemy'sdefenses
astridetheMountainTrail(Highway11). Advancingnorthandnortheast,itencountered
merelylightoppositionfromenemyoutpostsandreachedpositions2600yardssouthsouth-
westofTabioon5June1945whilesomeofitselementsadvancedtotheeasttoward
Bokod.
JFhilippineGuerrillaForces,NorthLuzon,meanwhile,passedtothecontrolof
IOorps,at00011,1June1945.
A
redispositionofforceswasimmediatelyputunderway
toreinforcethe121stInfantry(PG)whichwasheldupbydifficultterrainandsuperior
forcesintheBessangPassareawestofCervantes. Boththe.15thand66thInfantry
Regiments(PG)whichwereorderedtothatarea,arrivedby5
J u n e
1945-
In
orderto
reinforcestillfurthertheCervantesfront,ICorpsattachedthe1stBattalion,123d
Infantry,andthe122dFieldArtilleryBattalion(105mmhowitzer),bothofthe33dDivi-
sion,tothePhilippineGuerrillaForces,NorthLuzon. TheseunitsreachedButac
o n
3
e l s t
June1945*
t n
Battalion,123dInfantry,beingplacedinforcereserve. The122d
FieldArtilleryBattalionpromptlywentintopositionandfurnishedgeneralsupporting
firesfortheattackonBessangPass. The11thand14thInfantryRegiments,fhilippine
GuerrillaForces,NorthLuzon,redoubledtheireffortsagainstenemylinesofcommunica-
tionandsupplyinstallationsintheCagayanValleyandblockedtheexitfromthevalley
tothesouthwestonHighway11,whileelementsofthe11thInfantryconductedharassing
raidsbehindtheenemylinesintheBontocarea.
InordertodenytheuseofAparritotheenemy,theCommandingGeneral,ICorps,
atthedirectionoftheCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy,organizedtheConnollyTaskForce,
socalledafteritscommander,MajorConnolly,123dInfantry,andattachedittoPhilip-
DineGuerrillaForces,NorthLuzon. ItconsistedofCompanyB,6thRangerInfantry
Battalion,CompanyG,127thInfantry.BatteryC,694thFieldArtilleryBattalion(105mm
howitzer),plussupportingserviceunits,inallabout800strong. Itwasdirectedto
securethewestbankoftheCagayanRiveratitsmouthand,byartilleryfire todeny
theenemytheuseofAparri. TheforcebeganitsmarchnorthonHighway3on1June
1945,enroutetothevicinityofBallesteros(justwestofAparri),andhadreached
Laoag(IlocosNorte)by5June1945*
91
AsdirectedinSixthArmyFieldOrder62,theICorpsbeganwithdrawingthe32d
Division(less126thInfantry)fromtheVillaVerdeTrailandconcentrateditinthe
Bauang-Aringayarea,themovementbeingcompletedon4June1945
T n e
126thInfantry
(temporarilyattachedtothe25thDivision)continuedtoconductmoppingupoperationsin
theSantaFe-.Imuganarea.
AfterseizingAritaoon5June1945,
t h e
37thDivisioncapturedaseriesof
partiallycompletedenemycaveandpillboxpositionsinthatareawithoutmeetingenemy
opposition. Thisfurtherconfirmedthefactthattheeneuiyhadcountedonholdinghis
BaletePass-SantaFe-ImuganpositionthroughtheendofJune. Thebreak-throughin
thisareaandtherapidityoftheadvancedownHighway5hadtakenhimcompletelyby
surprise. Beforehecouldreacttoopposetheadvance,the37thDivisionhadoverrun
hisAritaodefensesandwaspreparingtodriveontothenorthtosealhisoneremaining
exitfromtheCagayanValleyatBagabag.
On6June1945SixthArmyFieldOrderdirectedICorps,whilecontinuingcurrent
missions,andinaccordancewithradioinstructionsof5June1945
t c
continuetheattack
tothenorthwardofAritao,captureBayombong,andbepreparedforafurtheradvancein
thedirectionofAparri. Atthetimethisdirectivewasissueditwasestimatedthat
therewereabout20,000JapanesetroopsintheCagayanValley. Theenemyhadheldthe
bulkofthesetroopsatthenorthernendofthevalleytomeetapossibleamphibiousas-
saultagainstAparri. DistributedatvariouspointsalongHighway5fromAparrito
Echaguehehadnumerousserviceandbasedefenseunits. Belatedly,theenemybegan
movingtroopssouthoverHighway5i
na n
apparentattempttoevacuatetheCagayanValley
andwithdrawtheseforcesintotheKiangan-Bontocmountainstrongholdbeforetne
seizureofBagabagshouldblockthislastremainingescaperoute. Allindications
pointedtoafastapproachingdisorganizationoftheJapanesecommandinnorthernLuzon.
Theenemy'sfailuretodefendAritaoandthepersistentreportsofenemymovementsto
thesouthoverHighway5madeaggressiveactiononourpartimperative. Itwasdecided
totakefulladvantageoftheenemy'sobviousdisorganizationbypushingtroopsforward
withtheutmostspeedwithaviewtokeepingtheenemyconstantlyoffbalance,andde-
featinghimdecisivelywhereverhemadeastand.
Inaccordancev/ithSixthArmyFieldOrder65,ICorpspushedthe37thDivision
northonHighway5towardBayombong. Spearheadedbyarmorandmotorizedinfantry,
thedivisioncapturedBambangwithoutoppositionon6June1945
an
^sweptnorth,cap-
turingBayombongon7June1945afterwipingoutlightoppositionofferedbysmall
delayingforces.
On3June1945SixthArmyFieldOrder66confirmedradioinstructionsissuedon
7June1945whichdirectedICorps,whilecontinuingcurrentmissions,tocontinuethe
attacknortheastwardofBayombong,tocaptureBagabag,to'securetheBagabagarea,and
tobepreparedtocontinuetheadvanceintotheCagayanValley. ItfurtherdirectedI
CorpstointensifyguerrillaactivitieswithintheCagayanValleytoharassenemycon-
centrationsandlinesofcommunication.
InaccordancewithICorpsordersbasedonthisSixthArmyfieldorder,the
37thDivisioncontinueditsadvancenorthwardandcapturedSolanoon8June1945after
crushingdisorganizedenemyresistance. Onthissamedaythe33dDivision,advancing
easttowardAmbuclaoontheBokodRoad,capturedPanasan(6000yardswestofAmbuclao)
withoutmeetingenemyresistance. On9June1945the37thDivisioncapturedBagabag
togetherwithlargequantitiesofenemysuppliesandequipment. Theextentofthe
enemy'sdisorganizationwasmanifestedbyhistotalfailuretodefendtheapproaches
toBagabag,whichhadservedasastagingandsupplypointforreinforcementsmoving
fromtheCagayanValleytotheBaletePass-SantaFe-Imuganarea. Leadingelements
ofthedivisionfordedtheMagatRiverinthevicinityofDongayop(3000yardssoutheast
ofBagabag)andreachedpositionsonHighway5approximately9000yardseastnortheast
ofB
a
gabag. Onthissameday,theConnollyForce,enroutetoBallesteros,reachedCla-
veria. (FordispositionsofICorpsat24001,S/151,9JuneI945,seeDiagram55.)
ByitsseizureofBagabag,SixthArmyblockedtheenemy'slastremainingroute
ofevacuationfromtheCagayanValley,whereinapproximately20,000Japanesesoldiers
werenowtrapped. TheendoftheLuzonCampaignwasinsight.
SixthArmyFieldOrder67,issuedon9June1945,directedICorpstocontinue
theadvanceeastwardintotheCagayanValley,tocaptureandsecureEchague,andtobe
92
a d V a n C e t o t h e n O r t h i n t h e
battalionn !v +/ directionofAparri. Sendinga
11n w e s tt 0
f* establishablockonHighway4attheLamutKiver,the37th
co
l
StrU<
:
tiOn f8 b r i d g e a c r o s s t h e
easto?B h M River3200yardseastsouth-
eastofBagabag.^Meanwhile,advanceelementsofthedivisionencounteredtheirfirst
strongenergyresistanceatthepassonHighway5inthevicinityofOrioung. Ina
sharptwo-daybattleon12June1945and13June1945.thedivisionovercamethisresis-
e
*TJ^
vanced e a s t
^nt gainstdisorganizedoppositionintotnemainCagayanValleyand
capturedEchagueon14June1945. OnecolumnofthedivisionadvanceduptheOscariz
noadtoaline4000yardssouthsoutheastofOscarizagainstlightresistance.
Meanwhile,at06001,11June1945.the6thDivision(less1stInfantryRegiment;
completedconcentrationintheDigdigareaandpassedtothecontrolofICorps. This
divisionimmediatelybeganrelievingtheelementsofthe3/thDivisionintheBagabag
areatoenablethatdivisiontoconcentrateitsentirestrengthintheCagayanValley.
Coincidentwiththisrelief,the6thDivisionbegantopushtroopsforwardtoward
KianganonHighway4. On12,JuneI945the6thDivisioncompletedreliefofthe37th
DivisionintheBagabagarea;andenthesameday,elementsofthedivisionadvancing
northwestenHighway4againstincreasinglyheavyenemyresistance,reachedaline10,000
yardsnorthnorthwestofBagabag.
Elementsofthe33dDivisionadvancingeastontheBokodRoadcapturedAmbuclao
on13June1945withoutmeetingenew opposition,whileotherelementsofthedivision
advancingnortheastontheMountainTrail(Highway11)capturedTabioagainstlight
opposition.
Inthemeantime,thePhilippineGuerrillaForces,.NorthLuzon,supportedbythe
122dFieldArtilleryBattalion,launchedafinalassaulttocaptureBessangPass. The
121stInfantryandthe15thInfantryattackedeast,theformerastride,thelattersouth
ofHighwayI4. The66thInfantrymadeacloseenvelopingmovementontherightofthe
15thInfantry,whileotherguerrillaforces,inpositiononthehighgroundnorthofand
paralleltoHighway4betweenBessangPassandCervantes,harassedtheenemy'srearand
linesofcommunication. On13June1945theGuerrillaForcescapturedBessangPass.
ThedownhillroadtoCervantesnowlayopenbeforethem. Onthedayprecedingthecap-
tureofBessangPass,theConnollyForcehadreachedBallesterosandhadbeguntooccupy
positionsdenyingtheenemytheuseofAparri.
(FordispositionsofICorpson3/156,14June1945.s
ee
Diagram56.)
The37thDivisionoftheICorpshavingseizedandoccupiedEchaguecouldnow
besentinaswiftadvancedownHighway5towardAparri. Ifsuccessful,thiswould
probablyendtheLuzonCampaignquickly. Atanyrate,aswiftandaggressiveadvance
downtheCagayanValleybythe37thDivisioncouldbeexpectedtobreakorganizedenemy
resistanceandcompletethedestructionofthe103dDivisionanditssupportingservice
and.basedefensetroopsandwouldtherewithgiveuscontroloftheCagayanValley. But
therewereseriousobjectionstothismove. Thesupplyofthe37thDivisionaswellas
the6thDivisionhadtopassoverHighway5,which,especiallyintheBaletePassregion,
wassubjecttolandslides. Roadmaintenance,aswellasbridgingthemanylargerivers,
offeredgreatdifficultieswhich,inviewoftherainyseason,mightprovetobeinsup-
erable. Witheverymilethe37thDivisionadvanced,thesedifficultieswouldincreas.
andtherevras,inaddition,thedangerthattheenemywouldcutitslinesofsupply.
Theargumentthatanadditionaldivision,ifindeed,onecouldhavebeenmadeavailable,
wouldbeanadvantage,wouldnotbearanalysis,sinceitwasdifficultenoughtosupply
twodivisionsnorthofBaletePassoveroneroad-tosupplythreewasopentoserious
question.
ItwasaccordinglydecidedtohavetheICorpspushitsrightrapidlydownthe
Ca*ayanValleytowardAparri. Thisoperationdid,indeed,involveconsiderablerisk,
butitwasacarefullycalculatedone. Thesuccessoftheoperationdependeduponthe
accuracyoftheestimatethattheenemyhadexhaustedhisprincipalmeansinthedefense
oftheBaletePass-SantaFe-Imuganposition;thattherapidadvanceofthe37thDivi-
sionhadcaughttheJapanese103dDivisioncompletelyunpreparedtodefenditselfagainst
anattackfromthesouth;andthattheenemy'scommunicationsweresodisorganizedthat
M s forces,would*.throwninto ^ ^
oftelrai^fndthef J hinthatabilitywasfullyjustified.
93
Inviewoftheforegoingconsiderations,SixthArmyFieldOrder69wasissuedon
15June1945. ItdirectedICorps,whilecontinuingcurrentmissions: todestroyhostile
forcesremainingintheEchagueareaandintheCagayanValleysouththereof;toadvance
aggressivelydowntheCagayanValley,tocaptureandsecuretheNaguilian-Cabatuan-
Cauayenarea,preparedforfurtheradvancetothenorth,whendirected;vigorouslyto
seekoutanddestroyenemyforcesalongtheaxisofadvancetotheCagayanValley,making
promptanddeterminedeffortstoeliminatethoseenemygroupswhichwereisolatedbythe
rapidityoftheadvance;toexpeditethedestructionofenemyforcesintheCervantes
area;tointensifyguerrillaactivitiesthroughoutthecorpszoneofactiontoharass
enemyconcentrationsandlinesofcommunicationandtodestroyisolatedenemydetach-
mentsandforagingparties;andtoexertmaximumpressurefromthesouthandsoutheast
againstenemyforcesintheBokod-Kiangan-Bontocarea.
TheaccuracyoftheestimateoftheenemysituationinnorthLuzonwaswell
demonstratedduringthedaysfollowingtheissuanceofthisfieldorder. Justasthe
initiallandingsofSixthArmyintheLingayenGulfareahadcaughttheenemyinthe
processofevacuationthroughtheCentralPlaintonorthLuzon,sothedebouchmentof
the37thDivisionfromtheCaraballoMountainsintotheCagayanValleyfoundtheJapa-
nese103dDivisionspreadoutonHighway5fromAparritoSantiagoinabelatedattempt
toevacuatethevalley. TheclashatOrioungPassha*dbeenwiththeadvanceelementsof
thisdivision. Nomajoractionsdevelopedduringtheadvanceofthe37thDivisionnorth
fromEchague. Enemycasualties,however,werehigh. Japanesetroopstothenumberof
about20,000withtheirvehiclesandsupplieswerescatteredinsmalldetachmentsall
alongHighway5* Asthe37thDivisionpushedon, theenemyscatteredbeforeit. Those
whowerenotannihilatedfledtotheSierraMadreMountainsontheeast,almostcertain
tofacedeaththerefromstarvationanddisease.
On16June1945the37thDivision,advancingintwocolumns,capturedCauayan
againstdisorganizedresistance. TheleftcolumnseizedCabatuanonthesameday,after
asharpfirefightatMurong. DrivingnorthfromCauayan,thedivisioncapturedJMa-
guilianon17June1945a
nd
then,withoutmeetingopposition,pushedontoseizeIiagan
on19June1945
an
dtoestablishabridgeheadacrossthePinacauandeIlaganRiver. On
20June1945advanceelementsofthedivisionreachedaline35
Q0
yardsnorthnortheast
ofIlaganwheretheyencounteredtheirfirststrongresistancefromanenemyforceof
approximatelycompanystrength. Theenemy'sfailuretocontestthecrossingofthePina-
cauandeIlaganRiverwasadditionalevidenceofthedegreeofhisdisorganization.
Whilethe37thDivisionwasdrivingtowardAparri,the6thDivisionhadintensi-
fiedmoppingupoperationsintheAritao-Bagabagareaalongtheaxisofadvancetothe
CagayanValleyandhadlaunchedtwodrivestoexertmaximumpressurefromthesouthand
southeastagainstenemyforcesintheBokod-Kiangan-Bontocarea. Oneofthesedrives
wasmadetothenorthwestupHighway4towardKiangan;theotherwasmadetothewest
andsouthwestfromBambang,ontheBambang-Pingkian-Kayapa-BokodRoad,inconjunc-
tionwithadrivetotheeastfromAmbuclaotowardBokodbythe33dDivision. The6th
Divisioncolumn,advancingnorthwestonHighway4fromBagabag,maderapidprogress
againstlightenemydelayingforcesandreachedaline18,000yardsnorthwestofBagabag
on18June1945- Hereitencountereddeterminedenemyresistancewhichslowedtheadvance.
By20June1945.
tb
-i3columnhadreachedaline2600yardssoutheastofBologafterover-
comingincreasinglyheavyresistance.
Thesouthcolumnofthe6thDivisionadvancedwestandsouthwestfromBambang
downthevalleyoftheSantaCruzRivertowardPingkianagainstverydeterminedenemy
resistance. On20June1945
tni
scolumnreachedaline10,300yardssouthwestofBambang.
Meanwhile,the33dDivisionhadadvancedeastfromAmbuclaoandhadseizedBokodwithout
meetingoppositionon17June1945* Continuingitsadvanceeastward,thedivision
reachedpositions1500yardseastofBokod,whereitranagainstorganizedenemydefenses
on20June1945.
AftercapturingBessangPasson13June1945,"thePhilippineGuerrillaForces,
NorthLuzon(Volckmann),hadmeanwhileadvancedeastagainstdisorganizedenemyresis-
tanceandhadseizedCervanteson15June1945* Continuingtheiroperations,theycap-
turedCamillas(48OOyardssouthsoutheastofCervantes)on17June1945,
an
<iCamay
(65OOyardssouthsoutheastofCervantes)andDinwide(7000yardssouthofCervantes)
on19June1945. On20June1945advanceelementsofthe15thInfantryapproachedto
within3^00yardseastofCervantes,wheretheycameunderintenseenemyartilleryfire.
Onthesameday,followingaheavyairstrike,elementsofthe11thInfantry(PG)crossed
theCagayanRiverandseizedTuguegaraoafterovercominglightenemyopposition.
94
FollowingthearmoredspearheaddowntheCegayanValley,
infantrymenfrom the37thDivisionclearHighway5
andthe"brushadjacenttotheroad,while patrolscom"btheareaoneither
sideoftheroadforadistanceof approximatelytwothousandyards.
(FordispositionsofICorpsonS/162,20June1945.seeDiagram57.)
TheenemycollapseintheCagayanValleyhadbecomearout. Enemytroopsthat
hadescapedimmediateannihilationorhadfailedtoescapeintotheeasternmountains,
oiacaraeclequipmentandsuppliesandfledinwilddisorderonHighway5towardAparri.
Hereandtnere,smallenemydetachmentsdid.indeed,makeasuicidalstana,butinthe
-lam,disorderandconfusionreignedsupreme.
Inviewoftheenemy'sdesperateplight,andinordertocompletetheannihila-
tionoitheenemyforcesfleeingtothenorth,itwasdecidedtomakeaverticalenvel-
opmentbyairbornetroopstoclosethetrapandpreventtheenemyfromallpossibility
ofescapingfromAparri. Accordingly,on21June1945,SixthArmyFieldOrder71,
incorporatingthisplan,wasissued. ItdirectedXICorpstobepreparedtomountone
parachuteinfantrybattalioncombatteamofthe11thAirborneDivisionon24hoursnotice
tcdropintheAparriareainordertcsecureAparri,andtoestablishcontactwithand
toassistelementsofICorpsinthedestructionofremaininghostileforcesinthe
CagayanValley. ItalsodirectedICorpstocontinuetocarrycutcurrentmissionsjto
advanceaggressivelydowntheCagayanValley,destroyinghostileforcesencountered;
vigorouslytoseekoutanddestroyenemyforcesalongtheaxisofadvancetoandwithin
theCagayanValley;tomakepromptanddeterminedeffortstoeliminateenemygroups
isolatedbytherapidityoftheadvance;tointensifypressureagainsthostileforcesin
theKiangan-Bontoc-Cervantesarea;andtobepreparedtoassumecontrolofthepara-
chuteinfantrybattalioncombatteam,afteritwasdroppedintheAparriarea. Itwas
expectedthat,priortcthisairborneenvelopment,theConnollyForce,thenoperating
fromBallesterostodenyAparritotheenemy,wouldhavebeenabletocrosstheCagayan
Riverandwouldhaveseizedthetown.
The37thDivisionsweptnorthwardtowardAparri, Overcomingenemyresistance
justnortheastofIlagan,thedivisioncapturedSanJuan(8000yardsnorthofIlagan)
on21June1945
and
continuingnorth,capturedTumauiniagainstlightenemyresistance
on22June1945* Armoredeleiaentsofthedivisionadvancingintwocolumns,reached
pos-tions95yardsnorthand10,000yardsnortheastofTumauini. Uptothistime,
the37thDivisionhaddestroyedatotalof23enemytanksandtankettesintheCagayan
Valley,
Inthemeantime,CompanyB,6thdangerInfantryBattalion(apartoftiieCcnnolly
a n d ha<i
Force)hadcrossedtheCagayanRiveron21June1945 occupiedAparriwithoutmeet-
ingenemyopposition. AFilipinoguerrillacompanyfromthe11thInfantry(PG),operating
undercontroloftheConnollyForce,hadalsocrossedtheCagayanRiversouthofAparri
unopposedandhadestablishedcontactwithRangerpatrolsinthevicinityofDugo.
ICorpshad,inthemeantime,intensifieditspressureontheenemy'smountain
stronghold*ntheKiangan-Bontoc-Cervantes-Bokodrectangle. Thenortherncolumn
ofthe6thDivisionhaddrivennorthwestonHighway4againstincreasinglysevereenemy
resistanceandhadreachedpositions2100yardssoutheastofBolog(12milesnorthwest
ofBagabag)on22June1945. Thesoutherncolumnofthedivisionhadadvancedsouthwest
ontheBambang-PingkianRoadagainstcollapsingenemyresistanceandhadcapturedFingkian
2 2 J u n e
on21June1945. On 1945^hiscoluianturnednorthwesttowardKayapeandreached
positions3400yardssoutheastofthattownbytheendoftheday.
Meanwhile,elementsofthe33dDivision,drivingeastandsoutheastfromBokod,
hadmadeslowprogressthroughruggedterrainandagainststubbornenemyresistancefrcm
organizeddefensivepositions. On22June1^45theseelementshadreachedpositions3000
yardssoutheastofBokod.whileotherelementsofthedivision,advancingnortheastonthe
MountainTrail(Highway11)hadcapturedtheridge4700yardsnortheastofTabioagainst
stiffeningenemyresistance,
PhilippineGuerrillaForces.NorthUizon.whichhadconsolidatedtheirpositions
rvv, .!,ofAoarriwithoutoppositionbyelementsoftheConnollyForceon21
T ,,<tolllZl WitttheaSos?unopposedadvanceofthe37thDivision,indicated
7*1
9
*&, theViZhadcomeformountingtheairbornetroopstoblocktheeneny3
clearlythatthetiJehadcome * telephonicinstructionissuedon21June
S r S ^ T S S S " ^ ^ ^ i lCorpsto.cuntanddropone parachute
95
infantrybattalioncombatteaminthe<Aparriareaon2J>June1945.detailstobearranged
directwiththeFifthAirForceandICorps. TheseinstructionsalsodirectedICorps,
whilecontinuingcurrentmissions,toassumecontrol'oftheparachuteinfantrybattalion
combatteamupon.completionofitsdropintheAparriareaon23June1945- SixthArmy
FieldOrder72,issuedon23June1945,confirmedthesetelephonicinstructionsandfur-
therdirectedICorpstoeffectspeedyjunctionoftheforcesadvancingnorthandthose
advancingsouthintheCagayanValley,tomakeAparri'secureandtocompletethedestruc-
tionofanyremaininghostileforcesinthatvalley.
Justafterdawnon23June1945,the3calledGypsyForce,composedofthe1st
Battalion,511thParachuteInfantry,reinforcedbycompaniesGandI,5
l l t h
Parachute
Infantry,BatteryC,457thParachuteFieldArtilleryBattalion(75mmHowitzer)andother
combatandserviceelements,departedfromLipaAirdrome(BatangasProvince)in67C-46
andC-47transportplanesofthe317thTroopCarrierGroup. Sevengliderstransported
heavysuppliesendequipment,includingajeepandthe75mmhowitzersofBatteryC,457th
ParachuteFieldArtilleryBattalion. At09001,theparachutistsbegandroppingon
CamalaniuganAirfield(7000yardssouth-southeastofAparri),withoutmeetingenemyop-
positibn. At09201,thesevengliderslandedonthedrop-zonewithoutmishapexcept
forslight-damagetothewingofoneglider. Thiswasthefirstairborneoperationin
which-gliderswereusedinthePacific. Theparachutistsquicklyorganized,assembled
theirequipmentandmadecontactwiththeConnollyForce. AtO928I,theGypsyForce
passed'tocontrolofICorps,whichcombineditwiththeConnollyForce,placedthe
CommandingOfficer,GypsyForce,incommandandreattachedthecombinedforcetothe
PhilippineGuerrillaForces,NorthLuzon. Theparachutistsatoncepreparedtoadvance
southtoeffectajunctionwiththe37thDivision.
Thesmoothnessandefficiencywithwhichthisairborneoperationwascarriedout
'isinitselfasufficientcommentonthehighlyeffectiveinter*-staffcooperationand
planningbetweenthegroundandairforceunitschargedwithresponsibilityforthe
planningandconductoftheoperation. Thespeedwithwhichtheairborneforceswere
concentrated,preparedandmountedatLipafortheoperation,allononly43hoursprior
notice,reflectsthehighestcreditonthe"Commanding-General,XICorps,theCommanding
-General,11thAirborneDivision,the'CommandingGeneral,FifthAirForce,theCoiiUianding
Officer,317thTroopCarrierGroup,theirrespectivestaffs,andthetroopsandtheir
commanders.
AdvancingsouthfromCamalaniugan,the1stBattalion,511thParachuteInfantry,
reinforced,capturedGattaranwithoutmeetingenemyoppositionon25June1945
an
^pushed
advanceelementssouthtopositions2000yardssouthoftheDummanRiver.
Meanwhile,the37thDivisionhadadvancednorthtowardTuguegarao. On23June
1945it
w
ascheckedtemporarilybymoderateresistancefromdug-inenemypositionssup-
portedbyartillery,justsouthofBalasig. Afterovercomingthisresistanceon24
June1945*thedivisionseizedBalasigandcapturedsixenemy15cmfieldpieces2500
yardsnorthofBalasig.
The11thInfantry(PG),whichhadmeanwhileoccupiedTuguegarao,wasbesetfrom
thenorth,eastandsouthbysuperiorenemyforcessupportedbytanks,mortarsandartil-
leryfireandon23June1945*was"forcedtowithdrawfromthetowntothewestbankof
theCagayanRiver. Ithad,however,succeededindisruptingtheenemy'slinesofcom-
munication,andintemporarilyisolatingelementsofhisforces,therebycompellinghim
todevotehimselftotherecaptureofTuguegarao,ratherthantothetaskofopposingthe
37thDivisionasitadvancedthroughthedefileformedbytheCagayanRiverandaseries
ofhihridgesthatextend'foraboutninemilessouthfromTuguegarao. On25June1945
the37thDivisioncapturedTuguegaraoafterasharpfirefightand,continuingitsadvance
madecontactwiththe1stBattalion,5HthParachuteInfantry,reinforced,3000yards
eastofAlcalaon26June1945- On27June1945the37thDivisionassumedcontrolofthe
1stBattalion,511thParachuteInfantry,reinforced,(GypsyForce),theConnollyForce
andthoseelementsofthe11thInfantry(PG)thenoperatingintheCagayanValley. Be-
tween27June1945and30June1945.the37thDivision,reinforced,conductedintensive
moppingupoperationsintheCagayanValleyandbroughtthevalleycompletelyunder
SixthArmy"control.
Whilethe37thDivision,reinforced,wasthusengaged,otherforcesoftheI
CorpsclosedinontheJapaneseKiahgan-Bontoc-Cervantes-Bokodmountainstronghold.
96
werefollowedshortly thereafter"by
gliderscarryingheavierequipment,
The&yp
8
yForce(1stB
n
,511thParachute
Infantry,fieinf).droppedon Camalaniugan
Airfield,4milessouthofAparri,
andthenpreparedto advanceupthe
CagayanValleyandjoin37thDivision
troopsmarchingnorth.
Despitethecrowdedroadconditionsduetoabandonedordestroyedenemymaterielanddespitethemany
unfordablestreamsandriversimpedingtheir advances,the37thDivisionandtheGypsyForcemade
surprisinglyrapid progressindenyingtheCagayanRiverValleytotheenemy.
Airdropped suppliestoleadingelementsofthe
GypsyForcewereresponsibleforthe logistical
successandrapidadvancesofthisforce.
June
D
l\l\
S
lZ'
a d V
?
n C i n s n
f
t h w e s t n
-Pingkian-KayapaRoad,capturedKayapaon
irsf55.12:2iss-ff=s-4S5s2st t s i i ssi sa
place. Onthesameday,the1stInfantry(6thDivision)assembledintheBayombong-
6 3
"
a
?
C
^
d
,!^
g
f
T
T
withSixth
*V
F i
^dOrder73.issuedon25June1945.and,
passingtocontrolofICorps,rejoineditsdivision.
FnilippineGuerrillaForces,meanwhile,continuedtoexertpressureagainstenemy
positionsontheapproachestoBontoc. The15thInfantry(PG)advancedeastastride
Highway4towardSab^ngan,but,althoughitencounteredstiffeningenemyresistanceon
theway,capturedKayanon30June1545andreachedpositions2700yardswestofBauko.
Inthemeantime,otnerelementsofthePhilippineGuerrillaForces,NorthLuzon,moving
overland,hadcapturedBesao(13,000yardswestofBontoc)on29June1945.
On30June1945.inaccordancewithSixthArmyFieldOrder63,theJ2dDivision
hadcompletedreliefofthe25thDivision,whichhadbeenmoppingupintheAritao-
Pingkian-Imugan-SantaFearea,andhadalsocompletedreliefofthe33dDivisionin
theBokodareaandontheMountainTrail(Highway11). The.25thDivisionconcentrated
atCampPatrick,9000yardssouthofTarlac, andthe33dDivisionassembledintheArin-
gay-Bauangarea. ThisredeploymentofforcesleftthreedivisionsinnorthLuzon:
the37thDivisionintheCagayanValley;the6thDivisionpushingnorthwesttoward
KianganandmoppingupalongtheBambang-Pingkian-Kayapa-BokodRoad;andthe32d
DivisionmoppinguptheAritao-Pingkian-Imugan-SantaFearea,securingtheBokod
areaandpushingnortheastontheMountainTrail(Highway11).
(FordispositionsofICorpsat23001,S/172,30June1945,seeDiagram58.)
At24001,30June1945*inaccordancewithSixthArmyFieldOrder68,XIVCorps
assumedresponsibilityforallICorpsmissionsinnorthLuzonandXICorpsmissionsin
centralandsouthLuzon;togetherwithcontrolofthe6th,32d,37thand38thDivisions,
thePhilippineGuerrillaForces,NorthLuzon,andallotherFilipinoguerrillaforceson
Luzon,inclusiveofthePhilippineArmyunitsattachedtoitfortacticaloperations.
7. Summary:
Withtheestablishmentofcontactbetweenthe37thDivisionandthe1stBattalion,
511thParachuteInfantry,inthevicinityofAlcalaintheCagayanValleyon26June1945.
theLuzonCampaigncametoanend. The37thDivisionhadmadetheadvancefromSantaFe
toAlcala,aroaddistanceof190miles,in28days. The1stBattalion,511thParachute
Infantry,reinforcedbytheConnollyForceandFilipinoguerrillas,hadclosedthetrap
atAlcala. FewoftheJapanese103dDivision,reinforced,escaped.
By30June1945,enemyforcesinnorthLuzonhadbeenisolatedintwolargepoc-
kets: oneintheSierraMadreMountains,eastoftheCagayanValley,intowhichanes-
timated11,000enemyremnantshadfledinwilddisorder;andthe-otherintheKiangan-
Bontocmountainstrongholdwhereanestimated12,000enemyremnantshaddug-mfora
final'suicidestand. ElsewhereonLuzonsmallgroupsofenemystragglerswerebeing
hunteddownandexterminatedastheyraidednativegardensorfoughtamongstthemselves
forfood. SixthArmynowcontrolledtheentireislandofLuzon. Duringthecampaign,
theenemylost173,563countedkilledand4.072captured,plusanestimatedadditional
67000killedordiedfromstarvationanddisease,agrandtotalofapproximately245.000
killedorcaptured. Againstthis.SixthArray'sbattlecasualtieswere8,140killed,
29,557woundedand157missing,agrandtotalof37,854*
*- ^The29'QokxvneaytroopsremainingonLuzonweredoomedtoultimateannihilation
atthe*hanlsofAmericantroopsandFilipinoguerrillas,ortodeathfromstarvationand
disease.--GeneralYamffshita,CommanderoftheJapanese14thAreaArmy,andcommonly
referred.,.fro--asthe"Tigerofitelaya",-ConquerorofSingapore-,hadbeenbeaten.
(Forthe'tacticalsituationonLuzonat24001,S/172,30June1945.seeDiagram
59.)
97
On30June1945,theCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy,issuedGeneralOrder
Number134:
"UpontheeveofrelinquishingresponsibilityfortacticaloperationsonLuzon,
IdesiretoexpresstoallunitsandstaffsoftheSixthArmymydeepgratitudefortheir
magnificent performance inthiscampaign,
"Highesthonorsmustbeaccordedtheofficersandmenofourcombatunits,who
withincomparableskill,gallantry,determination,andtenacitydefeatedthefanatical
enemyincloseandbittercombatonexceedinglydifficultterrain. Theirswasthesuf-
fering,theintensephysicalhardship,andthementalstraininseparablefromwar and
theirs,asitshouldbe,isthegloryofthevictory.
"GreatcreditisduetoMajorGeneralInnisP.Swift,commandingICorps,to
LieutenantGeneralCharlesP.Hall,commandingXICorps,andtoLieutenant General
OscarW.Griswold,commandingXIVCorps,fortheirableandskillfulleadershipin
conductingtheoperationsoftheirrespectivecorps. Greatcreditisalsoduetothe
divisionandseparateRCTcommandersfortheireffectiveandaggressivehandlingof
theirunitsandtoJwajorGeneralHughJ.Caseyforthefaithfulanduntiringsupport
affordedbytheserviceforcesunderhiscommand,
"ToourcomradesoftheAlliedNavalForcesandAlliedAirForcesIextendthe
thanksoftheentireSixthArmyfortheirwholeheartedsupportofthegroundforces. The
teamspiritandoutstandingeffectivenessdisplayedinallphasesofthissupportcontri-
butedimmeasurably tothesuccessofthegroundoperations,
"ThegallantPhilippineforces,despitetremendousdifficultiesandthevery
limitedmeansattheirdisposal,renderedinvaluablesupporttoouroperations;their
accomplishmentsareworthyofhighpraise.
"TotheofficersandmenofUSASOSIexpresssincereappreciationfortheeffi-
ciencywithwhichthemanyarduousresponsibilitiesoftheServicesofSupplywerehan-
dled. MuchcreditisduetheserviceunitsofbothSixthArmyandUSASOS,whoseloyal
andtirelesseffortsassuredthesuccessofthegroundoperations,
"% heartfeltthanksgotothemembersofmystafffortheirloyalty,unselfish
devotiontoduty,andtheirskillfulandhighlyeffectiveworkwhichcontributedinan
outstandingdegreetothesuccessoftheoperationsoftheSixthArmyinthiscampaign,
"HumblyandreverentlyIpaytributetoourdeadcomrades,whogavetheirlives
thatourarmsmighttriumph. Theirheroicexampleshouldimbueusallwithrenewed
determinationtocarryonthefightforthethingsforwhichtheyfoughtanddied,until
wehavewonthefinal,decisivevictory."
At00011,1July1945asdirectedbyOperations Instructions106,General
Headquarters,SouthwestBacificArea,31May1945,theCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy,
passedtheresponsibilityforalltacticalandlogisticalmissionsonLuzontotheCom-
mandingGeneral,EighthArmy. Withthisassumptionofresponsibility,theCommanding
General,EighthArmy,assumedcontrolofXIVCorps,composedofthe6th,32d,37thand
38thDivisions,PhilippineGuerrillaForces,NorthLuzon,allotherguerrillaunitson
Luzon,BiilippineArmyunitsattachedfortacticaloperationsandsupportingcombatand
serviceunits. OthermajorcombatunitsonLuzon,togetherwithsupportingcombatand
serviceunits,remainedundercontroloftheCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy,totrain
andrehabilitateforfutureoperationsagainsttheJapaneseEmpire.
WALTERiffi
General,U.
Commanding,
98
AIR SUPPORT
Air Support
A. SUMMARY OFAIROPERATIONS ON LUZON
F i f t h
tutefl
^ <"
M
the efforts of t t V mL
>ai
n
- ^ " ^ operations were supplementedby
t h e Co r ma n d t h e
*
b e
^
n
from the Clark 2ir Centfr \
V
* * * " **" to operate
a UnBBr y

f t h e
< * " of these ai r task forces
fr^ foUows!
WiDfi ( H) Wi t h a S 3 i
S
n e
* f
IDb 3
ll
h
nd attached units constitutedthe
I
Li n
f>'
en
17 landing and began unloading at Lingayen on11 January
S t r i p a t U n a y e n h a d be
*
un o n 1 0 J a
*^
t
H S ! ?" 4
We a t
?
6 r
1945. and
QrOUp U 9 ? 3 8 s ) a n d t h e
^
7 t hNi
^
h t F i
^
t e r
arrivedon
' f c f f - Squadron (pl6ls)
January 1545- On1?January 1945 theCommanding General, Allied AirForces,
rel i evea theCommander, Allied Naval Forces, of responsibility for direct air supportof
units of theSixth Army. The Jfangaldan Airfield was putin operation on24January 1945.
On15February 1945 thefollowing units under control of the308th Bomb Wing (H) werein
operation onthese two ai rfi el ds.
TYPE NO.A/CASSIGNED
18th Fighter Group
P-38
68
35th Fighter Group
P-47-51
69
475th Fighter Group
P-38
3d AirCommando Group P-51 ^
547th Night Fighter Squadron
P-6l
11
82d Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron
P-4O-51
21
110th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron P-4O-5I
24
24th MAGand 32d fldAG SBD
141
312th Bo-ob Group(L)
A-20
45
38th Bomb Group (M) B-25
43
26th Photo Squadron F-^
10
157th, 159th, 160th Liaison Squadrons L-5 51
Althoughtherewassomeshiftingofunitsontheseairfields,thenumberofoperational
planesremainedapproximatelythesameuntil18April1945*whenthetransferofthe24th
and32dI&rineAirGroupsoftheProvisionalMarineAirWingtotheThirteenthAirForce,
andthemovementofthe3dAirCommandoGroupfromtheMangaldanAirfieldtotheLaoag
Airfieldwasinitiated. The3dAirCo;umandoGroupdid,however,continuetooperateunder
the308thBoîbWing(H).Priortothisdatethe18thFighterGroupwasreplacedbythe
49thFighterGroup.
The308thBombWing(H),operatingfromairstripsintheLingayenGulfarea,provided
themainaireffortintheearlyphasesoftheLuzonCampaign,supplementedbythatof
the310thBomb.Ving(M)stationedonivlindoro. UponcompletionofairfieldsintheClark
AirCenterareaandthestartofoperationsofthe309thBo.ubWing(H)attheSanMarcel-
inoAirfieldon. 4February1945,theweightofthe3J8thBombWing'seffortwasshifted
tothesupportofICorpsandthePhilippineGuerrillaForces,NorthLuzon. On28May
1945the308thBombWing(H)wasrelievedofallcombatresponsibilityinthePhilippine
Islands,the309thBombWing (H),VFighterandVBomberCommandstakingovercontrolof
theunitswhichhadtheretoforebeenoperatingunderthe308thBoiiibWing(W).
Headquarters309thBombWing(H)withassignedandattachedunitsconstitutedtheair
taskforceinsupportoftheXICorpslandingintheSanAntonioarea,ZambalesProvince.
TheSanMarcelinoAirfieldwassecuredandimprovementofexistingairbasefacilities
beganimmediately. Cn 4February1945the348thFighterGroupbeganoperatingfromthe
field. On13February1945the345thBombGroup(M)commencedoperationsfromthesame
airfield. Twosquadronsofthe312thBombGroup(L),whichwerealsounderoperational
controlofthe309thBombWing(H),beganflyingmissionsfromFloridablancaAirfieldon
23Aoril1945. The309thBombWing(H)initiallysupportedtheXICorpsinitsdrive
99
throughtheZig-ZagPassandduringitsoperationsonBataan. Later,thiswingsupported
theXICorpsunitsintheareaeastofManilaandwestof
e
'ClarkAirCenter. The309th
BombWing(H)alsofurnishedthemajorportionoftheairassaultprior,tothelandings
onCaballo,ElFraile,andCarabaoIslands. On15May1945the309thBombWing(H),
havingbeenreleasedfromitsthencombatresponsibility,beganmovingtotheLingayen
Airfieldandafterrelievingthe308thBombWing(H)on29May1945.resumedoperations
andprovidedairsupportforICorpsandthePhilippineGuerrillaForces,NorthLuzon,
untilthecloseoftheLuzonCampaign.
The310thBombîng(M)remainedonMdndoroduringtheentireperiodoftheLuzon
Campaign. Unitsoperatingunderitscontrolwerethe8thFighterGroup,'3dAttack
Group(L),417thBombGroup(L),90thBombGroup(H)and380thBombGroup>(H). Dueto
theproximityofMindorotosouthernLuzon,the310thBombWing(M)wasabletorender
effectivesupporttotheXIVCorpsduringthelatter'soperationsintheBatangasand
Bicolareas. Whentheseoperationshadbeencompleted,thiswingaddeditssupportto
thatofthe309thBombWing(H)intheXICorpszoneofaction,andtothatofthe-308th
BombWing(H)intheICorpszoneofaction. Inthelatterstagesoftheoperationsin
northernLuzon,itseffortssupplementedthoseofthe309thBombWing(ti).
TheVFighterCommandassumedoperationalcontrolofthe475thFighterGroupandof
the421stNightFighterSquadronon26March1945*
n
theClarkAirCenter,andofthe
58thFighterGroupinthePoracareaon15April1945. Itsmaineffortsthroughoutthe
campaignwereinthezonesofactionoftheICorpsandthePhilippineGuerrillaForces,
NorthLuzon. Noteworthy,however,werethelargescalecoordinatednapalmstrikesin
theIpo-WawaDamareas,aswellasintheareanorthwestofSantaFealongHighway5
Thesestrikesarediscussedmorefullylaterinthisreport.
TheVBomberCommandbeganoperationsfromtheClarkAirCenteron25March1945*
Althoughthiscommandfunctionedprimarilyinastrategicrole,manyhighlysuccessful
missionswerecoordinatedwithgroundunitsafterthebombercommandtookovercontrol
ofsomeofthelightandmediumgroupspreviouslyassignedtothe-variousbombwings.
SomeheavystrikesweremadebyB-24sand,throughmutualagreementbetweenSixthArmy
andFifthAirForce,planeswhichwerenotabletogetthroughtoFormosaortheChina
CoastbecauseofbadweatherweregivensecondarytargetsintheCagayanValley.
Itshouldbeborneinmindthatthenumberofunitsundertheoperationalcontrolof
aparticularbombwingorfightercommandusuallyvariesfromdaytoday-. Theinherent
flexibilityofairpowermakesitpossibletoemploythewholeweightof-theavailable
airpoweragainstselectedtargetsinturn. Thus,dependingupontheaireffortrequired
forjointair-groundoperationsinaspecificarea,unitsmayoperateunderthecontrol
ofonetacticalheadquartersonedayandunderthatofanotheronthefollowingday.
ThiswasthecaseonLuzon. HencenopermanenttacticalorganizationcanbejSresferited
inthisreport.
ThefollowingtableincludesallofthecombatunitswhichoperatedundertheFifth
AirForceandfurnishedcloseairsupportforSixthArmyduringtheLuzonCampaign.
TYPEPLANES TOTAL
3dAirCommandoGroup
3dand4thFighterSquadronsCommando
P-5I3
50
8thFighterGroup
35th,36thand80thSquadrons
P-38S
75
35thFighterGroup
39th,40thand41stSquadrons
P-51s
75
49thFighterGroup
7th,8thand9thSquadrons
P-38S
-75
58thFighterGroup
69th,310th,311thand201stSquadrons
P-47s
100
348thFighterGroup
340th,341st,342dand460thSquadrons
P-51s
100
100
TYPE PLfNE5^
TCTA
475th Fighter Group
431st, 432d and 433d Squadrons
P-38s
-ZS
Total Fighters
550
3dBombGroup(L)
8th,13th,89thand90thSouadrona
A-20s
64
312thBombGroup(L)
386th,387th,388thand389thSquadrons
A-20s
64
417thBomb Group(L)
672d,673t674thand675thSquadrons
A-20s
Jk
TotalLightBombers
192
38thBombGroup(M)
B-258
71at,405th,822dand823dSquadrons
64
345thBombGroup<M)
B-25s
498th,499th,500thand501stSquadrons
Jtk
TotalMediumBombers
128
22dBombGroup(H)
B-24s
2d,19th,33dand408thSquadrons
48
43dBombGroup(H)
B-24s
63d,64th,65thand403dSquadrons
48
9QthBombGroup(H)
B-24s
319th,320th,321stand4OOthSquadrons 48
380thBombGroup(H)
B-24s
528th,529th
t
530thand531stSquadrons
TotalHeavyBombers 192
71stTacticalReconnaissanceGroup
17thTacticalReconnaissanceSquadron B-25a 16
626.TacticalReconnaissanceSquadron P-51s 25
110thTacticalReconnaissanceSquadron P-51a 5,
TotalReconnaissanceAircraft 66
irovisional ferine Air Wing SBDs
24th and 32d Marine Air Groups
Total Scout-bombers
GrandTotal 1294
The figures shown above aio authorized strengths. In very few instances were more
than two-thirds of any one unit's aircraft operational at any given time, which i s con-
sidered normal. In addition, aircraft were provided for the support of Eighth Army's
operations elsewhere in the Philippines, for convoy cover, and for fighter sweeps and
bomber escort missions to the China coast and Formosa. Bad flying weather also caused
the cancellation of a number of close support missions. All of these factors directly
influenced the amount and nature of the support furnished Sixth Armyby planes of the
Fifth Air Force.
101
Theheavybombgroupshadtheprimarymissionofhittingstrategictargetsalongthe
ChinacoastandonFormosa, ManyprimarytargetswereassignedonLuzon,butthemajority
oftheseweredeeptargetsandoutsidetheairforcebombline;consequentlytheyhavenot
beenconsideredinthisreportasclosegroundsupportmissions Nevertheless,any
strategicmissiononLuzonmu3tbeconsideredashavinggivenindirectsupporttothe
groundforces.
B. CLOSEAIR-GROUNDCOOPERATION
PhaseI-S/8.17January19k*>- SA9.28January19ii5
On17January1945land-basedplanescommencedoperationsfromtheLingayenAirstrip
insupportofgroundunits. Becauseofthelackofenemyopposition,therapidadvance
southintotheCentralPlainofferedfewopportunitiesforairsupportexceptforiso-
latedpocketsintheCabaruanHills.
ContinuingeffortstopreventenemymovementintooroutoftheCentralPlain,units
ofFifthAirForcebombedandstrafedthecorridorsandpassesalongHighway5leading
intotheCentralPlainfromtheCagayanValley,alongtheVillaVerdeTrail,andonthe
KennonRoadtoBaguio. SimilarmissionswereflownagainsttargetsalongHighway11,
northofBaguio,andfromBauangtoBaguio. Excellentresultswereachievedagainst
bridges,supplydumps,andtroopconcentrationsalongtheKennonRoad,andagainstbridges
inthevicinityofNaguilian(LaUnion). Bombingcausedlandslidesinanarrowdefile
northofBaguioalongHighway11. Littlesuccesswasachievedagainstthenumerous
bridgesalongHighway5and,eventhoughmanyweredamagedorknockedout,theshallow-
nessofthestreamsmadepossibleonlyapartialblockingoftheroad. Forexample,the
bridgesintheDigdigarea,onthesouthernapproachestoBaletePass,receivedmany
strikesbeforebeingdestroyed. Theenemytheneitherby-passedorquicklyrepaired
them. Badweatherandlowcloudcoveragepreventedcontinuousairassault,thusmaking
itpossiblefortheenemytokeepHighway5open. Duringthisperiod,betterresults
wereobtainedagainstbivouacs,supplydumps,andlinesofcommunicationalongHighway5
betweenBambangandBagabag. Tenbombardmentmissionswereflowninthisareaduring
the11-dayperiodfrom17to28January1945withthereporteddestructionofseveral
highwaybridgesandlargesupplydumps.
Inthesouth,themainconcentrationofaireffortwasdirectedagainstcrossingsof
theBampanga,MaasinandAngatRivers. Railroadandhighwaybridgesweredestroyedor
seriouslydamagedinthevicinityofGapan,forcingtheenemytousethesecondaryroad
totheeastofHighway^5*&&isevacuationtothenorth. Incontinuedsystematicinter-
diction,thebridgesatDiliman,PlaridelandPanginaywereattackedandallwereeither
destroyedordamagedtosuchanextentthattheywerepassableforlighttrafficonly.
Thesestrikesimpeded,toalargeextent,theenemy'seffortstoevacuatehisremaining
forcesandheavyequipmentnorthfromtheManilaarea.
Indescribingcloseairsupportoperationsduringthisperiod,themechanicalfunc-
tionsofrequestingmissionsandthecontrolofaircraftbyforwardcontrollersneednot
bementioned. TheexistingdoctrinesoftheFifthAirForceandSixthArmywerefound
tobesoundandnecessitatedslightmodificationsonly. TheSAP(SupportAiroraftParty)
andGLO(GroundLiaisonOfficer)systemsfunctionedwellandservedtoexpeditetheplan-
ning,andrapidexecutionofjointair-groundaction.
Fifty-sixclosesupportmissionswereflownbytheairtaskforcesduringtheperiod
incoordinationwithSixthArmyunits. Oneoftheareasmostheavilybombedwasthehigh
groundnorthoftheRosario-DamortisRoad,whichtheenemywasdefendingvigorously
fromprepareddefensivepositions. Strikesonenemysupportingartilleryaccountedfor
mostoftheaireffortinthisarea,andprovedtobeveryeffectiveinneutralizing
theheavyenemy'gunswhichhadbeenharassingthebeachesontheArmy'sleft.
ThedefilesleadingintotheKennonRoadweresubjectedtointenseairstrikeswhen
itbecameapparentthattheenemyintendedtoconductanall-outdefenseoftheareaeast
ofDongonandCampOne. VeryheavyairattackswerealsomadeintheTayug-SanNicolas-
Natividadtriangle,wheretheenemyfoughttenaciouslytoholdopenthewesternapproaches
totheVillaVerdeTrail. Atotalof21missionswereflownagainsttargetsinthisarea
duringtheperiod.
102
fhaseII -S/20.2QJanuary1^5-S/fff,5Fe
^
P e r i
dWeretheas3ault l a n d i n
Antonioaref^ l ^
0
^ ^
1
?
1 1 3
**
9January 1 9
^
and the r
*P
i d
Sym^ty TT
?c?
f r
mClarkMrCenterandGuimba ftiort0the
^dingin IheL n A S L* -
theSanAntonioareaon29January1945.onemissionwasflownagainstGrandeIsland.
I n a d v a n c e o ft h e
1 Q
,
c
*!
l s t
CavalryDivisionfromGuimbatoManila,1-3February
1943. athree-dayaircoverovertheleadingreconnaissanceand.armoredelementsofthe
divisioncolumnwasarrangedforbySixthArmy. Forwardaircontrollers,mountedin
radio-equippedjeepswereattachedtothe44thTankBattalionandthe1stCavalryDivi-
siontoexpediteattackbytheaircoveronanytargetsofopportunity. Flightsof9
SBDsrelievedeachotheronstationeverytwohoursfromdawnuntildusk,andP40spro-
tectedtheflanksofthecolumnduringdaylighthours. Asidefromconstitutinga
powerfulstrikingforce,theseplanesperformedvaluableaerialreconnaissance,reporting
anyobservationsofenemypositionsinthepathofadvance. Secondarytargetssuchas
ammunitiondumps,supplyareas,bridgesandbivouacareasweregiventoallflightsand
thesewerehitwhenbombswerenotusedagainstprimarytargetsaheadofthecolumn.
OnesquadronofA-20sremainedoncontinuousalertintheLingayenGulfareaduringday-
lighthours. WhentheplanesonairalertoverthelstCavalryDivisionwerenotneeded
forstrikesinsupportofthatdivision,theystrucksecondarytargetsinthezoneof
actionofICorps.Bypre-planningstrikesagainstthesesecondarytargetsandbyar-
rangingforcontrollersin ICorps'zonetotakeovercontrolofflightsastheycame
offformerstation,maximumresultswereobtained. Thisprocedureminimizedtheusual
wasteofairpowerwhencommittedtoairalertmissions.
Anincreaseinclosesupportmissionsandadecreaseinstrategicmissionsoccurred
e
intheICorpszoneofactionduringthisperiod,29January1945-5February1945.
T n
importantobjectiveofSanJosehadbeencaptured,andtheadvanceonRizalwasinpro-
gressattheendofthisphase. Approximately15coordinatedairstrikesweremadein
supportoftheadvancetoRizal. Missionswerealsoflownwithexcellentresultsagainst
enemydefensesinMunozandLupao,andconcentratedattacksweremadeagainsttheremain-
ingdefensesintheUminganarea. ThesouthernapproachestotheVillaVerdeTrailof-
feredsomelucrativetargets. Twelvemissionswereflownagainstenemytroopconcentra-
tions,vehiclecolumns,andartillerypositionsnortheastofBozorrubio,alongthe
ArodagatRiver,wheretheenemy,disorganizedandinretreat,washeavilyhitbyour
airstrikes* Thedestructioncausedbystrafingattacksagainstexposedcolumnsand
hastilyconstructeddefensivepositionsprobablyoutweighedtheresultsobtainedby
bombardmentmissions.
Wellprepared,stubbornlydefendedenemypositionseastofDongonandCampOnewere
poundedbyaerialbombardmentwithlittleeffect. Theenemy,establishedinhorizontal
cavepositionsanddeepfoxholes,wasrelativelysafefromeitherbombingorstrafing
attacks. However,anumberofdirecthits,whichwereobtainedoncaveentrances,
resultedinsealingsomeandindestroyinglightartillerypiecesinothers. Theenemy
defendersonthehighgroundnorthofDamortiswerepoundedfromtheairwithfewob-
servedresults.
TheremainingheavygunpositionseastofAgoowerepinpointedanddivebombedwith
satisfactoryresults,therebygreatlyassistingthe43dDivisioninitsadvancesupthe
BuedRiverValley.
Itbecameveryapparentasthecampaignprogressedthatthecombatpilotswerebe-
comingmorefamiliarwiththeoverallgroundsituationandmorecognizantoftheimpor-
tanceofneutralizingenemytargetsblockingtheadvanceofourinfantry. GLOsaccom-
paniedthepilotsonmanyvisitstofrontlineinfantryunits,wheretheywereableto
meetgroundforcecommandersanddiscusstheimmediateproblemsofaircooperation. This
closepersonalcontactwasavitalfactorinimprovingtheresultsobtainedfromairsup-
portmissionsasthecampaignwenton. Requestprocedurealsoimprovedgreatlyandfor-
wardcontrollersandflightleadersbecamefamiliarwiththeterrainandthetargetareas
tosuchanextentthatthetimeinvolvedindirectingplanestoatargetwascuttoa
minimum.
PhA.cift Ti l - S/ 28,6 February 192x5 - &fth . L Aflarch
The 3O9th Bomb Wing (H), operating from the San Marcelino Airstrip in the Sen
Antonio area, flew i t s fi rst missions in support of XI Corps against strongly intrenched
103
enemyforcesintheZig-ZagPassonHighway7. Thesemissionswerehighlysuccessful
andgreatlyassistedthecorpsinbreakingorganizedenemyresistanceinthisarea.
NapalmbombswereusedagainsttheenemyinZig-Zagifessandprovedveryeffectiveby
burningofflargeareasandexposingpreviouslycamouflagedgunpositionsandtrenches.
Closefighter-bombersupportwasfurnishedforthecombinedairborneandamphibious
assaultonCorregidoron16February1945andcontinuedthroughoutthisoperation,work-
ingincloseconjunctionwithnavalgunfiresupportships. Typicaloftheexcellent
airsupportgivendailybytheFifthAirForcewasonestrikeof31P-47inwhich4000
gallonsofnapalm,38x500lbbombs,and31,000roundsof.50caliberammunitionwere
expendedtoassistacompanyinthesuccessfulassaultagainstonestrongpointonthe
island. Between16February1945and25February19453closeairsupportmissions
wereflownbyfighterbombers,andthefollowingammunitionexpended: 34#900gallons
ofnapalm,286x500lbdemolitionbombs,and158,500roundsof.50caliberammunition.
HeavyairattacksweremadeintheareawestofClarkAirCentertosupport40th
Divisiontroops,atotalof62missionsbeingflownbetween6February1945and4March
1945. *totalof32,220gallonsofnapalmwasdroppedinthisarea,withhighlysatis-
factoryresultsbeingobtainedbecauseofthedrygrasscoveringtheterrain. Large
tehicleparks,fueldumps,andothersupplyareasweredestroyedbynapalm,demolition
bombsandstrafingattacks. Itwasnotedagainthattheenemyindefendingcavespre-
sentedadifficulttargetforairstrikes. Skip-bombingtacticsprovedsuccessfulagainst
thelargercaveswhenlocated,andsomesuccesswasattainedbydive-bombingagainstpin-
pointtargets. Glidebombing,orhighaltitudebombing,accomplishedlittleagainstthe
typeofdefensesencounteredinthisarea,althoughon21February1945and22February
1945222B-24softheVBomberCommanddropped684tonsofgeneralpurposebombsinthis
areawithexcellentresults.
HeavyairstrikesweremadeinsupportofoperationsofXIVCorpseastofManilafrom
12February1945to4March1945.
A
totalof200missionswereflownintotheMtOro-
Wawa-Ipo-Montalbanarea,andintotheTaytay-Antipolo-Teresaarea, iuanyclose
supportmissionswerealsoflownwithverysuccessfulresultsagainsttargetsalongthe
IferiquinaRiverandalongtheparallelroadandrailroadfromBayanbayanantoivlontalban.
Truckcolumns,troopmovements,andartillerypositionsconstitutedthemaintargetsin
thislatterarea. IntheWontalbanareabombinglikewiseneutralizedmanyheavyenemy
gunswhichattemptedtoshellourrearareas,agreatdealofcreditbeingduetheMar-
ineandArmyAirForcedivebombersinassistingourcounterbatteryfiredirectedagainst
thoseguns. Tacticalairreconnaissancelocatedmanytargetsandthenledflightsof
MarineSBDsandotherdivebomberaircraftintothetargets.
ThedrivesonIpo,Wawa,andAntipoloofferedagreatvarietyofairtargets. It
wasduringthisphasethatair-groundcooperationreachedahighstateofeffectiveness*
Theairwasabletohitmanytargetsthatcouldnotbereachedby,orweredefiladed
fromourartillery. Inthecasesoftargetswhichwerenoteasilydiscernablefromthe
air,ourartilleryormortarsoftenmarkedthemwithwhitephosphorousonveryshort
notice. Thisprocedurebecamestandardizedandprovedtobeextremelyeffective. The
attemptoftheenemytoconfuseoursupportingaircraftbyfiringsmokeintoourown
lineswasunsuccessful.
IntheICorpszoneofaction,from15to28February1945tclosesupportmissions
gavewayagaintomissionsflownagainsttheenemy'slinesofcommunication,especially
alongHighway5*
ne
VillaVerdeTrail,andtheiiennonRoad. Approximately
7
0missions
wereflownagainsttargetsalongHighway5fromSanJosetoSolana,whileICorpsdrove
throughtheenemydefensesontheapproachestoBaletePassandalongtheVillaVerde
Trail. AlthoughitwasknownthatonlypartialblockingofHighway5waspossible,it
wasfoundthatcontinuedstrikesgreatlyhamperedtheenemy'sabilitytoreinforceand
resupplyhisfrontlineunits. Manyammunitiondumpsweredestroyed,therebycausinga
noticeabledecreaseinenemyartilleryfire. SomestrikesweremadeintheCamp3area
ontheKennonRoadandafewclosesupportmissionswereflownintheCamp1area. First
priority,however,wasgiventotargetsintheBaguioareaandthenarrowdefilesalong
Highway11northofBaguio. Lucrativetargetswereknowntoexistinalmosteveryimpor-
tantbuildinginBaguio,andthesewerethereforesystematicallydestroyed.
TargetareasinBaguiowerepinpointedonphotomosaicsandassignedtoheavy,
medium,orlightbombers,ortodivebombers,dependingonthenatureofthetargets.
Dailyaerialphotographiccoverageoftheareawasobtainedtoassessbombdamage. By
theendofthisperiodapproximately20missionshadbeenflownandexcellentresults
achieved.
104
Closegroundsupportmissionswereacommonoccurrence
attackingdefiladedenemypositionsand,fortheresultsobtained,the
in
received thewholeheartedacclaimofgroundtroopsonmanyoccasion.
FifthAirForce
"Si's
1
s
PhaseIV-S^q. 5March19^-3/172.30Junel<Mij
^B
y<
jointagreementbetweenSixthArmyandFifthAirForcethethreebombwingswere
eachgiventhemissionofsupportingacorps. Thisprocedurewasputintoeffectatthe
lt
S
^n
0
? n Period,the308thBombWing(H)workinginconjunctionwithICorps,
the309thBombfling(H)withXICorps,andthe310thBombWing(H)withXIVCorps. This
provedtobeanexcellentscheme. Itreducedcommunicationproblems,speededupthe
flowofinformation,shortenedairrequestchannels,and,throughclosepersonalcontacts
betweenthestaffofficersofthevariousheadquarters,broughtaboutperfectmutual
understanding. Theresultwasamuchbetterutilizationof-combinedpower. Sufficient
flexibilitywasallowedtopermitwingstoflysupportmissionsinareasoutsideoftheir
zones,therebymakingitpossibleforacorpstoobtainadditionalairsupport,when
necessary,fromawingotherthantheonesupportingit. WhenVFighterandVBomber
Commandsbecameoperational,theycontrolledalltheseheavycommitmentsandwereable
tomoreeffectivelycombineunitsfrommorethanonewingforstrikesinthezoneofa
singlecorps.
Inanendeavortopresentatruepictureofaireffortduringthisextendedphase,
air-groundoperationsineachcorpszoneofactionwillbediscussedseparately. A
certainoverlapofresponsibilitywithinzonescannotbeavoidedduetochangesincorps
boundaries.
IntheXICorpszoneofaction,whentheThimbuLineintheAntipoloareabeganto
crumble,heavyaircommitmentsagainstthehighgroundnorthandsouthofAntipolocon-
tinuedunabated. Successiveenemydelayingpositionseastofthisareawerequickly
locatedbyreconnaissanceplanesandrepeatedlyhitbeforetheenemycouldconsolidate
otherdefenses. Inaddition,manyscatteredmissionswereflownintheenemy'srear
areasagainsthissupplydumpsandtroopconcentrations. TothesoutheastofAntipolo
onlylightresistancewasencountered;consequentlynoairsupportwasneeded. Butthe
enemycontinuedtoholdhisexcellentdefensivepositionsonallslopesofMtMataba,
andaccordinglyaheavyconcentrationofairstrikeswasdirectedagainstthisarea.
Hereagaintheenemycavepositionspresentedtheusualdifficultproblemtoourplanes.
TheenemyconcentratedintheWawa-Loobacareawassubjectedtoapproximately?0
airstrikes,outveryfewclosesupportmissionswereflowninthisareaduringthis
phase. Somemissionswereflownagainstenemydug-inpositionsonMtOro,however,and
afewstrikeswer.emadeintheLpoarea. DuringthemonthofApril,120missionswere
flowninawidelydispersedareaaroundIpo,
TheadvanceuptheSlniloan-InfantaRoadfromMabitacmetimmediateresistancefrom
theenemyintheKapatalanSawmill-SantaMariaarea. Approximately14missionswere
thereforeflowninsupportofouradvancinggroundforces. Againtheenemywascaught
inhastilypreparedpositionsandsufferedheavilyfromourbombingandstrafingattacks.
Inconjunctionwiththisadvance,themissionofknockingoutthebridgesontheInfanta
SiniloanRoadintheLamonBayareawerealsoassignedtotheairforce. Insystematic
attacks,fivebridgesweredestroyedalongthisroute,thusisolatingInfantaandserious-
lyrestrictingtheenemy'sfreedomofmovementinthisarea. Aerialreconnaissancepilots
wereinstructedtolocatelucrativetargetsintheareaandtoactaspathfindersin
leadingsuccessivemissionsintosuchtargets. TeamsofSixthArmyAlamoScoutshaving
reportedmanytargetsintheareasouthandwestofInfantawhichwereconcealedfrom
aerialobservacion,thesewerethenattackedwithverysatisfactoryresultsbybombing
andstrafing. Itwaslaterfoundthatmanyenemybivouacareasandsupplydumpshadbeen
destroyedbythesestrikes.
Theperiodfrom30April1945to30May1945.inXTCorps'zoneofaction,provedto
beamostimportantphaseinrespecttoairgroundcooperation. Closesupportmissions
faroutweighedallothermissionsduringthisperiod. Almostalloftheairmissionswere
flowninclosesupportofgroundunitsintheIpo-Wawa-Loobac"* ^ ~ ?*? ^
e
K0 missionswereflownalongthisfrontduringthemonthofMay. Ofthistotal,2jwere
individualnapalmstrikes,duringwhich1
9
tonsofnapalm,weredroppedandtwowere
105
largeconcentratednapalmattacks,duringwhich750tonswereplacedontargetsinthe
Wawa-loobacarea,and550tonsontargetsintheIpoarea. ThisgrandtotalofI3I9
tonsduringtnemonthconstitutedthegreatestamountofnapalmeverconcentratedon
oneareaintheSWPA. IntheWawa-Aoobacareaatotalof75
e
Planesinfivedaysof
operationsstruckfiveseparatepre-plannedtargetareaswithsaturationeffectobtained
inallareas. IntheIpoareaatotalof741planes,inthreedaysofoperations,struck
fiveseparatetargets*
Groundforcecommandershighlypraisedtheresultsachievedbytheseheavystrikes,
andsincenapalmmissionswerecloselycoordinatedwithplannedadvancesbyourground
forces,theywereabletoassesstheexcellentresultsobtainedbyactualgroundobser-
vations, Asystematicquestioningofallprisoners,ofwartakeninthisarearevealed
thattheenemytroopsfearedthe"firebomb"attacksfarmorethananyothertypeofair
attack. Theseprisonersfurtherstatedthatevenindeepcavestheyfeltunsafe;and
that,insomeinstances,theyleftthesesheltersforopenfoxholeswheneveranapalm
strikestarted.
DuringJune,airsupportinthezoneofactionofXICorpsdeclined,atotalofonly
125missionsbeingflown. Targetswerefoundtobeleaslucrativeandmorewidelyscat-
tered. Theonlyareasinwhichanoticeabledegreeofclosesupportwasgivenwasinthe
InfantaandMtPurro-MtAlapatad-MtDomireareas,wheremoppingupwasinprogress.
Inviewoftheextensiveadvancesmadebyourgroundforcesduringthisfinalperiod,few
targetswerelocatedthatwouldhavejustifiedairstrikes.
IntheXIVCorpszone,duringtheperiod4to31March1945
1 0
missionswereflown
inclosesupportofgroundforces. Thirtystrikesweremadeagainstthelastremaining
enemydefensesintheMtDalaga-Mt%lepunyoarea,eightintheCabuyaoarea,ninein
theTiaongarea,andeightintheLipaarea. Theremainderofthemissionswereflown
againstscatteredtargetsinthesamegeneralareas.
In{reparationfortheassaultlandingbythe158thRCTintheLegaspiarea,south-
eastBicolPeninsula,heavypre-invasionairattacksweremadeon25March1943against
Legaspiportandairfield,with31B-24s,4B-25s,60P-38S,and16P-47adropping200x
10001bbombs,58x5001bbombs,and16x250lbbombs,atotalof175tonsofbombsbeing
droppedby111planes. Strikesofsimilarmagnitudewerethereafterflowndaily,except
whenweathergroundedtheaircraft,untiltheassaultlandingatLegaspiPortwasmadeon
1April1945* T&
e
landingatLegaspiwaspracticallyunopposed,buton5April19451"h
en
resistancewasmetbyourforcesinthevicinityofIferaga,atotalof10airsupport
missionshelpedmateriallyinreducingthisstrongpoint. Hereagaintheenemywascaught
inhastilyprepareddefensesandsufferedheavilyfromstrafingattacks.
Theonlyothermajorresistanceencounteredintheadvancewasonthehighground
southofCarnaligandatMalabog. SevenstrikesweremadeonMalabogand4missions
wereflownagainsttheenemypocketsouthofCarnalig. Low-levelbombingbyA-20sas-
sistedmateriallyinneutralizingthisheavilydefendedarea. However,nostrafing
waspermittedinthisareaduetothepresenceofourtroopsonallsidesofthetarget
area. Fifteenotherscatteredclosesupportmissionswereflowninthefinalmoppingup
phase. From1AprilI945until6May1945.26strikesweremadeonthesouthwestslopes
ofMtIsaroginthevicinityofCurryTown.
Incontinuedmissionsagainsttheenemy'slinesofcommunicationinthezoneof
theICorpsfrom5to31March19451Highway5betweenSantaFeandBayombongreceived
atotalof23strikes. Baguiowassystematicallypoundedwithatotalof33strikesby
mediumandheavybombers;andthesurroundingareasofCampJohnHay,Itogon,andAntamok
Minesreceivedapproximatelysevenattackseachduringthisperiod. Inaddition,some40
scatteredmissionswereflowninclosesupportandonenemyrearareatroopconcentrations,
supplydumps,andotherinstallations. Thebulkoftheconcentratedairsupport,however,
wasdirectedagainsttargetsalongHighway5fromMinulitoSantaFeandalongtheVilla
VerdeTrail. Onehundredfifteenmissionswereflowninthisareawiththemainconcen-
trationsofeffortagainsttargetsatMinuli,PutIan,andSanta*e.
DuringthemonthofApril,thepreponderanceofairsupportwasshiftedtoclose
supportmissionsinallareasalongtheICorpsfront. Inall,150missionswereflown
intheKapintalan-SantaFe-Imuganareawithverysuccessfulresults. Thelevelling
ofBaguiobyaireffortalsocontinuedduringApril,andwhenthecitywascaptured,it
hadreceived60heavystrikesforthemonth. IntheoperationsintheBaguioarea,14
strikesweremadeonAsin,ontheGalianoRivernorthnorthwestofBaguio,13onCabuyo
106
17
y
'
5
^
3 8 i
n 8WereflOwninthe
^ ZTn f ^
Aaa
***
in
cloae
t Lw T
l n 8gP0UndtrOOp8
*
Onehundredfort
yseparateattacksweremade
5 T
aandal0D6theVUlaVerdeTrail
'
Ofthistotal
L ^ -
2
4eoMOli-
eaChm d
i S i T?fi?
eaconcen
*
r
ated^palmattackontargetsonthe
n2
5" Pi?adrnnnin S n ^ V**"*' * 26May1945.atotalof370P-
3
8sand
P-47sdropping350ton*ofnapalm. Thissaturationbombinggreatlyassistedinbreak-
ingthefinalenemyresistancealongtheVillaVerdeTrail. Seventyothermissionswere
alsoflownagainstwidelyscatteredtargetsintheenemy'srearareua,alongHighway5.
andinthePingkianandKayapaareasduringthemonth.
Closeairsupportwasprovidedintheformofaircoverovertherapidlymoving
columnsofthe37thDivisionalongHighway5throughoutthemonthofJune. Over130
strikesweremadealongthisroutefromSantaFetoCauayan- Someofthesestrikes
werethecontinuationofoperationstopreventenemyingressandegressfromtheimmedi-
atebattlefieldarea,effectedbystrikingtheenemy'slineofcommunication,butthe
majorpartofthiseffortwasincloseairsupportagainsttargetsopposingouradvanc-
ingtroops. Everyimportanttownaheadofthisadvancereceivedablanketbombing,and
anyresistanceofferedwasatoncemetbyattacksmadebyflightsofairalertplanes
overthecolumn. Missionsonairalertagainprovedtheirimportance,sincetheywere
ofgreatassistanceinpreventingthetroopsfrombeingstoppedbyenemydelayingaction.
Planesoncallbecamethemobileartillery,assistingforwardelementsofthecolumnin
destroyinganystubbornresistanceencountered.
TheonlyotherconcentrationofaireffortwasmadeagainsttheKiangan-Hucabarea
andinsupportofgroundtroopsintheiradvanceupHighway4fromBagabagtothatarea.
Approximately60missionswereflowninsupportofthisadvancefrom10to30June1945.
TheareaeastandsoutheastofSantaFealsoreceivedsome20strikesagainstwidely
scatteredtargetsduringthemonthofJune. TheareaalongHighway11northofBaguio
wasalsostruckinthevicinityofAcopaPlace.
ThePhilippineGuerrillaForces,NorthLuzon,werewellestablishedby4March1945
andcapableofrequestingandeffectivelydirectingprofitableairstrikes. AnSAPwas
attachedtoHeadquarters,PhilippineGuerrillaForces,NorthLuzon,andbecamethere-
questsourceforallstrikesagainsttargetsintheirfront. Lateron,thispartywas
supplementedbyotherSAPelementsinordertoprovideadditionalforwardcontrollers
todirectthemissionstothetargets. AnL-5tyPaircraft,equippedwithaVHFradio,
wasemployedtomarktargetsnotvisibletogroundobserverswithsmokepotsorgrenades.
Fortheperiod5March1945to31March19451186separatemissionswereflownin
supportofPhilippineGuerrillaForces,NorthLuzon. SixthmissionsintheSanFernando
(LaUnion)arearepresentedthelargestconcentrationofstrikes. Thirty-twomissions
wereflownagainsttheSolvecPointarea. SeventeenmissionswereflownintheSanQuin-
tinareanortheastofSolvecPoint,and13inandaroundBangued. Approximately20
otherscatteredmissionswereflowninguerrillaterritorybytheendofMarch. There-
mainderofthemissionsinnorthernLuzonweremostlyflownalongHighway5throughout
theCagayanValley.
DuringApril,I89separatemissionswereflowninnorthernLuzon. Fortyofthese
wereagainflownintheSolvecPointareaand20intheSanQuintin-Banguedarea.
AfterSanFernando(LaUnion)hadfallenintoguerrillahands,nostrikeswereflown
anywhereinthatarea. Twelvedirectairattacksweremadeonenemyconcentrationsin
Cervantesand14othermissionswereflowninthatimmediatearea. Approximately20
strikeswerealsodirectedagainsttheViganarea. Allremainingstrikesweremade
alongHighway5intheCagayanValleyandsoutheastbetweenBaletePassandBambang.
Manyofthetargetsinthelatterareawerehitwhenprimarytargetswereweatheredout
inotherareas. Everytargetselectedwasadefiniteenemyinstallation,eitherac-
cordingtoguerrillareports,aerialphotographicinterpretation,oraerialvisual
reconnaissancereports. Manylargeenemybivouacareas,supplydumps,andotherin-
stallationsweredestroyedbythesedivertedmissions.
DuringMay,345separatemissionswereflowninsupportoffbilippineGuerrilla
Forces K Luzon. SixthconcentratedclosesupportmissionswereflownagainstCer-
IE
:
rJL-Sr 2^jrrrirrrsasas i s z%
107
coast. BytheendofMaytheguerrillasheldthewestbankoftheCagayanRiverandhad
pushedtheenemyeasttoCervantesandsouthtoBontoc. ManyofthestrikesalongHigh-
way5werenowclosesupportmissionsagainsttargetsreportedbyguerrillas,sincethe
forwardcontrollerswereabletodirectmanyofthemissionstoobservedtargetseastof
theCagayanRiver.
DuringJune,474separatemissionswereflowninnorthernLuzon. Atotalof145of
thesewasflownintheCervantesareainclosesupportofguerrillaoperations. The
townsofCervantes,Mankayan,andBontocallreceivedheavyconcentrations, Tuguegarao
washeavilyhitduringthemonthbyAtotalof1/jOstrikes. Theguerrillas,crossing
theCagayanRiverfromthewest,hadattackedandseizedthetown,butwereunableto
holditinspiteofimmediateassistancebyairforces. Theairbombardmentcontinued,
however,andthe37thDivision,advancingnorthalongHighway5recapturedTuguegarao
withlittledifficulty. HeavystrikeswereconductedintheAparri-Dugoareaprior
totheairbornelandinginthatarea,andclosesupportwasgiventhisforceinits
advancetothesouthfromthedropzone.
Jointair-groundoperationsintheLuzonCampaignreachedastateofperfectionnever
attainedheretoforeintheSouthwestPacificTheater. Theearnestdesireoftheairand
groundcomponentstoemploytheirforcesasateaminordertoexerttheircombinedmaxi-
mumpoweragainsttheenemy,theestablishmentofanefficientair-groundliaisonsystem
andtheapplicationofproventacticalprinciplesandprocedures,weretheoutstanding
featuresofthecloseairsupportoperations. Theseoperationsdisruptedtheenemy's
linesofcommunication,destroyedmanyofhisammunitionandsupplydumps,muchofhis
motortransportation,andinflictedthousandsofcasualtiesuponhim.
Inadditiontocombatmissionsinsupportofthegroundforces,manyairdroppingand
evacuationmissionswereflown. Detailedreportsofsuchmissionsareincludedinthe
reportsoftheTransportationOfficerandtheSurgeon.
108
Directives
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHWEST R&CIFIC AREA
PENPAL HTADQPARTERB
PACIFIC AREA
APO 500
12 October
NUMBER
I
73 )
1* a* See current Intelligence 3\sssarlee aid A B BWo3 - Intel l i gent
b Allied Forces oaoupjr the l t w i MARlAIUS-OLlTHI-LIrTE-iaOROTAI
and oontrol approaches to the PHILIPPINES.
o* The THIRD FLEET oovera and supports ths LHOtTBI Operation byi
(1) Destroying or containing the Ji pi i Mi Meet.
(2) Destroying hosti l e navel and ai r forees and hipping
the FORMDSjURYOJyas-CHINA ooast araa prior to S Day.
In
(3) Strlkea in tba FORMOSA-CHINA coast-northern LUZON area
immediately preoeding 3 Day aa required to cover th
paaaaga of tha assault forces between LOZON and tha
FORMOSA-CHINA ooaat araa.
(4) Destroying hosti l e saaooaat defenses, ground foroaa and
i nstal l ati ons in tba LINOAYEN araa and furnishing dlraet
support and oover for preliminary oparationa from 3-2
unti l tha asoart oarrisrs assuna tha mission of dlraot
support.
(5) Subssquant
objaotiTaa
to 3 Day* balng praparad to atrlka host11a
as nsoassitatad by tha axlsting situation.
(6) Continuing
required.
strikes by lsad-based heavy bombers as
d* Tha 20th and lith Air fbroea support tha UN0AYEN Opsrstion by
attaoks against hosti l e ai r foroes and shipping in the general area of tha
RYUJffU3-K)RMD3A-CHINA ooast.
a. Details of air operations of supporting forces and tha
coordination of THIRD JLEaT, CHINA-BORMA-DJDIA and 300THW3T PACIFIC
carrier and land-based aircraft wi l l be published l ater.
2. a* Forces of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, oovered and supported by
the THIRD FLEET, the 20th and U*th Air Foroaa, wi l l , following King n
and Love i n Operations, sei i e and occupy LD20N, by overseas operations
to sei se a frrif^h/f* in LINGAYEN QOLJ and thence by oTerland operations
to destroy hosti l e forces and sei ze the CENTRAL PLAINS-MANILA area,
continuing operations to complete oonquest of the entire Island, al l for
the purpose of establishing basea to support future operations and to
reestablish tba PHHJPFINI Government.
b. Target Data for 3 Dayi 20 December
o. I Time (Zone minus 9) or ZTime wi l l be used during the
operation*
d Foroes.
KnaW, IB Arsy.
(1) SHTH 03 Army - Lt General
See Annex No 1, Tentative Troop Li st . Transfer
of control of units frosi SIXTH to KORPHArmies wi l l
be covered In subsequent i nstructi ons.
(2) FUST AD9TRAUAH Aray - Lt General 7. A. H. Sturdee,
CBI.
As constituted.
(3) nOHTH 03 Ai w - Lt Oeneral Robert L, Bichelberger,
OS Ans/.
See Annex No 1. Tentative Troop Li s t . Transfer
of oontrol of unite fro SIXTH to nOHTH Armies wi l l
be covered In subsequent i nstructi ons.
m ALLKD NAVAL Forces - Vies Adiral T. C. Klnkald.
v
*
;
CO MfJ.
As reinforced.
Lt General Oeorge C. tsnnsy,
ALLIED AIR Forces -
(5)
03 Army.
As constituted.
(6) 0SA3OS - IsiJ Osneral J. L. Frlnk, OS Arsy.
AS constituted.
(7) OINKRALHEAOQUAICnS Reserve.
33rd 03 infantry Division -
IB InfMfcry Dlvlsloa - BIAK.
3 . s . The SOTB 03
supported by the AIXISD NAVALandAIR
oroes, wiUi
(1) By overwater operations seixe and ocoupyi
(e) Beachheads in the LINOAYXN-DAUORriS-SANFBUUNDO
(La ONION) areas aa are required to Ini ti ate and
Insure uninterrupted naval and ai r operations in
support of the continued offensive to seize the
CXNTRALPLAIN3-UANILA area.
(2) Seise the CENTRALPLAINS-MANILA area by overland
operations to the southward.
(3) Prepare to conduct such operations as soy be directed
later by this headquarters to ooaplete the destruction
of hosti l e forces and the oooupatioa of LOZON.
(k) Be prepared to asaunt oontrol of one Infantry Divlalon
whenHike U Operation Is launched* See paragraph
3b(3) below.
(5) Occupy and defend aitea for radar and ai r earning
lnstalletlons as arranged with the CoaaaadersALLIED
NAVALand AIR Foroea.
(6) Aaune control of and direct the operations of FILIPINO
Forces inLOZON.
(7) Submit racoBinandatlona to Oeneral Headquarter* regard-
ing the i ni ti ati on i f necessary of airborne operations
fros LSYTK to assiat overland operations inCENTRAL
FLAIRS,LOZON.
(8) Establish f adl l t l e a for minor naval operations at the
earl i est practicable date in the LUCAYXNarea, LOZON,
aa arranged with the ConmaDder ALLIEDNAVALForcea and
be prepared to i ni t i at e tha establishment of naval, ai r
and l ogl atl o basea aa l ater directed by thla headquar-
tera t o support subsequent operations to oomplet* the
destruction of Japanese Foroes in the PHILIPPINES and
to aupport future operations to north and eastward of
the PHILIPPINEARCHIPSLAOO.
(9) Establish air f aci l i t i es In the LUDATENaree In the
following priority! Target Dete antire Installation
3/15.
2 PBY squadrons (tender-based)
2 fighter groups
1 night fighter squadron
2 tacti cal reconnaissanoe aquadrons
1 photo squadron
1 l i ai son squadron
1 dive-bomb group (7 squadrons)
1 Medium bomb group
b. The EKETH OSArmy, while continuing present missions, willt
(1) Relieve the SIXTHOSArmy of duties and missions i n
tfas LJRTE-SitMAR area at a time later designated by
thi s headquarters.
(2) Prepare to assi st the operations of the SIXTH 03 Army
by airHBOunting the 11th Airborne Division inLETTS
for offensive operations in the CENTRALPLAINS area
whenordered by Oeneral Headquartera* Target Detei
1-10 January 19\ 5 .
(3) prepare t o conduct operation Mike II when ordered by
t hi s headquarters. Target Datei 1-20 January.
The FIRST AUSTRALIAN Army wllli
Continue present missions,
d. The ALLIEDNAVALForces, whlls continuing present missions,
wi l l i
(1) Transport and eatabliah landing foroes ashore i n the
LINOAYW area, LOZON, aa arranged with the ConnaDding
Oeneral SIXTHUS Aiwi provide naval protection
therefor.
(2) Support the operation byt
(a) providing air protection for convoys and naval
task foroes end direct ai r support for the
landing (including preliminary operations in
LINOAYEN OOLF) and immediately following over-
land operations, supplemented as arranged with
the CosnanderTHIRD FLEET and the Coanmnder
ALLIEDAIR Foroes. (Instructions for the
coordination of air operations of theTHIRD
FLEET, ALLIED NAVAL Foroes and the ALLIEDAIR
Forces will be published l at er) .
(b) Transporting supporting troops and thei r auppliss
as required to the LINOAYEN<MJ area i n naval
assault shipping.
109
(o) In conjunction with the ALLIEDAIR Forces, employ-
ing carrier-baaed air to dny movement of and
destroy host i l e reserves moving overland from the
APARRI, CENTRALPLAINS and MANILA areas to the
LINGAYEN GULF area.
(3) Deny the movement of host i l e naval forces, reinforce-
ments and supplies to the LUZONarea from the BOHNBD-
PALAWAN-western VISAYAS area, from the SINGAFORE-
SAIOON area and from the CHINA coast-FORMOSA-JAPAN
Mainland area, in conjunction with commanderTHIRD
FLEET and the Commander ALLIED AIR Forces*
(4) Establish at the earl i est practicable date asea
blockade ofthe MANILA BAY and STOIC BAY areas.
(5) Provide submarine offensive reconnaissance along
probable routes ofmovement ofhosti l e naval forces
andofwaterborne reinforcements and supplies,
(6) Provide lifeguard services as required.
(7) Transfer to the Commander ALLIED AIR Forces the mission
of direct air support when land-based fighters and
light bombers are established in the LINGAYEN area,
at atime as arranged with the Compander ALLIEDAIR
forces.
(8) Escort and protect shipping on the l i nes of commun-
ication into the northern PHILIPPINEARCHIPELAGO.
(9) Ini t i at e motor torpedo boat operations in the
LINGAYEN GULF and adjacent waters by S/2 and
establish therein naval forces required to support
current and future operations.
(10) Prepare to execute Mike II Operation on subsequent
instructions from t hi s headquarters. Target Datei
1-20 January 191*5.
The ALLIED AIR Forces, while continuing present missions, will)
(1) Support the operation byi
V (a) Providing aerial reconnaissance and photography as
required.
/ ( b ) Continuing the destruction of hosti l e ground,
naval and ai r farces and defenses in theLUZON
area, intensifying strikes during the period
S-10 through S Day in coordination withTHIRD
XEET Operations in FORMOSA, the RYUKYUS area
and the CHINA coast, in order to protect the
movement ofamphibious forces towards the
objective areas. (Instructions for coordination
of air operations ofthe THIRD FLEET,ALLIED
NAVAL Forces and the ALLIED AIR Forces wi l l be
published l at er) .
^ (c) In conjunction with carrier-based air ofthe
ALLIED NAVAL Forces, denying the movement of
and destroying hosti l e reserves moving over-
land from the APARRI, CENTRALPLAINS andMANILA
areas towards the LINGAYEN area.
(d) providing protection ofconvoys and naval forces
and direct support of the landing as requested
by the Commander ALLIED NAVAL Forces.
(e) Assuming the mission of direct support ofground
operations in the LINGAYEN area and Central
LUZONat the earl i est practicable date after the
establishment offighters and l i ght bombersin
the LINGAYEN area, as arranged with the Commander
ALLIED NAVAL Forces aid the Commanding General
3KTH U3Array.
(2) Continue the destruction ofhosti l e naval and ai r forces
and shipping in the northeastern BORFEO, SULUARCHIPELAGO,
MINDANAO, PALAWAN, western VISAYAS and the ARAFURAand
CELEBES SSA areas, and deny the movement ofhostile naval
forces, reinforcements and supplies into the LUZON area.
(3) Continue the destruction ofhosti l e i nstal l ati ons and
sources ofwar materials in the eastern !ETHERLANDS
EA3T INDIES.
>(4) Establish and operate radar and ai r warning f aci l i t i es
as required in the LINGAYEN area and as arranged with
the Commanding General SIXTH USArmy.
(5) Transport the 11th Airborne Division fran LEYTE to i t s
objective area in central LUION as arranged with the
EIGHTHUS Army, protect landing operations and provide
direct air support far i t s subsequent operations.
Target Datei L-10 January 1945*
(6) Establish air forces in the LINGAYEN area in priority
as l i st ed in paragraph 3a(9)
,(7) Be prepared to support and execute Mike II Operation
on subsequent instructions from thi s headquarters.
Target Dates 1-20 January 1945
f. For missions ofCommanding General USA30S, see Annex No 4.
x. (1) For coordination ofplanning the Commanders ALLIED
NAVAL and AIR Forces or their designated representa-
tives wi l l report to the Commanding General SIXTH
US Army, who is charged with the coordination of
planning.
110
(2) A brief ofthe coordinated plan ofoperations wi l l be
furnished t hi s headquarters by the Commanding General
SIXTHUS Army by 20 November 1944*
(3) Commanders ALLIEDNAVAL and AIR Forces, SOUTHWEST
PACIFIC AREA, wi l l submit to t hi s headquarters by
18 November 1944* thei r respective plans for general
support to be afforded by their forces during the
period ofoperations.
(4) During the amphibious movement and landing, the
Commander Naval Attack Force lain commandofthe
amphibious operations; hi s command continues until
the landing force i sestablished ashore* Command
of the forces ashore i s then passed to the Landing
Force Commander. The exact time oftransfer of
command to the Commander Landing Force wi l l be
announced by radio* The controlling considerations
for fi xi ng the time when the landing farces are
Aflt.fthi^ ah /l aohrtiv wi l l h. sa AOTAA^ >IVthh
Commander Attack Force and the Commanding General
SIXTH US Army, and wi l l be announced by them to
thi s headquarters and appropriate subordinates.
(5) For coordination of land-based and naval aircraftin
support ofthe operation, see Standing Operating
Procedure Instructions No 16/2, thi s headquarters,
dated 26 September 1944.
(6) The Commanders ALLIED NAVAL and AIR Forces will
provide as arranged and coordinated with the
Commanding General SIXTH USArmy the necessary direct
support ofground forces to insure the Immediate
attack and destruction ofhosti l e armored forces
and tanks attacking the beachhead or threatening
the advance of the -JlXTH US Army uni ts.
(7) To coordinate the attack of THIRD FLEET carrier
ai rcraft, the Comnander ALLIED NAVAL Forces,in
concert with the Commander ALLIHB AJR Forces and
Comaanding General SIXTH USArmy, wi l l furnish the
CommanderTHIRD FLEETatthe earl i est practicable
date the following!
(a) Schedule and tracks ofechelons.
(b) Target mapsofai r and surface bombardment.
(c) Communication plans.
(d) Naval gunfire plans.
(e) Other plans and data necessary for the support
of the operation by the fast carrier forces.
(8) The Coznnanding General EIGHTH US Army and Commanding
General USASOS are responsible that their respective
units l i st ed In Annex No 1are at the required
strength and equipped and supplied for the operation
prior to the passage ofcontrol to the SIXTH US Army.
(9) Designation ofareas ofresponsibility and coordin-
ating instructions for naval and air operationsof
the THIRD FLEET, the 20th and 14th Air Forces and
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Forces wi l l be published l at er.
(10) Instructions for long ranê reconnaissance, mvi
bombing and attack restri cti ons wi l l be issuedin
subsequent operations instructions.
(11) Annex No1indicates the tentative troop l i s t far
the operation, and Annex No2indicates the troop
movements for concentration.
4* See Annex No4- Logi sti cs.
5* a. See Annex No5- Communications,
b. Command Posts.
PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS - HAWAII
THIRD FLEET - AFLOiff
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA . LEYTE
Adv Ec he l on - LINGAYEN ( d a t e and hour ofope ni ngt o
be announced l a t e r )
ADVANCED ALLIED LAND HEADQUARTERS - H0LLANDIA
Fwd Echel on - LEYTE
SIXTH US Army - LINGAYEN ( a s announced by t he CG SIXTH
US Army)
Rear Echel on - LEYTE
FIRST AUSTRALIAN Army - LAE
EIGHTH US Army - L5YTE
Rear Ec he l on - HOLLANDIA
ALLIED NAVAL Forces - LEYTE
ALLIED AIR For c e s - LEfTE
UNITED STATES ARMf SERVICES OF SUPPLY - HOLLANDIA
By command ofGeneral MacARTHURi
R. K. SUTHERLAND,
Lieutenant General, us Aray,
Chief of St af f .
OFFICIALi
/ a / S. J. CHAMBEHLIN,
S. J. CHAMBEHLIN,
Major General, Q. S. C. ,
Asat . Chief of St af f , 0- 3.
(Annexes omitted)
(Operations Instructions 73/I to 73/38 omitted)
GENKRAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
APO 500
20 Norember 1944.
OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS )
1
NUMBER 80 )
1. o." For information of hostile forcea see current Intelligence
Sumnariest Annex No3 Operations Instructions No 73 andAnnex No 2,
Operations Instructions No 74, this headquarters.
b. Guerrilla Foroee in southern LUZON conduct operations in
the BATAKGAS-BICOL area under GHQcontrol as follows!
(1) Destruction of hostile lines of communication as
prescribed in paragraph l b. Operations Instructions
No 73/&t this headquarters dated 17 November 1944.
(2) Commencing 3-8, i ni ti ate mo-iimim destruction of railroads
and bridges and supply installations in the northwestern
BICOL-TAYABAS-BATANGAS-BALAYAN area.
c. Thi s headquarters arrangesi
(1) Tor the initiation of deceptive measures to create an
enemy belief that the FORM0SA-AM0Y area and northern
JAPANare threatened by an immediate offensive.
(2) For radar and radio deceptive measures in coordination with
operations of the SIXTHUSArmy and ALLIEDNAVALForces.
(3) For the distribution of leaflets in the BICOL-BATANGAS
area to warn of impending operations in that area.
2* SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Forces will conduct deceptive operations to
create an enemy belief that an offensive will be launched against the
western BICOL or BATANGASarea prior to Mike I Operation.
3. a. The Commanding General SIXTH USArmy wills
(1) Supported by the ALLIEDNAVALand AIR Forcea, launch
miiyvr shore-to-shore operations at the earliest
practicable date after the establishment of a beachhead
in the MINDOROarea, and seize and occupyMARINDUQUE
ISLAND and objectives in eastern and northeastern
MD1DOR0 to Include, as practicable, the CALAPANarea,
MIND0R0 and other feasible objectives off the western
BICOL coast that will influence enemy to believe that
the next major offensive will be launched against
BTCOL-BATANGAS area.
(2) Inform the Commander ALLIED NAVAL Forces of any desired
post-S Dayobjecti ves for diversionary operations.
(3) Provide the Commander ALLIED NAVAL Forces with two
infantry companiea or equivalent in scouts and rangers
and other minor forces as requested by the Commander
ALLIED NAVAL Forces for amphibious operations to land
on and withdraw from the southern LUZON coast.
(4) Transfer to the Commanding General EIGHTHUSAimy the
missions assigned i n those Operations Instructions upon
the transfer of duties and missions i n the MIND0R0 area
to the Commanding General EIGHTH USArmy.
b. Commanding General EIGHTH USArmy wi l l i
Assume the missions of the SIXTH USArmy assigned in
these Operations Instructions upon the assumption of SIXTH
US Army duties and missions i n the MIND0R0 area.
c. Commander ALLIED NAVALForces wi l l s
(1) Conduct overwater operations for the occupation at
MARINDUQUB ISLAND and objectives on the eastern and
northeastern coast of MIND0R0 to include, as practicable,
CALAPAN area, MIND0B0 and other f easi bl e objectives off
the western BICOL coast as arranged with the commanding
General SIXTH USArmy and provide naval protection
therefor.
(2) Beginning about 3- 8, conduot naval operations l a the
western BICOL-BATANOAS area t o simulate cl ose recon-
naissance and ndnesweeping prior to landings.
(3) Beginning about S-5, conduct operations t o simulate
landings andwithdrawals in theTAYABAS-B4TANGA3-
BALAYAN area.
(4) Subsequent to S Day continue as practicable simulated
landings i n the western BICOL-BATANGAS area as arranged
with the Commanding General EIGHTHUSArmy andi n the
western LUZONarea as arranged with the Commanding
General SIXTHUSArmy/ s e e paragraph 3a(2j7
C5) Arrange with the Commanding General SECT?'US Army
for troops desired in simulated amphibious land-
ings (see paragraph 3&(3))
d. The Commander ALLIED AIRFbrces will1
(1) conduct airborne radar and radio countermeasures
and distribute l eaf l et s as directed by this heed-
quarters*
(2) Provide aerial reconnaissance and photography
as required to support ahore-to-ahore and deceptive
operations as requested by the Commanding General
SDCTH USArmy, Commanding General EIGHTHUSArmyt
the Ooramtnder AI1IED NAVAL Forces and this head-
quarters.
(3) Furni3h cover, bombardment and direct support for
operations indicated in paragraphs 3a and30 as re-
quested by the Commanding General SIXTH USArmyand
the Commander ALLIED 1WVAL Forces respectively.
(4) Oonduct dummy parachute drops in coordination with
deceptive operations of the ALLIED NAVAL Forces and
as arranged with the Commander ALLIED NAVAL Fbrces.
x. (1) Command of amphibious landing and subsequent opera-
tions1
No change, see Operations Instructions No74.
(2) Commanding General SIXTHUSArmy i s charged with
the coordination of plans for the shore-to-shore
operations and the Commander ALLIED NAVAL Fbrces
with diversion operations in the EICOL-BATANGAS
area. The Commanding General SIXTHUSArmy andthe
Commander ALLIEDNAVfl- Fbrces :ill submit to this
headquarters coordinated plans for operations ten
days prior to their i ni t i at i on.
(3) The Commanding General EIGHTH USArmy wi l l assume the
missions prescribed herein Tor the Commanding General
SIXTHUSArmy upon the assumption of combat respon-
s i bi l i t y in the KINDOR0 area. The Commanders ALLIED
NAVALand AIR Fbrees will continue missions in
support of the EIGHTHUSArmy as specified herein for
the SIXTHUSArmy.
4* Logi st i cs.
a. The Commander ALLIED NAVAL Forces andthe Coamanding General
SIXTH USArmy wi l l be responsible for the l ogi st i c support of forces
employed In these operations, as applicable.
h. Transfer of responsibility of SIXTH USArmy l ogi st i cal
support to EIGHTH USArmy wi l l be concurrent with transfer of duties and
missions as specified in paragraphs 3a(4) and3b.
5 . Communications - see Annex No1.
By comnand of General MaoARTHURi
R. K. SUTHERLAND,
Lieutenant General, USArmy,
Chief of St af f .
OFFICIAL!
/ s / S. J. CHAMBEHLIN,
S. J. CHAMBKRLIN,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, 0- 3.
(ANNEXES omitted)
(Operations Instructi ons 80/1 omitted)
30 November 1944
CITE NO1 CA 5 4 1 6 7
FROM 1 GHQ, SCO 1*ARTHUR
TO :CGSIXTHARMY
SUGARDASHDAYCMACBCEITEMSEVENTHREECtLkTHISKEADQ.1ARTERSCMAISNINE
JANUARYONENINEFOURFIVE
GENERALHEADQUARTERS
30UTBVESTPACIFICAREA
APO 500
19 December 1944*
INSTRUCTIONS )
t
NUT/HSR 84 )
1* for det ai l s for host i l e andfriendly foroes see current Int el -
ligence SLuuniaries and orders of Bfattle.
2. SOUTBTEST 1ACIFIC Forces wi l l continue the offensive inLUZON
and wi l l reinforce the farces for theMike I Operation.
3 . a. TheEIGHTHUS Army wi l l i
(1J Stage and mount reiuforoing unita for theMike I
Operation andpass control of uni ts to the SIXTH US
Army in the LINGAYEN area as arranged with the
Commanding General SIXTH US Army, with target dates
as fellowst ("Sea Staff Study - Reinforcements for
Mike I ) .
Ist Cavalry Division and112thCavalry S/18
Combat Team
32nd Infantry Division, reinforoed sA'8
33rd Infantry Diviaion, reinforced S/30
41st Infantry Diviaion, reinforoed S/32
See Tentative Troop Li st , ReinforoeTient for Mike I ,
Annex No1.
(2) Arrange with the Goomander ALLIED N.AVAL Fbroes for
overwater transportation for themovement of reinforcing
uni ts l i s t ed in Annex No1 from staging to objective
areas.
b. TheSIXTHUS Army wi l li
Arrange with the EIGHTHUS Army for the destinations
and dates of arrival of the reinforcements indicated in
paragraph 3
a
( l )above andassume control of units upon
arrival in the objective area.
c. TheALLIED NAVAL forces, while continuing missions assigned
in operations instructions No70.73,and74. wi l l 1
Transport byassaul t shipping the reinforcements
for theMike I Operation. (SeeAnnex No1- Tentative
Troop Li st i Reinforcement of Mike I) as arranged with the
Commanding General EIGHTHUS Array and provide Naval
protection therefor*
d. TheALLIED AIR Forces, while continuing missions assigned
in operations instructions j 70t73and74, wi l l i
provide oover andprotection as practicable forthe
overwater movement of reinforcements for the Mike I
Operation as requested bythe Commander ALLIEDNAVAL
Forces*
x Thet act i cal si tuati on may require modifications in target
dates, desti nati ons, or a reduction or increase in the reinforcements
indicated in paragraph 3a( l ) ( see operations Instructions No85- Kike III
Operation, to be i ssued)* Cbci-Tanders wi l l maintain suffi ci ent f l exi bi l i t y
in plans in order to execute the reinforcement plan es iadioated in these
Operations Instructi ons, oras modified in accordance v.ith the t act i oel
si t uat i on as l ater directed by thi s headquarters.
4* a. Supply
(1) The Ocmrianding General EIGHTH USArmy wi l l be r e s poR-
ai bl e that supplies aooomjenying reinforoing di vi si ons
and supporting troops (seeAnner No I - Tentative
Troop Li st , Reinforcements for Mike I)areas
requested bythe Coinraanding General SIXTH USArmy,
but notexceeding the following!
Claaa I, IIand IT(less oonstruotion 30 H/Q
materials)
Class III 10H/s
Class 7 (for ocnbat troops) 5 u/
Class V(for service troops) 3u/F
(2) TheCommanding General SIXTH USArmy wi l l be respon-
si bl e for the resupply of units in theobjective area.
(3) Forunits whose employment in Operations Wke I I , i n
or IY*i s planned, the supply level to aoccmpany same
wi l l be as prescribed in Operations Instructions therefor,
b* graouation.
As prescribed in operationa Instructions No73for
Mike I operation*
o* Transportation.
(1) TheComnander JLLIED NAVALForoes will provide over-
water transportation for troop*, equipmentand
supplies as arranged with the Oommbnding General
EIGHTHUS Army*
(2) The Commanding Oeneral USASOS wi l l provide heavy
shipping for movement of reinforoing units tothe
objective area, in excess of those transported in
naval assault oraft, as requested in l et t er.
Headquarters SIXTH USArmy, File AG400 P-5, Subjeeti
Heavy di ppi ng Requirements for Mike I Operation,*
dated 3 Docember 1944 andapproved byradio O54723.
this headquarters, dated 1?Deoember 1944*
d. Miscellaneous*
US Army troop units to be employed in the objective
area will be equipped in accordance with l et t er this
headquarters. File AG400 (2 4Ug44)D Subjectt "issue
of Items of Equipment in Exoess of Authorized Allowances,
dated 1 September 1944*
5* Communications*
a* Signal communications as ;>reeeribed in Annex No5* Opera-
tions instructions No73 this headquarters, 12 Ootober 1944andamend-
ments thereto trill continue to be in effect during tbe reinforcement cf
the Mike I area with the following additional
(1) TheEIGHTHUS Army in cooperation with the SIXTH US
Army, ALLIED NAVAL Forces and ALLIEDAIR ft>roes will
arrange for the signal ooinnunioations required fort
(a) Thestaging, mounting and transportation of rein-
foroing divisions to the objeotive area.
(b) TheNaval andAir support required during the
operations designated in (1) above*
(2) TheSIXTH US Any, Inaddition to themissions assigned
i n sub-paragraph (1) above, wi l l arrange forthe
aMlgnwnt of thenecessary radio frequencies for
the reeerre divisions at such a time andIn such a
way as will Insure the avoidance of radio interference
and the expeditious andeffecti ve operation of radio
painleatIon by these elements.
of Oeneral HecARTHURi
R. K. 30THWLAND,
Lieutenant Oeneral, US Any,
Chief of St af f .
OFFICIALi
/ a / W. I . CHAMBERS,
for S. J. CHiMBDLIN,
Major Oeneral, O. 3. C. ,
Asst. Chief of Staff,0-3*
(ANTCTJB osdtted)
(Operations Instructions 84/1to84/8omitted)
rBOMi OB}SWA- Information
17 January1943
TO: COSIXTH ARKT ( BTSATXHATO COUEIXB )
0 P 1 E A T I 0 I A L P S I O B I T T
STBATXOIC C0 I 8 I DEUI I 0 I S BXQUIBI ABLE RAPID ADTAKC1 TOTH1SOOTHWAED ABD
TEX IARLT SIIZU 1 07T O CLAEI r OLD ARIA PD CUHHHT II7QRMATI0T 0T H0STI U
DISPO8ITI0V8 LIADS TOTEX BI LHF THAT TEIXXXKT HAS OCCUFIXD ABLI DXFXH8ITX
POSITicornTHEFOOTHILLSALOSOTHXOXIOBALLIIXBOSARIODASHDIIQALUBAT
CMAWITHABLEPOSSIBLEKLXHXIT07MAHIUTZBIITEXXASTXEfPOSTICIOfTEB
LCZOJIPLAIISOUTH0TCABAHATUAJPD(CAX30027) THISDISPOSITId07TEX
XBXMTLMDS ITSXL7TOTEXXAHLTATTAIXXXBT07OUBDMIDIATX STRATEGIC
112
OBJECTIVEINTHAT ITPERMITSUSTr CONTAINTHEENEMYSNCRTH3G FORCEWHILE
ADVANCINGRAPIDLYWITHOURRIGHTTOWARDCLARKFIELDSEMICLNTHEITEMCOT?PS
TÎV,INF"TELTHMENT TOTHELEFTREARCMAFACILITATING THE IMMEDIATE
ENGAGEMENTOFTHEPOSSIBLEENEMYFORCESSOUTHOFCABANATHANTT
1
Y^^T)^^
ENABLEDTHUSTOAVOIDTHEDELAY INCIDENTTORETARDING THEADVANCEOFTHE
FOURTEENTHCORPSAWAITINGTHEARRIVALONAGÎT?
1
^."'"TDASH'VESTLINEOFTHE
ITEMCOPPSPDPARA IFHEAVYRESISTANCE ISENCOUNTERED IHTHECLARKFIELD
DASHBAMBANAfFJlCMA TTWILLBECOMPLETELYDISLOCATEDBYTHEEXECUTIONOF
THEMIKESEVEH0P2HATI0NPDPARA ITISDESIHEDTHATYOUDIRECTYOUR OPERATIONS
WITHABLEVIEWTOTHEEARLIESTPOSSIBLEATTAINMENTOFTHEINITIALSTBATEOIC
OBJECTIVE INDICATED
MAOARTHUR
OFFICIAL:
W.E.CHAMBERS,
Bri^. General,U.S.Army,
ActeAsst.Chief ofStuff,G-3,AdvEch
MSG CEN NH 3 1 1 5
OHIG MSG HR CRARLIS ABLE FI VE NOUGHT TWO THREE TWO
HC/T AUTHENTICATED
FtOM: ADV GHQ. SWPA
TO: CG SIXTH ARMY
O P E R A T I O N A L P R I O R I T Y
REPLYING YOUH WILLIAM LOVE ONE TWO THREE NOUGHT SECOND PD THE GENERAL
CONCEPT FOX CLEARANCE OF MANILA BAY COMPRISES THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE SEIZURE
OF BATAAN TO INCLUDE MARIVELES CMA THE OCCUPATION OF CORREGIDOR AND OF THE
SOUTH COAST IN THE GENERAL AREA OF TERNATE PD THE CAPTURE OF CORREGIDOR WILL
BE EFFECTED BY SHORE TO SHORE ASSAULT OR BY PARACHUTE DROP OR BOTH AS
INDICATED BY TUE TACTICAL SITUATION AFTER EFFECTIVE AI R NEUTRALIZATION PD
THE GROUND OPERATION WILL BE CARRIED OUT BY THE SIXTH ARMY PD THE ELEVENTH
AI3BCRNE DI VI S I ON WILL PASS TO YOUR CONTROL ON ABLE DATE TO BE DESIGNATED
AFTER THE CAPTURE OF MANILA PD THE NAVY WILL CLEAR OBSTRUCTIONS TO NAVIGATION
AND THE PORT OF MANILA WILL BE DEVELOPED BY THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY PD
APPROPRIATE ORDERS WILL BE I SSUED
MACARTHUR
TOO: O3O252Z
TOR: O3141OI
GENERALHEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFICAREA
AdvanceEchelon
A.P.0. 500
5February1945
AG385(5Feb45)C
SUBJECT! Course of LUZON Campai gn.
TO 1 Commanling Ge ne r al , SIXTH Army
Conmanding General t EIGHTH Army
Commander, ALLIED NAVAL For c e s
Commander, ALLIED AIR For c e s
1 . Af t e r t he c apt ur e o f t he Ci t y of I.'ANILA i t i s de s i r e d t ha t
o pe r a t i o ns t o reconquer and c o n s o l i d a t e LUZON be undert aken by SIXTH
Army g e n e r a l l y a l o ng t he f o l l o wi n g l i n e s i
a . Cl e ar BATAAN PENINSULA and MANILA BAY ar e a of h o s t i l e f a r c e s
wi t h t he o b j e c t i v e of prompt us e of t he l a t t e r a s a p o r t . Th i s mi s s i o n w i n
i nc l ude t he s e i z u r e o f CORREGIDOR and a ppr o pr i a t e p o s i t i o n s on t he r.-ARIVELES
c oaat and s o ut h s ho r e of MANILA BAY at t he e a r l i e s t p r a c t i c a b l e d a t e .
b. Clear south LUZON westward of LACUNA de BAY and the BICOL
PENINSULA wi th the obj ect i ve af opening BATANGAS BAY and t he securi ng of
the northern e x i t s t o SAN BERNARDINO STRAITS and VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE.
e. Clear northwest coast al area of LUZON north of LINGAYEN GULF
with the obj ect i ve of opening t hese areas for a i r f i e l d development.
d. Drive i nt o the mountains and cont ai n or destroy ho s t i l e f orces
north and east of the CENTRAL PLAINS and LAGUNA de BAY.
e . prepare t o conduct operat i ons i n the CAGAYAN VALLEY of northern
LUZON on l at e r orders of t hi s headquarters.
Z I t i s pos s i bl e that the des t ruct i on of enemy f orces i n the mountains
of north and eaat LUZON wi l l be time consuming because tbs nature of the
t errai n wi l l probably channel i ze operati ons and l i mi t development of f ul l
power. I n i t i a l l y , hos t i l e f orces should be dri ven i nt o the mountains,
contai ned and weakened, and our pri nci pal ef f ort devoted t o areas where
great er power may be appl i ed. The establ i shment of great er di scharge
BASICt Ltr f r CIHQ, SWPA, t o COsSIXTH and EIGHTH Armies and Comdrs \LLIED
NAVAL and AIR forces, f i l e AG 385 (5 Feb 45)C, dd 5 February j.-)kS,
Subject: "Course of LUZON Campaign." (Continued)
f a c i l i t i e s far cargo and the development of a short rout e of supply through
the VTSAYAS are urgent requi rements.
3 . The EIGHTH Army wi l l i ns t i t ut e operati ons at the e ar l i e s t prac-
t i c abl e date t o cl ear the northern coast of SAMAR and the i sl ands i n CAPE
VERDE PASSAGE with the obj ect i ve of securi ng the southern e xi t s t oSAN
BERNARDINO STRAITS and VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE.
lu Commanders ALLI2D NAVAL and ALLIED AIR Forces wi l l support the
operat i ons of the SIXTH and EIGHTH Armies, harmonizing l ocal ef f ort i n
accord with vari ous pl ans and request s of the SIXTH and EIGHTH Armies.
5 I ns t ruct i ons wi l l i ssue short l y for f orces of the EIGHTH Army
on LUZON t o pass to control of SIXTH Army*
6* Further i nst ruct i ons wi l l be i ssued from General Headquarters
from time t o time t o cover the l arger phases of coordi nati on and al l oc at i on
of Ground, Naval and Ai r resources.
/ s / Douglas MacArthur
DOUGLAS MacARTHUR,
General of the Army,
COHCQ&n d i n g
COPIED TOi
Commanding General , OSAFFE
Commanding General , USASOS
MSGCENKH Vfr
ORIGMSGCENNR EVMM
CITECHARLIIABLEXRAYFIVENOUGHTTWOSEVEi,ONI.
NOTAUTH
FROM: MACAHTHUR
TO: COMMANDINGGENEKALSIXTHAKMY(PASoJLD)TO CCMKAHDEP ALLIEDNAVAL
FOPCESTOCOMMANDERALLIEDAIRFORCESFORACTIONTOGHQLEYTEFOR
INFORMATION
U R G E N T
COMMANDING GNRAL PLAN SIXTH ARM* FOR OPENING ENTRABCE MANILA BKt HAS
BZaJa APPROVED BY GEORGE HOW QUfctii FOR EXECUTION WITH TARGET DATE FOR
DOG DAY AS ONE TWO FHHUAR* PD SIXTH ARMY TO SEIZE POSITIONS ON THE
SOUTH COAST IN THE VICINITY OF THE MARIVELES BAY ON THE SOUTH COAST OF
BATAAN PENINSULA BY OVERWATER OPERATIONS ON DOG DAY IN CONJUNCTION WITH
OVERLAND OPERATIONS SOUTHWEST PD FORCES TO BE LAUNCHED FROM SUBIC BAY TO
APPROXIMATE ONE REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM PLUS ONE BATTALION PD TO SEIZE
CORREGIDCB BY AIRBORNE AND OVERWATER OPERATIONS ON DOG PLUS ONI DAY PD
SEABORNE OPERATIONS TO BE LAUNCHED FROM VICINITY OF MARIVELES BAi ABD FORCES
TO INCLUDE APPROXIMATELY ONE REINFORCED Il-FANTRY BATTALION PD AIRBOHNE
OPERATIONS TO BE LAUUCltM) FROM MINDORO BY THE EIOHTH AHMY ALTO FORCES TO
INCLUDE ABLE PART OR ALL OF THE FIVE NAUGHT THREs, PARACHUTE INFANTRY PD
GENERAL COORDINATION OF THE OPERATION TO BE ARRANGED BY COMMANDING GENERAL
SIXTH ARMY PD ESTIMATES OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES REQUIRED CLN FIVE ABLE PETER DOG
113
CMATIVELOTSCHARLIEHEMCMATWONOUGHTLOVESUGARMIKECMAFIVELOVE
SUGARTARECMAAUGMENTEDBYLOVECHARLIEMIKENOWUNDER SIXTHAHMTCONTROL
PD COMMANDER ALLIEDNAVALFORCESWILLIMMEDIATELY INSTITUTETHEASSEMBLY
ATSUBICBAYOFAMPHIBIOUSCRAFTREQUIREDFORTHISOPERATIONPD SEND
IMMEDIATELYTOHEADQUARTERS SIXTHARMYREPRESENTATIVEPD TASKFORCES
DESIGNATEDTOSUPPORTTHEOPERATIONTOCONTACTWITHCOMKANDING GENERAL
SIXTHARMYPD CONDUCTPRELIMINARYBOMBARDMENTOFCORREGIDORAND MARIVELES
BAYANDNORTHCHANNELMANILABAYASPRACTICABLEPRIORTOOPERATIONSAND
DURINOLANDINGSPD COMMANDER ALLIEDAIRFORCESWILLINSTITUTE IMMEDIATELY
HEAVYPRELIMINARYNEUTRALIZATIONOFTHEDEFENSESOFCORREGIDORANDTHE
SOUTHERNCOASTOFBATAANPENINSULAANDMAKEPLANSTODROPAPPROPRIATE
ELEMENTSFIVENAUGHTTHREEPARACHUTEREGIMENTSODESIGNATEDBYSIXTHARMY
PD SENDREPRESENTATIVETCHEADQUARTERS SIXTHARMYFORCONSULTATIONPD
BOMBARDMENTOFCOEREGIDORAHDAPPROACHESTHERETOFROMSUBICBAYWILLBE
RESTRICTEDDURINGPERIODNAUGHTSIXONEEIGHTNOUGHTNOUGHTITEMAND
NAUGHTEIGHTONESIXNAUGHTNAUGHT ITEMFORTHEPURPOSESOFGROUND
RECONNAISSANCE CMAEXCEPTASSPECIFICALLYARRANGEDWITHSIXTHARMY
TOO:O5O51SZ
TOR: 0519151
MSGCENNR 588
OR10NRCITECAXFITSNOUGHTTHREEEIGHTFOUR fallT
NOAUTHENTICATION
FROM: ADVANGHQ,SGDMACARTHUR
TO: CGSIXTHARMYCKAEIGHTHARMYCMAADVICHCMAAPOTOURSIXIIQHT
BOTHACTION
INFO: CGEIGHTHARMYCMACOMMANDER ALLIEDNAVALFORCESCMACOMMANDER ALLIED
AIRFORCESCMACOTHREENOUGHTEIGHTHBOMBWINGCMACGUSATFECMACO
USASOSCMAGHQLETTS
UBGXNT
EFFECTIVEUPONRECEIPTTHISRADIOTHEELEVENTHAlRBORNSDIVISIONREENTORCED
ISRELIEVEDFROMASSIGNMENTTOEIGHTHANDASSIGNEDTOSIXTHARMYPDTHE
COMMANDING GENERALEIGHTHARMYISRELIEVEDOFANDTHECOMMANDING GENERAL
SIXTHARMYISCHARGEDWITHLOGISTICSUPPORTATANDFORWARD001BEACHHEADS
PD COMMANDING GENERALEIGHTHARMYWILLREMAINRESPONSIBLEFORLOGISTIC
SUPPORTFROMREARBASESTOTHEBEACHHEADSANDRETURNPD THX COMMANDING
GENERALSSIXTHANDEIGHTHARMIESWILLARRANGETHEDETAILS07BEL1ST
INCLUDINGTHETRANSFEROFCONTROLANDDIRECTIONOFTH0S1TILIPIIOFORCES
OFBATANGASANDTAYABASPROVINCESNOWUNDER1IGHTHARMYPD OOMMANDERS
ALLIEDNAVALFORCESANDAIRFORCXSANDCOMMANDING GENERALUSASOSWILL
CONTINUEPRESENTMISSIONSINSUPPORTOFTHKHIKESIIOPERATION
TOO: O91U25Z
TOR: 100811+1
MSG CEN NH 705
OBIG MSG CEN NR NONE KHYF
NO AUTIiENTICATION CITE X10011
ACTION CO SIXTH ARMY COM EIGHTH ARMY CANF. TOLQSA AM) HOLLANDIA. COM
AAF. TOLOSA.
INFO: ADVANCE ECHELON GHQ SWPA.
FROM: GHQ
BOUNDARY ESTABLISHING AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY. ELANDS IN SAN BERNARDINO
STRAITS DASH TICAO ISLAND. BURIAS AND DASH MARINDUQUE ISLAND DASH VERDE
ISLAND. ALL TO EIGHTH DASH MARICABAR ISLAND. TO SIXTH ARMY . DASH LUBAND
AID ADJACENT ISLANDS. TO EIGHTH ARMY. AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE
AND AS ARRANGED WITH CANF THE CG EIGHTH ARMY WILL RECONNOITER AND ESTABLISH
CCNTFOL OVER ISLANDS IN ITS AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY AS REQUIRED TO SECURE
THE SAT: BERNARDINO DASH VERDE ISLAND .ATER ROUTE SIXTH ARMY AT THE EARLIEST
PRACTICABLE DATE AFTER THE CAPTURE OF IKE MAMILA AREA. WILL CONDUCT 0V
T
=3?LAND
AND MINOR CVERWATSR OPERATIONS AS ARRANGED WITH THE CANF TO ESTABLISH CONTROL
OVER REQUIRED OBJECTIVES TO SECURE THE SAN BERNARDINO DASH VERDE ISLAND
WATER ROUTE. PRIMARY OBJECTIVES. THE SOUTHERN BOCCLO AND BATANGAS AREAS.
CANF WELL CONDUCT MINOR NAVAL OPERATIONS TO ASSIST SIXTH AND EIGHTH ARMIES
IN ACCOMPLISHMEOT OF ASSIGNED MISSIONS. SWEEP AND CLEAR THE SAN BERNARDINO
DASH VERDE ISLAND WATER RCUTES AND ESTABLISH THE REQUIRED NAVICATICNAL
INSTALLATIONS THEREIN IN CRDER TO CPEN FOR MOVEMENT CF SHIPPING AT THE
EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE. COMMANDER ALLIED AIR FORCES WILL SUPPORT THE
ABOVE OPERATIONS AS ARRANGED WITH THE CCM.'JUDING GENERALS SIXTH AND EIGHTH
ARMIES AND CANF. REFERENCE IS LETTER ADVANCE ECHELON THIS HEADQUARTERS DATED
FIVE FEBRUARY ONE NINE FOUR FI VE. . SUBJECT COURSE CF LUZON CAMPAICK. CITE
XRAY ONE XERO XERO ONE 01 ."2. MISSIONS JET FORTH THEREIN TC CLEAR THE EXITS
OF SAN BERNARDINO STRAITS AND VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE ARE EXTENDED TC INCLUDE
ESTABLISHING CONTROL OF ISLANDS ALONG THE SAN BERNARDINC DASH VERDE ISLAND
STEAMER CCURSE TC DEVELOP A SHORT ROUTE OF SUPPLY THROUGH THE VISAYAS AT THE
EARLIEoT PRACTICABLE DATE.
TOO: 101343 Z
TOR1 111107 I
MSOCXNIR366O
CITEHUMBJffiCHARLIEDASHONETOURTHREESXYEITOUR
FROM: OHQSWPA
TO lCOSIXTHARMY
THELOWLEVELOTWATERINRESERVOIRNOWHELDBYOTBTORCXSHAS
NECESSITATEDCUTTINGDAILYCONSUMPTIONIIKAIILATOCHIHALFAID
DEPRIVIIGSOUTHSIDEOTRITEROTAIYCITYWATEREXCEPTWHATIS
CARRIEDIITANKSPDREDUCTIONH WATERSUPPLYOTMANILATORAH
INDETERMINATEPERIODCONSTITUTESVERYSERIOUSHAZARDTOHEALTH
OTTHEPOPULATIONANDOTAMERICAN TROOPSWITHINCITYPDMAIYOT
INHABITANTSAREDRIVENAGAINTODRIHKIIOSEWAGECONTAMINATEDWATER
TROMSHALLOTWELLSBECAUSEOTDISTANCEATWHICHTHEYLIVEFROM
WATERPOIITSPDTHEREISINSUFFICIENTWATERTORADEQUATE CLEAHLUESS
IIRESTAURANTSAHDRESULTANTRETURNTOTHEIRTILTHYSTATEOFMONTH
AGOMAY1EXPECTEDPDALREADYMANYFLUSHTOILETSARECLOOOEDWITH
FECISANDANINCREASEINUSXOTGUTTERSCMAISTUARIISAIDVACANT
LOTSTORDEFECATIONISIHTITABLIPDIISUMMARY CMAWATER SHORTAGE
ISBRINGINGACKDAIOEROTEPIDIMICOTXNTXRIODISEASETROMWHICH
CITYWASAPPARENTLYESCAPINGPDOUTBREAKOTREALMAGNITUDEMIGHT
WILLPROVEGREATMILITARYDISASTERPDTHISSITUATIONWILLEXHE-
114
HE>in>ASSOOHASiHJiHISIEVOIfiIIT H BMOHTALBAHASIAISSKUHIDPS
(3) Assist Is training SIXTHUSAny units for future
WHATISTOUEBSTDUT1ASTBJT I MWRJHTHISWILLBIACCOHPLISHIDQUIET
operations by uti l i si ng SIXTHUSAmy units in actual
SOSHACARTHUR
TOO: 191315Z
TOR: 1922551
OfficeofOrigin < M Section
Date 21April
I n f o :
C/S.Qw?. Q-U
TO:
GHO.AFPAC,APO500
QPIRAIIOHAL PRIORITY
TOURHDMBJa CHARLIIDASHOKKJOURTHRU SITESJOURRHTIRSTORESERVOIR
IHMOBTALBAN AREAPSQUIRTDOTOUMIANIPODAM
KRUEGER
COSIXTHARMY
MSG era I R1+150
CITI HR CHARLII QH TOUR FIVI TWO (SHY?)
FROM: OHO.SWPA
TO : CO SIXTH ARMY
YOUR WILLIAM GIORGI OHB THRU NAUOHT THH1I TWISTY FIRST PD
CAPTURI OP IPO DiM WOULD PROYIDI DIFIffl TITl SOLUTIOH TOR
MANILA WAMR SUPPLY PROBLIM AHD I S HIGHLY PREFERABLI AS OBJ1CTIV1
SOD MACARTHUR
TOO: 22O535Z
TOR: 2215301
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AHKA
APO 500
31 May1945
OPERATIONS IIETHDCTIONS )
t
NUMBER 1O6 )
1 For diapoition of hostile and friendly forces, see current
Situation Reports, orders of Battle and Intelligence Sunmaries.
2. Sotrtlxwaat Pacific Forces in LUZONarea of PHUJPHNBISLANDS
will be regrouped in preparation for future operations.
3# a* The CommandingGeneral KIQHTHUSArmy willi
(1) Bffectire 0001/1. 1 J^y 1945t control of SIXTH
USArmyunits in LUZONas listed in Annex No 1,
Tentatire Troop Li st.
(2) Concurrently with the aaaunption of control of units
l i sted in Amex No 1, reliere the SIXTHUS Amy of
combat responaibility and of other datiea and missions
in LUZONexcept those which pertain directly to the
preparation of th SIXTHUS Amy far future oparatione.
combat as requested by and as arranged with the
Coananding General SIXTHUS Any,
(4) Release to the SIXTHUSAmy at the earliest practicable
date consistent with the tacti cal and l i gl st i cal
situation in LUZONthose units under EIGHTHUSAmy
oontrol that are designated to participate i n future
operations under SIXTH USArmy. All such units will be
released not later than 1 September 1945. Units to be
released wi l l be reported to this headquarters at least
one week prior to date of their arai l abi l i ty.
b. The commanding General SIXTHUSArmy willi
(1) Sffectire 0001/1. 1 July 1945, pass to the control of
the Commanding General EIGHTHUSArmy units as l i sted
i n Amex No 1, Tentative Troop Li st.
(2) Concurrently with the passage of control of units indicated
in paragraph 3b(l) transfer to Commanding, general EIGHTH
USArmy the mission of combat responsibility and other
duties and missions in LUi,OK other than those t.at pertain
directly to the preparation of the ÎyCTii UsnXciy for future
operations.
(3) Pass to the operational control of the b'IGjiTK (Jb Army such
additional forces aa are required to couvlcte the destruct-
ion of the Japanese, to proviae security -iid to control
r+iilippine iirmy "fid guerri l l a force* in ureat. ~>s aoreed
upon from ti..je to tirae v,it.i the Co;nmnuinu jfc-^trc.l iUKili
UoArmy. Units '..ill be rotated ai, arranged wit., the
Conrnandin^ General ZJCHTA Ui Army in order to insure t rai n-
ing in actual combat and rehabilitation for future or'fcr^tions.
(4) Prior to the transfer of combat responsibility to the
EIGHTH UoArm>i
(a) Continue the destruction of Japanese Forces in central
and southern LUi,OWand provide for trie security of
these areas.
(b) Continue the offensive in northern LU^Gi;, in the
direction BALETE pAo^--/ii
j
,J-iriI -nd de-troy hostile
forces in and establish control over tue CJIUA/.^.
VALLSI.
x. (1) The Conmandinu, Generals ^LCTH tnd iilGiiTH Lb<urr:J.e- ./ill
arran&e necessary details of transfer of coiou-und and
duties and will insure continuity of operations.
(2) The Commanders AiXIiiD :UVivL anu nJB Forces, upon txaiii-i^r
-f control in the LUZONarea from the _,I,CE: to xhe hiy.'.TH
tt> iirmy, .will continue missions in jupport of the j-Ijiirii
lib jirmy hitherto specified for support of the oLCTHLb
Army in the LUZOi.
1
area.
4 ose Annex i\O2 - Logistics.
5' -J
e
Annex J\jo 3 - Communications.
By command of general ^..
Li eut enant Geuerel t U.
Chief of St af f
OFFICIAL1
/s/ ''i.E.Chambers
for o.J.CiLU.SiixLi:.",
General,G.^.C.
ChiefofStaff,G-3.
( omi t t ed)
(Operati ons Inst ruct i ons 107/ 1t o 107/ 9 omitted)
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
APO 500
1 June1945
OPERATIONS INSTRUCTI0N3 )
NUMBER 107 )
1. For disposition of hostile and friendly forces see current
Intelligence Summaries, Situation Reports and Orders of Battle.
2. Southwest Pacific Forces in the southern PHILIPPINES will be
regrouped i n preparation for future operations.
3. a. The commanding General EIGHTHUSArmy willi
(1) Bffecti-ro 0001/11 1 J^y
1
945t P*S6 to the control of
Commanding General SIXTHUSArmy, units of theEIGHTH
USArmy as l i sted in Annex No 1 - Tentatire Troop Li st.
115
(2) Concentrate units instaging areas and pass control of
units tothe Commanding Qeneral SIXTHUSArmy upon (c) Relieve the Commanding General EIGHTHUSArmy of
arrival thereat asindicated in Annex No2- Troop responsibility for the operation of such EIGHTH US
Movement Directive No 213. Army supply points, including those atILOILO and
ZAMBOANGA,asare required for the l ogi sti c support
(3) Arrange for transportation toeffect the concentration of SIXTHUSArmy Forces inthe VXSAYAS and southern
indicated inparagraph 3a(2) with CommanderALLIED PHILIPPINE. Assume l ogi sti c support for the other
NAVALJbroes. units being served by supply points transferred from
the EIGHTHtothe SIXTH USArmy*
(4) Continue present missions and duties inthe southern
PHILIPPINES with forces assigned and with forces made
available by the Commanding Qeneral SIXTHUSArmy (see
par 3M3)).
(5) Assist intraining SIXTH IDS Arny units for future
operations by utilizing these units in actual combat
as requested by and asarranged with the Commanding
General SIXTHUSArmy.
(6) Release tothe Conmanding General SIXTHUSAxmyatthe
earliest practicable date consistent with the tactical
and logistical situation and not later than 1September
V)k5t al lunits made available by the SIXTH OSArmy for
canbat and security missions inthe southern PHILIPPINES
(see par 3b(3)).
b. The CommandingGeneral SIXTHUSArmy willi
(1) Bffeotive OOOl/l, 1July 1945, assume oontrol of EIGHTH
USArmyunits aslisted inAnnex No1- Tentative Troop
List.
(2) Assume control ofEIGHTHUSArmyunits asindicatedin
Annex No2- Troop Movement Directive No 213, effective
upon arrival of these units instaging areas.
(3) pass tothe operational oontrol ofEIGHTHUSAray such
forces asare required tocomplete the destructionof
the Japanese and provide security inthe southern
PHILIPPINE inareas asagreed frcn time totime with
the Qnmmanfling General EIGHTH03 Army. Units willbe
rota.ted asarranged with the Commanding GeneralEIGHTH
USAmy inorder toInsure training inactual combat and
rehabilitation for future operations*
(4) prepare and train SIXTHUSAmy units lathe southern
PHILIPPINES for future operations.
c. The commander AT.T.T|JT>NAVAL forces will
(
(1) provide the necessary transportation toeffect the
concentration designated inparagraph 3a(2) asarranged
with the commanding General EIGHTHU3Amy* See Annex
No2- Troop Movement Directive No213.
x. (1) The Cornnandlng Generals SIXTHand EIGHTHUSArmies will
arrange the necessary details of transfer ofunits and
will Insure the continuity ofoperations*
(2) The commanders AIJ-TFPNATALand AIR Forces will continue
the support ofoperations of the EIGHTHU3Army In the
southern PHILIPPINES*
it* a. Supply.
(1) The Commanding General EIGHTHUSArmy willi
(a) Transfer responsibility for l ogi sti c support ofthose
units listed In AnnexNo1- Tentative Troop List,
and AnnexNo2- Troop Movement Directive No213*
at such time asthese units pass tothe controlof
the commanding General SIXTHUSAray*
(b) Assure responslblity for logistic support for
those SIXTHUS Army units made available by the
Commanding General SIXTHUSArmy, fortraining,
ecmbat and security missions inthe southern
PHILIPPINES (see par 3a(4). 3a(5) and 3a(6)).
(o) Transfer on dates asarranged with the Commanding
General SIXTHUSArmy such EIGHTHUS Army supply
points (railheads, truokheada, and navigationheads)
including those atILOILO and ZAMBOANGA, as
required for the logistic support ofSIXTH US
Army Forces inthe 7ISATAS and southernPHILIP*
PINES.
(d) Arrange with the Comanding General SIXTHUSAnny
for the provision of supplies atSIXTHIBArmy
supply points for units referred to insub-
paragraph 4a(l)(b) above, i f required.
(2) The Commanding General SIXTH USAmy willi
(a) Assume responsiblity for the logistic supportof
those units passing tohis oontrol asspecified i n
Annex No1- Tentative Troop Llt, and Annex No2-
Troop Movement Directive, on dates of transfer.
(b) Relinquish responsiblity for logistic supportto
the Commanding General EIGHTHUSArmy for those
SIXTHUSArmy units made available totheEIGHTH
USArmy for training, combat and security missions
in the southern PHILIPPINES during the period of
such utilization.
(d) Provide supplies atSIXTHUSArmy supply pointsas
requested by the Conmanding General EIGHTHUS Army
for SIXTHUSArmy units referred toinsub-paragraph
Ua(2)(b) above.
(e) Be responsible for the rehabilitation and re-equipping
of till JUI' II U>*rmy units including those unite uvail-
able to the EIGHTH IL.j*rmy for training, combat and
security missions.
b. miscellaneous
The Commanding Generals _iLXT;; and r,Lj.'T;' U'JrtX.uieawill
arrange the details for transfer of l ogi st i c and canatructi-,.i
I'feSiXDnsibiliti.a with a vi> ..' to ef'i'tctiiiw SUCH transfers,
with a iuiniuu/n of uislocation jnu to insure olie wiinterrupted
supply und support of al l troopa ut al l tirnto.
( 2) xixcept us modified ubove, the proviiionb of Cijerutioi.- Instruc-
; n
d tions KO 7kt 8li ->
2
i -
i
9 91 93 94 - 97 at> a;/jtnded, t.11
pertaining to operations in tiit VLJ/IYIVJ anu southern xrili--
, reiuain In effect.
5 a. The SLOT, and EIGHTH UUArmies -while continuing in operation
the signal canmunication faci l i t i es required for the accomplishment of ^resu
missions will)
(1) Mutually arrange for the provision of t..e signal caiiuun-
ication faci l i t i es require^ to accomplish the ta&K&
assigned in paragraphs 3 and 4 of these Operations
Instructions.
(2) Insure taut, aurin^ the transfer of unitt;, the continuity
of signal communications is ,.iaiiituineu.
b. The A'-'-TF-D blnM.iL and AIR Forces -..h^le continuing in operation
the signal communication faci l i t i es required for the accomjJ.iani.ient of ^resen
missions vai l , in cooperation with the ZlîlCiiIk. AiW anu oi,CP.; li> *!>&,
insure the provision of signal coiEiunicution faci l i t i ea required for co-
operative -iction in the accoraplishi'ient of missions assiyieu in para-î'aph
3c and 3x(2) of these Operations Instructions.
By command of General to
Lieutenant General, U.o. Army,
Chief of
/ s / ,1. E. CIlAU3Eli>,
for b. J. CHui.îBLIl.,
,V,ajor General, G.~.C,
jsat. Chief of Staff, G->
(Ai<i.E<Ji> omitted)
(Operations Instructions 107/1 to 107/9 omitted)
116
Directives
SI XTH ARMY
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY
A. P. O. 1*1+2
2300120NovemberI5IA
FO 34
Maps:
AeronauticalCharts,LUZON- 1:1,000,000.
CoastandGeodetic Survey,LUZON-1:200*000.
1. a.
Oftheestimatedl6l,000troopsnowdisposedthroughoutLUZON
101,000areprobablymobile combat troopsandtheremainder'
basedefenseand servicetroops. Principalidentified combat
unitsare the8thDivision,the2ndArmoredDivision the
newlyactlvoted 103dand105thDivisions,andprobablythe58th
and61st Independent MixedBrigadesandthe26th Independent
InfantryRegiment. Itisprobablethattheenemywillexpand
theabovementioned Independent mixedbrigadestodivisionsby
theabsorptionofmiscellaneous smallcombet and serviceunits
InCENTRALLUZON, defined onthenortheastbyaline runnSJ
fromSANFERNANDO (LAUNION)toBALERBAYand onthesouthbya
linerunningfromMANILABAYeast andwest throughCAVITE (CITY)
thereareanestimated 77,000troops,ofwhich1+7,000arefirst'
linecombat troops. Theremainingarebasedefenseandservice
troops,butmanyofthesewillprobablybeused inacombat cap-
acity. Itisbelievedprobable thatatleact onenewdivision
hasmovedintothisareatoreplacetherecently departed26th
Division. The2dArmoredDivisionhasbeenlocated Inthisarea
withanapparent minimumof300tanksofalltypes. Onthenorth
flank, disposed intheremainingportionofNORTHERNLUZON, there
areanestimated 37,500troops,ofwhich23,000arereportedto
becombat troopsofthe103dDivisionwithheadquartereatTUGUK-
GARAO, anunidentifieddivisionintheSANFERNANDO (LAUNION)
areaandanunidentified independentmixedbrigadeintheVIGAN
area. Thereareanestimated31,000troops,ofwhich21,000
areprobably combat troopsontheBATANGASPENINSULAwhere the
8thandaprobableadditionalunidentifieddivisionare located.
Ofthe15,500troopsIntheBICOLPENINSULA,probably10,000are
ofthe105thDivisionknowntobelocatedthere. Principalcon-
centrationsareatLEGASPI,NAGA, PARACALE andATIMONAN. Itis
believedthat thereisatleastoneadditionalunidentified div-
isionwhichhasrecentlyarrived inLUZON, andthat thereis
everyprobability thatatleast twomoremayarrivepriorto
S-Day,andthat thepreponderance ofenemy strengthwillbeIn
theCENTRALLUZONarea. Itisbelievedthat thereareatleast
twodivisionsnowdisposedintheimmediateIHGAYEN GULFarea.
It islikelythatamobilestrikingforceofdivisionstrength
willbeheldalongthegeneral lineCAMILING-ROSALES,andit
appearslogicalthat theenemywillhaveadditionalstrongmob-
ileforcesInthevicinityofCABANATUAN (NUEVAECIJA)andSAN
FZRNANDO (PAMPANGA). Theenemyhasanundeterminednumberof
long-range coast defensegunsoneithersideofLINGAYENGULF,
locatedgenerally onCAPSBOLINAO-SANTIAGO ISLANDandbetween
MABILAOandARINGAY,withstrongfortifications runningfrom
SUALtoSANFABIAN. LINGAYM GULFisreportedtobemined.
DuetorepeatedAlliedcarrier-basedairattacks,theestimated
enemyairstrengthinthePHILIPPINES&of8Novemberwasre-
ducedtoanominalfigure ofl6ofightersand170bombers. The
enemygiveseveryindicationthathewillmakeanall-outaerial
defenseandhasthecapabilityofgreatlyincreasinghisair
strengthbystaging InplanesfromCHINA,FORMOSAandtheEMPIRE
andbyshore-basingthecomplements ofaircraft carriers. How-
ever,theimminent threattotheEMPIRE,posedbyourFleet,may
actasapowerfuldeterrent toalarge-scale aerialreinforcement
ofLUZON. TheJapanesefleetmaybeexpectedtoofferasub-
stantialtnreat toonr convoys,eventothepoint ofriskinga
large-scalenavalengagement.
b. (l) ForcesoftheSouthwestPacific, coveredandsupportedbythe
~ ThirdFleet, the20thand14thAirForces,willcontinuethe
offensivetoreoccupythePHILIPPINESbysellingabeachhead
inLINGAYEN GULF,destroyinghostileforces,andreoccupylng
theCENTRALPLAINS-MANILAarea;willcontinueoperations
tocoiimletetheconquest ofLUZOM,allforthepurpoteofes-
tablishingbasestosupportfutureoperationsandtore-es-
tablishthePHILIPPINEgovernment.
(2) Missionsassigned supportingforceebyGHQ,SWPA: Annex2.
2. a,. SixthArmy, supported oyAllied"avalandAirForc:
(1) Will byoverwateroperations, seiieandoccupybeachheadsin
theLIHGAYEN-DAMORTIS -SANFERNANDO (LAUNION)areasas
arerequiredtoinitiateandinsureuninterrupted navaland
airoperations insupport ofthecontinuedoffensivetoseize
theCENTRALPLAINS-MANILA area.
(2) Will seizetheCENTRALPLAINS-"MANILA areabyoverlandoper-
ationstothe southward.
(3) Willprepare toconductsuchoperationsasmayberequiredto
completethedestructionofhostileforcesandtheoccupa-
tionofLUZON.
W Willoccupyanddefendeltesforradarandair
and
lationsasarrangedwiththeCommanders,Allied
AirForces.
(5) Willassumecontrolofanddirect theoperationsofFILIPINO
Forces inLUZON.
(b) Win establishfacilitiesforminornavaloperationsatthe
earliestpracticabledate intheLINGAYENarea,LUZON,as
arrangedwiththeCommander,AlliedNavalForces;andbe
prepared toinitiatetheestablishment ofnaval,airand
logisticbasesaerequiredtosupportsubsequent operations
tocompletethedestructionofJapaneseForcesinthePHILIP-
PINESandtosupportfutureoperationstothenorthandeast
ofthePHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO.
b_. PhasesoftheOperation:
(1) PhaseI:
Anamphibious assaulttoseizeandconsolidatebeachheadsin
theLINGAYEN-DAMORTISareaofLINGAYENGULF,andtoinitiate
theestablishment ofairandbasefacilities therein.
(2) PhaseII:
AnattacktodestroyallhostileforcesnorthoftheAGNORIVER,
andtoseizeandsecurecrossingsoftheAGNORIVER.
(3) PhaseIII:
ThedestructionofhostileforceeintheCENTBALPLAINSarea;
thecontinuationoftheattacktocapture MANILA.
S-Day 20Decemberl^k (TargetDate)
H-Hour Tobeannounced
d_. Troopsdesignatedfortheoperation:
(l) Units:
(a) ArmyTroops:
UnitsandStaging: Annex3a.
(b) ICorps,reinforced:
1^ Commander: MajorGeneralInnisP.Swift,U.S.A.
2. UnitsandStaging: AnnexJb.
(c) XIVCorps,reinforced:
1. Commander: MajorGeneral0.W.Grlswold, U.S.A.
g. UnitsandStaging: Annex3>
(d) 11thAirborneDivision, reinforced:
\. Commander: MajorGeneralJosephM.Swing,U.S.A.
2. UnitsandStaging: Annex3d.
(e) 158thInfantryRCT,reinforced:
!_.Commander: BrigadierGeneralHanfordMacNlder,U.S.A.
2. UnitsandStaging: Annex3e_.
(f) 13thArmoredGroup:
^1. Commander: tobedesignated.
g. Unit6andStaging: Annex3f.
(g) SixthArmyService Command:
. Commander: MajorGeneralHughJ.Casey,U.S.A.
2. UnitsandStaging
1
Annex3.
(h) NavalService Command:
1. Commander: CaptainRobertE.Webb,U.S.N.
j>. UniteandStaging: Annex3h.
(l) SixthArmyReserve:
25thDivision,afloat.
(j) Command ofunitsdesignatedinthisorderasSixthArmy,
Corps,Division,separateRCT,orSixthArmyService
Commandunits,whicharenotalreadyapartofthese
commands,willpasstorespectiveCommanders effective
thisdate,oruponarrivalofeachunit inItsfinal
stagingarea,Ifarrivalthereat issubsequent tothe
dateofthisorder. Commanderswillbenotified,by
separatecommunication, ofdatesofarrivalofunits
instagingareas.
3. Annexk.OperationsMap.
117
a. I Corps, reinforced!
(1) Will, on S-Day at H-Hour, land in the DAQUPAN- MABILAOarea
with divisions abreeet, will attack vigorously to destroy
hostile forces encountered, and will seize and secure the
Army beachhead within the I Corps zone of action.
(2) Will seize and hold the DAGUPANbridge until relieved by ele-
ments of the XIV Corps.
(3) Win be prepared tc seize and secure crossings of theAGNC
RIVER within the I Corps zone of action.
(4) Will establish and maintain contact with tne 158th RCTand
with the XIV Corps.
(5) Will protect the left flank of Sixth Army,
b. XIV CorpB, reinforced:
(1) Will, on S-Day at H-Hour, land in the LIN&AYEN area with div-
isions abreast; will attack vigorously to destroy hostile
forces encountered, and will seize and Becure the Armybeach-
head within the XIV Corps zone of action.
(2) Will be prepared to seize and secure crossings of the AGNO RIVER
within*the XIV Corps zone of action south of the Army beach-
head.
(3) Will establish and maintain contact with I Corps.
(k) Will protect the right flank of Sixth Army.
. 25*h Division, reinforced!
In Sixth ArmyReserve, initially afloat, will be prepared:
(1) T
o
reinforce either the I or XIV Corps in the LINGAYEN GUU
area with:
(a) 1 RCT on S / 2.
(b) Reminder of division by S / U.
(2) To reinforce the 158th RCT in i ts i ni ti al objective area with
1RCT.
(3) TolandintheDAGUPAN-MAVILAOarea,commencingonS/2and
tomovetoanassemblyareainthegeneralBINALOKANarea.
&. 11thAirborneDivision,reinforced:
(1) Willbeprepared,onorafter1January1945,toundertakeone
ofthefollowingwhendirected:
(a) Toseizebyanairborneoperation,inconjunctionwith
grousiforces,anyoftnesubjoinedobjectives:
1. SANJOSS
2. CABANATUAN
3. TARLAC
k. CLARKFI2LD
. MALOLOS
6. DINALUPIHAN-KU1IS
(t) Tomovebyairtransportation,or,ifnecessarybywater
transportation,totheLIBGAY3NGUI?area.
. 158thRCT,reinforced:
(1) Will,onS/2at atimetoT>announced, landnorthofMABILAO,
withinthetoneofactionofICorps,willpassthroughthe
northflankoftheICorpsbeachhead,attacknorth,andcap-
tureRABON.
(2) Willblocktheadvanceofhostileforcesfromthedirectionof
SANFERNANDO.
(3) WillestablishandmaintaincontactwithICorp*,
f. 13thArmoredGroup:
WilllandIntheDAGUPAN-HABILAOareacommencingonS/2and
willmovetoanassemblyareainthegeneralP0Z0HRUBIOarea,
preparedtolaunchanarmoredattackinthezoneofadvanceof
eitherCorps.
e. 6thRangerInfantryBattalion:
Will onS/1,landIntheDAGUFAUareaandassembleinthatarea
in'SixthArmyReserve.
h. SixthArmyServiceCommand:
(l) WilllandinaccordancewithLoadingandlandingSchedule,
Annex7b_.
12) WithinthelimitsoftheArmyServiceArea:
(a) Willpromptly Initiateessentialtopographicandhydro-
graphicsurveysandwillmakesuchadjustmentstopre-
liminaryplaneforthetemporarybase,docks,dumps,
roadnetandairdrome*asmayberequiredbythere-
sultsofthesesurveys.
(b) Willconductaggressiveandextensiveengineerreconnais-
andwillcoordinatethisreconnaissancewiththatbeing
conductedbytheIandXIVCorps.
(c) Willestablishair,andtemporaryportandbasefacilities
asdirected. (Annex8,Engineer).
(d) Will,whendirected:
1. Assumeresponsibilityfortheunloadingofallunits,
~ appliesandmaterialsarrivingintheobjectivearea.
. Disperse,store,andissuesuppliestogroundandair
units.
J. IncoordinationwithPCAU,recruit,allocate,supervise
andadminister civilianlabor.
(3) Willbepreparedtoincreasethescopeofconstructionoper-
ationsasandwhenthearmyserviceareaboundaryisad-
vanced.
(4) WillbepreparedtoassumeoperationalcontrolofsuchESB
unitsasmaybodesignated.
(5) Willinitiatetheestablishmentofairandlogisticfacilities
asdirectedforthesupportofsubsequent operationsagainst
JAPAN.
(b) Willbepreparedtotransferbnseoperationsandconstruction
missionstoUSASOScontrolwhendirected.
âvalServiceCommand: Annex8,Engineer,
SixthArmyTroops:
(1) Willlandintheobjectiveareaandwillmovetobivouacareas
inaccordancewithLoadingandLandingSchedule,SixthAray
Troops,Annex7&
an
dappendicesthereto.
(2) Missions:
(a) Signal: Annex5,Signal.
(b) Engineer: Annex8,Engineer.
(c) Medical: Annex3,toAdm016,Medical.
(d) W. Annex1,toAdm0IS,tyi.
(e) Ordnance: Annex 2, to Adra0 16, Ordnance.
(1) During the annhibious movement and landing, the Commander,
Naval Attack Force, is in control of al l anphibious oper-
ations. The Commander of each Naval Attack Group operating
under the control of the Coramander, Naval Attack Force, i s
in control in his area of operation. . Control of forces
ashore passes to:
(a) Each assault Division Commander after his arrival ashore
and upon hie notification, by the mo6t prompt me/inn at
his disposal, to the Commander of his supporting Naval
Attack Group that he i s ready to assume command of hiB
forces aehore. Each assault Division Commander will
promptly notify his Corps Commander of the time he as-
sumes command of his forces ashore.
(b) Each Corps Conmnnder and the Commanding General, 158th ?.CI,
in his respective area of operations, after his arrival
aehore ani upon his notification, by the most prompt
means at his disposal, to the Commander of his supporting
Naval Attack Group that he is ready to assume command
of his forces ashore. The Commanding General, 158thRCT,
will promptly notify the Commanding General, Sixth Aray,
of the time he assumes conaand of his forces ashore.
Each Corps Commander will promptly inform the Commanding
General, Sixth Army:
1. The time each of his Division Commanders assumes coa-
mand of hie forces ashore.
. The time he, himself, assumes command of his forces
aahore.
(c) The Commanding General, Sixth Army, upon his announcement
to the Commander, Naval Attack Force, that he is ready
to asaume command of his forces ashore.
(2) Commanders, who have assumed command of their forces ashore
will continue under the control of the Commander, Naval Attack
Force, until the next senior Army commander assumes command
ashore.
(3) The Commanding General, Sixth Army:
(a) Will arrange for the movement of al l units to final stag-
ing area.
(b) Win arrange overwater transportation to objective areas
for the movement of Allied Air Foroe unita, exoept
those accompanying assault forces, as designated by the
Commander, Allied Air Force. (Annex 6f_, and 7c).
(c) Will arrange overwater transportation to objective areas
for naval service units as designated by the Commander,
Allied Saval Forces. (Annex 6f_ and 7cj.
(&) Will coordinate with the Commander, Naval Attack Force,
the plans for naval gunfire support and air support for
the landing operations and subsequent operations ashore
prior to the establishment of land-based aircraft In
the objective area.
sance,aspermittedbytheexistingtacticalsituation.
118
() Will coordinate with the Commander, Allied Airforce the
plans for air support after Und-based aircraft hare
Ten established In the objective area.
(4) In. Commanding Oeneral, 6Sth AAA Brigade, wi l l , when directed
be prepared to assume command of Antiaircraft Artillery re-
tained under the direct control of Sixth Armyandprovide a
coordinated antiaircraft defense of vi tal points and critical
areas and Installations In accordance with Annex 10 Anti-
aircraft Defense. '
(5) Corps Commanders, the Commandlnc Generals, 25th Diylslon, and
Sixth Army Service Command, andthe Commanding General lS8th
HCT, wi l l submit their plans to this headquarters onorbe-
fore 25 Horember 1944. These plans wi l l include the assign-
ment of shipping and loading and landing plans of al l units
either attached or assigned. '
(6) 'or coordination of land-based and naval aircraft in support of
the operation, see Standing Operating Procedure Instructions
o. 16/2, GH<1,SWPA, dated 26 September 1944.
(7) Whena hostile landing attack against one of our occupied areas
la Imminent or In progress the operational control of al l el e-
ments of the forces of the Southwest Pacific Area inthe
threatened area passes to the control of the local Ground
Force
c
ommander in order to obtain unified action.
(8) Corps andseparate unit commanders are responsible for the
supervision of loading of al l units assigned or attached to
their respective commands, except units In those areas for
which the Commanding General, Sixth Army, retains the re-
sponsibility of loading. (Annex 7 to Adm0 16, Transportation).
Wherever possible units andtheir equipment will be loaded
Intact.
(9) Commanders of al l echelons wi l l taka positive action to Insure
the safeguarding of captured storss andequipment against
pilfering and looting by members of our forces andby local
Inhabitants.
(10) Corps andseparate unit commanders wi l l inform nwiniiis of al l
echelons that one of the purposes of the PHILIPPINECampaign
i s to liberate the Tiliplnoe. Tothis end every effort com-
patible with the tactical situation wi l l be made to safeguard
the lives andproperty of the Filipino people.
(11) Corps and separate unit commanders will:
(a) Insure that units under their command do not fire on friendly
aircraft.
(0) Enforce passive defense measures, particularly dispersal
of ammunition andP.O.L. dumps.
4. Adm0.16.
5. a..SignalOrders > Annex5.
b. (1)CommandPosts
(a) SixthArmy: TAHADAI
OpensDAGUPAl-tobeannounced.
( b) I Corps : HOXLATOIA
OpensSABTABIAH-tobereported.
(e) XI
T
Corps< B0UQAIHVI1L1
OpensBAAT-tobereported.
(d) 158thHCT: H0SKF00B
OpensvicinityHABOH-tobereported.
(e) SixthArmySorvlceCommand: TACLOBAH
Subsequentlocation-
tobereported.
: LITTI
Subsequentlocation-
tobereported.
(f) 11th Airborne Division
: NOUMEA
Subsequentlocation-
(g) 25th Division
tobereported.
: LETTS
(h) HavalServiceCommand
Subsequentlocation-
to.bereported.
: LITTI
(l) 13thArmoredGroup
Subsequent location -
to be reported.
1 TANADAN
(J) 6thBangerInfBn
OpensDAOUPAH-tobereported.
(2) AxisofSignalCommunications:
( a ) S i x t h Army:
DAGUPAH - TAHLAC - SAN 7BRNAHD0 - MANILA.
( b) I Corps:
SAN FABIAH - HOSALES - CABAHATTJ1H - GAPAN.
(c) XIVCorps*
BAAT-.CAMILING-TAELAC-SANFERNANDO.
//WalterIrueger
WALTERKBUZaZR,
LieutenantGeneral,U.S.Army,
Commanding.
ANNEXESJ
1-Intelligence(ReproducedinVolumeIIIfollowingReportoftheAssist-
antChiefofStaff,G-2.
2-MissionsofSupportingForces.
3a-TroopList,SixthArmyTroops.
3b-TroopList,ICorps,reinforced.
3c-TroopList,XIVCorps,reinforced.
3d-TroopList,11thAirborneDivision,reinforced.
3e-TroopList,158thRCT,reinforced.
3f-TroopLlet,13thArmoredGroup.
3g-TroopLlt,SixthArmyServiceCommand.
3h-TroopList,NavalServiceCommand.
4-OperationsHap(SeeDiagram3,VolumeII).
5-Signal(ReproducedInVolumeIIIfollowingReportoftheSignalOfficer).
6a-AssignmentofShipping,SixthArmyTroope.
6t>-AssignmentofShipping,ICorps,reinforced.
6c-AssignmentofShipping,XIVCorps,reinforced.
%&-AssignmentofShipping,158thRCT,reinforced.
6e-AssignmentofShipping,SixthArmyServiceComnand.
6f-AssignmentofShipping,AirForceandNavalServiceCommand.
7a-LoadingandLandingSchedule,SixthArmyTroops.
7b-LoadingandLandingSchedule,SixthArmyServiceCommand.
7c-LoadingandLandingSchedule,AirForceandUavalServiceCommand.
8-Engineer(ReproducedInVolumeIVfollowingReportoftheEngineer).
9-FieldArtillery(ReproducedinVolumeIIIfollov;lngReportofthe
ArtilleryOfficer).
10-AntiaircraftDefense(ReproducedinVolumeIIIfollowingReportofthe
AntiaircraftOfficer).
11-ControlofFilipinoGuerrillaForces.
BXADqOASTXBSSIXTHASMT
A.P.0.442
2000117December1944
AMIBDKZNTNO.1toFO34,HeadquartersSixthArmy,20November1944.
FO34isamendedasfollows1
1. Change:
a.. Firstlineofparagraph2c_toread:
S-Day 9 January 19"*5 (Target Date)
b_. Second l i ne of paragraph 5b ( l ) (c) to read:
Opens SABISIDRO -
. Second l i ne of paragraph 5b (2) (c) to read:
SAK ISIDRO - CAMILISG - TARLAC - SAN FERNANDO
2. Del ete:
A . Paragraph 2d ( l ) ( d) .
b. Paragraph 3d.
. Paragraph5b(f).
ByconaaidofLieutenantGeneralKHUICER:
G. B. DECKS,
Brigadier General, 0. S. C.
Chief of Staff.
OFFICIAL:
0-3.
HEADQUARTERSSIXTHARM!
A.P.O.442
2300120November1944
ANBZX2toFO34,MissionsofSupportingForces.
1. ThefollowingmissionshavebeenassignedbyGeneralHeadquarters,SWPA,
inOperationsInstructionsNo.73,GiK},12October1944:
a,.TheCommandingGeneral,EighthUSArmy,whilecontinuingpresent
missions,will:
119
(1) Rel i eve the Si xth US Army of duti es and missions i n the LEXTE -
SAMAR area at a time l at er designated toy t hi s headquarters.
(2) Prepare to as s i s t the operations of the Sixth US Army toy ai r-
mounti ae the Ut h Airborne Di vi si on In LEYTE for offensi ve
operations i n the CENTRAL PLAINS area when ordered toy Gen-
eral Headquarters, Target Date 1 - 1 0 January 1945.
(3) Prepare to conduct operation Mike II when ordered toy t hi s head-
quarters, Target Date: 1 - 2 0 January 1945.
to. The Fi rst Australian Army wi l l :
Continue present mi ssi ons.
o. The Commander, Al l i ed Haval'Forces, while continuing present missions
wi l l :
(1) Transport and estatollsh landing forces ashore i n the LIHGAYEN
area, LUZON, as arranged with the Commanding General, Sixth
US Army; provide naval protecti on therefor.
12} Supporttheoperationtoy:
la) Providingairprotectionforconvoysandnavaltaskforces
anddirectairsupportforthelanding (including prelim-
inaryoperationsinLINGAYJSNGULP)andImmediatelyfollow-
ingoverlandoperations, supplementedasarrangedwith
theCommander,ThirdFleet,andtheCommander,AlliedAir
Forces.
(to) Transporting supportingtroopsandtheirsuppliesasre-
quiredtotheLINGAYJSA GULFareainnavalassaultship-
ping.
(c) InconjunctionwiththeAlliedAirForces,employing
carrier-basedairtodenymovementofanddestroy
hostilereservesmovingoverlandfromtheAPARRI,CEN-
TRALPLAINSandMANILA areastotheLINGAYENGULParea.
(3) Denythemovementofhostilenavalforces,reinforcementsand
suppliestotheLUZONareafromtneBORNEO-PALAWAN-west-
ernVISAYASarea,fromtheSINGAPORE-SAIGONareaandfrom
tneCHINAcoast-FOHMOSA-JAPANMainland area,inconjunc-
tionwithCommander,ThirdFleet,andtheCommander,Allied
AirForces.
(4) Establishattneearliestpracticable dateaseablockadeof
tneMANILASAXandSUBICBAYareas.
(5) Providesubmarine offensivereconnaissancealongprobable
routesofmovementofhostilenavalforcesandofwater-
bornereinforcementsandsupplies.
(0} Providelifeguardservicesasrequired.
(7) transfertotheCommander,AlliedAirForces,themissionof
directairsupportwhenland-basedfightersandlight bombers
areestablishedintheLINiiAiM area,atatimeasarranged
witntneCommander,AlliedAirForces.
(8} Escortandprotect shippingonth*linesofcommunication into
thenorthernPHILIPPINESARCHIPELAGO.
(9) Initiatemotortorpedoboat operationsInthdlEJOAYjfFGULFand
adjacentwatersoyS/2andestablishthereinnavalforces
requiredtosupportcurrentandfuture operations.
(10}PreparetoexecuteKikeIIOperationonsuosequent instructions
fromtnisheadquarters. TargetDate: 1 - 2 0January1945-
d. TheCommander,AlliedAirForces,whilecontinuingpresentmissions,
will:
{!) Supporttheoperationby:
(a) Providingaerialreconnaissanceandpnotographyasrequired.
ID} Continuingtnedestructionofhostileground,navaland
airforcesanddefensesintneLUZCllarea, intensifying
strikesduringtneperiodS-10tnrougnS-Dayincoor-
dinationwithThirdFleetOperationsinFORMOSA,tne
HYUKlUSareaandtheCHINAcoast,inordertoprotect
tnemovementofamphibiousforcestowardstneobjective
areas.
(c) Inconjunctionwithcarrler-DasedairoftneAlliedNaval
Forces,denyingthemovementofanddestroyinghostile
reservesmovingoverlandfromtneAPARRI,CENTRALPLAINS
andMANILA areastowardtneLING-Aii/Narea.
Id} -frovidlngprotectionofconveysandnavalforcesanddirect
supportofthelandingasrequestedoytneCommander,
AlliedNavalForces.
le) Assumingthemissionofdirectsupportofgroundoperations
intneLINGAYM areaandCENTRALLUZONattneearliest
practicable dsteaftertneestablishmentoffightersand
lignttoomoersintneLlflUAii*area,asarrangedwitntne
Commander,AlliedNavalForces,andtheCommandingGen-
eral, SixtnUSArmy.
(2) Continuetnedestructionofnostilenavalandairforcesand
snippingintnenortheasternBORNEO,SULUARCnlPiLAGO,MLSIDAiJAO,
i-ALAWAK, westernVISAlASandtneARAFORAandCJSLJCHJUSS)Aareas,
anddenythemovementofhostilenavalforces,reinforcements
andsuppliesintotneLU/.O.Narea.
(3) Continuethe'destructionofhostileinstallationsandsources
ofwarmaterialsintneeastern HETHJLRLAIIDSEASTiKDLaS.
(4) Establishandoperateradarandairwarningfacilitiesasre-
quiredintheLIHGAYXBareaandatarrangedwiththeCommand-
ingGeneral,SixthUSArmy.
(5) Transportthe11thAirDorneDivisionfromLElTStoItsobjective
areaincentralLUZONasarrangedwiththeEighthUSArmy,
protect landingoperationsandprovidedirectairsupport
foritssubsequent operations. TargetDate 1 - 1 0January
1945.
(to) EstablishairforcesintheLINGAYA2Jareainpriorityasdi-
rected.
(7) BepreparedtosupportandexecuteMikeIIOperationonsub-
sequent instructionsfromthisheadquarters. TargetDate!
1 - 2 0 January1945.
BycommandofLieutenantGeneralKRUEGER:
G. H. DECKER,
Brigadier General, G. S. C.
Chief of Staff.
OFFICIAL:
:
0-3-
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARKY
A. P. 0. 442
2000117December1944
AMEKDMENTfiO.1to
ANNEX2toFO34,Headquarters SixthArmy,20November1944.
Annex2toPO34isamendedasfollows:
1. Del ete:
a. Paragraph l a( 2) .
to. Paragraph l d( 5) .
2.
u
nder paragraph ld_ add the fol l owi ng:
(g) Block hos t i l e l i nes of communication in areas and at times
indicated:
(a) Before S-3 destroy highway 3 at the CLAVERIA, SANESTEBAN
and TAGUDIK def i l es .
(b) During the period S-5 through S-2 i ncl usi ve, cut the rai l
and highway systems running south from MANILA alonp
LAGUNA DEBAY.
(c) During the period S_5 through S-l :
1. Bl ock BALETE PASS.
2. Destroy the re.ilroad bridge 2. 6 miles east of CALAUAG.
(d) ê prepared to cut the r a i l and highway systems running
tiirough the PLARIDEL - CALOMPIT def i l e on l at er i n-
structi ons of t hi s headquarters or on request of Com-
manding General, Sixth US Army.
() Subsequent to S-Day, maintain the blockade of def i l es indicated
in paragraph Id (8) as required to deny thei r use to host i l e
f orces.
3. Add paragraph l e as fol l ows:
e.. Guerrilla Forces in LUZON conduct demolition and sabotage opera-
ti ons to destroy hos t i l e l i nes of communication i n LUZOH as
fol l ows:
( l ) During the period S-3 to S-Day operating under control of GHQ,
SWPA.
(a) Execute maximum demolitions a* sabotage to destroy cul -
vert s, wooden toridges and t res t l es on railroads and
main roads toetween the points l i s t e d toelow:
1. Road toetween LAOAG and TAGUDIH.
2. Road toetween BAGUIO and BONTOC.
J . Road between BAGABAG and BALETE PASS.
4. Road sout h from MANILA al ong e as t s i de of LAGUNA
DE BAY,
. Rai l road and road ietween TANAUAN andBAIANGAS.
j>. Rai l road and road between MANILA, LUCEMA aai LOPEZ.
X-
a
a l l r o a d between CALAUAG and RAGAY.
120
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY 34lst Ord Dep Co ig5 A
1
tape Aitape
A. P. 0.442 578th Ord AmCo igg
Altepo Aitapt
23001 20 November I9I+I+ 622d Ord Am Co igg
SariBaôr
3606th Ord Hvy Maint Co (Tic) ?10
Oro Bay - Hollaniic.
ANNEX 31t o FO34. Troop L l B t . I Cor p8 . r e i nf or c e d.
Alt&pe -
Hollpr.dia
COMBAT UNITS
Team 1, 3073d Ord Comp Co (AAA Maint) 11
Hollandia Eollanîa
Team 2, 3073d 0r d Comp Co (AAA Kaint) n Noemfoor Sander
Unit
Location Staging i,By Air)
107th OrdBomb Disp Sq 7
Hollandla Ait-_pe
Hq&HqCo,ICorps
Hollandia Hollandia Sao?-1ocr
Hq4HqBtry,ICorpsArty
108th OrdBomb Dlsp Sq 7
Holland!a Hollandia (B/ Air)
3bthMPCo
Hollandia Hollandia Hollandic
6thInfDiv 173d OrdBomb Dlsp Sq 7 Hollandia
Sansapor Saneapor
43dInfDiv
Aitape Aitape
826thAmphTrac B n(lessCoA) Quartermaster
MamiB Aitape
CoB,727thAmphTrac B n
Hollandia Sansapor Hollandia
Co C, 44th TankBn Hq &HqDet, 540th QMBn 17 Hollandia
Morotai Sansapor Sanse.por
7l 6t h Tank Bn ( l e s s 1Co)
Oro Bay Hollandia 558th QMRhdCo ( l ess 1 Pl at &1 Det) 80 Sansapor
Hollejidla
1 Co, 7l 6t h TkBn
Oro Bay Aitape
678th QMSalv Coll Co 188 USA
Hollandia
Hq &HqBt ry, 197th AAA Gp
Aitape Aitape
949th QMRhdCo 184 USA
Sansapor
lfalst AAAGun Bn
Aitape Aitape
3448th QMTrk Co 110 Sansanor
Toea
198th AAA AWBn ( l es s Btry A)
Sansapor Sansapor
3750th QMTrk Co 110 Toem
Aitape
222d AAA SLBn ( l e s s Bt rys A&B)
Aitape Aitape
3873d QMGns SupCo ( l ess 2d Pl at ) (4t hESB) 78 Aitape
Toem
470thAAAAWB n
Aitape Aitape
4072d QMServ Co 219 Toem
Sansapor
98thCmlBnMtz(lessDetEnHqCo, 4i8Sth QMServ Co 219 Sansapor
Biak
CoBandC)
Morotai Sansapor
1st Pl at , 601st QMGrRegCo ( l ess 2d Sec) 19 Biak
Sar.F.-ii or
Det,Hq&HqCo,CoB&C,98thCmlBnMt2
Hollandia Aitape
2d Pl at , 601st QMGr RegCo ( l ess 3d Sec) 19 Sansauor
Sansapor
Hq4HqCo,1136thEngr ConsGp
Leyte
L
eyte
Det, 198th QMGas SupCo 24 Sansapor
Aitr.pe
Aitape Aitape Aitape
533dEngrB&SRegtandDets Det, 198th QMGas SupCo 24 Aitape
543dEngrB&SRegtandDets(lessCoC) 2d Sec, 1st Pl at , 601st OMGr RegCo 7 Aitape
Aitape Sansapor Sansapor
CoC,BoatBn ,543dEngrB&SRegt
Finschhafen Biak 3d Sec, 2d Pl at , 601st QMGr RegCo 7 Aitepe
79thEngrCons B n
Hollandla Hollandia
180th QMLdry Pl at Hosp (Type 3) (atchd Biak
34othEngrConsBn
Morotai Morotai
92d Evac Hosp) 33 Biak
510thEngrLtPonCo
Biak Biak
181st QMLdry Pl at Hosp (Type B) (atchd Sansapor
671stEngrTopoCo
Leyte Leyte
29th Evac Hosp) 33 Sansaoor
55thFABn(155How)
Hollandia Hollandia 183d QMLdry Pl at Hoep (Type B) (atchd Toem -
l68thFABn(155Gun)
Hollandia Hollandia 54th Evac Hosp) 33 Toem - Hollandia
181stFABn(155
H
ow)
Aitape Aitape Holland U
289thFAObsnBn(lessBtry"A")
Hollandla Hollandia 236th QMLciry Pl at Bosp (Typo Ti) (at crd Hollandia
58thSir B n(lessCosA&C)
Hollandia Hollandia 43d Field Hosp) 33 USA (Dec)
PCAUnits#18,#19andif22
Oro Bay Oro Bay 26th QMWarDogPl at ( l ess det) 13 korot ai
Det, 26th QKWai'DogPl at 8 Biei>. /it ipe
TotalCombatUnits 42,252 1 Pl at , 3
u
2d Oj.;Depi\n> Cc '") Ait.-pe
SERVICE UNITS
CoA,52dSigBn 20?
CoA,60thSigBn 202 Noenlu
Unit gth Location Staging 293dJASCC Arm;/.373
Sansaoor
ansaoor
7'jtr. -'A.5CO
Leyte
192d Si gRader Mai nt Team (TypeA)
uni t 3, 5^th Cul CompCo 30 Toem Toem (atchd222dAAASL3n) Aitape Aitc-Tje
Unit 4, 94th Cml -capCo 30 Aitope Aitape 303dSigRadarMaintTeam (TypeD&C)
Unit 3, 24oth CEI CoiipCo 42 Toem Sansapor (atchdlSlstAAAGunBn) 4 Aitape Alt ape
TEFTeaa"
c
",989thSigServCo 26 Morotai Hollaniia
hr.pinecr
Transportation
^7<?d =gr
191 Hol l andi a Hollandia
W i s t -SngrioatMîxtCo
185 Aitape Aitape Hq&HqDet,506thPort Bn
Hollandia Rollandla
l462dEngr3oatMaintCo 191 Sansapor Sansapor 466thAmphTrkCo Aitfpe - Aitape -
1504thSngrWaterSupCo 136 Hollandia Hollfindla Sar.sapor Sans?.pcr
1420thSr.grMblSL:-.alntSec 3 Morotai Morotai 8O9thAmphTrkCo
Aitft-e Ait ape
244thPortCo(less1Plat)
AjT,cpe
Mr-Gleal 2$4thPortCo
Si.r.f apo
T
6l2thPortCo
A!., ape M.V -.pe
29t-.hRvc.c^csp(-'ICObed) 252 Sansapor Sansapor
613thPortCo
'lint ^.-^
&
54thIr.'j -cs-p(--00>.ei: 252 I Leir - Toom - fedPortCo
fiolLiiicixt
c2oEyacHos:--(400bed) 252 Biak i i ak litalServiceUnits
5thîeldHosp
211 Hol l andi a Hollandia
23d5leld Hosp 211 Saidor Hollandia TotalICorpsTroope
37thField Hosp
211 Toem Toem
U3dField Hosp
211 Hollandia Hollandl a Tobeeiiiply/edb;/ 2*W-
r
'iv.
6thFortSurgEosp 37
Hol l andi a Sansapor
Sansapor BycommandofWeatenaji'-Geuer: KKUi'G'.'R;
11thPortSurgHosp 37 Sansapor
15thPortSurgHoep 37 Sansapor Sansapor
55thPort SurgHosp 37 Finschhafen Aitape
G.E.DECKER,
Finschhafen Aitepe
56thPortSurgEosp 37
brigadierGjncrnl,G.S.C.
Finschhafen Aitape
:7thPortSurgHosp 37
ChiefofStaff.
Hollandia
clFtPort SurgHosp 37
Hollandia
Hollandia Hollandia OFFICIAL:
Hollandia Hollandia
62dPortSurgHosp 37
63dPortSurgHosp 37
Aitape Aitape 0-3.
Hq'4HQDet,70th"edBn(Sep) 29
105 Hollandia Hollandia
4O9th"KedCollCo
105 Sansapor Sansapor
105 Aitape Aitape
424thkedCollCo
505thl--edCollCo
USA Hollandia
569th--edAmbCo 93
117 Aitape
6o4thJ'edClrCo
Aitape
Sansapor Sansapor c
.CSth'--edClrCo 117
Biak Hollandia
"i'j^thiiedClrCo
117
T 4 Aitape Aitepe
Co i> _
J
?3'1''at'.S-(ESB)
1?4 Sansaoor Saneapor
CoC,'263dMedBn(ESB)
EXTRACT FROM
12 Lae Lae
10thMaiContlUnit
i 2 Sansar>or Sansapor
12thK.-J]ContlUnit
AMENDMENT NO. 1 t o
12 Aitape Alt-pe
53dMaiContlUnit
12 Sansapor Sansapor
l>letMnlContlUnit A1INEXES 3^, 3, 3d,and 3g,t o FO34, Headauar t er s Slx*n i -v,
12 Noumea Noumen
rrthHalContlUnit
12 Eol l andi a Hollandia
"iO':ti-K.ilContlUr.it
YYXXXXXXXX xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx
Saas.ipcr Ssjieapor
13
13
'fath I'.al Surv Unit
Nouuida Noumea
UC5ta MedConp Unit (M^.1Surv)
12 A.it/-r>e Aitape
1. Annex 32ito FO 34, Troon List, I ôcps, reinforce., :., attended as follows:
2d Mec Ccrp Unit (Mai Contl)
Aitppe Aitap3
13
!+02d Mt-dComp Unit (Mai Surv)
Unit -?.:i^-i_
?t
r^.u-
1
21 Ait'-p3 Aitape
15th MeaSupPl at (Avn)
a. Add:
35thCrjnlnaiInvestiâiir.g^ci :'
1/ Hollandia Hollandia
Kq &.HcDet,243dOrdBnConp N&valFireControlTeamsy\andf?
is<i
Sansanor SanEapor
4SthCrdMMCo 274thCnlServPlat (ISBSDat) 3<
19c
Finschxiafen Finachhafen
9^1thOrciHvyMaintCo(?A) 275thCmlServPlptH >-.?DeO y
Attar
Aitape Aitape
169
2S3thOrdMMCo
(b) Ixeeute aaxiana destruction of hosti l e taaps and signal
ooannlcatlons throughout LUZOI, oatIda of MANILA
City and other aajor town*.
(e) Wreck hostile troop trains and
>>l
f
tt
wgr convoys M feasi bl e.
(2) After S-Day execute similar alsslons as directed by Coaaandlng
Oeneral, 8IXTH 03 iBKT.
(3) To be prepared to execute maximum destruction and sabotage along
the following routes as later directed by OHQ, SVPA or Coand-
ing General, SUTH USABHT.
(a) Railroad and road between PLARIDXL anl CABASATUAI Includ-
ing railroad and road bridges at PLARISH.
(b) Railroad and road between MAHILAand SAI TSSOUMDO
(PAMPAIOA) including the railroad and road bridges
at GALUMPH.
By coaaand of Lieutenant General XRQEODt
0. E. ^
Brigadier Oeneral, 0. S. C ,
Chief of Staff.
OFFICIAL:
G-3-
HBADQjUARTIRS SIXTH AHMX
A. P. 0 . 442
2300120loveaber1944
3atoFO34,TroopLlat,SixthAnyTroops. (CorrectedCopy)
COMBATUHITS
Unit Strength Location Staging
aq &iiq Co Sixth Army 1.457 Leyte Leyte
738ta MP Bn 651 Leyte Leyte
25tn Inf Dir 13.929 louiaea lousea
6th Hanger Inf Bn 51o Leyte Leyte
Co C, 2d Filipino Bn (OIC) 190 Hollandla ttollandla
727tn Aapa Trac Bn (l ess CoB) 32b Leyte Leyte
Co A, 82otn AmphTrac Bn 202 Leyte Leyte
nq &llq i t ry. 14th AAA Op 70 Emirau Bnlrau
4o9taAAAAWBn 725 Leyte Leyte
471stAAAAVBn(lessBtry0) b24 Ssdrau Ssirau
516tnAAAGunBn 640 Hoaaea Bouaea
737tnAAAGunBn 640 lelrau Jtelrau
BtryD,471atAAAAWBn 164 Houaea Vouaea
725thAAASLBtry(Sep) 230 Xairan lalrau
ttq&UqCo,52O2dEngrConsBrlg 109 Leyte Leyte
HtnESJ3(leas3*&SHegte,*ed*n,3Boat
MaintCosandSetsIo4tnOrdMalntCo) 1,041 Oro Bar Oro B*y
55ota*ryPonBn 390 Leyte Wt .
50OCQngrLPonCo 202 Leyte Leyte
b"+lstingrCanCo
70 Leyte Leyte
o42dJUagrCamCo
70 Leyte Leyte
lOlltnSngrTroadwayBridgeCo 144 HolUndia Leyte
hq4fiqBtry,Io8taFAOp
99 Tlnsohhafen Tlnschnafen
HqAhqUtry,191stFAOp
99 Toea Hollandia
251etFA an(105How)
4l Tinschhafen Tlnschnafen
4b5tnFA Bn(8"how)
5^9 Leyte Leyte
472dFABn(105H**)
491 Oro Bay Oro Bay
544tQFA Hn(240how)
489 USA UoUandU
b9<+tnFABn(105How)
491 Tlnscnbafen Hollandl*
7ootnFA an(155aov)
576 Tlnsohhafen Tlnscnnafen
983dF Aan(155un)
539 Leyte Leyte
lothSlgOpnsBn(lessSets)
4oo Leyte Leyte
CoA,99tnSlgan
202 Leyte Leyte
PCAUnits#3.#4.#5and#b
19o Leyte Leyte
PCAUnits20and*21
98 Oro Bay Oro Bay
30btnCICDet
29 Leyte Leyte
442dCICDet
1stCensorshipAreaDot
15 Hollandla Hollandla
42 Leyte Leyte
12
Leyte Leyte
33dCriminalInvestigatingSec
TotalCombatUnits 2b.581
SXE7ICKUIITS
Unit Strength Location Staging
uqAaq00,931st*ngrConsOp
9* Morotal Morotal
4l4thEngrDunpTrkCo(lessDot) 89 HollandU Leyte
Det,l+lUthEngrDumpTrkCo
18 Flnschhafen Finachhafen
-571tEngrDumpTrkCo 107 Saaaapor Sansapor
689thEngrBaseIqulpCo
173 Biak Leyt.
695thSngrBaseiqulpCo
HolUndia BollandU
759thEngrPartsSupCo Flnschhafen Tlnscbhafen
S
7S2dSngrPetroDietCo 224 Flnschhafen Hollandia
439thXngrSepCo 209 Flnschhafoa Finachhafen
1491stIngrMaintCo 191 Hollandla Wt e
1519thIngr*aterSupCo 136 Green Bongalnrllle
1603d ftogr MapSep Set 11 Leyte Leyte
1623d Xngr Model Making St 27 Leyte Wt e
84lst Xngr A-mBn
777 Morotal Morotai
g63d Xngr Am Bn
777 Biak Leyte
1876th Xngr Am Bn
777 Morotai Morotai
1879th Ingr Am Bn 777 HolUndia Leyte
1913th Ingr Am Bn
777 HolUndia Leyte
6th Ingr Topo Co (Corps) 142 Leyte Leyte
1679th Ingr Serv Set (Surrey Liaison) 10 Leyte Leyte
M+dlcal
HqAHqSt, 135th KedOp Leyte Leyte
26jd MdBn (KB) ( l ess 3 Cos)
Biak Leyte
264th MdBn (ISB) ( l ess Cos A &C) 164 Oro Bay Oro Bay
983d*edAmbCo 93 Oro Bay Oro Bay
6thMaiSurrUnit
13 Leyte Leyte
7thMaiContlUnit 12 Leyte Leyte
21stUdSupPlat
31 Leyte Leyte
Ordnance
Hq-*HqSet,12thOrdBmComp 17 HolUndU HolUndia
Hq*HqDt,259thOrdBn 35 Finechhafen
HqAHqDt,189thOrdBn Milne Bay Milne Bay
21stOrdMMCo 169 Aitape Aitape
318thOrdSepCo i5 Milne Bay Milne Bay
253dOrdMalntCo(AA) 163 Finachhafen Flnschhafen
Aitape
Sanaapor
Toaa
511thOrdHryMalntCo(FA) 198 Milne Bay Milne Bay
579thOrdAaCo 186 Oro Bay Oro Bay
580thOrdAnCo 186 Brisbane Toea
6llthOrdAaCo 186 Aitape Aitape
Admiralties
959thOrdHIMCo 211 Finsohhafen Flnschhafen
171stOrdBoabSlapSqd 7 Layte Leyte
7 Leyte Leyte
172dOrdBoabSlapSqd
Tobeemployedby25thSir.
Qnarteraaater
19 Oro Bay Oro Bay
HqHqDt,473dQKBn(Mbl)
601st9<OrRegCo(less4PlatsandSet,
36
HolUndia HolUndia
CoHq)
110 Oro Bay Oro Bay
3444th9*TrkCo
Sansapor Sansapor
3874th0>OaaSupCo(loss2dPlat)
219 Oro Bay Oro Bay
4096th<*SerrCo
31
Leyte
15th<>(CrPlat
Leyte Leyte
1PUt,28thQHCarCo
Leyte Leyte
39th<*WarDogPUt
75
Oro Bay OroBay
1PUt,92dqMhdCo
Signal
436thSlgConsBn(Am) (lessSetCoA) 5O9 Morotai Morotal
112thSlg2ICo 247 USA Bougainville
1PUt,281stSlgPigeonCo 38 Leyte Leyte
THFTeam
a
A
a
,989thSlg8errCo 26 Layte Leyte
VBTTeaa"I
1
,989thSlgSarrCo 26 Layta Leyte
THFTeam
a
T",989thSig8arrCo
26 Layte Leyte
1stBdStaSec,832dSlgSerr Ba
20 Layte Leyte
U4thBadStaSac,832dSlgSarrBn 20 Sallandia Leyte
17thBadStaSec,832dSlgSarrBn 20 Sansapor Sansapor
20thHadStaSec,832dSlgSarrBa 20 Hoeafoor Hoeafoor
98thSigBadMaintTeam(TypeA)
(atchdto725tbAAASLBtrySep) 5 Finachhafen Finschhafen
291stai-aRadliaiatTeam(TypeC)
(atchdto318thAAAOunBn) 4 Finsohhafen Finachhafen
292dsigRaduaintTeam(TypeC)
(atchdto737thAAAdunBn) 4 Tinaohhafen Finsohhafen
Transportation
11thAirCargoResupplysquadron 210 Leyte Leyte
Mlaoellaneoua
34thURU 58 Leyte Leyte
GH(iU3A3C6Sig Opna Qp (Prov)
560 Leyte Leyte
163d POTProo Co
117 HolUndia HolUndia
131st ACT Band
37 Bougainrille Bougainville
155th An Dlsb sec
20 Leyte Leyte
169th Tin Disb seo
20 Leyte Leyte
Total serrioe units 10,163
Total sixth army Troops 36.744
By cenmand of Lieutenant Oeneral KRUfiQBRi
0. H. EBCXER.
Brigadier Oeneral, 0.3C..
Chief of Staff.
122
Plat,244thPortCo
160thTinDili)Sec
64 Blak 1424thIngrMbl8LMalntSec 3 BougainTllle Bougal nrl l l e
20 Sanaapor 1425thIngrMblSLNalntSec
3 Bougal nTl l U BougainTllle FieldUnit*,5250thTechlat C o nCo
(Sep)(Pror)
14 Saneapor Medical
FieldUnit.#5,5250thTechIntCorpCo
(Sep)(Pror)
14 Altape 7thIracEoap(750bed)
531 Guadalcanal Gloucester
b. Delatet
21atIracHosp(750bed) 531 Bougalnrllle BougalnTille
24thfieldHoap 211 lalrau Bougal nri l l e
Unit),94thCalC o mCo
Unit4,94thColCoapCo
1 P Ut , 342d ONDepSupCo
30
jjg
Toea
Altape
Altape
4latFieldHoap
20thPortSurgBoap
21stPortSurgHoap
24thPortSurgHoap
37
37
211
37
Blak
Sydney
Brisbane
Brisbane
Blak
Gloucester
Gloucester
Gloucester
c. Changet
31stPortSurgHoap
33dPortSurgHoap
37
37
Bougal nri l i e
BougalnTille
Bougalnrllle
Bougalnrille
St agi ng are* of 10t hMaiContl Unit f roa Laet o Bl ak.
Stagingareaof1420thIngrMblSLMalntSeefroaMorotaito
Flnechhafen.
xxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxx
By command of Li eutenant General KBUXOBti
XXXXXXXXXX
38thPortSurgHoap
Hq4HqDet,135thMedBn(Sep)
CoA,264thMedBn(KB)
CoC,264thMdBn(ISB)
408thMedCollCo
410thMedCollCo
607thMedCirCo
894thMadClrCo
981stMedAnbCo
37
29
110
110
105
105
117
117
93
Bougal nTl l U
Leyte
Korotal
Oro Bay
Hollandla
Milne Bay
Morotai
Vakde
Lae -
Finschhafen
g
Leyte
Bougai nvi l l e
Gloucester
Hol l andU
Olouceater
Morotai
Gloucester
Lae -
Finschhafen
0. H. DZCOB
Bri gadi er General, 0. S. C.
Chief of St af f .
26thMedCoapUnlt (MaiContl)
3d*MaiContlUnit
34thMaiContlUnit
99thMaiContlUnit
65thMaiContlUnit
12
12
12
12
12
BougainTllle
BougainTllle
*ev Georgia
Hol UndU
Olouceater
BougainTllle
Bougal nrl l l e
Bougal nrl l l e
Hol Undl a
Olouceater
403dMedCoapUnlt (Mai SUIT) 13 BougalnTill* Bougal nri l l e
OFFICIAL!
421stMedCompUnit (Mai SUIT) 13 BougalnTllU BougainTllle
422dMedCoapUnit(MaiSurr)
33dMai SUITUnit
13
13
Imlrau
Gloucester
Bougal nrl l l e
Olouceater
55thMedSupPlat(ATH) 21 Morotai Morotai
Ordnance.
Hq*HqSet,latOrdBn 35 BougalnTllU Bougalnrllle
55thrdAmCo 18b Moresby Olouceater
90thOrdHrMalntCo(Ik) 210 BougalnTllU BougalnrllU
120thOrdMMCo I69 Bougalnrllle Bougainrllle
263dOrdMMCo 169 Gloucester Olouceater
517thOrdH TMalntCo(FA) 198 Oro Bay OroBay
HUDQUABTtHS SIXTH ABMT 6l4thOrdAaCo 186 BougainTllle BougainTllle
A. P. 0. U42 3OO7tbOrdSepCo Il6 Bougalnrllle Bougainrllle
21001 20 Sorember 19a*
3149thOrdMAMCo 120 BougainTllle BougainTllle
102dOrdBoabSlapSqd 7 BougalnTille BougalnTille
AilSEX 3to ' 0 3U, Troop l i s t , XIVCorpe, rei nf orced.
103dOrdBombSlapSqd
106thOrdBoabSlapSqd
7
7
Bougalnrille
Bougalnrllle
BougainTllle
Bougalnrllle
COMBAT U3JITS Teama3 * 4 , 3073dOrdCoapCo(AAA 22 Morotai Gloucester
(ByAir)
Unit Strength Locati on Staging
(ftiartermaatar
Eq4HqCo,XIYCorpe
Hq4HqBtry,XIVCorpeArty
39thMPCo
37thIafD I T
40thInfDlT
658thAmphTracBn
672dAaphTracBn
754thTkBn
637thTBBn
640th TD Bn
2d Cml Bn, *t x
Hq4 HqCo, 1125th Ingr (C) Op
51+l+th Xngr B4SBegt ( l eas Boat Bn)and
Deta
591+th Ingr B43Begt ( l e e s CoaA* B)and
Seta
131st Ingr (C) Bn (HD)
1279th Ingr (C) Bn (K>)
Boat Bn, 544th Ingr B4SBegt ( l eaa Co C)
Co A, i oat Bn, 594th Sngr 34S Regt
Co C, Boat Bn, 544th Ingr MS Regt
530th Ingr Lt Pon Co
670th Zngr TopoCo
Hq &HqBtry, 66th AAA Bri g
Hq4 HqBtry, 251at AAA Op
70th AAA OunBn
209th AAA AVBn (SP)
373d AAA SL Bn
95l 8t AAA AVBn
144th AAA Opns Set
517th PA Bn (155 Oon)
756th ?ABn (155 How)
757th TABn (155
H
<)
Btry "A", 289th FAOoenBn
SSth Sl gBn ( l e s s Co C)
2 PCA Unit* ( 1and #2)
PCA Unit #3
716
117
150
14,322
14,322
504
504
7*5
787
644
1, 022
85
I.O39
Bougalnrllle
Bougalmrllle
Bougainville
Bougelnrtlle
Gloucester
USAto
Finschhafen
USA to
Finschhafen
Bougainrllle
lapiritu
Santo*
Gloucester
BougainTllle
Bougainville
Horotal
OroBy
BougainTllle
BougainTllle
Morotai
Olouceater
Toea
BougainTllle
BougainTllie
Bougalnrille
Bougalnrllle
Jlnechhafen
BougainrllU
BougainTllle
Finschhafen
USA
Finachhafen
Flnschhafen
Leyte
BougainTllle
OroBay
Leyte
Bougainville
Bougainrille
BougalnTille
BougainTllle
Gloucester
Gloucester
BougainTllle
BougainTllle
BougalnTille
Gloucester
BougainTllle
Bougainrllle
Bougainrllle
Olouceater
BougainTllle
BougainTllle
Morotai
Olouceater
Toea
Leyte
Bougai nTl l l e
BougainTl l i e
Bougal nrl l l e
Bougal nri l l e
Olouceater
BougalnTille
BougainTllle
Olouceater
BougalnTille
Finschhafen
Finschhafen
Hollandla
BougainTl l i e
Oro Bay
Leyte
Hq4HqSet,268th<*Bn(Mbl)
236thQMSalTCollCo(less1Plat)
569thQHHhdCo
1998thqHTrkCo(lesa2dPlat)
3118th <$ SerrCo
3667th <Trk Co
3769th (JMTrk Co
4074th QH SerrCo
25th C*VarBogP u t
1 Pl at , 4j t h OrHc Co
234th QMLdry PU t Hoap (Type B)
(atchd 21st*Tftc Hoap)
235th <*
L
dry PUt Hoep (Type B)
(atchd 7thI rac Hoap)
237th <VLdry Pl at Heap (
x
ype B)
(atchd 4l at Fi el d Hoap)
1 Pl at , 558th QMBhd Co (l eaa Set )
2d PUt , 373d QHOaaSupCo(4th ISB)
189th QHOaa SupCo (l eaa Set )
Slesai.
CoC,98th8lgBn
295thJASCO
593d JASCO
TBT Team B, 989th Sl g SerrCo
99th Sl gBadar Malnt Team (Type A)
100th Si gHftdar Maint Team (Type A)
(atchd 373d AAASL Bn)
191et Sl gBadar Malnt Team (Type A)
(atchd 3734 AAA SL Bn)
295th Si gBadnr Malnt Team (Type c;
(atchd t o 70th AAA Oun Bn)
Transportation
55
219
17 Bougainrllle
148 Imlrau-Green
184 Finschhafen
Gloucester
Bougal nrl l l *
110 BougainTllle
110 BougainTllle
219 Bougal nTl l U
26 Bougal nrl l l e
21 BougainTllla
33 USA(Sec)
33 USA(Sec)
33 USA(Dec)
32 Arawe
50 Gloucester
68 Hollandla
202
490
490
26
5
5
5
4
Sanseqior
Ssplrltu
Santos
Leyte
Morotai
Aitape
Altape
Finschhafen
Finnehhafen
Bougalnrllie
Bougalnrllle
Finschhafen
Gloucester
Bougalnrille
BougainTllle
Bougalnrllle
Bougalnrllle
Bougalnrllle
Bougainville
Finachhafen
Finachhafen
Flnechh&fen
Gloucester
Gloucester
HolUndla
Saneapor
BougainTllle
Gloucester
Hollandla
Altape
Altape
Finschhafen
Fln8chhafen
Total Combat Uni te
Chemical
183dCalCompPlat
Unit4,240thCmlCoap
45, 200
SIHVICI UMITS
40
56
Bougalnrllle
7lnechhafen
BougainTllla
Oloucetter
Hq4 BqSet , 489th Port Bn
451t Amph Trk Co
455th Aaph Trk Co
210th Port Co
211th Port Co
218th Port Co
245th Port Co
Total 8errl ce Units 8,883
23
184
184
230
230
230
2T0
MilneBay
Bougalnrllle
*ev Georgia
Bougainrllle
Bougalnrille
lalrau
Gloucester
MilneBay
Bougainville
Bougainville
Bougainville
BougainTllle
BougalnTille
Gloucestei
Total XIV Corps Troopa 5*^01
963d Ingr Malnt Co
1520th Ingr Vater Sup Co
3015th Ingr Boat Malnt Co
3Ol6th Ingr Boat Malnt Co- ( l ea*
3017th Ingr Boat Maint Co
1 Pl at )
191
136
15
131
185
Bougalnrllle
BougainTllle
Olouceater
Gloucester
Morotai
Bougainrllla
BougainTllle
Olouceater
Olouceater
Morotai
By cosnand of Lieutenant General KRUIGIBt
123
G.H.DECKER,
BrigadierGeneral,G.S.C.
ChiefofStaff.
CI7TCIAL:
EXTRACTFROM
_;:2I:DMINTNO.Ito
(O"1LXES3b,3,3d.and3e.toFO34,HeadquartersSixthArmy,20November1944.
XXXLOCXXXX XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX
Annex3t 3
:
+,TroopList,XIVCorps,reinforced,isamendedas
follows:
Unit Anprox.Strength Staging
Add:
l.ival Fire Control Terns #3and#4 6 Bougainville
Plat, 129th ^4 GasSup Co 4o Finschhafen
FieldUnitTTfa 5250thTech
J
ntCompCo
(Sep)(Prov5 11 Finochhafen
Field"Unit#7.5250thTechIntCompCo
(Sep)(Prov)
13
Gloucester
b. Change:
StagingareaofPCAUnits#1and#2fronOroBaytoLeyte.
189thQMGasSupCo(lessDet)toread189thQMGasSupCo(less
Plat)(lessDet).
Staeinrareasof234th,235thand237thQKLdryPlatsHosp(Type
B)fromFinsclihafentoHollandia.
Statin-areaof99thSigRadar.aintTeam(TypeA)fromAitape
toFinschhafen.
Sta.-ingareaof100thSigRadarfoaintTeam(TypeA)(Atchd373d
AAA SL3n)fromAitapetoFinschhafen.
XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX
Bycomr.ancofLieutenantGeneralKRUEOER:
G.H.DECKER
ChiefofStaff.
HEADQUARTERSSIXTHARMY
A.P.0.442
23OOI20ôvonber1,44
Air.lEXZutoFO;&,lrcoplist,llthAirborneDivision,Reinforced. (Ihii
annexwasliterdeleted.)
HEADQUARTERSSIXTHARMT
A.P.0.442
23OOI20November1944
3etoFG34,TroopList,158thInfantryRCT(Reinforced)
Unit
St r engt h Locat i on Staging
COMBAT UNITS
Hq&HnCo,158thRCT
158thInf
1C4
^,146
K'uEfoor
ike.Tfoor lVôTooi
147thFABn
I'.cdoor
BtryA,198t
v
-A M'VBr
707th AAA MC Bt rj '\')
"caafoor
708thAAAMGBtry(A/B) 90 Noemfoor
Noemfoor
534thEngrB&SRegt&Dets(lessBoatBn)_ Morotai
Morotai
TotalCombatUnits 5,011
SERVICEUNITS
Det, Unit1,94thCmlCompCo 15 Noemfoor Noemfoor
3dPortSurgHosp 37 Noemfoor Noemfoor
71stEvacHosp(400bed) 252 loemfoor Noemfoor
506thMedCollCo 105 Noemfoor Noemfoor
637thMedClrCo 117 Noemfoor- Noemfoor
Finschhafen
39thMalSurvUnit 13 Noemfoor Noemfoor
59thMalContlUnit 12 Noemfoor Noemfoor
49thOrdMMCo 169 Noemfoor Noemfoor
Det, 6?9thOrdAmCo 91 Noemfoor Noemfoor
2058thQMTrkCo(less1Plat) 6l Aitape Aitape
Det, CoHq,601stQMGrRegCo g Hollandia Aitape
179thQMLdryPlat,Hosp(TypeB)
(atchd71stEvacHoep) 33 Noemfoor Aitape
Det, 1stPlat,558thQJ-iRhdCo 74 Uoemfoor Noeafoor
2dPlat,3874thQMGasSupCo 54 Noemfoor Noemfoor
1Plat,4095thQMServCo 109 Aitape Aitape
3295thSigServPlat 30 Noemfoor Noemfoor
Det, CoA,436thSigConeBn 11 Hollandia Morotai
464thAcnhTrkCo Ig4 Noemfoor Noemfoor
234thPortCo 230 Noemfoor- Noemfoor
MilneBay Sansapor
l6latFinDlabUnit g Noemfoor Noemfoor
Leyte Leyte
PCAUnit#7 43
TotalService lf662
Total158thRCT 6,673
G.H. DECKEfi,
BrigadierGeneral,&.S.C.
ChiefofStaff.
OFFICIAL:
G-3.
EXTRACTFROM
AMENDMENTNO.1to
A N N E I E S
31.3.3 BA
6
- 3S.
t0F 0
3
1
*.HeadquartersSixthArny,20 V.ov.mlei-1944
xxxxxxxxxx
4. Annex3e,toFO34,TroopList,l^.r^.hIi-f:)t>y>Cx(roinforo^ci)la
amendedasfollows:
JJit, 'in A, VjCth i Jg
l
>ono Bn 11 Morotai
-2:x xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx
G.H.DECKER,
ChiefofStaff.
^FICIAi;
HaDQ!0AHTERS SIjClH ARUY
A. V. 0. 442
2300X. 20 Novaaber 19*4
AIC1EX Sf to jr S4, Hoop Li a t , Sixth Amy Sci r l ce Conmnl . Tor r e s tod Ccpyi
Unit
Strength Location
Staging
17 Finschhafen Holland ia
333dQMSalvRepCo
201 lillneBay MilneBay
1060th Engr Port Cona &Hep Gp
Hq &Hq Co, 93l8t Engr Cons Gp
Hq&Hq Co, 1178th Engr Cons Gp
Hqfc Hq Co, 1180th Engr Cons Gp
5208th Engr Serv Gp Hq
5252d Engr Base Dep Gp (Prov)
1312th Engr Serv Regt (l eas 1 Co)
43d Engr Cons Bn
810th Engr Avn Bn
828th Engr Avn Bn
836th Engr Avn Bn
864th Engr Avn Bn
870th Engr Avn Bn
871st Engr Avn Bn
874th Engr Avn Bn
1872d Engr Avn Bn
1896th Engr Avn Bn
617th Engr Base Equipment Co
1962d Engr Avn Dep Co
495th Engr Hvy Shop Co
573d Engr Dump Trie Co
585th Engr Dump Trk Co
730th Engr Dep Co
757th Engr Par t s Sup Co
773d Engr Dump Trk Co
Co B, 796th Engr Forestry Bn
2870th Sngr Serv Det ( Ut i l i t y)
875th Engr Serv Co (Avn)
1042d Engr Gs Gen Unit
1361st Engr Dump Trk Co
1384th Engr Pet Dlst Co (l ess Det)
Det, 1384th Engr Pet Dlst Co
1517th Engr Water Sup Co
3014th Engr Maint Co
Checilcal
253
94
94
94
31
31
31
72
1,240
901
777
777
777
777
777
777
777
777
777
173
210
171
107
107
209
171
107
174
107
107
155
41
146
22
107
210
14
136
191
Hollandia
Morotal
Biak
Morotai
MilneBay
Hollandia
Hollandia
Finschhafen
OroBay
Morotal
Biak
Blak
Morotal
Biak
Hollandia
Biak
Biak
Finschhafen
Biak
Morotal
Leyte
Leyte
Emirau
Leyte
USA
MilneBay
Oro3ay
Leyte
(Afloat)
Finschhafen
MilneBay
Korotai
Leyte
Aitape
Bougainville
USA
Morotei
Toem
Emirau
OroBay
Hollandia
Morotal
Blak
Morotal
MilneBay
Hollandia
Hollandia
Finsohhafen
OroBay
Morotai
Biak
Biak
liorotai
Blak
Hollandia
Biak
Finschhafen
Finschhafen
Biak
torotai
Leyte
Leyte
Emirau
Leyte
Finschhafen
KlineBay
OroBay
Leyte
Finschhafen
MilneBay
Morotai
Leyte
Aitape
Bougainville
Hollandia
Morotal
Morotai
Emirau
OroBay
539thCM SalvRepCo
584thQM LdryCo(3emi-Mbl)(less2Plate) 2
693dQMTrkCo
8<,2dQM Fumigation&BathCo
897thQM LdryCo(Semi-Mbl)(less2lists
984th:ji3ervCo
3349th<iM TrkCo
3352dQMTrkCo
3819th QMGas Sup Co
3446th QMTrk Co
3452d QMTrk Co
3460thQM TrkCo
3473dQM TrkCo
3477thQM TrkCo
3525thQMTrkCo
3579thQM TrkCo
MblSee,937thQM letFrodLe^
3714thQM TrkCo(Hvy)
3716thQM TrkCo(Hvy)
4075thQM ServCo
4076th3M 3errCo
4137th*jMServCo
4139th iM ServCo
4281stQM Dep SupCo
13th<}MBkryPlat
1Plat,48th3M Gr Re.;;?o
155th<$ LdryPlatHosp (TypeA)
(atchd120thGenHosp)
491stQM Dep Sup Co(less2dPlat)
2dPlat,491stQM Dep SupCo
165thQJJLdryPlatHosp (TypeA)
(atchd80thGen Hosp)
168thJJfLdryPlatHosp (TypeA)
(atchd 60thGenHosp)
177thQ" LdryPlatHosp (TypeB)
(atchd251stSta Hosp)
1Plat,281stQM RefrigCo(Mbl)
1Plat,482dQM RefrigCo(Mbl)
2dSec,2d Flat,588th JdLdryCo
1stSec,3d Plat,286th$f.F.-frigCo(Mbl)
3dSec,3dPlat,286th .JMKefrigCo(Mbl)
127th Ql!^-ryCo
316thQMBkryCo(less1llat)
201
14 142
110
88
142
219
110
110
128
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
18
1C7
107
219
219
219
219
192
36
21
47
140
"52
47
47
33
30
30
27
1 8
6
168
128
Bougainville
Emira-u
Finschhafen
Leyte
Boupainville
Emirau
Hollandia
Leyte
NewGeorgiaNewGeorgia
Finschhfeii
NewGeorgi*
MilneBay
MilneBay
OroBay
Blak
Hollandia
Biak
Holla adia
OroBay
Lae
Leyte
Hollandia
Hollaudia
Bougainville
Bougainville
MilneBay
Lae
OroBay
Emirau
Leyte
Finschhefen
Bougainville
Hollandia
Hollandia
Finschhafen
Hollandia
Milne Bay
RussellIs
Aitape
Aitape
Sansapor
Flr.schhafen
Aitape
Finschhafen
NewGeorgia
MilneBay
MilneBay
OroBay
Blak
Finacfchafen
Hollaedla
Hollandia
Oro
r
i*y
Lae
Leyto
Hollandia
Hollandla
Pousainville
Bougainville
MilneB&y
Lao
OroBay
Emirau
Leyto
Finschhafen
Bougainville
Hollacdla
Hollandia
Finschhfifen
Hollflndia
KlineBay
Bougainville
Aitape
Aitape
Sansapcr
Firschhafen
Aitape
93d Cml Comp Co 218 Milne Bay Milne Bay
Medical
Gen Hosp (1,000 bed)
60th Gen Hosp (1,000 bed)
37tb Sta Hosp (250 bed)
107thStaHosp(250bed)
251stSta Hosp(750bed)
360thSta Hosp(500bed)
334thGenDisp
49thMed DepCo
58th Med Base Dep Co
712th San Co
714th San Co
718th San Co
742d San Co
26th Army Med Lab
1st Med Comp Unit (Mai Contl)
9th Mai Contl Unit
38th Mai Contl Unit
110th Comp Unit (Mai Contl)
423d Mai Surv Unit
213th Comp Unit (Mai Surv)
77th Med Comp Unit (Mai Contl)
37th Med Corap Unit (Mai Contl)
99th Med Comp Sec (Vet)
106thMedCompSec(Vet)
27thMai SurvUnit
618
618
618
618
804
604
186
186
186
501
353
39
150
47
117
117
117
117
58
12
12
12
12
13
13
12
12
5
5
13
USA
USA
USA
Finschhafen
Milne Bay
Finschhafen
Aitape
Arawe
NewGeorgia
Gloucester
Milne Bay
USA
USA
USA
NewGeorgia
MilneBay
Bougainville
Green
Finschhafen
Bougainville
Finschhafen
Bougainville
Bougainville
Bougainville
Tresury
Guadalcanal
Bougainville
Biak
Finschhafen
Aitape
Direct
Direct
Direct
Finschhafen
MilneBay
Finschhafen
Aitape
Finschhafen
NewGeorgia
Gloucester
Milne Bay
Hollandia
Holland la
Hollandia
NewGeorgia
MilneBay
Bougainville
Green
Finschhafen
Bougainville
Finschhefen
Bougainville
Bougainville
Bougainville
Bougainville
Gloucester
Bougainville
Hollsndla
Finschhtfen
Aitape
442dSigConsBn
276thSigConsCo
CoC,60thSigBn
3292dSigBaseICaintCo(lessDet)
586thSigDepCo
3294thSigBaseDepCo
Det"M"3170SigServSn
Det"M"3169thSig ServBn
Det,"M" 3169thSig ServEn
Det,"M"3169thSigServBn
Transports 11on
Hq&Hq Det,387thPortBn
465thAmphTrkCo
eilthAmphTrkCo
81?thAmphTrk Co(less1Plat)
1Flat,812thAmp TrkCo
Hq&Hq Det,373dPortBn
803dArmyMarineShipRepCo
792dBaseDep CoTC
243dPortCo
614thPortCo
615thPortCo
616thPortCo
650thFortCo
430thPortCo
431etPortCo
432dPortCo
851stPortCo
852dPortCo
PortMarineMaintCo
790thRy OperatingCo
453
202
202
165
143
132
559
209
54
38
23
184
184
148
36
23
84
121
230
230
230
230
230
230
230
230
,230
230
204
149
Leyte
Hollsndia
Hollandia
Leyte
Finschhafen
MilneBay
Hollandia
OroBay
Hollandia
Biak
Hollandia
OroBay
Lae
Toem
Biak
Korotai
Hollandia
Brisbane
Moresby
].:ilneBay
MilneBay
Morotai
Biak
USA
USA
USA
TJSA
USA
USA
Finschhafen
Leyte
Leyte
Hollandia
Leyte
Finacbnafen
LilneTay
Leyte
Cro3ey
Hollcriie
Fiak
Kollandia
OroI3ay
Lae
Toem
Biek
V.orotai
Hollarriia
Finschhafen
Fltschhafen
:,:ilneBay
Milne Bay
t'.orotel
Biak
Hollandia
Hollsndia
Hollandia
Finschhofen
Finschhafen
Hollandia
Finschhafen
Ordnance
Hq&HqDet,229thOrdBaseGp
HqitHqDet,9thOrdBn
179thOrd Hvy MaintAutoCo
191stOrdDepCo
211thOrdMAMCo
21PthOrd MAMCo
523dOrd Hvy MaintCo(FA)
307thOrd MaintCo(AA)
577thOrd AmCo
615thOrd AmCo(lessDet)
Det,615thOrd AnCo
629thOrd AmCo(lessDet)
849thOrd DepCo
3449thOrd MAMCo
41
35
211
165
120
120
198
163
186
175
11
95
186
120
Hollandia
Finschhafen
Hollandia
Townsville
Finschhafen
Finschhafen
Finschhafen
Finsehhafen
Brisbane
Townsville
Finsehhafen
Finschhafen
Morotai
MilneBay
Hollandia
Finschhafen
Hollandia
Finschhafen
Finschhafen
Fiaschhafen
Finschhafen
Finschhafen
Brisbane
Townsville
Fifischhafen
Finschhafen
Morotai
MilneBay
Miscellaneous
Hq cHq Det,804thMPBn
12thReplacementDep
SixthArmyServCommandHq
22dSpecServCo
27thSpecServCo
CoD,720thMPBn(ZI)
814thMPCo
MPEscortGdCo(Prov)
12thPostalRegSec
70thAPU
34thCriminal InvestigatingSec
TotalAscoaTroops
By command of Lieutenant
38
163
1,000
125
125
155
170
135
32
13
15
Finschhafen
OroBay
Leyte
Bougainville
NewGeorgia
OroBay
Lae
USA
Hollandia
Holla n<iia
Leyte
Finschhafen
OroBay
Leyte
sBougainville
NewGeorgia
OroSay
Lae
Hollandia
Holland la
Hollandia
Leyte
32,501
General KBUEGER:
Quartermaster
Hq fcHqDet,473dQMGp
Hq&HqDet,21stQUBn(Mbl)
HqIIHqDet,29thQMBn(Mbl)
Hq&HqDet,490thQMBn
HqkHqDet,493dQMBn
92dCMRhdCo(less1Plat)
112thQMBkryCo(less2Plats)
266thQMBkryCo(less2Plats)
286th QMRefrig Co fl l bl )(l ese 2d & 3d
26
19
19
17
17
95
110
110
Pl at a)
OroBay
Milne Bay
OroBay
Emirau
Bougainville
OroBay
Sansapor
Bougainville
OroBay
Milne Bay
OroBay
Emirau
Bougainville
OroBay
Sansapor
Bougainville
OFFICIAL:
G-3
G. H. DECKER,
Brigadier General, G. S.
Chief of Staff.
125
___
1 LSD 300 700 LCTs to XIY Corps
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY Oro Bay Blue
3 LST 900 1,800
A. P. 0. U42 Leyte Blue
1 LST 300 600
Leyte Yellow
23001 20 November 1944
1,500 3,100
ANNEX t o FO 34, Troop Li s t 13t h Armored Group. Totals
COMBAT UNITS
Blue 4LCI 720
TransDiv38Carry
6thRangerInfBn
Leyte
Unit
Leyte Blue
3LST 900 1,800
1LST
Hq 4 Hq Co, 13t h ArradOp 98 USA Hollandia Hollandia Blue 500 6O0
44t h Tk Bn ( l e s s CoC) 629 Leyte Leyte
775th TkBn 751 OroBay OpoBay Totals
1,920 2,400
186th Engr (C) Bn(ND) 637 USA Hollandia
632d TD Bn 787 Leyte Leyte
SJ_2
25THINFDIVSHIPPING
TotalCombatUnite 2.902
2APA 2,600 1,000 TransDiv2
BycommandofLieutenantGeneralKRUEGER: Noumea
White-Blue
White-Blue 2AP 2,600 1,000 TransDiv2
Noumea White-Blue 1AKA 250 2,000 TransDiv2
Noumea
White-Blue 1AK 500 2,000 TransDiv2
Noumea
White-Blue 3APA 3,900 1,500 TransDiv23
1APA Trans
Noumea
Noumea
White-Blue
i,4oo
500 Div23
3APA 3,900
G.H.DECKER, Noumea
White-Blue 1.500 TransDiv23
BripadierGeneral,G.S.C. Noumea White-Blue 2LibShips600
4
.000 TroopShips
ChiefofStaff.
Totals25thInf 15,750 13.500
OTHERSIXTHARMYTROOPUNITS
OFFICIAL:
Leyte Blue 1APA 1,300 500 TransDiv5
OroBay4
Lae Blue 1 APA 1,300 500 TransDiv5
MilneBay 4
OroBay Blue 1AKA 250 2,000 TransDiy5
Leyte Blue
9
LST 2,700
5.400
Leyte White3 2LST 600 1, 200
Morotai Blue 2LST 600 1, 200
Morotai Yellow-
G-3.
Crimson LST 900 1, 800
Sansapor Orange-
Green 1LST 300 600
3
Hollandia Blue
3 LST 900 1, 800
A.P.0.442
OroBay White3
3
LST 900 1.800
23001 20 November 1944
Totalsotherunits 9.750 16, 800
ANNEX 3h to FO 34, Troop Li st , Naval Service Command.
Direct 1LibShip
7.500 EngrSupplies
Direct 1LibShip
4,
500 EngrSupplies
Unit i ength Location Staging
Direct 1LibShip
6,
000 Engr4MiscSuppli
Cone Bn #115 1,114 MilneBay MilneBty
TotalsS/2 25,000
>*7.
700
One-half CBCons Bn (Sp) 522 MilneBay MilneBay
CBMaint Unit #606
276 MilneBay MilneBay
_k
One Mot Amph Base Repair Unit 520 USA Direct
Li
Five Camps (250 men) - Tents 110 USA Direct
Leyte Blue 6LST 1,800
3.600
One PT Advance Base Unit 119 Milne-Bay MilneBay
Leyte Orange 5LST 1,500
3,
000
4 Sansapor ASansapor
Morotai Blue 1LST 300 600
One Diapensary (100 'bed) Motile
87 Woendl Woendi
One Administration Comp (Small) 48 USA Direct
Morotai White3 3
LST 900 1,800
Noumea Blue 2LibShips 1,000
4,
000 TroOpships(25th
One Radio Station Opns Base (Large)
63
USA Direct
InfDiv).
Motile CommUnit #9 21 Hollandia Hollandia
Hollandia Blue 1LibShip 500 2,000 Troopship
One Storage Faci l i t i es Comp (Small)
33
USA Direct
Direct 1LibShip 000 Engr Supplies
One Port Director 10 Hollandia Hollandia
6,
Direct 1LibShip
6, 000 Engrl'iscSupplies
C8, Visual Station #80 8 Hollandia Hollandia
Direct 1LibShip EngrSupplies
Rad Sta (Operating Base #66) 18 Holiondia Hollandia
4,
000
Direct 2LibShips 000 SEPOESupplies
One BombDisposal
u
ni t 2 USA Direct
12,
Direct 1 LibShin
5
000 Engr Supplies
One Mine Disposal Unit 2 USA Direct
.
Direct 1LibShip 200 AvnSupplies
Fleet Post Office 10 USA Direct
7.
Direct 1LibShip 8,200 EngrSupplies
Int ernal Communications (small) USA Direct 6
Direct 2LibShips 000 AmmShips
Teletypewriter system USA Direct 13
One Radio Station Operating Base (Small) 10 Finschhafen Finschhafen
Totals 6,000 67,400
Total Naval Service Command 2,992
GRAND TOTAL 193,901
Leyte Blue 7 LST 2,100 4,200
Leyte White 3 1 LST
20T 600
By command of Lieutenant General KRUEGER:
Totals 2,400 4,800
G. H. DECKER,
Leyte Blue 24LCT 1,000 900 Carrytroopunits
Chief of Staff.
(SeeAnnex7a)
(SeparateConvoy)
OFFICIAL:
Direct Army, Air
F
orce&
Navy Tows SLOWCONVOY
Leyte Blue 5LSM
300
750 Carrytroopunits
(SeeAnnex7a&7b)
Emirau Blue4
Yellow
Criiison 1LibShip 500 2,000 TroopShip
OroBay Blue 1LibShip 500 2,000 TroopShit)
Finschhafen Blue
C
V
J
LibShips1,000 4,000 TroopShips
HEADQUARTERSSIXTHARMY Noumea Blue 1LibShip 500 2,000 TroopShip(25thInf
A.P.0.442 Direct 1Lib ___ Ship 3.500 EngrSupulies
Direct 2LibShips -
12,000
1000I29November 1944
Direct 1Lib
SEPOESupplies
. Ship 4,400
AvnSupplies
Direct 1LibShip 4,000
ANNEX6atoFO34,AssignmentofShipping,SixthArmyTroops.(CorrectedCopy
Direct 1Lib
Engr Supplies
Ship 6,000 Engr4MiscSupplies
FROM TOBEACH* NO4TYPE TROOPS TONS REMARKS
Direct 1LibShip
7.000 AmShip
SDAY
Totals
2,800 46,690
126
s4is
Leyte
Aitape 4
Blue 13LSI
3.900 7,gOO
A.P.0.442
Hollandia
Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct
Dirsct
Direct
Direct
Totals
Blue 1LibShip
1LibShip
1LibShip
1LibShip
2LibShips
1LibShip
1LibShip
1LibShip
1LibShip
2LibShip
1LibShip
1LibShip
500
4,400
2,000
4,4oo
3.500
4,200
12,000
4,100
7.200
2.300
5.500
12,000
6,000
7-000
78,000
TroopShip
Engr4MineSupplies
EjjgrSupplies
QMSupplies
SE?OESupplies
CivilianSupplies
AvnSupplies
EngrS u p p n e8
E
ngr Supplies
SEPOESupplies
WiseSupplies
AmShip
1000129November1944
ANNEX6btoFO34,AssignmentofShipping,ICorpsReinforced.(CorrectedCopy)
FROM TOBEACH* NO4TYPE TROOPS TONS REMARKS
Aitape
Aitape
Aitape
Hollandia4
Aitape
Aitape
Aitape
Aitape
Hollandia4
WhiteNo
WhiteNo
WhiteNo
WhiteNo
4 No
WhiteNo
WhiteNo
WhiteNo
3
3
3
2
3
2
2
2
3
1
1
1
2
1
1
APA
AP
AK
LSD
APA
AP
AKA
SDAY
3.900
1,300
500
300
2,600
1,300
250
1,500
500
2,000
700
1,000
500
2,000
Trans
Trans
Trans
Trans
Trans
Trans
Trans
Dlv
Div
Div
Div
Dlv
Div
Div
6
6
6
6
7
7
7
Hollandia
Toem
Morotai
Blue
Blue
Blue
1
2
3
s4
LSD
LSD
LSD"
1 8(SeparateConvoy)
Carriesrem.1060
PC4RGandESB
Craft.
CarryESBcraft4
miscRrEchs.
CarryESBcraft4
miscRrEchs.
Aitape
Aitape
Aitape
Hollandia
Hollandia
Hollandia
Hollandia4
Aitape
Hollandia4
Aitape
WhiteNo
WhiteNo
WhiteNo
WhiteNo
WhiteNo
WhiteNo
WhiteNo
WhiteNo
2
2
3
3
2
2
2
3
1
5
3
1
1
2
6
2
LSD
LST
LST
LST
LST
LSM
LSM
LSM
300
1,500
900
300
300
120
360
120
700
3,000
1,800
600
600
300
900
300
TransDiv
6
S430
TotalsWhiteBeach 14,050 16,400
Morotai
Hollandia
MilneBay4
OroBay
Noumea
Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct
Totals
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
__~
___
2LST
4LST
400
800
1LibShip 500
3LibShipsl,500
1LibShip
2LibShips
1LibShip
1LibShip
1LibShip
1LibShip
2LibShips
3,200
1,600
3.200
2,000
6,000
5,400
12,000
2,300
4.170
6,500
4,400
7.000
54,570
TroopShip
TroopShips(25th
InfDiv)
EngrSupplies
SBPOESupplies
EngrSupplies
CivilianSupplies
GenEngrSupplies
AvnSupplies
OrdSupplies
Sansapor
Sansapor
Sansapor
Sansapor
Hollandia4
Sansapor
Sansapor
Sansapor
Sansapor
Aitape
Hollandia4
Sansapor
Sansapor
Hollandia4
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue4
WhiteNo
Blue
Blue
3
3
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
8
APA
AP
AK
LSV
LSD
APA
AP
AKA
AK
LSD
LST
3.900
1,300
500
800
300
3.900
1,300
250
500-
300
2,400
1,500
500
2,000
500
700
1,500
500
2,000
2,000
700
4,800
Trans
Trans
Trans
Trans
Trans
Trans
Trans
Trans
Trans
Trans
Div
Div
Div
Div
Div
Div
Div
Div
Div
Div
26
26
26
26
26
20
20
20
20
20
S 4 35
Sansapor Blue 10LSM 600 1.500
Sansapor4
Biak
Direct
Blue 1 Lib Ship 200
4 Lib Shi ps^- - ^
2,000
24.000
TroopShip
SEFOESupplies
Totals
Totals
BlueBeach
S-Day
16,050
30,100
18,200
34,600
Totals 200 26,000
Emirau
Finschhafen
Direct
Direct
Direct
Direct
T
otals
Blue
Blue
3LST
1LibShip
3LibShips
1LibShip
4LibShips
1LibShip
600
200
800
2,400
2,000
9,000
6,900
24,000
.640
49,940
RearEchTroopUnit
Slg, Cml4OrdSupplJ
EngrSupplies
S7P0ISupplies
CivilianSupplies
Aitape
Aitape
Hollandia4
Aitape
Hollandia
Hollandia
Morotai
Aitape
Aitape
Hollandia
Hollandia
Morotai
Toem
WhiteNo
WhiteNo
WhiteNo
WhiteNo
WhiteNo
WhiteNo
WhiteNo
WhiteNo
WhiteNo
WhiteNo
WhiteNo
WhiteNo
2
2
2
3
3
2
2
3
2
3
2
2
3
l
l
1
l
l
2
3
l
l
2
1
APA
AP
AKA
APA
AKA
AK
LST
LST
LST
LST
LST
LST
3.900
1,300
250
1.300
250
500
600
900
300
300
600
300
1,500
500
2.000
500
2,000
2,000
1,200
1,800
600
600
1,200
600
Trans
Trans
Trans
Trans
Trans
Trans
Div
Div
Div
Div
Div
Div
24
24
24
32
32
32
Direct
Direct
L
otals
4 Lib Ships
6 Lib Ships_
LJJo
24,
20.
44,
000
poo
000
SFPOESupplies
Sig4OrdSupplies
Totals
Sansapor
Sansapor
Sansapor
Hollandia
Sansapor
Biak
WhiteBeach
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
2
1
1
3
2
2
APA
AP
APH
LST
LST
LST
10,500
3.900
1,300
1.300
900
600
600
14,200
1,500
500
200
1,800
1,200
1,200
Trans
^rans
Trans
Div
Div
Div
32
32
32
Direct
1 Lib Ship V
J
l
64P CivilianSupplies Noemfoor Blue 1 LST __joo 600
NOTE:
BEACHDESIGNATION
158thRCT,Reinf
43dInfDivReinf
6thInfDivReinf
37thInfDivReinf
40thInfDivReinf
Red
White#1,#2&#3
Blue
Yellow-Crimson
Orange-Green
40DWTofaviationsupplieswillbeloadedonallLSTsleaving
Hollandia,Biak,Morotai,OroBayandSansapor,forthe
5
/2,
S/4andS/5Echelons.
Totals
Totals
BlueBead
S/1
l
Hollandia
Hollandia
Hollandia
Sansapor
Aitape
Totals
WhiteNo3
WhiteNo3
Blue
Blue
White
S /2
8,900
19,400
1
1
3
1
1
APA
AP
LST
Lib
Lib
Ship
Ship.
Sj
1.300
1,300
900
200
200
3.900
Lit
7,000
21,200
1,
2,
2.
6,
500
500
800
000
000
800
Trans
Trans
Troop
Troop
Div9
Div9
Ship
Ship
0.H.DECKER,
ChiefofStaff.
Aitape4
Biak
Hollandia
Totals
White
Blue
S/4
1
1
Lib
Lib
Ship
Ship
200
200
400
2,
2.
4,
000
00.0
000
Troop
Troop
Ship
Ship
S_12
OFFICIAL: tjtape4
Toem White 1LibShip 200 2, 000 TroopShip
G-3.
127
Sansapor Blue 1LibShip 200 2,000 TroopShip
_1
Hollandla Blue 1LibShip 200 2,000 TroopShip
Gloucester Orange- 3APA
3,900 1,500 TransDiv18
Green
Gloucester Orange-
Green 1AP
TransDiv18
Aitape White 1LST 200 800 RrEchB
Gloucester Orange-
Sansapor Blue 2LST 400 1,600 RrEchs
Green 1AKA
TransDlv18
Eollandia Blue 2LST 400 1,600 RrEchB
Gloucester Orange-
Toem Blue 1LST 200 800 RrEchB
5
L S T
Aitspe White 1LibShip 200 2,000 RrEchs
Green
Sansapor Blue 1LibShip 200 2.000 RrEchB
Finschhafen
4GloucesterOrange-
4LST
Green
Gloucester Orange-
Totals
S
430 1, ,400 8,800
3LSM Green
S435
TotalsOrange-GreenBeach
Aitape White 3LibShips 300 6,000 *rEchs
Sansapor Blue 3LibShips 300 6,000 RrEchs
BougainvilleYellow-
3APA TransDiv38
Crimson
BougainvilleYellow-
1AP TransDiv38
BEACHDESIGNATION
Crimson
43dInfDiv,Reinf WhiteNo.1,No.2ANo.3
BougainvilleYellow
158thRCT,Reinf Red
-
TransDiv38
CriDSon 1APH
37thInfDiv,Reinf Yellow- Crimson
BougainvilleYellow-
TransDiv38
6thInfDlv,Reinf Blue
40thInfDiv,Reinf Orange- Green
Crimson 1AKA
BougainvilleYellow-
Crimson 7LST
NOTE: 40DWTofaviationupplieewillbeloadedonallLSTB leaving
Bougainville Yellow -
Hollandia,Bialc,Morotal,OroBay,andSansapor,fortheS/2,
S44,andS-/5echelons.
CrlmBon 6LSM
TotalsYellow-CrimsonBeach 9.300
Bycommand ofLieutenantGeneralKRtJEGER:
Totals S / 1Day 19,150
Gloucester Orange-
0.H.DECKER,
Green 1LibShip 500 2,000 TroopShip
ChiefofStaff.
BougainvilleYellow-
Crimson TransDiv5
BougainvilleYellow-
Crimson TransDiv5
BougainvilleYellow-
Crimson
OFFICIAL:
G-3.
BougainvilleYellow-
Crimson TroopShip
Gloucester Orange- 1LibShip 300 2,000 TroopShip
HSADQUARfZRS SIXTHARMY
Green
A.P.0.442
BougainvilleYellow-
1000129November 1944
Crimson 1LibShip 300 2.000 TroopShip
ANNEX oU>fO3,Assignment ofShipping,XIVCorps. (Corrected Copy)
600 4,000
FROM 5 0 * TYPE TROOPS TONS
S412
S-DAY
BougainvilleYellow-
Crimson 1LibShip 300 2,000 TroopShip
Tram Dlv-10
TransDlv10
Gloucester Orange-
Green 1LibShip 300 2,000 TroopShip
BougainvilleYellow-
TranBDiv10
Crimson 2 îtoShips 600 4,000 TroopShip
TransDlv10
S410
TransDlv30
BougainvilleYellow-
Crimson 3LibShips 600 6,000 RrEchs
TransDiv30
TrsnaDiv30
S435
Bougainville Yellow -
Crimson 3 Lib Ships 600 6,000 Rr Echs
Gloucester Orange -
16,020 17,700
Green 3 Lib Ships 600 6,000 Rr Echs
BougainvilleYellow-
Crlmeon 4APA TransDlv28
BEACH DESIGNATIONS
BougainvilleYelltw-
Crimeon 1AKA TransDlv28
158th RCT, Reinf Red
BougainvilleYellow-
43d Inf Div, Reinf White #1, #2 &#3
Crlmeon 1LSV TransDiv28
6th Inf Dlv, Reinf Blue
Hollandla& Yellow-
37th Inf Div, Reinf Yellow - Crimson
TransDiv28
Morotal Crimson 1LSI
40th Inf Div, Reinf Orange - Green
BougainvilleYellow-
Crimeon 4APA
TransDiv 8
By command of Lieutenant General KEUEGER:
BougainvilleYellow-
Crimson 1AlA
TraneDivg
BougainvilleYellow-
Crimson 8LST
Leyte Yellow-
G.H.DECKER,
Crimson 1LST
BougainvilleYellow-
ChiefofStaff.
Crimson 12LSM
TotalsYellow-CrimsonBach 15,420 17,400
OFFICIAL:
TotalsS-Dy 3 1 . ^ 35,100
G-3.
128
A. P. 0 . 442
10001, 29 November 1944
Biak
Yellow 4 LST 1,200 2, 400
Di rect
Army, Air Force &Navy Tows Slow convoy
ANNEX 6d t o TO 3 4 . Assi gnment of s hi ppi ng , 158th RCTRei nf orced, ( correct ed Cc
FROM TO Bj EACH* NO&TYPg TR0QB5 TONS
mtm
G
Milne Bay &
Oro say White No.2 1 Lib Ship
Troop Ship
Noemf oor Red 10 APD 1. 440
Tr ans Di v A
Totals s / 12 Day
Noemf oor Red
3 APA 3. 900 1.500
Tr ans Di v "A
Aitape&
Noemfoor Red 1AM 250 2,000 Tr a ns Di v "A
Noemfoor Red 2 LST 600 1,200
Morotai Red 600
Leyte White No.3 4 LST
2 LST 1,200
Milne say
Noemfoor&
Blue 1 Lib ship
Troop Ship
Sansapor Red 1 LST 300 6O0
Totals s / 18Day
Total s
7.090 6,500
S_ / 30
Biak uni te 6 LST 4,800
Holland!a white 9 LST 7,200
<orotai 100 1 LST 800 Rr a o hs
Hollandia sl ue 1 LST 800
jpemfoor Rd 1 LST 200 800 Rr Bchs
Aitape White 1 LST 800
Noemfoor Red 1 l i b Ship 200 2,000 Rr EDhs
Totals s/ 30 Day 3,400 13,600
Total s
500 3,600
S/ 40
BEACH DESIGNATIONS
Finsohhafen white 10 LST 2,000 8,000
158th RCT, Rei nf. Red
Snirau White 1 LST 200 800
43d Inf Di v, Rei nf. White #1, #2, &
m Milne, OroBay.
6th Inf Div, Rei nf. Blue
Finschhafen &
37t h i nf Di v, Rei nf . Yellow-Crimson
Gloucester white 6 LSI 6,000 3,000
40th Inf Di v, Rei nf . Orange-Green
oro B*y tfhite 2 lib ships 400 4,000
Finschhafen white 1 lib Ship 200 2.000
NOTE: 40 EWT of a v i a t i o n s uppl i e s wi l l be l oaded on a l l LSTs
l e a v i ng Hol l andi a, Bi ak, Ms rot ai , Oro Bay, and s ans apor,
Totals S/ 40 Day 8,800 17,800
f or theS / 2, s / 4 . andS/ 5 eohel ons
BEACH DESIGNATIONS
By conmand of Li eutenant General KRUSGERi
43d Inf Div,Reinf White No.1, No.2 No. 3
6th Inf Div, Reinf Blue
37th Inf Div, Reinf Yellow-crimson
C. H.DECKER, 40th inf Div, Reinf arange-creen
Brigadier General, G.S. C ,
Chief of St af f . NOTEt 40 DWTof avi ati on supplies wi l l be loaded ona l l LSTs
leaving Bollandia, Biak, Morotai, OroBay,andSansapor
for thes / 2 , s / 4,ends/5 echel ons.
Ry command of Lieutenant General KRUEGERJ
OFFICIAL:
G-3
G. H.DECKER,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff.
OFFICIAL:
A. P. 0 . 442
G-3
10001, 29 November 1944
ANNEX 6 t o F03 4 , Assi gnment of Shi ppi ng, Si xt h Army Se r vi c e Commend. (Corrected
Copy)
FROM TC BEACH* Nj } & 'rypg TROOIS TONS REMARKS
S-DAY
Hollandia Thita 1 LSD 300 700 Trans Div 7
HEADQUARTERS SIXTHARMT
A. P. 0. 442
S_/ 1
1000129November1944
Morotai Yellow -
ANNEX6ftoF034,AssignmentofShipping,AirForceandHavalUnits.
Crimson LST 1, 200 2,400
4
(CorrectedCopy)
3_/ 2
TOBEACH* NO &TYPE TROOPS TONS SERVICE REMARKS
FHOM
250 Trans
Finschhafen flhite ND. 2 1 AKA 2,000 Div5
S-DAT
Finsohhafen WhiteNo. 2 1 APH 1,300 200 Trans Div5
I/ilneBay White NO- 2 1 APA 1,300 500 Trans Div5
Hollandia Blue 50 Air 0 . 1 LST w/I Corps
Morotai Yellow -
Units
Crimson 2 LST 600 1,200
Sansapor Blue 25 Air 0 . 1 LST w/I Corps
Hollandia WhiteNO. 3 1 LST 300 600
Units
Aitape White 25
Air 0 . 1 LST w/I Corps
Total s S / 2 Day 3.750 4,500
Units
Gloucester Yellow-
S/ 4
25 Air 0.1LSTv/XIVCorps
Crimson
Units
300 600
Blue 1 LST Leyte
Bougai nvi l l e Orange -
Morotai Yellow -
75 Air 0.2LSTW/XIVCorps
Crimson 6 LST 1,800 3,600 Green Units
Biak WhiteNO. 2 7 LST 2,100 4,200 300 600 Air
Finschhafen WhiteND. 3
LST 600 White No3 1 /_ Toem 1
Ship 500 Troop Ship
Oro Bay WhiteNo. 2 1 lib 2, 000 500 600
Hollandia WhiteNO. 2 2 Ub ship* 1,000 4,000 Troop Ships Total s
Blue 1 lib Ship 500 2,000 Troop Ship
riLak gl ue 2 Ub ShiP 1,000 4,000 Troop Ships
Lee Whit*NO. 2 1 Ship Toem
Ub
500 2,000 Troop Ship
WhiteNo 31LST 300 600'Air
Bri sbane,
Townsvi l l e
MilneBy
WhiteNo* 2 1 Ub
_ 5 o o 2,000 Troop Ship
Leyte Orange-
Q J. k m r
8.J0 *5.ooo
Green 3LST 900 1,800 Air
129
Noemfoor Yellow HEADQUARTERSSIXTHARMY
Crimson 3LST 900 1,800 Air A.P.0.442
Leyte Yellow 0.1LSTw/6thArmy 1000129November1944
Crimson 25 Air Units
Hollandia Yellow ANNEX7atoFO34,LoadingandLandingSchedule,SixthArmyTroops.
Crisson 25
Air 0.1LSTw/6thArmy
Units
(C (CorrectedCopy)
UNIT PERSONNEL VEHICLES REMARKS
Noumea Blue 25
Air 0.1LSTw/25th
S-DAY
Koemfoor Red 25 Air
InfDiv
0.1 LST w/l58th
HCT
2LST's-LeytetoBlueBeach
1LST -LeytetoYellow-CrimsonBeach
Totals 1,900 3,600 556thEngrHvyPonBn(lessDet) 300 145
Miscellaneouspersonnel 50 0
LLH
PressCorrespondents
1011thEngrTreadvayBridgeCo
35
120
0
6 (Bulk)Equipment
Sansapor Orange
Green
-
4 LST 1,200 2,400 Air
willarrivedirect
ETAunknown
Morotai Yellow 1LST -LeytetoBlueBeach
Crimson 3 LST 1,200 1,800 Air
Sansapor Orange -
Green 1 Lib Ship 500 2.000 Air Troop Ship
Miscellaneouspersonnel
PressCorrespondents
50
35
0
0
Totals 2,900 6,200
GHQpersonnel
Eq&HqCo,SixthArmy
39
10
3
0
Det,ASCOM 15
10 ASCOMUnit
Det,BaseM 12 2 ASCOMUnit
Leyte bellow-
Det,Hq4HqCo,5202dEngrCons
Brigade 10 4
Koenfoor
Crimson
Yellow-
Crimson
1LST
LST
300
1,200 2,
600
4oo
Air
Air
171atOrdBombDlspSqd
172dOrdBombDispSqd
671stEngrTopoCo(leesDet)
7
7
1
10
7
7
I
1
CorpsUnit
Biak Crane*-
Green 2LST 600 1, 200 Air
Hq4HqCo,1136thEngrConeGp
(lessDet) 10 6 ICorpsUnit
Hollandia Yellow- Det,l6thSigOpnsBn
8 2
Crinson 2LST 600 1, 200 Air Note! AnyremainingspacecanbeusedbyEngineerUnits
Totals 2,700 5, 4oo 1LSD -OroBaytoBlueBeach
s4-12 4thESB(less3B4SRegts,MedBn,3
BoatMaintCosandDet,l64thOrd
Milne- MaintCo)(lessDet) 220 30
Sansapor4
Finschhafen Red
BnuriinvilleYellow-
Crimson
Emirau Yellow-
1LST
1LibShip
300
500
600
2,000
Navy
Air
PTAdvBase
TroopShip
TomovefromBougainvilleonXIVCorps
Shipping112thSigR.I.Co(lessDet)
S41
1LST -LeytetoBlueBeach
121
Criason
Smimu,
GreenIsland,
Bougainville
&Munda Yellow-
1LibShip 500 2,000 Air TroopShip
Hq4HqCo,SixthArmy
Det,738thMPBn
l6thSigOpnsBn(leesDet)
GHQ,USASOSSigOpnsGp(Prov)
&
90
12
15
24
Criasron 1+LibShips 2.000 8.000 Air TroopShips
(lessDet)
VHPTeamF,989thSigServCo
117
26
20
4
Totals 3,300 12,600
1Plat,48thQMGrRegCo 21
3
ASCOMUnit
Det,274thCmlServPlat 2 0 ICorpsUnit
Det,275thCmlServPlat 21 0 ICorpsUnit
Leyte
MilneBay-
Milne-
Hollpudia4
Yellow-
Cj-i,r.=on
I?ed
1
5
LST
LST
200
1,500
800
3,000
Air
Navy
l6thSigOpnsBn(lessDet)
Det,GHQUSASOSSigOpnsGp(Prov)
Hq4HqCo,5202dEngrConsBrig
(lessDet)
VHFTeamE,989thSigServCo
90
163
10
26
24
29
4
4
Red
1LST Navy
Totals
Hq4HqDet,135thMedBn(Sep)
3^ 8 XIVCorpsUnit
1Plat,CoA,99thSigBn
97 35
Morotai
Biak
Yellow -
Crimson
Yellow -
2 LST 400 1,600 Air
Hq4HqCo,SixthArmy
AirSupportParty
Hq4HqDet,135thMedGp
Det,ASCOM
U
8
13
4
9
5 ASCOMUnit
Crimson 4 LST 800 3,200 Air
1LST-HollandiatoBlueBeach
Eollandia Yellow -
Crimson 1 LST 200 800 Air
BtryA,289thFAObsnBn(lessDet) 140 30 XIVCorpsUnit
Morotai Yellow -
408thMedCollCo(lessDet) 12 XIVCorpsUnit
Crimson 1 Lib Ship
95
601stQMGrRegCo(less4Plats4
Direct (US) H
e
d 1 Lib Ship
Troop Ship
DetCoHq) 36 4
Det,Hq4HqCo,13thArmdGp 15 4
t ot al s 1,900 9,100
NavalMblCommUnit40A 100 22 NavalUnit
S 4 35
4 LCI' s - Leyte t o Blue Be a ch
Direct (US) Red 1 Lib Ship 800 6,000 Navy Troop Ship
6t h Ranger Inf Bn 498
To move from Aitape on I Corps shi ppi ng
BEACH DESIGNATIONS
6 l l t h Ord Am Co 186 16
43d Inf Div, Reinf White #1, #2 &#3
To movs from Sansapor on I Corps Shipping
6th Inf Div, Reinf Blue
37th Inf Div, Reinf Yellow - Crimson
17th Rad Sta Sec, 832d Sig Serv Bn 20
40t h Inf Div, Reinf Orange - Green
NOTE: UoDWTofaviationsupplieswillbeloadedonallLSTsleaving
Hollandia,Biak,Morotai,OroBay,andSansaporfortheS/2,S 1LST -LeytetoBlueBeach
andS/5echelons.
GHQ
200 70
727thAmphTracBn(lessCoB) 326
97
G.H.DECKER,
632dTDBn(lessDet) 737
153
BrigadierGeneral,G.S.C. 44th Tk Bn (l ess Co C) (less D
e
t) 579
154
ChiefofStaff. Det, l6th Sig OpnsBn 14
S
18
Det, 6th Ranger Inf B
n
17
1 LST - Morotai to Blue Beach
230 ASCOM Uni t
6l6th Port Co
G-3.
130
CoA,436thSlgConsBa(lessDet) 202
60
Det,Hq4HqCo,931stXagrOp 12
4
DetM",3170thSigServBn
145 8 ASCOMUnit
64lstXagrCamouflageCo
55 0
1LST -SaasaportoOrange-GreenBeach
642dXngrCamouflageCo
55 10
CoC,98thSlgCOBS B n 202
83 - XIV Corps Unit
3LST's-MorotaitoWhiteBeach#3
3LST'B-Morotalto
Y
ellov-CrimsonBeach 1876thIngrAvnBn(lessDet)
650 200
1LST -MorotaltoBlueBeach 1LST -MorotaltoBlueBeach
235
S4lstXagrAvnBn(lessDet) 750 436thSigConsBn(leesCoA)
210
70
5LST's-LeytetoOrangeBeach
3LST'B-HollaadiatoBlueBeach
12thAirSuptParty 22 4
1962dXngrAvnDepCo
218 17 ASCOMUnit
Hq4HqCo,13thArmdOp(lessDel 83 22 689thXngrBaseEoulpCo(lessDet)
150 70
186thIngr(0)Bn(HD)(lessDet) 600 180 863dEngrAvnBn(lessDet)
750 230
782dIngrPetrolDiatCo 224 40 263dMedBn(ESB)(less3Cos)
47 9
2LST
1
a-LeytetoWhiteBeach#3
1Liberty-HollandlatoBlueBeach
1913thEngrAvnBn(lessDet) 400
120 442dCICDet
15 6
Ho4HqDet,12thOrdBn(Comp)
17 6
3LST's-OroBaytoWhiteBeach#3 163dPOWProcCo
117 14
Hq4HqBtry,191stFAGp
99
2?
775thTkBn(lessDet) 701 166 Det,186thEngr(C)Ba(HD)
37 36
PCAUnits#18,19and22 147 33 ICorpsUaits
695thEngrBaseEquipCo
173 90
Hq4HqDet,473dQMBn(Mbl) 19 3
TomovefromroBayonASCOMShipping
1APA -LeytetoBlueBeach
264th
M
edBn(ESB)(lessCosA4C)164 164
27
Hq4HqCo,SixthArmy
(availableif
Plat,92dQMHhdCo
75 3
needed)
Det, BaseM 320 20 ASCOMUnit
TomovefromMilneBayonASCOMShipping
Det,ASCOM 60 ASCOM Unit 25
Hq4HqDet,169thOrdBn
35 6
738thMPBn(lessDet) 200 15 511thOrd*ryMaintCo(HeldArmy) 198 33
39thQMWarDogPlat 26 2
TomovefromToemonASCOMShipping
1APA -LaeandOroBaytoBlueBeach
580thOrdAmCo 186 16
Det,4thESB(less3B&SBegts,Med
Ba, 3BoatMaintCosandDet,
TomovefromMorotalonASCOMShipping
164thOrdMaintCo) 510
30 From Oro Bay
Det,981stMedAmbCo 46 18 From Lae (HT
Hq4HqCo,931stEngrAvnConsGp
Corps Unit) (leesDet)
48 11
579thOrdAmCo 186 16 From Oro Bay
4
6
4096thQMServCo 219
622dPortCo 230
From Oro Bay
- / < - / /
S 4- 5
From Lae ( I
1AEA -OroBayandMilneBaytoBlueBeach
983dMedAmi)Co 93
3444thQMTrkCo 110
Hq4HqDet,489thPortBn 23
PCAUnits#20421 98
Det,4thESB(less3B&SBegts,Med
Bn, 3BoatMaintCosandDetl64th
OrdMaintCo) 10
TomovefromHoumeaon25thInfDivShipping
25thInfDlv 13.929
TomovefromFinschhafenonASCOMShipping
s
22
1,800
Corps Unit)
FromOroBay
FromOroBay
FromMilneBay
(XIVCorps)
FromOroBay
(400DVTBulk)
(OroBay)
5 LST's - Leyte to Blue Beach
1491st Ingr Maint Co
191
750
1879th Engr Avn Bn ( l es s Det)
1 LST - Leyte to Vhite Beach #3
277
Det, 1913th Engr Avn Bn
TechIntTeam#3 15
1Plat,CoB,442dSigConsBn
96
PCAUnits#5and6 98
Det,16thSigOpnsBn 145
VHFTeamA,989thSigCo 26
CoA,99thSigBn(less1Plat)
lessDet
4o
24 LCT's - Leyte to Blue Beach (separate
68
220
60
7 ASCOMUnit
38
ASCOMUnit
22
4o
4
20
6
5
convoy) Hq4HqDet,259thOrdBa 35
Det,253dOrdMaintCo(AA) 27
Det,759thEngrPartsSupCo 120
0 489th AAAAVBn 725 116
439thEngrDepCo(lessDet) 189
20
SLOWCONVOY-Direct-Army,HavyandAir"Force IOVB
TomovefromKoemfooron158thECTShipping
S ^12
20thHadStaSec,832dSlgServBn 20
5LSM's-LeytetoBlueBeach
ASCOM ( l e s s Dets) 15 10 ASCOMUnit
Base M ( l es s Dets)
4 Hn Co, Sixth Army
75
275
33
25
ASCOMUnit
GHQ 2 70
lote:"UseanyremainingspaceforArmySigUnitsfromS/18Echelon.
1Liberty-XmlrautoBlueand
Y
ellov-CrimsonBeach
1stCensorshipAreaDet
PCAUnits#3&4
Det,Plat,28l3tPigeon
Hq4HqCo,5202dEngrConsBrig
(lessDets) ,
69thEngrTopoCo(lessDet)
1stBadStaSec,832dSigServBn
Det,l6thSigOpnsBn
Det,GHQUSASOS,SigOpasOp
Det,671stEngrTopo.Co
21stMedSupPlat(Avn)
33dCrimlaalIavestigatlngSec
Det,189thQMOasSupCo
37
98
15
89
60
20
W 5
140
40
21
15
30
8
22
4
21
12
1
40
24
10
ICorpsUnit
XITCorpsUnit
471stAAAAVBn(lessBtryD)
573dEngrDumpTrkCo
Hq4HqDet,490thQMBa
Det,Hq4HqBtry,l4thAAAOp
1Liberty-FinschhafentoBlueBeach
Det,1679thXngrServDet
(Surveyliaison)
Hn4HqBtry,l68thTAOp
7&0thFABn(155How)(lessDet)
Det,759thEngrPartsSupCo
291stSlgHadarMalntUnit(TypeC)
624
107
17
40
2
99
526
186
106
58
3
6
Bulk
29
125
10
9
ASCOMUnit
ASCOMUnit
ASCOMUnit
(attached518thAAAGunBn)
1420thIngrMobSLMaintTeam
4
3
4
2 ICorpsUait
506thIngrLightPoaCo(lessDet 190
PCAUnit#8 ^
PCAUnit#7 *5
Hq4HqCoSixthArny fp5
Det OHQUSASOSSlg0paaOp(Prov) 140
Det,CoA,99thSigBa(less1Plat) 45
4l4thIngrDumpTrkCo(lessDet) 89
75
11
11
41
25
22
30
(XIVCorpsUnit)
(158thBCTUnit)
(20Trkstomobile
loadHqsSixthArmy)
1Liberty-OroBaytoBlueBeach
Det,4th1SB(less3B4SHegts,Med
Bn, 3BoatMaintCos4Det,l64th
QrdMaintCo)
472dFABa(105How)
12thReplacementBa(lessDet)
I30
491
150
49
120
2 ASCOMUnit
14thHadStaSec,832dSigServBa 20
1Liberty-FlaschhafentoBlueBeach
131
Hq4HqDet,804thMPBn ASCOMUnit Det,408thMedCollCo 10 6 XIVCorpaUnit
38 9
251stFABn(105How) 120 237thQMLdryPlat (Houp)TypeB
491
792dBaseDepCo(TC) 121
5
ASCOMUnit (atchd4lstFieldHosp) 33 1 XIV CorpsUnit
Det,586thSlgDepCo 48 4 ASCOMUnit 234thQMLdryPlat (Hosp)TypeB
26thArmyHed Lab
58 9
ASCOMUnit (atchd21stEvacHosp) 33 1 XIVCorpsUnit
127thQMBfcpyCo 168
4
ASCOMUnit 235thQMLdryPlat (Hosp)TypeB
Det,4l4thIngrDpTrkCo 18
15 1 XIV CorpsUnit
35thCriminalInvestigating Sec
15 4 ICorpsUnit
(atchd 17thEvacHosp) 33
Unit 6 5250thTechIntCompCo
(sep)(Prov) 14
5
XIVCorpsUnit
1Liberty-0roBayandMilneBaytoBlueBeach
15 FromMilneBay
To move from Bougai nvi l l e on XIV Corps Shipping
Det, 3819thQMGasSupCo 10
(ASCOMUnit)
21 FromMilneBay
Det, 112th Si g R I Co 53 745thEngrHvyShopCo 171
(ASCOMUnit)
Det,4thESB(less3B4SRegts,MedBn,
To move from Noumea on 25th Inf Dlv Shipping 3BoatMaint Cos&Det,l64thOrd
Maint Co) 26
25 FromOroBay
518th AAAGun Bn 640
97 Det, 775thTkBn 50 50 FromOroBay
Btry D, 471st AAAAW Bn 29 517thOrdHvyMaint Co (FieldArmy) 198 33 FromOroBay
TomovefromBougainville onXIVCorps Shipping
1519thEngrWaterSupCo 136
20 (Detmayarriveon
S/12)
585thEngrDumpTrkCo (ASCOM) SixthArmy 49 32 32 Det, 112thSigRICo
TomobileloadHq8
34thMRU 58 20
465thFABn (8"Hov) 569
Hq&HqCo,SixthArmy 690 s Organicvehicles 1Liberty-Sansapor andBiaktoBlueBeach
6thMal SurvUnit 13 4
7thMalContlUnit 12 8 3874thQMGasSupCo(less2dPlat) 74 50 From Sansapor
Det,CoA,99thSigBn 22 20 112thQMBkryCo(less2Plats) 110 2 From Sansapor
CoA,826thAmphTracBn 202 56
(ASCOMUnit)
Det, 738thMPBn 321 62 571stEngrDumpTrkCo 107 58 From Sansapor
l6O3dEngrMapDepDet 11 2 Det,689thEngrBaseEquipCo 23 20 FromBiak
1623dEngrModelMakingDet 27 0 Det,863dEngrAvnBn 27 25 FromBiak
Det.64lstEngrCamCo 15 0 Det, 510thEngrLPonCo 35 25
FromBiak
Det, 642dEngrCamCo 15 10 (ICorpsUnit)
15thQMCarPlat
31 22 3dSec,3dPlat,286thQMRefrlgCo 8 From Sansapor
Plat,28thQMCarCo 22 (ASCOMUnit)
35
MiscellaneousRearEchelons
155thFinDiibSec 20 1
189thFinDisbSec 20 1
11thAirCargoResupplySq 210
17 3LST's-EmirautoBlueBeach
Det,CoA,99thSigBn 10 22
Det,l6thSigOpnBn 50 54 Hq4HqBtry, l4thAAAGp(leesDet) 30
9
13
J
983dFABn(155Gun) 737thAAAGunBn 640
539 133
1Plat, 281etSigPigeonCo 725thAAASLBtry(Sep) 230 56
(lessDet) 23
1Liberty-FinschhafentoBlueBeach
l6j9thEngrServDet (SurveyLiaison)
(lessDet) 10 0 Det, 760thFABn(155How) 50 25
Det,671stEngrTOpoCo 35 10 ICorpsUnit Det,981stMedAmb Co 47 19 XIV CorpsUnit
Det, 1136thEngrCons p 60 12 ICorpsUnit 253dOrdMaint Co(AA) 163 38
Det,506thEngrLtPonCo 12 28 292dSigRadarMaintUnit (TypeC)
Det,69thEngrTopoCo 60 8 (Atchd737thAAAGunBn) 4
Det,GHQ 50 10 98thSigRadarMaintUnit (TypeA)
Det,556thEngrHvyPonBn 90 60 (Atchdto725thAAASLBtry)(Sep) 5 4
Det,44thTkBn (lessCoC) 50 38 959thOrdHAM Co 211
39
Det,632dTDBn 50
TomovefromFinschhafen onASCOM Shipping
1Liberty-AitapeandHollandiatoBlueBeach
Det,439thEngrDepCo 20
694thFABn(105How) 4gi 120 FromHollandia
21stOrdMMCo 169 1+5 FromAitape Bycommand ofLieutenantGeneralKRUEGER: /
Det "K",3169thSigServBn 54 7 FromHollandia
ASCOMUnit
TomovefromBougainville on*IVCorpsShipping
Det, 112thSigHICo 1+7 G.H.DECKER,
131stAGFBand 37
BrijsdierGeneral,G.S.C.
Chief ofStaff.
TomovefromMilneBayonASCOM Shipping
318thOrdDepCo 28 OFFICIAL:
S418'(Separate Convoy)
1LSDfromHollandiatoBlueBeach
2LSD'sfromToemtoBlueBeachand
3LSD'efromMorotaitoBlueBeach
Det, 1060thEngrPortCons4RepGp 43 20 ASCOMUnit Hollandia
(1/2LSD)
Det "M", 3170thSigServBn 356
23 ASCOMUnitHollandia
ESBcraft loadedwithM-lRearEchelons
S430 A.P.0.442
10001, 29 November 1944
2LST's-Morotai toBlueBeach
ANNEX 7b_to FO 34, Loading and Landing Schedule, Si xth Amy Servi ce Comnand,
Det,Hq4HqCo,931stEngrConeGp 34 10
(Corrected Copy)
Det,84lstEngrAvnBn 27 20
UNI
'
r
Det, 1876thEngrAvnBn 127 55 PERSONNEL VEHICLES REMARKS
Det,436thSigConsBn(Avn)(lees
Det,CoA) 49
3-DAY
CoB, 796thEngrForestryBn 155 21 ASCOMUnit
1 LSD - Hollandia to White Beach No. 2
849thOrdDepCo(lessDet) 86 .17 ASCOMUnit
1060th Engr P C&R Gp ( l e s s Det)
4LST's-HollandiatoBlueBeach 200 20
To Move from Leyte on Auny Shipping:
CoC,2dFilipinoBn 190 15
544thFABn(240mm) 489
DetASCOM
Det, 1913thEng-AvnBn 200 75
15 10
Det Base II
165thLdryPlat (TypeA)(atchd 12 2
80thGenHosp) 47 1 ASCOMUnit
177thQMLdryPlat (TypeB)(atchd
S / 1 A
251st StaHoip) 33 1 ASCOMUnit
4 LSTs - Morotai to Yellow-Crimaon Beach
Det, 1879thEngrAvnBn 27 35
Det,BtryA,289thFAbenBn 10 9 IIVCorpsUnit
836th Engr Avn Bn 777
255
132
To h.ove from Leyte on Army Shipping:
1 L3T - Leyto to Blue Beach
Det ASCOU
40
1 Pl at , 48th QMGr Reg Co
21
Det, ,,3CCM
80
Det, Base M 40
To kove from Biak and Vorotal on I Corps Shipping: Hqtr. Hq,Det, 229th Crd Pese Gp 41
6
276th Sig Cons Co (l oss Det) ISO
47
Det Hq &Hq Co, 1178th Sngr Cons Gp 25
FK: Biak (Blue
1 Liberty - Brisbane, Townsville and Kline Bay to ,-Mte Beach No. 2
Beach)
Det Hq &Hq Oo, 1180th Sngr Cons Gp 25
PV: Korotai
577 Ord Am Co i s6
16 Brisbane
(White Beach 3)
615th Ord AmCo ( l ess Det) 175
15 Townsville
774th Engr Dump Trk Co 107
To Llove from Bougainville on XIV Corps Shipping: 58 fcllne Bay
3819th .<*,:Gas ûp Co 128
20 Milne Bay
Hq&Hq Det, 189th Ord Bn 35
4075th QM?3rv Co 219 6 Milne Array Unit
511th Ord Hvy toint Co (Field Army) 193
33 Milne rmy Unit
2 LSTs - Morotal to Yellow-Crimson Beach
491st $:. Dep Sup Co ( l es s 2d Pl at) 147
1 Liberty - Oro Bay to '.Vhite Beach No. 2
617th Engr Base Equip Co 173
90 465th Amph Trk Co 184
58
Hq&Hq Det, 1180th ilngr Cons Gp
Co D, 720th MPBn 155
20
( l es s Det)
69 18 Hq&. Hq Det, 29th QJG Bn 19
3
1384th Engr Pet Dist Co
224 20 4281st QM Dep Sup Co 192
2
849th Ord Dep Co ( l es s Det)
100 6 3446th Q> Trk Co n o
60
Pl at, 92d JJJ Rhd Co 75
3 Anny Unit
1 LST - Hollandia to V/hite Beach No. 3
264th Med Bn (ESB)(less Cos At C) 164
27 Army Unit
Det "M", 3169th 31g Serv Bn 209
14
Co C, 60th Sig Bn 192 57
68 2 1 Liberty - Lae to rthlte Beach No. 2
Det "M", 3170th i31g Serv Bn
4139th -MSgrv Co 219
4
1 APA - Kilne Bay to ,Vhite Beach No. 2
3579th # Trie Co Ho
60
40 9 I Corps Unit 811th Amph Trk Co 184
58
613th Port Co ( l es s Det)
814th MPCo 170
Hq&Hq Det, 5208th Sngr Serv Gp
218 26
93d Cml Comp Co
219 4 2 Liberties - Hollandia to rfhlte Beach No 2
4137th QM Serv Co
31 4 22
132 11
3294th Sig Base Dep Co
230 9 334th Gen Dlsp 39
3
614th Port Co
230 " 9
5212th Sngr Serv GpHq 31
4
615th Port Co
60 DiVTs
Det, 1060th P C&RGp 10
10
20 - Navy Outboard fcotor Riggings 1361st 107 Engr Dump Trk Co
58 (? iVhether gets
1 APHand 1 AKA - Finschhafen to iThite Beach No. 2 here from US)
49th Med Dep Co 150 23
852d Port Co IIP Escort Guard Co (Prov) 135 6
230 4
99th Sig Radar Malnt Team (Type A) 5 4 XIV Corps Unit
70th APU 13 1
Det, 615th Ord AmCo 11 0
12th Postal Reg Sec 32 2
9th Mai Contl Unit 12 3
693d '$1Trk Co 110 60
Hq& Hq Det, 9th "Ord Bn 35 6
5213th Engr Serv Gp 31 4
212th Ord KAM Co 120 45
58th Med Base Dep Co 47 5
Hq&Hq Det, 259th Ord Bn 35 6 Army Unit
3477th QM Trk Co 110 60
191st 31g Rad Kaint Unit (Tyse A)
Hq&Hq Det, 387th Port Bn 23 5
(Atchd 373d AAA 3L 3n) 5 4 XIV Corps Unit
Pl at, 491st Dep Sup Co 52 2
295th Si g Rad Kaint Unit (Type C)
99th Mod Conp Co 5 3
(Atchd 70th AA Gun Bn) 4 4 XIV Corps Unit
173 tt Ord HAM Co 211 36
Det, 253d Ord Kaint Co (AA) 27 5 Army Unit
Ho. Co &Co B, 52d Sig Bn ( l ess Det) 275 62 (ForGHi})
Det, 759th Sngr Parts Sup Co 120 0 Army Unit
439th Sngr Dep Co ( l eas Det) 189 20 Army Unit 1 Liberty - Toem and Biak to Blue Beach
629th Ord AmCo ( l e s s Det) 95 6
984th tyu Serv Co 219 4 812th Amph Trk Co ( l ess 1 Plat) 148 42 Toem
243d Fort Co 230 9 580th Ord An Co 186 16 ToemAnnyUnit
569th 3J< Rhd Co 184 10 XIV Corps Unit 1 Pl at , 812th AmpTrk Co 36 16 Biak
Det, 5252d ngr Base Dep Gp 20 4 3452d $L Trk Co 110 60 Biak
100th Sig Radar toint Team (Type A)
(Atchd 373d AAASL Bn) 5 XIV Corps Unit 2 Liberties - Biak to Blue Beach
- / 4
V7 Hq&Hq Det, 1178th Engr Cons Gp
( l ess Det) 69 18
on Amy Shipping
1896thEngrAvnBn 777 255
650thFortCo 230 9
616th Port Co 230 9 Morotai
41stFieldHosp 211 22 XIVCorpsUnit
De t , JUOCOM 60 25 Leyte
De t, BaseM 320 20 Leyte
ToMovefromBougainvilleandGloucesteronXIVCorpsShipping:
i New Georgia on XIV Corps Ship]
77thMedCompUnit(MaiContl) 12 Gloucester
37thMedCompUnit(MaiCont) 12 Bougainville
_
3349th & Trie Co ( l es s Det) 65
_
New Georgia
110thMaiContlUnit 12 Bougainville
Hq&Hq Det, 493d (#i Bn 17 3 Bougainville
423dMelSurvUnit 13 Bougainville
742d l..ed Jan Co ( l es s Det) 93 1 Green Island
213thMaiSurvUnit 13 Bougainville
712th Ued Jan Co ( l es s Det) 87 1 New Georgia
718th lied San So ( l ess Det) 88 1 Bougainville ToUovefromLeyteandHollandlaonArmyShipping:
1962dEngrAvnDepCo 218 17 Leyte
Det"M",3170thSigServBn 145 8 Hollandla
3 LSTs - BiEk to VJhite Beach #2
828th iingr Avn Bn ( l es s Det) 577 180
4LSTs-BiaktoYellowBeach
4 LSTs - Biak to .'mite BeachtfZ
810thEngrAvnBn 777 255
10th lal Contl Unit 12 4 I Corps Unit
777 255 TomovefromLeyteonAnnyShipping:
864th Sngr Avn Bn
38 0
1PUt,CoB442dSigConsBn 96 38
Det M, 3169th Sig Serv Bn
15 7 TechIntTeamNo.3
6 LSTs - Morotai to Yellow Beach
901 235 To Move from Hollandia and Leyte on organic shipping In tow (slow convoy):
32 4
803d Army Marine Ship ep Co 84 2
43d Kngr Cons Bn
Hq &Hq Det, 373d Port Bn
48 11 Amy Unit 757th Sngr Parts Sup Co 174 10
Hq&Hq Co, 931st Engr Cons Gp
117 18 XlV Corpa Unit 495th Engr Hv Shop Co 171 32
( l es s Det)
21 4 XlV Corpa Unit
607th Med Clr Co J
55th Med Sup Pl at (Avn) S / 12
Rear Echelons, 836th Engr Avn 3n
Rear Echelon, 617ta Engr Baae Equip Co 1 Liberty - Milne ây and Oro Bay to "ftiite Beach No. 2:
Ulac Air Force Equip Personal
1 LST - Flnachaff en to White Beach #3 360th Sta Hosp (500 bed) 353 13 Milne Bay
769th Sngr Dump Trk Co
107 58 Oro Bay
189 25
191st Ord Dep Co
92d QM Rhd Co ( l ess 1 Plat) 95 10 Oro Bay
84 35
3473d QM Txk Co ( l ass Det)
3525th QM Trk Co 110 60 Oro Bay
790th Railway Oper Co
142 2
Hqk Hq Det, 473d QM Gp 26 7 Oro Bay
40 10 XIV Corpa Unit
Pl at , 189th QMGas Sup Co
Det, 12th Replacement Bn 13 12 Oro Bay
851st Port Co
230 4
133
To Move from Aitape on I Corps Shipping to rfhite Beach No. 3:
ToKovefromMorotal,KilneBayandHollandiaon..rmyShipping:
316th <MBkry Co ( l oss 1 Plat) 128 3 Det,3819th.<UGasSupCo 10 15 MilneBay
CoB,796thEngrForestryBn 155 21 Morotai
To Move from Bougainville, Green Island and New Georgia OnXIV Corps Shipping: 849thOrdDepCo(lessDet) 86 17 Morotai
165thqmLdryFlat (TypeA)(Atchd
Det, 3349th :&Trk Co 45 NewGeorgia 80thGenHosp) 47 1 Hollandia
29 3 Bougainville 177thQKLdryPlat(TypeB)(Atchd
Det, 718th Ked oan Co
Det, 742d Ked 3an Co
25 3 CreenIsland 251stStaHosp) 33 1 Hollandia
Det, 712th Med Jan Co 30 3 NewGeorgia
To Kove from Kilne Bay on Army Shipping:
BayonArmyShipping:
'745th 2apx Hvy Shop Co _1?A_
21
12thReplacementBn(lessDet) 160 2 OroBay
127th,jMBkryCo 168 4 Flnschhafen _35
573d Engr Dump Trk Co 107 58 Emirau
Hq & Hq De t , 490t h ><MBn 17 3 Emlrau To Move from Sansepor on Army Shipping:
792dBaseDepCo(TC) 121 5 Finschhafen
107thStaHosp(250bed) 186 9 Finschhafen 112th #1 Bkry Co ( l es s 2 Flas) 110 2
26thArmyMedLab 58 9 Finschhafen
Det,586SigDepCo 48 4 Finschhafen 3d Sec, 3d Pl at , 286th QMRefrig Co 8 7
HqIt Hq Det, 804th MPBn 38 9 Finschhafen
To Kove from Bougainville on XIV Corps Shipping:
To Kove from Leyte on LSMs (Amy Shipping x 7a): ;Anne Annex7a):
4076th .)- derv Co 219 4
ASCOM ( l es s Dets) 15 10
38th Mai Contl Unit 12 3
Det, Base M 75 33
1st Ked Corap Unit (Kal Contl) 12 3
22d Spec Serv Co 125 15
1 Pl at , 482d 3K Refrig Co (Kob) 30 , - 7
4 LSTs - Leyte to White Beach #3:
10LSTs- Finschhafento .hiteBeach
Det, 276th Sig Cons Co 22 28
Det, ASCOM 50 10
3460th f$ Trk Co
110 60
Det, 3292d Sig Base Vialat Co 17 4
1872d Engr Avn Bn ( l ess Det) 700 190
34th Criminal Investigating Sec 15 4
in 58
585th -ingr Dump Trk Co 107 26 (.i2Trkstomobile
211th Ord MAK Co 120 45
loadHqSixthArmy
307th Ord Malnt Co (AA) 163 38
Annex7a_)
523d Ord Hv Maint Co (Field Arty) 198 33
Sig Corps Photo Lab portable)(GHQ) 11 4
874th Engr Avn Bn ( l ess Det) 700 190
442d Sig Cons Bn ( l ess 1 Plat) 357 140 586th Sig Dep Co (l esa Det) 93 17
Det, BaseU 365 17 99th Ord Hvy Maint Co (Field -mny) 198 33 ICorpsUnit
2870th Sngr Serv Det 41 3
3292d Sig Base Malnt Co (l er* Det) 148 1 L3T - Smlrau t o .vhlto Beaoh
liob Sec, 937th QM Pet Prod Lab 18 20
862d ty. Fumigation and Bath Co 88 14 1517th ngr ./atef Sup Co 136 41
13th JMBkry Pl at 36 2
1 Liberty-Milne Bay to ..Tiite Beech No. 2: 584th ^d Ldry Co (5kl-Vob)(Less 2
142 22
Pl ats)
316thOrdDep 185 28 ArmyUnit
714thKedSanCo 117 4
6 LSIs (British ATAs) - Kilne Bay, Oro Bay, Finschhafen and Gloucester
Hq&HqDet,21stQKBn(Mob) 19 3 to ./hits Beaoh:
3449th Ord KAM Co 120 45
3352d JJ Trie Co 110 60 80th Gen Hosp (15C0 Bed)
804 KlineBay 25
1 Pl at , 281st $1 Hefrig Co (Kob) 30 7 333d ^ Salv Rep Co 2C1 16 KlineBay
3014th Kngr liair.t Co 191
66 CroBay
ToWovefromKewGeorgiaonXIVCorpsShipping: 730th Jingr Dp Co.
209 24 Finschhafen
lSOthGenHeap(1500Bed)
804 25 Finschhafen
144thStaHosp(lessDet) 86 16 165thLdryPlat(TypeA)(tchd12Cth
GenHosp) 47
1 Finschhafen
ToMovefromHolland laooArmyShipping: 60th Gen Hosp (1000 Bed) 618
20 Finschhafen
,251st Sta Hosp (750 Bed)
501 15 Gloucester
DetK,3170th3ig3ervBn 356 23 168th î Ldry Flat (Type ;0Utchd
DetM,3169th31gServBn 54 7 60th Gen Hosp) 47
Finschhafen
Det,1060thEngrPC&RGp 43 . 20 (1/2LSD) Replacements
CroBay
g/30. 2 Liberties - Oro Bay to ,/hite Beach f / ^
6 LSTs - Biak tc *nite Beach
131Eth Engr Gen Serv Hegt ( l es s 1 Co)1240
185
871st Engr Avn Bn 777 255
S / 40
Det, 828th Sngr Avn Bn 200 75
Rr Echelons M-l Avn Units
1 Liberty - Finschhafen to ..hite Peax*
9 LSTs - nollaDdia to .Yhite Beach Det,1872d^nrrAvnBn
77 65
5252d3ngrBa3eDepGp(Irov)(less
87Cth Engr Avn Bn 777 255
Det) 52
43Cth Port Co 230 4 lC6thI'.edCompJec(Vet)
11
431st Port Co 230 4 Det,874thSngr~vnBn
77
5
65
3
432d Fort Co 230 4 Det,439thEngrDepCo '
20 4 ArmyUnit
3714th Qfri Trk Co (Hvy) 107 155 Det,442d3igConsBn(Hvy)
10
3716th QMTrk Co (Hvy) 107 155 Det,3473d4iTrkCo
22
26 25
Rr Echelons, li-1 tJnlts
1 LST - Aitape to ,/hite Beach
AfterS/ 45
2dSec,SdFlat ,588thQKiLdryCo 27 4
RrEchelons,K-1 -- ToWovefromUSDirect:
875thEngrServ
Co(Avn) 146 20
GenH6sp(1000Bed)
618 21
1 LST - Hollandia to Blue Beach
GenHospj'1000Bed) 618 21
GenHop(1000Bed)
618 21
286th $i Refrlg Co (Mob)(less 2d &3d
Pl ats)
17 7
Port L'arine Malnt Co (TC) 204 30
onXXVCorpsShipping:
By eommajiA' of Li e ut e nant General KRUEGER:
1042dEngrGasGenUnit 22 5 Bougainville
539th& SalvHepCo 201 16 Bougainville
897th ;>'.LdryCo(SemiHob) 142 22 NewGeorgia
27thSpecServCo 125 19 NewGeorgia
G.H.DECKER,
266th ^ BkryCo(less2Plats) 110 2 Bougainville
BrigadierGeneral,S.3.C.,
Det,144thStaHosp 100 2 Bougainville
ChiefofStaff.
ToMovefromAitapeonICorpsShipping:
37thStaHosp(250bed) 186 OFFICIAL:
1stSec,3dPlat,286thy.\RefrigCo
(Mob) 8
27thMaiSurvUnit 5
134
HEADQ.UABT5RS SIXTH AFMY 10t h Radar c a l i br a t i on Det Air 33 Sansapor
A. p . o . 442
10001, 29 November 1944 3 LSTt o Yellow -crira3on Beach
Adv tfch, 35t h Fi ght er GP Air 624 180 Morotai
9t h por t abl e Hosp Air 47
10 riorotai
82d TACReoco sq Air 139
62 Morotai
Ser vi oe Personnel Vehiolea St agi ng
Nate: Available apace remaining on 2 LS7S - Morotai to Yellow - Crimson
S - DAY
Beach on s/4 Aflcom Shipping (Annex 7p_) can be ut i l i zed by above uni t s .
1 LSTt o ?;hite Beach No. 3
1 Liberty ship to Orange Beach
Det G, 86t h Fi ght er ,Ying
Air
17 4 Toem
pear Fjoh, 18th Fighter GP
Air 200 144 Sansapor
A33 3ch 00 C596t h SAW Bn
Ai r
39 li Bn Hq Det, 596th SAW BQ Air 95 25 Sansepor
A33 %h Det B. 35t h Fi ght er
Oont rol sq
Air 28
23d GO Ha t , 00 D. 596t h SAW Bn Ai r 34
24t h GOH a t , 00 D, 596t h SAW Bn Air 34
13t h r l a t , 00 c, 596t h SAW En
Air 35
14t h ] l a t , 00 G, 596t h SAW Bn Air 35
9
4
4
7
7
4 LST to Yellow - Crimson Beach
Toem
Toem
Toem
35th Fighter Oont Sq (l ess Det B) Air 215
26 Noemfoor
It)em
% (P Ci 565th SAWBn Air 168 41 Noemfoor
Adv sch ?q 00 c, 596t h SAW Bn Air 94 30
Toem
15th Plat 00 C. 565th SAWBn Air 59 15 Noemfoor
It)em
16th Ha t , co C. 565th SAWBn Air 59 15 Noemfoor
17th Ha t , co C. 565th SAWBn Air 59 15 Noemfoor
?o move on I corps s hi ppi ng
18th Ha t , 00 C. 565th SAWBn Air 59 15 Noemfoor
19th Ha t , Co C. 565th SAWBn Air 59 16 Noemfoor
1st supt Aircraft Party Air 22 1914th Qf.i i r k Oo
4 Leyt e Air 91 66 Noemfoor
11th supt Aircraft Iterty
Air 22 415th OMPlat ADG
4 Sensepor Air 24 15 Itoemfoor
3th supt Aircraft Parly
Ai r 22 80th Airdrome sq Noemfoor 4 Ai t epe Air I87 53
TC irove on XT7Corps shipping
2 LST to Orange - Green Beach
ljth gupt Aircraft Jterty
Air 22 4 Bougai nvi l l e
Uith cupt Aircraft Ifirty
Ai r 22 4 Bougai nvi l l e
1805th Ord sem Oo Air 80 24 Biak
1131st MP Co Air Biak
15th supt Aircraft Party
235 24
1156th 0MOo Su Air 10 Fiek
2d 3ii't Aircraft farty
35
Air 22 4 Gloucester
547th Night Fighter sq Air 230 40 Owi
25th Liaison Sq (less Det) Air 121 30 Biak
To move wi t h 6t h Div, 43d DLV, I Corps, 37t h Div, 40th Div &XIV Corps, each
1 Air v a l u a t i o n Team Air 3 1
1 LST to Yellow - crimson Beach
71st Pecoo GP. Bj&Bl Sq Air 91 27 Leyte
HOth TAC Reoco Sq
Air
136
46
Leyte
1 LST t o 7ihite Beach No.-3
2 LST to Orange Beach
qear Ech Hq (X> C. 596t h SAWBn Air 11 Toem
Det 82, 15 Weather sqn Air Kol l andi a
Bear 13ch Det Dt 35t h Fi ght er
20th Pl at , 00 C, 565th SAWBn Air 59
11 Hsl l andi a
Oontrol sq
Air 55 14 Toem
1093d Sig CoSG Air 103
11 Hol l andi a
15t h Ha t , 00 C. 596t h SAW Bn Air 34 7 Toem
Air 91 10 j -ol l andi a
Det IJO 59 AAC Sq
16th r l a t , 00 C, 596t h SAW Bn Air 34 7 Toem
21st serv GP Cpa TmNo. 3
m Det &21 ELat, 58t h CASW (14
Air 229 83 Hollandia
AAC) Air 64 15 It)em
(Incl 2009th QMTrk Co)
Ground Obs, Oo D596th SAWBn
pader Det SCR5
8
4 (14ACC) Air 24 8 Toem
(l ess 6 Teams)
Air 73 58 Hollandia
17t h n e t , 00 Ci 596t h SAW Bn Air 35 7 Toem
18t h Pl at , oo C, 596t h SAT?Bn Air 35 7 Toam
Det 15t h êa sq ( i ncl par t Det
;]D. 59 AAIS) Air 46 15 Toem
1 LST t o Red Beach
One PT Adv Base Unit Navy 119 f.'ilne
Finschha fen
3 LST to Orange - Green Beach A Sansapor
308th Bomb Ting HI (i&e) fcT Air 382 65 Leyt e
2 Liberty ships White Beach to
Compo Co Air
Det i t ). 3 , 5278th Bomb OommSq Air 44 4 Leyte
MAG No. 24 Hq Sq
CO A. 929th Sig Bn (SOP) TAC Air 185 38 Leyte
I^G No. 32 m Sq
Air 590 125 Bnirau
Co c. 929th sife BQ (Sep) TAC Air 201 58 Leyte
7t h TBC Air comm Sq ( l eas Det )
T30h Air I nt e l l , Unit I I Air
12 4 Leyte
2015th oj.' Trk 00 (Adv Det) Air
50 25 Leyte
4 l i b e r t y shi pe t o white Beach
Data 3 &4. 1st Rad sqn Air
52 12 Leyte
Air 130 42 Bnirau
VMSB No.142
3 LST to Yellow - crimson Beaoh NO. 243
Air 223 90 ' jnirau
NO* 244
Air 223 90 Greene
Noemfoor
306th Airdrome Sq Air 273 75
VMSBNo. 341
Air 223 90 Greene
Bi 64th serv GP Air 214 37 Noemfoor
VSMB NO.133
93d ser vi ce sq Air
256 80 Noemfoor
VSMB NO.
236 Air 223 90 Bougai nvi l l e
81 Noemfoor 223 I.Xinda 31
VSI.SNo. 241
Air 90
1536th ord sem Co Air
To move ot si xt h Army shipping
22 4 Leyte
8th supt Ai rcraft party Air 5 LST to Red Beach
To move on 25th Inf Div shipping Che cons BQ
Navy 1.114 230 Milne
22 4 Noumea One-half Cons Bn (Sp)
Navy 522 80 nine
l 6t h supt Ai rcraft party Air One cons Bn Meint unit Navy 276 20 Mi ne
To move on si xt h Army Shipping for 13th ATinJ GP 1 LST to Red Beeoh
4 Hol l endl a
12th supt Ai rcraft party Air
22
Navy Milne
Bilk load only
To move on 158th RCT Shipping
Cne Mobile com Unit
Navy 21 Kol l andi a
4 Noemfoor One I br t Director
Navy 18 Hol l andi a
22
Navy 18 Hol l andi a
3d supt Ai rcraft Iterty Air
One Dispensary (100 Bsd) Mbl
Navy 87 Vtoendi
3 rjnerg serv Units (naval ai r ) Navy 21 T'anus
To move on 25th mf Div Shipping
Air 1 LST to êllow - Crimson Bsach
1 Air Evaluation Team
3 / 4 2015th QMi rk 00 (leas 1 Pl at ) Air 51
32 Leyte
Tech Air I nt e l l . Unit No. 1
Air 16 Leyte
4 LSTt o Orange - Green Beach
Tech Air I nt e l l . Unit No. I l l
Air 30 Leyte
73 Sanaapor
Air 253
S / 30
65th serv sq Sansapor
Air 13
5
30t h Mal ar i a survey Uni t 16 Sansapor
Air 57
1 Liberty Ship to Yellow - Crimson Beach
4t h Pl a t , Co A, 565*a SAW Bn 26 Sansapor
Air 270
m &nq Sqt 86t h Fifchter Wing 25
Sensapor
Air 231 Air 400 147 Morotai
Rear h , 38t h BombGP
349t h s i g Co Wing 120 Sanaapor
Air 417 Air 94 42 Morotai
18t h Fi ght er GPAdvBoh
12
8 Sansapor
809th Chem CoA0
62d Mal ar i a cont r ol Uni t
135
2 LST to YHow - crimson Beach
Bear Ech,35th FighterGP
Adv Beb, 38th Bomb GP
1 1STto yellow - crimson Baoh
Hq 4 HqSq,595th SAW Bn
k L3T to YBIIOW - crimson Beach
Air
Air
Air
100
500
215
15
lljO
62
Morotai
Morotai
Hollandia
e.
(1) Willfurnishsuppliesandequipment requiredbySixthArrayunite
employed inthisoperationandstaginginareasunderEighth
Army control.
(2) Willassist SixthArmyunits employedInthis operationinload-
ingoutfromEighthArmyareasbyfurnishingnecessary labor
and transportation.
CoamandlnffGenerals.ICprpe.XIVCorpsand158thRCT:
386th servsqn
1541st crdserv 00
1964th QH irk00
1927th (91 -irk 00
69th servgqn
1828th ordservCo
26th Photosq
21st pilat 00 c, 5(>5 Sig Air
Air
Air
Air
Air
Air
Air
Air
Air
59
231
61
106
101
242
80
130
5?
24
56
69
77
23
k2
11
Biak
Biak
Biak
Biak
Biak
Biak
Biak
Biak
(1)
(2)
Willberesponsiblefortheloadingofunitsandaccompanying
suppliesformovenenttotheLINGAYEN GULF area,asprescribed
inparagraph1,Annex7toAdm0lb,Transportation Plan.
Priortorequestingtheassistancemadeavailableinpara-
graph1d(2)above, laborandfacilities availabletothem
willbeutilizedtothegreatest practicable extent.
Willunloadallvessels scheduledfordischarge over theirre-
spective beachesuntilrelievedbydirectionofComma-iding
General, SixthAroy.
1 l i bert y shi p to RedBeach
f. CommandingGeneral.25thInfantry Division:
Naval uni ts
300 Direct
(US)
Willberesponsiblefortheloadingofunitsandaccompanying supplies
formovementtotheLINGAYEN GULFarea,asprescribedinparagraph1,
Annex7toAdm016,Transportation Plan.
S / 35 g. CommandingGeneral.11thAirborne Division!
Liberty ship t o RedBeaoh
Naval uni t s
command of Lieutenant General KRUEGERj
800
Direct
(us)
h.
WillberesponsibleforloadinghisDivisionandacconpanying supplies
formovementbywatertotheLINGAYEN GULFarea,orbyairtoanyof
theobjective areas listedinparagraph3d(l)(a)ofF03k.
CommandingOfficer.6thRanger Infantry Battalion;
Willberesponsibleforloadinghisunitandaccompanying suppliesfor
movementtotheLINGAYEN GULFarea.
G. H. DECKER,
Brigadier General, G.S. C ,
Chief of s t af f .
1. CommandingGeneral.ASCOM:
(1) Will,exceptforthosefacilities constructedbySixthArmyand
Corpsinthelandingphases,initiateandprosecutethecon-
structionoffacilities withintheArmyBase Area.
(2) Will,upondirectionofthisheadquarters, relievetheCommand-
ingGenerals,ICorps,XIVCorpsand158thRCTofthefollow-
inglogisticresponsibilities intheLINGAYEtfGULFarea: the
discharge, storage,andissueofsuppliesandmaterials,the
continuationofapproved constructionprojects,andtheoper-
ationofsupplypointfacilitieswithintheArmyBaseArea.
Theseresponsibilities willbedelegatedtotheCommanding
General,ASCOM,attheearliestpracticable date consistent
withthetacticalsituation.
(3) Willbepreparedtoextenddeliveryofsuppliestoadvancedsup-
plypointsastheoperationprogresses. SeeInclosure7,Sup-
plyInM-lOperation.
ADM016toaccompanyFO3U.
A. P.0 . 1+1+2
2300123NovemberI9UI+
(k)
(5)
Willbepreparedtoincreasethescopeofconstructionandmain-
tenanceoperationsasandwhentheboundaryoftheA m yBase
Areaisadvanced.
WillberesponsiblefortheloadingofASCOMunitsandaccompany-
ingsuppliesformovement'totheLINGAYENGULFareaaflpre-
scribedinparagraph1,Annex7toAdm016.Transportation
Plan.
1. LOGISTICRESPONSIBILITIES.
a . USASOS.asdirectedbyGHQ:
(6) Will,pursuanttoinstructionsIssuedbythisheadquarters,re-
cruit,allocate,administerandsupervise civilian Labor)
usedintheArmyBaseArea.
(1) Willprovidesuppliesanddeliver themafloat,loadedforse-
lectivedischarge,toSixthArmyregulating stations,asde-
siredbyCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy.
(7) Willberesponsible thatavailable civilianlaborisemployedto
thegreatest extent practicableintheoperationofallfaci-
litiesandservicesunderhiscontrol.
(2) WillliepreparedtorelieveCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy,of
rasponsibilltyforallconstructionandlogisticsupportin
theobjective area.
(8) Willreceive,store,andissue,asdirectedbytheCommanding
General, SixthArmy,maintenance suppliesfortheFilipino
F
orcesandsuppliesforcivilianrelief.
b. AlliedNavalForces,asdirectedbyGHft: (9)
F
oradditionalresponsibilities,seeIncloeure5toAdm016
(i) Willprovideoverwatertransportationfortroopsandaccompany-
ingsuppliesforelementsofSixthArmyandAlliedAirForces
employedinthisoperation,attimesandtoplaces designated
byCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy.
j.
SOPASCOM.
CommandingGeneral. SixthArmy:
*
(?)
(3)
Willcontrolallshippingoperatingindirect supportofthis
operation.
Willconductslow convoysmovinglighters,barges,tankersand
otherslowcrafttotheobjectivearea. Targetdateforar-
rivalofinitialconvoy: S^5.
(l) "illestablishandoperateregulating stationsatLIlTEand
HOLLANDIAtocontrolmovementofheavy shipping.
i2) ""illcontrolthemovementofshippingforwardofSixthArmyre-
gulatingstationsandwillberesponsibleforreaupplyto
theLINGAYENGULFareauntilresponsibilityforlogisticsup-
portofLINGAYENGULFareaistransferredtotheCommanding
General,USASOS,bydirectionofOHQ.
c.
^
AlliedAirForces,asdirectedbyGHQ:
(l) Willtransport emergency suppliesbyairtotheLINGAYEN GULF
areaoncalloftheCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy.
(?) Willevacuate casualtiesbyairuponcallofCommanding General,
SixthArmy.
(3) "illberesponsiblefortheloadingofunitsandaccompanying
suppliesformovementtotheLINGAYSN GULFareaasprescribed
inparagraph1,Annex7toAdm016,TransportationPlan.
(U) WillperformallconstructionintheArmyServiceAreaexcept
thatspecifioallyassignedtotheCommanding General,ASCOM.
2. SUPPLYBASES.
(3) Willberesponsibleforequippingairforceunitsandinsuring
that suchunitsembarkfrommountingarea*withlevelsofin-
itialsuppliesasprescribedinparagraph3below.
(1+) Willarrangeforpreloadingofstandard loadedships containing
airforcetechnical supplies.
a. CountingareasandbasesinLBYTB,NEWGUINEA,NEWBRITAIN andthe
SOLOMONSforinitialsupply. '
b. UNITEDSTATES,augmentedasnecessaryfrombasesinLEYTB NEWGUINEA
andAUSTRALIA,forresupply.
3. SUPPLYLE7ELS.
i. Commanding General.EighthArmy,asdirectedbyGHO.:
a. Thefollowingquantitieswillbedeliveredtotheobjectiveareaduring
136
theinitialphase toS1l2 l a c l )
t h e Co mf f i a ndi ng Gene
- P . 158th Rci and
theirrespective
ClassI,IIandIV(ieB8Engineer) - 30D/S
Haas III- MTgasolineanddietillato - 15 D/S
A l 1 t h e rClaBS IIX items
x. - 30D/S
OlassIV,Engineer- SeeAnnexktoAdm016.
ClassV_CombatUnits _ c u/F
Non-divisionalserviceunits . 3 U/F
b. Eachunitarrivingintheobjectiveareaatanytimeduringthe in-
itialphase(Sto5/l2l n c l )v l l l c ^ w l t h u the f o l l o w l
minimum levelsofsupplyofthequantitiesprescribedinparagraph
3aabove: ^ *^
ClassI,II,III&IV(I,SBEngineer) _ 10D/S
ClassIV,Engineer- SeeAnnex 1+toAda016.
Cl Class VV
2
c. Unitsarrivingafter8 / 1 2willcarrywiththem:
ClassI,IIandIV(lessEngineer) - 30D/S
ClassIII _ 10D/S
ClassIV,Engineer- SeeAnnexktoAdm016.
ClassV- CombatUnits _ 5 U/F
Npn-dlvlsionalserviceunits - 3 U/F
d. SixthArnyReserve (25thInfantryDivisionand6th BangerInfantry
Bn)onmovementtoobjectiveareawillcarrywiththem!
Level*setoutInparagraph3*.above.
m. 11th AirborneDivisionwillcarrywithitthefollowing:
(1) TormovementofDivisionbyair:
AsprescribedbyCommandingGeneral,11th AirborneDivision.
(2) FormovementofDivisionbywater:
Levelssetoutinparagraph3cabove.
f. VoyageRations:
Asrequiredtoinsurethatall unitswillarriveintheobjective
areawithrationlevelsprescribedabove.
g. TheCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy,willregulatethedeliveryof
suppliessothatlevelsintheLIHGAYENGULFareawillnotmaterial-
lyexceed:
ClassI- IIIA,lncl - 30D/S
ClassIV - asrequired
ClassV /
k. RESUPPLY.
a. Responsibility:
CommandingGeneral,SixthArmy,untilrelievedofthatresponsibi-
litybytheCommandingGeneral,USASOS.
b. Method:
(1) SFPQEstandardloadedshipsandsupplementarysupplyships
calledforwardasrequired.
(2) Bulkdistributionofavgas,motortransportandautomotive
dleselfuel. Targetdate: S/7.
(3) Ammunition shipscontainingbalancedloadeofammunitionfor
groundforces.
(k) Standardloadedshipscontainingairforcetechnicalsupplies
calledforwardasrequired.
(5) floatingreserveships,asindicatedbelow,tobecalledfor-
wardifneeded:
2LibertyShips
ClassIIIAviation
2LibertyShips
ClassIII
2LibertyShips ClassV(AirForce)
2LibertyShips ClassV(GroundForce)
(6) SeeInclosure1toAnnex7toAdm016,TentativeScheduleof
HeavyShipping,forfurtherdetails.
c. Miscellaneous.
(1) Aviationgasandoilandairforcetechnicalsupplieswillbe
forwardedonLSTsassetoutbelow. AsdirectedbyGHQ,Allied
AirForcewillprocureanddeliversuchsuppliestoappropri-
ateLSTloadingpoints:
OneachLSTloadingatHGLLABDIA,BIAK,MOROTAI,OROBATand
SANSAPQRandscheduledtoarriveinthobjectiveareaon
S/2andS/4-5: koDWTs.
(2) AsdirectedbyGHQ,USASOSwillmaintainatLIYTEabalanced
stockofClassIgupplles,10daysfor20,000,forthespeci-
ficpurposeofeffectingemergencysupplybyairtransportation.
5. DUMPS.
InitiallybyuniteasprescribedbyCommandingGeneral*,SixthArmy
(for2 ytroops).ICorp.,XITCorps,15hHCTandASCOMtoafford
earlylogistic support.
b. Truckheadsandothersupplypointslocatedintheareaforwardof
ArmyBaseAreatobepreparedandoperatedbyComtandingGeneral,
SixthArmy.
c. Permanentdumps,supplypointsandtruckheadsintheArmyBaseArea
tobepreparedandoperatedbyCommandingGeneral,ASCOM.
6. REQUISITIONS.
a. Afterarrivalofunitsinobjectivearea,requisitions,exceptfor
ammunitionandengineersupplies,willberoutedfromDivisions,
ASCOMunits,ArmyTroops,CorpsTroopsandthe158thRCTtoASCOM.
b. Requisitionsforammunitionwillberoutedasprescribedin
8b,Annex2toAda016,OrdnancePlan.
c. Requisitionsforengineersupplieswillberoutedasprescribedin
paragraph2,AnnexktoAdm016,EngineerSup.ly
7. WATER.
Fromlocalsources,withatleastonewaterpointforeach5,000 men.
8. EVACUATION.
SeeAnnex3toAdm016, MedicalPlan.
b. Burials'
SeeInclosure1toAnnex1toAdm016,SOPforBuripleandEs-
tablishmentofCemeteries,25Septemberl$ik.
c. Salvage;
SeeInclosure3toAnnex1toAda016,QuartermasterPlan,and
paragraph12,Annex2toAdo016,OrdnancePlan.
d. CapturedMaterial!
Allitemsofcapturedequipmentandmaterial,exceptthoserequired
forimmediateuseinoperations,willbedeliveredtoASCOKwhich
willassembleandholdsuchitemsintheobjectiveareaforlater
determinationastodisposition. SeeInclosure2,Dispositionof
CapturedEnemyEquipment.
e. PrisonersofWarandEnemyAlienCivilianInterneee:
SeeInclosure1toAnnex9toAdm016,ProvostMarshalPlan.
9. COSSTRUCTIOH.
n. General)
(l) TheCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy, isresponsibleforthein-
itiation,prosecutionandmaintenanceofallconstructionpro-
jectsinthezoneofadvanceforwardoftheArmyBaseAreaand
forcertaininitialconstructionintheArmyBaseAree.Con-
structionwillbelimitedtotheprovisionofminimumessential
operationalfacilities.
(2) TheCommandingGeneral,ASCOM,isresponsibleforinitiation,
prosecutionandmaintenanceofallconstruction project3
intheArmyBaseAreafromandafterthedotedesignatedby
theCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy.
(3) WhendirectedbyGHQ.,responsibilityforthecontinuationof de-
velopmentandcompletionofapprovedconstructionprojects
willpasstotheCommandingGeneral,USASOS,andtheCommander,
AlliedHavel
F
orce.
b. LayoutPlan
;
Subjecttomodifications,necessitatedbydetailedfieldreconnais-
sance,allocationofareaswillbeasshownoncap,Inclosure6
toAdm016,Map: AllocationofAreas.
c. RoadsandBridges:
(1) Initialaccessroadsfrombeachestodumpsanddispersalareas
asprescribedbyCorpsCommandersandCommandingGeneral,158th
RCT,intheirrespectivezones.
(2) Responsibilityfornewconstructionandmaintenancewithinas-
signedareasorzoneswillbeasdesignatedfroxtimetotime
byCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy.
d. SeeAnnex8toFO3!+,Engineer,fordetailsofconstructionprojects.
10. TRAFFIC.
a. ControlinitiallybyCorpsCommandersandCommandingGeneral,158th
RCT,intheirrespectivezones. Thesecommandercwilleliminate
non-essentialtraffic.
b. Subsequentcontrolbycommandersintheirrespectiveareasorzones
asdefinedbyCommandingGeneral,SixthArmy.
c. Trafficwilldrivetoleftinconformitywithlocalcustom.
d. SeeAnnex9toAdm016,ProvostMarshalPlan,forfurtherdetails.
11. SERVICETHOOPS.
a. Forattachments,seeAnnexes3to3hInclusivetoFO 3k.
137
(l ) Initially for al l service troops aa prescribed by Commanding
Generals, I Corps, XIT Corpa and 158th RC1within thair pones
of action.
(a) Later afl Interallied by toe Area Allocation Group, SeaInolo-
sure 8, Araa Allocation Group.
Serviceunits,especiallyport,QHserrlce,andQMtruckcompanies,
availableforthisoperationareextremelyHaltedinnumber.To
rendertheserrlcasrequiredwillnecessitatetheirconsiderable
augmentationbydetachmentsofcoabattroopsandmotor transport.
d. Civilianlabor,availablelocally,vlllbeemployedtothegreatest
extentpracticable. Itwillbeorganisedforemployment, initially
tosupplenentandlatertoreplaceserrlcetroops.
12. PERSOSHEL.
a. Stragglers:
CommandingGenerals,ICo r p B | 117Corps,ASCOM,and158thRCTvlll
beresponsibleforstragglercontrolwithintheirrespectIrecones.
b. Malli
(1) PostalUnitAPO70and12thPRSwillprovidesailserviceforall
unitsnotservicedbypermanentlyassignedAPOs.
(2) Allcommanderswillprovidesuitableshelterforthesafeguarding
andprocessingofmail.
13) OfficialmailforCommandingGenerals,Army,Corps,Division*,and
ASCOM,willbeaddressedincareofapplicablepermanentlyas-
signed.APOnumber.
(4) Uponarrivalinobjectivearea,personnelofallunits,organ-
izationsandseparatedetachments (exceptthoseunits,organ-
isations,anddetachments organicallyassignedtoahigher
unitwhichhasapermanentlyassignedAPO;as,forexample,a
division)willuseAPO70astheirmailaddress.
c. StrengthReports:
SeeIncloeure1. EffectiveS/5thesereportswillbepreparedby
CommandIngGenerals,ASCOM,ICorps,XITCorps,separatedivisions
andRCTs,andAroyTroops. The informationcontainedthereinwill
besubmittedtothisheadquartersbytelephoneorspecialmessenger
notlaterthan1400hourseachday. Numbersonlywillbereported
Intelephoneconversation;referencebeingmadetodesignatedlines.
Forexample,theICorpsinreportingtotalT/0strengthofcommand
wouldstate: "LineA,2562and47065,etc*.
d. CasualtyReports
Allunits(exceptAirforceandSavyunits)chargedwithreporting
individualcasualtieswillinsurethepromptrenditionofsuch
reports. AnInformationcopyofthesereportswillbeforwarded
directtothisheadquarters.
a. PaymentofTroops:
Financepersonnelorganictoacommandwillpayallorganicandat-
tachedelementsofthe command.
f. HandlingofCasuals?
CasualcampswillbeestablishedbyCorpsandseparatedivisionsand
HCTstoaccommodatecasualswithintheirrespective commandsand
thosewhomaybereceivedfromothersourcesfordeliverywithin
thecommand. ASCOMwillestablishnot laterthanS/10anArea
CasualCampcentrallylocated,andadditionalsimilarcampsas
maybecomenecessary,forthereceipt,processingandre-eqolp-
plngofIncomingcasuals,patientsdischargedfromhospitals,
furloughees,andanyotherpersonnelofsuchcategories.
13. MISCELLANEOUS.
a. Sanitation:
SeeInclosure1toAnnex3toAda016,MadicalPlan.
b. PeriodicReports:
G-lPeriodicReportswillbesubmittedbyCommandingGenerals,ASCGM,
ICorps,XIVCorps,"^separatedivisionsandRCTsasprescribed
byInclosure1toAdm016. Thesereportswillbedeliveredby
specialmessengersoastoreachthisheadquartersnotlaterthan
1130hourseachFriday.
G-2PeriodicReportwillbesubmittedasprescribedbyFM101-5and
IntelligenceSOP.
G-3PeriodicReportwillbesubmittedasprescribedbyseparate
letterofinstructions.
G-4PeriodicReportwillbesubmittedasprescribedbyInclosure4
toAdm016,InstructionsforSubmissionof0-4PeriodicReport.
c. ClTll Affairs:
SeeAnnex8toAda016,CivilAffairsPlan.
(l) VlthtnapplicableT/Xi(orT/BAs)asprescribedbyCommanding
Generals,SixthArmy, (forArmyTroops),ICorps,XIVCorps,
11thAirborneDivision,25thInfantryDivision,158thRCT
andASCOMandCommandingOfficer,6thRangerInfantryBattalion.
(2) Equipment inexcessofapplicabletablesauthorizedbythis
headquarters. Minoradditions,notinvolvingcontrolleditems,
maybeprescribedbyCommandingGeneralf,ICorps,XIVCorps,
ASCOM, 11thAirborneDivision,25thInfantryDivisionand
158thRCT.
(3) Assaultunitswillbestrippedofallequipmentpotessentialto
theaccomplishmentoftheirmission.
(4) Bothcombatandserviceunitswilltakewiththemtotneobjec-
tiveareaonlysuchvehiclesasareessentialtothefunction-
ingoftheunit.
(5) Vehiclesandweaponswillbeprotected carefullyagainst possible
ImmersionInsaltwater. Unitemovingbyamphibious crafton
assault echelonswillemphasizewaterproofingoftrucks,trac-
tors,andtowedweapons. Assoonaspracticable afterlanding,
waterproofingmaterialswillberemovedandvehiclesandweap-
onswillbewashed infreshwaterandcarefully lubricated.
(6) Vehiclesandweaponswillbeinspecteddailyandkeptinthe
bestpossible condition.
(7) Anextracanteenwithcover(leescup)willbecarriedbyeach
manoftheassaultcombatunits,exceptFAandAAA.
ConservationofSupplies:
Conservationofequipmentandsuppliesisacommand responsibility.
XachCommanderwill!
(1) Provideadequateguardsforallsuppliesandequipmenten-
routetotheobjectivearea.
(2) Postadequateguardsoverallsupplydumps,Includingcap-
turedenemydumps,withinstructions,toprevent pilfering
bysoldiersandcivilians.
(3) Insurethatrations,clothing,andothersuppliesarenot
giventociviliansbysoldiersofhiscommand. PCAUsare
theonlyagenciesauthorizedtomake issuesofsuppliesto
civilians.
(4) Impressonallindividualstheseriousnessofpilferingour
ownorcapturedsuppliesandthenecessityofpreventing
anyrationsorothersuppliesfromfallingintoenemyhands.
(5) Takepromptdisciplinary actionIneverycaseofpilfering,and
givepublicitywithinhiscommandtopunishments imposed
therefor.
(6) Insurethatunserviceablevehiclesarenotdismantledforre-
clamationofpartsexceptbyOrdnanceMaintenance Companies.
(7) Insurethatallcapturedtrucks,capableofbeingsalvaged,are
safeguardedfrompilferageuntildispositionisdirected.
(8)Insurethatanaggressivecampaignisconducted inallechelons
ofcommandtorecoverammunition abandonedordiscardedby
troops. Suchammunitionwillbeturnedintothenearest
ammunitiondumps.
BycommandofLieutenant GeneralKRUEGER:
G.H.DECKER,
BrigadierGeneral,0.S.C.
Chief of Staff.
OFFICIAL:
8 InclosuresS
1-0-1PerlodioReport. (Omitted)
2-Ur.,HqSixthArmy,AO386.3D-5,22Hov44,Subject: Disposition
ofCapturedEnemyEquipment. (Omitted)
3-ListofShippingDesignators. (Omitted)
k-InstructionsforSubmissionof0-4PeriodicReport. (Omitted)
5-SOPASCOM,28September44. (Omitted)
6-Mapt AllocationofAreas. (Omitted)
7-SupplyinM-lOperation. lOmltted)
8-AreaAllocationGroup. (Omitted)
AntEXES:
1-QuartermasterPlan.
Incl1 -SOPforBurialsandEstablishmentofCemeteries,25Sept44.
(Omitted)
Incl2 -ListofQuartermasterUnits. (Omitted)
Incl3-SalvageCollectingPlan. (Omitted)
2-OrdnancePlan.
Incl1-Ammunition IdentificationCode. (Omitted)
3-MdlcalPlan.
Incl1 -Ltr.,HqSixthArmy,2Sept44,Subject! Sanitation. (Omitted)
4-EngineerSupplyPlan..
Incl1 -EngineerSupplySOP. (Omitted)
Incl2 -Li,tofA4PSuppliesforone(l)RCT (Reinforced). (Omitted)
Incl3-ListofA4PSuppliesforone(l)A/BRCT(Reinforced). (Omitted)
Incl
4-Ltr.,HqSixthArmy, 30August44,Subject: SparePartsSupply
forEngineerEquipment. (Omitted)
5-ChemicalPlan.
Incl1-Ammunition IdentificationCodeforCVMunitions. (Omitted)
136
6 - Si gnal Supply Pl an. See Annex 5 to FO 34.
7 - Transportation Pl an.
Incl 1 - Tentative Schedule of HeaVy Shipping. (Omitted)
Incl 2 - SOPfor Air-Supply, lU.FebUk. (Omitted)
Incl 3 - Dally Port Summary Inst ruct i ons. (Omitted)
g - Ci vi l Affaire Pl an.
s
Incl 1 - Instructi ons for Processing and Interrogating Personnel other
than Japanese recovered from the Enemy. (Omitted)
Incl 2 - Cel l l ne Pri ces . (Omitted)
9 - Provost Marshal Pl an.
Incl 1 - Prisoners of WarandEnemy Allen Ci vi l i an Internees. (Omitted)
(Annexes to ADM0 16 are reproduced In Volume III following the reports of
the appropriate st af f s ect i ons . )
EXTRACTFROM
Amendment No.1toAdm016toaccompanyFO34.
xxxxxxxxxx xxjcxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxx
1. Paragraph12c,Adm0low accompanyFO34,thlBheadquarters,23
November 19W , ischangedfeefollovsJ
Change"SeeInclosure1"toread"SeeInclosure2".
2. Tolistof8InclosurestoAdm016toaccompanyFO34,add"Inclosure
9-DallyStrengthReport" AcopyofInclosure9-DallyStrength
Report,isattachedhereto
XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX
ByconaandofLieutenantGeneralKRU3GERJ
0.H.DECKER,
ChiefofStaff.
1Incl:
DailyStrengthReport. (Omitted)
EXTRACTFROM
AmendmentNo.2toAdm016toaccompanyFO3U.
xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx
1. AllprovisionsinAdm016regardingthe11thAirborneDivisionare
suspended.
xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx
BycommandofLieutenantGeneralKRUEOSR:
G.H.DECKER,
BrigadierGeneral,.
s
-C.,
ChiefofStaff.
OFFICIAL:
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARKY
A. P. 0. 442
0900 18 January1945
ADIL 0 16/ 1t o accompany FO 34,
1. a f f e c t i v e 00011. 19 Januery 1945(S / 10) ASCOM as s ume
and reflponaibillty for al l unloading operations in the
GOLFarea.
2. Effecti ve same date as above the Army Base Area Is establ i shed with
boundary inland from the beach as fol l ows:
From RABDN along road to ALACAE thence south t o BIKDAY thence along
BUED RIVTSP to the SAK FABL4N - SAN JACB'TC HOA" then south to
3aK JACINTO thence west on road to ;..AKGRLDAN thence along south
l i mi t s of KAKGA1DAK thence along road to ANOLID to SULISAY ISAKSAY)
thence t o DAGUFAN thence along the south Uni t s of DAGUFAN thence
along road running southwest from Dx.CR.TAN (and south of DAWF.vK
RIVEH) to the point where such road crosses t he CALU.Y HIVEH thence
along CALMLY KIVErt to town of NAGPALAGAN thence along unnamed
stream to town of BALOCOC thence along road froni B/J.OCOC to 3ALASA
to BAOABAG thence along road t o 3A1'AT to 1/AGTAKINC to LABRADOR to
town of S1TALwi ]l al l roa'lfl, rai l roads, ri vers, streams and towns
inclusive to the ARMY BASEAREA. (See Inclosure 1t o A2i:0 16/],
ARMY BASEARSA Boundary, 19 January 1&45).
3. The inland Army Ease Area boundary as defined in paragraph 2 above i s
the rear boundary of the I Corps and XIVCorps within t hei r respect-
ive zones of acti on ef f ect i ve 00011, 19 Janiary 1945
4.
./ithin the Army Base Area ASCOt! i s responsi bl e, ef f ect i ve 00011, 19
January 1945, for the following:
a. military Pol i ce and traffi c control .
b. Hoad maintenance and construction.
c. Bridge maintenance and construction except for the following
bridges which wi l l be constructed for 35 ten t raf f i c bythe
organizations Indicated below and then released to ASC0Mfor
maintenance. (Coordinates refer to LIKGAYEN andLAKAOG Sheets
1:50000 Seri es) :
Bridge aoross slough at 14. 1-52. 2 (52O2d ECB)
Bridge across BUED RIVER at 12. 3-49. 5 (I Corps)
Bridges across BUKDRIVER at KAFOALDAN (5202dECB)
Bridge aoross stream at 07. 3-41. 7 (5202d ECB)
Bridge across CALKAY SIV2R at 93. 0-37. 8 (5202dECB)
Bridge across AGNORIVER at 92. 0-35. 4 (5202dECB)
Bridges between SAN FABIAN and SAKJACINT: (I Corps)
d. Al l other construction except that which maybe delegated to the
5202d Engineer Construction Brleade byt hi s headquarters.
5. Units wi l l continue to draw from unit dumps, regardless of l ocati on,
unt i l further i nstructi ons are issued by'this headquarters.
Appropriate Orders wi l l issue from thi s headquarters attaching the
e.
following uni ts to ASCOM effecti ve 00011, 19 January1945:
Unit Present Assignment
Hqh.HqDet, 506th Fort Bn I Corps
Hq4 HqDet, 489th Fort Bn XIVCorps
234th Tort Co 158thRCT
244th Port Co I Corps
294th Port Co "
612th Port Co "
613th Fort Co "
622d Fort Co "
210th Fort Co XIVCorps
211th Port Co "
218th Port Co "
245th Port Co "
464th Amph TrkCo 158thRCT
466th AmphTrkCo I Corps
809th Amph TrkCo "
451st Amph Trk Co XIVCorps
455th Amph Trk Co "
3750th WVTrkCo I Corps
2058th VjUTrkCo (-1 PlAt) 158thRCT
3448th QMTrkCo I Corps
4096th QMServ Co Sixth Army
Plat 92d Railhead Co "
4th SB( l es s 3 Bk 3 Regts, UedBn, 3 Boat "
lialnt Cosand Dets, 164th OrdMaint
Co)
53M EngP BkSRegt end Dets I Corps
543d Engr BfcS Regt and Dts "
1461st Engr Boat Ualnt Co "
1468A Engr Boat Ualnt Co "
544th Engr BfcS Regt and Dets HV Corps
594th Eogr BfcS Regt (l eas CoB)* Dets "
3015th Bngr Boat Main* Co "
3016th Engr Bot Maint Co ( l ess 1 Pl at ) "
3017th Engr Boat liaint Co *
534th Eir BfcS Regt * Dets ( l ess Boat Bn) lWth8CT
By commnd of Lieutenant General KHDKGER:
G. H. DECKER,
Brigadier General, G. S. C ,
Chief of Staff.
1 Inol:
1 - Army Base Are* Boundary,
19 January 1945. (omitted)
139
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARWTt
A. r . O. 442
0900 EOJanuary1945
ADM016/2toaccompanyFO34.
1. Reference ismadetoparagraph2,Annex9toAdm016,Provost
Marshal Plan.
2. Effective0001121January1945,thezonesofresponsibility
formilitary policeandtraffic controlwillbeasdelineatedonInclo-
sure1herewith.
Bycommand ofLieutenant GeneralKECEGER:
G.E.DECKER,
ChiefofStaff.
1 Incl:
1 - Zones of responsibility for
Kilitury Police Traffic Control, (omitted)
HEADQUARTERS SIXIH ARMY
A. P. O. 442
2300 24January1945
ADU016/3
MAPS: MANAOAG, BINALONAN,AGUILARandSANCARLOSSheets,1:50,000.
1. Armysupplypointswillbeestablishedasfollows:
a. Quartermaster:
(1) Anny QM Supply Point No. 1.
Location: ROSALES.
To Open: 1 February 1945.
Operating Level: 3 D/S Class I &III for 45,000 troops
increasing to 60,000 troops by 5 February.
To Serve: I Corps (l ess 43d Infantry Division and 158th
RCTwith attachments) and Sixth Army troops in that
vi ci ni t y.
(2) ArmyQMSupplyPointNo.2.
Location: TAHLAC.
ToOpen: 30January1945.
OperatingLevel: 3D/Sallclassesfor60,000troops.
ToServe: XIVCorpandSixthArmytroopsinthatviolnity.
(3) The43dInfantryDivisionand158thRCTwithattachments,32d
InfantryDivisionwithattachments,AlliedAirForces,ASCOM
troopsandIandXXVCorpsandSixthArmytroopsnotinthe
vicinityofArmyQMSupplyPointsNo.1or2willdrawrequired
QMSupplies,allclasses,fromASCOMQMsupplypointsinthe
ArmyBaseAreaeffective29January1945.
(4) ICorps (less43dInfantryDivisionand158thRCTwith
attachments)willdrawrequiredQMClassIIandIVfrom
ASCOMQMsupplypointsintheArmy BaseAreaeffective
29January1945.
b. Medical:
(1) ArmyMedicalSupplyPointNo.1.
Location: URDANETA.
To Open: 30 January 1945.
Operating Level: 15 D/S for 45,000 troops.
To Serve: I Corps (l ess 43d Infantry Division and 158th
RCTwith attachments) and Sixth Army troops In that vl oi nl ty.
(2) Army Medical Supply Point No. 2.
Location: TARLAC.
To Open: 27 January 1945.
Operating Level: 15 D/S for 60,000 troopo.
To Serve: XTVCorps and Sixth Army troops in that vi ci ni t y.
(3) The 43d Infantry Division and 158th RCTwith attachments, 32d
Infantry Division with attachments, Allied Air Forces, ASCOM
troops and I and XIV Corps and Sixth Army troops not in the
vi oi ni ty of Anny Medical Supply Points No. 1 or 2 wi l l draw
required Medical Supplies from ASCOMMedical Supply Points in
the Army Base Area effecti ve 29 January 1945.
o. Engineer;
(1) Army Engineer Supply Point No. 1
Location: TARLAC.
To Open: 29 January 194b.
Operating Level: Approximately 1000 tons of Class II and IV.
To Serve: XIV Corps, 6th Infantry Division and Sixth Amy
troops in that vi ci ni t y.
(2) All units except those authorized to draw from Army Engineer
Supply Point No. 1 wi l l draw Engineer supplies from either
the SAN FABIAN or DAGDPANEngineer Depots in the Army Base
Area unti l further instructions from thi s headquarters.
d. Signal:
(1) AnnySignalSupplyPointNo.1.
Looatlon: BAYAMBANG.
OperatingLevel: Approximately 200tonsClassIVand
50toneClassII.
(2) ThesignalSupplyDepotatDAGDPANwillremainInoperation
for issueofSignal suppliestoallunitsuntilfurther
instructionsareissuedbythisheadquarters.
e. Ordnance:
(1) Army Class II and IV Ordnanoe Supply Points to be announced
l at er. Units wi l l continue to draw Class II and IT Ordnance
Items from organlo or attached Ordnanoe maintenance units
unti l further Instructions are issued by this headquarters.
(2) As of 00011 25 January 1945, Ordnanoo Ammunition Supply Points
as indicated below wi l l be taken over and operated by Sixth
Army as follows:
Amy Designation Location Former Designation 3 U/F level for
Any ASF #1 14.7-54.1 White Beach #2 43d Div
158th RCTand
Supporting Units.
Army ASP #2 15.0-40.2 6th Div Rear 6th Div and
Supporting Units.
Army ASF #5 35.2-40.6 25th Div Forward 25th Div and
Supporting Units.
Army ASP #6 91.4-29.4 40th Div ASP f/3 40th Div and
Supporting Units.
Army ASP #8 08.5-26.5 37th Div ASP #2 37thDivand
SupportingUnite.
(3) ArmyOrdnanceAmmunition SupplyPointsforthe1stCavalry
Divisionandsupportingunitsandthe32dInfantry Division
andsupportingunitswillbeannounced later.
(4) ThefollowinglevelsofClassV (Ordnance)willbemaintained:
WithUnits:
CombatUnits-Nottoexceed2U/F.
ServiceUnits-1U/F.
1U/Ffortroops served.
ASCOMDepots:
2U/Fforallunits.
f. Chemical:
(1) CVEAmmunitionSupplyPointNo.1.
Location: TARLAC.
OperatingLevel: 1U/FClassV.
ToServe: XIVCorps.
(2) ICorpsandSixthArmyTroopswilldrawCA'SClassVsupplies
fromCW3DepotsIntheArmyBaseAreauntilfurtherinstruc-
tionsfromthisheadquarters.
(3) Allunitswillmaintainalevelofnotmorethan2U/Fchemical
munitions in their possession.
(4) All units wi l l draw Class II and IV, Chemical Warfare supplies
from CWSDepota in the Army Base Area until further instruc-
tions are issued by thi s headquarters.
g. CivilRelief:
Supplypointstobeannounced later.
Bycommand ofLieutenant GeneralKRUEGER:
G.H.DECKER,
BrigadierGeneral,G.S.C.,
ChiefofStaff.
OFFICIAL:
U
140
HBADQ.UAHTERSSIXTHARMY 2. 3ee ADM0 16/ 3 f or Supply Poi nt s responsi bl e f or servi ng uni t s In
A.P.0.442 tbe M-l area with Information on l oc at i ons , dates of openi ng, oper-
et l ng l e v e l s and uni t s to be served.
23OOI25January I9U5
ADM016/4
3 . Appropriate orders wi l l i s s ue from t hi s Headquarters at t achi ng servi ce
uni t s , e f f e c t i ve 00011 29 January 1945, as f ol l ows :
1.UponarrivalIntheM-lareathelit CaTalryDivision (leas603dTank
Present
Co)andattachedunits,willdelivertoASCQKdumps thefollowing S S i l Attachment Attach To
quantitiesofsuppliesbasedonunit strengths(SeeInol1forunits
attachedtothe1stCavalry D i ) Det 275th Cml Serv Fl at (1 Off. 15SM) ICorps 6thArmy
678th QH3al v Col l Co ( - 1 Pl at ) ICorps 6thArmy
ClassI-20D/S
40724 qn 3erv Co
ICorps 6thArmy
ClassV-AllammunitionInexcessof2U/.
3873d QUQas Sup Co (-2d Pl at )
ICorps 6thArmy
2d Fl at 3873d QMGas Sup Co
XIVCorps 6thArmy
2. UponarriralintheM-lareathe32dInfantryDirisionandattachedunite
569th QMRailhead Co
XIVCorps 6thArmy
willdelivertoASCONdumpsthefollowingquantitiesofsuppliesbased
1 Fl at , 342d QMDep SupCo
ICorps ASCOM
onunit strengths(See Incl1forunitsattachedtothe32dInfantry
4188th H>iServ Co
ICorps ASCOM
Division)i
3118th QM3erv Co
XIVCorps 6thAxtny
3667th QMTruck Co (-Ed Pl at ) XIVCorps ASCOM
ClassV-Allammunitioninexcessof2U/I.
1998th qy Truck Co (Avn)(-2d Pl at ) XIVCorps ASCOM
236th QMSal v Coll Co (-2 Pl at s ) XIVCorps ASCOM
3. Appropriate orderswillissuefromthisheadquarters transferring service
l e t Pl at 4095th QMServ Co 158thRCT ASCOM
unitsupontheirarrivalashoreintheM-lareaasfollows 2d Pl at , 3874th QMGas SupCo 158thRCT ASCOM
Pm
To fre Attached To
By conmand of Lieutenant General KRUEGER:
656thMedClrCo 1stCa T Div 135th Med Group
llOOthMdCollCo 1stCarDiv 135th Md Oroup
30th>vacHosp 1stCmvDiv Sixth Any
G. H. DECKER,
182dQMLdryPlat (TypeB) 1stCavDiv 30th Ivac Hosp
Bri gadi er General, G. S. C.
398thMedCollCo
32dInfDiv 135th Md Oroup
Chief of St af f .
893dMedClrCo 32dInfDiv 135th >Ud Oroup
98th*vacHosp 32dInfDiv 8ixth Any
3529th9KTruckCo 32dInfDiv ASCCM
37UlstQMTruckCo 32dInfDiv ASCOH
262dQM
B
kryCo
32dInfDiv ASCCM
BycoaaandofLieutenant GeneralXHUIOXEt
0. H.CECKXR,
Brigadier General, 0. S. C.
(
Chief of Staff.
HEADQTiRTER3 SIXTH ARMY
A. P. O. 442
0800 29January1945
1 Incl!
ADM016/6
1 - M-l Reinforcing Divisions and Attached Units.
1 . Addi t i onal Amy Ordnanoe Ammunition Suppl y Po i nt s wi l l open a e f ol l ows :
DESIGNATION LOCATIOH TO OFSN OPERATING LEVEL TO SERVE
M-l BHNF0RCIH3 DIVI3I0IB AMD ATTACBBD OKTTB
ArmyASP#4 ROSALES 0001128January1/2U/Fforone ICorpsand
div(Relnf) supporting
ATTACHMKlTr OT COMBAT UOTT3
units
WITH 1ST CAYALHT DIVI3ICB ( - 603d TASK Co . ) :
ArmyASP#13 TAHLAC 0001128January1/2U/Fforone XIVCorps
div (Reinf) andsupport-
Strength
ingunits
112th C*v BCT 2439
2. ArmyAmmunitionSupplyPointsannouncedInparagraph1c(2)ofADM0
947t h FA Bn ( 1 Bow)
918
16/3dated24January 1945willremainopenandwillcontinueto
85t h Cal Bn
896
serveunitsasIndicated.
UHTT3 ATEACHMP"'
3. ArmyASP#5willservethe32dInfantryDivision (lessoneinfantry
regiment)whenItrelieveselementsofthe25thInfantry Division.
WITH13TCAVALRYDIVI8I0B(-603dTABSCO.):
4. Column4ofparagraph1c(2)ofADM 016/3dated24January1945
636thMedClrCo 11?
ischangedtoread 1_V/TlevelInsteadof3U/Flevel.
109
30thSvaoHosp
236
BycommandofLieutenantGeneralERUEGER:
19thPortSurgHoep
37
27thPortSurgBop
400thMadCollCo
37
162
384th QMTrk Co 0. H. DECKER,
9498thOrdMMCo
115
33
182d <MLdry Pl at (Typ B) Brigadier General, G. S. C.
S Ai rcraft Support Part i es Chief of Staff.
WITH 32D mTAKTHT DIVTSIOHi
398th Med CoU Co
105
893d Med Clr Co
m
98th Xveo Hoep
17th port Surg Hosp
296
90th Port Surg Hosp
37
37
S89th Ord MM Co
162
S9t h QMTik Co
119
3741et m TrkCo
S6M 91 BkryCo
115
168
A. P. O. 442
t Aircraft Support Partlee
2200 31 January 1945
AW 0 1 6 / 7 .
MAP: TAHLAC She e t , 1: 90, 000.
1. Paragraph 1 of Ada0 16/3 le amended to Include the following:
HSADOJIARTffiS SIXTH ARMY
(9) The 112 RCTwill draw required OJfsupplies, al l claesee,
A. P. O. 442 froa Aray <&Supply Point NO. 1.
13001, 28 January 1945
2. See Ami 1 hereto for details of Ojoarteraastar Plan.
ADM 0 1 6 / 0
3. Paragraph 1 b of Ada0 16/3 * wended to Include the following:
(4) The 112th RCTwill draw required edloal supplies froa
29 January 1945 (S / 20). S paragraph 1 b (2) Incl 7 to ADM0 16, Aray Medloal Supply Point No. 1.
thi* Headquartere datad 23 Novenber 1944.
1. ASCOMes.ue. ful l l ogl -tl c r. . poa. l bl l i ty for the " " ^ f j ^
141
4. Any Signal Supply Point Mo. I will be (itabllihtd as fol l ow:
Location: SAM MIOUIL
To Open : 18 February 1948
Operating Level: Approximately 900 ton* Claw II end IV
ToServe: Alltroop*lathvicinity
MTB; ArmySignalSupplyPointBo.1willooatlanetoeervloe
unitelatbTlelaltyofBATAMBAHO.
8. Paragraph9ofAda 016/8Isehangadasfollows:
Chang*3667th91TruckCo(-8dFlat)toread9667th91TruckCo.
BycommandofLieutenantGeneralEHQSOKB:
a. H.n
Brigadier Soneral, 0. s . C,
Chief of Staff.
OmCIAL:
' &
Annex:
1 - Quartermaster Plan
BBADQmRBBS SIXTH ARmT
A.P.O. 448
teoo 31 January1MB
Annex 1 to Ada0 16/ 7, Quartermaster Plan.
1. Sf f eot l ve 1 February 1948,the - 1 operational area I s divided into
four 91 supply t n i i , hereafter referred to as the SAN FABLAM9>
Area, DAOUPAH 91 Area, AmyQuartermaster Supply Point Mo.1 Area
and Anqr Quartermaster Supply Point Mo.t Area for the purpose of
furnishing Qnartemaater suppl l ss and eervl ees. See Inol 1 for above
t.Quartermaster supplies will be Issued to Quartermasters of Corps,
Divisions, and Air Force, end Supply Officers of Groups aad other
separate units. Subordinate units will not deal with Area Quarter-
master Supply Officers.
5.Supplies will be obtained froa the Area Qmrtermester Supply Point
in which the unit headquarters is located unless special arrange-
ments are made through the Amy or Base "M"Quartermaster.
The Commanding Officer, Base "",wi l l determine the polioles and
procedure to be followed la supplying units in the Amy Base Area.
S.Policies governing the operation of Amy Quartermaster Supply Point*
Mo. 1 sad Mo. 8:
a. Ration cycle begins with breakfast.
b. level authorised in units (effective 10 days after arrival
la M-l area):
Class I - 1 8/9 D/S la unit kltohens.
1 D/S in unit Quartermaster or unit supply
dump. Mote: (Condiments will be issued
for 8 day periods as soon
as supply level peml ts).
Class II It IT - Sssentlal items not to exoeed 10 D/3.
Class III - Not to exceed 8 D/S.
e. Supplies la exoeaa of quantltlee apeolfled above will be turned
In to Area Quartermaater Supply Polnte between the datea 8
February and 10 February, both inclusive. Sixth Amy Unite
stationed in the Amy Base Supply Areas will arrange with the
Area Quartermaster for turning In suppllss In exoess of levels
prescribed In paragraph 8 b above.
d. Requisitions:
(1) "Dally Telagrams" will be furnished to Qaartermastsr Supply
Pointa No. 1 and Ho. 8 to arrive by 1800 dally Betting forth
the number of ratlona, by type, required to be furnished
the unit on the day following for consumption ooimwnolng
on the second day following submission of telegram.
"Dally Telegram" will atato the estimated requirements of
Class III items for delivery on the same schedule.
(8) Consolidated requisitions for Class II and 17 supplies nay
be submitted to the Quartermaster Supply Point as required,
ordinarily once per week.
e. The Army Quartermaster wi l l oontrol the distribution of Items which
are In short supply.
6. Salvage:
ByunittransportationtoAreaQuart laterSupplyPoint.See
Inol3toAnnex1Adm016.
7. Buriala and Cemeteries:
188th ROT DAM0RTI3
43d Di vi si on DAMQRTI3
Remainder of I Corp*i XIV-Corps andAmyTaops:
In Bass Cemetery at SANTA
BARBARA when. possi bl e,
otharwlss In Di vi si on
Cemeteries.
8. Miscellaneous:
a. Al l quartermaster suppl l ss brought by uni t s whloh arrived on8
through 3 / 1 2 Sehelons which have not ys t been discharged wi l l
bs dollTsrsd to t hs Amy Baas Quartermaster Supply Point deel g-
natsd bythe Quartermaster Bas* "M"for atook.
b, TTnlta (except rei nforci ng Di vi si ons andattached uni t s) arri vi ng
on S 4 lfl and subsequent sobelons wi l l turn over to t bs nsarsst
Base or Amy Quartermaster Supply Point a l l Clasa I , II andIT
Quartermaster suppl i es l a exness of 100/ B. (aupereedes
l e t t e r AO400D-S,HqSi xth Aaqr. 8? January 1948, 8abj :
Unit Supplies t o be Delivered t o ASOOM taps.)
o. AssIg w i t of Qwrt emest or Uni t s . See Iaol S.
By ooi of Lieutenant General XBOKSLi
0. H.
Brigadier General, 0. 8. 0 . ,
Chief of St af f .
8Iaols:
Iaol1.Map,<ySupplyAreas,(omitted)
Inela-Listof9fUnits.
HUDLtUAHTffiS 3IXIEARUY
A.P.O. 44t
tiOO 31 January 1948
ListofQuarti eterUnits
Unit Attached To
HqtHqDet,866thQaBn(mob)
HqAHqDot,473dQaBn Si xth Amy
118thQHBakeryCo(-1stk8dPlats) Si xthAmy
187thQMBakeryCo Si xth Amy
18thQVCarPlat Sixth Army
88thQCarPlat Si xth Army
189thQMGasSupplyCo XIV Corps
I96thQUGesSupplyCo I Corps
3873dQU0*0SupplyCo Sixth Amy
1Plat,49thQMCrRegCo XIV Corps
601stQMOrRegCo(-IPlate*,DetCoHq) Sixth Amy
Det,CoHq,601stQMOrRegCo 188thRCT
1st*.8dPlats,601stQVGrRegCo I Corps
179thQMLdryPlat(TypeB) 71st Evao Bosp
180thQMLdryDet(TypeB) 92d Svao Hosp
181etQMLdryDet(TypeB) 89th Bvao Hosp
IBSdgMLdryDet(TypeB) 30th Ivao Hosp
183d91LdryDet(TypeB) 84th svao Hosp
894thiMLdryPlat(TypeB) 81st Svao Eoep
838th91LdryPlat(TypeB) 7th Svao Hosp
896tbQMLdryPlat(TypeB) 43d Field Hosp
897thQMLdryPlat(TypeB) 41st Fi el d Hosp
888thm RailheadCo(-1stFlat) I Corp*
1stPlat,888thm RailheadCo(-Det) XT? Corps
Det,1stPlat,8B8thQMRailheadCo 188th RCT
869thQ*RailheadCo Si xthAmy
949th91RailheadCo(SnroutefromU.S.T) Sixth Amy
1PUt,836thQMSalvCollCo HV Corps
678thQMSalvCollCo(-3dPlat) Sixth Atty
3dPlat,678thQMSalvCollCo I Corps
3118thQMServloeCo SixthAmy
4078dQMServiceCo Sixth Amy
4074thQMServiceCo XT7 Corpe
4188thQMServiceCo I Corps
3dPlat,389thQUTr*Co Sixth Army
384thQMTrkCo I Corps
2088thQUTrkCo(-1Plat) 188thRCT
3444th91TUcCo Sixth Army
3889th91TrkCo I Corps
9769thQUTrkCo HV Corps
88th91HarDogFlat HV Corps
86thQUmarDogPlat I Corps
39thQMiarDogPtet Sixth Amy
By oonaand of Lieutenant General KBUBCSR:
0.H.
BrigadierGeneral,d.8. C ,
ChiefofStaff.
142
SlXIfi ABUT
A. P. 0 . 442
2200, 2 February1945
AIM 01 6 / 8
1 . R*f ernce l a aad t o paragraph 2 , Annex 9 t o At e0 1 6 . Provos t
Marafcal Pl a n , andAt e0 1 6 / 2 . iTOToe*
2 . XfTcetlT* on data* aa ladloated In Inol 1, son** or responsibility
for military polio* and trafflo oontrol and *t*t* of readme** for
forward Boveavnt of military polioe unita will be as lndloatad on
attached aarked sap.
By nnani of Ueutenant OeneralKHDBOER:
0. H. DICKER,
Brigadier Oeneral, G. 3. C ,
Ohiaf of Staff.
1 lAOlt
1 Mapt Zoo* of H*pon*lbllity for
uni t ary Pol l e* and Traffio
Oontrolr (oalttad)
HXADQUARTSRS SIXTH ARMY
A. P. 0 . 442
0800, 5 February1943,
A! 0 16/9
1. Additional Amy ordnance Anoinltion Supply Point* wi l l be established
as follow*1
pealgnation Location tb Open OPLevel To sarre
Amy ASP414 San Miguel 0800 6 Feb 1 u/'F far XIVCorpsand
XT7 corps & supporting uni ts
supporting
units
Amy ASPIflS ouiaba
0800 6 *b 1 u/F for one I Corps and
diT (Reinf) supporting units
2. Additional CSSAnmunition supply Point wi l l be established as follows1
nul gnatl on location Ty open OPLer*l To Serre
CTS3ASP42 RDoales 0800 6 Feb 1 U/ FClass VI Corp* uni ts
( l e u 158th RCT,
32d & 43d
Divisions)
By eoamand of Lieutenant General KRUEGKPi
G. H.DECKBR,
Brigadier General, G. S. C*
Chief of Staff.
OFFICIAL!
HEADQUARTERS 3IXTHARMY
A. P. 0 . 442
2300 7 February 1945
AOU 0 16/ 10
1. Army Si gnal Supply Poi nt* wi l l be tabl l ahed andolo*ed as'f ol l ows:
Designation Location To 0p*n OpLaval To Sarv*
0800 8 Fab 50 ton* Cl II Al l troops
50 tons Cl IV In vi oi nl t y
Amy Sig SP #3 Balungao
Army Sl SP #1 Bayambeng t o olo* 0800 8 Feb.
0. H. DECKER,
Brigadier Geneml, 0. S. C. ,
Chlaf Of St af f .
A. P. 0 . 442
0800 13 February1945
AIM 0 1 6 / 1 1 .
1. Amy Engineer Supply Point mi l be established as followsi
DESIGNATION, LOCATION TOOPEN OPLEVEL TO SERVE
Anny Eogr SPNO 2 SanFernando 0800 12 Feb 1500tons Al l Troops
(pampenga Prov) clasa II &17 in Vicinity
By oommand of Lieutenant General KHUEGERi
G. H. DECiSR,
Chief of Staff.
OFFICIAL1
HEADQUARTERS SLXTHARMY
A. P. 0 . 442
22001 17 February1945
AIM 0 16/ 12 t o accompany JO 5 2
1 . Ef f e c t i ve OOOli, 13 February 1945 (S/ 35) LUZON Base Se ot i on, USASOS,
was e s t abl i s he d as t hat part of LUZON ISLAND wi t h boundary i nl and
from LINGAYEN GULFas f ol l ows 1
MABILAO ( 3 mi l e s north of SANFABIAN) - KABUANAN -
BINALONAN - ROSALES - GCIKBA - VICTORIA - LAPAZ-
ARAYAT - SANLUIS - CALUMPIT - VACABEES - OTAGUA -
PORAC - FORT STOTSENBURG - BAMBAN - TAPLAC -
OiMILXNG - VANGATABEU - BUGALLON - SUAL, a l l
i nol usi ve. see attached l nol osure.
2. oomnanAlng Oenernl, USASOS, within the LUZON Base Seotion (short
t i t l a LUBSEC>. at OOOli, 13 February 19451assumed responsi bi l i ty for.
a i ni t i at i on and completion of approved construction projects andfor
operation of servi oe i ns t al l at i ons , including those pertaining to
port, base, highways androads, railways, ai rf i el ds , bulk petroleum
di stri buti on f a c i l i t i e s , hospi t al l zat l on, inter-agency l i nes of
signal ooncunioati ons, andother act i vi t i es not in di rect support
of combat operati ons.
b. Rehabi l i tati on, maintenance and operation of rai l ways.
0. Advancing supplies anc l ogi s t i o servi oe to Sixth Army supply points
to maintain prescribed l evel s or as arranged with Commanding
General, Sixth Army.
3 . oofflmanding General, USASOS,has been oharged with responsi bi l i t y forthe
following projeot* outsi de of the LUZON Base Seotion1
a. Rehabilitation of the OALCOCANrailroad yards, shops, rol l i ng stock
and equipment within the yard area.
b. Rehabilitation of the oommeroial communications systems inthe
greater MANILA Area.
4* l.fevement of personnel andfceeessery equipment and supplies for these
projeots throughand i nt o Sixth Army areas of responsi bi l i t y wi l l
be subjeot to olearanoe by Commanding General, Sixth Army.
5* Sixth Army supply poi nt s, staging areas andother taoti oal i nst al l at i ons
looated within the LUZON Base Section area remain under control of
Commanding oeneral, si xt h Army.
By onmmend of Lieutenant General KRJBGKRj
G. H.DECKER,
Brigadier General, C. S.
Chief of St af f .
OFFICIAL!
OFFICIAL:
1 Inoli
iPP LUZONBU* seotion* USASOS. (emitted)
0-4/
143
A. P. 0 . 442
1800 19 ftbruaxy 1945
AIM 0 16/ 13
1 Tne f ol l owi ng Msdieal suppl y Poi nt i a now open.
Des i gnat i on t Army Medical suppl y poi nt #3
l o c a t i o n 1 i f t nl l a - s out heas t s e ot i on of San Lazaro Reoe Course
(8O.5 - 68.4)
Unit, 15th Msdioal supply platoon
Operating Level1 15 D/ Sfor 20,000 troops
TOssrrei XIV Oorps and sixth Amy troops in the Ifenila area
2. paragraph 2 f, Inol 4 to Adm0 16, this headquarters, dated 20
November 1944 1 rescinded. Data on captured materiel will not be
shown on future G-4 Periodic Reports. Captured materiel wi l l be re-
ported under the provisions of paragraph 5 Inol No 3/1 to Annex
1, Quartermaster Plan, Adm0 16, this headquarters, dated 20
November 1944
By command of lieutenant General KRUEGERi
G. H. DECffiR,
Brigadier General, G. 3.
Chief of Staff.
HZADQUARTIRS SIXTH ARKY
A. P. 0. Uk2
1000125February19^5
ADM016/14
1. Thefollowingchange*andadditionsareannouncedinAnyQuartermaster
SupplyPoints:
a. Designation ' ArmySupplyPoint#1.
Location < Resales.
ToOpen *Howopen.
OperatingLevel : 3D/SClassIandIIIfor1*5,000.
ToServe > TroopslocatedinareashownonInclosure1.
b. Designation > ArmySupplyPoint#2.
Location < Tarlac.
ToOpen >SowOpen.
OperatingLevel 3D/SCUssIandIIIfor35,000-3D/SClass
IIandITfor100,000.
ToServe >AmyandXICorpsunitenorthoflineANOELSS-
ARATAT-SANILDXFONSO. SeeInclosure1.
c. Designation *ArmySupplyPoint#3*
Location
:
SanFernando,Panpanga.
ToOpen Opened23February.
OperatingLevel : **3D/SClassIandIII(exceptV-80gas)for
75.000.
ToServe
:
AllunitsexceptXICorps,southoflineANOELIS
ARAYAT-SANILDITONSO. SeeInclosure1.
ClassIIandITsupplieswillbestockedatthispointinthenear
future. RequisitionsmaybesubmittedtoAraySupplyPoint#3-
Unitswillbeadvisedwhenandwheresuppliesmaybedrawn.
XIVCorpswillhaulmaximumquantityofV-80gasolinefrombulk
plantatTarlacusingtanktrucks.
2. ArmyChemicalWarfareSupplyPointsareopenedandclosedasfollows!
Designation Chemical Warfare Supply Point #3.
Location San pwnando (Patnpenga Province - 1845*5 - I8I7. 7).
ToOpen Opened 22 February.
OperatingLevel 1 u/r Class V.
ToSsrre Droops in vi ci ni t y.
Designation
Location
Chemical Warfare Supply Point #1.
Tarlao
Closed 22 February
3 . a. The following Array Ordnanoe Ammunition Supply Point i s opened1
Designation
Location
Ammunition supply Point #16.
San Fernando, Pampanga.
TOOPen 27 Itebruary.
Operating Level 1 U/F.
To serve XIV Corps and 40th Division.
b The following Army Ordnanoe Ammunition Supply Points have been closed1
Designation Location
ASP#2
ASP#3
ASP#6
ASP#8
Gueguesanguen
San Jfceinto
ttmunday
San Carlos
(15.0 -40.2)
(17.6 -44.0)
(914 - 294)
(O8.5 -76.5)
ASP m
Blue Beaoh
ASP #10
ASP#11
Blnmaley
Iingayen
(riolnity)
ASP #12
ASP#13
Blnmaley
Tarlao
4. Amendment to Annex5, Adm0 16 to accompany F0 34 f ol l ow
paragraph 3 h (1) (b) 6 of Annex 5 to Adm0 16, Chemies.1 nan, Is
ohangsd to read as follows1
Bomber of serrioeable and unserviceable 42 inch mortars, flame-
throwsrs and *imfthrowr ki t s , by type, on hand.*
By eommand of lieutenant General KHJBGBRt
G. H. DSCKBR,
Brigadier General, G. S. C,
Chief of Staff*
orao
;
1 I n o l .
MAPi LUZON QMSUPPLY AHHAS. ( Omi t t ed)
HKADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY
A. P. 0 . 442
1700 9 Muroh 1945
ADM 0 16/ 15
1. The f ol l owi ng ohanges i n Army quartermaster suppl y Poi nt s ere announced 1
a. Army QM Supply Poi nt ND. 1 (ROSALES)i
(1) dos e s , exoept for bakery, at 0001 15 March. Bakery serves
32d Division, 25th Division and other units in vl oi ni t y.
(2) 25th Division Truokhead opens SAN JCSE, HUEVASCIJA, at 0001
15 J*roh.
Serving: 25th Division, attaohed units and army uni ts in
vi ci ni t y.
Level t Class I 1 D/ SBration, l ess bakery ingredients,
1 D/s emergenoy ration, (2 D/Srations
in unit kltohens. )
Class III 5 D/ S
Class II &IV 10 D/S essenti al items.
(3) 32d Division Truokhead opens IAYUS, PANGASINAN, at 0001 15
Iferoh.
Serving) 32d Division, attached uni ts and army units in
vi ci ni t y.
Levelr same as for 25th Division Truokhead.
(4) Army units north of l i ne TARLAC- CABAKATUANnot served by
division truokheads wi l l draw al l cl asses Qiartermestcr
supplies at Base M.
(5) Requisi ti ons.
(a) Daily telegrams showing Class I and III requirements
wi l l be submitted to Commanding Offieer, Base Mby
1200 on the date preceding the date delivery i s re-
quired.
(b) class II &IVrequisitions wi l l be submitted to Raae
Mas required, normally once per week.
b.. Army QJIsupply point No. 2 (TARLAC)s
(1) closes 0001 15 Maroh. Units formerly supplied by this
point wi l l be supplied as follows
North of l i ne TAHLAOCABANATUAN - from BaseM
South of l i ne TARLAC-CABANATUAN- from Army QMSupply
Point No. 3
0. Army QMSupply Point No. 3 (SANFBRNANDO)i
Now Open.
Operating Level1 3 D/ Sal l classes for 50, 000. The V-80 bulk
plant at DADwi l l r e f i l l al l tank vehi cl es, unit containers
as desired and vehiole tanks.
Serving t All uni ts south of TARLACand west of PLARIDEL.
See mol 1.
d. QMDepot MANILA (location near dooks inmsdiately north of Pasig
Mver mouth).
Opens 0001 10 j*roh.
Serving: All units south and east of l i ne DINGALANBAY -
CABANATAUN-PLARIDEL. See Inol 1.
2 . The following Army Bigineer Supply Point i s announced1
Designation Army gnglneer supply ibint No. 3
Looation MANILA (GRACE a.RK).
Opens Now open.
Operating Level 10 D/s 01 II 4 IV.
10 serve
All Army troops in the MANILAarea and the XIV Corps.
144
j . ;jr.iy ma wt r supply Foint r e. 1 (TAMLAC) i s closed effective0001
TV command of lieutenant General '-:-il2CIR:
G. H.DSJ-'ER,
ier General, G..S. C-
Chief of staff.
J SiP
:.2AiriARr:RS SIXTH AHW
. 1. 0. 442
l6C0 23 ','orch1945
Adm C1 ft/16
1. Thefollowing Army -y SLTfly Point 13announced:
"esi^natirn: .jr"
v
..;.'.supply Icint .10. 4 (formerly XICorps 7.; Dump)
Location: JITIC E^-.V (vicinity CLOV^K)
(pens: 0C01, 2k't-rci: l ^ j .
cperatine Level: 10D/Sclasses I to I", inclusive, for 21,000 trcops.
To 'isrve; All.'jmya.-ic Air Ftirce units in o".:'IC S;.Y area ('.Vestof
i . .jr.; "ecic.1 3u]_l;
T
Point : c .j ,located i;
;
:'._'ILr., passed to control
of L*"GZG effective 0001, 11"arci. l
=
't5 All Array units served by
t..is supply point will draw medicel supplies from tb I'JPSiJC T.'edical
Sui-I'ly Joint at the same location (Southeast section cf SanLazaro
pace course).
yjeomcuna of Lieutenant General KRÊGEP:
C. K. UECJOTt,
Bri gadi er General, G. C ,
Chief of St aff.
RTErtS SIXTH
A. P. C. 442
1300 11 Apri l 1945
Adi) C16/ 1"
a. it.e following Aray Ordnance Amrcunitior. Supply Point is announced:
Designation: Anraunition Supply Point ].o. 17
Location: ia.ci-^, lUeva ^cija
Cpena: Limited Issue - 10 April 1943
j ul l issues - 15 April 1945
Operatint Level: 1 u/? (for troops in vicinity)
TOSsi-ve: Troops ic vicinity^
b. Ths follov?ins Army.Ordnance Ammunitior. Supply Points will close as
indicated:
Location pete Closed
Bosales 10 April 1945
ASPIf4
Guimba 15 April 19*5
ASP $15
2. a. Thefollowing Army Medical Supply Points are announced:
(1) Designation Army tfedioal SP Hk
Location: SanJose, Nueva Boija
ipw Open.
Operating Levels 15D/Sfor 60,000
To serve: Troops in vi ci ni t y.
(2) Designation: Army Medical SP ffi
Location: patangas. Batungas
i:ow open. ,
- O O P Sinvicinity.
b T t S supSy Point will draw medical supplies from the Base
:.; radical supply Point at the same location.
3* a. Thefollovdng Army sitnal Supply Points are announced:
(1) Designation: Army Signal 5PI.e.4
Location' SanFernando, re.T,pan(/a
NowOpen.
Operating Level: 15n/sfor troops in vicinity
To Serve: units in vi ci ni t y.
(2) Designation: Army Signal 3?No.5
Location: SanJose, riueva ixija
Openedi 10Apri]1945
Operating Level: 15c/s for units in vicir.it/
To Serve: units in vicinity.
b. Thefollowing Army Sifcri-al Supply Point closeo 03 inuiceted:
Designation Location Date Closed
Aat If3 10 s'.-ril 1916
CC'^C'B CFCÎERAL KRl'ESEft:
':..il.D.CCJ i^,
Brigadi:'- Oenert-1, "",.5.0.
Ch-i-jf of at t i f .
CFFICI/l:
/.etc'}-c.
t00 It j,nl
A<3m 0 16/ 18
1. Thefollowing Army C7i"3SupplyPoint 13 enncur.ced:
Designation: Army C1V0o? ^4
Locetion; san Jose, i?jeva Eoije
Opens: 19April194j
Operating level: 1U/FClass y
Toserve: iroopa in vicinity.
2. Thefollowing Army ]3iineer Supply r-oint is announced:
Designation: Army Engineer SI #k
Location: SanJose, JHevu Boija
OPens: 21April1945
Operating level: class II (except spare purts) - 7-10 11/3
Class IV- as required
Vaxiraumof 6,000 ton3.
To serve: Allunits assigned or attached tc oix+h Array (except
bridging andconstruction supplies). Q"idini; andccn-
struction supplies to Corps.
3. Thefollowing Army ^:.Supply Itiint will close as indicated:
Designation Location pate Clcaed
Army QJi'SP flh Subic Bay ( ^ c . Olanâpo) 2400 20 April 1
BY COlZ'JdJD 0? GFJSFUL KHUSG3R:
c. 1:.uzc'ir-,
Brigaoier General, ". z..C.
Chief of St aff.
OFFICIAL:
Actg G-4
FEADQ,UARTERS SIXTH ARfT
A. P. 0. 442
1200 2j Apri l 1945
Adm 0 16/19
1. a. -effective 25 Apr i l , the ar eas for which PHIBSEC bases arer e -
sponsi bl e for l ogi s t i c a l support wi l l be as i ndi cat ed on
i ncl osure #1.
b . There wi l l be no cnange in uni t s drawing suppl i es and equipment
through army supply poi nt s under exi st i ng admi ni st r at i ve or der s .
In the event a uni t i s in one base area and i s supplied byan
array or corps supply poi nt in another base ar ea, the uni t wi l l
continue t o drew from the corps or army supply poi nt .
c. in i nst ances where l o g i s t i c a l support i s received di r e c t from a
base, requisitions, daily telegrams andallied iwtters will be
submitted bytheunit or supply point involved to thebase
serving thearea in which the unit or supply point is located.
145
HEADQUARTERS SIXTHARMY
2. Thefollowing Array Qiartermaster Supply Point i s enncunoed:
A. P. 0. 442
1000 1 June 1945
Designation! Army Qiartermaster Supply Point#>.
Location: s&nJose, Nueva goija.
Adm 0 16/22
Opens
:
1 May1945
Operating leveli 5D/s
The f ol l owi ng Army Supply Poi nt s wi l l c l os e a s i ndi c a t e d:
To serve: 25th infantry Division and troops in vi ci ni t y.
Designation Location To Cl ose
BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KRUEGER:
CMSASP#2 Rosales 2400 5 June 1945
OrdASP#5 Binalonan 2400 1 June 1945
SignalSP#4 SanFernando,Pamp. 2400 1 June 1945
G. H. DECKER,
Br i gadi er Gener al , G. S. C.
Chief of St af f .
G. H. DEC?J2R,
OFFICIAL: Br i gadi er Gener al , G. S. C.
Chief of St af f .
OFFICIAL:
Aotg G-
1 I n c l . Ict g G-4
Areas of Res pons i bi l i t y
for baaes under PHIBSEC ( emi t t ed)
Adm 0 16/ 23 ( Omi t t ed) .
AP0 442
1000,17June1945.
A. P. 0. 442
Adm016/24
1400 5 wiy 1945
1. ThefollowingArmyQuartermasterSupplyPointlaannounoed:
Adm 0 16/ 20
Designation: ArmyQMSupplyPointNo.6.
Location: Solano,NuevaVlzcaya.
1. The f ol l owi ng ordnance Amin i ti on Supply Poi nt s ar e cl osed as i ndi c a t e d i
Opens: 18Jane1945
OperatingLevel: 10D/SClassItIII-35,000
Desi gnat i on Locat i on Date Closed
LimitedEssentials ClassII&IT.
ASP #14 San Mi guel , Tarl ac 2400 4 May 1945
ToServe: Troopsinthevicinity.
ASP #16 San Pternando, Pampanga 2400 4 v&y 1945
2. ThefollowingArmyMedicalSupplyPointIsannounced:
2. The fol l owi ng ordnance Amnunltion Supply Poi nt i s announced1
Designation: ArmyMedicalSupplyPointNo.7.
Desi gnat i onj Ammunition Supply Poi nt No. 18.
Location: Bayombong,NuevaYizceya.
Locat i on: Angel es, Pampanga.
Opens: Nowopen.
Opened: 4 May 1945.
OperatingLevel: 10D/S-40,000.
To Ser ve: Troops i n v i c i n i t y .
ToServe: TroopsInthevicinity.
BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KRUEGER1
3. The37thInfantry DivisionTruckheedatSolano,NuevaVizceyawill
close16June1945.
4. ThefollowingArmyEngineerSupplyPointisclosedasindicated:
G. H. DECKER
Br i gadi er Gener al , G S. C., Designation Location DateClosed
Chief of St a f f .
A m y EngineerSPNo.5 Solano,NuevaVlzcaya 15June1945
5. ThefollowingArmyEngineerSupplyPointisannounoed:
OFFI CUXJ Designation: ArmyEngineerSupplyPointNo.6.
Location: Bayombong,Nueva Vlzcaya.
Opens: Nowopen.
ToServe: Troopsinthevicinity~ Bridgeconstructionmaterials only.
BYCOMMANDOFGENERAL KRUEGER:
G.H.DECKER
BrigadierGeneral,G.S.C ,
ChiefofStaff,
OFFICIAL:
A.P.0. 442
2000 11May1945
Adm016/21
ThefollowingArmySupplyPoint isannounced:
A.P.0.U42
Designation: ArmySupplyPoint (Anderson).
1500,22JuneI9I+5
Location: ilauban.
Opened: 8May1945.
Adm016/25
ToServe: 1stAndersonBattalion (P.G.)andessential civilian
reliefneeds.
ThefollowingArrayCWSSupplyPointisannounced:
Operating Levels: ClassI&III 10D/Sfor1000
ClassII&IV Asrequired
Designation: ArmyCWSSP#5
ClassV
Location: Bagabag,NuevaVizcaya
CivilRelief Asallocatedbythis
Opens: NowOpen
headquarters.
OperatingLevel: 1U/FClassV
ToServe: Troopsinthevicinity
BYCOMMANDOFGENERALKRUEGER:
BYCOMMANDOFGENERAL KRUEGER:
G.H.DECKER,
BrigadierGeneral,G.S.C. G.H.DICKER,
ChiefofStaff.
Brigadier General,G.S.C.
ChiefofStaff.
OFFICIAL: OFFICIAL:
t
Acting G-4
146
X. P. 0 . 442
4 . Omitted.
21301, , 16 January V)k5
5> No change.
FO 42.
LUZONi 1/250,000.
LUZONi 1/50,000.
1. omitted.
2 . a. Sixth Army continues the offensive.
b . 25th Division (leas 35th Infantry) passes to the control of the
Commanding General, i Oorps, effect i ve 24001 16 January 1945.
3* XIV Corps wi l l continue current mi ssi ons.
b . I Corps, while continuing current missions wi l l , employing the
25th Division,, (l ess 35th i nfant ry) a e iz o and secure the l i ne
URDANETA- BINAL0NAN.
0. 35th Infantry wi l l remain in present l ocat i on in Army r eser ve.
x. (1) Reoonnaissanoe to include general l i ne CAMILING - PANIQUI -
CUYAPO- SAN LEON - SAN QUIOTIN - SANNICOLAS.
(2) Corps oomraanders wi l l secure needed crossings over the
AGNORIVER i n t hei r respect i ve zones of aot i on.
4. Quitted.
5 . N change.
/ a / Wal t er KTusger
WALTER KRUEGER,
Li eut enant Gener al , u . S. Army
Commanding
A. P. 0. 442
12001 18 January 1945
PC 43
Mips: LUZON - 1/ 250, 000. LUZON - 1/50, 000
1. Omi t t ed.
2. a.sixthArmycontinuestheoffensivetoseizetheCENTRALPLAINS-
MANILAarea.
b . Boundar y be t we e n Co r p s j DAGUPAN - CALASIAO - SAN CARLOS - MALASIQUI
CARMEN - SAN MANUEL (TARLAC PROVINCE) - ANA0 - VICTORIA - LA PAZ -
MAGALANG ( a l l i n c l u s i v e t o XIV Co r p s ) .
3 * a- XTV Cor ps 1
(1) will,by1800120January1945,securethelineCAMILING-
FANIQUI-ANAO.
(2) '.Till,on21January1945.advancerapidlytosecuretheline
TARLAC-VICTORIA,preparedforfurtheradvancetosecure
CLARKFIELD.
(3) will continue t oi
(a) Protect the wes"t flank of Sixth Army.
(b) Jfiintain contact with I Corps.
b_. I corps
s
(1) Will continue current missions.
(2) Will, by 1800120 January 1945, secure the line CUYAPO -
BALUNOAO - RIZAL (PANGANISAN PROVINCE) - PIAS - BACTAD -
SAN FELIPE, pushi ng r econnai ssance t o i ncl ude t he l i ne
VICTORIA ( excl us i ve) - GUIMBA.
c_. The 13t h Armored Group wi l l , by 1800121 January 1945. assembl e
t he 44t h Tank Bat t al i on ( l e s s Company C) i n t he ROSALES a r e a ,
coor di nat i ng t he movement of t h i s u n i t wi t h t he Commanding
Gener al , I Corps.
d_. The 35t h I nf ant r y wi l l remai n i n pr es ent l oc a t i on i n Si xt h Army
Reser ve.
e . Headquar t er s and Headquar t er s Bat t er y, 68t h AAABr i gade, pas s es t o
~ t he c ont r ol of t he Commanding Gener al , Si xt h Anrny and a l l Si xt h
Army AAAu n i t s a r e a t t a c he d t o t he 68t h AAABrigade e f f e c t i ve a t
00011 20 Januar y 1945'
x . Onand a f t e r 0001121 January 1945t a l l r eques t s f or AAA pr ot e c t i on
~ wi l l be s ubmi t t ed d i r e o t t o Headquar t er s Si xt h Army. Commanders
wi l l be r e s pons i bl e f or suppl y and evacuat i on of AAAu n i t s pr o-
vi di ng AAA p r o t e c t i o n t o t h e i r r e s pe c t i ve commands.
/ s / Tt el t er
K
rueger
WALT5R KRUEGER,
Li eut enant General , U.S.Army,
Commanding.
A. P. 0. 442
19301 21 January 1945
F044-
l*ps LUZON- 1/250,000. LUZON- 1/50,000.
1. emitted.
2. a_. sixth Army continues the offensive to seize the CENTRALPLAINS -
MANILA area.
b_. present boundary between XIV Corps and I corps i s extended to
MEXICO (inclusive to XIV Corps).
3 a. XTV Corps will continue:
(1) Aggressive advance to the southward and secure CLARKFIELD.
(2) To protect r i ght flank of Army.
(3) TOmaintain contact with I Corps.
b. I corpst
(2) Will be prepared to seoure the l i ne VICTORIA (exclusive) -
GUIMBA, when direoted.
4 emitted.
5 emitted.
/ s/ wal t er Krueger
WALTER KRUEGER,
Li e u t e n a n t Ge n e r a l , U. S. Army,
Commanding.
A. P . 0 . 442
20001 26January1945
FO45
Maps: LUZON- 1/250,000. LUZON- 1/60,000.
1. a_. Current i nt el l i gence report s.
b. Pursuant to instructions of the Commander-in-chief, Southwest
"~ Pacific area:
(1) The Commanding General, Eighth Army wi l l , on 29 January 1945,
land the XI Corps in southern ZAMBALESPROVINCE and seize the
SANANTONIO - CASTHLEJ0S - SANFELIPE area, aft er which t hi s
Corps wi l l continue operations to the eastward under command
of the Commanding General, Sixth Army.
(2) 1st Cavalry Division and 32d Infantry Division, both reinforced
(Annex 1) , wi l l land at White Beach (LINGAYEN GULF) on
27 January 1945, at which time both Divisions wi l l pass to
command of the Commanding General, Sixth Army.
2. a_. Sixth Army continues the offensive to secure the CENTRAL PLAINS -
MANILA area.
b. Bouiriary between Corps: DAGUPAN - SAN CARLOS - MALASIQUI - CARMEN -
~ ANAO - VICTORIA - LAPAZ - ZARAGOZA - SAN ANTONIO (NUEVA SCIJA PROV)-
PLARIDEL ( al l inclusive to XIV Corps).
c. 35th Infantry Regiment i s released to the Commanding General, I Corps,
~ effective 08001, 28 January 1945.
d. 1st Cavalry Division, reinforced, wi l l assemble in the URDANETA area
~ in Sixth Army Reserve, prepared for immediate movement to the
GUIMBA area.
e. 32d Division, reinforced, wi l l assemble in the MANA0AG- SANVICENTE -
"~ MAPANDANarea, where the Division (less one infantry regiment) wi l l
pass to the control of the Commanding General, I Corps, effective
08001 30 January 1945 for the purpose of relieving elements 25th
Division north of the AGNORIVER. The excepted infantry regiment
wi l l remain in Army Reserve.
147
3 a. XIVCorpss
(1) Will continue to advance vigorously to the southeast and se-
cure the crossing of the FAMPANGA RIVER at CALUT.TrT.
(2) YU11 reconnoiter to include the l i ne HACCMCY- i.'ALOLOS -
TLARIDEL.
(3) 7rt.ll continue:
(a) TOprotect the west flank of Sixth Army.
(b) To maintain contact with I Corps.
(4) Will be prepared to establish and maintain contact with XI
Corps in the DIMALUFIHAN area, when di rect ed.
I corps:
(1) '."ill continue current missions.
(2) 7,'ill, on 28 January 1945 alvance vigorously to the southeast
and secure the l i ne LICAE - TALAVERA- MUNOZ- LUFAO.
(3) '.Till reconnoiter to include the line CABANATUAN - BONGABON -
SANJOSE.
(4) Ti l l promptly assemble the 1st Cavalry Division, reinforced,
in the GUIMBAarea at the disposal of the Commanding General,
Sixth Army.
13th Armored Croup:
(1) 'Till be prepared to support the advance of I Corps.
(2) 7,111 assemble the 44th Tank Battalion (less Company C) in the
CVEBA area, coordinating t hi s movement with the ComAandlng
General, I Corps.
mCl ' / 3 and Adm C16/4*
<rrent Sixth Army SCI.
Qoran&nd ?..-its :
(1)SixthArmy-GALAÎAC.
(2)ICorps-ATGIO.
(3) XIVCorps-3..NKIlUiL(TAHLACPROV).
(4) 1stCavalryDivision-vicinityUHDANETA.(Tobereported).
(5) 32InfantryDivision-vicinityMANAC^G. (Tobereported).
/ s / ./alter Krueger
./ALTER KRUEGER,
Li eut enant General , U. S. Army,
Commanding.
1 - Troop Li s t : 1st -av Div (;>ei.-if).
32d Inf Div ( Rei nf ) .
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARCT
A. T. 0. 442
20001 26 January 1945
A12TSX. 1 t c F0 45, Troop l i s t .
1st CAVALRY DIVIoICI.
1
1s t cav Div ( l as s 603d Tank Co)
112th Cav ROT
947th FADR (155How)
5th OnlBn
19t h Ifert surg Koai'
27th Port .surg Hosr
3498t h ord n ; Co
384t h Qf:TrkCo
13th Support Ai r cr af t Part y
32d IirFAI.'TRY DIVISION (RSIIiFCRCED)
32d Inf Civ
17th Port Sur^ Hosp
30t h Port sur g itosp
289th Crd )T Co
19thSupportAircraftParty
BycommandofLieutenantGeneralKRUECER:
/ s/ G. H. Decker
C. H. uS^'y-SR
Br i gadi er General , G. S. C. ,
Chief of St af f .
OFFICIAL:
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH
A. F. C. 442
16001 26 January l
AJffiHDMZliT NC.1 to ATJNKX1 t o F0451 Troop l i s t
AlflvEX 1 t o F0 45 i s amended as follows 1
32d IKFAITTRY BIYISTnic (
Del et et
229th ord \z\ Co
By command of l i e ut e na nt General KTWEO^H:
G. II. IGCI^R,
Br i gadi er Gc-Loral, C.
Chief of St af f .
OFFICIAL1
p
0-3
HEADqUAETERS SIXTH ARMT
A. P. 0. 1&2
2300130Jamoary19^5
10kS
Mapat LDZOH-1/250,000. LUZOB-1/50,000.
1. Omitted.
2.a.SixthArmycontinuestheoffensive.
Boundaries:
(l) BetweenXIandXIVCorps: BUCAOHIVER-MTPIHATU3A(exclusive)
DIHALUPIHAH-OHAHI(alllncluuiretoXICorpe).
(2) BetweenXITandICorps: DAGOPAH-SANCARLOS- Q
CAEMIH-HAKPICUAH-VICT0EU(allinclusiretoH TCorps),
thenceLICAB-PIHAOPAHAAN-CABU-TAMALA (allInclusiveto
ICorpe).
c. 1stCsralxyDirleion,reinforced,(less112thCavalryECT)isattached
~ toXIVCorpe,effective0001131JannaryI9U5
i. 19l8tFieldArtilleryGroupandthel65thFieldArtilleryBattalion
areattachedtoICorps,effective0001131JanuaryI9U5.
. U4thlankBattalion(lessCoC)isattachedto1stCavalryDivision,
effective0001131January1945.
XICorps:
(1) Willcontinuecurrentmissions.
(2) Willadvancevigorouslytotheeastward,andwillestablishand
maintaincontactwithXIVCorpsalongthelineHERMOSA-
DIHALUPIHAH.
(3) WillreconnoitertoincludeBATAANPENLHSULA.
(4) WillprotectrightflankofSixthArmyinzoneof actionofthe
Corps.
. XIVCorps:
(1) Willcontinuecurrentmission,protectingwestflankofSixth
ArmyinzoneofactionoftheCorps.
(2) W i ncontinuetopushaggressivelytothesouthward,moving
withitslefton 1February19^-55securecrossingsoverthe
PAMPAHGARIVERwithinthezoneof actionoftheCorps;secure
thelineMALOLOS-SIBULSPRINGS-CABANATUAH;andbepre-
paredpromptlytocontinuetheadvancetocaptureMANILA.
(3) WillestablishandmaintaincontactwithXICorpsalongthe
lineHZRMOSA-DINALUPIHAH.
. ICorps:
(1) Will.-continuecurrentmissions.
(2) Will,on 1February19^5.attackvigorouslytothesoutheast
andeast,captureSANJOSS,and,continuingtheadvance,se-
curethelineCABANATUAN (exclusive)-BOHGABOH-RIZAL
(NOIVA1CIJAPROV)
(3) Willblockthesouthwardadvanceofhostileforcesfromthe
CAGAIANVALLir.
148
(4) WillinterdictroadsandtrailsintheBALJCTIPASSareawith
long-rangeartilleryfire.
(5) WillpuehreconnaissancetoDIJJGALENBATandBALERBAIandbe
preparedtocleartheaeareasofenemyforces,whendirected.
(6) Willbepreparedtoassembleoneengineeraviationorconstruc-
tionbattalionintheROSALESareareadyformovementandto
passtoArmycontrolon36hourspriornotificationbythis
headquarters.
A. SixthArmyReserve:
(1) 126thInfantry,32dDlTislon,assembledinMAHAOAO-HAPANDAH-
SANVICSNTIarea.
(2) 112thCavalryEOT_assembledInGUIKBAarea.
(3) 13thArmoredGroup-assembledInSANJACINTOarea,preparedto
supporttheattackofICorps.
x. CommandingGeneral,ICorps,willcoordinatemovementofletCavalry
~ DivisionthroughICorpszoneofactionwithpriorityonGUBtBA-
TALAVERA-CABANATUAN
rO
adto1stCavalryDivisionuntil20001
1February1945*
4. a.IandXIVCorps1 Nochange*
b XICorpsj
(1) AsdirectedinAdm05,HeadquartersEighth Amy*
(2) AllreportsrequiredbyHeadquartersEighthArmyunderAdm0
5 willberenderedtothisheadquarters.
5. Nochange.
/a/ Wal ter Krueger,
WALTER KRUEGER,
Li eut enant General , U. S. Army,
Cosnanding.
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH AHMY
A. P. 0. 442
20001,2February1945
FO47
Maps LUZOH-1/250,000. LUZOH-1/50,000.
1. Omitted.
2. a. SixthArmycontinuestheoffensive,
b. BoundariesbetweenCorps: Hochange.
3. a,.XICorpswillcontinuecurrentmissions.
b. XIVCorps:
(2) Willcontinueaggressiveadvancetothesouthward;capture
MANILA;andstcurethelineCAVITX-TAGIG-TAYTAY-
AHTIPOLO-MONTALBAN.
(3) WillprotectleftflankofSixthArmywithinzoneofaction
oftheCorps.
c.ICorpswillcontinuecurrentmissions.
d. SixthArmyReserve:
(1) 126thInfantryRegimentremaininpresentarea.
(2) 112thCavalryRegimentalCombatTeamremaininpresentarea.
(3) 13thArmoredGroupremaininpresentareapreparedtocontinue
currentmissions.
4 . Omi tted.
5. Command Poet s *
a. Advance I c he l o n Si xt h Army open. QIRONA ifiOOl 3 ^ r u a r y 1945-
b. Rear Echel on Si x t h Amy - CALASIAO.
c . Other comnand pos t s - t o be r e por t e d.
/ s / Walter Krueger,
WAITER KRUEGER,
Li eut enant General , TJ. 3 . Army.
Commanding.
A. P. 0. 442
AG370. 2 -
2 February 1945*
SUBJECT: Let t er of I ns t r uc t i ons .
TO t Col one l George Me r r e l l
Li e ut e na nt Col one l Ru s s e l l Volkmann
Major Robert S . Lapham
It ej or Bernard L. Anderson
Captain George F. Miller
Captain Alejo Santos
1* Instructions contained herein are issued to further the coordi-
nation between Oierrila jbroes on Iuzon and Sixth Arny units.
2. sixth Armycontinues the offensive.
3 Interior units under the control of each addresaee-t
a. will oontlnue offensive operations against the enemy in,
present areas byt
(1) Ambushing ground forces and patrols.
(2) Seizing amnunition andsupply dumps for ownuse or
destroying dumps when i t is impracticable to capture
them.
(3) Disrupting lines of oomminications.
(4.) Blocking routes of advance or withdrawal.
b. will continue to inform this headquarters of enemy:
(1) Strengths.
(2) Locations.
(3) Composition.
(4) Armament.
(5) Directionsofmovement.
(6) Intents.
c. wi l l perform such additional missions as may be assigned by
thi s headquarters
d. wi l l contact Corps Commanders upon arrival of Sixth Armyuni ta
i n respecti ve Filipino Force operational areas and perform such missions as
may be assigned to include the guarding of bridges, towns and army i ns t al l a-
ti ons in rear areas.
4 a* Those forces operating under the immediate di recti on of Corps
Commanders wi l l be supplied and armed, i n so far as possi bl e, by Corps Com-
manders concerned.
b_. Those forces not operating under the immediate direction of
Corps Commanders wi l l be supplied and armed, i n so for as possi bl e, by thi s
headquarters..
5 Eri sti ng means for si gnal communication remain i n ef f ect .
By command of Lieutenant General KRUEGERi
/ s / Chas W Clegg
CHAS. IT.CLEGG,
Lt Col . . A. G. D. r
Asst. Adj. Gen.
A. P. 0 . 442
130017February1945
7048
Maps* LUZOH-1/250,000. LUZOH-1/50,000.
1. CurrentIntelligenceandoperationsreports.
2. a.SixthAny, supportedbyAlliedNavalandAirForces,continues
theoffensivebyseizingtheMAHIVKLXSBAYareaandCQRRSGIDOR
byshoretoshoreandairborneoperationstoassistinopening
theentrancetoKABILABAY,andsecuringBATAAHPENINSULA.
D-Day 12FebruaryI945(TargetDate),
H-Eour
Sobeannounced.
a. 503dParachuteRegiment,mountedfromMINDORObytheCommanding
General,UghthArmy,willdroponCORBXGIDORonD/1andwill
passtothecontroloftheCommandingGeneral,XICorps,on
arrivalthereat.
149
d_. Amphibious shippingavailableforshoretoshoreoperations:
Annex1.
. Troopsavailablefortheoperation: AsdesignatedbytheCommand-
ingGeneral,XICorps,fromtroopspresentlyunderhis command.
3. B...XICorps(Annex2,OperationsHap):
(1) WillonIt-SayatB-Bour,employingnottoexceedonerein-
forcedregimentalcombat team,landIntheMARIVELESBAT
areaofsouthernBATAAN, seizeandsecureabeachheadand
establishcontroloverthesoutherntipofBAIAAH.
(2) Will,inconjunctionwiththeamphibiousassaultinthe
MARIVELESBATarea,launcharigorousattacktothesouth-
wardalongtheeastcoastofBAIAAHanddestroyhostile
forces encountered.
(3) Will,onD-Day,moreonereinforcedinfantrybattaliontothe
MARIVELESBATarea,preparedforashoretoshoreoperation
againstCORREGIDORonIf1}nconjunctionwiththeattack
ofthe503
d
ParachuteRegiment.
(U) WillonD/1,employingthe503dParachuteRegimentinair-
borneoperationsasarrangedwiththeCommandingGeneral,
EighthAmy, andbyshoretoshoreoperationsfromthe
MARIVELESBATarea,captureCORRBOIBOH,
. XIVCorps:
(2) Will,employingaminimusofoneinfantrybattalion,continue
tomaintaincontactwithXICorpsalongthelineESEMCSA-
DINALTJPIHAS.
. ICorpswillcontinuecurrentmissions.
x. (l) TheCommandingGeneral,XICorps:
(a) Willarrangedetailsofloading,landing,andnaralgun-
firesupportdirectwiththedesignatedcommanderof
navalsupportingforces.
(b) Willarrangedetailsofcloseairsupportdirectwiththe
CoomandlngGeneral,fifthAirforce.
(c) Willcoordinatetheemployment ofthe5O3&Parachute
RegimentwiththeCommandingGeneral,EighthArmy,and
theCommandingGeneral,fifthAirforce.
(d) Willsubmitabriefofhisplanfortheoperation,to
includeplansofclosesupportingnavalandairforceB,
tothisheadquartersonorbefore10February19^5
(2) DuringtheamphibiousmovementandlandingofelementsofXI
Corps,theCommander,HavalAttackGroup,IsIncommandof
allamphibiousoperations. Controlofforcesashorepasses
tothegroundforcecommanderuponhiearrivalashoreand
u-ponhisnotificationtotheCommander,BavalAttackGroup,
bythecostpromptmeansathisdisposal,thatheIsready
toaeaumeicommandofhisforcesashore.
(3) Durisstheairbornemovementofthe503dParachuteRegiment
theCommandingGeneral,fifthAirforce,1*Incommandof
theairborneoperation. Commandofthisunitpeasesto
theCommandingGeneral,XICorps,uponcompletionofthe
droponCOHKSCIDQH.
k. Supply.
a. Levelsofsupplytob*takenwiththeforcelandinginMARIVELES
BATarea:
ClassItoITInclusive - 10D/
s
ClasBV 3XJ/J
. Additionalsuppliesforthe503dParachuteRegimenttobeforwarded
bytheCommandingGeneral,XICorps,byoverwatertransportfrom
MARIVSLSSBATonD+2:
ClassI 5D/S
ClassV - 1U/f
. Resupply!
ResponsibilityofCommandingGeneral,XICorps,tomaintainlevels
forentireforceasprescribedInparagraphk&abovebyover-
watershipmentsfromSTOICBAT.
d. Evacuation:
ByreturningnavalcrafttohospitalsunderXICorpscontrolin
theSUuICBATarea.
a. Seecurrent indextoSOI.
to.CommandingGeneral,XICorps,willarrangefornecessarycoordlna-
~ tiontoInsurecontinuouscommunicationsbetweenallelements
involved.
(l) RadioCircuits:
(a) XICorps-RCTatMARIVELES (D-DAT).
(b) RCTatMARIVELES-BLTand503dParachuteRegimentat
CORREGIDOR (D/l).
(c) XIVCorpswillguardradiocircuit (b)andbeprepared
torelaytraffic,ifnecessary.
(2) Codes:
(a) CombinedAssault Code.
CCBP013O-D12.
(b) HazardousDutyCode.
Effective- SIGWHF-6
SIGFAF
SIGLTT-8
Reserve -SIOVHF-7
SIGAAF
SIGLTT-9
c. CommandPoets:
(1) SixthAray GERONA
RearEchelon CALASIAO
(2) XIVCorps GRACEPARE,MANILA
(3) XICorps CASTILLBJOS
(U) ICorps TOMANA
(5) 503dParachuteRegiment MINDOHO
/s/ WalterErueger
WALTERKRUEGER,
Commanding.
ANNEXES:
1. AssignmentofShipping.
2. OperationsNap.(Omitted)
HEADQUARTERS SIXTHARMT
A.P.0.U42
130017februaryI9U5
ASHEX1tofOkS,AssignmentofShipping.
ASSAULT
NO&TTP* PERSOBKEL TOKKAGE REMARKS
5APD 700
5LCI 900
20LSM 1100 1000
5LST 1500 3OOO
25LCM 125 2175 ESBCraftfrom
SubicBay.
^325 6375
HEIUTORCEMZira&HSSUPPLT
gLSM keo 1200 CommencingonD/2
andevery6days
thereafter.
RESERVE
5APT 700
Standbyafteruse
5LCI 900 isassaulttolift
20LSM 1100 1000 RegtlestIB Qif
needed.
2700 3000
BycommandofLieutenantGeneralKRDSGER:
G.H.BECKER,
BrigadierGeneral,G.S.C.p
ChiefofStaff.
OFflCIAL:
150
A. P. 0. 442
10001 g February I9I+5
AMENDMENT BO. 1 t o FO 1*8. Headquart er. Si xt h Army, 1 February I9U5.
TO US l a amended aa f o l l o ws :
Del ete Paragraph 5b (?) (b) and subst i t ut e the fol l owi ng:
(b) Hazardous Duty Code.
Ef f ect i ve - SWFQGI
SWPIPO
SIOHMI-5
1st Reserve - SWPRCA
SWPOMI
SIGNMI-6
2dReserve - SWPKHN
SWPATJ
SIOHMI-7
0.H.DICKIE,
ChiefofStaff.
OFFICIAL:
0-3.
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMT
A. P. 0. 442
1200111February1945
AMENDMENTHO.2toFO48,HeadquartersSixthArmy,1February1945.
FO48isamendedasfollows:
Changeallreferenceto503*ParachuteRegimenttoread503*1Parachute
RegimentalCombatTeam.
G.H.DBCKKR,
BrigadierOr-ere1,G.S.C.
Chief oi I'I".
OFFICIAL:
0-3.
A.P.O.442
090019February1945
FO
Maps: LUZON-1/250,000. LUZON-1/50,000.
1. a..Omitted.
b PursuanttoinstructionsoftheCommander-in-Chief,Southwest
PacificArea,the33dDiTi,ionwilllandonWHITEBEACH
(LINGATSNGOLF)on10February19^5,atwhichtimetheDiv-
isionwillpasstothecommandoftheCommandingGeneral
SixthArmy.
2 a SixthArmycontinuestheoffensivetosecuretheCENTRALPLAINS-
' MANILAarea,tosecureBATAASPENINSULA,andtoopenMANILABAT.
b. BoundarybetweenCorps: Nochange.
c. 33dDivisionwillassembleintheMAHAOAG-SANJACINTO-SAN
" FABIA5area,wheretheDivisionwillpasstothecontrolof
theCommandingGeneral,ICorps,effectiveOSOOl12^binary
I9U5forthepurposeofrelievingtheU3dDivisionand158th
RCTinthePOZOESCBIO-ROSARIO-DAMORTISarea.
d 12bthInfantryHeglMnt isreleasedtotbsCommandingGeneral,
ICorps,effeotive0800115February13*5
<. ConfirmingradioInstructions,effective080018February1945:
(1) 71btbTankBattalionItreleasedfromthecontrolofthe
CommandingGeneral,ICorpsandpassestothecontrolof
theCommandingOfficer,13thArmoredGroup.
(2) 775thTankBattalionIsreleasedfromthecontrolofthe
CommandingOfficer,13thArmoredGroup,andpassestothe
controloftheCommandingGeneral,ICorps.
f. Confirmingradioinstructions,effective12001$February1945,the
112thCavalryRCT(leasTroop0)isattachedto1stCaralryDiv-
lslon.
3. a.XICorpswillcontinuecurrentmissions.
b_. XIVCorpswillcontinuecurrentmissions.
. ICorps!
(2) Will,employingthe33dDivision,effectthereliefofthe
158thRCTand*+3dDivisioninthePOZORRUBIO-ROSARIO-
DAMORTISareaasfollows:
158thRCT by0800114February19U5
43dDiTision by0800116February1945
(3) Will,uponcompletionofthereliefofthe158thRCT,re-
leasetheRCTforconcentrationintheTARLACarea,where
itwillpasstoSixthArmyReserre,effective0800115
FebruaryI9U5.
(4) Will,uponcompletionofthereliefofthe43dDivision,con-
centratetheDivisionintheURDANETA-MAPANDAN-SANTA
BARBARAareawhereItwillpasstoSixthArmyReserve,ef-
fective0800117February1945.
(5) 'illconcentrateoneInfantryregiment (less1Bn)inthe
generalSANJOSE(NUEVAECIJA)areaby0800110February
I9U5,atthedisposaloftheCommandingGeneral,Sixth
Army,untilfurtherorders.
k. a..XI,XIVandICorpa: Nochange,
b. 33dDivision:
(1) WillturnintoBaseMDepotsallClassI,IIandIVinex-
cessoftendayssupply.
(2) WillretainallClassIII.
(3) WilltakeoverallClassVia43dDiTi8ionand158thRCTdumps;
-retainingunderdivisioncontrolsufficientadditionalam-
munitiontobringloveltotwounitsoflire;andwillturn
inbalanceofClassVtoBaseMammunitiondumpsatMAN-
GALDAI.
5. CommandPoets:
Tobereported.
/a/ WalterKrueger
WALTERKRUEGER
LieutenantGeneral,U.S.Army.,
ComiDanding.
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMT
A. P. 0. kk2
1200111FebruaryI9U5
AMENDMENTNO.1toFO1+9,HeadquartersSixthArmy,9FebruaryI9I+5.
FO49,thisheadquarters,9February19^5,Isamendedasfollows:
1. Changeparagraph3M toread:
Will,uponcompletionofthereliefofthe43dDivision,concentrate
theDivision(leasoneregimentalcombatteam)intheURDANETA-
MAPANDAN-SANTABARBARAareawhereItwillpasstoSixthArmyRe-
serve,effective0800117February1945;andwillconcentratethe
exceptedregimentalcombatteamintheGUIMBAareawhereItwill
passtoSixthArmyReserve,effective0800117February1945.
BycommandofLieutenantGeneralKRUBGER:
G. H. DECOR,
Bri gadi er General, G. S. C.
Chief of St af f .
OFFICIAL:
151
6thDivision(less1stBCT)andCoC,44thTankBn,pasetocontrol
fflSADQUARTIRS SIXTH iBMT
ofCommandingGeneral,XIVCorps,effective0800I17FebruaryI9U5
A. F. 0. 442
16001 11 February
OneInfantryregiment,43dDivision,passestocontrolofCommanding
General,ICorps,effective0800117FebruaryI9U5
TO 50
Maps: LUZON-1/250,000. LUZON-1/50,000.
1. a. Omitted.
1). PursuanttoradioinstructionsoftheCommander-in-Chief,South-
~ vestPacificArea,the11thAirborneDirltionisrelievedfrom
assignmenttoUghthArmyanditassignedtoSixthArmy,effec-
tive0001110FebruaryI9U5.
2. a. SixthArmycontliraestheoffensivetosecuretheCENTRALPLAINS-
~ MANILAarea,tosecureBATAAHPENINSULA,andtoopenMANILABAT.
. BoundarybetweenCorpss Nochange.
3. a.XICorpsvillcontinuecurrentmissions,
b. XIVCorps:
(1) Vlllcontinuecurrentmissions.
(2) Willconcentrateonetankdestroyercompanyandonemedium
tankcompanyintheDINALUPIHAHareaby1800113February
I9U5and12OOI14February1945respectively,atwhich
timesunitsvillpasstothecontroloftheCommanding
General,XICorps.
. ICorps!
(2) Willconcentratethe1stBegimentalCombatTeaminthe
DINALUPIHANareaby1800114February1945,atwhichtime
the1stBegimentalCombatTeamwlj.1passtothecontrol
oftheCommandingGeneral,XICorps.
(3) Confirmingverbalordersvlllreleaseonebattery,465th
FieldArtilleryBattalion,toXIVCorps,effective13001
11February1945.
d. Confirmingradioinstructions,the11thAirborneDivisionpasses
tothecontroloftheCommandingGeneral,XIVCorps,effective
OOOlI10FebruaryI9U5.
x. TheCommandingGeneral,ICorps,vlllcoordinatethemovementof
~ the1stHeglmentalCombatTeamfrompresentlocationtoDINALU-
PIHANvlththeCommandingGenerals,XIVandXICorps.
4. a..UnitsonmovementtoDINALUPIHAN area:
(l) Suppliestoaccompanyunits:
ClassI 5Bays
ClassIII 5Days
ClassV 1-1/2UnitsofFire
(2) Hesupply:
(a) InitiallyfromArmySupplyPointsatTAELACbyunit
transportation.
(b) UponopeningHighway7fromOLONGAPOtoDINALUPIHAN-
byU Corps.
t>. ICorpscontinuesresponsibilityofresupplyofdesignatedbattery,
~ 465thFieldArtilleryBattalion,releasedtoXIYCorpscontrol.
Nochange.
// WalterErueger
WALTXRERUBGER,
lieutenantGeneral,U.S.Army,
Commanding.
HEADQUARTERS8IXJHARMT
A.P.0.*2
1700115February1945
FO51
Maps: LUZON-1,250,000. LUZON-1/50,000. PHILIPPINEISLANDS-1/500,000.
1. Omitted.
2. a. SixthArmycontinuestheoffensive.
b. BoundariesbetveenCorps,effective0800117February
(1) BetveenXIandXIVCorps: lastcoastBATAAN-DINALUPIHAN-
SAWTOOTHMI(allinclusivetoXICorps).
(2) BetveenXIandICorps: PALAUIGBAT-HIGHPEAK(bothin-
clusivetoICorps).
(3) BetveenIandXITCorps: HIGHPEAS-MABABANBA-TABLAC-
LICAB-MATATAP-CABU-MTSACA-D2SIADAPOINT(allin-
clusivetoICorps).
TheInfantryregiment (lessonebattalion)he14byICorpsInthe
SANJOSSINUEVASCIJA)areaatthedisposaloftheCommanding
General,SixthArmy,isreleasedtoICorps,effectiveatonce.
XI
Corpsvlllcontinuecurrentmissions.
3..
b. XIVCorpsvillcontinuecurrentmissions,makingadeterminedeffort
toachieveobjectivesprescribedinFO47,thisheadquarters,2
FebruaryI9U5.
ICorps
(2) WillrelievepromptlythoseelementsoftheXIVCorps1owIn
thatareaoftheXIVCorpszoneofactionvhichpassesto
ICorps,asprescribedinthisFO,andvillcarryoutthe
missionsforvhichtheXIVCorpsvasheretoforeresponsible
inthatarea. Movementoftheunitsrelievedvlllbeas
directedbyCommandingGeneral,XIVCorps.
(3) Willconcentratethe6thDivision(less1stRCT)andC
o
C,
44thTankBn,IntheCABANATUAN area,southofthePAMPANGA
RIVER,by0800117February19U5.
4. a. SupplyPoints:
(1) ICorps-Nochange.
(2) XICorps-Nochange.
(3) (a)XIVCorps(lees6thDivision(less1stBCT)andC
o
C,
44thTankBn)-Nochange.
(b) 6thDivision(lees1stHCT)andCoC,44thTankBn:
,1. Suppliestoaccompanyunitsonmovementtoassembly
area:
ClassI - 10D/S
ClassIII - 10D/S
ClassV - 2U/F
Suppliestoachieveabovelevelvillbedrawnfrom
BaseM.
g. BesupplyfromArmySupplyPointstobedesignatedlater.
b. UnitsinSixthArmyReservevillbuildupandmaintainthefollowing
levelsofSupply;
ClassI
5
/S
ClassIII -
5
D/S
ClassV - 2U/F
5. Nochange.
/s/ WalterErueger
WALTERKRUEGER,
Cnmm^nH\rig.
A.P.0.442
2200117February1945
FO 52
Maps: LUZON - 1/ 250, 000. LUZON - 1/ 50, 000. PHILIPPINE ISLANDS - 1/ 500, 000.
1. a..Omitted.
1>. PursuanttoinstructionsfromtheCommander-in-Chief, Southwest
PacificArea,changesinlogisticresponsibilitiesandcontrol
ofunitsonLUZONareannounced. (SeeSixthArmyAdm016/12)
2. a. SixthArmy:
(1) Betainscontrolofarmysupplypoints,tacticalheadquarters,
stagingareasandothertacticalInstallationswithinLUZON
BaseSection,USASOS,area.
(2) Continuestoberesponsibleforoverallprotectionofthe
LUZONBaseSection,USASOS,areafromenemyaction.
b. ControlofUnits: Annex1,TroopList.
3. I,XIandXIVCorps:
a.. Willcontinuetoutilise tacticalheadquartersandothertactical
installationswithintheLUZONBaseSection,USASOS,areauntil
themilitarynecessityfortheirusenolongerexists.
b. WillretainresponsibilityforsecurityofallSixthArmy,Corps
andLUZONBaseSection,USASOS,installationswithinrespective
Corpsboundaries,andwillcoordinatedefensivemeasureswith
localcommanders concerned.
152
k. Adm016/12.
9th Mai Cont Unit
12
10th Mai Cont Unit
5. Nochange. 12
12th Mai Cont Unit
12
37th Med CampUnit (Mai Cont)
12
38th Med Comp Unit (Mai Cont)
12
// WalterKrueger
53d Mai Cont Unit
12
VALTIBKRUEGER,
59th Mai Cont Uni t
12
6l s t Mai Cont Unit
12
ANKEX:
Commanding. 77th Med CompUnit (Mai Cont)
12
1-TroopList.
90th Mai Cont Unit
12
91st Mai Cont Unit
12
92d Mai Cont Unit
12
HEADQUARTERSSIXTHARM*
A.P.0.U 2
22001, 17 February I945
ANNEX 1 t o K> 5 2 , Troop Li s t .
J ^ f ol l owi ng uni t s now In, enroute t o , or under ordera t o LINGAYEN
wi l l pasa t o the cont rol of the Commanding General, USASOSi
ENGPJEBR UNITS
533d Engr B&fl Regt, 3d ESB
Boat Bn ( - Co C) , 543d EB&SR
146l s t Engr Maint Co, 3d SSB
li,.62d Bngr Maint Co, 3d-ESB ( - 1 pl at )
Hq & Hq Co & Med Det , 4th ESB
534tn Bngr B&S Regt ( - Boat Bn), 4th ESB
5'l4th Bngr BAS Regt, 4th ESB
594th Engr B&S Regt, 4th ESB
Hq.& Hq Det, 564th Engr Maint Bn, 4th ESB
3015th Eogr Maint Co, 4th ESB
3016th Bngr Maint Co (-2d Pl a t ) , 4th ESB
3017th Engr Maint Co, 4th E3B
1573d Sngr Hvy Shop Co, 4th ESB
1768th Engr Part s Sup Pl at , 4th ESB
164th Ord Maint Co, 4th ESB
C# Hq 4 Ha. Co, 4t h ESB
299th Si g Co, 4t h ESB
8lOth Bngr Avn Bn
828111 Engr Avn Bn
836th Engr Avn Bn
841st Engr Avn Bn
863d Engr Avn Bn
864th Engr Avn Bn
870th Engr Avn Bn
871st Bagr Avn Bn
874th Bngr Avn Bn
1872d Engr Avn Bn
1896th Engr Avn Bn
1913th Engr Avn Bn
6l 7t h Bngr Base Equip Co
695th Engr Base Equip Co
5252d Engr Base Dep Gp (Prov)
I962d Bngr Avn Dep Co
1542d Bngr Base Surv Co
Hq &Hq Co, 1178th Engr Const Gp
Hq.&Hq Co, 1180th Engr Const Gp
391st Bngr Dep Co
730th Engr Dep Co
573* Engr Dump Trk Co
769th Engr DumpTrk Co
136l st Engr Dump Trk Co
Co B, 796th Engr Forestry Bn
1042d Eêr Gas Generating Unit
1312th Engr GS Regt ( - 1 Bn)
972d p-igr Maint Co
3014tb VPeTMaint Co
757th Engr part s Supply Co
782d Engr Pet r Di at Co
1384th Engr Pet r Di st Co
Hq & Hq.Co, 1060th Engr Port Const &Rep Op
Hq 5208th Engr Serv Gp
Hq &Hq Co, 5202d Engr Const Bri g ( - De t )
1517th E"gr Water Sup Co
Det 1781st Engr Parts Sup Pl at
CHEMICAL WARFARE UNITS
93d Cml Comp Co
MEDICAL UNITS
60th Gen Hosp (1000 bed)
31s t Gen Hoep (1000 bed)
37th Sta Hosp (250 bed)
107th St a Hosp
144th St a Hosp
251st St a Hosp (750
b
d)
360th St a Hosp (500 bed)
5t h Fd Hoep
7th Brae Hosp
21st Bvac HOBP
1st Med Comp Uni t (Mai Cont)
2d Med CompUni t (Mai Cont)
1959
1120
145
105
262
927
2085
1996
48
185
131
185
169
57
I69
89
140
777
777
798
798
777
777
777
507
507
777
777
777
134
173
72
209
179
94
90
209
209
107
107
107
107
107
155
22
1240
171
171
191
191
174
224
224
253
31
31
109
31
136
70
218
618
805
804
618
186
186
186
501
353
227
531
531
12
12
93d Mai Cont Unit
12
99th Mai Cont Unit
12
100th Mai Cont Unit
12
110th Med CompUnit (Mai Cont)
12
5th Mai Surv Unit
13
6th Mai Surv Unit
13
26th Mai Surv Unit
13
27th Mai Surv Unit
13
33d Mai SUIT Unit
13
39th Mai Surv Unit
13
213th Med CompUnit (Mai Surv)
13
402d Med CompUnit (Mai Surv)
13
423d Med CompUnit (Mai Surv)
13
99th Med Comp Sec (Food Inspecti on)
5
106th Med Comp Sec (Food Inspecti on)
5
334th itod Comp Det (Gen Disp Type 2)
569th Med AmbCo
84
49th Med Dep Co
145
58th Med Base Dep Co
44
26th Med Lab
58
712th Med San Co
117
714th Med San Co
117
713th Med San Co
117
742d Med San Co
117
264thMedBn,4thESB
425
MILITARYPOLICEUNITS
1st Pangasinan Co (PC) 130
2d Pangasinan Co (PC) 130
l63d MPPOWProcessing Co
84
Co D, 720th MPBn (ZI)
150
814th MPCo
141
34th Criminal Invest i gat i on Sec
15
Btry B, 232d AAASL Bn (Type A) MPEscort Guard Co (Prov) 202
ORDNANCE TOUTS
55t h Ord AmCo 186
577th ord AmCo 186
578th Ord AmCo 186
579th Ord AmCo 186
580th ord AmCo 186
615th ord AmCo 186
629th ord AmCo 186
Hq & Hq Det, 9th Ord Bn 35
191st Ord Dep Co I85
849th Ord Dep Co 185
179th Ord HAMCo 211
959th Ord HAMCo 211
3007th ord Base Dep Co 118
Hq &Hq Det, 189th Ord Bn 35
523d Ord MJCO (FA) 198
211th Ord MAM Co 120
99th Ord HM Co 198
511th Ord HM Co 198
3449th Ord MAM Co 120
3149th Ord MAUCo 120
307th Ord Maint Co (AA) 163
517t h Ord HMCo (FA) 198
370th Ord Mtr Assy Co 170
Hq & Hq,Det, 226th Ord Base Dep
176th Ord Serv Det (Bomb Di sposal ) 7
179ta Ord Serv Det (Bomb Di sposal ) 7
180tti Ord Serv Det (Bomb Di sposal ) 7
181t Ord Serv Det (Bomb Di sposal ) 7
I82d Ord Serv Det (Bomb Di sposal ) 7
183d Ord Serv Det (Bomb Di sposal ) 7
POSTALUNTJ3
12th Pos t al Regul ati ng Sec 32
70th APUni t *3
SIGNALUNITS
442d Si g Const Bn 453
276th Si g Const Bn 192
Co C. 60th Si g Bn 202
3294th Si g Base Dep 132
3292d Si g Base Maint Co ( - Det) 170
Det 586t h Si g Dep Co (One Rad Rpr Sec &One S&I Seo) 29
GHft Si g QommGp (P) 576
GEQ 110b CommGp (P) 352
232d Si g Opns Co 178
Others
Det M> 1170th Si g Serv Bn
Det 832d Si g Serv Bn 21
Dst 997th Si g Serv Bn 10
Det 3168th Si g Serv Bn 24
153
SPECIAL 3BTVICBUNITS
22d Spec Serv Co
125
27th Spec Serv Co
125
6th Spec Serv Co ( - 2 pl at s)
67
TRANSPORTATIONUNITS
Hq tcHq Det, 21at Amphib Trk Bn (TC)
19
451st Amphib Trk Co
173
455th Amphib Trk Co 184
464th AJnphib Trk Co 184
465th AmphibTrk Co I84
466th Amphib Trk Co
179
809th AmphibTrk Co
157
811th AmphibTrk Co
184
812th Amphib Trk Co
184
792d Base Dep Co (TC) 121
350th Hbr Craft Co 286
368th Hbr Craft Co 286
210th port Co 230
211th Part Co 230
218th Part Co 230
234th Port Co 230
243d Part Co 230
244th part Co 163
245th part Co 230
294th part Co 214
605th Part Co 230
606th Part Co 230
6l0th part Co 230
6l 2th part Co 240
613th Port Co 238
6l 4th Part Co 230
615th Part Co 230
6l 6th Part Co 230
622d Part Co 218
650th Part Co 230
851st Part Co 230
852d Part Co 230
H<1&Hq Det, 373d Port Bn (TC) 23
Hq &Hq Det, 387th Port Bn (TC) 23
Hq &Hq Det, 489th Port Bn (TC) 23
Hq &Hq Det, 506th Part Bn (TC) 34
790th Railway Operating Co (TC) 149
775*t Railway Grand Div 84
803d Amy Marine Ship Rep Co 84
1112th Comb Co (TC) (Port Marine Maint) 300
QUARTgMASTERUNITS
Hq 4 Hq Det, 29th QMBn (Mob)
19
Hq 4 Hq Det, 490th QMBn
17
Hq 4 Hq Det, 493d QMBn (Mob)
17
Hq 4 Hq Det, 473d QMGp
26
Hq &Hq Det, 540th QMBn
25
13th Qll Bkry Plat
36
262d QMBkry Co
159
266thQMBkryCo(-3d&4thPlata)
92
316thQMBkryCo
136
112thQMBkryCo(-1st&2dPlata)
110
491stQMDepCoSup
192
42Sl3tQMDepCoSup
192
862dQMfumigation4BathCo
84
3819thQMGasSupCo
128
3873dQMGasSupCo(-2dPlat)
82
3874thQMGasSupCo
128
2dPlat,342dQMDepSupCo
45
1stPlat.48thQMGrRegCo(Redeaignated107thQM
35
GRPlat)
155th QMLdry Plat Hoap (Type A)(120th Gen Hosp) 47
165th QMLdry Plat Hosp (Type A)(80th Gen Hosp) 47
168th QMLdry Plat HOBP (Type A)(60th Gen Hoap) 47
177th QMLdry Pl at Hosp (Type B)(251st Sta Hosp) 33
584th QMLdry Co (SM)(-lst 4 2d Pl at s)
60
2d Sec, 2d Pl at , 588th Ldry Co
32
897th QMLdry Co (SM)(-3d 4 4th Pl at s)
155
One Sac, 2d Pl at , 897th QMLdry Co (SM)
30
92d QM Rhd Co
170
2d Pl at , 281st QMRefrig Co (Mob)
30
286th QMRefri g Co (-2d Plat & 2d Sec & Plat Hq, 3d Pl at) 112
1st Pl at (-3d Sec) , 482d QMRefri g Co 20
333d QMSalv Rep Co 201
539th QMSal v Rep Co 201
236th QMSalv c ol l Co ( - 2 pl at s) 67
1 Pl at , 678th QMSalv c ol l Co 40
984th qMServ Co 219
3118th QMServ Co 219
4075th QMSerr Co 219
l e t Pl at , 4095th QMServ Co 109
1998th QMTrk Co (Avn)(-2d Pl at ) 79
(w/atchd 3366th QMServ Det (Dr Aug))
3667th QMTrk Co (w/atchd 3365ta QMServ Det (Dr Aug)) 124
3741st QMTrk Co (w/atchd 3330th QMServ Det (Dr Aug)) 124
693d QMTrk Co (w/atchd 3326th QMServ Det (Dr Aug)) 124
3352d QMTrk Co (w/atchd 333lBt QMServ Det (Dr Aug)) 124.
3446th QMTrk Co (w/atchd 3353d QMServ Det (Dr Aug)) 124
3448th QMTrk Co (w/atchd 3354th QMServ Det (Dr Aug)) 124
2058th QMTrk Co ( - 1st Pl at)(w/ atchd 3367th QMServ Det 6l
(Dr Aug))
3452d QMTrk Co (w/atchd 3356th QMServ Det (Dr Aug))' 134
3473d QMTrk Co (w/atchd 3359*h QMServ Det (Dr Aug)) 134
3714th QMTrk Co (Hvy)(w/atchd 336l st QMServ Det 141
(Dr Aug))
3716th QMTrk Co (Hvy)(w/atchd 3364th QMServ Det 141
(Dr AUg))
937th QMPet Prod Lab 17
3335th QMServ Det (Dr Aug) 24
3355th QMServ Det (Dr Aug) 24
3363d QMServ Det (Dr Aug) . 24
Hq &Hq Btry, li*2d CAOp 82
31st CABn (Prov QMHvy Trk Co) 404
259th CABn (Prov QMHvy Trk Co) 368
268th CABn (Prov QMHvy Trk Co) 466
283d CABn (Prov QMHvy Trk Co) 523
By command of Lieutenant General KHDSGERj
G. H. DECKER,
Chief of St af f .
OFFICIALJ
A.P.0.V+2
17001kMarch
AMENDMENTHO.1toANNEX1toTO52,TroopList,HeadquartersSixthArmy
17February19^5,
ANNEX1toTO52,TroopList,isamendedasfollows:
1. EngineerUnita:
a. Delete:
Approx.
Unit
Strength
1962dIngrDepotCo(Ayn)
209
173
13ol8tEngrDumpTrkCo
107
972dEngrMaintCo
191
b. ChangeHq4HqCo,5202dEngrConeBrig (-Det)toread:
Hq&HqCo,5202dEngrConsBrig.
. Add:
Unit
391stEngr D # pCo(Avn)
209
173
571stEngrDumpTrkCo
107
(3dEngrConsBn
867
1519thEngrWaterSupCo
136
963dEngrMalntCo
191
759thEngrPartsSupCo(less1Plat)
17*
1639thEngrServDet(Utility)
42
1664thEngrServDet(Utility)
36
1731stEngrServDet(Utility)
57
2g67thEngrServDet(Utility)
22
1046thEngrServDet(OasOen)
22
Approx.
2. OrdnanceUnite:
Strength
Add212thOrdMAMCo
120
3. Add:
MiscellaneousUnits:
1stCampHq&CampCo
203
BycommandofLieutenantGeneralKRUEOERi
G.H.DECKER,
ChiefofStaff.
07FICIAL:
&
0-3.
154
H1ADQ.UARTIRSSIXTHARM!
A.P.0.442
1645119February19U5
F053.
Mapst LUZOH-1/250,000. LUZOH-1/50,000.
1. Omitted.
2. a.SixthA m y continues theoffensIT*.
b. BoundariesbetweenCorpe,effective0800121February1945:
(1) BetweenIandIICorps: PALAUIGBAI-HIGHPIAK- MABABANBA-
TABLAC-LlCAB-MAYAPYAP (allInclusivetoICorp.).
(2) BetweenIandXITCorps: MAYAPTAP-CABU-MTBACA-DESXADA
POIHT (allinclusivetoICorpe).
(3) BetweenXIandXITCorps: PAMPANGARITEH(toXITCorps) from
MAYAPYAP toMANILABAY.
. 40thDlTlslon,reinforcedbyCoD,754thTankBn,CoB,82dCmlBn
andCoB,640thTDBn,passes tothecontroloftheCommanding
General,XICorps,effective0800121FebruaryI945.
d. 1stRegimentalCombat TeampassestothecontroloftheCommanding
General,XITCorps,effectIreuponItsarrlTalIntheSANVICENTE
(BALACAH)area.
Onebattery,5^-thFABn,passestothecontroloftheCommanding
General,XITCorps,effective1800120February1945.
3.a.
XICorps:
(2) WillcarryoutmissionsinthatareaoftheXITCorpszoneof
actionwhichpassestoXICorps,asprescribedInthisFQ,
andforwhichtheXITCorpswasheretoforeresponsible.
(3) Willcomplete theconcentrationofthe1stRegimentalCombat
TeamIntheSA5TICENTE(BULACAN)areaby1800123February
1945,coordinatingthismovementwiththeCommandingGeneral,
XITCorps.
(4) Confirmingverbalorders,willmoveonebattery,5^-thFABn,
totheMANILA areaby1800120February1945,coordinating
thismovementwiththeCommandingGeneral,XITCorps.
b. XITCorps:
(2) WillcaptureTERNATEandsecurethesouthernapproachestothe
SOUTHCHANNEL,MANILABAY.
(3) WillbepreparedtogarrisonMANILAwiththe37thDivisionand
torelinquishcontrolofthisDivisionandMANILAupon24
hoursnotice,whendirected.
(4) Willbepreparedtocontinueaggressiveadvancesouthwardof
MANILAwiththeobjectiveofopeningBATANGASBAY.
c. ICorpswillcontinuecurrentmissions,takingaggressiveactionto
~ imporvethedispositionsofitsunitsonthenorthandeastflanks.
4. a. SupplyPoint3:
(1) ICorps-Nochange.
(2) XITCorps-
N
change.
(3) XICorps(less40thDivision)-Nochange.
40thDivision-ArmysupplypointsatTARLACandSANMIGUEL.
b XICorpscontinuesresponsibilityforFieldArtilleryClassV re-
~* supplyofdesignatedbattery,544thFABn,releasedtoXITCorps
control,
c. Suppliestoaccompany 1stRCTonmovement toSANTICENTE (BULACAN):
D
/
S
ClassI- 5
T - 1U/F
5. Nochange.
/s/ WalterKrueger
WALTERKRUEGER,
Lieutenant General,U.S.Army,
Commanding.
A.P.0.M*2
1700125February
ro54
Maps: LUZOH-1/250,000. LUZOB- 1/50,000.
1. a. Oaitted.
3>. Pursuant toInstructionsfromtheCommander-in-Chief, Southwest
PacificArea:
(1) Elementsofthe24thDivisionnowInLUZOHandthe503d
ParachuteRegimentalCombatTeamwillmovetoMINDCEOin
shippingasarrangedbyHeadquarters,SixthArmy,andwill
passtocontroloftheCommandingGeneral,EighthArmy,upon
arrivalthereat.
(2) 40thDivision,reinforced,willconcentrate,prepare,andmount
forearlyoperationsagainsttheTISATASfromLINGAYSNGULF
andwillpasstocontroloftheCommandingGeneral,Eighth
Army,upon embarkation.
2. a."'zthArmycontinuestheoffensive,
b. BoundariesbetweenCorps: Hochange.
. Confirmingradioinstructionsfromthisheadquarters:
(1) 632dTankDestroyerBattalionpassestocontrolofthe Commanding
General,ICorps,effective0800125February1945.
(2) 43dDivisionpassestocontroloftheCommandingGeneral,
XICorps,asspecifiedbelow:
(a) 172dRCTIntheBAMBAK-area,effective2400126FebruaryI9U5.
(b) 169thInfantryinthe/CAMILINGarea,effective24001
28FebruaryI9I15.
(c) Division,lessunitsIn(a)and(b)above,inpresent
location,effective2400128February1945.
3, a.E VCorpe1
(1) Willcontinuecurrentmissions,reducingeocpeditiouslyall
obstaclestotheimmediaterestorationofpertandbase
facilitiesintheMANILAarea.
(2) Confirmingradioinstructionsfromthisheadquarters,will:
(a) Relieveelementsofthe24thDivisionnowunderXIVCorps
controlwithothertroops.
(b) Concentratepromptlythe3dBattalion,19thInfantry,at
NASUGBU(BATANGASPROVINCE)and,on1March1945,nount
thisBattalioninassault shippingtobefurnished,as
arrangedbythisheadquarters.
(c) Concentratethe2dBattalion,19thInfantry,andCannon
Company,21stInfantry,atNASUGBU(BATANGASPROVINCE)
by7March1945 end,onthatdate,mounttheseunits
inamphibious shippingtobefurnished,asarrangedby
thisheadquarters.
J>. XICorps1
(1) ffill continue current missions.
(2) Confirming radio instructions from this headquarters, willj
(a) Press operations on CORREGIDOR, in BATAANend in the
BA1SBAN- FORT STOTSENBURG area to destroy hosti l e
forces there at an early date.
(b) Relieve the 40th Division in i t s present zone of action
and concentrate that Division in the general SANJACINTO
area by 18001 4 March 1945* at which time i t passes to
control of the Commanding General, sixth Any.
(c) Relieve elements of the 24th Division now under XI Corps
control with other troops.
(d) Concentrate the 24th Division Reconnaissance Troop, 34th
Regimental Combat Team ( l ess 3d Battalion) and 11th
Field Artillery Battalion at SUBIC BAY and, by
28 February 1945t mount these units in amphibious
shipping, as arranged by this headquarters.
(e) Concentrate the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, at SUBIC
BAYby 10 March 1945, and mount that Battalion In
amphibious shipping, as arranged by this headquarters.
(f) Relieve the 503d Parachute Regimental Combat Team and
concentrate that unit at COBBEGIDOR by 10 March 1945,
for mounting In amphibious shipping, as arranged by
this headquarters.
. I Corps:
(2) Confirmingradioinstructionsfromthisheadquarters,will:
(a) Pressvigorouslycurrentaggressiveactionwiththeright
wingoftheCorpsinordertoshortenlinesso.asto
economizetroopsandmakethemavailableforfurther
operations.
(b) Relievethe169thInfantryandconcentratethatRegiment
intheCAMILIHGareaby1800126February1945,at
whichtimeitrevertstocontroloftheCommanding
Gsneral,43dDivision.
d. Confirmingradioinstructionsfromthisheadquarters,the43dDlv-
~ isionwillconcentratethe172dRegimentalCombatTeamInthe
BAMBAN areaby2400126February1945.
e. 158thRegimentalCombatTeamwillremaininArmyReserve.
155
k. SupplyLevels:
a. Toaccompanyunite stagingoutofNASUGBU, CORREGIDQR andSUBICBAT:
ClassI 15days(includesvoyage rations)
ClassII&IV(leesEngineer
andSignal) 30days(as available)
Signal(ClassII& IV) T/equipment,plussuppliesauth-
orizedinASFCatalogSig4-1,and
components ofsetsofT/Sequipment.
3dBn,19thInf,willtake15days
supplyinaddition.
EngineerClassIV (a) Engineer suppliesforunit con-
sumptionwillincludeaminimum
of60daysofwaterpurification
chemicals.
(t>) Assaultandpioneer suppliesin
proportionandinconformitywith
listAssault andPioneerSupplies
forOneRegimentalCombat Team
(Reinforced)dated5August I9V+.
ClassIII 15days
ClassV 3 U / F
b_. TOaccompanytroopsstagingoutofLINGAYEN:
ClassI 15days(includesvoyage rations)
ClassII&IV(leseEngineer,
OrdnanceandSignal) 30days
Engineer ClassIV (a) Engineer suppliesforunit con-
sumptionwillincludeaminimumof
bOdaysofwaterpurification chem-
icals,basedonthedivisionand
attachedtroops.
(b) Assaultandpioneersuppliesfor
divisionsandseparate combat teams
willbeinconformitywithlist,
AssaultandPioneerSuppliesforOne
RegimentalCombat Team (Reinforced),
dated5August1944.
OrdnanceClassII Usingorganizations: Organization
sparepartsandequipmentaspres-
cribedinappropriateSKLs,and30
dayssupplyC&.P. 740thLMCo:
30D/Sfor40thDiv.
SignalClass II&IV T/Sequipmentplussuppliesauth-
orizedinASFCatalogSig4-1,and
componentsofsetsofT/Sequipment.
ClassIII 15days
ClassV
5. Nochange.
/s/ WalterKrueger
WALTER KRUEGER,
Commanding.
A.P.0.4U2
17001 28 February I9I+5
FO 55
Maps: PHILIPPINE ISLAITDS - l/jOO.OOO. LUZON - 1/250,000. LUZON - 1/50,000.
1. Omitted.
2. a. SixthArm;'-continuesthe offensive.
b. Boundaries,effective000115MarchI9U5:
(l) BetweenXIV Corpsand37thDivision: NICHOLSFIELD-FORT
WILLIAMMcXINLEY (bothinclusive to37thDivision)-thence
MrtRIilNARIVERtoSANTOLAN-BALARAFILTERS-MALINTA(all
inclusivetoXIVCorps)-thenceMANILA andDAGUPANRail-
roadtoBOCAUEBIVSR (inclusiveto37thDivision).
(2) Between37thDivisionandXICorps: BOCAUERIVER fromrail-
roadcrossingatBOCAUEtoconfluencewithBULACAN RIVEH-
thenceBULACAITRIVER toKAKILABAY (allinclusivetoXICorps),
(3) BetweenXICorpsandXIVCorps: PAMPAIIGARIVER (toXIV Corps)
fromMAYAPYAP toSANLUIS-thence"PULILAN-PLASIDEL-
BOCAUE(allinclusive toXI Corps).
(4) BetweenXICorpsandICorps: Nochange.
(5) BetweenXIVCorpeand ICorps: Nochange.
(1) 37thDivision,reinforced, passestocontrolofthe Commanding
General,SixthAmy, effective000115MarchI9U5.
(2) 158thRegimentalCombatTeamand603dTankCoapany, inthe
PARAKAQUEarea,passto controloftheCommandingGeneral,
XIVCorps,effectiveOOOlI5MarchI9U5.
3. a. XIVCorps:
(1) Willcontinue currentmissionsapplicabletotheXIV Corps
withinitszoneofactionasprescribed inthisF0.
(2) Willpressvigorously operations eastandnortheast ofMANILA
todestroyhostileforces intheANTIPOLO-MONTALBAN -IPO
areaandeastandsoutheast thereof.
(3) Willadvanceaggressively southward, destroyinghostileforces
encountered; securethelineLLIJAN-BATANGAS-LIPA-
TANAUAH -LINGA;openBALAYANandBATANGASBAY;andbepre-
paredtoadvance tothelineLUCENA-TAYABAS-LUCBAN -
CAVIHTI- PAGSANJAN.
(4) Will,afteropeningBATANGASBAY,beprepared toconcentrate
the158thRegimentalCombatTeam inthegeneralBAUAN area
forehore-to-shore operationstosecurenorthernexitsto
SANBERNARDINO STRAITS.
b. XICorps:
(1) Willcontinue currentmissions.
(2) Willconcentratethe603dTankCompany inthegeneralPARANAQUE
areaby000115March19^5 coordinatingthismovement with
theCommandingGeneral,XIVCorps.
(3) Willcarryoutcurrentmissions inthatareaoftheXIV Corps
zoneofactionwhichpasoee toXICorps,asprescribed in
thisFo,andforwhichtheXIVCorpswasheretoforerespon-
sible.
. ICorpswillcontinue currentmissions,takingaggressive action
withtherightwingoftheCorps inordertosecurecurrentob-
jectivesatanearlydate.
d. 37thDivision:
(1) WillgarrisonMANILA, relievingXIVCorpsofthoseresponsibi-
litiesintheMANILA areaassigned inLetter,thishead-
quarters,9February19^5,Subject: "ControloftheMANILA
area,"andwhichat000115March19^5remaintheresponsi-
bilityofXIVCorps;andwillcarryout'currentmissions in
thatareaoftheXIVCorps zoneofactionwhichpassesto37th
Divisionasprescribed inthisFO,andforwhichtheXIVCorps
washeretofore responsible.
(2) Willbepreparedtoconcentrate oneregimentalcombat team
intheMANILA areaon2^hoursnotice,andplacethisre-
gimentalcombat teamatthedisposalofthe Commanding
General,SixthArmy.
e. 158thRegimentalCombatTeamwillmovebymotor shuttletothe
~ generalPARANAQUE area,closingbyOOOlI5March1945,coor-
dinatingthismovementwiththeCommandingGenerals,XIand
XIVCorps,respectively.
x. CorpsCommandersandtheCommandingGeneral,37thDivision,will
takespecialprecautionstoprotectvitalrailroadandhighway
bridgeswithintheirrespectivezonesofaction.
4. Omitted.
5. Nochange.
/s/ WalterKrueger
WALTER KRUEGER,
Lieutenant General,0.S.Army.
Commanding.
156
A.P.0.442
170016MarchI9U5
FO 56
Maps! PHILIPPINE ISLANDS- 1/500,000.
LUZOH- 1/250,000.
LUZON- 1/50,000.
MANILAandvicinity- 1/25,000.
1. Omitted.
2. a. SixthArmy continues theoffensive.
b. Boundaries,effective OOOH 15MarchI9U5:
(1) BetweenXIVCorpsandXICorps: GUADALUPB-thencePASIORIVER
toconfluencewithTAGIGRIVER-TAGIGRIVERtoLAGUNAdeBAY
TALIMPOINT-JALAJALAPOINT (allinclusive toXICorps)-
thenceSANTACRUZ-CAVINTI-MAUBAN (allinclusivetoXIV
Corps).
(2) BetweenXIV Corpsand37thDivision: Highway 54from junction
withHighway 1Anortheast toJunctionwithHighway21A(all
inclusiveto37thDivision).
(3) BetweenXICorpsand37thDivision: Highway54from Junction
withHighway21Anorthandwest toMALABON-thenceNAVOTAS
RIVERtoMANILABAY (allinclusiveto37thDivision).
(4) BetweenXICorpsandICorps: PALAUIGBAY-HIGHPEAK-MABA-
BANABA-TARLAC-LICAB-MAYAPYAP-CABU-MTBACA-DESIADA
POINT (allinclusivetoICorps).
. 6thDivision,with112thCavalryRegimentalCombat Team attached,
passes tocontroloftheCommanding General,XICorps,effective
OOOH 15March1945.
d_. 43dDivision(less oneregimental combat team)passestocontrol
oftheCommanding General,XIV Corps,effectiveuponarrivalin
theTATTAYarea,andrevertstocontroloftheCommandingGen-
eral,XICorps,atOOOlI15March1945.
e. ThefollowingunitspasstocontroloftheCommandingGeneral,XI
~ Corps,effective0001115MarchI9I+5:
757thFieldArtilleryBattalion
517thH e l d Artillery Battalion
544thFieldArtilleryBattalion (lessthoseelementsnowapartof
XI Corps)
BtryCr 465thFieldArtilleryBattalion
BtryA,289thFieldArtilleryObservationBattalion
S2dChemicalBattalion(Motorized)(lessthoseelementsnowapart
ofXI Corps)
640thTankDestroyerBattalion (lessthoseelementsnowapartof
XI Corps)
754th Tank Battalion (less tnose eleasents now a part of XI Corps)
Company C, 44th Tank Battalion
3. a.. XIV Corps:
(1) Willcontinue current missions,pressingvigorouslytheattack
against enemypositions intheANTIPOLO-MONTALBANarea,un-
tilrelieved ofthatduty inthisareabytheXICorps.
(2) Willrelievethe1stCavalryDivisioninitspresent soneof
actionbythe43dDivision (lessoneregimentalcombat team)
andwill,byOOOH 15March1945,completetheconcentration
ofthe1stCavalryDivisionIntheALABAWOarea(LAGUNA
PROVINCE).
(3) WillcarryoutmissionsInthat areaofthe37thDivisionlone
ofactionwhichpassestoXITCorps,asprescribedinthis
FO,andforwhichthe37thDivisionwasheretoforerespon-
sible.
b. XICorpe:
Willconcentrate the43dDivision (lessoneregimental combat
(1)
team)intheTAYTAYareainaccordancewiththefollowing
schedule,coordinatingmovementsinvolvedwiththeCommanding
General,XIVCorps:
(a) Oneregimental combat teamby080018March1945.
(b) 43dDivision(lessoneregimentalcombat team)fcy24001
12March1945.
(2) Willcontinue currentmissionsand,effective0001115March
1945will:
(a) CarryoutmissionsInthat areaoftheXIVCorpszoneof
actionwhichpassestoXICorps,asprescribedinthis
FO,andforwhichtheXIVCorpswasheretoforerespon-
sible.
(b) Carryoutmissionsinthat areaofthe 37thDivisionzone
ofactionwhichpassestoXICorpsasprescribed in
thisFO,andforwhichthe37thDivisionwasheretofore
responsible.
ICorpewillcontinuecurrentmissions andmakedetermined efforts
" tosecurethevitalBALETEPASSareaatanearlydate.
d. 37thDivision:
(l) Willcontinue to:
(a) GarrisonthegreaterMANILA areawiththeDivision (less
oneregimental combat team)andprovidetacticalse-
curitytherein.
(b) Makeavailableoneregimental combat teamtotheProvost
MarshalGeneral,USA7FE,rotatingregimentalcombat
teamsonthisdutyfromtimetotimeasagreedupon
betweenCommandingGenerals concerned.
(2) W m beprepared, intheeventofanemergency,tomakeavail-
abletheDivision(lessoneregimental combatteam)tothe
ProvostMarshalGeneral,USAFFE,forprovostmarshalduties
inMANILA,whendirectedbythisheadquarters.
(3) Willbeprepared, on24hourenotice,toplaceoneregimental
combat teaminMANILAatthedisposaloftheCommanding
General,SixthArmy.
(4) WillestablishandmaintaincontactwithXIandXIVCorps.
4. Adm0I6/I5.
5. Hochange.
/s/ WalterKrueger
WALTERKHUSGER,
Lieutenant General,U.S.Army.,
Commanding.
A.P.0.442
1900111March1945
FO57
Maps: PHILIPPINEISLANDS-1/500,000.
LUZON-1/50,000.
1. Current intelligenceft"aoperationsreports.
2. a.. SixthArmy,supportedbyAlliedNavalandAirForces,continues
theoffensiveonLUZONbyseizingtheLEGASPIarea,ALB.AY
PROVINCE,byshore-to-ehoreoperationsandsecuringthenorth-
ernexitstoSANBERNARDINO STRAIT.
b. D-Day 25March1945(TargetDate)
H-Hour Tobedetermined.
. Assignment ofshipping: Annex.2.
d_. Troopsdesignatedfortheoperation:
(1) 158thRegimentalCombatTeam, reinforced.
(a) Commander: BrigadierGeneralHanfordMacNlder,U.S.A.
(b) Uniteandstaging: Annex3.
(2) SixthArmyReserve:
511thParachute InfantryRegiment (lessonebattalion).
(3) Commandofunitsreinforcingthe158thRegimentalCombat
TeampassestotheCommandingGeneralthereofat18001
17March1945,oruponarrivalofsuchunit initsstag-
ingarea,ifthatarrivalissubsequent to1800117March
1945.
3. a.. 158thRegimentalCombatTeam, reinforced:
(1) W m onD-Day,atH-Hour, land intheLEGASPIarea,seizea
beachhead, andcaptureLEGASPI.
(2) WillsecurepromptlythenorthernexitstoSANBEHNARDIKO
STRAITandclearSORSOGONPROVINCEofallenemyforces.
(3) Willbepreparedforfurtheroffensiveoperationstothe
northwest ofLEGASPI,whendirected.
b. XIVCorps,insupportoftheoperation:
(1) Willconcentratethe158thRegimentalCombatTeaminthe
generalLEMERYarea(BAlANGASPROVINCE)by1800117March
1945,atwhichtimeitwillpasstocontrolofthe Command-
ingGeneral,SixthArmy.
(2) Willbeprepared,whendirected:
(a) Toconcentratethe511thParachuteInfantryRegiment
(lessonebattalion)onorafterD-DayatNICHOLS
FIELDon24hoursnotice.
(b) Tomountthe5HthParachuteInfantryRegiment (less
onebattalion)fromNICHOLSFIELDforairbornemove-
menttoreinforcethe158thRegimentalCombatTeam
initsobjectivearea:
1. Withoneparachute Infantrybattalionwithin48
hOUTB.
157
c
Jb. CommandPosts!
2. Withthe511thParachute InfantryRegiment (less
~ onebattalion)within60houru.
Unit
Location
x. (l) Commanding General,158thRegimentalCombat Team:
(a) Willarrangedetails of loading, landingandnavalgun-
firesupport directwiththeCommander,NavalAttack
Group.
(b) Willarrangedetails ofcloseairiupportdirectwith
tneCommanding General,FifthAirForce.
tcj Willassume controlofanddirect operationsofPhilip-
pineForces intheobjectivearea.
(d) WillfurnishtheCommanding General,SixthArmy,with
prompt, frequent,andconcisereports onhissitua-
tion,plane andcasualties. Theseradioreports are
inadditiontothedailyreports requiredbythis
Headquarters.
(e) Willsubmit tothisHeadquarters,by17March19U5,a
brief ofhisplanfortheoperation, toinclude plane
ofclosesupporting navalandairforces.
(2) Commanding General,XIVCorps '
(a) Willarrangedetails ofemployment oftroopcarrierair-
craftforliftingtheSixthArmyReserveforthisop-
eration (511thParachute InfantryRegiment, lessone
battalion)directwiththeCommandingGeneral,Fifth
AirForce.
(b) Willsubmit hisplanformountingtheSixthArmyReserve
forthisoperation (511thParachute InfantryRegiment,
lessonebattalion)tothisHeadquartersby22MarchI9
(3) During theamphibious movement andlanding, theCommander,
NavalAttackGroup, isincommandoftheamphibious opera-
tions. Controlofforcesashorepasses tothe Commanding
General,158thRegimentalCombatTeam,uponhis arrival
ashoreanduponhisnotificationtotheCommander, Naval
AttackGroup,bythemostpromptmeansathisdisposal,
that heisready toassume commandofhieforcesashore.
TheCommanding General,158thRegimentalCombatTeam,will
notifypromptly theCommanding General,SjjcthArmy, ofthe
timeheassumes comnciidofhisforces ashore.
k. Ada017.
5. . (l) Seecurrent IndextoSignalOperations Instructions.
(2) Continuous communicationbetweenallelements Involved in
thisoperationwillbemaintained.
(3) TheCommending General,158thRegimentalCombatTeam,will:
(a) Arrangefornecessary coordinationbetweenground, naval,
andairforceelementsInvolvedtoinsureadequate
and continuous communications.
(b) Notifythisheadquarterswhenfacilities areavailable
' topermit SixthArmyL-5airmessenger serviceto
beextended totheLXGASPI area.
(c) Usecryptographicsystemsasfollows:
. HazardousDutySystems:
2dReserve
EffectiveD-Dav 1stReserve
SWPBMQ, SWPESS SIGWHFJ+
SWPRSX SWFUBK SIGJKR
SIGNMI_6 SIGNMI_7 SIGNMIg
formalSystems:
Army System#11orHavalchfjnnel181(Strip).
CSP1607(M-209orCSP 1500).
Cryptonet#20systems,2022,20^2(StripandDT).
JJ. Army system#881andCryptonet#20systems 2022
and2<A2whenauthorizedbythis headquarters
atwhichtimeallhazardoussystemswillbe
superseded.
j+. Sigabacryptographicdevicewhensituationhasbeen
reported secure andauthorization obtainedfrom
thisheadquarters.
(d) 1_.MaintainradiosilenceuntilH-Hour oruntilthe
element ofsurprisehasbeenlost.
2_. Enter SixthArmyradionets6Dand6Rassoonas
practicable afterradiosilence isliftedand
tnereaftermaintain continuousradiocontact with
this Xquarters.
3. Beprepared to:
(a) EstablishcontactwithSixthArmyCommand Ship
~ intheLEGASPIareainnets6Gand6R.
(b_) MaintainradiocontactwithXIVCorpsorade-
signatedunit thereofaslaterdirected.
(e) Establish necessary communications forliaisonand/or
controlofPhilippine Forces inthearea.
SixthArmy SANFERNANDO (PAMPANGA PROVINCE)
XIV Corps MANILA
158thRegimental Combat Team
LEKERY (Subsequent locations to
be reported).
/s/Walter Krueger
WALTER KRUEGER,
Lieutenant General,U.S.Army,
Commanding.
A1IHEXES:
1-Intelligence (Reproduced inVoluue IIIfollowing thereportofthe
Assistant ChiefofStaff, G-2)
2-Assignment ofShipping
3-Unitsand Staging
A. ? . :. 442
17001 1- j t r ch l"Tf
A1:A;.DI3,'T NO. 1 to JO 57i i:eadquarter3 Sixth Ar-ryi 11 !.XircL lv-,_".
FO57 i-3 amended as follows r
1. paragraph 2b_; chaise 25 ::erch 14J to I Aj.ril 1-,'J.
2. paratrapli 2d_(3): in jd and 4th l i nes change 1-COI 1; MircK 1945
to I'.'OOI 24 rarch 1945.
3 . rarayraph 3b_(l): Cl:ange itOOl 17 Mire: 1945 tc 1G00I 24 lurch 1?;
4. TBre._rei'h 3x( l ) ( e) : Charge 1' ;arcl. 1S45 t c 24 Vhrcl 1945.
5. ?arat rap:i 3x( 2) ( b) : i-ii-te 22 Vyarch Ip.'c t c 24 r i i ch 194; .
3y coimnand of lieu t-ntr.t "eneral YhV,Z2'~<:
Brigaclier " ^ nj r t l , C. _.. C.i
Oidef :f j t of f .
+^<_*^S
HEAT;;: ,V-fTI?o oI XT" r
- . l : C. H4 2
21001 2-1 r.farch I945
ADITS"US;:? i:0. 2 to ^ 57, Haadi . ar t sr s s i xt h Arr,?.-, 11 r.'arch 1?4J.
FO57 i s furt her amended as f oi l.vs.
hs Jo ( 2) ( a) ej;o (:):
;:JC:'CI
J
S FIELD tc ' i " ^ ^ ..ir.nû;.
vy conjver.O. of Licut'-'ntrt "r.eral KR'.'ZOSR:
3rit;adi' ;r General, 0. 3.
Chief of Staff.
OFFICIAL:
158
A. p . o. 442
19001 11 March 1945
SERVICE UNITS
ANNEX 2 t o TO57 Assignment of Shi ppi ng, 158th RCT, r e i nf or c e d.
ASSAULT ANDREINFORCIMr,
D-DAY
Det 274th Cml Serv Pl at
500th Ked Coll Co ( l es s
71st Evac Hoep
3d Port Surg Hosp
Det;
15
45
252
37
Lemery Area
Cannen Area
Manila Area
Lenery Area
XIV Corps
135tn Med
Op
Si xt h Army
XIV Coros
Lemery
11
11
13001
17 :;a
Type
8 LCI
Remarks
Det 3498th Ord MM Co
Det b ^ d Ord Am Co
109th Ord Serv Det (Bomb
70
10
Manila
Lemery
Area
Area
(15Stn HCI,
XIV Corps
11
n
11
4
5
LSM
LST
200
1500
Tow4 LCM
Tow 5 LCM
1 Sec, 103th GR Pl at
1 Pl at , 37b9t n tyi Trk Co
1 Pl at ( l es s 1 Sec) 4074th
45
Kanila Area
Grace Park Area
Quezon Air Fiel<
n
11
11
D/9
QMServ Co
Det, 558th QMEnd Co
50
ii ii
Lemery Area
n
AIV Corps
11
11
4 LSM 200 200 Tow 2 LCM
183d QMHosp Ldry Det
Manila Area
U5Stii HCT;
s i xt h Army Lemery 13001
5 LST
IS
r o t e : The Dand
eqvii-pient
1000
RESUflLY
1750
D/9 echel ons wi l l loed suppl i es and
a t both Subic and Batangas Bays.
Tow5 LCM
AS necessary
from Layte by
USASCS shi ppi ng.
Det, 293d JASCO
37th Rad TG Team, 3170th
Sig Serv Bn
28th Msg Cen Team, 3l 6st h
Sig Serv Bn
108th AGF Band
Det, 274th Sig Cons Co
Support Ai rcraft Part y No. 18
Lemery
II
II
Area
II
II
11 11
XIV Corps
n
XIV Corps
(158th aci ;
XI Corps
XIV Corps
"
11
11
11
11
17 Mar
comaend of Li eut enant General KRUEGER: l 6l s t Fi n Disb Sec
(158th TICT;
II
11
11
1 Pl at 277th Port Co Subic Bay Area XI Corps Subic
G. H.- D2CKER, 1 Sec 120th QMSkry Co 11 11
Bay
11
Bri gadi er General , G. S. C.
Chief of St af f . Tot al Service ^' nits
Tot al Task Force
KoteS Command shownincolumn "Present Control" isresponsible formovenent of
units tostatinsarea,coordinating movenent with command (s)thruv/hoee
zone (sjtheunitnustpass.
HEADQUARTERS SIXTHAft:Y
A. P. C. 442
ByCommand ofLieutenant General KSUSGSf,:
170c1 13
Al.EZf.rEIT NO. 1 t o AinrSX 2 t o F0 5 7 , Headquart ers Si xt h Amy, 11 ".ferch 1945.
AMuUC2 t o JO 5 7 , Assifcnitent of Shi ppi ng, i s amended as f ol l ows!
Under >L^y shi ppi ng add:
Tyfe l er sonnel
Bulk Tons Remarks
G.K.DKCKET1,
Brigadier General, G-.S.C.
3 A^D 432
Chief of Staff.
2ycorarnand of Lieutenant General KRUTCER: CF7ICIAL:
0-3
G. K. DECKER,
Br i gadi er Gener al , G. S . C.
Chief of St aff.
OFFICIAL: HEADQUARTERSSIXTH
A. P. C. 442
17001 13 t>'arch 1945
NO. 1 t o AI'USX 3 t o FO57. Headquarters Sixth Army, 11 Maroh 1945.
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY ANNEX 3 to FO57, Unita and St agi ng, 15th Regimental Combat Team, Reinf,
A. P. 0. 1+42 i s amended as follows :
15001 11 March 1945
ASIIEX 3 t o F0 57, Uni t s and St agi ng, 158t h RCT, Hei nf .
Under column "Staging Date" change 1P00I 17 fjarch t o 18001 2k March.
By command of Li eut enant General KRUEGERi
PRESENT
PRESEHT COiiTROL STAGING STAGING
APPR0X
LOCATION (See Note/ AREA DATE
STRSIJGTH
U1JIT
COMBAT UNITS
XIV Corps Lemery 18001
Lemery Area
Eq &Hq Det , 158t h RCT 59 G. H. DECKER,
17 Mar
Bri gadi er General , G. S. C.
158th I nf Regt
3,000 Chief of St af f .
488
147thFA3n
3?95thSigServPlat
SubicBay Area
XI Corps
Det,14b0thBoatMaintCo
GracePark Area
XIV Corpe
1279thEngrBn(C)
Subic
Subic Bay Area
XI Corps
Btry"D"?10thAAAAWBn
Bay
OFFICIAL:
Co"D"592dEB&SR
1PlatCo"B"592dEB&SR
0-3.
4,702
TotalCombatUnits
159
HEADQUARTERSSIXTH ARMY
A. P. 0 . 442
2100 I 26 March1945
AMENDMENTNO. 2 t o ANNEX3 t o F05 7 , Headquart ers Si xt h Army, 11Nfcrch1945.
Annex 3 t o JO5 7 , Uni t s andSt agi ng 156t h Regimental Combat Team,
Rei nf or ced, i s f ur t her amended a s fol l ows
1 Under combat u n i t s ohan&e s t a gi ng ar ea of Det , 1460th Boat Miint
Co from LEMERYt o SUBIGBAY.
2 . under Ser vi ce Uni t sadd:
Approx Jresent Present St agi ng St agi ng
Control Area Date
Unit Strength Location
Si xt h Army LET.IERY 26 Mar 45
rCAU jf& 49 MANILA
3 Change t o t a l s t o r ead:
Total Servi ce Uni t s 930
Total Task Force
5.632
By command of Lieutenant General KRUEGERi
G. H. IECKER,
Chief of St aff.
OFFICIAL!
HEAD.;!ARTER3SIXTH ART/
A. I-. 0.442
0800 15 '"arch 1945
017toaccompanyFO57
supply.
a. 3aae3.
(1) 5t>r i ni t i al supplies:
SUBIC BAY.
(2) ?or rasupply:
SUBIC BAY and Base K (LEYTE).
b. Levels.
(1) Toaccompany assault echelon (D-Day):
(a) Balk load at SUBIC BAY:
Classes I to IVincl - 10 D/s
Class v
(b) Load with Task Force uni t s loading at SUBIC BAY:
Classes 1 to IV i ncl - 5 D/S
Class v - 1U/F
Voyage r at i ons - 7 E/s
(c) Load with Task Force uni t s loeding at BALAYAN BAY:
Classes I to IVi ncl - 5 D/ S
Class v - 1U/F
Voyage rat i ons - 2 B/ S
(2) To accompany Task Force uni t s moving from BALAYANBAY on
rei nforcei ng echelon (D/ 9) t
Classes I t o IVi ncl - 5 D/s
Class V - 1U/F
Voyage r at i ons - 2D/s
(3) Tobe at t ai ned in objective area1
Class I to IV i ncl - 15 D/ S
Class V - 3U/F
Resuppl y.
(1) Responsi bi l i t y of Commanding General, Sixth Army:
(a) OnD / 9 by amphibious oraft from SUBICBA.Y1
Clasaes I t o IVi ncl - 15D/S
Class V - 1U/F
(b) Oie IS Boat to rendezvous at SUBIC BAYon D-Day for
cal l forward with cargo as follows1
Class V- Arty and Mortar 3/4 u/ F
All ot hers 1/2 u/F
This FS Boat to accompany D/ 9 echelon if not
called forward prior thereto.
(2) Responsibility of Commanding General, USASOSj
On D/ 13 and approximately every seven days thereafter
by FS Boats from Base K (LEYTE)1
Classes I to IV incl - 8D/S
Class V - As required.
A3prescribed by Commanding General, 158th Regimental Combat
Team (Reinforced).
e. Requisitions
After arrival' of Task Force in objeotive area, requisitions
will be consolidated and routed direct to Base K(LSYTE)
with information copy to this headquarters.
f Miscellaneous.
(1) The Commanding General, XI Corps, is responsible for making
available at SUBIC BAYthe supplies set out in paragraphs
1 b (1) (a) and (b) and paragraph 1 c (1) (a) and for
loading such supplies on the amphibious craft provided
for t hei r l i f t .
(2) The Commanding General, XIVCorps, is responsible far making
available at BALAYANBAYthe supplies set out in paragraphs
1 b (1) (c) and 1 b (2).
(3) The Commanding General, 158th Regimental CombatTeam
(Reinforced) is responsible for the loading of task
force units and their accompanying supplies (as prescribed
in paragraphs 1 b (1) (b) and (c) and paragraph 1 b (2)
for movement to the objective area.
(4) The Commanding Generals, XI and XIV Corps, will assist the
Commanding General, 158th Regimental CombatTeam
(Reinforced), in loading task force units for movement
to the objective area by furnishing necessary labor
and transportation. This assistance will not be requested
until al l task force f aci l i t i es prove inadequate or have
been exhausted.
2. 'Evacuation.
a. Casualties.
SeeAnnex3toAdm017,Medicalplan.
b. Burials.
SeeInclosure1toAnnex1toAdm 017,SOPforBurialsand
EstablishmentofCemeteries,5March1945*
SeeInclosure2toAnnex1toAdm017,QuartermasterPlanand
paragraph9,Annex2toAdm 017,OrdnancePlan.
d. Captured Material.
Allitemsofcapturedequipmentandmaterial,exceptthoserequired
forimmediateuseinoperations,willbeassembledandheldin
theobjectiveareaforlaterdeterminationastodisposition.See
Inclosure2,DispositionofCapturedEnemyEquipment.
e. Irisonersof',7arandEnemyAlienCivilianInternees.
(1) Theuniteffectingcaptureofprisonersofwarwillaccomplish
identificationofprisonersasprescribedbyparagraphs3
and5.USAFFERegulationsNo.80-40,23Sept1944- ?brthis
purposetheCommandingGeneral,158thRegimental CombatTeam
(Reinforced),willusethetemporarynumberspresently
assignedtohim.Ifadditionalnumbersarerequired,are-
questwillbesubmittedtothisheadquartersbythemost
expeditiousmeans.
(2) A3longasamphibioustransportationisavailable,theCom-
mandingGeneral,158thRegimental CombatTeam (Reinforced\
willevacuateprisonersofwarunderguardfromunitsunder
hiscommandandwilldeliverthemtotheCommandingGeneral,
XICorpsatSUBICBAY. TheCommandingGeneral,158thRegi-
mentalCombatTeam (Reinforced),willreportbyradioto
theCommandingGeneral,XICorps,thenumberofprisoners
beingevacuated,meansoftransport,estimatedtimeofde-
liveryatSUBICBAY,andanyotheridentifyinginformation.
Informationcopywillbesenttothisheadquarters.The
CommandingGeneral,XICorps,willreceipttotheguards
fortheprisonersandtheireffectsandwillcoordinate
arrangementsforreturnoftheguardstotheirunit.The
CommandingGeneral,XICorps,willmakefinaldeliveryof
prisonersofwartotheCommandingGeneral,LuzonBase
Section,AP0358.
(3) whenamphibiousresupplyfromSUBICBAYceases,theCommand-
ingGeneral,156thRegimentalCombatTeam (Reinforced),will
holdprisonersofwarinasuitableenclosureandrequest
thisheadquartersforinstructionsastotheirdisposition.
160
(4) The Commanding General, 156th Regimental Oombat Team (Fein-
forced), wi l l submit a report of the prisoners oaptured and/
or disposed of as of 2400, eaoh Monday, For this purpose
the model form attached to USAFFE Regulations Kb. 80-40
wi l l be used. An information oopy will be furnished this
headquarters.
(5) 3emy al i ens oaptured by the Commanding General, 156th Regi-
mental Combat Team (Reinforced), wi l l be tagged with WD PMC
Form No. 1 in the same manner as Prisoners of 7ar, except
that the words "Enemy Alien" wi l l be written above the words
Prisoner of Tfar.
(6) Anumber wi l l be assigned each enemy al i en. That number wi l l
appear on his qneny Alien Tag, on the bag containing his
ef f ect s, andcoal l other forms and reports which may be re-
quired. jt>r this purpose the Commanding General, 158th
Regimental Combat Teem (Reinforoed)i wi l l use the enemy
al i en numbers presently assigned to him. If additional
numbers are required, a request wi l l be submitted to this
haadquarters by the. moat expeditious means.
(7) Evacuation of enemy aliens wi l l be thrcuth the same channels
as outlined for prisoners of war in paragraph 2 e (2) and
(3) a';ove. Sneniy aliens captured will be impounded ?i
enclosures separate from prisoners of war, safeguarded,
and otherwise accorded treatment similar to that given to
Prisoners of war.
Traffic.
Controlby onamandin,:General,156thRegimentalCombatTeam(Reinforced).
4
Conraandin& General, 158th Regimental Combat Teem (Reinforced),
will be raspcns^.ble for straggler control within his command.
b.
(1) Oomruinding Ceneral, 158th Regimental Combat Team (Reinforced),
wi l l provide suitable shelter for the safeguarding and pro-
cessing of al l mail.
(2) Official mail for the 158th Regimental Combat Team (Reinforced),
wi l l be addressed as follows: Conccanding General, 158th
Regimental Corr.tat Team (Reinforced), IPO 70.
(I) i'p.-n arrival in objective area, personnel of al l uni ts, organ-
izations and detachments (except those uni t s, organizations
and detachments organically assigned to a higher unit which
has a permanently assigned Arv, as fcr example a di vi si on;
will use Ai-u 70
a 3
their sai l i ng eadress.
c. strength Reports.
(1) AS of 22jCO, each Tuesday, the Commanding General, 158th Hegi-
nental combat Team (Reinforced;, will submit a radio report
to this headquarters. Attention 0-1t containing the follow-
ing strength information, broken down by officers and en-
l i sted meni
va) T/0 strength of 15th Hegimental combat Team.
(b) Assigned strength of 158th Regimental Combat Team.
(c) Effective strength of 158th Regimental Combat Team,
^d) T/Qstrength of attached troops.
ve; Assigned strength of attached troops.
(f) infective strength of attached troops. (TOT brevity,
report totals as Able tfiker , et c. , respectively.;
(2) '.Then daily courier service i s established, the Commanding
General, 158th Regimental Combat leem (Reinforced;, will
submit the above information as a Daily strength wsport and will
discontinue the radio report.
d. Replacements.
. 1 ; units will submit monthly personnel requisitions for IOBO re-
placements in accordance with provisions of l etter. Head-
quarters, Sixth Army, f i l e AO 200.3 s, subjeeti -lersonnel
replacement Requisitions", dated 4 July 1944.
(2) units may submit special requiaitiona as the situation dictates.
5 construction.
.he conmanding General, 158th Regimental * J ^ ^ J j f ? ^ ^
wi l l make prompt reconnaissance to ascertain the feasi bi l i ty of
Saci nTt he air f i el d in the vi ci ni ty of LSGiSPI in operable con-
dition for l i ai son and transporttype planes. Aradlo report
containing the resul ts of the above reconnaissance wi l l be for-
warded to this headquarters at the earlieat practxcable time.
a. .sanitation.
See Inclosure 1 to Annex 3. Kedioal Plan.
b. nasualtiea*
(1) An information copy of al l caaualty reports rendered by Sixth
Armyunits will be furnished this headquarters. (See USAFFS
Ciroular NO. 86, dated 6 October 19M, as amended, and
Sixth Army Casualty Reporting Manual No. 3 , dated 22 April
1944 as amended.)
(2) Aradio report will be furnished this headquarters. Attention
0-1, each Wednesday l i st i ng the following accumulative
totals compiled from the corresponding 0-1 Periodic Report
(inolosure l ) i
(a) Dead al l causes.
(b) WLA(To include injured al l causes).
(0) Missing al l causes.
(d) Prisoners of WarCaptured to data. (Ibr brevity, report
totala as Able , Bator , Charlie, et c, respec-
ti vel y.)
o. Payment of Troopa.
Upon arrival in the objective area and consistent with the tacti cal
situation, al l units of the task force may submit their vouchers
to the l 6l et Finance Disbursing Section for payment.
d. Periodic Reports.
0-1 Periodic Report will be submitted aa prescribed by Inclosure
1( 0-1 periodic Report.
0-2 Periodic Report will be aubmitted aa preecrlbed by m 101-5
and Intelligence SOP.
0-3 Periodic Report will be submitted as prescribed by separate
l etter of instructions.
0-4 Periodic Report wi l l be aubmitted as prescribed by Incloaure
3 , 0-4 Periodio Report.
e. CiTil Affaira.
SeeAnnex7toAdm017,CivilAffairaPlan.
f. Equipment.
(1) Within applicable T/Za aa preaorlbed ly Ccnmanding General,
158th Regimental Combat Team (Reinforoed).
(2) Equipment in exceaa of applicable tables aa authorized by this
headquarters. Minor additions! not involving controlled
items, may be prescribed by Commanding General, 158th
Regimental CombatTeam (Reinforced).
(3) Vehlclea and weapons will be protected carefully against
possible immersion in aalt water. Unite will emphasize
waterproofing of trucks, tractors, and towed weapons. Aa
soon as practicable after landing, waterproofing materials
will be removed and vehicles arid weapons will be washed
in fresh water end oarefully lubricated.
(4) An extra canteen with cover (less cup) will be carried by
each man of the assault combat units, except FAandAAA
By command of Lieutenant General KRUEGER:
G. K. DECFER,
Chief of Staff.
OFFICIAL!
3 Inolosurest (inelosures furnished only to
those commanders indicated by
in distribution l i s t . )
1 - G-l Feriodio Report.
2 - Ltr. , HI Sixth Arr.y, AG386.3 D-5 22 Nov 441 subjects Disposition
of Captured Enemy Equipment.
3 - C-4 Periodic Report.
Annexes:
1 - quartermaster Plan.
incl 1 - SOP Burials and Cemeteries,
mcl 2 - Salvage collecting Plan.
2 (Xdnanoe Flan.
mcl 1 - sample radio reports.
inol 2 WDAGOForm No. 580, as modified by Sixth Army, ll/44
mol 3 - '.lADCO Form Ns-58lt as modified by Sixth Army, 11/44.
3 - Medical plan.
mol 1 - Ltr. , HqSixth Army, 2 Sept 44i subject! Sanitation.
4 - Engineer supply plan.
Inol 1 - Eogineer A & P Supplies for one (1) RCT (Reinforced).
5 - Chemloel Plan.
mcl 1 - chemioal warfare Ammunition Status Report.
6 - Transportation Plan.
mcl 1 - SOP for Air Supply, 9 Feb 43.
7 - Civil Affairs plan.
(Abore annexea are reproduced in Volume III followinc the appropriate
Staff Section Beporta.)
161
T'ZAD ' Jv?(TERS SIXTH ARI.T
. i. o.442
OfOC 20 "arc:. 1?45
Amendment ~ic 1 to Adm 0 1? to accor.ipany JOJ7
1 kitr.yx 7 to Ada CI ?, Civil Affairs E. ^ , is amended aa fclloviS!
t . Add para/raph 1 d as follows:
d. l et t er , Headquarters VS^FIT;, dated 4 T.Brch 19451 Subject:
SL'dlians Jteo.wsred frois 2iie.iv Occupied Turrit, 'i-j..
L. ;,ad i.r".^rau!i 10 a^ fcllowi :
10. ;,'ith rsferi.ica to l et t er mentioned in iaragrajh 1 i , >?ase
Casual Camps ~re in operation at the folloivinf locations;
oo::to Tom-c Vi.ivdriit:-, :'-..\IL.;., L"XI'
- : : ^ h i c Iriacr., I.r:,TH.H.
;
->-, ai-AL Irovince, LU~0>:
T^XCEO, L;" II.
% cc- Jr . d of l i e .t e r . ^t Gecer&l KJVJSCER:
G. H. DECKER,
Urigadier General, G.S.C.,
Chief of dt af f .
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARM?
A. P.0. 442
13001 23March I 945.
P058
Maps: PHILIPPINE ISLANDS - 1/500,000
LUZON- 1/250,000
LUZON- 1/50,000
1. Omitted.
2. a_. Sixth Army continues the offensive.
Jj. Boundaries, effective 00011 23 March 1945.
(1) Boundaries between Corps and boundary 37th Division: NoChange.
(2) Between I Corps and Philippine Guerrilla Forces, North Luzon
(Volkmann): ARITIC - B0K0D - thence AGH0RIVER t o LOO -
AMPUSUNGUN- A1SULHIG - LUGAD00 - BACN0TAN ( al l inclusive
to I Corps)*
. 129th Regimental Combat Team and 136th Field Artillery Battalion,
37th Division, pass to control of the Commanding General, I Corps,
effective upon arri val in the BAUANG (LA UNION) area.
i, 66th Infantry Regiment, Philippine Army, passes t o control of the
Commanding General, I Corps, effective 000II 28 March 1945.
e_. Confirming radio instructions, Battery B, 544th Field Artillery
Battalion, passes to control of the Commanding General, I Corps,
upon arri val in the PUGO (LA UNION) area.
3. a. XXVCorpas
(1) Will promptly secure the l i ne LLIJAN - BATANGAS- LIPA -
TANAUAN- LINGA, and open and secure BATANGASBAYfor early
development as a port and supply base.
(2) Will advance aggressively eastward, destroy enemy forces south
of LAGUNADEBAYand secure the line LUCENA- TAYABAS -
LUCBAN - CAVINTI - PAGSANJANJ establish contact with XI
Corps east of LAGUNADEBAY.
(3) , i i l l secure the .vest .iud south flank3 of j i xt h Army within tlvs
XIV Corps zone of action.
(4) -./ill maintain contact with XI Corps and 37th Division.
(5) a i l l , in support of the operation to seize lMZrJ>21, continue
those missions assigned XIV Corp3 in FO57> this headquarters,
as amended
b_. XI Corpsj
(1) J i l l vigorously pres3 operations in t he ANTIPOLO- MOiiTALBAN -
IPO area ^nd east and southeast thereof and destroy host i l e
Tciceo in those areas; est abl i sh contact with XIV Corps
east of LuiJUi.ji Ui LAY.
(2) | ill destroy host i l e forces renainine in PAIÂAUU and BATAAN
PRCVr.Ci-3 und in those parts of &il/iBAi*i8 and TARLAC PH0VINC
within the Corps zone of action,.
(3) Will capture CAEALLO, EL FRAlLiS and CAIWJAG L>LAI;B-> in njîlU.
JVy
(4) i-illsecurethevestflankofaixthArmywithintheXICorps
zoneofaction.
(5) i i l l nfaintsin contact v;ith I and X3V COTXJS and 37th Division.
c. I Corps1
(1) î l l advance viôroaily pith i t s l eft and secure the 3A-v F^H.\A-\JX)
(L. UNION) area for early development as a port and supply base.
(^) Will û-L itron^ reconnaissance in the direction of U^'JUIO
jDu ,rill be prepared to attack Laid capture BAuUIo, \-ueii
directed..
(3) Mi l continue determined effort s to securefch-^vi t ' j l D.JZ-. :-
J _-'rv
7
i irs' . i t an ej rl y dato in order to shorten lines and
provide an entrance into the CI.JHYH^! ViiLLE/ for future offen-
sive opcr _t i ons.
(4) trill destroy noatile forces raii.jiiiiH^ in K^ J.WLU!.. =ind..'u'iV.t
KCIJA pnO^L.Cfii -ii^ i'i T-rioae ^-1 ,- .f lai.:-ua -nd TnHLu.C
'..'ithill the Z.i. : ; 2uu>; c:' .. - u.
(_,) ia contact v;it:i
forces, ;?ori Lui-on (7cl c^. j i a, / .
(6) Will rri-irit:.in contact i/ith XI Corps,
d. 37th Divisionj
(1) ' di l l , by r. . i l and motor movementSi concentrate tun ]2^th iieg.i-
':.ei:i,ul Combtii. leji: <->ad 136th Field *rt i llory Battalion in
tht gsntrul BAUîG (U. Ul."ICi\
7
) area by 24001 27 MMVC:; 1545,
coordinating r ai l movements with this hesidûii ctirs and i/)ot<"'r
::ove:i:ifciits i/ith the Coiuuanuin^; Generals, XI tna I Corpd,
respectively.
(2) , i i l l garrison the greater it_Ai,iUt area ./ith the Division (I&03
t./o regiincatal co.,.ljt tea'r. _. r,6tli Field ^rtiller.-Bi-.ti-:! ioi
..ml provide t:ctic&l security therein.
(j) ulill continue toj
(a) Ii/akt available one reîi-cnfc-.! cowbtit tear,", to the prcv-3t
i.i.ai'-J'I'.'.1 S'-i.ciul, U'JAFFL, rot-.,ti'i^, reî'ns.ital cornbst ts<tiu-.
on tlii^ '"iuty froi t w,s to ijuie as L.^r=ed ^1011 bfetecs'i
Coioaanding Generals concerned*
(b) Be prepared, in the event of an emcr&enc,/, to raake availtibit.
the Division (less two regimental coab^t teams and 136iii
Field Art i l l ery Battalion) to the provost Larahal Geueral,
l>i*FFJL, for provost Marshal duties in IÛJLA, when
directed by this headquarters.
(a) Be prepared, on 24 hours' not i ce, to place one regimental
combat team in MANILAat the disposal of the Ccnmnandia
General, si xt h Army..
(4) ' Ji l l maintain contact vdth XIV sad XI Corps.
e* Philippine Guerrila Forces, horth Luzou (Volckmann)t
(1) . i i l l continue iaissions as directed in Letter of Instructions,
this headquarters, 2 February 1945
(2) /. ill by an aggressive offensive seize Cî?/^.TJS5 und etitablish
control over Highway 4 east thereof to include Bu.ruC.
(3) will establish and maintain contact wita I Corps*.
f. Antiaircraft Defenset Annex 1..
x. Corps Coruianders and the Commanding General , 37th Division, . . ill
continue to t^ke special precautions to protect vi t al r ^ i l r ^ a
and hi^ji'.vay bridges V7ithin their respective zones of action.
4 The 129th Regimental Combat Teaiti and the 136th Field Art i l l ery Battalion
will concentrate in the BAUANG (ui. UNION)area with the follovang
levels of supplyi
Classes I to IV inclusive - 5 D/S
Class V - Art i l l ery and llortar, 1/2 U/F
All other weapons j 1 u/F
(Ammunition shortages not available in MAIJILAarea will be reporteu
to I corps by the 37th Division)*
5 . oee current Index to Sixth ArmyiisnaL Operations Instructions uiiu
Comtiiunication Directive.
b. Command posts
XI Corps fcutLOLCti ( BULACAN)
XIV Cor ps CAXNLL;3AI\G (LAGUI^JA)
37th I nf ant r y Division ftlAMILA
Phi l i ppi ne Guerri l a Forces, CAMPj i i . M , DAHIGAYCb PT
North Luzon (Volckra^nn) (LAUNION)
66th Infantry Regiment (PA.) KIBUNGAI'J (MOUi^JTAll^)
. (J) Durincs theperi od t h^tt he]29t h Regiiuental Comt-t Team oper at es
under cont r ol of Counanding Gener al , I Corps, f r equenci es ,
c a l l s i gns , e t c . , asassi gned t o1^9th Regi ment al Combat Team
by 37t h Di vi si on maybecont i nued i n ef f ect byI Corps.
(2) I Corps andPhi l i ppi ne Gue r r i l l a Forces, North Luzon (Vclckmann)
t o mai nt ai n r adi o cont act byu t i l i z i n g t heSi xt h Army Corps
l at er al net6Yi f desired..
(3) Comnunications forPhi l i ppi ne Guer r i l l a Forces, North Luzon
(Volckmann) wi l l beas di rect ed byACofoG-2,iaixth Army,
pending r ecei pt of Si gnal Operations Inst ruct i ons from t hi s
headquart ers.
/ s / Ualter ijrueger,
iALTJiR KRUEGiRi
Lieutenant General, U.J . *rL.y,
1 - Ant i ai r cr af t Defense.(Omitted)
162
'3AD;L'Ar.TrtS SDCTKART1Y
- . P. 0. iw2
i.001 7 April 1945
- i/
c
,oo,ooo.
LUiCi; - 1/ 2J 0, 000.
LUZO:; - 1/5c,ooo.
1.
a_. 3ixtr ^ ^ continues the offensive.
b. poundaries, affective 0001J 10 April I9L5.
(1) Tfetween XIV Corps and XI Corps: Highway 54 from junction
with Jljiway 1A northeast to GUAEALUPE- thence PASIC
RIVSft to confluence with TAGICRIVER - TAGIC RIVER to
LAG-J!^.DEBAY- TALI!:POINT- JAUJ^LR F0I1.T (all inclu-
sive to XI Oorpa) thenco SAOTACRUZ- CAVINTI -MAUBAN
(all inclusive to XT7 Corps).
(2) petween XI Corps and I Corps: No change.
(3) Bstween I oora and Philippine Guerrilla Forces, North
Luson, (Volcl-anar.n): ; t change.
c_. 37th Division (leas I4Jth Re
b
imt.-ntol Combat Team and those
elements no\7 a part of I Corps) passes to control of the
Oommaiidin^ General, I Cor;J, effective upon arrival in the
^: (LA-jiaci;) area.
d. oorr-piny , 637th Ta.ik Destroyer 3attalion, i s attached to the
37th Division upon arrival in the I1AMLA area.
3 a. :av Corps
:
(1) 71II continue current missions, destroy hostile forces
remaining in i t s zone of action, seize MAUBAN and
xvKTB'OtLO:, and be prepared for further advance to the
southeast.
(2) Will move Company B, 637th Tank Destroyer Battalion, to
the KAFILA.area by 08001 9 April 1945, coordinating
movement with the Corananding General, 37th Division.
b_. XI Corps:
(1) " i l l continue current missions.
(2) Will provide t act i cal security for MANILA,and will
establish therein liaison with the Provost Marshal
General, USAFFE.
. I Corps:
(2) Will attack vigorously a l l along the l i ne, making i t s
main effort on the right to seize the BALETEPASS -
SANTAFE area at an early dat e, and will capture BAGTJIO.
d. 37th Division (less 145th Regimental Combat Team and those
~ elements now a part of I Corps), with Company B, 637th Tank
Destroyer Battalion, attached, wi l l move to the general
NAGUILIAN (LA UNION) area in accordancewith following
schedule, coordinating movement with t hi s headquarters:
(1) One reglDBntal combat tean by 18001 10 April 1945.
(2) Remainder of Division (less exeepted elements) by 18001
11 April 1945.
4. a. Levels of supply to accompany the 37th Division units moving
~ to NAGUILIAN (LAUNION):
Class I &I I I inclusive
5 D/S plus Travel
Class II IcIV
Supplies on band
ClassV
Art i l l ery and Mortar 1/2 U/F
All other weapons 1 TJ/F
(Ammunition required t o f i l l shortages which is not available
in the MANILAarea wi l l be reported to I Corps by the 37th
Division).
j^ Supply poi nt s:
(1) 37th Division (less 145th Regimental Combat Team) Base M
(2) 145 th Regimental combat Team Manila Base
(3) All others *
emitted.
/a/Walter Krueger
WALTER KRUEGER,
General , U. S. Army,
Commanding.
A. P. 0. 442
19151 12 April 1945.
B0 60
IHILIPPINE ISLANDS- 1/500,000
LOZON- 1/250,000
LOZQN- 1/50,000
1* Omitted.
2. sixthArmycontinuestheoffensivetoclearsoutheasternLOZOJOF
11eaanyfcrcee.
b Boundaries* Nochange*
2r Confirmingradioinstructions,511thParcnuteinfantryRegiment
(lessonebattalion)nowlasixthArrayReservefortheoperation
toseizeLBGASPI, isreleasedtocontroloftheCommandingGeneral
XVfCorps,effective0001112April1945.
3 a. Confirmingradioinstructions,H 7Corps:
(1) Willaggressivelycontinuecurrentmissions,
(2) willadvancepromptlyandvigorouslysoutheastward,capture
CALAUAG,securethelineVINAS RIVER-CUlAOPOINT,andbe
preparedforfurtheradvanceintotheBICOLPROVINCES.
b_, 158thRCT,,reinforcedi.
(1) Willadvancepromptlyandvigorouslynorthwestwardandclear
AlBAYPROVINCEofallenemyforces.
(2) fillaggressivelyreoonnoitertoIncludethelineSABAiC-
ANAYAN-CCTMO.
(3) WillcompletethedestructionofenemyforcesinS0RS0G0N
PROVINCE.
(4) Confirming radio instructions, will destroy enemy rad^r
installations on CATADUANESISLAM),makine themaximum
use of guerrila forces - this operation.
4. Nochange.
5 NOchange.
/ s / '.'/alter Krueer
WALT3F KHU3GER,
General, U3.Array
IISAIi'Ll'.-JTrERS 3LCT-? AR
1
Y
A. P. C. 442
19151 18 April J943
FO61
I.-tipa: PHILIPPICS13U:IS-1/200,000andlA0,00C.
1. omi t t ed.
2. a, s i xt h Army cont i nues the offensive t c dest roy enemy f e c e s r j -
nsiining on LL
T
ZCW.
b_. poundaries 1
(1) Between XI and XIV Corps, ef f ect i ve OCOli 22 . u r i l 194J :
CARA^C I.SL.J.D (excl usi ve) - Highway 54 fro- junction
with Highway lA nort heast t o 3"ADALVF2 - thenco PASIG
RIVER t o confluence with TAGIG R17ER - TACIG F
J
I*'3R t o
LAGUI^l DS BAY - TALB: PC'HCT - "ALA.ULA ?CI'.;T - oAij?A
MARIA RIVER - :UISI - PAG13 - i.'XriUTIDAY CREEK - KA1IVA
RIVER - ADOS RIVSR ( al l inclusive; tc XI Corps).
(2) retween XI Corps and I Ooris : Ko chcr ê.
(3) i^tween I Corps and Ptllipi-iiio Qjerrilla Jbrces, North Luzon,
(Volckmann): I* change.
^ radi o I nst r uct i ons and pursuant to aut hori t y of the
ocmmander-in-Chief United St at es Army Forces i n t he Paci f i c:
(1) 145th Regimental Combat Team, 37th Di vi si on, passes to
oont rol of the Commandirie; General, XI Corjs, ef f ect i ve
upon r e l i e f by the 20th Regimental Combat Teac., 6th Di vi si on,
in
(2) 20th Regimental Combat Team, 6th Di vi si on, passes t c cont rol
of the Provost Marshal General, United St at es Army Forces
i n the ?ar j &st , effeot i ve upon completing the r e l i e f of
the 145th Regimental Combat Team, 37th Di vi si on, i n IIAKILA.
163
<K 158th Regimental Combat Te&m, reinforced, passes to oontrol of the
Oorananding General, XIV Corps, effeotive 0001I 22 April 1945
e_. oorapany Ct 85th Chemical Battalion, passes to control of the
Commanding General, I Corps, effeotive upon arri val i n the
3AUAKG area.
a_. XIV corpst
(1) Ti l l continue current missions*
(2) Will, by 2i,00l 21 April, complete r el i ef of XI Corps uni t s
in that part of the XI Corps zone of action which passes
to XIV Corps, es prescribed in this F0, and will destroy
host i l e forces t herei n.
(3) "111, by overland and shore-to-shore operations, vigorously
attack and destroy enemy foroes remaining in the BICOL
FRCVIUCES.
(4) confirming radio i nst ruct i ons, will promptly garrison
CARABAO ISLAM) with guer r i l l a forces, relieving elements
of the XI Corps on that Island.
(3) V/ill move Oompeny c 85th Chemioal Battalion, to the BAUANG
area by 2^001 21 April, coordinating movement with this
headquarters*
b XI Corps:
(1) will continue current missions.
(2) confirming radio i nst ruct i ons, wi.ll promptly rel i eve the
145th Regimental Combat Team, 37th Division, in MANILA,
with the 20th Regimental Combat Team, 6th Division,
coordinating det ai l s of the rel i ef with the Irovost
ftprshal General, United States Array Ftoroes in the Jfer Bast.
I Corps will continue current missions.
No change.
Cnitted.
/ s/ wal t er Jfrueger
WALTER KPOEGSR
Ge n e r a l , u . S . Army,
Commanding.
HUIXJJAOTER3 SIXTH ARM!
A. P . 0 . 442
2aooi 24 mj 1.945.
FO 62
Mapsi PHUilPPINB ISLANDS - 1/200,000
LUZON- V50.000
U- a* emitted..
b* pursuant to provisions of Operations Instructions Mo. 104, General
~ Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, the Commander, Allied Air
Ibrces, at 00O12 24 May1945, assumes responsibility for the
antiairoraft arti l l ery defense of that portion of Luzon indicated
in laolosure 1, and assumes operational control of antiaircraft
arti l l ery units l i sted in Indosure 2.
2. a. Sixth Army continues the offensive to destroy enemy foroes remaining
onLUZON.
b. Boundaries, effective OOOlX1 June 1945t
(1) Between XUT, XI, and I Oorpai Bo otuoge.
(2) Between I Corps and Philippine Guerrilla Jbroes, North Luxoai
ARITAO (exolusive) - BOKOD- AMBUCU0- DATAKBJ LDQADO0 -
SANGABRIEL- BACNOTAN (al l Inclusive to Philippine Guerrilla
>rces. North Luzon)*
o* J "suant to instructions from the Commander-in-chief, Southwest
~ Pacific Area, and confirming radio Instructions of this head-
quarters, the following units now under control of the Prorost
Mu.ahal General, united States Army Forces in the Far Sast, pass
to control of the CommandIng General, XI Corps, at 00011 on dates
indicated*
One Infantry battalion, 20th Regimental Team -21 May1945
20th Regimental Combat Team (l ess one Infantry BattallonJ- 1 June 1945
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 191st Field
Artillery Group -15 Jun 1945
d. 187th Glider Infantry Regimental Combat Team, reinforoed, passes
~ to control of Prorost Marshal General, United states Army Forces
in the Far East, In MANILAat 00011 1 June 1945
e. 66th infantry Regiment, Philippine Army, passes to oontrol of the
~ nown^n^ng offi cer, Philippine Guerrilla forces, North Luzon,
effective 00011 1 June 1945
f. 145th Regimental Combat Team passes to oontrol of Commanding General*
~ I Corps, effective 0001I 2 June 1945'
3* ft. JOTCorpei
(1) fillcontinuecurrentmissions,rigorouslysearchingoutand
destroyingenemyforcesremainingintheCorpszoneof
action.
(2) fillmorethe187thGliderinfantryRegimentalCombatTeam,
reinforced,toMANILAby240012P my19451coordinating
oremantwiththeProrostMarshalGeneral,UnitedStates
ArmyForoesinthefarBast*
b_. XICorpsi
(1) f i l l continue current missions.
(2) f i l l coordinate the rel i ef of the 20th Regimental CombatTeam
and Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 191st Held
Artillery Group, in MANILAwith the prorost Marshal General*
United States Army Forces in the far l as t .
(3J f i l l concentrate the 145th Regimental Combat Team in the
general SAN JOSS (NUOTA BCIJA) area by 000II 2 June 1945,
coordinating movement involved with the Commanding General,
I Corpo.
e I Oorpsi
(1) f i l l continue current missions and capture the SANTA FE -
IMDGANarea at an early date; thereafter!
(a) f i l l relieve the 25th Division in i t s present zone of
action with the 37th Division and concentrate th
25th Division in the DIGDIG - SAN JOSS (NUE/A ICIJA)
area.
(b) f i l l advance aggressively northward with Its ri ght,
destroy hosti l e farces encountered In the SANTA IB -
ABITAO area; capture ARITAO; assure the security of
SANFERNANDO (LAUNION) - BAGUIOareas and block the
entrances from the north and northeast in the CENTRAL
VALOT of LUZON.
(c) Will withdraw the 32d Dirlsion from the VILIA VERDX TRAIL
when the tactical situation permits, or terrain and
weather coalitions require, relieving the 33d Division
In Its present zone of aotlon with the 32d Division, aid
eonoentratlng the 33d Dirlsion in the ARINGAT - BAUANG
(LAUNION) area.
(d) Will be prepared to eonoentrate the 25th Division in the
TARLAC - BAMBANarea when the 6th Division, l ess one
regimental combat teen, i s made available to I Corps
In the DIGDIG (NXUTABCIJA) area.
d. 68th AAABrldage:
(1) Will assuM responsibility for the antiaircraft arti l l ery defense
of that portion of LUZONnot assigned to the Coomnnder,
Allied Air Foroes. (Inolosure 1)
(8) Will provide antiaircraft arti l l ery for antialreraft protection
and for support of ground troops in the zones of action of
I, XI, and XIV Corps, as directed by this headquarters.
, Philippine Guerrilla Forces, North Luzon, wi l l oontlnue missions
assigned in FOM aad Letter of Instructions, 2 Febrmry 14S.
both this bsadqwrters.
x. Corps mi11Iere wi l l ut i l i se guerrlla forces to the maximum to
prorlds and maintain security within their respectlre zones of
actlom.
4. lerela of supply to aocompmny the 146th Regimental Combat Teen and the
lB7th GlUer Infantry Regimental Combat Teem, relnforoed:
145thROT Ifl7th Oli mf RCT
(Has* I
5 Q^s
Class II * I? Supplies on hand Supplies on hand.
Class I I I
5 iV/3 Thicle tanks full*
ClassV Artillery and mortar 1 u/F
All other weapons 1 U/F
5* Mo change.
/ a/ fal ter Xrueger
1ALT2RKRUBMR,
General, U. S. Army,
Commanding
S I nel s :
Inel 1 - Map, PHILIFPI1B ISLANDS, 1/ 1, 000, 000 (omitted)
Inel 2 - Troop Li st
164
SIXTH
4-
4. P. 0. 442
22ooi 24fey1945.
I ndoaure No. 2 t o 7062,Headquarters Si xth Army.
Dni t s l i s t e d below wi l l pass t o the operati onal control ofthe
Commander, Al l i ed Air*>roes, at present l ocat i on, ef f ect i ye 00011
24 Hay1945i
Hq &HqBtry, lO2d AAA Brig 160thAAAOpnsDet
Hq * Hq.Btry, 6thAAA Group 156thAAAOpnsDet
Hq * HaBtry, 14thAAA Group 1420thBigrSLMaintDet
HqftHqBtry, 120th AAAGroup 1421stBagr3LliaiatDet
Hq 4 HqBt ry, 251st AAA Group 1425thffigr3LMaintDet
Hq tcHqBtry* 197th AAAGroup 1424thEagr3LMaintDet
70th AAA Gun Bn 1426thBigr3LMaintDet
507th AAAGun Bn 220thSigRadarMaintDnit(TypeC)
508th AAAGun Bn 243dSigRadarMaintUnit(TypeC)
518th AAAGun Bn 246thSigRadarMaintUnit(TypeC)
734th AAA Gun Bn 291stSigRadarMaintDnit(TypeC)
737th AAA Gun Bn 292daigRadarMaintUnit(Type0)
101st AAA AW Bn(A/T) 295thsigRadarMatntCult(TypeC)
BtryA*102dAAAAtBn 95thSigRadarMaintunit(TypeA)
210thAAAAffBn(lessBtry0) 98thsigRadarMaintunit(TypeAJ
469thAAAAfBn 99thSigRadarMaintUnit(TypeA)
100thsigRadarMaintunit(TypeA)
Bt rys C&D*470th AAAAff Bn
l^lstsigRadarMaintunit(TypeA)
471at AAA Aff Bn
1924SigRadarMaintDnit(TypeA)
BtryD,210thAAAAWBn(uponarrival
472d AAAAff Bn
950t h AAAAff.Bn
atSublcBay)
951t AAAAff Bn
707t h AAAMGBt ry Airborne (Sep))
708th AAA1CBtry Airborne(Sep)
373dAAASLBn
222dAAASLBn(lessBtrysA4B)
725thAAASLBtry
A. P.. 0442
22001 28Ifey I945
FO 63
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS- 1/200,000*
LUZON- 1/ 50, 000.
>
1. omi t t ed.
2. a . s i xt h Army i nt e ns i f i e s t he of f ensi ve t o dest r oy remaining enemy
f or ces i n LUZON.
b . Boundaries between Corps: Nochange.
c_ Phi l i ppi ne Guer r i l l a Forces* North Luzon (Volckmann), pass t o
cont r ol of t he Commanding General,. I Corps, ef f ect i ve 00011
1 June145.
d 6t h Di vi si on ( l es s oner egi ment al combat team) pasaes t o cont r ol
"" of t he commanding General , I Corps, upon a r r i v a l i n theDIGDIG
area.
3. a_. XIV corps will continue current missions,
b. XI Corps:
(1) TTill, continuing current missions, vigorously seek out,
attack, and destroy remaining hostile forces in that
portion of BUIACAN. PIZAL, and TAYABASPROVINCES within
the corps zone of action.
(2) will concentrate the 6th Division (less one regimental com-
bat team) in the DIGDIGarea according to the following
schedule, coordinating movement with the Commanding
General, I corpst
(a) Oneregimental combat team by 000115 June 1945
(b) The Division (less one regimental combat team) by
00011 15 June 1945*
I oorpa:
(1) will continue current missions, pushing the advance to
and capture ARITAOwith the utmost determination and
speed, and will be prepared to adverce thereafter, when
directed, into the CAGAYANVALLEYto capture HAYCMBONG.
si st Ihilippine Guerrilla Forces, North Luzon
(2)
(Vololar.ann), as iBceasaryj
(a) To capture CERVANTESa't an early dat e.
(b) Tb exert maximum pressure against enemy for
CAGAYAN VALLEY.
(O-) Todeny t heus eof AFARRI t o enemy f o r c e s .
For 6th Division (leas one regimental combat team) in move to DIGDIG
Levels of Supply
Class 1 5D/S
Class 11 &IV Supplies onhand
Class HI 3 Q/S
Class v Artillery and mortar ammunition
on hand.
(Minimum quantity 1/2 u/F)
All other weapons 1u/F
(Ammunition required to f i l l shortages which i s not available
prior to movement will be reported to I Corps by the 6th Division)
5 5. See current Index to Sixth Army Signal operation Instructions,
Communication Directive, and Signal Operation Instruction
SPeciel l et t er #1, dated 8 April 1945.
b.. command Posts> Nochange.
p_. Commanding General, 1 Corps, will establish communications with
jhilippine Guerrilla Forces, North Luzon (Volckmann). Frequen-
cies and oall signs presently assigned Guerrilla pbrces maybe
oontimed in effeot by I Corps.
/s/ttalter Krueger
HALTERKRUEGER
General, U . S .Army
Commanding.
A. P.0 . 442
20001 31 May 1945
AMENDMENT NO. 1 t o FO63, Headquar t er s s i xt h Army, 28May 1945,
FO 63, Headquart ers s i xt h Army, 28May1945, i s amended as f ol l ows !
So much of TO63, t h i s headquar t er s , as r eads "6thDi vi si on ( l esa
one r egi ment al combat t eam)" i s changed t o r ead 6t hDi vi si on
(less one infantry regiment).
BY COIJMANDOFGENERAL KRUEGERt
G. H* DECKER,
Br i gadi er Gener al , G.S.C.
Chief of St af f .
OFFICIAL1
^-^L-Jl{2a^(û<JLjU
0-3
A. P. 0 . 442
08001 2 June1945
F064.
Maps: PHILIPPINE ISLANDS - 1/ 200, 000.
LUZON- L/5O.OOO.
1 . omi t t ed.
2.a.sixthArmycontinuestheoffensivetodestroyhostileforces
~ remainingonLUZON.
165
b_. Boundaries between Oorpa, effecti ve 000115 June 1945<
(1) Batwean XIV Oorpa and XI Oorpaj HIGHWAY54 from junotion
with HIGHWAYlA northeast to GUADALUPE - thence PASIG RIVER
to confluence with TAGIG RIVER - TAGIG RIVER to LACUNADE
BAY- TALIM POINT - JALAJALA POINT - PANGIL - PANGILRIVER -
thenoe LALAVINAN RIVER to LAMONBAY ( al l inclusive to XI
Corps).
(2) Bstween XI Corps and I Corps: No change.
c_. 2d cavalry Brigade, 1st cavalry Division, passes to control of
Commanding General, XI Corps, effecti ve 000H 5 June 1945*
3 a. XTV Corps wi l l continue current missions.
b_. XI Oorps:
(1) "/ill oontinue current missions.
(2) 'Will carry out missions in that area of the XIV Oorps zone
of action whioh passes to XI Corps, as prescribed in this
FO, and for whioh the XIV Corps was heretofore responsible.
o_. I corps wi l l oontinue ourrent missions.
4. XIV corps wi l l continue l ogi st i oal support of the 2d Cavalry Brigade,
1st cavalry Division. Direct contact between XI and XIV Corps i s
authorized for this purpose.
5 " IB change.
/ s/ wal t er Krueger
WALTERKRUEGER,
General, U. S. Army
Commanding.
BXADQflAKTKRS SIXTH ARMT
A. P. 0. 442
19001 6 June 19145.
10 65
llapei ffilUPPPS ISLANDS - 1/ 200*000
1 . Omi tted.
2 a. Si x t h Army cont i nue* the of f e ns i ve t o dest roy enemy f oroes remain-
~ l ag oa LUZON.
b . Boundari es between Corpsi Bo change.
3* a_. XCTandXI Corps cont i nue ourrent mi s s i ons .
b . I Oorps wi l l oonti nue current l e s i o n s and, confirming radi o
i ns t r uc t i ons of 5 June 1945* oonti nue t he at t ack northward of
ARITAO, capture BAYOMBQNG, andbe prepared f or f urt her advanoe
In the di r e c t i on of APARBI.
Omitted.
Bo ohange.
/ a/ falter Krueger
WALTER KHUKHfft,
General , U. 9* Aray,
Coaaandlng
A. P. 0 . 442
19001 a June 1945.
n> 66.
lApat PHILIPPINE ISLANDS - 1/200,000
1. omitted.
2 . a si xt h Amor oontinuee the offensive to destroy enemy foroes re-
maining on LUZON.
b. Boundaries between Corps1 No change.
3 - XIV and XI Oorps oontinue ourrent missions*
b* 1 oo^ps1
(1) wi l l oontinue ourrent missions and, confirming radio instruc-
tions of 7 June I9451 oontinue the attack northeastward of
BAYOMBONG, capture BAGABAO, secure the BAGABAGarea, and
be prepared to continue the advance i nto the OAGAYAN VALLSY
in the direction of APARRI.
( 2) Ki l l i nt e ns i f y g ue r r i l l a a c t i v i t i e s wi t hi n t he CAGAYAN
VA1XRY t o harass enemy concent rat i ons and l i ne s of com-
muni cat i on.
4 . Omitted.
5* No change.
//falter Brueger
WALTSR KRUBGBR,
General , U. s Army
Commanding
A. P. C. 442
19001 9 June 1945
FO67.
T.ppst JHILIPPINE ISLANDS - 1/ 200, 000.
1 . omi t t ed.
2 . MOchange*
3 a. XIVand XI corps : ND change.
b. I corps wi l l cont i nue the advance eastward i nt o the CAGAYAN
~ VALIEY, capture and secure ECHAGUE, and be prepared f or
f urt her advance northward i n the di r e c t i o n of APARRI.
4< omi t t ed.
5 IP change.
/ s / Wal t e r Krueger
WALTER KRuEUEH
General , U. S.- Army
Commanding.
A. P. 0 . 442
06001 12 June 1945
F0 68.
Maps: PHILIPPINE ISLANDS - 1/ 200, 000
1 . Qui t t ed.
2* a-
Sixth Army continues the offensive to destroy enemy forces re-
maining in LUZONand regroups units i n preparation for future
operations.
h.
Boundaries between Corps, effecti ve 00011 15 June 1945'
(1) Between XIV oorps and XI Corps1 Dissolved.
(2) Between XI Corps and I Oorps1 No ohange.
Units l i st ed in Annex 1,. Troop Li st, XI Corps, pasa from control
of the Commanding General, XIV Oorps, to control of the Com-
manding General, XI Corps, effeoti ve 00011 15 June 1945*
d.
Units l i st ed in Annex 2, Troop Li st, XIV Corps, pass to control
of the Commanding General, XT7 Corps, effeoti ve 24001 30 June
I945.
3 a XIV corps
(1) wi l l , effeotive 00011 15 June 1945, be relieved of re-
sponsibility for al l missions currently assigned to i t .
(2) will promptly displace Corps Headquarters and Corps Troops,
remaining under Oorps control, to the vioinity of SAN
JOSE (NUEVA ECIJA).
(3) -willt effeotive 24001 30 June 19451 assume oontrol of units
l i sted i n Annex 2, Troop l i s t , XIV Corps, and, after
00011 1 july 19451 *i l l be prepared to carry out those
missions on LUZONassigned by the Commanding General,
Eighth Army.
166
fr II Corpst
(1) wi l l , effeotive OOOH 35 June 1945, assume oontrol of
unlta listed in Annex 1, Troop l i s t , XI Corpus will
oontinue missions currently assigned to U Oorps and
those missions heretofore assigned XIV Corps.
(2) Ki l l , effective OOOll 1 July 1945, be relieved of re-
sponsibility for al l oombat missions currently assigned
to i t *
I Qorps:
(1) Will oontinue current missions.
(2) Hl l r effeotive 24001 30 June 1945, be relieved of re-
sponsibility for al l oombat missions ournently assigned
to i t .
x. TO insure continuity of operations and to facilitate details
of transfer of oontrol of units and responsibility, direct
contact between Oorps commandana i s authorized.
4 * XI Oorps wi l l , effeotive OOOH15 June 1945f assume responsl-
~ bi l i ty for the logistio support of those units listed in
Annex 1, this JO, and will assume responsibility for oper-
ation of al l supply installations now operated by XIV Oorps.
b_. XIV Oorps wi l l , effective 24001 30 June 1945 assume responsi-
bi l i ty for the logistio support of those units listed in
Annex 2, this FO, and will assume responsibility for oper-
ation of al l supply installations now operated by I Oorps
which pertain to the supply of units listed in Annex 2.
c. Levels of supply to aooompany units on move fromCANLUBANG
~ (LACUNA PROVINCE) t o SANJOSE (NUBVA ECIJA PROVINCE)!
Cl ass I
Class I I & IT Supplies onrand
Cl ass III 3 D/S
Class V 1 U/F
Current signal operation Instructions and Communication Dlr-
5. a.
eoti ve remain i n ef f eot .
b. uni t* passing to oontrol of Commanding General, I I Corps, on
~ 15 June I945 wi l l retai n cal l signs and frequencies presently
assigned.
0.. The XIV corps wi l l continue to operate the switohboard in i t s
~ present looation at CANIIJBANGunt i l 30 June 1945*
d. command Pbsta:
XTV corpsj CANLUBANG (Time of opening SANJOSE, NUBVAECIJA,
to be reported).
Others 1 No change.
/s/Vfalter Hrueger
WALTER KRUEGER
General , U. S. Army,
Commanding.
ANNEXES:
1 - Troop Li s t , XI corps
2 - Troop Li s t , E T Corps
HEADqPARTERS SIXTHARMY
A. P. 0 . 442
08001 12 JUne1945
ANNKX1 to FO68, Troop Li s t , XLCorps.
The fol l owi ng uni t s wi l l pass to oontrol of the.Oommanding General.
XI corps, e f f e c t i ve 0001hours. 15 June 1945*
COMBATUNnfl
Approx
Strength
11.893
1st oav
7.770
Ut h A/ B 4.323
158thRCT
746
A) 290
SS S ? - BI(-119-t. D-t
642
637th TDBn (- CoB)
463
85th chamioal Mortar m (- 0 o;
2,030
592d EOgr Boat &shore Regt
188
1460th m& Boat Maint Co
558
1279th Bngr C ED
469
131st Bgr 0 Bn (- * A)
491
472d FA BQ
516
756th FA Bn
505
947th FA En
SERVICE UNITS
183d chemi Ml sarv Pl at 68
264th chemical s e r v pl at S5
Dot, 274th chamioal serv *Ut 15
Ut h OIC Dt 11
490th CICDot 14
491st CICDet 14
801st CICDet 11
904th ci c net 14
952d CICDti 14
953d CICDet 14
954,th CICDot 14
12th order of Battle Team 3
13th order of Battl e Team 3
168th language Dot H
176th Language Det U
119th iboto Int Team 6
120th Itooto int Team 7
3d pl at , 439th Ettgr DepCo 36
530th Bngr L J&n 00 202
149lat Engr MBint 00 191
1520th Engr wsup 00 136
16l st plnanoe nlsb Seo 19
3d ml oontl Det 12
422d m l airv Det 13
607th Med cl r 00 117
408th M9d col l 00 105
506th Medcol l Co (- Dot) 47
3d Kirt Surg Hosp 30
5th K>rt surg Hosp 37
7th jort surg Hosp 37
27th Part surg Bosp 37
33d Port sarg Hosp 37
90th ord HMCo 210
120th ord MM00 159
3498th ordi r 00 73
Det, 643d ord Am00 8
102d ord Bomb Disp Sq. 7
109th OrdBomb Disp Si 0
171st ord serv Det (Bomb Disp) 6
PCAU#2 49
PCAU#8 49
PCAU #11 49
Hq &HO..Det, 268th QMBn 20
1st Seo,4th Pl at, 120th QMBkry Co 8
189th QM 0s Sup Co 113
108th QMor Reg00 32
2d s e c , 4th pl at , 601st QMcr RegOo 23
183d QMLdry Det 27
1st pl at, 558th QMRhd Co 58
3d pl at , 236th QMSalv Call Co 37
3769th QMirk 00 (w/atohd 3334th QMDrDot) 143
28th MBg Cent Tam, (DB)Det6, 4025th Sig Srv GP 21
37th Radio Tele fixed Sta, 2 PosEl,
Dot 6, 4025th s i g serv GP H
Det, 274th s i g HvCons 00 11
276th Tort 00 (-Det) 170
277th rort co 230
108th ACTBand (158th RCT) 28
BY COMMANDOFGENERALKRUEGERi
G H.DECKER
Bri gadi er General , G-S. C
Chief of St af f .
OFFICIAL:
A. P. 0 . 442
08001 12 June19*6
ANNEX2 t o FO68, Troop l i s t , HV Corps.
The f ol l owi ng uni t s wi l l pass to oont rol of the Commanding 0eBral (
XIV corps , e f f e o t i v e 2400 I hours, 30 June 1945
COMBATUNIT3
Uni t
6t h Inf Div
14.037
32d Inf Div
14.037
37t h m fBLv
14.037
38t h i nf Di v
14.037
167
Unit
COc (l ess 2d Ha t ) ,2d Fi l i pi no Bi
193
COD, 754th Tank151
122
00 Ct 775th TiankTH
122
135
CO Pi 637+h TD En
156
Co Ci 85th (jnl Mortar Bn
122
Dtry Ci 168th FABn(155 Oun)
144
Etry Bi 465th FABfl (8 How)
120
Btry At 544th FAEn (240 How)
504
251st FA3*.(105 now)
504
694th FA3a (105 How)
26
26th inf scout ipg Plat
26
39th Inf scout Dog Ha t
SERVICEUNITS
40
183d cntL Serv Plat (37thDiv)
236th onl serv plat (3ftth Div)
54
237th onl Serv Ha t (6th Div)
54
275th enl Serv plat (32d Div)
54
PCAuni t s 1, 2, 3. 6. 7. 8, 11,16, 18, 19
490
CIC Dets 6, 32.37, 38.473,485.490,4911956
140
Order of Battle Teams 6, 8, , and 19
15
Ihoto Int er Teems 113,115.116and 129
49
Language Deta 169,171.173and 174
55
37
592d 3BSH (l ess Flat Co3 b Co D)
1,767
1460th ^ngr Boat Maint Co (less Det) 168
1876th sngr Avn Bn 803
492d m^r 3ase Equip(30
1504 and8 Tech I nt el Units
164
695th Sngr Base EquipCo
173
27th m^r const Bn
617
79th sngr const 31
834
339th Engr const 3a
865
340th Engr const Ba 886
Hq &H<1 Oo,931st Sngr Const GP (Avn) 209
Hq. &HqCo. 1112th sngr ccnstGP
80
439 th Engr DepotCo 224
2d Pl at , 441st wigr Depot Co 37
198th KQgr Dimjj Trk Co 107
414th snfer Dimp Trk Co 107
585th EQgr DumpTrk Co 107
136lst Engr DumpTrk00 107
1491st *jigr Tsup00 191
1520th -Tigr w31P Co 139
}R &Hq Det, 1st Crd 30. 35
Hq (.HqDet, 243d CrdServ 3a 17
103d ord Serv Det (^mfc Disp) 7
108th CrdServ Det (Bomb Disp) 7
173d Ordserv set (Bomb Disp) 7
175th CrdServ Det (iprab Disp)
7
341st Ord repot Co
180
622d ord Am Co
189
Z|8*h OrdMI Co
162
49th OrdMM Co
162
204th ordIT. Co
162
162
263d ord KM Co
162
288th OilMU Co
130
3608th ord m: CO (Tank)(less Det)
4
Det 267th Ordwaint Co AA
83
120th ojuBkry Co (less 1st &3d Pl at s)
83
127th Q>! BkryCo
2d Pl at , 3G73d 0>!GasSup Co
67
4th Pl at , 3064th QUGB CO 26
601st ,?}.'. GHCo (less 3d &4th Pl at s) 25
2d sec,3d Pl at , 601st QM GR Co 7
3d sec,4th Pl at , 601st QJLI GB Co 7
181st oy.Ldry Det (Mbl)(29th Evac Hosp)
33
191st OJCLdry' D3t (ivtbl) (3d Field Hosp)
48
235th o>ILdry Det (1*1)(23d Field Hosp)
48
236th qv-idry Det (?fol) 43d Field Hosp)
48
558th OM Rhd OO
177
101
569th OMRhd00 (l ess 1st Pl at )
212
4072d oMServ Co
212
4186th QVServ 00
110
3444th OM i r k Co (w/atchd 3351st W Dr Det)
42
3d pl at , 389th qjv;i r k co '
84
198th c>lGassup Co (l sss Det)(3dESB) 202
Co A. 99th Sig Bn 130
586th si g Dspot Co (l ess Det) 148
274th Sig HvyConst Co (l ess 1 Pl at ) 15
Air Grdin teams 1. 4. 5 . and7. 293d JA3C0 38
281st Sig Higeon Co,1st Conbat Flat 210
11th Air Cargo Resupply sq 21
2d Rad Carr Term Team, 989th SigServ Ba
282
29th Evac Hosp (400 bed)
217
212
3d Field Hosp
211
23d Field HOSP
211
24th Field Hosp
206
41st Field Hosp
211
43d Field Hosp
211
91st Field Hosp
26
92d Field Hosp
27
16th port surg Hosp
27
19th Port surg Hoap
24th or t 3Eg Hosp
34
31ot
f
or t s i r g Hoap
35
63d Itort ai rg Hosp
12
25th 1*L1 OontlDet
12
26th 1*1 oontl net
12
37th Mai oontlDet 13
421st 1*1 SurvDet 13
425th MaiSurvDet 93
981st Mad An* Co (Ktzd) 110
604th Med Clr Co
unit
110
605th M3dcl rCo
110
608th Med cl r ff>
117
893d Medcl r 00
105
409th Medcol l 00
105
410th Medcol l 00
105
424th Hfed col l co
105
505th Madcol l 00
34
Hi 4 HqDet, 135th MedGP
H<1&HqDet, 135th Vied 31
20
19
55th Npdsup Het(Avn)
BYCONKANDOFGENERA!KRUEGEB:
G.H.DECKER
BrigadierGeneral,G.Si
ChiefofStaff.
OFFICIALi
0-3
SIXTH ifllY
4. P. 0. 442
1900117 June 1945*
NO* 1 to ANNEX 2 to 1068,HMdquartera Si xt h Azny* 12 June
ANNEX 2 to JO68, Troop lXt, XTT Corps, i uMndcd as followst
Change CoB. 637th TDBa to r*adt 0oB. 632d TD Bn
2, saxrlc* Dnitai
f Ad&i
qnlt
APPTOX at rengt h
Amy Ground Forces Band 17
b*. Deletet:
strength
010 oats 478. 485* W0, 491 5k
BY COMMANDOFGENERAL KRUHJERi
a. E . DECKER.
Brigadier&enral,G.3.C.
ChiefofStafit
OFFICIAI4
SIITflAJMY
A. P. 0.442
UOOI 18 Jane1949.
F069.
Maps: PHUIPPINI ISLANDS - 1/800,000
LUZON- 1/90,000
1. Omitted.
X. Noohange.
3. a_. XIandUVCorps: Nochange.
b. I Corps, Al l s continuing eorreot missionst
(1) Will destroy host i l e foroes remaining IntheXCHAGOI
area and in the OAOATAH7ALLBT south thereof.
(8) Will advanee aggresslTely northvard inthe CAGAXANVALLIY,
capt ur e and s e e v e the HAODILIAJI - CABATOAM - CAIIAYAI
area, prepared for further adranoe to thenorth, when
dlreoted.
(9) Will vigorously seek outanddestroy enemy forces alongthe
axis of advance to the CAGAYAN VALLXT, asking prompt and
determioed efforts to eliminate those enemy groups
were Isolated bythe rapi di t y of ouradvance.
168
(4) Will expedite the destruction of enemy forces In the CERVANTES
area.
(5) Will intensify guerrilla acti vi ti es throughout the Corps zone
of aotion to harass eneny concentrations and lines of com-
munication and destroy isolated enemy detachments and
foraging parties.
(6) Will exert maximumpressure on ensxiy forces in the BCKOD-
KIANGAN - BONTOCarea from the south and southeast.
5. Mo change.
/ / Waitar Krueger
ALTER KRUB3ER,
General, U. S. Army,
Commanding*
HEADQUARTERS SIXTHAEMY
A. P. 0. 442
19001 17 June 1945.
F0 70.
Maps: PHILIPPINE ISLANDS - 1/ 200, 000
LUZON - 1/ 50, 000
1. a_. Omitted.
b^. (1) Southwest Paci f i c Forces i n t he southern PHILIPPINES and i n
LUZON wi l l be regrouped i n preparati on for f ut ure operat i ons.
(2) Pursuant t o i ns t ruct i ons from the Commander-in-Chief, United
St at e s Army Forces, Pac i f i c :
(a) The Commanding General, Eighth Army:
U V/ l l l , e f f e c t i v e 00011 1 July 1945, assume cont rol of
Si xt h Army uni t s on LUZON as l i s t e d i n Annox la_,
Troop Li s t , whi l e si mul taneousl y passi ng t o the con-
t r o l of t he Commanding General, Si xt h Army, uni t s of
the Eighth Army as l i s t e d i n Annex lb^, Troop Li s t .
Z. While conti nui ng current mi ssi ons and dut i es i n t he
Southern PHILIPFI>CES with f orces assi gned and with
f orces made avai l abl e by the Commanding General,
Si xt h Army, wi l l concurrentl y with the assumption
of cont rol of the uni t s l i s t e d i n Annex l a , r e l i e ve
the Si xth Army of combat res pons i bi l i t y and of other
dut i es and mi ssi ons on LUZON except t hose which per-
t ai n di r e c t l y t o t he preparati on of t he Si xth Army
for f ut ure operat i ons .
"i_. Wi l l concent rat e uni t s as i ndi cat ed i n Annex 2, Troop
Movement Di rect i ve, i n st agi ng areas and pass con-
t r ol of uni t s to the Commanding General, Si xth Array,
upon arri val t he r e at .
4_. /.'ill arrange wi t h Commander, Al l i ed Naval Forces, f or
transportation to effect the concentration indicated
in paragraph lb_(2)(a):3.
5. Will assist in training Sixth Armyunits for future
~~ operations by utilizing these units in actual
combat as requested by and as arranged with the
Commanding General, 31xth Army.
6. Will release to the Commanding General, Sixth Army
"" at the earliest practicable date consistent with
the tactical situation, and not later than 1
3eptember 1945, al l units made available by the
Sixth Army for combat and security missions in
LUZONand southern PHILIPPINES.
7. .7111 arrange with the Commanding General, Sixth Army,
~~ necessary details of transfer of command, duties
and units, insuring continuity of operations.
(b) The Coamander, Al l i ed Naval Forces:
1_. Will provide Vhe necessary transportation to ef f ect
the concentration designated i n paragraph Ibj 2) ( a)
as arranged with Commanding General, Eighth Army, ~
See Annex 2, Troop Movement Di rect i ve.
. Will continue the support of the operations of the Eighth
"" Army i n the southern PHILIPPINES and wi l l , upon
transfer of control i n the LUZON area from the Sixth
to the Eighth Army, continue missions in support of
the Eighth Army hi t hert o speci fi ed for support of
the Si xth Army i n the LUZON area.
The Commander, Al l i ed Air Foroes, wi l l continue the support
(c)
of operations of the Eighth Any i n the southern
PHILIPPINES and wi l l , upon transfer of oontrol i n the
LUZON area from the Si xth to the Eighth Army, continue
missions i n support of the Eighth Amy hi therto speci fi ed
for support of the Sixth Army i n the LUZON area.
2. Pursuant to i nstructi ons from the Comnander-ln-Chlef, United States Army
Forces, Paoi f l c, Si xth Army rel i nqui shes the responsi bi l i ty far combat
missions and other duti es and missions on LUZON, other than those that
pertain di rect l y to the preparation of Sixth Army f or future operations,
to the Eighth Any, and regroups forces as di rect ed.
3. a_. Units l i s t ed i n Annex l a, Troop Li s t , wi l l pass to the oontrol of
~ the Cenmanding General, Eighth Amy, ef f ect i ve 00011 1 July 1945.
x* (1) The Commanding General, 3ixth Army, wi l l t
(a) Assume oontrol of Eighth Army uni ts as l i s t e d i n Annex lb_.
Troop Li st , ef f ect i ve 00011 1 July 1945*
(b) Concurrently with the passage of control of uni ts as
indicated herei n, transfer to the Commanding General,
Eighth Army, the mission of combat responsi bi l i t y and
other duties and missions i n LUZON except those per-
taining di rectl y to the preparation of Sixth Army for
future combat*
(a) Assume control of Eighth Army Units as indicated i n Annex
2, Troop Movement Di recti ve, ef f ect i ve upon arrival of
these uni ts in staging areas.
(d) Pass to the operational control of the Commanding General,
Eighth Army, such forces as are required to complete the
destruction of the Japanese i n the southern PHILIPPINES
and on LUZON, to oontrol Philippine Army and Guerrilla
forces and to provide security in areas as agreed upon
from time to time with the Commanding General, Eighth
Army* uni t s wi l l be rotated as arranged with the
Commanding General, Eighth Army, in order t o insure
training in actual combat and rehabi l i tati on for future
operations*
(a) Prior to the transfer of combat responsi bi l i ty to the
Eighth Army*
I,- Continue the destruction of Japanese forces in central
and southern LUZON and provide for the security of
these areas.
2. Continue the offensi ve in northern LUZON in the di reo-
~* ti on BALETEPASS - APARRI and destroy hos t i l e forces
i n and establ i sh control over the CAGAYANVALLEY.
( f ) Arrange with the Commanding General, Eighth Army, neoessary
det ai l s of transfer of coomand, duties and uni t s , insur-
ing continuity of operations.
(2) Rotation of uni t s as indicated l a paragraph 3x( l ) ( d) wi l l be
upon request of the basic unit cocmander concerned through
normal command channels to the Commanding General, Sixth Army,
who wi l l arrange det ai l s of the rotation with the Coonanding
General, Eighth Army.
4. Pursuant to Instructions from the Commander i n Chief, United States Army
Foroes, Paci f i c:
a_. Concurrently with the transfer of responsi bi l i t i es outlined in para-
~ graph 2, above, the Commanding General, Sixth Army, wi l l be rel i eved
of, and the Commanding General, Eighth Army, wi l l assume responsi -
bi l i t y on LUZON for:
(1) The l ogi s t i cal support of a l l uni ts passing t o his control .
(2) Logi sti c support of Philippine Army and Guerrilla uni ts passing
to hi s control .
(3) Operation of such supply points as are required for the l ogi s t i c
support of forces passing to hi s control and such Sixth Arny
Units as must draw from these supply poi nts.
(4) The continuation of al l construction projects heretofore
assigned to the Commanding General, Sixth Army, which are
incident to the transfer of l ogi s t l o responsi bi l i ty set forth
herein.
b. Concurrently with the transfer of the responsi bi l i t i es outlined in
~ paragraph 2, above, the Comnandlng General, Sixth Army, wi l l :
(1) Assume responsi bi l i t y for the operation of such Eighth Army
Supply Poi nts, including those at H0IL0 and ZAMBOANGA as are
required for the l ogi s t l o support of those forces herein
transferred from Eighth to Sixth Army in the VISAYAS and
southern PHILIPPINES.
(2) Relinquish responsi bi l i t y for normal maintenance and l ogi s t i c
support t o the Commanding General, Eighth Army, for those
Sixth Amy uni ts made avai l abl e t o the Eighth Army for training)
combat and security Missions in the southern PHILIPPINES during
the period of such ut i l i zat i on.
(3) Provide suppl i es at such Sixth Army operated supply points as
are requested by the Commanding General, Eighth Army, f or
those Sixth Army troops referred to in paragraph 4b(2), above,
and for such Eighth Army troops as must draw from these supply
poi nt s.
c. The Commanding General, Sixth Army, retai ns the responsi bi l i ty for
~ re-equipping a l l Sixth Army uni ts including those transferred to
the operational control of Eighth Amy.
169
Requisitions pertaining to units in the south*rn PHHIFPIWS for
al l olaases of supplies except Ordnance and Chealoal Warfare,
anranltlon will be submitted as follows:
(1) By Sixth Amy Supply Point at XLOUO to Coamndlng Offloor,
Base K, with information oopy to this headquarters.
(S) By Sixth Amy Supply Point at ZAMBOARGA to Coonandlng Officer,
Base K, with information oopy to thi s headquarters.
(3) By troops at CSBD to Cosanndlng Offleer, Base 3.
(4) By troops at LOTS to Coonanding Offloer, Base K.
(5) Requisitions for Ordnance and Chemical Warfare araranltion
will be subsiltted to thi s headquarters.
(6) Requests for emergency air supply will be submitted to this
headquarters.
Reports, except 0-1 Periodic Reports, heretofore submitted to lighth
Amy, wi l l upon the date of transfer, be submitted to the Oonaandlng
General, Sixth Army, A.P.O. 442. 0-1 Feriodle Reports are not
deelred except that a copy of the final 0-1 Perlodle Report sub*
mltted to Eighth Amy will be submitted to this headquarters.
5. a. (1) see Index 1-32 Sixth Any Signal Operations Instructions,
effectlTe1July1945.
(2) All Units passing to control of Contending General, Eighth Army,
will oease operations under Sixth Amy Signal Operations
Instructions, effectlTe 24001 30 June 1949.
b. (1) CoaBandlng General, I Corps, and Conmanding General, XI Corps,
will assist the Coanandlng General, XIV Corps, in providing
the signal oonaunication faci l i ti es required by X2V Corps.
(2) Wire construction projects now underway will be completed by
the units which are nor employed thereon.
Consnand Posts:
-SANFERNANDO,PAMPANGA
(11 Sixth Airy
-LEYTE
(2) Eighth Army
. TU1LANA, PANGASINAN
(3> I Corps
- MANILA
(4) XICorps
-CANLUBANG,LAGUNA {Timeofopening
(5) XIVCorps
SANJOSE,NUEVAECIJA,tobe
reported)
/s/WalterKrueger-
WALTERKRUEGER,
General,U.S.Army,
ConnsDdlag.
ANNEXES:
l a - Troop Li s t
l b - Troop Li s t
2 - Troop Movement Di r e c t i ve
A. P. 0 . 442
19001 17 June 1945
AKIJEX l a t o FO70, Troop l i s t .
The f ol l owi ng uni t s wi l l pass t o t he operat i onal cont rol of Com-
manding General , Eighth Army, e f f e c t i v e 00011 hours, 1 July 1945 Exact
st at us of uni t s wi l l be as i ndi cated i n a separate l e t t e r to be i ssued
by t hi s headquarters.
COMBATUNITS
Unit
Hq * Hq C XIV Corps
Hq &m Btry, XIV Corps Arty
6th i nf Div
32d inf Div
37th &* Div
38th mf Div
Co c ( l e s s 2d Ha t ) , 2d Fi l i pi no Ba
Oo Di 754th Tank Bn
Co C. 775th Tank Bn
Co ", 632d TD Bn
1
CD c. 85th onl Mortar Bn
Ptry C. 168th FA Ba (155 Oin)
Btry B. 465th FA Bn (8 How)
Btry A, 544th FA Bn (240 How)
251st FA Bn (105 How)
694th FA Bn (105 How)
26th Inf Scout Dog Pl at
39th mf Scout Dog Plat
KP Pl at , XIV oorpa
39th MP CO
SEHVICB UMTS
183d (jnl Serv Flat (37th Di y)
236th onl Serv pl at (38th Di v)
237th onl Serr Pi t t (6th Di v)
275th onl sarv pl at (32d Div)
PCA Units 1, 2, 3 , 6, 7i 8, 11, 16, 18, 19
CIC Dets 6, 32, 37. 38. 214. 956
Language Dets 165, 169, 171. 173. 174
order of Bat t l e Team 4 . & 8, 9 , 19
Photo Inter Teams 109, 110, 111, 113, 115.
116, 129
NO4 and 8 Tech Int el uni t s
233d Pin Dlsb seo
131at Army Ground pcrce Band
592d EBSR ( l es s Plat Co B 4 Co D)
1460th Bngr Boat Maint Co ( l es s Det)
1876th Engr Avn Bn
492d Engr Base Equip (Jo
695th Engr Base TSquip Co
Surv pl at , 670th Engr Topo Co
27th Engr const Bn
79th Engr const Bn
339th sngr Const Ba
340th Engr const Ba
Bl &Hq Co 931st sogr Const GP (Avn)
Hq 4 Jfl Co, 1112th Eogr Const GP
m &Hq COt 1129th Engr Combat GP
439th Bngr Depot Co
2d pl at , 441st Engr Depot
198th Engr lump Trk Co
414th Engr rump i rk 00
585th Engr Dump Trk co
I 36l s t Epgr Maint 00
1491st Bngr Maint Co
1520th sngr w sup Co
m & Hq Dot, 1st Ord B
HI &m Det, 243d ord Serv Bn
103d ord serv Det (30mb Dlap)
108th ord serv Det (Bomb Disp)
173d ord serv Det (Bomb Di sp)
175th ord serv Det (Bomb Disp)
341st ord Depot 00
622d ord Am co
48th ord 1.35 00
49th ord MM Co
204th ord KM Co
263d ord MMCo
288th ord MM Co
3608th ord HMCo (Tank)(les Det)
Det, 267th Ord Maint no AA
120th qjj Efcry Co ( l es s 3d &4th Pl at s )
127th QMBkry CO
2d Ha t , 3873d QMGas Sup Co
4th Pl at , 3064th qMGRCo
601st QMGR Co ( l e s s 1 s t , 3d &4th Pl at s )
2d s ec, 3d Pl at , 601st QMGRCo
2d s eo, 4t h Pl at , 601at QMGRCo
181st QM Idry Det (Mbl) (29th Evao s p )
191st QMLdry Det (Mbl) (3d Field Hosp)
235th QMl dry Det (Mbl) (23d Fi el d Hosp)
236th QMl dry Let (Mbl) (43d Fi el d Hosp)
558th QMRod co
569th QMphd 00 ( l es s 1st Pl at )
4072d QMserv 00
4186th QMServ co
3444th QMTTk 00 (w/atchd 3351st serv Dot)
3d Pl at , 389th QMTrk Co
198th QMGas sup Co ( l es s Det) (3d ESB)
88th s i g Bo ( l es s co C)
Co A. 99th s i g Bn
586th s i g Depot 00 ( l e s s Det)
274th s i g HV Const 00 ( l e s s 1 Pl at )
Air CTd LB Teams 1, 4 . 5 . 7. 293d JASCO
28l s t Si g Pigeon Co. 1st Combat Pl at
11th Air cargo Resupply Sq
2d pad oarr Term Team, 989th Sig Serv Bn
29th i^vac Hosp (400 bed)
3d Fi el d Hosp
23d Field Hosp
24th Fi el d Hosp
41s t Fi el d Hosp
43d Field Hosp
91st Fi el d Hosp
92d Fi el d Hoep
16th Port surg Hosp
19th Port surg Hosp
24th Port surg Hosp
31st Port surg Hasp
63d port surg Hosp
25th wil contl Det
26t h Mai Contl Da*
37th wal oontl Dst
421st Kd surv Det
425th Mel Surv Det
981st Med jmb 00 (Mtzd)
604th ued cl r 00
605th Med cl r Co
608th Med cl r Co
893d Med cl r Co
409th Med Coll Co
410th Med col l Co
424th Mod c ol l 00
505th Med ool l Co
Ha &Hq Det, 135th Med GP
ffi &Hq Det, 135th Med Bn
55th Med sup flat
40
54
54
54
490
92
55
15
49
55
37
10 .
37
1.767
168
803
I64
173
25
817
834
865
886
209
80
88
224
37
107
107
107
107
191
139
35
17
7
7
7
7
180
189
162
162
162
162
162
130
4
83
83
67
26
25
7
7
33
48
48
48
IT?
101
212
212
110
42
84
580
202
130
148
15
38
210
21
282
217
212
211
211
206
211
211
?6
57
27
34
35
12
12
12
13
13
93
110
110
110
117
105
105
105
105
34
20
19
170
0-3
BYCOMMAND07GENERALKRUEGERi
G. R.DECKER
Brigadier General t G S C
Chief of St af f .
OFFICIALi
A. P. 0 . 442
19001 22 June 1945
AM3WDMENT NO. 1 t o AJINEX U t o FO7Ot Headquarters Si xt h Amy, 17 June 1945.
ANNEX l a t o FO7 0 , Troop Li s t , i a amended aa f ol l owe r
Service Units1
a. Add1
unit
Bl &m. Do*.259th Ord Bi
33
6l l t h OrdAm00 (l eaaDst)
89
1st Ha t , 189th QM Oaasup Oo
24
b.. pal ete 1
Unit
Hi &HqDet,135th MedBn 20
601at QMGrRagCo (l eas 1s t , 3d &4th Pl ata) 25
2d Sao,3d Fl at , 601at QMGrRegCo 7
2d seo, 4th Pl at , 601st QMGrRagCo 7
Air-cround Llaiaon Teams, 293d JASCO, 1, 4. 5. and7 16
COMMAND 0? GENERAL KRUEGBSi
G. H. DECKER,
Br i gadi e r Ge ne r al , G. S . c>
Chief of St af f .
OFFICIAL
A. P. 0 . 442
19001 17 June 1945
ANNEX l b t o FO7 0 , Troop I i t
The f ol l owi ng uni t a wi l l paaa t o the operat i onal cont rol of
Comnanding General , s i x t h i raj r. . f f . c t l T . 00011 hours. 1 July 1945.
Enact statua of uni t * wi l l beaa i ndi c t e d i n a aeparete l e t t e r tobe
i ssued by t hi s headquarters.
Unit
CEBU
14*500
Amerioal Di vi si on (leaa dat a. )
630
746th AAA Gun Bn
650
43th CA Bi
4
275th s i g Fdar Mi nt Unit
177
HI &m Co. (le Det)542d EBSfl
83
HI AHICOt BoatffW5424 KB3R
180
Co B (lea 1 Pl at ) , 542d EB3R
329
Shora Bn( l e "Co*DAB ) .5421 EB3S
65
1439th Bigr Maint 00 ( l eas Dat)
286
58t h Bvao *OBV
37
10th Port surgHP
37
17th Port surg Hoep
96
670th Medci r Co
101
399th Med ( pl l CO
S
110
15
12
?i Pl at , 5t hspeci al servi ce Co 27
15th PCAU
39
39
24th PCAU
L7TTE
13.995
81st mfDlT
539th Aaph Troo Bn 502
540th Aaph Trao Bn 502
710th TkBn 724
Hqk HqCo, 1136th Sngr COp 119
154th Ingr CBn 63?
155th Sngr CBn 637
4 Ut Port Surg Hoap 34
65th Port Sorg Hoap 34
17th Fl ai l Hoap 222
178th MaiCont Det 12
218th MaiSurr Dat 13
240th QM Ldiy Co(17th Fi el d Hoap) 21
1st FLat, 3008th QMGROo 26
Base Ceneorehip Dat 15
139th Photo Interpreter T 7
313th HqI nt el l Det 4
343d Interrogator Tk C
388th Trans Ta 6
37th Order of Battl e TB 3
Taaa D, 1st Info 4 Hist flerr 4
71st JASCO 448
2216th PGATrans 9<T 25
371st Interpreter Ta. 7
PAHAT
40th Inf DIT ( l es s Dets) 13,995
739th AAAGunBn 630
470th AAA AW Bn( l es s Btrl es Ck D) 460
Co B, 80th CalBn 167
Det, 272d CalSTPl at 25
Det, 781st Sngr Patrol Diat Co 21
Det, Hq a;HqCo542d XBSB 25
COS Ct C, 542d BB8R 400
3d Pl at , 1459th Sngr Malnt Co 46
37th Field Hoap 222
637th HadClrCo ( l es s 1 Pl at) 112
34th Mai Cont Det 12
65th llal Coot Dat 12
33d Mai 3UTT Det 13
403d Mai SUTT Det 13
259th OrdMM Co 162
Det, 611th Ord Aaa Co 20
184th OrdBoab Dlsp Sq 5
1st PUt ,316th (91Bkry Co 25
101st QMGfiPl at (l eas 1See) 14
234th QM Ldry Det (37th Fi el d Hosp) 21
396th QMRefrlg TrkDet 71
1st PUt ,569th QM RhdCo 75
3315th QM Trie Co 119
3336th QMDet (DA) 48
1st Pl at , 480th Aaph Txfc Co 74
13th MagCanTa (DB),Det8, 4625th SlgSerr Op 13
13th BadTgFixed Sta (GB),Det8, 4025th Sl gSerr Gp 12
DM, 3dSkiSeo,20d SigDepCo 8
Det, 586th Sl gDepCo 6
1st Pl at , 274th SlgHTConst Co 80
2d PUt , 12th SpST CO 22
13th PCAU 49
26th PCAU 49
ZAMBOANGA
41st Inf DIT( Us sData) 13,995
166th AAAGunBn( Us sBtxys At B) 400
203d SigBadar Malnt Unit 4
802d AAAA>Bn 785
273d CalSTPUt ( l es s Det) 25
783d Sngr Petrol Dlst Co (l ees Det) 166
2d Field Hosp 222
8th Port Surg Hosp 37
12th Port Surg Hosp 37
90th Mai Coat Det 12
91st MaiCont Dat 12
205th Mai SUTT Det 13
119th OrdMM Co ( l es s Det) 109
623d OrdAnaCo( l es s Det) 171
4th PUt , ( l es s Ut Sec) , 119th QMBkry Co 33
8d Pl at , 301st QHRhdCo 81
390tn I ft* Co 134
2d Seo, 1stPUt , 588th QM Ldry Co 15
3d PUt (leaa 3dSee) , 3064th QMGRCo 15
4297th QMGasSupCo( l es s Det) 45
808th Aaph TrkCo ( l es s onePUt ) 110
296th Port Co( Us s2dPUt 136
Co C, 52dSlg Bn '
5
Det 3dSfcl Seo,202d SlgDapCo 8
8th MagCanTeas (DB),Det8, 4025th Sl gSer* Gp 15
8th RadTgFxdSta (BI),Det8, 4025th SlgSerr Gp 12
4th Pl at , 12thSpSvCo 22
23d PCAU *
9
BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KHUKGEB:
G.H.DECKER,
BrigadierGeneral,G.S. C ,
ChiefofStaff.
OFFICIAL:
171
14. BtryA,l66thAAAGunBn 630 PALAWAN ^ A iCote 3
A. P. 0 . kUZ
20001 27 June 1945
15 BtryB,166thAAAGunBn 630 MINDANAO ZAMBOAl'CA Not e 3
16 Det746thAAAGunBn 50
LEYTE CEBU Not e 3
AMENDMENT NO. 1 t o ANNEX l b t o PO 70 t Headquart ers Si xt h Army, 17 June 1945'
18 476thAAAAWBn(leas2trys
C4D) 450 PALAWAN ZAKBCAKGA Note3
ANNEX l b 'to JO 70, Troop Li a t , i s amended as f ol l ow! 1
478thAAAAWBn(lessBtrys
Delete the following uni t s :
19
C A D ) 450 CEBU LEYTE Note3
APProi.
unit Strength
20 52dEngrCBn 925
LEYTE CEBU Note3
21 DetHq4HqCo,542dEBSR 25
PANAY CEBU Note3
CEHJ
22 CQSC4D,542dEBSR 420 PANAY CEBU Note3
746th AAAGunBn 630
45th CA Bn 650
23 DetHq&HqCo,542dEBSR 6i MINDANAO CEBU Note3
15th PCAD 39
24th PCAU 39
24 Co E4 one Pl at CoB, 542d
275th si gnal Radar l i nt Unit 4
MINDANAO CEBU Note
EBSR 250 3
35th Mpgcen Team (DB)i Det 8, 4025th Sig Serv G 15
40th Radio Tg Fixed Station ( El ) , Det 8, 4025th Sig Serv Gp 12
25
Co A, 542d EBSR 210 LEYVE CEBU Note
3
LEYTE
26 2d Pl at ( l ess Det, l459th
Engr Maint Co
LEYTE CEBU Note
3
539th Amph Tfac Bn 502
Base censorship Det 15
Det 1st Pl at , 1459th Engr
27
Team Di 1st Info &Hi st ori cal Section
4 6 MINDANAO CEEU Note
Maint Co 3
178th Mai cpnt Det
12
218th Mai gurv Det PANAY CEBU
13 28 3d Pl at , 1459th
E
B
r
Maint Co 55
Note 3
240th QMI^ry (p
21
1st Sl at , 3008th QM Cr PegCo
26
29
103d M
a
l Cont Unit 7
MINDANAO CEBU Note
3
Det 578th Ord Amm Co 92
MINDANAO CEBU Note
30
3
13th PCAU
49 31
Det 106th Ord MM Co *7
MINDANAO CEBU Note
3
26th PCAU
49
37th Field Hosp
222 32
592d JASCO (l ess Det) 280 LEYTE CEBU Note 1
234th QMI4ry Det (37th yield Hosp)
21
396th QMRefrig i r k Det Det 592d JASCO
3*
MINDANAO CEBU Note
r
-
i
71 33
1st pl at , 274th Sig Hv cons Co
2d pl at , 12th SP Serv Co
80
22 3^
CoB, 262d MedBn (l ess Det) 150 MINDANAO LEYTE Note
3
13th Msg cen Team (DB), Det 8, 4025th Sig Serv GP
13
13th Rad Tg jlxed Station (CE), Det 8, 4025th Sig Serv Gp 12
Det, 3d S &I Sec, 202d si g DePCo
8
ZAMBOANGA
23d PCAU 49
4 t h P l a t , ( I e s 3 1 S e c ) , 119t h QM Efcry Co 33
2d P l a t , 301s t QM Rhd Co 81
808t h APPh i r k Co ( l es s 1 Pl a t )
110
296t h *or t co (.less 2d Pl a t )
136
Co C, 52d s i g Bn
95
4t h Pl a t , 12t h SP Serv Co
22
Det , 3d S &I Sec, 202d Sig Dep Co
8
G. H. DECKER
Brigadier General, G*S.
Chief of Staff.
OFFICIAL:
A.P.0.442
1900117JuneI9U5
iTi'.ZX2toF070,TroopMovementDirective
TheCommander,AlliedNavalForces,willfurnishthenecessarytransporta-
tionforthefollowingunitsasarrangedv/ithCommandingGeneral,
E
ighthU.S.
Army. Uponarrivalatdestinations,theseunitswillherelievedfrompresent
attacliaentandassignmentandvillheattachedorassignedtoSixthArmyasin-
dicatedinaseparateletterto"beissuedbythisheadquarters.
Det CoB, 262d Med Bn
36
35 32
272d Cml Serv Plat (l ees Det) 18
37
CoB, 80th CmlMortar Bn 190
38
658th Amphib Trac Bn ( l ess
one Pl at ) 65O
39
One Plat CoB, 658th Amphib
Trac Bn 35
40 20th Port Surg Hosp 37
41 21st Port Surg Hosp 37
42 Det 506th Med Coll Co 50
43 7
One Sec, 101st QMGR Pl at
44 543d EBSR 2,200
45
Det l462d Engr Maint Co 4o
46 Det 273d Cml Serv Pl at 10
47
Co A, 263d Med Bn 125
48 Det 119th Ord KM Co 20
^9
Det 623d Ord Amm Co 8
50 Det 623d Ord Amm Co 61
3d Sec 3d Pl at , 3064th QM GR Co 7
52
Det 4297th QMG
a
s SupCo
25
53
One Pl at , 808th Amph TrkCo 45
5U 2d Pl at , 296th Port Co 60
55
295th JASCO (l ess Det) 300
51
PANAY LEYTE Note
3
MINDANAO PA1TAY Note
3
1TEGR0S PANAY Note
3
MINDANAO PANAY Note
3
ZAMB0A1IGA PANAY N-ote
3
NEGROS PANAY Note
3
NEGROS PANAY Note
3
1,'EGROS PAEAY Note 1
MINDORO PANAY Kote
3
MINDANAO PANAY Note
3
MI I CDAKAO PANAY Note
3
PALAWAN ZAMBOANGA Note
3
MINDANAO ZAMBOANGA Note
3
PALAWAN ZAMBOAKGA Note
3
3
. MINDANAO ZAMBOANGA Note
3
MINDANAO ZAM30ANGA Note
3
3
PALAWAN ZAMBCANGA Note
3
3
MINDANAO ZAMEOANGA Note 2
56 Det 295th JASCO 104 MINDORO ZAMBOANGA Note
Apnrojc. Present
Staging
Serial Unit Personnel Location
Area
Remarks
57
539th Amphib Trac Bn 500 LEYTE BATANGAS Note
C
V
J
1 ÔthInfDiv(lessoneRCT
andoneBn)
2 lOSthRCT
3 3dBn,164thInf
4 l64thRCT(less3dBn)
5 163dInf(lesstwoBns)
6 OneCo,163dInf
7 3dBn,163dInf
g Io2dInf
9 2dBn,186thInf
9,600
4,900
1,200
2,750
1,300
190
900
3,100
900
KEGROS
MINDANAO
MINDANAO
NEGROS
J OLO
TAWI TAWI
MINDANAO
MINDANAO
PALAWAN
PANAY
PANAY
CEBU
CEBU
ZAMBOANGA
ZAMBOANGA
ZAM50ANGA
ZAMBOANGA
ZAMBOANGA
Note
Note
Note
Note
Note
Note
Note
Note
Note
NoteU Targetdateforclosinginconcentrationarea: 1July1945.
1
Note2: Targetdateforclosinginconcentrationarea: 15JulyI5C5.
Note3: Targetdateforclosinginconcentrationarea: 1September1945.
1
BYCOMMANDOFGENERALKRUEGER:
1
1
2
G. H. DECKER,
2
Chief of Staff.
2
OFFICIAL:
2
2
G-3
172
3
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ABJY
A. P. 0. 442
20001 27 June 1945
AMENDMENT NO.1 t o ANNEX 2 t o TO 70, Hmdquart era Si xt h Army, 17 JUne1945.
ANNEX2 t o yo 70. Troop Morement Di r e c t i ve , i a amended aa f ol l ows :
1. Delete the following serials1
Seri al uni t
Remarks
16 Det, 746th AAAGun Bn 50 LEYTE CEBU
Note3
57 539t h r r ao Bn 500 LEYTE BATANGAS
Note3
2- change st agi ng areas of the following uni t s as underl i ned:
Serial Unit
44 543d EBSR 2,200
MINDANAO
45 Det, 1462d Bigr Maint Co 40
MINDANAO
3 - Adds er i al s 57 thru 92 i nol usi ves
Approx. Present St agi ng
serial Unit Personnel Looation Area Remarks
57 80th onl Mortar Bn (leas
MINDANAO LUZON Note 3
Cos A, B & C) 191
MINDANAO LEGASPI Note 3
58 00A, 80th onlMortar Bn 167
MINDANAO 2AMB0ANGA Note 3
59 CoC, 80th onl Mortar Bn 167
MINDORO-PALA-
60 532d EBSR 2,048
WAN-LEYTE PANAY Not e 3
61 1452d Eogr Boat Maint
CO (ESB) 162 MINDOR0-LEYTE PANAY Not e 3
62 1439th Engr Boat Maint
Co (ESB) 160 PANAY-LEYTE CEBD Not e 3
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
1462d Engr Boat Maint
Co(ESB)
Dot, 163d Ord Bn (ESB)
00 A, 98th SigBn (Corps)
2d Pl at , 453d Engr Depot(Jo
411th Med col l 00
412th Med col l 00
656th Med cl r Co
603d Medcl rco
30th Evac Bosp
99th Evao BMP
One Pl at , 982d MedAmb Co
180th onl serv Plat
Dot, 558th OrdHMCo (Tk)
Teams 6 &8, 3073dOrd
Maint Co (AA)
Tam 7, 3073d Ord Maint
Co (AA)
983d QA serv 00
1st Plat (l eas 2d Sec),
580th QM LdryCo
4297th 91GasSupCo (leas
1st Hat )
1st Plat, 4297th QM Gas
Sup/0o
297th Sig RadMaint unit
173
33
215
33
101
101
112
112
286
286
40
55
26
24
12
115
12
100
25
4
LINGAYEN-M0R0-
TAI-ZAMBOANGA
ZAMBOANGA
MINDANAO
MINDORO
MINDANAO
MINDORO
MINDANAO
MINDANAO
MINDANAO
MINDANAO
MINDANAO
MINDANAO
MINDANAO
MINDANAO
MINDORO
MINDANAO
MINDANAO
ZAMBOANGA-
PALAWAN
ZAMBOANGA
CEBU
LEYTE
LEYTE
LUZON
LEYTE
ZAMBOANGA
LEYTE
ZAMBOANGA
LEYTE
PANAY
ZAMBOANGA
LEYTE
CEBCT
LEYTE
LEYTE
ZAMBOANGA
ZAMBOANGA
PANAY
PANAY
LEGASPI
LUZON
Note
3
Note 3
Note 3
Note 3
Note
3
Note
3
Note 3
Note 3
Note 3
Note 3
Note
3
Note 3
Note
3
Note 3
Note
3
Note
3
Note
3
Note
3
Note 3
Note
3
83
203dsigBadMaintUnit
(Type C)
k
MINDANAO ZAMBOANGA Note 3
84
Deta, 5th SPeo Serr Co 100
MNDORO-LEYTE LUZON Note 3
85
Det, 783d Engr Pet Diat Co 33
PALAWAN ZAMBOANGA Note 3
86
Det, 783d Engr Pet Diat Co 33
MINDANAO ZAMBOANGA Note 3
87
103d Mai Oont Det 12
MINDANAO CEBU Note 3
92 1 P l a t , 605t h MedCl r
Co 50
MINDORO LEYTE Note 3
G.H.DECKER,
ChiefofStaff.
OFFICIAL
0-3
:i3;.I;.-j:*.K
>
2H3 sIX.Tr. AH.T
A. I . ; . 442
22jOI 21 June 1943
FC ?1
T.pps
t
'R IOLA;,E6 - 1/200,000.
LUZON- 1/JO.COO.
1. e mi t t e d.
2. sixth Arzy continues current raissic.is, intensifying effort to
destroy remaining host i l e forces in north LUL,C^.
3 a_. XIVcoris
:
HO change.
b_ XI CPrps:
(1) ",111continue currant misoions.
(2) " i l l be jrapared to mount oneparachute infantry bat t al i on
combat team or.24-hour notice to drop in the AJA?RI area
in orCer to 1
(a) Secure AF*3RI.
-(b) sst at l i sh connect with andassi st sleinents of I Corps
in thedestruction of rai.tining host i l e forces inthe
CAGAYAI;VALLEY.
I Oorpsi conf i mi n^ r adi c i ns t r uct i ons of 19 June1
C
45:
(1) '//ill continue:
(a) Tocarry out current missions.
(b) Toadvance aggressively northward in the CAGA'.V--VALL3"i
destroying host i l e forces encountered.
(c) Tovigorously seek outanddestroy enemy forces along
the axis of advance to andwithin the CAGAYANVALLEY,
making prompt anddetermined effort s to eliminate
those enemy groups which were Isolated bythe rapidity
of ouradvance.
(2) Will intensify pressure against host i l e forces inthe SIANGAN
BONTOC- CERVANTES area.
(3) Will beprepared t o assume control of oneparachute infantry
bat t al i on combat team, upon completion of i t s drop inthe
APARRI area.
1. (1) TheCommanding General, XICorps:
(a) Will arrange det ai l s of mounting anddroppingone
parachute infantry bat t al i on oombat team di r ect with
the Commanding General, Fifth AirForce, coordinating
these plans with theCommanding General, I Corps.
(b) Will arrange det ai l s of close ai r support di r ect with
the Commanding General, Fifth AirForce, coordinating
these plans with theCommanding General, I Corps.
(2) During theairborne movement of parachute infantry uni t s,
the Commanding General, Fifth AirForce, is in command
of the airborne operation. Command of these uni t s passes
t o theCommanding General, I Corps, upon completion oft he
drop.
4. Resupply of the parachute infantry bat t al i on combat team i sthe
responsi bi l i t y of t heCommanding General, I Corps, andwi l l be by
ai r dropping unt i l ground or overwater contact has been established
with U3AFIP forces at ABULUG; t hereaft er byoverwater t ransport at i on
from BASEU - ABULUG.
5. Nochange.
/ s / Walter Krueger
WALTER KRUEGER,
Gener al , U. S. Army,
Commanding.
173
HEADQUARTERS S ARMY
A. r . o. 442
22001 23 Tune
JO 72.
Mapa: IrJIIIFIlE IOLKKDS - 1/200,COO.
1. Chitted.
2. ift cr-enge.
3. a_. confirming telephonic instructions of 21 June 1945 from the
OoumandincGeneral, Sixth tsiy, XI Corps, while continuing
current missions, will mount and drop one parachute infantry
battalion combat team in the APARSI area on 23 June 1945
arranginc det ai l s di rect with the Commanding Generals, Fifth
Air Tfcree, aid I Corps.
b_. I Corps:
(1) confirming telephonic instructions of 21 June 1945 from
the Ccironsnding General, Sixth Army, will assume control
of one parachute infantry battalion combat team upon
completion of i t 3 drop in the AFARRI area on 23 June 1945-
(2) Till secure AFARM.
(3) ~i l l effect sp-seuy junction of the forces tidvancint; north
and those advancing south in the CAOA'/iU!VALLEYi com-
pleting destruction of remaining, hostile forces in that
valle; .
(4) ",ill continue current missions.
<;. emitted.
5. IX-change.
/s/'.Valter KTueger
'.7ALTER KPl'EGSB,
Gener al , U. S. Ar.Tyi
Commending.
A. P. 0. 442
2200 I 25 June 1945.
F0 7 3 .
Maps: FHILIPFINE ISLANDS-1/200,000.
1. Omitted.
2. a_. SixthArmyregroupsforcesinpreparationforfutureoperations.
b^. BoundarybetweenICorpsandXICorps: Dissolved, effective
2400130June1945.
c_. 11thAirborneDivisionpassestocontroloftheCommanding
General,SixthA m y ,effective000111July1945.
d_. AmericalDivisionpassestocontroloftheCommandingGeneral,
XICorps,effective000111July1945.
. 41stDivision,less162dRegimentalCombatTeam,3dBattalion,
~ 163dKegimentalCombatTeam,aaJ2dBattalion,186thRegi-
mental CombatTeam,passsestocontroloftheCommanding
General,ICorps,effective000111July1945. Excepted
unitspasstocontroloftheCommandingGeneral,ICorps,
uponclosinginZAUBOANGA,onorabout15July1945.
f_. UnitelistedinAnnex1,thisfield order,passtooperational
controloftheCommandingGeneral,EighthArmy,effective00011
1July1945,forthepurposeofprovidingtrainingInactual
combat,andprovidingcontrolandsupplyofsuchguerrilla
forcesasmaybedesignatedbytheCommandingGeneral,Eighth
Army.
3. . XICorpswill:
(1) Confirming radio instructions, move the 1st Infantry, 6th
revision, to ti.e general DI^DIC area in accordance with
tho fello'.7int. schedule, coordinating movement v/ith the
Ooni'îidin;. General t I Corps, and pa^sin^ elements of
l s
+
Infantry tc control of the Commanding Gener.il, I
Corps, uj.cn arrival in the LICDIC area:
1 Infantry battalion on 2j jura 1945
1 infantry Battalion on 27 June 1945
tjer.iaindsr of 1st infantry on 29 June 1945
(2) Pclieve elements of the 25th Division in tho DIir.ALA:. BAY-
'..13RA"' area with one infantry bat t al i on, 43d Division, by
24C0I 30 June 1945t coordinating det ai l s of rel i ef with
the Corvrandin,; Generals, I and XIV Corps, respectively.
(3) "withdraw al l XI Oori's uni t s, except those units l i st ed in
Annex 1, from combat coiror.sncine 30 June 1945t assemble
those units in previously designated rehabi l i t at i on areas,
coordinating movement with the Commanding General, XIV
Corp3, ar.d i ni t i at e tha t r:inin^ program as prescribed by
g M2Jr.oranduni Tvo. 25, this headquarters, 25 May 145
b. I corps wi l l :
(1) i ni t i at e the r el i ef ofthe 33d Division by elements of the
32d Division or. 30 June 1945 coordinating det ai l s of
rel i ef v;ith the; Commanding General, XIV Corps.
(2) vithdraw al l I Corps uni t s, excej t t ose units l i st ed in
Annex 1, from combat commencing 30 Juno 1945 asseinble
those u.iJ.ta in designated rehabi l i t at i on arean, coordi-
nating movement with the Comnanding General, XTV Corps,
and i ni t i at e the training program as prescribed by Train-
in^ Memorandum I o. 25, this headquarters, 25 f.'ay l
q
45
c_. xr/ Corps: As desi(_noted in F0 &5, this headq'-arters, 12 îne l
n
.',5
d. 11th Airborne Division, 40th Division, and l st Division will
i ni t i at e the t rai ni r. program prescribed by T^rsiniri; f.'e-.crurduiii
;,o. 2j , t hi s het-dquou'ters, 25 ray 1945*
x. s t a t i on of uni t s l i st ed in Annex 1, this field order, r..uy be
effected by request of corps aiiu division cor.u,..nders concerned,
through ccr.maiid channels, to thio he_dquertor.., vhici. 7/ill
coordinute rotation with Headquarters 2i(_;:'.th ._nr'.
4. supply.
a. Tlie 25th Division wi l l :
(1) carr./ the following levels of supply i:: iiiovint to the
TAFL/.C ai'ea1
Class I - IV, both inclusive, not to exceed 5 D/S
Cla3s Vi 1 U/F less ar t i l l er y ant. :,iortar.
(2) upon closing in the TARLACarea oper. a Division railhead
with levels of supply as follows:
Class I - iv, 5 D/S
Class V, 1 U/F
b. The 43d Division upon closing in the CAPATTATTAI'area will he
based upon the Army Supply Brint et SAi: JCSS for normal nif-in-
ter.ance ond supplies.
c_. The lot Infantry, ^th Division, will carr;, t hj fcllov.dr^; levels
of svppl;,' in moving to the BAYO'^CyG area:
CV.ss I 5 D/S
Class II ;. iv Supplies on hand
Ciass III 3 D/S
Brescribed loads
d_. other details; yo change.
5. a_. see Index I-33 sixth Army Signal Operation Instructions, effective
00021 1 July 1945-
b_. oonnanO Josts :
(1) sixth Army SAI; FEK:AIO)O
(2) I Corps
(3) XI corps t'JJOTLA
(4) 11th Airijorne Division LIPA
C3) 40th Di vi si on N20R0S
(6) 81st Di vi si on L3YTE
c_. (1) 11th Airborne Division -^11 e s t t bl i s h r adi o com-ijnio .tio-i
with Headc a r t e r s Si xt h Ar.\ on Ifet 6D". See si xt l . Arnv/
Signal der at i on Instructions, It em30-31.
(2) 40th and 2l,3t Livisions wi l l e.3tab3ish radio ccn.-.nnicotion
with Keadîarters Sixth Army on :>t 6A". See Sixth irm-
Signal Operation Instructions, Item 30-3I.
/s/".7alter I
WALTER
Cener al , ' ".
Arr.y
1 - Troop List
HKADQUARTERS
ARMY
A. P. 0 . 442
19001 2 July 1945
AMENDMENTNO.1to F073,Headqiartei-s Sixth Amy, 25June1943.
F0 73,Headquarters Sixth Army, 25June 1945, i s amendedas follows:
Delete paragraph 4 and substitute the following:
4. Confirming wb a l iMtraotlom:
s.. The25th Division wi l l :
(1) Carry the following levels of supply in HOTIM to the
TARLACarea:
174
Class I - IV, both lnolualYe, not to exceed 5D/ s.
Class 7, 1 V/T l e s s art i l l ery andmortar.
(8) Upon cl osi ng i n the TARLACarea, d m Q||cl ass I , Class II
nornal maintenance, and Class III from Ai w QMSmroly
Point #3, SAN JSRHANDO, ( P) . Al l othar suppllea wi l l
be reqal si ti oned from MANILAdepots.
. The43d Infantry DiTiaion upon cl osi ng i n the CABAHiTDAN area
wi l l be based upon the AmySupply Point at SAN J08K for noraal
maintenance and suppl i es. Al l other Class II andIV i t esu wi l l
be requi si ti oned fro llANILA depots.
. Thel t Infantry, 6th DiTiaion, wi l l oarry the following
of supply i n BOYing t o the BAY0MB0NOarea:
ClassI
5D/S
ClassII&IV
Suppliesonhand
ClassIII
3D/S
ClassV
Prescribedloads
d_. Other det ai l s: re change.
G. H. DECKER,
Major Gener al , C3 .Ci
Chief of s t a f f
A. P. 0 . 442
22001, 25 JUne1945
1 t o ^0 7 3 ,Troop L i s t .
t t e following uni t a wi l l pass to operat i onal coat r ol of the
Commanding General, Eighth Army, effect i ve OOOli 1 July1945:
COlfflAT UNITS
St at us Rerrârks
One RCT(less one Inf Bn),
Americal Div (To be designated)
3,o00
Asend xi Corps Kote 3
103d inf Regt (less 1st &3d 3ns),
43d IJLV
2,300
Asgnd XI Corps Itote 1
3d 31, 103d Inf Reet, 43d Div
1 ?n, 188th P/o fleet, 11th A/J3 Div
Cue Inf 31Reinf, 40th Div (TObe
designated)
670
C70
XI Corps I'ote 3
Asgnd Sixth Army Jbte* 3
Aagnd Sixth Army Note 3
l at squadron, 12th
1st cav d v
Cav Regt, 775
Asgnd XLCorps NDte 3
2d 31, 155th PCT
gtry /., l 6l st AAAGun Bi
870
150
Asgnd
Atohd
Sixth Army
Sixth Arm
1
.'
Note 3
Note
Btry Di 209th AAAAW Bn
2d Plat, ptry - , 209th AAAKUBn
2d rl at , ^try c, 20Qth AA.AA^Bn
rrov r l at , rtry A, 209th AAAAW Bn
One r l at , ?try A, 209th AAAAW Bn
670th jjigr Topo Co (less Survey Plat)
186th -=Jigr Combat Bn
Cos c r Ft 5^4th EP i SB
1 r l et , 3017th -cjigr Boat :.&int Co
Hj'dro gurvey Team, 544*h EBeSR
556th sngr ivy ft>nto,n 31
510th TTi^r L ponton Co
1011th Engr Treadway BridgeCo
14.2
S5
90
600
550
43
8
340
209
138
Atohd
Atohd
Atchd
Atchd
Atohd
Asgnd
Atchd
Aagnd
Asgnd
Asgnd
As^nd
Atohd
Atohd
Sixth Arny
Sixth Army
Sixth Army
Sixth Army
Sixth Army
Sixth Army
I corps
Sixth Army
Sixth Arny
SixthArray
Sixth Army
I Corps
I Corps
!*>te
Mote
Note
IJbte 1
Itote 1
Note
Note
Note
rbt e 1
Note
Note
Kote
SBOTICE OTITS
Det, 781at Bngr Pet Diet Co
Hq &HqDet, 70th Med Bn
679th MadColl Co
21
28
105
Atchd Si xt h Anny Note 2
Asgnd Si xt h Anny
Atchd XI Corps
607th MedClr Co 107 Atchd XI Corps
61st Ited Base Dep Co 44 Asgnd Si xt h Amy Note 2
One Pl at, 614th Ord Am Co 50 Atchd XI Corps Note 2
Det CoHq, 601st QVGr Co 8 4t end XI Corps
276th Port Co (l eas Det) 130 Atchd I Corps Note 2
Note 1: Tobe r e l e as e d t o Comnands as i ndi cat ed i n St at us column above,
on 1 August 1945.
Note 2: Tobe r e l e as e d t o Corananda a s i ndi cat ed i n St at ue column abore,
on 15August 1945.
Not e 3 : Tobe r e l e as e d t o Comnanda a s i ndi cat ed i n St at ue oolumn above,
on 1 September 1945.
BY COMMAND OFGENERAL KHUEGBH:
G. H. DECKER,
Bri gadi er General , G. S. C. ,
Chief of Staff.
OFFICIAL:
0- 3.
175
Roster of Officers
COMMANDINGGENERAL
GeneralWalterKrueeer, O-I531
AIDSPSCAMP
LieutenantColonelHenryB.Decherd,Jr.,0-39731+5
MajorIkeS.Karapmann,Jr.,0-425733
MajorJohnH.Crichton,0-442629
CHIEFOFSTAFF
MajorGeneralGeorgeH.Decker, O-I595O
Deputy ChiefofStaff
ColonelKennethPierce,O-l?385
SecretaryoftheGeneralStaff
ColonelBoylstonB.Baes,0-250303
AssistanttoSecretaryoftheGeneralStaff
1stLieutenantCurtisR.Kirkland, O-lb86256
Chief Clerk
CWOCurtisR.Wold, W-2127566
G-l SECTION
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l
Colonel George S. Price, 0-12258
Executive Officer
Colonel Richard R. Middlet>rooks, O-27686O
Avsrds and Decorations
Lieutenant Colonel Henrick 0. Antell, 0-166599
Lieutenant Colonel Vi r t i l Key, 0-227473
Captaintfetob&. Lasley, O-I894645
1st Lieutenant /. G. Veils, 0-1825093
C-oerations
ColonelOwen'.Griffin,0-324942
Lieutenant ColonelJohnL.Goodwyn,0-257979
MajorPatrickJ.Maloney, 0-1284170
1stLieutenantHenryP.Kapna, 0-1184533
Personnel
Lieutenant ColonelWilliamC.Hoffmann,0-302133
MajorMarkE.Switzer, 0-1107711
MajorFrankE.Watson, O-361895
CaptainBenjaminG.Page, 0-1031432
CaptainJosephK.Phillips, 0-1103357
l3tlieutenant WalterE.Schroeder, 0-1030816
6-2SICTIOJST
AssistantChiefofStaff,G-2
ColonelHortonV.White,0-15301
Executive Officer
ColonelFrederickW.Bradshaw.0-300580
(9Januaryto27March1945)
ColonelFrederickW.Heln,0-14956
(27Mayto30June1945)
Comhat Intelligence
LieutenantColonelEphraimL.Marke, O-319b3b
(TDfromGHQSWPA)
MajorFloydK.Haskell, 0-1010732
MajorV/illiama.Perahall,0-355278
Administration
1stLieutenantElmanM.Hockman,O-I6S63I+6
WOJGWarrenE.Kitchen,W-2135228
WeatherOfficer
CaptainClaytonE.Jensen,O-S5fa9O2(TDfrom20thWeatherSq)
Topographic&Photo Interpretation
LieutenantColonelJuniusS.Stearns,Jr.,0-371246
MajorJohnG.Draughon,0-390491
CaptainLawrenceA.Buckland, O-IOU7906
CaptainJosephE.Dooley, O-IOI35O6
CaptainBenjaminFriedman, 0-104l553
1stLieutenantDouglasDespaln, 0-1044795
1stLieutenantCharlesR.Brockhoff, 0-1058196
letLieutenantWilliamR.Koran,O-IO32I65
2dLieutenantVincentHayden, 0-2027467
2dLieutenantMortimerA.Henrich, 0-2027449
PsychologicalWarfareUnit
MajorPaulT.Anderson,0-1284984(TDfrom USAFFE)
1stLieutenantJohnR.Sand'berg,O-536337(TDfromUSAFFS)
AirLiaisonOfficers
Major Charles J. Bryant, 0-390491
Captain Joseph B. Kaesshaefer, O-5U536O
Planning
Lieutenant Colonel Joy R. Bogue, 0-230524
Captain John A. liahner, O-38920S
Captain Charles R. Rowland, O-SS8U56
2d Lieutenant Henry Zylstra, 0-2007505
Language
MajorGeorgeAurell,O-9ObOb2
F/Lt (RAAF)G.H.Broinowski,266450
1stLieutenantRo'bertH.Brower,0-558^+5'+
1stLieutenantPhilS.Ishio,O-SS8314
1stLieutenantS.S.Yamamoto,O-8S8916
Lieutenant(jg)RobertFuld (USSR),2J2532
Lieutenant(jg)PaulGilman(USKR),230163
CaptainEn/inAbonyi,0-4b0174
CaptainJohnH.Crichton,0-442629
CaptainLouisA.Kohn,0-254247
CaptainHenryM.Myerson,O-IOI2667
1stLieutenantClementT.Ajello,0-1080b83
1stLieutenantJamesE.Ma6sey,Jr.,O-46ll4b
SpecialIntelligence
LieutenantColonelFranklinK.Rawolle,O-339954
MajorRichardH.Bryant,0-282582
MajorEoaerA..liilans,0-301573
CaptainfoayoS.Stunt z,0-454428
CaptainWalterW.Stuart,0-455375
1st Lieutenant Jose L. Rifareal, 0-21276
OrderofBattle
Captain Robert I . Mitchell, 0-485983
Captain Paul A. White, O-436372
2dLieutenantStephenB.Ives,Jr.,0-2027784
Counterintelligence Corps
MajorBlairP.LaTjatt,0-452996(TDfromHqUSAFFE)
CaptainHaroldF.Frederick,0-1031241(TDfromHqUSAFFE)
CaptainJohnH.Norton,O-26238(TDfromHqUSAFFE)
CaptainGeorgeR.Hanaa,0-1641357(TDfromHqUSAFFE)
CaptainJohn0.Platt,0-2035142(TDfromHqUSAFFE)
CaptainJamesJ.Ripley,Jr.,0-1557357(TDfromHqUSAFFS)
CaptainWilliamE.Starlsuck,O-1O4S6O1(TDfromHqUSAFFE)
2dLieutenant ChesterDevenow,0-2027795 (TDfromHqUSAFFS)
2dLieutenantDuvalA.Edwards,0-2026844(TDfromHqUSAFFE)
2dLieutenantJamesW.English,0-2023825(TDfromHqUSAFFE)
2dLieutenantMiltonG.Horwitz,O-2O26966(TDfromHqUSAFFE)
2dLieutenantGeorgeR.Splane,0-164028(TDfromEqUSAFFE)
2dLieutenantWilliamA.Owens,0-2026827(TDfromHqUSAFFE)
TechnicalIntelligence
MajorEdwardI.Creed,0-1+5199^(TDfromUSASOS)
MajorFredD.Kierstead,0-35^003(TDfromUSASOS)
CaptainLawrenceT.Sternal,O-I5J6696(TDfromUSASOS)
CaptainPaulJ../alsh,O-IO35616(TDfromUSASOS)
1stLieutenantFrankJ.DiPhillips,0-1110459
(TDfromUSASOS)
1stLieutenantWilliam1.Howland,O-lb4506l(TDfromUSASOS)
1stLieutenantJamesJ.Molthan,O-2O36513(TDfromUSASOS)
1stLieutenantPhillipA.Wurzel,0-2034488(TDfromUSASOS)
2dLieutenantJohnH.Lotz,O-2O27533(TDfromUSASOS)
176
182dCensorshipAreaDetachment
CaptainHenryR.Attias,O-IOO307O (TDfromHqUSAFFE)
CaptainBaxterC.Reese,0-1003147(TDfromHqUSAFFE)
1stLieutenantRichardB.Miller,0-1648608
(TDfromHqUSAFFE)
1stLieutenantTedC.Rlngman,0-1003153(TDfromHqUSAFFFO
AlamoScouts
MajorGibsonNiles,0-23938
CaptainLewisB.Hochstrasser,0-454794
(TDfrom1stC
a
vDiv)
CaptainFredA.Sukap,O-3S5767(TDfrom2dESB)
1stLieutenantJohnM.Adams,O-I634532
(TDfrom98thSigOpBn)
1stLieutenantHenryL.Baker,0-534045
(TDfrom1stRenBn)
1stLieutenantMiltonH.3eckworth,0-1302084
(TDfrom1stC
a
vDiv)
1stLieutenantGeorgeA.Derr,0-1324989
(TD from 33d Inf Div)
1st Lieutenant John M. Dove, O-IO3O653 (TDfrom 1st C
a
v Div)
1st Lieutenant John C. S. Hall, 0-1031246
(TD from 1st Cav Div)
1st Lieutenant V/oodrow H. Hobbs, O-IO3O676
(TDfrom1stC
a
vDiv)
1stLieutenantJohnR.MacGowan,O-386232
1stLieutenantWilburF.Littlefield,O-5O867S
(TDfrom40thInfDiv)
1stLieutenantMarionC.Myers,O-I305095
(TDfrom6thInfDiv)
1stLieutenantWilliamE.Nelliet,0-1301351
(TDfrom11thA/BDiv)
letLieutenantWilmotB.Ouzts,O-51U31I+
(TDfrom158thInfRegt)
1stLieutenantRobertS.Sumner,O-l6S83b
1stLieutenantTomJ.Rounsavllle,O-296367
(TDfrom11thA/3Div)
1stLieutenantGeorgeS.Thompson,0-1288816
(TDfrom158thInfRegt)
1stLieutenantSidneyS.Tison,O-534o6l
(TDfrom1stRenBn)
1stLieutenantChesterB.Vickery,0-103225*+
(TDfrom1stC
a
vDiv)
2dLieutenantHermanS.Chanley,O-I6863I8
(TDfrom1stC
a
vDiv)
2dLieutenantAubreyL.H
a
ll,O-I690906
2dLieutenantJoeKoon,O-I69678I
2dLieutenantIrvinRay,0-1690904(TDfrom1stCavDiv)
2dLieutenantWilliamB.Watson,O-I696775
(TDfrom1stC
a
vDiv)
Q-lSECTION
AssistantChiefofStaff,G-3
BrigadierGeneralClydeD.Eddleman,0-15842
ExecutiveOfficer
ColonelDavidW.Gray,O-I8988
ColonelJohnF.Bird,O-l6l79
Administration
CaptainCharleeW.Hess,0-2035010
CaptainJamesR.Smith,0-424542
Operations
ColonelPaulR.Weyrauch,0-1825
ColonelJohnJ.Tolson,III,0-20826
ColonelBenjamin0.Turnage,Jr.,O-2O36O
LieutenantColonelHarryA.Stella,0-21385
LieutenantColonelHaroldE.Bisbort,0-288164
LieutenantColonelCharlesT.Heinrlch,0-354372
MajorGeorgeH.Reppert,0-451205
CaptainO
a
therBlair,0-1283366
CaptainRichardN.Knight,Jr.,O-4l6l65
1stLieutenantNormanW.Ross,0-519.653
1stLieutenantAubigneM.Sims,0-519222
2dLieutenantJamesL.Peterson,0-2007809
TrainingandLiaison
ColonelHarleyB.West,O-268317
Training
Colonel Joseph L. D
ar
k, O-I6979
ColonelH.J.McGee,0-18600
LieutenantColonelJamesB.Bonham,0-23107
LieutenantColonelFrankH.Linnell,0-24089
LieutenantColonelCharlesR.Meyers,O-2O762
MajorFrederickC.Fenton,0-266828
MajorWilliamB.Collins,O-I283725
MajorJohnE.Arthur,0-351768
Major David A. Marcelle, 0-397220
Major Thomas J. Cleary, Jr . , 0-23998
CaptainMarionB.Adams,0-408265
CaptainGeorgeJ. M
o
tz,0-409515
CaptainRobertJ.Smith,0-1010813
Air-GroundLiaison
LieutenantColonelJamesF.McKenna, 26443
LieutenantColonelDinoA.Alberti,O-38I237
MajorClarenceT.Marsh,
J
r.,0-22996
MajorHenryW.Butterfield,0-362324
MajorOrvilleD.Cantwell,0-2433448
MajorPhillip1.Miller,0-384270
MajorMauriceW.Roberts,O-338834
MajorEdgarS.Sanders,0-400155
MajorJackS.Siegfried,0-313012
MajorJames&.Baker,0-209465
MajorRobertL.Duncan,0-352743
MajorCarlJ.Gilbert,O-4o4313
Major Maurice W. Hammond, O-29737&
MajorHarryW.Holmquiet,0-367344
Major Thomao H. McCallle, 0-314754
Major James A. Morris, 0-384183
MajorMartinKynett,0-327341
MajorCarlH.Chambers,O-32693O
MajorJamesM.McKeand,0-328052
Major Bertram C. Wright, 0-28288
Captain Donald A. Cook, O-4l6ll6
Captain Wallace Carnahan, 0-358996
Captain Douglas P. Moreau, 0-452423
CaptainGradyD.H
e
xt,O-4O31OO
CaptainRossG.Ramsey,0-323400
CaptainKarlF.Schmidt,0-1283322
Captain Fred B. (Tuggle, 0-298804
Captain William D. D
a
vid, 0-297703
Captain William A. Gresham, O-4l3136
Captain Vincent L. Tolson, 0-1287270
Captain Robert C. Forman, 0-339217
CaptainAlH.Stuckey,0-350057
Captain Edward D. Evans, 0-1040111
1st Lieutenant Robert S. Bruce, 0-1293899
1st Lieutenant Joseph A. Oallena, 0-441998
letLieutenantEdwardD.Dobson,0-461125
1stLieutenantJamesM.Lowman,O-IO3I963
InformationandEducation
LieutenantColonelFloydV.Goates,O-517O83
MajorMilesC.Romney,0-326121(TD)
CaptainMichaelF.Sterna,0-400905(TD)
CaptainRichelieuC.Hines,
J
r.,0-352319
2dLieutenantMarvinS.Corwin,0-2027395
TroopMovement
MajorPhilipD.H
e
lmig,Jr.,0-323121
CaptainCharlesJ.Hickman,O-2O36432
2dLieutenantAverilW.T
a
ber,0-200751
G-4SECTIOK
AssistantChiefofStaff,G_4
ColonelWilliamN.Leaf,0-15129
ExecutiveOfficer
ColonelGeorgeW.Palner,0-15593
Planning
LieutenantColonelFrederickA.Daugherty,0-337212
MajorHughP.Carter,0-344120
Operations
LieutenantColonelJamesD.Scott,O-38I93I
MajorJanesM.Fielding,0-322434
CaptainrfilsonE.Still,0-373944
CaptainCliffordE.Cross,O-9163O7
1stLieutenantGordonE.Mooney,0-1049998
Supply
LieutenantColonelElbertH.Smith,0-298925
MajorIrwlnT.Shaw,O-3S3657
MajorEldonM.Knox,0-389646
CaptainJosephW.Moore,0-1100252
1stLieutenantEugeneL.Bailey,O-517125
1stLieutenantCharlesW.Stanton,0-1041921
2d Lieutenant George F. Baker, O-2O37716 (Asgd G-4 1 March 1945)
2d Lieutenant Thurmon C. Satterfield, O-I69O897
(Asgd G-4 25 March I945)
Administration
CWOThurmonC.Satterfield,W-2116244
(Relievedfromassignment24March1945)
WO(jg)JackA.Davis,W-2135227(AssignedG-416March1945)
ARTILLERYSECTION
ArtilleryOfficer
BrigadierGeneralHomerW.Kiefer,0-3792
177
Executive Officer
CaptainWinfordG.Scott,0-925084
ColonelWilliamH.Allen,Jr.,O-1SO53 1stLieutenantPaulE.Armstrong, 0-1112544
ColonelThomas \l.Dunn,0-18157 2dLieutenantJamesH.Miller, 0-2026968
Intelligence Engineering
Lieutenant ColonelHerbertF.Schaible 0-296571
MajorJohnF.Taylor, O-355U9U
CaptainJosephD.Lascola,0-415526
Operations
Lieutenant ColonelWilliamP.Whelihan,0-19102
Lieutenant ColonelJohnB.Corbly,Jr.,0-22944
MajorJackM.Minnoch,0-425007
CaptainJohnM.Hannan, O-II67OI8
SupplyandPersonnel
Lieutenant ColonelThomasR.Malone,Jr.,O-240422
MajorRayH.Beardsley, O-I165589
MajorWalterE.Satterfield,0-307374
MajorFrancisX.Olney,O-3I+I358
CaptainAllenM.Early,0-325640
Air Section
MajorJamesA.McCord,0-381252
MajorDavidG.Cogswell,0-398857
CaptainCarrollE.Cary, 0-1177404
1stLieutenantWallaceR.Sears, 0-1182000
1stLieutenant IrwinE.Johnson,O-II83897
Administration
CWOLouisStsricha,W-2108o28
WO(jg)JamesE.Provence,W-2136271
ANTIAIRCRAFT SECTION
Antiaircraft Officer
ColonelWilliamL.McNamee, O-I678I
ExecutiveOfficer
ColonelFrankT.Ostenberg, O-I6863
Operations
LieutenantColonelWilliaoH.Price,Jr.,0-21903
LieutenantColonelJohnB.Manley,Jr.,0-23847
MajorRobertC.Rouzie, 0-1046252
CaptainJamesH.Gary, O-4&7698
CaptainRobertG.Tippett, 0-1050116
CaptainHartieE.Troutman,0-^70269
CaptainChesterF.Purcell, 0-1040294
CaptainChesterR.Unruh, C-1044l36
Supply
j Paul A. Anson, 0-4l l 0l 4
Major Edward S. Croft, J r . , 0-354734
Administration
1st Lieutenant Arthur E. Sol i , 0-1057894
CWOJohnnie H. Davis, W-2H2552
ENGINEER SECTION
The Engineer
Brigadier General Samuel D. Sturgis,
J
r . , O-9325
Executive Officer
Colonel William J. Ely, 0-13974
Administration
Lieutenant Colonel Cole A. Allen, 0-308884
Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Rynearson, 0-19722
Captain Jack D. Parker, O-IIO385I
1st Lieutenant Edward J. St r i f e, O-l6s6348
WO(jg) Reinhold F. Bohlman, W-2127642
Oper at i ons
Colonel John C. B. El l i o t t , 0-16411
Li eut enant Colonel C. H. Shuey. 0-4649 (USMC) (TD)
Major Harold Brennon, SX-1004 ( Aust r al i an Army)(TD)
Capt ai n P. K. fioos, 0-919350 (TD)
Capt ai n R. B. Sample. 0-1101199 (
TD
)
Const r uct i on
Li eut enant Colonel William R. Harri son, 0-904916
Li eut enant Col onel Marion S. Webb, 0-477093
Major Howard L. Mul l i n, 0-258538
LieutenantColonelRussellC.Baker,0-291797
LieutenantColonelThomasT.Conger,0-888046
MajorFrancisD.Beyer,O-278537
MajorSpencerJ.Buchanan,O-23I626
MajorWilliamF.McCali,O-358393
MajorHaroldP.Rounds,0-524-268
CaptainRobertK.Bauerle,0-355319
CaptainEverettM.Hodges,Jr.,0-1106820
CaptainSpencerB.Powers,O-3OOI58
1st Lieutenant Ruel D. Gierhart, O-II6152
1stLieutenantL.E.Knapp,0-1113304
1stLieutenantDudleyL.O'Neal,0-1116803
TroopsandTraining
LieutenantColonelArthurL.Baker,0-362844
LieutenantColonelJamesE.Walsh,0-19372
CaptainM.D.Beavens,0-915287(TD)
CaptainLeonardF.Griffin,0-441288
CaptainSamuelE.Reinberz,0-1575528
CaptainEvanG.Simraonds,O-377l4O
CaptainHarryC.Wilt,0-1302739
CaptainEdwardM.Wright,0-24693
CaptainMelon0.Wright,0-396422
1stLieutenantC.Brenner,0-1557817(TD)
1stLieutenantH.C.Hall,O-lfa45626(TD)
Maps
LieutenantColonelElmoreG.Lawton,O-31572I
MajorOrrisA.Carnegie,O-36fa2O4
CaptninGeorgeDelvin, 0-1104l25
CaptainJosephM.Phillips,0-1103357
Supply
Lieutenant Colonel Harold B. McCullough, O-312763
Lieutenant Colonel Gale E. Kevill, O-280O6O
Major William E. Arenson, 0-1100433
Captain Glen B. Keith (TD)
Captain George V. Larkin, O-25396O
Captain D. D. Connors, O-HO6653 (TD)
Captain F. . Dyer, 0-1107399 (TD)
Captain James L. Somnerville, 0-1100346
1st Lieutenant Arnold Abrams, 0-11066b8
1st Lieutenant James P. Beggins, 0-1580788
1st Lieutenant Robert B. Benson, 0-1557840
1st Lieutenant Jack 'I. Da
vies, 0-1104115
1st Lieutenant Albert D. Hagopian, O-IIO87II
1st Lieutenant C. D. M
a
cMurray, O-H82913 (TD)
1st Lieutenant Fred S. Moore, 0-1109534
1st Lieutenant 0. E. St i fel , O-lll6Sl4 (TD)
1st Lieutenant Richard R. Werner, O-2O35235
CHEMICAL WARFARE SECTION
Chemical Offi cer
Colonel John R. Burns, O-I65O9
Execut i ve Offi cer
Li eut enant Colonel Leonard L. McKinney, O-2S334O
Admi ni st rat i on and I nt el l i gence
Captain Grant R. Br i ckel l , 0-1037413
2d Li eut enant Li ndel l L. Cunrains, O-2O27496
Operations
Captain John M. McDonald, 0-424080
Captain Robert P. Rockway, O-IO37691
Supply
Captain Charles R. Ross, 0-1038099
ORDKANCESECTION
OrdnanceOfficer
Brigadier General Phi l i p &. Blackmore, 0-3?01
Executive Officer
Colonel John S. Li del l , O-2921&5
Administration and Operations
Major Clifton B. Nelson, 0-502250
Major James L. Farmer, J r . , 0-353909
Captain Kenneth R. Baldwin, 0-1574191
1st Lieutenant John H. Adams, 0-1556258
178
Captain Albert E. H
o
ll, J r . , O-l64l4o4
Ammunition 1st Lieutenant Gerald J. Dean, 0-2037228
1st Lieutenant George D. Finlay, I I I , O-I65O519
Major Clinton A. Wagoner, 0-1548331
, Captain John K. Mills, 0-392931
Signal Intelligence
Captain Vendel P. K
O
v
a
r, 0-377528
Captain Robert J. Fromme, 0-1548788
LieutenantColonelRobert S.Auten, O-368OO7
Captain Woodro J. Ti l l , 0-1548324 1stLieutenantJohnJ.
H
iggias,O-I639173
Captain Donald E. Druckemlller, 0-381869 1stLieutenantHaroldA.Furnes6,O-163487I
2d lieutenant William J. C
a
in, 0-513773
WO(jg) Joe B. Roberts, W-2127568 Supply
Maintenance and Inspection ColonelStuartS.Hoff,0-272826
MajorBobH.filover,0-1635940
Lieutenant Colonel Phi l l i p P. Johnston, O-329315 CaptainHowardW.Brody, 0-1637088
MajorJosephL.Douda,0-444496 CWORobertL.Gibson,W-2107096
Major Lyle B. Cox, O-446b92
Captain
ti
oward E. Theiss, O-U37S39 Training
Captain Richard L. Taggart, 0-451424
Captain Thomas Richardson, 0-399100 Lieutenant ColonelTomL.Uhr,0-316499
Captain Richard C. Jones, 0-1574270 MajorEdwardN.Jenkins,0-454900
1st Lieutenant Howard A. Sykes, O-U6516O
Administration
Supply
Capt ai n Wal t er J . Wi l l i ams, 0-1644228
Colonel Everette W. F
aU
lk, O-33l4l4 WO(jg) Horace S. Haynes, W-2127644
Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Wilson, 0-304025
Major Charles H. Masters, 0-359812 Phot ography
Major Paul L. Sanders, 0-1+20828
Major Joseph J. Laurlno, 0-398147 Capt ai n Maurice R. Fos t e r , 0-412120 (TD)
Captain Carl P. Blakely, O-38338O
Captain Robert H. Crooker, 0-1573141
Captain Arthur L. Sutton, 0-1577923
CVfOJohn A. Gushing, V.-21O7O95
SURGEONSECTION
TheSurgeon
BrigadierGeneralGeneralWilliamA.Hagins,0-4050
QUARTERMASTER SSCTIOH
Executive Officer
Quartermaster Officer
ColonelJsaesA.McCallam,0-9466
Brigadier General Charles R. Lehner, 0-5740
Consultants
Executive Officer
ColonelBradleyL.Coley,0-211368
(TDfrom9thGeneral
H
ospltal)
Colonel James C. Longino, 0-6702
LieutenantColonelFrankGlenn,0-404386
LieutenantColonelHarrisonJ.Shull,O-31S4O9
Field Service Division Lieutenant ColonelMosesR.Kaufman,0-475184
Lieutenant ColonelGeorge0.Eaton, O-4o6l71
Colonel Arthur C. Bass, 0-295976
(TDfromChiefSurgeonUSASOS)
Lieutenant Colonel M
a
lvin L. Rauschenberg, Jr . , 0-392677
Major Loraine T. Brockman, 0-397320
Dental
Major William A. Barrett, 0-3825%
Captain George H. Bowman, 0-346618
ColonelWilliamS.Shuttleworth, O-8898
Captain H. Carl Balsiger, 0-464465
CaptainAlfredL.Thelin,0-38466
Captain Howard L. Alexander, O-157S097
Captain Edwin A. Schmidt, 0-1580281
HospitalizationandEvacuation
Administration
LieutenantColonelWilburD.Dice,O-23671
MajorJohnE.Tysell,0-443631
LieutenantColonelByronJ.Hays,0-386530
MajorJohnJ.Bethman,0-377987
Operations
MajorJamesC.MacFarland, 0-1576321
CaptainHowe11R.Evans,Jr.,0-467496
ColonelHenryC.Harrell,0-22307
2d~LieutenantLOnnieB.Braly,O-2OO7693
ColonelStuartI.Draper,0-23599
2dLieutenantDavidT.Adams,O-2O26519
ColonelLuciu6K.Patterson,0-9103
LieutenantColonelReinhardBecker, O-27O5b7
Supply
LieutenantColonelAlfredH.Bungardt,0-26403
ColonelRalphE.Hansen,0-185147
Statistics
MajorLewisC.Lee,O-4OOO33
MajorJamesE.McDowell,0-378500
1stLieutenant ClydeW.Benke, 0-1686290
CaptainWilliamE.Gillian,O-I5855OO
CaptainRobertJ.Hatcher, O-888599
Supply
CaptainDavidC.McLaughlin, 0-1578842
CaptainJohnA.Kaehler,O-I588O83
CaptainIrwinLee ,0-888579
CaptainJohnM.Hunt,O-I543I58
Salvage
Captain Herbert A. Loghry, O-I547697
1st Lieutenant Robert E. Miller, 0-1535241
LieutenantColonelLawrenceE.Swope,0-387457
CaptainLeRoyShulman,Jr., 0-1577847
VeterinarianandMedical Inspector
WO(jg)EarlM.Aldridge,W-2134999
Colonel James A. McCallam, O-946b
Captain Omar S. Werntz, 0-394514
Personnel
SIGNALSECTION Major Robert H. Har r i age, 0-420726
Major John H. Jameson, 0-418790
SignalOfficer Captain Donald I . Bel l , 0-420022
Colonel Harry Reichelderfer, 0-7547 Admi ni st rat i on
Executive Officer WO(jg) Robert S. Carey, W-2135247
ColonelDonaldR.Bodine,0-20238
ColonelFredW.Kunesh, O-I6768
Communications TRANSPORTATION SECTION
ColonelWalterB.Bess,0-20151 Transportation Officer
MajorAlfredJ.Blanton, O-32666I
MajorJesseW.Billings,0-284144
Colonel John U. Calkins, J r . , O-ll4357
MajorRobertL.Gardenier,0-429257
CaptainWilliamF.Broderick,0-499237
Executive Officer
CaptainArthurJ.Riely,0-451049
CaptainFillmoreE.Garrison,0-436255
Colonel Florin L. McDonald, 0-249722
CaptainJohnR.Evans,O-2O35464
179
Traffic Control Division
Postal Section
Lieutenant Colonel Irwin M. Diamond, 0-346411
Lieutenant Colonel Charles C. Mitchell, 0-487566
Major Robert J . Barth, 0-390901
Major Louis A. Dlllard, O-39U5O7
Major James T. Hardy, O-347319
Major Robert J. Lee, 0-324695
Major Cyril A. Millson, O-358O4l
Major Hare-.d H. Thomas, 0-1102502
Captain Euward B. Bowers, O-1O42?45
Captain William E. Braxemeyer, 0-372265
Captain Robert A. Brundage, O-2O35622
Captaitj James R. Connor, 0-394059
Captain -'ayiaond A. Geiger, O-2O35OO7
Captain ..illiam D. Poggeto, O-3717O5
Captain George E. Uisch, 0-924902
1st Lieutenant Rayraond Gueble, O-I32383O
1st Lieutenant Fran . 0-16862S rankk Riley Riley, O-I6862S99
Captain Jfjaes H. Turner, 0-483736
Captain Phi l l i p M. Young, O-IOOOO76
1st Lieutenant William B. Meador 0-1000823
CWO Robert L
v
Howard, W-21OS637
' O( j ) Smil 3. Jackson, tf-2109573
ichine Records Unit
Major William A. McLellan, 0-1000417
Captain Archie T. Wilson, O-IOO335I
1st Lieutenant Ernest DeFrank, O-IOO3709
2d Lieutenant Xennard P. Shuley, 0-2026980
Planning and Logi st i cs Division
Lieutenant Colonel Donald D. Dickson 0-341899
JUDGEADVOCATE
Major James A. Ross, 0-391192
1st Lieutenant Robert A. Allen,
Fi el d Supervision Division
0-540139
The Judge Advocate
ColonelWilliamP. Connally, Jr.,O-I7567
Lieutenant Colonel Haxwood L. Marshall, O-I6979I
Major Cleburn R. Rasor, 0-315204
Major Thomas M. Simpson, J r . , O-I576652
Major Stanley C. Strout, 0-505460
Captain A. Page Boyce, O-52613U
Captain Greg B. Busch, 0-335319
Captain Pierson E. Clair, J r . , O-I57I+398
Captain George A. Davenport, 0-924755
Captain Otis M. Gllliam, 0-328003
Captain Earl L. Guillot, O-924S12
Captain Charles Rockwell, 0-1040147
Captain Thomas A. Tully, 0-1575239
1st Lieutenant Harold F. Block, O-2O35289
(TD from 4l st Inf Div)
1st Lieutenant Richard E. Bruning, 0-1308467
1st Lieutenant James E. Donovan, 0-2035303
(TD from 4l st Inf Div)
2d Lieutenant Laurence P. H
a
l l , O-19475bl
AssistantJudgeAdvocate
Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Reichmann, 0-335073
MajorJamesL.Nolan,0-502380
MajorFinleyJ.GiVbs,O-9O5698
MajorJosephBigel,0-2051802
CaptsinRichardS.Euckley, O-I895162
CaptainRichardN.Hu n te r , 0-2052309
1stLieutenantAlfredL.Shortridge, 0-2052413
1stLieutenantJulianL.0'Malley,0-2051851
1stLieutenantRobertR.Hawfield,0-525321
1stLieutenantLynnB.Griffith, O-2O5I96
ChiefClerk
'i'O(jg)CharlesK.Hopkins, W-2127745
Small Craft and Lighterage Division FINANCESECTION
Major George S. Smith, O-I53U15I
Captain Joseph L. Delafield, O-91l6ll
Captain James W. C. Irvi ne, 0-490774
Captain Curtis J. Sundquist, 0-456575
Troops Division
Captain Robert A. Edwards, 0-15781+15
Administrative Officer
TheFinr.nceOfficer
Colonel Paul A. Mayo, 0-18621
Assistants
Major Edgar R. Brooks, 0-472794
Capt ai n John F. Gauchat, 0-288587
1st Li eut enant Ri chard E. Stemple, 0-2023441
WO(j ) Robert E. Erdaiann, '.'-2135049
1st Lieutenant Robert J. Horn, O-IHI672
INSPECTORGEHERAL'SSECTION
TheInspectorGeneral
ColonelGeorgeC.Mergens, O-1530OO
ADJUTANTGENERAL'SOFFICE
ExecutiveOfficer
TheAdjutantGeneral
ColonelJohnS.Cooley, 0-14603
ExecutiveOfficer
LieutenantColonelJamesW.
ClassificationandAssignmentSection
O-2S1395
Major Jack C. Archambault, 0-395310
Captain Francis J. Shea, 0-319770
1st Lieutenant Cecil E. Greathouse, 0-1896022
1st Lieutenant Robert A. Stemper, 0-1994536
MajorRobertE.Wallace,O-3I8767
InspectionandInvestigationService
MajorOrvieP. Anderson, 0-337262
MajorPhilipE.Coleman, 0-323809
MajorJohn'.hite,0-410719
CaptainFrBnkE.Garden,0-313792
CaptainGeorgeG.Gaynor, 0-1017143
CaptainGeorgeJ.Holly,0-422274
CaptainA.S.Miller, O-376323
Administration
Publications
CWOSolomonThurman, W-2108641
LieutenantColonelAlan'>/.Hall, O-24OOS7
WO(jg)RobertE.Laskowski, ./-
MiscellaneousSection
LieutenantColonelCharlesW. Clegg, 0-234627
CaptainAndrewG.Beck, O-39l6lO
1stLieutenantJohnL. V/erne,O-I686275
2dlieutenantRobertE.Ojainn,0-1169293
CWORaymondT.Rodriquez, W-21O7O9S
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
Civil Affairs Officer
Colonel George D. Sears, 0-333697
Personnel
Executive Officer
Lieutenant Colonel Walter A. Mixtacki, O-3756b7
Captain Morley R. Hartley, 0-1000240
1st Lieutenant Floyd A. Lafayette, 0-2035815
1st Lieutenant Thomas D. Kl st l er, 0-588992
1st Lieutenant William I. Plunkett, O-13196W
1st Lieutenant Anthony T. Hovakovich, 0-203J215
1st Lieutenant Christopher Hackney, O-IO3966O
1st Lieutenant 3ruce Clevenger, 0-1894668
1st Lieutenant Ralph D. Meister, 0-446567
2d Lieutenant Charles D. Schwartz, O-2O26969
Lieutenant Colonel Arthur S. Bell, 0-155108
Medical Officer
Major Potenciano R. Aragon, 0-471519
Public Safety Officer
Lieutenant Colonel Clarence N. Coleman, 0-420496
180
Legal Officer
Lieutenant Colonel Loomls Patrick, 0-918878
Supply Officers
Major Myron D. Cook, O-I166O35
Major Harry C. Flowers, 0-340134
1stLieutenantMontyMorgan,Jr.,0-1304258
FinanceOfficer
LieutenantCommanderHenryI.Cobb,0-127579 (USNR)
LiaisonOfficers
LieutenantColonelCarlErickson
CaptainSydneyC.Jenkins,0-234720
CaptainManielS.Kestler,0-522082
CaptainJosephRichards,O-9l69S8
OperationsOfficers
Lieutenant Colonel George S. Cook, 0-251434
Lieutenant Colonel ^rJph Jordon, 0-21911
TransportationOfficer
MajorRaymondL.Brenna
AgricultureOfficer
MajorFrancisX.Lee,0-523735
PROVOSTMARSHALSECTION
TheProvostMarshal
ColonelHarryB.Emigh,0-229348
LieutenantColonelArthurS.Bell,0-155108(Acting)
LieutenantColonelC.NormanColeman,0-420496(Acting)
AssistantProvostMarshal
CaptainHerbertA.Johnson,0-420320
CriminalInvestigator
CaptainWilliamP.Vise,O-12846o6
TrafficOfficers
CaptainRociusC.Newell,O-I796843
1stLieutenantThomasClyde
ViceandTownPatrols
2dlieutenantGeorgeE.Pritchard,0-2027315
AdministrativeOfficer
WO(jg)BenJ.Kernan,W-2135230
PUBLICRELATIONSSECTIOM
PublicRelationsOfficer
ColonelMaitlandBottoms,0-7445
MajorPaulA.Conlin,0-905766
ExecutiveOfficer
LieutenantColonelWalterM.Harrison,O-I96767
AssistantPublicRelation
1stLieutenantRogerB.Farquhar,0-1534730
2dLieutenantPerryR.McMahon,0-^2027070
Editor,SixthArmyHews
1stLieutenantAbbottSimon,O-2O26969
HISTORICALSECTION
Historian
Colonel Thomas J . Grayson, O-326252
LieutenantColonelWilliamB.Ruggles,0-151250
AssistantHistorian
1stLieutenantAlexanderG.Park,0-lb78279
AdministrativeOfficer
1stLieutenantGeraldV.Morgan,0-1895214
CHAPLAIN SECTION
TheChaplain
ColonelLutherD.Miller,0-11793 (Priorto23March1945)
LieutenantColonelMartinC.Poch,0-20097(After23March1945)
AssistantChaplain
MajorJohnJ.F.Hyan,0-522400
SPECIALSERVICESECTION
SpecialServiceOfficer
LieutenantColonelHerbertL.Krueger,0-334701
MajorNicholasBernard,O-9OO332
AssistantSpecialServiceOfficers
1stLieutenantMarionJ.Knight
1stLieutenantErnestT.Beatty,0-1018234
HEADQUARTERSCOMMANDANT
CommandingOfficerandEeqdquartersCommandant
Colonel Chester F. Allen, 0-279111
Executive Officer
LieutenantColonelJosephAston,0-331805
MajorJohnC.Bode,O-389456
BilletingOfficer
CaptainPaulWeingarten,0-1303804
Supply
1stLieutenantEdwardKimball,0-538022
7?
G
181

Report of Luzon Campaign - 6th US ARMY

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Report of Luzon Campaign - 6th US ARMY

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