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(Motion To Quash) (Caption) Motion To Quash
(Motion To Quash) (Caption) Motion To Quash
(CAPTION)
MOTION TO QUASH
COME NOW defendants, by counsel and unto this Honorable Court, most
respectfully move to quash the information filed against the defendants on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
ARGUMENTS
Defendants are indicted for committing the crime of "Unjust Vexation" that is
punished under the Article 287, Paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code; Said
provision states that:
"Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto menor
or a fine ranging from 5 pesos to 200 pesos, or both."(emphasis ours)
Defendants, however, most respectfully submit that this Honorable Court
lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense for the reason that
article 287, paragraph 2 of the revised penal code that punishes "unjust
vexations" cannot be a basis of any criminal prosecution for being NULL AND
VOID AND patently unconstitutional on its face because of the FOLLOWING
reasons:
a)Said penal provision condemns no specific or definite act or omission thus
failing to define any crime or felony;
b)Said penal provision is so indefinite, vague and overbroad as not to enable
it to be known what ACT is forbidden;
c)Such vagueness and overbreadth result to violation of the due process
clause and the right to be informed of the nature of the offense charged;
d) such vagueness and overbreadth likewise amount to an invalid delegation
by Congress of legislative power to the courts to determine what acts should
be held to be criminal and punishable.
Justice (later Chief Justice) Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of
PEOPLE v. CABURAL, G.R. No. L-34105, February 4, 1983, also made a
similar observation, stating that:
"The maxim Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege has its roots in history. It
is in accordance with both centuries of civil law and common law tradition.
Moreover, it is an indispensable corollary to a regime of liberty enshrined in
our Constitution. It is of the essence then that while anti-social acts should
be penalized, there must be a clear definition of the punishable offense as
well as the penalty that may be imposed - a penalty, to repeat, that can be
fixed by the legislative body, and the legislative body alone. So
constitutionalism mandates, with its stress on jurisdictio rather than
guvernaculum. The judiciary as the dispenser of justice through law must be
aware of the limitation on its own power." (emphasis and underscoring
ours).
The rationale of said doctrine that a criminal or penal legislation must clearly
define or specify the particular act or acts punished is ably explained by the
United Stated Supreme Court in the case of LANZETTA v. STATE OF NEW
JERSEY, 306 U.S. 451, where it held that:
"x x x It is the statute, not the accusation under it, that prescribes the rule
to govern conduct and warns against transgression. x x x No one may be
required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of
penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State
commands or forbids. x x x" (emphasis and underscoring ours).
Article 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code condemns no SPECIFIC act or
omission!Therefore, it does not define any crime or felony.
Paragraph 2 of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code does not define, much
less specify, the acts constituting or deemed included in the term "unjust
vexations" resulting to making the said provision a sort of a "catch-all"
provision patently offensive to the due process clause;
c)In People v. Reyes, 98 Phil. 646, March 23, 1956, it was held that the act
of seizing, taking and holding possession of passenger jeep belonging to
complainant, without the knowledge and consent of the latter, for the
purpose of answering for the debt of the said owner, constitutes unjust
vexation;
d)In People v. Yanga, 100 Phil. 385, November 28, 1956, accused was
convicted of unjust vexation for the act of compelling the complainant to do
something against his will, by holding the latter around the neck and
dragging him from the latter's residence to the police outpost;
e)In People v. Abuy, G.R. No. L-17616, May 30, 1962, the accused was
prosecuted for unjust vexation for the act of embracing and taking hold of
the wrist of the complainant;
f)In People v. Carreon, G.R. No. L-17920, May 30, 1962, accused was
convicted of unjust vexation by the act of threatening the complainant by
holding and pushing his shoulder and uttering to the latter in a threatening
tone the following words: "What inspection did you make to my sister in the
mountain when you are not connected with the Bureau of Education?"
g)In People v. Gilo, G.R. No. L-18202, April 30, 1964, the Court held that
the absence of an allegation of "lewd design" in a complaint for acts of
lasciviousness converts the act into unjust vexation;
h)In Andal v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-29814, March 28, 1969,
accused were found guilty of unjust vexation under an information charging
them with the offense of offending religious feelings, by the performance of
acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful;
i)In People v. Maravilla, G.R. No. L-47646, September 19, 1988, a accused
was convicted of unjust vexation for the act of grabbing the left breast of the
complainant against her will; and
j) Recently in Kwan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113006, November 23,
2000, the act of abruptly cutting off the electric, water pipe and telephone
The term 'candidate' refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective
public office regardless of whether or not said person has already filed his
certificate of candidacy or has been nominated by any political party as its
candidate. The term 'election campaign' of 'partisan political activity' refers
to acts designed to have a candidate elected or not or promote the
candidacy of a person or persons to a public office . . ."
"If that is all there is to that provision, it suffers from the fatal constitutional
infirmity of vagueness and may be stricken down. x x x x x x x x x x x x.
"There are still constitutional questions of a serious character then to be
faced. The practices which the act identifies with "election campaign"
or"partisan political activity" must be such that they are free from the taint
of being violative of free speech, free press, freedom of assembly, and
freedom of association. What removes the sting from constitutional objection
of vagueness is the enumeration of the acts deemed included in the terms
"election campaign" or "partisan political activity." (emphasis and
underscoring ours).
Article 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code punishes "unjust vexations"
and that is all there is to it! As such, applying the incontestable logic of the
Supreme Court in said case of GONZALES v. COMELEC would lead us to the
inescapable conclusion that said penal provision suffers from the fatal
constitutional infirmity of vagueness and must be stricken down;
In the case of Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, cited by
our own Supreme Court en banc in the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operators Assn., Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. L-24693, July
31, 1967), the United States Supreme Court ruled:
"That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be
sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on
their part will render them liable to its penalties is a well-recognized
requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the
settled rules of law; and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing
carry out a statute which in terms merely penalized and punished all acts
detrimental to the public interest when unjust and unreasonable in the
estimation of the court x x x (emphasis and underscoring ours).
Recently, in COATES v. CITY OF CINCINNATI, 402 U.S. 611, the United
States Supreme Court passed upon the issue of constitutionality of a
Cincinnati, Ohio, ordinance that provides that:
It shall be unlawful for three or more persons to assemble, except at a
public meeting of citizens, on any of the sidewalks, street corners, vacant
lots, or mouths of alleys, and there conduct themselves in a manner
annoying to persons passing by, or occupants of adjacent buildings.
Whoever violates any of the provisions of this section shall be fined not
exceeding fifty dollars ($50.00), or be imprisoned not less than one (1) nor
more than thirty (30) days or both. Section 901-L6, Code of Ordinances of
the City of Cincinnati. (emphasis and underscoring ours).
In hammering down the constitutionality of the above-cited Cincinnati, Ohio
ordinance in its landmark decision, the United States Supreme Court held
that:
Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others. Thus, the
ordinance is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his
conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather
in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all. As a result, men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning. Connally v.
General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391.
It is said that the ordinance is broad enough to encompass many types of
conduct clearly within the city's constitutional power to prohibit. And so,
indeed, it is. The city is free to prevent people from blocking sidewalks,
obstructing traffic, littering streets, committing assaults, or engaging in
countless other forms of antisocial conduct. It can do so through the
enactment and enforcement of ordinances directed with reasonable
specificity toward the conduct to be prohibited. It cannot constitutionally do
in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court (148 SCRA 659), the law becomes a
"roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers;
Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code fails to set an immutable and
ascertainable standard of guilt, but leaves such standard to the variant and
changing views and notions of different judges or courts which are called
upon to enforce it. Instead of defining the specific acts or omissions
punished, it leaves to the courts the power to determine what acts or types
of conduct constitute "unjust vexation". Moreover, liability under the said
provision is also made dependent upon the varying degrees of sensibility and
emotions of people. It depends upon whether or not another is vexed or
annoyed by said act or conduct. As previously intimated, one cannot be
convicted of a violation of a law that fails to set up an immutable and an
ascertainable standard of guilt.
Conclusion
In view of all the foregoing, Defendants submit that Art. 287, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code that punishes "unjust vexations" is unconstitutional on
its face for its fatal failure to forbid a specific or definite act or conduct
resulting to its congenital vagueness and overbreadth which are anathema
to constitutional due process and the right to be informed of the nature of
the offense charged;
Moreover, by leaving it to the judiciary to determine the "justness" or
"unjustness" of an act or conduct that is not clearly defined or specified by
law constitutes a fixing by Congress of an unascertainable standard of guilt
and therefore an invalid delegation, if not an abdication, of legislative power;
Therefore, the conclusion is inevitable that Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised
Penal Code, being facially unconstitutional, cannot be a basis of any criminal
prosecution. As such, there is no offense to speak of and consequently, this
Honorable Court cannot acquire any jurisdiction whatsoever to try the
defendants of the charge of "unjust vexation".
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it view of all the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed that
the information be quashed, and defendants discharged.
Other relief just and equitable are likewise prayed for.
_____________, Philippines, __Date__.
(COUNSEL)
(NOTICE OF HEARING)
(EXPLANATION)
COPY FURNISHED:
OPPOSING COUNSEL