Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4089

January 12, 1909

ARTURO PELAYO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MARCELO LAURON, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
J.H. Junquera, for appellant.
Filemon Sotto, for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On the 23rd of November, 1906, Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in Cebu, filed a
complaint against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella setting forth that on or about the 13th
of October of said year, at night, the plaintiff was called to the house of the defendants,
situated in San Nicolas, and that upon arrival he was requested by them to render medical
assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth to a child; that therefore, and
after consultation with the attending physician, Dr. Escao, it was found necessary, on
account of the difficult birth, to remove the fetus by means of forceps which operation was
performed by the plaintiff, who also had to remove the afterbirth, in which services he was
occupied until the following morning, and that afterwards, on the same day, he visited the
patient several times; that the just and equitable value of the services rendered by him was
P500, which the defendants refuse to pay without alleging any good reason therefor; that for
said reason he prayed that the judgment be entered in his favor as against the defendants,
or any of them, for the sum of P500 and costs, together with any other relief that might be
deemed proper.
In answer to the complaint counsel for the defendants denied all of the allegation therein
contained and alleged as a special defense, that their daughter-in-law had died in
consequence of the said childbirth, and that when she was alive she lived with her husband
independently and in a separate house without any relation whatever with them, and that, if
on the day when she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants, her stay their was
accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances; therefore, he prayed that the defendants be
absolved of the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.
The plaintiff demurred to the above answer, and the court below sustained the demurrer,
directing the defendants, on the 23rd of January, 1907, to amend their answer. In
compliance with this order the defendants presented, on the same date, their amended
answer, denying each and every one of the allegations contained in the complaint, and
requesting that the same be dismissed with costs.
As a result of the evidence adduced by both parties, judgment was entered by the court
below on the 5th of April, 1907, whereby the defendants were absolved from the former

complaint, on account of the lack of sufficient evidence to establish a right of action against
the defendants, with costs against the plaintiff, who excepted to the said judgment and in
addition moved for a new trial on the ground that the judgment was contrary to law; the
motion was overruled and the plaintiff excepted and in due course presented the
corresponding bill of exceptions. The motion of the defendants requesting that the
declaration contained in the judgment that the defendants had demanded therefrom, for the
reason that, according to the evidence, no such request had been made, was also denied,
and to the decision the defendants excepted.
Assuming that it is a real fact of knowledge by the defendants that the plaintiff, by virtue of
having been sent for by the former, attended a physician and rendered professional
services to a daughter-in-law of the said defendants during a difficult and laborious
childbirth, in order to decide the claim of the said physician regarding the recovery of his
fees, it becomes necessary to decide who is bound to pay the bill, whether the father and
mother-in-law of the patient, or the husband of the latter.
According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by law, by contracts, by
quasi-contracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or
negligence occurs.
Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the code or
in special laws, etc., are the only demandable ones. Obligations arising from contracts have
legal force between the contracting parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with their
stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and 1091.)
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual
obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.)
If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something (art. 1088), and spouses
are mutually bound to support each other, there can be no question but that, when either of
them by reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other is under the
unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that health
may be restored, and he or she may be freed from the sickness by which life is jeopardized;
the party bound to furnish such support is therefore liable for all expenses, including the
fees of the medical expert for his professional services. This liability originates from the
above-cited mutual obligation which the law has expressly established between the married
couple.
In the face of the above legal precepts it is unquestionable that the person bound to pay the
fees due to the plaintiff for the professional services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law
of the defendants during her childbirth, is the husband of the patient and not her father and
mother- in-law, the defendants herein. The fact that it was not the husband who called the
plaintiff and requested his assistance for his wife is no bar to the fulfillment of the said
obligation, as the defendants, in view of the imminent danger, to which the life of the patient
was at that moment exposed, considered that medical assistance was urgently needed, and
the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the indispensable services of a physician
at such critical moments is specially established by the law, as has been seen, and
compliance therewith is unavoidable; therefore, the plaintiff, who believes that he is entitled

to recover his fees, must direct his action against the husband who is under obligation to
furnish medical assistance to his lawful wife in such an emergency.
From the foregoing it may readily be understood that it was improper to have brought an
action against the defendants simply because they were the parties who called the plaintiff
and requested him to assist the patient during her difficult confinement, and also, possibly,
because they were her father and mother-in-law and the sickness occurred in their house.
The defendants were not, nor are they now, under any obligation by virtue of any legal
provision, to pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence of any contract entered into between
them and the plaintiff from which such obligation might have arisen.
In applying the provisions of the Civil Code in an action for support, the supreme court of
Spain, while recognizing the validity and efficiency of a contract to furnish support wherein a
person bound himself to support another who was not his relative, established the rule that
the law does impose the obligation to pay for the support of a stranger, but as the liability
arose out of a contract, the stipulations of the agreement must be held. (Decision of May 11,
1897.)
Within the meaning of the law, the father and mother-in-law are strangers with respect to
the obligation that devolves upon the husband to provide support, among which is the
furnishing of medical assistance to his wife at the time of her confinement; and, on the other
hand, it does not appear that a contract existed between the defendants and the plaintiff
physician, for which reason it is obvious that the former can not be compelled to pay fees
which they are under no liability to pay because it does not appear that they consented to
bind themselves.
The foregoing suffices to demonstrate that the first and second errors assigned to the
judgment below are unfounded, because, if the plaintiff has no right of action against the
defendants, it is needless to declare whether or not the use of forceps is a surgical
operation.
Therefore, in view of the consideration hereinbefore set forth, it is our opinion that the
judgment appealed from should be affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So
ordered.
Mapa and Tracey, JJ., concur.
Arellano, C.J., and Carson, J., concurs in the result.
Willard, J., dissents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Pelayo, a physician, rendered a medical assistance
during the child delivery of the daughter-in-law of the defendants. The just
and equitable value of services rendered by him was P500.00 which the
defendants refused to pay without alleging any good reason. With this, the
plaintiff prayed that the judgment be entered in his favor as against the
defendants for the sum of P500.00 and costs.
The defendants denied all of the allegation of the plaintiff,
contending that their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the childbirth, and that when she was alive, she lived with her husband independently
and in a separate house, that on the day she gave birth she was in the house

of the defendants and her stay there was accidental and due to fortuitous
circumstances.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants are obliged to pay the
petitioner for the medical assistance rendered to their daughter-in-law.
HELD:
According to Article 1089 of the Old Civil Code (now 1157),
obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, by illicit
acts and omissions or by those which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.
Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in
the Code or in special law, etc., are the only demandable ones.
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness
comprised among the mutual obligations to which the spouses are bound by
of mutual support as provided by the law or the Code. Consequently,
obligation to pay the plaintiff for the medical assistance rendered to
defendants daughter-in-law must be couched on the husband.

is
way
the
the

In the case at bar, the obligation of the husband to furnish

his wife in the indispensable services of a physician at such critical
moments is especially established by the law and the compliance therewith is
unavoidable.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26002

October 31, 1969

ABELARDO BAUTISTA and ROBERTO TAN TING, petitioners-appellees,

vs.
FEDERICO O. BORROMEO, INC., HONORABLE CESAR C. CRUZ, Judge of the
Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal and JESUS BAUTISTA, Deputy Sheriff of
Manila as Special Sheriff, respondents-appellants.
Dante O. Tinga and Leopoldo V. Repotente, Jr. for petitioners-appellees.
Modesto S. Mendoza for respondents-appellants.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Respondents-appellants seek to overturn the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
of January 6, 1966 granting petitioners-appellees' petition for relief from judgment, setting
aside the July 23, 1965 decision of the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal, in Civil Case
1365 and ordering a new trial.
The background facts are as follows:

On September 15, 1964, the Ford truck of petitioner Roberto Tan Ting driven by Abelardo
Bautista, the other petitioner, and the Volkswagen delivery panel truck owned by
respondent Federico O. Borromeo, Inc. (hereinafter called Borromeo) were involved in a
traffic accident along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. In said traffic accident, Quintin
Delgado, a helper in Borromeo's delivery panel truck, sustained injuries which resulted in
his instantaneous death. Borromeo had to pay Delgado's widow the sum of P4,444
representing the compensation (death benefit) and funeral expenses due Delgado under
the Workmen's Compensation Act.
On June 17, 1965, upon the averment that the said vehicular accident was caused by
petitioners' negligence, Borromeo started suit in the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal
to recover from petitioners the compensation and funeral expenses it paid to the widow of
Quintin Delgado.1
At the scheduled hearing of the case on July 23, 1965, neither petitioners nor their counsel
appeared. Borromeo was thus allowed to present its evidence ex parte. On the same day,
July 23, 1965, the municipal court rendered judgment in favor of Borromeo and against the
petitioners in the principal sum of P4,444, and P500 attorney's fees, and costs.
Respondents aver that this judgment has been executed and satisfied.
On August 6, 1965, petitioners received copy of the municipal court's decision.
On August 13, 1965, petitioners moved to set aside the decision. On August 14, 1965, this
motion was denied.
On August 16, 1965, copy of this order of denial was sent by registered mail to counsel of
petitioners. Said counsel did not receive this registered mail and the mail matter was
returned to the court unclaimed. However, said counsel learned of this denial on September
2, 1965 allegedly "in the course of his investigation."
Petitioners filed a notice of appeal dated September 2, 1965. They, however, paid the
appellate docket fee and deposited their cash appeal bond only on September 28, 1965.
Their appeal was consequently turned down by the municipal court, for the reason that the
deposit of the bond and the payment of the docket fee were done after the lapse of the
reglementary period.
Nothing was done by petitioners until October 26, 1965, when they lodged a petition for
relief from the inferior court's judgment in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 2 They there
claimed excusable negligence for the failure of petitioners' counsel to appear in the July 23,
1965 hearing at the municipal court and asserted that they had a good and substantial
defense in that "there was no contractual relationship between the parties, whether express
or implied." They sought preliminary injunction, prayed for trial de novo on the merits. A
restraining order was at first issued by the court; but the prayer for preliminary injunction
was eventually denied.
Respondents' answer contended that the petition for relief was filed out of time; that
petitioners' counsel's failure to attend the hearing of July 23, 1965 does not constitute

excusable negligence; and that the affidavits attached to the petition do not show good and
substantial defense.
Petitioners thereafter moved for judgment on the pleadings. No objection thereto was
interposed by respondents. The lower court then rendered the judgment mentioned in the
first part of this opinion.
A move to reconsider failed. Hence, this appeal.
We vote to reverse the lower court's judgment for the following reasons:
1. The petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is unavailable to
petitioners.
A basic precept is that when another remedy at law is open to a party, he cannot sue out a
petition for relief under Rule 38.3 Thus, a petition for relief is not a substitute for appeal. It
has been held that where a defendant could have appealed but did not appeal from
the decision of the inferior court to the Court of First Instance but instead filed a petition for
relief, his petition was inappropriate as it "would amount to reviving his right to appeal which
he had irretrievably lost through the gross inaction of his counsel."4
Here, petitioners learned of the municipal court judgment on August 6, 1965, when they
received a copy of its decision. They moved to set aside that judgment on August 13, 1965.
At that time, a petition for relief could not be availed of because the judgment of the
municipal court had not yet become final.5 But, on September 2, 1965, petitioners learned of
the court's order of August 14, 1965 denying their motion to set aside. They could have
appealed. Because, nothing in the record suggests that the notices to petitioners to take
delivery of the registered envelope containing the inferior court's resolution denying
petitioners' motion to set aside the decision were ever served on said petitioners. On the
contrary, Teresita Roxas, secretary of petitioners' counsel, in her affidavit dated October 23,
1965, Annex E of the petition for relief, categorically denied receipt of any such notice, thus:
"That I have not received any registry notice corresponding to a registered mail at the
Manila Post Office containing an order by the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal, dated
August 14, 1965."6
But petitioners did not perfect their appeal to the Court of First Instance on time they paid
the appellate docket fee and deposited their appeal bond only on September 28, eleven
(11) days late. Clearly, their failure to seasonably appeal was through their own fault.
And, when they did file a petition for relief on October 26, 1965, it was way beyond the sixtyday period from August 6, 1965, the time they first learned of the judgment to be set aside,
as required by Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
We accordingly, rule that petitioners' petition for relief must fail.
2. Petitioners failed to make out a case of excusable negligence for counsel's nonattendance at the July 23, 1965 hearing.

Their counsel, Atty. Leopoldo V. Repotente, Jr., explains his failure to attend the hearing in
this wise "he relied on the assurance of his associate, Atty. Lucenito N. Tagle, that the
latter will attend to the case for him since on that same date he (Atty. Repotente) had
another case before the City Court of Quezon City." In his sworn statement, Atty. Tagle in
turn stated that he was unable to attend the hearing despite his promise to do so because,
in his own words, "when I transferred to my new office at A & T Building, Escolta, Manila,
the record of this case was misplaced, mislaid or otherwise lost by my helpers and was not
among those turned over to my possession" and "it was only a few days after the date of
hearing on July 23, 1965, that I found the record of this case in one of the drawers of my
table in my former office and it was only then that I realized my failure to attend the hearing
on July 23, 1965, ... ."
We cannot view such negligence of petitioners' two attorneys as excusable. There was no
plausible reason for Repotente to entrust the hearing of the case to another lawyer. His
lame excuse was that he requested Tagle to attend the hearing of said case for him
because he had another hearing at the City Court of Quezon City. This is unworthy of
serious consideration. For, as respondents aver and this is not denied by petitioners
the hearing of July 23, 1965 before the municipal court was set in open court during the
initial date of hearing held on July 1, 1965 after Atty. Repotente consulted his calendar.
When Repotente agreed in open court to set the trial of the case for July 23, 1965, it may
very well be presumed that his other case in Quezon City was not yet calendared for
hearing. He could not have, in good faith, agreed to set the case for hearing on the day on
which he had another previously scheduled trial. Further, he failed to notify his clients of the
hearing set for July 23, 1965; they also failed to appear thereat. Certainly, Repotentes'
inadvertence cannot be labeled as excusable.
Nor may Atty. Tagle offer as excuse the fact that the record of the case "was misplaced,
mislaid or otherwise lost." This is a stereotyped excuse. It is resorted to by lawyers in order
to win new trial of the case and thereby move farther away the day of reckoning. To be
remembered is that the life of each case is in its record. If the record of the case was
misplaced, mislaid or lost, he should have nevertheless attended the scheduled hearing and
requested for a postponement by reason thereof. But he did not. Appropriate it is to recall
here that a prudent lawyer keeps a separate record or diary of hearings of cases he handles
and of his professional engagements. A lawyer's schedules of hearings intended as
reminder are not noted by the lawyer in his record of the case. That would be useless for
the purpose.
There is then no excusable negligence to which the petition for relief can cling.
3. Even on the merits, petitioners' case must fall.
Borromeo paid the widow of its employee, Quintin Delgado, compensation (death benefit)
and funeral expenses for the latter's death while in the course of employment. This
obligation arises from law Section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.7 The same law
in its Section 6 also provides that "[i]n case an employee suffers an injury for which
compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall be
optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his employer, under
this Act, or sue such other person for damages, in accordance with law; and in case

compensation is claimed and allowed in accordance with this Act, the employer who paid
such compensation or was found liable to pay the same, shall succeed the injured
employee to the right of recovering from such person what he paid: ..."8
It is evident from the foregoing that "if compensation is claimed and awarded, and the
employer pays it, the employer becomes subrogated to and acquires, by operation of law,
the worker's rights against the tortfeasor."9
No need then there is to establish any contractual relationship between Quintin Delgado
and herein petitioners. Indeed, there is none. The cause of action of respondent corporation
is one which does not spring from a creditor-debtor relationship. It arises by virtue of its
subrogation to the right of Quintin Delgado to sue the guilty party. Such subrogation is
sanctioned by the Workmen's Compensation Law aforesaid. It is as a subrogee to the rights
of its deceased employee, Quintin Delgado, that Borromeo filed a suit against petitioners in
the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal. 10
FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the appealed decision of January 6, 1966 under review is
hereby reversed and the petition for relief is hereby dismissed.
Costs against petitioners-appellees. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee
and Barredo, JJ.,concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21676

February 28, 1969

VICENTE ALDABA, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CESAR ALDABA, ET AL., respondents.
Rodas and Almeda for petitioners.
Dakila F. Castro and Associates for respondents.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in case CA-G.R. No. 27561R, entitled "Vicente Aldaba, et al., plaintiffs-appellants, versus Cesar Aldaba, et al.,
defendants-appellees", affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its
Civil Case No. 41260.
When Belen Aldaba, a rich woman of Malolos, Bulacan, died on February 25, 1955, she left
as her presumptive heirs her surviving husband Estanislao Bautista, and her brother Cesar

Aldaba. Belen Aldaba was childless. Among the properties that she left were the two lots
involved in this case, situated at 427 Maganda Street, Santa Mesa, Manila.
Petitioners Dr. Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba, father and daughter, respectively, lived
during the last war in their house in Malate, Manila. Belen Aldaba used to go to their house
to seek the advice and medical assistance of Dr. Vicente Aldaba. When the latter's house
was burned during the liberation of Manila in 1945, Belen Aldaba invited Dr. Aldaba and his
daughter, who was then a student in medicine, to live in one of her two houses standing on
the lots in question, and the Aldaba father and daughter accepted the offer of Belen and
they actually lived in one of those two houses until sometime in 1957 when respondent
Emmanuel Bautista filed an ejectment case against them in the city court of Manila. Dr.
Vicente Aldaba continued to act as a sort of adviser of Belen and Jane, after becoming a
qualified doctor of medicine, became the personal physician of Belen until the latter's death
on February 25, 1955.
On June 24, 1955, the presumptive heirs Estanislao Bautista and Cesar Aldaba, executed a
deed of extrajudicial partition of the properties left by the deceased Belen Aldaba, by virtue
of which deed the two lots in question were alloted to Cesar Aldaba. Subsequently, on
August 26, 1957, herein respondents Cesar Aldaba and Emmanuel Bautista, the latter
being a grandson of Estanislao Bautista by his first marriage, executed a deed whereby the
two lots that were alloted to Cesar Aldaba were ceded to Emmanuel Bautista in exchange
of the latter's lot situated at San Juan, Rizal. By virtue of the deed of extra-judicial partition
and the deed of exchange, Transfer certificates of Title Nos. 1334 and 1335, respectively,
covering lots Nos. 32 and 34 now in question both in the name of Belen Aldaba, were
cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Manila, and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 49996
and 49997 in the name of Emmanuel Bautista were issued in lieu thereof.
Emmanuel Bautista then required Dr. Vicente Aldaba to vacate the lots in question and,
upon the latter's refusal, filed an ejectment case against him in the City Court of Manila.
Without awaiting the final result of the ejectment case, herein petitioners filed, on August 22,
1959, a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No.
41260, against herein respondents Cesar Aldaba and Emmanuel Bautista and the Register
of Deeds of Manila, alleging that they had become the owners of the two lots in question,
and praying that the deed of partition entered into by Estanislao Bautista and Cesar Aldaba
be declared null and void with respect to Lot No. 32, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 1334, and lot No. 34 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No 1335; that said lots be
declared the property of therein plaintiffs (herein petitioners); and that the Register of Deeds
of Manila be ordered to cancel TCT Nos. 49996 and 49997 in the name of Emmanuel
Bautista and in lieu thereof issue two new TCTs in the name of therein plaintiffs.
After hearing, the court a quo rendered a decision dismissing the complaint, and declaring,
among others, that if the deceased Belen Aldaba intended to convey the lots in question to
Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba, by way of donation, the conveyance should be
considered a donation inter vivos, for the validity of which a public instrument was
necessary pursuant to Article 749 of the Civil Code. The dispositive portion of the decision
of the trial court reads as follows:

IN VIEW WHEREOF both complaint and counterclaim dismissed; the Court holds
Emmanuel Bautista to be the absolute owner of the property in question, land and
improvement, but with the right of plaintiffs to stay until they should have been
reimbursed of P5,000.00 but without any obligation, until such reimbursement, to pay
any rental unto defendant Emmanuel Bautista. No pronouncement as to costs.
From this decision, therein plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter court
rendered a decision, on June 21, 1963, raising from P5,000 to P8,000 the amount to be
reimbursed to plaintiffs-appellants, but affirming in all other respects the decision of the
lower court. Herein petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the decision having been
denied by the Court of Appeals, they forthwith filed the present petition in this Court.
Before this Court, petitioners now contend that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in affirming
the decision of the Court of First Instance; (2) in holding that the donation, as found by the
Court of First Instance of Manila, was a simple donation inter vivos and not a donation "con
causa onerosa and so it was void for it did not follow the requirements of Article 749 of the
Civil Code; (3) in not holding that the property in question had already been donated to
herein petitioners in consideration of the latter's services; (4) in not declaring petitioners to
be the absolute owners of the property in dispute; and (5) in considering testimonies which
had been stricken out.
The errors assigned by petitioners being interrelated, We are going to discuss them
together.
Petitioners contend that petitioners Dr. Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba had rendered
services to the deceased Belen Aldaba for more than ten years without receiving any
compensation, and so in compensation for their services Belen Aldaba gave them the lots in
dispute including the improvements thereon. It is the stand of petitioners that the property in
question was conveyed to them by way of an onerous donation which is governed by Article
733, and not Article 749, of the Civil Code. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code an onerous
donation does not have to be done by virtue of a public instrument. The petitioners point to
the note, Exhibit 6, as indicating that a donation had been made, which note reads as
follows:
June 18, 1953
Jane,
Huag kayong umalis diyan. Talagang iyan ay para sa inyo. Alam nila
na iyan ay sa inyo.
Belen A. Bautista.
Petitioners maintain that the note, although it could not transmit title, showed, nevertheless,
that a donation had already been made long before its writing, in consideration of the
services rendered before the writing and to be rendered after its writing. And the donation
being with an onerous cause, petitioners maintain that it was valid even if it was done orally.

Petitioners further maintain that if Exhibit 6 labors under some ambiguity, this ambiguity is
cured by Exhibit 7, which reads as follows:
June 27, 1956
Dear Nana Tering,
Narito po ang notice tungkol sa amillaramiento na pagbabayaran diyan
sa lupa at bahay na kinatatayuan ninyo. Sa Malolos po ito tinanggap.
Ang pagbabayaran po ng Inkong ay bayad na.
Gumagalang,
"Cely."
The addressee, Tering, was the wife of Dr. Vicente Aldaba, and the sender, Cely was the
wife of respondent Emmanuel Bautista. This note, petitioners argue, proves that
respondents had recognized the ownership of the petitioners of the house and lot, for,
otherwise, Cely should have sent the notice of real estate tax to respondent Cesar Aldaba,
to whom was alloted the property in question by virtue of the extra-judicial partition.
Respondents, Cesar Aldaba and Emmanuel Bautista, on the other hand, contend that the
evidence of the plaintiff does not disclose clearly that a donation had been made.
Respondents point out that the note, Exhibit 6, as worded, is vague, in that it could not be
interpreted as referring to the lots in question, or that which was given therein was given for
a valuable consideration. And finally, respondents contend that if the property had really
been given to petitioners, why did they not take any step to transfer the property in their
names?
The Court of Appeals, in its decision, made the following findings and conclusions:
(1) The note Exhibit 6 did not make any reference to the lots in question, nor to the
services rendered, or to be rendered, in favor of Belen. The note was insufficient is a
conveyance, and hence could not be considered as evidence of a donation with
onerous cause. This note can be considered, at most, as indicative of the intention to
donate.
(2) There is no satisfactory explanation why from 1945 to 1955, no notarial
document was executed by Belen in favor of petitioners who were educated
persons. The reason given was "extremada delicadeza" which reason the Court of
Appeals considered as unsatisfactory.
(3) The evidence regarding the value of the services (P53,000.00) rendered by
petitioners (father and daughter) to Belen does not improve the proof regarding the
alleged donation. If petitioners believed that the gratuitous use of the property was
not sufficient to compensate them for their services, they could have presented their
claims in the intestate proceedings, which they themselves could have initiated, if
none was instituted.

The conclusion of the Court of Appeals, as well as that of the trial court, that there was no
onerous donation made by Belen Aldaba to petitioners is based upon their appreciation of
the evidence, and this Court will not disturb the factual findings of those courts.
lawphi 1.nt

The question to be resolved in the instant case is: Was there a disposition of the property in
question made by the deceased Belen Aldaba in favor of herein petitioners? The note,
Exhibit 6, considered alone, was, as held by the Court of Appeals, confirming the opinion of
the lower court, only an indication of the intention of Belen Aldaba to donate to the
petitioners the property occupied by the latter. We agree with this conclusion of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals. The note, in fact, expressed that the property was really
intended for the petitioners, "talagang iyan ay para sa inyo." If the property was only
intended for petitioners then, at the time of its writing, the property had not yet been
disposed of in their favor. There is no evidence in the record that such intention was
effectively carried out after the writing of the note. Inasmuch as the mere expression of an
intention is not a promise, because a promise is an undertaking to carry the intention into
effect, 1 We cannot, considering Exhibit 6 alone, conclude that the deceased promised,
much less did convey, the property in question to the petitioners. That the note, Exhibit 6,
was only an indication of an intention to give was also the interpretation given by petitioners
themselves, when they said in their memorandum, dated February 2, 1960, in the lower
court 2 thus:
Legally speaking, there was a contractual relation created between Belen Aldaba
and the plaintiff since 1945 whereby the former would give to the latter the two
parcels of land, together with the house standing thereon, upon the rendition of said
services. This fact can be gleaned from the note (Exh. "6", Plaintiffs) which in part
says: TALAGANG IYAN AY PARA SAINYO
We have said that Exhibit 6 expressed only the intention to donate. Let us suppose, for the
sake of argument, that previous to the writing of the note there had already been a
disposition of the property in favor of the petitioners. This disposition alone, would not make
the donation a donation for a valuable consideration. We still have to ask: What was the
consideration of such disposition? We do not find in the record that there had been an
express agreement between petitioners and Belen Aldaba that the latter would pay for the
services of the former. If there was no express agreement, could it not be at least implied?
There could not be an implied contract for payment because We find in the record that Jane
did not expect to be paid for her services. In the memorandum of counsel for the petitioners
in the trial court We find this statement:
For all she did to her aunt she expected not to be paid.3
When a person does not expect to be paid for his services, there cannot be a contract
implied in fact to make compensation for said services.
However, no contract implied in fact to make compensation for personal services
performed for another arises unless the party furnishing the services then expected
or had reason to expect the payment or compensation by the other party. To give
rise to an implied contract to pay for services, they must have been rendered by one
party in expectation that the other party would pay for them, and have been

accepted by the other party with knowledge of that expectation. (58 Am. Jur. p. 512
and cases cited therein).
In the same manner when the person rendering the services has renounced his fees, the
services are not demandable obligations. 4
Even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the services of petitioners constituted a
demandable debt, We still have to ask whether in the instant case this was the
consideration for which the deceased made the (alleged) disposition of the property to the
petitioners. As we have adverted to, we have not come across in the record even a claim
that there was an express agreement between petitioners and Belen Aldaba that the latter
would give the property in question in consideration of the services of petitioners. All that
petitioners could claim regarding this matter was that "it was impliedly understood" between
them. 5 How said agreement was implied and from what facts it was implied, petitioners did
not make clear. The question of whether or not what is relied upon as a consideration had
been knowingly accepted by the parties as a consideration, is a question of fact, 6 and the
Court of Appeals has not found in the instant case that the lots in question were given to
petitioners in consideration of the services rendered by them to Belen Aldaba.
We find, therefore, that the conditions to constitute a donation cum causa onerosa are not
present in the instant case, and the claim of petitioners that the two lots in question were
donated to them by Belen Aldaba cannot be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with costs against the
petitioners. It is so ordered.

ALDABA vs. CA- Donation

A letter showing an intention to donate is not sufficient to prove donation; and most certainly not
the form required by law in donations.

FACTS:
Two lots owned by Belen Aldaba are being disputed in this case. Petitoners Dr. Vicente Aldaba
and Jane Aldaba, father and daughter, lived with Belen Aldaba for 10 years and took care of her
until her death. Belen had presumptive heirs her surviving husband Estanislao Bautista, and her
brother Cesar Aldaba (represented as the respondents in this case.) After the death of Belen,
the respondents asked the petitioners to leave the premises and upon their refusal, the former
instituted an ejectment case. The petitioners argue that Belen really intended to donate the
property to them as evidence by the note written by Belen to them which reads, Huag kayong
umalis diyan. Talagang iyan ay para sa inyo. Alam nila na iyan ay sa inyo. They also argue that
the property was for compensation of their services which amounted to P53,000. The
respondents contend that the letter no way proves a donation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a disposition of property by Belen in favour of the petitioners?

RULING: NO
For the following reasons: (1) The note was insufficient conveyance, and hence could not be
considered as evidence of a donation with onerous caus. The note can be considered, at most,
as indicative of the intention to donate. (2) no notarial document was executed by Belen to the
petitioners during those 10 years. (3) P53,000 worth of services made by the petitioners no way
proves the alleged donation. If at all, the petitioners believed that the gratuitous use of the
property was not sufficient to compensate them for their services, they could have presented
their claims in the intestate proceedings, which they themselves could have initiated, if none
was instituted.
The SC emphasized that there was no express agreement between the parties and that
respondents Jane did not even expect to be compensated.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-36840 May 22, 1973

PEOPLE'S CAR INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
COMMANDO SECURITY SERVICE AGENCY, defendant-appellee.

TEEHANKEE, J.:
In this appeal from the adverse judgment of the Davao court of first instance limiting
plaintiff-appellant's recovery under its complaint to the sum of P1,000.00 instead of the
actual damages of P8,489.10 claimed and suffered by it as a direct result of the wrongful
acts of defendant security agency's guard assigned at plaintiff's premises in pursuance of

their "Guard Service Contract", the Court finds merit in the appeal and accordingly reverses
the trial court's judgment.
The appeal was certified to this Court by a special division of the Court of Appeals on a
four-to-one vote as per its resolution of April 14, 1973 that "Since the case was submitted to
the court a quo for decision on the strength of the stipulation of facts, only questions of law
can be involved in the present appeal."
The Court has accepted such certification and docketed this appeal on the strength of its
own finding from the records that plaintiff's notice of appeal was expressly to this Court (not
to the appellate court)" on pure questions of law" 1 and its record on appeal accordingly prayed
2

that" the corresponding records be certified and forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court." The trial
3
court so approved the same on July 3, 1971 instead of having required the filing of a petition for review
of the judgment sought to be appealed from directly with this Court, in accordance with the provisions of
Republic Act 5440. By some unexplained and hitherto undiscovered error of the clerk of court,
furthermore, the record on appeal was erroneously forwarded to the appellate court rather than to this
Court.

The parties submitted the case for judgment on a stipulation of facts. There is thus no
dispute as to the factual bases of plaintiff's complaint for recovery of actual damages
against defendant, to wit, that under the subsisting "Guard Service Contract" between the
parties, defendant-appellee as a duly licensed security service agency undertook in
consideration of the payments made by plaintiff to safeguard and protect the business
premises of (plaintiff) from theft, pilferage, robbery, vandalism and all other unlawful acts of
any person or person prejudicial to the interest of (plaintiff)." 4
On April 5, 1970 at around 1:00 A.M., however, defendant's security guard on duty at
plaintiff's premises, "without any authority, consent, approval, knowledge or orders of the
plaintiff and/or defendant brought out of the compound of the plaintiff a car belonging to its
customer, and drove said car for a place or places unknown, abandoning his post as such
security guard on duty inside the plaintiff's compound, and while so driving said car in one
of the City streets lost control of said car, causing the same to fall into a ditch along J.P.
Laurel St., Davao City by reason of which the plaintiff's complaint for qualified theft against
said driver, was blottered in the office of the Davao City Police Department." 5
As a result of these wrongful acts of defendant's security guard, the car of plaintiff's
customer, Joseph Luy, which had been left with plaintiff for servicing and maintenance,
"suffered extensive damage in the total amount of P7,079." 6 besides the car rental value
"chargeable to defendant" in the sum of P1,410.00 for a car that plaintiff had to rent and make available to
its said customer to enable him to pursue his business and occupation for the period of forty-seven (47)
7
days (from April 25 to June 10, 1970) that it took plaintiff to repair the damaged car, or total actual
damages incurred by plaintiff in the sum of P8,489.10.

Plaintiff claimed that defendant was liable for the entire amount under paragraph 5 of their
contract whereunder defendant assumed "sole responsibility for the acts done during their
watch hours" by its guards, whereas defendant contended, without questioning the amount
of the actual damages incurred by plaintiff, that its liability "shall not exceed one thousand
(P1,000.00) pesos per guard post" under paragraph 4 of their contract.

The parties thus likewise stipulated on this sole issue submitted by them for adjudication, as
follows:
Interpretation of the contract, as to the extent of the liability of the defendant
to the plaintiff by reason of the acts of the employees of the defendant is the
only issue to be resolved.
The defendant relies on Par. 4 of the contract to support its contention while
the plaintiff relies on Par. 5 of the same contract in support of its claims
against the defendant. For ready reference they are quoted hereunder:
'Par. 4. Party of the Second Part (defendant) through the
negligence of its guards, after an investigation has been
conducted by the Party of the First Part (plaintiff) wherein the
Party of the Second Part has been duly represented shall
assume full responsibilities for any loss or damages that may
occur to any property of the Party of the First Part for which it is
accountable, during the watch hours of the Party of the Second
Part, provided the same is reported to the Party of the Second
Part within twenty-four (24) hours of the occurrence, except
where such loss or damage is due to force majeure, provided
however that after the proper investigation to be made thereof
that the guard on post is found negligent and that the amount of
the loss shall not exceed ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00)
PESOS per guard post.'
'Par. 5 The party of the Second Part assumes the
responsibility for the proper performance by the guards
employed, of their duties and (shall) be solely responsible for
the acts done during their watch hours, the Party of the First
Part being specifically released from any and all liabilities to the
former's employee or to the third parties arising from the acts or
omissions done by the guard during their tour of
duty.' ... 8
The trial court, misreading the above-quoted contractual provisions, held that "the liability of
the defendant in favor of the plaintiff falls under paragraph 4 of the Guard Service Contract"
and rendered judgment "finding the defendant liable to the plaintiff in the amount of
P1,000.00 with costs."
Hence, this appeal, which, as already indicated, is meritorious and must be granted.
Paragraph 4 of the contract, which limits defendant's liability for the amount of loss or
damage to any property of plaintiff to "P1,000.00 per guard post," is by its own terms
applicable only for loss or damage 'through thenegligence of its guards ... during the watch
hours" provided that the same is duly reported by plaintiff within 24 hours of the occurrence
and the guard's negligence is verified after proper investigation with the attendance of both
contracting parties. Said paragraph is manifestly inapplicable to the stipulated facts of

record, which involve neither property of plaintiff that has been lost or damaged at its
premises nor mere negligence of defendant's security guard on duty.
Here, instead of defendant, through its assigned security guards, complying with its
contractual undertaking 'to safeguard and protect the business premises of (plaintiff) from
theft, robbery, vandalism and all other unlawful acts of any person or persons," defendant's
own guard on duty unlawfully and wrongfully drove out of plaintiffs premises a customer's
car, lost control of it on the highway causing it to fall into a ditch, thereby directly causing
plaintiff to incur actual damages in the total amount of P8,489.10.
Defendant is therefore undoubtedly liable to indemnify plaintiff for the entire damages thus
incurred, since under paragraph 5 of their contract it "assumed the responsibility for the
proper performance by the guards employed of their duties and (contracted to) be solely
responsible for the acts done during their watch hours" and "specifically released (plaintiff)
from any and all liabilities ... to the third parties arising from the acts or omissions done by
the guards during their tour of duty." As plaintiff had duly discharged its liability to the third
party, its customer, Joseph Luy, for the undisputed damages of P8,489.10 caused said
customer, due to the wanton and unlawful act of defendant's guard, defendant in turn was
clearly liable under the terms of paragraph 5 of their contract to indemnify plaintiff in the
same amount.
The trial court's approach that "had plaintiff understood the liability of the defendant to fall
under paragraph 5, it should have told Joseph Luy, owner of the car, that under the Guard
Service Contract, it was not liable for the damage but the defendant and had Luy insisted on
the liability of the plaintiff, the latter should have challenged him to bring the matter to court.
If Luy accepted the challenge and instituted an action against the plaintiff, it should have
filed a third-party complaint against the Commando Security Service Agency. But if Luy
instituted the action against the plaintiff and the defendant, the plaintiff should have filed a
crossclaim against the latter," 9 was unduly technical and unrealistic and untenable.
Plaintiff was in law liable to its customer for the damages caused the customer's car, which
had been entrusted into its custody. Plaintiff therefore was in law justified in making good
such damages and relying in turn on defendant to honor its contract and indemnify it for
such undisputed damages, which had been caused directly by the unlawful and wrongful
acts of defendant's security guard in breach of their contract. As ordained in Article 1159,
Civil Code, "obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting
parties and should be complied with in good faith."
Plaintiff in law could not tell its customer, as per the trial court's view, that "under the Guard
Service Contract it was not liable for the damage but the defendant" since the customer
could not hold defendant to account for the damages as he had no privity of contract with
defendant. Such an approach of telling the adverse party to go to court, notwithstanding his
plainly valid claim, aside from its ethical deficiency among others, could hardly create any
goodwill for plaintiff's business, in the same way that defendant's baseless attempt to evade
fully discharging its contractual liability to plaintiff cannot be expected to have brought it
more business. Worse, the administration of justice is prejudiced, since the court dockets
are unduly burdened with unnecessary litigation.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and judgment is hereby
rendered sentencing defendant-appellee to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of P8,489.10 as
and by way of reimbursement of the stipulated actual damages and expenses, as well as
the costs of suit in both instances. It is so ordered.

PEOPLES CAR INC., vs Commando Security L-36840 May 22, 1973

Facts:
Plaintiff, a car dealer, entered into a contract with defendant, a security agency, its duty is to guard the formers
premises from theft, robbery, vandalism and other unlawful acts. On a certain night, the security guard deployed by
the defendant, without authority neither from the plaintiff nor from defendant, drove a car, which was entrusted to
the plaintiff by a customer for service and maintenance, outside of the plaintiffs compound and around the city
which after the security guard lost control of, fell into a ditch, causing it severe damage. Plaintiff complained against
the security guard for qualified theft. While the car is undergoing repair, plaintiff rented a car for its customer for 47
days until the car is fixed, and took pain to repair the damaged car.
Then plaintiff instituted a claim against the defendant for recovery of the actual damages it incurred due
to the unlawful act of the latters personnel, citing inter alia the Par. 5 of the contract that defendant
accepts sole responsibility for the acts done during their watch hours. Defendant on the other hand,
interposed, that it may be liable but its liability is limited under Par. 4 of said contract providing: that its
liability shall not exceed one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos per guard post. To quote the contract:
Par. 4. Party of the Second Part (defendant) through the negligence of its guards, after an
investigation has been conducted by the Party of the First Part (plaintiff) wherein the Party of the Second
Part has been duly represented shall assume full responsibilities for any loss or damages that may occur
to any property of the Party of the First Part for which it is accountable, during the watch hours of the
Party of the Second Part, provided the same is reported to the Party of the Second Part within twenty-four
(24) hours of the occurrence, except where such loss or damage is due to force majeure, provided
however that after the proper investigation to be made thereof that the guard on post is found negligent
and that the amount of the loss shall not exceed ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS per guard post.
Par. 5 The party of the Second Part assumes the responsibility for the proper performance by the
guards employed, of their duties and (shall) be solely responsible for the acts done during their watch
hours, the Party of the First Part being specifically released from any and all liabilities to the formers
employee or to the third parties arising from the acts or omissions done by the guard during their tour of
8
duty. ...
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant limiting its liability to P1,000.00 under par. 4
and said that under paragraph 5, it is the customer who should bring the suit before the court.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover its expenses from the defendant on account of the latters
rd
employees unlawful act, despite the provision under paragraph 5 it is the 3 party who should institute
the claim which held the plaintiff harmless from any and all liabilities of the defendants employees?
Held:
rd

Yes. 3 parties, the customer in the case at bar, are not bound by the contract between the defendant
and plaintiff. But the plaintiff is in law liable for the damages caused the customers car, which had been
entrusted into its custody. Plaintiff therefore was in law justified in making good such damages and relying
in turn on defendant to honor its contract and indemnify it for such undisputed damages, which had been
caused directly by the unlawful and wrongful acts of defendants security guard in breach of their contract.

As ordained in Article 1159, Civil Code, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between
the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.
Plaintiff in law could not tell its customer, as per the trial courts view, that under the Guard Service
Contract it was not liable for the damage but the defendant since the customer could not hold
defendant to account for the damages as he had no privity of contract with defendant. Such an approach
of telling the adverse party to go to court, notwithstanding his plainly valid claim, aside from its ethical
deficiency among others, could hardly create any goodwill for plaintiffs business, in the same way that
defendants baseless attempt to evade fully discharging its contractual liability to plaintiff cannot be
expected to have brought it more business.