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Case Law
The rule against perpetuities forbids future interests that could potentially vest
after the established time period.
The rule is often stated as follows: No interest is good unless it must vest, if at
all, not later than twenty-one years after the death of some life in being at the
creation of the interest.[2] For the purposes of the rule, a life is "in being" at
conception. Although most discussions and analysis relating to the rule revolve
around wills and trusts, the rule applies to any future dispositions of property,
including options. When a part of a grant or will violates the rule, only that
portion of the grant or devise is removed. All other parts that do not violate the
rule are still valid. The perpetuities period under the common law rule is not a
fixed term of years. By its terms, the rule limits the period to at the latest 21 years
after the death of the last identifiable individual living at the time the interest was
created ("life in being"). This "measuring" or "validating" life need not have been
a purchaser or taker in the conveyance or devise. The measuring life could be the
grantor, a life tenant, a tenant for a term of years, or in the case of a contingent
remainder or executory devise to a class of unascertained individuals, the person
capable of producing members of that class.
The rule against perpetuities at common law has been amended by various
statutes. In England, the Statute of Uses (1536) and the Statute of Wills (1540)
and the consequent rise of flexible future interests made the rule a significant
judicial tool in defeating the intent of landowners to impose limitations on remote
future owners in grants and devises. Major alterations to the common law rule in
the United Kingdom came into effect under the Perpetuities and Accumulations
Act 1964, including the application of the traditional 21-year limitation period to
options.[3]
The rule is notoriously difficult to properly apply, as pointed out by a 1961
decision of the Supreme Court of California which held that it was not legal
malpractice for an attorney to draft a will that inadvertently violated the rule
against perpetuities.[4] Therefore, in the United States it has been abolished by
Under the rule, a future interest must vest within a certain period of time. This
period is limited to the duration of a life or lives in being (the "measuring lives")
at the time the interest in the property is transferred, plus twenty-one years.
..
114. Rule against perpetuity.- (Indian Succession Act)
No bequest is valid whereby the vesting of the thing bequeathed
may be delayed beyond the life-time of one or more persons living
at the testator's death and the minority of some person who shall
be in existence at the expiration of that period, and to whom, if he
attains full age, the thing bequeathed is to belong.
Illustrations
(i) A fund is bequeathed to A for his life and after his death to B for
his life; and after B's death to such of the sons of B as shall first
attain the age of 25. A and B survive the testator. Here the son of B
who shall first attain the age of 25 may be a son born after the
death of the testator; such son may not attain 25 until more than 18
Collected by the All India Christian Council, www.christiancouncil.in Page 38 of 123
years have elapsed from the death of the longer liver of A and B;
and the vesting of the fund may thus be delayed beyond the
In Madras City, the City Civil Court and the High Court have
original civil jurisdiction. While the City Civil Court has limited
pecuniary jurisdiction, the High Court has unlimited pecuniary
jurisdiction. Between these two courts, viz. the City Civil Court
and the High Court, the High Court is the principal civil court
having original jurisdiction.
If the City Civil Court is the Principal Civil Court of Original
Jurisdiction, there is no necessity at all, in the Special Marriage
Act, to specify `City Civil Court` also, while defining `District
Court`. While defining `District Court`, besides the Principal Civil
Court of Original Jurisdiction, the `City Civil Court` has also been
specified.
If City Civil Court is also a Principal Civil Court of
Original Jurisdiction, then, mere mention of `Principal Civil Court
of Original Jurisdiction` would suffice, to define `District Court`.
But, here, `City Civil Court` has also been specified. It shows that
when there is a higher forum of court having original civil
jurisdiction, than the City Civil Court, the latter court, viz. City
Civil Court, cannot be classified as the `Principal Civil Court of
Original Jurisdiction`.
The property which devolved on a Hindu on the death of his father
intestate, after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act,
did not constitute HUF property, consisting of his own branch
including his sons. (1982) 138 IT 673 (MP)
The property which devolved upon heirs mentioned in Class I of
Schedule u/s.8 constituted the absolute properties and his sons
have no rights by birth in such properties.
(1986) 3 S.C.C. 567
(1983) 144 ITR 18 (AP)
(1978) 114 ITR 523 (Mad)
Act 1956, the interest of the minor daughters in the property left
by the father whether the property of the father`s separate
property or the father`s interest in the joint family property, will be
the undivided interest in the joint family property, and in respect of
those properties Sec.6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act
has no application. As such, there is no need to get the permission
of the court under Sec.8 of the H.M.G.Act.
A Hindu Coparcenary is narrower than a Hindu Undivided Family.
A Hindu joint family consists of all persons lineally descended from
a common ancestor and includes their wife and unmarried
daughter. A Hindu Coparcenary is much narrower body than the
joint family. It includes only those persons who acquire by birth an
interest in the joint or coparcenary property, these being sons,
grandsons and great-grandsons of the holder of joint property for
the time being. Therefore there may be a joint Hindu family
consisting of a single male member and widows of a deceased
coparceners. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1523
Succession to coparcenary property:
So far as a Mitakshara co-parcenary property is concerned, when a
person having an intereset in the said property dies, his interest in
the property shall devolve by survivorship, on the surviving
members of the co-parcenery, and not in accordance with the
Hindu Succession Act--Sec.6(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. But
this position differs, when a person dies, leaving behind him, his
daughter. In such a case, his interest in the co-parcenary property
devolves, only under Sec.8 of the Hindu Succession Act, and not by
survivorship--Proviso to Sec.6(1) of the Hindu Succession Act.
Here in the case on hand, the vendor`s father had daughters and
he died only after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act.
So his intereset in the co-parcenary property devolved, only under
Sec.8of the Hindu Succession Act, on his sons and daughters, and
accordingly, his sons (including the vendor) took the property and
partitioned amongst themselves.
When a property devolves under Sec.8 of the Hindu Succession
Act, it devolves, only on Class-I heirs, viz. sons and daughters, and
not on a son`s son. Grand-sons and grand-daughters are not
included in Class-I heirs. When a property devolves under Sec.8
of the Hindu Succession Act, on a Class-I heir, viz. son or
daughter, it becomes the personal and absolute property of the
said Class-I heir.
(1986) 3 Supreme Court Cases 567 (Commissioner of Wealth Tax,
Kanpur and others vs. Chander Sen and others)
Under the Hindu Law, the moment a son is born, he gets a share
in the father`s property and becomes part of the coparcenary. His
right accrues to him not on the death of of the father or
inheritance from the father but with the very fact of his birth.
Normally, therefore, the father gets a property from whatever
source, from the grandfather or from any other source, be it
separated property or not, his son should have a share in that and
it will become part of the joint family of his son and grandson and
other members who form joint Hindu family with him. But this
position has since been affected by Sec.8 of the Hindu Succession
Act. Since the Preamble to the Act reiterates that theAct is to
`amend` and codify the law and Section 4 thereof makes it clear
that one should look to the Act in case of doubt, and not to the
pre-exisiting Hindu Law, the express words of Section 8 of the
Hindu Succession Act would prevail over the aforesaid general law.
When therefore, son inherits the property in the situation
contemplated by Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, he does
not take it as karta of his own undivided family, but takes it in his
inidividual capacity. The Scheudle to the Hindu Succession Act
referred to in Section 8(a) indicates heirs in Class I and only
includes sons and does not include son`s son but does include son
of a pre-deceased son.
Sigamani
Second Appeal - on date of hearing applicant and counsel were
absent - High Court disposal of the Second Appeal on merits unwarranted - Not proper - Ought to have dismissed the appeal for
non-prosecution - Or.41, R.11 (1) & (2) CPC
2002 (1) TLNJ (SC) 31
AIR 1953 Madras 767 = 1953-I M.L.J. 825 In Summary Suit,
under Order 37, City Civil Court to which Order 37 applies has
no power to condone the delay in filing and obtaining leave to
defend suits filed under Rule 3 of Order 37 CPC. When a period
of limitation has been affixed for the purpose of doing an act or
taking a proceeding under the statute of Limitation Act or under
any other enactment, Courts do not possess the power to extend
the time unless and until such a power is specifically conferred on
them.
Vested remainder in immovable property is present interest in
property and can be sold --AIR 1947 Bom. 185
--AIR 1937 Pat. 163
There is no doctrine of law in India which prevents a beneficiary
with his interest by way of mortgage. though it is true enough
that in India, such an interest is not technically regarded as an
equitable estate.
--ILR (1940)2 Cal. 436 (PC)
--AIR 1940 RC 134
--45 CWN 253
Summary suit-only copy of plaint and annexure thereto has to be
furnished to defendants-furnishing of copies of documents which
particular
subject, so that it may serve as a useful Code
applicable to the circumstances existing at the time when the
consolidating Act is passed: ILR 22 Cal 788
This Code is intended mainly to regular procedure in civil courts,
it is not ordinarily intended to create new rights or take away
existing ones. AIR 1932 Lah. 401
This Code deals with procedural matters , that is, with matters
relating to the machinery for the enforcement of substantive
rights as contra-distinguished
from the substantive rights
themselves. For substantive rights, one should look to statute
law or general principles of law.
AIR 1964 Raj. 140
Document fixing a term of 3 years, and either party given liberty
to terminate the lease by giving three months` notice. Held: it
amounts to tenancy-at-will and it cannot be said to be lease for
three years requiring registration. It is admissible though not
registered.
2000-I L.W. 494 -- Sengappan vs. Anumbatha Veda Vinayagar
Temple, by Hereditary Trustee.
Division Bench of our High Court, comprising of Their Lordships
K.A.Swami C.J. and AR. Lakshmanan J., rendered in S.P.
Padmavathi vs. State of Tamilnadu (1997-2 L.W. 579) - Held that in
respect of a sale deed executed pursuant to a decree for specific
performance, the stamp duty and registration charges have to be
collected, as mentioned in the agreement for sale.
AIR 1961 Madras 388 (A.K.S. Muhammed Sultan Rowther and C
vs. Manickam Chettiar), wherein it has been held @8 that the
payments made from time to time should be appropriated in the
order of time of deliveries AIR 1982 Calcutta 386 (M/s. West
Bengal Decorating C vs. M/s. Damodar Das Daga), and
contended that a suit for value of goods sold and delivered does
not come within the ambit of Order 37 CPC.
Small Cause Court Advocate Fee Rules
5000-10%
5000-10000 - 5%
10001-20000 - 3%
20001-50000 - 2%
500001-100000 - 1%
100001 - 1/2%
Revision under Art.227 of Constitution of India - by a person not
party to suit maintainable - decree obtained by agent against
principal
held collusive - set aside - decree obtained by
suppressing materials and without indulging necessary parties
1998-I L.W. 372
Sarkar's Law of Evidence Tenth Edition page 645-- 1991-1 L.W.
256
Defendant dead after judgment by trial court. Appeal can be
filed straightway by L.Rs. of deceased defednant.
See also M.L.J. Reports (Supreme Court) page 27
C.A.N606/78 Shiv Dass and others vs. Smt. Devki and others
Respondent died after conclusion of aruguments and before
judgment.
Statutory tenant = Holding over tenant
AIR 1972 SC 2526
AIR 1965 SC 414
CF payable under
Registration of
resolution by C
124, 130
Charge Registration Future damages for use and
occupation/mesne profits (future) -- no cause of action yet court
can grant decree under Or.20, R.12(1)(c) r/w. Or.20 R.12 in
final decree (discretionary) AIR 1967 SC 155
Future damages for use and occupation only for three years
Or.20, R.12(1)(c)(iii) CPC.
I - L.W. 443
AIR 1977 CRL. 319 AIR 1963 SC 1405
Advocate suppression facts fraudulently and obtaining orders Though tendering apology should not go unpunished - 1987
Crl.L.J. 1038
David Annusamy
Jurisdiction
maintainable even if immovable property situate
outside the jurisdiction - Mortgage.
Sec.92 CPC Petition pending - Or.39 R.1 CPC. can be ordered
1993-2 L.W. 308 DB
Or.9, R.9 CPC will come into play, only when there is default in
the appearance of the plaintiff or the applln. and now when
there is default in the payment of the amount directed to be paid,
as a condition for resotration. 1993-2 L.W. 321 Abdul Hadi
Where a suit was based on a cheque issued by plaintiff and
encashed and utilised by defendant - held: it was a suit for
recovery of a loan and not a suit on cheque
AIR 1982 Delhi 590
Recovery of rent on the basis of lease deed - triable under Or.37
AIR 1983 Kar. 1
Where a memorandum of appeal, returned for rectification of
certain defects, is rectified after delay.
Held: condonation of such delay will be governed by Sec. 151
and not by Sec.148 CPC. or S.5 of the Limitation Act. ILR (1979) I
Mad. 55
91 Mad. L.W. 530
Where a suit was stayed sine die and one of the parties died. Held,
the appln. for substitution of L.Rs. made on the revival of the suit
would be allowed, as no suit would be said to have been pending
during the stay.
AIR 1984 Del. 138
64 Punj. LR. 454
When an agent suing on behalf of an undisclosed principal dies,
pending suit, the suit after death of the agent, should be
continued, if it can be continued at all by the agent`s
representative and not by the principal.
17 MLJ 116
If a plaintiff sues and dies after his suit has been dismissed, his
L.R. may appeal from the decree without an application to be
brought on record in his place.
40 PLR 767
The bringing on record of a L.R. of a deceased plaintiff must be
entitled to the purpose of carrying on the suit and cannot have
the effect of conferring any right to heirship to a property.
AIR 1976 H.P. 174
ILR 41 Mad 442
42 IC 86
17 IC 101
L.R. not claimant heir Succession Certificate is necessary to file
E.p. and not to continue E.P.
AIR 1988 AP 314
Sarkar`s Law on CPC 1992 8th Editiion page 935 Vol.I
1987 H.P. para 5 Succession Certificate not necessary Decree in
favour of deceased plaintiff - nullity - subsequently cannot be
validated by amendment - suit must be treated as pending.
AIR 1958 Cal. 691
AIR 1962 All 541
Legal rep. of a deceased deft. can seek to set aside an exparte
decree against the deft. by reason of Sec.146 CPC.
(1970) I An.W.R. 240
AIR 1954 Mys. 32
1981 All L.J. 666
Appeal AIR 1958 SC 394
Real owner can file appeal AIR 1940 Mad. 6 To enable a person to
take a proceeding under Sec.146 CPC. as a person claiming
under a party to a litigation, it is not necessary he should have
been brought on record as such.
AIR 1947 Mad. 34 DB
Or. 22 does not apply to the case of death of plaintiff after decree
and of his L.R. wishing to appeal ILR Mad 236
Where deft. is dead at the time of institution of suit, the plaintiff
cannot proceed with the suit by substituting heirs - suit nullity.
ILR 31 Mad. 86
AIR 1958 Cal. 681
AIR 1964 Mys. 293
AIR 1971 Goa 54
A mere doubt about the eligibility of the petr. to receive
compensation in the absence of an other contending party laying
claim to the whole or part of compensation will not constitute a
dispute under Sec.30 of L.A. Act.
The collector has no
jurisdiction to transfer the matter to the Judge AIR 1977 Gau. 47
Tenant`s right under Sec.9 cannot be taken away by the dismissal
of the ejecment suit. The court should dispose of the petition
u/s.9 quite apart, from the manner in which the ejectment suits
have been terminated.
AIR (37) 1950 Mad. 759
Sec.9 petition will lie, only in a suit in ejectment, and not in a
RCOP for eviction 1993 TLNJ 322
The term `description` includes, age, father`s name, caste, etc.
7 MLJ 81
Plaint defective - Opportunity to be given to cure defect - failute
2)
No contract between parties regarding payment of interest plaintiff is entitled to claim interest at 6% p.a. under Sec.1 of
Interest Act 32/1839 AIR 1977 Mad 56
See Sec.80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
An Arbitrator can just file the award in the court, without any
appln. but the act of filing must be his or on his behalf AIR 1953
SC 313 = 1953(1) MLJ 841
AIR 1979 Mad. 1 FB
Notice to all parties in I.As. Rule 32 CRP Or.9, R.9(2) CPC
1980 - I M.L.J. 278
1992 - 2 L.W. Part 13 page 467
U/s. 35 of the Stamp Act, an unstamped document cannot be
admitted in evidence for a collateral purpose.
Section enacts that it shall not be admitted in evidence `for any
purpose` 1946-I M.L.J. 295 (PC)
(1941) AC 108
(1953) CPL 652 CA
Whenever a court passes an order directing the preservation of
`status quo` it should by the same order state in unequivocal
terms what the `status quo` is, otherwise, the court will be failing
to to its duty.
--Srinivasan J. 1988-2 L.W. Part 13 342
Sec.19(b) of Hindu Succession Act
Tenancy in common This interest is created where two or more persons have individual
possession but distinct interest estates in any subject of property,
in equal or unequal shares and either by the same or by different
titles. On the death of a tenant-in-common, his share goes to
his representative.
Joint tenancy - (co-parcener)
An estate held by two or more, jointly with an equal right in all,
to share in the enjoyment of the land during their lives. On the
death of one, his right accrues to others by survivorship. In this
tenancy, there are four units, viz. of possession, interest, title
and time.
In a per stirpes distribution, a group represents a deceased
ancestor. The group takes the proportional share to which the
deceased ancestor would have been entitled if still living.
For example, a man died intestate; his wife predeceased him. He
had four children, three of whom are still living at the time of his
death. The deceased child had three children, all still living. These
three grandchildren will share equally in one-fourth of their
grandfather's estate, the share the deceased parent would have
taken if still alive. The three living children will also each receive
one-fourth of the estate.
Per stirpes differs from per capita, in which an equal share is given
to each of a number of persons who all stand in equal degree of
relationship to the deceased.
In a per capita distribution, an equal share of an estate is given to
each heir, all of whom stand in equal degree of relationship from a
decedent. For example, a woman died intestate, that is, without a
will. Her husband and three children predeceased her, and her
only living heirs are her ten grandchildren. These grandchildren
will take per capita. In other words, each grandchild will receive
one-tenth of the estate.
Per capita differs from per stirpes, where persons do not inherit in
their individual capacity but take as part of a group represented by
a deceased ancestor closer in line to the decedent.
applicant
AIR 1979 Cal. 182
AIR 1980 SC 64
AIR 1978 Del. 129
Sec.44 of C.F. Act Claim of future mesne profits/damages
is based on future
cause of action In view of Or.20, R.12 CPC.
the said relief can be claimed in the present suit but need not be
valued and court fee paid now. AIR 1967 SC 155
Vakalath and appearance are filed for a particular court. It is
for a suit or proceeding in that court, the advocate is authorised
and obliges himself to appear If a matter was to be transferred
from one court to a totally distinct court, it appears that the
authority given to advocate would come to an end.
adduced by the
2000 TLNJ 65
Statutory suit - other suit 1999 T.L.N.J. 110
Or.2, R.3 CPC.
There is no provision in the Code enabling the plaintiffs who
have separate causes of action against the same defendant to
join themselves and their causes of action in one suit
ILR 18 All. 432
ILR 15 All. 380
ILR 4 All. 261
The plaintiffs can only join in suing several defendants in one
suit for several causes of action when both the plaintiffs and
the defendants are jointly interested in each or all of such causes
of action.
ILR 18 All. 131
Partner dies - firm - suit against firm - not abated AIR 1973 Patna
441
Even a limited company, liability of Director may be unlimited
vide Sec.322, 323 of Companies Act.
The omission to cancel any stamp may result in the document
being taken to be unstamped to that extent.
The drawing of two lines crossing each other across the face of the
stamp is an effectual cancellation AIR 1961 Raj. 43
Companies Act
Sec.51 service of company
54 document execution by company
47,48 execution of deeds
446 suits stayed against wound up company
632 payment of suit costs by company
125 Registration of charge
332 unlimited liability of Director
Generelia specialibus non derogant: It is well known proposition
of law that where a matter falls under any specified provisin, then
it must be governed by that provision AIR 1985 46
Summoning of Document from another court R.358 CRP
R.75 CRP
Probate of Will
AIR 1954 Patna 175
Petition under Sec.482 Cr.P.C. after exhausting the remedy by
way of Revision, is not maintainable.
1990 SCC Crl. 537
Successor Judge can perform duty of his predeessor Sec.35 CPC. /
Cr.P.C.
2004 (3) CTC 754 Techmo Car SPA vs. the Madras Aluminium
Company Ltd. Madras High Court DB per P. Sathasivam J.
The words `court` has been defined in Section 2(l) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 as follows:
2(l)(e) Court means the principal Civil Court of original
jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court, in exercise
of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to
(2002)I M.L.J. 760 Rengasami Reddiar (died) and others vs. M.K.
Mummachi Reddiar (died) and others - Mrs. Prabha Sridevan
Partition should be stamped and registered otherwise not
admissible in evidence.
But a Memorandum evidencing a family arrangement already
entered into and prepare as a record, need not be stamped or
registered. (2000) 2 T.L.N.J. 315 A.C. Lakshmipathy vs. A.M.
Chakrapani Reddiar. See also AIR 1966 S.C. 292 Tek Bahadur
Bhujil vs. Debi Singh Bhujil and others Family arrangement
essentials Arrangement when brought by document, registration
necessary Memorandum of arrangement - Registration not
necessary.
2004-4 L.W.429 Tirupati Balaji Developers Pvt. Ltd. & others vs.
State of Bihar
& others
- Supreme Court Judgment
Relationship between Supreme Court and High Court Remarks
called for by Supreme Court from Patna High Court Aversion
shown by Patna High Court - Such response expunged
Sec.34 of C.P.C. will not apply to a suit on mortgage. Interest has
to be fixed only under Order 34, Rule 11 CPC. at such rate as the
court may think fit. 1998-2 L.W. 26 N.M.Veerappa vs. Canara
Bank (Supreme Court DB)
2000 SCC (Cri) 1962 In the matter of `RV` a Judicial Officer High Courts shall have restraint, care and circumspection while
exercising its power of superintendence lest those who dispense
judge to others should themselves suffer injustice.
The higher
tiers are provided in the judicial hierarchy to set right the errors
which could possibly have crept in, in the findings, orders, or
proceedings of the courts at the lower tiers. It is well to remember
the words of a jurist that ` Judge who has not committed any
error is yet to be born`.
AIR 1970 SC 652 A.K.K. Nambiar vs. Union of India and another
The appellant made allegations against the Chief Minister of
Andhra Pradesh and other persons of whose names were disclosed
and some of whose names were not disclosed. Neither the Chief
Minister nor any other persons was made a party. The appellant
filed an affidavit in support of the petition. Neither the petition
nor the affidavit was verified. The affidavits which were filed in
answer to the appellant`s petition were also not verified.
The
reasons for verification of affidavits are to enable the Court to find
out which facts can be said to be proved on the affidavit evidence
of rival parties. Allegations may be true to knowledge or
allegations may be true to information received from persons or
allegations may be based
on records.
The importance of
verification is to test the genuineness and authenticity
of
allegations and also to make the deponent responsible for the
allegations. In essence, verification is required to enable the Court
to find out as to whether it will be safe to act on such affidavit
evidence. In the present case, the affidavits of all the parties suffer
from the mischief of lack of proper verification with the result
that the affidavits should not be admissible in evidence.
AIR 1978 Goa 12 Caetano Dias vs. Caetano Rodrigues Affidavits must be duly verified. Ordinarily any conclusion of
the Court should be arrived at upon evidence, subject to cross
examination, if any. An exception is made by Or.19 of the C.P.C.
by allowing proof of certain facts to be made by affidavits. It
therefore stands to reason that those affidavits should strictly
abide with the prescribed form. Order 19, Rule3(1) states that
affidavits shall be confined to such facts as the deponent is able,
of his own knowledge to prove. An exception is made in case of
interlocutory applications. In such applications, statements of his
belief may be admitted .. To my mind in view of the
AIR 1955 Punjab 164 State vs. Dittu Ram Pritam Dass - While
dealing with applications under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act, Courts
are always influenced by the consideration whether extension of
the period of limitation is likely to affect the rights which have
come to vest in the opposite party by efflux of time. If therefore a
convict `s appeal is out of time it is the practice of the Punjab High
Court to condone the delay as no right can be said to vest in the
State to have the conviction of an innocent person upheld. But
it is not so in the case of State filing petition under Sec.5 of the
Limitation Act to condone delay in filing appeal against acquittal of
a person.
his fellow country men. It is on his behaviour that they will form
their opinion of our system of justice. He must be dignified so as
to earn the respect of all who appear before him. He must be alert
to follow all that goes on. He must be understanding - to show
that he is aware of the temptations that beset everyone. He must
be merciful so as to show that he too has that quality which
droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven upon the place beneath.
2005-1- Law Weekly Journal Section - Speech of Chief Justice
Mr. Justice R.C. Lahoti while inagurating the additional building of
Gauati High Court on 7.8.2004
Verified Petition
Or.VI, Rule 14A(2) CPC.
Rule 56 (6) CRP
Petitions with supporting affidavits
Rule 48(2) CRP Transfer Petition
Rule 82 CRP Commissioner
Order 38, Rule 1 CPC.
Order 39, Rule 1 CPC
Order 32, Rule 3 Affidavit verifying facts
Order 41, Rule 3A condone delay
Sec.408 r/w 407(3) Cr.P.C. Transfer Petition
Rule 196 Crl.R.P. condone delay
Onerous condition while granting bail (1980) 1 Supreme Court
Cases 81 Hussainara Khatoon and others vs. Home Secretary,
State of Bihar Imposing of onerous condition while granting bail
Bail system oppressive and discriminatory against the poor.
Affidavit - AIR 1988 SC 1381 Smt. Sudha Devi vs. M.P. Narayanan
and others - Sec.3 of Evidence Act - Affidavit is not included as
evidence in the Evidence Act. Unless court permits, it cannot be
treated as evidence.
Affidavit AIR 1956 Calcutta 496 Biskha Rani Chose vs. Satish
Chandra Reddy Verification of affidavit that to the best of my
knowledge means nothing.
This kind of verification cannot be
accepted.
Sec.47 CPC. appeal AIR 1994 AP 334 B. Nookaraju vs. M.S.N.
Charities and others Under the unamended Code, all questions
decided by the Executing Court and covered by Section 47 were
treated as decrees as defined under Sec.2(2) of the unamended
Code and therefore they were not appealable orders. Now, in view
of exclusion of `orders` passed under Sec.47 of the unamended
Code from the definition of `decree` as per the amended Code,
orders passed under Section 47 of unamended Code are not more
`decrees` and they are only `appealable orders` not attracted by
Section 96 of the Code. Only CMA will lie, even against deemed
decrees.
Joint Family property 2001-L.W. 1 700 Mohanraj vs Vallachi
Ammal and 8 others Madras High Court S. Jagadeesan J. When property is acquired by father and it devolves on his legal
heirs after his death, so far as male heirs are concerned it will
assume the character of joint family property.
- In the case of
disposition by father the property will assume the character in the
hands of the son, depending on the recital. Section 8 of the Hindu
Succession Act has no application, where father dies leaving sons
as well as female heirs, entitled to inherit jointly with the sons.
No natural guardian under Sec.6 of the Hindu Minority
Guardianship Act.
AIR 2002 Madras 296 Mr. Justice V. Kanagaraj Govindammal vs.
Bhuvaneswari Financing Corporation Estate of deceased
whether actually have vested on the heirs Must be pleaded and
Issued should be framed while suing heirs of a deceased
Affidavit - AIR 1988 SC 1381 Smt. Sudha Devi vs. M.P. Narayanan
and others - Sec.3 of Evidence Act - Affidavit is not included as
evidence in the Evidence Act. Unless court permits, it cannot be
treated as evidence.
Affidavit AIR 1956 Calcutta 496 Biskha Rani Chose vs. Satish
Chandra Reddy Verification of affidavit that to the best of my
knowledge means nothing.
This kind of verification cannot be
accepted.
Sec.47 CPC. appeal AIR 1994 AP 334 B. Nookaraju vs. M.S.N.
Charities and others Under the unamended Code, all questions
decided by the Executing Court and covered by Section 47 were
treated as decrees as defined under Sec.2(2) of the unamended
Code and therefore they were not appealable orders. Now, in view
of exclusion of `orders` passed under Sec.47 of the unamended
Code from the definition of `decree` as per the amended Code,
orders passed under Section 47 of unamended Code are not more
`decrees` and they are only `appealable orders` not attracted by
Section 96 of the Code. Only CMA will lie, even against deemed
decrees.
Joint Family property 2001-L.W. 1 700 Mohanraj vs Vallachi
Ammal and 8 others Madras High Court S. Jagadeesan J. When property is acquired by father and it devolves on his legal
heirs after his death, so far as male heirs are concerned it will
assume the character of joint family property.
- In the case of
disposition by father the property will assume the character in the
hands of the son, depending on the recital. Section 8 of the Hindu
Succession Act has no application, where father dies leaving sons
as well as female heirs, entitled to inherit jointly with the sons.
No natural guardian under Sec.6 of the Hindu Minority
Guardianship Act.
2005 SCC (Crl) 435 Sunita Devi vs. State of Bihar and another
[refers to State of Ratan Lal Arora (2004) 4 SCC 590 = 2004 SCC
(Crl) 1353 - where in a case the decision has been rendered
without reference to statutory bars, the same cannot have any
precedent value and shall have to be treated as having been
rendered per incuriam.
case, the court could allow a party to establish his case by having
the disputed handwriting examined by a Handwriting Expert. Ma
be the court also can do the comparison of the disputed signature
with any admitted signature and arrive at a decision in that
regard. But when the defendants choose to have the benefit of the
handwriting expert also to prove their case, they cannot be
prevented unless their attempt is very much belated or with any
ulterior motive.
Hand writing expert opinion
-In Kothandapani Padayachi vs.
Ranganatha Padayachi (1997) 1 M.L.J. 304, Madras High Court
has held: This Court as well as the Supreme Court have been
indicating that although there is no legal bar to the judge using his
own eyes to compare the disputed writing with the admitted
writing, he should, as a matter of prudence and caution, hesitate
to base his finding solely on comparison made by himself. The
prudent course is said to lie in obtaining the opinion and
assistance of the expert also. It is equally reiterated that prudence
demands that the court should be extremely slow in venturing an
opinion on the basis of mere comparison since a comparison of
handwriting is at all times a mode of proof hazardous and
includive and especially when it is made by one not conversant
with the subject and without such guidance as might be derived
from the evidence of experts.
Hand writing expert opinion
-In Dhanakodi Pandayachi vs.
Muthukumaraswami (1997) 2 M.L.J. 37 the Madras High Court
has held that the role of the court while exercising the powers
under Sec.73 of the Evidence Act and method of approach to be
adopted would vary also depending upon the relative facts and
circumstances of the case. In the light of the principles laid down
by the Apex Court in the latest pronouncement referred above, one
of the reasons assigned by the learned first appellate Judge in this
case to reverse the finding of the learned trial Judge which has
been recorded on undertaking a comparison by himself of the
Not only a sale deed but even an agreement of sale will prevail over
attachment before judgment made subsequent to the agreement of
sale.
(Vannarakkal Kallalthil Sreedharan vs. Chandramaath
Balakrishnan 1990(3) SCC 291)