(1) Barredo vs. Garcia & et. al. No.

48006/July 8, 1942
Article 2180: VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER
Damages; Quasi-delict or "Culpa Aquiliana"; Primary and Direct
Responsibility of Em-ployers under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code.A head-on collision between a taxi and a carretela resulted
in the death of a 16-year-old boy, one of the passengers of the
car-retela. A criminal action was filed against the taxi driver and he
was convicted and sentenced accordingly. The court in the criminal
case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil
action be reserved. There-after the parents of the deceased brought
suit for damages against the proprietor of the taxi, the employer of
the taxi driver, under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Defendant
contended that his liability was governed by the Revised Penal Code,
according to which his responsibil-ity was only secondary, but no
civil action had been brought against the taxi driver. Held: That this
separate civil action lies, the em-ployer being primarily and directly
responsi-ble in damages under articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil
Code.
-----------------------------------------------------(2) SALEN & et. al. vs. BALCE No. L-14414/ April 27, 1960
ARTICLE 2180 : VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF PARENTS
CIVIL LIABILITY; PARENTS SUBSIDIARILY LIABLE FOR CRIMINAL ACT
OF MINOR" OVER 15 YEARS; ARTICLE 2180 OF NEW CIVIL CODE
APPLICABLE.Under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father
is civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the latter is
an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age, who acts without
discernment, unless it appears that there is no fault or negligence on
his part. This is because a son who commits the act under any of
those conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12,
subdivisions 1. 2 and 3, Revised Penal Code). The idea is not to leave
the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the
person who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority and
control. But a minor over 15 years who acts with discernment is not
exempt from criminal liability, for which reason the Code is silent as
to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand convicted. In
that case resort should be had to the general law, the Civil Code,
which, under Article 2180, provides that "The father and, in case of
his death, or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages
caused by the minor children who lived in their company." This
provision covers not only obligations which arise from quasi-delicts
but also those which arise from criminal offenses. To hold otherwise
would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily
liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would
attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent.
__________________________
(3) Virata & et. al. vs. Ochoa & et. al. 81 SCRA 472/ Jan. 31, 1978
ARTICLE 2176: FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE
Civil liability in negligence cases; Option of offended party to file
action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal or
action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana; Prohibition
against recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act or
omission.In negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose
between an action under the Revised Penal Code or for quasidelict
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is
prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Pshilippines is to
recover twice for the same negligent act.
Quasi-delicts; Phrase fault or negligence includes voluntary and
negligent acts punishable by law.Article 2176, where it refers to

fault or negligence, covers not only acts not punishable by law

but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
Obligations; Sources of; Quasi-delict and acts or omissions
punished by law constitute two different sources of obligations.
Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, quasi-delict
and an act or omission punishable by law are two different sources
of obligation.
_______________________________
(4) Spouse Elcano vs. Hill & Hill 77 SCRA 98/ May 26, 1977
ARTICLE 2180: VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF PARENTS
Civil law; Damages; Quasi-delicts; The concept of culpa aquiliana
includes acts which are criminal in character, whether voluntary or
negligent.Contrary to an immediate impression one might get
upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in
Garciathat the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code
therein referred to contemplates only acts of negligence and not
intentional voluntary actsdeeper reflection would reveal that the
thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in
fact is actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the
reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of
Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or
estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of
Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that
obligations which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault
or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject
of Chapter 11, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)
And it is precisely the underlined qualification, not punishable by
law, that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an undesirable
construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that killeth,
rather than the spirit that giveth life hence, the ruling that (W)e
will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render
almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or causi-delito, which is conserved
and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil
Code. And so, because Justice Bocobo was Chairman of the Code
Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is
to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia
doctrine, no longer uses the term, not punishable by law, thereby
making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts
which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law,
whether voluntary or negligent.
A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the victim do not recover damages on both
scores.. . . It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginald Hill in
the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict,
hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
The vicarious liability of the parents on account of a delict
committed by their minor child is not extinguished by the fact that
said, child who is Hiring with and dependent upon said parents is
married.Coming now to the second issue about the effect of
Reginalds emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of
Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the
conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from
responsibility cannot be upheld. . . . . It must be borne in mind that,

according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary

liability of parents with their offending child under Article 2180 is
that it is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor
children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third
persons. On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in
providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not,
nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents,
is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter
into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation.
(See Manresa, id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing
someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage
of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it
that the child, while still a minor, does not give cause to any
litigation, in the same manner that the parents are answerable for
the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real
property which cannot be done by their minor married child without
their consent, (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.) Accordingly, in Our
considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding
the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it
is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the
liability of Atty. Hill has become merely subsidiary to that of his son.
________________________________
(5) Singson &et. al. vs. BPI & et. al. 23 SCRA 111/ June 27, 1968
Civil law; Tort; Damages; Existence of a contract between the
parties is not a bar to the commission of a, tort by the one against
the other.It has been repeatedly held: that the existence of a
contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort
by the one against the other and the consequent recovery 01
damages therefor (Cangco v. Manila Railroad, 38 Phil. 768; Yamada
v. Manila Railroad, 33 Phil. 8; Vasquez v. Borja, 74 Phil. 560). Indeed,
this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent
case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966,
involving an airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket,
had been illegally ousted from his first-class accomodation and
compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held
entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of
tort on the latters part, for, although the relation between a
passenger and a carrier is contractual both in origin and nature the
act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.
__________________________
(6) Air France vs. Carrascoso & et. al. 18 SCRA 155/ September 28,
1966

felt that it is but just and equitable that attorneys fees be given. We
do not intend to break tradition that discretion well exercisedas it
was hereshould not be disturbed.
___________________________
(7) Farolan & et.al. vs. Solmac Marketing Corporation,& et. al. 195
SCRA 168/ March 13, 1991
Damages; Good Faith, defined; Good faith refers to a state of the
mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned.
It consists of the honest intention to abstain from taking an
unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another.The
respondent court committed a reversible error in overruling the trial
courts finding that: x x x with reference to the claim of plaintiff to
damages, actual and exemplary, and attorneys fees, the Court finds
it difficult to discredit or disregard totally the defendants defense of
good faith premised on the excuse that they were all the time
awaiting clarification of the Board of Investments on the matter: We
hold that this finding of the trial court is correct for good faith is
always presumed and it is upon him who alleges the contrary that
the burden of proof lies. In Abando v. Lozada, we defined good faith
as refer*ring+ to a state of the mind which is manifested by the acts
of the individual concerned. It consists of the honest intention to
abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage
of another. It is the opposite of fraud, and its absence should be
established by convincing evidence.
Public Officers; Mistakes concededly committed by public officers
are not actionable absent any clear showing that they were
motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.
But even granting that the petitioners committed a mistake in
withholding the release of the subject importation because indeed it
was composed of OPP film scraps, contrary to the evidence
submitted by the National Institute of Science and Technology that
the same was pure oriented OPP, nonetheless, it is the duty of the
Court to see to it that public officers are not hampered in the
performance of their duties or in making decisions for fear of
personal liability for damages due to honest mistake. Whatever
damage they may have caused as a result of such an erroneous
interpretation, if any at all, is in the nature of a damnum absque
injuria. Mistakes concededly committed by public officers are not
actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by
malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. After all, even
under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are
protected by the presumption of good faith.
-------------------------------------------------

Damages; Moral damages; Trial; Bad faith in breach of contract of

carriage.Where at the start of the trial, respondent's counsel
placed petitioner on guard that he intended to prove that, while
sitting in the plane in Bangkok, the respondent was ousted .by
petitioner's manager, who gave his seat to a white man, and
evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was
presented without objection on the part of the petitioner, it is
therefore unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is
sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral
damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the
evidence.
Exemplary damages.The New Civil Code gives the court ample
power to grant exemplary damages in contracts and quasi-contracts.
The only condition is that defendant should have acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. The manner
of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits
into this legal precept.
Attorney's fees.The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The
grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for
attorney's fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below

(8) Del Prado vs. Manila Electric Co (MERALCO) 52 Phil. 900 March
7, 1929
ARTICLE 2179: CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
NEGLIGENCE; CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE; MITIGATION OF
DAMAGES.Contributory negligence upon part of a plaintiff, not
amounting to the proximate cause of his injury, is not completely
destructive of his right of action in cases where liability arises from
breach of a contractual duty; but such contributory negligence goes
in mitigation of damages, under article 1103 of the Civil Code.
CARRIERS; STREET RAILWAY; PASSENGER BOARDING MOVING
CAR; DUTY OF MOTORMAN NOT TO INCREASE RISK.Though there
is no obligation on the part of a street railway company to stop its
cars to take on intending passengers at other points than those
appointed for stoppage, nevertheless when the motorman sees a
person attempting to board the car while in motion, and at a place
not appointed for stopping, he should not do any act to increase the
peril of such person; and if, in violation of this duty, the motorman
in charge of a car prematurely accelerates speed while the intending

passenger is in the act of boarding the car, with the result that he
slips and gets his foot crushed under the wheel of the moving car,
the company is civilly liable in damages.
OBLIGATION OF COMPANY TO PASSENGER.The relation between
a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons is of a contractual
nature; and the failure upon part of the carrier to use due care in
conveying its passengers safely is a breach of obligation under article
1101, and related provisions, of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the
duty that the carrier of passengers owes to its patrons extends to
persons boarding the. cars as well as to those alighting therefrom.
-----------------------------------------------------(9) Astudillo vs. Manila, Electric Co., 55 Phil. 427(1930)
DAMAGES; NEGLIGENCE; ELECTRICITY, INJURIES INCIDENT TO
PRODUCTION AND USE.The liability of electric light companies for
damages for personal injuries is governed by the rules of negligence.
Considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the
measure of care required of electric companies must be
commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of
exercising this high. degree of diligence and care extends to every
place where persons have a right to be.
AMOUNT OF DAMAGES FOR DEATH OF BOY.A young man met his
death through electrocution when he placed his right hand on a wire
connected with an electric light pole situated near Santa Lucia Gate,
Intramuros, in the City of Manila. The young man was at that time
less than 20 years of age, a student, and working in a college. It is
held: That the mother of the deceased should be awarded damages
from the Electric Company in the amount of P1,500.
_______________________________
(10) Del Rosario vs. Manila Electric Co., 57 Phil., 478(1932)
Negligence; Unexplained Break in Electric Wire; Responsibility of
Lighting Company for Death of Child.Shortly after 2 o'clock in the
afternoon trouble developed in an overhead wire conducting
electricity for lighting purposes in the City of Manila. The wire soon
parted and one of the charged ends fell to the ground in shrubbery
close to the way. The lighting company received a telephonic report
of this incident at 2.25 p. m., and promised to send an inspector. At
4 p. m. the neigh-boring school turned out and as the children went
home one of the boys, of the age of 9 years, touched the wire with
his hand and received a shock which resulted in death. Held, that
the lighting company was responsible for the death. The delay in
leaving this danger unguarded so long after information of the
trouble was received constituted negligence on its part.
Apparent Contributory Negligence of Child.The circumstance that
the boy who was killed touched the wire after one of his companions
had warned him not to do so, did not relieve the company of
responsibility, owing to his immature years and the natural curiosity
of a child to do something out of the ordinary.
________________________
(11) Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co., & et. al. 33 Phil. 8(1915)
Article 2180: VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE OF MASTER.Where an injury is
caused by the negligence of a servant or employee of a public
enterprise, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee or in supervision over him after
the selection, or both. But that presumption may be rebutted.

If, in such a case, the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court
that in the selection of the employee and in his supervision over him
he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family,
the presumption of negligence on his part is overcome and he is
relieved from liability.
NEGLIGENCE; GARAGE COMPANY; FAILURE TO PROPERLY
INSTRUCT DRIVERS CROSSING RAILROADS.A garage and taxicab
company whose business it is to let automobiles and taxicabs for
hire and to furnish drivers therefor is negligent where it appears that
it was the custom of the drivers, known to the officers of the
company, to pass over railroad crossings without any effort to
determine the proximity of a train, and the company made no effort
to change the custom or to instruct its drivers to the effect that
railroad crossings should not be passed over without due diligence
being observed to determine the approach of trains.
RESPONSIBILITY OF GARAGE COMPANY.Where, under such
circumstances, one of the drivers of the said company, conveying
passengers in the company's machine, attempted to pass over a
railroad crossing without precaution or effort to determine the
proximity of a train, the automobile was struck by a train and the
passengers injured, the taxicab company is responsible for the
damages sustained by the passengers.
---------------------------------------------------(12) Go & et. al. vs. IAC & et. al. 197 SCRA 22(1991)
Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Damages; Although as a rule, there should be
no penalty on the right to litigate, but under the peculiar
circumstances of this case showing that it was the bank officers
gross negligence which caused inconvenience, humiliation and
embarrasment to private respondent, the latter is entitled to an
award of damages.Although this Court has consistently held that
there should be no penalty on the right to litigate and that error
alone in the filing of a case be it before the courts or the proper
police authorities, is not a ground for moral damages, we hold that
under the peculiar circumstances of this case, private respondent is
entitled to an award of damages. Indeed, it would be unjust to
overlook the fact that petitioners negligence was the root of all the
inconvenience and embarrassment experienced by the private
respondent albeit they happened after the filing of the complaint
with the constabulary authorities. Petitioner Gos negligence in fact
led to the swindling of his employer. Had Go exercised the diligence
expected of him as a bank officer and employee, he would have
noticed the glaring disparity between the payees name and address
on the treasury checks involved and the name and address of the
depositor appearing in the banks records. The situation would have
been different if the treasury checks were tampered with only as to
their amounts because the alteration would have been unnoticeable
and hard to detect as the herein altered check bearing the amount
of $913.40 shows. But the error in the name and address of the
payee was very patent and could not have escaped the trained eyes
of bank officers and employees. There is therefore, no other
conclusion than that the bank through its employees (including the
tellers who allegedly conducted an identification check on the
depositor) was grossly negligent in handling the business
transaction herein involved. While at that stage of events private
respondent was still out of the picture, it definitely was the start of
his consequent involvement as his name was illegally used in the
illicit transaction. Again, knowing that its viability depended on the
confidence reposed upon it by the public, the bank through its
employees should have exercised the caution expected of it. In
crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all
damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the
act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages
have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the
defendant. As Gos negligence was the root cause of the complained

inconvenience, humiliation and embarrassment, Go is liable to

private respondents for damages.
Petitioner-bank cannot disclaim liability for the negligence of its
employees, because it failed to prove not only that it exercised due
diligence to prevent damage but that it was not negligent in the
selection and supervision of its employees.Anent petitioner banks
claim that it is not co-equally liable with Go for damages, under
the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, (E)mployers
shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees x x x
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Pursuant to this
provision, the bank is responsible for the acts of its employee unless
there is proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage. Hence, the burden of proof lies upon
the bank and it cannot now disclaim liability in view of its own
failure to prove not only that it exercised due diligence to prevent
damage but that it was not negligent in the selection and
supervision of its employees.
________________________________
(13) Gilchrist vs. Cuddy & et. al. 29 Phil. 542(1915)

DAMAGES; INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTS BY STRANGERS.The

interference with lawful contracts by strangers thereto gives rise to
an action for damages in favor of the injured person. The law does
not require that the responsible person shall have known the
identity of the injured person.
FACTS OF THIS CASE.The defendants induced the owner of a
cinematograph film to break his contract of lease with a theater
owner and lease the film to them, with the avowed purpose of
exhibiting it in another theater in the same city. As the profits of the
lessee depended upon the patronage of the public and hence the
task of estimating his damages with accuracy would be quite difficult
if not impossible: Held, That injunction against further interference
with the contract was properly issued.
At the time the defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga offered their
claim for damages arising out of the wrongful issuance of the
restraining order, there was nothing between them and the plaintiff
to litigate, the rightfulness of plaintiff's demand having already been
finally adjudicated and determined in the same action.
__________________________
(14) SAMSON VS. DIONISIO ET AL., 11 Phil. 538(1908)
LAW OF WATERS; PUBLIC DOMAIN.No private person has a right
to usurp the possession of an estero, a branch of a river, or a lake of
public dominion and use, unless it is shown that the body of water is
entirely within his own property, otherwise he violates the law
which expressly excepts such waters from exclusive private use.
OBSTRUCTION OF FLOW OF PUBLIC WATERS.Any person who
without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow
or communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby
causing loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the
residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake,
shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and
damages to the injured party.
____________________________

(15) Andamo & et.al. vs. IAC & et. al. 191 SCRA 195(1990)
Civil Law; Action; The purpose of an action or suit and the law to
govern it including the period of prescription is to be determined not
by the claim of the party filing the action made in his argument or
brief but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for
relief.It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is
determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the
cause of action. The purpose of an action or suit and the law to
govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be determined
not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument
or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer
for relief. The nature of an action is not necessarily determined or
controlled by its title or heading but by the body of the pleading or
complaint itself.
Quasi-delicts; Elements of quasi-delict.A careful examination of
the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the
elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered
by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some
other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of
the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
There is an assertion of a causal connection between the act of
building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners;
Case at bar.Clearly, from petitioners complaint, the waterpaths
and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to
have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an
assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these
waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if
proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for
the recovery of damages.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to fault or negligence, covers not
only acts not punishable by law but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the
tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary.
Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties
which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable
manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others.
Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on
his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained
using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to
adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected
forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an
adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim
indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
_____________________________
(16) Bernal and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban E. & Ice Plant, 54
Phil. 327(1930)
DAMAGES; DEATH OF CHILD.Damages in the amount of P1,000
are allowed the mother of a child five years of age, for the death of
the child as a consequence of burns from the hot water which was
permitted to flow down the side of a public street and into which
the child fell, the cause of death being the fault and negligence of
the defendant. (Civil Code, art. 1902; Manzanares vs. Moreta [1918],
38 Phil., 821.)

(17) Tenchavez vs. Escao,& et. al. 15 SCRA 355(1965)

Husband and wife; Foreign divorce between Filipino citizens decreed
after the effectivity of the new Civil Code; Remarriage of divorced
consort.A foreign divorce between Filipino citizens,, sought and
decreed after the effectivity of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No.
386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in the Philippines; and
neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the
divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce,
entitled to validity in this country.
Invalid divorce entitles innocent consort to recover damages.The
desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort
entitles the other to recover damages.
Action for alienation of affections against parents of one consort;
Absence of proof of malice.An action for alienation of affections
against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of
proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
_______________________________
(18) Ylarde & et. al. vs. Aquino,& et. al. 163 SCRA 697(1988)
Torts and Damages; Schools and Colleges; Liability of teachers for
torts committed by their students.It is only the teachers and not
the principal or head of an academic school who should be
answerable for torts committed by their students. In a school of arts
and trades, it is only the head of the school who can be held liable.
Under Section 2180 of the Civil Code, the teacher-in-charge of
school children should be held liable for negligence in his supervision
over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to
prevent any injury on their persons.
Teacher's responsibility.A teacher who stands in loco parentis to
his pupils should make sure that the children are protected from all
harm in his company.
Work Education.Excavation should not be placed in the category
of school gardening, planting trees, and the like as these
undertakings do not expose the children to any risk that can result in
death or physical injuries.
Existence of reckless imprudence, determination.In determining
whether or not reckless imprudence exists, the degree of care
required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person
endangered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the
same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged
according to the average conduct of persons of his age and
experience.
____________________________
(19) Jarco Marketing Corporation & et.al vs. Court of Appeals, & et.
al. 321 SCRA 375(1999)
Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Words and Phrases; Doctrine of Attractive
Nuisance, Explained.One who maintains on his premises
dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to
attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to
prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is
liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the
child is technically a trespasser in the premises. The principal reason
for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question
although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or
alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to approach,
get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to
such children. (Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. v. Balandan, et al., 91 Phil.
488, 490 *1952+). Same; Same; Same; Accident, Explained.An

accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or

negligence attaches to the defendant. It is a fortuitous
circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any
human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human
agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or
unexpected by the person to whom it happens.
Negligence, Explained.Negligence is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or
the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would
not do. Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of
the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury.
Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictoryone cannot
exist with the other.Accident and negligence are intrinsically
contradictory; one cannot exist with the other. Accident occurs
when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not
caused by fault of any person and which could not have been
prevented by any means suggested by common prudence.
Test in Determining Existence of Negligence.The test in
determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the
landmark case of Picart v. Smith, thus: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which
an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?
If not, then he is guilty of negligence. Same; Same; Evidence;
Hearsay Rule; Res Gestae; Witnesses; It is axiomatic that matters
relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to
a physician are generally considered declarations and admissions.
It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or
suffering and statements made to a physician are generally
considered declarations and admissions. All that is required for their
admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made or
uttered under the influence of a startling event before the declarant
had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the
person who testified in court. Under the circumstances thus
described, it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age
and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with
her life. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales testimony on
the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her
tragic death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their negligence or
omission to secure or make stable the counters base.
Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Children; Presumptions; Children below nine (9)
years old are conclusively presumed incapable of contributory
negligence.Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply
the conclusive presumption that favors children below nine (9) years
old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. In his
book, former Judge Cezar S. Sangco stated: In our jurisdiction, a
person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have
acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from
criminal liability. The same presumption and a like exemption from
criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under
fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with
discernment. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict
and required discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal
or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively
presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption
of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a
child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one,
under our law. The rule, therefore, is that a child under nine years
of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory
negligence as a matter of law.
__________________________

(20) Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company, 27 SCRA 674(1969)

Damages; Negligence; One is liable for damages for act of
negligence causing damage to another.The Civil Code making clear
.that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being negligence, is under obligation to pay for the damage done.
(Art. 2176) Unless it could be satisfactorily shown, therefore, that
defendant-appellee was guilty of negligence, then it could not be
held liable.
Definition.Negligence is want of the care required by the
circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term
and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the
degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably
require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is
necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care
under the circumstances.
Where victim has duty to stop despite failure of appellees employer
to put down crossing bars.The f irst two assigned errors would
make much of ,the failure of the lower court to hold that the
crossing bars not having been put down and there being no guard at
the gate-house, there still was a duty on the part of the- victim to
stop his jeep to avoid a collision and that main witness of defendantappellee, who drove the engine, was not qualified to do so at the
time of the accident. For one cannot just single out a circumstance
and then confidently assign to it decisive weight and significance.
Considered separately, neither of the two above errors assigned
would call for a judgment different in character. Nor would a
combination of acts allegedly impressed with negligence suffice to
alter the result. The quantum of proof required still had not been
met. The alleged errors fail of their desired effect. The case for
plaintiff-appellant, such as it was, had not been improved. There is
no justification for reversing the judgment of the lower court.
Criminal negligence; May be attributed to a person who does not
exercise precaution and control in crossing railroads.A person in
control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular
road crossing, and who does not exercise that precaution and that
control over it as to be able to stop the same almost immediately
upon the appearance of a train, is guilty of criminal negligence,
providing a collision occurs and injury results.
Where facts of the case show it was incumbent upon the victim to
stop his vehicle.Predicated on the testimonies of the plaintiff s
witnesses, on the knowledge of the deceased and his familiarity with
the set up of the checkpoint, the existence of the tracks, and on the
further fact that the locomotive had blown its siren or whistle, which
was heard by said witnesses, it is dear that the victim was so
sufficiently warned in advance of the oncoming train that it was
incumbent upon him to avoid a possible accidentand this
consisted simply in stopping his vehicle before the crossing and
allowing the train to move on. A prudent man under similar
circumstances would have acted in this manner. This, unfortunately,
the victim failed to do.
_________________________
(21) Fernando & et. al. vs. Court of Appeals, & et. al. 208 SCRA
714(1992)
Civil Law; Negligence; Definition of; Under the Law, a person who
by his omission causes damage to another, there being negligence is
obliged to pay for the damage done.Negligence has been defined
as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury (Corliss v. Manila Railroad Company, L-21291, March 28, 1969,
27 SCRA 674, 680). Under the law, a person who by his omission

causes damage to another, there being negligence, is obliged to pay

for the damage done (Article 2176, New Civil Code).
To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence
of another, a claimant must establish the relation between the
omission and the damage; Definition of Proximate cause.To be
entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of
another, a claimant must establish the relation between the
omission and the damage. He must prove under Article 2179 of the
New Civil Code that the defendants negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury. Proximate cause has been
defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred (Vda. de
Bataclan, et al. v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186). Proof of such relation
of cause and effect is not an arduous one if the claimant did not in
any way contribute to the negligence of the defendant. However,
where the resulting injury was the product of the negligence of both
parties, there exists a difficulty to discern which acts shall be
considered the proximate cause of the accident.
___________________________
(23) Fuellas vs. Cadano, 3 SCRA 361(1961)
ARTICLE 2180: VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF PARENTS
Damages; Subsidiary liability; Civil liability for crimes committed by
minors; Scope of parents liability.The subsidiary liability of
parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Art.
2180 of the new Civil Code covers obligations arising from both
quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.
Liability determined under both the Civil Code and the Penal Code.
The subsidiary liability of parents arising from the criminal acts of
their minor children who act with discernment is determined under
the provisions of Art. 2180, N.C.C. and under Article 101 of the
Revised Penal Code, because to hold that the former only covers
obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which
arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while
for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother
may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her
son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal
intent.
____________________________
(24) Tamargo & et. al. vs. Court of Appeals,& et. al. 209 SCRA
518(1992)
Actions; Quasi-delicts; Parents and Child; Adoption; The natural
parents of a minor still living with the former when the latter
accidentally shot a girl with an air rifle are liable for damages thus
caused rather than the adopter even if petition for adoption filed
before the accident and granted thereafter.We do not believe
that parental authority is properly regarded as having been
retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do
not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of
adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents
accruing at a time when the adopting parents had no actual or
physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactive effect may
perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where
such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage
in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold
that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the
Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious
act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have
prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had
no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and

unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with

the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of
vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental
dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura
spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to
their control at the time the tort was committed.
In the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun
or had already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting;
in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural
parents, not the adopting parents.
_________________________
25) Cuadra vs. Monfort, 35 SCRA 160(1970)
ARTICLE 2180: VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF PARENTS
Civil Law; Minors; Damages; Diligence of a good father of a family;
Liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children.In
the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that
the defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance
of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his
parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act
which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it
was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to
expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And
as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an
innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no
parent, however careful, would have any special reason to
anticipate, much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any
mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the childs character
which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the
blame would be attributed to her parents.
Civil Law; Minors; Damages; What constitutes fault within
contemplation of law on torts; Knowledge of consequence of
minors acts could be determined by her age.She was 13 years and
should have known that by jokingly saying aloud that she had found
an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the
object at her, it was likely that something would happen to her
friend, as in fact, she was hurt.
Liability of the father.There being no evidence that he had
properly advised his daughter to behave properly and not to play
dangerous jokes on her classmates and playmates, he can be liable
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
________________________
(26) Amadora & et.al vs. Court of Appeals,& et. al. 160 SCRA
315(1988)
Civil Law; Torts; Article 2180 of the Civil Code should apply to all
schools, academic as well as non-academic.After an exhaustive
examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion
that the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic
as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than
technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort
committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such
student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general
rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head
thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the
general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for
the acts of their students except where the school is technical in
nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be anBwerable.
Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis, teachers should
apply to the words pupHs and students and heads of
establishments of arts and trades to the word apprentices.

No substantial distinction between the academic and the nonacademic schools insofar as torts committed by their students are
concerned.There is really no substantial distinction between the
academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed
by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected
from the teacher over the students under his control and
supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching,
The suggestion in the Sxconde and Mercado Cases is that the
provision would make the teacher or even the head of the school of
arts and trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its
custody but if that same tort were committed in an academic school,
no liability would attach to the teacher or the school head. All other
circumstances being the same, the teacher or the head of the
academic school would be absolved whereas the teacher and the
head of the nonacademic school would be held liable, and simply
because the latter is a school of arts and trades.
No plausible reason why different degrees of vigilance should be
exercised by the school authorities.The Court cannot see why
different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the school
authorities on the basis only of the nature of their respective
schools. There does not seem to be any plausible reason for relaxLng
that vigilance simply because the school is academic in nature and
for increasing such vigilance where the school is nonacademic.
Notably, the injury subject of liability is caused by the student and
not by the school itself nor it is a result of the operations of the
school or its equipment. The injury contemplated may be caused by
any student regardless of the school where he is registered. The
teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself by simply
showing that he is teaching in an academic school where, on the
other hand, the head would be held liable if the school were nonacademic.
Reason for the disparity.The reason for the disparity can be
traced to the fact that historically the head of the school of arts and
trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of
the academic school. The old schools of arts and trades were
engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their master who
personally and directly instructed them on the technique and
secrets of their craft. The head of the school of arts and trades was
such a master and so was personally involved in the task of teaching
his students, who usually even boarded with him and so came under
his constant control, supervision and influence. By contrast, the
head of the academic school was not as involved with his students
and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who
were the persons directly dealing with the students. The head of the
academic school had then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with
the students. Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted
for the acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and
trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be so blamed.
Distinction no longer obtains at presentIt is conceded that the
distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the expansion of
the schools of arts and trades, the consequent increase in their
enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the direct and
personal contact of their heads with the students. Article 2180,
however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the provision
must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and original
mandate until the legislature, taking into account the changes in the
situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary
amendment.
Custody requirement; Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not mean
that the student must be boarding with the school authorities but
the student should be within the control and under its influence at
the time of the occurrence of the injury.From a reading of the
provision under examination, it is clear that while the custody
requirement, to repeat Palisoc vs. Brillantes, does not mean that the
student must be boarding with the school authorities, it does signify

that the student should be within the control and under the
influence of the school authorities at the time of the occurrence of
the injury. This does not necessarily mean that such custody be coterminous with the semester, beginning with the start of classes and
ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the time before or
after such period, such as the period of registration, and in the case
of graduating students, the period before the commencement
exercises. In the view of the Court, the student is in the custody of
the school authorities as long as he is under the control and
influence of the school and within its premises, whether the
semester has not yet begun or has already ended.
Teacher-in-charge must answer for his students torts. The teacherin-charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or other
administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in the
specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not
necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher be physically
present and in a position to prevent it. Custody does not connote
immediate and actual physical control but refers more to the
influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a
result of such influence.
The school may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or
even of the head thereof under the general principle of respondent
superior but may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had
exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.
Liability attaches to the teacher and the head of the technical
school although the wrongdoer was already of age.In this
connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable
not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not
require that the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the
parent, who will be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher
is held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him
regardless of the students age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability
attached to the teacher and the head of the technical school
although the wrongdoer was already of age. In this sense, Article
2180 treats the parent more favorably than the teacher.
_________________________

(28) Mercado & et. al. vs. Lira, & et. al. 3 SCRA 124(1961)
Damages; Moral damages; Death of passenger; Amount
recoverable; Heirs entitled to moral damages.Damages in excess
of P3,000.00 may be awarded for the death of a passenger, and in
addition, the heirs may demand moral damages commensurate with
the mental anguish suffered by them.
Passengers injured not entitled to moral damages.A passenger
who suffered physical injuries because of the carriers negligence
(culpa contractual) cannot be considered in the descriptive
expression analogous cases used in Art. 2119 for which the new
Civil Code authorizes indemnification for moral damages in favor of
the injured party.
Breach of contract of transportation; When moral damages
recoverable.Moral damages are not recoverable in damage
actions predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation
except when there is evidence of fraud, malice or bad faith on the
part of the carrier.
_____________________________
(29) E. Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands., 34 Phil.
311(1916)
ARTICLE 2180: VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF STATE
An act permitting a suit against the state gives rise to no liability not
previously existing unless it is clearly expressed in the act.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; LlABILITY FOR THE
NEGLIGENT ACTS OF ITS OFFICERS, AGENTS, AND EMPLOYEES.
The Government of the Philippine Islands its only liable for the
negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees when they are
acting as special agents within. the meaning of paragraph 5 of article
1903 of the Civil Code, and a chauffeur of the General Hospital is not
such a special agent.
In the case at bar GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS is not liable for the acts of the chauffeur of the General
Hospital who is not such a special agent.

(27) Exconde vs. Capuno, 101 Phil. 843(1957)

_________________________________
ClVIL LlABILITY OF PARENTS FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY THEIR
MINOR CHILDREN; RELIEF FROM LIABILITY.The civil liability which
the law imposes upon the father, and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the
minor children who live with them is a necessary consequence of
the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon
the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their
company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to
their means" while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to
correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155,
Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve
themselves of such liability is if they prove that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Article
1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code).
LIABILITY OF TEACHERS OR DIRECTOR; INSTITUTIONS AFFECTED.
The civil liability imposed by Article 1903 of the old Civil Code on
teachers or directors of arts and trades for damages caused by
pupils or apprentices under their custody, only applies to an
institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational
institution. [Exconde vs. Capuno, 101 Phil. 843(1957)]

(30) Castilex Industrial Corporation vs. Vasquez, Jr., & et. al. 321
SCRA 393(1999)
Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Employer-Employee Relationships; Words and
Phrases; The phrase even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph of Article
2180 of the Civil Code should be interpreted to mean that it is not
necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or
industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting
within the scope of his assigned task.Petitioner contends that the
fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to
instances where the employer is not engaged in business or
industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and
selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision.
Instead, the fourth paragraph should apply. Petitioners
interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The phrase
even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean
that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any
business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee
who is acting within the scope of his assigned task.

_________________________
Fourth and Fifth Paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
Distinguished; Admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different
hatsthey perform functions which are beyond their office, title or
designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of

duty.A distinction must be made between the two provisions to

determine what is applicable. Both provisions apply to employers:
the fourth paragraph, to owners and managers of an establishment
or enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to employers in general,
whether or not engaged in any business or industry. The fourth
paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in
the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions,
while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees
acting within the scope of their assigned task. The latter is an
expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts
included. Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer
is engaged in a business or industry, are covered so long as they
were acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though
committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the
occasion of their functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes
wear different hats. They perform functions which are beyond their
office, title or designation but which, nevertheless, are still within
the call of duty.
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in
any business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts
committed by employees within the scope of their assigned tasks.
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in
any business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts
committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But
it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship;
once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer
liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned
task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that
the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.
The mere fact that an employee was using a service vehicle at the
time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge his
employer with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle
unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the
course or scope of his employment.The court a quo and the Court
of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a
company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks
regardless of the time and circumstances. We do not agree. The
mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the
injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with
liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears
that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his
employment.
The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our
jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, not
on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours. Whether the fault
or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in
American law or jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the
presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer
as in ours, it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his
employers business or within the scope of his assigned task.
To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or
was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the
time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m.
of 28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABADs
working day had ended; his overtime work had already been
completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was
known as a haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and
addicts, had no connection to petitioners business; neither had it
any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service
vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or
one of the perks attached to his position. Since there is paucity of
evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions
entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing

ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require that
petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of
the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.
_________________________________
(31) Filamer Christian Institute vs. Court of Appeals, & et. al. 190
SCRA 485(1990)
Torts; Quasi-Delict; Even assuming that an employer-employee
relationship exists between Filamer and Funtecha, still, Filamer
cannot be made liable for the damages sustained by the victim,
considering that at the time of the accident, Funtecha was not
acting within the scope of his employment.But even if we were
to concede the status of an employee on Funtecha, still the primary
responsibility for his wrongdoing cannot be imputed to petitioner
Filamer for the plain reason that at the time of the accident, it has
been satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was not acting within the
scope of his supposed employment. His duty was to sweep the
school passages for two hours every morning before his regular
classes. Taking the wheels of the Pinoy jeep from the authorized
driver at 6:30 in the evening and then driving the vehicle in a
reckless manner resulting in multiple injuries to a third person were
certainly not within the ambit of his assigned tasks. In other words,
at the time of the injury, Funtecha was not engaged in the execution
of the janitorial services for which he was employed, but for some
purpose of his own. It is but fair therefore that Funtecha should bear
the full brunt of his tortious negligence. Petitioner Filamer cannot be
made liable for the damages he had caused.
-----------------------------------------------------------31) Caedo & et. al vs. Yu Khe That, & et. al. 26 SCRA 410(1968)
Civil law; Negligence; Damage; Liability of vehicle owner for his
driver's negligence; Basis of master's liability.In mo-tor vehicle
mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former,
who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence,
prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver
was negligent, if he has been found guilty of reckless driving or
violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding
two months (Art. 2184, Civil Code).
Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the
driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is
likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the
exercise of due diligence. The rule is not new, although formulated
as law for .the first time in the new Civil Code. It was expressed in
Chapman v. Underwood (1914), 27 Phil. 374.
The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not res-pondeat
superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is
.that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the
master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own
negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or
damage.
Test of imputed negligence; Article 2184, Civil Code, construed.
The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code
is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held
to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional
drivers. In many cases they refrain from driving their own cars and
instead hire other persons to drive for them precisely because they
are not trained or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the
rules of traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers posed by the
different situations that are continually encountered on the road.
What would be a negligent omission under the aforesaid Article on
the part of a car owner who is in the prime of age and knows how to
handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the part, say, of an
old and infirm person who is not similarly equipped.

The law does not require that a person must possess a certain
measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or
in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor
vehicle. The test of his negligence, within the meaning of Article
2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own
senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as
far as perception is concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by
law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one
passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to
another. Were the law to require a uniform standard of
perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners
who, by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services,
would be effectively proscribed.
______________________ _____
32) Ramos & et.al. vs. Court of Appeals, & et. al. 380 SCRA
467(2002)
Physicians; Anesthesiologists; Medical Malpractice; Negligence; The
conduct of a preanesthetic/preoperative evaluation prior to an
operation, whether elective or emergency, cannot be dispensed
withsuch evaluation is necessary for the formulation of a plan of
anesthesia care suited to the needs of the patient concerned.The
conduct of a preanesthetic/preoperative evaluation prior to an
operation, whether elective or emergency, cannot be dispensed
with. Such evaluation is necessary for the formulation of a plan of
anesthesia care suited to the needs of the patient concerned. Preevaluation for anesthesia involves taking the patients medical
history, reviewing his current drug therapy, conducting physical
examination, interpreting laboratory data, and determining the
appropriate prescription of preoperative medications as necessary
to the conduct of anesthesia. Physical examination of the patient
entails not only evaluating the patients central nervous system,
cardiovascular system and lungs but also the upper airway.
Examination of the upper airway would in turn include an analysis of
the patients cervical spine mobility, temporomandibular mobility,
prominent central incisors, deceased or artificial teeth, ability to
visualize uvula and the thyromental distance.
To auscultate means to listen to the sounds arising within organs
as an aid to diagnosis and treatment, the examination being made
either by use of the stethoscope or by direct application of the ear
to the body. (WEBSTERS THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY,
p. 145 [1976]).
Witnesses; Expert Testimony; A pulmonologist could not be
considered an authority on anesthesia practice and procedure and
their complications.What is left to be determined therefore is
whether Erlindas hapless condition was due to any fault or
negligence on the part of Dr. Gutierrez while she (Erlinda) was under
the latters care. Dr. Gutierrez maintains that the bronchospasm and
cardiac arrest resulting in the patients comatose condition was
brought about by the anaphylactic reaction of the patient to
Thiopental Sodium (pentothal). In the Decision, we explained why
we found Dr. Gutierrez theory unacceptable. In the first place, Dr.
Eduardo Jamora, the witness who was presented to support her (Dr.
Gutierrez) theory, was a pulmonologist. Thus, he could not be
considered an authority on anesthesia practice and procedure and
their complications.
The standard practice in anesthesia is that every single act that the
anesthesiologist performs must be recorded.The Court has
reservations on giving evidentiary weight to the entries purportedly
contained in Dr. Gutierrez synopsis. It is significant to note that the
said record prepared by Dr. Gutierrez was made only after Erlinda
was taken out of the operating room. The standard practice in
anesthesia is that every single act that the anesthesiologist performs
must be recorded. In Dr. Gutierrez case, she could not account for

at least ten (10) minutes of what happened during the

administration of anesthesia on Erlinda.
Captain of the Ship Doctrine; Words and Phrases; Under the
Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine, a surgeon is likened to a captain of the
ship, in that it is his duty to control everything going on in the
operating room.The Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine was discussed in
McConnell v. Williams (65 A 2d 243 [1949]), where the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania stated that under this doctrine, a surgeon is
likened to captain of the ship, in that it is his duty to control
everything going on in the operating room.
Human Relations; A surgeons irresponsible conduct of arriving
very late for a scheduled operation is violative, not only of his duty
as a physician but also of Article 19 of the Civil Code.Dr. Hosakas
irresponsible conduct of arriving very late for the scheduled
operation of petitioner Erlinda is violative, not only of his duty as a
physician to serve the interest of his patients with the greatest
solicitude, giving them always his best talent and skill, but also of
Article 19 of the Civil Code which requires a person, in the
performance of his duties, to act with justice and give everyone his
due.
Hospitals; Employer-Employee Relationship; Elements.It has
been consistently held that in determining whether an employeremployee relationship exists between the parties, the following
elements must be present: (1) selection and engagement of
services; (2) payment of wages; (3) the power to hire and fire; and
(4) the power to control not only the end to be achieved, but the
means to be used in reaching such an end.
There is no employer-employee relationship between a hospital and
medical consultants.DLSMC maintains that first, a hospital does
not hire or engage the services of a consultant, but rather, accredits
the latter and grants him or her the privilege of maintaining a clinic
and/or admitting patients in the hospital upon a showing by the
consultant that he or she possesses the necessary qualifications,
such as accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate),
evidence of fellowship and references. Second, it is not the hospital
but the patient who pays the consultants fee for services rendered
by the latter. Third, a hospital does not dismiss a consultant; instead,
the latter may lose his or her accreditation or privileges granted by
the hospital. Lastly, DLSMC argues that when a doctor refers a
patient for admission in a hospital, it is the doctor who prescribes
the treatment to be given to said patient. The hospitals obligation is
limited to providing the patient with the preferred room
accommodation, the nutritional diet and medications prescribed by
the doctor, the equipment and facilities necessary for the treatment
of the patient, as well as the services of the hospital staff who
perform the ministerial tasks of ensuring that the doctors orders are
carried out strictly. After a careful consideration of the arguments
raised by DLSMC, the Court finds that respondent hospitals position
on this issue is meritorious. There is no employer-employee
relationship between DLSMC and Drs. Gutierrez and Hosaka which
would hold DLSMC solidarity liable for the injury suffered by
petitioner Erlinda under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
The contract between a medical consultant and his patient is
separate and distinct from the contract between the hospital and
said patient.Neither is there any showing that it is DLSMC which
pays any of its consultants for medical services rendered by the
latter to their respective patients. Moreover, the contract between
the consultant in respondent hospital and his patient is separate and
distinct from the contract between respondent hospital and said
patient. The first has for its object the rendition of medical services
by the consultant to the patient, while the second concerns the
provision by the hospital of facilities and services by its staff such as
nurses and laboratory personnel necessary for the proper treatment
of the patient.