ERY ig 62 YERYM, ROE 5 thatyy wilderness areas can and do remain on this planet, even where the Sthé nagy stfategy is one of hands-off management of these “resources,” ‘woiipethct of respect for and in awe of that resourve or through the resource's "ei ysii Accessibility and remoteness to current human intervention. But if all anagyt is New Class management, then itis difficult to see how protected rand mmaaes are any less “managed” by the New Class than penetrated ones, Mhetigat of respect for and in awe of organic communities or through. the v9 accajlity and remoteness of organic communities to current New Class reer Ifthe later is true, then Luke’s observation that areas protected by eehe liky? the nature conservancy are really nature’s cemetery (i.e. a reminder SY fa Nye long dead), then too, strong communities, even under a loose federal of a jetta the risk of being the tombstones for an organic negativity and pop- ‘Sjalism oflly dead in the wider scheme of thing. new political science aysby \unue #34 ~ Contemporary British Politics Chris Toulouse and Kent Worcester, editors aris Howell, Turning to the State: Thatcherism d the Crisis of British Trade Unionism; Robert «er, Globalization and the Crisis of Social ymocracy; Robin Melville, From Anti- écherism to Post-Thatcherism: Contemporary ¢ttish Politics and its Sources; John Kurt “pbsen, British Ulster: Is Peace a Rational Choice? | Simone Gross, British Local Government ‘form: The Demise of Local Democracy; Chris }louse, The Lessons of the Poll Tax; Anthony yker, Major’s Government in a Major Key; CJ. ‘Re, Party Politics. " “gend witheck for US. funds payable to "NPS" to New Political Science, Dept. fo Gegent Department, Suffolk University, Boston, Massachusetts 02108- Huh INDIGENOUS RESPONSES TO THE SOMALIA CRISIS. 163, Every Man a Sultan. Indigenous Responses to the Somalia Crisis Jesse Walker In 1910, a British colonial official travelling through what is now Somalia asked an African companion who the people he saw around him were. “Somalis, replied the African: “They no good; each man his own sultan.” In most media accounts of the Somalia crisis, the idea individualistic Somalis ate “no good,” at least in so far as governing themselves is concerned, has been a recurring theme. ‘This was the ultimate rationale for Operation Restore Hope. In the chaos of clan warfare it was argued, only an extemal power could restore order. A gritty pic- ture was painted of maniacal gangsters killing each other (and everyone else) in the streets of Mogadishu, stealing eight-enths of the food shipped in by relief ‘workers, eradicating all civie order. It seemed as though the UN would have to build a new social infrastructure from seratch In fact, the rampaging terrorists, while real, were fallout from past interna tional intervention in the region. Far from the helpless victims portrayed on TV, ordinary Somalis actually were engaged in a phenomenal self-help effort. Out- side the southwestern corridor from Mogadishu to Baidoa and Kismayu, the country was “relatively peaceful and well-governed by an alliance of traditional elders and local leaders that has reemerged in the wake of the collapse of central authority."? In 1993, in the secessionist northern republic of Somaliland, tradi- tional leaders arbitrated a landmark peace settlement, despite a weak, corrupt government and a complete absence of UN troops. Meanwhile, the UN has proven itself capable of its own blunders and brutalities. Altogether, the Operation Restore Hope was little more than the latest chapter in a long history of paternalistic intervention in Somali society. From the old British and Italian colonialists to the modem aid establishment, outsiders have failed repeatedly to appreciate the, capabilities of Somalia's indigenous institutions; indeed have worked against them. The result has been decades of disorder. Planned Chaos When Westerners first came to Somalia, they brought with them a set of 1. Said Samat, “The Politics of Petry.” in Africa Report (Sept/Oct. 1993). 2. Said Samatar, “Mow 10 Save Starving Somalia,” in Manchester Guardian (December 3, 1992),10s JHSSE WALKER economic assumptions that got in the way of understanding Somali society. ‘Their economic models favored sedentary living, though the Somali desert did not; time afer time, they refused to admit pastoralists’ real contributions 10 the Somali economy. ‘These resumptions were reflected in the Glover report, released in 1947 by she British Somaliland Protectorate, according to which Somalia's agricultural and range land were overutilized; communal ownership, fovercommercialization, and pastoral ignorance were blamed, Three major premise were formulated: (1) as a system of land tenure, communal owoetship is environmentally damaging; (2) as a system of land use, nomadic pastoralism is unproductive and static; and (3) traditional inshtutions, where they exts, are inefficient and outmoded ané encourage inequalities."* All were incorrect. The first, a misunderstanding of what Garret Hardin would later call the “tragedy of the commons,” is an accurate description of what happens when property rights are ill-defined, But tke Somalis did, in fact, have strictly defined use rights and ‘ules of resource consimption. Common ownership had evolved as a rational response to the ard landscape, en reflected a certain degre of environmental wisdom, not degradation.* Contrary to the stereotype of the unproductive, static nomadic economy, Somalia's herders have been successful and innovative to this day. Indeed, before the current chaos, Somalia was the number two sheep and goat exporter in the world’ Where it was economically appropriate, Somalis did engage in agriculture — with more success, ironically, Before the onset of attempts 10 “encourage” farming. “Outmoded” traditional institutions have proven far more able to adapt to changing circumstances than the cever-crumbling political institutions imposed from without, Political independence did not leed to » more independent approach to social organization; if anything, the situation grew worse, especially after October 1969, when Major General Motammed Siad Barre overthrew Somalia's elected govemnment and began two decades of dictatorial rule. Barre’s régime was a notorious violator of human rights, responsible for tens of thousands of deaths, institutionalized torture, and ruthless suppression. of dissent. The most quintessentially totalitarian policy of the Barre government ‘was its deliberate alienupt to destroy all authorities and associations outside the state. The intention, in the words of one Somali human-rights activist, was “to dismantle the institutions that allowed people to articulate their grievances and that provided a framework for the resolution of conflict." Rarre initially aligned his govemment with the Soviet bloc, implementing The Peasaré 3. Susan Gunn, “Somalis,” in John P. Powelson and Richard S Betrayed, 2nd ed, (Washington; Cato Institute, 1990). 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid, 6. Rakiya Omaar, quoted in James Ridgeway, “From the People Who Brough You Desert Storm," in The Village Voice (December 15,1992) INDIGENOUS RESPONSES TO THE SOMALIA CRISIS 165 jes and raking i military and economic aid. In 1975, the central government expropriated all the land in the country and did its best to force nomads to join its official cooperatives or to become farmers. Many rationales were offered for the continued enti-pastoralism, but the core reasons ‘were best expressed by former USAID food monitor Michael Maren: “African leaders like to settle nomads. Nomacls make it hard to build a modern state, and even hardor to build a socialist state. Nomads can't be taxed, they can't be drafted, and they can't be controlled, They also can't be used to attract any unless you can get ther to stay in one place. In addition, many 1s, in an attempt to be modem, view nomads as an embarsissment and a nuisance. From Bamako to Nairobi I've listened to Africa's élite discuss nomads as if they were vermin, They'd rather have their countries symbolized ‘by gaudy, foreign-buit hotels than by poorly clothed peopte with atte." Barre invaded Kthiopia in 1977. When the Soviet Union switched to the [Ethiopian side, he moved Somalia into the West's orbit. His country lost the war, but by 1982 it was one of Aftica’s largest recipients of U.S. economic and military aid, receiving over $600 million over the 1980s. That shift in loyalties also brought a shift in rhetoric, tut Barre's “capitalism” was no more open to voluntary initiative than his “socialism” had been. Indeed, the extension of government power al the expense of the grass roo's continued, with the US taxpayer helping to foot the bill. {As the 1980s progressed, many ethnic Somalis began fleeing Ethiopia for Somalia, providing Barre with another opportunity to demand aid from his benefactors. They obliged. Barre's government inflated the number of refugees centering his country by at Ieast a Falf million. The extta food uid was then siverted, some to the local marketplace by thieving officials, some to the army to tation its sporadic attacks on Ethiopia, These attacks, in turn, provoked the Ethiopian government to more reprisals against ethnic Somalis, refueling calls for aid to feed the growing refugee population. ‘An important effect of this was to alter the economic incentives Somalis faced. Noinads who had in the past tamed during droughts to the clan system's ivivate mutual aid networks could now go to the camps instead, This created. some severe public health problems — habits appropriate to dispersed desert Tife became death sentences in the crowded, disease-ridden camps — in addition to eroding the indigenous economy. Nonetheless, the Somali people continued to innovate and adjust: “Neither ‘the Western nor the socialist metiods of land reform turned out as planned, West- ‘ern range conservation projects hustened the destruction of the environmen:; socialist-style land reform contributed to class formation and stengthened the ‘economic and political statuses of élites. Both committed those who hold land by 7. Michael Maren, “Manna from Heaven? Somalia Pays the Price for Years of Aid” in The Village Voice January 19, 1993.