DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

COMMANDER
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
250 MAKALAPA DRIVE
PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII 96860-3131

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5830
Ser N00/074
17 Apr 14
FINAL ENDORSEMENT on CDR
(bX3), (b)(6)
b ..3...b..6) ltrs of 23 Nov 13

and CDR

(b)(3), (b){6)

From:
To:

Commander, U.S. Paci fic Fleet

File

Subj:

COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A

CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH-60S AIRCRAFT , BUNO
167985, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34' 18" E 037 25' 29" RESULTING
IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES, USN AND CWO3 JONATHAN S.
GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013

Ref:

(k)

COMNAVAIRSYSCOM

Encl:

(72) My ltr 5830 Ser Code N00/013 of 17 Mar 14

142000Z

Feb

14

I have reviewed the subject invest i gation and, pursuant to

enclosure 72, I have taken this investigation as a matter within my
1.

cognizance. As modified below, I approve the investigating officers'

findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations.
2.

Executive Summary

a. Background. HSC-6 helicopter "INDIAN 617" experienced a

mishap on deck USS WILLIAM P. LAWRENCE (WPL) in the Red Sea on 22
September 2013 at 1245(C). The Class A Mishap r esulted in the loss of
two Naval Aviators and the total loss of the MH- 608 aircraft.
b.
All relevant personnel were qual ified for the positions they
held and the aircraft was in compliance with all periodic maintenance
inspections and applicable t echnical directi ves.

c . The investigating officers (IO) opined that the officer of the

deck (OOD) did not violate published procedures and that the conning
officer's rudder-and-speed combination was not excessive . They also
opined t he following :
31

Subj:

COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A

CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH-60S AIRCRAFT, BUNO
167985, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34' 18" E 037 25' 29" RESULTING
IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES, USN AND CW03 JONATHAN S.
GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013

While the chosen course likely put the ship in a position

to experience the large rolls which caused the water
impact, neither the initial choice of course nor the
decision to come to course 195 were the result of
negligence on the part of the crew of WPL.
It was not
reasonably foreseeable that such a large roll or rolls
would occur in such a manner that would set in motion the
chain of events which resulted in this mishap. 1
Five of the six endorsers, including Commander, Naval Surface Force,
U.S. Pacific Fleet (CNSP) agreed. However, Commander, Naval Air
Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CNAP) did not agree.
d.
In his endorsement, CNAP opined that a series of seemingly
minor, innocuous misjudgments had a cumulative catastrophic outcome
when graded against the harshness of the unforgiving nature of
operations at sea . The Commanding Officer and her crew failed to
obviate the potential effects of the environmental conditions, and did
not take advantage of the opportunities to break the chain of events
that ultimately led to a wall of water impacting the helicopter's
spinning rotor blades, resulting in the mishap. CNAP found that there
was more that the Commanding Officer could and should have done to
properly and thoroughly assess the risk factors that led to this
mishap.
e . Causation . This mishap was the product of (1) accepting
unnecessary risks during routine, yet inherently dangerous, shipboard
helicopter operations, (2) failing to systematically train frigate and
destroyer Commanding Officers on previous mishaps, and (3) failing to
incorporate the findings of these mishaps into NATOPS procedures.
Though several factors contributed to this mishap, the primary cause
was the Commanding Officer's failure to fully account for the combined
effects of wave height and starboard quartering seas, exacerbated by
maintaining a speed of over 30 knots. The risks induced by a totality
of these factors were not warranted. The roll of 12 to starboard 2
minutes prior to the mishap provided warning of increasing risk;
actions as simple as immediately slowing or altering course to a more
1

IO Opinion 16.

32

Subj:

COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A

CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH-60S AIRCRAFT, BUNO
167985, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34' 18" E 037 25' 29 " RESULTING
IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES, USN AND CW03 JONATHAN S.
GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013

stable heading were not taken. While the surface and aviation
communities should have done more to train the CO on similar mishaps,
she was ultimately r e sponsible for the safe operation of her ship.
3.

Administrative Changes

a. Insert page number 23 at the center bottom of the SECOND

ENDORSEMENT on CDR
(b)(3), (b)(6)
and CDR
(b)(3), (b)(6)
l t;r of
23 Nov 13.
b. Change the THIRD ENDORSEMENT to read "THIRD ENDORSEMENT on CDR
(b)(3), (b)(6)
and CDR
(b)(3), (b)(6)
ltr of 23 Nov 13."
c.
Insert page number 25 at the center bottom of the FOURTH
ENDORSEMENT on CDR
(b)(3), (b)(6)
and CDR
b 3 b 6
1 tr of
23 Nov 13.

d. Delete page number 145 and replace with page number 26 at the
center bottom of the FIFTH ENDORSEMENT on CDR
(b)(3), (b)(6)
and
CDR
(b)(3), (b)(6)
l tr of 2 3 Nov 13 .

CDR

e.

Delete "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" from the FIFTH ENDORSEMENT on

and CDR
ltr of 23 Nov 13.
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

f.
on CDR

Change the SIXTH ENDORSEMENT header to read "S I XTH ENDORSEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)
and CDR
(b)(3), (b)(6)
ltr of 23 Nov 13."

g. Change the SIXTH ENDORSEMENT recipient from "Fi l e" to

"Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet."
h. Change the subject of SIXTH ENDORSEMENT to read "COMMAND
INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP
INVOLVING HSC-6 MH-608 AIRCRAFT, BUNO 167985, WHICH OCURRED AT N 22
34' 18" E 037 25' 29" RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES,
USN AND CWO3 JONATHAN S. GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 201 3".
4.

Findings of Fact.

I concur wi th all findings of fact .

33

Subj:

COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A

CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH-608 AIRCRAFT, BUNO
167985, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34' 18" E 037 25' 29" RESULTING
IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES, USN AND CWO3 JONATHAN S .
GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013

5. Opinions.
I concur with all opinions as modified through the
SIXTH ENDORSEMENT, except as modified below.
a. Opinion 7: Modify Opinion 7 to read:
"Though BUNO 167895
"INDIAN 617" was properly authorized and scheduled for the assigned
mission on 22 September 2013, subsequent changes to the CSG's schedule
did not trigger changes to the helicopter logistics schedule. WPL's
Commanding Officer accepted a higher risk helicopter evolution at
flank speed with quartering seas in an effort to execute a schedule
that was pressurized on one side by delays to the helicopter logistics
schedule, and on the other side by the need to have WPL proceed to
relieve the uss STOCKDALE (DDG 106) as plane guard in support of the
STOCKDALE's replenishment-at-sea schedule. By attempting to
accomplish both tasks simultaneously, without appropriately managing
risk, the ship's Commanding Officer traded away safety margin during
the execution of these two competing events. [Findings of Fact 7-11]"
b. Opinion 10: Modify Opinion 10 to read:
"Though the OOD did
not violate any published procedures during WPL's course change, the
Commanding Officer and OOD failed to heed the caution contained on
page 7-4 of reference (c), which advises that "special care should be
exercised when maneuvering while helicopters are turning on deck." As
a result, they failed to identify and properly assess the increasing
danger to the vessel, aircraft, and crew associated with maneuvering
at flank speed on a heading that placed swells on the starboard
quarter while a helicopter, though chocked and chained, operated on
the flight deck. [Findings of Fact 32-36, 38, 68 and 69]"
d. Opinion 11: Modify Opinion 11 to read:
"The Commanding
Officer accepted increased risk to life and property by maneuvering at
flank speed and permitting the OOD to execute a course change that
placed the seas on WPL's starboard quarter while INDIAN 617 operated
on deck when the operational urgency to do so could have been negated
had she communicated her situation to the Helicopter Element
Coordinator (HEC). [Findings of Fact 38, 40 and 41)"
e. Opinion 12: Modify Opinion 12 to read:
"The combined effects
of wave height, starboard quartering seas, and ship's speed set the
34

Subj : COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A

CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH-60S AIRCRAFT, BUNO
167985, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34' 18" E 037 25' 29" RESULTING
IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES, USN AND CWO3 JONATHAN S.
GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013
conditions for this mishap.
67, 68]"

[Findings of Fact

26-29,

31, 38, 47-50,

f. Opinion 16: Modify Opinion 16 to read:

"A truly strong
safety climate regarding helicopter operations should have included
training on previous mishaps and HAZREPs associated with DDG 51/79
Class ship handling, and should have allowed flight-deck personnel the
opportunity to communicate their concerns during the evolution.
[Findings of Fact 75)"
g. Add Opinion 16A:
"Once the ship achieved the ordered course
of 190 and began to experience heavy rolls, including a roll that
exceeded 12 that preceded the mishap by 2 minutes, the CO had ample
warning that the ship's new heading created risk to life and property;
yet she proceeded to course 195, exacerbating the situation. An
experienced Commanding Officer exercising prudent seamanship and
situational awareness should have foreseen that the combination of
WPL's course, speed, and the prevailing seas could cause larger and
more dangerous rolls. [Findings of Fact 29, 31, 37, 47-50, 67, 68]"
6. Recommendations.
I approve and adopt the recommendations of the
Investigating Officers. The actions directed by CNAP in the SIXTH
ENDORSEMENT are modified as described in paragraph 7 below.
7. Necessary Action. The dangers associated with seawater intrusion
over the flight deck of DDG 51/79 Class ships are well known. Navy
leaders concluded that we need to manage these types of risks better;
yet in this instance we did not and two men were lost.
a.

By copy of this endorsement, I direct the following action:

(1) CNSP and CNAP shall conduct a safety stand-down for all
helicopter commands and all frigates and destroyers to address the
dangers of seawater intrusion during helicopter operations.
Commanders shall ensure that reference (k} , which is Change 11 to
reference (c), and this and similar mishaps are briefed. The safety
stand-downs for Pacific Fleet units shall be completed by 30 May 2014.
CNAP and CNSP shall also coordinate with Commander, Naval Air Force,
Atlantic (CNAL) and Commander, Naval Surface Force, Atlantic (CNSL).

35

Subj :

COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A

CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC - 6 MH-608 AIRCRAFT, BUNO
167985, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34' 18" E 037 25' 29" RESULTING
IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES, USN AND CW03 JONATHAN S .
GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013

(2) CNSP shall forward a redacted copy of this investigation,

including endorsements, to the WPL's Officer of the Deck and Conning
Officer who were on watch during the mishap, and their present
Commanding Officer[s], for constructive counseling regarding my
findings of fact and opinions.
b . On 14 February 2014, Commander, Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIR) issued interim change2 11 to reference (c), which addressed
the particular risks associated with helicopter operations on lowfreeboard vessels. Before that interim change, the Helicopter
Operating Procedures for Air-capable Ships NATOPS Manual cautioned to
use "special care", but did not expressly restrict ship maneuvering
when a helicopter was operating on deck. 3 By copy of this endorsement,
I request the following actions:
(1) NAVAIR, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) , and the Naval
Safety Center coordinate with CNSP and CNAP to review all previous
documented occurrences of seawater intrusions associated with flight
operations aboard DDG 51/79 Class ships. Use those results to review
and expand upon reference (k) and to codify changes to reference (c) .
Define more explicitly the safe-operating parameters that shall govern
helicopter operations on air-capable ships, including the risks posed
by platform-specific characteristics and associated risk-mitigation
measures.
Incorporate those changes into all applicable training
syllabi.
(2) NAVAIR and NAVSEA conduct joint modeling of this mishap
and other occurrences of seawater intrusions in order to refine
current ship handling procedures during air-capable ship helicopter
evolutions.
(3) NAVAIR and NAVSEA review wind, sea state, pitch, roll,
ship's speed, and wave height/period parameters governing helicopter
operations aboard DDG 51/79 Class ships and other low-freeboard
vessels. Validate the restrictions and warnings contained in
reference (k); issue detailed changes to reference (c) that address
2
3

Reference (k) .
Reference (c) at page 7-4 (version in effect 22 Sep 2013).

36

Subj:

COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A

CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH-60S AIRCRAFT, BUNO
167985, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34' 18" E 037 25' 29" RESULTING
IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES, USN AND CW03 JONATHAN S.
GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013

specific wind, sea, and maneuvering restrictions that affect take-off,

landing, and on-deck-engaged- rotor operations (including at "red
deck") across a broad range of expected operating conditions.
8.

Accountability

a. I will direct appropriate administrative action for CDR Jana

A. Vavasseur.
9.

Conclusion

a . The WPL Commanding Officer's actions contributed to the loss

of life, loss of an aircraft, and damage to the ship. While
conducting flight operations, she maneuvered at flank speed and did
not fully assess the environmental factors . She unnecessarily assumed
increased risk during the helicopter evolution, which was unwarranted
given the operational circumstance, and she did not communicate with
the HEC. In thi s instance, the Commanding Officer did not exercise
the highest degree of judgment, seamanship, or prudence.
b. A Commanding Officer has absolute responsibility and
accountability for the conduct of her unit's mission; Article 802 of
Navy Regulations addresses this. Her responsibility to execute
operations and to manage risk across the full range of environmental
conditions is ever-present. These environmental conditions are both
naturally occurring (the wind, seas and weather in which our units
operate) as well as operationally induced {the mission at hand, and
the c ircumstances in which we are employing the unit, from peace
through crisis and into war) . The management of risk is a
comprehensive calculus, an enduring requirement, and an integral
element for successful command. Commanding Officers have an enduring
responsibility to manage risk, which requires the finest sense of
judgment.
c. Commanding Officers must execute this most seri ous
responsibility through a continuous assessment of all factors that
affect our operations - whether at sea, in the air, or ashore. We
achieve success by drawing from our experience, expertise, and
operational traditions, all of which value seamanship and airmanship;

37

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A

CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH-60S AIRCRAFT, BUNO
167985, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34' 18" E 037 25' 29" RESULTING
IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES, USN AND CWO3 JONATHAN S.
GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013
and by developing a finely tuned understanding of the physical
environment in which we operate. These factors combine in our
assessment of risk, both risk to mission and risk to force, and how
this assessment relates to safety -- foremost for our Sailors, our
most valued of all resources, and for our ships and aircraft. A
Commanding Officer is trusted to get this balance right.
d. The tragic events of 22 September 2013 unfolded in the
following manner :
Prior to the mishap, WPL observed true winds from northwest to
northwest-by-north at 25-30 knots and combined seas running with the
wind at 5-6 feet with a 4-5 second period.
At 1237, INDIAN 617 was recovered. WPL's course was 130 true,
which placed the seas directly astern.
Immediately after recovery,
WPL turned to starboard seeking course 190 true.

WPL rolled moderately during the course change from 130 to 190,
but at course 190, rolls became excessive with increasing magnitude.
o
At 1242, WPL rolled 12 to starboard.
o
At 1243, WPL changed course from 190 to 195, and rolls got worse.
o
At 1244, WPL rolled 16.6 to starboard and a thick "wall" of water
enveloped INDIAN 617, which was still turning on deck.
o
At 1245, a crash on deck was reported.
o
At 1247, there was a report of INDIAN 617 going overboard.
e. When viewed in isolation, at every moment, CDR Vavasseur's
maneuvering was within the envelope:
o
DDG110INST 3750.1A (written before NAVAIR promulgated Change 11 to
reference (c)) places no restrictions for maneuvering the ship while
at red deck with chocks and chains installedi
o
At the time of the incident, reference (c) only restricted
maneuvering in high sea states, which was not technically the
situation at the time of the mishapi and,
o
At the time of the incident reference (c) also stated that, "once
chocks and chains are installed, ship is free to maneuver."

f. But I expect more from my Commanding Officers than simply the

ability to stay within the written operating parameters .
I expect
38

...
Subj: :

COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A

CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH-60S AIRCRAFT, BUNO
167985, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34' 18" E 037 25' 29" RESULTING
IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES, USN AND CWO3 JONATHAN S .
GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013

Commanding Officers to exercise independent thought and sound

judgment. In this case, the risks assumed by proceeding at 30+ knots
and turning into quartering seas with a helicopter on deck with rotors
engaged, did not correlate to the environment in which the ship was
operating. The Commanding Officer failed to factor in the totality of
the physical conditions (wind, sea state, course steered, etc.) and
the perceived operational necessity to return to station at an ordered
flank bell, given the mission at hand. There was time to rectify the
situation by simply reducing speed after taking INDIAN 617 aboard; a
significant reduction in speed, thereby creating a more stable
platform, could have been achieved in seconds.
g. There are those who will contend that my conclusion is
unreasonable, perhaps even harsh and uncompromising; they might say
that it fails to recognize the challenges of Commanding Officers'
positions and the factors beyond their immediate control; and that my
conclusions will breed timidity instead of aggressiveness in our
Commanding Officers. On the contrary, I believe that the missions we
are regularly asked to perform -- and must be ready to perform in
conditions of extreme adversity while in conflict -- together with the
lives of those we are charged to lead, demand a trust in our
leadership to employ every means available to make the right
decisions. This means factoring in the totality of conditions
affecting any given operation, and fully employing one's skills and
experience to draw the right conclusions. No single set of operating
procedures, instruction manuals, guidelines, or checklists -- while
essential contributing tools -- relieves this enduring responsibility.
This highest of all standards is demanded in the naval profession all
the time.
h. Equally incumbent on the naval profession is an institutional
obligation to provide the necessary foundation to support our
Commanding Officers. WPL's Commanding Officer was ill served by us,
who did not provide her all necessary information and training for a
thorough operational risk management calculus. Specifically, there is
no systematic process in the surface warfare community for
disseminating a pattern of known hazards and incorporating them into
refined operating parameters beyond the most general of notes,
warnings, and cautions in NATOPS. Accordingly, and as noted by

39

Subj: :

COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A

CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH- 60S AI RCRAFT, BUNO
167985, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34' 18" E 037 25' 29" RESULTING
IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES, USN AND CWO3 JONATHAN S.
GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013

Commander, Destroyer Squadron TWO THREE in the SECOND ENDORSEMENT, the

event warrants further review of wind, sea state, pitch, roll, ship's
speed, and wave height/period parameters governing H-60 aircraft
operations aboard DDG-51 Class ships. This analysis should address
take-off, landing, and on-deck rotor operations across a broad range
of expected operating conditionsi and it must be jointly conducted by
both the Naval Aviation and Surface Warfare enterprises .
i . In the case of the WPL's helicopter mishap, the Commanding
Offi cer did not do all that should have been done. While she did not
exceed published procedures and operating parameters, she failed to
accurately evaluate the totality of the combined effects of ship's
speed together with winds, sea state, and course. While procedural
compliance is essential, the full scope of responsibilities in our
profession extends beyond simple compliance and blind obedience -- we
require more.
(b}(6}

Copy to:
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMNAVSURFPAC
COMNAVFORCENTCOM
NAVAIR
NAVSEA
NAVSAFECEN
COMCARSTKGRU 11
COMCARAIRWING 11
CDR
(b}(3}, (b}(6}
CDR
(b}(3}, (b}(6}

40

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

COMMANDER NAVAL AIR FORCE PACIFIC

BOX 357051

SAN DIEGO CALIFORN IA 92135-7051

5830
Ser N01J// 17 1
25 Feb 14

SIXTH ENDORSEMENT on CDR

(b)(3), (b)(6),

From:
To:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

l tr of 17 Jun 13

and CDR

b 3 , (b)(6)

Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific

File

Subj: : COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC- 6 MH- 60S AIRCRAFT ,
BUNO 167895, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34 18 E 037 25 29
RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES , USN AND
CW02 JONATHAN S. GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013
1. After thorough review, I close out this investigation,
concurring with the recommendations in previous endorsements for
further analysis of environmental impacts on ship handling
during Air-Capable ship flight deck operations. The Naval
Aviation Community in conjunction with the Surface Warfare
Community have already taken the first important step,
publ ishing a change to NAVAIR Publication 00-80T-122 (AIRCRAFT
OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR AIR-CAPABLE SHIPS NATOPS MANUAL) that
specif i cally addresses the hazards associated with this mishap.
2 . This tragic mishap highlights t he importance of prudently
assessing, in totality, all p o tent ial hazards of our operating
environment. Naval leadership must inculcate in our Commanding
Officers an expectat ion to apply their experience, training, and
knowledge to situations that fall outside, or on t he margins of,
speci f ic written guidance, identi f ying and appraising dangers
inherent to each specific tactical or operational situation. In
this evolu tion, a series of seemingly minor, innocuous
misjudgments had a cumulat i ve catastrophi c outcome when g r aded
by the h arshness and unforgiving nat ure of operations at sea.
The ship's crew fai l ed to obviate the potential impacts of the
environmental conditions, and did not take advantage of
opportunities to break the chain of events that u l timately led
to a wall of water i mpacting the h e licopter 's spinning rotor
blades, resulting in unrecoverable ground resonance, viol ent
airframe oscillations , and the death of two shipmates.
I concur
with the chain of command endorsements that n o purposeful
negligence or specific violation of published procedures took
27

Subj:

COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC - 6 MH-60S AIRCRAFT,
BUNO 167895, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34 18 E 037 25 29
RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES, USN AND
CW02 JONATHAN S. GIBSON, USN ON .22 SEP 2013

place. However, based on the trust and confidence imbued in our

selected leaders, I believe there is more that could have, and
should have been done by the Commanding Officer of the USS
WILLIAM P. LAWRENCE (DDG 110) in properly and thoroughly
assessing the total ity of risk factors present at the t i me of
the mishap.
3.
I concur with the op1n1ons and recommendations contained
therein, subject to the following comments:
Opinion 7 :
I do not concur with Opinion 7 as written.
(b)(5)
Opinion 7 will be modified to read:
a.

(b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5)
b 5
(b)(5)
(b)(5)
b 5
(bX5l
(b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5)

b. Opinion 10 : I do not concur with Opinion 10 as written.

(b)(5)
Opinion 10 will be modified to read:
b 5
b 5
(b)(5)
(b)(5)

c . Opinion 11: I do not concur with Opinion 11 as written.

Opinion 11 will be modified to read:
(b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5)

.b..5.

28

Subj:

COMMAND INVESTI GATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLAS S ALPHA MI SHAP I NVOLVI NG HSC-6 MH-60S AIRCRAFT,
BUNO 1 6 78 95, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34 18 E 037 25 29
RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES, USN AND
CWO2 J ONATHAN S . GI BSON, USN ON 22 SEP 20 13

d. Opinion 12: I do not con cur with Opinion 12 as wr itten.

Opini o n 12 will be mo difi e d to r e ad:
b 5
b55
(b)(5)

e. Opinion 16: I do not c oncur wi th Op i n ion 16 as wr i t ten.

Opinion 16 wi ll be mo dified to read:
(b)(5)
(b)(5)
b 5
,b ,5,
(b)(5)
(bX5l
(b)(5)
b 5
(bX5l
(b)(5)
b 5
b 5
(b)(5)

4.

I direc t t h e fol l owing a ctions to b e take n:

a.
b 5
(b)(5)

(b)(5)
(b)(5)

.b. .5.

b.

(b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5)

c.

(b)(5)
(b)(5)
,b 5
(b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5)
(bX5l

29

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH-60S AIRCRAFT,
BUNO 167895, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34 18 E 037 25 29
RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES, USN AND
CWO2 JONATHAN S. GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013
5.
The findings of f act, opinions, and recommendations of the
investigation as modified above are h ereby approved. The
recommendations contained in this investigation for perfecting
our safety procedures must be vigorously implemented and
methodically reviewed. Operations at sea are inherently
dangerous, and require constant vigilance to identify and break
a potential mishap's chain of events before a tragedy takes
place. This hallmark of professional seamanship and airmanship
shall be a defining characteristic of all Commanding Officers,
ensuring that we only accept operational risk when the benefits
far outweigh the potential cost, particularly when operating at
or near the edges of the envelope.
(b)(6)

D. H. BUSS
Copy to:
COMPACFLT
COMNAVSURFPAC
COMNAVFORCENTCOM
COMCARSTRKGRU 11
COMDESRON 23
COMCARAIRWING 11
CDR
(b)(3), (b)(6 )
CDR
.b .3.. (b)(6)

30

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

COMMANDER, NAVAL SURFACE FORCE

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

2841 RENDOVA ROAD

SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92155-5490

IN REPLY REFERTO

5830
ser N00J/108
24 Jan 14

FIFTH ENDORSEMENT on CDR

_b 3_, _b 6_

(b)(3), (b)(6) 1 tr of 23 Nov 13

From:
To:

and CDR (b)(3), (b)(6)

Commander, Naval Surface Force , u.s. Pacific Fleet

Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH-60S AIRCRAFT,
BUNO 167895, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34 ' 18" E 037 25'
29" RESULTING IN THB DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES USN
AND CWO3 JONATHAN S. GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013
1

1. Forwarded concurring with the finding of fact, opinions and

recommendations of the investigating officers as endorsed by Commanders
Carrier Strike Group ELEVEN, Commander Carrier Air Wing ELEVEN and Commander
Destroyer Squadron TWO THREE.
2. Specifically concurring wi~h and reiterating CVW-ll's and CDS-23's
recommendations that the Surface and Aviation enterprises seek methods to
prevent flight deck sea water intrusions, v ia both material improvements and
revised maneuvering parameters during flight operations.
(b)(6)
T. H .

Copy to:
COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES CENTRAL
COMDESRON TWO THREE
COMCARAIRWING ELEVEN
COMSTRKGRU ELEVEN

COPEMAN

COMMAND

145

FOR OFFICAL USE ONLY

DEPARTMENT OF T HE NAVY

COMMAN DER, U.S. NAVAL FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND

PSC 901, FPO AE 09805-0001

IN REP\.Y TO:

5830
Ser N013 / 195
23 Dec 13
FOURTH ENDOR SEMENT on CDR
(b)(3), (b)(6)

From:
To:
Via:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ltr of 23 Nov 1 3

and CDR

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Commander, u.s. Naval Forces centr al Command

Commander, Naval Air Force, u.s. Pacific Fl eet
commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacif i c Fleet

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVI NG HSC- 6 MH- 60S AIRCRAFT,
BUNO 167895, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34' 18" E 037 25'
29" RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES, USN
AND CW03 JONATHAN S. GI BSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013

1 . Forwarded, concurring with t he findings of fact, opinions,

and recommendations of the investigating offic ers, as endorsed
by Commander, Carri er Strike Group ELEVEN , Commander, Carrier
Air Wing ELEVEN, and Commander, Destroyer Squadron TWO THREE.
(b)(6)

J. W. MI LLER

Copy to :
COMDESRON TWO THREE
COMCARAI RWING ELEVEN
COMSTRKGRU ELEVEN

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

COMMANDER

CARRIER STRIKE GROUP ELEVEN

UNIT 25066

FPO AE 96601-4703

IN REPLY REFER TO

5830
Ser N00J/312
20 Dec 13

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on CDR

(b )(3), (b )(6)

From:
To:
Via:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ltr ot 15 Nov 13

and CDR

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Commander, Carrier Strike Group ELEVEN

Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fl eet
{l) Commander, u.s. FIFTH Fleet
(2) Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj : COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A

CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH-60S AIRCRAFT,
BONO 167895, WH ICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34' 18" E 037 25' 29"
RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L . JONES, USN AND
CWO3 JONATHAN S . GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013

1. Forwarded, concurring with the findings of fact, op1n1ons, and

recommendations of the investigating officer , as endorsed by
Commande r, Carrier Air Wing ELEVEN and Commander, Destroyer Squadron
TWO THREE.
2. I specifically find that AWSl
(b)(3), (b)(6)
, USN, sustained his
injuries while in the line of duty and not due to his own mi sconduct.
By copy of this letter, Commanding Officer, Helicopter Sea Control
Squadron SIX is directed to make appropriate medical record entries.
3. I am satisfied that negligence was not a contributing fac t o r by
anyone within HSC- 6 or USS WILLIAM P LAWRENCE (DDG 110). The r efore, I
do not believe any disciplinary action or administrative co r rect ive
measures are warranted in this case.
4. My point of contact for t his case is my Staff Judge Advocate,
CDR
(b)(3), (b)(6)
He may be reached by telephone or e , JAGC, USN.
mail at
,b..6,
or
_b _3 . (b)(6)
@ccsg11.navy .mil.
(b )(6)

M. S. WHITE

Copy to :

COMDESRON TWO THREE

COMCARAIRWING ELEVEN

24

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

COMMANDER. DESTROYER SQUADRON TWO THREE

UNIT 25073

FPO AP 96601-4722

IN REPLY REFER TO

5800
Ser N00/250
15 Dec 13
SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CDR
(b)(3), (b)(6)
ltr of 23 Nov 13

and CDR

(b)(3), (b)(6)

From:
To:
Via:

Commander, Destroyer Squadron TWO THREE

Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific
{1) Commander, Carrier Strike Group ELEVEN
{2) Commander, U.S. FIFTH Fleet
{3) Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet
(4) Commander, Naval Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj:

COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES Sill{ROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH-60S AIRCRAFT,
BUNO 167895, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34 ' 18" E 037 25'
29" RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES, USN
AND CW03 JONATHAN S. GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 13.

The subject investigation is respectfully forwarded with

concurrence regarding the Investigating Officers' findings of fact,
opinions, and recommendations.

1.

2 . I respectfully recommend Finding of Fact NR 37 be updated to match

the contents of Enclosures 4 and s, which characterize uss WILLIAM P
LAWRENCE making "best speed at/for split plant" vice "best speed"
prior to flight operations ."
3 . Based upon a detailed review of the contents herein, I believe a
thorough and impartial investigation was conducted . I concur with the
Line of Duty findings cited, and respectfully submit that no punitive
or non-punitive action is required for any of the parties involved .
4.
Within the subject investigation, the existence of a safe
operating c limate and compliance with governing directives aboard USS
WILLIAM P. LAWRENCE and within Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron SIX was
well documented. Consequently, the subject event potentially warrants
further review of wind, sea state, pitch, roll, ship's speed, and wave
height/period parameters governing MH- 608 aircraft operations aboard
DDG-51 Class ships. This analysis should address take - off, landing,
and on-deck rotor operation across a broad range of expected operating
conditions, and be jointly conducted by the Naval Aviation and Surface
Warfare Enterprises. Such will ensure timely review, promulgation,
and education of any modifications to existing references that may be
deemed applicable.
(b)(6)

H.

T _

WORKMAN

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

COMMANDER CARRIER AIR WING ELEVEN

UNIT 25120

FPO AP 96601-4408

5830
Ser 00/359
10 Dec 13
FIRST ENOORSEMENT on CDR
(b)(3), (b)(6)
ltr of 23 Nov 13

and CDR

(b)(3), (b)(6)

From:
To:
Via:

Commander, Carrier Air Wing 11

Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific
(1) Commander, Destroyer Squadron TWO THREE
(2) Commander, Carrier Strike Group 11
(3) commander, U.S. FIFTH Fleet
(4) Commander, Naval Surface Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj:

COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A

CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH-60S AIRCRAFT, BUNO
167895, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34' 18" E 037 25' 29"
RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES, USN AND
CWO3 JONATHAN S. GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 13

1. The investigating officers conducted a thorough and impartial

investigation regarding the subject mishap.
I concur with the facts,
opinions, and recommendations contained therein.
Specifically, I find
that the injury incurred by AWSl b 3, (b)(6) was incurred in the line of
duty and not due to the member's own misconduct.
I believe no
punitive or non- punitive action is required for any of the parties
involved.
2. This tragic mishap continues to highlight the dangers of operating
helicopters on DDG - 51 class ships. Operations were conducted in
accordance with regulations, procedures and good headwork, yet
catastrophic events still occurred. While embarked aviation
operations are inherently dangerous, I believe there is room for
improvement.
I recommend that the Naval Aviation Enterprise and
Surface Warfare Enterprise jointly investigate potential material and
non-material solut i ons to mitigate the risks of sea water intrusion on
ship flight decks.
3 . All original evidence obtained by this i nvest i gation will be
maintained by the Force Judge Advocate, Naval Air Force, Pacific,
(b)(6)
(b)(6)

22

23 Nov 2013

From:
To:
Subj :

Ref :

Encl :

CDR
USN

(b)(3), {b)(6)
CDR
(bX3), {bX6)
, USN

Commander, Carrier Air Wing ELEVEN

COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE C I RCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH-60S AIRCRAFT ,
BUNO 167895, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34 ' 18" E 037 25 '
29" RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L . JONES , USN
AND CWO3 JONATHAN S . GI BSON , USN ON 22 SEP 2013
(a) JAGINS T 58 0 0 .7 F, Ma nual of the Judge Advocate General
(b) OPNAVINST 3710.7U, NATOPS General Flight and Opera ti ng
Instructions
(c) NAVAIR 00-80T-122, Helicopter Operating Procedures for
Air-Capable Ships NATOPS Manual
(d) NAEC-ENG-7576 , Shipboard Aviation Facilities Resume
(e) A1-H60SA- NFM- 000, MH- 60S NATOPS Flight Manual
(f) DDGllOINST 3750 . 1A, Helicopter Standard Operating
Procedures
(g) COMNAVSURFORINST 3700.1B, Aviation Readiness
Qualification (ARQ), Aviation Facility Certification
(AVCERT) and Aviation (Air) Certification of

COMNAVSURFOR Ships

(h) HSC-6INST3710 . 3A, HELSEACOMBATRON SIX Standard

Operating Procedures
(i) NAVAIR 17-1-537 , Technical Manual, Aircraft Securing
and Handling Procedures
( j ) CNAFINST 13800. 1 A, Integrated Launch and Recovery
Television Surveillance System
(1) command Investigation Convening Letter dated 24 S e p
2013
HSC- 6
(2) Written Statements of AWS1
(b)(3), (b)(6)
I
Flight Crew Chief
, HSC-6

{3) Written Statement of AWS3

(b)(3), (b)(6)
Flight Crew

( 4) Written Statement of CDR Jana A. Vavasseur,

Commanding Officer , USS WILLIAM P. LAWRENCE (DDG
110) .
(5) Written Statement of LTJG
(b)(3), (b)(6)
Officer
of the Deck , USS WILLIAM P. LAWRENCE {DOG 110) .
( 6) Written Statement of ENS
(b)(3),(b)(6)
, Junior
Officer of the Deck, USS WILLIAM P . LAWRENCE
(DDG 110)

Subj:

COMMAND I NVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC- 6 MH-60S AIRCRAFT,

BUNO 167895, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34 ' 18" E 037 25 '

29" RESULTING I N THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L . JON ES , USN

AND CWO3 JONATHAN S . GIBSON , USN ON 22 SEP 2013
(7) Written Statement of LTJG
(b)(3),(b)(6)
, Conning
Officer, USS WILLIAM P . LAWRENCE (DDG 110)
(8) Written Statement by QMC (SW/AW)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
III , Quartermaste r of the Wa t ch , USS WILLIAM
P . LAWRENCE (DDG 110)
(9) Writ ten Statement of SN
(b)(3),(b)(6)
, He l msman ,
USS WILLIAM P . LAWRENCE (DDG 110)
(10) Written Statement of SN
(b)(3), (b)(6)
Helmsman , USS WILL IAM P . LAWRENCE (DDG 110)
{11) Written Statement of PSC
(b)(3), (b)(6)
, Helo
Control Officer, USS WILLIAM P . LAWRENCE (DDG 1 10)
(12} Written Statement of BMl
(b)(3), (b)(6)
Flight Deck Officer , USS WILLIAM P. LAWRENCE (DDG
110)
(13) Written Statement of 8M2
(b)(3),(b)(6)
, Landing
Signalman Enlisted, USS WI LLIAM P . LAWRENCE (DDG
110)

(14) Written Statement of SN

(b)(3),(b)(6)
, Chock and
Chainman , USS WILLIAM P . LAWRENCE (DDG 11 0)
(1 5) Wr it ten Statement of LS3
(b)(3),(b)(6)
, Chock and

Chainman , USS WILLIAM P . LAWRENCE (DDG 110)

(16) Written Statement of AT2

(b)(3), (b)(6)
I
Worki ng

Party , HSM-75 Combat Element 3

(17) Wr i tten Statement of ATAT

(b)(3), (b)(6)
, Worki ng

Party , HSM-75 Combat Element 3

(18) Written Statement of AD3

(b)(3),(b)(6)
Working
Party , HSM-75 Combat Element 3
(19) Written Statement of AE3
(b)(3),(b)(6)
, Working

Party , HSM- 75 Combat Element 3

(20) Written Statement of AM2

b3, b6)
, Working
Par t y , HSM- 75 Combat Element 3
(21) Wr i tten Statement of LT
(b)(3), (b)(6)
, Tactical

Action Officer, USS WILLIAM P . LAWRENCE (DDG 110)

(22) Summary of intervie w s tatements of OS 1 b 3 , (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) r Surface Warfare Coordinator , USS WILLIAM P.

LAWRENCE (DDG 110)

{23) Written Statement of CDR

(b)(3),(b)(6)
, Commanding
Officer, HSC-6
{24) Written Statement of HM3
(b)(3),(b)(6)
,
USS
NI MITZ (CVN 68) , Passenger
(2 5) Writt en Statement of CTI 2
b .3.. b .6. , Flight Deck

Phone Talker , USS WI LLIAM P. LAWRENCE (DDG 1 10)

(26) USS NIMIT Z (CVN 68) Weather Forecast for 22 Sep 13

(27) Summary of interview statements of OS1
b . 3 .. b . 6.
2

Subj:

COMMAND INVEST I GAT ION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH - 60S AIRCRAFT,

BUNO 167895, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22o 34 ' 18" E 037 25 '
29" RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L . JONES , USN
AND CWO3 JONATHAN S . GI BSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013
Anti -Submarine Tactical Air Control l er, USS
WILL I AM P . LAWRENCE (DDG 110)
(28) Summary of interview statements of LCDR
(b)(3), (b)(6)
HSM-75 Combat Element 4 Officer-in-Charge
(29) Copy of USS WILLIAM P . LAWRENCE (DDG 110) 22 Sep 13
Ship ' s Deck Log , OPNAV 3100/99
(30) USS WILLIAM P. LAWRENCE (DDG 110) MISHAP Site Survey
(3 1 ) USS WILLIAM P. LAWRENCE (DDG 110) Underway Watch

Bil l

(32) Aviation Life Support Systems Inspection Records and

Maintenance Action Forms for LCDR Jones ' and CWO3
Gi bson's f l ight gear
(33) Copy of HSC-6INST 3710 . 3A Risk Assessment Form from

22 Sep 13

(34) Copy of DDG-110 Weather Observations for 22SEP13,

3141 - 3

(35) Flight Deck Witness Locations

(36) Copy of Designat i on as Level 3 Anti - Su bmarine

Tactical Air Controller letter for OS2

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

b __3_, b __6_

(37) Copy of Designation as Off i cer of the Deck (U/W)

letter for LTJG

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(38) Copy of Designation as Tactical Action Officer (TA)

letter for LT
.b. .3...b..6.

( 39) Aviation HSC- 6 Pilot Deck Landing Qualification

Currency tracker dated 21 Sep 2013

(4 0) OPNAV 3710/4 Naval Aircraft Flight Records (NAVFLIR)

for HSC- 6 Det 1
Copy
of HSC - 6 Flight Schedules for 17 - 22 Sep 2013
( 41)
signed by Det Officer in Charge
( 4 2) Copy of BUNO 167895 Da i ly Inspection I Turnaround

Inspection Records

( 4 3) Copy of AWBS Form F, Tactical Weight and Ba l ance

Clearance Form fo r HSC-6 MH-60S

( 4 4) Copy of BUNO 1 67895 OPNAV 4790/141 Aircraft

Inspection and Acceptance Reco r d for 22 Sep 2013

( 4 5) Copy of Medica l Up-Chit ICO CWO3 Jonathan S . Gibson

( 46) HSC-6 Pilot Designation Letter for CWO3 Jonathan S .
Gibson
(47) Copy of NATOPS Evaluation Report and Instrument

rating ICO CWO3 Jonathan S . Gibson

(48) Copy of Medical Up-Chit ICO LCDR Landon L . Jones

( 4 9) HSC-6 Pilot Designation Letter for LCDR Landon L.
Jones
3

Subj :

COMMAND INVEST I GAT I ON INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH-60S AIRCRAFT ,
BUNO 1 67895, WH I CH OCCURRED AT N 22 3 4' 18" E 037 25 '
29" RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L . JONES , USN
AND CWO3 JONATHAN S . GIBSON , USN ON 22 SEP 2013

(50) Copy of NATOPS Eva l uation Report and Instrument

rating reo LCDR Landon L . Jones

(51) NASTP Tr aining Qualif i c ati on letter for LCDR Landon

L. Jones
(52) NAS T P Training Qualification letter for CWO3

Jonathan S . Gibson

(53) Copy of Medical Up - Chit ICO AWSl

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(54) Copy of NATOPS Evaluation Report ICO AWS 1 (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b )(3), (b )(6)

(55) copy of Medical Up - Ch it reo AWS3

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(56) Copy of NATOPS Evaluation Report ICO AWS3 (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(57) Written Statement of PR2

(b)(3), (b)(6)
, HSC-6

Det 1

(58) USS WILLIAM P . LAWRENCE Personnel Qualification

Standards sheets

(59) USS WILLIAM P . LAWRENCE Aviation Facility

Cert i f i cation msg 22 1 8192 APR 12

(60) USS WILLI AM P . LAWRENCE Sh i p ' s Inertia l Navigation

System Data

(61) Investigators ' Opinion of Sequence of Event s

(62) Weather Data from NIMITZ Strike Group Oceanogr aphy

Team (SGOT) for 22 Sep 2013

(63) Flight Log Book en t ries for LCDR Landon L . J ones and
CWO3 Jonathan s. Gibson
(64) Flight Deck Cha i n Inventory & Maintenance Records
(65) Personal Observations of the crash site from the

JAGMAN Investigating Officers

(66) Transcription of USS WILLIAM P . LAWRENCE LAND/LAUNCH

Frequency
(67) Line of Du ty investigation reo , LCDR Landon L.

Jones , DTD 10 October 2013

(68) Line of Duty i nvestigation reo CWO3 Jonathan S.

Gibson , DTD 10 October 2013

(69) Copy of BUNO 167895 NALCOM I S OMA Scheduled

Inspections Report and Aircraft/Equ i p ment Workload

Report

( 70) Written Statement of CDR

(b)(3), (b)(6)
, Combat

Direction Center Officer, USS NIMITZ (CVN 68)

(7 1 ) Command Investigation Extension Letter dated 24 Oct

2013

Subj : COMMAND I NVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP I NVOLVING HSC-6 MH-60S AIRCRAFT,
BUNO 167895, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34 ' 18" E 037 25'
29" RESULTING I N THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L . JONES , USN
AND CWO3 JONATHAN S . GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013
Pre limin a r y St ateme n t

1 . Purs u ant to enclosure (1) and in accordance with reference

(a) , a command investigation was conducted to inquire into the
circumstances surrounding a Class Alpha Mishap involvi ng the
loss of an MH-60S a i rcraft Bureau Number (BUNO) 167895 in the
Red Sea on 22 September 2013.
2 . In accordance with Title 10 USC 2255 and section 024lc(2) of
reference (a) , one of the Investigating Officers, CDR (b)(3), (b)(6),
i s a graduate of the Naval Aviat i on Safety Course and i s
qualif ied to conduct the inqu iry i nto the facts surround i ng the
mishap .

3 . Per reference (a) , an exte n sion for submission of this

report was requested and granted by the Convening Authority to
expire on 23 November 2013, enclosure (71) . Extensions were
necessary to ensure receipt and analysis of critical enclosures .
(b)(3),(b)(6)
, JAGC, USN, Staff Judge Advoca t e, Car ri er
4 . CDR
Strike Group ELEVEN assisted the Investigating Officers with
legal advice du ri ng the course of this investigation .

5 . Line of
LCDR Landon
and 68) . A
i s included

Duty invest i gat i ons were performed previously for

L . Jones and CWO3 Jonathan s . Gibson (enclosures 67
Line of Duty determination for AWSl
(b)(3), (b)(6)
i n this report .

6. All reasonably available and relevant evi dence was

collected . There were no difficulties encountered during the
conduct of this investigation.
In cases where severa l documents
show the same qua l ification, only one document is enclosed.
However all documents were reviewed and verified as consisten t .

7. The Avia ti on Mishap Board wi l l maintain all or i ginal

evidence .

Subj : COMMAND INVESTIGATION I NTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH-60S AIRCRAFT 1
BUNO 167895/ WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 o 34' 18" E 037 25 1
29" RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L . JONES, USN
AND CWO3 JONATHAN S . GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013
8.
There were several eye witnesses to this mi shap .
Enclosure
35 is a g r aphical depiction of where each individual at the
scene was standing.
9 . The Investigating Officers have met each of the Convening
Authority's directives .
They have investigated the cause o f the
accident and provided op i n i ons as to any fault, neglect or
responsibility .
Inves t i g ating Officers have also provided
recommendations to mitiga t e the possibility of this type of
mishap happening i n t he f uture .

Findings of Fac t
1 . MH-60S Aircraft BUNO 167895, INDIAN 617 ( IN 617) and USS
WILLIAM P. LAWRENCE (DDG 110) (WPL) were involved in a Class A
Flight Mishap on 22 September 2013 .
[ Enclosures 29, 41, 70 and
65]
2.
LCDR Landon L. Jones , USN and CWO3 Jonathan S. Gibson, USN
were onboard BUNO 167895 when the mishap occurr ed.
All
crewmembers were active duty US Navy Personnel assigned to HSC-6
deployed with NIMITZ Carrier Strike Group and embarked on USNS
RAINIER (AOE 7} during the mishap .
[Enclosure 41]
3 . The mishap occurred on the flight deck of WPL on 22
September 2013. (Enclosures 29, 41 and 65)
4.
The mishap resulted in complete destruct i on of the Aircraft
and substantial damage to the WPL flight deck .
(Enclosures 30
and 65)
5.

Both pilots perished in the mishap .

[Enclosures 23)

6 . AWS1
(b)(3), (b)(6)
, USN , assigned t o HSC-6 deployed with
NIMITZ Carrier Strike Group and embarked on USNS RA I NIER (AOE 7}
was injured during the mishap .
[Enclosure 2]
7 . According to Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management

Informa t ion System (NALCOMIS) Organizational Maintenance

Subj :

COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MI SHAP INVOLVING HSC- 6 MH-60S AIRCRAFT ,

BUNO 167895 , WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34' 18" E 037 25'

29" RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L . JONES , USN

AND CW03 JONATHAN S . GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013

Activity (OMA) and the aircraft discrepancy log book (ADB)

summary report , BUNO 167895/INDIAN 617 (IN 617) was i n
compliance with al l periodic maintenance inspections and
applicable technical directives . The aircraft had 1012 . 2 total
flight hours . 1 43 . 6 f l ight hours had occurred since the last
intermediate phase inspection . The aircraft ' s 364 Day Special
inspection was completed on 29 August 2013 .
[Enclosure 69)
8 . Daily and Turnaround inspections were conducted on BUNO
167895 on 2 1 September 2013 . No discrepancies were noted .
[Enclosure 42)

9 . According to NALCOMIS OMA, the ADB summary report, and the

OPNAV 4790/141 Aircraft Inspection and Acceptance Record , BUNO
167895 was fully mission capab l e for miss i on assigned .
[Enc l osures 44 and 69)
10 . BUNO 167895 was within all weight and balance limitations.

[Enclosure 43)

11 . The mishap flight was proper l y scheduled per applicable

d i rectives (references (b) and (h)) . The f l ight was authorized
by HSC-6 Detachment 1 Officer- in-Charge LCDR L. L . Jones .
[Enclosure 39 and 41)
1 2 . LCDR Landon L . Jones ' s last flight was 16 Sep 20 1 3 .
[Enclosures 40 and 63)
13 . CW03 Jonathan S . Gibson ' s last flight was 20 Sep 2013 .
[Enclosures 40 and 63)
14. LCDR Jones and CW03 Gi bson were current for day landings on
a i r capable ships in accordance with reference (e) .
[Enclosure
39)
1 5 . LCDR Landon L . Jones was the HSC-6 Det 1 Officer- In-Charge.
He was a Helicopter Aircraft Commander (HAC) and was Assistant
NATOPS Instructor qualified.
He had 3800 . 9 total flight hours
with 1961 . 2 flight hours in H-60 model aircraft.
[Enclosures 49
and 63]

Subj:

COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH - 60S AIRCRAFT,

BUNO 167895 , WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34' 18" E 037 25'

29" RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES, USN

AND CWO3 JONATHAN S. GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013

16. CWO3 Jonat han S. Gibson was HSC-6 Det 1 Training Officer.
He was a Helicopter Second Pilot (H2P).
He had 436 . 9 total
flight hours with 225.6 flight hours in H-60 model aircraft .
[Enclosures 46 and 63]
17 .
IN 617 Fli ght Crew clearances, qualifications, and
designations were current and appropriate for the assigned
mission including Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures
Standardization (NATOPS ) , Instrument , Egress Training, Naval
Aviation Survival Training , Aircrew Coordination Training and a
current Medical up-chit.
[Enclosures 45-56]
18 . LCDR Jones' and CWO3 Gibson's Aviation Life Support Systems
were in compliance with all periodic maintenance inspections.
No flight gear for LCDR Jones or CWO3 Gibson was found onboard
USNS RAINER (AOE 7) .
[Enclosure 57 and 32]

19 . The crew of IN 617 completed a pre-mission Crew Risk

Assessment Form IAW reference (h) and discussed ORM issues and
mitigation techniques during the brief conducted prior to the
fli ght. The Crew Chief, AWSl (b)(3), (b)(6) , received approximately 56 hours of sleep the night prior to the mishap and was
experiencing some personal stress due to family issues. The
only noted stress factor was the fast pace of scheduled events
for the mission.
[Enclosure 2 and 33)
20. The Officer of the Deck (OOD), Tactical Action Officer
(TAO) and Anti - Submarine Tactical Air Controller (ASTAC) aboard
WPL were designated and qualified per applicable directives.
[Enclosures 31 and 36-38)
21. The Helicopter Control Officer (HCO), Flight Deck Officer
(FDO), Landing Signalman Enlisted (LSE), Helmsmen, and starboard
Chock and Chainman aboard WPL were qualified per applicable
Personnel Qualification Standards ( PQS) .
[Enclosure 58 J
22 . The port Chock and Chainman was not qualified in 43219-DCH1
(Helicopter Operations for Air Capable Ships) 302 Flight Deck
Crewman in his PQS . This qualification is not r.equired per
reference (c) .
[Enclosure 58]

Subj : COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH - 60S AIRCRAFT,
BUNO 167895, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34' 18" E 037 25'
29" RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES, USN
AND CW03 JONATHAN S. GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013
23. The LSE and port Chock and Chainman were not listed on the
watchbill.
[Enclosure 31)
24 . WPL had a current Aviation Facility Certification for H-60S
aircraft in accordance with reference (g) .
[Enclosure 59]
25.
IN 617 took off from USNS RAINIER at approximately 1045C
and stopped at USS NIMITZ (CVN 68) en route to WPL .
[Enc losure
41)
26.
Weather forecast by the NIMITZ Strike Group Oceanography
Team (SGOT) for 1200-1600L called for wind from the northwest at
25-30 knots gusting to 35 knots; swell of 3 - 5 ft from the
northwest with a period of 4-6 seconds; combined seas of 5-7 ft;
sea state of 4 .
[Enclosure 26)

27. Observed weather for the mishap area was reported by the
NIMITZ SGOT as 30.6 degrees Celsius; sea surface temperature
30.6 degrees Celsius; sea height 2- 3 ft with a period of 2-3
seconds; swell of 2-4 ft from 330T with a period of 4- 6 seconds;
altimeter setting of 29 . 77; surface winds 320 degrees true at 28
knots; sky clear; visibility 6 nautical miles with haze; no
thunderstorms; no turbulence, icing or precipitation .
(At 1256C
USS NIMITZ was 9nm from WPL).
[Enclosures 62)
28. The WPL Surface Weather Observations log recorded seas of 3
feet or less for the entire day and swell of 4 to 5 feet
throughout the day, with swell from 250 to 320 degrees true for
a calculated combined sea height of 5.0 to 5.8 feet.
[Enclosure
34)
29. The ship OOD stated seas during that time were 5-7 feet
with a 4-5 second period.
[Enclosure 5)

30. According to the National Weather Service, and consistent

with consultations with the CCSG- 11 METOC Officer, significant
wave height is the average of the highest one-third (33%) of
waves (measured from trough to crest) that occur in a given
period and, as a general rule, the largest individual wave one
may encounter is approximately twice as high as the Significant
Wave Height (or Seas).
For a significant wave height of six
9

Subj :

COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH - 60S AIRCRAFT ,

BUNO 167895, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34' 18" E 037 25'
29" RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES, USN
AND CW03 JONATHAN S. GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013

feet, approximately one in every one hundred waves will be

greater than 10 feet ; and one in every 1000 waves will be
greater than 12 feet .
31. True winds (TW) as observed by the OOD and Conning Officer
were 320 to 325 degrees true at 25-35 knots.
[Enclosures 5 and
7]
32 .
Reference (c) defines "Green Deck" as winds and ship
movement within specified limits for a particular type of
aircraft and ship . Green Deck is required for launching and
recovering aircraft.
"Red Deck" is defined as the condition
when an aircraft is secured to the flight deck with rotors
turning or stopped .

35. The OOD, JOOD and CONN ship pitch was indicated at 1 degree
and ship roll was indicated at 3 to 6 degrees.
[Enclosures 5 , 6
and 7]
36.
Ship's Inertial Navigation System data for WPL indicted
ship pitch varied from +0 . 6 to -0 . 9 degrees and ship roll
varied from +4.2 to -6.3 degrees between 1230C and 1240C .
Positive values are defined as bow up for pitch and starboard
roll .
[Enclosure 60]
37.
Prior to fl i ght operations, WPL completed an Underway
Replenishment and had been ordered to make "best speed" to take
station on USS NIMITZ (CVN 68), which was 30 nm to the south, in
order to relieve USS STOCKDALE (DDG 106) (STK) so that STK could
conduct Underway Replenishment .
[Enclosures 4 and 5]
38 . The following sequence of events occurred during IN 617
flight operations with WPL :
1130C:
IN 617 checks in with WPL [Enclosure 66]

10

Subj : COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH- 60S AIRCRAFT,
BUNO 167895, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34' 18" E 037 25'
29" RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES, USN
AND CW03 JONATHAN S. GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013
1225C: HCO passes environmental information to IN 617 in
preparation for landing. The information passed was
true winds at 335 at 22 knots, relative winds 80 to
port at 10 knots, ship's pitch 1, ship's roll 5
[Enclosure 66]
1226C: IN 617 acknowledges information and requests Green
Deck for landing [Enclosure 66]
1226C : Foxtrot Corpen (ship's true course and speed during
flight operations) was 130 at 27 knots when Green
Deck given [Enclosure 29]
1228C : WPL waved off IN 617 due to winds fluctuating out of
limits [Enclosures 4, 5, 11, 22 and 66]
1235C: CONN ordered : All Ahead Flank, indicate 160rpm (30-31
kts) [Enclosures 4, 5 and 2 9]
1236C: HCO passes environmental information to IN 617 in
preparation for landing . The information passed was
true winds at 330 at 30 knots, relative winds 60 to
port at 10 knots, Foxtrot Corpen of 130 true at 31
knots, ship's pitch 1, ship's roll 3 [Enclosure 66]
1237C : IN 617 acknowledges information [Enclosure 66]
1237C: HCO passes Green Deck to IN 617 [Enclosure 66]
1237C : IN 617 landed [Enclosures 4, 5 and 11]
1239C : IN 617 chocked & chained on the Flight Deck (FD) and
Red Deck set [Enclosures 4, 5, 6, 11 and 66]
1239C: CONN ordered: Right 3 Degrees Rudder, Steady on
course 190 [Enclosure 29]
1243C: CONN ordered: Right 2 Degrees Rudder, Steady on
course 195 [Enclosure 29]
1245C: Crash on Deck reported [Enclosure 29]
1245C : CONN ordered all stop (not recorded in the deck log)
[Enclosures 4 and 7-9]
Report
of IN 617 going overboard on the port side
1247C:
[Enclosures 4 and 6]
1247C: CONN ordered Left 30 Degrees Rudder, All Engines
Ahead Full for 20 knots [Enclosure 29]
1247C: Ship began SAR efforts [Enclosure 4]

39. The co and OOD stated that increasing speed to 160 rpm (3031 knots) on course 130 resulted in winds stable and in the
envelope for Green Deck.
[Enclosures 4 and 5]
40. The CO entered the bridge at 1228C . The CO personally
monitored the winds during IN 617's second approach and
11

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH - 60S AIRCRAFT,
BUNO 167895, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34 ' 18" E 037 25 '
29" RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L . JONES, USN
AND CWO3 JONATHAN S . GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013
monitored the Helmsman's inputs during ship maneu vering after IN
617 landed.
[Enclosures 4 and 29]
41 . The bridge team made a conscious effort to l imit the rudder
used based on ship ' s speed to minimize heel of the ship.
[ Enclosures 4 and 5)
42 . According to multiple witnesses , IN 617 recovered safely at
approximately 1 239C and was secured to the FD with chocks and
chains by the FD crew .
[Enclosures 11-15]
43 .
IN 617 crewmen verified the cha i ns were installed p roperly
after landing .
[Enclosures 2 and 3]
44 . After IN 617 was chocked & chained, the co and OOD stated
they maneuvered WPL to 190 true to get to the ir station on NIM,
then maneuvered to 195 true based on a refined maneuvering
board solut i on .
[Enclosures 4, 5 and 6]
45. WPL ' s speed was above 30 knots from 1235C until 1245C.
[Enclosure 60]
46.
During the maneuvers from 130 true t o 195 true, relative
winds remained in the envelope for Green Deck.
[Enc l osures 4 , 5
and 7]
47 . During the turn from 130 to 190, a ll ship rol l s were less
than 6.5.
Immediately upon arriving at course 190, the ship
encountered a roll of 12 to starboard at 1242C. Subsequen t
rolls were smaller in amplitude and the s h ip retuned to
equilibrium within one minute .
[Enclosure 60]
48. As the ship turned from 190 to 195 at 1243C, the sh i p's
rolling oscillations increased in frequency and magnitude . The
rolls are more pronounced to starboard .
[Enclosure 60]
49. At 1244 : 34C , the ship rolls 13 . 1 to port and then 16.6 to
starboard . These are the largest rolls recorded by t he ship's
i nertia l navigation system since 1230C .
[Enclosure 60]
50. The OOD and CONN observed a roll to port pr i or to the
mishap of 12 to 13.5 degrees .
[Enclosures 5 and 7]

12

Subj:

COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC- 6 MH-60S AIRCRAFT,
BUNO 167895, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34' 18" E 037 25'
29" RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES, USN
AND CWO3 JONATHAN S. GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013

51 . Multiple witnesses observed the ship take a large roll to

port followed by a large roll to starboard.
[Enclosures 2, 5,
10 and 12]
52.
During the roll to port, the Flight Deck Officer noticed
the chains attached to IN 617 tightened but held.
[Enclosure
12]
53. Multiple witnesses observed a thick " wall" of water came
from the starboard side which enveloped IN 617.
[Enclosures 2,
3, 8, 11 - 16, 19-22, 24 and 27]
54. Multiple other witnesses described the water more as a
solid jet of water that shot up vertically and then back down
vice a wave that moved across the flight deck.

55. The flight deck phone talker saw a wave from astern hit the
aft rotors immediately before the large wave.
[Enclosure 25]
56 . Multiple witnesses observed the IN 617 fuselage began to
shake violently.
[Enclosures 3, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15, 19 and 27]
57 . Multiple witnesses observed the rotor blades impact the
flight deck.
[Enclosures 3, 5, 11, 12, 21 and 27]
58. Multiple witnesses observed IN 617 rotate clockwise and
move starboard and forward on the flight deck after water
impact .
[Enclosures 3, 4, 11, 12, 15, 17 - 19 and 25]
59. Multiple flight deck witnesses ran into the starboard
hangar as IN 617 moved towards the starboard side of the ship.
60. Several witnesses who sought shelter in the starboard
hangar heard what sounded like rotors hitting the hangar door
but did not hear engine noise.

61. Multiple witnesses observed the helicopter tail was to be

either at an unnatural angle or broken off .
[Enclosures 2, 4,
8, 9, 15, 21 and 25)
62.
Immediately following the start of the mishap, there was a
large roll to port.
[Enclosures 4, 8, 15 and 17)

13

Subj :

COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH- 60S AIRCRAFT ,
BUNO 167895, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34 ' 18 " E 037 25 '
29" RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L . JONES , USN
AND CW03 JONATHAN S . GIBSON , USN ON 22 SEP 2013

63 . After the l arge rol l, IN 617 then moved across the flight
deck and went overboard to port.
[Enclosures 2, 8 , 15, 17, 21
and 27]
64 . Multiple witnesses saw both pilots in the aircraft as it
moved about the flight deck .
[Enclosures 2, 3 , 13 , 22 and 27]
65 .
IN 617 went overboard from WPL at N22 34 ' 18" E037 25 '
29". WPL was heading approximately 195 true at time of impact.
Wreckage was distr i buted to the south of the impact down the
line of set and drift at 160 true at 1.63 knots to a maximum of
N22 29 . 47 ' E037 22 . 49 ' .
[Enclosures 29 , 60 and 62 ]

66 .
Post-mishap photographs show indications of rotor impact
with the f l ight deck as well as signs of damage 20 feet above
the flight deck. The aircraft tail rotor was found on the aft
starboard side of the flight deck. The empennage sect i on of the
a i rcraft was found on the forward port s i de of the flight deck .
The empennage showed signs of breaking off the aircraft cabin by
twisting to the right . The right main landing gear broke off
the aircraft at the p i vot point. Both pilot doors were found on
the f l ight deck wi th door handles in the locked position and
both emergency release handl es shear wired in the closed
pos i tion .
[Enclosure 65]
67 . Reference (c) , on page 9-1, states : " Comb i ned wave and
swell effect can result in seawater over the flight deck of FFG
7, DDG 5 1, and DDG 79 class sh i ps, resulting in helicopter
damage. Addit i ona l ly, the wave action created by the Venturi
effect between UNREP sh i ps can cause rotor system damage. "
68 . Reference (c) , on page 7-4 , states : "Specia l care should be
exercised when maneuvering while helicopters are spinning on
deck . In high sea states , only maneuvering to maintain a safe
navigation course is recommended. "
69 . Reference (c) , Figure 2- 13 , states : " Once chocks and chains
are installed, ship is free to maneuver".
70 . The chains used to secure IN 617 to the deck were unable to
be ident i f i ed as f l ight deck crew do not reco r d wh i ch chains are
14

Subj :

COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC- 6 MH-60S AIRCRAFT,

BUNO 167895, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34' 18" E 037 25 '

29" RESULTI NG IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L . JONES, USN

AND CW03 JONATHAN S. GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013

to be used before flight ops. An inventory after the incident

identified two chains missing as 98313009192 and 98313009198 .
The chain maintenance was current in accordance with reference
(i).
[Enclosure 64]
71. The flight deck camera images were not recorded during the
incident. Reference (j) requires all aircraft launch and
recovery operations be televised and recorded on aircraft
carriers . There is no requirement to record television
operations on air capable ships.
72 . Reference (e) states the emergency procedure for "Unusual
Vibrations On Deck" are to 1) lower the collective, 2) Secure
the Power Control Levers (PCLs) and 3) Apply the rotor brake.
Securing the PCLs shuts down the engines.

73 . Reference (d) states, the average height of the flight deck

above the water for this class of ship is 14'10".
74.
Reference (f) states,
maneuvering the ship when
changes should be made as
prevent damaging the nets
nets."

"Consideration must be taken prior to

the nets are down . Course and speed
to cause minimal roll of the ship to
or injuring personnel working with the

75 . According to the HSM-75 Combat Element (CEL) 4 Officer-inCharge, there was a strong safety culture onboard WPL. HSM-75
CEL 4 flew the morning of the incident and attempted to fly the
previous night in similar conditions. The previous night's
flight was not cancelled for sea state or ship motion. The
conditions on 22 Sep 2013 were the roughest seas WPL had
conducted flight operations in since Jan 2013 during transit
across the Pacific Ocean.
During that transi t in Jan 2013, WPL
operated helicopters with rolls up to 12 .
[Enclosures 28]

76. Search and rescue (SAR) procedures were initiated

immediately by WPL. Approximately six minutes after IN 617 went
in the water , INDIAN 615, a MH-60S from HSC-6, checked in with
WPL to assist in the SAR effort.
For the next 26 hours, a
coordinated search plan was executed by 3 destroyers, one

15

Subj:

COMMAND INV8STIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH - 60S AIRCRAFT ,

BUNO 167895, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34' 18" E 037 25'

29" RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L . JONES , USN

AND CWO3 JONATHAN S . GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013

replenishment ship, 7 rigid hull inflatable boats (RHIBs}, one

P- 3 aircraft, one HC- 130 aircraft and multiple helicopters .
Over 100 square nautical miles were searched with a 99.99%
probability of success.
Several pieces of debris from IN 617
were fo und .
[Enclosure 4-10, 23, 29, 66 and 70]
77 . A Line of Duty determination concerning LCDR Landon L .
Jones was completed on 1 4 October 2013.
LCDR La ndon L. Jones
died while in the line of duty a nd not due to his misconduct.
[Enclosure 67)
78 . A Line of Duty determination concerning CWO3 Jonathan
Gibson was completed on 14 October 2013.
CWO3 Jonathan S .
Gibson died while in the line of duty and not due to his
misconduct.
[Enclosure 68)

s.

OPINIONS

The i nju ries incurred by AWSl

(b)(3),(b)(6)
during the IN 617
mishap were incurred in the line of duty and not due to his own
misconduct .
[Fi ndings of Fact 1-3 , 6]
1.

2.
IN 617's flight crew was fully qualified, per all known and
current instructions, to perform the duties they were assigned
on the HSC- 6 flight schedule on 22 Sep 2013 .
[Find i ngs of Fact
11, 14-17 )
3.
WPL's crew was fully qualified, per all known and current
ins truct io ns , to perform the duties they were assigned on 22 Sep
2013.
[Fi ndings of Fact 20, 21 and 24)

4.

The LSE and Port Chock and Chainman were not ass i gned to
their positions on the cur rent WPL watchbill, but this was not a
contributing factor to the mishap.
[Findings of Fact 23, 42 and
43]

5. The mishap aircrew was in compliance with all crew rest and
currency requirements. While some stress factors were
identified for the aircrew, human error is not suspected as a

16

Subj :

COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH- 60S AIRCRAFT,

BUNO 167895, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34' 18" E 037 25'

29" RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L . JONES , USN

AND CWO3 JONATHAN S . GIBSON , USN ON 22 SEP 2013

casual factor for this mishap .

I t is highly unlikely that
fat i gue , use of medication or alcohol use were involved.
[Findings of Fact 11- 14 , 19 and 25)
6 . Airc r aft BUNO 167895 and aircrew flight gear had no material
failure that contributed to the mishap .
It is most l i kely that
both p i lots were wearing all appropriate flight gear .
[Findings
of Fact 8, 9 and 18]
7.

(b)(5)
(b)(5)

(b)(5)

8 . While IN 617 was chocked and chained on the deck of WPL , the
ship took a large roll to port followed by a l arger correct i ng
roll to starboard.
This resu l ted i n a wave of unknown size
impacting the starboard aft port i on of WPL's hull, which in turn
resulted in a large amount of wa t er impacting the rotor blades/
pushing them down and possibly impacting the fuselage.
This
caused the tail to break off and the helicopter to shake
The violent shaking , in turn , resulted in the
violently.
helicopter breaking free of the chocks and cha ins , and also
caused the left and right pilot doors to detach from the
fuselage.
The helicopter then moved forward and starboard while
the rotor blades and other parts of the helicopter i mpacted
surrounding structures.
WPL took another strong roll to port,
which resulted in the helicopter continuing the clockwise
rotation while the rotor b l ades carne apart and the empennage
section rotated into the forward port corner of the flight deck.
At this time, the empennage section broke off the fuselage and
rema i ned on WPL while the fuselage slid overboard off the port
side of the flight deck . Enclosure 61 provides a graphical
recreation of the JAGMAN Investigating Officers' opinion on the
[Findings of Fact 1- 4, 25 1 53, 55sequence of mishap events .
58, and 61-66]
9 . LCDR Jones and CWO3 Gibson 1 the only aircrew onboard IN 617
at the time of the mishap, were both likely incapacitated by the
violent aircraft motion and unable to execute emergency egress .
Based on witness accounts of sounds they heard 1 it is possible
17

Subj:

COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH - 60S AIRCRAFT ,

BUNO 167895, WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22a 34' 18" E 037 25 '

29" RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES, USN

AND CW03 JONATHAN S . GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013

the aircrew executed the proper emergency procedure for unusual

ground vibrations . With both pilot ' s doors removed, emergency
egress after water entry would have been simplified . Most
l ikely, both pilots were e ither unconscious or injured inside IN
617 ' s cockpit when the aircraft went over the side of WPL's
flight deck, thus preventing the i r egress from the cockpit.
[ Findings of Fact 5 , 56, 64 , 66 and 72)
10.

(b)(5)
(b)(5)

b 5
(b )(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5)

(b)(5)

11.

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)
(b)(5)

b 5
(b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5)

(b )(5)

12 .

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

b . 5.
(b)(5)

1 3 . Chocks and chains were instal l ed proper l y, per all known

and current i nstruct i ons.
I N 61 7 crew membe r s ve r ified t he
chock and chain installation. The Fl ight Deck Officer observed
t he chains holding the aircraft duri n g the 13 roll to port.
When securing helicopters to the flight deck, properly insta lled
chains have some slack. Most l i kely, the violent motion of the

18

Subj : COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH- 60S AIRCRAFT,
BUNO 167895 , WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34' 18" E 037 25'
29" RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L . JONES, USN
AND CW03 JONATHAN S. GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013
aircraft after water impact shook the aircraft free from the
chocks and chains .
[Findings of Fact 43, 52, 56 and 70]

14 . Ship motion as a reaction to wave motion is a factor of

wave height, wave period, ship speed, ship course relative to
wave direction and hu l l length . Based on ship inertial data and
witness accounts, WPL entered conditions favorable for large
rolls once on course 190 true. On this heading, one large roll
occurred but damped out relatively quickly . By adjusting course
to 195 true, WPL entered condit i ons which resulted in large,
undamped rolls . The rolls alone were not enough to cause the
mishap. The period of the waves and rolls were such that the
ship rolled to starboard coincident with another wave . Upon
impact with the hull, the water from the wave was squeezed
against the hu l l and redirected upward, creating a thick " wall''
of water which the prevai l ing winds pushed over the flight deck,
enveloping IN . 617 . The sudden impact of a considerable volume
of water on IN 617 ' s main and tail rotors caused a large
imbalance in rotor stability.
Most l ikely the unbalanced rotors
began disintegrating causing significant vibrations to IN 617 .
This resulted in IN 617 coming unchained as well as loss of tail
rotor effectiveness. Without a tail rotor to counter main rotor
torque as well as no longer being secured to the flight deck ,
the aircraft spun freely on the flight deck . An additional roll
to port resulted in IN 617 going over the side .
[Findings of
Fact 27 - 31, 47-50, 53 and 54]
15. The mishap was not caused by an unusually large , or
"rogue", wave . A "rogue" wave is an open ocean phenomenon,
caused by wave addition over hundreds of miles. The likelihood
of a rogue wave forming in the Red Sea is extremely remote .
Several surface units were all in the same area of operation
during the incident and none, including WPL, reported any
indications of a rogue wave . The largest single wave
potentially encountered based on observed significant wave
heights could have been 12 feet. There are no regulations on
maximum wave heights or sea states for flight operations .
Furthermore, the forecast conditions were accurate .
[Findings
of Fact 26, 27, 28, 68 and 69]
19

Subj :

COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MI SHAP INVOLV I NG HSC- 6 MH-60S AI RCRAFT ,

BUNO 167895 , WH I CH OCCURRED AT N 22 34' 18" E 037 25 '

29 " RESULTING I N THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES , USN

AND CWO3 J ONATHAN S . GIBSON , USN ON 22 SEP 2013

16 .

(b )(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

,b.,5.
(b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5)

.b .5.
,b.,5.
(b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5)

.b .5.
(b)(5)
.b . 5.

b 5
(b)(5)

(b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5)

17. Search and Rescue operations and procedu res were

appropriately executed. Given the high calculated probab i lity
of success and the extremely quick response by search aircraft
and ships, it is most likely tha t LCDR Jones and CWO3 Gibson did
not survive initial water entry .
[Findi ngs of Fact 76 ]
18 . LCDR Landon L . Jones and CWO3 Jonathan S . Gibson perished
while in the line of duty and not due to their own misconduct .
Fu rthermore, no supervisory negligence or malpractice was causal
t o this mishap.
[Findings of Fact 77 and 78 ]

20

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

A CLASS ALPHA MISHAP INVOLVING HSC-6 MH-60S AIRCRAFT,
BUNO 167895 , WHICH OCCURRED AT N 22 34' 18" E 037 25'
29" RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF LCDR LANDON L. JONES, USN
AND CWO3 JONATHAN S. GIBSON, USN ON 22 SEP 2013
Recommendations
1.

While i t wou ld n ot have a f f ected the outcome of th is mishap,

the flight deck camera must include recording capability and the
requirement to record all flight ope rations . This wou l d
si gnificantly improve safety and mishap prevention.
2 . The JAGMAN Investigating Officers believe this incident was
caused by water corning up the side of t he flight deck and
impacting the turning rotor blades of t he hel icopter.
Investigation should be conducted into material modifications to
DDG class ships or changes to standard operating procedures in
order to mitigate risks of water impacting helicopters on deck .
Potential solutions could include modification of flight deck
nets to p rov ide a solid barrier to deflect water, disengaging

rotors, or maneuvering restric tions .

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(bX3), (bX6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)-

21