G.R. No.

L-10144
ANASTASIA PAMINTUAN, ET AL., petitioners, stalker
vs.
JULIO LLORENTE, Judge of First Instance, and CLEMENTE DAYRIT, respondents.
Pedro Abad Santos and Aurelio Pineda for petitioners. William A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan for respondents.
PER CURIAM:
This is an applicant for the writ of mandamus. Its purpose is to compel the Honorable Julio Llorente to continue with the trial of a cause
commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pampanga, while he was yet judge of said court. The important facts alleged in the
complaint are as follows:
First. That on the 3d day of August, 1910, the defendant (Clemente Dayrit) commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Pampanga against the plaintiffs in this action. Said action was numbered 507.
Second. That at the time of the commencement of said action (the 3d of August, 1910), the said Honorable Julio Llorente was judge of the Court
of First Instance of said province.
Third. That on the 1st day of July, 1914, the Honorable Julio Llorente ceased to be judge of said court and became judge, on said date, of the Fifth
Judicial District, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 2347 .
Fourth. That sometime between the 3d day of August, 1910, and the 1st day of July, 1914, the said judge had entered upon the trial of said cause;
that the declarations of some of the witnesses had been taken; that he had seen and heard said witnesses; that he had made an ocular inspection
of the property in question in said cause No. 507.
Fifth. That on the 1st day of July, 1914, the trial of said cause was still pending.
`Sixth. That after the 1st day of July, 1914, and after the Honorable Julio Llorente had ceased to be judge of the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Pampanga and had become judge of the Fifth Judicial District, he refused to continue with the trial of said cause, No. 507, for the
reason that he claimed that he was incompetent to try the same.
The plaintiffs, upon the foregoing facts, prayed that a writ of mandamus should be issued by this court, directing, requiring, and compelling the
said Honorable Julio Llorente to continue the trial of said cause No. 507 until its conclusion.
To said petition, the defendants or respondent presented a demurrer, alleging that the facts stated were not sufficient to constitute a cause of
action; that the facts stated in said complaint showed that the Honorable Julio Llorente had been judge of the Fifth Judicial District from the 1st day
of July, 1914, and was, therefore, incompetent to continue the trial of said cause No. 507 pending in the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Pampanga, the Seventh Judicial District.
Upon the issue thus presented the cause was submitted to this court.
The simple question presented by the petition and the demurrer is, whether or not, under the provisions of Act No. 2347, a judge who had
commenced the trial of a cause and who had ceased to be the judge of the particular court in which said cause was pending, before the
termination of the same, may be compelled by mandamus to continue with the trial of the same. The petitioners in the present cause rely upon the
provisions of section 24 of said Act No. 2347. Said section 24 provides:
All criminal or civil cases, and all judicial proceedings of a like nature, pending decision or sentence, or pending continuance of the evidence in the
present Courts of First Instance, at the time when this Act takes effect, shall remain under the jurisdiction of said courts, until their final decision;
and all civil or criminal cases, and all judicial proceedings of a like nature that have been filed or initiated and are pending trial or a hearing in said
courts shall be transferred to their successors for trial and sentence, and all pending decision or decree, or continuance of the evidence in the
Court of Land Registration at the date on which this Act takes effect, shall continue until their final decision under the jurisdiction of the judges of
said court to whom such cases were assigned, and all cases filed or begun, but pending trial or a hearing in the Court of Land Registration, shall
be transferred to the judges of the Court of First Instance of the provinces where said lands made the object of said cases are situate.
The particular part of said section upon which the petitioners rely is the following:
All criminal or civil cases . . . pending decision or sentence in the present Courts of First Instance at the time when this Act takes effect, shall
remain under the jurisdiction of said courts, until their final decision.
If the quoted provision of said section 24 was the only provision of said Act No. 2347, there might be but little difficulty in ascertaining the purpose
of the Legislature. We find, however, another section which bears an important relation to the interpretation of said section 24. Section 7 of said
Act, among other things, provides:
The present judges of Courts of First Instance, judges at large, and judges of the Court of Land Registration vacate their positions on the taking
effect of this Act.
This Act took effect on the 1st day of July, 1914.
It will be noted that section 7, in effect, provides that the present judges (those appointed prior to July 1, 1914) shall vacate their positions on the
1st day of July, 1914. The language used in the phrase "shall vacate their positions" is very strong language. The Legislature could hardly have
used stronger language if its real purpose was to terminate the judicial authority of the "present judges." The word "vacate" means, according to
Webster, "To make vacant; to leave empty; to cease from filling or occupying; to annul; to deprive of force; to make of no authority or validity; to
defeat; to put an end to."
The Standard Dictionary also defines the word "vacate" as follows: "To make vacant; empty; to surrender possession of by removal; to put an end
to; give up; quit; leave."
Bouvier, in his valuable Law Dictionary, defines the words "vacate" as follows: "To annul; to render an act void."
Black, in his Law Dictionary, defines the word "vacate" to mean: "To annul; to cancel or rescind; to render an act void."
Mr. Ladd, in the case of Bautista vs. Johnson (2 Phil. Rep., 230) defines the word "vacate," as used in Act No. 267 , to mean: "To annul; to render
void." Mr. Ladd continues by saying: "No stronger word could have been employed by the Commission (Legislature) in the law in question to
signify absolute extinction."
If then the judicial authority of the "present judges" was ended or terminated or extinguished, by what authority could they continue to act? And
suppose also that the "present judges" had not been reappointed, by what authority could the act? But the petitioners argue that under the
provisions of section 24 (Act No. 2347) "all criminal or civil cases . . . pending decision or sentence, or pending continuance of the evidence in the
present courts . . . shall remain under the jurisdiction of said courts, until their final decision," and that, therefore, the "present judges" are vested
with authority and jurisdiction to continue to consider said cases until their final decision. A careful reading of said provisions discloses the fact,
however, that said "criminal or civil cases," etc., "pending decision, shall remain under the jurisdiction of the courts," and not under the jurisdiction
of the judges. The purpose of this provision was to clearly indicate that the existing Courts of First Instance were to continue; that the existing
courts were not "vacated" or terminated or extinguished. Had the existence of the courts been terminated or "vacated," then, of course, all actions

pending would have been ended, and it would have been necessary to recommence them in the new courts. It was clearly not the intention of the
Legislature to destroy the existing Courts of First Instance. The law clearly indicates the contrary. Its purpose was simply to change the personnel
of the judges, or at least to require all the judges to be reappointed under the new law and under new qualifications. Had the Legislature intended
that all criminal and civil cases pending decision, etc., etc., shall remain under the jurisdiction of the "present judges," it would have said so. On
the contrary, it is said that all criminal and civil cases pending decision, shall remain under the jurisdiction of the courts then existing.
The petitioners argue at length that the word "judges" and "courts" are used synonymously and interchangeably. That is true, generally speaking.
In ordinary parlance judges are spoken of as the courts and the courts are referred to, when the person speaking means the judge simply. It is
common for persons, lawyers, and judges, as well as the law, to use these terms interchangeably. But, notwithstanding that fact, there is an
important distinction between them which should be kept in mind. Courts may exist without a present judge. There may be a judge without a court.
The judge may become disqualified, but such fact does not destroy the court. It simply means that there is no judge to act in the court. The courts
of the Philippine Islands were created and the judges were appointed thereto later. In a few instances, the judges were appointed before the
courts were established. A person may be appointed a judge and be assigned to a particular district or court subsequently. So it appears that there
is an important distinction between the court, as an entity, and the person who occupies the position of judge. In the most general sense these
words may be used interchangeably. In the statute under consideration, however, it is clear that the Legislature intended to make a distinction
between "courts" and "judges." It is clear, when sections 7 and 24 are read together, that when the Legislature "vacated" the "present judges" by
section 7, that they did not intend to "vacate" the "court," or otherwise they would not have provided that "all criminal and civil cases, pending
decision," etc., "shall remain under the jurisdiction of the courts." It was clearly not the intention of the Legislature to "vacate" the courts. Its
purpose was simply to change the personnel of the judges of the courts. In other words, on and after the 1st of July, 1914, there were no judges of
the Courts of First Instance until and unless others were appointed. But the courts still existed, just as though the law had not been changed. The
law simply changed the personnel of the courts.
Certainly the Legislature did not intend to provide, after it had vacated, terminated and put an end the judicial authority of the "present judges," that
said judges should continue to exercise judicial authority, unless and until they were reappointed. The Act nowhere provides that the existing
courts shall be supplanted. It (the Act) simply changes the district. It expressly recognizes the existence and continuance of the present courts,
with the same jurisdiction which theretofore existed. The new judges which were appointed under and by authority of said Act (No. 2347) "have the
same jurisdiction and competency as conferred by existing law upon the Courts of First Instance." attempt even to change the jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance, except to confer upon them the jurisdiction which had theretofore been exercised by the Court of Land Registration. In
every other respect the "Courts" of First Instance existed after the 1st of July, 1914, with the same powers and jurisdiction which they had
exercised theretofore.
The petitioners further argue that the Honorable Julio Llorente, having heard a part of the proof in case No. 507, should, for that reason, hear it all
and decide the case. In answer to that argument, as we have pointed out above, he is no longer judge of that court and has no more authority to
act as judge of the same than any other person. His authority was "vacated" and terminated and extinguished to act as judge in said district, after
the 1st of July, 1914.
The question presented by the petitioners here has already been decided by this court. In the case of United States vs. Soler, 6 Phil. Rep., 321,
the court, speaking through the late Mr. Justice Willard, said:
The seventh assignment of error in the brief of the appellant is to the effect that the judgment is void because the judge who tried the case had
ceased to be the judge of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon at the time he signed the judgment, and at that time was the judge of the Court
of First Instance of the Eleventh Judicial District, the Province of Sorsogon being included in the Eighth Judicial District. It is admitted in the brief of
the Solicitor-General that on the 30th day of April, 1904, when the judgment was signed, the judge who signed it was not the judge of the district
court in which the action was pending. We think that this assignment of error must be sustained. . . .
The judgment of the court below is set aside and the case is remanded for a new trial. Upon the new trial it will not be necessary to retake the
evidence already taken and appearing in the record, but the parties will be at liberty to present such other evidence as they see fit, with the costs
of this instance de officio.
See also U. S. vs. Singuimuto, 3 Phil. Rep., 176.
In the case of the United States vs. Macavinta, 8 Phil. Rep., 447, this court held that: "A judge who hears a part of the testimony and leaves the
jurisdiction of the court where the cause was being tried before the same is finally closed and submitted, has no jurisdiction to impose a sentence
in said cause."
In that case, from the record it appears that the Honorable Mariano Cui heard a part of the proof presented. Before the close of the trial he was
transferred to another district and the Honorable W. F. Norris was appointed as the regular judge. The case was again called up to trial and the
parties litigant renounced their right to present further proof. Whereupon the said Norris ordered a transcription of the notes taken by the
stenographer during the trial of the cause and remitted the same to the Honorable Mariano Cui, who had heard the evidence during the trial of the
cause, in order that he might prepare the sentence. Later the said Cui, while he was judge of another district, prepared the sentence in said case,
finding the defendant guilty of the crime charged. From that sentence the defendant appealed to this court. In this court the defendant and
appellant contended that the said Honorable Mariano Cui had no jurisdiction to prepare the sentence, not having concluded the trial.
After a consideration of the assignments of error made by the appellant, this court said: "The Honorable Mariano Cui did not have jurisdiction over
the said cause at the time it was submitted to the court of said province, he had no authority or jurisdiction to render the decision therein, and for
this reason the said sentence is reversed and the case is hereby ordered to be remanded to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Capiz,
with direction that the judge thereof render such sentence in the cause as the record and evidence justify."
See also the case of U. S. vs. Autiz, 10 Phil. Rep., 233.
If then a judge who has been transferred or changed from one court or province to another, cannot decide a case which he tried, but had not yet
decided before his transfer, how can the "present judges" whose position have been vacated continue to take jurisdiction of "pending decisions?"
In view of the above-quoted decisions of this court, the question contains its own answer. The mere fact that a judge happened to be reappointed
cannot change the result, unless he happens to be assigned to the same district or province. In the latter case it will, of course, be his duty to
dispose of the case.
There is not a word nor a single provisions in said Act (No. 2347) which tends to show or to intimate that the Legislature intended to establish, in
the place of the existing courts, other and different Courts of First Instance. Said Act changed the personnel of the judges of the existing Courts of
First Instance only.
In the case of Santos vs. Johnson, 6 Phil. Rep, 473, this court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Arellano, said:
It appearing that the defendant judge was not at that time the judge of the province in question, we hold that he properly refused to sign and certify
the bill of exceptions presented to him in a case which he had tried. The certification and signing of a bill of exceptions are jurisdictional acts which

cannot be executed by one who has no jurisdiction over the matter on account of his having ceased to be the judge of the court in which the case
was tried by him as such judge. He has no right to exercise any jurisdiction in a court of which he has ceased to be the judge. (Enriquez vs.
Watson, 3 Phil. Rep., 279; Ricamora vs. Trent, 3 Phil. Rep., 137; Osme?a vs. Gorordo, 5 Phil. Rep., 37.)
In a very recent case decided by this court (Mapiot vs. Mapiot, R. G. No. 7748, not reported), one judge heard all of the proof submitted and later
another judge decided the case, without any objection from either of the parties, upon the proof theretofore submitted, and the decision of the
lower court was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Many more instances might be given showing where one judge of the Court of First Instance had
heard a part or all of the proof in a particular case, and where the decision was rendered by another judge upon the same, and in some instances,
additional proof.
We do not believe that it was the intention of the Legislature to provide that a judge whose position had been vacated on the 1st of July, 1914, and
who had been appointed and transferred to another district as judge, should continue to act in his original district and to continue to have
jurisdiction of cases, criminal or civil, theretofore pending before him. It is our opinion that one who has been judge of the court of a particular
district and who is afterwards appointed judge of another district, has no authority, after he becomes judge of the latter district, to take any action
in cases pending in the former district, at the time he retired therefrom.
For all of the foregoing reason, we are of the opinion and so hold that the petitioners are not entitled to the writ of mandamus as prayed for. The
demurrer is therefore hereby sustained, with costs against the petitioners.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Araullo, JJ., concur. Trent, J., concurs in the result.
No. L-21638. July 26, 1966.
ONG SIU, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. ANTONIO P. PAREDES, in his capacity as Judge of Branch II of the Municipal Court of
Manila, CHARLIE FUNG, and BENJAMIN LU, respondents-appellees.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (in Civ. Case No. 53280) dismissing the petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by Ong Siu, Sy So Ty, Francisco Ong, and Lucio Ong, to restrain respondent Judge Antonio P. Paredes of the Municipal Court of
Manila from retrying Criminal Cases Nos. F038479 and F-038480 of the latter court.
The disputed facts of this case are as follows:
In August, 1961, petitioners-appellants Ong Siu and Sy So Ty were charged in the Municipal Court of Manila with slight physical injuries (Crim.
Case No. F-038479), while petitioners-appellants Francisco Ong and Lucio Ong were charged with light threats (Crim. Case No. F-038480). On
the other hand, respondents-appellees Charlie Fung and Benjamin Lu were accused of the crime of serious physical injuries and slight physical
injuries in Criminal Cases Nos. F-038477 and F-038478 of the same court.
These four cases were jointly tried by Judge Andres Sta. Maria of Branch II of the Municipal Court, and a single decision was rendered under
date of July 7, 1962, On July 9, 1962, and before the decision could be promulgated, Judge Sta. Maria was appointed to and assumed the
position of Judge of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro. Judge Milagros German succeeded him as Municipal Judge of Manila. Charlie Fung
and Benjamin Lu, the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. F-038477 and F-038478 petitioned the court that the unpromulgated decision of Judge Sta.
Maria be declared null and void. In her order of August 14, 1962, Judge German granted the petition and the unpromulgated decision of Judge
Sta. Maria was declared a nullity, as if no trial was had before. But before a retrial of the cases could be held, Judge German resigned from the
position. Solicitor Lauro C. Maiquez of the Solicitor Generals Office, was temporarily assigned to preside over Branch II of the Municipal Court.
Upon petition of herein appellants, the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. F-038479 and F-038480, Acting Judge Maiquez in his order of August
22, 1962, directed the promulgation of the decision of Judge Sta. Maria, for August 29, 1962. However, on August 23, 1962, respondent Judge
Antonio P. Paredes was appointed to the vacant position of Municipal Judge. In his order of even date, Judge Paredes also scheduled the
promulgation of the decision of Judge Sta. Maria. This was done with respect to appellants, the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. F-038479 and F038480, but not with regard to Charlie Fung and Benjamin Lu who did not appear during the promulgation of the judgment. Def endants Fung and
Lu, who were ordered arrested for their non-appearance, thereupon instituted certiorari and prohibition proceeding in the Court of First Instance of
Manila to restrain the promulgation of the decision (Civ. Case No. 51468).
In its decision of November 5, 1962, the Court of First Instance of Manila (Judge Jose N. Leuterio presiding) granted the writ, on the ground
that since Judge Sta. Maria was no longer a judge of the Municipal Court, the decision written by him could no longer be validly promulgated,
Upon the decision of Judge Leuterio becoming final, Judge Antonio Paredes of the Municipal Court ordered a retrial of the four criminal cases
(Nos. F-038477, F-038478, F038479, and F-038480), which was set for March 14, 1963. Herein appellants now in turn went to the Court of First
Instance of Manila and applied for a writ to restrain the Municipal Judge from retrying the four cases. lt was alleged that, as the decision acquitting
them had already been promulgated with respect to them, a retrial of the cases would subject them to double jeopardy for the same offenses.
On June 20, 1963, the Court of First Instance of Manila (Judge Arsenio Santos, presiding) dismissed the petition, for the reason that the
decision of Judge Sta. Maria being invalid because its promulgation was effected when the judge had already ceased to be a municipal judge, the
same cannot place the defendants twice in jeopardy for the same offense. This is the decision that is the subject of the present appeal.
The appellants in effect contend that since the decision of Judge Sta. Maria was signed by him while he was still the judge of the Municipal Court
of Manila where they were tried, its promulgation, although made in his absence, was valid. In support of this contention, they cite Section 6 of
Rule 116 (now Rule 120) of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment.The judgment is promulgated by reading the judgment or sentence in the presence of the defendant and
any jugde of the court in which it was rendered. The defendant must be personally present if the conviction is for a grave offense; if for a light
offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his attorney or representative. And when the judge is absent or outside of the
province or city, his presence is not necessary and the judgment may be promulgated or read to the defendant by the clerk of court. x x x. (Italics
supplied.)
Pursuant to the above-quoted provisions, the petitionersappellants argue, the decision of Judge Sta. Maria was promulgated in the presence of
Judge Paredes, another judge of the Municipal Court. They claim that the absence of Judge Sta. Maria during the promulgation does not render
the decision he penned prior to his appointment to the position of judge of the court of first instance null and void. Thus, it is alleged, the
promulgation thereof, upon order of Judge Paredes, was valid and could be the basis of the defense of double jeopardy.
The above-quoted Section 6 of Rule 116 (now Rule 120) of the Rules of Court, allowing the dispensability of the presence of the judge in the
reading of a sentence refers only to the physical absence of the judge, and not to his inability to be present during the promulgation of the
judgment because of the cessation of or his removal from office. This is clear from the use of the disjunctive clause absent or outside of the
province or city in the provision. In other words, the decision of the judge may be promulgated even without his presence, as long as he is still a
judge of that court.1

In the present case, what we have is not merely physical absence of the judge who penned the decision, but the cessation or termination of his
incumbency as such judge. In the case of People v. Bonifacio So y Ortega,2 this Court ruled:
It is well-settled that, to be binding a judgment must be duly signed, and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who signed it.
In Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, supra, Judge Barretto signed his decision on January 14; two days later (January 16), he qualified as Secretary
of Finance thereby retiring from the judiciary; and on January 17 his decision was promulgated. This Court held such decision to be void, because
at the time of the promulgation the judge who prepared it was no longer a judicial officer.
In criminal proceedings the Rules are more explicit. They require the judgment to be promulgated by reading the judgment or sentence in the
presence of the defendant and the judge of the court who has rendered it (Rule 116, sec. 6); and although it is true that it may be read by the clerk
when the judge is absent or outside the province, it is implied that it may be read, provided he is still the judge therein.
It is contended that herein decision was promulgated, to all intents and purposes, when it was delivered to the clerk for promulgationJune
18. That contention was however, indirectly overruled in People v. Court of Appeals, a case similar to this wherein we regarded compliance with
sec. 6 of Rule 116 as essential to promulgation, and held that as the judgment was promulgated after the judge who penned it had ceased to be
judge, it was not legally binding.
It is true that in Cea vs. Cinco (50 Off. Gaz. 5254) this section was interpreted to mean that where judgment is one of acquittal, reading in the
presence of the. defendant may be substituted by giving a copy of the decision to him. We declared that such actdelivery of copyamounted to
promulgation. In the case before us, notice that the decision would be read (on June 30) was sent out, while Judge Encarnacion was still a judge.
Yet no copy of such decision was given the accused, and he was not informed thereof during said judges incumbency. No judgment was therefore
validly entered. (C/. Landicho v. Tan, 48 Off. Gaz. 1007)."
Here, in the present case, when the notice for the promulgation of the decision was sent out, the judge who signed the decision was no longer the
judge of the court, and no copy of the judgment of acquittal was delivered to the appellants. With more reasons, therefore, is there no judgment
validly entered in this case.
It may also be stated that pursuant to Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, for the defense of double jeopardy to be invoked, there must
be either previous acquittal, or conviction, or the case against the accused was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent or
that there is another pending charge against him involving the same offense, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. In the case at bar,
while it is true that there was a valid information, the accused had been arraigned, and the cases were heard by a competent court, there is,
however, no valid judgment acquitting or convicting the accused or terminating the cases without their express consent. And neither is there any
other criminal.charge pending against the accused. In the rehearing being ordered by the respondent judge, no new information is filed. This
hearing is made necessary only because of the nullity of the judgment rendered by the judge who heard the cases and by the fact that the trial
court is not a court of record. The rehearing thus ordered actually is nothing more than a continuation of the trial of the charges against the
accused for the purpose of enabling the respondent Judge to properly render the decision in the cases. It is similar to a proceeding for the
reconstitution of lost evidence. As this Court had said in the case of United States v. Laguna (17 Phil. 532, 540) quoted with approval in the
case ofPeople v. Dagatan:3
In the present case, there might have been a delay that has worked hardship or disadvantage on the accused, but the same cannot be attributed
solely to the Government, since reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the defense (Gunabe vs. Director of Prisons, 44 O.G.
1244). x x x
x x x. Every person who finds himself in a court of justice, in whatever capacity, must hold himself while there, subject to those unforeseen
events which suddenly and unavoidably intervene and change the Whole aspect of things. The sickness or death of the judge, or of counsel for
the prosecution, the destruction by f ire or f lood of the court-house and all the records and evidence of the pending trialany of these things are
sufficient to interrupt the course of the proceedings and to require that they be begun anew. Such events weigh equally against all. As no one can
be charged with their occurrence, so no one can legally lose or profit by their results. While the law protects persons charged with crime from the
unjust and arbitrary acts of man, there is no shield which may be interposed against the tyranny of unforeseen events. Until the proceedings
which, under the system which the law provides, constitute his trial are terminated, the happening of an unforeseen event which renders the
continuance of his trial for the time impossible, as it can not be used for his conviction, can not be urged for his absolution.
Wherefore, finding no error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
Chief Justice Concepcion and Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, J.P. Bengzon,Zaldivar and Sanchez, concur.
Decision affirmed.
RODRIGUEZ VS TESORERO
o
L-3054: Petitioner, as a tax-payer, an elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party, applies for a writ of prohibition to restrain the
Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing E.O. No. 225 (appropriates funds for the operation of the Philippine Government during the
period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes)
o
L-3056: petitioner, with reference to EO No. 226 (appropriates P6M to defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the hold
lug of the national elections to be held in Nov. 1949), asks this Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise
disposing of that amount or any part of it."

As petitioners fail to assailing the constitutionally of Act No. 671 in their oral argument and memorandum (they rest their case chiefly on the
proposition that the CA No. 671 has ceased to have any force and effect), constitutionality of said act will be taken for granted.

Act No. 671, enacted by the National Assembly, is an act declaring a state of total emergency as a result of war between the United States
and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines and authorizing the president to promulgate rules and regulations to
meet such emergency, pursuant to Art. VI, sec. 26, of the Constitution. The problem is, CA No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its
effectiveness
Issue: WON CA No. 671 has ceased to have any force and effect
Held and Ratio

YES. Art. VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited period" as used in the
Constitution means restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, must be temporary or it can not
be said to be an emergency.

It is to be presumed that CA No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view as the opposite would make the law repugnant to the
Constitution, and contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The
assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either.

Moreover, the fact that Sec. 4, CA No. 471 (which stipulates that "the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall be in full force and
effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide") is silent regarding the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the
express provision for the repeal of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of it only means that the National Assembly believed that
there was no necessity to provide for a provision regarding the repeal of the authority itself. There would be no point in repealing or annulling
the rules and regulations promulgated under a law if the law itself was to remain in force, since, in that case, the President could not only
make new rules and regulations but he could restore the ones already annulled by the legislature.

It would anomalous to have two legislative bodies (Legislative and Executive) operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and
simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions. Even if the emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended while
Congress was in session and be revived after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be limited. Congress by a 2/3 vote could repeal
executive orders promulgated by the President during congressional recess, and the President in turn could treat in the same manner,
between sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the latter.

Aside from these anomalies, Sec. 3which provides that the President shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress
report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein grantedimplies that there was to be only one
meeting of Congress at which the President was to give an account of his trusteeship.

Moreover, Pres. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a special session, who recommended the enactment of the Emergency Powers
Act, if indeed he was not its author, and who was the very President to be entrusted with its execution, stated in his autobiography, that CA No.
671 was only "for a certain period" and "would become invalid unless reenacted." These connote automatic extinction of the law upon the
conclusion of a certain period. A new legislation was necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that period.

What then was the contemplated period? Pres. Quezon said he issued the call for a special session of the National Assembly "when it became
evident that we were completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular
session which was to open on January 1, 1942." From that, the conferring of enormous powers upon the President was decided upon with
specific view to the inability of the National Assembly to meet, as no other factor than this inability could have motivated the delegation of
powers so vast as to amount to an abdication by the National Assembly of its authority.

HELD: Thus, the Court held that the period contemplated from the foregoing was a period coextensive with the inability of Congress to
function, a period ending with the convening of that body. Particularly, CA No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met, not in the first
special session where the Congress may "consider general legislation or only such as he (President) may designate." (Art. VI(9), Constitution)
but in regular session on May 25, 1946 where the power Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the
organic law. The Court further held that EO Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law (because they were issued when
CA No. 671 was not in full force and effect).

Having arrived at this conclusion, the Court need not decide the question as to which department of government is authorized to inquire
whether the contingency on which the law is predicated still exists. The right of one or another department to declare the emergency
terminated is not in issue.

What the Court in this case did is to find out the will of legislature and, once found, to apply it. Of course, the function of interpreting statutes in
proper cases, as in this, will not be denied the courts as their constitutional prerogative and duty.

No legal principle can be found to support the proposition that the Chief Executive has the exclusive authority to say that war has not ended,
and may act on the strength of his opinion and findings in contravention of the law as the courts have construed it.

Another peg to the ratio decidendi (naks! Method ang dating! Haha!) Acts Nos. 600 and 620 even imparts by express provision that the rules
and regulations to be eventually made in pursuance of Acts Nos. 600 and 620, were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of
adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly." From this the idea
was fixed that the Acts themselves would lapse not latter than the rules and regulations. The design to provide for the automatic repeal of
those rules and regulations necessarily was predicated on the consciousness of a prior or at best simultaneous repeal of their source.

The question whether war, in law or in fact, continues, is irrelevant. If we were to that actual hostilities between the original belligerents are still
raging, the elusion would not be altered.

In the light of the conditions surrounding the approval of the Emergency Power Act, we are of the opinion that the "state of total emergency as
a result of war" envisaged in the preamble referred to the impending invasion and occupation of the Philippines by the enemy and the
consequent total disorganization of the Government, principally the impossibility for the National Assembly to act. The state of affairs was one
which called for immediate action and with which the National Assembly would not be able to cope. The war itself and its attendant chaos and
calamities could not have necessitated the delegation had the National Assembly been in a position to operate.

A Note on the System of Separation of Powers: The Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects and shortcomings,
in preference to the commingling of powers in one man or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have
given notice that they share the faith of other democracy-loving people in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this
framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not expecting periods of crisis no matter how serious. The truth is
that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances "the various branches,
executive, legislative, and judicial," given the ability to act, are called upon "to the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them
respectively." (Thus, the President should not retain his extraordinary powers as long as turmoil and other ills directly or indirectly traceable to
the late war harass the Philippines)
For lack of the required number of votes, judgment was not obtained. However, after rehearing, the required number of votes was had, by
resolution of September 16, 1949, which follows.