De Bumanglag vs. Bumanglag [A.M. No.

188 November 29, 1976]

Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Saturday, February 25, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts:
Esteban T. Bumanglad, the respondent, was found by the Court in its decision of September 24, 1973
guilty of gross immoral conduct and ordered his suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years;
Respondent filed several motions for reconsideration but the same were denied;
As a result of such denial, the respondent wrote a petition to the President of the Philippines that he
promulgate(s) a decree that the order of suspension by the Supreme Court be set aside and that your
humble self be allowed to become an active member of the New Society.
The respondent alleged in the same petition that he was deprived of due process of law;
The Clerk of Court, by way of an indorsement from the Assistant Executive Secretary, received a copy of
the petition and was requested to comment and/or appropriate action on the subject matter;
However, in a subsequent letter to the President the respondent retracted and acknowledged his non
observance of protocol of separation of powers;
In the end, the respondent asked for an apology from the members of the Honorable Court.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not respondent may be disciplined for gross ignorance of the law and of the Constitution in
not observing the protocol of separation of power by asking the President to set aside by decree the
decision of the Court imposing suspension upon the respondent
(2) Whether or not a decision duly promulgated by the Supreme Court may be set aside by a Presidential
Decree
Held:
(1) Respondent is hereby administered a reprimand for gross ignorance of the law and of the Constitution
in having asked the President to set aside by decree the Court's decision which suspended him for two
years from the practice of law, with warning that the commission of any transgression in the future of his
oath and duties as a member of the bar will be severely dealt with.
(2) Since respondent has apologized for his "big mistake" and now appreciates that under the
fundamental principle of separation of powers enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, a
decision of this Court may not be set aside by the President, the Court is disposed to view his misconduct
and/or ignorance with liberality and will administer a reprimand with warning of severe action on any
future transgressions, considering respondent's unenviable record.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. 188 November 29, 1976

RICARDA GABRIEL DE BUMANGLAG, complainant,

vs.
ESTEBAN T. BUMANGLAG, respondent.
RESOLUTION

TEEHANKEE, J.:
In the Court's decision of September 24, 1973, the Court found respondent guilty of gross immoral
conduct and ordered his suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. Respondent
filed several motions for reconsideration, all of which were denied per the Court's Resolutions of
November 20, 1973, December 19, 1973, January 9, 1974 and October 30, 1974.
On March 31, 1975, the Clerk of Court received a 1st Indorsement dated February 21, 1975 from then
Assistant Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora "requesting comment and/or appropriate action" on the
therewith enclosed petition of respondent to the President of the Philippines that he "promulgate(s) a
decree that the order of suspension by the Supreme Court be set aside and that your humble self be
allowed to become an active member of the New Society".
The Court per its Resolution of June 16, 1975 directed the Clerk of Court "to furnish the Office of the
President through Assistant Executive Secretary Zamora with copies of the Court's decision of September
24, 1973 wherein the Court in a spirit of liberality by majority vote imposed a lesser penalty of two-year
suspension instead of disbarment (as voted by a minority composed of Justices Castro and Makasiar)
and of the Court's resolutions of November 20, 1973 and December 19, 1973 denying for lack of merit
respondent's two motions for reconsideration dated October 18, 1973 and December 12, 1973"; and
further resolved "to require respondent to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why he should not
be subjected to further disciplinary action for making false statements and misrepresentations in his
petition to the President that he has been allegedly deprived of due process of law contrary to the facts of
record as stated in the Court's decision, and for gross ignorance of the law and of the Constitution in
asking the President to set aside by decree this Court's decision imposing upon him two-year suspension
from the practice of law".
In a 2nd Indorserment of June 18, 1975 and received by the Clerk of Court on the same day, then
Assistant Executive Secretary Zamora forwarded respondent's letter of the same date to the President
stating that "(T)he undersigned by now (has) come to realize that I made a big mistake by making said
letter to you, Your Excellency, because the Honorable Supreme Court may believe that I may be
challenging the decision which is already final and executory and as such do not observe the doctrine of
protocol of separation of power(s)", and withdrawing and asking the President to disregard his first letter.
Respondent in his Explanation of July 23, 1975 cited the fact that he had "immediately" withdrawn his
letter asking for the President's intervention and that "lately, however, he has fully realized that the Chief
Executive is bereft (of) any authority to set aside or modify the decision of this Honorable Supreme Court"
and "with folded hands begs and asks an apology from the members of this Honorable Court, with the full
assurance that nothing of this sort will be repeated by him in the future."
Respondent served his two-year suspension, as duly noted in the Court's Resolution of November 7,
1975. Since respondent has apologized for his "big mistake" and now appreciates that under the
fundamental principle of separation of powers enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, a
decision of this Court may not be set aside by the President, the Court is disposed to view his misconduct
and/or ignorance with liberality and will administer a reprimand with warning of severe action on any
future transgressions, considering respondent's unenviable record.
A final word is called for on respondent's statement in his Explanation inferring that he was led to file his

petition with the President by the fact that his motions for reconsideration "were only denied by the Clerk
of Court without any comment whatsoever". As the Court has had occasion to state in People vs. Catolico
* and earlier cases, this remark of respondent exposes his lack of appreciation or disregard of the timehonored usage of the Court that minute resolutions, summons and processes of the Court, upon being
duly adopted and recorded are transmitted to the interested parties by and upon the signature of the Clerk
of Court who is duly authorized to do so. With the thousands of resolutions approved monthly by the
Court, it would unduly tax the time and attention of the Chief Justice and members of the Court to the
prejudice of the administration of justice if all such papers, other than decisions, could be released only
upon their own signatures.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby administered a reprimand for gross ignorance of the law and of the
Constitution in having asked the President to set aside by decree the Court's decision which suspended
him for two years from the practice of law, with warning that the commission of any transgression in the
future of his oath and duties as a member of the bar will be severely dealt with.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Muoz-Palma, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.

LEGAL ETHICS
Victoria Legarda vs. Court of Appeals Canon 15G.R. No. 94457 March 18, 1991
Facts
: Petitioner engaged the services of counsel to handle her case. Said counsel filed his appearance with
an urgent motion for extension of time to file the answer within 10 days from February 26, 1985. However,
said counsel failed to file the answer within the extended period prayed for. Counsel for private
respondent, New Cathay House Inc. filed an ex-parte motion to declare petitioner in default. This was
granted by the trial court on March 25, 1985 and private respondent was allowed to present evidence
ex-parte
.
Thereafter, on March 25, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of private respondent. Copy of
saiddecision was duly served on counsel for the petitioner but he did not take any action. Thus, the
judgment became final andexecutory. On May 8, 1985, upon motion of private respondent, a writ of
execution of the judgment was issued by the trial court.At public auction, the sheriff sold the aforestated
property of petitioner to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. After the one year redemptionperiod expired without the
petitioner redeeming the property, ownership was consolidated in the name of Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr.The
sheriff issued a final deed of sale on July 8, 1986 in his favor. Upon learning of this, petitioner prevailed
upon her counsel, toseek the appropriate relief. On November 6, 1986 said counsel filed in the CA a
petition for annulment of judgment calling attentionto the unjust enrichment of private respondent in
securing the transfer in its name of the property valued at P 2.5 million without justification; that when the
complaint was filed in court by private respondent against the petitioner, the parties came to anagreement
to settle their differences, the private respondent assuring petitioner that the complaint it filed shall be
withdrawn sopetitioner advised her lawyer that there was no longer any need to file an answer to the
complaint. On February 22, 1985, privaterespondent nevertheless filed an

ex-parte
motion to declare the petitioner in default. The documentary evidence presented byprivate respondent,
which served as the basis of the decision, is falsified and tampered with, giving rise to a presumption of
fraud.An amended petition was filed by counsel for petitioner in the Court of Appeals raising the additional
issue that the decision is notsupported by the allegations in the pleadings or by the evidence submitted.
The CA rendered its decision and made the ff.observations: xxx
Thus, it
is our belief that this case is one of-pure and simple negligence on the part of defendant's counsel
whosimply failed to file the answer in behalf of defendant, But counsel's negligence does not stop here
.
For after it had been furnished with copy of the decision by default against defendant, it should then have
appealed therefrom or file a petition from relief from theorder declaring their client in default or from the
judgment by default
.
[sic]
Again, counsel negligently failed to do either
. xxx. It wasonly in March 1990 when the secretary of counsel for petitioner informed the latter of the
adverse decision against her only afterpersistent telephone inquiries of the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether counsel committed gross negligence.
Held/Ruling:
Petitioner's counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and dean of a law school. It is to be expected that
he wouldextend the highest quality of service as a lawyer to the petitioner. Unfortunately, counsel appears
to have abandoned the cause of petitioner. After agreeing to defend the petitioner in the civil case filed
against her by private respondent, said counsel did nothingmore than enter his appearance and seek for
an extension of time to file the answer. Nevertheless, he failed to file the answer.Hence, petitioner was
declared in default on motion of private respondent's counsel. After the evidence of private respondent
wasreceived
ex-parte
, a judgment was rendered by the trial court.Said counsel for petitioner received a copy of the judgment
but took no steps to have the same set aside or to appeal therefrom.Thus, the judgment became final and
executory. The property of petitioner was sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment infavor of private
respondent. The property was sold to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., representative of private respondent, and a
certificateof sale was issued in his favor. The redemption period expired after one year so a final deed of
sale was issued by the sheriff in favorof Cabrera, who in turn appears to have transferred the same to
private respondent.During all the time, the petitioner was abroad. When, upon her return, she learned, to
her great shock, what happened to her caseand property, she nevertheless did not lose faith in her
counsel. She still asked Atty. Coronel to take such appropriate action possibleunder the circumstances.As
above related, said counsel filed a petition for annulment of judgment and its amendment in the Court of
Appeals. But that wasall he did. After an adverse judgment was rendered against petitioner, of which
counsel was duly notified, said counsel did notinform the petitioner about it. He did not even ask for a
reconsideration thereof, or file a petition for review before this Court. Thus,the judgment became final. It
was only upon repeated telephone inquiries of petitioner that she learned from the secretary of
hercounsel of the judgment that had unfortunately become final.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and theexertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing can be
taken or withheld from his client except in accordancewith the law. He should present every remedy or
defense authorized by the law in support of his client's cause, regardless of hisown personal views. In the
full discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he
maydisplease the judge or the general public.

epublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 94457 March 18, 1991

VICTORIA LEGARDA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NEW CATHAY HOUSE, INC., THE HONORABLE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 94, respondents.
Singson, Valdez & Associates for petitioner.
Lenito T. Serrano for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:p
Nothing is more settled than the rule that the mistake of a counsel binds the client. It is only in case of
gross or palpable negligence of counsel when the courts must step in and accord relief to a client who
suffered thereby.
The present case is a typical example of such rare exception.
Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the owner of a parcel of land and the improvements thereon located at
123 West Avenue, Quezon City. On January 11, 1985 respondent New Cathay House, Inc. filed a
complaint against the petitioner for specific performance with preliminary injunction and damages in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for Quezon City alleging, among others, that petitioner entered into a lease
agreement with the private respondent through its representative, Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., of the
aforestated property of petitioner effective January 1, 1985 until December 31, 1989 or for a period of five
(5) years; that the rental is P25,000.00 per month with 5% escalation per year; that on November 23,
1984, private respondent deposited the amount of P72,000.00 with petitioner as down payment of rentals;
that respondent drew up the written contract and sent it to petitioner, that petitioner failed and refused to
execute and sign the same despite demands of respondent; and that the respondent suffered damages
due to the delay in the renovation and opening of its restaurant business. The private respondent prayed
that pending the resolution of the case a restraining order be issued against petitioner or her agents
enjoining them from stopping the renovation and use of the premises by private respondent. It was also
prayed that after due hearing the petitioner be ordered to execute the lease contract; to pay actual
compensatory, exemplary and other damages in such amount as may be proved during the trial including
P30,000.00 attorney's fees plus P300.00 per appearance of counsel, and to pay the expenses of
litigation. 1
Petitioner engaged the services of counsel to handle her case. Said counsel filed his appearance with an
urgent motion for extension of time to file the answer within ten (10) days from February 26, 1985. 2
However, said counsel failed to file the answer within the extended period prayed for. Counsel for private
respondent filed an ex-parte motion to declare petitioner in default. This was granted by the trial court on
March 25, 1985 and private respondent was allowed to present evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, on March
25, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant Victoria G. Legarda to execute and sign
Exhibit "D":, the lease contract for the premises at 123 West Avenue, Quezon City. Accordingly, the
preliminary injunction earlier issued on January 31, 1985 is hereby made permanent.
Judgment is likewise rendered ordering defendant to pay exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00
to serve as example and deterrent for others, and actual and compensatory damages as follows:
1. For loss and destroyed goodwill and reputation in the amount of P100,000.00;
2. The sum of P61,704.40 as adjustments in the costs of labor and materials for the renovation of the
premises;
3. The sum of P50,000.00 as unearned income for the delay of plaintiff 's operations from January 1, 1985
up to February 25, 1985 or a period of almost two (2) months;
4. The sum of P16,635.57 and P50,424.40 as additional compensatory damages incurred by plaintiff for
the extension of the lease of its premises at Makati and salaries of idle employees, respectively;
5. The sum of P10,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees; and
6. The costs of suit. 3
Copy of said decision was duly served on counsel for the petitioner but he did not take any action. Thus,
the judgment became final and executory. On May 8, 1985, upon motion of private respondent, a writ of
execution of the judgment was issued by the trial court. 4
At public auction, the sheriff sold the aforestated property of petitioner to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. for the
sum of P376,500.00 to satisfy the judgment. The sheriff issued a certificate of sale dated June 8, 1985
covering the said property. 5 After the one year redemption period expired without the petitioner
redeeming the property, ownership was consolidated in the name of Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. The sheriff
issued a final deed of sale on July 8, 1986 in his favor. Cabrera registered the same in the office of the
Register of Deeds on July 11, 1986.
Upon learning of this unfortunate turn of events, petitioner prevailed upon her counsel, to seek the
appropriate relief. On November 6, 1986 said counsel filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for
annulment of judgment calling attention to the unjust enrichment of private respondent in securing the
transfer in its name of the property valued at P 2.5 million without justification; that when the complaint
was filed in court by private respondent against the petitioner, the parties came to an agreement to settle
their differences, the private respondent assuring petitioner that the complaint it filed shall be withdrawn
so petitioner advised her lawyer that there was no longer any need to file an answer to the complaint; that
on February 22, 1985, private respondent nevertheless filed an ex-parte motion to declare the petitioner
in default; that petitioner was deprived of the right to present her defense through false pretenses,
misrepresentation and fraud practiced upon her by private respondent warranting the annulment of the
judgment; that the documentary evidence presented by private respondent, which served as the basis of
the decision, is falsified and tampered with; that as an example, the voucher filed by petitioner, contains
typewritten entries to the effect that the term of the lease is for five (5) years to which petitioner never
agreed, and that the option to buy the property was given to the private respondent; that the fact that the
property worth P2 million was sold at public auction at a shockingly and questionably low price of
P376,500.00 is by itself a sufficient basis for annulling the sale for being grossly inadequate to shock the
conscience and understanding of men, giving rise to a presumption of fraud. 6 Thus, it was prayed that a
preliminary mandatory injunction issue ordering the private respondent to surrender the property to
petitioner and to enjoin the former from further harassing and threatening the peaceful possession of
petitioner; and that after hearing, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-43811 and the sheriffs
certificate of sale 7 be likewise annulled; that private respondent be adjudged to pay petitioner no less
than P500,000.00 actual and moral damages, as well as exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the
amount of P50,000.00, plus the costs of the suit. 8

On February 2, 1987 an amended petition was filed by counsel for petitioner in the Court of Appeals
raising the additional issue that the decision is not supported by the allegations in the pleadings or by the
evidence submitted. 9
In due course, a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals on November 29, 1989. 10 The appellate
court made the following observations:
On the other hand, petitioner's above allegation of fraud supposedly practiced upon her by Roberto V.
Cabrera, Jr. is so improbable as to inspire belief. For the Coronel Law Office had already entered its
appearance as petitioner's counsel by then, so that if it were true that Cabrera had already agreed to the
conditions imposed by petitioner, said law office would have asked plaintiff to file the proper motion to
dismiss or withdraw complaint with the Court, and if plaintiff had refused to do so, it would have filed
defendant's answer anyway so that she would not be declared in default. Or said law office would have
prepared a compromise agreement embodying the conditions imposed by their client in the lease contract
in question which plaintiff had allegedly already accepted, so that the same could have been submitted to
the Court and judgment on a compromise could be entered. All these, any conscientious lawyer of lesser
stature than the Coronel Law Office, headed by no less than a former law dean, Dean Antonio Coronel, or
even a new member of the bar, would normally have done under the circumstances to protect the
interests of their client, instead of leaving it to the initiative of plaintiff to withdraw its complaint against
defendant, as it had allegedly promised the latter. Thus, it is our belief that this case is one of-pure and
simple negligence on the part of defendant's counsel who simply failed to file the answer in behalf of
defendant, But counsel's negligence does not stop here. For after it had been furnished with copy of the
decision by default against defendant, it should then have appealed therefrom or file a petition from relief
from the order declaring their client in default or from the judgment by default. [sic] Again, counsel
negligently failed to do either. Hence, defendant is bound by the acts of her counsel in this case and
cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different if it had proceeded differently
(Pulido vs. C.A., 122 SCRA 63; Ayllon vs. Sevilla, 156 SCRA 257, among other cases). And the rationale
of this rule is obvious and clear. For "if such grounds were to be admitted as reasons for opening cases,
there would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and
show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or learned" (Fernandez vs.
Tan Tiong Tick, 1 SCRA 1138). 11
Despite these findings, the appellate court nevertheless dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment
with costs against the petitioner. A copy of the said judgment appears to have been served on counsel for
the petitioner. However, said counsel did not file a motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom, so it
became final.
It was only in March 1990 when the secretary of counsel for petitioner informed the latter of the adverse
decision against her only after persistent telephone inquiries of the petitioner.
Hence, petitioner secured the services of another lawyer who filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court wherein it is prayed that the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in
Civil Case No. Q-43811, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 10487 and the sheriff's sale
at public auction of the property in question be annulled, as the same are attributable to the gross
negligence and inefficiency of petitioner's counsel, whose blunder cannot bind the petitioner who was
deprived of due process thereby. It is further prayed that private respondent Cathay House, Inc. be
ordered to reconvey to petitioner the property covered by TCT No. 270814, which was sold at public
auction to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. and in whose favor its ownership was consolidated, and thereafter
ownership appears to have been transferred to private respondent.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Petitioner's counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and dean of a law school. It is to be expected that
he would extend the highest quality of service as a lawyer to the petitioner. Unfortunately, counsel
appears to have abandoned the cause of petitioner. After agreeing to defend the petitioner in the civil

case filed against her by private respondent, said counsel did nothing more than enter his appearance
and seek for an extension of time to file the answer. Nevertheless, he failed to file the answer. Hence,
petitioner was declared in default on motion of private respondent's counsel. After the evidence of private
respondent was received ex-parte, a judgment was rendered by the trial court.
Said counsel for petitioner received a copy of the judgment but took no steps to have the same set aside
or to appeal therefrom. Thus, the judgment became final and executory. The property of petitioner was
sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment in favor of private respondent. The property was sold to
Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., representative of private respondent, and a certificate of sale was issued in his
favor. The redemption period expired after one year so a final deed of sale was issued by the sheriff in
favor of Cabrera, who in turn appears to have transferred the same to private respondent.
During all the time, the petitioner was abroad. When, upon her return, she learned, to her great shock,
what happened to her case and property, she nevertheless did not lose faith in her counsel. She still
asked Atty. Coronel to take such appropriate action possible under the circumstances.
As above related, said counsel filed a petition for annulment of judgment and its amendment in the Court
of Appeals. But that was all he did. After an adverse judgment was rendered against petitioner, of which
counsel was duly notified, said counsel did not inform the petitioner about it. He did not even ask for a
reconsideration thereof, or file a petition for review before this Court. Thus, the judgment became final. It
was only upon repeated telephone inquiries of petitioner that she learned from the secretary of her
counsel of the judgment that had unfortunately become final.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing can be
taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the law. He should present every remedy or
defense authorized by the law in support of his client's cause, regardless of his own personal views. In
the full discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he may
displease the judge or the general public. 12
Judged by the actuations of said counsel in this case, he has miserably failed in his duty to exercise his
utmost learning and ability in maintaining his client's cause. 13 It is not only a case of simple negligence
as found by the appellate court, but of reckless and gross negligence, so much so that his client was
deprived of her property without due process of law.
In People's Homesite & Housing Corp. vs. Tiongco and Escasa, 14 this Court ruled as follows:
Procedural technicality should not be made a bar to the vindication of a legitimate grievance. When such
technicality deserts from being an aid to justice, the courts are justified in excepting from its operation a
particular case. Where there was something fishy and suspicious about the actuations of the former
counsel of petitioner in the case at bar, in that he did not given any significance at all to the processes of
the court, which has proven prejudicial to the rights of said clients, under a lame and flimsy explanation
that the court's processes just escaped his attention, it is held that said lawyer deprived his clients of their
day in court, thus entitling said clients to petition for relief from judgment despite the lapse of the
reglementary period for filing said period for filing said petition.
In Escudero vs. Judge Dulay, 15 this Court, in holding that the counsel's blunder in procedure is an
exception to the rule that the client is bound by the mistakes of counsel, made the following disquisition:
Petitioners contend, through their new counsel, that the judgments rendered against them by the
respondent court are null and void, because they were therein deprived of their day in court and divested
of their property without due process of law, through the gross ignorance, mistake and negligence of their
previous counsel. They acknowledge that, while as a rule, clients are bound by the mistake of their
counsel, the rule should not be applied automatically to their case, as their trial counsel's blunder in
procedure and gross ignorance of existing jurisprudence changed their cause of action and violated their
substantial rights.

We are impressed with petitioner's contentions.

Ordinarily, a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will not be a substitute or cure for
failure to file a timely petition for review on certiorari (appeal) under Rule 45 of the Rules. Where,
however, the application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the rule may
be relaxed.
xxx xxx xxx
While this Court is cognizant of the rule that, generally, a client will suffer the consequences of the
negligence, mistake or lack of competence of his counsel, in the interest of justice and equity, exceptions
may be made to such rule, in accordance with the facts and circumstances of each case. Adherence to
the general rule would, in the instant case, result in the outright deprivation of their property through a
technicality.
In its questioned decision dated November 19, 1989 the Court of Appeals found, in no uncertain terms,
the negligence of the then counsel for petitioner when he failed to file the proper motion to dismiss or to
draw a compromise agreement if it was true that they agreed on a settlement of the case; or in simply
filing an answer; and that after having been furnished a copy of the decision by the court he failed to
appeal therefrom or to file a petition for relief from the order declaring petitioner in default. In all these
instances the appellate court found said counsel negligent but his acts were held to bind his client,
petitioner herein, nevertheless.
The Court disagrees and finds that the negligence of counsel in this case appears to be so gross and
inexcusable. This was compounded by the fact, that after petitioner gave said counsel another chance to
make up for his omissions by asking him to file a petition for annulment of the judgment in the appellate
court, again counsel abandoned the case of petitioner in that after he received a copy of the adverse
judgment of the appellate court, he did not do anything to save the situation or inform his client of the
judgment. He allowed the judgment to lapse and become final. Such reckless and gross negligence
should not be allowed to bind the petitioner. Petitioner was thereby effectively deprived of her day in court.
Thus, We have before Us a case where to enforce an alleged lease agreement of the property of
petitioner, private respondent went to court, and that because of the gross negligence of the counsel for
the petitioner, she lost the case as well as the title and ownership of the property, which is worth millions.
The mere lessee then now became the owner of the property. Its true owner then, the petitioner, now is
consigned to penury all because her lawyer appear to have abandoned her case not once but repeatedly.
The Court cannot allow such a grave injustice to prevail. It cannot tolerate such unjust enrichment of the
private respondent at the expense of the petitioner. The situation is aggravated by the fact that said
counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and the dean of a law school as the Court at the beginning of
this discourse observed. His competence should be beyond cavil. Thus, there appears to be no cogent
excuse for his repeated negligence and inaction. His lack of devotion to duty is so gross and palpable that
this Court must come to the aid of his distraught client, the petitioner herein.
As member of the Philippine Bar he owes complete fidelity to the cause of his client. He should give
adequate attention, care and time to his cases. This is the reason why a practicing lawyer should accept
only so many cases he can afford to handle. And once he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake
the task with dedication and care. If he should do any less, then he is not true to his oath as a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City dated March 25, 1985 in Civil Case No. Q-43811; the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1989 in CA-G.R. No. SP-10487; the Sheriff 's Certificate of Sale dated June 27, 1985 of
the property in question; and the subsequent final deed of sale covering the same property, are all hereby
declared null and void. Private respondent New Cathay House, Inc. is directed to reconvey said property
to the petitioner, and the Register of Deeds is ordered to cancel the registration of said property in the

name of private respondent and to issue a new one in the name of petitioner. Costs against private
respondent. Said counsel for petitioner is hereby required to show cause within ten (10) days from notice
why he should not be held administratively liable for his acts and omissions hereinabove described in this
decision.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22536

August 31, 1967

DOMINGO V. AUSTRIA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ANTONIO C. MASAQUEL, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch II of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, respondent.
Primicias, Del Castillo and Macaraeg for petitioner.
Antonio C. Masaquel for respondent.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to annul or set aside the order of respondent Judge Antonio
Masaquel, dated February 10, 1964, in Civil Case No. 13258 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
declaring petitioner Domingo V. Austria guilty of contempt of court and imposing upon him a fine of
P50.00.
The facts that gave rise to the incident in question are not disputed. Petitioner was one of the plaintiffs in
the above-mentioned Civil Case No. 132581 against Pedro Bravo for the recovery of three parcels of land
one parcel being located at Bayambang and two parcels in San Carlos, in the province of Pangasinan.
On April 19, 1963, after trial, respondent Judge rendered a decision declaring the plaintiffs the owners of
the three parcels of land in question and ordering the defendant to vacate the lands and pay the plaintiffs
damages only with respect to the land located at Bayambang. The plaintiffs filed a motion for the
immediate execution of the judgment which motion was granted by respondent Judge on May 31, 1963
and, upon the plaintiffs' having posted a surety bond in the sum of P2,000.00, the sheriff placed them
in possession of the lands located at San Carlos.
On May 23, 1963, Atty. Mariano C. Sicat, a former assistant or associate of respondent Judge when the
latter was still in the practice of law before his appointment to the bench, entered his appearance as the
new counsel for defendant Pedro Bravo, vice Attorney Antonio Resngit. On June 14, 1963, the defendant,
through Atty. Sicat, filed a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of the judgment, and on June 20, 1963
respondent Judge granted the stay of execution, over the objection of plaintiffs, and ordered the sheriff to
restore the possession of the lands in San Carlos to the defendant. The petitioner likewise had asked for
the appointment of a receiver over the parcel of land located at Bayambang, which prayer was granted by
respondent Judge on July 8, 1963; but upon the filing of a bond by the defendant for the non-appointment
of a receiver, the order receivership was set aside. On August 24, 1963, pending the approval of the

defendant's amended record on appeal, Atty. Sicat filed a motion for new trial and to set aside the
judgment and, over the vigorous objection of plaintiffs, the respondent Judge granted the said motion on
November 7, 1963. The hearing on the retrial was finally set for February 10, 1964.
Before the opening of the court's session in the morning of February 10, 1964, Atty. Daniel Macaraeg,
counsel for petitioner and his co-plaintiffs, saw respondent Judge in his chamber and verbally transmitted
to him the request of petitioner that he (the Judge) inhibit himself from further hearing the case upon the
ground that the new counsel for the defendant, Atty. Mariano C. Sikat, was his former associate. The
respondent Judge, however, rejected the request because, according to him, the reason for the request of
his inhibition is not one of the grounds for disqualification of a judge provided for in the Rules of Court.
Thereafter, when the case was called for hearing in open court, the following transpired, as shown by the
transcript of the stenographic notes taken during said hearing:2
APPEARANCE:
ATTY. DANIEL C. MACARAEG:
appeared in behalf of plaintiffs. (After the case was called)
COURT:
Your client is here?
ATTY. MACARAEG:
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Where is he?
ATTY. MACARAEG:
He is here, Your Honor.
COURT:
What is your name?
PLAINTIFF:
Domingo Austria, sir.
COURT:
You are one of the plaintiffs in this case?
DOMINGO AUSTRIA:
Yes, sir.
COURT:
Atty. Macaraeg approached me in chambers requesting me to disqualify myself in hearing this case. Did
you authorize Atty. Macaraeg to approach me verbally to disqualify myself from hearing this case because
the lawyer of the other party was my former assistant?

DOMINGO AUSTRIA:
Yes, sir.
COURT:
Is that your reason why you requested Atty. Macaraeg to approach me, requesting me to disqualify myself
simply because the lawyer of the other party was my assistant?
DOMINGO AUSTRIA:
Yes, sir.
COURT:
All right. Do you doubt the integrity of the presiding Judge to decide this case fairly and impartially
because the lawyer of the other party was my former assistant? Do you doubt? Just answer the question?
DOMINGO AUSTRIA:
Yes, sir.
COURT:
The Court hereby finds you guilty of contempt of Court and you are hereby ordered to pay a fine of
P50.00.
ATTY. MACARAEG:
With due indulgence of this Honorable Court I have learned, after I have conferred with you in
chambers, another ground of the plaintiffs for their requesting me to ask for the disqualification of Your
Honor in this case, and this ground consists of the rampant rumor coming from the defendant Pedro
Bravo himself that he is boasting in San Carlos that because he has a new lawyer, that surely he is going
to win this case.
COURT:
Why did you not wait until the case is finally decided and find out if that is true or not?
ATTY. MACARAEG:
And maybe, that is why the plaintiffs requested me to approach Your Honor because of that rampant
rumor that Pedro Bravo is spreading.
COURT:
You mean to say because of that rumor, you are going to doubt my integrity?
ATTY. MACARAEG:
As for me, I entertain no doubt, Your Honor.
COURT:
Your client expressed openly in Court his doubts on the integrity of the Court simply based on rumors and

that is a ground for contempt of court, if only to maintain the faith of the people in the courts.
ATTY. MACARAEG:
Taking into consideration that these plaintiffs are laymen and we cannot expect from them the thinking of
a lawyer, I am most respectfully praying that the Order of this Court be reconsidered.
COURT:
Denied. Your client should pay a fine of P50.00. We will hear this case this afternoon.
ATTY. MACARAEG:
Yes, Your Honor.
The respondent Judge forthwith dictated the following order:3
Before this Court opened its sessions this morning, Atty. Daniel C. Macaraeg, counsel for the plaintiffs,
approached the presiding Judge of this Court in his chambers and manifested the desire of his clients for
the Judge to disqualify himself from trying the above-entitled case for the reason that counsel for the
defendant, Atty. Marciano C. Sicat was formerly an associate of the Judge of this Court while he was still
engaged in the practice of law. To this manifestation of Atty. Macaraeg, the Presiding Judge informed the
latter that such fact alone does not in itself constitute a legal ground to disqualify the Presiding Judge of
this Court, from trying this case.
When the above-entitled case was called for hearing, the Presiding Judge called on one of the plaintiffs
who was present, namely, Domingo Austria, and inquired from the latter if it was true that he asked his
lawyer Atty. Macaraeg to approach the Judge in chambers and to ask him to disqualify himself from trying
this case because defendant's lawyer, Atty. Sicat was formerly associated with the said Judge. To this
query Domingo Austria answered in the affirmative. When he was also asked as to whether the said
Domingo Austria has lost faith in the sense of fairness and justice of the Presiding Judge of this Court
simply because of his former association with the defendant's lawyer, said Domingo Austria likewise
answered in the affirmative.
The Court considers the actuation of the plaintiff Domingo Austria, in the premises, as offensive, insulting
and a reflection on the integrity and honesty of the Presiding Judge of this Court and shows his lack of
respect to the Court. The said Domingo Austria is not justified and has no reason to entertain doubts in
the fairness and integrity of the Presiding Judge of this Court, simply because of the latter's former
association with defendant's counsel. For this reason and in order to maintain the people's faith and
respect in their courts the last bulwark in our democratic institutions the Presiding Judge declared
said plaintiff Domingo Austria in direct contempt of court and he was ordered to pay a fine of P50.00.
The Court found from the manifestation of plaintiffs' counsel Atty. Macaraeg that the basis of the
statement, of Domingo Austria that he has lost his faith in the Presiding Judge of this Court is the rumors
being circulated by the defendant Pedro Bravo that he will surely win in the present case because of his
new lawyer, Atty. Marciano C. Sicat. The Court believes that rumors of the sort do not serve as a sufficient
basis or justification for the plaintiff Domingo Austria to insinuate bias and partiality, on the part of the
Court and to express openly his loss of faith and confidence in the integrity, fairness and capability of the
Presiding Judge of this Court to perform his sworn duty of upholding and administering justice, without
fear or favor, and by reason of which this Court denied the verbal motion to reconsider filed by counsel for
the plaintiff Domingo Austria, finding him guilty of contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of
P50.00.
SO ORDERED.
Given in open Court this 10th day of February, 1964, at Lingayen, Pangasinan.

Petitioner Domingo Austria, accordingly, paid the fine of P50.00 under protest. Having been punished
summarily for direct contempt of court, and the remedy of appeal not being available to him, petitioner
filed the instant petition for certiorari before this Court.
It is the position of the petitioner that under the facts and circumstances attendant to the hearing of the
Civil Case No. 13250 on February 10, 1063, he had not committed an act of contempt against the court
and the respondent Judge had acted in excess of his jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion when he
declared petitioner in direct contempt of court and imposed on him the fine of P50.00 as a penalty.
After a careful study of the record, We find merit in this petition.
The respondent Judge declared the petitioner in direct contempt of court. Our task, therefore, is to
determine whether or not the petitioner was guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or
judge, as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, or had committed an act of disrespect
toward the court or judge.4
The respondent Judge considered the actuation of the petitioner, in the premises, as offensive, insulting,
and a reflection on his integrity and honesty and a showing of lack of respect to the court. The respondent
Judge considered that the petitioner was not justified and had no reason to entertain doubts in his
fairness and integrity simply because the defendant's counsel was his former associate.1wph1.t
We do not agree with the respondent Judge. It is our considered view that when the petitioner requested
respondent Judge to inhibit himself from further trying the case upon the ground that the counsel for the
opposite party was the former associate of the respondent Judge, petitioner did so because he was
impelled by a justifiable apprehension which can occur in the mind of a litigant who sees what seems to
be an advantage on the part of his adversary; and that the petitioner made his request in a manner that
was not disrespectful, much less insulting or offensive to the respondent Judge or to the court.
We are in accord with the statement of respondent Judge in his memorandum that the circumstance
invoked by petitioner in asking him to inhibit himself from further trying the case that Atty. Sicat was his
former associate in his practice of law is not one of the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 137 of the new Rules of Court for disqualifying a judge. While it is true that respondent
Judge may not be compelled to disqualify himself, the fact that Atty. Sicat, admittedly his former
associate, was counsel for a party in the case being tried by him, may constitute a just or valid reason for
him to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the case on a retrial, if he so decides, pursuant to the
provision of the second paragraph of Section 1 of the said Rule 137.5
The apprehension of petitioner regarding the probable bias of respondent Judge does not appear to be
groundless or entirely devoid of reason. The respondent Judge had decided the case in favor of petitioner
and his co-plaintiffs, and that upon plaintiffs' timely motion and filing of bond they were already placed in
possession of the lands in question pending appeal. It was when Atty. Sicat took over as new counsel for
defendant that the latter was given back the properties, upon a motion to stay the execution of the
judgment which was filed by said counsel and was granted by respondent Judge over the opposition of
petitioner's counsel. Again, when the same counsel for defendant filed a motion for a new trial, said
motion was granted by respondent Judge in spite of the vigorous objection of counsel for the petitioner
and his co-plaintiffs. And then the petitioner became aware of the fact that his adversary, the defendant
Pedro Bravo, had been boasting in San Carlos that he was sure to win his case because of his new
lawyer.
We believe that the petitioner the layman that he is did not take a belligerent or arrogant attitude
toward respondent Judge. What he did was to request his lawyer, Atty. Macaraeg, to approach
respondent Judge in his chamber and suggest to him to refrain from hearing the case on the new trial,
precisely in order that respondent Judge might not be embarrassed or exposed to public odium. There is
nothing in the record which shows that when respondent Judge refused to disqualify himself, the
petitioner insisted in asking for his disqualification. If the request of petitioner for respondent Judge to

disqualify himself came to the knowledge of the public it was because respondent Judge himself brought
up the matter in open court.
While We consider it improper for a litigant or counsel to see a judge in chambers and talk to him about a
matter related to the case pending in the court of said judge, in the case now before Us We do not
consider it as an act of contempt of court when petitioner asked his counsel to see respondent Judge in
his chamber and request him to disqualify himself upon a ground which respondent Judge might consider
just or valid. It is one thing to act not in accordance with the rules, and another thing to act in a manner
which would amount to a disrespect or an affront to the dignity of the court or judge. We believe that the
circumstances that led respondent Judge to declare petitioner in direct contempt of court do not indicate
any deliberate design on the part of petitioner to disrespect respondent Judge or to cast aspersion against
his integrity as a judge. On the contrary, it may be said that petitioner wanted to avoid cause for any one
to doubt the integrity of respondent Judge. This is so because when a party litigant desires or suggests
the voluntary disqualification of a judge, it is understood, without saying it in so many words, that said
litigant having knowledge of the past or present relationship of the judge with the other party or counsel
feels that no matter how upright the judge is there is peril of his being unconsciously swayed by his
former connection and he may unwittingly render a biased or unfair decision. Hence, while it may be
conceded that in requesting the disqualification of a judge by reason of his relation with a party or counsel
there is some implication of the probability of his being partial to one side, the request can not constitute
contempt of court if done honestly and in a respectful manner, as was done by petitioner in the present
case. Perhaps the fault of petitioner, if at all, is his having asked his counsel to make the request to
respondent Judge inside the latter's chamber.
The following observation of this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Dizon, is relevant to the question
before Us:
Petitioner invoking the provisions of section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, argues that the case of
respondent judge does not fall under any one of the grounds for the disqualification of judicial officers
stated therein. Assuming arguendo that a literal interpretation of the legal provision relied upon justifies
petitioner's contention to a certain degree, it should not be forgotten that, in construing and applying said
legal provision, we cannot disregard its true intention nor the real ground for the disqualification of a judge
or judicial officer, which is the impossibility of rendering an impartial judgment upon the matter before him.
It has been said, in fact, that due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge (30
Am. Jur. p. 767). Moreover, second only to the duty of rendering a just decision, is the duty of doing it in a
manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to its fairness and the integrity of the Judge. Consequently,
we take it to be the true intention of the law stated in general terms that no judge shall preside in a
case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent (30 Am. Jur. supra) . . . . 6
(Emphasis supplied).
It is in line with the above-quoted observation that this Court, in amending the Rules of Court, added the
second paragraph under Section 1 of Rule 137, which provides that a judge in the exercise of his sound
discretion may disqualify himself from sitting in a case for just or valid grounds other than those
specifically mentioned in the first paragraph of said section.7 "The courts should administer justice free
from suspicion or bias and prejudice; otherwise, parties litigants might lose confidence in the judiciary and
destroy its nobleness and decorum." 8
Respondent Judge declared petitioner in contempt of court after the latter answered "Yes, sir" to this
question of the judge: "Do you doubt the integrity of the presiding Judge to decide this case fairly and
impartially because the lawyer of the other party was my former assistant? Do you doubt? Just answer
the question?" We believe that petitioner had not committed an act amounting to contempt of court when
he made that answer. The petitioner had not misbehaved in court, or in the presence of respondent
Judge, as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings. Neither did the petitioner act in a manner that was
disrespectful to respondent Judge. When petitioner answered "Yes, sir" to the question asked by
respondent Judge, petitioner simply expressed his sincere feeling under the circumstances. In order that
a person may be summarily punished for direct contempt of court, it must appear that his behavior or his

utterance tends to obstruct the proceedings in court, or constitutes an affront to the dignity of the court. As
stated by this Court, "Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant
belligerence, a defiance of the court . . . ."9
We commend the zeal shown by respondent Judge in his effort to protect his own integrity and the dignity
of the court. We are constrained to say, however, that he had gone a little farther than what was
necessary under the circumstances. We are inclined to believe that respondent Judge felt offended when
petitioner answered "Yes, sir" to the question adverted to in the preceding paragraph. But the petitioner
was simply truthful and candid to the court when he gave that answer. It would have been unfair to
respondent Judge had petitioner answered "No, sir," because then he would not be sincere with the court,
and he would be inconsistent with the request that he made through his counsel for respondent Judge to
inhibit himself from further hearing the case. When respondent Judge asked that question, he necessarily
expected a truthful answer from petitioner, and indeed petitioner gave him the truthful answer. We are not
persuaded that in so answering petitioner meant to be disrespectful, offensive or insulting to respondent
Judge. Nor do We consider that in so answering petitioner meant to cast reflection on the integrity and
honesty of respondent Judge. We believe that in so answering the petitioner was simply manifesting the
misgiving of an ordinary layman about the outcome of his case that is going to be tried by a judge who
has been closely associated with the counsel for his adversary. The petitioner would never have
expressed that misgiving of his had respondent Judge not asked him in open court a question that evoked
that answer. A judge can not prevent any person even a litigant or counsel in a case before him to
entertain in his mind an opinion about him as a judge. Certainly, any person is entitled to his opinion about
a judge, whether that opinion is flattering to the judge, or not. It would be different if a person would
deliberately and maliciously express an adverse opinion about a judge, without reason, but simply to
malign and discredit the judge. In the case now before Us We believe that petitioner did not mean to
malign or discredit respondent Judge in answering as he did. It can be said that petitioner was simply
moved by a desire to protect his interests in the case pending before the court, presided by respondent
Judge. A citizen of this Republic is entitled to expect that our courts of justice are presided by judges who
are free from bias and prejudice and it should not be made a count against the citizen if he so
expresses himself truthfully, sincerely, and respectfully. A judge, as a public servant, should not be so thinskinned or sensitive as to feel hurt or offended if a citizen expresses an honest opinion about him which
may not altogether be flattering to him. 10 After all, what matters is that a judge performs his duties in
accordance with the dictates of his conscience and the light that God has given him. A judge should never
allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties. And
a judge should always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be
exercised for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the
judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.
It is worth mentioning here that numerous cases there have been where judges, and even members of
this Court, were asked to inhibit themselves from trying, or from participating in the consideration of, a
case, but scarcely were the movants punished for contempt even if the grounds upon which they based
their motions for disqualification are not among those provided in the rules. It is only when there was
direct imputation of bias or prejudice, or a stubborn insistence to disqualify the judge, done in a malicious,
arrogant, belligerent and disrespectful manner, that movants were held in contempt of court. 11 And this
liberal attitude of the courts is in keeping with the doctrine that "The power to punish for contempt of court
should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the
court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice
must falter or fail." 12 The power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature,
should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice. 13
Wherefore, the order of respondent Judge dated February 10, 1964, in Civil Case No. 13259 of the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan, declaring petitioner in direct contempt of court and ordering him to pay a
fine of P50.00, is hereby annulled and set aside; and it is ordered that the sum of P50.00, paid under
protest by petitioner as a fine, be refunded to him. No costs. It is so ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-95-1035 June 21, 1995

EMETERIO GALLO through Counsel Atty. Francisco C. Aurillo, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE CORDERO, MTC, Babatgon, Leyte, respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a sworn complaint dated September 8, 1994 of Emeterio Gallo, charging Judge Jose Cordero of
the Municipal Trial Court of Babatgon, Leyte with non-feasance, manifest bias, gross ignorance of the
law, and graft and rank favoritism.
The complaint is made in connection with Criminal Case No. 2194 entitled "People v. Cristuto Barreta,
Alberto Macabata, Danilo Morillo, and Rodolfo Villanueva," which complainant filed in respondent judge's
court on August 23, 1994 for violation of P.D.No. 772, otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law. The
criminal complaint alleged:
That several years ago, at Barangay Bagong Silang, municipality of Babatgon, Province of Leyte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all taking
advantage of the absence or tolerance of the land owners, did then and there, succeeded in occupying
and possessing certain portions of the property of the latter against their will for residential and small
farming purposes, and have refused to vacate the property despite demands for them to do so.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On August 26, 1994, respondent issued a subpoena 1 to complainant requiring him to appear and to
testify regarding his affidavit and to bring with him documents attesting to his ownership of the land.
Complainant appeared as directed on August 30, 1994 in respondent's office. According to complainant's
affidavit dated September 7, 1994, 2 the following transpired:
That on August 30, 1994 I saw Honorable Judge Jose Cordero in his office, having been summoned to
appear before him on that day;
That he then asked me if I have papers of ownership of land, such as tax declaration, and I said yes but
did not bring them as this was no trial; and besides, he already had the records submitted by the chief of
police;
That since he insisted on seeing our tax declaration, with his permission I went to the office of the
municipal assessor, secured a certified copy of the tax declaration of land in Bagong Silang, and gave it to
him; and noting the area to be 21 hectares the Judge commented that ours is quite a big tract of land;
That when I asked the Judge if the accused have already been arrested, he said No; so I said, what about

this case of ours? And he asked what I really wanted. When I said I want them ejected from our land the
Judge said: "No, you cannot eject tenants now under the law." I countered that the four accused are not
tenants, but the Judge said, "Even then, nobody can eject them.
That disappointed at his answers which clearly were biased for the accused, I asked permission to leave,
which was granted. But he added that I should see him again on Sept. 14, the day before trial which he
set for Sept. 15; . . . .
The following day, according to complainant, his son Roger Gallo went to respondent's office to deliver his
letter in which he inquired from the judge whether he had already issued a warrant of arrest against the
accused; that upon entering the office, Roger saw respondent conversing with the accused in the criminal
case; 3 that an aide of respondent received the letter and opened it; that respondent did not however say
anything nor reply to complainant's letter; that when Roger left the office, respondent judge and the four
accused continued their conversation. 4
Complainant charges that (a) in violation of art. 207 (malicious delay in the administration of justice)
and art. 208 (negligence and tolerance in the prosecution of crimes) of the Revised Penal Code
respondent judge refused to order the arrest of the accused in Criminal Case No. 2194; (b) that
respondent privately conferred with the accused in his office on August 31, 1994 which "logically
and naturally arouses suspicion of graft and rank favoritism;" and (c) that he acted with bias and
ignorance of the law in telling complainant, "You cannot eject tenants now under the law," and
that even if the accused were not tenants, "nobody can eject them." Complainant Gallo prays that
(1) respondent be preventively suspended or ordered to inhibit himself from hearing the case and
that another judge be assigned to handle the case and (2) after due hearing, respondent be
dismissed from the service.
In his comment, respondent alleges that he did not order the arrest of the accused for the following
reasons: (1) the complaint charges no offense under P.D. No. 772 because of "the absence [of]
recital in the body of [the] complaint that the property occupied possessed is within the urban
communities" per the ruling in People v. Echavez, 5 that the crime of squatting applies only to
urban communities, 6 (2) the complaint is defective because of its failure to state the name of the
offended party and the date and time of the commission of
the offense; (3) respondent acted in compliance with Administrative Circular No. 8-92 which
"reiterates to all trial court judges the need for a careful consideration of the proper application of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657) to avoid conflict of jurisdiction with the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Boards," and (4) he thought that complainant Gallo
was merely pressuring the accused to vacate the property through the filing of a criminal case
against them.
Respondent also contends that he cannot be liable under art. 208 of the Revised Penal Code, because
this provision applies to the failure of public prosecutors to prosecute for law violations.
Respondent denied uttering the statements attributed to him allegedly showing that he had prejudged the
case, the truth being that he merely
asked complainant certain questions to ascertain compliance with Rule 110 6 and 11 7 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure.
As for his alleged "private conference" with the accused, respondent claims that he merely tried to advise
them of their right to a counsel de oficio in case they could not afford to hire a lawyer.
With regard to complainant's demand for his inhibition, respondent alleges that there was no basis for
complainant to say that he could not expect justice from him (respondent judge) because the case had
just been set for the arraignment of the accused.
To be sure, Criminal Case No. 2194 was filed invoking the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
respondent judge's court, considering that under P.D. No. 772 the offense charged is punishable by

imprisonment ranging from 6 months to 1 year or a fine of not less than P1,000.00 nor more than
P5,000.00. 8 Hence, in accordance with Rule 112, 9(b), in relation to 3(a) thereof, respondent's job was
to determine at the outset if there was sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial, on the basis of the
complaint and affidavits submitted. If there was no sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial, the judge
should dismiss the complaint or information, otherwise, he should issue a warrant of arrest after
personally examining the complainant and his witnesses in writing and under oath in the form of
searching questions and answers.
Apparently, respondent judge found sufficient ground to hold the accused in the criminal case for trial.
That is why subpoenas were issued to the complainant and the accused. In the case of the complainant,
the subpoena required him to testify and bring with him the papers showing his title to the land. But
respondent judge did not examine him with a view to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Instead, as he
now says in his comment, he subpoenaed complainant only to determine the sufficiency of the complaint.
Yet, respondent likewise required the accused to present their evidence the next day, August 31, 1994.
It would thus appear that respondent was confused about what to do. He says in his comment that
he found the criminal complaint to be insufficient because it does not state the time of
commission of the offense and the name of the offended party. He also contends that it does not
charge an offense because in accordance with the ruling in People v. Echavez, 9 the offense
punished under P.D. No. 772 is committed only in urban communities, although in Jumawan v.
Eviota 10 we overruled People v. Echavez and held that what is punished by the law is squatting
on land which is used for residential, commercial or other purposes. Be that as it may, however,
what respondent should have done was to dismiss the criminal case. The fact, however, is that he
did not dismiss the complaint; neither did he, on the other hand, order the arrest of the accused in
that case.
Respondent judge also opened himself to charges of partiality and bias by meeting privately with the four
accused. He says that he merely wanted to apprise them of their constitutional right. Whatever his
purpose was, it was improper for respondent judge to meet them without the presence of complainant. As
already stated, the subpoena required the accused to appear in court on August 31, 1994 to give their
testimony. But no hearing was set on that date. In fact complainant's son, Roger, merely chanced on the
accused in the office of the judge on August 31, 1994 because he had been sent by his father to deliver
the latter's letter inquiring whether the judge had yet issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused.
Thus, respondent judge not only has shown gross ignorance of law and procedure but has also
failed to live up to the norm that "judges should not only be impartial but should also appear
impartial." 11 He thus violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that "a
judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities." In the words
of Rule 2.01 of that Canon, "A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Respondent judge was compulsorily retired on March 11, 1995, after reaching the age of 70. This fact,
however, does not render this case moot and academic. As held in Zarate v. Judge Romanillos: 12
[T]he jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the
mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. The
Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare
him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with dreadful and
dangerous implications. . . . If innocent, respondent official merits vindication of his name and integrity as
he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the
corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.
ACCORDINGLY, a FINE of P10,000.00 is imposed on respondent Judge Jose Cordero, the same to be
deducted from whatever retirement benefits he may be entitled to receive from the government.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, and Puno, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 492

September 5, 1967

OLEGARIA BLANZA and MARIA PASION, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. AGUSTIN ARCANGEL, respondent.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Complainants Olegaria Blanza and Maria Pasion ask this Court to take disciplinary action against
respondent Atty. Agustin Arcangel for professional non-feasance. They complain that way back in April,
1955, respondent volunteered to help them in their respective pension claims in connection with the
deaths of their husbands, both P.C. soldiers, and for this purpose, they handed over to him the pertinent
documents and also affixed their signatures on blank papers. But subsequently, they noticed that since
then, respondent had lost interest in the progress of their claims and when they finally asked for the return
of their papers six years later, respondent refused to surrender them.
Respondent answered these accusations before Fiscal Raa to whom this case was referred by the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. He admitted having received the
documents from complainants but explainer that it was for photostating purposes only. His failure to
immediately return them, he said, was due to complainants' refusal to hand him the money to pay for the
photostating costs which prevented him from withdrawing said documents from the photostat service.
Anyway, he had already advanced the expenses himself and turned over, on December 13, 1961, the
documents, their respective photostats and the photostat service receipt to the fiscal.
Finding respondent's explanation satisfactory and considering that he charged complainants nothing for
his services, Fiscal Raa recommended the former's exoneration, or at most, that he be reprimanded
only. The Solicitor General, however, feels that respondent deserves at least a severe reprimand
considering (1) his failure to attend to complainants' pension claims for six years; (2) his failure to
immediately return the documents despite repeated demands upon him, and (3) his failure to return to
complainant Pasion, allegedly, all of her documents.
At the hearing of the case before this Court on October 21, 1963, only respondent, thru counsel,
appeared. In lieu of oral arguments, therefore, respondent submitted his memorandum, annexing
therewith an affidavit executed by Olegaria Blanza asking for the dismissal of the administrative case.1
Respondent first submits that he was not obliged to follow up complainants' pension claims since there
was no agreement for his compensation as their counsel. Respondent, however, overlooks the fact that
he volunteered his professional services and thus was not legally entitled to recover fees.2 But having
established the attorney-client relationship voluntarily, he was bound to attend to complainants' claims
with all due diligence.
Nevertheless, We find the evidence adduced insufficient to warrant the taking of disciplinary action

against respondent attorney. There is no clear preponderance of evidence substantiating the accusations
against him.3
Respondent's explanation for the delay in filing the claims and in returning the documents has not been
controverted by complainants. On the contrary, they admitted4 that respondent asked them to shoulder
the photostating expenses but they did not give him any money therefor. Moreover, the documents and
their photostats were actually returned by respondent during the fiscal's investigation with him paying for
the photostating costs himself. And the condition of the photostats themselves they appear to have
been in existence for quite some time5 supports respondent's allegation that they remained in
possession of the photostat service for the failure of the owners (respondents and/or complainants), to
withdraw the same upon payment of the corresponding costs. Hence, complainants themselves are partly
to blame for the delay in filing their respective claims.1awphl.nt
As for the alleged failure of respondent to return all her documents to complainant Pasion, the former
denies this. Fiscal Raa made no findings on the matter. The affidavit of Mrs. Blanza pardoning
respondent cannot prejudice complainant Pasion because res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet.
Still, there is equiponderance of evidence which must necessarily redound to respondent's benefit.
Complainant Pasion had another opportunity to substantiate her charges in the hearing set for October
21, 1963 but she let it go. Neither she nor her counsel of record appeared.
But while We are constrained to dismiss the charges against respondent for being legally insufficient, yet
We cannot but counsel against his actuations as a member of the bar. A lawyer has a more dynamic and
positive role in the community than merely complying with the minimal technicalities of the statute. As a
man of law, he is necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen. His conduct
must, perforce, be par excellence, especially so when, as in this case, he volunteers his professional
services. Respondent here has not lived up to that ideal standard. It was unnecessary to have
complainants wait, and hope, for six long years on their pension claims. Upon their refusal to co-operate,
respondent should have forthwith terminated their professional relationship instead of keeping them
hanging indefinitely. And altho We voted that he not be reprimanded, in a legal sense, let this be a
reminder to Atty. Arcangel of what the high standards of his chosen profession require of him.
Accordingly, the case against respondent is dismissed. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando,
JJ., concur